

THE NEW LARNED HISTORY

FOR READY REFERENCE
READING AND RESEARCH

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THE ACTUAL WORDS OF THE WORLD'S BEST HISTORIANS
BIOGRAPHERS AND SPECIALISTS

A COMPLETE SYSTEM OF HISTORY FOR ALL USES EXTENDING TO
ALL COUNTRIES AND SUBJECTS AND REPRESENTING
THE BETTER AND NEWER LITERATURE
OF HISTORY

BUILT ON THE WORK OF THE PAST

J. N. LARNED

READING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

John Hay, reading the Declaration of Independence from the balcony of the
Independence Observatory. The observatory is no longer in existence. At the left
are members of the second Continental Congress and people from the street. The
State House in Philadelphia, now known as Independence Hall, is in the back-
ground.

(After painting by M. G. Abbey, in the State Capitol, Harrisburg, Pa.)

IN 12 VOLUMES

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1901

READING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

John Hixon reading the Declaration of Independence from the balcony of the Rittenhouse Observatory. The observatory is no longer in existence. At the left are members of the second Continental Congress and people from the street. The old State House in Philadelphia, now known as Independence Hall, is in the background.

(After painting by M. G. Abbey, in the State Capitol, Harrisburg, Pa.)

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J. N. LARNED

NOW COMPLETELY REVISED, ENLARGED AND BROUGHT UP TO DATE

WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF TEXT ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS AND CHARTS
MANY OF THEM FULL-PAGE INSERTS, IN DUOTONE, AND FRONTISPICES IN COLOR; ALSO NUMEROUS
DOUBLE AND SINGLE-PAGE HISTORICAL AND OTHER MAPS IN COLOR, FROM ORIGINAL
STUDIES AND DRAWINGS BY ALAN C. REILEY AND OTHERS

IN 12 VOLUMES

VOL. XI.—U. S. A., 1865-WORLD WAR, 1914



SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS
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1924

THE
NEW LARNED HISTORY

OF THE
UNITED STATES

AND
THE WORLD

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THE NEW LARNED HISTORY

FOR READY REFERENCE, READING AND RESEARCH

VOLUME XI

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (*Continued*)

1865.—Economic effect of the war upon the North.—Immigration.—Women's work time.—Labor-saving devices.—Effect of unoccupied lands on unemployment.—Manufactures.—Profiteering.—As the war came to a close, it was possible to look abroad over the country, and begin to estimate its effects. "Was the commercial management of the North creditable to the Government and an honor to the people? . . . To deal with this subject in its entirety would lead us into the labyrinths of complex economic theory, yet two or three simple facts appear so plain that even the mere historian may venture to set them forth. When we look into the statistics which seem to show a general increase of business during the war, we find that in point of fact this increase was highly specialized. All those industries that dealt with the physical necessities of life and all those that dealt peculiarly with armies flourished amazingly. And yet there is another side to the story, for there were other industries that were set back and some that almost, if not entirely, disappeared. A good instance is the manufacture of cotton cloth. When the war opened, 200,000 hands were employed in this manufacture in New England. With the sealing up of the South and the failure of the cotton supply, their work temporarily ceased. What became of the workmen? Briefly, one of three things happened: some went into other trades, such as munitions, in which the war had created an abnormal demand for labor; a great number of them became soldiers; and many of them went West and became farmers or miners. Furthermore, many whose trades were not injured by the war left their jobs and fled westward to escape conscription. Their places were left open to be filled by operatives from the injured trades. In one or another of these ways the laborer who was thrown out of work was generally able to recover employment. But it is important to remember that the key to the labor situation at that time was the vast area of unoccupied land which could be had for nothing or next to nothing. . . . One of the noteworthy features of Northern life during the war is that there was no abnormal increase in pauperism. A great deal has been written upon the extensive charities of the time, but . . . what is really referred to is the volunteer aid given to the Government in supporting the armies. This was done on a vast scale, by all classes of the population—that is, by all who supported the Union party, for the separation between the two parties was bitter and unforgetting. But of charity in the ordinary sense . . . there was no peculiar need. Here again the fact that the free land could be easily reached is the final explanation. . . . The unemployed workman . . . could take advantage

of the Homestead Act . . . and acquire a farm of 160 acres free; or he could secure at almost nominal cost farm-land which had been given to railroads as an inducement to build. . . . In addition to the reason just mentioned—the search for new occupation by Eastern labor which had been thrown out of employment—three other causes helped to maintain the efficiency of work in the mines, in the forests, and on the farms. These three factors were immigration, the labor of women, and labor-saving machines. Immigration, naturally, fell off to a certain degree but it did not become altogether negligible. It is probable that 110,000 able-bodied men came into the country while war was in progress—a poor offset to the many hundred thousand who became soldiers, but nevertheless a contribution that counted for something. Vastly more important, in the work of the North, was the part taken by women. A pathetic detail with which in our own experience the world has again become familiar was the absence of young men throughout most of the North, and the presence of women new to the work in many occupations, especially farming. . . . Even more important than the change in the personnel of labor were the new machines of the day. During the fifteen years previous to the war American ingenuity had reached a high point. Such inventions as the sewing-machine and the horse-reaper date in their practical forms from that period, and both of these helped the North to fight the war. . . . It was the horse-reaper, the horse-rake, the horse-thresher that enabled women and boys to work the farms while husbands, fathers, and elder brothers were at the front. All these causes maintained Northern farming at a high pitch of productivity. . . . For example, in 1859, the total production of wheat for the whole country was 173 million bushels; in 1862, the North alone produced 177 millions; even in 1864, with over a million men under arms, it still produced 160 million bushels. . . . Who, in the last analysis, provided all these supplies? Who paid the soldiers? Who supplemented their meager pay and supported their families? The people, of course; and they did so both directly and indirectly. In taxes and loans they paid to the Government about three thousand millions of dollars. Their indirect assistance was perhaps as great, though it is impossible today to estimate with any approach to accuracy the amount either in money or service. Among obvious items are the collections made by the Sanitary Commission for the benefit of the hospital service. . . . In a hundred other ways both individuals and localities strained their resources to supplement those of the Government. Immense subscription lists were circulated to raise funds for the families of soldiers. The city of Philadelphia

alone spent in this way in a single year \$600,000. There is also evidence of a vast amount of unrecorded relief of needy families by the neighbors. . . . Furthermore, the whole matter was adjusted voluntarily] without systematic government direction, since there was nothing in the financial policy of the Government to correspond to conscription. Consequently, both in the way of loans and in the way of contributions, as well as in the matter of unpaid service, the entire burden fell upon the war party alone. . . . Those Northerners who did not wish to lend money, or to make financial sacrifice, or to give unpaid service, were free to pursue their own bent. . . . The clue to the story of capital is to be found in this fact, too often forgotten, that there was an economic-political division cutting deep through every stratum of the Northern people. Their economic life as well as their political life was controlled on the one hand by a devotion to the cause of the war, and on the other hand by a hatred of that cause or by cynical indifference. . . . The financial policy, left in the hands of Chase, may truly be described as barren of ideas. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the 'loyal' North was left at the mercy of its domestic enemies and a prey to parasites by Chase's policy of loans instead of taxes and of voluntary support instead of enforced support. The consequence of this financial policy was an immense opportunity for the 'disloyals' and the parasites to make huge war profits out of the 'loyals' and the Government. Of course, it must not be supposed that everyone who seized the chance to feather his nest was so careless or so impolitic as to let himself be classed as a 'disloyal.' . . . [In 1861 a report of the Quartermaster-General complained that recruiting would stop unless clothing could be supplied; and stated that troops on duty before the enemy lacked winter clothing.] . . . 'Could 150,000 suits of clothing, overcoats, coats, and pantaloons be placed today, in depot, it would scarce supply the calls now before us. They would certainly leave no surplus.' The Government attempted to meet this difficulty in the shortest possible time by purchasing clothing abroad. But such disregard of home industry, the 'patriotism' of the New England manufacturers could not endure. Along with the report just quoted, the Quartermaster-General forwarded to the Secretary of War a long argumentative protest from a committee of the Boston Board of Trade against the purchase of army clothing in Europe. . . . Abroad the agents of North and South were fighting a commercial duel in which each strove to monopolize the munitions market. . . . [The blockade prevented the movement of cotton to Europe.] As a consequence, four-month notes which had been given by Southern agents with their orders fell due, had to be renewed, and began to be held in disfavor. Agents of the North, getting wind of these hitches in negotiations, eagerly sought to take over the unpaid Confederate orders. . . . Two powerful commercial combinations took charge of the policy of the woolen interests—the National Wool-growers' Association and the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, which were soon in control of this immense industry. Woolen mills sprang up so fast that a report of the New York Chamber of Commerce pronounced their increase 'scarcely credible.' . . . Dividends on mill stock rose to 10, 15, 25, and even 40 per cent. And all the while the wool growers and the wool manufacturers were clamoring to Congress for protection of the home industry, exclusion of the wicked foreign competition. . . . Of course, it is not meant that every wool

grower and every woolen manufacturer was . . . 'disloyal.' . . . Numbers of them were to be found in that great host of 'loyals' who put their dividends into government bonds and gave their services unpaid as auxiliaries of the Commissary Department or the Hospital Service of the Army. What is meant is that the abnormal conditions of industry, uncorrected by the Government, afforded a glaring opportunity for unscrupulous men of business who, whatever their professions, cared a hundred times more for themselves than for their country. . . . It is estimated that prices in the main advanced about 100 per cent while wages were not advanced more than sixty per cent. It is not strange that these years of war form a period of bitter antagonism between labor and capital. What went on in the woolen business is to be found more or less in every business. Immense fortunes sprang up over night. They had but two roots: government contracts and excessive profits due to war prices. The gigantic fortunes which characterized the North at the end of the war are thus accounted for."—N. W. Stephenson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Union* (*Chronicles of America Series*, v. 29, pp. 206-223.)

1865 (January).—Congressional adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.—"A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution prohibiting slavery throughout the United States had passed the Senate on April 8, 1864, but had failed of the necessary two-thirds vote in the House. The two most vital thoughts which animated the Baltimore convention when it met in June had been the renomination of Mr. Lincoln and the success of this constitutional amendment. The first was recognized as a popular decision needing only the formality of an announcement by the convention; and the full emphasis of speech and resolution had therefore been centered on the latter as the dominant and aggressive reform upon which the party would stake its political fortunes in the presidential campaign. Mr. Lincoln had himself suggested to Mr. Morgan the wisdom of sounding that key-note in his opening speech before the convention, and the great victory gained at the polls in November not only demonstrated his sagacity, but enabled him to take up the question with confidence among his recommendations to Congress in the annual message of December 6, 1864. . . . The joint resolution was called up in the House on January 6, 1865, and general discussion followed from time to time, occupying perhaps half the days of that month. As at the previous session, the Republicans all favored, while the Democrats mainly opposed it; but important exceptions among the latter showed what immense gains the proposition had made in popular opinion and in congressional willingness to recognize and embody it. The logic of events had become more powerful than party creed or strategy. For fifteen years the Democratic party had stood as sentinel and bulwark to slavery, and yet, despite its alliance and championship, the 'peculiar institution' was being consumed in the fire of war. It had withered in popular elections, been paralyzed by confiscation laws, crushed by executive decrees, trampled upon by marching Union armies. More notable than all, the agony of dissolution had come upon it in its final stronghold—the constitutions of the slave States. Local public opinion had throttled it in West Virginia, in Missouri, in Arkansas, in Louisiana, in Maryland, and the same spirit of change was upon Tennessee, and even showing itself in Kentucky. The Democratic party did not and could not, shut its eyes to the

accomplished facts."—J. G. Nicolay, *Short life of Abraham Lincoln*, pp. 471-474.—"On the last day of [January, 1865] . . . one of the grandest events of the century was witnessed in the House of Representatives in the final passage of the Constitutional Amendment [the Thirteenth] forever prohibiting slavery. Numerous propositions on the subject had been submitted, but the honor of drafting the one adopted belongs to Lyman Trumbull, who had introduced it early in the first session of this Congress. It passed the Senate on the 8th of April, 1864, only six members voting against it, . . . but failed in the House on the 15th of June following. It now came up on the motion of Mr. Ashley to reconsider this vote. Congress had abolished slavery in the District of Columbia, and prohibited it in all the Territories. It had repealed the Fugitive Slave law, and declared free all negro soldiers in the Union armies and their families; and the President had played his grand part in the Proclamation of Emancipation. But the question now to be decided completely overshadowed all others. The debate on the subject had been protracted and very spirited. . . . The time for the momentous vote had now come, and no language could describe the solemnity and impressiveness of the spectacle pending the roll-call. The success of the measure had been considered very doubtful, and depended upon certain negotiations, the result of which was not fully assured, and the particulars of which never reached the public. The anxiety and suspense during the balloting produced a deathly stillness, but when it became certainly known that the measure had prevailed the cheering in the densely-packed hall and galleries surpassed all precedent and begged all description. Members joined in the general shouting, which was kept up for several minutes, many embracing each other, and others completely surrendering themselves to their tears of joy. It seemed to me I had been born into a new life."—G. W. Julian, *Political recollections*, ch. 11.—"The Joint Resolution passed [the House of Representatives, on January 31st], 119 to 56, 8 not voting, 10 Democrats voting aye. . . . It was the greatest day the House had ever seen, nor is it likely ever to see a greater."—O. J. Hollister, *Life of Schuyler Colfax*, p. 245.—The Thirteenth Amendment, which was ratified before the close of the year by three-fourths of the states, and its embodiment in the Constitution of the United States proclaimed by the secretary of state on December 18, 1865, is as follows: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

1865 (February).—Hampton Roads peace conference.—"Several informal attempts at opening negotiations for the termination of hostilities were made in the course of this Winter—Hon. Francis P. Blair, of Maryland, visiting Richmond twice on the subject, with the consent, though not by the request, of President Lincoln. At length, upon their direct application, Messrs. Alex. H. Stephens, John A. Campbell, and Robert M. T. Hunter, were permitted to pass General Grant's lines before Petersburg, and proceed to Fortress Monroe; where [on board a steamer in Hampton Roads] they were met by Governor Seward, followed by President Lincoln; and a free, full conference was had."—H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 2, ch. 30.—

Secretary Seward first went to meet the three Confederate commissioners, with the following letter of instructions from President Lincoln, dated January 31, 1865: "Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State: You will proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, there to meet and informally confer with Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, on the basis of my letter to F. P. Blair, Esq., of January 18, 1865, a copy of which you have. You will make known to them that three things are indispensable, to wit: 1. The restoration of the national authority throughout all the States. 2. No receding by the executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress, and in preceding documents. 3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government. You will inform them that all propositions of theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they choose to say, and report to me. You will not assume to definitely consummate anything. Yours, etc., Abraham Lincoln." Two days later, the President followed him, persuaded by a telegram from General Grant to meet the commissioners personally. In a subsequent message to the Senate, Lincoln reported the results of the conference as follows: "On the morning of the 3rd, three gentlemen, Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, came aboard of our steamer, and had an interview with the Secretary of State and myself, of several hours' duration. No question of preliminaries to the meeting was then and there made or mentioned. No other person was present; no papers were exchanged or produced; and it was, in advance, agreed that the conversation was to be informal and verbal merely. On our part the whole substance of the instructions to the Secretary of State, hereinbefore recited, was stated and insisted upon, and nothing was said inconsistent therewith; while, by the other party, it was not said that in any event or on any condition, they ever would consent to reunion; and yet they equally omitted to declare that they never would so consent. They seemed to desire a postponement of that question, and the adoption of some other course first which, as some of them seemed to argue, might or might not lead to reunion; but which course, we thought, would amount to an indefinite postponement. The conference ended without result."—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 644-649.

ALSO IN: B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 20.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 10, ch. 6.

1865 (February: South Carolina).—Evacuation of Charleston by Confederates.—Federal occupation of the city.—While General Hardee, with 14,000 men, waited at Charleston for the expected coming of General Sherman to attack that city, the latter pursued a movement which made Charleston untenable and shook it like a ripened apple into the hands of General Gillmore, who was waiting at the gates. The Confederates evacuated the city in haste and with reckless disorder, and it was occupied by the Federal troops on the morning of February 18. The following is the report of Colonel A. G. Bennet, who was the first to enter the city: "On the morning of February the 18th I received information that led me to believe the defences and lines guarding the city of Charleston had been deserted by the enemy. I immediately proceeded to Cummings

Point, from when I sent a small boat in the direction of Fort Moultrie, which boat, when 40 yards east from Fort Sumter, was met by a boat from Sullivan's Island, containing a full corps of band musicians abandoned by the enemy. These confirmed my belief of an evacuation. I had no troops that could be available under two hours, as, except in a few pontoon boats, there were no means whatever of landing troops near the enemy's works or into the city. I directed Major Hennessy to proceed to Fort Sumter and there replace our flag. The flag was replaced over the southeast angle of Fort Sumter at 9 o'clock A.M. I now pushed for the city, stopping at Fort Ripley and Castle Pinckney, from which works Rebel flags were hauled down and the American flag substituted. . . . I landed at Mill's wharf, Charleston, at 10 o'clock A. M. where I learned that a part of the enemy's troops yet remained in the city, while mounted patrols were out in every direction applying the torch and driving the inhabitants before them. I at once addressed to the Mayor of the city [a communication demanding its surrender]. . . . My whole force consisted of five officers and the armed crews of two small boats, comprising in all 22 men. Both officers and men volunteered to advance from the wharf into the city; but no reinforcements being in sight, I did not deem it expedient to move on. . . . Observing a small boat sailing toward the bay under a flag of truce, I put off to it, and received from a member of the common council a letter [from the Mayor, announcing the evacuation of the city by the Confederate military authorities]. . . . The deputation sent to convey the above letter represented to me that the city was in the hands of either the Rebel soldiery or the mob. They entreated of me in the name of humanity to interpose my military authority and save the city from utter destruction. . . . Two companies of the 52d Pennsylvania regiment and about 30 men of the 3d Rhode Island volunteer heavy artillery having landed, I proceeded with them to the citadel. I here established my headquarters, and sent small parties in all directions with instructions to impress negroes wherever found, and to make them work the fire apparatus, until all fires were extinguished."—A. G. Bennett, *Report*, Feb. 24, 1865 (quoted in *Tenney's military and naval history of the Rebellion*, ch. 49).—At noon on Apr. 14, 1865, the fourth anniversary of the lowering of the flag of the United States at Fort Sumter, it was formally raised by General Anderson over the ruins of the fort, with impressive ceremonies, in which many visitors from the North took part. An address was delivered on the occasion by the Reverend Henry Ward Beecher.

1865 (February-March: The Carolinas).—Sherman's march from Savannah to Goldsboro.—Burning of Columbia.—Battle of Bentonville.—"By the middle of January, a lodgment had been effected in South Carolina [at Pocatigo, on the railroad between Savannah and Charleston], and Sherman had his whole army once more in hand as a moving column. He had no idea of wasting time on either Charleston or Augusta, but he determined to play upon the fears of the rebels, and compel them to retain a force to protect those places. . . . Accordingly he gave out with some ostentation that he was moving upon either Charleston or Augusta. . . . On the 1st of February, the army designed for the active campaign from Savannah northward was again 60,000 strong; and, as before, was

composed of two wings, the right under Howard and the left under Slocum. . . . Sherman . . . started on his northward march on the 1st of February. On that day his right wing was south of the Salkehatchie river, and his left still struggling in the swamps of the Savannah, at Sister's Ferry. . . . The division generals led their columns through the swamps, the water up to their shoulders, crossed over to the pine land beyond, and then, turning upon the rebels who had opposed the passage, drove them off in utter disorder. All the roads northward had been held for weeks by Wheeler's cavalry, and details of negro laborers had been compelled to fell trees and burn bridges to impede the national march. Sherman's pioneers, however, removed the trees, and the heads of columns rebuilt the bridges before the rear could close up, and the rebels retreated behind the Edisto river at Branchville. . . . Sherman determined to waste no time on Branchville, which the enemy could no longer hold, and turned his columns directly north upon Columbia, where it was supposed the rebels would concentrate. Attempts were made to delay him at the crossings of the rivers; there were numerous bridge-heads with earth or cotton parapets to carry, and cypress swamps to cross; but nothing stayed his course. On the 13th, he learned that there was no enemy in Columbia except Hampton's cavalry. Hardee, at Charleston, took it for granted that Sherman was moving upon that place, and the rebels in Augusta supposed that they were Sherman's object; so Charleston and Augusta were protected, while Columbia was abandoned to the care of the cavalry." With little or no resistance, Sherman entered the capital of South Carolina on February 17. . . . "Beauregard, meanwhile, and the rebel cavalry, had retreated upon Charlotte, in North Carolina, due north from Columbia; and on the 20th and 21st Sherman followed as far as Winnsboro. . . . At Winnsboro, however, Sherman turned his principal columns northeastward towards Goldsboro, still 200 miles away. Heavy rains again impeded his movements . . . and it was not till the 3d of March that the army arrived at Cheraw. At this point large quantities of guns and ammunition were captured, brought from Charleston under the supposition that here, at least, they would be secure. Hardee had moved due north from Charleston by his only remaining railroad, through Florence, but only reached Cheraw in time to escape with his troops across the Pedee river, just before Sherman arrived. . . . Having secured the passage of the Pedee . . . Sherman had but little uneasiness about the future. . . . On the 11th of March, Fayetteville was reached, and Sherman had traversed the entire extent of South Carolina. On the 12th, he sent a dispatch to Grant, the first since leaving the Savannah. . . . On the 15th of March, the command began its march for Goldsboro." The scattered Confederate forces were now getting together and General Johnston had been put in command of them. . . . On the 15th Hardee was encountered at Averysboro, where he attempted to check Sherman's advance while Johnston concentrated in the rear. Some sharp fighting occurred, in which Sherman lost seventy-seven men killed and 477 wounded. Hardee reported his loss at 500. In the morning he had disappeared. "From Averysboro both wings turned eastward by different roads, and on the flight of the 18th of March the army was within 27 miles of Goldsboro, and only five from Bentonville. The columns were

now about ten miles apart." At Bentonsville, on the 19th, Slocum's wing was attacked by Johnston, who had marched his whole command with great rapidity, hoping to "overwhelm Sherman's left flank before it could be relieved by its co-operating column." But Slocum held his ground that day against six distinct assaults, and the next day Sherman brought his whole army into position. He did not push the enemy, however, either on the 20th or on the 21st, being uncertain as to Johnston's strength. During the night of the 21st the latter retreated. "The total national loss was 191 killed, and 1,455 wounded and missing. Johnston states his losses to have been 223 killed, 1,467 wounded, and 653 missing, but Sherman captured 1,621 prisoners. . . . At daybreak on the 22nd . . . the army moved to Goldsboro, where Schofield had already arrived. [See below: 1865 (February-March: North Carolina).] . . . Thus was concluded one of the longest and most important marches ever made by an organized army in civilized war."—A. Badeau, *Military history of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 3, ch. 31.

ALSO IN: S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, *Sherman and his campaigns*, ch. 26-29.—H. W. Slocum and W. Hampton, *Sherman's march and the battle of Bentonsville (Battles and leaders*, v. 4).

1865 (February-March: North Carolina).—Occupation of Wilmington.—Battle of Kinston.—Junction with Sherman at Goldsboro.—On February 9, General Schofield, transferred from the west, arrived at Fort Fisher with Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps, and took command of the newly created Department of North Carolina. Advancing on Wilmington, the Confederates, under Hoke, retreating before him, he occupied that city on the 22nd. This accomplished, General Cox was sent to Newberne to take command of forces ordered there, and to open communication thence by railroad with Goldsboro, preparatory to the arrival of General Sherman at that point. In the prosecution of this undertaking, he fought the battle of Kinston, March 10, repelling a fierce attack by Bragg with the forces which were being collected against Sherman. "After Bragg's retreat Schofield steadily pressed the work of rebuilding the railway. Kinston was occupied on March 14th." On the 21st Schofield entered Goldsboro, "and there, in a couple of days more, was reassembled the grand army under Sherman, whose march from Savannah had been quite as remarkable as the former one from Atlanta to the sea."—J. D. Cox, *March to the sea (Campaigns of the Civil War*, ch. 9).

1865 (February-March: Virginia).—Sheridan's destroying march through central Virginia.—Battle of Waynesborough.—"The last campaign against Lee may be said to have been inaugurated when General Sheridan started with his cavalry from Winchester, Virginia, on the 27th of February, 1865, with a sort of *carte blanche* of destruction as to the enemy's supply depots and communications. The general's instructions looked to his crossing the James River above Richmond, and his possible junction with the command of General Sherman somewhere in North Carolina; but the swollen condition of the James, and the destruction of the bridges prevented his crossing. . . . General Sheridan's command on this expedition consisted of the first cavalry division, under Brevet Major-General Wesley Merritt, and the third cavalry division, under Brevet Major-General Geo. A. Custer, to whose division was added one brigade of the

cavalry of the old army of West Virginia, under Colonel Caphart. . . . They left Winchester on a damp, disagreeable morning. . . . But the spirits of the bold dragoons were not dampened, and they felt lively enough to push on to Waynesborough to the camp of General Jubal Early, late of the Confederacy, upon whom the brilliant Custer fell with his division, and soon had his guns, and men, and 'matériel,' and would have had him but that he had sufficient presence of mind to absent his person when he found how things were going. This was General Early's last appearance in public life. . . . Early's command at Waynesborough being now dispersed or captured, . . . General Sheridan proceeded to occupy Charlottesville. . . . Then on again toward Lynchburg and the James River. . . . When it was found impossible to cross the James River, attention was for a while directed to the demolition of the James River and Kanawha Canal. . . . When the ingenious destruction corps could devise no further damage here, the command turned off to try its hand upon a railroad or two. All the time the rains had descended—the flood-gates of the clouds were up and the water kept pouring through. . . . Although nothing short of a flotilla seemed likely to ride out the storm, the cavalry rode on hopefully, and came safely to harbor at the White House, on the Pamunkey, where supplies were furnished them, and where the March winds blew them dry again. . . . Immediately upon his arrival at this depot, General Sheridan reported to General Grant, at City Point, for orders."—*With General Sheridan in Lee's last campaign, by a staff officer*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: G. E. Pond, *Shenandoah valley in 1864*, ch. 14.—A. Badeau, *Military history of Ulysses S. Grant*, v. 3, ch. 31.—P. H. Sheridan, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 4.

1865 (March).—Emancipation of families of colored soldiers.—"The President in his annual message, December, 1863, had estimated the colored soldiers in the service at 'nearly 100,000.' They were mostly from the border States, and the slaves of loyal masters. While they were fighting the battles of the country, their masters, who were generally opposed to their enlistment, could sell into perpetual slavery their wives and children. To deter slaves from enlisting, or to punish them when they did enlist, slave-masters made merchandise of the wives and children of colored soldiers, and often sold them into a harsher bondage. To put an end to a practice so cruel, unjust, injurious, and dishonorable to the country, Mr. Wilson introduced into the Senate on the 8th of January [1864], in his bill to promote enlistments, a provision declaring that when any man or boy of African descent, owing service or labor in any State, under its laws, should be mustered into the military or naval service of the United States, he, and his mother, wife, and children, should be forever free." The bill was warmly debated and its supporters did not succeed in bringing it to a vote during that session of Congress. At the next session, on the 13th of December, 1864, Mr. Wilson introduced a joint resolution 'to make free the wives and children of persons who had been, or might be, mustered into the service of the United States. [This passed the Senate a few days later, by a vote of twenty-seven to 10; was passed by the House on February 22, 1865, and signed by the President on March 3.]"—H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power*, v. 3, ch. 30.

1865 (March).—President Lincoln's second

inaugural address.—“The days of the Confederacy were evidently numbered. Only the last blow remained to be struck. Then Lincoln's second inauguration came [March 4, 1865], and with it his second inaugural address. Lincoln's famous ‘Gettysburg speech’ has been much and justly admired. But far greater, as well as far more characteristic, was that inaugural in which he poured out the whole devotion and tenderness of his great soul. It had all the solemnity of a father's last admonition and blessing to his children before he lay down to die. . . . No American President had ever spoken words like these to the American people. America never had a President who found such words in the depth of his heart.”—C. Schurz, *Abraham Lincoln: An essay*, pp. 103-104.

The following is the text of the inaugural address:

“Fellow-countrymen: At this second appearance to take the oath of the presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then a statement, somewhat in detail, of a course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured. On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it—all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it without war—seeking to dissolve the Union, and divide effects, by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came. One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the Southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes his aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered—that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes. ‘Woe unto the world because of offenses! for it must needs

be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.’ If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope—fervently do we pray—that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's 250 years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said 3,000 years ago, so still it must be said. ‘The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.’ With malice towards none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.”—Abraham Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 656-657.

1865 (March-April: Virginia).—Flanking of Lee's lines.—Battle of Five Forks.—Final assault at Petersburg and Confederate retreat.—“Lee after assuming supreme command had quickly decided to save his army he must abandon Richmond. His intention was to withdraw to Danville, unite with Johnston's force in North Carolina, and attack Sherman before Grant could come to his assistance. But the animals of the artillery and transport trains were in so emaciated a condition as to be useless for heavy work, until the roads should have recovered, and Lee feared lest before he could withdraw his army, Grant might extend so far to the left as to make retreat impossible. He therefore determined to make a sortie in force against the Federal lines near the Appomattox. . . . The task was assigned to Gordon, commanding the 2nd Army Corps, whose reputation as a leader of dash and enterprise had been steadily growing. . . . At 4:30 a. m. on March 25th Gordon assaulted. As confederate deserters were allowed to enter the Federal lines with their arms, the piquet posts were easily surprised, and the storming party, rushing forward to the main line, carried Fort Stedman and three adjacent batteries. There, however, the Confederate success ended. Gordon's attack was left almost entirely unsupported. . . . Assaults made from Fort Stedman upon the forts on its right and left were repulsed; and as soon as there was sufficient light to distinguish friend from foe, the Federal artillery in the main works and from the high ground in the rear . . . opened fire upon Fort Stedman. . . . Hartranft's division attacked and recaptured Fort Stedman. Of Gordon's command 1,949 were taken prisoners, and his loss in killed and wounded was also heavy. [Grant states that the Confederate losses in all numbered 4,000 men, and the Federal losses 2,000.] . . . Grant had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable, if possible, to leave the Armies of the Potomac and the James the work of crushing Lee's army. . . . It seemed but just that, as a reward for the years of toil and of dogged perseverance in the face of continued

failure, it should have the honour of forcing its old antagonist to surrender at last. Grant saw that Lee must abandon Richmond within a few days at the latest."—W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861-1865*, pp. 506-508.—"One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion," [wrote General Grant], "was the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line. . . . Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come up; . . . but I had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind. However, [Sheridan] having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to make my plans. . . . The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the James River, and take his place on our extreme left, 30 miles away. . . . Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. They were directed on the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the South Side Railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad. There was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe. This was what was known as the battle of White Oak Road. . . . The 29th of March came, and . . . on that day I moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about Petersburg. It soon set in raining again, however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. . . . It became necessary . . . to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. The army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading north-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee's line. . . . The column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and Five Forks. My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre

to protect their right, so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made. General Wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached me of Sheridan's success. . . . Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading northwest to Five Forks. He had only his cavalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. He gradually drove them back however, until in the neighborhood of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter other troops, besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assistance. I replied to him . . . that I would send Warren. Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court-House and put himself in communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next morning. . . . Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. . . . Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon Five Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night. . . . It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. At all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. Finally he went himself. He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the 5th corps. The troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made. . . . It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy. The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some 6,000 prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities falling into our hands. . . . Pursuit continued until about 9 o'clock at night, when Sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance of him of the part of the enemys' line which had been captured, returned. . . . This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of April. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2d. [The assault was successfully made, and the outer works of Petersburg were soon in the hands of the National troops. Early in the morning of the 3d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Grant and Meade took possession of the city. The following day they were visited there by President Lincoln, who had been at City Point for a week or more, watching the course of events.]"—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 63-65.

Also in: P. H. Sheridan, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 5-6.—A. A. Humphreys, *Virginia campaign of '64 and '65*, ch. 12-13.—H. Porter, *Five Forks*

and the pursuit of Lee (*Battles and leaders*, v. 4).—R. de Trobriand, *Four years with the Army of the Potomac*, ch. 34.

1865 (April: Virginia).—Abandonment of Richmond and retreat of Lee.—Battle of Sailor's Creek.—Surrender at Appomattox Court House.—Grant's generosity.—“The success of the Federal army in breaking the lines of Petersburg had rendered the retreat of the Confederate force imperative. An effort to hold Richmond with every line of communication with the South broken or in imminent danger would have been madness. But by abandoning his works and concentrating his army, which still amounted to about 30,000 men, General Lee might retire to some natural stronghold in the interior, where the defensible features of the country would enable him to oppose Grant's formidable host until he could rally strength to strike an effective blow. This course was at once decided upon, and early on the morning of the 2d of April, Lee sent a despatch to the Government authorities at Richmond informing them of the disastrous situation of affairs and of the necessity of his evacuating Petersburg that night. Orders were also sent to the forces north of the James to move at once and join him, while all the preparations necessary for the evacuation of Richmond, both as the seat of government and as a military post, were expeditiously made. There was, indeed, no time to be lost. . . . By midnight the evacuation was completed. . . . As the troops moved noiselessly onward in the darkness that just precedes the dawn, a bright light like a broad flash of lightning illumined the heavens for an instant; then followed a tremendous explosion. “The magazine at Fort Drewry is blown up,” ran in whispers through the ranks, and again silence reigned. Once more the sky was overspread by a lurid light, but not so fleeting as before. It was now the conflagration of Richmond that lighted the night-march of the soldiers, and many a stout heart was wrung with anguish at the fate of the city and its defenceless inhabitants. The burning of public property of little value had given rise to a destructive fire that laid in ashes nearly one-third of the devoted city. . . . The retreat of Lee's army did not long remain unknown to the Federals. The explosion of the magazine at Fort Drewry and the conflagration of Richmond apprised them of the fact and they lost no time in taking possession of the abandoned works and entering the defenceless cities. On the morning of the 3d of April the mayor of Richmond surrendered the city to the Federal commander in its vicinity, and General Weitzel took immediate possession. He at once proceeded to enforce order and took measures to arrest the conflagration, while with great humanity he endeavored to relieve the distressed citizens. . . . As soon as Grant became aware of Lee's line of retreat he pushed forward his whole available force, numbering 70,000 or 80,000 men, in order to intercept him on the line of the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Sheridan's cavalry formed the van of the pursuing column, and was closely followed by the artillery and infantry. Lee pressed on as rapidly as possible to Amelia Court-house, where he had ordered supplies to be deposited for the use of his troops on their arrival. . . . The hope of finding a supply of food at this point, which had done much to buoy up the spirits of the men, was destined to be cruelly dispelled. Through an unfortunate error or misapprehension of orders the provision-train had been taken on to Richmond without

unloading its stores at Amelia Court-house. . . . It was a terrible blow alike to the men and to their general. . . . The only chance remaining to the Army of Northern Virginia was to reach the hill-country without delay. Yet here it was detained by the error of a railroad official, while the precious minutes and hours moved remorselessly by. . . . Yet no murmur came from the lips of the men to the ear of their commander, and on the evening of that unfortunate day [April 5th] they resumed their weary march in silence and composure. Some small amount of food had been brought in by the foragers, greatly inadequate for the wants of the soldiers, yet aiding them to somewhat alleviate the pangs of hunger. A handful of corn was now a feast to the weary veterans as they trudged onward through the April night. . . . Sheridan's cavalry was already upon the flank of the Confederate army, and the infantry was following with all speed. . . . During the forenoon of [the 6th] the pursuing columns thickened and frequent skirmishes delayed the march. These delays enabled the Federals to accumulate in such force that it became necessary for Lee to halt his advance in order to arrest their attack till his column could close up, and the trains and such artillery as was not needed for action could reach a point of safety. This object was accomplished early in the afternoon. Ewells, the rear-most corps in the army, closed upon those in front at a position on Sailor's Creek, a small tributary of the Appomattox River. . . . His corps was surrounded by the pursuing columns and captured with but little opposition. About the same time the divisions of Anderson, Pickett, and Bushrod Johnson were almost broken up, about 10,000 men in all being captured. The remainder of the army continued its retreat during the night of the 6th, and reached Farmville early on the morning of the 7th, where the troops obtained two days' rations, the first regular supplies they had received during the retreat. At Farmville a short halt was made to allow the men to rest and cook their provisions. The effective portion of the Army of Northern Virginia did not now exceed 10,000 men. This great reduction had been caused by the disaster of the previous day at Sailor's Creek, by desertions on the retreat, and by an exhaustion which obliged many to leave the ranks. Those who still remained by their colors were veterans whose courage never failed, and who were yet ready to face any odds. The heads of the Federal columns beginning to appear about eleven o'clock, the Confederates resumed their retreat.” On the afternoon of the 7th, Lee received a note from Grant calling upon him to surrender, and replied to it, asking what terms would be offered. Further notes were exchanged between the two commanders the following day, while the retreat continued. Lee hoped to reach Appomattox Court House and secure supplies that were there, which might enable him to “push on to the Staunton River and maintain himself behind that stream until a junction could be made with Johnston.” But when, in the afternoon of April 8, he reached the neighborhood of Appomattox Court House, “he was met by the intelligence of the capture of the stores placed for his army at the station two miles beyond. Notwithstanding this overwhelming news, he determined to make one more effort to force himself through the Federal toils that encompassed him.” This attempt was made at three o'clock on the morning of April 9, General Gordon leading the attack, which failed. Lee then yielded to his

fate, and sent a flag of truce, asking for an interview with Grant to arrange terms of surrender. "About 11 o'clock General Lee, accompanied only by Colonel Marshall of his staff, proceeded to the village to meet General Grant, who had now arrived. The meeting between the two renowned generals took place at the house of a Mr. McLean at Appomattox Court-house, to which mansion, after exchanging courteous salutations, they repaired to settle the terms on which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia should be concluded. . . . The written instrument of surrender covered the following points: Duplicate rolls of all the officers and men were to be made, and the officers to sign paroles for themselves and their men, all agreeing not to bear arms against the United States unless regularly exchanged. The arms, artillery, and public property were to be turned over to an officer appointed to receive them, the officers retaining their side-arms and private horses and baggage. In addition to this, General Grant permitted every man of the Confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule to retain it for farming purposes, General Lee remarking that this would have a happy effect. . . . After completion of these measures General Lee remarked that his men were badly in need of food, that they had been living for several days on parched corn exclusively, and requested rations and forage for 25,000 men. These rations were granted out of the car-loads of Confederate provisions which had been stopped by the Federal cavalry. . . . Three days after the surrender the Army of Northern Virginia had dispersed in every direction, and three weeks later the veterans of a hundred battles had changed the musket and the sword for the implements of husbandry. . . . Thousands of soldiers were set adrift on the world without a penny in their pockets to enable them to reach their homes. Yet none of the scenes of riot that often follow the disbanding of armies marked their course."—A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, ch. 21.—"General Grant's behavior at Appomattox was marked by a desire to spare the feelings of his great opponent. There was no theatrical display; his troops were not paraded with bands playing and banners flying, before whose lines the Confederates much march and stack arms. He did not demand Lee's sword, as is customary, but actually apologized to him for not having his own, saying it had been left behind in the wagon; promptly stopped salutes from being fired to mark the event, and the terms granted were liberal and generous. 'No man could have behaved better than General Grant did under the circumstances,' said Lee to a friend in Richmond. 'He did not touch my sword; the usual custom is for the sword to be received when tendered, and then handed back, but he did not touch mine.' Neither did the Union chief enter the Southern lines to show himself or to parade his victory, or go to Richmond or Petersburg to exult over a fallen people, but mounted his horse and with his staff started for Washington. Washington, at Yorktown, was not as considerate and thoughtful of the feelings of Cornwallis or his men. Charges were now withdrawn from the guns, flags furled, and the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia turned their backs upon each other for the first time in four long, bloody years."—F. Lee, *General Lee*, ch. 15.—"With the news that articles of surrender had been signed, which meant that the war was over, the North went into a paroxysm of joy. Stanton

uttered the prevalent sentiment when he telegraphed Grant: 'Thanks be to Almighty God for the great victory with which He has this day crowned you and the gallant armies under your command. The thanks of this Department, and of the government, and of the United States—their reverence and honor have been deserved—will be rendered to you and the brave and gallant officers and soldiers of your army for all time.' A salute of two hundred guns was ordered fired from every arsenal and fort. The nation was mad for joy. In the South there was corresponding depression. The feelings there, indeed, were mingled. With the humiliation naturally consequent on defeat, the sorrow over a lost cause, doubt and fear as to the future, there was a sigh of relief in knowing that the strife was ended. Lee's farewell address to his army is simple and characteristic of this taciturn man; and yet it shows between the lines a world of pathos. He wrote: 'After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources. I need not tell the survivors of so many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that I have consented to this result from no distrust of them; but, feeling that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss that would have attended the continuation of the contest, I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past service have endeared them to their countrymen. By the terms of agreement, officers and men can return to their homes and remain there until exchanged. You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the conscientiousness of duty faithfully performed; and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend to you his blessing and protection. With an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration of myself, I bid you an affectionate farewell.'"—G. C. Lee, *True history of the Civil War*, pp. 388-389.—From the moment that full military authority was placed in the hands of Grant, victory by the Union armies had been a foregone conclusion. "Grant had the best and broadest military temperament for aggressive warfare this continent has ever seen; he was the supreme and indispensable warrior for whom the Union cause long waited. With his hard sense, grim tenacity, and clearness of military insight, he conducted the most difficult of conquests—that of subduing brethren forcibly by other brethren of the same race and traditions; and in doing so he simplified and adapted modes of warfare to his ends, unhindered by routine or precedent. Grant had splendid subordinates, it is true; but it was his safe discrimination that brought them into place, and he got the best work out of all who served under him. The vigorous Sherman, the fiery and hot-blooded Sheridan, the methodical Meade, he generously allowed to reap each his full glory, in commands the fittest for winning a peculiar lustre; yet he all the while inspired and directed, brought up supports at the right time and place, thought out and worked out details, and quietly and discreetly kept down those quarrels and jealousies which, under most other Union commanders, were a constant obstacle to success. Nor did he, like McClellan, strive against his political masters at Washington; but his relations with the President and War Department, and with Halleck, too, were

harmonious and friendly, and largely because he lodged no complaints, but always did cheerfully the best with what was given him. Grant could take the city, and rule his tongue besides; and his military judgment, surpassingly sound on the whole, betrayed him but rarely into an irritable or harsh exercise of discipline. No commander, North or South, approached him in the wide range of experience gained, from the Missouri River to the James, in contact with high officers or immense operations. Besides Sherman, Sheridan, and Meade, he personally directed McPherson, Thomas, Schofield, Hooker, McClelland, Buell, Logan, Blair, in the West; Burnside, Hancock, Wright, Ord, Humphreys, in the East; and many other generals of distinction. He served early under Halleck, Pope and Frémont; he cooperated with Foote and Porter of the navy. His responsible operations, too, were more varied, as well as on a vaster scale, than any other general of the war, on either side, conducted. Nearly all the historic surrenders of this war were made to him, and he negotiated them with admirable spirit and self-possession. Behind his quiet and impassive demeanor must have bounded a restless and impetuous spirit of activity, in these years, which he repressed by habitual discretion."—J. Schouler, *History of the United States*, pp. 602-603.

ALSO IN: U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, ch. 65-67.—H. Porter, *Surrender at Appomattox Court House (Battles and leaders, v. 4)*.—A. Badeau, *Military history of Ulysses S. Grant*, ch. 33-34.—J. W. Keifer, *Battle of Sailor's Creek (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery, Loyal Legion of the United States, v. 3)*.

1865 (April: Virginia).—President Lincoln at Richmond.—Assembling and dispersing of "the gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia."—Virtual proclamation of the end of the war.—"President Lincoln had been at City Point and vicinity for several days before the fall of Richmond, in constant communication with the General-in-Chief, at the front, receiving dispatches from him and transmitting them instantly to the Secretary of War, whence they were diffused over the country, by the telegraph. On the day after Richmond was evacuated, he went up to that city in Admiral Porter's flag-ship, the Malvern. Captain Ralph Chandler, with the Sangamon, several tugs, and 30 small boats, with about 300 men, had already cleared the channel of the river of torpedoes, and made the navigation comparatively safe. When near Rocketts, the President and the Admiral left the Malvern, and proceeded to the city in the commander's gig. With its crew, armed with carbines, they landed and walked to Weitzel's quarters, in the late residence of Davis, cheered on the way by the huzzas and grateful ejaculations of a vast concourse of emancipated slaves, who had been told that the tall man was their Liberator. They crowded around him so thickly in their eagerness to see him, and to grasp his hand, that a file of soldiers were needed to clear the way. After a brief rest at Weitzel's the President rode rapidly through the principal streets of Richmond, in an open carriage, and, at near sunset, departed for City Point. Two days afterward, the President went to Richmond again, accompanied by his wife, the Vice-President, and several Senators, when he was called upon by leading Confederates, several of them members of the rebel Virginia legislature, whose chief business was to endeavor to arrange a compromise whereby the equivalent for

submission should be the security to the Virginia insurgents, as far as possible, of their political power and worldly possessions. The President was assured by Judge Campbell a member of the Confederate 'Government' (who, for two years, had been satisfied, he said, that success was impossible), that the so-called Virginia Legislature, if allowed to reassemble, with the Governor, would work for the reconstruction of the Union, their first step being the withdrawal of the Virginia troops from the field, on condition that the confiscation of property in Virginia should not be allowed. Anxious to end the war without further bloodshed, if possible, and satisfied that the withdrawal of the Virginia troops—in other words, nearly all of Lee's army—would accomplish it, he left with General Weitzel, on his departure from Richmond [April 6], authority to allow 'the gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia, in support of the rebellion, to assemble at Richmond and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government.' A safeguard was given. The fugitives returned, with the Governor, but instead of performing in good faith what had been promised in their name, they began legislating generally, as if they were the legal representatives of the people of Virginia. So soon as notice of this perfidy was given to the President after his return to Washington, he directed Weitzel to revoke the safeguard, and allow 'the gentlemen who had acted as the Legislature of Virginia' to return to private life. The surrender of Lee had, meanwhile, made the contemplated action unnecessary. The President was blamed by the loyal people for allowing these men to assemble with acknowledged powers; and the Confederates abused him for dissolving the assembly. The President returned to Washington City on the day of Lee's surrender, where he was the recipient of a multitude of congratulations because of the dawn of peace. On the 11th he issued proclamations, one declaring the closing, until further notice, of certain ports in the Southern States, whereof the blockade had been raised by their capture, respectively; and the other, demanding, henceforth, for our vessels in foreign ports, on penalty of retaliation, those privileges and immunities which had hitherto been denied them on the plea of according equal belligerent rights to the Republic and its internal enemies. . . . On the following day an order was issued from the War Department, which had been approved by General Grant, putting an end to all drafting and recruiting for the National army, and the purchase of munitions of war and supplies; and declaring that the number of general and staff officers would be speedily reduced, and all military restrictions on trade and commerce be removed forthwith. This virtual proclamation of the end of the war went over the land on the anniversary of the evacuation of Fort Sumter [April 14], while General Anderson was replacing the old flag over the ruins of that fortress."—B. J. Loring, *Field book of the Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 21.

ALSO IN: H. J. Raymond, *Life and public services of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 20.—C. C. Coffin, *Late scenes in Richmond (Atlantic Monthly, June, 1865)*.

1865 (April 11).—President Lincoln's last public address.—His view of reconstruction in Louisiana.—On the evening of April 11, a great multitude of people gathered about the White House, to convey their congratulations to the President, and to signify their joy at the sure

prospect of peace. Lincoln came out and spoke to them, expressing first his participation in their gladness, and then turning to discuss briefly the criticism which had opened upon his policy of reconstruction, as practically illustrated in Louisiana. He spoke of his message and proclamation of December, 1863; of the approval given to them by every member of his cabinet; of the entire silence at the time of all who had become critics and objectors since action under the plan had been taken in Louisiana. He then went on as follows: "When the message of 1863, with the plan before mentioned, reached New Orleans, General Banks wrote me that he was confident that the people, with his military coöperation, would reconstruct substantially on that plan. I wrote to him and some of them to try it. They tried it, and the result is known. Such has been my only agency in getting up the Louisiana government. As to sustaining it, my promise is out, as before stated. But as bad promises are better broken than kept, I shall treat this as a bad promise, and break it whenever I shall be convinced that keeping it is adverse to the public interest; but I have not yet been so convinced. I have been shown a letter on this subject, supposed to be an able one, in which the writer expresses regret that my mind has not seemed to be definitely fixed on the question whether the seceded States, so called, are in the Union or out of it. It would perhaps add astonishment to his regret were he to learn that since I have found professed Union men endeavoring to make that question, I have purposely forbore any public expression upon it. As appears to me, that question has not been, nor yet is, a practically material one, and that any discussion of it, while it thus remains practically immaterial, could have no effect other than the mischievous one of dividing our friends. As yet, whatever it may hereafter become, that question is bad as the basis of a controversy, and good for nothing at all—a merely pernicious abstraction. We all agree that the seceded States, so called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union, and the sole object of the government, civil and military, in regard to those States is to again get them into that proper practical relation. I believe that it is not only possible, but in fact easier, to do this without deciding or even considering whether these States have ever been out of the Union, than with it. Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad. Let us all join in doing the acts necessary to restoring the proper practical relations between these States and the Union, and each forever after innocently indulge his own opinion whether in doing the acts he brought the States from without into the Union, or only gave them proper assistance, they never having been out of it. The amount of the new Louisiana constituency, so to speak, on which the new Louisiana government rests, would be more satisfactory to all if it contained 50,000, or 30,000, or even 20,000, instead of only about 12,000, as it does. It is also unsatisfactory to some that the elective franchise is not given to the colored man. I would myself prefer that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on those who serve our cause as soldiers. Still, the question is not whether the Louisiana government, as it stands, is quite all that is desirable. The question is, will it be wiser to take it as it is and help to improve it, or to reject and disperse it? Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation with the Union sooner by sus-

taining or by discarding her new State government? Some 12,000 voters in the heretofore slave State of Louisiana have sworn allegiance to the Union, assumed to be the rightful political power of the State, held elections, organized a State Government, adopted a free-State constitution, giving the benefit of public schools equally to black and white, and empowering the legislature to confer the elective franchise upon the colored man. Their legislature has already voted to ratify the constitutional amendment recently passed by Congress, abolishing slavery throughout the nation. These 12,000 persons are thus fully committed to the Union and to perpetual freedom in the State—committed to the very things, and nearly all the things, the nation wants—and they ask the nation's recognition and its assistance to make good their committal. Now, if we reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and disperse them. We, in effect, say to the white man: You are worthless or worse; we will neither help you, nor be helped by you. To the blacks we say: This cup of liberty which these, your old masters, hold to your lips we will dash from you, and leave you to the chances of gathering the spilled and scattered contents in some vague and undefined when, where, and how. If this course, discouraging and paralyzing both white and black, has any tendency to bring Louisiana into proper practical relations with the Union, I have so far been unable to perceive it. If, on the contrary, we recognize and sustain the new government of Louisiana, the converse of all this is made true. We encourage the hearts and nerve the arms of the 12,000 to adhere to their work, and argue for it, and proselyte for it, and fight for it, and feed it, and grow it, and ripen it to a complete success. The colored man, too, in seeing all united for him, is inspired with vigilance, and energy, and daring, to the same end. Grant that he desires the elective franchise, will he not attain it sooner by saving the already advanced steps toward it than by running backward over them? Concede that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than by smashing it. Again, if we reject Louisiana we also reject one vote in favor of the proposed amendment to the national Constitution. To meet this proposition it has been argued that no more than three-fourths of those States which have not attempted secession are necessary to validly ratify the amendment. I do not commit myself against this further than to say that such a ratification would be questionable, and sure to be persistently questioned, while a ratification by three-fourths of all the States would be unquestioned and unquestionable. I repeat the question: Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation with the Union sooner by sustaining or by discarding her new State government? What has been said of Louisiana will apply generally to other States. And yet so great peculiarities pertain to each State, and such important and sudden changes occur in the same State, and withal so new and unprecedented is the whole case that no exclusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as to details and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan would surely become a new entanglement. Important principles may and must be inflexible. In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied that action will

be proper."—A. Lincoln, *Complete works*, v. 2, pp. 673-675.

1865 (April 14).—Assassination of President Lincoln.—“From the very beginning of his Presidency, Mr. Lincoln had been constantly subject to the threats of his enemies and the warnings of his friend. . . . Although he freely discussed with the officials about him the possibilities of danger, he always considered them remote, as is the habit of men constitutionally brave, and positively refused to torment himself with precautions for his own safety. He would sum the matter up by saying that both friends and strangers must have daily access to him in all manner of ways and places; his life was therefore in reach of any one, sane or mad, who was ready to murder and be hanged for it; that he could not possibly guard against all danger unless he were to shut himself up in an iron box, in which condition he could scarcely perform the duties of a President; by the hand of a murderer he could die only once; to go continually in fear would be to die over and over. He therefore went in and out before the people, always unarmed, generally unattended. . . . Four years of threats and boastings, of alarms that were unfounded, and of plots that came to nothing thus passed away; but precisely at the time when the triumph of the nation over the long insurrection seemed assured, and a feeling of peace and security was diffused over the country, one of the conspiracies, not seemingly more important than the many abortive ones, ripened in the sudden heat of hatred and despair. A little band of malignant secessionists, consisting of John Wilkes Booth, an actor, of a family of famous players; Lewis Powell, alias Payne, a disbanded rebel soldier from Florida; George Atzerodt, formerly a coachmaker, but more recently a spy and blockade runner of the Potomac; David E. Herold, a young druggist's clerk, Samuel Arnold and Michael O'Laughlin, Maryland secessionists and Confederate soldiers, and John H. Surratt, had their ordinary rendezvous at the house of Mrs. Mary E. Surratt, the widowed mother of the last named, formerly a woman of some property in Maryland, but reduced by reverses to keeping a small boarding-house in Washington. Booth was the leader of the little coterie. He was a young man of twenty-six. . . . He was a fanatical secessionist; had assisted at the capture and execution of John Brown, and had imbibed at Richmond and other Southern cities where he had played, a furious spirit of partisanship against Lincoln and the Union party. After the reflection of Mr. Lincoln, which rang the knell of the insurrection, Booth, like many of the secessionists North and South, was stung to the quick by disappointment. He visited Canada, consorted with the rebel emissaries there, and at last—whether or not at their instigation cannot certainly be said, conceived a scheme to capture the President and take him to Richmond. He spent a great part of the autumn and winter inducing a small number of loose fish of secession sympathies to join him in his fantastic enterprise. . . . There are indications in the evidence given on the trial of the conspirators that they suffered some great disappointment in their schemes in the latter part of March, and a letter from Arnold to Booth, dated March 27, showed that some of them had grown timid of the consequences of their contemplated enterprise and were ready to give it up. He advised Booth, before going further, ‘to go and see how it will be taken in R—d.’ But timid as they might be

by nature, the whole group was so completely under the ascendancy of Booth that they did not dare disobey him when in his presence; and after the surrender of Lee, in an access of malice and rage which was akin to madness, he called them together and assigned each his part in the new crime, the purpose of which had arisen suddenly in his mind out of the ruins of the abandoned abduction scheme. This plan was as brief and simple as it was horrible. Powell, alias Payne, the stalwart, brutal, simple-minded boy from Florida, was to murder Seward; Atzerodt, the comic villain of the drama, was assigned to remove Andrew Johnson; Booth reserved for himself the most difficult and most conspicuous rôle of the tragedy; it was Herold's duty to attend him as a page and aid in his escape. Minor parts were assigned to stage carpenters and other hangers-on, who probably did not understand what it all meant. Herold, Atzerodt, and Surratt had previously deposited at a tavern at Surrattsville, Maryland, owned by Mrs. Surratt, but kept by a man named Lloyd, a quantity of ropes, carbines, ammunition, and whisky, which were to be used in the abduction scheme. On the 11th of April Mrs. Surratt, being at the tavern, told Lloyd to have the shooting irons in readiness, and on Friday, the 14th, again visited the place and told him they would probably be called for that night. The preparations for the final blow were made with feverish haste; it was only about noon of the 14th that Booth learned the President was to go to Ford's Theater that night. It has always been a matter of surprise in Europe that he should have been at a place of amusement on Good Friday; but the day was not kept sacred in America, except by the members of certain churches. It was not, throughout the country, a day of religious observance. The President was fond of the theater; it was one of his few means of recreation. It was natural enough that, on this day of profound national thanksgiving, he should take advantage of a few hours' relaxation to see a comedy. Besides, the town was thronged with soldiers and officers, all eager to see him; it was represented to him that appearing occasionally in public would gratify many people whom he could not otherwise meet. . . . From the moment Booth ascertained the President's intention to attend the theater in the evening his every action was alert and energetic. He and his confederates, Herold, Surratt and Atzerodt were seen on horseback in every part of the city. He had a hurried conference with Mrs. Surratt before she started for Lloyd's tavern. . . . Booth was perfectly at home in Ford's Theater, where he was greatly liked by all the employees, without other reason than the sufficient one of his youth and good looks. Either by himself or with the aid of his friends he arranged his whole plan of attack and escape during the afternoon. He counted upon address and audacity to gain access to the small passage behind the President's box; once there, he guarded against interference by an arrangement of a wooden bar to be fastened by a simple mortice in the angle of the wall and the door by which he entered, so that the door could not be opened from without. He even provided for the contingency of not gaining entrance to the box by boring a hole in its door, through which he might either observe the occupants or take aim and shoot. He hired at a livery stable a small, fleet horse, which he showed with pride during the day to barkeepers and loafers among his friends. The moon rose that night at ten

o'clock. A few minutes before that hour he called one of the underlings of the theater to the back door and left him there holding his horse. He then went to a saloon near by, took a drink of brandy, and entering the theater, passed rapidly through the crowd in rear of the dress circle and made his way to the passage leading to the President's box. He showed a card to a servant in attendance and was allowed to pass in. He entered noiselessly, and, turning, fastened the door with the bar he had previously made ready, without disturbing any of the occupants of the box, between whom and himself there yet remained the slight partition and the door through which he had bored the hole. . . . Holding a pistol in one hand and a knife in the other, he opened the box door, put the pistol to the President's head, and fired; dropping the weapon, he took the knife in his right hand, and when Major Rathbone sprang to seize him he struck savagely at him. Major Rathbone received the blow on his left arm, suffering a wide and deep wound. Booth, rushing forward, then placed his left hand on the railing of the box and vaulted lightly over to the stage. It was a high leap, but nothing to such a trained athlete. . . . He would have got safely away but for his spur catching in the folds of the Union flag with which the front of the box was draped. He fell on the stage, the torn flag trailing on his spur, but instantly rose as if he had received no hurt, though in fact the fall had broken his leg; he turned to the audience, brandishing his dripping knife, and shouting the State motto of Virginia, 'Sic Semper Tyrannis,' and fled rapidly across the stage and out of sight. Major Rathbone had shouted, 'Stop him!' The cry went out, 'He has shot the President.' From the audience, at first stupid with surprise, and afterwards wild with excitement and horror, two or three men jumped upon the stage in pursuit of the flying assassin; but he ran through the familiar passages, leaped upon his horse, which was in waiting in the alley behind, rewarded with a kick and a curse the call-boy who had held him, and rode rapidly away in the light of the just risen moon. The President scarcely moved; his head drooped forward slightly, his eyes closed. . . . It was afterward ascertained that a large derringer bullet had entered the back of the head on the left side, and, passing through the brain, had lodged just behind the left eye. By direction of Rathbone and Crawford, the President was carried to a house across the street and laid upon a bed in a small room at the rear of the hall, on the ground floor. . . . The President had been shot a few minutes past ten. The wound would have brought instant death to most men, but his vital tenacity was extraordinary. . . . At twenty-two minutes after seven he died. Stanton broke the silence by saying, 'Now he belongs to the ages.'" At the same hour in which the president was murdered, an attempt was made by one of Booth's fellow conspirators to kill the secretary of state. Seward had been thrown from his carriage a few days before and was prostrated by the serious injuries received. Pending to bring a prescription from his physician, the assassin, Payne, made his way into the sick-room of the secretary and stabbed him three times, but not fatally, in the neck and cheek. Two sons, Frederick and Augustus Seward, were seriously wounded defending their father, and a soldier-nurse who was present struggled bravely with the assassin, though weaponless, and was stabbed repeatedly. Payne escaped for the time, but was caught a few days later. Booth made his way

to Port Tobacco, and thence across the Potomac, into Virginia, assisted and concealed by numerous sympathizers. He eluded his pursuers until April 25, when he was hunted down by a party of soldiers, while sleeping in a bar, below Fredericksburg, and, refusing to surrender, was shot. "The surviving conspirators, with the exception of John H. Surratt, were tried by a military commission sitting in Washington in the months of May and June. . . . Mrs. Surratt, Payne, Herold, and Atzerodt were hanged on the 7th of July; Mudd, Arnold, and O'Laughlin were imprisoned for life at the Tortugas, though the term was afterwards shortened; and Spangler, the scene shifter at the theater, was sentenced to six years in jail. John H. Surratt escaped to Canada," and thence to England. "He wandered over Europe, enlisted in the Papal Zouaves, deserted and fled to Egypt,



FORD'S THEATER, WASHINGTON

where he was detected and brought back to Washington in 1867. His trial lasted two months and ended in a disagreement of the jury."—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 10, ch. 14-15.—"The first and inevitable result of the emotion which swept over the earth at Lincoln's death was to enroll him among martyrs and heroes. Men forgot that they had despised him, jeered at him, doubted him. They forgot his mistakes, forgot his plodding caution, forgot his homely ways. They saw now, with the vision which an awful and sudden disaster so often gives, the simple, noble outlines on which he had worked. They realized how completely he had sunk every partisan and personal consideration, every non-essential, in the tasks which he had set for himself—to prevent the extension of slavery, to save the Union. They realized how, while they had forgotten everything in disputes over this man, this measure, this event, he had seen only the two great objects of the struggle. They saw how slowly, but surely, he had edu-

cated them to feel the vital importance of these objects, had resolved their partisan warfare into a moral struggle. The wisdom of his words, the sincerity of his acts, the steadfastness of his life were clear to them at last. With this realization came a feeling that he was more than a man. He was prophet, they said, a man raised up by God for a special work, and they laid then the foundation of the Lincoln myth which still entralls so many minds. The real Lincoln, the great Lincoln, is not, however, this prophet and martyr. He is the simple, steady, resolute, unselfish man whose supreme ambition was to find out the truth of the questions which confronted him in life, and whose highest satisfaction was in following the truth he discovered. . . . It took four years of dogged struggle, of constant repetitions of the few truths which he believed to be essential, to teach the people of the United States that they could trust him; it took a murderer's bullet to make them realize the surpassing greatness of his simplicity, his common sense, and his resolution. It is this man who never rested until he had found what he believed to be the right, and, who, having found it, could never be turned from it, who is the Real Lincoln."—I. M. Tarbell, *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, v. 2, pp. 261-262.—"A man may be great by intellect or by character or by both. The highest men are great by both; and of these was Abraham Lincoln. . . . Thoughtfulness and intensity, the capacity to reflect steadily and patiently on a problem till it has been solved, is one of the two most distinct impressions which one gets from that strong, rugged face with its furrowed brow and deep-set eyes. The other impression is that of unshaken and unshakable resolution. Slow in reaching a decision, he held fearlessly to it when he had reached it. He had not merely physical courage, and that in ample measure, but the rarer quality of being willing to face misconception and unpopularity. It was his undaunted firmness and his clear thinking that fitted Lincoln to be the pilot who brought your ship through the wildest tempest that ever broke upon her. Three points should never be forgotten which, if they do not add to Lincoln's greatness, make it more winning and attractive. One is the fact that he rose all unaided to the pinnacle of power and responsibility. . . . A second is the gentleness of his heart. He who has to refuse every hour requests from those whom a private person would have been glad to indulge, he who has to punish those whom a private person would pity and pardon, can seldom retain either tenderness or patience. But Lincoln's tenderness and patience were inexhaustible. . . . To preserve truthfulness and conscientiousness appears scarcely possible in the stress of life where immense issues seem to make it necessary, and therefore to make it right, to toss aside the ordinary rules of conduct in order to secure the end desired. To Abraham Lincoln, however, truthfulness and conscientiousness remained the rule of life. He felt and owned his responsibility not only to the people, but to a higher power. Few rulers who have wielded like power amid like temptations have so stainless a record."—J. Bryce, *University and historical addresses*, pp. 201-203.—"Many great deeds had been done in the war. The greatest was the keeping of the North together in an enterprise so arduous, and an enterprise for objects so confusedly related as the Union and freedom. Abraham Lincoln did this; nobody else could have done it; to do it he bore on his sole shoulders such a weight of care and

pain as few other men have borne. When it was over it seemed to the people that he had all along been thinking their real thoughts for them; but they knew that this was because he had fearlessly thought for himself. He had been able to save the nation, partly because he saw that unity was not to be sought by the way of base concession. He had been able to . . . free the slaves, partly because he would not hasten to this object at the sacrifice of what he thought a larger purpose. This most unrelenting enemy to the project of the Confederacy was the one man who had quite purged his heart and mind from hatred or even anger towards his fellow-countrymen of the South. That fact came to be seen in the South too, and generations in America are likely to remember it when all other features of his statecraft have grown indistinct. . . . They will remember it as adding a peculiar lustre to the renovation of their national existence, as no small part of the glory, surpassing that of former wars, which has become the common heritage of North and South. For perhaps not many conquerors, and certainly few successful statesmen, have escaped the tendency of power to harden or at least to narrow their human sympathies; but in this man a natural wealth of tender compassion became richer and more tender while in the stress of deadly conflict he developed an astounding strength."—Lord Charnwood, *Abraham Lincoln (Makers of the nineteenth century)*, pp. 454-455.)

ALSO IN: H. J. Raymond, *Life and public services of Abraham Lincoln*, ch. 21.—J. G. Holland, *Life of Lincoln*, ch. 30.—B. P. Poore, *Reminiscences*, v. 2, ch. 15.—B. Pittman, *Report of the trial of the conspirators*.—Idem, *Trial of John H. Surratt*.—T. M. Harris, *Assassination of Lincoln: A history*.

1865 (April 15).—Succession of Vice President Andrew Johnson to the presidency.—"Nearly all the members of the cabinet were at Lincoln's bedside on the Saturday morning when he died, and they at once signed a paper addressed to the Vice-President. 'The emergency of the government,' said they, 'demands that you should immediately qualify according to the requirements of the Constitution and enter upon the duties of President of the United States.' Only Seward's name was missing. First there was Hugh McCulloch, who after Chase's resignation and Fessenden's brief incumbency of the office, had become but lately Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury, now in the midst of great financial operations, looking to the payment of the war debt. Then followed the names of Edwin M. Stanton, who almost from the beginning had been Secretary of War. . . . Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy; William Dennison, . . . who in 1864 had taken Montgomery Blair's place as Postmaster-General; John P. Usher, of Indiana, since 1862 Secretary of the Interior, soon to give way to James Harlan; and James Speed, of Kentucky, . . . Attorney-General McCulloch and Speed were sent to find Johnson at his lodgings in the Kirkwood House. Chase, whom Lincoln . . . had just appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was found to administer the oath, and [on April 15] in the parlor of the hotel in the presence of these three men, Francis P. Blair, Sr., his son, Montgomery Blair, Senator Foot, ex-Senator Hale and a few others the ceremony was quickly concluded. Johnson repeated the words of the oath 'very distinctly and impressively,' kissed the 21st verse of the 11th chapter of Eze-

kiel in the Bible which was handed him, whereupon the Chief Justice said: 'You are President. May God support, guide and bless you in your arduous duties.' The other in attendance came forward to tender their sad congratulations' and, determining not to make a speech, the new President availed himself of the Chief Justice's offer to prepare a public address to be printed in the newspapers. Mr. Chase left the room for this purpose, whereupon Mr. Johnson at once uttered some remarks as to his incompetency 'to perform duties so important and responsible,' and his policies, which, he said, would be developed gradually, appealing to his past career 'as a guarantee for the future.' 'Toil and an honest advocacy of the great principles of free government' had been his portion in life. The country had departed from the true way. When its present perils were at an end, he would hope for a return to 'principles consonant with popular rights.' At noon of this day Johnson met the Cabinet in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury, where Welles says that he 'deported himself admirably,' and stated that his policy would be 'in all essentials . . . the same as that of the late President.' The heads of the departments were desired to continue in their places and go forward with their work. . . . On April 18 when a delegation of citizens from Illinois, headed by Governor Oglesby, presented themselves at the new President's office in the Treasury Building, he told them that it was not alone the assassin of Lincoln who was guilty of his murder. Others shared the responsibility for the monstrous outrage. The American people must be taught that treason was 'the blackest of crimes,' and that 'traitors shall suffer its penalty.' This fact must be 'engraven on every heart.' Its President had been assassinated; should the nation be assassinated also? On April 24, to a number of Southern loyalists, he said that the time had come 'when the people should be taught to understand the length and breadth, the depth and height of treason. . . . When 'the conscious and intelligent traitors' were found, 'the penalty and the forfeit should be paid.' 'Treason and traitors must be driven from the land.'—E. P. Oberholzer, *History of the United States since the Civil War*, v. 1, pp. 5-8.

ALSO IN: H. W. Wilson, *Rise and fall of the slave power in America*, v. 3, ch. 43.—G. W. Julian, *Political recollections*, ch. 11.

1865 (April 26).—General Johnston's surrender.—"Davis was of the opinion that Johnston, who was in North Carolina closely watched by Sherman, needed not to have surrendered, even after Lee was compelled to do so. But as early as the 23d of February, when Johnston was reinstated in command of the Army of the Tennessee, the cause of the Confederacy appeared to him hopeless, and he saw no good in continuing the fighting except for the sake of obtaining better terms of peace. He was directed by General Lee to drive back Sherman, an order admirable in its comprehensiveness, but sorely lacking in practicability owing to the small number and scattered condition of Johnston's available troops. After much marching and two or three unimportant engagements, the Army of the Tennessee was concentrated near Bentonville on the 18th of March. On the 19th, 20th, and 21st an engagement occurred at this place, in which the Confederates, though they had the advantage, were not able to prevent Sherman from uniting with Schofield. On the 22d Johnston moved towards Raleigh. April 11 he heard of the surrender of Lee, and

immediately decided that further resistance on his part was useless. He met President Davis, by appointment, at Greensboro on the 12th. Mr. Davis argued for the continuance of the war, for he believed that a brave stand would recall the soldiers who had deserted and arouse the spirit of the country. Finding no support, he finally persuaded Johnston to send Sherman a letter asking for an armistice . . . 'the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war.' General Sherman assented to a meeting, which took place on . . . [April 16] at a house on the Raleigh road. The first thing Sherman did was to show Johnston a telegram announcing the assassination of President Lincoln. This elicited from the Confederate general the declaration that 'the event was the greatest possible calamity to the South.' General Sherman stated that an armistice giving opportunity for the civil powers to negotiate terms of peace was out of the question; for Washington would never consent to the recognition of any civil capacity on the part of the leaders of the Confederacy. Johnston suggested that, as generals had been known to arrange the terms of permanent peace, so they might. After considerable discussion, and much argument as to whether the Confederate President and his Cabinet should be included in the general amnesty, a Basis of Agreement was signed by both generals."—G. C. Lee, *True history of the Civil War*, pp. 390-392.—The memorandum of agreement, signed on April 18 provided for the disbanding of all the Confederate armies, the recognition of the State governments of the several States lately forming the rebel Confederacy, the complete restoration of their old status in the Union, and complete amnesty to all concerned in the rebellion. This was forwarded to Washington, and, of course, it was disapproved, but with an unnecessary publication of sharp censure of General Sherman, and with expressions that seemed to imply distrust of the loyalty of his motives. General Grant was ordered to proceed to General Sherman's headquarters and to direct further operations. He executed this mission with great delicacy, and his presence with Sherman was hardly known. The latter held a second conference with Johnston on the 26th, and there General Johnston made the surrender of his army on the same terms that had been granted to Lee.

ALSO IN: W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 23.—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 3, ch. 92.—J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of military operations*, ch. 12.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 10, ch. 12.

1865 (April-May).—End of the war.—Fall of Mobile.—Stoneman's raid.—Wilson's raid.—Capture of Jefferson Davis.—Final surrenders.—After the surrender of Johnston, "there were still a few expeditions out in the South that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. . . . The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from the commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off: one under Canby himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman from East Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March. They were all eminently successful, but without any good result. Indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to

spare them. . . Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. He got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg. His approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at Appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. He then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of Johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between Sherman and Johnston for the latter's surrender. In this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while 14 guns and nearly 2,000 prisoners were the trophies of his success. Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March. The city of Mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments—Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north of the city. These forts were invested. On the night of the 8th of April, the National troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. On the 11th the city was evacuated. . . . Wilson moved out [from Eastport, Mississippi] with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed. He was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. Forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. . . . He had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of Wilson's cavalry. Selma fell on the 2d of April. . . . Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Point fell in quick succession. These were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material. . . . Macon surrendered on the 21st of April. Here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston's army. Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by Sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. This stopped all fighting. General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officer still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war. Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. This occurred at Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May. For myself, and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: I feared that, if not captured, he might get into the trans-Mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy."—U. S. Grant, *Personal memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 69.—"Davis and members of the Richmond Cabinet who had been in touch with Johnston . . . had reached Greensboro in North Carolina [with the Confederate archives] on the day of Lincoln's assassination. On the 18th they were in Charlotte, where they remained eight days. Starting forth again, not knowing with what end in view, the fugitives were soon obliged to separate and go off in different directions. Davis himself was overtaken by a body of cavalry, under the command of General James H. Wilson, in a camp in the pine woods of southern Georgia

on May 10. Mrs. Davis accompanied her husband in his flight. When they were warned of his danger, she put upon him her waterproof coat, which looked like a woman's coarse gown, and threw over his head and shoulders a shawl, which led to the story, soon published everywhere, that he had been taken in his 'wife's clothes.' He was escorted to General Wilson's headquarters and then conveyed by water from Augusta to Fortress Monroe, where he was placed in a stone casemate under a strong guard."—E. P. Oberholtzer, *History of the United States since the Civil War*, v. 1, p. 10.—"His family were returned by water to Savannah and there set at liberty. Secretary Reagan—the only person of consequence captured with Davis—was taken to Boston, and confined, with Vice-President Stephens (captured about this time also in Georgia), in Fort Warren; but each was liberated on parole a few months thereafter."—H. Greeley, *American conflict*, v. 2, ch. 35.—"Davis spent two years, from 1865 to 1867, in prison, a part of the time in chains. This was a fortunate indignity for him. Intensely unpopular in the South when the Confederacy collapsed, he gained sympathy as a post-war sufferer for the cause. The South forgot his faults and his mistakes and only remembered that though he was not primarily responsible for secession he was a martyr for the principle of secession. . . . What shall we say of him now after this long time? The South respects him but it is almost glad that he was not quite great enough to succeed. The South is well satisfied to be a part of the Union. It still differs politically from the North, but this difference is more the result of habit and tradition than of thought. The South maintains, as it should, that secession was justified and that Jefferson Davis was right, but it feels that out of the evil of defeat and political overthrow Providence has brought good. What happened happened for the best."—H. J. Eckenrode, *Jefferson Davis, President of the South*, pp. 357-359.

ALSO IN: J. H. Reagan, *Flight and capture of Jefferson Davis (Annals of the war by leading participants)*.—G. W. Lawton, "Running at the heads" (*Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1865).—J. Davis, *Rise and fall of the Confederate government*, v. 2, ch. 54.—C. C. Andrews, *History of the campaign of Mobile*.—W. E. Dodd, *Life of Jefferson Davis*.—C. M. Blackford, *Trials and trial of Jefferson Davis*.

1865 (May).—Statistics of the Civil War.—Northern navy.—Losses caused by Confederate cruisers.—Numbers of combatants.—Disbandment of Union army.—Army of occupation in the South.—Sale of 7-30 bonds.—Appropriations for quartermaster's department.—Improvement in transportation.—"In the four years of their service the armies of the Union, counting every form of conflict, great and small, had been in 2,265 engagements with the Confederate troops. From the time when active hostilities began until the last gun of the war was fired, a fight of some kind—a raid, a skirmish, or a pitched battle—occurred at some point on our widely extended front nearly eleven times per week upon an average. Counting only those engagements in which the Union loss in killed, wounded, and missing exceeded 100, the total number was 330,—averaging one every four and a half days. From the northernmost point of contact to the southernmost, the distance by any practicable line of communication was more than 2,000 miles. From East to West the extremes were 1,500 miles apart. During the first year of hostilities—one of



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LAST MEETING OF JEFFERSON DAVIS'S CABINET, AT THE HOME OF AMSTEAD BURT, MAY 4, 1865

Left to right: Basil W. Duke; John C. Breckenridge; W. C. P. Breckenridge; Judah P. Benjamin; S. W. Ferguson; Braxton Bragg; J. C. Vaughn; G. C. Dibrell

(From painting by Wilbur G. Kurtz)

preparation on both sides—the battles were . . . 35 in number, of which the most serious was the Union defeat at Bull Run. In 1862 the war had greatly increased in magnitude and intensity, as is shown by the 84 engagements between the armies. The net result of the year's operations was highly favorable to the Rebellion. In 1863 the battles were 110 in number—among them some of the most significant and important victories for the Union. In 1864 there were 73 engagements, and in the winter and early spring of 1865 there were 28. In fact, 1864-65 was one continuous campaign. . . . Not only in life but in treasure the cost of the war was enormous. In addition to the large revenues of the Government which had been currently absorbed, the public debt at the close of the struggle was \$2,808,549,437.55. The incidental losses were innumerable in kind, incalculable in amount. Mention is made here only of the actual expenditure of money—estimated by the standard of gold. The outlay was indeed principally made in paper, but the faith of the United States was given for redemption in coin—a faith which has never been tarnished, and which in this instance has been signally vindicated by the steady determination of the people. . . . For the three years of the rebellion, after the first year, our War Department alone expended \$603,314,411.82, \$690,391,048.66, and \$1,030,690,400 respectively. The Secretary, Mr. Welles, found upon entering his office but a single ship in a Northern port fitted to engage in aggressive operations. . . . By the end of the year 1863 the Government had 600 vessels of war which were increased to 700 before the rebellion was subdued. Of the total number at least 75 were ironclad.”—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 2; v. 1, ch. 25.—“Eleven Confederate cruisers figured in the ‘Alabama claims’ settlement between the United States and Great Britain. They were the *Alabama*, *Shenandoah*, *Florida*, *Tallahassee*, *Georgia*, *Chickamauga*, *Nashville*, *Retribution*, *Sumter*, *Sallie* and *Boston*. The actual losses inflicted by the *Alabama* (\$6,547,600) were only about \$60,000 greater than those charged to the *Shenandoah*. The sum total of the claims filed against the eleven cruisers for ships and cargoes was \$17,900,633, all but about \$4,000,000 being caused by the *Alabama* and *Shenandoah*. . . . In the ‘case of the United States’ . . . it is stated that while in 1860 two-thirds of the commerce of New York was carried on in American bottoms, in 1863 three-fourths was carried on in foreign bottoms. The transfer of American vessels to the British flag to avoid capture is stated thus: In 1861, vessels 126, tonnage 71,673; in 1862, vessels 135, tonnage 64,578; in 1863, vessels 348, tonnage 252,579; in 1864, vessels 106, tonnage 92,052. . . . The cruisers built or purchased in England for the Confederate navy, were the *Florida*, *Alabama*, *Shenandoah* and *Rappahannock*. The latter never made a cruise, and the others were procured for the government by James D. Bulloch, naval agent. . . . He also had constructed in France, the armored ram *Stonewall*.”—J. T. Scharf, *History of the Confederate States navy*, ch. 26.—See also ALABAMA CLAIMS.—“The enlistments in the Union army during the War of the Rebellion numbered 2,898,304. This number includes about 230,000 militia and ‘emergency men,’ who served for short terms, and some part of whom were not mustered into the United States service. The terms of service (expiring by the terms of enlistment or by the close of the war), under 1,580,00 of these enlist-

ments, was from two weeks to fourteen months. The number of individuals under arms was considerably less than the number of enlistments, because of repeated enlistments by individuals. It is probable that many of the 200,000 men who served for short terms in 1861 and 1862 enlisted again. Over 200,000 men reenlisted in the veteran regiments, the Veteran Reserve Corps and Hancock's Veteran Corps. . . . The total number of men in the Confederate armies has been estimated at 600,000 to 700,000 by General Marcus J. Wright, and at about 600,000 by General Early, Alexander H. Stephens, and Dr. Joseph Jones, surgeon-general of the United Confederate Veterans but, excepting the last-named neither of these writers gives the source of his figures, and . . . the largest of these estimates is too low. It is a part of human nature which persuades the losers in war to believe that the result must have come from a great disparity in numbers. The sustained conflict and terrible loss of four years of war placed the reputation of Southern valor so high that exaggerated statements of numbers cannot further exalt it in the estimation of the world. . . . On the other hand, it would not disparage Northern courage to establish a large disproportion in numbers, in view of the defensive attitude of the South, and the necessity of invading and occupying a constantly enlarging territory which was forced upon the Northern army. This required many more men than mere battles upon equal terms would have required. . . . The fact that the average strength shown on the returns of all the Confederate armies during the four years of the war was 55 per cent. of the average strength of all the Union armies for the same time tends to prove that the Confederate estimates of 600,000 to 700,000 for the total number in the Confederate army, or 20 or 24 per cent. of the total number (2,898,304) in the Union armies, are too small. But it would be an error to assume that the ratio of 55 per cent. between the average strength of the Union armies and the average strength of the Confederate armies shows the absolute ratio between the number of men who were enrolled on each side, because it might not give due effect to the varying terms of service of the various levies on either side.”—T. L. Livermore, *Numbers and losses in the Civil War in America, 1861-1865*, pp. 1-3, 48.—See also PRISONS AND PRISON-PENS, CONFEDERATE.—“The disbandment of the great Northern army had begun on the 29th of April, before Lincoln had yet been put in his grave, or Davis had been captured. By August 7, 641,000 troops had returned to the peaceful walks of life, ready to be absorbed in the ranks of citizenship, and the work was continued rapidly afterward. To pacify the country, if further need arose, and to reestablish the national authority, five military divisions were created: the Atlantic, commanded by General George G. Meade, with headquarters at Philadelphia; the Mississippi, by General William T. Sherman, stationed at St. Louis; the Gulf, by General Philip H. Sheridan, at New Orleans; the Tennessee, by General George H. Thomas, at Nashville; and the Pacific, by General H. W. Halleck, at San Francisco. These five divisions comprised eighteen departments, at the head of which stood such tried commanders as Hancock, Pope, Hooker, Schofield, McDowell, Stoneman, Canby, Terry and Ord. The great purchases on account of the army ceased. The horses and mules, the munitions and supplies of war were offered for sale, and the proceeds covered into the Treasury. The

prisoners who had been gathered into camps and stockades in various parts of the North took the oath of allegiance and were sent to their homes. In the navy, too, retrenchment was instantly begun. Coast squadrons and river flotillas were reduced in size, or wholly dispersed. The vessels and equipment were sold and thousands of seamen were at liberty to return to the merchant service, whence they had been drawn for the national defence. The army had cost the government over \$1,000,000,000 in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865. Two years later when there was a full return to a peace footing the total expenditures for the same use were less than \$100,000,000. The debt of the United States, when it was finally adjusted, reached a grand aggregate as a result of the war of about \$3,000,000,000. To the task of paying this great sum the country returned cheerfully and even humorously. Jay Cooke, the Philadelphia banker and loan agent for the government, published a pamphlet entitled 'Our National Debt a National Blessing.' This suggestion aroused general laughter. . . . The work of providing the money for the payment of the accumulating warrants upon the Treasury, and of sending the soldiers home with their wages in their pockets was going forward wisely and confidently. When Mr. McCulloch came to the head of the Treasury Department with the beginning of Lincoln's second term, on March 4, 1865, he found that the pecuniary wants of the government were being met by the sale of '7-30's, i. e. three-year Treasury notes bearing interest at the rate of two cents a day, or \$7.30 a year on a note of \$100. The contract had been made by Mr. McCulloch's predecessor in office, William P. Fessenden, with Jay Cooke, the sanguine and energetic man through whom large sales of bonds had been effected by Secretary Chase in the early years of the war. Cooke immediately established the machinery for a nationwide appeal. As the war came to an end hope filled every heart, and in a few months \$830,000,000 worth of the notes were distributed among the people. On the day Lincoln was shot the sales reached a total of about \$4,000,000, and continued at nearly this rate daily after his death. In May a new impulse was given to the movement, and on one day, May 13, more than \$30,000,000 were received in exchange for notes at Cooke's various sales agencies. The payment of the charges of the war, by the sale of paper falling due at the expiration of short terms, would call for much adjustment of the debt at later dates, but the generous subscription of money by the people for government uses in these few weeks following Mr. Johnson's coming to the Presidency was, at once, an expression of their virility at the end of a prolonged and exhausting contest, and of their patriotic faith in the future of the nation."—E. P. Oberholzer, *History of the United States since the Civil War*, v. 1, pp. 25-28.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1861-1864; 1863-1914.—"The amount of appropriations for the quartermaster's department during the war was \$1,184,300,608.95. The concluding paragraph of Meigs's report of 1864 illustrates the principle on which the war was conducted, that human life was more valuable than material. 'That an army is wasteful is certain,' he wrote, 'but it is more wasteful to allow a soldier to sicken and die for want of the blanket or knapsack, which he has thoughtlessly thrown away in the heat of the march or the fight than to again supply him on the first opportunity with these articles indispensable to health and efficiency.' A mass of

evidence warrants the statement that never had an army been so well supplied with food and clothing as was that of the North; never before were the comfort and welfare of the men so well looked after. Private agencies, . . . helped to secure this result but they needed and obtained the heavy co-operation of the government. . . . Until our Civil War the art of transporting troops and their supplies by rail and by river steamboats was in its infancy. Under the conditions of the large expanse of territory and the consequent necessity of moving soldiers and food great distances, it developed through our mechanical ingenuity into an indispensable branch of logistics. Some remarkable exploits for the time were done. Lewis B. Parsons was superintendent of river and railroad transportation for the armies both in the West and East; he received mention from Meigs 'for his just and energetic control,' and a high tribute from General Grant."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, v. 5, pp. 225-226.

1865 (May).—Feeling of surrendered Confederate officers.—Attitude in North Carolina.—After the surrender of Johnston, General Jacob D. Cox was put in command of the military district within which the surrender occurred, and had charge of the arrangements made for paroling and disbanding the Confederate forces. General Cox has given an interesting report of conversations which he had in that connection with General Johnston and General Hardee. Talking with General Hardee of the war, the latter was asked "what had been his own experience as to the result, and when had he himself recognized the hopelessness of the contest. 'I confess,' said he, laughing, 'that I was one of the hot Southerners who shared the notion that one man of the South could whip three Yankees; but the first year of the war pretty effectually knocked that nonsense out of us, and, to tell the truth, ever since that time we military men have generally seen that it was only a question how long it would take to wear our army out and destroy it. We have seen that there was no real hope of success, except by some extraordinary accident of fortune, and we have also seen that the politicians would never give up till the army was gone. So we have fought with the knowledge that we were to be sacrificed with the result we see to-day, and none of us could tell who would live to see it. We have continued to do our best, however, and have meant to fight as if we were sure of success.' . . . Johnston was very warm in his recognition of the soldiery qualities and the wonderful energy and persistence of our army and the ability of Sherman. Referring to his own plans, he said he had hoped to have had time enough to have collected a larger force to oppose Sherman, and to give it a more complete and efficient organization. The Confederate government had reckoned upon the almost impassable character of the rivers and swamps to give a respite till spring—at least they hoped for this. 'Indeed,' said he, with a smile, 'Hardee here, 'giving a friendly nod of his head toward his subordinate, 'reported the Salkehatchie Swamps as absolutely impassable; but when I heard that Sherman had not only started, but was marching through those very swamps at the rate of thirteen miles a day, making corduroy road every foot of the way, I made up my mind there had been no such army since the days of Julius Cæsar.' Hardee laughingly admitted his mistaken report


from Charleston, but justified it by saying that all precedent was against such a march, and that he would still have believed it impossible if he had not seen it done. . . . I accepted several invitations to address the people at different points and explain our attitude and purpose during the interregnum, and to give them serious advice as to their conduct in the very trying circumstances in which they were. . . . There was a wistful solicitude noticeable in people of all classes to know what was to become of them. Their leaders had educated them to believe that the success of the National arms would mean the loss of every liberty and subjection to every form of hateful tyranny. Yet they almost universally showed a spirit of complete resignation to what might come, and a wish to conform obediently to everything enjoined by the officers of the occupying armies. It was the rarest thing in the world to meet with anything like sullen resistance or hostile or unfriendly utterances. (Footnote: The same disposition in the people was noticed elsewhere in the South. Halleck said, in a dispatch of April 22d, 'From all I can learn, Richmond is to-day more loyal than Washington or Baltimore.' Sherman sent similar reports from Savannah). . . . The owners of property did not hope for profits; they expressed themselves earnestly as anxious only that such crops might be raised as would save the community, white and black alike, from absolute destitution. I know of prominent examples of well-known men offering the farm hands all that they could raise for that season if they would only go to work and plant something which could still ripen into food. . . . As soldiers, we refrained from meddling in civil affairs, but it was understood that we should preserve the peace and allow no force to be used by others. It was a time when everybody felt the need of being patient and conciliatory, and the natural authority of known character and wisdom asserted itself. Everybody soon went to work to make a living, and the burning problems of political and social importance were postponed. . . . We had opportunity to notice to what great straits the people had been reduced for two years in the matter of manufactured goods of all kinds. . . . Carriages, wagons, and farm implements went to decay, or could only be rudely patched up by the rough mechanics of the plantation. The stringent blockade shut out foreign goods, and the people were generally clothed in homespun. In many houses the floors were bare because the carpets had been cut up to make blankets for the soldiers. . . . I think I cannot be mistaken in the judgment I formed at the time, that to the great body of the Southern people it was a relief that the struggle was really over; that they breathed more freely and felt that a new lease of life came with peace. . . . Why it was that the mellowness of spirit which seemed so prevalent could not have ripened without interruption or check into a quicker and more complete fraternization, belongs to another field of inquiry. The military chronicler stops where he was mustered out."—J. D. Cox, *Military reminiscences of the Civil War*, v. 2, pp. 526, 531-532, 540-541, 545-546, 548.

1865 (May).—Summary of governmental control of railroads during Civil War. See RAILROADS: 1861-1865.

1865 (May-July).—President Johnson's measures of Reconstruction.—Amnesty proclamation.—Growth of antagonism to the president.—Popular feeling.—"It was scarcely to be expected that

a man who had fought his way to the fore in eastern Tennessee during those controversial years would possess the characteristics of a diplomat. Even his friends found . . . [President Johnson] uncommunicative, too often defiant and violent in controversy, irritating in manners, indiscreet, and lacking flexibility in the management of men. The messages which he wrote as President were dignified and judicious, and his addresses were not lacking in power, but he was prone to indulge in unseemly repartee with his hearers when speaking on the stump. . . . Unhappily, too, he was distrustful by nature, giving his confidence reluctantly and with reserve, so that he was almost without friends or spokesmen in either House of Congress. His policies have commended themselves, on the whole, even after the scrutiny of half a century. The extent to which he was able to put them into effect is part of the history of reconstruction. The close of the Civil War found the nation as well as the several sections of the country facing a variety of complicated and pressing social, economic and political problems. . . . Most of these problems, moreover, had to be solved through political agencies, such as party conventions and legislatures, with all the limitations of partisanship that these terms convey. . . . In their attitude toward the South, the people of the North, as well as the politicians, fell into two groups. The smaller or radical party desired a stern reckoning with all 'rebels' and the imprisonment and execution of the leaders. They hoped, also, to effect an immediate extension to the negroes of the right to vote. It was this faction that welcomed the accession of Johnson to the Presidency. The other group was much the larger and was inclined toward gentler measures and toward leaving the question of suffrage largely for the future. Lincoln and his Secretary of State, Seward, were representative of this party. The attitude of the South toward the North was more difficult to determine. . . . Careful observers differed as to whether the South accepted its defeat in good faith and would treat the blacks justly, or whether it was sullen, unrepentant and ready to adopt any measures short of actual slavery to repress the negro. In theory, the union of the states was still intact. The South had attempted to secede and had failed. Practically, however, the southern states were out of connection with the remainder of the nation and some method must be found of reconstructing the broken federation."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War*, pp. 5-7.—"The first six weeks of Johnson's administration were dominated by the emotions which the assassination of his predecessor excited in all parts of the land. At Washington affairs fell largely under the direction of the secretary of war, whose total loss of self-control in the crisis contributed to intensify the panicky and vindictive feeling that prevailed. . . . When, however, the excitement caused by the assassination of Mr. Lincoln subsided, . . . northern sentiment began to show alarm at the vindictive course to which the President seemed tending. . . . Moreover, . . . the advice which was given to Mr. Johnson by most of his constitutional advisers was of another quality than that which he had been wont to receive from the embittered and revengeful Unionists of Tennessee. He had gladly retained all the members of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, and in them he found persisting that distaste for proscription which Booth's victim had made no attempt to conceal. Especially was this feeling manifest after the return of Seward to duty in

May; for the secretary of state harbored no resentments in politics, and the weight of his influence could not have failed, under the circumstances, to be very great. Accordingly, though many prominent Confederates were kept in strict confinement, and were treated in some cases with much more rigor and harshness than was necessary, the policy of bringing them to trial and punishment gradually was abandoned. . . . The prisoners of state who were put in rigorous confinement under the influence of the demand for harsh treatment included Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens, president and vice-president of the defunct Confederacy, Reagan, Seddon, Campbell, and Mallory, of the late Confederate cabinet, half a dozen of the state governors under the Confederacy, and a number of other prominent men."—W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction*,



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political and economic, pp. 20-23.—“The work of the restoration, the reorganization, the reconstruction of the South had begun before Lincoln’s death, and, while the way was not plain, some experiments of an interesting nature already had been undertaken. [See above: 1865 (April 11).] . . . Johnson’s first act, by way of the development of Lincoln’s policies in reference to the South, was a recognition on May 9 of the Virginia government which had its seat at Alexandria, and the governor attempting to act under it, Francis H. Pierpont. The Secretary of the Treasury was directed to appoint revenue officers, the Postmaster-General to establish post-offices, the judges to hold courts, etc. . . . Three weeks after President Johnson’s recognition of the Pierpont government in Virginia, on May 20, he published his Amnesty Proclamation. In this paper he merely developed the policy which had been laid down by Lincoln in similar papers issued on December 8, 1863, and March 26, 1864. The proclamation

was discussed at length in the Cabinet.”—E. P. Oberholtzer, *History of the United States since the Civil War*, v. I, pp. 28-31.—The proclamation of amnesty and pardon, of May 29, 1865, was addressed “to ‘all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the existing Rebellion,’ upon the condition that such person should take and subscribe an oath—to be registered for permanent preservation—solemnly declaring that henceforth they would ‘faithfully support, protect, and defend, the Constitution of the United States and the union of the States thereunder’; and that they would also ‘abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which have been made during the existing Rebellion, with reference to the emancipation of slaves.’ . . . The general declaration of amnesty was somewhat narrowed in its scope by the enumeration, at the end of the proclamation, of certain classes which were excepted from its benefits.” Of the thirteen classes thus excepted, the first six were nearly identical with those excepted in President Lincoln’s proclamation of Dec. 8, 1863. (See above: 1863 [December].) The classes that he now added were: “Seventh, ‘All persons who have been, or are, absentees from the United States for the purpose of aiding the Rebellion.’ . . . Eighth, ‘All officers in the rebel service who had been educated at the United States Military or Naval Academy.’ . . . Ninth, ‘All men who held the pretended offices of governors of States in insurrection against the United States.’ . . . Tenth, ‘All persons who left their homes within the jurisdiction and protection of the United States, and passed beyond the Federal military lines into the pretended Confederate States for the purpose of aiding the Rebellion.’ . . . Eleventh, ‘All persons who have been engaged in the destruction of the commerce of the United States upon the high seas . . . and upon the lakes and rivers that separate the British Provinces from the United States.’ . . . Twelfth, ‘All persons who, at the time when they seek to obtain amnesty and pardon, are in military, naval, or civil confinement, as prisoners of war, or persons detained for offenses of any kind either before or after conviction.’ . . . Thirteenth, ‘All participants in the Rebellion, the estimated value of whose taxable property is over \$20,000.’ . . . Full pardon was granted, without further act on their part, to all who had taken the oath prescribed in President Lincoln’s proclamation of December 8, 1863, and who had thenceforward kept and maintained the same inviolate. . . . A circular from Mr. Seward accompanied the proclamation, directing that the oath might ‘be taken and subscribed before any commissioned officer, civil, military, or naval, in the service of the United States, or before any civil or military officer of a loyal State or Territory, who, by the laws thereof, may be qualified to administer oaths.’ Every one who took the oath was entitled to a certified copy of it, . . . and a duplicate properly vouched, was forwarded to the State Department. . . . With these details complete, a second step of great moment was taken by the Government on the same day (May 29). A proclamation was issued appointing William W. Holden provisional governor of the State of North Carolina. . . . The proclamation made it the duty of Governor Holden, ‘at the earliest practicable period, to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper for assembling a convention—composed of delegates who are loyal to the United States and no others—for the purpose

of altering or amending the Constitution thereof, and with authority to exercise, within the limit of said State, all the powers necessary and proper to enable the loyal people of the State of North Carolina to restore said State to its constitutional relations to the Federal Government.' . . . It was specially provided in the proclamation that in 'choosing delegates to any State Convention no person shall be qualified as an elector or eligible as a member unless he shall have previously taken the prescribed oath of allegiance, and unless he shall also possess the qualification of a voter as defined under the Constitution and Laws of North Carolina, as they existed on the 20th of May, 1861, immediately prior to the so-called ordinance of secession.' Mr. Lincoln had in mind, as was shown by his letter to Governor Hahn of Louisiana, to try the experiment of negro suffrage, beginning with those who had served in the Union Army, and who could read and write; but President Johnson's plan confined the suffrage to white men, by prescribing the same qualifications as were required in North Carolina before the war. . . . A fortnight later, on the 13th of June, a proclamation was issued for the reconstruction of the civil government of Mississippi, and William L. Sharkey was appointed provisional governor. Four days later, on the 17th of June, a similar proclamation was issued for Georgia with James Johnson for provisional governor, and for Texas with Andrew J. Hamilton for provisional governor. On the 21st of the same month Lewis E. Parsons was appointed provisional governor of Alabama, and on the 30th Benjamin F. Perry was appointed provisional governor of South Carolina. On the 13th of July the list was completed by the appointment of William Marvin as provisional governor of Florida. The precise text of the North Carolina proclamation, 'mutatis mutandis,' was repeated in each one of those relating to these six States. . . . For the reconstruction of the other four States of the Confederacy different provisions were made." In Virginia, the so-called "Pierpont government [see VIRGINIA: 1861 (June-November)] the shell of which had been preserved after West Virginia's separate existence had been recognized by the National Government, with its temporary capital at Alexandria, was accepted by President Johnson's Administration as the legitimate Government of Virginia. . . . A course not dissimilar to that adopted in Virginia was followed in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee. In all of them the so-called 'ten-per-cent' governments established under Mr. Lincoln's authority were now recognized. . . . The whole scheme of reconstruction, as originated by Mr. Seward and adopted by the President, was in operation by the middle of July, three months after the assassination of Mr. Lincoln."—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 3-4.—"The exception [in the proclamation] for persons holding property valued at more than \$20,000, known as the '13th exception,' was new, and where in the South dismay was not complete this feature of the plan led to protest. Memorials began to come into the President. A number of Virginians visited him in July and complained of their situation. They were seeking credits in the North and West, which were not procurable while they rested under this ban of the government. The President called upon his own knowledge of the South. 'It was the wealthy men who dragooned the people into secession,' said he. 'I know how the thing was done. You rich men

used the press and bullied your little men into force the state into secession.' He seemed to speak as a 'poor white' for the 'poor whites.' . . . [The question of suffrage for the negroes was already looming on the political horizon.] The negro suffrage leaders had wrought with Lincoln without feeling certain that they had converted him to their views and, at his death, they almost instantly turned their artillery upon Johnson. Some thought that he would prove easier of conquest and they regarded the change of presidents very hopefully. . . . First among them, perhaps, was Charles Sumner, Senator from Massachusetts. . . . It was Sumner and Chase who most concerned themselves about Johnson's principles in the few days following Lincoln's death. A week after that event, on the evening of April 22, they together visited the new President. 'He said,' Sumner wrote to Francis Lieber, 'that colored persons are to have the right of suffrage. . . . I was charmed with his sympathy which was entirely different from his predecessor's.' . . . Chase was less confident. He went to the President with the 'rough draft' of an address, which he hoped might be issued, on the subject of 'the reorganization of the rebel states.' In the paper he had 'incorporated a distinct recognition of the loyal colored men as citizens entitled to the right of suffrage.' . . . At the end Chase 'almost hoped that the President's reluctance was conquered.' . . . While Johnson was leading Sumner to believe that there was 'no difference' between them, and sent him and Chase away 'light hearted,' what treatment did the question receive in meetings of the Cabinet? On May 9, when the case of North Carolina was being discussed, and negro suffrage was under consideration, Stanton, Dennison and Speed were found to favor, and Welles, McCulloch and Usher to oppose the scheme. . . . That there was a possibility of Sumner's having misunderstood the President, or of the President having suffered a certain change of heart, dawned upon the negrophiles before May was yet done. The proclamation recognizing the Pierpont government in Virginia had aroused Thaddeus Stevens. 'Is there no way,' he inquired of Sumner, 'to arrest the insane course of the President in reorganization?' From a hotel in Philadelphia on July 6 he wrote to Johnson, begging him to 'hoid his hand and await the action of Congress,' meantime governing the South by 'military rulers.' He had found not one Union man in the North, he said, who approved of the President's course. . . . The appointment of the provisional governors was declared to be a great usurpation of authority. 'If something is not done,' said Stevens to Sumner, 'the President will be crowned King before Congress meets.' . . . Horace Greeley and the New York *Tribune*, which he sent into Republican homes in all parts of the country, deeply influencing the thought and opinion of the people, had accepted Johnson as a suitable successor of Lincoln in the Presidential office, and refrained for some months from open criticism of his course. But the editor spoke day by day for the negroes. . . . The old Abolitionists who had served so valiantly in bringing on the war, and whose principles on the subjects of philanthropy and peace prevented them from taking any but the smallest part in its active prosecution, now again came forward with their advice. Indeed the tongue of Wendell Phillips scarcely ever had been silent. The sentiments of him and his like were in general such that they must oppose what Gerrit Smith called 'a rigorous and bloody policy'

toward the Southern white people, but they would have the negro empowered to vote against his erstwhile master. . . . The displeasure of the radicals was increased in the summer by the tactless courses of some of Johnson's Southern governors. B. F. Perry of South Carolina had offended more openly than any. In July, in his home in Greenville, he spoke to an assemblage of his friends and neighbors in terms which at once were commented on with great disfavor in all parts of the North. He reminded the people that the Southern states had spent three thousand millions of dollars in the war; they must now give up four million slaves, which meant a pecuniary sacrifice of two thousand million more. Their lands had been desolated; their cities and towns were smouldering ruins. No man in South Carolina had done more than he to avert this fate for his state, but none could feel 'more bitterly the humiliation and degradation of going back into the Union.' In the death of Lincoln they had suffered no great loss; in Johnson, born in the South, of antecedents inclining him to Democratic and state rights' views they could hope to find a friend."—E. P. Oberholtzer, *History of the United States since the Civil War*, v. 1, pp. 32-33, 38-46.

As the President's policy was developed "by the appointment of the provisional governors, his radical leanings became continually less conspicuous; till by midsummer those politicians who had had the brightest hopes were in despair of any settlement that would realize their chief aims. These aims included the proscription of the Confederate leaders, extensive confiscation of plantations in the South, the enfranchisement of the freedmen and the postponement of political reorganization in the States till the continued ascendancy of the Union party could be insured. As the administration's policy was unfolded, it was obviously incompatible with every item of this programme. What hope of proscription was held out by the numerous exceptions from the privilege of amnesty, was extinguished by the liberal issue of special pardons to individuals who applied. Confiscation was stopped short by the attorney-general's opinion that property which had been seized by the Federal authorities under the confiscation acts must be restored to the pardoned owners. Negro suffrage was doomed by the franchise provisions of Johnson's proclamations; and the haste with which reorganization was pressed to completion in state after state filled the radicals, and not a few others as well, with gloomy forebodings of a reunited Democracy sweeping the Union men out of their control of the national government. . . . Each further step in the process of reorganization brought to the front an increasing proportion of those who had been conspicuous in the military or civil service of the Confederacy. Thus the newly chosen governor of South Carolina had been a Confederate senator; the governor of Mississippi had been a brigadier-general in the Confederate army. . . . Such facts had a very disquieting effect in the North. Yet they were to the South normal and inevitable."—W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, political and economic, 1865-1877*, pp. 41-42, 44, 45.—"One requirement of a durable reconstruction was that the North must be satisfied. . . . Moreover satisfaction would not be complete unless Congress had a hand in the work and unless the radical Republicans had a chance to be heard. No member of the cabinet however seems to have advised the summoning of Congress and in April

Sumner hoped that it would not be done. In truth the administration of Lincoln had accustomed Congress and the people to arbitrary power which was relished by each party or faction if exercised to further its own particular ends. In April Sumner was content to have reconstruction by executive decree as he then felt sure that it would confer the franchise on the negro, but in August his opinion was: 'Refer the whole question of reconstruction to Congress where it belongs. What right has the President to reorganize States?' The second thought was the rational one. . . . The war was over and the peaceful rule of legislation by Congress with the advice and approval of the executive ought to have been resumed. . . . All agreed that some conditions should be imposed on the States which had been 'in rebellion' before they should be entitled to the privileges of those which had sustained the Union cause. As soon as might be consistent with popular deliberation it was desirable to submit those conditions to the South for acceptance for she was in a temper at the close of the war to consider patiently the terms of the victor. 'The people,' wrote Schofield to Halleck from Raleigh, May 7, 'are now in a mood to accept anything in reason and to do what the government desires. . . . I believe the Administration need have no anxiety about the question of slavery or any other important question in this State.' . . . The North Carolina and subsequent proclamations lifted a heavy load from the Southerner. He felt that he was getting off easy. Under the directions men went to work with alacrity to elect delegates to the constitutional conventions; they showed eagerness to get back into the Union. As soon as his policy was developed the radical Republicans took issue with the President. Wade, . . . went to Washington in June and entreated him to convene Congress. But on July 29 the Ohio senator wrote to Sumner from his home: 'I regret to say that with regard to the policy resolved upon by the President, I have no consolation to impart. . . . The salvation of the country devolves upon Congress and against the Executive.' Thaddeus Stevens asked Sumner by letter, 'Is there no way to arrest the insane course of the President in reorganization?' and later wrote, 'I have twice written him, urging him to stay his hand until Congress meets.' Sumner said that the exclusion of the negroes from voting for delegates to the North Carolina Convention was 'madness'; and his speech as president of the Massachusetts Republican convention in September was called by an opponent a 'Declaration of war against the President.' . . . But for the most part the Northern people approved the policy of the President. . . . Party convention after party convention, Democratic as well as Republican, held during the summer and autumn indorsed the policy of the President and pledged him their cordial support. There were but two discordant notes. The Union convention of Pennsylvania dominated by Stevens and the Republican of Massachusetts by Sumner expressed a certain confidence in Johnson, but condemned virtually his policy. But every one in Massachusetts did not agree with Sumner. . . . Governor Andrews sympathized with the defeated Southerners, . . . and, while thinking Johnson precipitate, urged that New England might give him her friendly co-operation. He had also the support of the great war governor of Indiana. . . . Johnson himself comprehended the radical opposition under the leadership of Sumner and Stevens but felt sure that he had the great mass of Northern

people at his back. . . . The dejected and impoverished South was sensible of the blessings of peace. The raising of the blockade giving her again open ports, the restoration of commercial intercourse with the North, the transmission of the United States mails, the reopening, as far as possible, of the United States courts—these renewals of former bonds of Union were infusing fresh hope into this people, who had just seen the fruitless ending of long years of sacrifice. With the benefits, it is true, came the Treasury establishment with collectors of customs and internal revenue but the significance of being taxed to pay for her own subjugation was not at first duly appreciated by the South. The summer and autumn were characterized by political activity; the first step taken under the new order of things was the election of a convention in each State. The general desire to take part in reconstruction is evidenced by the large number of applications for pardon from men in the excepted classes so that they might vote and be eligible for election as delegates. The President granted pardons freely and wisely.”—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, v. 5, pp. 529-531, 533-535.

1865 (July-December).—Reports of Carl Schurz and General Grant on condition of the South.—Other investigators.—Confederate attitude.—“Black Codes” enacted.—In the summer of 1865, President Johnson commissioned Carl Schurz and General Grant to visit the southern states and investigate the condition of affairs in them. These reports had been meant for the President’s own information, but, on December 18, were transmitted by him to the Senate on request. General Grant’s report was thereafter frequently appealed to by the supporters of Johnson and the other, Carl Schurz’s, was an “important document for those who opposed the President’s policy. General Grant’s tour in the South had been brief; he had spent one day in Raleigh, two days in Charleston and one each in Savannah and Augusta. On the trains and during his stops he had conversed freely with Southern citizens and officers of the United States army who with their commands were stationed in different places for the preservation of order until civil government should be entirely restored. Conclusions based only on such a journey of observation might not be important; but considering that the magnanimous victor of Appomattox had since the end of the war been in a position to acquire abundant information from all sides, that he was a man who would be likely to recognize the importance of the facts which came to him and that he possessed one of those minds which often attain to correct judgments without knowledge of the how and the why, it is natural that his opinion should then have carried weight and should now be of historic value in helping us to form a due estimate of Southern sentiment and of a judicious policy of reconstruction. ‘I am satisfied,’ he wrote, ‘that the mass of thinking men of the South accept the present situation of affairs in good faith. . . . Slavery and the right of a State to secede, they regard as having been settled forever by the highest tribunal, arms, that man can resort to.’ Leading men not only accept the decision as final but believe it ‘a fortunate one for the whole country.’ . . . [Schurz] spent three months in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. He was a careful observer and his report is a model of method and expression. Though it is a radical document some of his words may from the point of view of our day

be well cited as an endorsement of the President’s policy. ‘The generosity and toleration shown by the Government,’ he wrote, . . . ‘has facilitated the re-establishment of the forms of civil government and led many of those who had been active in the rebellion to take part in the act of bringing back the States to their constitutional relations. . . . There is at present no danger of another insurrection against the authority of the United States on a large scale.’ But when Schurz discussed ‘the moral value of these results’ he furnished food for the Republicans who believed that more rigorous conditions than those imposed by the President should be exacted from the late Confederate States. ‘Treason does, under existing circumstances, not appear odious in the South,’ he wrote. ‘The people are not impressed with any sense of its criminality. And there is yet among the southern people an utter absence of national feeling.’ Their submission and loyalty ‘springs from necessity and calculation.’ ‘Although they regret the abolition of slavery they certainly do not intend to re-establish it in its old form. . . . But while accepting the “abolition of slavery” they think that some species of serfdom, peonage, or other form of compulsory labor is not slavery and may be introduced without a violation of their pledge. Although formally admitting negro testimony they think that negro testimony will be taken practically for what they themselves consider it “worth.”’ For their protection Schurz thought ‘the extension of the franchise to the colored people’ necessary; and as the masses at the South were ‘strongly opposed to colored suffrage,’ the only manner in which they could be induced to grant it was to make it ‘a condition precedent to readmission.’—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, v. 5, pp. 551-553.—“I may sum up [Schurz wrote, in summarizing his report], all I have said in a few words. If nothing were necessary but to restore the machinery of government in the States lately in rebellion in point of form, the movements made to that end by the people of the south might be considered satisfactory. But if it is required that the southern people should also accommodate themselves to the results of the war in point of spirit, those movements fall far short of what must be insisted upon. The loyalty of the masses and most of the leaders of the southern people consists in submission to necessity. There is, except in individual instances, an entire absence of that national spirit which forms the basis of true loyalty and patriotism. The emancipation of the slaves is submitted to only in so far as chattel slavery in the old form could not be kept up. But although the freedman is no longer considered the property of the individual master, he is considered the slave of society, and all independent State legislation will share the tendency to make him such. [Between October, 1865, and April, 1866, there were apprenticeship, vagrancy and contract labor laws enacted in several of the states which had that tendency, and were known as ‘Black Codes.’ (See BLACK CODES.)] Practical attempts on the part of the southern people to deprive the negro of his rights as a freeman may result in bloody collisions, and will certainly plunge southern society into restless fluctuations and anarchical confusion. Such evils can be prevented only by continuing the control of the national government in the States lately in rebellion until free labor is fully developed and firmly established, and the advantages and blessings of the new order of things have disclosed themselves. This desirable result will be hastened by a firm declaration on

the part of the government that national control in the south will not cease until such results are secured. Only in this way can that security be established in the south which will render numerous immigration possible, and such immigration would materially aid a favorable development of things. The solution of the problem would be very much facilitated by enabling all the loyal and free-labor elements in the south to exercise a healthy influence upon legislation. It will hardly be possible to secure the freedman against oppressive class legislation and private persecution, unless he be endowed with a certain measure of political power. As to the future peace and harmony of the Union, it is of the highest importance that the people lately in rebellion be not permitted to build up another 'peculiar institution' whose spirit is in conflict with the fundamental principles of our political system; for as long as they cherish interests peculiar to them in preference to those they have in common with the rest of the American people, their loyalty to the Union will always be uncertain. I desire not to be understood as saying that there are no well-meaning men among those who were compromised in the rebellion. There are many, but neither their number nor their influence is strong enough to control the manifest tendency of the popular spirit. There are great reasons for hope that a determined policy on the part of the national government will produce innumerable and valuable conversions. This consideration counsels lenity as to persons, such as is demanded by the humane and enlightened spirit of our times, and vigor and firmness in the carrying out of principles such as is demanded by the national sense of justice and the exigencies of our situation." With the report of Carl Schurz, the president transmitted to the Senate, at the same time, a letter written by General Grant after making a hurried tour of inspection in some of the Southern states, during the last week of November and early in December. General Grant wrote: "Four years of war, during which law was executed only at the point of the bayonet throughout the States in rebellion, have left the people possibly in a condition not to yield that ready obedience to civil authority the American people have generally been in the habit of yielding. This would render the presence of small garrisons throughout those States necessary until such time as labor returns to its proper channel, and civil authority is fully established. I did not meet any one, either those holding places under the government or citizens of the southern States, who think it practicable to withdraw the military from the south at present. The white and the black mutually require the protection of the general government. There is such universal acquiescence in the authority of the general government throughout the portions of country visited by me, that the mere presence of a military force, without regard to numbers, is sufficient to maintain order. The good of the country, and economy, require that the force kept in the interior, where there are many freedmen, (elsewhere in the southern States than at forts upon the seacoast no force is necessary,) should all be white troops. The reasons for this are obvious without mentioning many of them. The presence of black troops, lately slaves, demoralizes labor, both by their advice and by furnishing in their camps a resort for the freedmen for long distances around. White troops generally excite no opposition, and therefore a small number of them can maintain order in a given district. Colored troops must be kept in bodies

sufficient to defend themselves. It is not the thinking men who would use violence towards any class of troops sent among them by the general government, but the ignorant in some places might; and the late slave seems to be imbued with the idea that the property of his late master should, by right, belong to him, or at least should have no protection from the colored soldier. There is danger of collisions being brought on by such causes. My observations lead me to the conclusion that the citizens of the southern States are anxious to return to self-government, within the Union, as soon as possible; that whilst reconstructing they want and require protection from the government; that they are in earnest in wishing to do what they think is required by the government, not humiliating to them as citizens, and that if such a course were pointed out they would pursue it in good faith. It is to be regretted that there cannot be a greater commingling, at this time, between the citizens of the two sections, and particularly of those intrusted with the law-making power. . . . In some instances, I am sorry to say, the freedman's mind does not seem to be disabused of the idea that a freedman has the right to live without care or provision for the future. The effect of the belief in division of lands is idleness and accumulation in camps, towns, and cities. In such cases I think it will be found that vice and disease will tend to the extermination or great reduction of the colored race. It cannot be expected that the opinions held by men at the south for years can be changed in a day, and therefore the freedmen require, for a few years, not only laws to protect them, but the fostering care of those who will give them good counsel, and on whom they rely."—*30th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document no. 2, pp. 45-46, 106-107.*—See also LOUISIANA: 1865-1867.—Other investigators who studied conditions in the South were "Harvey M. Watterson, Kentucky Democrat and Unionist; . . . Benjamin C. Truman, New England journalist and soldier, whose long report was perhaps the best of all; [and Chief Justice Chase. . . . In addition, a constant stream of information and misinformation was going northward from treasury agents, officers of the army, the Freedmen's Bureau, teachers, and missionaries. . . . Truman came to the conclusion that 'the rank and file of the disbanded Southern army . . . are the backbone and sinew of the South. . . . To the disbanded regiments of the rebel army, both officers and men, I look with great confidence as the best and altogether the most hopeful element of the South, the real basis of reconstruction and the material of worthy citizenship.' General John Tarbel, before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, testified that 'there are, no doubt, disloyal and disorderly persons in the South, but it is an entire mistake to apply these terms to a whole people. I would as soon travel alone, unarmed, through the South as through the North. The South I left is not at all the South I hear and read about in the North. From the sentiment I hear in the North, I would scarcely recognize the people I saw, and, except their politics, I like so well. I have entire faith that the better classes are friendly to the negroes.' . . . The point of view of the Confederate military leaders was exhibited by General Wade Hampton in a letter to President Johnson and by General Lee in his advice to General Letcher of Virginia. General Hampton wrote: 'The South unequivocally "accepts the situation" in which she is placed. Everything that she has done has been done in perfect

faith, and in the true and highest sense of the word, she is loyal. By this I mean that she intends to abide by the laws of the land honestly, to fulfill all her obligations faithfully and to keep her word sacredly, and I assert that the North has no right to demand more of her. You have no right to ask, or expect that she will at once profess unbounded love to that Union from which for four years she tried to escape at the cost of her best blood and all her treasures.' General Lee in order to set an example applied through General Grant for a pardon under the amnesty proclamation and soon afterwards he wrote to Governor Letcher: 'All should unite in honest efforts to obliterate the effects of war, and to restore the blessings of peace. They should remain, if possible, in the country; promote harmony and good-feeling; qualify themselves to vote; and elect to the State and general legislatures wise and patriotic men, who will devote their abilities to the interests of the country and the healing of all dissensions.' . . . Southerners of the Confederacy everywhere, then, accepted the destruction of slavery and the renunciation of state sovereignty; they welcomed an early restoration of the Union, without any punishment of leaders of the defeated cause. But they were proud of their Confederate records; . . . they considered the negro as free but inferior, and expected to be permitted to fix his status in the social organization and to solve the problems of free labor in their own way. To embarrass the easy and permanent realization of these views there was a society disrupted, economically prostrate, deprived of its natural leaders, subjected to a control not always wisely conceived nor effectively exercised, and, finally, containing within its own population unassimilated elements which presented problems fraught with difficulty and danger."—W. L. Fleming, *Sequel of Appomattox (Chronicles of America Series, v. 32, pp. 1-33)*.—"The first state legislature to meet under Johnson's plan was that of Mississippi. It assembled in November, 1865, and quickly made a new black code. In this state, feeling was rather extreme, and the legislators, ignorant of the effect in the North, made such regulations as comported with their ideas of the status of freedmen. . . . Other Southern legislatures followed the example of Mississippi, though none of them went quite so far in repression. They were either not so severe in their ideas, or were disposed to be cautious because of the criticism the Mississippi laws aroused in the North. But the new code, taken all together, created the impression outside the South that the states, once the problem was entirely in their hands, would impose a condition of part freedom on the former slaves. The radicals, in congress and out, made such capital of it, and insisted that it showed that presidential reconstruction did not safeguard the fruits of military victory."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States, pp. 602, 603*.—See also MISSISSIPPI: 1865-1869; 1866.

"To fix the position of four million emancipated blacks in the social order was one of the most important problems that confronted the Southern state governments in 1865, not only because of the inherent difficulties of the problem but because of the suspicious attitude of the victorious North, especially the radical politicians and the former abolitionists, toward the South in all things that concerned the negro. Some kind of legislation for the freedmen was necessary in 1865-1866. The slave codes were obsolete; the few laws for the free negroes were not applicable to the present

conditions; most laws and codes then in force were made expressly for whites. The task of the law makers was to express in the law the transition of the negroes from slavery to citizenship; to regulate family life, morals and conduct; to give the ex-slave the right to hold property, the right to personal protection, and the right to testify in courts; to provide for the aged and helpless and the orphans; to force the blacks to settle down, have homes, engage in some kind of work, and fulfill contracts; to provide for negro education which formerly had been forbidden; to prevent the exploitation of the ignorant blacks by unscrupulous persons, and to protect the whites in person and property from lawless blacks. In general the laws relating to whites were extended to the blacks, sometimes with slight modifications. But one principle was never lost sight of, viz., that the races were unlike . . . and should be kept separate. It was believed that in some matters laws should not be uniform for the two races. The laws making distinction of race are the ones usually called the 'Black Laws' or the 'Black Code.' [See BLACK CODES.] The sources of these laws are found in the ante-bellum laws for free negroes, in the Northern and Southern vagrancy laws, in the freedmen's codes of the West Indies, in the Roman law on freedom, in pure theory to some extent, and to a great degree in the regulations for blacks made by the United States army and Treasury officials in 1862-1865, and in the Freedmen's Bureau rules. Theoretically the control of the blacks by the army, the Treasury Department, and the [Freedmen's] Bureau was almost absolute and if carried out would have transferred the control of the slave from the master to the United States government. The laws passed by the states were much the same but from a different point of view. From the southern point of view these laws in no way limited any rights of the blacks. They were simply an extension of rights not before possessed. The slave codes were superseded by white men's laws. Some of the laws bore more heavily on whites, others on blacks. This was true especially of the laws relating to standing in court—where the black had the advantage of the white. Most of the laws usually called 'Black Laws' made no distinction of races. As a rule the states that acted first in 1865 made the wider distinction between the races. The laws of 1866 bestow more privileges than those of 1865. This legislation was severely criticised by the Northern politicians and served as a convenient issue in the campaign of 1866. The criticisms were generally to the effect that the laws were meant to re-enslave the blacks. It is noteworthy that President Johnson did not at all appreciate the importance of this problem of negro legislation. He seemed to think that the destruction of slavery left nothing else to be done. The legislatures that passed these laws were composed mainly of men of little experience, non-slaveholders, who had been Unionists or luke-warm Confederates. This fact will account for much of the crudeness of the early legislation. The laws would have been more liberal, but the general principles would have been the same had the legislatures been composed of the experienced popular leaders who were then disfranchised. The laws were never in force in any of the states; the Freedmen's Bureau suspended them until 1868, when the reconstructed governments repealed them. Since the downfall of the Reconstruction regime, the essential parts of this legislation have been re-enacted in the Southern states, especially the laws relating to definition of race, to the sepa-

ration of the races in schools and in public conveyances, and to the prohibition of inter-marriage of the races. The labor, contract, and vagrancy laws are about the same, though now applying to both races."—W. L. Fleming, *Documentary history of Reconstruction*, v. 1, pp. 243-245.—From the Northern point of view "the character of the laws and ordinances passed under these circumstances . . . [was] the most concrete and convincing argument against restoring the Southern States by the short and easy road proposed by President Johnson. . . . So those laws deserve careful consideration, as well as the situation which led to them. The Southern people, blacks and whites, were in a position of almost unexampled difficulty. To the ravages of war and invasion, of impoverishment and bereavement—and, as it fell out, to two successive seasons of disastrous weather for crops,—was added at the outset a complete disarrangement of the principal supply of labor. The mental overturning was as great as the material. To the negroes 'freedom' brought a vague promise of life without toil or trouble. The hard facts soon undeceived them. But for the indulgent Providence they at first hoped for, some occasional and partial substitute appeared in the offices of the Freedmen's Bureau. [See below: 1865-1866.] . . . The Bureau accomplished considerable good; but its administration on the whole was not of the highest class. . . . At most, it touched only the circumference of the problem. Three and a half millions of newly enfranchised ignorant men, women and children! What should provide for the helpless among them, especially for the children, whom the master's care had supported? How should order be maintained in the lower mass, half-brutalized, whom slavery had at least restrained from vagabondage, rapine, and crime? And how should the whole body be induced to furnish the dynamic, driving power of industry essential to the community's needs? These questions the South essayed to answer in part by a system of laws, of which we may take as a fair specimen the legislation of Mississippi—the only State which had enacted this class of laws before Congress met,—as they are summarized. . . [by] Professor J. W. Burgess, *Reconstruction and the Constitution*. The law of apprenticeship ran thus: Negro children under eighteen, orphans or receiving no support from their parents, to be apprenticed, by clerk of probate court, to some suitable person,—by preference the former master or mistress; the court to fix the terms, having the interest of the minor particularly in view; males to be apprenticed till end of twenty-first year, females to end of eighteenth. No other punishment to be permitted than the common law permits to a parent or guardian. If the apprenticeship runs away, he is to be apprehended and returned, or, if he refuses to return, to be confined or put under bonds till the next term of the court, which shall then decide as to the cause of his desertion, and if it appears groundless compel his return, or if he has been ill-treated fine the master not more than \$100 for the benefit of his apprentice. This statute seems not oppressive but beneficent. The law of vagrancy provided that all freedmen having no lawful employment or business, or who are found unlawfully assembling, and all white persons so assembling in company with freedmen, or 'usually associating with freedmen, free negroes, or mulattoes, on terms of equality,' are to be deemed vagrants, and fined, a white man not more than \$200, a negro not more than \$50, and imprisoned, a white man not more than six months, a negro not more than ten days. If the negro does not

pay his fine within five days, he is to be hired out by the sheriff to the person who will pay his fine and costs for the shortest term of service. The same treatment is to be applied to any negro who fails to pay his tax. This statute meant legal servitude for any negro not finding employment, and the same penalty for a white man who merely consorted with negroes on equal terms. The law of civil rights provided that all negroes are to have the same rights with whites as to personal property, as to suing and being sued, but they must not rent or lease lands or tenements except in incorporated towns and cities, and under the control of the corporate authorities. Provision is made for the intermarriage of negroes, and the legalization of previous connections; but intermarriage between whites and negroes is to be punished with imprisonment for life. Negroes may be witnesses in all civil cases in which negroes are parties, and in criminal cases where the alleged crime is by a white person against a negro. Every negro shall have a lawful home and employment, and hold either a public license to do job-work or a written contract for labor. If a laborer quits his employment before the time specified in the contract, he is to forfeit his wages for the year up to the time of quitting. Any one enticing a laborer to desert his work, or selling or giving food or raiment or any other thing knowingly to a deserter from contract labor, may be punished by fine or imprisonment. No negro is to carry arms without a public license. Any negro guilty of riot, affray, trespass, seditious speeches, insulting gestures, language or acts, or committing any other misdemeanor, to be fined and imprisoned, or if the fine is not paid in five days to be hired out to whoever will pay fine and costs. All penal and criminal laws against offenses by slaves or free negroes to continue in force except as specially repealed. . . . The establishment of pillory and whipping-post; the imposition of unjust taxes, with heavy license fees for the practice of mechanic arts; requirements of certified employment under some white man; prohibition of preaching or religious meetings without a special license; sale into indefinite servitude for slight occasion; and so on [form] a long, grim chapter. Whatever excuses may be pleaded for these laws, under the circumstances of the South, all have this implication,—that the negro was unfit for freedom. He was to be kept as near to slavery as possible; to be made, 'if no longer the slave of an individual master, the slave of society.'—And further, as to the broad conditions of the time, two things are to be noted. The physical violence was almost wholly practiced by the whites against the negroes. Bands of armed white men, says Mr. Schurz, patrolled the highways (as in the days of slavery) to drive back wanderers; murder and mutilation of colored men and women were common,—'a number of such cases I had occasion to examine myself.' In some districts there was a reign of terror among the freedmen. And finally, the anticipation of failure of voluntary labor speedily proved groundless. A law was at work more efficient than any on the statute-books,—Nature's primal law, 'Work or Starve!' Many, probably a majority of the freedmen, worked on for their old masters, for wages. The others, after some brief experience of idleness and starvation, found work as best they could. No tropical paradise of laziness was open to the Southern negro. The first Christmas holidays, looked forward to with vague hope by the freedmen and vague fear by the whites, passed without any visitation of angels or

insurrection of fiends. In a word, the most apparent justifications for the reactionary legislation,—danger of rapine and outrage from emancipated barbarians, and a failure of the essential supply of labor—proved alike groundless.”—G. S. Merriam, *Negro and the nation*, pp. 288-293.—See also RACE PROBLEMS: 1705-1805.

ALSO IN: E. P. Oberholtzer, *History of the United States since the Civil War*, v. 1, pp. 128-130.—M. L. Avery, *Dixie after the war*.—J. W. Garner, *Reconstruction in Mississippi*, pp. 113 ff.—C. Schurz, *Reminiscences*, v. 3.

1865-1866.—Creation of the Freedmen's Bureau.—On the last day of the 38th Congress, March 3, 1865, an act was passed to establish a bureau for the relief of freedmen and refugees. It was among the last acts approved by Abraham Lincoln, and was designed as a protection to the freedmen of the South and to the class of white men known as “refugees,”—driven from their homes on account of their loyalty to the Union. The act provided that the bureau should have “supervision and management of all abandoned lands, and the control of all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from rebel States, or from any district of country within the territory embraced in the operations of the army, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the head of the bureau and approved by the President. The said bureau shall be under the management and control of a commissioner, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. . . . The Secretary of War may direct such issues of provisions, clothing, and fuel as he may deem needful for the immediate and temporary shelter and supply of destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen, and their wives and children, under such rules and regulations as he may direct. . . . The President may, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint an assistant commissioner for each of the States declared to be in insurrection, not exceeding ten. . . . Any military officer may be detailed and assigned to duty under this act. . . . The commissioner, under the direction of the President, shall have authority to set apart for the use of loyal refugees and freedmen such tracts of land, within the insurrectionary States, as shall have been abandoned, or to which the United States shall have acquired title by confiscation, or sale, or otherwise. And to every male citizen, whether refugee or freedman, as aforesaid, there shall be assigned not more than 40 acres of such land, and the person to whom it is so assigned shall be protected in the use and enjoyment of the land for the term of three years, at an annual rent not exceeding 6 per centum upon the value of said land as it was appraised by the State authorities in the year 1860. . . . At the end of said term, or at any time during said term, the occupants of any parcels so assigned may purchase the land and receive such title thereto as the United States can convey. . . . On the 20th of May, 1865, Major-Gen. O. O. Howard was appointed Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau. He gave great attention to the subject of education; and after planting schools for the freedmen throughout a great portion of the South, in 1870—five years after the work was begun—he made a report. It was full of interest. In five years there were 4,239 schools established, 9,307 teachers employed, and 247,333 pupils instructed. In 1868 the average attendance was 89,306; but in 1870 it was 91,308, or 79¾ per cent. of the total number enrolled. The emancipated people sustained 1,324 schools themselves, and owned 592 school buildings. The Freedmen's

Bureau furnished 654 buildings for school purposes.”—G. W. Williams, *History of the negro race in America*, v. 2, pt. 8, ch. 21-22.—In addition to a commissioner and assistant commissioner for each state the bureau had “a large number of local agents, most of them Northern men. It had large powers in the settlement of disputes between blacks and whites, and the latter, accustomed to manage their own affairs, considered it an intrusive organization, and a symbol of their humiliation. Most of the bureau officials were practical men, although some were enthusiastic friends of the negro race and had too much confidence in the effect of freedom on it. But they were at the best in a trying situation, and became much disliked in the South. The blacks themselves had little concept of the duties and obligations of their new condition. By most evidence they worked well during the spring and summer of 1865. By autumn they seemed to be more restless. The freedmen's bureau bill provided that the abandoned and confiscated lands of Southerners should be distributed among them at not more than forty acres to each adult male. As it was doubtful if the confiscation act of 1862 would pass the courts, very little land had been acquired by the government, although much was occupied in some districts. The distribution was thus delayed, but the negroes knew it was contemplated, came to look upon it as an act of justice, and in some unexplained way believed that the donation would be made at the end of 1865, as a great Christmas gift from the national government. At this time the South was full of enthusiastic men and women who as missionaries and teachers sought to uplift the dull minds and souls which slavery had enthralled. The situation was complex, but it was an epoch of violent readjustment, and it was not to be expected that it should have passed smoothly. The negro himself leaned hard on the friends from the North, caught at the prospect of ‘forty acres and a mule,’ and, as Christmas approached refused to contract for farm labor during the coming year. The white employers were resentful. They believed that the Northern men in the South were disorganizing conditions there, and the events which followed—the hot debates in Congress and the violent language of the radicals—were not likely to remove the Southerner's suspicions. Thus it happened that the blacks and whites, who even in the darkest days of war lived harmoniously side by side, came to be antagonistic and united in opposition to one another.”—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 603-604.—“The bureau assumed, in short, a general guardianship of the emancipated race, and, backed by the paramount military force of the United States, undertook to play a determining rôle in the process of reorganizing southern society. The orders and instructions issued by General Howard, the head of the bureau, for carrying out . . . [its] comprehensive programme, were characterized almost uniformly by moderation and good judgment. Much the same may be said of the directions that emanated from the assistant commissioners for their respective states, though here in some cases a tendency appeared to lecture the southern whites on the sinfulness of slavery and on their general depravity, and to address to the freedmen pious homilies and moral platitudes obviously above their intelligence. . . . The local agents, whose function it was to apply the general policy of the bureau to concrete cases, displayed, of course, the greatest diversity of spirit and ability. It was from these lower officials that the southern

whites formed their general estimate of the character and value of the institution, while the people of the North were guided more by the just and practical policy outlined in the orders from headquarters. However much tact and practical good sense the local agent was able to bring to the performance of his delicate duties, he in most cases, being a northern man, was wholly unable to take a view of the situation that could make him agreeable to the whites of the neighborhood. He saw in both freedom and former master qualities which the latter could never admit. Hence the working of the bureau, with its intrusion into the fundamental relationships of social life, engendered violent hostility from the outset on the part of the whites. The feeling was enhanced by the conduct of the ignorant, unscrupulous, and deliberately oppressive agents who were not rare. As soon, therefore, as it became established, the bureau took the form, to the southern mind, of a diabolical device for the perpetuation of the national government's control over the South, and for the humiliation of the whites before their former slaves. The bureau, however, was by the terms of the law but a transitional institution, limited in its existence to one year after the end of the war. Its functions were not well correlated by the law with those of the regular military authority, and at first the two species of armed rule caused some confusion in the process of social rehabilitation. Before this situation was cleared up a third species of authority was installed in every state by the president's policy of restoring civil government."—W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, political and economic*, pp. 32-34.—See also above: 1865 (July-December).—"During the month of January, 1866, the Republicans in Congress became convinced that the newly organized 'States,' with the exception of Tennessee, were consciously developing freedmen's codes which would not differ greatly from their old slave codes. . . . [This conviction was strengthened by Carl Schurz's report, in which Congress was inclined to place more credence than in the report made by General Grant.] While its Committee on Reconstruction was deliberating, it, therefore, most naturally set itself about doing what it could, under the Thirteenth Amendment, and also under its still existing war powers, in behalf of the civil rights of the freedmen. The first measure it attempted was one to enlarge the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau. This supplementary project originated with the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, and was presented in the Senate on the 12th of January, 1866. The new bill proposed to increase the personnel of the bureau and expand the powers vested in it as provided in the law of March 3d, 1865."—J. W. Burgess, *Reconstruction and the constitution*, pp. 63-64.—"By this bill the bureau which had been organized during the preceding session was enlarged as to both the duration and the territorial extent of its powers. The limit of one year after the end of the war was abolished, and the bureau's operations were to extend to 'refuges and freedom in all parts of the United States.' The powers of the officials were of the vaguest character imaginable, involving practically absolute discretion in the regulation of matters in which the freedmen were interested. Provisions, clothing and fuel were to be furnished to destitute blacks, land was to be set apart for their use, and schools and asylums to be erected for their benefit. But the central point of the bill was in the seventh and eighth sections. Here it was made the duty of the President to extend the military protection of the bureau to


all cases in which the civil rights and immunities of white persons were denied to others on account of race, color or any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude. Further, any person who should, under color of any state law, ordinance or custom, subject the negro to the deprivation of equal civil rights with the white man, should be guilty of a misdemeanor, and the jurisdiction of such cases was conferred upon the officials of the bureau. Such jurisdiction was limited, however, to states in which the ordinary course of judicial proceedings had been interrupted by rebellion, and was to cease there when those states should be fully restored to all their constitutional relations to the United States. The grave questions of constitutionality involved in the details of this bill were modified in their bearing by the general basis on which the whole legislation rested. It was, according to Senator Trumbull, who had charge of it in the Senate, a war measure, and inapplicable, by its terms, to any other state of affairs. . . . But the President, in vetoing the bill, protested against 'declaring to the American people and to the world, that the United States are still in a condition of civil war.' He asserted that the rebellion was, in fact, at an end. Mr. Johnson was in rather a difficult position here; for the *habeas corpus* was still suspended in the Southern states, and even while he was writing his veto message a military order had gone forth looking to the suppression of disloyal papers there. . . . The President's real grievance was evidently that which he referred to last in his veto message. He complained that the bill regarded certain states as 'not fully restored in all their constitutional relations to the United States,' and announced that in his judgment most of the states were fully restored, and were entitled to all their constitutional rights as members of the Union. Congress was censured with repressed severity for refusing to accord to those states the right imperatively required by the constitution, of representation in the two houses. The President's veto, made effective by the failure to override it in the Senate, strengthened the extremists in Congress; for many who desired the success of the conservative plan were indignant that it should be thwarted at the outset. A concurrent resolution was passed declaring that no member from any of the insurrectionary states should be admitted to either house till Congress should declare such state entitled to representation. This was the formal declaration of war upon the executive policy. It notified the President that Congress intended to form its own judgment upon the status of the states, irrespective of any extraneous decision. . . . A great silence and mystery hung about the committee whose report was to embody the views of Congress on the condition of the states. No one doubted that the enveloping clouds would continue until a satisfactory solution of the negro question should be discovered."—W. A. Dunning, *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction*, pp. 88-91.

ALSO IN: O. Skinner, *Issues of American policies*, pt. 2, ch. 2.

1865-1866 (December-April).—Reconstruction question in Congress.—Joint Committee of Fifteen.—Fourteenth Amendment.—"On the second day of the session (December 5 [1865]) the President's message was heard. Written by George Bancroft, Andrew Johnson ought ever afterwards to have made use of that historian's pen and only addressed his countrymen in such carefully prepared letters and messages. . . . It met in a conciliatory way the hostile or critical attitude of a

part of Congress; and to Republican members disposed to work with the President it was a cheering indication that they were separated by no chasm. . . . Recounting the steps which he had taken he asked, 'Is it not a sure promise of harmony and renewed attachment to the Union that, after all that has happened, the return of the General Government is known only as a beneficence?' In a still further discussion his words are those of a statesman: 'Every patriot must wish for a general amnesty at the earliest epoch consistent with public safety. For this great end there is need of a concurrence of all opinions and the spirit of mutual conciliation. All parties in the late terrible conflict must work together in harmony. It is not too much to ask in the name of the whole people that, on the one side, the plan of restoration shall proceed in conformity with a willingness to cast the disorders of the past into oblivion; and that on the other the evidence of sincerity in the future maintenance of the Union shall be put beyond any doubt by the ratification of the proposed amendment to the Constitution which provides for the abolition of slavery forever within the limits of our country.' The adoption of this amendment (the Thirteenth) ought in his opinion to entitle the Southern States to representation in the national legislature but this was for the Senate and House each for itself to judge. He advocated leaving the question of suffrage for the negroes to the States and thought that if the freedmen showed 'patience and manly virtues' they might after a while obtain a participation in the elective franchise. . . . Johnson had almost atoned for his mistake in not convening Congress in the early autumn. While the difficulty of the two working together was somewhat greater than it would have been three months earlier, a harmonious co-operation was entirely feasible. The President's message was in the spirit of Lincoln's second inaugural and of the words of Burke, 'Nobody shall persuade me when a whole people are concerned that acts of lenity are not means of conciliation'; and if his plan had been sanctioned by the Republican majority in Congress it would undoubtedly have worked out pretty well the problem of reconstruction. . . . The President's policy was before Congress. Sumner and Stevens, who were never deficient in frankness lost no opportunity of presenting theirs. That Congress should insist that the late Confederate States accord civil rights and the suffrage to the negroes was the main feature of Sumner's. Stevens proposed: the reduction of those States to territories, no account therefore to be taken of their ratifications of the Thirteenth Amendment, three-fourths of the loyal States being sufficient; a constitutional amendment changing the basis of representation in the House from population to actual voters; measures to confer on negroes homesteads, to 'hedge them around with protective laws,' and to give them the suffrage. . . . Thus the question was fairly before Congress and the country. The main body of Republican senators and representatives may be looked upon as the jury with Johnson the advocate on one side and Stevens and Sumner on the other. Burke had said, 'I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people,' but Stevens in his plan of reducing the States to conquered provinces and of confiscation of the land of their inhabitants had discovered it. In his vindictive policy however he had no following of importance and he himself in his speech disclaimed speaking for the Republican party. No attempt

was made to inaugurate his project of confiscation and the quiet assent of Congress to the proclamation of the Secretary of State implying that three-quarters of the whole number of States were required for the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment disposed of his plan for reducing the late Confederate States to territories. . . . The majority of his party in Congress was against him and the sentiment of the North was well expressed in the autumn elections when Connecticut, Wisconsin and Minnesota declared specifically against extending the franchise to coloured persons. From all the evidence it is impossible to resist the conclusion that from the assembling of Congress in December, 1865 to the veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill on February 19, 1866 the majority of Republican senators and representatives were nearer to the President's view than to that of Sumner or of Stevens. But the people of the late Confederacy were rendering the President's task of securing the



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acceptance of his policy by the North doubly difficult. Carl Schurz said in his report that the 'generosity and toleration shown by the government' had not been met on the part of the South 'with a corresponding generosity to the government's friends.' The evidence confirming this is various and abundant. Secretary Welles wrote that, 'The extreme men of the South were in some localities as rash, unreasonable and impracticable as the Radicals of the North and for a time gave the administration scarcely less embarrassment. . . . The first feeling of submission to the will of the conqueror had been succeeded by demands for the rights of their States under the Constitution; between the sentiment prevailing in the State legislatures and that which had governed the earlier conventions there was a marked difference. . . . [The 'Black Codes'] were not passed in a spirit of defiance to the North, but many good people believed they were; and this and other misconstructions of them had a powerful effect on Northern sentiment. The difficulties of the problem were not generally comprehended at the North. . . . The five and a half million whites

who were legislating for three and a half million blacks were under the influence of 'the black terror' which was not known and therefore not appreciated at the North. Many of the laws were neither right nor far-sighted but they were natural. The enactments the least liberal as to civil rights and the most rigorous as to punishment of misdemeanors and crimes were those of South Carolina, Mississippi and Louisiana in which States the proportion of negroes to white men was the largest. These States too passed their acts before Christmas. When the 'dreaded holidays' had gone by, and the planters' fear of a general insurrection had subsided, when the hopes of the negroes for a parcelling out of the land had come to naught and they had shown a disposition to buckle to work conditions began to improve. And these new developments had undoubtedly some influence in the improvement of the laws concerning the freedmen, which however, was mainly due to the circumstance that the States enacting their legislation after January 1, 1866, were the most advanced in accepting the situation and were those where the whites largely outnumbered the blacks. . . . What further affected Northern sentiment was the reports of cruelties practised upon the negroes which were due largely if not wholly to the antipathy of the poor whites. In his speech of December 20, 1865, Sumner made a point of this, speaking of 'sickening and heartrending outrages where Human Rights are sacrificed and rebel Barbarism received a new letter of license.' That affairs of the sort occurred as one of the results of the social revolution was undoubted but on the other hand exaggerated accounts of them were readily believed by those who desired to use them as an argument for a severe policy towards the South. . . . It was not difficult to convince many Republicans that the acceptance of a plan of reconstruction by the South was positive proof that it was too liberal. Herein lay a manifest mistake of the President's: he had made an offer and secured its acceptance before the predominant partner had agreed to it. . . . The horrors of Andersonville and other prison pens were exaggerated and used as an argument against mercy and the animosity to Jefferson Davis was exploited to turn men from a policy which seemed to imply that he should not be brought to judgment. To recapitulate: the assertion by Congress of its prerogative, a disposition on the part of the Southern States to claim rights instead of submitting to conditions, harsh laws of the Southern legislatures concerning the freedmen, denial by them of complete civil rights and qualified suffrage to the negroes, outrages upon the coloured people, Southern hatred of Northerners, Southern and Democratic support of the President—all these influences contributed in varying proportions to the decision of Congress not to adopt Johnson's policy but to construct one of their own."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, v. 5, pp. 546-548, 550-551, 553-554, 556, 558-559, 563, 565.—"In the opposition on principle to the President's policy three chief elements were distinguishable: first, the extreme negrophiles, who on abstract grounds of human equality and natural rights, demanded full civil and political privileges for the freedmen; second, the partisan politicians who viewed the elevation of the blacks mainly as a means of humbling the Democrats and maintaining the existing supremacy of the Republican Party; and third, the representatives of an exalted statesmanship, who saw in the existing situation an opportunity for decisively fixing in our system a broader and more national

principle of civil rights and political privilege. It was this last element that controlled the proceedings during the earlier months of the thirty-ninth Congress. Later the more radical elements assumed the lead. The President, as we have seen, had prepared to push his theory before Congress at its very opening. Credentials were promptly presented by members elect from the restored states. But Congress declined to be hurried into committing itself to any doctrine on the great subject. Instead of the customary reference of the credentials of the claimants to the committees on elections in the respective houses, a joint committee of fifteen was constituted to inquire into the condition of the rebellious states and their title to representation; and it was agreed that all papers relating to those states should be referred to this committee. Thus was provided a convenient limbo to which might be relegated any question that should threaten to interfere with the placid progress of Congressional deliberation. The next step was to unfold a scheme by which the ends of the conservative Republicans might be attained by simple legislation. . . . Despite the strong opposition to Mr. Johnson's policy among the Republicans in Congress, there was at the same time a disinclination to an open rupture with the President. It was in obedience to this latter feeling that the joint committee on reconstruction was so heartily agreed to. Through this the main issue—the recognition of the Southern state governments—were deferred until it could be ascertained whether a substantial protection for the freedmen might not be obtained without coming to open hostility with the President. In accordance with this plan the aggressive spirit of the radicals was repressed, and a series of measures was devised, of which the Freedmen's Bureau Bill was the first to be presented."—W. A. Dunning, *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction*, pp. 86-87.—"Within a few days after the meeting of Congress, in December, 1865, Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, asked leave to introduce a joint resolution which provided that a committee of fifteen members should be appointed—nine of whom were to be members of the House and six to be members of the Senate—for the purpose of inquiring into the condition of the states which had formed the so-called Confederate States of America. This committee was to report whether these state or any of them were entitled to be represented in either house of Congress. Leave was given to report at any time, by bill or otherwise, and until such should be made and finally acted upon by Congress, no member was to be received into either house from any of those states. All papers relating to this representation in Congress were to be referred to this committee without debate. This resolution was adopted in the House by a vote of—yeas 133, nays, 36." [In the Senate it received amendments which made it a concurrent instead of a joint resolution, and which struck out the clause relating to the non-admittance of members from the states in question pending the committee's report, and also that which required a reference of papers to the committee without debate.]—S. S. Cox, *Three decades of Federal legislation*, ch. 18.—The Joint Committee on Reconstruction was constituted by the appointment (December 14), on the part of the House, of Thaddeus Stevens, Elihu B. Washburn, Justin S. Morrill, Henry Grider, John A. Bingham, Roscoe Conkling, George S. Boutwell, Henry T. Blow, and Andrew J. Rogers; and by the appointment (December 21), on the part of the Senate,

of William Pitt Fessenden, James W. Grimes, Ira Harris, Jacob M. Howard, Reverdy Johnson, and George H. Williams. "For the present, all . . . [the Confederate States] were to be denied representation. With Stevens as chairman of the House Committee on Reconstruction and Johnson in the President's chair, a battle was inevitable, in which quarter would be neither asked nor given. Unhappily for themselves, the southern states played unwittingly into the hands of Stevens and his radical colleagues. The outcome of the war had placed upon the freedmen responsibilities which they could not be expected to carry. To many of them emancipation meant merely cessation from work. Vagabondage was common. Rumor was widespread that the government was going to give each negro forty acres of land and a mule, and the blacks loafed about, awaiting the division. . . . 'The race was free, but without status, without leaders, without property, and without education.' Fully alive to the dangers of giving unrestricted freedom to so large a body of ignorant negroes, the southern whites passed the 'black codes.' . . . It is now evident that the South was actuated by what it considered the necessities of its situation and not merely by a spirit of defiance. Yet the fear on the part of the North that slavery was being restored under a disguise was not unnatural. Radical northern newspapers and leading extremists in Congress exaggerated the importance of the codes until they seemed like a systematic attempt to evade the results of the war. As Republican leaders in Congress saw the satisfaction created in the South by the President's policy, and discovered that northern Democrats were rallying to his support, the jealousies of partisanship caused them still further to increase their grip on the processes of reconstruction. A disquieting by-product of the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery, also began to appear. Hitherto only three-fifths of the negroes had been counted in apportioning representation in the House of Representatives. As soon as the slaves became free, however, they were counted as if they were whites, and thereby the strength of the South in Congress would be increased. It was hardly to be expected that the North would view such a development with satisfaction."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War*, (*United States*, v. 3, pp. 9-11).—To this question the committee gave attention first. "When all become free, representation for all necessarily follows. . . . As representation is by the Constitution based upon population, your committee [said their report, when made, on June 8, 1866] did not think it advisable to recommend a change of that basis. . . . It appeared to your committee that the rights of these persons by whom the basis of representation had been thus increased should be recognized by the general government. . . . It did not seem just or proper that all the political advantages derived from their becoming free should be confined to their former masters, who had fought against the Union, and withheld from themselves, who had always been loyal. . . . Doubts were entertained whether Congress had power, even under the amended Constitution, to prescribe the qualifications of voters in a State, or could act directly on the subject. It was doubtful, in the opinion of your committee, whether the States would consent to surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were attached. As the best if not the only method of surmounting the difficulty, and as

eminently just and proper in itself, your committee came to the conclusion that political power should be possessed in all the States exactly in proportion as the right of suffrage should be granted, without distinction of color or race. This it was thought would leave the whole question with the people of each State, holding out to all the advantage of increased political power as an inducement to allow all to participate in its exercise." To this conclusion the committee arrived as early as January 22, when they made a preliminary report, recommending an amendment to the constitution to the effect that "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed: Provided, That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation." Grave objections were found to the proposed exclusion of the colored race as a whole from the basis of representation, in case the suffrage should be denied to any part of it. It was shown, moreover, that disfranchisement might be practically accomplished on other grounds than that of race or color and the intended effect of the constitutional provision evaded. Hence the proposition of the committee failed in the Senate (March 9, 1866), though adopted by the House (January 31). On February 20, the Committee on Reconstruction reported a concurrent resolution, "That in order to close agitation upon a question which seems likely to disturb the action of the Government, as well as to quiet the uncertainty which is agitating the minds of the people of the eleven States which have been declared to be in insurrection, no Senator or Representative shall be admitted into either branch of Congress from any of said States until Congress shall have declared such State entitled to such representation." The House adopted this important concurrent resolution the same evening. In the Senate it was debated until March 2, when it was passed by a vote of 29 to 18. On April 30 the Reconstruction Committee reported a joint resolution embodying a comprehensive amendment to the Constitution, designed to protect the rights of the freedmen of the South, as citizens of the United States, and to fix the basis of representation in Congress, as well as to settle other questions arising out of the war. (See below: 1866: [June].) "This proposed amendment to the Constitution was accompanied by two bills, one of which provided that when any State lately in insurrection should have ratified the amendment, its Senators and Representatives, if found duly elected and qualified, should be admitted as members to Congress. The other bill declared the high ex-officials of the late Confederacy ineligible to any office under the Government of the United States."—W. H. Barnes, *History of the 39th Congress*, ch. 3, 13-19.

ALSO IN: *Report of Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 39th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Report no. 30.*—A. R. Conkling, *Life and letters of Roscoe Conkling*, ch. 14.

1865-1868.—Social and economic conditions of the South.—Taxation.—Cotton frauds.—"Confiscable" property.—Relief projects.—Church discipline.—Unionists in Southern states.—Confederates in border states.—"When the armies of

the Union and of the Confederacy were disbanded in 1865, two matters had been settled beyond further dispute: the negro was to be free, and the Union was to be perpetuated. But though slavery and state sovereignty were no longer at issue, there were still many problems which pressed for solution. . . . The surviving Confederate soldiers came straggling back to communities which were now far from being satisfactory dwelling places for civilized people. Everywhere they found missing many of the best of their former neighbors. They found property destroyed, the labor system disorganized, and the inhabitants in many places suffering from want. They found the white people demoralized and sometimes divided among themselves, and the negroes free, bewildered, and disorderly, for organized government had lapsed with the surrender of the Confederate armies. Beneath a disorganized society lay a devastated land. The destruction of property affected all classes of the population. The accumulating capital of the South had disappeared in worthless Confederate stocks, bonds, and currency. The banks had failed early in the war. Two billion dollars invested in slaves had been wiped out. Factories which had been running before the war, or were developed after 1861 in order to supply the blockaded country, had been destroyed by Federal raiders or seized and sold or dismantled because they had furnished supplies to the Confederacy. Mining industries were paralyzed. Public buildings which had been used for war purposes were destroyed or confiscated for the uses of the army or for the new freedmen's schools. It was months before courthouses, state capitols, school and college buildings were again made available for normal uses. The military school buildings had been destroyed by the Federal forces. Among the schools which suffered were the Virginia Military Institute, the University of Alabama, the Louisiana State Seminary, and many smaller institutions. Nearly all these had been used in some way for war purposes and were therefore subject to destruction or confiscation. The farmers and planters found themselves 'land poor.' The soil remained, but there was a prevalent lack of labor, of agricultural equipment, of farm stock, of seeds, and of money with which to make good the deficiency. As a result, a man with hundreds of acres might be as poor as a negro refugee. . . . There were few stocks of merchandise in the South when the war ended, and Northern creditors had lost so heavily . . . that they were cautious about extending credit again. Long before 1865 all coin had been sent out in contraband trade through the blockade. . . . Horses, mules, wagons, and carriages were scarce, the country roads were nearly impassable, and bridges were in bad repair or had been burned or washed away. Steamboats had almost disappeared from the rivers. . . . Postal facilities, which had been poor enough during the last year of the Confederacy, were entirely lacking for several months after the surrender. [Except those in Federal hands] the railways were in a state of physical dilapidation little removed from destruction. . . . About two-thirds of all the lines were hopelessly bankrupt. Fortunately the United States War Department took over the control of the railway lines. . . . During the summer and fall of 1865 'loyal' boards of directors were appointed for most of the roads, and the army withdrew its control. But repairs and reconstruction were accomplished with difficulty because of the

demoralization of labor and the lack of funds or credit. . . . Had there been unrestricted commercial freedom in the South in 1865-66, the distress of the people would have been somewhat lessened, for here and there were to be found . . . stores of cotton, tobacco, rice, and other farm products, all of which were bringing high prices in the market. But for several months the operation of wartime laws and regulations hindered the distribution of even these scanty stores. Property upon which the Confederate Government had a claim was of course subject to confiscation, and private property offered for sale, even that of Unionists, was subject to a 25 per cent tax on sales, a shipping tax, and a revenue tax. The revenue tax on cotton, ranging from two to three cents a pound during the three years after the war, brought in over \$68,000,000. This tax, with other Federal revenues, yielded much more than the entire expenses of reconstruction from 1865 to 1868 and of all relief measures for the South, both public and private. After May, 1865, the 25 per cent tax was imposed only upon the produce of slave labor. None of the war taxes, except that on cotton, was levied upon the crops of 1866, but while these taxes lasted they seriously impeded the resumption of trade. Even these restrictions, however, might have been borne if only they had been honestly applied. Unfortunately, some of the most spectacular frauds ever perpetrated were carried through in connection with the attempt of the United States Treasury Department to collect and sell the confiscable property in the South. The property to be sold consisted of what had been captured and seized by the army and the navy, of 'abandoned' property, as such was called whose owner was absent in the Confederate service, and of property subject to seizure under the confiscation acts of Congress. No captures were made after the general surrender, and no further seizures of 'abandoned' property were made after Johnson's amnesty proclamation of May 29, 1865. This left only the 'confiscable' property to be collected and sold. For collection purposes the States of the South were divided into districts, each under the supervision of an agent of the Treasury Department, who received a commission of about 25 per cent. Cotton, regarded as the root of the slavery evil, was singled out as the principal object of confiscation. It was known that the Confederate Government had owned in 1865 about 150,000 bales, but the records were defective and much of it, with no clear indication of ownership, still remained with the producers. Secretary Chase, foreseeing the difficulty of effecting a just settlement, counseled against seizure, but his judgment was overruled. Secretary McCulloch said of his agents: 'I am sure I sent some honest cotton agents South; but it sometimes seems doubtful whether any of them remained honest very long.' Some of the natives, even, became cotton thieves. . . . [The agents turned over to the United States about \$34,000,000. About 40,000 claimants were subsequently indemnified on the ground that the property taken from them did not belong to the Confederate Government, but many thousands of other claimants have been unable to prove that their property was seized by government agents and hence have received nothing. . . . Other property, including horses, mules, wagons, tobacco, rice, and sugar which the natives claimed as their own, was seized. In some places the agents even collected delinquent

Confederate taxes. Much of the confiscable property was not sold but was turned over to the Freedmen's Bureau for its support. The total amount seized cannot be satisfactorily ascertained. The Ku Klux minority report asserted that 3,000,000 bales of cotton were taken, of which the United States received only 114,000. It is certain that, owing to the deliberate destruction of cotton by fire in 1864-65, this estimate was too high, but all the testimony points to the fact that the frauds were stupendous. As a result the United States Government did not succeed in obtaining the Confederate property to which it had a claim, and the country itself was stripped of necessities to a degree that left it not only destitute but outraged and embittered. 'Such practices,' said Trowbridge, 'had a pernicious effect, engendering a contempt for the Government and a murderous ill-will which too commonly vented itself upon soldiers and negroes.' The South faced the work of reconstruction not only with a shortage of material and greatly hampered in the employment even of that but still more with a shortage of men. . . . The greatest weakness of both races was their extreme poverty. The crops of 1865 turned out badly, for most of the soldiers reached home too late for successful planting and the negro labor was not dependable. . . . The poorer whites who had lost all were close to starvation. In the white counties which had sent so large a proportion of men to the army the destitution was most acute. In many families the breadwinner had been killed in war. . . . Where the armies had passed, few of the people, white or black, remained; most of them had been forced as 'refugees' within the Union lines or into the interior of the Confederacy. Now, along with the disbanded Confederate soldiers, they came straggling back to their war-swept homes. It is estimated, in December, 1865, that in the States of Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia there were five hundred thousand white people who were without the necessaries of life; numbers died from lack of food. Within a few months relief agencies were at work. In the North, especially in the border States and in New York, charitable organizations collected and forwarded great quantities of supplies to the negroes and to the whites in the hill and mountain counties. The reorganized state and local governments sent food from the unravaged portions of the Black Belt to the nearest white counties, and the army commanders gave some aid. As soon as the Freedmen's Bureau was organized, it fed to the limit of its supplies the needy whites as well as the blacks. The extent of the relief afforded by the charity of the North and by the agencies of the United States Government is not now generally remembered, probably on account of the later objectionable activities of the Freedmen's Bureau, but it was at the time properly appreciated. . . . Acute distress continued until 1867; after that year there was no further danger of starvation. Some of the poor whites, especially in the remote districts, never again reached a comfortable standard of living; some were demoralized by too much assistance; others were discouraged and left the South for the West or the North. But the mass of the people accepted the discipline of poverty and made the best of their situation. The difficulties, however, that beset even the courageous and the competent were enormous. The general paralysis of industry, the breaking up of society, and poverty on all sides bore especially

hard on those who had not previously been manual laborers. Physicians could get practice enough but no fees; lawyers who had supported the Confederacy found it difficult to get back into the reorganized courts because of the test oaths and the competitions of 'loyal' attorneys; and for the teachers there were few schools. . . . General Lee's good example influenced many. Commercial enterprise were willing to pay for the use of his name and reputation, but he wished to farm and could get no opportunity. 'They are offering my father everything,' his daughter said, 'except the only thing he will accept, a place to earn honest bread while engaged in some useful work.' This remark led to an offer of the presidency of Washington College, now Washington and Lee University, which he accepted. 'I have a self-imposed task which I must accomplish,' he said, 'I have led the young men of the South in battle; I have seen many of them fall under my standard. I shall devote my life now to training young men to do their duty in life.' The condition of honest folk was still further troubled by a general spirit of lawlessness in many regions. Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana recognized the 'Union' state government, but the coming of peace brought legal anarchy to the other States of the Confederacy. . . . For a period of four or six months there was no government except that exercised by the commanders of the military garrisons left behind when the armies marched away. Even before the surrender the local governments were unable to make their authority respected, and soon after the war ended parts of the country became infested with outlaws, pretended treasury agents, horse thieves, cattle thieves, and deserters. Away from the military posts only lynch law could cope with these elements of disorder. With the aid of the army in the more settled regions, and by extra-legal means elsewhere, the outlaws, thieves, cotton burners, and house burners were brought somewhat under control even before the state governments were recognized, though the embers of lawlessness continued to smolder. The relations between the Federal soldiers stationed in the principal towns and the native white population were not, on the whole, so bad as might have been expected. If the commanding officer were well disposed, there was little danger of friction, though sometimes his troops got out of hand. The regulars had a better reputation than the volunteers. . . . These men might get along well together, but the women would have nothing to do with the 'Yankees' and ill feeling arose because of their antipathy. . . . In retaliation the soldiers developed ingenious ways of annoying the whites. . . . The negro troops, even at their best, were everywhere considered offensive by the native whites. . . . The negro soldier, impudent by reason of his new freedom, his new uniform, and his new gun, was more than Southern temper could tranquilly bear, and race conflicts were frequent. . . . The task of the Federal forces was not easy. The garrisons were not large enough nor numerous enough to keep order in the absence of civil government. The commanders in the South asked in vain for cavalry to police the rural districts. Much of the disorder, violence, and incendiarism attributed at the time to lawless soldiers appeared later to be due to discharged soldiers and others pretending to be soldiers in order to carry out schemes of robbery. The whites complained vigorously

of the garrisons, and petitions were sent to Washington from mass meetings and from state legislatures asking for their removal. The high commanders, however, bore themselves well, and in a few fortunate cases Southern whites were on most amicable terms with the garrison commanders. The correspondence of responsible military officers in the South shows how earnestly and considerably each, as a rule, tried to work out his task. . . . The church organizations were as much involved in the war and in the reconstruction as were secular institutions. . . . As the Federal armies occupied Southern territory, the church buildings of each denomination were turned over to the corresponding Northern body, and Southern ministers were permitted to remain only upon agreeing to conduct 'loyal services, pray for the President of the United States and for Federal victories' and to foster 'loyal sentiment.' The Protestant Episcopal churches in Alabama were closed from September to December, 1865, and some congregations were dispersed by the soldiers because Bishop Wilmer had directed his clergy to omit the prayer for President Davis but had substituted no other. . . . The Unionist, or 'Tory,' of the lower and eastern South found himself, in 1865, a man without a country. Few in number in any community, they found themselves upon their return from a harsh exile the victims of ostracism or open hostility. . . . In the border States society was sharply divided and feeling was bitter. In eastern Tennessee, eastern Kentucky, West Virginia, and parts of Arkansas and Missouri returning Confederates met harsher treatment than did the Unionists in the lower South. Trowbridge says of east Tennessee: 'Returning rebels were robbed; and if one had stolen unawares to his home, it was not safe for him to remain there.' . . . Confederates and Confederate sympathizers in Maryland, West Virginia, and Kentucky were disfranchised. In West Virginia, Tennessee, and Missouri 'war trespass' suits were brought against returning Confederates for military acts done in war time. In Missouri and West Virginia strict test oaths excluded Confederates from office, from the polls, and from the professions of teaching, preaching, and law. On the other hand in central and western Kentucky the predominant Unionist population, themselves suffering through the abolition of slavery, and by the objectionable operations of the Freedmen's Bureau and the unwise military administration, showed more sympathy for the Confederates, welcomed them home, and soon relieved them of all restrictions. Still another element of discord was added by the Northerners who came to exploit the South. . . . With the better class, the Southerners, especially the soldiers, associated freely if seldom intimately. But the conduct of a few of their number who considered that the war had opened all doors to them, who very freely expressed their views, gave advice, condemned old customs, and were generally offensive, did much to bring all Northerners into disrepute. Tactlessly critical letters published in Northern papers did not add to their popularity."—W. L. Fleming, *Sequel of Appomattox (Chronicles of America Series, v. 32, pp. 1-3, 6-12, 14-19, 21-26)*.—See also ARKANSAS: 1868; KENTUCKY: 1864-1865; 1865; 1867-1895; LOUISIANA: 1865-1867; MARYLAND: 1864-1867; TENNESSEE: 1865-1866; TEXAS: 1865-1876.

1865-1868.—Reconstruction in Florida.—Repeal of Secession Ordinance.—Refusal to ratify

Fourteenth Amendment.—Final admission. See FLORIDA: 1865-1868.

1865-1872.—Wealth of nation.—Filling up of the West.—Growth of railroads.—Iron and coal.—Development of "big business."—Introduction of machinery.—Increase of immigration.—Rise of packing industry.—While quarrels over the status of the South raged in Congress, development of the North and West went steadily on. "The slow, unceasing ages had been accumulating a priceless inheritance for the American people. Nearly all of their natural resources, in 1865, were still lying fallow, and even undiscovered in many instances. Americans had begun, it is true, to exploit their more obvious, external wealth, their forests and their land; the first had made them one of the world's two greatest shipbuilding nations, while the second had furnished a large part of the resources that had enabled the Federal Government to fight what was, up to that time, the greatest war in history. But the extensive prairie plains whose settlement was to follow the railroad extensions of the sixties and the seventies—Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Oklahoma, Minnesota, the Dakotas—had been only slightly penetrated. This region, with a rainfall not too abundant and not too scanty, with a cultivable soil extending from eight inches to twenty feet under the ground, with hardly a rock in its whole extent, with scarcely a tree, except where it bordered on the streams, has been pronounced by competent scientists the finest farming country to which man has ever set the plow. Our mineral wealth was likewise lying everywhere ready to the uses of the new generations. The United States now supplies the world with half its copper, but in 1865 it was importing a considerable part of its own supply. It was not till 1859 that the first 'oil gusher' of western Pennsylvania opened up an entirely new source of wealth. Though we had the largest coal deposits known to geologists, we were bringing large supplies of this indispensable necessity from Nova Scotia. It has been said that coal and iron are the two mineral products that have chiefly affected modern civilization. Certainly the nations that have made the greatest progress industrially and commercially—England, Germany, America—are the three that possess these minerals in largest amounts. From sixty to seventy percent. of all the known coal deposits in the world were located in our national domain. Nature had given no other nation anything even remotely comparable to the four hundred and eighty square miles of anthracite in western Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Enormous fields of bituminous lay in those Appalachian ranges extending from Pennsylvania to Alabama, in Michigan, in the Rocky Mountains, and in the Pacific regions. In speaking of our iron it is necessary to use terms that are even more extravagant. From colonial times Americans had worked the iron ore plentifully scattered along the Atlantic coast, but the greatest field of all, that in Minnesota, had not been scratched. From the statement of the country up to 1869, it had mined only 50,000,000 tons of iron ore; while up to 1910 we had produced 685,000,000 tons. . . .

"Industrial America is a product of the decades succeeding the Civil War; yet even in 1865 we were a large manufacturing nation. The leading characteristic of our industries, as compared with present conditions, was that they were individualized. Nearly all had outgrown the household stage, the factory system had gained a foothold in nearly every line, even the corporation had made its appearance, yet small-scale production prevailed in practically every field. In the decade preceding

the War, vans were still making regular trips through New England and the Middle States, leaving at farmhouses bundles of straw plait, which the members of the household fashioned into hats. The farmers' wives and daughters still supplemented the family income by working on goods for city dealers in ready-made clothing. . . . In this period before the Civil War comparatively small single owners, or frequently copartnerships, controlled practically every industrial field. Individual proprietors, not uncommonly powerful families which were almost feudal in character, owned the great cotton and woolen mills of New England. Separate proprietors, likewise, controlled the iron and steel factories of New York State and Pennsylvania. Indeed it was not until the War that corporations entered the iron industry, now regarded as the field above all others adapted to this kind of organization. The manufacture of sewing machines, firearms, and agricultural implements started on a great scale in the Civil War [see INVENTIONS: 19th century: Sewing machine; Reaper]; still, the prevailing unit was the private owner or the partnership. In many manufacturing lines the joint stock company had become the prevailing organization, but even in these fields the element that so characterizes our own age, that of combination, was exerting practically no influence. Competition was the order of the day: the industrial warfare of the sixties was a free-for-all. . . .

"The transformation of the United States from a nation of farmers and small-scale manufacturers to a highly organized industrial state had begun. Probably the most important single influence was the War itself. . . . Spiritually the struggle accomplished much in awakening the nation to a consciousness of its great opportunities. The fact that we could spend more than a million dollars a day . . . and that soon after hostilities ceased we rapidly paid off our large debt, directed the attention of foreign capitalists to our resources, and gave them the utmost confidence in this new investment field. Immigration, too, started after the war at a rate hitherto without parallel in our annals. The Germans who had come in the years preceding the Civil War had been largely political refugees and democratic idealists, but now, in much larger numbers, began the influx of north and south Germans whose dominating motive was economic. These Germans began to find their way to the farms of the Mississippi Valley; the Irish began once more to crowd our cities; the Slavs gravitated towards the mines of Pennsylvania; the Scandinavians settled whole counties of certain northwestern States [see also IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1790-1860; 1835-1915]; while the Jews began that conquest of the tailoring industries that was ultimately to make them the clothiers of a hundred million people. For this industrial development America supplied the land, the resources, and the business leaders, while Europe furnished the liquid capital and the laborers. Even more directly did the War stimulate our industrial development. Perhaps the greatest effect was the way in which it changed our transportation system. The mere necessity of constantly transporting hundreds of thousands of troops and war supplies demanded reconstruction and reëquipment on an extensive scale. The American Civil War was the first great conflict in which railroads played a conspicuous military part, and their development during those four years naturally left them in a strong position to meet the new necessities of peace. [See also RAILROADS: 1861-1865; 1869-1910.] One of the

first effects of the War was to close the Mississippi River; consequently the products of the Western farms had to go east by railroad, and this fact led to that preëminence of the great trunk lines which they retain to this day. Almost overnight Chicago became the great Western shipping center, and though the river boats lingered for a time on the Ohio and the Mississippi they grew fewer year by year. Prosperity, greater than the country had ever known, prevailed everywhere in the North throughout the last two years of the War. So, too, feeding and supplying an army of millions of men laid the foundation of many of our greatest industries. The Northern soldiers in the early days of the war were clothed in garments so variegated that they sometimes had trouble in telling friend from foe, and not infrequently they shot at one another; so inadequately were our woolen mills prepared to supply their uniforms! But larger government contracts enabled the proprietors to reconstruct their mills, install modern machines, and build up an organization and a prosperous business that still endures. Making boots and shoes for Northern soldiers laid the foundation of America's great shoe industry. Machinery had already been applied to shoe manufacture, but only to a limited extent; under the pressure of war conditions, however, American inventive skill found ways of performing mechanically almost all the operations that had formerly been done by hand. The McKay sewing machine, one of the greatest of our inventions, which was perfected in the second year of the war, did as much perhaps as any single device to keep our soldiers well shod and comfortable. The necessity of feeding these armies created our great packing plants. Though McCormick had invented his reaper several years before the war, the new agricultural machinery had made no great headway. Without this machinery, however, our Western farmers could never have harvested the gigantic crops which not only fed our soldiers but laid the basis of our economic prosperity. Thus the War directly established one of the greatest, and certainly one of the most romantic, of our industries—that of agricultural machinery. [See also INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: United States; AGRICULTURE: Modern: United States: 1860-1888.]

"Above all, however, the victory at Appomattox threw upon the country more than a million unemployed men. Our European critics predicted that their return to civil life would produce dire social and political consequences. But these critics were thinking in terms of their own countries; they failed to consider that the United States had an immense unoccupied domain which was waiting for development. The men who fought the Civil War had demonstrated precisely the adventurous, hardy instincts which were most needed in this great enterprise. Even before the war ended, a great immigration started toward the mines and farms of the trans-Mississippi country. There was probably no important town or district west of the Alleghanies that did not absorb a considerable number. In most instances, too, our ex-soldiers became leaders in these new communities. Perhaps this movement has its most typical and picturesque illustration in the extent to which the Northern soldiers opened up the oil-producing regions of western Pennsylvania. Venango County, where this great development started, boasted that it had more ex-soldiers than any similar section of the United States."—B. J. Hendrick, *Age of big business*, pp. 3-7, 13-18.

1865-1885.—Westward freight trade.—Cattle

ranges.—Pony Express.—Mining camps.—The "Long Trail."—Influence of cattle industry on the West.—Homesteading.—"It was nearly half a century after the journey of Lewis and Clark that the Forty-Niners were crossing the Plains, whither, meanwhile, the Mormons had trekked in search of a country where they might live as they liked. Still the wealth of the Plains remained untouched. California was in the eyes of the world. The great cow-range was overleaped. But, in the early fifties, when the placer fields of California began to be less numerous and less rich, the half savage population of the mines roared on northward, even across our northern line. Soon it was to roll back. Next it worked east and southeast and northeast over the great dry plains of Washington and Oregon, so that, as readily may be seen, the cow-range proper was not settled as most of the West was, by a directly westbound thrust of an eastern population; but, on the contrary, it was approached from several different angles—from the north, from the east, from the west and northwest, and finally from the south. . . . All these new white men who had crowded into the unknown country of the Plains, the Rockies, the Sierras, and the Cascades, had to be fed. They could not employ and remain content with the means by which the red man there had always fed himself. Hence a new industry sprang up in the United States, which of itself made certain history in that land. The business of freighting supplies to the West, whether by bull-train or by pack-train, was an industry *sui generis*, very highly specialized, and pursued by men of great business ability as well as by men of great hardihood and daring. Each of these freight trains which went West carried hanging on its flank more and more of the white men. As the train returned, more and more was learned in the States of the new country which lay between the Missouri and the Rockies, which ran no man knew how far north, and no man could guess how far south. Now appears in history Fort Benton, on the Missouri, the great northern supply post—just as at an earlier date there had appeared Fort Hall, one of the old fur-trading posts beyond the Rockies, Bent's Fort on the Arkansas, and many other outposts of the Saxon civilization in the West. Later came the pony express [see PONY EXPRESS] and the stage coach which made history and romance for a generation. Feverishly, boisterously, a strong, rugged, womanless population crowded westward and formed the wavering, now advancing, now receding line of the great frontier of American story. But for long there was no sign of permanent settlement on the Plains, and no one thought of this region as the frontier. . . . It was after the Civil War that the first great drives of cattle from the south toward the north began, and after men had learned in the State of Texas that cattle moved from the Rio Grande to the upper portions of the State and fed on the mesquite grass would attain greater stature than in the hot coast country. . . . The iron trails, crossing the northern range soon after the Civil War, brought a market to the cattle country. Inevitably the men of the lower range would seek to reach the railroads with what they had to sell—their greatest natural product, cattle on the hoof. This was the primary cause of the great north-bound drives, . . . the greatest pastoral phenomena in the story of the world. The southern herds at that time had no market at their doors. They

had to go to the market, and they had to go on foot. . . . The braiding of a hundred minor pathways, the Long Trail lay like a vast rope connecting the cattle country of the South with that of the North. Lying loose or coiled, it ran for more than two thousand miles along the eastern edge of the Rocky Mountains, sometimes close in at their feet, again hundreds of miles away across the hard tablelands or the well-flowered prairies. It traversed in a fair line the vast land of Texas, curled over the Indian Nations, over Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Montana, and bent in wide overlapping circles as far west as Utah and Nevada; as far east as Missouri, Iowa, even Illinois; and as far north as the British possessions. Even to-day you may trace plainly its former course, from its faint beginnings in the lazy land of Mexico, the Ararat of the cattle-range. It is distinct across Texas, and multifold still in the Indian lands. . . . If the influence of the cattle industry was paramount in the development of the frontier region found by the first railways, it should not be concluded that this upthrust of the southern cattle constituted the only contribution to the West of that day. There were indeed earlier influences, the chief of which was the advent of the wild population of the placer mines. The riches of the gold-fields hastened the building of the first transcontinental railroads and the men of the mines set their mark also indelibly upon the range. . . . We may never know how much history remains forever unwritten. Of the beginnings of the Idaho camps there have trickled back into record only brief, inconsequent, and partial stories. The miners who surged this way and that all through the Sierras, the upper Cascades, north into the Selkirks, and thence back again into the Rockies were a turbulent mob. Having overrun all our mountain ranges, following the earlier trails of the traders and trappers, they now recoiled upon themselves and rolled back eastward to meet the advancing civilization of the westbound rails, caring nothing for history and less for the civilized society in which they formerly had lived. This story of bedlam broken loose, of men gone crazed by the sudden subversion of all known values and all standards of life, was at first something which had no historian and can be recorded only by way of hearsay stories which do not always tally as to the truth. So the flood of gold-seekers—passing north into the Fraser River country, south again into Oregon and Washington, and across the great desert plains into Nevada and Idaho—made new centers of lurid activity. . . . Before these adventurers, now eastbound and no longer facing west, there arose the vast and formidable mountain ranges which in their time had daunted even the calm minds of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark. But the prospectors and the pack-trains alike penetrated the Salmon River Range. . . . Southward of the Idaho camps the same sort of story was repeating itself. Nevada had drawn to herself a portion of the wild men of the stampedes. Carson for its day (1859-60) was a capital not unlike the others. Some of its men had come down from the upper fields, some had arrived from the East over the old Santa Fé Trail, and yet others had drifted in from California. All the camps were very much alike. A straggling row of long cabins or huts of motley construction; a few stores so-called, sometimes of logs . . . a number of saloons, each of which customarily also supported a dance-hall; a series

of cabins or huts where dwelt individual men, each doing his own cooking and washing! and outside these huts the upturn earth. . . . Church and school were unknown. Law there was none. . . .

"Until the closing days of the Civil War the northern range was a wide, open domain, the greatest ever offered for the use of a people. None claimed it then in fee; none wanted it in fee. The grasses and the sweet waters offered accessible and profitable chemistry for all men who had cows to range. The land laws still were vague and inexact in application, and each man could construe them much as he liked. The excellent homestead law of 1862 [see above: 1862 (May): Passage of the Homestead Act] one of the few really good land laws . . . on our national statute books, worked well enough so long as we had good farming lands for homesteading—lands of which a quarter section would support a home and a family. This same homestead law was the only one available for use on the cattle-range. In practice it was violated thousands of times—in fact, of necessity violated by any cattle man who wished to acquire sufficient range to run a considerable herd. Our great timber kings, our great cattle kings, made their fortunes out of their open contempt for the homestead law, which was designed to give all the people an even chance for a home and a farm. . . . Swiftly enough, here and there along all the great waterways of the northern range, ranchers and their men filed claims on the water fronts. The dry land thus lay tributary to them. For the most part the open lands were held practically under squatter rights; the rights respected, at least for a time. These were the days of the open range. Fences had not come, nor had farms been staked out. From the South now appeared that tremendous and elemental force—most revolutionary of all the great changes we have noted in the swiftly changing West—the bringing in of thousands of horned kine along the northbound trails. The trails were hurrying from the Rio Grande to the upper plains of Texas and northward, along the north and south line of the Frontier—that land which now we have been seeking less to define and to mark precisely than fundamentally to understand. The Indian wars had much to do with the cow trade. The Indians were crowded upon the reservations, and they had to be fed, and fed on beef. . . . But every herd which passed north for delivery of one sort or the other advanced the education of the cowman, whether of the northern or the southern ranges. Some of the southern men began to start feeding ranges in the North, retaining their breeding ranges in the South. The demand for the great upper range for cattle seemed for the time insatiable.

"To the vision of the railroad builders a tremendous potential freightage now appeared. The railroad builders began to calculate that one day they would parallel the northbound cow trail with iron trails of their own and compete with nature for the carrying of this beef. The whole swift story of all that development, while the west-bound rails were crossing and criss-crossing the newly won frontier, scarce lasted twenty years. . . . The names of new rivers came upon our maps; and beyond the first railroads we began to hear of the Yellowstone, the Powder, the Musselshell, the Tongue, the Big Horn, the Little Missouri. . . . It was a wild, strange day.

But withal it was the kindest and most generous time, alike the most contented and the boldest time, in all the history of our frontiers. There never was a better life than that of the cowman who had a good range on the Plains and cattle enough to stock his range. There never will be found a better man's country in all the world than that which ran from the Missouri up to the low foothills of the Rockies. . . . The barbed-wire fence, which was at first used extensively by the great operators, came at last to be the greatest friend of the Little Fellow on the range. The Little Fellow, who under the provisions of the homestead act began to push West and to depart farther and farther from the protecting lines of the railways, could locate land and water for himself and fence in both. 'I've got the law back of me,' was what he said; and what he said was true. Around the old cow camps of the trails, and around the young settlements which did not aspire to be called cow camps, the homesteaders fenced in land—so much land that there came to be no place near any of the shipping-points where a big herd from the South could be held. Along the southern range artificial barriers to the long drive began to be raised. It would be hard to say whether fear of Texas competition or of Texas cattle fever was the more powerful motive in the minds of ranchers in Colorado and Kansas. But the cattle quarantine laws of 1885 nearly broke up the long drive of that year. Men began to talk of fencing off the trails, and keeping the northbound herds within the fences—a thing obviously impossible. The railroads soon rendered this discussion needless. Their agents went down to Texas and convinced the shippers that it would be cheaper and safer to put their cows on cattle trains and ship them directly to the ranges where they were to be delivered. And in time the rails running north and south across the Staked Plains into the heart of the lower range began to carry most of the cattle. So ended the old cattle trails."—E. Hough, *Passing of the frontier*, pp. 15-17, 26, 30-32, 57-61, 137-143, 148-150.

1865-1894.—Decay of mercantile marine.—"The Civil War of 1861 took away any chance which remained to American ships of continuing as the great sea-carriers. The American mind had to concentrate on fighting. Meanwhile, much of the tonnage had passed under other flags, while in Great Britain the accessibility of coal deposits, the cheapness of labour, the successful introduction of iron for shipbuilding, the great advances in ship construction, and especially the wonderful progress of the steamship, had been able to give back to Great Britain her supremacy as a Mercantile Marine. And when the Civil War was over, America was too interested internally to pay a maximum amount of attention to ocean trading. For the riches of the country were only beginning to be developed. Mines and manufactures, railroads and so on were now needing all the available capital. The New England shipyards, which for many years had been so valuable owing to the ample supplies of timber ready to hand, became unwanted in proportion as the Clyde, with its adjacent coalfields, was becoming more important for building ships of iron and then steel. It would be untrue to say that America ignored the building of iron ships, and in the early 'seventies she was interested in a mild way. The 'eighties passed without much enthusiasm for the subject, and then in 1894 and following year

the Cramp shipyard launched the two fine transatlantic liners *St. Louis* and *St. Paul*, both being constructed of steel. There were many other steel ships built, and orders were received from abroad, but, broadly speaking, and in strict reference to merchant ships and not warships, America was not even now a shipbuilding country. Those splendid schooners with which the port of Gloucester is for ever associated, and those other sailing craft along the American coast do not alter the statement, nor do the vessels on the American lakes and rivers. We are thinking of ocean-going ships, which are the essential feature of any Mercantile Marine. The trade between the Atlantic and Pacific ports still remained for the old full-rigged clippers, because there were not enough cargoes east-bound to make it worth while for the steamship. And so America went on, content to allow her Merchant Service to be comparatively small and unprogressive."—E. K. Chatterton, *Mercantile marine*, pp. 222-223.

1865-1917.—Development of associated news service. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1865-1917.

1866.—Abrogation of reciprocity treaty with Canada. See TARIFF: 1854-1866.

1866.—First legislation for irrigation. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1847-1901.

1866.—Organization of Grand Army of the Republic. See GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC.

1866.—Results of Civil War in Indian territory. See OKLAHOMA: 1866.

1866.—Fenian movement and invasion of Canada. See IRELAND: 1858-1867; CANADA: 1866-1871.

1866 (February).—French warned out of Mexico. See MEXICO: 1861-1867.

1866 (April).—Passage of the first Civil Rights Bill over the president's veto.—"Immediately on the reassembling of Congress after the holidays, January 5, 1866, Mr. Trumbull [in the Senate], in pursuance of previous notice, introduced a bill 'to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication.' This bill, having been read twice, was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary." A few days later the bill was reported back from the committee, and it came up for discussion on January 29. On February 1 it passed the Senate and went to the House. In that body it was reported from the Judiciary Committee on March 1, and debate upon the measure began. It passed the House, with some amendments, March 13, by a vote of 111 to 38. The amendments of the House were agreed to by the Senate and it went to the President, who returned it with an elaborate veto message on March 27. In the Senate, on April 6, by 33 ayes to 15 nays, and the House three days later, by 122 affirmative votes to 31 in the negative, the bill was passed notwithstanding the veto, and became law. As enacted, the Civil Rights Bill declared "that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are . . . citizens of the United States; and such citizens of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, . . . shall have the same right in every State and Territory of the United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by

white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom of the contrary notwithstanding." Section 2 of the act provided penalties for its violation. The remaining section gave to the district and circuit courts of the United States cognizance of all crimes and offenses committed against the provisions of the act; extended the jurisdiction of those courts and enlarged and defined the powers and duties of the district attorneys, marshals, deputy marshals and commissioners of the United States, to that end; made it lawful for the President "to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as shall be necessary to prevent the violation and enforce the due execution of this act;" and, finally, provided that "upon all questions of law arising in any cause under the provisions of this act a final appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States."—W. H. Barnes, *History of the 39th Congress*, ch. 9-11.—"The Freedmen's Bureau Bill had been confessedly in the nature of a temporary expedient. It had aimed to secure the protection of the blacks by military authority for a period that Congress should deem sufficient. By the . . . [Civil Rights Bill] however, the protection was to be incorporated permanently into the law of the land, and to be entrusted to the civil authorities of the nation. As the bill passed, it provided first a broad foundation for rights in the declaration that 'all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are . . . citizens of the United States.' It then secured to all such citizens of every race and color the same rights as were enjoyed by white citizens in respect to making and enforcing contracts, appearing in the courts, receiving, holding and transferring property, and enjoying the benefit of all laws for the security of person and property. Section second made it a misdemeanor to subject any inhabitant of any state or territory to the deprivation of any right secured by the act, or to different punishment, by reason of race, color or previous condition of servitude, from that prescribed for white persons. The remainder of the bill was occupied with provisions in great detail for the enforcement of the first two sections. Cognizance of all cases arising under the act was given exclusively to United States courts, and the machinery for its strict execution was borrowed, with grim satisfaction, from the Fugitive Slave Act. At the time the Civil Rights Bill was proposed, it had become a well-grounded conviction that the Southern states would not yield to the negroes any appreciable share of the rights which northern sentiment demanded for them. The legislatures of the reorganized governments, under cover of police regulations and vagrancy laws, had enacted severe discriminations against the freedmen in all the common civil rights. In several states the tendency of these enactments toward a system of peonage had appeared so pronounced as to induce the military commanders to order that they be disregarded. This situation strengthened the resolution, already well defined, to remove the possibility of a system of modified slavery under state sanction. It was feared that Congress would be unable to effect this purpose after the admission of the Southern representatives. The end must be achieved before extending recognition to the new governments, and acquiescence in the

result could then be made a condition of the erring states' return. . . . The proposition that United States courts should assume jurisdiction of disputes relating to property and contracts, and even of criminal actions down to common assault and battery, seemed like a complete revelation of that diabolical spirit of centralization, of which only the cloven hoof had been manifested heretofore. But the supporters of the bill showed a clear appreciation of the change that the great conflict had wrought. They found a constitutional basis for the law in the Thirteenth Amendment. . . . A statute which is not equal to all is an encroachment on the liberty of the deprived persons, and subjects them to a degree of servitude. It is the duty of Congress, therefore, to counteract the effects of any such state laws. Thus the constitutionality of the bill was maintained. . . . The far-reaching consequences of this view of the Thirteenth Amendment filled the friends of the old system with dismay. . . . The idea that the amendment carried with it an enormous centralization of power in the general government had never been heard of during the long discussion of the resolution in Congress. It was a recently devised scheme of the consolidationists to change the whole foundation of the government by interpretation. . . . Whatever may have been the intention of the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment, the construction put upon it by Congress in the Civil Rights Bill was promptly adopted by the judiciary. The bill was vetoed by the President on the same general line of reasoning that was employed with respect to the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, but was immediately passed over the veto. . . . In addition to the definition of 'slavery' and 'involuntary servitude,' the Civil Rights Bill undertook to fix the precise meaning of the phrase 'citizen of the United States.' The matter had been involved, up to this time, in hopeless confusion. . . . During the war, . . . Mr. Lincoln's attorney-general . . . gave it as his official opinion that a free negro, born within the United States, was *ipso facto* a citizen thereof. . . . With that assumption the status of United States citizenship was placed entirely beyond the reach of any state influence whatever, and a purely national conception was attained. This view was the one incorporated into the Civil Rights Bill. . . . The intense opposition which the Civil Rights Bill had excited permitted little hope that its provisions could remain permanently upon the statute book. Hence arose the movement to incorporate the principles of the bill in the Constitution."—W. A. Dunning, *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction*, pp. 91-97, 99.—"The President on March 27, in a message remarkable for its moderation and careful reasoning . . . objected to the measure because it conferred citizenship on the negroes when eleven out of thirty-six States were unrepresented and attempted to fix by Federal law 'a perfect equality of the white and black races in every State of the Union.' It was an invasion by Federal authority of the rights of the State; it had no warrant in the Constitution and was contrary to all precedents. It was a 'stride toward centralization and the concentration of all legislative power in the national government.' . . . The passage of this bill over the President's veto was indeed a momentous event, not only because, in view of Johnson's character, it rendered the breach between him and Congress complete but also for the reason that it opened a new chapter

in constitutional practice. Since Washington there had been many vetoes but never until now had Congress passed over the President's veto a measure of importance; and this measure was one over which feeling on Congress and the country had been wrought up to the highest tension. . . . Johnson's fall from December 5, 1865, when he sent his message to Congress to the April day on which the Senate passed the Civil Rights Bill over his veto was great and may be accounted for by the defects of his character and especially by his lack of political sense. On him the whole history of England the United States, of government by discussion and compromise was lost. . . . The moderate senators and representatives (who constituted a majority of the Union party) asked him for only a slight compromise; their action was really an entreaty that he would unite with them to preserve Congress and the country from the policy of the radicals. The two projects which Johnson had most at heart were the speedy admission of the Southern senators and representatives to Congress and the relegation of the question of negro suffrage to the States themselves. Himself shrinking from the imposition on these communities of the franchise for the coloured people, his unyielding disposition in regard to matters involving no vital principle did much to bring it about. His quarrel with Congress prevented the readmission into the Union on generous terms of the members of the late Confederacy; and for the quarrel and its unhappy results Johnson's lack of imagination and his inordinate sensitiveness to political gadflies were largely responsible: it was not a contest in which fundamentals were involved. He sacrificed two important objects to petty considerations. His pride of opinion, his desire to beat, blinded him to the real welfare of the South and of the whole country."—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, v. 5, pp. 583, 586-587, 580.

1866 (June).—Congressional adoption of Fourteenth Amendment.—Report of Reconstruction committee.—State legislatures during period.—"No one in Washington in the spring of 1866 thought that the enactment of the freedmen's bureau and the civil rights bills would satisfy all parties. The House, in the hands of the radicals, with Stevens at the head, would spend all its strength to carry out a policy of severe reconstruction. But the Senate was less united. In fact, it contained four factions. One, a rather large one, was as radical as Stevens; another was radical, but temperately so; another was composed of moderate Republicans who had followed Lincoln, and another of Democrats who were openly for the South. The fourth group was the only one that Johnson could count on. The third was friendly in the beginning of the year, and probably would have continued so if he had accepted the . . . [Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights bills]. It was currently said that he promised to approve the civil rights bill, and his subsequent veto of it was considered an act of bad faith which further alienated the men of the third group. With all the Senate Republicans united it was possible to carry a bill over the President's veto. The radicals were conscious of their power and jubilant over the prospect of success. Their first move was an amendment giving constitutional vigor to the main features of the civil rights bill. But in its first form the fourteenth amendment dealt with negro suffrage

alone. It did not seem fair that the South, the old three-fifths apportionment being now absolute, should have full benefit of its colored population while it excluded them from the polls. So it was proposed to exclude negroes from the basis of representation in those states in which they might not vote. As this would be a loss of representation in such states, it was hoped that it would impel them to concede the franchise to the freedmen. In this form the amendment passed the House by a vote of 120 to 32, but it failed in the Senate. Five extreme radicals, Sumner among them, voted against it because it did not authorize negro suffrage outright. This was before the veto of the civil rights bill. Nearly two months later [April 30, 1866] the amendment came before Congress in a new form. The provision regarding suffrage was retained, and three features of the vetoed bill were added: 1. 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the states wherein they reside.' 2. No state should abridge the rights of such citizens. 3. No state should 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law' or deny equal protection of the laws. It also excluded from federal or state office until pardoned by Congress persons who, having held high federal or state office, later supported the Confederacy. It guaranteed the payment of the national war debt, and ordered that no state should pay the Confederate debt or pay for the loss of the slaves through emancipation. It was so sweeping a programme of reconstruction that the extreme radicals would not oppose it. Sumner and three of his five colleagues in the Senate who voted against the first form now gave it their votes, and it passed both houses [the House on May 10, and the Senate on June 8] by the necessary two-thirds vote. It only remained to be approved by three-fourths of the states."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 607-608.—"In June, 1866, about the time of the Fourteenth Amendment was sent to the State legislatures, the joint reconstruction committee presented its report to Congress. The essence of the report was the declaration that the seceding States were disorganized communities *outside* the Union, and that they should be denied representation 'until sufficient guarantees were provided which would tend to secure the civil rights of all citizens, temporary restoration of suffrage to those not guilty of participating in the rebellion, and the disqualification from office of at least a portion of those whose crimes have proved them to be enemies of the Union and unworthy of public confidence.' The 'guarantees' proposed by the committee were substantially the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment which had just been proposed by Congress and which was before the country for ratification or rejection."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 518-519.—"The standing of the Southern state organizations was in doubt after the refusal of Congress to recognize them. Nevertheless, in spite of this uncertainty they continued to function as States during the year of controversy which followed; the courts were opened and steadily grew in influence; here and there militia and patrols were reorganized; officials who refused to 'accept the situation' were dismissed; elections were held; the legislatures revised the laws to fit new conditions and enacted new laws for the emancipated blacks. To all this progress in reorganization the action of Con-

gress was a severe blow, since it gave notice that none of the problems of reconstruction were yet solved. An increasing spirit of irritation and independence was observed throughout the States in question, and at the elections the former Confederates gained more and more offices. The year was marked in the South by the tendency toward the formation of parties, by the development of the 'Southern outrages' issue by an attempt to frustrate radical action, and finally by a line-up of the great mass of the whites in opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment and other radical plans of Congress."—W. L. Fleming, *Sequel of Appomattox (Chronicles of America Series, v. 32, pp. 81-82)*.

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 9.—W. H. Barnes, *History of the 39th Congress*, ch. 17-18.

1866 (July).—Restoration of Tennessee to her former, proper, practical relation to the Union." See TENNESSEE: 1865-1866.

1866 (July).—New Orleans riot. See LOUISIANA: 1865-1867.

1866 (August).—Proclamation of peace.—By successive orders for particular localities, the blockade, the prohibition of commercial intercourse, and the suspension of the *habeas corpus* were revoked by Mr. Johnson; but it was not till August 20, 1866, that the final proclamation went forth that the insurrection was ended, 'and that peace, order, tranquillity and civil authority now exist in and through the whole of the United States of America.' Prior to that date, in all the states not declared at peace by special proclamations, the presumptive status of the inhabitants, under the unrevoked orders of Mr. Lincoln, was that of public enemies. The only evidence of a different status was the fact of having taken the amnesty oath, or of having received a special pardon from the President. By the final order of Mr. Johnson, however, the liability of all civilians in the United States to the President's military authority ceased, and no legal effect of the war remained upon the private citizen in the southern states, save that a rapidly diminishing number of unpardoned individuals were still responsible before the civil law for the crimes of treason and rebellion. Such was the condition of affairs that was claimed to have been brought about, by the autumn of 1866, through executive action. As far as the judiciary was concerned, the restoration seemed to be fully accepted. The district courts of the United States resumed their work under the direction of the President as fast as the provisional organizations were effected. Chief Justice Chase declined to sit on the circuit bench while military authority was maintained in the circuit, on the ground that it was not becoming to the dignity of the highest judicial officers of the government to act under even the least shadow of subjection to armed force. He did not object, however, to the holding of a circuit court by the district judge sitting alone. As early as the December term of 1865, the Supreme Court ordered the cases on its docket from the Southern States to be called and disposed of. Upon the proclamations by the President of the end of the insurrection, the regular sessions of all the courts were resumed."—W. A. Dunning, *Essays on Civil War and Reconstruction*, pp. 83-85.

1866-1867 (October-March).—Reconstruction issue before the people.—Congress sustained by the North.—Rejection of Fourteenth Amendment by Southern states.—"The Congressional election that was approaching when [the Re-

construction] report was made gave the voters of the country an opportunity to decide between Johnson's mild plan of reconstruction and the harsh plan foreshadowed by the joint committee. In the campaign both sides made unusual efforts to gain votes. As the canvass proceeded it became plainer and plainer that the congressional party would win. The President's cause was weakened by a number of outrages that were committed against the freedmen in the South. Of special advantage to the Northern radicals was a riot which occurred late in July in New Orleans and resulted in the killing of forty or fifty negroes and the wounding of about one hundred and fifty more. The President himself contributed vastly to his own undoing. He made an electioneering trip—'swinging around the circle,' he called it,—and on the tour his indiscretions of speech were so many and so great that he invited much of the ridicule and scorn which his enemies heaped upon him. At one place his remarks were so offensive to the audience that he was silenced and driven from the platform."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 519.—"The returns of the elections, as they came in during September, October, and November, told uniformly the tale of a great defeat in the North for the President. When the record was complete, it revealed that the next House of Representatives would show, like its predecessor, a two-thirds majority that could override any veto; and that from the Senate, as a result of the election of new legislatures, would disappear several of the small band of former Republicans who had sustained Mr. Johnson's policy. There was no room anywhere for doubt that the people of the North would support Congress as against the President in the policy of reconstruction. What, then, was the feeling of the South as to the plan that Congress had proposed? So far as it could be expressed by the attitude assumed towards the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, a series of responses by the legislatures, beginning in October, showed that sentiment was as strongly on one side in the South as the elections showed it to be on the other side in the North. By February, 1867, ratification of the amendment had been voted down in the legislature of every one of the seceding states, except Tennessee; and the best showing in favor of ratification in any of the bodies that voted was 10 votes out of 103 in the lower house in North Carolina. In three States the adverse vote was unanimous in both houses. The reasons assigned for this attitude included all of those conservative doctrines which had been so strongly urged in Congress against any change of the Constitution in respect to citizenship and the basis of representation. But especial stress was in most of the States laid upon the effects of the section imposing political disabilities on leading ex-Confederates, which would, if ratified, depose from office very many of the chief functionaries of the existing State governments, and upon the contention that, if the communities which the legislatures represented were really States of the Union, the presence of their members in Congress was essential to the validity of the amendment; while if those communities were not States, their ratification of the amendment was unnecessary. Whatever the reasons, real or nominal, the fact that the South stood solidly opposed on the great issue of reconstruction to the North was through this attitude put in the strongest and clearest light."—W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruc-*

tion, political and economic, pp. 82-84.—"No one could doubt that the Northern States would ratify; but the Southern States were more than a fourth of the 27 States then in the Union and could defeat the amendment. . . . Most Republicans were ready to forget all if those States, chastened by adversity, approved the amendment. In view of what came later, they would have done well to bow the head to the yoke and submit to necessity. But the fires of controversy had filled them with defiance, and one by one in the autumn of 1866 and in the winter following they repudiated the amendment. Their legislatures under the Johnson plan were full of ex-Confederates, who took it as an indignity to disfranchise their former comrades, repudiate the Confederate debt, and accept a lower rank in Congress. They were in despair, and felt that if they must be humiliated, it might better come through the force of the conqueror than by their own consent. Posterity has some admiration for their spirit, but the Northern people were only inclined to think them stiffnecked, and unreasonable. The situation pleased the extreme radicals, who felt that the North must now come to a policy of severity. The autumn elections seemed to support them, since the Senate was now Republican by 42 to 11 votes and the House by 143 to 49. Stevens and Sumner, who thought that the negro could only be protected by having the ballot, were ready to demand negro suffrage, and believed the country would indorse such a demand. Garfield, in the House, summed up their feeling in a remarkable speech. Congress, he said, had been generous; it might, had it so desired, have hanged 'every rebel traitor in the South for their bloody conspiracy,' or confiscated their property; but through generosity it had withheld its hand. Its offer to receive the Southern States into the Union with no other restriction than the Fourteenth Amendment had been flung back into its face, and 'it is now our turn to act. They would not cooperate with us in rebuilding what they destroyed. We must remove the rubbish and rebuild from the bottom.' By the rubbish, he meant the existing governments under Johnson's plan. The Southerners believed that by holding out courageously they could block the amendment forever, since it could not be adopted without their consent. By rebuilding the government in their States from the bottom, Garfield meant that the negroes themselves must be allowed to vote, that they would thus gain control of the Southern States, and that the amendment could then be ratified. This favorite program of the extreme radicals was now to be carried into effect."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 608-609.—In a letter addressed November 25, 1866, to General Richard Taylor, lately of the Confederate army, and brother-in-law of Jefferson Davis, General Grant wrote: "I have talked with several members of Congress who are classed with the radicals; Schenck and Bidwell for instance. They express the most generous views as to what would be done if the Constitutional amendments proposed by Congress were adopted by the Southern States. What was done in the case of Tennessee was an earnest of what would be done in all cases. Even the disqualification to hold office imposed on certain classes by one article of the amendment would, no doubt, be removed at once, except it might be in the cases of the very highest offenders, such, for instance, as those who went

abroad to aid in the Rebellion, those who left seats in Congress, etc. All or very nearly all would soon be restored, and so far as security to property and liberty is concerned, all would be restored at once. I would like exceedingly to see one Southern State, excluded State, ratify the amendments to enable us to see the exact course that would be pursued. I believe it would much modify the demands that may be made if there is delay." "But the President's endeavors did not cease. . . . He used all the authority of his office to dissuade the Southerners from accepting the amendment which the entire North had ratified."—A. Badeau, *Grant in peace*, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: C. W. Burgess, *Reconstruction and the constitution*, p. 104.—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 10-11.

1866-1867 (December-March).—**Tenure-of-Office Bill.**—"Against the early decision of the founders of the Government, . . . against the repeatedly expressed judgment of ex-President Madison, against the equally emphatic judgment of Chief Justice Marshall, and above all, against the unbroken practice of the Government for 78 years, the Republican leaders now determined to deprive the President of the power of removing Federal officers. Many were induced to join in the movement under the belief that it was important to test the true meaning of the Constitution in the premises, and that this could be most effectively done by directly restraining by law the power which had been so long conceded to the Executive Department. To that end Mr. Williams of Oregon, on the first Monday of December, 1866, introduced a bill 'to regulate the tenure of civil offices.'"—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 2, p. 270.—"The programme unfolded in the winter of 1866-1867 consisted of two parts which were developed simultaneously. The first part was devoted to the effective assertion of congressional supremacy over the judicial and executive branches of the government; the second part consisted in the effective assertion of congressional supremacy in the conquered South. Little legislation was actually enacted as to the judiciary, but much was initiated and held in suspense till the proper moment for decisive action. In December, 1866, and January, 1867, three highly important opinions were announced by the Supreme Court. In *ex parte* Milligan it was declared that military commissions and the other incidents of martial law were unconstitutional save where flagrant war made the action of the ordinary courts impossible. In *Cummings vs. Missouri* a state test-oath, by which Confederate sympathizers were excluded from various professions, was held to contravene the constitutional prohibition of *ex post facto* laws [see also SUPREME COURT: 1866-1873]; and in *ex parte* Garland the Federal test-oath so far as it operated to prevent attorneys from practising in the United States courts, was for similar reasons found invalid. [See also ARKANSAS: 1865-1866.] These cases all manifested a spirit in the court that boded ill for the radical projects of reconstruction; and the congressional leaders, while obviously reluctant to attack the venerated judicial organ, did not conceal their purpose to do so if the provocation should go further. As to the executive, however, there was neither hesitation nor restraint; by the end of the session, March 4, a number of the most indispensable and fully recognized attributes of the presidential office had been taken from it, and a resolute movement to oust Johnson by impeachment had made substantial headway. Of

the assaults on the constitutional powers of the president, the most important and far-reaching were those directed against his control over his subordinates in the civil service and in the army. By the celebrated tenure of office act, which [was passed over the president's veto, without debate and] became law March 2, 1867, he was prohibited from removing civil officers save with the consent of the Senate, and was made guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment if he should violate the act. By a section inserted in the army appropriation act of the same date he was forbidden to issue military orders except through the General of the Army; or to relieve the general of his command or assign him to duty elsewhere than at Washington, save at the general's own request, or with the previous approval of the Senate; and a violation of these provisions also was declared to be a misdemeanor. In the passage of the tenure of office act, both a permanent and a temporary influence were operative. Participation by the Senate in the power of removal had never, since the origin of the Constitution, ceased to be claimed by members of the body whose prestige and power would be enhanced by the recognition of the principle; but no House of Representatives would have been likely to contribute to the exaltation of the rival chamber except under the pressure of such a condition as existed in 1867, when Johnson's removals of radical office-holders were producing the maximum of exasperation. The legislation touching the president's military functions was purely a result of the tension between Johnson and Congress; and in requiring that the commander-in-chief shall consult the Senate before giving certain orders to his subordinate, it is without parallel in our history, either for its encroachment on the constitutional power of the executive or for inherent preposterousness. But its source is even more astonishing than its content; for it was secretly dictated to Boutwell by the president's official adviser, Edwin M. Stanton, secretary of war."—W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, political and economic*, pp. 88-91.—See also PRESIDENT: United States: Presidential powers and functions.

ALSO IN: J. H. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 519.—C. W. Burgess, *Reconstruction and the constitution*, pp. 123-128.—W. H. Barnes, *History of the 39th Congress*, p. 560.

1866-1871.—**Ku Klux Klan of the Southern states and its outrages.**—"It would have been contrary to the experience of mankind, and an exception to all the teachings of history, if the social and political revolution which the results of the war had imposed on the states then recently insurgent had gone into operation peacefully, harmoniously, and successfully. It was impossible for such to be the case. The transition was from a state in which the superiority and domination of the white race over the colored race existed unquestioned for centuries. It was too a condition of things in which the most prominent whites were disfranchised and deprived of the right to hold public offices. Their late slaves were enfranchised, and the judicial and other offices were largely filled by dishonest and unfriendly strangers from the North. What was worse still, many of these places were filled by ignorant and brutal negroes. The transition was too sudden and violent. It was hard to submit to it quietly."—S. S. Cox, *Three decades of Federal legislation*, ch. 25.—"Sober men kept their heads; prudent men saw how sad an increase of passion would come out of

hasty counsels of strife, an open grapple between those outlawed and those appointed to govern. Men whom experience had chastened saw that only the slow processes of opinion could mend the unutterable errors of a time like that. But there were men to whom counsels of prudence seemed as ineffectual as they were unpalatable, men who could not sit still and suffer what was now put upon them. It was folly for them to give rein to their impulses; it was impossible for them to do nothing. . . . In May, 1866, a little group of young men in the Tennessee village of Pulaski, finding time hang heavy on their hands after the excitement of the field, so lately abandoned, formed a secret club for the mere pleasure of association, for private amusement,—for anything that might promise to break the monotony of the too quiet place, as their wits might work upon the matter, and one of their number suggested that they call themselves the *Kuklos*, the Circle. . . . Here was a very tempting and dangerous instrument of power for days of disorder and social upheaval, when law seemed set aside by the very government itself, and outsiders, adventurers, were in the seats of authority, the poor negroes, and white men without honor, their only partisans. Year by year the organization spread, from county to county, from State to State. Every country-side wished to have its own Ku Klux, founded in secrecy and mystery like the mother 'Den' at Pulaski, until at last there had sprung into existence a great *Ku Klux Klan*, an 'Invisible Empire of the South,' bound together in loose organization. . . . Similar secret orders grew up alongside the great Klan, or in States where its 'dens' had not been established: Knights of the White Camellia, Pale Faces, Constitutional Union Guards, the White Brotherhood, to serve the same ends by the same means. The Knights of the White Camellia, founded in New Orleans in the winter of 1867-1868, spread their organization abroad more widely even than the Ku Klux Klan. . . . The ranks of those who flocked into the South to take part in the reconstruction of the States and the habilitation of the negro for his life of freedom were strangely mixed of good and bad. The teachers came upon an errand of mercy and humanity, but came too many of them with bitter thoughts and intolerant purpose against the white people of the South, upon whom, as they did not reflect, the fortunes of the negro in any case depended. The politicians came for the most part like a predatory horde; but here and there emerged a man of integrity, of principle, of wise and moderate counsel, who hated with an ineradicable hatred the party and the practice of federal control which he represented. The Ku Klux and those who masqueraded in their guise struck at first only at those who made palpable mischief between the races or set just law aside to make themselves masters; but their work grew under their hands, and their zest for it. Brutal crimes were committed; the innocent suffered with the guilty; a reign of terror was brought on, and society was infinitely more disturbed than defended. Law seemed oftentimes given over. The right to the writ of *habeas corpus* was again and again suspended to check the lawless work. At least one governor of the reconstruction period sent to his adjutant general lists of leading citizens proscribed, with the suggestion that those whose names were specially marked should be tried by court martial and executed at once before the writ should be restored. One lawless force seemed in contest with another."

—W. Wilson, *History of the American people*, v. 5, pp. 59-64.—"Already before the Reconstruction Acts were passed, the political adventurers in the South had begun organizing the negroes into secret bodies, known later as the Union or Loyal League. The members of these bodies were sworn to obey the decisions of the organization and to execute them. The original idea seems to have been a combination for protection against bands of lawless white people, and for mutual aid and assistance in the hard struggle for existence to which the freedmen were now exposed. The League soon took on, however, a political character, and became a sort of Republican party organization in the South. It is difficult to determine whether the Ku-Klux organization preceded that of the Loyal League and provoked it



MEMBERS OF KU KLUX KLAN

Costumes worn in Tennessee and Northern Alabama
(From contemporary print)

or not. So far as we know, both of them were first heard of in the year 1866. It is probable that the Ku-Klux had its origin a little farther north than the Loyal League. . . . After the Reconstruction Acts were passed and put into operation, and especially after the Southern communities were reorganized as 'States' under them, and the military government gave way to the 'State' governments, this organization spread all over the South, and contributed much by its violent and unlawful method toward wringing finally the new 'state' governments of the South from the hands of the negroes and the 'carpet-baggers.' As it extended, its methods became more lawless and violent. Its members whipped, plundered, burned, abducted, imprisoned, tortured and murdered, for the prime purpose of keeping the negroes from exercising suffrage and holding office. They were protected by many respectable people who would not have participated personally

in their nefarious work. And they had confederates everywhere, who, upon the witness stand and in the jury box, would perjure themselves to prevent their conviction and punishment. It was even said that there were many cases where members of these Klans were able to have themselves subpoenaed as witnesses, or summoned as jurors, in the trials of their comrades, and that they were sworn to perjure themselves, if necessary, to clear each other. The respectable people of the South tried to make it appear that these lawless bands were simply freebooters, such as generally infest a country for a time after a period of war, and had no political meaning

direction of these organizations, and to operate the newly established 'State' governments under the same direction. This opened the way for the 'carpet-bag' governments in the Southern 'States.'—J. W. Burgess, *Reconstruction and the constitution*, pp. 250-253.—“Senator Scott, in a speech in the Senate, gave as the result of the investigation that came to his own knowledge, as follows: In North Carolina, in 14 counties, there were 18 murders and 315 whippings. In South Carolina, 9 counties, 35 murders and 276 other flagrant outrages. In Georgia, 29 counties, 72 murders and 126 whippings. In Alabama, 26 counties, 215 murders and



KU KLUX WARNING

Cartoon expressing the extreme Southern view

(From the *Independent Monitor*, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, Sept. 1, 1868)

or purpose whatsoever; and it is probably true that the Klans never went beyond any wider bond than the county organization, or Klan, being rather the moral bond of a common purpose; but it cannot be well questioned now that they had one purpose at least in common, and that was a chief purpose with them all, viz., to terrorize the negro out of the exercise of his newly-granted privileges of suffrage and office-holding, and keep him in his place as a menial. . . . The formation of the Union Leagues in 1867 and 1868 enabled the negroes to vote in these years for delegates to the constitutional conventions required under the Reconstruction Acts, and to vote upon the ratification of the constitutions framed by them, and to participate in the election for the 'State' officers and legislative members under those constitutions, with the help and under the

116 other outrages. In Florida, in one county alone there were 153 cases of homicide. In Mississippi, 20 counties, 23 homicides and 76 other cases of outrage. In 99 counties in different States he found 526 homicides and 2,000 cases of whipping. But the committee state that in Louisiana alone in the year 1868 there were more than 1,000 murders, and most of them were the result of the operations of the Ku Klux.”—H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power*, v. 3, ch. 45.—See also KU KLUX KLAN. ALSO IN: *Report of Joint Select Committee (42nd Congress, 2nd session, Senate Report no. 41)*.—W. G. Brown, *Lower South in American history*, pp. 191-225.—J. W. Garner, *Reconstruction in Mississippi*, pp. 338-353.—D. L. Wilson, *Ku-Klux Klans (Century Magazine, v. 6, pp. 398-410)*.—M. L. Avary, *Dixie after the war*, pp. 268-278.

1866-1872.—Rise and dissolution of the National Labor Union.—The National Labor Union was organized at Baltimore in 1866 and in the next year had its second meeting at Chicago. The growing importance of the effects of European emigration upon American labor was now recognized and in 1869 a delegate from the Philadelphia meeting was sent to Basel to confer with the European labor representatives on that subject. During the next few years both the European and American organizations were shattered on the rock of internal dissensions. The Franco-German War of 1870 had interfered with the meeting of the congress in that year, but the growth of the anarchist movement was the principal cause of the disruption of the European organization. The National Labor Union in America held its congresses from 1866 to 1872, but the growth of Socialism made inroads into its membership until the organization dwindled away to nothing. Nevertheless, despite the melancholy failure of this ambitious attempt to found a national labor organization it must not be forgotten that it was a forerunner of the American Federation of Labor organized ten years later. See AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR.

1866-1876.—Indian Wars: Fetterman massacre.—Indian reservations.—Baker massacre.—“The early turbulent population of miners and adventurers was crude, lawless and aggressive. It cared nothing whatever for the Indian tribes. War, instant and merciless, where it meant murder for the most part, was set on foot as soon as white touched red in that far western region. . . . Red Cloud, Crazy Horse, Roman Nose, American Horse, Black Kettle—these were names of great Indian generals who proved their ability to fight. At times they brought into the open country, which as yet remained unoccupied by the great pastoral movement from the south, as many as five thousand mounted warriors in one body, and they were well armed and well supplied with ammunition. . . . There were fought in the West from 1860 to 1875 more than two hundred pitched actions between the Army and the Indians. In most cases the white men were heavily outnumbered. The account which the Army gave of itself on scores of unremembered minor fields . . . would make one of the best pages of our history, could it be written today. The enlisted men of the frontier Army were riding and shooting men, able to live as the Indians did and able to beat them at their own game. They were led by Army officers whose type has never been improved upon in any later stage of our Army itself, or of any army in the world. There are certain great battles which may at least receive notice. . . . The Fetterman Massacre in 1866, near Fort Phil Kearney, a post located at the edge of the Big Horn Mountains, was a blow which the Army never has forgotten. ‘In a place of fifty feet square lay the bodies of Colonel Fetterman, Captain Brown, and sixty-five enlisted men. Each man was stripped naked and hacked and scalped, the skulls beaten in with war clubs and the bodies gashed with knives almost beyond recognition, with other ghastly mutilations that the civilized pen hesitates to record.’ [See also WYOMING: 1866 (June-December).] This tragedy brought the Indian problem before the country as never before. The hand of the Western rancher and trader was implacably against the tribesmen of the plains; the city-dweller of the East, with hazy notions of the Indian character, was disposed to

urge lenient methods upon those responsible for governmental policy. While the Sioux and Cheyenne wars dragged on, Congress created, by act of July 20, 1867, a peace commission of four civilians and three army officers to deal with the hostile tribes. For more than a year, with scant sympathy for the military members, this commission endeavored to remove the causes of friction by amicable conference with the Indian chiefs. . . . Segregation of the Indian tribes upon reservations seemed to the commission the only solution of the vexing problem. Various treaties were made and others were projected looking toward the removal of the tribesmen from the highways of continental travel. The result was misgiving and increased unrest among the Indians.

“In midsummer of 1868 forays occurred at many points along the border of the Indian Territory. General Sheridan, who now commanded the Department of the Missouri, believed that a general war was imminent. He determined to teach the southern tribesmen a lesson they would not forget. In the dead of winter our troops marched against the Cheyennes, then in their encampments below the Kansas line. The Indians did not believe that white men could march in weather forty below zero, during which they themselves sat in their tepees around their fires; but our cavalymen did march in such weather, and under conditions such as our cavalry perhaps could not endure today. Among these troops was the Seventh Cavalry, Custer’s Regiment, formed after the Civil War, and it was led by Lieutenant-Colonel George A. Custer himself, that gallant officer whose name was to go into further and more melancholy history of the Plains. Custer marched until he got in touch with the trails of the Cheyennes, whom he knew to belong to Black Kettle’s band. He did not at the time know that below them, in the same valley of the Washita, were also the winter encampments of the Kiowas, the Comanches, the Arapahoes, and even a few Apaches. He attacked at dawn of a bleak winter morning, November 27, 1868, after taking the precaution of surrounding the camp and killed Black Kettle, and another chief, Little Rock, and over a hundred of their warriors. Many women and children also were killed in this attack. The result was one which sank deep into the Indian mind. They began to respect the men who could outmarch them and outlive them on the range. Surely, they thought, these were not the same men who had abandoned Forts Phil Kearney, C. F. Smith, and Reno. There had been some mistake about this matter. The Indians began to think it over. The result was a pacifying of all the country south of the Platte. The lower Indians began to come in and give themselves up to the reservation life. One of the hardest of pitched battles ever fought with an Indian tribe occurred in September, 1868, on the Arickaree or South Fork of the Republican River, where General ‘Sandy’ Forsyth, and his scouts, for nine days fought over six hundred Cheyennes and Arapahoes. These savages had been committing atrocities upon the settlers of the Saline, the Solomon, and the Republican valleys, and were known to have killed some sixty-four men and women at the time General Sheridan resolved to punish them. Forsyth had no chance to get a command of troops, but he was allowed to enlist fifty scouts, all ‘first-class, hardened frontiersmen,’ and with this body of fighting men he carried out the most dramatic battle perhaps ever waged

on the Plains. Forsyth ran into the trail of two or three large Indian villages, but none the less he followed on until he came to the valley of the South Fork. Here the Cheyennes, under the redoubtable Roman Nose surrounded him on the 17th of September. The small band of scouts took refuge on a brushy island some sixty yards from shore, and hastily dug themselves in under fire. They stood at bay outnumbered ten to one, with small prospect of escape, for the little island offered no protection of itself, and was in point-blank range from the banks of the river. All their horses soon were shot down, and the men lay in the rifle pits with no hope of escape. Roman Nose, enraged at the resistance put up by Forsyth's men, led a band of some four hundred of his warriors in the most desperate charge that has been recorded in all our Indian fighting annals. It was rarely that the Indian would charge at all; but these tribesmen . . . charged in full view not only once but three times in one day, and got within a hundred feet of the foot of the island where the scouts were lying. . . . But they never reached them and finally the Indians retired chanting dirges for their many dead. Seven of the scouts were killed and seventeen wounded, including Forsyth himself.]

What is known as the Baker Massacre was the turning-point in the half-century of warfare with the Blackfeet. . . . On January 22, 1870, Major E. M. Baker, led by half-breeds, . . . surprised the Piegiens in their winter camp on the Marias River, just below the border. He, like Custer, attacked at dawn, opening the encounter with a general fire into the tepees. He killed a hundred and seventy-three of the Piegiens, including very many women and children, as was unhappily the case so often in their surprise attacks. It was deplorable warfare. But it ended the resistance of the savage Blackfeet. They have been disposed for peace from that day to this. The terrible revenge which the Sioux and Cheyennes took in the battle which annihilated Custer and his men on the Little Big Horn in the summer of 1876; the Homeric running fight made by Chief Joseph of the Nez Percés—a fight which baffled our best generals and their men for a hundred and ten days over more than fourteen hundred miles of wilderness—these are events so well known that it seems needless to do more than to refer to them. The Nez Percés in turn went down forever when Joseph came out and surrendered, saying, 'From where the sun now stands I fight against the white man no more forever.' . . . The Modoc war against the warriors of Captain Jack in 1873 was waged in the lava beds of Oregon, and it had the distinction of being one of the first Indian wars to be well reported in the newspapers. We heard a great deal of the long and trying campaigns waged by the Army in revenge for the murder of General Canby in his council tent. We got small glory out of that war, perhaps, but at last we hanged the ring-leader of the murderers; and the extreme Northwest remained free from that time on.

"Far in the dry Southwest, where home-building man did not as yet essay a general occupation of the soil, the bloody-thirsty Apache long waged a warfare which tried the mettle of our Army as perhaps no other tribes ever have done. The Spaniards had fought these Apaches for nearly three hundred years, and had not beaten them. They offered three hundred dollars each for Apache scalps, and took a certain number of them.

But they left all the remaining braves sworn to an eternal enmity. The Apaches became mountain outlaws, whose blood-mad thirst for revenge never died. No tribe ever fought more bitterly. Hemmed in and surrounded, with no hope of escape, in some instances they perished literally to the last man. General George Crook finished the work of cleaning up the Apache outlaws only by use of the trailers of their own people who sided with the whites for pay. Without the Pima scouts he never could have run down the Apaches as he did. Perhaps these were the hardest of all the Plains Indians to find and to fight. But in 1872 Crook subdued them and concentrated them in reservations in Arizona. Ten years later, under Geronimo, a tribe of the Apaches broke loose and yielded to General Crook only after a prolonged war. Once again they raided New Mexico and Arizona in 1885-6. This was the last raid of Geronimo. He was forced by General Miles to surrender and, together with his chief warriors, was deported to Fort Pickens in Florida. In all these savage pitched battles and bloody skirmishes, the surprises and murderous assaults all over the old range, there were hundreds of settlers killed, hundreds also of our army men, including some splendid officers. In the Custer fight alone, on the little Big Horn, the Army lost Custer himself, thirteen commissioned officers, and two hundred and fifty-six enlisted men killed, with two officers and fifty-one men wounded; a total of three hundred and twenty-three killed, and wounded in one battle. Custer had in his full column about seven hundred men. The number of the Indians has been variously estimated. They had perhaps five thousand men in their villages when they met Custer in this, the most historic and most ghastly battle of the Plain. It would be bootless to revive any of the old discussions regarding Custer and his rash courage. Whether in error or in wisdom, he died, and gallantly."—E. Hough, *Passing of the Frontier* (*Chronicles of America Series*, pp. 26, 123-135).—"Hostilities with a powerful confederation of Sioux or Dakota tribes of Indians, in the northwest, were brought about, in the spring of 1876 by gold discoveries in the Black Hills and the consequent rush of miners into the Indian reservation. To subdue the hostile Indians, three military expeditions were set in motion,—from Fort Fetterman, under General Crook, from Fort Ellis, in Montana, under General Gibbon, and from Bismarck, in Dakota, under General Terry. These were to converge on the upper waters of the Yellowstone, where Sitting Bull, the able chief of the Sioux, had his camp, in the valley of the small stream commonly known as the Little Big Horn. The Sioux warrior used the advantage of his central position like a Napoleon, striking his assailants in turn, as they came near, with far stronger forces than they knew him to possess. Crook was forced back; Gibbon was brought to a halt. Terry came last on the ground. His command included the famous Seventh Cavalry,—the regiment of General Custer. In ignorance of the surprising number of braves which Sitting Bull had collected, Custer was sent to make a detour and attack the Indian camp from the rear. Doing so, on the 25th of June, he rode into a death trap. Five companies of the regiment, with its heroic commander at their head, were surrounded so overwhelmingly that not one man escaped. The remaining seven companies were too far from the others to cooperate in the

attack. They fortified a bluff and held their ground until the 27th, when Terry and Gibbon came to their relief. The Indians retreated toward the mountains. The campaign was soon resumed, and prosecuted through the fall and winter, until Sitting Bull and some of his followers fled into British America and the remaining hostiles surrendered."—F. Whittaker, *Complete life of General George A. Custer*, bk. 8, ch. 4-5.—See also INDIANS, AMERICAN: 1865-1876; OKLAHOMA: 1866-1879; MONTANA: 1876.

ALSO IN: J. F. Finerty, *War path and bivouac*, pt. 1.—E. B. Andrews, *History of the last quarter century*, ch. 7.

1866-1877.—Granger movement.—Opposition to growing monopolies.—Farmers' Alliance.—Rural life.—Social influence of Granges.—The order, composed of farmers, known as Patrons of Husbandry, or Grangers, was founded in 1866. It grew rapidly during the first decade of its existence, and reported a membership, in November, 1875, of 763,263. After that period the numbers declined. The general aims of the order were set forth in a "Declaration of Purposes," as follows: "We shall endeavor to advance our cause by laboring to accomplishing the following objects: To develop a better and higher manhood and womanhood among ourselves. To enhance the comforts and attractions of our homes, and strengthen our attachments to our pursuits. To foster mutual understanding and co-operation. . . . To discountenance the credit system, the mortgage system, the fashion system, and every other system tending to prodigality and bankruptcy. We propose meeting together, talking together, working together, buying together, selling together, and in general acting together for our mutual protection and advancement, as occasion may require. We shall avoid litigation as much as possible by arbitration in the Grange. . . . We are not enemies to capital, but we oppose the tyranny of monopolies. We long to see the antagonism between labor and capital removed by common consent and by an enlightened statesmanship worthy of the nineteenth century. . . . Last, but not least, we proclaim it among our purposes to inculcate a proper appreciation of the abilities and sphere of woman, as is indicated by admitting her to membership and position in our order."—R. T. Ely, *Labor movement in America*, ch. 3.—See also MINNESOTA: 1868.—"In 1867 O. H. Kelly, once a farmer, but at the time a clerk in the Post Office Department at Washington, with six clerks from other bureaus or departments, formed the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry. The object of the Grange was to organize the farmers of the country in their own interests. This organization was to be secret and was to consist of local granges bound together in a national association. After several years of struggle, the order began to grow rapidly, and by 1875 there were over twenty thousand local granges with seven hundred and fifty thousand members. After that it began to decline, and by 1880 its membership is estimated to have been not over one hundred and fifty thousand. It has survived in many states to this day, but its early aggressiveness has never returned. One of the main purposes of the Grange was to combat monopolies and discrimination. Although it disclaimed any political motives, nevertheless, between 1870 and 1875 farmers' legislatures were elected in numerous states. In Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota they at once

passed laws to regulate railroads and warehouses—the so-called Granger Laws. The main features of these laws were the fixing of passenger and freight rates, and the prohibition of a large per-mile charge for a short than for a long haul. The rates were established either by the law, or by a commission established by the law. Provision was also made for the fixing of rates of storage in elevators and for preventing discriminations in services rendered by them. [See also RAILROADS: 1870-1876]. Most of the Granger legislation did not last long. Some of the laws were so severe that the railroads insisted they could not operate under them. The people soon became frightened at what they had done owing in large measure to a careful campaign of 'education' paid for by the railroads. By this propaganda people's fears were aroused lest railroad building would cease and the states be ruined. For these reasons most of the rate-fixing laws were repealed. Certain results, however, were accomplished. In the first place, railroad commissions were established in many states that had not had them before, and the example was gradually followed by others. Secondly, the doctrine had been introduced that the railroads were public servants instead of private concerns that could tell the public to mind its own business. Moreover, since the inadequacy of state regulation had been proved, the way was cleared for national control."—L. R. Wells, *Industrial history of the United States*, pp. 414-415.—"On all hands there was a manifest growing uneasiness because of the apparent rise of monopolies and the concentration of capital in the hands of comparatively small groups of men who seemed to be in a position to control at their pleasure the productive industries of the country; because of the power of the railways to determine by discriminating rates what sections of the country, what industries, what sorts of products and of manufactures should be accorded the easiest access to the markets; because of the increase in the cost of the necessary tools of industry and of all manufactured goods through the operation of the tariff,—the inequitable clogs which seemed to many to be put by the law itself upon the free and whole some rivalries of commerce and production. The farmers of the West and South, no less than the workingmen of the industrial East, had begun, close upon the heels of the war, to organize themselves for the protection and advancement of their own special interests, to which the programmes of the political parties paid little heed. Between 1872 and 1875 the local 'granges' of a secret order known as the Patrons of Industry had multiplied in a very significant manner, until their membership rose to quite a million and a half and was spread over the entire Union. It was the purpose of the order to promote by every proper means the interests of the farmers of the country, though it was no part of its plan to agitate questions of politics, put candidates for office into the field at elections or use its gathering power to determine the fate of parties. Politicians, nevertheless, found means to use it,—felt obliged to use it because they feared to let it act for itself. Its discussions turned often on questions of transportation, upon the railways and their power to make or ruin; it was but a short step in such a field from an association for mutual protection and advice to a political party organized for the control of legislation. 'Grangers' were not always to be held off, therefore, by their prudent

leaders from using their numbers and their ready concert of action to further or defeat the ambitions of particular groups of politicians; and even while their granges grew other organizations of farmers came into existence whose aims were frankly and openly political. About the time of Mr. Hayes's accession to the presidency independent associations began to make their appearance in the South and in the West, under the name of the 'Farmers' Alliance,' whose common object it was to oppose monopoly and the power of money in public affairs in the interest of those who had neither the use of capital nor the protection of tariffs. The first 'Alliance' made its appearance in Texas, to prevent the wholesale purchase of the public lands of the State by private individuals. The organization spread into other southern States, and with its extension went also an enlargement of its programme of reform. Almost at the same time a 'National Farmers' Alliance' was established in Illinois which quickly extended its organization into Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, and Dakota. [See NATIONAL FARMERS' ALLIANCE.] Many sorts of reform commended themselves to the leaders of the movement, north and south: chief among them, government control of the means of transportation, the entire divorce of the government from the banks, and a paper currency issued directly to the people on the security of their land,—some escape from the power of the money lenders and of the great railways, and a war upon monopolies. These were vague purposes, and the means of reform proposed showed the thinking of crude and ignorant minds; but politicians felt with evident concern that new, it might be uncontrollable, forces had begun to play through the matters which they handled, and that it must presently be harder than ever to calculate the fortunes of parties at the polls. They perceived how difficult and delicate a task it must prove to keep the tacit pledges of the protective system to the manufacturers and give the free capital of the country, the proper support of government and yet satisfy the classes now astray in these new associations of laborers and farmers, whose distress was as real as their programmes of reform were visionary. There was a significance in these new movements which did not lie upon the surface. New questions had become national and were being uncomfortably pressed upon the attention of national party leaders because the attitude of the country towards the national government had been subtly changed by the events of war and reconstruction. The war had not merely roused the spirit of nationality, until then but half-conscious, into vivid life and filled every country-side of the North and West with a new ardor for that government which was greater than the government of States, the government upon which the unity and prestige of the nation itself depended. It had also disclosed the real foundations of the Union; had shown them to be laid, not in the constitution, its mere formal structure, but upon deep beds of conviction and sentiment. It was not a theory of lawyers that had won when the southern Confederacy was crushed, but the passionate beliefs of an efficient majority of the nation, to whom the constitution was but a partial expression of the ideals which underlay their common life."—W. Wilson, *History of the American people*, pp. 10-14.

"It is difficult for the present generation to form any conception of the dreariness and dull-

ness of farm life half a century ago. Especially in the West, where farms were large, opportunities for social intercourse were few, and weeks might pass without the farmer seeing his nearest neighbors. For his wife existence was even more drear. She went to the market town less often than he and the routine of her life on the farm kept her close to the farmhouse and prevented visits even to her neighbors' dwellings. The difficulty of getting domestic servants made the work of the farmer's wife extremely laborious; and at that time there were none of the modern conveniences which lighten work such as power churns, cream separators, and washing-machines. Even more than the husband, the wife was likely to degenerate into a drudge without the hope—and eventually without the desire—of anything better. The church formed, to be sure, a means of social intercourse; but according to prevailing religious notions the churchyard was not the place nor the Sabbath the time for that healthy but unrestrained hilarity which is essential to the well-being of man. Into lives thus circumscribed the Grange came as a liberalizing and uplifting influence. Its admission of women into the order on the same terms as men made it a real community servant and gave both women and a man a new sense of the dignity of woman. More important perhaps than any change in theories concerning womankind, it afforded an opportunity for men and women to work and play together, apparently much to the satisfaction and enjoyment of both sexes. Not only in Grange meetings, which came at least once a month and often more frequently, but also in Grange picnics and festivals the farmers and their wives and children came together for joyous human intercourse. Such frequent meetings were bound to work a change of heart. Much of man's self-respect arises from the esteem of others, and the desire to keep that esteem is certainly a powerful agent in social welfare. It was reported that in many communities the advent of the Grange created a marked improvement in the dress and manners of the members. Crabbed men came out of their shells and grew genial; disheartened women became cheerful; repressed children delighted in the chance to play with other boys and girls of their own age. The ritual of the Grange, inculcating lessons of orderliness, industry, thrift, and temperance, expressed the member's ideals in more dignified and pleasing language than they themselves could have invented. The songs of the Grange gave an opportunity for the exercise of the musical sense of people not too critical of literary quality, when with 'spontaneous trills on every tongue,' as one of the songs has it, the members varied the ritual with music. One of the virtues especially enjoined on Grange members was charity. Ceres, Pomona, and Flora, offices of the Grange to be filled only by women, were made to represent Faith, Hope, and Charity, respectively; and in the ceremony of dedicating the Grange hall these three stood always beside the altar while the chaplain read the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians. Not only in theory but in practice did the order proclaim its devotion to charitable work. It was not uncommon for members of a local Grange to foregather and harvest the crops for a sick brother or help rebuild a house destroyed by fire or tornado. In times of drought or plague both state and national Granges were generous in donations for the sufferers; in 1874, when the Mississippi River overflowed its

banks in its lower reaches, money and supplies were sent to the farmers of Louisiana and Alabama; again in the same year relief was sent to those Patrons who suffered from the grasshopper plague west of the Mississippi; and in 1876 money was sent to South Carolina to aid sufferers from a prolonged drought in that State. These charitable deeds, endearing giver and receiver to each other, resulted in a better understanding and a greater tolerance between people of different parts of the country. The meeting of the local Granges were forums in which the members trained themselves in public speaking and parliamentary practice. Programs were arranged, sometimes with the help of suggestions from officers of the state Grange; and the discussion of a wide variety of topics, mostly economic and usually concerned especially with the interests of the farmer, could not help being stimulating, even if conclusions were sometimes reached which were at variance with orthodox political economy. The Grange was responsible, too, for a great increase in the number and circulation of agricultural journals. Many of these papers were recognized as official organs of the order and, by publishing news of the Granges and discussing the political and economic phases of the farmers movement, they built up an extensive circulation. Rural postmasters everywhere reported a great increase in their mails after the establishment of a Grange in the vicinity. One said that after the advent of the order there were thirty newspapers taken at his office where previously there had been but one. Papers for which members or local Granges subscribed were read, passed from hand to hand, and thoroughly discussed. This is good evidence that farmers were forming the habit of reading. All the Granger laws might have been repealed; all the schemes for coöperation might have come to naught; all the moral and religious teachings of the Grange might have been left to the church; but if the Granger movement had created nothing else than this desire to read, it would have been worth while. For after the farmer began to read, he was no longer like deadwood, floating in the backwaters of the current; he became more like a propelled vessel in midstream—sometimes, to be sure, driven into turbulent waters, sometimes tossed about by conflicting currents, but at least making progress.”—S. J. Buck, *Agrarian Crusade* (*Chronicles of America Series*, v. 45, pp. 72-76).

1866-1890.—Enforcement of child labor laws. —Organization of child labor bureaus. See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1866-1890.

1867.—Growth of agricultural schools since 1790. See EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: United States: Agricultural societies.

1867.—Fessenden's influence on Reconstruction. See MAINE: 1854-1867.

1867.—Nebraska admitted to Union. See NEBRASKA: 1854-1867.


1867.—Purchase of Alaska. See ALASKA: 1787-1867; 1867; also Map.

1867 (January).—Negro suffrage in the District of Columbia.—As early as Jan. 18, 1866, the House of Representatives passed a bill extending the suffrage in the District of Columbia, by striking out the word "white" from all laws and parts of laws prescribing the qualification of electors for any office in the District, and declaring that no person should be disqualified from voting at any election in the District on account of color. As it was known that the president would veto the bill if sent to him, the Senate held it until

the next session. In December, 1866, it was called up in that body by Senator Sumner, and after considerable debate was passed, December 13. On January 7 following it was returned by the president with his veto, but was passed over the veto by the Senate (29 to 10) the same day, and by the House (113 to 38) the day following, thus becoming a law.—Based on W. H. Barnes, *History of the 39th Congress*, ch. 4, 21.

ALSO IN: G. W. Julian, *Political recollections*, ch. 12.

1867 (March).—Military Reconstruction Acts of Congress.—“The first concern of the radicals was to abolish the governments Johnson had set up in the Southern states, and to substitute others which conformed to the radical theory. Stevens had ever advocated such a course and introduced a bill to that effect in the first session of the existing congress. Moderate views, however, had prevailed and his bill was not pressed. He now, January 3, 1867, called it up, and spite of the



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opposition of the liberals, it was referred to the joint committee on reconstruction, which reported it a month later with some modifications. It abolished existing southern governments and created military rule in the South to continue during the pleasure of congress. The house passed it, but the senate moderates opposed it so strongly that compromise was necessary. The bill as it passed the house provided the military governors be appointed by the general of the army—General Grant. The moderate senators did not like to ignore the president's constitutional power as commander-in-chief, they thought he ought to appoint the military governors, and they wished the bill to specify the time at which the scheme should cease to operate. They had their way, and the measure in its final form passed both houses, was vetoed by Johnson, and passed over his veto, March 2, 1867. Sumner, always the champion of negro suffrage, desired that the bill specify that the state constitutions to be adopted under the proposed scheme should enfranchise the freedmen, and his demand was granted. The act of March 2 was the first of three which together em-

bodied the congressional plan of reconstruction. Its chief features were: 1. The South was to be divided into five military districts as follows: (a) Virginia, (b) the Carolinas, (c) Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, (d) Mississippi and Louisiana, and (e) Texas and Arkansas. Tennessee was not in this arrangement, for in 1866 it accepted the fourteenth amendment and was recognized as in full fellowship. Over each military district there was to be a military governor appointed by the president with the consent of the senate. 3. This governor must preserve order in his district, and he might continue local civil officers there or supplant them by military tribunals as he saw fit. 4. A constitutional convention should be called in each state, the delegates being chosen by all citizens, regardless of race or color, except those disfranchised for rebellion or for felony at common law. 5. When the revised constitution, which must accept the franchise provided in this act, was approved by those who voted for the members of the convention and was accepted by congress, and when the legislature under it had adopted the fourteenth amendment and the said amendment had become a part of the federal constitution, such a state should be readmitted into the union and military government should cease. The day after this act was passed congress adjourned. Its last care was to call an extra session of the succeeding congress, the fortieth, to meet on March 4. It had taken the situation into its own hands so effectually that even this function was taken from the president. The new congress was more opposed to Johnson than its predecessor, and carried on the task of reconstruction with eagerness. The act of March 2 merely enacted a plan; a new law, that of March 23, provided machinery for putting the plan into effect. It provided for a registration of voters and for holding elections of delegates to the conventions. It also provided that a constitution to be accepted must have the approval of a majority of the registered voters. This was done to meet an objection of the other side that the proposed proceedings in the South would be only minority legislation. Johnson vetoed this act and congress overrode the veto."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 609-610.

ALSO IN: S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 520-521.—O. J. Hollister, *Life of Schuyler Colfax*, ch. 9.—W. H. Barnes, *History of the 39th Congress*, ch. 22.—H. A. Herbert, *Why the Solid South?* (*Noted men of the Solid South.*)

1867-1868.—Reconstruction Acts in operation.—Conventions.—Third Reconstruction Act.—Johnson's opposition to reconstruction ceased when the acts were passed over his veto. "He considered it his duty to enforce the law and appointed five military governors provided for, all generals of prominence; and they ordered registrations of voters and called for elections as the laws directed. The radicals thought their work well done, but the Southerners, with the aid of Stanbery, the attorney-general, found a weak point in it. The law allowed all to register who did not voluntarily serve the confederacy. Did the registration officers have authority to determine that an applicant had fought voluntarily or involuntarily? The question was referred to Washington, and Stanbery decided that the officers had no discretion and must register all who offered. Under this interpretation of the law the Southerners would register in large numbers and probably defeat the objects of congressional reconstruction. The radicals were alarmed. Sec-

retary of War Stanton, their chief reliance in the cabinet, was in entire opposition to the president, and wrote a new law which congress passed over Johnson's veto July 19, 1867. It was the third reconstruction act of the radicals. It gave the registration officials the specific authority Stanbery had not found in the first acts, and in other ways made it impossible to evade the will of the congressional majority. In these three laws congressional reconstruction received its legal basis and became inevitable."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, p. 610.—"Despite his dissent from the provisions [of the Reconstruction Acts] the president at once set military reconstruction in operation. When he mitigated its harshness, however, where latitude was allowed him, Congress passed additional acts, over the veto, of course, extending and defining the powers of the commanding generals. Armed with complete authority, the generals proceeded to remove many of the ordinary civil officers and to replace them with their own appointees, to compel order by means of the soldiery, to set aside court decrees and even to close the courts and to enact legislation. In the meanwhile a total of 703,000 black and 627,000 white voters were registered, delegates to constitutional conventions were elected, constitutions were drawn up and adopted which permitted negro suffrage, and state officers and legislators elected. In conformity with the provisions of the act, the newly chosen legislatures ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, sent representatives and senators to Washington, where they were admitted to Congress."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War*, pp. 14-15.—"In the early winter of 1867 elections were held in all the military districts, and by February, 1868, constitutional conventions were in sessions in all the States affected by the act. The work of framing and ratifying the constitutions was pushed forward with vigor all over the South, and by the end of June, 1868, seven States, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and Louisiana, had done the things required by the act and had been restored to the Union. Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas failed to secure the proper ratification of their respective constitutions and were therefore compelled to remain outside the Union under the rule of their military governors."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 520.—See also ARKANSAS: 1868; FLORIDA: 1865-1868; GEORGIA: 1865-1872; KENTUCKY: 1867-1895; NORTH CAROLINA: 1868-1876; SOUTH CAROLINA: 1865-1872; TEXAS: 1865-1876.

1867-1870.—Control of Pribilof islands.—Care of seals. See PRIBILOV ISLANDS.

1867-1893.—Represented at four international conferences on bimetalism. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1867-1893.

1868.—Passage of eight-hour day law for government employees. See LABOR LEGISLATION: 1862-1920.

1868.—Burlingame Treaty with China. See CHINA: 1857-1868.

1868 (March-May).—Impeachment and trial of President Johnson.—"Until the spring of 1866, a year after Mr. Johnson became President, there was entire harmony between him and his Cabinet. . . . No objection was raised even to that part of the President's first message which treated of the suffrage question, by any member of the Cabinet. It was in fact, approved by all, and by none more heartily than by Mr. Stanton. A change took place soon after the Civil Rights bill became a law over the President's veto, and bitter


controversy arose between the President and Congress. In this controversy and at its commencement, Mr. Dennison [postmaster-general] and Mr. Harlan [secretary of the interior] sided with Congress and tendered their resignations, which were very reluctantly accepted. They resigned because they could not heartily sustain the President, but there was no breach of the social relations which had existed between them. Mr. Speed [attorney-general] soon after followed the example of Dennison and Harlan. Mr. Stanton [secretary of war] also sided with Congress, but he did not resign. He was advised by prominent political and personal friends to 'stick,' and he did so, contrary to all precedent and in opposition to the judgment of conservative men of his party. . . . He attended the Cabinet meetings, not as an adviser of the President, but as an opponent of the policy to which he had himself been committed, and the President lacked the nerve to dismiss him. . . . In this crisis of his political life, Mr. Johnson exhibited a want of spirit and decision which astonished those who were familiar with his antecedents. He knew when the Tenure-of-Office Bill was before Congress that the object of its leading supporters was to tie his hands, and yet he refrained from using them when they were free."—H. McCulloch, *Men and measures of half a century*, ch. 26.—"Although Johnson kept within the letter of the law and obeyed it when it was clear, he was not trusted and was much disliked. Congress expressed its feeling by fixing the times of its own reassembling, and in allowing many contemptuous utterances on the floors of the two houses. He gave great offense in the summer of 1866 in several speeches in what was known as his 'swinging-around-the-circle' tour in the West. He was said to have been intoxicated when he spoke at Cleveland, where the jibes from the crowd irritated him until he broke into a series of angry and rude retorts. It was probably the most undignified exhibition a president of the United States ever made of himself. It gave an argument to his enemies, who redoubled their abuse and aroused such contempt for him in the country that they felt able to treat him in the most disdainful manner without fear of popular reproof. They pronounced him a traitor, and talked openly of impeaching him. They desired to take out of his hands the execution of their program. They had wished to take from him the appointment of the military governors, but the moderates in the senate blocked them in that. Then they passed over his veto the tenure-of-office act, March 2, 1867 [see above: 1865 (December-March)]. Secretary Stanton, they thought, was necessary to their plans. He was bold, resourceful, and defiant of Johnson. If he should be dismissed from the war department, where he had a wide supervision over the new military districts, and a man of Johnson's way of thinking should take his place, much might be lost in the execution of the reconstruction laws. . . . [The Tenure-of-Office Act] directed that if the president removed a cabinet officer during the recess of congress, he should report the case to the senate within twenty days after it convened, and the senate might order the reinstatement of the officer in question. Such a removal could, therefore, only be a suspension. The constitution is not specific on this point, but in 1867 it had been held for a long time that it gave the president the power to dismiss a cabinet officer, and Jackson and others had exercised the right. Johnson and his advisers, therefore, disputed the con-

stitutionality of the tenure-of-office act and were prepared to test it in the courts when the opportunity came. Not only Johnson but many others opposed to the plans of the radicals turned their eyes to the supreme court, finding in it the last hope of checking the course of the innovators. They saw in all that was done an exaltation of military authority and a dangerous menace to liberty. If the court did not save them, they thought, who would?"—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 611-612.—The president suspended Stanton on August 12, 1867, "after the Tenure-of-Office Bill had become a law, and in accordance with its provisions, [directing General Grant to act as secretary of war ad interim]; and when the Senate refused to approve of the suspension [Jan. 13, 1868], he issued orders for his removal and the appointment of Lorenzo Thomas to be Secretary of War ad interim. If he had tried to give his enemies an advantage over him, to furnish them with weapons for his own discomfiture, he could not have done it more effectually. . . . If he had removed Mr. Stanton instead of suspending him, and justified his action on the ground that his control of the members of his Cabinet was a constitutional right of which he could not be deprived by Congress, he probably would not have been impeached. The gist of the charges against him was that he had violated a law of Congress in removing Mr. Stanton, or issuing an order for his removal, after the Senate had refused to sanction his suspension. In the articles of impeachment there were other charges against the President, the most serious of which were that he had delivered intemperate, inflammatory speeches, which were intended to bring into contempt the Congress of the United States and duly enacted laws. The speeches made by the President in Cleveland, St. Louis, and other places in August and September, 1866—in fact, all his public addresses during his contest with Congress—were in the worst possible taste, derogatory to himself and to his high position; but they . . . did not constitute good ground for his impeachment; and this was the opinion of the House, which in January, 1867, after they were made, refused to impeach him by the decisive vote of 108 to 57. Other causes for his impeachment were subsequently sought for. His bank account was examined. His private conduct in Washington was carefully scrutinized. Men were employed to investigate his public and private character in Tennessee, but nothing was found to his discredit. . . . Nothing was found to justify his impeachment, but the order which he issued for the removal of Mr. Stanton and his appointment of General Thomas to be Secretary of the War Department ad interim after the Senate had refused to sanction Mr. Stanton's suspension." The formal presentment by the House of Representatives of its impeachment against the president, at the bar of the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, was made on March, 5, 1868. The answer of the president was presented on the 23rd; the trial opened on Monday, March 30, and closed on May 26 following. "The trial was a very interesting one, not only to the people of the United States, but to the people of other countries. . . . It was the first instance in the history of nations of the trial of the head of a government before one of the branches of the law-making power, sitting as a judicial tribunal, on charges presented by another. The presiding officer was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court—the senators of the respective States were the jury—the

House of Representatives the prosecutor. The managers to conduct the impeachment for the House were John A. Bingham, George S. Boutwell, James F. Wilson, Benjamin F. Butler, Thomas Williams, Thaddeus Stevens and John A. Logan, all members of the House, all lawyers, and some of them distinguished in the profession. The President entered his appearance by Henry Stanbery, Benjamin K. Curtis, Jeremiah S. Black, William M. Evarts, and Thomas A. K. Nelson. William S. Groesbeck, in the course of the trial, appeared and took part as counsel for the President in place of Mr. Black. [The result of the trial was a failure of the impeachment. The senators who voted "guilty" were thirty-five in number—being less than two-thirds of the whole—against 19. Of those who voted in the negative seven were Republicans who had steadily opposed

quishment of the War Department. . . . The Senate now confirmed the nomination of General Schofield to be Secretary of War. The General at once accepted the appointment and entered upon the duties of his office, and administered these duties to the end of his term, according to his own testimony, in perfect harmony with the President. . . . What we have as certain facts are that the judgment was an acquittal, that it was rendered in accordance with law and evidence, and that it preserved the constitutional balance between the executive and the legislature in the governmental system of the country; and that for this the judgment of history coincides with the judgment of the court."—J. W. Burgess, *Reconstruction and the constitution*, pp. 191-192, 194.

ALSO IN: *Trial of Andrew Johnson* (published by order of the Senate), 3 v., *Congressional Globe*,



HIGH COURT OF IMPEACHMENT IN SESSION IN THE SENATE CHAMBER, MARCH 23, 1868

Benjamin R. Curtis of the counsel for President Johnson, reading the answer to the articles of impeachment. Seated at the table in the middle are the Committee of Managers of the House of Representatives.

(From a drawing by Jay Hambidge)

the president's policy; four were Republicans who had adhered to him throughout; eight were Democrats.]—H. McCulloch, *Men and measures of half a century*, ch. 26.—“The truth of the whole matter is that, while Mr. Johnson was an unfit person to be President of the United States . . . he was utterly and entirely guiltless of the commission of any crime or misdemeanor. . . . He was not behind any of his accusers in patriotism and loyalty to the country, and in his willingness to sacrifice every personal advantage for the maintenance of the Union and the preservation of the Government. In fact, most of them were pygmies in these qualities beside him. It is true that he differed with them somewhat in his conception of what measures were for the welfare of the country and what not, but the sequel has shown that he was nearer right than they in this respect. So soon as the Court of Impeachment pronounced its acquittal of the President, Mr. Stanton addressed to the President a letter announcing his relin-

Supplement, 40th Congress, 2nd session.—G. C. Gorham, *Edwin M. Stanton*, v. 2, pp. 393-445.

1868 (November).—Twenty-first presidential election.—General Ulysses S. Grant, nominated by the Republican party, was elected president in November 1868, by 3,012,833 votes of the people against 2,703,249 votes cast for Horatio Seymour, ex-governor of New York, the candidate of the Democratic party. The electoral vote returned and counted was 214 for Grant and 80 for Seymour, who carried the states of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, Louisiana, Kentucky and Oregon. Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, was elected vice president, over General Frank P. Blair.—Based on E. Stanwood, *History of presidential elections*, ch. 22.

ALSO IN: W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, political and economic*, ch. 8.

1868-1870.—Errors of Congress.—Process of reconstruction.—Coercion of states.—Outcome of Fifteenth Amendment.—“The method of recon-

struction resorted to by Congress occasioned dreadful evils. It ignored the natural prejudices of the whites, many of whom were as loyal as any citizens in the land. . . . [In a letter dated 1873] Salmon P. Chase said: 'Congress was wrong in the exclusion from suffrage of certain classes of citizens, and of all unable to take a prescribed retrospective oath, and wrong also in the establishment of arbitrary military governments for the States, and in authorizing military commissions for the trial of civilians in times of peace. There should have been as little military government as possible; no military commissions, no classes excluded from suffrage, and no oath except one of faithful obedience and support to the Constitution and laws, and sincere attachment to the Constitutional Government of the United States.' . . . [John Sherman said:] 'It is a question of grave doubt whether the Fifteenth Amendment, though right in principle, was wise or expedient. The declared object was to secure impartial suffrage to the negro race. The practical result has been that the wise provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment have been modified by the Fifteenth Amendment. The latter amendment has been practically nullified by the action of most of the States where the great body of this race live and will probably always remain. This is done not by an express denial to them of the right of suffrage, but by ingenious provisions, which exclude them on the alleged ground of ignorance, while permitting all of the white race, however ignorant, to vote at all elections. No way is pointed out by which Congress can enforce this amendment. If the principle of the Fourteenth Amendment had remained in full force, Congress could have reduced the representation of any State, in the proportion which the number of the male inhabitants of such State, denied the right of suffrage, might bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age, in such State. This simple remedy, easily enforced by Congress, would have secured the right of all persons, without distinction of race or color, to vote at all elections. The reduction of the representation would have deterred every State from excluding the vote of any portion of the male population above twenty-one years of age. As the result of the Fifteenth Amendment [see below: 1869-1870] the political power of the States lately in rebellion has been increased, while the population conferring this increase is practically denied all political power. I see no remedy for this wrong except the growing intelligence of the negro race.' If the South was to become again genuine part and parcel of this Union, it would not, nor would the North consent that it should, remain permanently under military government. Black legislatures abused their power, becoming instruments of carpet-bag leaders and rings in robbing white property-holders. Only doctrinaires or the stupid could have expected that the whites would long submit. So soon as federal bayonets were gone, fair means or foul were certain to remove the sceptre from colored hands."—E. B. Andrews, *United States in our own time*, pp. 36-38.

1868-1870.—Reconstruction complete.—Restoration of all the Southern states to representation in Congress.—"On the 22d of June, 1868, an act was passed, with the following preamble and resolution, for the admission of Arkansas:—'Whereas the people of Arkansas, in pursuance of an act entitled, An act for the more efficient government of the Rebel States, passed March 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto, have framed

and adopted a constitution of State government, which is republican, and the legislature of said State has duly ratified the amendment of the Constitution of the United States proposed by the XXXIXth Congress, and known as Article XIV.; Therefore, Be it enacted, etc., that the State of Arkansas is entitled and admitted to representation in Congress, as one of the States of the Union, upon the following fundamental condition.' The 'fundamental condition,' as finally agreed upon, was, 'That there shall never be in said State any denial or abridgment of the elective franchise, or of any other right, to any person by reason or on account of race or color, except Indians not taxed.' The bill was vetoed by the President on the 20th but passed over the veto on the 22nd in the House by the vote of 111 to 31, and in the Senate by a vote of 30 to 7. On the 25th of June a similar act was passed admitting the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, in pursuance of a similar preamble, with the conditions that they should ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, that they should not deprive 'any citizen, or class of citizens of the State of the right to vote by the constitution thereof'; and that no person prohibited from holding office by said Amendment should be 'deemed eligible to any office in either of said States unless relieved from disability as provided in said amendment'; the State of Georgia being also required to declare 'null and void' certain provisions of its constitution, and 'in addition give the assent of said State to the fundamental condition hereinbefore imposed on the same.' The bill passed the House, May 14,—yeas 110, nays 35; in the Senate, June 9,—yeas 31, nays 5. It was vetoed by the President on the 25th, and passed the same day, by both houses, over the Presidential veto. On the 27th of January, 1870, Virginia was admitted into the Union by a vote, in the House, of 136 to 58; and in the Senate by a vote of 47 to 10. The following were the preamble, oaths, and conditions precedent: 'Whereas the people of Virginia have framed and adopted a constitution of State government which is republican; and whereas the legislature of Virginia, elected under said constitution, has ratified the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States; and whereas the performance of these several acts in good faith is a condition precedent to a representation of the State in Congress,' said State should be admitted to a representation in Congress; with the additional conditions precedent, however, that the constitution should never be so amended as to deprive any class of citizens of the right 'to vote,' 'to hold office,' on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude; neither should there be 'other qualifications' required for such reason; nor should any be deprived of 'school rights or privileges' on such account. On the 3d of February Mississippi was admitted by a bill resembling the former in every particular, by substantially the same vote. On the 30th of March Texas was readmitted to the Union on a bill very similar, though not identical with the above. . . . By this act of Congress the last of the 'wayward sisters' was brought back and restored to the family of States, and the fractured Union was, outwardly at least, repaired. It was ten years, eight months, and twenty days after South Carolina raised the banner of revolt and led off in 'the dance of death.'"—H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power*, v. 3, ch. 44.—See also ARKANSAS: 1863; FLORIDA: 1865-1868; GEORGIA: 1865-

1872; KENTUCKY: 1867-1895; LOUISIANA: 1865-1867; NORTH CAROLINA: 1868-1876; SOUTH CAROLINA: 1865-1872; TEXAS: 1865-1876; VIRGINIA: 1868-1876; BLACK AND TAN CONVENTIONS; BLACK CODES; RACE PROBLEMS: 1705-1895.

ALSO IN: S. S. COX, *Three decades of Federal legislation*, ch. 27-31.—C. R. LINGLEY, *Since the Civil War*, pp. 15-17.

1868-1876.—Reconstruction governments.—“Carpet-baggers.”—Legislatures.—Frauds.—Indebtedness of states.—Amnesty Act.—Enforcement Acts in the courts.—Breakdown of “Reconstruction.”—“The conduct of the men who appeared upon the scenes as the creators of the new South was so tyrannic, corrupt, mean and vulgar as to repel the historian. . . . Virginia, Texas and Georgia had been in no great hurry . . . to exchange military government exercised by the white officers of the United States army for ‘State’ government under the electorate proposed in the Reconstruction Acts. In this they were wise. The army officers did not, as a rule, sympathize with the radical movements of the Republicans in Congress, and . . . their rule, though exercised under a repellent title, was in fact far milder than, and far preferable to, the civil government of the adventurer and the negro. . . . The common soldiers from the Northern ‘States’ also fraternized with their race relatives in the South. . . . It is even said . . . that many of them doffed their uniforms on election day, went to the polls, and voted the Democratic ticket. In spite of the threats of Congress, and the ever-increasing conditions imposed by that body upon the permission to resume the ‘State’ status, these three communities held out under military rule until so many of their leading citizens had been amnestied by Congress and made again eligible to office and mandate, and until so much better provisions concerning the enfranchisement of the ex-Confederates had been secured, as to put them in a far better position to resume ‘State’ government than was the case two years before. Moreover, these communities had larger white than black populations. After their full restoration, consequently, Virginia and Georgia escaped largely the suffering experienced by most of the others, and Texas also managed to pull through the years from 1870 to 1874 with only about a four-fold increase of taxation, and the creation of a debt of only about 5,000,000 of dollars, when she reached the period of union of almost all her best citizens in the Democratic party. . . . Mississippi also had held back in 1868 and 1869 . . . in order to secure better terms for the ex-Confederates in the enfranchising and disfranchising provisions of the ‘State’ constitution, and by doing so had accomplished this result. [See also MISSISSIPPI: 1866; 1868-1870.] But Mississippi was one of the three Southern communities in which the negro population far outnumbered the white. Mississippi was not, for this reason chiefly, so fortunate as Virginia, Texas and Georgia. She was obliged, with South Carolina and Louisiana, to pass through the fiery furnace. . . . Of all the ‘States’ included in the Congressional Act of June 25, 1868, only North Carolina had been fortunate enough to rid herself, before 1872, of the rule of the adventurers and their ignorant negro support. This happened because . . . the legislature of 1868 had proceeded promptly to authorize the issue of \$25,000,000 of bonds, when the whole taxable property of the ‘State’ was not over \$125,000,000. From the first moment the people were threatened

with confiscation, and when to this was added the legislative act, known as the Schaffner law . . . the whites came together in the election of 1870, [and] captured the legislature.”—J. W. BURGESS, *Reconstruction and the constitution*, pp. 246-250.—See also NORTH CAROLINA: 1868-1876.—“By 1871 the last Confederate state was reconstructed. . . . Not all the activities of the legislatures were bad. Provisions were made for education, for example, that were in line with the needs of the States. Nevertheless, their conduct in the main was such as to drive the South almost into revolt. In the South Carolina legislature only twenty-two members out of 155 could read and write. The negroes were in the majority and although they paid only \$143 in taxes altogether, they helped add \$20,000,000 to the State debt in four years. In Arkansas the running expenses of the State increased 1500 per cent.; in Louisiana the public debt mounted from \$14,000,000 to \$48,000,000 between 1868 and 1871. Only ignorance and dishonesty could explain such extravagance and waste. Submission, however, was not merely advisable; it presented the only prospect of peace. Open resentment was largely suppressed, but it was inevitable that the whites should become hostile to the blacks, and that they should dislike the Republican party for its ruthless imposition of a system which governed them without their consent and which placed them at the mercy of the incompetent and unscrupulous. A system which made a negro the successor of Jefferson Davis in the United States Senate could scarcely fail to throw the majority of southern whites into the ranks of the enemies of the Republican organization.”—C. R. LINGLEY, *Since the Civil War*, pp. 16-17.—“Reconstruction brought into office a type of man hitherto unknown to the politics of the South. Those who had been organizing the Republican party there, and had established themselves and their friends in the convention were now ready to seize the governorships, the judgeships and the seats in the Senate and House of Representatives at Washington. They would procure themselves places in the legislatures, use the taxing power, lend the public credit and expend the public funds. Counties, cities, all jurisdictions from the greatest to the least fell into the hands of the elements which enjoyed the favor and support of the Radical leaders in Congress, and these were the carpet-baggers, the scalawags and their dupes and tools, the enfranchised ex-slaves. . . . Some of the members of the legislatures never had seen the districts which they had been elected to represent. A number of those who may have visited their constituencies during the campaign to ask for the votes of the people did not return. . . . All the legislatures contained considerable bodies of the negroes. [See also BLACK AND TAN CONVENTIONS.] The debates were more ignorant as to matter and more disgraceful as to form than any ever heard in parliamentary bodies in our Anglo-Saxon world . . . and personal encounters, both inside and outside the meeting halls, were of frequent occurrence. The legislature of Louisiana was ‘a shameful and disgraceful burlesque upon Republican institutions,’ said General Rousseau. . . . Judges, sheriffs, assessors, treasurers, clerks, supervisors, commissioners and other officials in counties and towns, whether white or black, were ignorant and incompetent. School officers were so illiterate that to keep their records in order Democrats must be employed to act as clerks. In many cases not one member

of a board of supervisors, charged with the most important duties could perform the smallest operation in arithmetic. Many justices of the peace could not make out a warrant for an arrest. . . . Negro, carpetbagger or scalawag sheriffs often received \$15,000 or \$20,000 a year in fees. When they were incapable of performing their duties they 'farmed out' their offices. . . . Six states were reorganized in time to seat senators and representatives in the 40th Congress in 1868 and 1869. Ten of the twelve senators were carpetbaggers. Three were natives of New York; the others came from New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont. One-half of the thirty-two members returned to the House of Representatives were carpetbaggers. The rest were in large part scalawags. . . . No negro was seated [in Congress] until Mississippi was reconstructed, when that State sent to the United States Senate a colored preacher, named Revels, and its late military governor, General Adelbert Ames of Maine. . . . What was begun in the conventions was continued in the legislatures. Bills appeared to make blacks and whites 'equal.' . . . New offices of various kinds were created that there might be the largest possible number of salaried posts. . . . State constabulary systems were established ostensibly to preserve the peace, really to make more jobs. 'Financial agents' were appointed to negotiate loans for which service they were paid large bonuses and commissions. Old public institutions were ruined, new ones which served no purpose were created. The common schools which were organized, often to be directed by negroes, were not adapted to the needs of the people. Superintendents and teachers frequently were 'without respectable antecedents and of a low character.' . . . Beginning with small speculation corruption soon assumed gross forms. Local and State treasuries were pillaged in a thousand ways. Subsidies, exemptions, grants and endorsements of different kinds to the advantage of railroads, canals, levees and other private enterprises, robbery here and fraud there, often forwarded by bribery, filled the air in every Southern State. . . . The public printing cost Louisiana about \$1,500,000 in three years and of this sum a newspaper in New Orleans, controlled by Governor Warmoth, received about \$700,000 in two years. The expense to the State on this account in previous years had been only \$37,000 per annum. [See also LOUISIANA: 1865-1867; 1874-1877.] In one year in South Carolina the amount appropriated on account of printing was \$450,000. . . . 'Hell Hole Swamp,' a tract of land near Charleston, was purchased by a group of men for . . . \$26,100, to be sold in a little while to the State for \$120,000. Six thousand acres of land in North Carolina which the owner was about to give to the negroes to escape . . . taxes were bought . . . [for \$3,600; two thousand acres, at a low price, were added] and the tract was transferred to the State as a penitentiary site for \$100,000. [See also SOUTH CAROLINA: 1865-1872.] . . . The bonds of 37 railroads in Georgia were endorsed for a total sum of \$30,000,000, 32 of them at one time during a single session of the legislature. . . . All but one soon went into the hands of receivers. A man named Littlefield from Maine, a native scalawag named Swepson and a few others induced the legislature of North Carolina to authorize the issue of bonds of a face value of \$25,000,000 on the faith of the State for the construction of a system of railways. They never

put down a mile of iron in the commonwealth. Moving from North Carolina to Florida they gained control of three railroads in that state, free of all old encumbrances, for about \$2,000 a mile. . . . In 1869 the members of the legislature of Louisiana voted themselves \$250,000, and in 1870, \$500,000. The session of 1871 cost the state nearly a million dollars, an average of \$113.50 a day for each member of the body. . . . The corruption in Louisiana was 'utterly astounding.' . . . Lotteries and other evil contrivances received the endorsement of the state. The greatest of these, the so-called Louisiana Lottery, was given a charter for 25 years which enabled it to extend its baneful influence into a period otherwise cleared of the moral wreckage of this unfortunate age. . . . The riot of wrong continued until nothing remained for the corrupt to exploit or for the thief to steal. The states were without credit in the money markets of the world. Loans falling due were converted into new ones on extravagant terms; interest was paid by new bond issues. More than one commonwealth was brought to the verge of bankruptcy. Public securities were for sale for a song and schemes of repudiation were freely discussed. [See also LOUISIANA: 1874-1877.] The indebtedness of South Carolina in less than three years had been increased from \$5,500,000 to \$18,500,000. . . . In Georgia in 1870 Bullock and his 'plundering dynasty' had increased the public debt more than \$20,000,000 and the governor had approved bills which would raise the total to \$30,000,000. . . . In 1872 bonds, scrip and other obligations issued by the state and the counties and towns of Alabama had reached a total sum of more than \$52,000,000. In Arkansas the state debt in a short time was increased four or five fold; many counties were bankrupt. In Florida where the debt in 1866 was about \$600,000 it had been increased in January, 1872, to more than \$5,000,000. The debt of Louisiana as a result of the activities of two legislatures was multiplied by five. In 1872 it was \$48,000,000; if parish and municipal debts were added the total became \$76,000,000. . . . Against the policies which were productive of continued bitter feeling between the sections there was a growing revulsion of sentiment. It had been revealed in the discussions called out by the bills relating to the reconstruction of Mississippi, Virginia, Texas and Georgia. A time had come, enlightened Republican leaders believed, for dealing, if not magnanimously, at least justly with the South. The movement gained special force in Missouri. . . . [where] a constitutional convention which had met . . . in 1865 had prescribed such tests for voters and office-holders that a considerable part of the citizens of the state were barred from participating in the elections. . . . and every political campaign was 'little less than a civil war in itself.' [See MISSOURI: 1865-1874.] . . . By the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment the disability to hold office in the case of men who had violated their oaths to engage in rebellion against the United States could be removed by a two-thirds vote of each house of Congress. This amendment made President Johnson's amnesty proclamation inoperative except in the remission of penalties. Congress now took complete control of the work of deciding when 'rebels' should be restored to the right of holding office. In the Fortieth Congress, 1,431 persons were amnestied; in the Forty-first Congress, ending March 4, 1871, 3,185. The echoes of the struggle in Missouri were heard over the whole

nation. The need of some action to satisfy the rising opinion on the subject was reflected in Congress and Grant in his message in December, 1871, recommended the passage of a bill granting general amnesty to all but some of the 'great criminals' of the war. A measure of this kind was presented at once and would have been enacted promptly by the necessary two-thirds vote if Sumner had not interposed in behalf of a supplemental civil rights bill for which he had been diligently laboring for the last three sessions. . . . It would guarantee to negroes equal rights in railway stations and trains, and on steamboats. . . . Another general amnesty bill which had passed the house was taken from the calendar and reached consideration in the Senate on May 8 to have Sumner's civil rights bill attached to it, as in the case of the measure which had been defeated in February. It, therefore, likewise failed. Another House bill . . . on May 21 . . . rid of this encumbrance, was passed by a vote of 28 to 2. . . . Political disabilities were now removed from all participants in the rebellion, except senators and representatives of the Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh Congresses which covered the period of the secession of the Southern states, cabinet officers of the United States, officers of the judiciary, of the army and navy, and in the diplomatic service of the United States, who had violated their oaths and allied themselves with the Confederacy. From 150,000, to 160,000, so it was supposed, had been excluded from office; now the number who were denied political rights were reduced to '500, or possibly 600.'—E. P. Oberholtzer, *History of the United States since the Civil War*, v. 2, pp. 319-334, 268-272.—"Before the end of 1871 the United States courts in Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina were busily occupied with trials under the enforcement acts. All of the accused were indicted for 'conspiracy,' and the subsequent trials were fought out mainly on conspiracy charges. These spectacular preliminary testings of the legal workability of the force acts became known as 'the Kuklux trials.' . . . Experience soon showed at least three fatal defects in successfully disposing of cases after the indictment stage. The real trouble began in the courts. In the first place, it was difficult to prove 'conspiracy' and 'intent' to deny rights under the constitution. . . . Furthermore, the law could not keep the juries black. . . . White judges were inclined toward leniency in judging the white man prosecuted under the force acts on the testimony of black men. Race prejudice thus checked the rigid application of the law. About 20 per cent of the cases tried resulted in conviction. Fully 70 per cent were dismissed, quashed or nolle prossed. In the second place, there were not enough Federal courts to do the business. . . . Grand juries and marshals, in fact, indicted and arrested ten times as many offenders as the courts could try. . . . In the third place, the enforcement policy broke down because the Supreme Court of the United States . . . deprived the enforcement legislation of much strength when it rendered its decisions in the cases of *United States v. Reese* and *United States v. Cruikshank*, both in 1876. 'The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage,' the court concluded in the first case. 'The power of Congress to legislate at all upon the subject of voting at state elections rests upon this Amendment and can be exercised by providing a punishment only when the wrongful refusal to receive the vote of a

qualified elector at such election is because of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude. In the *Cruikshank* case the court declared that 'the right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship. The right to vote in the states comes from the states.' . . . [Finally], the laws were regarded by the masses of the Southern white people as odious and oppressive, and they exhausted every means to defeat their operation. . . . By 1874 the disintegration of Republican government in the South was clearly evidenced by the loss of elections through the decrease of black votes cast. If the practical object of the enforcement laws was to maintain the negro in the political position intended for him by Northern radicals, then the logic of events was proving the inadequacy of the laws. 'It is absolutely essential,' declared a great negro convention in Montgomery, December, 1874, 'to our protection in our civil and political rights that the laws of the United States shall be enforced so as to compel respect and obedience for them. Before the state laws and state courts we are utterly helpless.' Republicans throughout the South took up the cry for more enforcement laws from Congress—laws to remedy the defects in the statutes of 1870-1871. It was suggested that all cases involving the negro be transferred to the United States courts, and at least one-half of juries in cases involving the negro be black, that grand and petit juries be purged of whites who 'sympathize with the Kuklux clan.' . . . But Congress did not act upon the various suggestions from the South. In 1875 it passed Sumner's civil rights bill, which never proved workable. It refused to do more. The people of the North were, in fact, becoming disgusted with the Southern question. . . . The breakdown of Reconstruction is to be attributed in considerable extent to a dawning consciousness in the North of the real conditions in the South. . . . The force acts were in fact out of joint with the times. They did not square with public consciousness either North or South. . . . They fitted a condition of war, not of peace; and suggest an autocracy rather than a democracy. From many angles they were attacked and emasculated and then relegated to their proper place as curiosities in our political history.'—W. W. Davis, *Federal enforcement acts (Studies in Southern history and politics)*, pp. 218, 225-228.—See also RACE PROBLEMS: 1705-1895.

1868-1894.—Cuban questions in controversy with Spain.—Secession of reciprocity with Cuba. See CUBA: 1868-1895.

1869.—Negotiation of Johnson-Clarendon Treaty and its rejection by the Senate. See ALABAMA CLAIMS: 1862-1869.

1869.—Wyoming organized as territory. See WYOMING: 1865-1869.

1869.—Gold speculation.—Black Friday. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1869.

1869.—Founding of Order of Knights of Labor. See KNIGHTS OF LABOR.

1869-1870.—Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment.—"The great defect of the Fourteenth Amendment, as freely charged during its discussion, was its at least tacit recognition of the right of States to disfranchise the ex-slaves, should they so elect. True, they could not do it without sacrificing so much in the basis of their representation in Congress; but if they were willing to make that sacrifice, there was nothing in the amendment to prevent such discrimination. To remedy that defect . . . it was resolved to incorporate into the organic law a new provision for their protection, and to

supplement the amendments of the Constitution already adopted by another. There were accordingly introduced into both houses, almost simultaneously, measures for that purpose. . . . In the House, on the 11th of January, 1869, Mr. Boutwell reported from the Committee on the Judiciary a joint resolution proposing an amendment which provided that the right to vote of no citizen should be abridged by the United States or any State by reason of race, color, or previous condition of slavery." The joint resolution was adopted in the House, 150 affirmative to 42 negative votes, on January 30. Adopted in the Senate with amendments, by 39 to 16 votes, it went to a Committee of Conference, on whose report the joint resolution was finally adopted by both Houses on February 25, and submitted for ratification to the legislatures of the states, in the following form: "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." "The amendment received the votes of 29 States, constituting the requisite three fourths, and thus became a part of the organic law. On the 30th of March, 1870, President Grant communicated the fact to Congress in a special message."—H. Wilson, *History of the rise and fall of the slave power*, v. 3, ch. 47.—"There were thirty-six states in the union in 1865; in five of these—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island—negroes apparently exercised full suffrage privileges; in one—New York—they could vote, provided they possessed certain qualifications as to residence and property which were not required of white men; in the remaining thirty states they were entirely disfranchised. . . . Negro suffrage was forced upon the District of Columbia by act of January 8, 1867, upon the territories by act of January 10, 1867, and upon the South by the Reconstruction acts of March 2, March 23, and July 19, 1867. . . . Constitutional amendments establishing negro suffrage were rejected in Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, 1865; in Kansas, Ohio, and Minnesota, 1867; in Michigan and Missouri, 1868; and in New York, 1869. The question in New York was of course the removal of the special property qualification required of negroes. Only two states, Iowa (1868) and Minnesota (1868) voluntarily granted the franchise to negroes before the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment."—W. W. Davis, *Federal enforcement acts (Studies in Southern history and politics*, pp. 240).

ALSO IN: J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 2, ch. 16 and 19.—W. L. Fleming, *Sequel of Appomattox (Chronicles of America Series*, v. 32, pp. 169-172).—W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, political and economic*, pp. 174-176.

1869-1872.—Supreme Court decisions on relation of seceded states to the Union.—Chase on Reconstruction measures.—"A large group of Supreme Court cases turned upon the effect of the Civil War on the rights of property. In two cases, *United States v. Anderson* (1869-70), and the *Protector* (1871), the court passed on the important question as to when the war legally began and ended, but the two decisions did not harmonize. In the first case the court held without dissent that the proclamation of August 20, 1866, was 'the first official declaration that we have on the part of the executive that the rebellion was wholly suppressed, and . . . the limitation . . . did not begin to run until the rebellion was suppressed through-

out the whole country.' In the second case it was held without dissent that 'the war did not begin or close at the same time in all the States;' but that it began in the first seven States by the proclamation of blockade, April 19, 1861, and in Virginia and North Carolina by the similar proclamation of April 27, 1861; and that it ceased in twelve States by the proclamation of April 12, 1866, and in Texas by the proclamation of August 25, 1866. In another decision of much importance, *The Grapeshot*, the court upheld provisional courts set up by direction of the President, without any legislative authority, in parts of the seceded States occupied by the federal troops. Three important decisions expounded the vexed relation of seceded States to the Union,—the question which had so perplexed Congress. In *Thorington v. Smith*, the court without dissent recognized as a fact the existence of Confederate paper notes during the war, and their use in contracts then made. Chase, who drew the opinion, took the ground that the Confederacy 'was an actual government of all the insurgent States;' though he refused to recognize it as having been a *de facto* government, obedience to which did not constitute treason to the United States, he did style it a 'government of paramount force; . . . the rights and obligations of a belligerent were conceded to it, in its military character, very soon after the war began, from motives of humanity and expediency by the United States.' This ground was modified a little later in the case of *United States v. Keebler*, in which it was held that 'the whole Confederate power must be regarded by us as a usurpation of unlawful authority, incapable of passing valid laws,' and that 'acts of the Confederate Congress can have no force, as law, in divesting or transferring rights;' and again in *Hickman v. Jones, et al.*, when it was held that the recognition of belligerent rights 'did not extend to the pretended government of the Confederacy. The intercourse was confined to its military authorities; . . . the act of the Confederate Congress creating the tribunal in question was void. It was as if it were not.' Another group of cases in which Chase took particular interest related to the border intercourse, which as Secretary of the Treasury he had alternately prohibited and regulated. In *Padelford's Case* (1869-70), the question was raised as to whether Lincoln's amnesty proclamation of December 8, 1863, restored the property rights of a man who had accepted the provisions of that proclamation. The court held that the amnesty did restore him to his rights; and in this instance and also in the case of *United States v. Anderson*, the court enforced, and thereby gave its adhesion to, the confiscation acts of 1861-62, and to the acts for the collection of abandoned property, under which the Treasury had taken possession of immense quantities of property. In the case of *Miller v. United States*, the court declined to apply the constitutional amendment allowing jury trial and due process of law to those confiscation acts, on the ground that they were not punitive but military acts, exercised under power to declare war and make rules respecting captures. In the case of *Corbett v. Nutt* (1870-71), the court refused to apply the principle of the confiscation acts to commercial transactions within the Confederate lines, and thus 'to taint with invalidity even the commonest transactions of exchange in the daily life of these people.' These decisions taken together show that the action of the court was both sensible and humane. It refused to hold the internal transactions of individuals within the Confederacy, or those of the Confederate and state

governments with individuals, to be simply a mass of futile agreements and restrictions; only so far as acts of individuals or of the Confederacy had been made the means of opposition to the United States were they held illegal and invalid. In this group of decisions there was little dissent, and in no case was Chase among the dissenters. It was inevitable that the Supreme Court should eventually construe and limit the reconstruction acts so far as they related to the domain of the President. The President's contact with the judiciary power came principally through his pardoning power; and in the Padelford, Klein, and Armstrong cases the court affirmed that his pardon removed any responsibility for an offense connected with the rebellion, and that though an act of Congress might carry the pardon into effect, it could not abridge the President's pardoning power. Though the right of the President to set up provisional courts in the seceded States was approved by the court, Chase could not forget the arbitrary tribunals of the Civil War, to which he had given a reluctant consent when they were founded; and therefore in *Tarbell's Case* (1871), when the Supreme Court denied the power of a state court by *habeas corpus* to release men illegally enlisted in the army, Chase felt it his duty to dissent. This was very nearly the point which had been raised in the Garner controversy in 1856, when as governor of Ohio he [Chase] had insisted on the power of state *habeas corpus* against federal officials. He now entered his protest in favor of his old principle that 'a writ of *habeas corpus* may issue from a state court to inquire into the validity of imprisonment or detention without a sentence of any court whatever, by an officer of the United States,' even though the President's proclamation of December, 1863, issued after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, was 'a public act of which all courts of the United States are bound to take notice.' This decision, however, was not construed to traverse the authority to exclude from office certain classes of persons who had engaged in the rebellion, given to Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the famous case of *Texas v. White*, decided in 1869, the court drew nearer to the fundamental question of the status of the Southern States during the war; the opinion was written by the chief justice, who considered it his most important work on the bench. The critical point before the court was whether Texas was a State in the Union in 1862 and 1865. In a splendid phrase Chase laid down his theory of government: 'The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States. When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States she entered into an indissoluble relation. There was no place for reconstruction, or revocation, except through revolution, or through consent of the States.' Hence, he argued, the acts of the seceding legislature were null, for 'Texas continued to be a State and a State of the Union.' But the chief justice went on to show that although the obligations of Texas were unimpaired, its federal relations were affected, and some of its privileges for the time being forfeited; and that under the power to guarantee to every State a republican form of government Congress had the right to provide for the reconstruction of a State. The decision not only admitted that reconstruction had been constitutionally performed under the acts of Congress, it also recognized, as legitimate and as representing the State, the provisional government which was actually in existence before Texas was readmitted to representation in Congress.

Grier, Swayne, and Miller, in dissenting opinions, denied that under the provisional government, subject as it was to military power and deprived of representation in Congress, Texas could be considered as a State in the Union. The plain effect of this decision was to deny that theory of state suicide to which Chase had earlier given his adhesion; for it asserted that, as soon as the war ended and the people of Texas chose to reconstitute the government, they recovered statehood, though not necessarily complete privileges in the Union, since those involved a question to be decided by the national government. The 'Nation' said of the decision: 'The Supreme Court has thus in this judgment placed the nation and the State upon exactly the same footing: whatever weakens the one weakens the other; whoever denies the historical origin of the one denies the same origin for the other. This theory gives the greatest security both to the State and to the Union.' In the announcement of this decision the court placed itself side by side with Congress and the new President, in affirming that the process of reconstruction had been constitutional, or at least allowable, and could no longer be questioned. Three years later, in the case of *White v. Hart*, (1872), though Chase dissented on one point, he acquiesced in a sweeping approval of the whole system of constitutional reconstruction. 'The action of Congress upon the subject,' said he, 'cannot be inquired into. The case is clearly one in which the judicial is bound to follow the action of the political department of the government, and is concluded by it.' Congress had never been quite certain of the constitutional ground upon which it reconstructed the Southern States, and the Supreme Court eliminated most of the prevailing theories. The theory of state suicide it denied resolutely: 'At no time were the rebellious States out of the pale of the Union. Their rights under the Constitution were suspended but not destroyed. Their constitutional duties and obligations were unaffected and remained the same.' The doctrine of conquered provinces was also denied. 'The Constitution,' said the court, 'assumed that the government and the Union which it created, and the States which it incorporated into the Union, would be indestructible and perpetual.' The decision thus rested squarely upon a modification of the theory of forfeited rights. 'A citizen is still a citizen though guilty of crime and visited with punishment. His political rights may be put in abeyance or forfeited.'—A. B. Hart, *Salmon Portland Chase*, pp. 374-381.

1869-1877.—Administration of Grant.—His first cabinet.—Widespread corruption.—"That the new President lacked the touch of the skilful administrator was seen in the selection of his cabinet advisers. In making his cabinet appointments he refused to consult with party leaders, and in some instances the appointees themselves were not consulted. The composition of his first cabinet seemed in a large measure to be determined by considerations of 'personal friendships or unintelligent caprice.' As a secretary of state he chose Elihu B. Washburne, a close friend to whom he was greatly indebted for his military advancement but a man who had no fitness for the duties of the State Department. This appointment, however, was only a passing compliment. Washburne promptly resigned, and his place in the cabinet was filled by Hamilton Fish, a most competent person. For the Treasury, Grant named A. T. Stewart, one of the richest merchants in America. . . . Stewart, however, was hardly in office before he had to withdraw on account of an existing statute, which provided

that no one appointed secretary of the treasury should 'directly or indirectly be concerned or interested in carrying on the business of trade or commerce.' [He was succeeded by George M. Boutwell, commissioner of inland revenue during the Civil War.] The navy portfolio was given to Adolph E. Borie, whose chief distinction was that of being a rich man of Philadelphia, and a personal friend of Grant's. [He was an invalid and resigned at once, and was succeeded by George M. Robeson of New Jersey.] . . . For secretary of the interior the President named Jacob D. Cox [governor] of Ohio, and for attorney-general E. Rockwood Hoar of Massachusetts. Cox and Hoar were regarded as well fitted for their places. [Schofield, who was requested to continue for a while in office as secretary of war, was soon succeeded by Rawlins. John A. Cresswell was postmaster-general.] Taking it all in all, it was nearly the poorest body of advisers that a President had ever gathered around him."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 530.—"For eight years Grant was President. His two administrations were marked by extraordinary achievement both in the domestic and in the foreign field. True, he was the target of abuse and criticism; no President in the long list, with the possible exception of Johnson, has been more bitterly assailed, and he was vulnerable at many points. He was a soldier with a limited experience in dealing with men of affairs and only a superficial acquaintance with politics; with no great knowledge of history, or literature, and innocent of the science of government; yet William Tecumseh Sherman, in one of his flashes of political insight, came very near the mark when he wrote in the summer of 1868: 'My own opinion is that, considering the state of the country, Grant will make the best President we can get. What we want in national politics is quiet, harmony, and stability, and these are more likely with Grant than any politician I know of.' Grant made serious mistakes; but almost without exception they were errors arising from childlike trust and unfortunate associations. They seldom affected adversely measures of broad public policy. When we recall the great accomplishments of his administrations,—the establishment of the principle of international arbitration through the Treaty of Washington and the adjudication of the Alabama claims by the Geneva Tribunal; the upholding of American dignity and the assertion of American rights in the matter of the Virginius and the handling of the Cuban complications; the rehabilitation of the national credit, and the maintenance of the national honor, the inauguration of a consistent and merciful policy toward the Indians; the recognition of the principles of civil service reform; and the restoration of a semblance of order in the South,—we are tempted to subordinate, though we cannot honestly ignore, the personal differences which marred the period of his service and the public scandal attaching to some of those who, in the shelter of his friendship and of offices bestowed upon them through his favor, betrayed his trust. It was a time of universal prodigality and extravagance, when speculation flourished and the nation's moral fiber had been coarsened by the excesses of war. It was not strange that the widespread taint invaded public place. It would have been more strange if it had not."—L. A. Coolidge, *Ulysses S. Grant*, pp. 276-280.—"More perplexing than the diplomatic questions were the financial problems which confronted President Grant at the beginning of his administration. Our financial house was in a state of great disorder. There was a national debt of

more than \$2,500,000,000, but no definite plans had been made for its payment. The holders of the bonds did not know in what kind of money they would be paid. There was in circulation nearly \$350,000,000 of paper money (greenbacks) in the form of United States notes. In the value of these greenbacks there were violent fluctuations. Now a greenback dollar would be worth ninety cents in gold; presently it would be worth only eighty cents. Should the national debt be paid with the paper money or with gold? . . . In the campaign of 1868 the sentiment in favor of paying certain classes of the bonds with greenbacks was strong. But the greenbacks idea had no charms for President Grant. In his inaugural address on March 4, 1869, he said: 'To protect the national honor every dollar of government indebtedness should be paid in gold, unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract. In accordance with the wishes of the President, Congress at once undertook to strengthen the public credit, declaring in March, 1869, that it was the purpose of the United States to pay its notes (the greenbacks) and its bonds in coin (that is, in gold or silver), and pledging the faith of the nation to such payment. The pledge as to the bonds was kept, but the redemption of the greenbacks was delayed, with the result that the currency remained in a chaotic condition. Gold was virtually a commodity like wheat or corn, and its value rose and fell as the value of greenbacks fell and rose. In September, 1869, Jay Gould and James Fisk, two daring speculators, set about to 'corner' the gold supply, and actually secured control of nearly \$120,000,000. As the amount of gold outside the National Treasury was limited they were able to advance the price of the yellow metal to a point that meant disaster to those who needed it in the transaction of business. In New York the bidding for gold was attended by frantic excitement and led to a financial convulsion known as Black Friday."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 553.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1869.—"The United States had need of any feeling of national pride that might come as the result of the Geneva award, to offset the shame of domestic revelations, for one of the characteristics of the decade after the war was the widespread corruption in political and commercial life. One of the most flagrant examples was the Tweed Ring in New York. [See NEW YORK: 1863-1871.] . . . More important both because of its effect on national politics and because of its influence on railway legislation for many years afterward was the Credit Mobilier scandal. . . . Fear was widespread that political life in Washington was riddled with corruption. Corporations which were large and wealthy for that day were already getting a controlling grip on the legislatures of the states, and if the Credit Mobilier scandal were typical, had begun to reach out to Congress. [See also CREDIT MOBILIER SCANDAL.] Had the charges been made a little earlier they might have influenced the election of 1872, which turned largely on certain omissions and failings of the administration, and especially of General Grant himself. There is something intensely pathetic in General Grant as President of the United States, . . . [a man] who was unacquainted with either the theory or the practice of politics, who consulted nobody in choosing his cabinet or writing his inaugural address, who had scarcely visited a state capital except to capture it and had been elected to the executive chair in times that were to try men's souls. An indolent man, he called himself, but the world knew that he was tireless and irresistible on

the field when necessity demanded, persistent, imperturbable, simple and direct in his language, and upright in his character. The tragedy of President Grant's career was his choice of friends and advisors. In Congress he followed the counsels of second-rate men who gave him second-rate advice; outside he associated too frequently with questionable characters who cleverly used him as a mask for schemes that were an insult to his integrity, but which his lack of experience and his utter inability to judge character kept hidden from his view. Honorable himself and loyal to a fault to his friends, he believed in the honesty of men who betrayed him, long after the rest of the world had discovered what they were. He could accept costly gifts from admirers and appoint these same men to offices, without dreaming that their generosity had sprung from any motive except gratitude for his services during the war. It was inevitable, in view of these facts, that the presidential campaign of 1872 should be essentially an anti-Grant movement, but its particular characteristics had their origin before the General's first election."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War*, pp. 40-43.

ALSO IN: E. B. Andrews, *History of the last quarter-century in the United States*, v. 1, ch. 2.—H. Garland, *Ulysses S. Grant*, ch. 30-50.

1869-1890.—Recovery of the domination of whites in the South.—Suppression of the colored vote.—“Between 1869 and 1876, the whites had in every Southern State except South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, regained control of the government, and in 1876 those three States were also recovered. The circumstances were different, according to the character of the population in each State. In some a union of the moderate white Republicans with the Democrats, brought about by the disgust of all property holders at the scandals they saw and at the increase to their burdens as tax-payers, had secured legitimately chosen majorities, and ejected the corrupt officials. In some the same result was attained by paying or otherwise inducing the negroes not to go to the polls, or by driving them away by threats or actual violence. Once possessed again of a voting majority, the whites, all of whom had by 1872 been relieved of their disabilities, took good care, by a variety of devices, legal and extra-legal, to keep that majority safe; and in no State has their control of the government been since shaken. President Hayes withdrew, 1877, such Federal troops as were still left at the South, and none have ever since been despatched thither. . . . With the disappearance of the carpet-bag and negro governments, the third era in the political history of the South since the war began. The first had been that of exclusively white suffrage; the second, that of predominantly negro suffrage. In the third, universal suffrage and complete legal equality were soon perceived to mean in practice the full supremacy of the whites. To dislodge the coloured man from his rights was impossible, for they were secured by the Federal Constitution which prevails against all State action. The idea of disturbing them was scarcely entertained. Even at the election of 1872 the Southern Democrats no more expected to repeal the Fifteenth Amendment than the English Tories expected at the election of 1874 to repeal the Irish Church Disestablishment Act of 1869. But the more they despaired of getting rid of the amendment, the more resolved were the Southern people to prevent it from taking any effect which could endanger their supremacy. They did not hate the negro, certainly not half so much

as they hated his white leaders by whom they had been robbed. ‘We have got,’ they said, ‘to save civilization,’ and if civilization could be saved only by suppressing the coloured vote, they were ready to suppress it. . . . The modes of suppression have not been the same in all districts and at all times. At first there was a good deal of what is called ‘bulldozing,’ i.e. rough treatment and terrorism, applied to frighten the coloured men from coming to or voting at the polls. Afterwards, the methods were less harsh. Registrations were so managed as to exclude negro voters, arrangements for polling were contrived in such wise as to lead the voter to the wrong place so that his vote might be refused; and, if the necessity arose, the Republican candidates were counted out, or the election returns tampered with. ‘I would stuff a ballot-box,’ said a prominent man, ‘in order to have a good, honest government;’ and he said it in good faith, and with no sense of incongruity. Sometimes the local negro preachers were warned or paid to keep their flocks away. . . . Notwithstanding these impediments, the negro long maintained the struggle, valuing the vote as the symbol of his freedom, and fearing to be reenslaved if the Republican party should be defeated. Leaders and organizers were found in the Federal office-holders, of course all Republicans. . . . After 1884, however, when the presidency of the United States passed to a Democrat, some of these office-holders were replaced by Democrats and the rest became less zealous. . . . Their friends at the North were exasperated, not without reason, for the gift of suffrage to the negroes had resulted in securing to the South a larger representation in Congress and in presidential elections than it enjoyed before the war, or would have enjoyed had the negroes been left unenfranchised. They argued, and truly, that where the law gives a right, the law ought to secure the exercise thereof; and when the Southern men replied that the negroes were ignorant, they rejoined that all over the country there were myriads of ignorant voters, mostly recent immigrants, whom no one thought of excluding. Accordingly in 1890, having a majority in both Houses of Congress and a President of their own party, the Republican leaders introduced a bill subjecting the control of Federal elections to officers to be appointed by the President, in the hope of thus calling out a full negro vote, five sixths of which would doubtless have gone to their party. The measure appeared to dispassionate observers quite constitutional, and the mischief it was designed to remedy was palpable. . . . It passed the House, but was dropped in the Senate under the threat of an obstructive resistance by the (then Democratic) minority.”—J. Bryce, *American commonwealth*, v. 2, ch. 92.—“In several cases involving the enforcement acts, the Court found portions of the laws in conflict with the Constitution and finally, in 1883, the decision in *United States v. Harris* completed their destruction. Here the court met a complaint that a group of white men had taken some negroes away from the officers of the law and ill-treated them. Such conduct seemed to be contrary to that part of the Ku Klux Act which forbade combinations designed to deprive citizens of their legal rights. The Court, however, called attention to the important words, ‘No State shall make or enforce,’ and was of opinion that the constitutional power of Congress extends only to cases where States have acted in such a manner as to deprive citizens of their rights. If individuals, on the contrary, conspire to take away these rights, relief must be sought at the hands of the state

government. As the great purpose of the Ku Klux Act had been to combat precisely such individual combinations, it appeared that the Court had, at a blow, demolished the law. Not long afterwards the Court declared unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which had been designed to insure equal rights to negroes in hotels, conveyances and theatres. Here again the Court was of opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment grants no power to the United States but forbids certain activities by the states. . . . The history of the effects of the war and of reconstruction on the political status of the negro has been concisely summarized as falling into three periods. At the close of the war: (1) the negroes were more powerful in politics than their numbers, intelligence and property seemed to justify; (2) the Republican party was a power in the South; and (3) the negroes enjoyed political rights on a legal and constitutional equality with the whites. By 1877 the first of these generalizations was no longer a fact; by 1890 the Republican party had ceased to be of importance in the South; and by the opening of the twentieth century, the negro as a possible voter was not on a legal and constitutional equality with the white. In the sphere of government the war and reconstruction were of lasting importance. Pre-eminently it was definitely established that the federal government is supreme over the states. Although the Constitution had seemed to many to establish that supremacy in no uncertain terms, it can not be doubted that only as a result of the war and reconstruction did the theory receive a degree of popular assent that approached unanimity. Temporarily, at least, reconstruction added greatly to the prestige and self-confidence of Congress. During the war the powers of the President had necessarily expanded. The reaction, although hastened by the character and disposition of President Johnson, was inevitable. The depression of the executive elevated the legislature and not until the beginning of the twentieth century did the scales swing back again toward their former position."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War*, pp. 26, 28-29.

1869-1893.—**Liquor problem.**—Rise of Prohibition party. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1869-1893.

1869-1913.—**Solid South.**—"The enfranchisement of the mass of negroes and the attempt of the Republican party to enforce negro rule upon the South drove the white people to unite solidly against those whom they regarded as their oppressors. From the close of the Reconstruction period until 1896, the political solidarity of the South in National elections was never broken. In the face of the danger of negro domination, white men who believed in protective tariffs and other national policies advocated by the Republican party surrendered their convictions and voted solidly with their fellow-citizens who held opposite views on these questions. Since that time, there has been but one party of any consequence in the South, and that a white man's party, and but one great issue, namely, the maintenance of white supremacy. The motive back of this policy was the simple instinct of self-preservation rather than that of revenge or hatred. But this political solidarity, once so necessary to the preservation of Southern civilization from the effects of negro domination, resulted in the political effacement of the South and the loss of its leadership in national affairs. From 1861 to 1913, the South furnished the nation with no President or Vice-President. Not even the Democratic party itself dared nominate a Southern

man as its candidate, so certain would have been his defeat. Of the eleven speakers of the national house of representatives elected during this period, only two were Southern men; of one hundred and twenty-five cabinet members, the South furnished only fourteen; of twenty Justices of the Supreme Court, only five were taken from the South; and of one hundred and twelve diplomatic representatives accredited to the courts of England, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, the German Empire, Italy, and Spain, only ten were Southern men. Thus it came to pass that the South not only lost its leadership, but it ceased to play any part in national affairs. With a few exceptions, it has produced no great leaders since the War. Great political leaders do not develop readily under conditions such as exist where there are no opposition parties, where there is no party rivalry and little or no discussion of national issues, and where everything that bears the image of a single party is accepted as a matter of course. In short, the very atmosphere of the South has been unfavorable to the growth of statesmen."—W. W. Davis, *Federal enforcement acts (Studies in Southern History*, pp. 370-371).—See also GEORGIA: 1876-1890.

ALSO IN: E. B. Andrews, *United States in our own time*, pp. 113-166.

1870.—**Readmission of Mississippi, Texas and Virginia to Union.** See MISSISSIPPI: 1868-1879; TEXAS: 1865-1876; VIRGINIA: 1868-1876.

1870.—**President Grant's message to Congress on the desirability of an annexation of Santo Domingo.** See SANTO DOMINGO: 1868-1873.

1870.—**Ninth census.**—The total population was 38,558,371 (exceeding that of 1860 by 7,115,049), classed and distributed as follows:

North Atlantic division		
	White.	Black.
Maine	624,809	1,606
New Hampshire	317,697	580
Vermont	329,613	924
Massachusetts	1,443,156	13,947
Rhode Island	212,219	4,980
Connecticut	527,549	9,668
New York	4,330,210	52,081
New Jersey	875,407	30,658
Pennsylvania	3,456,609	65,294
	12,117,269	179,738
South Atlantic division		
Delaware	102,221	22,794
Maryland	605,497	175,391
District of Columbia	88,278	43,404
Virginia	712,089	512,841
West Virginia	424,033	17,080
North Carolina	678,470	391,650
South Carolina	280,667	415,814
Georgia	638,926	545,142
Florida	96,057	91,680
	3,635,238	2,216,705
North central division		
Ohio	2,601,946	63,213
Indiana	1,655,837	24,560
Illinois	2,511,096	28,762
Michigan	1,167,282	11,849
Wisconsin	1,051,351	2,113
Minnesota	438,257	759
Iowa	1,188,207	5,762
Missouri	1,603,146	118,071
Dakota	12,887	94
Nebraska	122,117	780
Kansas	346,377	17,108
	12,698,503	273,080

South central division

	White.	Black.
Kentucky	1,098,692	222,210
Tennessee	936,119	322,331
Alabama	521,384	475,510
Mississippi	382,896	444,201
Louisiana	362,065	364,210
Texas	564,700	253,475
Arkansas	362,115	122,169
	4,227,971	2,204,106

Western division

Montana	18,306	183
Wyoming	8,726	183
Colorado	39,221	456
New Mexico	90,393	172
Arizona	9,581	26
Utah	86,044	118
Nevada	38,959	357
Idaho	10,618	60
Washington	22,195	207
Oregon	86,920	346
California	499,424	4,272
	910,396	6,380

Grand total 33,589,377 4,880,009

In addition the census shows 63,199 Chinese, 55 Japanese, and 25,731 civilized Indians, making a total of 38,558,371, as stated above. In the decade preceding this census the immigrant arrivals numbered 2,466,752, of which 1,106,970 were from the British Islands, and 1,073,429 from other parts of Europe.

1870-1872.—Tariff legislation. See TARIFF: 1860-1883.

1870-1881.—Civil service reform. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: 1870-1880.

1870-1892.—Adverse agricultural conditions in North Carolina.—Political and economic legacy of Reconstruction. See NORTH CAROLINA: 1870-1892.

1870-1910.—Increase in immigration.—Changed nationality and character of immigrants. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1870-1910.

1870-1919.—Development of negro education. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: United States: Negroes.

1871.—Act of Congress creating territorial government for District of Columbia. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: 1871-1874; WASHINGTON, D. C.: 1802-1871.

1871.—Renewed negotiations with Great Britain.—Joint High Commission, Treaty of Washington and Geneva Award. See ALABAMA CLAIMS: 1869-1871; 1871; 1871-1872; ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1871-1872.

1871.—First Civil Service Reform Act. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1870-1880.

1871 (April).—Force Bill.—At the extra session of Congress, which met March 4, 1871 a sweeping act was passed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. "This Act allowed suit in Federal courts by the party injured against any person who should in any way deprive another of the rights of a citizen; it made it a penal offence to conspire to take away from any person the rights of a citizen; it provided that inability, neglect, or refusal by any State to suppress such conspiracy, to protect the rights of its citizens, or to call upon the President for aid, should be 'deemed a denial by such State

of the equal protection of the laws' under the XIVth Amendment; it declared such conspiracies, if not suppressed by the authorities, 'a rebellion against the Government of the United States'; it authorized the President, 'when in his judgment the public safety shall require it,' to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any district, and suppress the insurrection by means of the army and navy; and it excluded from the jury-box any person 'who shall, in the judgment of the court, be in complicity with any such combination or conspiracy.' The authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was to cease after the end of the next regular Session of Congress."

A. Johnston, *History of American politics*, p. 214. ALSO IN: *Annual Cyclopædia*, 1871, p. 228.

1872.—Decision of the San Juan water boundary question by emperor of Germany. See SAN JUAN OR NORTHWESTERN WATER-BOUNDARY QUESTION.

1872.—Twenty-second presidential election.—The leading candidates for president in 1872 were General Grant, nominated for reelection by the main body of the Republican party, and Horace Greeley, of New York, put forward by a revolted section of that party and accepted and supported by the Democratic party. "In 1870 the Republican party in Missouri had split into two parts. The 'Radical' wing wished to maintain for the present the disqualifications imposed on the late rebels by the State Constitution during the war; the 'Liberal' wing, headed by B. Gratz Brown and Carl Schurz, wished to abolish these disqualifications and substitute 'universal amnesty and universal enfranchisement.' Supported by the Democrats, the Liberal Republicans carried the State, though opposed by the Federal office-holders and the influence of the Administration. This success stimulated a reaction in the National Republican party, many of whose members believed that the powers of the Federal Government over the local concerns of the States had already been enforced up to or beyond constitutional limits, that the various enforcement Acts were designed rather for the political advancement of President Grant's personal adherents than for the benefit of the country, the freedmen, or even of the Republican party; and that the efforts to police the Southern States by the force of the Federal Government ought to cease. In the spring of 1871 the Liberal Republicans and Democrats of Ohio began to show symptoms of common feeling on these subjects, and during the summer the 'Liberal' movement continued to develop within the Republican party. January 24th, 1872, the Missouri Liberals issued a call for a National Convention at Cincinnati in the following May." At the meeting in Cincinnati the Liberal Republican convention nominated Horace Greeley for president, and B. Gratz Brown for vice president. The Democratic national convention which met at Baltimore, June 9th, adopted these candidates, with the "platform" on which they were nominated. "A few recalcitrant Democrats met at Louisville, Ky., September 3d, and nominated Charles O'Connor, of New York, and John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts."—A. Johnston, *History of American politics*, ch. 22.—The Prohibitionists put in nomination James Black, of Pennsylvania, for president, and John Russell, of Michigan, for vice president. The Republican nominee for vice president, on the ticket with General Grant, was Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts. The popular vote cast was 3,585,444, or 3,597,132, for Grant, and 2,843,563, or 2,834,125 for Greeley (according to the return that may be counted from Louisiana, where two rival returning

boards disputed authority with one another); 29,489 for O'Connor and 5,608 for Black. Horace Greeley died on Nov. 29, 1872, before the electoral colleges cast their vote, the consequence being that the Democratic votes in the colleges were scattered. The following is the electoral vote for president as counted by Congress: Grant, 286; Thomas A. Hendricks, 42; B. Gratz Brown, 18; Charles J. Jenkins, 2; David Davis, 1. The votes of Louisiana and Arkansas were rejected, as were three votes cast in Georgia for Horace Greeley, deceased.—Based on E. Stanwood, *History of presidential elections*, ch. 23.

ALSO IN: G. W. Julian, *Political recollections*, ch. 15.—E. McPherson, *Handbook of politics for 1872 and 1874*.—E. B. Andrews, *History of the last quarter-century*, ch. 3.

1872-1873.—Credit Mobilier scandal. See CREDIT MOBILIER SCANDAL.

1873.—"Demonetization of silver." See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1848-1893.

1873.—Financial panic.—"The panic of 1873 differed very materially from the other great panics by which this country has been afflicted. Lack of capital was the main difficulty in 1837 and 1857. Population had increased so rapidly that millions of human beings were out of work, and apprehension spread lest there might not be food enough to go around. In 1873, however, men were well employed. Business of all kinds was in excellent condition, and no one doubted for a moment that there would be plenty for every man to eat. The excellent condition of trade, in fact, was the chief factor in the panic of 1873. Every one was busy, and wanted money with which to carry on his trade. For two years before the crash, money had been in great demand. Railroads had recently been built to an extent such in this country had never known before. Whereas, in 1861, railroad construction amounted to only 651 miles, in 1871 it reached the then unprecedented figure of 7,779 miles. This new mileage, moreover, was mainly in the West, where the immediate remuneration was but slight. Railroads were being pushed forward into regions which could not be expected to return an income for twenty years. The cost of railroad construction in this country during the five years preceding September, 1873, was estimated by the Comptroller of the Currency at no less than \$1,700,000,000. The money to pay for this extravagant building was obtained, not from the earnings of the old portions of the road, but from enormous issues of railroad bonds, placed to a large extent among the banks of this country, but still more among the capitalists of Europe. In the Northern Pacific Company occurred the most flagrant abuse of railroad credit the world has ever known. . . . One after another of the Western roads defaulted in paying the interest on its bonds. The result was, that, by the summer of 1873, the market for new issues of railroad bonds had practically disappeared. Meantime the banks and bankers of New York were loaded down with railroad paper. The railroads had borrowed money for short periods in the expectation that before their notes fell due they would have raised the money to make payment by the sale of bonds. A temporary relief was felt, in June, 1873, through the customary midsummer ease in money. But this temporary respite only made the difficulty worse. Deluded by the momentary calm, the New York banks added still further to their loans. . . . The year before, money had grown tight early in September, and the more cautious banks began gradually to call their loans, fearing that the experience of 1872 might

be renewed. But the rates for money did not noticeably increase, and the only cause for excitement early in the month was the failure, on September 8, of the Mercantile Warehouse and Security Company, owing to advances on bonds of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad. This was followed, on the 13th, by the failure of Kenyon, Cox & Co., of which firm Daniel Drew was a member, caused by loans to the Canada Southern railroad. By this time the sky was heavily overcast. Money was now advancing rapidly, the New York banks were calling loans on every hand, and new loans on railroad paper were scarcely to be had at all. Suddenly, on the 18th of September, the tempest burst. On the morning of that dark day, Jay Cooke, the agent of the U. S. Government, with some four millions of deposits from all parts of the country, and his fifteen millions of Northern Pacific paper, declared his inability to meet his debts. The report flew down 'the street' with the ferocity of a cyclone. Railroad shares were thrown upon the market by the bushel, in utter disregard of their intrinsic value. . . . Stock brokers continued to announce their failures all day long. Nothing seemed able to withstand the shock, and when, on September 19, the great banking house of Fisk & Hatch went under, terror became universal. A run was started on the Union Trust Co., which was believed to have close intimacy with Vanderbilt's railroads, and on the Fourth National Bank, whose dealings were largely with Wall street brokers. The panic was by this time so general that the banks began to refuse one another's certified checks, and on the 20th a considerable number of the New York banks suspended payment. On that day the Union Trust Co., the National Trust Co., and the National Bank of the Commonwealth all closed their doors. At 11 o'clock on the 20th, the New York Stock Exchange, for the first time in its history, closed its doors, and the Governing Committee announced that the board would not be opened till further notice. This high-handed measure caused an outcry for the moment, but on calmer judgment it was generally conceded that the measure was a good one. On the evening of that Saturday, September 20, the Clearing House Association met and adopted a plan similar to that adopted in the panic of 1857, and in substance this: Any bank in the Clearing House Association might deposit with a committee of five persons, to be appointed for that purpose, an amount of its bills receivable, or other securities to be approved by the committee, and the committee were then to issue to that bank certificates of deposit, bearing interest at 5 per cent. per annum, to an amount not exceeding 75 per cent. of the securities or bills receivable so deposited. These certificates could be used in settlement of balances at the Clearing House for a period not to extend beyond the 1st of the following November, and they were to be received by creditor banks during that period daily, in the proportion which they bore to the aggregate amount of the debtor balances paid at the Clearing House. The amount of certificates should not exceed \$10,000,000. The legal tenders belonging to the associated banks were to be considered and treated as a common fund held for mutual aid and protection, and the committee were given power to equalize the same by assessment or otherwise in their discretion. This scheme, simple as it was, proved of the utmost efficacy in mitigating the evils that must always follow a distrust among banks. The lull occasioned by the intervening Sunday was employed by President Grant and Secretary of the Treasury

Richardson in a visit to New York. All day long they gave audience to business men at the Fifth Avenue Hotel. Suggestions of every description were offered as a remedy for the disease. The most feasible proposition, and that which was finally adopted, was the purchase of Government bonds. . . . Shortly after his return from the Fifth Avenue Hotel, Secretary Richardson announced his intention to buy Government bonds, and, in a few days, \$13,000,000 of the U. S. greenbacks were thus absorbed. . . . On Tuesday, September 30, the Stock Exchange was once more opened. It was expected on all hands that this would be the signal for another onslaught. But so general was this expectation that most persons refrained for the moment from offering their stocks. As a result, the market opened a trifle higher than it had closed ten days before. It continued to advance, moreover, till October 7. On that day a new decline set in, and on October 14 came a fearful drop, which carried prices lower than on September 20. From this reaction there was a gradual improvement till October 31, when the failure of Hoyt, Sprague & Co., the great mill owners of Providence and New York, once more shook the market and brought stocks, on October 31 and November 1, to the lowest prices of the year. With those prices it became manifest that the panic had reached its end. Money had already begun to flow to New York both from Europe and from the West, and the public, tempted by the excessive decline in stocks, began to purchase freely. The result was a steady though gradual improvement through the remainder of the year."—*The Panic of 1873* (*Banker's Magazine*, November, 1891).

1873.—Boundaries of Idaho marked. See IDAHO: 1864-1873.

1873.—Origin of American National Conference of Charities and Correction. See CHARITIES: United States: 1874-1902.

1873-1874.—Origin of the Interstate Commerce Act.—Demand for cheap transportation.—"The difficulties of freight transportation between the States was discussed at length by Congress, spite of railway attorneys' insistence that the subject was beyond Congressional control. In the House of Representatives, during January, 1874, Hon. G. W. McCrary, Chairman of the Committee on Railroads and Canals, made an exhaustive report affirming the constitutional power of Congress to regulate inter-state commerce. This valuable paper laid bare, in Section 8, Article I, of the Constitution, a depth of meaning which, till then, few had suspected, a discovery that prepared the way for the Inter-state Commerce Act, passed on February 4, 1887. A National Cheap Transportation Association was organized on May 6, 1873, which also demanded lower transportation rates and an increase of avenues for commerce by water and rail. Its manifesto to the public asserted that cheap transportation for persons and property is essential to the public welfare and to the maintenance of a homogeneous and harmonious population. Another Cheap Transportation Convention was held in Richmond, December 1-4, 1874, which petitioned Congress in this interest."—E. B. Andrews, *History of the last quarter-century in the United States*, v. 1, pp. 282-283.

1874-1878.—Act of Congress abolishing territorial government for District of Columbia.—Organic Act creating permanent Board of Commissioners. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: 1871-1874; WASHINGTON, D. C.: 1873-1915.

1874-1890.—Resumption of specie payment. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1874-1890.

1875.—Exposure of the Molly Maguires. See PENNSYLVANIA: 1875.

1875.—Treaty with Hawaii. See HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: Discovery and early history.

1875.—Whisky Ring. See WHISKY RING.

1875.—Second Civil Rights Bill and its declared unconstitutionality.—"Congress, to give full effect to the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution, passed an act in 1875, which provided that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land and water, theatres and other places of public amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude. . . . In 1883 the act was held unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment, says Bradley, J., does not 'invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation, but to provide modes of relief against State legislation or State action of the kinds referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws and the action of State officers, executive and judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.' Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3."—T. M. Cooley, *Constitutional limitations which rest upon the legislative power of the states*, pp. 733-734 and footnote.


1876.—Admission of Colorado into the Union. See COLORADO: 1857-1875.

1876.—Centennial Exhibition at Philadelphia.—In 1871, the Congress of the United States passed an act to provide for the commemoration, in 1876, of the centennial anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, by holding an exhibition, at Philadelphia, "of American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures." The act created a commission, composed of one delegate from each state and territory of the United States, to which commission was committed the "exclusive control" of the contemplated exhibition; though the state of Pennsylvania was required to make provision for the erection of suitable buildings. "To the surprise of those writers who had contended that there would be no exhibits from abroad, there was shown a universal desire on the part of all nations to cooperate liberally in the World's Fair of 1876. The exhibition opened on the 10th of May, 1876, and from that time until Nov. 10, 1876, there were admitted a grand total of 9,910,966 persons, of whom 8,004,274 paid admission fees amounting to \$3,813,724.49."—C. B. Norton, *World's fairs*, ch. 6.—See also below: 1877; CENTENNIAL OF 1876.

1876-1877.—Twenty-third presidential election and its disputed result.—The electoral commission.—"It would be easy to over-estimate the responsibility of General Grant for the political corruption of his administrations. For the most part the wrong-doing of the time began before his first election. Democrats as well as Republicans participated in many of the scandals. Politicians in the cities, the states and the nation seemed to be determined to have a share in the enormous wealth that was being created in America, and they got it by means that varied from the merely unethical and indiscreet, to the openly corrupt. As for the President, his own defence, given in his last message to Congress, may be taken as the best one: 'Failures have been errors of judgment, not of intent.' Under the circumstances, however, it was

natural that the presidential campaign of 1876 should turn upon the failings of the administration. Popular interest in the southern issue was on the wane. Early in the election year, nevertheless, James G. Blaine, Republican leader in the House, made a forceful attack on Jefferson Davis, as the wilful author of the 'gigantic murders and crimes at Andersonville,' the southern prison in which federal captives had been held. Instantly the sectional hatred flared up and Blaine, already a well-known leader, became a prominent candidate for the nomination [but failed to receive it]. Republican reformers generally favored Bristow. A third-term boom for Grant was effectively crushed by an adverse resolution in the House."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War*, v. 3, pp. 48-49.—Four candidates for the presidency were named and voted for by as many different parties in 1876, although the contest of the election was practically between the Republicans and Democrats, as in previous years. The former, after a prolonged struggle of rival factions, put in nomination Ex-Governor Rutherford B. Hayes, of Ohio, with William A. Wheeler, of New York, for vice president. The candidates of the Democratic party were ex-Governor Samuel J. Tilden, of New York, for President, and Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, for vice president. Before these nominations were made, the Prohibition Reform party and the party calling itself the Independent, but popularly known as the "Greenback party" [see GREENBACK PARTY], had already brought candidates into the field. The first named put Green Clay Smith, of Kentucky and G. T. Stewart, of Ohio, in nomination; the nominees of the last named were Peter Cooper, of New York, and Samuel F. Cary, of Ohio. "Thirty-eight States participated in the election. Colorado had been admitted to the Union in August, 1876, and, in order to save an additional election, the choice of electors for that occasion was conferred upon the legislature. All the other States appointed them by popular vote. The polls had hardly closed on the day of election, the 7th of November, when the Democrats began to claim the presidency. The returns came in so unfavorably for the Republicans that there was hardly a newspaper organ of the other party which did not, on the following morning, concede the election of Mr. Tilden. He was believed to have carried every Southern State, as well as New York, Indiana, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The whole number of electoral votes was 369. If the above estimate were correct, the Democratic candidates would have 203 votes, and the Republican candidates 166 votes. But word was sent out on the same day from Republican headquarters at Washington that Hayes and Wheeler were elected by one majority; that the States of South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana had chosen Republican electors. Then began the most extraordinary contest that ever took place in the country. The only hope of the Republicans was in the perfect defence of their position. The loss of a single vote would be fatal. An adequate history of the four months between the popular election and the inauguration of Mr. Hayes, would fill volumes. Space can be given here for only a bare reference to some of the most important events. Neither party was over-scrupulous, and no doubt the acts of some members of each party were grossly illegal and corrupt. . . . In four States, South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, and Oregon, there were double returns. In South Carolina there were loud complaints that detachments of the army stationed near the polls had prevented a fair and free election. Although

the board of State canvassers certified to the choice of the Hayes electors, who were chosen on the face of the returns, the Democratic candidates for electors met on the day fixed for the meeting of electors and cast ballots for Tilden and Hendricks. In Florida there were allegations of fraud on both sides. The canvassing board and the governor certified to the election of the Hayes electors, but, fortified by a court decision in their favor, the Democratic electors also met and voted. In Louisiana there was anarchy. There were two governors, two returning boards, two sets of returns showing different results, and two electoral colleges. In Oregon the Democratic governor adjudged one of the Republican electors ineligible [because as postmaster he was a federal official], and gave a certificate to the highest candidate on the Democratic list. The Republican electors, having no certificate from the governor, met and voted for Hayes and Wheeler. The Democratic elector,



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whose appointment was certified to by the governor, appointed two others to fill the vacancies, when the two Republican electors would not meet with him, and the three voted for Tilden and Hendricks. All of these cases were very complicated in their incidents, and a brief account which should convey an intelligible idea of what occurred is impossible. . . . [Two sets of electors secured credentials in the four States, and double sets of votes were sent to Washington.] Thus, for the first and only time in the history of the country, the election ended in such a way as to leave the result in actual doubt, and in two States the number of legal votes given for the electors was in dispute. . . . As soon as the electoral votes were cast it became a question of the very first importance how they were to be counted. It was evident that the Senate would refuse to be governed by the 22nd joint rule [under which no electoral vote to which any member of either House objected could be counted unless both Houses agreed to the counting of it]—in fact the Senate voted to rescind the rule,—and it was

further evident that if the count were to take place in accordance with that rule it would result in throwing out electoral votes on both sides on the most frivolous pretexts. It was asserted by the Republicans that, under the Constitution, the President of the Senate alone had the right to count, in spite of the fact that the joint rule, the work of their party, had assumed the power for the two Houses of Congress. On the other hand, the Democrats, who had always denounced that rule as unconstitutional, now maintained that the right to count was conferred upon Congress. A compromise became necessary, and the moderate men on both sides determined to effect the establishment of a tribunal, as evenly divided politically as might be, which should decide all disputed questions so far as the Constitution gave authority to Congress to decide them. The outcome of their efforts was the Electoral Commission law of 1877,"



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by which a Commission was created, consisting of fifteen members—the Senate appointing five from its own body, the House five, and four associate justices of the Supreme Court, designated in the bill, appointing a fifth from the same court. The senators selected were Edmunds, Morton, Frelinghuysen (Republicans), and Thurman and Bayard (Democrats). The Representatives were Payne, Hunton, Abbott (Democrats), and Garfield and Hoar (Republicans). The four Supreme Court justices designated by the act were Clifford, Field (Democrats), Strong and Miller (Republicans). They selected for the fifth member of the commission Justice Bradley, who was a Republican. "The natural choice of the justices would have been their associate, David Davis; but he had been elected only five days before as senator from Illinois, and it was regarded by him and by others as improper that he should serve. Thus the commission consisted of eight Republicans and seven Democrats. If Judge Davis had been selected, there would have been only seven Republicans,

and the result of the operation of the law might have been different. . . . The count had begun on the first day of February, and the final vote upon Wisconsin was not reached until the early morning of March 2. As question after question was decided uniformly in favor of the Republicans, it became evident to the Democrats that their case was lost. They charged gross partisanship upon the Republican members of the Electoral Commission, in determining every point involved in the dual returns for their own party, though as a matter of fact there does not seem to have been much room for choice between the two parties on the score of partisanship. Each member of the commission favored by his vote that view which would result in adding to the electoral vote of his own party. But as the result of the count became more and more certainly a Republican triumph, the anger of the Democrats arose. Some of them were for discontinuing the count; and the symptoms of a disposition to filibuster so that there should be no declaration of the result gave reason for public disquietude. But the conservative members of the party were too patriotic to allow the failure of a law which they had been instrumental in passing to lead to anarchy or revolution, and they sternly discountenanced all attempts to defeat the conclusion of the count. The summing up of the votes [Hayes, 185; Tilden, 184], was read by Mr. Allison of Iowa, one of the tellers on the part of the Senate, at a little after four o'clock, on the morning of the 2d of March, amid great excitement. . . . Mr. Ferry thereupon declared Rutherford B. Hayes elected President, and William A. Wheeler Vice-President, of the United States. The decision was acquiesced in peaceably by the whole country, and by men of every party. But the Democrats have never ceased to denounce the whole affair as a fraud. . . . It is to be hoped that the patriotism of the American people and their love of peace may never again be put to such a severe test as was that of 1876 and 1877. [According to the Democratic count, the popular vote stood: Tilden, 4,300,500; Hayes, 4,036,208; Cooper, 81,737; Smith, 9,522. The Republican count gave: Tilden 4,285,992; Hayes, 4,033,768.]—E. Stanwood, *History of presidential elections*, ch. 24.—"The 'eight to seven' decisions became a by-word in politics, and they are generally regarded as proof that even members of the Supreme Court were controlled by partisan bias. But this discreditable result was more than offset by the notable spectacle of half a nation submitting quietly, even in times of intense party feeling, to a decision that had the form of law. Rarely, in any country, has free government been subjected to such strain—or withstood one so triumphantly. After all, the South reaped the fruits of victory. President Hayes at once removed the Federal garrisons. Then the state governments to which his election had been due immediately vanished, and the South was left to work out its salvation for itself as best it could."—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy*, p. 573.

ALSO IN: C. A. O'Neil, *American electoral system*, ch. 20-21.—A. M. Gibson, *Political crime.—Congressional Record*, v. 5, 1877, pt. 1-2.—J. F. Rhodes, *Hayes-Tilden election* (*Century Magazine*, Oct., 1909).—P. L. Haworth, *Hayes-Tilden election*.—E. Stanwood, *James Gillespie Blaine*, pp. 188-191.—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 562-567.—C. E. Dunning, *Reconstruction, civil and political*, pp. 316.

1876-1884.—Fraud in Florida elections. See FLORIDA: 1876-1884.

1877.—Desert Land Act passed. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1847-1901.

1877.—Electoral Count Act passed. See ELECTIONS: Difficulties arising, etc.

1877.—Expedition into Texas.—Instructions to General Sherman. See TEXAS: 1870-1896.

1877.—Change in life of the nation.—Influence of Philadelphia exposition.—“With the coming of Mr. Hayes the whole air of politics seemed to change. . . . Almost at once affairs wore a normal aspect again. The process of reconstruction, at least, had reached its unedifying end, and the hands of political leaders were free to take up the history of the country where it had been broken off in 1861. Instead of the quick, resistless despatch of party measures from session to session by congressional majorities which even the President's veto could not check or defeat, there had come a breathing space in which no party was supreme and the slow and moderate ways of compromise and accommodation were once again vouchsafed the country, at last quite out of breath with the pace to which it had been forced in its affairs. Not for fourteen years, from the elections of 1875 to those of 1889, were either Democrats or Republicans to control both Congress and the Executive. There was leisure from passion; men could look about them deliberately and without excitement and note how the country had changed. It was no longer the country of 1861. Sixteen years, mixed of war which forced industry to a quick, almost abnormal development and of peace that came like a release of energies cramped, pent up, uneasy, had brought something like an industrial revolution with them. The South was of a sudden added as a modern economic force to the national. Her old system of labor, which had shut her in to a virtual isolation, was destroyed; she was open at last to the labor of the world and was to enter with all her resources the industrial life from which she had so long held off. The great Appalachian region which stretched its mighty highlands from Pennsylvania through Maryland, the Virginias, Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Carolinas full seven hundred miles into Alabama and Georgia, and which spread its broad surfaces of mountain, valley, and plateau one hundred and fifty miles by the way upon either hand, geologists knew to be an almost unbroken coal field, it might be thirty-nine thousand square miles in area. Upon its skirts and in the broken country to the east and west of it iron also abounded, and mineral deposits which no man had looked into. The world still needed the southern cotton and tobacco, and before the first crude processes of reconstruction were over the cotton fields were once more producing almost as much as they had yielded in 1860, the year of greatest abundance ere the war came on,—so readily had free labor taken the place of slave. The industrial development of the South had been joined to that of the rest of the country, and for the first time since the modern industrial age set in capitalists turned to her for investment and the enterprises that bring wealth and power. And what was for the South as yet but an exciting prospect and confident hope was for the North already a reality. The war had been a supreme test of economic vitality, and the States of the North and West had emerged from it stronger than they went into it. Almost every industry that yielded the necessities of modern life and action had felt and responded to its quickening compulsion; and when peace came manufacturers but looked about them for wider

markets, better and cheaper processes, a broader scope of operation. Artificial stimulation in the shape of heavy tariff duties had been added to the natural stimulation of the time and of the rapid and healthy growth of the nation. Congress had taxed almost every article of use in the country to support the war, and had added to the innumerable direct taxes which it imposed an enormously expanded system of duties on imports. It had done so in part to offset the direct taxes, to enable the manufacturers, who had to pay large sums to the government on the articles they made, to keep the market nevertheless against the importers; but it had made the duties much higher than that consideration taken alone made necessary. It had raised them to a point that made profit, very great profit, certain to accrue to the manufacturer. No considerable body of manufacturers asked for such ‘protection’ that did not get it, and as much of it as they asked for, though it reduced the revenues of the government to grant it. Hardly a month went by while the war lasted that Congress did not add a new duty or increase an old one, and every industry was nursed to make the most of itself in the home markets, until its undisputed monopoly there as against foreign manufactures gave it wide margins of profit of which to avail itself in underselling competitors in the markets of the world. The country got visible proof of its extraordinary material progress at its Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia. The last year of General Grant's presidency was the centennial year of the independence of the United States, and the anniversary was celebrated by a great international industrial exposition at the city of Philadelphia, where the Congress had sat which took counsel for the young republic at its birth. All the greater commercial and industrial nations were represented in its exhibits. Foreign governments responded very promptly to the invitation to lend their aid in securing its success, among the rest the government of Great Britain, whose defeat in arms the great fair was meant to celebrate. The presence of her official commissioners made it a festival of reconciliation. America's own bitter war of civil revolution also was over, and a time of healing at hand. The thronging crowds at Philadelphia, the gay and spacious buildings, the peaceable power of the world's workmen exhibited upon every hand spoke of good will and the brotherhood of nations, where there was no rivalry but the rivalry to serve and to enrich mankind. It was significant for America that objects of beauty marked everywhere among those exhibits the refinement and the ennobling art of the world. Throughout all the long hundred years in which they had been building a nation Americans had shown themselves children of utility, not of art. Beauty they had neglected. Everything they used showed only the plain, unstudied lines of practical serviceability. Grace was not in their thought, but efficiency. The very houses they built whether for homes or for use in their business, showed how little thought they gave to the satisfaction of the eye. Their homes were for the most part of wood and the perishable material hardly justified costly ornament or elaborate design; and yet the men of the colonial time, keeping still some of the taste of an older world, had given even their simple frame dwellings a certain grace and dignity of line, and here and there a detail, about some doorway or the columns of a stately porch, which rewarded the eye. Builders of the later time had forgotten the elder canons of taste and built without artistic perception of form even when they

built elaborately and at great cost. The same plainness, the same hard lines of mere serviceability were to be seen in almost everything the country made. The things to be seen at Philadelphia, gathered from all the world, awakened it to a new sense of form and beauty. Foreign governments had generously sent priceless works of painting and sculpture over sea to give distinction to the galleries of the Exhibition. Private citizens and local museums also had freely loaned their chief art treasures. Everywhere there was some touch of beauty, some suggested grace of form. Visitors poured by the million across the grounds and through the buildings of the Exhibition, out of every State and region of the country, and the impressions they received were never wholly obliterated. Men and women of all sorts, common and gentle alike, had from that day a keener sense of what was fitted to please the eye. The pride of life and of great success that came with the vision of national wealth and boundless resources to be got from the countless exhibits of farm and factory had in it also some touch of corrected taste, some impulse of suitable adornment. Men knew afterwards that that had been the dawn of an artistic renaissance in America which was to put her architects and artists alongside the modern masters of beauty and redeem the life of her people from its ugly severity."—W. Wilson, *History of the American peoples*, pp. 1-2, 4, 6-8.

1878.—Acquisition of Pago Pago recognized. See PAGO PAGO; SAMOA: 1830-1878.

1878.—Bland Bill.—Allison Silver Act.—"With a Democratic House throwing obstacles in his way, and with politicians of his own party unfriendly to him, Hayes could hardly hope for a brilliant administration. The only important law enacted by Congress during his Presidency was a measure to which he was opposed. This was the Bland-Allison Silver Bill, which was brought forward in 1878 with the purpose of undoing the work done by the demonetization of silver five years before. It was the wish of the silver men led by Richard P. Bland, a representative from Missouri, to repeal the law of 1873 and restore the free and unlimited coinage of silver, so that the white metal might again have 'its ancient legal equality with gold as a debt-paying money.' Bland carried his bill through the House, but in the Senate Allison of Iowa secured an amendment restricting the amount to be coined. The bill was amended provided that the secretary of the treasury should buy not less than \$2,000,000 nor more than \$4,000,000 worth of silver bullion each month and coin it into silver dollars [of 412½ grains of standard silver, or 371¼ grains of fine silver to the dollar]. When the bill went to the President it was vetoed, but the veto was not sustained. The bill came out of the West, and the debate on it and the voting showed that in the Western country there was a sentiment for the free coinage of silver that could not be comfortably ignored. The interests of the creditor classes and of Eastern business men called for the gold standard, but the owners of silver-mines and the debtor farmer of the West were insistent in their demands for the restoration of bimetalism."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 570.—"As every Secretary of the Treasury, throughout the period in which the act was in force kept to the minimum amount, the practical result was a monthly purchase of two million dollars' worth of silver bullion. . . . The amount of silver obtainable with two million dollars obviously varies according to the price of the metal in terms of the dollars with which the pur-

chases are made. In February, 1878, when the first purchases were made, those dollars were the inconvertible United States notes, or greenbacks, worth something less than their face in gold. . . . When specie payments were resumed, on the first of January, 1879, and the greenbacks became redeemable in gold, the measure of value in the United States became gold, and the extent of the coinage of silver dollars under the act of 1878 became simply a question of how much silver bullion could be bought with two million dollars of gold. The price of silver in 1878 was, in terms of gold, not far from a dollar or an ounce of standard silver. After 1878 it went down almost steadily. The silver dollar of 412½ grains contains less than an ounce (480 grains) of standard silver. The monthly purchase of two million dollars' worth of silver therefore yielded more than two million silver dollars, the amount being obviously greater as the price of silver went lower. On the average, the monthly yield was not far from two and a half millions of silver dollars. So much each month, therefore, or thirty millions of silver dollars a year, was roughly the addition to the currency of the community from the act of 1878. An important provision of the act of 1878 was that authorizing the issue of silver certificates against the deposit of silver dollars. . . . The dollars and certificates between them constitute what we may call the silver currency of the act of 1878. The passage of that act was due to causes easily described. It was part of the opposition to the contraction of the currency and the resumption of specie payments, which forms the most important episode of our financial history between 1867 and 1879. . . . No doubt some additional force was given to the movement in favor of the use of silver from the desire of the silver-mining States and their representatives, that the price of the metal should be kept up through a larger use of it for coinage. But this element, while sometimes prominent in the agitation, was not then, as it has not been in more recent years, of any great importance by itself. The real strength of the agitation for the wider use of silver as money comes from the conviction of large masses of the people that the community has not enough money."—F. W. Taussig, *Silver situation in the United States*, pt. 1.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1848-1893; 1874-1890.

ALSO IN: C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War (United States, v. 3, pp. 139-141, 327-329)*.—A. D. Noyes, *Forty years of American finance*, ch. 2-3.—D. R. Dewey, *Financial history of the United States*, ch. 14-17.

1878-1893.—Represented at international conferences on bimetalism. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1867-1893.

1879.—Mississippi River Commission created. See MISSISSIPPI RIVER: 1875-1879.

1879-1921.—Child labor restrictive legislation.—Lack of enforcement. See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1879-1921.

1880.—Revival of National Farmers' Alliance. See NATIONAL FARMERS' ALLIANCE.

1880.—Twenty-fourth presidential election.—"Toward the end of his term President Hayes could write in his diary: 'I think I have the confidence of the country.' To a large extent this was doubtless true. One of his successors, Woodrow Wilson, says of him: 'He was upright, public spirited, inclined to serve the country unselfishly and in the interest of sound policy.' Carl Schurz said of him: 'Public station in this country has seldom, if ever, been graced by a man of finer

character or higher and more conscientious conception of duty and more patriotic motives.' But the leaders who controlled the machinery of the Republican party did not share in this confidence and esteem. In the minds of practical politicians Hayes was simply an 'old granny,' a 'goody goody' unfit for the sinful world in which he lived."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 570-571.—For the twenty-fourth presidential election, in 1880, the Republicans, meeting at Chicago, June 2, named General James A. Garfield, of Ohio, as its candidate for president and Chester A. Arthur, of New York, for vice president. The so-called Greenback party (which had appeared four years before, in the election of 1876), meeting at Chicago on June 9, put in nomination, for president, James B. Weaver of Iowa, and, for vice president, B. J. Chambers, of Texas. The main object and principle of the Greenback party was set forth in the following declarations of its platform: "That the right to make and issue money is a sovereign power to be maintained by the people for the common benefit. The delegation of this right to corporations is a surrender of the central attribute of sovereignty. . . . All money, whether metallic or paper, should be issued and its volume controlled by the government, and not by or through banking corporations, and when so issued, should be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private. . . . Legal tender currency [the greenback notes of the Civil War period] should be substituted for the notes of the national banks, the national banking system abolished, and the unlimited coinage of silver, as well as gold, established by law." The Prohibitionists (Temperance) in convention at Cleveland, June 17, nominated Neal Dow, of Maine, for president, and A. M. Thompson, of Ohio, for vice president. On June 22, at Cincinnati, the Democratic party held its convention and nominated General Winfield S. Hancock, of Pennsylvania, for president, and William H. English, of Indiana, for vice president. At the election, in November, the popular vote cast was 4,454,416 for Garfield, 4,444,952 for Hancock, 308,578 for Weaver, and 10,305 for Dow. The electoral votes were divided between Garfield and Hancock, being 214 for the former and 155 for the latter. Every former slave state was carried by the Democratic party, together with New Jersey, California and Nevada.—E. McPherson, *Handbook of politics for 1880 and 1882*.

ALSO IN: J. C. Ridpath, *Life and work of James A. Garfield*, ch. 10-11.—J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, ch. 29.—D. S. Muzzey, *American history*, pp. 521-523.—E. Stanwood, *History of the presidency*, ch. 26.

1880.—Tenth census.—The total population was 50,155,783 (exceeding that of 1870 by 11,597,412), classed and distributed as follows:

North Atlantic division

	White.	Black.
Maine	646,852	1,451
New Hampshire.....	346,220	685
Vermont	331,218	1,057
Massachusetts	1,763,782	18,697
Rhode Island.....	269,939	6,488
Connecticut	610,769	11,547
New York.....	4,501,022	65,104
New Jersey.....	1,092,017	38,853
Pennsylvania	4,197,016	85,535
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	14,273,844	229,417

South Atlantic division

	White.	Black.
Delaware	120,160	26,442
Maryland	724,693	210,230
District of Columbia.....	118,006	59,596
Virginia	880,858	631,616
West Virginia.....	592,537	25,886
North Carolina.....	867,242	531,277
South Carolina.....	391,105	604,332
Georgia	816,906	725,133
Florida	142,605	126,690
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	4,654,112	2,941,202

North Central division

Ohio	3,117,920	79,900
Indiana	1,938,798	39,228
Illinois	3,031,151	46,368
Michigan	1,614,560	15,100
Wisconsin	1,309,618	2,702
Minnesota	776,884	1,564
Iowa	1,614,600	9,516
Missouri	2,022,826	145,350
Dakota	133,147	401
Nebraska	449,764	2,385
Kansas	952,155	43,107
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	16,961,423	385,621

South Central division

Kentucky	1,377,179	271,451
Tennessee	1,138,831	403,151
Alabama	662,185	600,103
Mississippi	479,398	650,291
Louisiana	454,954	483,655
Texas	1,197,237	393,384
Arkansas	591,531	210,666
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	5,901,315	3,012,701

Western division

Montana	35,385	346
Wyoming	19,437	298
Colorado	191,126	2,435
New Mexico.....	108,721	1,015
Arizona	35,160	155
Utah	142,423	232
Nevada	53,556	488
Idaho	29,013	53
Washington	67,199	325
Oregon	163,075	487
California	767,181	6,018
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	1,612,276	11,852

Grand total..... 43,402,970 6,580,793

In addition the census shows 105,465 Chinese, 148 Japanese, and 66,407 civilized Indians, making a total of 50,155,783, as stated above. The immigrants arriving in the country during the preceding ten years numbered 2,944,695, of whom 989,163 were from the British Islands and 1,357,801 from other parts of Europe.—See also CENSUS: United States.

1880-1882.—Railroad building.—Abuses. See RAILROADS: 1880-1882.

1880-1906.—Anti-Chinese agitation.—Treaty suppressing immigration of coolies.—Protest against Chinese boycott of American goods. See RACE PROBLEMS: 1880-1906.

1881.—Brief administration of President Garfield.—Need for civil service reform.—Clamor for office.—Assassination of President Garfield.—“Garfield’s administration began under the most favorable conditions and with every manifestation of popular good-will. But soon there was trouble. When choosing his cabinet he selected Blaine as his secretary of state. . . . This appointment excited the wrath of [Roscoe] Conkling, who was now a member of the Senate. But the President, supported by the powerful Blaine, ventured to brave the New Yorker’s fury. Without consulting Conkling or his colleague, Thomas C. Platt, he appointed W. H. Robertson for the coveted position of collector of the port of New York. The gauntlet was now thrown down and the battle was on. Disregarding considerations of party harmony, Conkling attacked the President at every point where his armor was weak, but in vain; the onslaught did not bring the rejection of Robertson’s name. Smarting under failure . . . Conkling resigned his seat in the Senate, his fellow-senator Thomas C. Platt . . . joining him in taking leave. In order to secure a vindication for the stand they had taken, the two senators now appealed to the New York legislature for reelection; but to their surprise and mortification the legislature elected two other men. Conkling never again held public office.”—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 573.—“With Conkling defeated and out of the way, with Blaine entering upon his active foreign policy, and with the national spirit aroused by the preparations for the Centennial celebration of the British surrender at Yorktown, Garfield’s good-fortune seemed secure; but he had yet to reckon with an evil spirit which he himself had helped conjure up to aid in his campaign. The inauguration of Garfield was attended by no reversal of political parties which would warrant a general proscription of office-holders. No charge of hostility could be made against the Hayes holdovers, since Hayes was not a candidate for reelection. Yet the thirst for office carried the expectations and demands for reward quite beyond the criterion of party; every active worker for Garfield in the campaign seemed to think himself entitled to an office. It was estimated that one-third the working time of the president was absorbed by applicants for office and that six-sevenths of his callers came upon the same errand. Candidates waylaid him when he ventured from the shelter of his official residence, and followed him even to the doors of the church where he worshipped. Contributors to the campaign fund, who sought a return, crowded his waiting-room and dogged his footsteps. His service in the army and in Congress had made him a wide acquaintance which now became a misfortune. If he had erred in adopting machine methods in the campaign, he must pay the penalty. During his four months’ term of office he made 300 appointments, of which 89, or nearly a fourth, were to replace removals; Hayes, in his entire first year, made only 74 removals, or less than a tenth of his appointments. Additional evidence of the conditions existing in Washington and the need of reform was furnished by Thomas W. Brady, second assistant postmaster-general, who actually threatened President Garfield with exposure of his campaign methods if he did not call off a pending investigation into Brady’s conduct in office. Brady was a hold-over from Grant’s administration, in charge of the ‘star’ routes, or those on which the mails were carried by private contract. . . . It was found that . . . [he], with various treasury and other clerks essential to the plan, had conspired

with Senator Dorsey, of Arkansas, and other contractors, to increase the compensation on many of the two thousand star routes, dividing the profits among themselves. In the competitive bidding they secured one hundred and thirty-four routes, for which they were entitled to receive \$143,169; but this sum they raised by supplementary agreements for ‘increase and expenditure’ to \$622,808. To cover their tracks, the conspirators devised hundreds of petitions for the extension of new star routes. . . . True to this threat, Brady published a letter from Garfield to ‘My dear Hubbell,’ who as chairman of the Republican congressional committee in 1880 levied the two per cent. ‘voluntary contribution’ on the government clerks. The letter . . . expressed the hope that Brady would give them all the assistance possible and inquired how the departments generally were doing. It could be interpreted in no other way than as extorting a contribution from the government employes. Sherman had warned Garfield at the beginning of the campaign that the public sentiment in favor of reform in the civil service could not be ignored, although politicians attempted to ridicule and belittle Hayes’s efforts in that direction. The disgust of the people was increased by the events of the Brady and Dorsey ‘trial.’ Political influence was manifest at every turn, every obstacle known to astute political minds was cast in the way of the prosecution, and statements were openly made that no jury could be found in the city of Washington to convict these high and influential men. Partisan newspapers were persistent in minimizing the offence and in applying the party whitewash. On the other side, charges of jury-bribing were investigated and the foreman indicted; and five government employes, including the marshal of the District of Columbia, were dismissed from office for meddling in the case. Making use of technicalities and the law’s delay, all the accused eventually escaped punishment except one small offender who was probably the least guilty. In the midst of these exposures, with the clamor for office filling his ears, and with the party leaders in New York contending for supremacy, President Garfield was assassinated under conditions which pointed directly to the spoils system as the cause. Accompanied by Secretary Blaine, he planned to leave Washington on a visit to his *alma mater*, Williams College, July 2, 1881. As the two entered the Pennsylvania Railroad station in that city, one Charles J. Guiteau fired two bullets into the president’s back. The wounded man slowly succumbed and passed away September 19. The oath of office was taken by Vice-President Arthur at his home in New York, September 20, and repeated a few days later in Washington. . . . Garfield’s murderer in public statements declared that he ‘removed’ the president as a ‘political necessity,’ because party dissensions demanded it. He had been by turns preacher, editor, reformer, and politician, had allied himself with the Republican campaign managers, and had been a persistent office-seeker since the inauguration. . . . Guiteau was arraigned in the courts of the District of Columbia, pleaded not guilty, was pronounced sane by medical experts, found guilty, and was executed in Washington, June 30, 1882, lacking two days of a year from the date on which the crime was committed. . . . Conditions existing at the time of Garfield’s assassination called attention not only to the evils of the demand for office, but also to the necessity of providing a more dependable succession for the presidency. If some assassin had removed Arthur during the first months of his ad-

ministration, the United States would have been without a legal head. The Constitution leaves Congress to arrange a sequence beyond the vice-president; by act of 1792 it was provided that the president *pro tem* of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives should follow the vice-president in order; and this was deemed sufficient. . . . Although the hazard of the situation at this time was admitted, nothing was done until the 'presidential succession' act of 1886 [see below: 1886], which provided a further succession of members of the cabinet in order, beginning with the secretary of state."—E. E. Sparks, *National development, 1877-1885*, pp. 187-191, 193-194.

ALSO IN: E. B. Andrews, *History of the last quarter-century*, v. 1, pp. 317-336.—J. G. Blaine, *Eulogy on President Garfield*.—J. C. Ridpath, *Life and works of James A. Garfield*, ch. 12-13.

1881-1885.—President Arthur's administration.—"The successor of Garfield, President Arthur, . . . was able, and there never was the slightest spot upon his integrity; but [in his early days] he was lively, jocose, easy-going, with little appearance of devotion to work, dashing off whatever he had to do with ease and accuracy. . . . His nomination to the Vice-Presidency, which on the death of Garfield led him to the Presidency, was very curious, and an account of it given . . . [by] a member of the Garfield cabinet, . . . later an ambassador in Europe, was as follows: After the defeat of the 'Stalwarts,' who had fought so desperately for the renomination of General Grant at the Chicago Convention of 1880, the victorious side of the convention determined to concede to them, as an olive-branch, the Vice-Presidency, and with this intent . . . [a number of delegates] who had been especially active in preventing Grant's renomination went to the room of the New York delegation, which had taken the leading part in his support, knocked at the door, and called for Mr. Levi P. Morton . . . [and] said to him, 'We wish to give the Vice-Presidency to New York as a token of good will, and you are the man who should take it; don't fail to accept it.' Mr. Morton answered that he had but a moment before, in this conference of his delegation, declined the nomination. At this the visitors said, 'Go back instantly and tell them that you have reconsidered and will accept; we will see that the convention nominates you.' Mr. Morton started to follow this advice, but was just too late: . . . the place which he had declined had been offered to General Arthur. . . . Up to the time when the Presidency devolved upon him General Arthur had shown no qualities which would have suggested him for that high office. . . . But the change in him on taking the Presidency was amazing. Up to that time he had been known as one of Mr. Conkling's henchmen, though of the better sort. As such he had held the collectorship of the port of New York, and as such, during his occupancy of the Vice-Presidency, he had visited Albany and done his best, though in vain, to secure Mr. Conkling's renomination; but immediately on his elevation to the Presidency all this was changed, and there is excellent authority for the statement that when Mr. Conkling wished him to continue, as President, in the subservient position which he had taken as Vice-President, Mr. Arthur had refused, and when taxed with ingratitude he said: 'No. For the Vice-Presidency I was indebted to Mr. Conkling, but for the Presidency of the United States my debt is to the Almighty.' . . . Rarely has there been a better or more dignified administration; the new Secretary of State, Mr. Frelinghuysen, was in every

respect fitted for his office, and the other men whom Mr. Arthur summoned about him were satisfactory."—A. D. White, *Autobiography*, pp. 192-194.—"Improvements in the coast defences were begun under . . . [President Arthur's] administration, and the building of a steel navy inaugurated. Letter postage was reduced, special delivery of letters commenced, and the star-route frauds were stamped out. Those popular acts, due largely to the suggestion of the president, would seem to warrant him and his party a continuance in power. Unfortunately, the financial depression continued. The crops of 1883, although surpassing the unfortunate yield of 1881, were scarcely up to the average, and the corn crop fell nearly four hundred million bushels behind. Large quantities of stocks and bonds had been watered by extensions and consolidations which could not be expected to yield immediate dividends, and they declined steadily during the year. Northern Pacific threw on the market in October, 1883, an issue of twenty million dollars and created a mild panic. More than ten thousand firms became bankrupt during 1882, a larger number than marked any year since 1873. Causes for the depression were found in over-production, financial troubles abroad, over-railroad building, and capital lying idle because rates of interest were unattractive. For no one of these misfortunes was President Arthur accountable; yet with proverbial short sight the people placed the responsibility on the shoulders of the party in power. Conviction was growing that the tariff enriched the few at the expense of the many; and disappointment over the failure of the Republican party to revise the tariff in 1880-1882, when it was in full command of the government, rapidly changed to a desire for revenge. Discontent in the party ranged from the habitually disgruntled, who felt that the party had been in power long enough, to thoughtful reformers, who accused the party leaders of being professional politicians, guilty of corrupt practices, and negligent of needed reforms. In truth, the germ of reform was in the air. Anti-monopolists held meetings in various states demanding restriction of corporations by the federal government, post-office savings-banks, government ownership of telegraphs, abolition of convict labor, woman suffrage, and legal restraint of combinations intended to advance prices. Some of this animosity was engendered by a combination effected in 1881, whereby the Western Union Telegraph Company absorbed its great rival, the American Union Company."—E. E. Sparks, *National development, 1877-1885*, pp. 328-329.

ALSO IN: J. Sherman, *Recollections*, v. 2, ch. 44-47.

1882.—First Federal immigration law approved. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1835-1913.

1882.—Passage of the Edmunds Bill, to suppress polygamy in Utah. See UTAH: 1882-1893.

1882-1889.—New industrial age.—Formation of Standard Oil and other trusts.—"Standard Oil was dominant by the beginning of the '80's, and concentration had begun in sugar, steel and other basic industries. Here was an economic tendency of revolutionary significance—the organization of business in a way that was bound to change the outlook of a whole nation. It had vast potentialities for good and evil—all it wanted was harnessing and directing. But the new thing did not fit into the little outlines and verbiages which served as a philosophy for our political hacks. So they gaped at it and let it run wild, called it names,

and threw stones at it. And by that time the force was too big for them."—W. Lippmann, *Preface to politics*, p. 27.—See also TRUSTS: United States: Standard Oil Company; 1904-1909; 1906-1910; 1907: Chief existing combinations; 1911: Supreme Court decisions; International: Struggle for oil; CAPITALISM: 19th century: United States.

ALSO IN: D. A. Wells, *Recent economic changes*, ch. 2.—K. Coman, *Industrial history of the United States*, ch. 7.—J. W. Jenks, *Trust problem*.

1883.—Treaty with Siam. See SIAM: 1800-1893. 1883.—Hayes Commission on tariff. See TARIFF: 1883.

1883.—Passage of Pendleton Civil Service Reform Bill. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1880-1883.

1884.—Financial disasters.—"The month of May, 1884, concludes the prosperous period which

Appearance of the Independents or "Mugwumps."—James G. Blaine, of Maine, and General John A. Logan, of Illinois, nominated at Chicago, June 3, were the Republican candidates for president and vice president, in the election of 1884. The Democratic national convention, held, likewise, at Chicago, July 8, put forward Governor Grover Cleveland, of New York, as its candidate for president, with Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, for vice president. General Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts, and General A. M. West, of Mississippi, received double nominations, from the National or Greenback party and an Anti-Monopoly party (so-called) for president and vice president, respectively; while the Prohibitionists put in nomination John P. St. John, of Kansas, and William Daniel, of Maryland. The election was an exceedingly close one, its result turning upon a plurality of only 1,149 in New York, by which that state was given to Cleveland, with its thirty-six electoral votes, securing his election. The total popular vote counted as follows: Cleveland, 4,874,986; Blaine, 4,851,981; Butler, 175,370; St. John, 150,369. The electoral vote was divided between Cleveland and Blaine, 219 for the former and 182 for the latter.—E. McPherson, *Handbook of politics, 1884 and 1886*.—*Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1884.—"At the presidential election of 1884 a section of the Republican party, more important by the intelligence and social position of the men who composed it than by its voting power, 'bolted' (to use the technical term) from their party, and refused to support Mr. Blaine. Some simply abstained, some, obeying the impulse to vote which is strong in good citizens in America, voted for Mr. St. John, the Prohibitionist candidate, though well aware that this was practically the same thing as abstention. The majority, however, voted against their party for Mr. Cleveland, the Democratic candidate; and it seems to have been the transference of their vote which turned the balance in New York State, and thereby determined the issue of the whole election in Mr. Cleveland's favour." This group "goes by the name of Mugwumps. . . . The name is said to be formed from an Indian word denoting a chief or aged wise man, and was applied by the 'straight-out' Republicans to their bolting brethren as a term of ridicule. It was then taken up by the latter as a term of compliment; though the description they used formally in 1884 was that of 'Independent Republicans.' . . . [Their chief doctrine was] the necessity of reforming the civil service by making appointments without reference to party, . . . and a general reform in the methods of politics by selecting men for Federal, State, and municipal offices, with reference rather to personal fitness than to political affiliations."—J. Bryce, *American commonwealth*, v. 2, ch. 56, with footnote.—"Mr. Blaine was an old campaigner. He knew that his record would be violently assailed. He felt, however, that he had drawn all the enemy's fire in 1876 and 1880, and that in consequence their ammunition had been practically exhausted. He had no intention of conducting a defensive battle. With all his natural aggressiveness, therefore, he began to carry the war into the enemy's country. At first he trusted to the old sectional issue which had won so many elections for his party. The memories of the Civil War were again invoked. The perils of the 'Solid South' and of 'the South once more in the saddle' were pictured by a thousand party orators. But somehow or other this issue had, in sporting parlance, gone stale. . . . The tariff question was then taken up and ham-



CARTOON OF BLAINE
BY THOMAS NAST, 1884

followed the crisis of 1873. During this period the most gigantic speculations in railroads occurred; the zenith of the movement was in 1880, and as early as 1881 a retrograde movement began, only to end in the disasters in question. The decline in prices had been steady for three years; they had sunk little by little under the influence of a ruinous competition, caused by the number of new lines and the lowering of rates, but above all through the manipulations by the managers on a scale unexampled until now. In connection with the disasters of May, 1884, the names of certain speculators who misused other people's money, such as Ward, of Grant & Ward; Fish, President of the Marine Bank; and John C. Eno, of the Second National Bank, will long be remembered. General Grant, who was a silent partner in Ward's concern, was an innocent sufferer, both in fortune and reputation."—C. Juglar, *Brief history of panics*, pp. 102-103.

1884.—Twenty-fifth presidential election.—

mered at industriously. This had proved sufficient to pull Mr. Garfield through in 1880, and much was hoped from it by Mr. Blaine. The Democratic platform, however, had been very wisely drawn, and its tariff plank decidedly appealed to the common sense of the American people. . . . In this there was no suggestion of the favourite Republican bogey of Free Trade. It was instead a lucid definition of Protection as Protection had been understood by Lincoln and by the Republican financiers of his administration. Hence the tariff issue was another weapon which bent and broke in the hands of those who tried to wield it. Seeing the futility of their efforts to rekindle the war spirit or to frighten the manufacturing interests, the Republican managers, in their desperation, descended to the lower plane of personal abuse, justifying themselves by citing the attacks which Democrats and Independents were making upon Mr. Blaine. From that moment the contest became shameful and indecent to an almost incredible degree. No such campaign of slander had ever before been waged. . . . Late in October it became evident that the vote of New York would decide the result of the election; and both parties concentrated upon that State their intensest energies. Mr. Cleveland as Governor had, . . . offended the labour vote, the Roman Catholics, and Tammany Hall—three immensely powerful elements. Mr. Blaine, on the other hand, because of his Irish descent, his Catholic mother, and his professed sympathies with the cause of Ireland and the so-called Irish 'patriots,' was strong precisely where Cleveland was known to be most vulnerable. Yet in New York Mr. Blaine had made one venomous and implacable enemy. This was Roscoe Conkling, with whom, so far back as 1866, there had been established something like a personal feud. . . . His [Conkling's] power in New York was great, and the Republican managers could do nothing with him. . . . [Nevertheless when] on the evening of the 18th of November, the official count was made; [it was found] that a plurality of 1149 votes in the State of New York had given the presidency to Mr. Cleveland. . . . [The vote in New York was probably influenced to a certain extent by an address made by the Reverend S. D. Burchard, one of Blaine's supporters, in which he said that he and his friends would not vote for the party of "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion." Blaine took no notice of this thrust and in consequence was accused by the Democratic press of acquiescing in an insult to the Roman Catholic voters.] The election of Mr. Cleveland marks an epoch in our national history, the importance of which can only now be fully understood. It meant that, with the exception of the negro question, the issues springing from the Civil War had been definitely settled. It meant the beginning of a true re-union of all States and sections. It meant that the nation had turned its back upon the past, and was about to move forward with confidence and courage to a future of material prosperity, and to a greatness of which no one at that time could form an adequate conception. And it meant, although none then surmised it, that, as a result of new conditions, there was ultimately to be effected a momentous change in the whole social and political structure of the American republic."—H. T. Peck, *Twenty years of the republic*, pp. 32-34, 40-42, 48.

ALSO IN: E. E. Sparks, *National development*, ch. 19.—E. B. Andrews, *United States in our own time*, ch. 16.—J. Sherman, *Recollections of forty years*, ch. 47.—E. Stanwood, *James Gillespie*

Blaine, ch. 9.—D. S. Muzzey, *American history*, pp. 526-531.

1884.—Represented at Berlin Conference regarding affairs in Africa. See BERLIN ACT.


1884-1912.—Government of Alaska. See ALASKA: 1884-1912.

1885.—Alien contract labor law. See LABOR LEGISLATION: 1864-1920; IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1870-1910.

1885-1888.—Termination of the Fishery Articles of the Treaty of Washington.—Renewed controversies. See FISHERIES: 1877-1898.

1885-1891.—Indian problem.—Dawes Bill.—Education Act.—Reservations.—Hostilities between whites and Indians.—"The Indians did not escape from the pressure of the population westward; their frontier was rapidly disappearing, for their reservations stood in the way of great railway systems to the Pacific. Even the Indian Territory, once remote from civilization, was in the path of settlement, and ranchers looked with envious eye upon the vast domains given over to hunting. 'The Indian must make his final stand for existence where he is now,' said Lamar, secretary of the interior, in 1885; no longer could he be pushed back into the wilderness. With the filling up of the country to the west, another removal of the Indian was impracticable; the immediate problem, therefore, was the adjustment of Indian barbarism to Anglo-Saxon civilization. The alert American, busy with the interests of modern life, would not tolerate the uneconomic use of millions of acres over to Indian occupancy; and the humanitarian friends of the Indian slowly came to the conviction that a life of dependence upon government rations from day to day accomplished little in the way of permanent progress. A new solution was therefore proposed, the breaking up of the tribal relation and substitution of individual ownership in place of tribal ownership on the reservation. In 1887 the so-called Dawes bill was enacted, providing for the allotment of lands in severalty; to each head of a family a quarter-section was to be granted, with smaller allotments to others; and in order to protect the grantee against land-sharks and speculators, conveyance of the land thus allotted was prohibited for a period of twenty-five years. Along with these material grants, under the Dawes act the Indian in severalty received the right of citizenship. There was hope that when the Indian became a citizen, with the individual ownership of a farm, the system of rations, annuities, and tribal institutions would disappear. [See also OKLAHOMA: 1885-1887.] In order to satisfy the land-hunger of the whites, efforts were made to buy from the Indians portions of their reservations, wherewith to enlarge the public domain for settlement by homesteaders. The Indian reservations in 1885 amounted to 225,000 square miles, one-eighth of which would suffice to furnish a half-section of land—320 acres—to each man, woman, and child of the 250,000 Indians west of the Mississippi. The government, however, instead of paying the money directly to the Indians, invested the funds for the benefit of the tribes. More liberal appropriations were also made for the education of Indians, until, in 1888, 15,000 Indian youths, or more than a third of the total number considered 'teachable,' were enrolled in schools. In 1891 a compulsory education act was passed by Congress, and all children of a suitable age were brought under its jurisdiction; for some of them, government day-schools were provided; but the majority were taken from their homes and placed in reservation boarding-

schools, or in training-schools outside the reservations, as at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, or at the Haskell Institute in Lawrence, Kansas. The Indian problem seemed at last in a fair way of settlement; certainly there was outward peace, though occasionally there was an outbreak, usually because of disregard of Indian treaty rights by careless or over-aggressive settlers, and particularly by cattle-men, as was shown by an unwarranted attack upon the Utes in Colorado in 1887. In 1885 the turbulent Apaches in New Mexico went on the warpath, murdered a hundred persons, and threw the Southwest into a panic. The Indians also suffered from the bad management of some of the agencies; rations were stolen by dishonest officials, and renewed charges were made that the government was not living up to its



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treaty obligations. A long record of such provocations led a portion of the Sioux tribe in Dakota to engage in hostilities in 1890. Medicine-men preached the coming of a messiah who should give the Indians power to destroy their enemies, and ghost dances wrought the tribe up to a religious frenzy. Troops were quickly assembled under General Miles, and there was open warfare, resulting in the killing of five hundred Indians and thirty soldiers in the battle of Wounded Knee, December 29, 1890. The rich district of Oklahoma—the beautiful land—within the limits of the Indian Territory, was especially coveted by the white man. Lawless 'boomers,' as far back as 1880, had sought to occupy this land, but were driven off by Federal troops. In 1885 President Cleveland warned off intruders. The land could not be opened up except by executive proclamation; and President Cleveland continued obdurate in his determination to keep faith with

the tribes. A horde of restless and angry pioneers crowded to the frontier, and frequently molested the Indians within the territory. Finally with the consent of the Indian nations, the land was purchased by the government, and President Harrison issued the desired proclamation permitting entrance at twelve o'clock, noon, April 22, 1889."—D. R. Dewey, *National problems*, pp. 6-10.— See also OKLAHOMA: 1885: Threatened Indian outbreak.

1885-1897. — Political unrest. — Increase and shifting of population. — Growth of cities. — Development of manufactures. — Production of metals. — Influence of Grangers. — "The years from 1885 to 1897 cover a period of unsettlement. Action and reaction followed in quick succession. The period lacks definiteness either of purpose or of progress; there was no unanimity of opinion as to the facts of economic life or as to national policy. Old political platforms were not applicable to the new problems. Party politics became confused, and shrewd political leaders were at a loss which way to turn. The result was uncertainty, vacillation, and inconsistency; independence of judgment aroused dissensions, and was frequently rewarded by defeat and retirement from public life. A Democratic president and House opposed by a Republican Senate mark the first four years; then for two brief years (1889-1891) there was a united Republican executive and Congress; a Democratic House blocked legislation during the next two years. For an equal term the Democrats were in possession of the executive and the legislative branch (1893-1895), and this was again followed by a divided Congress. Meanwhile there were disagreements within the two parties. On monetary questions the West and South did not agree with the East; on taxation the Democratic party was hopelessly split. . . . Futile attempts were made to restrain the increasing power of corporations and organized capital. The addition of new racial stocks to the population and the inefficiency of municipal government also widened the field of agitation. The economic life of the country was unstable; a slow recovery from the depression of 1884 led to imprudent undertakings, while commercial recklessness and legislative error destroyed prosperity. Once more the nation had to climb the long and arduous road leading to confidence and enterprise. At every turn—from recovery to panic, and then to fresh recovery—perplexing problems arose. Some of these were new, such as the control of combinations of wealth, but more were disguised under new forms, such as the relation of public office to party responsibility. Between 1880 and the beginning of the new century twenty-six million people were added to the population, or more than the entire number of inhabitants in 1850. . . . Population quickly followed the construction of railroads through the northern tier of states and territories stretching from Minnesota to Oregon, so that in twenty years the number of people in this vast domain more than trebled. Farmers settled in Dakota so rapidly that single counties with scarcely an inhabitant at the beginning of the summer were well populated by the end of the year. Rich minerals of gold, silver, and copper were discovered in Idaho and Montana; while in Washington Territory timber supplies of great value were open to a market. South of this border growth, violent changes appeared in the current of migration. Between 1880 and 1890 population declined in the agricultural counties of western Illinois and eastern Iowa, because of the opening

up of more promising land to the west. In the next ten years many farmers in Nebraska, Colorado, and South Dakota, discouraged by the deficiency of water and the intense winter cold, abandoned their homes. Oklahoma and the Indian Territory furnished an outlet, and many farmers moved northward into Canada. Taking the entire area west of the Mississippi, the rate of increase of population was not much more than half as great in the last ten years of the century as in the previous decade. . . . The growth of municipalities continued unabated; the number of cities with eight thousand or more inhabitants nearly doubled between 1880 and 1890. In 1880 the urban population constituted less than a quarter (22.6 per cent.) of the total population; by 1890 it had increased to nearly thirty per cent of the total, and by 1900 to a full third. In the North Atlantic division of states, covering New England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the city growth was even more marked, embracing in 1890 more than half of the population. . . . Rural sections in many states lost in population. In New England nearly two-thirds of the townships had a smaller number of inhabitants in 1890 than in 1880. This movement however, was not confined to the East; Ohio and Illinois disclosed nearly as large a percentage of loss, and in Iowa 686 out of 1513 townships fell off. The relative importance of agriculture to the other great branches of industry declined during the period under consideration. . . . The development of manufactures was the great industrial characteristic of this period. The number of the employés and the value of the product was more than doubled. In this growth the steel industry took a leading part, the value of its output increasing eightfold. By 1892 imports and exports of manufactures of iron and steel balanced, and henceforth the United States exported more than she imported. Steel was employed for many new purposes, as, for example, freight-cars. Its use made possible the construction of office-buildings running even to thirty stories in height and requiring as much as a thousand tons of steel. Another marked feature was the establishment of cotton manufacturers in the South, where water-power, low-priced labor of women and children, long hours of labor, and the cheap cost of living gave advantages which quickly attracted capital; in less than twenty years the number of spindles operated in factories in the southern states was increased five times, while the North made but little gain. . . . The application of electricity to industrial arts was pursued with eager activity. Arc-lighting was introduced in 1880, and this was followed by the use of the incandescent filament. . . . [New industries for the production of electric apparatus and supplies of all sorts] quickened the demand for copper, and new mines increased the output from 27,000 tons, in 1880, to 270,000 tons in 1900—half the world's product. The production of pig-iron trebled in the same period, giving to the United States the leadership over every other nation in this staple. Here, again, the South showed a remarkable economic development: a great mineral section stretching from West Virginia to northern Alabama, seven hundred miles long and one hundred and fifty miles wide, was opened up, and through proximity of coking coal and limestone to the iron, gave every assurance of an early and successful development of the manufacture of steel products. Alabama became the centre of the iron industry, and this state, which in 1880 occupied the tenth

place in the output of pig-iron, rose to third in rank ten years later. In 1890 the South produced as much coal, iron-ore, and pig-iron as the whole country did in 1870. Birmingham, Alabama, began indeed to send pig-iron to northern and western markets. Down to the panic year, 1893, large additions were made to railway mileage. The greater part of new construction was devoted to finishing the systems reaching through the West to the Pacific coast, and the filling in of branches and feeders. . . . The telephone, which as a business started in 1880, became a part of the machinery of communication. . . . Its convenience to the home, both for business and social purposes, led to the establishment of exchanges in suburban districts of cities and in small towns, until even the outlying farms were brought within the range of its ameliorating influences. In 1900 there were over forty-two hundred exchanges with nearly two million subscribers, a ratio of a telephone to every forty of the population."—D. R. Dewey, *National problems, 1885-1897*, pp. 3-6, 12-13, 15-20.—"The Granger movement, unsuccessful in itself, started the country upon an era of legislative regulation of industry. State railroad boards were gradually set up, and the first Interstate Commerce Law was passed in 1887. . . . [See below: 1887: Interstate, etc.] Most of the states enacted anti-trust laws, and the Sherman Anti-trust Act was passed in 1890. After this time the agitation for better control of the great combinations went on with vigor, resulting in the establishment of the federal Bureau of Corporations, the Federal Trade Commission, and the passage of the Clayton Act. The events of the period may be considered to constitute another revolution in the turn of economic history,—the combinations being the antitheses of individualism so ardently preached in the early years of the century, and the movement for regulation being likewise a departure from the doctrine of *laissez-faire*."—L. R. Wells, *Industrial history of the United States*, pp. 564, 565.

1886.—Bering sea controversy with Canada. See *BERING SEA QUESTION*.

1886.—Conquest of Apache Indians. See *INDIANS, AMERICAN: 1886*.

1886.—Act to provide successions to the presidency in case of death.—The death of President Garfield before the first meeting of the Congress elected in 1880, had shown the possibility of an administrative lacuna, which, it was felt, should be guarded against. "An act of 1791 provided that in case of the death, resignation, or disability of both president and vice-president, the succession should devolve first upon the president pro tempore of the Senate and then upon the speaker of the House of Representatives, until the disability should be removed or a new election be held. But supposing a newly elected president to die and be succeeded by the vice-president before the assembling of the newly elected Congress; then there would be no president pro tempore of the Senate and no speaker of the House of Representatives, and thus the death of one person might cause the presidency to lapse. Moreover the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress might be members of the party defeated in the last presidential election; indeed, this is often the case. Sound policy and fair dealing require that a victorious party shall not be turned out because of the death of the president and vice-president. Accordingly an act of 1886 provided that in such an event the succession should devolve upon the members of the cabinet in the following order:

secretary of state, secretary of the treasury, secretary of war, attorney-general, postmaster-general, secretary of the navy, secretary of the interior. This would seem to be ample provision against a lapse."—J. Fiske, *Civil government in the United States*, ch. 8.

1886-1887.—Repeal of the Tenure-of-Office Act.—The question of the force and validity of the Tenure-of-Office Act (see above: 1866-1867 [December-March]) in its interference with the power of the executive to make removals from office, was brought to a sharp issue with the Senate by President Cleveland. He had suspended from office a district attorney in Alabama, and the Senate, when Congress came together, called on him for the grounds of his action, and for the papers relating to the case. He refused to comply with the demand in an able message, which strenuously asserted that the accountability of the President for such action was to the people alone. "On behalf of the President it was contended that his power of removal was absolute and not in any way subject to the consent of the Senate; that the Senate had no right to call for papers relating to the subject as to which is could take no action, and that the papers relating to suspensions were not official but were private. . . . On behalf of the Senate it was contended that the power of removal was not involved; that the suspensions and the appointments under consideration were made under the Tenure-of-office Act, and were expressly referred, by the President in the nomination messages, to that law; that under that law the removal of an officer was subject to the approval of the Senate; that such officer would resume his office, if the Senate took no action, at the end of the session; that the removal of an officer and the appointment of a successor were connected subjects, to be considered together; that the right of the Houses of Congress to be informed as to the acts of the Executive Department could not be limited as claimed; and, finally, that the particular resolution called for papers relating to the management of his office by the officer suspended, which was a proper subject of inquiry."—B. Harrison, *This country of ours*, ch. 6.—The effect of the discussion raised was to bring about, in March, 1887, the passage of a bill repealing the Tenure-of-office Act.—Based on Grover Cleveland, *Independence of the executive* (*Atlantic Monthly*, June-July, 1900).

ALSO IN: D. R. Dewey, *National problems*, pp. 28-31.—Grover Cleveland, *Presidential problems*, pp. 42-48.

1887.—Acquisition of Pearl Harbor from Hawaii.—Importance. See HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: Discovery and early history.

1887.—Hatch Act passed, providing for experiment stations. See EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: United States: Experiment stations.

1887.—Electoral Count Act.—To avoid the recurrence of any such dangerous question as that which arose in 1876, relative to the counting of electoral votes for president and vice-president (see above: 1876-1877), Congress passed an act, approved February 3, 1887, which provides that any contest regarding the choice of electors must be decided, as provided by the laws of the state, at least six days before the meeting of the electors on the second Monday in January; that a certificate of election must be issued by the state executive in triplicate to the electors and transmitted by them to the president of the Senate with their votes for president and vice-president; that objection to the reception of any return must

be in writing, and signed by one member of each House. In the language of the act: "No electoral vote or votes from any State which shall have been regularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully certified to, according to Section 3 of this Act, from which but one return has been received, shall be rejected, but the two Houses concurrently may reject the vote or votes when they agree that such vote, or votes have not been so regularly given by electors whose appointment has been so certified. If more than one return, or paper purporting to be a return, from a State shall have been received by the President of the Senate, those votes, and those only, shall be counted which shall have been regularly given by the electors who are shown by the determination mentioned in Section 2 of this Act to have been appointed, if the determination in said section provided for shall have been made. . . . But in case there shall arise the question which of two or more of such State authorities determining what electors have been appointed, as mentioned in Section 2 of this Act, is the lawful tribunal of such State, the votes regularly given to those electors, and those only, of such State shall be counted whose title as electors the two Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide is supported by the decision of such State so authorized by its laws. And in such case of more than one return, or paper purporting to be a return, from a State, if there shall have been no such determination of the question in the State aforesaid, then those votes, and those only, shall be counted which the two Houses shall concurrently decide were cast by lawful electors appointed in accordance with the laws of the State, unless the two Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide such votes not to be the lawful votes of the legally appointed electors of such State." If the two Houses disagree, the votes of those electors holding the certificate of the state executive shall be counted.

1887.—Inter-State Commerce Act.—By an act of Congress approved February 4, 1887, the railroads of the country passing through more than one state were placed under the supervision of the general government in certain particulars. The act forbade special rates to special shippers, and the charging for the carriage of passengers or a given class of freight—conditions being the same—any greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer haul over the same line in the same direction.—See also CAPITALISM: 19th century: Regulation; RAILROADS: 1887-1906.

1887-1888.—Attempt at tariff reform.—Defeat of Mills Bill. See TARIFF: 1887-1888.

1887-1907.—Development of electric railroads. See RAILROADS, ELECTRIC: Interurban electric railroads.

1887-1920.—Growth of woman suffrage. See SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: United States: 1851-1920.


1888.—Twenty-sixth presidential election.—President Cleveland was nominated for re-election by the Democratic national convention, held at St. Louis, June 5, with Allen G. Thurman, of Ohio, for vice president. The Republican convention, at Chicago, June 19, named Benjamin Harrison, of Indiana, for president, and Levi P. Morton, of New York, for vice president. At Indianapolis, May 30, the Prohibition party had already put in nomination General Clinton B. Fisk, of New Jersey, and John A. Brooks, of Missouri, for president and vice president, respectively. The Union Labor party, convening at Cincinnati, May 15, had nominated Alson J.

Streeter, of Illinois, and Charles E. Cunningham, of Arkansas; the United Labor party, a rival organization, had put forward Robert H. Cowdrey, of Illinois, and William H. T. Wakefield, of Kansas; and still another labor ticket had been brought forward in February, at Washington, where an organization calling itself the Industrial Reform party, put Albert E. Redstone, of California, and John Colvin, of Kansas, in nomination. At Des Moines, Iowa, May 15, the National Equal Rights party had named a woman for the presidency, in the person of Mrs. Belva Lockwood, of Washington, with Alfred H. Love, of Philadelphia, named for vice president. Finally, in August, an organization attempting to revive the American party of former days, convening at Washington, presented James L. Curtis, of New York, for president, and James R. Greer of Tennessee (who declined the honor) for vice president. In the ensuing election, the popular vote was distributed as follows: Cleveland 5,540,329; Harrison, 5,439,853; Fisk, 249,506; Streeter, 146,935; Cowdrey, 2,818; Curtis, 1,591. Notwithstanding the greater number of votes cast for Cleveland (his plurality being 100,476), Harrison was chosen president by the electoral votes, receiving 233, while 168 were given for Cleveland.—Based on *Appletons' Annual Cyclopædia*, 1888, pp. 773-782, 799-828.—“An analysis of the vote showed that Mr. Cleveland had been defeated by a very narrow margin. Even in Mr. Harrison's own State he had come within 2,000 votes of a majority, and had obviously lost New York only through the treachery of his own party.”—H. T. Peck, *Twenty years of the republic*, p. 165.—“In the contest of 1888 the personalities of the candidates did not become an issue as in 1884. Consequently there was very little mudslinging. The overshadowing subject was the tariff, and never before in all our history did that subject figure so conspicuously in a Presidential campaign. The contention of the Republicans was that the American system of protection must be maintained, and they labored in almost desperate fashion to convince the voters that if the Democrats won the system would be destroyed. Manufacturing interests were alarmed by the cry of ‘British free trade.’ A spectacular feature of the campaign was the organization of thousands of political clubs. Of these the Republicans had more than 6,000 while the Democrats had about 3,000. Through the clubs a ‘campaign of education’ was conducted; tons of pamphlets were circulated, and voters were given partisan instruction on the question at issue. But the managers of the campaign did not rely upon ‘education’ alone. Regarding money as the ‘sinews of war,’ they provided themselves with the largest campaign funds that up to that time had ever been raised. The Democrats relied chiefly upon assessments on office-holders, while the Republicans ‘put the manufacturers under the fire and fried the fat out of them.’ The contributions which flowed into the campaign treasuries was spent like water. More was spent by the Republicans because they had more.”—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 612.

ALSO IN: E. B. Andrews, *History of the last quarter-century*, v. 2, pp. 157-168.

1888-1892.—Agriculturists in politics.—Farmers' Alliance.—Growth of Populism.—“The Republican protective policy had its strongest supporters among the industrial communities of the East where the profits of manufacture were distributed. In the West, where the agricultural staples had produced a simplicity of interest somewhat resembling those of the Old South in its

cotton crop, the advantage of protection was questioned even in Republican communities. The Granger States and the Prairie States were normally Republican, but they had experienced falling prices for their corn and wheat, as the South had for its cotton, in the eighties, and had listened encouragingly to the advocates of tariff reform. . . . The Republican leaders felt the discontent, and brought forward the agricultural schedule of the McKinley Bill to appease it, but dissatisfaction increased in 1889 and 1890 through most of the farming sections. The farmer in the South was directly affected by the falling price of cotton, and retained his hereditary aversion to the protective tariff. He could not believe that either party was working in his interests. The dominant issues of the eighties did not touch his problems. . . . The Southern farmer was without interest in the pension system and was prone to criticize it. The Fourteenth Amendment had forced the



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repudiation of the whole Confederate debt, leaving the Southern veterans compelled to pay taxes that were disbursed for the benefit of Union veterans and debarred from enjoying similar rewards. They could not turn Republican, yet in their own party they saw men who failed to represent them. In the North agriculture was depressed and the farmers were discontented. In many regions the farms were worn out. Scientific farming was beginning to be talked about to some extent, but was little practiced. The improvements in transportation had brought the younger and more fertile lands of the West into competition with the East for the city markets. Cattle, raised on the plains and slaughtered at Kansas City or Chicago, were offered for sale in New York and Philadelphia. Western fruits of superior quality were competing with the common varieties of the Eastern orchards. Here, as in the South, the farmers saw the parties quarreling over issues that touched the manufacturing classes, but disregarding those of agriculture. In the West, however, that agricultural discontent was keenest.


In no other region were uniform conditions to be found over so large an area. The Granger States had shown how uniformly in discontent may bring forth political readjustments. . . . The frontier of the eighties presented new obstacles in its doubtful rainfall and its experimental farmers. It contained as well the conditions that had always prevailed along the edge of settlement. Transportation was vital to its life,—as vital as it had been in the Granger States,—yet was nearly as unregulated. The Interstate Commerce Law of 1887 had little noticeable immediate effect. Discrimination, unreasonable rates and overcapitalization were still grievances that affected the West. The new activity of organized labor shown in the Western strikes of 1885 and 1886 added another obstacle to the easy prosperity of farmers who needed uninterrupted train service. . . . An anti-corporation movement, too, might reasonably be expected in this new frontier. Producing only the raw products of agriculture, its inhabitants . . . were impressed with the cost of what they had to buy and the low price of what they sold. They were ready listeners to agitators against the trusts. . . . The crisis which precipitated Western discontent into politics came in 1889 when rainfall declined and crops failed. . . . Since the high day of the Granger movement there had always been associations among the farmers and organizations striving to get their votes. The Grange had itself continued as a social and economic bond after its attack upon the railroads. There had been a Farmers' Union and an Agricultural Wheel. The great success of the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor had had imitators who were less successful because farming had been too profitable to give much room for organized discontent, while in times of prosperity the farmer was an individualist. A new activity among the farmers' papers was now an evidence of a growing desire to get the advantage of coöperation. The greatest farmer organization of the eighties was the Farmers' Alliance, a loose federation of agricultural clubs that reflected local conditions, West and South. In the South, it was noted in 1888 as 'growing rapidly,' but 'only incidentally of political importance.' In Dakota, it had been active since 1885, conducting for its members fire and hail insurance, a purchasing department, and an elevator company. In Texas it was building cotton and woolen mills. The machinery of this organization was used by the farmers in stating their common cause, and as their aims broadened it merged, during 1890, into a People's Party. [See also NATIONAL FARMERS' ALLIANCE.] In Kansas, during the summer of this year, the movement broke over the lines of both old parties and had such success that its promoters thought a new political party had been born. Agricultural discontent, growing with the hard times of 1889, had been noticed, but there had been no means of measuring it until Congress adjourned after the passage of the McKinley Bill and the members came home to conduct the congressional campaign of 1890. They found that the recent law had become the chief issue before them. . . . The tariff and the way it had been passed were used against them by the Democrats and the Farmers' Alliance. . . . Corrupt methods in framing the schedules furnished an influential argument throughout the West. Even in the East the tariff reformers asserted that undue favors had been done for greedy interests; that manufacturers who had bought immunity by their contributions to Quay's

campaign fund had been rewarded with increased protection. The farmers believed these charges, plausible though unprobable, for they were disposed to believe that both the great parties were interested only in selfish exploitation of the Government to the advantage of politicians. In every State Republican candidates had to meet this fire as well as the local issues. . . . The Democrats defeated the Republicans in the East while the Farmers' Alliance undermined them in the West. In Kansas and Nebraska the Alliance controlled the result, sent their own men to Washington, and secured the Kansas Legislature which returned the first Populist Senator. [See also KANSAS: 1880-1890.] In several States fusion tickets were successful with Democratic and Alliance support. In the South, Democrats found it aided them in winning nomination—for the real Southern elections was within this party and not at the polls—to assert that they were and had been farmers. . . . Union between the Knights of Labor and the Farmers' Alliance for political purposes was the aim of the promoters of the People's Party, a party that was to right all the wrongs from which the plain people suffered and restore the Government to their hands. Until the next presidential election they had time to organize for the crusade. . . . The election of 1890 stunned and bewildered both old parties. The Republicans lost their control of the Lower House, while the Democrats paid for their victory the price of a partial alliance with a new movement whose weight they could only estimate. Populism was engendered by local troubles in the West and South, but its name now acquired a national usage and its leaders were encouraged to attempt a national organization. In a series of conventions, held between 1889 and 1892, the People's Party developed into a finished organization with state delegations and a national committee. At St. Louis, in December, 1889, the Farmers' Alliance held a national convention and considered the basis for wider growth. The outcome was an attempt to combine in one party organized labor, organized agriculture, and believers in the single tax. . . . In December, 1890, the farmers met at Ocala, Florida, to rejoice over the congressional victory and to plan for 1892. Since each of the great parties was believed to be indifferent to the people and corrupt, a permanent third party was a matter of conviction, and in May, 1891, this party was formally created in a mass convention at Cincinnati. . . . On July 2, 1892, the party met in . . . [St. Louis] in its first national nominating convention. The platform of the People's Party was based on calamity. 'We meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin,' it declared. 'Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the legislature, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized. . . . The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled; public opinion silenced; business prostrated; our homes covered with mortgages; labor impoverished; and the land concentrating in the hands of the capitalists.' . . . The greatest of the evils in sight was 'the vast conspiracy against mankind,' which had demoralized silver, added to the purchasing power of gold, and abridged the supply of money 'to fatten usurers.' To correct the financial evils the platform demanded 'the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the present legal ratio of sixteen to one,' and an issue of legal-tender currency until the circulation should reach 'an average of fifty dollars per capita. Postal savings banks,

a graduated income tax, and economy in government were the subsidiary demands. No demand of the Populists attracted so much attention as this for free silver, but its platform touched reform at every angle. In the field of transportation it asked for government ownership of railroads, telegraphs, and telephones. It asked that land monopolies be prevented, that the public lands be in part regained, and that alien ownership be forbidden. It wanted the Australian ballot, liberal pensions, restrictions of immigration, an eight-hour day, a single term for President and vice-president, direct election of United States Senators, abolition of the Pinkerton detectives, and was curious about the initiative and referendum. It was in many respects a prophecy as to the workings of reform for the next twenty years. The People's Party entered the campaign of 1892 with this platform and with the support of advanced reformers, with a considerable following in the West and South, and with James S. Weaver and James G. Field as candidates."—F. L. Paxson, *New nation* (W. R. Dodd, ed., *Riverside history of the United States*, v. 4, pp. 177-187, 208-211).

1888-1893.—"Billion Dollar" Congress.—Pension Act.—Increase in navy.—"In his first annual message Harrison suggested liberal appropriations for pensions, naval construction, and coast defenses, and the hint was not lost on Congress. The economies of the Democrats were thrown aside, and much was heard about expenditures in keeping with the dignity of the nation. When the Congress of 1891-1893 ended it had won the title of 'the billion dollar Congress.' Reed expressed the feeling of his political friends in the retort, 'This is a billion dollar country.' The most notable increase was for pensions. Both parties feared to antagonize the soldier vote, and certain politicians had learned the art of utilizing it by asking for grants in behalf of the soldiers which no one dared refuse. Most of these grants were good. No one desired to be parsimonious with the men who saved the union; but there was danger that the process should run into extravagance. It might even become a means of debasing the elections. At first, relief was given to disabled soldiers and their dependent relatives. Under this plan there were 234,821 pensioners in 1875 receiving \$29,270,407 annually. Garfield declared this was probably the highest point in which pensions would rise; but in 1879 arrears were granted increasing the cost by \$25,000,000 a year; and by 1885 the cost of pensions was \$65,171,937. Besides this, each session of Congress saw the enactment of many private pension bills, granting relief where the laws would not apply. Many such bills were worthy ones; but they were rarely inspected closely, and had come to be granted as favors to members through a 'courtesy' analogous to 'senatorial courtesy.' The presidents formerly signed these bills as a matter of course, but Cleveland investigated them, and vetoed many which he thought involved fraud. At this time the Republicans carried through Congress a bill giving twelve dollars a month to each old soldier dependent on his own or another person's labor, and Cleveland vetoed this also. He was widely criticized as a foe to the veterans, and the republican platform of 1888 demanded 'in the presence of an overflowing treasury' legislation to keep old soldiers from dependence on public or private charity. Thus committed, the party did not hesitate to take up a more liberal pension policy. 'Corporal' Tanner, accepted representative of the soldier vote, became commissioner of pensions, and

was said to have exclaimed, 'God help the surplus revenue.' He passed claims freely, and even looked up persons, some of them rich men, who he thought ought to be pensioned. He was so active that Harrison removed him within a year. The pension act, which Cleveland vetoed, now became law. As a result, the appropriation for this purpose rose from \$89,000,000 in 1889 to \$159,000,000 in 1893. It remained at nearly the latter amount until 1912, when by the Sherwood act, which neither party was willing to oppose, additional gifts were made, bringing up the annual expenditure to \$180,000,000. The act of 1890, like its successor of 1912, was of twofold purpose; it was intended to reduce the surplus and thus save protection, and to have influence on the election. To carry it into operation the government . . . [in 1918 had] paid since its enactment over a billion and a quarter of dollars. The large sums



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voted for the navy occasioned more satisfaction. By 1880 wooden ships were discarded in European navies, but they continued the role in the United States. Secretary of the Navy Hunt, a Southerner whom Garfield appointed, took up the task of improvement, and in 1883 two steel cruisers were ordered. Secretary Whitney, under Cleveland, continued to urge enlargement, and in 1888 he secured \$17,000,000 for that purpose. These plans were unrealized when Cleveland went out of office, but the liberal gifts under his successor increased the strength of the navy, so that in 1893 it contained 22 steel ships and had risen from twelfth to fifth place among the nations of the world."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 726-727.

1888-1921.—Industrial arbitration laws.—Erdman Act.—Newlands Act. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1888-1921.

1889.—Extradition treaty with England. See EXTRADITION.

1889.—Treaty with England and Germany providing for joint control in Samoa. See SAMOA: 1879-1889.

1889.—Origin of term Pan-Americanism. See PAN-AMERICANISM.

1889.—Purchase of Creek and Seminole lands. See OKLAHOMA: 1885-1889.

1889-1890.—Opening of Oklahoma.—Johnstown flood.—Pan-American Congress.—Admission of seven new states.—“In the centre of Indian Territory there is a large district called, in the Indian language, Oklahoma, or the ‘Beautiful Land.’ This tract was finally purchased from the Indians by the United States, early in 1889. On the 22d of April, of that year, some 50,000 persons were waiting impatiently on the borders of Oklahoma for President Harrison’s signal, giving them permission to enter and take up lands in the coveted region. At precisely twelve o’clock, noon, of that day, the blast of a bugle announced that Oklahoma was open to settlement. Instantly an avalanche of human beings rushed wildly across the line, each one eager to get the first chance. [See also OKLAHOMA: 1889-1890.] . . . A week after the opening of Oklahoma, the centennial anniversary of the inauguration of Washington, and of the beginning of our government under the Constitution, was celebrated in New York City [April 29-May 1]. . . . In a little less than a month from that occasion, the most terrible disaster of the kind ever known in our history occurred (May 31, 1889) in Western Pennsylvania. By the breaking of a dam, a body of water forty feet high and nearly half a mile in width swept down through a deep and narrow valley. In less than fifteen minutes, the flood had traversed a distance of eighteen miles. In that brief time, it dashed seven towns out of existence, and ended by carrying away the greater part of Johnstown. The whole valley at that place was choked with ruins; at least 5,000 persons lost their lives, and property worth ten million dollars was utterly destroyed. [See also PENNSYLVANIA: 1889.] In the autumn (October 2, 1889), representatives of the leading governments of Central and of South America, together with the Republic of Mexico, met representatives chosen by the United States in a conference or congress held at Washington. The object of the congress was to bring about a closer union of the Americas, for purposes of trade, and of mutual advantages. The delegates spent six weeks in visiting the principal commercial and manufacturing cities of the United States. They then returned to Washington, and devoted the greater part of the remainder of the year and part of 1890 to the discussion of business.”—D. H. Montgomery, *Leading facts of American history*, sect. 390-392.—“An act to provide for the division of Dakota into two States, and to enable the people of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington, to form constitutions and State governments . . . was approved by President Cleveland, February 22, 1889. This act provided that the Territory of Dakota should be divided on the line of the seventh standard parallel. . . . On the 4th of July, 1889, the four conventions assembled—for North Dakota at Bismark, for South Dakota at Sioux Falls, for Montana at Helena, and for Washington at Olympia.”—F. N. Thorpe, *Recent constitution-making in the United States (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept., 1891)*.—Acceptable constitutions having been framed and adopted in the several proposed new states, North Dakota and South Dakota were ad-

mitted to the Union by proclamation of President Harrison, November 3, 1889, Montana, November 8, and Washington, November 11, in the same year. “Early in the session of the fifty-first Congress Wyoming presented her claims for Statehood, asking for admission to the Union under the Constitution of September, 1889, which was adopted by the people on November 5, following. The bill for admission passed the House of Representatives on March 27, 1890, passed the Senate on June 27, and received the President’s signature on July 10. By its terms Wyoming became a state from and after the date of the President’s approval. [Idaho had previously been admitted, by a bill which received the President’s signature on July 3, 1890.]”—*Appletons’ Annual Cyclopædia*, 1890 and 1889.—See also DAKOTA TERRITORY: 1882-1889; NORTH DAKOTA: 1800-1916; SOUTH DAKOTA: 1883-1890; WASHINGTON: 1889.

ALSO IN: E. B. Andrews, *History of the last quarter-century in the United States*, v. 2, pp. 195-207.

1889-1892.—Foreign relations under Harrison.—Bering sea claimed as a *Mare Clausum*.—Capture of Canadian sealing vessels.—Agreement to arbitrate.—Decision of arbitrators.—For several years the department of state had been carrying on a vigorous correspondence on sealing rights in Bering sea. “In 1886 certain Canadian sealers were seized by United States revenue cutters in Bering Sea, at a distance of upwards of sixty miles from the nearest land. The United States Court at Sitka pronounced a sentence of condemnation, but the President subsequently ordered the vessels to be released; and on August 17, 1887, Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State, instructed the American ministers at London, Paris, and certain other capitals, to invite the governments to which they were accredited to co-operate with the United States in measures for the better protection of the fur-seals. . . . The responses to this overture were generally favorable, and negotiations with Great Britain had practically reached a favorable conclusion, when, on May 16, 1888, nine days after the adverse report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on the Bayard-Chamberlain treaty, they were arrested on an objection from the Canadian government.”—J. B. Moore, *Principles of American diplomacy*, p. 149.—“At this stage Congress took the matter up, and, in order to remove all doubts as to the position of the United States, declared, by the act of March 2, 1889, that the prohibition of killing of seals within the limits of Alaskan territory should apply ‘to all the dominion of the United States in the waters of Bering sea’; and ordered the President to issue a proclamation that all persons violating such law would be arrested and their vessels seized. This bold announcement that the Bering Sea was practically a *mare clausum*, over which the United States had sole jurisdiction, gave authority for further captures, which were followed by renewed protests of the British government against unlawful interference with a legitimate industry on the high seas. Eight more vessels were taken during the summer of 1880. The correspondence which ensued between Secretary Blaine and Lord Salisbury traversed a wide range of the principles of international law, and at times appeared to give promise of a serious breach between Great Britain and the United States.”—D. R. Dewey, *National problems*, pp. 210-211.—“Mr. Blaine sought to defend the seizures on the ground that the killing of seals in the open sea was *contra bonos mores*,

as well as on the supposition that Russia had asserted and exercised exclusive rights in Bering Sea, and that the treaties of 1824 and 1825 did not apply to that body of water. On February 29, 1892, however, a treaty was signed, by which a tribunal of arbitration, to sit at Paris, was invested with power to decide: (1) what exclusive jurisdiction, or exclusive rights in the seal-fisheries, in Bering Sea, Russia asserted prior to the cession of Alaska to the United States; (2) how far those claims were recognized by Great Britain; (3) whether Bering Sea was included in the phrase 'Pacific Ocean,' as used in the treaties of 1824 and 1825; (4) whether all Russia's rights passed to the United States; and (5) whether the United States had any right of protection or property in the fur-seals in Bering Sea outside the ordinary three-mile limit. If the arbitrators found that the exclusive rights of the United States were insufficient, they were to determine what concurrent regulations the two governments should jointly enforce outside territorial waters. Before the tribunal of arbitration, the representatives of the United States relied much upon a theory of property in fur-seals; but on the various questions of right submitted, the decision of the arbitrators was adverse to the United States. . . . The arbitrators, after deciding against the United States on questions of right, proceeded to prescribe regulations, which were afterwards duly put into operation by the two governments. Under a treaty of arbitration signed at Washington on February 8, 1896, the sum of \$473,151.26 was awarded as compensation to be paid by the United States for interference with the Canadian sealers." —J. B. Moore, *Principles of American diplomacy*, pp. 150-151, 154.—See also **BERING SEA QUESTION**.

1889-1893.—Work of Civil Service Commission under Roosevelt. See **CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1889**.

1889-1898.—Act establishing Federal court for Indian Territory.—Tribal ownership and its abuse.—Abolition of tribal courts.—Allotment of lands. See **OKLAHOMA: 1889-1898**.

1889-1903.—Negotiations and final purchase of Panama canal rights from France.—Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with England.—Treaty with Panama. See **PANAMA CANAL: 1889-1903**.

1889-1921.—Factory inspection and medical inspection of school children.—School certificates.—Working papers. See **CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1889-1921**.

1890.—McKinley Tariff Act. See **TARIFF: 1890**.

1890.—Eleventh census.—The total population was 62,622,250 (exceeding that of 1880 by 12,466,467), classed and distributed as follows:

North Atlantic division

	White	Black
Maine	659,263	1,190
New Hampshire	375,840	614
Vermont	331,418	937
Massachusetts	2,215,373	22,144
Rhode Island	337,859	7,393
Connecticut	733,438	12,302
New York	5,923,952	70,092
New Jersey	1,396,581	47,638
Pennsylvania	5,148,257	107,596
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	17,121,981	269,906

South Atlantic division

	White	Black
Delaware	140,066	28,386
Maryland	826,493	215,657
District of Columbia	154,695	75,572
Virginia	1,020,122	635,438
West Virginia	730,077	32,690
North Carolina	1,055,382	561,018
South Carolina	462,008	688,934
Georgia	978,357	858,815
Florida	224,949	166,180
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	5,592,149	3,262,690

North Central division

Ohio	3,584,805	87,113
Indiana	2,146,736	45,215
Illinois	3,768,472	57,028
Michigan	2,072,884	15,223
Wisconsin	1,680,473	2,444
Minnesota	1,296,159	3,683
Iowa	1,901,086	10,685
Missouri	2,528,458	150,184
North Dakota	182,123	373
South Dakota	327,290	541
Nebraska	1,046,888	8,913
Kansas	1,376,553	49,710
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	21,911,927	431,112

South Central division

Kentucky	1,590,462	268,071
Tennessee	1,336,637	430,678
Alabama	833,718	678,489
Mississippi	544,851	742,559
Louisiana	558,395	559,193
Texas	1,745,935	488,171
Oklahoma	58,826	2,973
Arkansas	818,752	309,117
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	7,487,576	3,479,251

Western division

Montana	127,271	1,490
Wyoming	59,275	922
Colorado	404,468	6,215
New Mexico	142,719	1,956
Arizona	55,580	1,357
Utah	205,899	588
Nevada	39,084	242
Idaho	82,018	201
Washington	340,513	1,602
Oregon	301,758	1,186
California	1,111,672	11,322
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	2,870,257	27,081

Grand total 54,983,890 7,470,040

In addition the census shows 107,475 Chinese, 2,039 Japanese, and 58,806 civilized Indians, making a total of 62,622,250, as stated above. Immigration in the preceding decades rose to 5,246,613 in the total arrivals, 1,462,839 being from the British Islands and 3,258,743 from other European countries. In the single year ending June 30, 1890, the immigrants arriving from Europe numbered 443,225 (273,104 males, 170,121 females), of whom 57,020 were from England; 53,024 from Ireland; 12,041 from Scotland; 92,427 from Germany; 22,062 from Hungary; 11,073 from Poland; 33,147 from Russia; 51,799 from Italy; 29,632 from

Sweden; 11,370 from Norway; 9,366 from Denmark; and 6,585 from France.

1890.—Barrundia case with Central America. See ASYLUM, RIGHT OF: Right of asylum on merchant ships; CENTRAL AMERICA: 1886-1894.

1890.—Idaho and Wyoming admitted to Union. See IDAHO: 1883-1907; WYOMING: 1889-1890.

1890.—Morrill Act establishing land grant colleges. See EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: United States: Land grant colleges.

1890.—Represented at First International American Conference. See AMERICAN REPUBLICS, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF: 1890.

1890-1893.—Silver Bill and its effect.—Financial panic.—Extra session of Congress.—Repeal of Sherman Act.—“The act of July 14, 1890 [known as the Sherman Act], repealed the silver act of 1878, and so brought to a close the precise experiment tried under that measure. . . . But the new act . . . is even more remarkable than that of 1878. It is unique in monetary history. It provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall purchase each month at the market price four and a half million ounces of silver bullion. In payment he shall issue Treasury notes of the United States, in denominations of between one dollar and one thousand dollars. These Treasury notes, unlike the old silver certificates, are a direct legal tender for all debts, public, or private, unless a different medium is expressly stipulated in the contract. They differ from the silver certificates in another respect; they are redeemable either in gold or silver coin, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. The indirect process of redemption which, as we have seen, was applied to the silver certificates, is replaced for the new notes by direct redemption. The avowed object is to keep the silver money equal to gold, for it is declared to be ‘the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals at a parity with each other on the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law.’ The act of 1878 is repealed; but the coinage of two million ounces of silver into dollars is to be continued for a year (until July 1, 1891). Thereafter it is directed that only so many silver dollars shall be coined as may be needed for redeeming any Treasury notes presented for redemption. Practically, this means that the coinage shall cease; redemption in silver dollars will not be called for. The coinage of silver dollars accordingly was suspended by the Treasury on July 1, 1891; a change which was the occasion of some vociferous abuse and equally vociferous praise, but which in reality was of no consequence whatever. The monthly issues of the new Treasury notes vary, like those of the old silver certificates, with the price of silver. But the new issues vary directly with the price of silver, while, as we have seen, the old issues varied inversely with the price. The volume of Treasury notes issued is equal to the market price of four and one half million ounces of silver. If silver sells at \$1.20 an ounce, the monthly issue of notes will be \$5,400,000; if at \$1.00 an ounce, \$4,500,000. For a month or two after the passage of the act, the price of silver advanced rapidly, and at its highest, in August, 1890, touched \$1.21. But the rise proved to be but temporary. After September a steady decline set in, and continued almost without interruption through the rest of 1890, through 1891, and through 1892. The year 1891 opened with silver at a price of about \$1.00 an ounce; by the close of the year the price had fallen to about 95 cents. In 1892 a still further and more marked

decline set in, and by the close of the year the price had gone as low as 85 cents.”—F. W. Taussig, *Silver situation in the United States*, ch. 6.—“The President’s remedy for the drain upon the Treasury was to repeal the purchasing clause of the Sherman Silver Law of 1890 and thus discontinue the issuance of the treasury notes. Accordingly he called Congress together in special session in August, 1893, and earnestly recommended the immediate repeal of the provisions of the act of 1890 authorizing the purchase of the bullion. In the House the cause of silver found an ardent champion in William Jennings Bryan, a young member from Nebraska. In a speech that attracted the attention of the country Bryan stated the arguments of the free silver party. As for the proposed repeal, he denied that it would bring the endless chain to rest, asserting that it could still be kept in motion by the greenbacks. . . . But opposition was in vain. In the House repeal was promptly agreed to by a vote of 239 to 109. In the Senate, where silver was stronger, the bill was delayed by obstructive tactics. . . . Senator Jones of Nevada made a speech that filled a hundred pages of ‘The Congressional Record’; and Senator Allen of Nebraska spoke for fifteen hours. But the obstructionists were at last compelled to surrender. On October 30 the bill reached a vote and was passed, twenty-two Democrats and twenty-six Republicans voting for it, and twenty-two Democrats, twelve Republicans, and three Populists voting against it. The vote showed that on the silver question the two great parties beyond all doubt were split wide open. With the repeal of the Silver-purchase Act, business men in the East breathed a sigh of relief. They said ‘that the advocates of free silver had had their Waterloo and that they were now going to their St. Helena.’ But talk of this kind was premature. . . . The gold reserve fell lower and lower. By the middle of January, 1894, less than three months after the repeal—the gold reserve was less than \$70,000,000. Here indeed was a crisis.”—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 645-646.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1848-1893; 1874-1890.

ALSO IN: L. R. Ehrich, *Question of silver*, p. 23.—A. B. Hepburn, *History of coinage and currency in the United States*, pp. 297-414.—D. R. Dewey, *National problems*, pp. 220-237.

1890-1902.—Sherman Anti-Trust Act.—Its passage. See SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT; RAILROADS: 1890-1902.

1890-1914.—Growth of American peace organizations. See PEACE MOVEMENT: Peace organizations.

1891.—Ocean Mail Act passed. See COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1789-1920.

1891.—Mafia incident. See LOUISIANA: 1891.

1891.—Trouble with Chile.—Nineteen men of the *Baltimore* were wounded and two killed in a street battle in Valparaiso, which was the direct result of the irritation felt over the asylum given to political fugitives in the legation. The matter was settled later by an apology from Chile, and the payment of her of \$75,000 for the victims. See CHILE: 1891-1892.

1891-1907.—Allotments to Indians.—Purchase of Cherokee outlet.—Struggle of Oklahoma for statehood. See OKLAHOMA: 1891-1901; 1891-1907.

1891-1914.—Merchant marine.—“For many years following the act of 1891, agitation for further direct aid to American shipping was persistent. The war with Spain, the new insular possessions, the reawakened interest in the Navy, the digging of the Panama Canal, and the grow-

ing interest in foreign markets for American manufactures, gave special impetus to this agitation in the early years of the new century. In successive Congresses measures were introduced providing for subsidies and subventions of various sorts. Typical of these was the Gallinger Bill of 1905, based upon the majority report of the Merchant Marine Commission of 1904, providing for a general bounty to all American shipping which conformed to specified requirements and a special subvention to steamers running to various Latin-American, South African, and Asiatic points. Owing, however, to prejudice against anything which smacked of subsidy, to preference in certain quarters for indirect aid, and to insufficient enthusiasm over American shipping, none of these proposals secured the approval of both houses of Congress. Events proved that the next governmental action in behalf of our merchant marine was to take the form of indirect aid. Despite the tradition of a century, a 'free ship' policy was adopted. The first step was taken in the Panama Canal Act of 1912, which provided that foreign-built vessels, American-owned, and not more than five years old, might be admitted to American registry for trade with foreign countries and with the Philippines, Guam, and Tutuila, and might be granted mail contracts under the act of 1891. On August 18, 1914, the five-year age limit was removed."—G. M. Fisk and P. S. Peirce, *international commercial policies*, p. 280.—See also below: 1914-1920; 1922: Economic situation.

1892.—Chinese Exclusion Act.—A bill "to absolutely prohibit the coming of Chinese persons into the United States," reported by Representative Geary, of California, was passed by the House, April 4, 1892, yeas 179, nays 43, 107 not voting. In the senate, a substitute, going little further than to continue the then existing laws for the regulation of Chinese immigration, was reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations and adopted. The two bills were referred to a Conference Committee, with the result that a compromise measure, slightly modified from the House bill, was passed by both branches of Congress, May 3 and May 4, and signed by the president on May 5. It continues former laws for ten years. It directs "that any Chinese person or person of Chinese descent when convicted and adjudged under any of said laws to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States," shall be removed to China, or to such other country as he may prove to be a subject or citizen of. It declares that any such person under arrest "shall be adjudged to be unlawfully within the United States, unless such person shall establish, by affirmative proof, . . . his lawful right to remain in the United States"; and that any such person "convicted and adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a period of not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed from the United States, as hereinbefore provided." The act denies bail, on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, by a Chinese person seeking to land in the United States. It requires all Chinese laborers who were within the limits of the United States at the time of the passage of the act, and who were entitled to remain, to obtain certificates of residence, from district collectors of internal revenue, and orders the deportation of those who had failed to do so at the expiration of one year. This extraordinary measure of exclusion has been commonly known as the "Geary Act."—Based on E. McPherson, *Handbook of politics*, 1892.

1892.—Settlement of Alaskan boundary.—A

convention between the governments of the United States and Great Britain was entered into and ratifications exchanged in August, 1892, providing for a coincident or joint survey, "as may in practice be found most convenient," to determine the boundary line between Alaska and the Canadian provinces.

1892.—Controversy with Chile.—Warlike presidential message. See CHILE: 1891-1892.

1892.—Twenty-seventh presidential election.—Five parties presented candidates in the presidential election held Nov. 8, 1892—namely: Democratic, Republican, People's or Populist, Prohibitionist, and Socialist Labor. The nominees of the Democratic party were Grover Cleveland, for president, and Adlai E. Stevenson, for vice president; of the Republican party, Benjamin Harrison and Whitelaw Reid, for president and vice president, respectively; of the Populist party, James B. Weaver and James G. Field; of the Prohibition party, John Bidwell and James B. Cranfill; of the Socialist Labor party, Simon Wing and Charles H. Matchett. The dominant issues in the canvass were the tariff question and the silver question. "The Democrats named no electoral tickets in Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota, and Wyoming, but voted for the people's party electors with the object of taking those States away from the Republicans. They put out an electoral ticket in Nevada, but still voted mostly for the Populist electors. In North Dakota also there was a partial fusion between the Democrats and the People's party, and in Minnesota a part of the Weaver electoral ticket was accepted by the Democrats. In Louisiana there was a fusion of the Republicans and the People's party, each nominating half of the 8 electors. In Alabama there was a fusion of some of the Republicans with the People's party. In Texas a Republican ticket called the Lily White was set up, which differed from the regular ticket. In Michigan a new electoral law, which was declared constitutional by the United States Supreme Court on Oct. 17, 1892, provided for the separate election of a Presidential elector in each Congressional district, and in consequence the electoral vote of the State was divided. In Oregon the name of one of the four electors on the People's ticket was also placed on the Democratic ticket. . . . The total popular vote cast was reported as 12,154,542," of which Cleveland received 5,556,553; Harrison, 5,175,577; Weaver, 1,122,045; Bidwell 279,191; Wing, 21,191. The electoral votes of the states were cast as follows: Cleveland, 277; Harrison, 145; Weaver, 22; giving Cleveland a clear majority of 110.—*Appletons' Annual Cyclopædia*, 1892.—"The most striking feature of the elections was the great losses of the Republicans in the West. Illinois and Wisconsin went Democratic by large majorities, California and Ohio were very close, and Colorado, Idaho, Kansas and Nevada chose Populist electors. The Democrats carried all the Northern states generally regarded as doubtful, viz., Connecticut, New York and Indiana, but they nearly lost Delaware. An unusual incident of the result was the division of the electoral votes in several states, owing to the closeness of the popular vote. Thus in Ohio one Cleveland elector and in Oregon one Weaver elector was chosen, the others being Republican; and in California and North Dakota Mr. Harrison secured single votes in the same way. From the conditions of fusion between the Democrats and Populists in the last-named state, it resulted that one of her three electoral votes was given to each of the three candidates. In Michigan, under the district

method of choosing electors recently established, Harrison got nine votes and Cleveland five."—*Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1893.

ALSO IN: G. F. Parker, *Recollections of Grover Cleveland*, ch. 9-10.—D. R. Dewey, *National problems*, ch. 15.—S. J. Buck, *Agrarian crusade*.

1893.—Abandonment of polygamy by Mormons. See UTAH: 1882-1893.

1893.—Revolution in the Hawaiian islands and proposed annexation. See HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: Discovery and early history.

1893.—World's Columbian exposition at Chicago. See WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION.

1893.—Panic and unemployment.—“While President Cleveland was struggling to secure the repeal of the Sherman Silver Law and moving heaven and earth to maintain the gold standard, the country was passing through a period of hard times known as the Panic of 1893. In the autumn of 1892 conditions in the financial world were bad. They continued to grow worse, and by the middle of 1893 the country was experiencing the most disastrous panic of its history. In December the comptroller of the currency announced the failure during the year of 158 national banks, 172 State banks, 177 private banks, forty-seven savings banks, thirteen loan and trust companies, and six mortgage companies. Most of the failures were in the South and West where finances were in such a state of collapse that general bankruptcy was threatened. . . . Although the political doctors differed widely about the cause of the panic there could be no difference of opinion as to its effects. Its blighting influence was felt in every section of the country, and in its train there followed a period of hard times that lasted for nearly three years. The rich as well as the poor were reached by the depression. In the cities hundreds of thousands found themselves without employment. Never before in the history of the United States had there been such a large number of men out of work. In the West farmers, unable to sell their crops at any price, were sometimes forced to burn as fuel the grain which they had raised at great expense and with much toil.”—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 646-650.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1848-1893.

1893.—Agreement with Great Britain limiting pelagic sealing. See PRIBILOV ISLANDS.

1893-1896.—Civil service reform.—Attack on spoils system. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1893-1896.

1893-1897.—Period of depression.—Effect on railroads. See RAILROADS: 1893-1910.

1893-1899.—Indian affairs.—Dawes Commission appointed. See INDIANS, AMERICAN: 1893-1899.

1894.—Wilson Tariff Act. See TARIFF: 1894.

1894.—Coxey movement.—“The slow progress of the Wilson Bill, prolonging as it did the feeling of uncertainty in the business world, had depressed all forms of industry. Thousands of men who had been thrown out of work in the summer and autumn of 1893 found themselves at the beginning of winter wholly destitute. Some of them had left their homes in the Eastern States and had gone to the Pacific Coast as railway builders. They now turned their faces homeward, intending to tramp the long distance, and to live upon the charity of the intervening towns and cities. These men were presently joined by others who were out of work, and finally by swarms of professional vagabonds and tramps. Through some curious psychological impulse, the notion of a general crusade of squalor spread all through the country;

and from every quarter of the West and the Southwest, bands of ragged, hungry, homeless men appeared, fierce of aspect, and terrifying to the people of the hamlets and sparsely settled districts through which they passed. . . . [Three men] after a fashion took command of the roving bands. These three—Coxey, Kelly, and Fry—styling themselves ‘generals,’ led the largest groups, which were now known as ‘armies of the unemployed,’ and later as ‘Industrials’ and ‘Commonwealers.’ Coxey was the most conspicuous of the three. He had a definite plan of action. He organized what he styled the ‘Army of the Commonweal of Christ,’ and with it he intended to march on Washington, to enter the Capitol and to overawe Congress into passing a law providing for the unemployed. His demand was that \$500,000,000 in irredeemable paper money should be issued, and that this sum should be spent in improving the public highways throughout the country. Such became at last the declared purpose of all the Commonwealers; and so the three ‘armies’ began their march to Washington from different points,—Coxey setting out from Massillon, Ohio, on March 25th, Frye from Los Angeles, California, early in April, and Kelly from San Francisco on April 26th.”—H. T. Peck, *Twenty years of the republic*, pp. 372-373.—“On May 1 [Coxey’s army, which had reached the number of about 350, arrived at Washington] marched to the capitol, but under an old District law was prevented by the police from entering the grounds. Coxey and another of the leaders, attempting to elude the police and address the assembled crowds, were arrested and afterwards convicted of a misdemeanor. . . . [Frye’s army] numbering from six to eight hundred men, availed themselves of the assistance, more or less involuntary, of freight trains on the Southern Pacific Railway as far as St. Louis, from which place they continued on foot. . . . [Kelly refused to leave Oakland, California, until freight accommodations as far as Omaha, Nebraska, were furnished.] The railroads eastward from Omaha refused absolutely to carry them, and they went into camp near Council Bluffs, in Iowa, . . . and ultimately continued on foot as far as Des Moines, in Iowa. A band coming east on a stolen train on the Northern Pacific, after overpowering a squad of United States marshals, was captured by a detachment of regular troops at Forsyth, Montana, April 26. Two days later the militia were called out to rescue a train from a band at Mount Sterling, Ohio.”—*Political Science Quarterly*, *Record of Political Events*, June, 1894.—There were straggling movements, from different quarters of the country, in imitation of those described, prolonged through most of the summer of 1894; but the public feeling favorable to them was limited, and they commonly came to an ignominious end.

1894.—Strike at Pullman.—“The year 1893 was a year of contrasts. In the midst of the industrial crisis and dark depression the country celebrated the four-hundredth anniversary of its discovery by Columbus, on a scale of grand magnificence and perfection of detail which not only aroused the pride of Americans but excited the respect and admiration of foreigners. . . . Whatever elation was aroused by this unprecedented display of the world’s industry and art was brought low by the industrial embarrassments and suffering of the working-class during the winter of 1893-1894. The business depression of 1893 threw hundreds of thousands of workmen out of employment, causing great distress and taxing the relief agencies in the large manufacturing centres to the utmost.

Never before had the evil of unemployment been so wide-spread in the United States. The spirit of discontent became general. . . . In the general depression of business the car-building industry had not escaped, and the Pullman Company was obliged, for lack of orders, to discharge many employes, and finally, in order to meet competition, to bid for contracts on the basis of actual cost, or even below. Wages were consequently lowered [and in May the men stopped work]. As four thousand of the employes were members of the American Railway Union [which had been formed by Eugene V. Debs], this organization came to the support of the local workmen and demanded that the difference be submitted to arbitration. This the Pullman Company refused, on the ground that the cost of manufacturing was a question of fact, and could not be submitted to arbitration. In retaliation the American Railway Union voted that its members should not handle Pullman cars over railways using such equipment. . . . [The boycott went into effect on June 26, and caused paralyzed traffic and business.] The railroad managers promptly met the issue, and determined that, as the boycott was not on account of any grievance between the railroad companies and their own employes, it was unjustifiable; and that in their resistance they would act unitedly. Employes of all the railroads centring in Chicago, and many of the more distant systems, extending through twenty-seven states and territories from Cincinnati to San Francisco, struck, and placed a boycott upon Pullman cars wherever found. Violent efforts were made in Chicago to prevent the running of trains; mobs composed in large part of lawless men, hoodlums, and professional criminals infesting that city since the Columbian Exposition of the previous year, gathered in the freight-yards and looted and burned hundreds of cars. . . . Upon the demand of the post-office department that obstruction of the mails be removed, and upon representation of the judicial officers of the government of the United States that the processes of the Federal courts could not be executed, and upon the basis that conspiracies existed which interfered with interstate commerce, President Cleveland ordered regular troops to the scenes of disturbance. Rioting and bloodshed continued for some days; but public interest was sustained for weeks over the discussion as to the responsibility for the suppression of the disorder and the rights of labor leaders when injunctions were issued by the courts. . . . Both houses of Congress indorsed the president's action, and the newspapers of the country reflected approval."—D. R. Dewey, *National problems, 1885-1897*, pp. 288-289, 291-293.—The strike was practically ended by July 15.—See also LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1877-1911.

ALSO IN: Grover Cleveland, *Presidential problems*, pp. 79-117.—United States Strike Commission, *Report on Chicago strike, June and July, 1894*.—W. J. Ashley, *Railroad strike of 1894*.—W. H. Cardwardine, *Pullman strike*.

1894.—Legislation to promote reclamation of arid lands.—The following measure of legislation to promote the reclamation of arid lands was carried through Congress as an amendment to the Appropriation Bill for Sundry Civil Expenditures, and became law Aug. 18, 1894:

"Sec. 4. That to aid the public land States in the reclamation of the desert lands therein, and the settlement, cultivation, and sale thereof in small tracts to actual settlers, the Secretary of the Interior with the approval of the President, be, and hereby is, authorized and empowered, upon

proper application of the State to contract and agree, from time to time, with each of the States in which there may be situated desert lands as defined by the Act entitled 'An Act to provide for the sale of desert land in certain States and Territories,' approved March 3d, 1877, and the Act amendatory thereof, approved March 3d, 1891, binding the United States to donate, grant and patent to the State free of cost for survey or price such desert lands, not exceeding one million acres in each State, as the State may cause to be irrigated, reclaimed, occupied, and not less than twenty acres of each one hundred and sixty-acre tract cultivated by actual settlers, within ten years next after the passage of this Act, as thoroughly as is required of citizens who may enter the said desert land law. Before the application of any State is allowed or any contract or agreement is executed or any segregation of any of the land from the public domain is ordered by the Secretary of the Interior, the State shall file a map of the said land proposed to be irrigated which shall exhibit a plan showing the mode of the contemplated irrigation and which plan shall be sufficient to thoroughly irrigate and reclaim said land and prepare it to raise ordinary agricultural crops and shall also show the source of the water to be used for irrigation and reclamation, and the Secretary of the Interior may make necessary regulations for the reservation of the lands applied for by the States to date from the date of the filing of the map and plan of irrigation, but such reservation shall be of no force whatever if such map and plan of irrigation shall not be approved. That any State contracting under this section is hereby authorized to make all necessary contracts to cause the said lands to be reclaimed, and to induce their settlement and cultivation in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this section; but the State shall not be authorized to lease any of said lands or to use or dispose of the same in any way whatever, except to secure their reclamation, cultivation and settlement. As fast as any State may furnish satisfactory proof according to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, that any of said lands are irrigated, reclaimed and occupied by actual settlers, patents shall be issued to the State or its assigns for said land so reclaimed and settled: Provided, That said States shall not sell or dispose of more than one hundred and sixty acres of said land to any one person, and any surplus of money derived by any State from the sale of said lands in excess of the cost of their reclamation, shall be held as a trust fund for and be applied to the reclamation of other desert lands in such State. That to enable the Secretary of the Interior to examine any of the lands that may be selected under the provisions of this section, there is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, one thousand dollars."—*Acts, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, ch. 302*.—See also CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1847-1901.

1894.—Discussion of proportional representation. See PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: United States.

1894.—Treaty with China regulating immigration. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1862-1913.

1894-1895.—President Cleveland's statement regarding insurrection in Mosquito Indian strip.—Bluefield incident. See NICARAGUA: 1894-1905.

1894-1895.—Provision for admission of Utah as a state.—On July 17, 1894, the president, by

his signature, gave effect to a bill which provided for the admission of Utah to the Union as a state. The bill provided for the holding of a convention in March, 1895, to frame a constitution for the proposed new state, and for submitting such constitution to the people at the election in November, 1895.

1895.—Status of civil service reform.—Commissioner Roosevelt's review.—“In 1883 the civil service law was established at Washington, and in the larger post-offices and custom-houses throughout the country, taking in a total of some 14,000 employes. . . . In 1880 the railway mail service was added, in 1893 all the free delivery post-offices, and in 1894 all the smaller custom-houses and the internal revenue service. Other important but smaller extensions have been made, and the larger offices have grown, so that now about 50,000 employes are under the protection of the law. There are, of course, and there always must be in a body so large, individual cases where the law is evaded, or even violated; and as yet we do not touch the question of promotions and reductions. But, speaking broadly, and with due allowance for such comparatively slight exceptions, these 50,000 places are now taken out of the political arena. They can no longer be scrambled for a struggle as ignoble and brutal as the strife of pirates over plunder; they no longer serve as a vast bribery chest with which to debauch the voters of the country. Those holding them no longer keep their political life by the frail tenure of service to the party boss and the party machine; they stand as American citizens, and are allowed the privilege of earning their own bread without molestation so long as they faithfully serve the public. The classified service, the service in which the merit system is applied, has grown fast. It is true that the outside service where the spoils theories are still applied in all their original nakedness, has grown only less fast. The number of offices under the government has increased very rapidly during the last twenty years; but the growth of the classified service has been even more rapid, so that a constantly increasing percentage of the whole is withdrawn from the degrading grasp of the spoils system. Now, something like a quarter of all the offices under the federal government in point of numbers, representing nearly a half in point of salaries, has been put upon the basis of decency and merit. This has been done by the action of successive Presidents under the law of 1883, without the necessity of action by Congress. There still remain some things that can be done without further legislation. For instance, the labor force in the navy yards was put on a merit basis, and removed from the domain of politics, under Secretary Tracy. This was done merely by order of the secretary of the navy, which order could have been reversed by his successor, Secretary Herbert. Instead of reversing it, however, Secretary Herbert has zealously lived up to its requirements, and has withstood all pressure for the weakening of the system in the interests of the local party machines and bosses. It is unsafe to trust to always having secretaries of the navy like Messrs. Tracy and Herbert. The Civil Service Commission should be given supervision over the laborers who come under the direction of Cabinet officers. Indeed, all the laboring force and all the employes of the District of Columbia employed by the federal government should be put under the Commission. When this has been done, and when a few other

comparatively slight extensions have been made, all that can be accomplished by the unaided action of the executive will have been accomplished. Congress must then itself act by passing some such bill as that of Senator Lodge in reference to fourth-class postmasters; by passing some bill in reference to the consular service on the outlines of that suggested by Senator Morgan (but giving power to the Civil Service Commission itself in the matter); and then by providing that all postmasters and similar officers shall hold office during good behavior, including as well those nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, as those appointed by the President alone. Of all the offices under the federal government, not one in a hundred can properly be called political.” —T. Roosevelt, *Present status of civil service reform* (*Atlantic*, February, 1895).—See also CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1893-1896.

1895.—President Cleveland's special message on the condition of national finances.—In a special message to Congress, on January 28, 1895, President Cleveland renewed an earnest appeal which he had made at the opening of the session, for legislation to correct the mischievous working of the existing currency system of the country. The condition of the national finances, was set forth clearly in this message, as follows: “The real trouble which confronts us consists in a lack of confidence, widespread and constantly increasing, in the continuing ability or disposition of the Government to pay its obligations in gold. This lack of confidence grows to some extent out of the palpable and apparent embarrassment attending the efforts of the Government under existing laws to procure gold, and to a greater extent out of the impossibility of either keeping it in the Treasury or canceling obligations by its expenditure after it is obtained. The only way left open to the Government for procuring gold is by the issue and sale of its bonds. The only bonds that can be so issued were authorized nearly twenty-five years ago, and are not well calculated to meet our present needs. Among other disadvantages, they are made payable in coin, instead of specifically in gold, which, in existing conditions, detracts largely and in an increasing ratio from their desirability as investments. It is by no means certain that bonds of this description can much longer be disposed of at a price creditable to the financial character of our Government. The most dangerous and irritating feature of the situation, however, remains to be mentioned. It is found in the means by which the Treasury is despoiled of the gold thus obtained without canceling a single Government obligation and solely for the benefit of those who find profit in shipping it abroad or whose fears induce them to hoard it at home. We have outstanding about five hundred millions of currency notes of the Government for which gold may be demanded, and, curiously enough, the law requires that when presented and, in fact, redeemed and paid in gold, they shall be reissued. Thus the same notes may do duty many times in drawing gold from the Treasury; nor can the process be arrested as long as private parties, for profit or otherwise, see an advantage in repeating the operation. More than \$300,000,000 in these notes have already been redeemed in gold, and notwithstanding such redemption they are all still outstanding. Since the 17th day of January, 1894, our bonded interest-bearing debt has been increased \$100,000,000 for the purpose of obtaining gold to replenish our coin reserve. Two issues were made amounting

to fifty millions each—one in January, and the other in November. As a result of the first issue there was realized something more than \$53,000,000 in gold. Between that issue and the succeeding one in November, comprising a period of about ten months, nearly \$103,000,000 in gold were drawn from the Treasury. This made the second issue necessary, and upon that more than fifty-eight millions in gold was again realized. Between the date of this second issue and the present time, covering a period of only about two months, more than \$69,000,000 in gold have been drawn from the Treasury. These large sums of gold were expended without any cancellation of Government obligations or in any permanent way benefiting our people or improving our pecuniary situation. The financial events of the past year suggest facts and conditions which should certainly arrest attention. More than \$172,000,000 in gold have been drawn out of the Treasury during the year for the purpose of shipment abroad or hoarding at home. While nearly one hundred and three millions of this amount was drawn out during the first ten months of the year, a sum aggregating more than two-thirds of that amount, being about sixty-nine millions, was drawn out during the following two months, thus indicating a marked acceleration of the depleting process with the lapse of time. The obligations upon which this gold has been drawn from the Treasury are still outstanding and are available for use in repeating the exhausting operation with shorter intervals as our perplexities accumulate. . . . It will hardly do to say that a simple increase of revenue will cure our troubles. The apprehension now existing and constantly increasing as to our financial ability does not rest upon a calculation of our revenue. The time has passed when the eyes of investors abroad and our people at home were fixed upon the revenues of the Government. Changed conditions have attracted their attention to the gold of the Government. There need be no fear that we cannot pay our current expenses with such money as we have. There is now in the Treasury a comfortable surplus of more than \$63,000,000, but it is not in gold, and therefore does not meet our difficulty. . . . Whatever ideas may be insisted upon as to silver or bimetallism, a proper solution of the question now pressing upon us only requires a recognition of gold as well as silver, and a concession of its importance, rightfully or wrongfully acquired, as a basis of national credit, a necessity in the honorable discharge of our obligations payable in gold, and a badge of solvency. . . . In my opinion the Secretary of the Treasury should be authorized to issue bonds of the Government for the purpose of procuring and maintaining a sufficient gold reserve and redemption and cancellation of the United States legal-tender notes and the Treasury notes issued for the purchase of silver under the law of July 14, 1890. . . . The principal and interest of these bonds should be payable on their face in gold, because they should be sold only for gold or its representative, and because there would now probably be difficulty in favorably disposing of bonds not containing this stipulation. . . . National banks should not be allowed to take out circulating notes of a less denomination than \$10, and when such as are now outstanding reach the Treasury, except for redemption and retirement, they should be canceled and notes of the denomination of \$10 and upward issued in their stead. Silver certificates of the denomination of \$10 and upward should be replaced by certificates of de-

nominations under \$10. As a constant means for the maintenance of a reasonable supply of gold in the Treasury our duties on imports should be paid in gold, allowing all other dues to the Government to be paid in any other form of money. I believe all the provisions I have suggested should be embodied in our laws if we are to enjoy a complete reinstatement of a sound financial condition." The president's recommendations were not acted upon. The silver interest in Congress defeated all measures introduced for the purpose and left the situation unchanged. The government was forced to a new issue of bonds under the old act, for the replenishing of its gold reserve.—See also above: 1890-1893: Silver Bill and its effect.

ALSO IN: D. R. Dewey, *Financial history of the United States*, pp. 444ff.—A. D. Noyes, *Thirty years of American finance*, pp. 158-248.—J. Sherman, *Recollections*, v. 2, ch. 64.

1895 (January-February).—Monetary situation.—Contract for replenishing the gold reserve in the treasury.—The alarming situation of the treasury of the United States at the beginning of the year 1895 was clearly described by the president in his special message to Congress, January 28. (See above 1895: President Cleveland's special message.) By the operation of what had been aptly called "the endless chain" of the greenback currency issues of the government (paid out with one hand, to be redeemed with the other in gold, which the declining value of silver brought more and more into demand) the gold reserve in the treasury was fast being exhausted, and the hour was approaching when, without some effective relief, the obligations of the nation would have to be paid in depreciated silver coin, and its credit lost. The appeal of the president to Congress had no effect. The Senate was controlled by a majority of men who desired precisely the result which he wished to avert. The state of things in that body was described by Senator Sherman, of the Committee on Finance, in the following words: "The Committee on Finance is utterly helpless to deal with this vast question. We are quite divided upon it. We are not allowed to propose a measure to this Senate which all can approve of, unless there is attached to it a provision for free coinage of silver." The attitude of the House was different, but almost equally hostile to the president's views. Its Republican majority was not favorable to the aims of the free silver parties, but held that the relief needed for the Treasury was to be sought in a return to higher import duties, as a means of obtaining increased revenue. Hence a bill to carry out the recommendations of the president was rejected in the House, on February 7, by a vote of 162 against 135. "The secretary of the treasury [John Griffin Carlisle], using power which he possessed under existing law—for Congress refused to give him any new power for dealing with the situation,—began to sell bonds—that is, to borrow money—in order to secure gold enough to bring the reserve up to the \$100,000,000 mark. . . . There were two sales of bonds but no good results followed; the more gold the Treasury borrowed the lower the reserve fell. By February, 1895, although about \$117,000,000 of gold had been borrowed, the gold reserve was only \$41,000,000. In desperation Cleveland now called J. P. Morgan to the White House and after conferring with that great financier entered into an agreement with the banking houses of Morgan, Belmont, and Rothschild for the purchase of 3,500,000

ounces of gold to be paid for in United States bonds, which were to be delivered at a price considerably lower than the current market price and were to bear interest at 4 per cent. As a part of the arrangement the bankers agreed to use their influence to protect the Treasury from further withdrawals of gold. When the nature of the transaction became known to the public the indignation which arose was nation wide. Even in the East there was a storm of criticism. . . . The Morgan-Belmont arrangements brought relief to the Treasury for about ten months; then the endless chain began to work again, and quickly the Government was in such a bad financial plight that in January, 1896, a loan had to be resorted to. This time the sale of bonds was thrown open to the public with the most gratifying results. A call was made for \$100,000,000 and response came from more than 4,500 subscribers, whose bids covered the sum asked for many times over. . . . In spite of the replenishment the reserve again began to fall, and by July, 1896, it was about \$90,000,000. But it was allowed to fall no further. As a Presidential campaign was now in full swing, financiers were seized with a fear that a new bond issue might have the effect of strengthening the claims of the silver advocates. Accordingly the bankers combined to support the reserve by paying out gold in exchange for notes, instead of presenting notes to the Treasury to be exchanged for gold. The plan succeeded; the reserve fell no further, the endless chain came to rest, and the gold standard was henceforth maintained. The bonds issued to maintain it amounted altogether to \$262,000,000."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 646-648.—"The new gold loan, with its great addition to the public debt, made for the sole purpose of 'insulting silver,' was the last straw upon the back of the far from patient Populists. By this time, men had formed the habit of speaking of gold and silver as though the two metals were possessed of human attributes. They were not only animified, but personified; and both vices and virtues were ascribed to them. . . . In truth, at this period, a large portion of the American people was touched by something very like emotional madness over one of the most prosaic questions of pure economics. The tide of Populism which had begun to rise in 1880, which had swollen to a flood in 1890, and which in 1892 had temporarily been diverted into Democratic channels, was now roaring through the West with a fury that swept everything before it. In all the silver-producing States it seemed to be wrecking the older parties; while in Kansas and Nebraska, men and women and even children turned away from the ordinary vocations of life, and gave themselves up body and soul to the politics of unrestrained emotion."—H. T. Peck, *Twenty years of the republic*, pp. 448-449.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1874-1890.

ALSO IN: D. R. Dewey, *National problems*, pp. 271-274.—W. J. Bryan, *First battle*, pp. 136 ff.

1895 (April-May).—Decision of the Supreme Court against the constitutionality of income tax.—Cases testing the constitutionality of the income tax which Congress had attached to the Tariff Act of 1894 (see TARIFF: 1894) were brought to a partial decision in the Supreme Court in April, and finally in May, 1895. The cases in question were "Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company," and "Hyde v. Continental Trust Company." On the first hearing, the illness and absence of one of the justices, Howell Edmunds Jackson, of

Tennessee, left but eight members in attendance, and they divided equally on several points which were vital to the decision of the question of constitutionality in the tax. The appellants accordingly filed a petition for a re-hearing, submitting among other reasons, the following: "The question involved in these cases was as to the constitutionality of the provisions of the tariff act of August 15, 1894 (sections 27 to 37), purporting to impose a tax on incomes. The Court has held that the same are unconstitutional, so far as they purport to impose a tax upon the rent or income of real estate and income derived from municipal bonds. It has, however, announced that it was equally divided in opinion as to the following questions, and has expressed no opinion in regard to them: (1) Whether the void provisions invalidate the whole act. (2) Whether, as to the income from personal property as such, the act is unconstitutional as laying direct taxes. (3) Whether any part of the tax, if not considered as a direct tax, is invalid for want of uniformity. The court has reversed the decree of the Circuit Court and remanded the case, with directions to enter a decree in favor of complainant in respect only of the voluntary payment of the tax on the rents and income of defendant's real estate, and that which it holds in trust, and on the income from the municipal bonds owned or so held by it. While, therefore, the two points above stated have been decided, there has been no decision of the remaining questions regarding the constitutionality of the act, and no judgment has been announced authoritatively establishing any principle for interpretation of the statute in those respects." The re-hearing asked for was granted by the court on May 6, when Justice Jackson was able to take his seat on the bench, after which, on May 20, by the opinion of five members of the Court against four, the law was pronounced null, so far as concerned the imposition of a tax on incomes. The opinion of the majority was delivered by Chief Justice Fuller, who said, in part: "The Constitution divided Federal taxation into two great classes, the class of direct taxes, and the class of duties, imposts and excises; and prescribed two rules which qualified the grant of power as to each class. The power to lay direct taxes apportioned among the several States in proportion to their representation in the popular branch of Congress, a representation based on population as ascertained by the census, was plenary and absolute; but to lay direct taxes without apportionment was forbidden. The power to lay duties, imposts, and excises was subject to the qualification that the imposition must be uniform throughout the United States. Our previous decision was confined to the consideration of the validity of the tax on the income from real estate and on the income from municipal bonds. . . . We are now permitted to broaden the field of inquiry, and to determine to which of the two great classes a tax upon a person's entire income, . . . belongs; and we are unable to conclude that the enforced subtraction from the yield of all the owner's real or personal property, in the manner prescribed, is so different from a tax upon the property itself, that it is not a direct, but an indirect tax in the meaning of the Constitution. The words of the Constitution are to be taken in their obvious sense, and to have a reasonable construction. In *Gibbons v. Ogden*, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, with his usual felicity, said: 'The enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it must be under-

stood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.' 9 Wheat. 1, 188. And in *Rhode Island v. Massachusetts*, where the question was whether a controversy between two States over the boundary between them was within the grant of judicial power, Mr. Justice Baldwin, speaking for the Court, observed: 'The solution of this question must necessarily depend on the words of the Constitution; the meaning and intention of the convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions of the people of and in the several States; together with a reference as to such sources of judicial information as are resorted to by all courts in construing statutes, and to which this court has always resorted in construing the Constitution.' 12 Pet. 657, 721. We know of no reason for holding otherwise than that the words 'direct taxes,' on the one hand, and 'duties, imposts and excises,' on the other, were used in the Constitution in their natural and obvious sense. Nor in arriving at what those terms embrace do we perceive any ground for enlarging them beyond or narrowing them within their natural and obvious import at the time the Constitution was framed and ratified. And passing from the text, we regard the conclusion reached as inevitable, when the circumstances which surrounded the convention and controlled its action and the views of those who framed and those who adopted the Constitution are considered. . . . In the light of the struggle in the convention as to whether or not the new Nation should be empowered to levy taxes directly on the individual until after the States had failed to respond to requisitions . . . —it would seem beyond reasonable question that direct taxation, taking the place as it did of requisitions, was purposely restrained to apportionment according to representation, in order that the former system as to ratio might be retained while the mode of collection was changed. This is forcibly illustrated by a letter of Mr. Madison of January 29, 1789 . . . [written] . . . before the organization of the government and the submission of the proposed amendment to Congress, which, while opposing the amendment as calculated to impair the power only to be exercised in extraordinary emergencies, assigns adequate ground for its rejection as substantially unnecessary, since, he says, 'every State which chooses to collect its own quota may always prevent a Federal collection, by keeping a little beforehand in its finances and making its payment at once into the Federal treasury.' The reasons for the clauses of the Constitution in respect of direct taxation are not far to seek. The States, respectively, possessed plenary powers of taxation. They could tax the property of their citizens in such manner and to such extent as they saw fit; they had unrestricted powers to impose duties or imposts on imports from abroad, and excises on manufactures, consumable commodities, or otherwise. They gave up the great sources of revenue derived from commerce; they retained the concurrent power of levying excises, and duties if covering anything other than excises; but in respect of them the range of taxation was narrowed by the power granted over interstate commerce, and by the danger of being put at disadvantage in dealing with excises on manufactures. They retained the power of direct taxation, and to that they looked as their chief resource; but even in respect of that, they granted the concurrent power, and if the tax were placed by both governments on the same subject, the claim

of the United States had preference. Therefore, they did not grant the power of direct taxation without regard to their own condition and resources as States; but they granted the power of apportioned direct taxation, a power just as efficacious to serve the needs of the general government, but securing to the States the opportunity to pay the amount apportioned, and to recoup from their own citizens in the most feasible way, and in harmony with their systems of local self-government. If, in the changes of wealth and population in particular States, apportionment produced inequality, it was an inequality stipulated for, just as the equal representation of the States, however small, in the Senate, was stipulated for. . . . Moreover, whatever the reasons for the constitutional provisions, there they are, and they appear to us to speak in plain language. It is said that a tax on the whole income of property is not a direct tax in the meaning of the Constitution, but a duty, and, as a duty, leviable without apportionment, whether direct or indirect. We do not think so. Direct taxation was not restricted in one breath and the restriction blown to the winds in another. . . . Our conclusions may therefore be summed up as follows: First. We adhere to the opinion already announced, that, taxes on real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes on the rents or income of real estate are equally direct taxes. Second. We are of opinion that taxes on personal property, or on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes. Third. The tax imposed by sections twenty-seven to thirty-seven, inclusive, of the act of 1894, so far as it falls on the income of real estate and of personal property, being a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution, and, therefore, unconstitutional and void because not apportioned according to representation, all those sections, constituting one entire scheme of taxation, are necessarily invalid."

Four dissenting opinions were prepared, by Justices Harlan, Brown, Jackson and White. In that of Justice Harlan, he said: "What are 'direct taxes' within the meaning of the Constitution? In the convention of 1787, Rufus King asked what was the precise meaning of 'direct' taxation, and no one answered. Madison Papers, 5 Elliott's Debates, 451. The debates of that famous body do not show that any delegate attempted to give a clear, succinct definition of what, in his opinion, was a direct tax. Indeed the report of those debates, upon the question now before us, is very meagre and unsatisfactory. An illustration of this is found in the case of *Gouverneur Morris*. It is stated that on the 12th of July, 1787, he moved to add to a clause empowering Congress to vary representation according to the principles of 'wealth and numbers of inhabitants,' a proviso 'that taxation shall be in proportion to representation.' And he is reported to have remarked, on that occasion, that while some objections lay against his motion, he supposed 'they would be removed by restraining the rule to direct taxation.' Elliott's Debates, 302. But, on the 8th of August, 1787, the work of the Committee on Detail being before the convention, Mr. Morris is reported to have remarked, 'let it not be said that direct taxation is to be proportioned to representation.' 5 Elliott's Debates, 393. If the question propounded by Rufus King had been answered in accordance with the interpretation now given, it is not at all certain that the Constitution, in its present form, would have been adopted by the convention, nor, if adopted, that it would have been accepted by the requisite number of States." The

following is from the dissenting opinion of Justice Brown: "In view of the fact that the great burden of taxation among the several States is assessed upon real estate at a valuation, and that a similar tax was apparently an important part of the revenue of such States at the time the Constitution was adopted, it is not unreasonable to suppose that this is the only undefined direct tax the framers of the Constitution had in view when they incorporated this clause into that instrument. The significance of the words 'direct taxes' was not so well understood then as it is now, and it is entirely probable that these words were used with reference to a generally accepted method of raising a revenue by tax upon real estate. . . . But, however this may be, I regard it as very clear that the clause requiring direct taxes to be apportioned to the population has no application to taxes which are not capable of apportionment according to population. It cannot be supposed that the convention could have contemplated a practical inhibition upon the power of Congress to tax in some way all taxable property within the jurisdiction of the Federal government, for the purposes of a national revenue. And if the proposed tax were such that in its nature it could not be apportioned according to population, it naturally follows that it could not have been considered a direct tax, within the meaning of the clause in question." Mr. Justice Jackson concluded his dissenting opinion as follows: "The practical operation of the decision is not only to disregard the great principles of equality in taxation, but the further principle that in the imposition of taxes for the benefit of the government the burdens thereof should be imposed upon those having the most ability to bear them. This decision, in effect, works out a directly opposite result, in relieving the citizens having the greater ability, while the burdens of taxation are made to fall most heavily and oppressive upon those having the least ability. It lightens the burden upon the larger number in some States subject to the tax, and places it most unequally and disproportionately on the smaller number in other States. Considered in all its bearings, this decision is, in my judgment, the most disastrous blow ever struck at the constitutional power of Congress. It strikes down an important portion of the most vital and essential power of the government in practically excluding any recourse to incomes from real and personal estate for the purpose of raising needed revenue to meet the government's wants and necessities under any circumstances. I am therefore compelled to enter my dissent to the judgment of the court." The opinion delivered by the majority of the Court was criticised with severity by Justice White, who said: "The injustice of the conclusion points to the error of adopting it. It takes invested wealth and reads it into the Constitution as a favored and protected class of property, which cannot be taxed without apportionment, whilst it leaves the occupation of the minister, the doctor, the professor, the lawyer, the inventor, the author, the merchant, the mechanic, and all other forms of industry upon which the prosperity of a people must depend, subject to taxation without that condition. A rule which works out this result, which, it seems to me, stultifies the Constitution by making it an instrument of the most grievous wrong, should not be adopted, especially when, in order to do so, the decisions of this court, the opinions of the law writers and publicists, tradition, practice, and the settled policy of the gov-

ernment must be overthrown. To destroy the fixed interpretation of the Constitution, by which the rule of apportionment according to population, is confined to direct taxes on real estate so as to make that rule include indirect taxes on real estate and taxes, whether direct or indirect, on invested personal property, stocks, bonds, etc., reads into the Constitution the most flagrantly unjust, unequal, and wrongful system of taxation known to any civilized government. This strikes me as too clear for argument. I can conceive of no greater injustice than would result from imposing on one million of people in one State, having only ten millions of invested wealth, the same amount of tax as that imposed on the like number of people in another State having fifty times that amount of invested wealth. The application of the rule of apportionment by population to invested personal wealth would not only work out this wrong, but would ultimately prove a self-destructive process, from the facility with which such property changes its situs. If so taxed, all property of this character would soon be transferred to the States where the sum of accumulated wealth was greatest in proportion to population, and where therefore the burden of taxation would be lightest, and thus the mighty wrong resulting from the very nature of the extension of the rule would be aggravated. It is clear then, I think, that the admission of the power of taxation in regard to invested personal property, coupled with the restriction that the tax must be distributed by population and not by wealth, involves a substantial denial of the power itself, because the condition renders its exercise practically impossible. To say a thing can only be done in a way which must necessarily bring about the grossest wrong, is to delusively admit the existence of the power while substantially denying it. . . . It is, I submit, greatly to be deplored that, after more than one hundred years of our national existence, after the government has withstood the strain of foreign wars and the dread ordeal of civil strife, and its people have become united and powerful, this court should consider itself compelled to go back to a long repudiated and rejected theory of the Constitution, by which the government is deprived of an inherent attribute of its being, a necessary power of taxation."—*United States Reports*, v. 158, pp. 601-715.

1895 (July-November).—Correspondence with the government of Great Britain on the Venezuela Boundary Question. See VENEZUELA: 1895 (July).

1895 (September).—Executive order for improvement of consular service.—In his annual message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1895, President Cleveland made the following statement of measures adopted for the improvement of the consular service of the country: "In view of the growth of our interests in foreign countries and the encouraging prospects for a general expansion of our commerce, the question of an improvement in the consular service has increased in importance and urgency. Though there is no doubt that the great body of consular officers are rendering valuable services to the trade and industries of the country, the need of some plan of appointment and control which would tend to secure a higher average of efficiency can not be denied. The importance of the subject has led the Executive to consider what steps might properly be taken without additional legislation to answer the need of a better system of consular appointments. The

matter having been committed to the consideration of the Secretary of State, in pursuance of his recommendations, an Executive order was issued on the 20th of September, 1895, by the terms of which it is provided that after that date any vacancy in a consular or commercial agency with an annual salary or compensation from official fees of not more than \$2,500 or less than \$1,000 should be filled either by transfer or promotion from some other position under the Department of State of a character tending to qualify the incumbent for the position to be filled, or by the appointment of a person not under the Department of State, but having previously served thereunder and shown his capacity and fitness for consular duty, or by the appointment of a person who, having been selected by the President and sent to a board for examination, is found, upon such examination, to be qualified for the position. Posts which pay less than \$1,000 being usually, on account of their small compensation, filled by selection from residents of the locality, it was not deemed practicable to put them under the new system. The compensation of \$2,500 was adopted as the maximum limit in the classification for the reason that consular officers receiving more than that sum are often charged with functions and duties scarcely inferior in dignity and importance to those of diplomatic agents, and it was therefore thought best to continue their selection in the discretion of the Executive without subjecting them to examination before a board. Excluding seventy-one places with compensation at present less than \$1,000, and fifty-three places above the maximum in compensation, the number of positions remaining within the scope of the order is one hundred and ninety-six. . . . In execution of the Executive order referred to, the Secretary of State has designated as a board to conduct the prescribed examinations the Third Assistant Secretary of State, the Solicitor of the Department of State, and the Chief of the Consular Bureau, and has specified the subjects to which such examinations shall relate. . . . The expense attending such a plan would be insignificant compared with its usefulness, and I hope the legislation necessary to set it on foot will be speedily forthcoming. I am thoroughly convinced that in addition to their salaries our ambassadors and ministers at foreign courts should be provided by the Government with official residences. The salaries of these officers are comparatively small and in most cases insufficient to pay, with other necessary expenses, the cost of maintaining household establishments in keeping with their important and delicate functions. The usefulness of a nation's diplomatic representative undeniably depends upon the appropriateness of his surroundings, and a country like ours, while avoiding unnecessary glitter and show, should be certain that it does not suffer in its relations with foreign nations through parsimony and shabbiness in its diplomatic outfit. These considerations and the other advantages of having fixed and somewhat permanent locations for our embassies, would abundantly justify the moderate expenditure necessary to carry out this suggestion."—*Message of the President (54th Congress, 1st session, House Documents, v. 1)*.

1895 (December).—Message of President Cleveland on boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela.—"It had long been known in the United States that there existed a boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, but in view of the fact that many of the boundary lines in South America were vaguely defined and

had for many years caused more or less irritation between the South American republics, the settlement of this particular one was not considered important to American interest. . . . The dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela originated in conflicting Dutch and Spanish territorial claims in the northeastern part of the South American continent,—England being the successor of the Dutch in Guiana, while Venezuela based her claims upon Spanish title. It became apparent in 1840 that these early territorial claims were in conflict. . . . In 1876, Venezuela called the attention of the United States to the alleged encroachments of British Guiana upon her soil, laying especial emphasis upon English advances in the region lying about the mouth of the Orinoco River. From that time to 1895, Venezuela upon several occasions had urged the United States as the 'oldest of the republics of the new continent,' and therefore the one called upon 'to lend the others its powerful moral support in disputes with European nations,' to intercede in its behalf. Without exception, the replies from Washington expressed sympathy with Venezuela in her controversy. In some instances assurances were given that if Great Britain were wrongfully seeking to extend the lines of her Guiana colony, such action would be regarded by the United States as an unjustifiable encroachment upon the Western Hemisphere, and therefore a subject coming clearly within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. . . . Mr. Frelinghuysen, in 1882, had offered to propose to Great Britain a submission of the question to the arbitration of a third power, should Venezuela so request. . . . There was a word of caution to Mr. Lowell, the American Minister in London (July 7, 1884), not to commit the United States 'to any determinate political solution' of the question, which at that time indicated clearly the conservative attitude of the government. In this letter Mr. Frelinghuysen stated that 'The moral position of the United States in these matters [alleged foreign encroachments in the Americas] was well known through the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, but formal action in the direction of applying that doctrine to a speculative case affecting Venezuela seemed to be inopportune, and I could not advise Venezuela to arouse a discussion of the point.' Venezuela readily accepted the arbitration proposals of the United States, but not without some show of embarrassment. Should the United States use its good offices in an endeavor to incline Great Britain to submit the matter to the arbitration of a third power, the United States, therefore, as mediator in the case, would likely be debarred from acting in the capacity of umpire; and the United States alone was acceptable as an umpire to Venezuela."—J. B. Henderson, Jr., *American diplomatic questions*, pp. 412-414.—"In 1890 . . . [Blaine] instructed Lincoln to proffer our good offices and to suggest an informal conference of the three countries. Meantime the question had become acute, owing to the discovery of gold in the region in dispute and the probability of actual occupation. Cleveland therefore proposed to handle it with vigor. He referred to it in his message of 1894, expressing his hope for arbitration, and Congress recommended such action to both parties. England refused, as she had in the case of Lincoln's suggestion, to submit the whole question, but she would arbitrate within fixed limits. It was at this point that Secretary Gresham died and Olney took office. It was not, however, as a result of Gresham's death that the

United States policy showed that sudden acceleration which became a nine days' wonder for the whole world; the change had already been determined upon by Cleveland. He believed that, in accordance with the non-colonization pronouncement of Monroe, the boundaries of foreign colonies in America had become fixed, that they were determinable by judicial process, and must be so determined lest in a contest between a strong European nation and a weak American one the line might be pushed back and the area of freedom curtailed. To insist upon such a judicial settlement was, he urged, our duty and privilege. June 20, 1895, Olney sent his dispatch setting forth these views. To the more usual phrases of the Monroe Doctrine he added, 'That distance and three thousand miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between an European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient will hardly be denied.' Not content with thus proclaiming the ultimate extinction of European colonial possessions, he announced with reference to the present, 'Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.' Great Britain, he declared, could not be considered as a Southern American power, if she advanced her frontier, she would be acting contrary to the Monroe Doctrine. In order that we might know that no such extension was taking place, full arbitration was necessary. The President, he said, must be informed of her policy before the next meeting of Congress; 'if he is disappointed in that hope' the result will be 'calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations between this country and Great Britain.' Lord Salisbury in a long dispatch controverted these statements, and refused to admit the intervention of the United States between Great Britain and Venezuela. [Great Britain had consistently refused, since the middle of the century, to submit to arbitration her title to territory within a line run by a surveyor named Schomburgk.] In a special message of December 17, 1895, Cleveland dealt with the matter in a manner similar to that which Polk had made use of in connection with Oregon, but more vigorously. He recommended that we appoint a commission of our own to investigate the facts. If its report should show that Great Britain was extending her territory, nothing would remain but to accept the situation, to recognize its plain requirements, and to deal with it accordingly. War spirit ran high, but it is only fair to President Cleveland to say that he was throughout probably conscious of irresistible weight of the forces making for peace between Great Britain and the United States. He was not bluffing, for he was prepared to meet the call; but he did not expect to be called. Like Polk, he was 'looking England in the eye.' Venezuela prepared her case for the benefit of our commission, and Great Britain brought out a timely parliamentary Blue Book, which answered the same purpose.—C. R. Fish, *American diplomacy*, pp. 392-393.—'The shock that was propagated through the English-speaking world, and far beyond its bounds, by this message of President Cleveland had no parallel since the seizure of Slidell and Mason a generation in the past. Two facts contributed much to the intensity of the disturbance. The existence of anything like a serious difference between the British and the American Government was absolutely unsuspected outside of a very small circle of public men; and the President was believed by both his

friends and his foes to be so resolutely pacific in his attitude that only the most imperious exigency could change it. The message revealed a disagreement so grave as to have moved even Mr. Cleveland to thought and speech of war. Nor was anything reassuring to be found in the action of Congress; for both houses, without opposition, adopted the measure that the President recommended, and with the new year a commission of distinguished Americans appointed by the President began its laborious task of determining the true divisional line between Venezuela and British Guiana.'—W. A. Dunning, *British empire and the United States*, pp. 310-311.—The House refused to wait for any reference of the matter to its Committee on Foreign Relations, but framed and passed at once (December 18) without debate or division, an act authorizing the suggested commission and appropriating \$100,000 for the expenses of its work. In the Senate there were some voices raised against needless and unseemly haste in the treatment of so grave a proposition. However, the Senate was persuaded to refer the House Bill to its Committee on Foreign Relations, but the Committee reported it on the following day (December 20), and it was passed without division.—See also MONROE DOCTRINE: 1870-1895; VENEZUELA: 1895 (July); (December).

1895-1896 (December-January).—Feeling in England and America over Venezuela boundary dispute.—'It is agreed by persons experienced in earthquakes that this species of phenomenon includes distinct varieties, clearly marked off from one another by physical and psychological effects. The most destructive materially and most disturbing mentally is that known in unscientific parlance as the 'twister.' President Cleveland's message had all the effects of the twister. Materially there was a huge displacement of credits and securities in the financial markets. Psychologically there was manifest on both sides of the Atlantic great bewilderment and obfuscation, with strange distortions and incoherencies in the reasoning processes. American public opinion sustained with extraordinary emphasis and unanimity the President's assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, and his belligerent attitude toward the violation of it by Great Britain. Every latent current of hostility to the British and all the springs of aggressive national consciousness united in an impressive flood of popular feeling. If the administration had had no other purpose than to evoke for the information of the world the visible spirit of the American democracy, that purpose was fully achieved in the first week succeeding the Venezuelan message. Then came the distortions and confusion of the twister. It began to appear on calm reflection that, despite the stirring words at the end of Cleveland's message, war with Great Britain was neither declared nor imminent. Whether or not the Monroe Doctrine applied to the boundary dispute, no allegation was made that the treasured doctrine had in fact been violated. Peril to the honor and interests of the United States was hypothetical, not actual; and the warning of dire results to follow a certain contingency was to be effective only after a body of historians and jurists should have discovered a boundary line which in all probability was humanly undiscoverable. With the due realization of these conditions the spirit of militant Americanism receded into the depths and, stronger and more self-confident for having been revealed in its full proportions, awaited a more propitious season for asserting itself. Among the English

people, meanwhile, Cleveland's message and the manifestations of American feeling that followed it were received chiefly with bewilderment and incredulity. That the two governments should have reached in utter secrecy the verge of war, was incomprehensible; that so grave a situation should be due to an obscure boundary dispute in one of the least important fragments of the empire, seemed grotesquely beyond the limits of belief. Some voices from the lurking-places of ancient Toryism were shrill with resentment and defiance toward the new display of Yankee insolence; but the great volume of opinion sounded the note of amazed regret that tension had arisen, and of eager confidence that its causes could be removed. While responsible politicians were appropriately reticent, men of light and leading in other fields pronounced with emphasis and iteration that war between the two great English-speaking nations was unthinkable. Authors, journalists, ministers of the Gospel, and business men demanded that a peaceful way out of the threatening difficulty should be promptly found. The enormous development in means of communication and thence in personal relationships between the two peoples made powerfully for amity. Where in the days of the *Trent* affair intimacies between Englishmen and Americans were numbered by dozens, thousands and myriads existed in 1896. Across the dividing Atlantic, therefore, sped by mail and by cable great streams of protest against rupture in fact or in feeling. Friendly responses from America came promptly in reassuring volume. Influential groups on both sides of the ocean demanded that, no matter how tight and tangled the knot made by diplomacy, it be opened by the methods of peace, not of war. Arbitration for the settlement of disputes between the kindred peoples became within a few weeks the theme of an extremely energetic and wide-spread agitation, guided by co-operating leaders of the intellectual classes of both nations. While this unofficial sentiment was taking active shape, there was much uneasiness lest the diplomatists should not see their way, after so peremptory a disagreement, to a dignified resumption of intercourse about the Venezuelan question. A counter-irritant to oversensitiveness on this ground in the British Foreign Office was found in the acute conditions that arose in a far distant part of the empire less than a fortnight after Cleveland's disturbing message was published. Jameson's ill-starred raid into the Transvaal met its humiliating end on January 2, 1896, and on the following day the German Emperor's congratulatory despatch to the Boer President was made known. The explosion of British wrath over this incident drove Venezuela and its boundary quite out of the range of popular interest. . . . Yet the attitude of the United States, however unimportant relatively, could not be ignored by a prudent foreign minister in the presence of threatening conditions nearer home. For this reason, perhaps, among others, Lord Salisbury met more than half way the advances of the Cleveland administration toward further negotiation. In the middle of January the American commission applied through Secretary Olney for documentary and other information on which Great Britain based its views as to the true divisional line between Guiana and Venezuela. Lord Salisbury furnished with enthusiasm all that his office possessed. At the opening of Parliament in February both he and Mr. Balfour, leader of the Commons, admitted the interest of the United States in the boundary question, and intimated

the hope that diplomacy would achieve a settlement of the difficulty. At the same time his Lordship indicated a much less intolerant attitude than before as to the efficacy of arbitration in international differences. In accordance with the disposition thus manifested, a suggestion from Mr. Olney that negotiations be undertaken at Washington for the settlement of the difficulty with Venezuela was agreed to by the British Government, with a voluntary expression of willingness to take up the matter either with Venezuela or with the United States acting as her friend. So full a concession to the American view could not fail to insure a pacific agreement. The negotiations were begun forthwith between Great Britain and America. The British abandoned their insistence on a fixed line as the irreducible minimum of their territory, and accepted the submission of the whole claim of each power to arbitration, with the proviso that actual occupation or control of any region for fifty years should give title to either party. . . . In its broad character as a diplomatic episode this whole affair stands as an assertion by the United States and a recognition by Great Britain of a far wider interest and authority beyond her borders than was ever before definitely maintained by the American Republic, whether as Monroe Doctrine or otherwise. The giant democracy took her place among the great powers of the earth, whether for weal or for woe, and the British motherland was the first to accord recognition to the new position. More than this, however, gives importance to the Venezuelan boundary controversy in the history of the relations of English-speaking peoples. Here began a systematic and comprehensive agitation for the definitive supplanting of war by arbitration as the last resort in the disputes among nations. The negotiation of the treaty by which the Venezuelan boundary was settled was accompanied by the framing of a general treaty of arbitration applicable for the future to controversies between Great Britain and the United States. The diplomats who in November and December of 1895 sent thrills of warlike feeling through a hundred million English-speaking people, in the spring of 1896 were meticulously intent on devising the formulas that should render war impossible. So far as this situation was a result of the disturbance caused by the presidential message of December 17, it impressively confirmed and justified the unwavering contention of Mr. Cleveland that that document was in purpose and effect a powerful factor in the maintenance of peace."—W. A. Dunning, *British empire and the United States*, pp. 311-318.

1895-1896 (December-February).—Gold reserve in the treasury again imperiled.—Refusal of any measures of relief by the Senate.—In his annual message to Congress, December 2, 1895, President Cleveland described at length the stress of circumstances under which in the previous February, the secretary of the treasury had contracted with certain bankers and financiers to replenish and protect the reserve of gold in the treasury for redemption of United States notes (see above: 1895: January-February), and added: "The performance of this contract not only restored the reserve, but checked for a time the withdrawals of gold and brought on a period of restored confidence and such peace and quiet in business circles as were of the greatest possible value to every interest that affects our people. I have never had the slightest misgiving concerning the wisdom or propriety of this arrangement, and am quite

willing to answer for my full share of responsibility for its promotion. I believe it averted a disaster the imminence of which was, fortunately, not at the time generally understood by our people. Though the contract mentioned stayed for a time the tide of gold withdrawal, its good results could not be permanent. Recent withdrawals have reduced the reserve from \$107,571,230 on the 8th day of July, 1895, to \$79,333,966. How long it will remain large enough to render its increase unnecessary is only matter of conjecture, though quite large withdrawals for shipment in the immediate future are predicted in well-informed quarters. About \$16,000,000 has been withdrawn during the month of November. The foregoing statement of events and conditions develops the fact that after increasing our interest-bearing bonded indebtedness more than \$162,000,000 to save our gold reserve we are nearly where we started, having now in such reserve \$79,333,966 as against \$65,438,377 in February, 1894, when the first bonds were issued. Though the amount of gold drawn from the Treasury appears to be very large as gathered from the facts and figures herein presented, it actually was much larger, considerable sums having been acquired by the Treasury within the several periods stated without the issue of bonds. On the 28th of January, 1895, it was reported by the Secretary of the Treasury that more than \$172,000,000 of gold had been withdrawn for hoarding or shipment during the year preceding. He now reports that from January 1, 1879, to July 14, 1890, a period of more than eleven years, only a little over \$28,000,000 was withdrawn, and that between July 14, 1890, the date of the passage of the law for an increased purchase of silver, and the 1st day of December, 1895, or within less than five and a half years, there was withdrawn nearly \$375,000,000, making a total of more than \$403,000,000 drawn from the Treasury in gold since January 1, 1879, the date fixed in 1875 for the retirement of the United States notes. "Nearly \$327,000,000 of the gold thus withdrawn has been paid out, on these United States notes, and yet every one of the \$346,000,000 is still uncanceled and ready to do service in future gold depletions. More than \$76,000,000 in gold has since their creation in 1890 been paid out from the Treasury upon the notes given on the purchase of silver by the Government, and yet the whole, amounting to \$153,000,000, except a little more than \$16,000,000 which has been retired by exchanges for silver at the request of the holders, remains outstanding and prepared to join their older and more experienced allies in future raids upon the Treasury's gold reserve. In other words, the Government has paid in gold more than nine-tenths of its United States notes and still owes them all. It has paid in gold about one-half of its notes given for silver purchases without extinguishing by such payment one dollar of these notes. . . . I am convinced the only thorough and practicable remedy for our troubles is found in the retirement and cancellation of our United States notes, commonly called greenbacks, and the outstanding Treasury notes issued by the Government in payment of silver purchases under the act of 1890. I believe this could be quite readily accomplished by the exchange of these notes for United States bonds, of small as well as large denominations, bearing a low rate of interest. They should be long-term bonds, thus increasing their desirability as investments, and because their payment could be well postponed to a period far removed from present finan-

cial burdens and perplexities, when with increased prosperity and resources they would be more easily met. . . . In the present stage of our difficulty it is not easy to understand how the amount of our revenue receipts directly affects it. The important question is not the quantity of money received in revenue payments, but the kind of money we maintain and our ability to continue in sound financial condition. We are considering the Government's holdings of gold as related to the soundness of our money and as affecting our national credit and monetary strength. If our gold reserve had never been impaired; if no bonds had ever been issued to replenish it; if there had been no fear and timidity concerning our ability to continue gold payments; if any part of our revenues were now paid in gold, and if we could look to our gold receipts as a means of maintaining a safe reserve, the amount of our revenues would be an influential factor in the problem. But unfortunately all the circumstances that might lend weight to this consideration are entirely lacking. In our present predicament no gold is received by the Government in payment of revenue charges, nor would there be if the revenues were increased. The receipts of the Treasury, when not in silver certificates, consist of United States notes and Treasury notes issued for silver purchases. These forms of money are only useful to the Government in paying its current ordinary expenses, and its quantity in Government possession does not in the least contribute toward giving us that kind of safe financial standing or condition which is built on gold alone. If it is said that these notes if held by the Government can be used to obtain gold for our reserve, the answer is easy. The people draw gold from the Treasury on demand upon United States notes and Treasury notes, but the proposition that the Treasury can on demand draw gold from the people upon them would be regarded in these days with wonder and amusement; and even if this could be done there is nothing to prevent those thus parting with their gold from regaining it the next day or the next hour by the presentation of the notes they received in exchange for it. The secretary of the treasury might use such notes taken from a surplus revenue to buy gold in the market. Of course he could not do this without paying a premium. Private holders of gold, unlike the Government, having no parity to maintain, would not be restrained from making the best bargain possible when they furnished gold to the Treasury; but the moment the Secretary of the Treasury bought gold on any terms above par he would establish a general and universal premium upon it, thus breaking down the parity between gold and silver, which the Government is pledged to maintain, and opening the way to new and serious complications. In the meantime the premium would not remain stationary, and the absurd spectacle might be presented of a dealer selling gold to the Government and with United States notes or Treasury notes in his hand immediately clamoring for its return and a resale at a higher premium. It may be claimed that a large revenue and redundant receipts might favorably affect the situation under discussion by affording an opportunity of retaining these notes in the Treasury when received, and thus preventing their presentation for gold. Such retention to be useful ought to be at least measurably permanent; and this is precisely what is prohibited, so far as United States notes are concerned, by the law of 1878, forbidding their further retirement. That statute in so many words

provides, that these notes when received into the Treasury and belonging to the United States shall be 'paid out again and kept in circulation.'—*United States, message and documents* (Abridgment), 1895-1896, p. 27.—"The difficulty which had been anticipated in keeping gold in the treasury became acute as a result of the president's Venezuelan message of December 17. [See above: 1895 (December); 1895-1896 (December-January).] The 'war scare' which was caused by that document was attended by a panic on the London Exchange, which communicated itself to the Continental exchanges and produced at once serious consequences in New York. Prices fell heavily, some failures were reported, and the withdrawal of gold from the treasury assumed great proportions. On the 20th the reserve had gone down to \$69,650,000, ten millions less than three weeks earlier, with future large reductions obviously near at hand. The president accordingly on that day sent to Congress a special message, stating the situation, alluding to the effect of his recently announced foreign policy, and declaring that the result conveyed a 'warning that even the patriotic sentiment of our people is not an adequate substitute for a sound financial policy.' He asked Congress to postpone its holiday recess until something had been done to reassure the apprehensive among the people, but declared that in any case he should use every means in the power of the executive to maintain the country's credit. The suggestion was acted upon. . . . On December 26 two bills were introduced in the House of Representatives by Chairman Dingley of the ways and means committee. Adopting the view maintained by the Republicans, that the chief cause of the difficulty in maintaining the gold reserve was the deficiency in the revenue, he proposed first a bill 'to temporarily increase the revenues.' This provided that until August 1, 1898, the customs duties on most varieties of wool and woolen goods and on lumber, should stand at 60 per cent of those imposed by the McKinley Act of 1890, and that the duties in all the other schedules of the tariff, except sugar, should, with slight exceptions, be increased by 15 per cent over those of the existing law. This bill passed the House on the 27th by a party vote of 205 to 81. On the following day the second bill 'to maintain and protect the coin redemption fund,' was passed by 170 to 136,—47 Republicans in the minority. This bill authorized the secretary of the treasury to procure coin for redeeming legal-tenders by the sale of three-per-cent five-year bonds, and to provide for temporary deficiencies by the issue of three-year three-per-cent certificates of indebtedness in small denominations. The administration was as little satisfied with this bill as with that changing the tariff, and proceeded with the bond issue. . . . The failure of the bills in the Senate was foreseen, but the precise form in which it was manifested excited some surprise. On February 1, [1896], the bond bill was transformed by the adoption of a substitute providing for the free coinage of silver, and this was passed by a vote of 42 to 35. On the 14th the House refused, by 215 to 90, to concur in the Senate's amendment, and the whole subject was dropped. Meanwhile the Senate finance committee had reported a free-coinage substitute for the House tariff bill also. But after this further exhibition of their strength the silver senators refused to go further, and on February 25 joined with the Democrats in rejecting, by 33 to 22, a vote to take up the bill for consideration. This vote was recognized as finally disposing of

the measure."—*Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1896.—President Cleveland, in writing of the bond sales nearly ten years later, said: "The sales of United States bonds in the years 1894, 1895, and 1896 for the purpose of replenishing the stock of gold in the public Treasury have been greatly misunderstood by many honest people, and often deliberately misrepresented. . . . Without shame and without repentance, I confess my share of the guilt; and I refuse to shield my accomplices in this crime who, with me, held high places in that administration. And though Mr. Morgan and Mr. Belmont and scores of other bankers and financiers who were accessories in these transactions may be steeped in destructive propensities, and may be constantly busy in sinful schemes, I shall always recall with satisfaction and self-congratulation my association with them at a time when our country solely needed their aid."—Grover Cleveland, *Presidential problems*, pp. 121, 170.

1895-1896 (December-December).—Plans for coast defense.—In his annual report to the president, 1895, the secretary of war wrote as follows of pending plans for coast defense, and of the progress of work upon them: "In your annual message transmitted to Congress in December, 1886, attention was directed to the urgent necessity for seacoast defense in these words: 'The defenseless condition of our sea-coast and lake frontier is perfectly palpable; the examinations made must convince us all that certain of our cities should be fortified and that work on the most important of these fortifications should be commenced at once.' . . . Since that time the condition of these defenses has been under grave consideration by the people and by this Department. Its inadequacy and impotency have been so evident that the intelligence of the country long since ceased to discuss that humiliating phase of the subject, but has addressed itself to the more practical undertaking of urging more rapid progress in the execution of the plan of defense devised by the Endicott Board in 1886, with subsequent slight modifications. That plan contemplated a system of fortifications at 27 ports (to which Puget Sound was subsequently added), requiring 677 guns and 824 mortars of modern construction, at a cost of \$97,782,800, excluding \$28,595,000 for floating batteries. By an immediate appropriation at that time of \$21,500,000 and an annual appropriation of \$9,000,00 thereafter, as then recommended, the system of land defenses could have been completed in 1895. The original plan contemplated an expenditure of \$97,782,800 by the end of the present year. The actual expenditures and appropriations for armament and emplacements have, however, been but \$10,631,000. The first appropriation for guns was made only seven years ago and the first appropriation for emplacements was made only five years ago. The average annual appropriations for these two objects has been less than \$1,500,000. The work has therefore been conducted at about one-seventh the rate proposed. If future appropriations for the manufacture of guns, mortars, and carriages be no larger than the average authorized for the purpose since 1888, it will require twenty-two years more to supply the armament of the eighteen important ports for which complete projects are approved. If the appropriations for the engineer work are to continue at the rate of the annual appropriations since 1890, it will require seventy years to complete the emplacements and platforms for this armament for the ports referred to."—*Report of the Secretary of War*, 1895,

p. 19 (54th Congress, 1st session, House Documents, v. 1).—In his message of the following year (1896), the subject was touched upon by the president, as follows: "During the past year rapid progress has been made toward the completion of the scheme adopted for the erection and armament of fortifications along our seacoast, while equal progress has been made in providing the material for submarine defense in connection with these works. . . . We shall soon have complete about one-fifth of the comprehensive system, the first step in which was noted in my message to the Congress of December 4, 1893. When it is understood that a masonry emplacement not only furnishes a platform for the heavy modern high-power gun, but also in every particular serves the purpose and takes the place of the fort of former days, the importance of the work accomplished is better comprehended. In the hope that the work will be prosecuted with no less vigor in the future, the Secretary of War has submitted an estimate by which, if allowed, there will be provided and either built or building by the end of the next fiscal year such additional guns, mortars, gun carriages, and emplacements, as will represent not far from one-third of the total work to be done under the plan adopted for our coast defenses—thus affording a prospect that the entire work will be substantially completed within six years. In less time than that, however, we shall have attained a marked degree of security. The experience and results of the past year demonstrate that with a continuation of recent careful methods the cost of the remaining work will be much less than the original estimate. We should always keep in mind that of all forms of military preparation coast defense alone is essentially pacific in its nature."—*Message of the President, 1896 (54th Congress, 2nd session, House Documents, v. 1)*.

1895-1898.—Insurrection renewed in Cuba.—General Weyler made governor.—Concentration order.—Attitude of United States toward Spain. See CUBA: 1895-1898.

1896.—Order relative to army flags issued. See FLAGS: United States.

1896.—Party platforms and nominations.—Republican.—Marcus Alonzo Hanna, the Ohio merchant and politician who was leading the Republican party at this juncture, saw in 1895 strong evidence that the election would be very close. Some time in August or September of that year, he reported to Governor McKinley, of Ohio, in the presence of H. H. Kohlsaat, of Chicago, that he "could obtain the votes of New York and Pennsylvania on condition that McKinley would promise to appoint 'Tom Platt Secretary of the Treasury, and they want it in writing. Platt says he has had an experience with one President (Harrison) born in Ohio, and he wants no more verbal promises.' McKinley . . . paced the little room for a few minutes; finally . . . he said: 'There are some things in this world that come too high. If I cannot be President without promising to make Tom Platt Secretary of the Treasury, I will never be President.' . . . [In June, 1896, Kohlsaat] spent hours with McKinley, urging him to declare definitely for gold. . . . He said Whitelaw Reid, editor of the *New York Tribune*, had been to see him a few days before, on his return from Arizona to New York, and strongly advised against it. Reid said: 'If a gold plank is adopted we will not carry a State west of the Mississippi River.'"—H. H. Kohlsaat, *From McKinley to Harding*, p. 30.—The Republican national conven-

tion was held at St. Louis from the sixteenth to the eighteenth of June. By that time it was generally understood that W. H. McKinley was the chosen candidate. There was therefore no difficulty looked for on this point, but the party platform was a troublesome one to build. "The Committee on Resolutions found it difficult to reach an agreement as to the financial declaration to be made. Senator Teller, who was a member of that Committee, held out for a free silver plank, and his colleagues were slow to antagonise him. Mr. Hanna let them discuss the question for nearly two days, during which time the business of the Convention was at a standstill. . . . The wildest stories were circulated regarding the coming action of the Platform Committee. This delay and the resulting rumours seriously alarmed the advocates of gold. They feared lest in the end some sort of compromise might be made. Finally, several of the most influential of their number . . . went to Mr. Hanna's rooms . . . and . . . demanded that he accept a gold-standard plank for the platform, or else they would carry the fight to the floor of the Convention and thus precipitate an open conflict between themselves and the supporters of Mr. McKinley. They gave Mr. Hanna just one hour in which to accede to their demand. . . . They had quite unconsciously played his game, and victory was now assured. . . . On June 18th the platform was read to the Convention by Senator Foraker. It described the Cleveland administration as responsible for 'a record of unparalleled incapacity, dishonour, and disaster.' [In administrative management, the platform went on, 'it has ruthlessly sacrificed indispensable revenue, entailed an unceasing deficit, eked out ordinary current expenses with borrowed money, piled up the public debt by \$262,000,000 in time of peace, forced an adverse balance of trade, kept a perpetual menace hanging over the redemption fund, pawned American credit to alien syndicates, and reversed all the measures and results of successful Republican rule. In the broad effect of its policy it has precipitated panic, blighted industry and trade with prolonged depression, closed factories, reduced work and wages, halted enterprise, and crippled American production while stimulating foreign production for the American market.' . . .] It renewed Republican allegiance to 'the policy of protection as the bulwark of American industrial independence and the foundation of American development and prosperity.' [He stated that 'this true American policy taxes foreign products and encourages home industry; it puts the burden of revenue on foreign goods; it secures the American market for the American producer; it upholds the American standard of wages for the American workingman; it puts the factory by the side of the farm, and makes the American farmer less dependent on foreign demand and price; it diffuses general thrift, and founds the strength of all on the strength of each. In its reasonable application it is just, fair, and impartial; equally opposed to foreign control and domestic monopoly, to sectional discrimination, and individual favoritism.' It went on:] 'Protection and reciprocity are twin measures of Republican policy and go hand in hand. Democratic rule has recklessly struck down both, and both must be re-established.' It declared for a 'firm, vigorous and dignified' foreign policy; for American control of the Hawaiian Islands; for the purchase of the Danish West Indies; and for the construction, operation and ownership of the Nicaraguan canal by the United States. The Monroe Doctrine was reaffirmed, and American intervention in Cuba

was mentioned with approval. 'We favour the continued enlargement of the navy, and a complete system of harbour and sea-coast defences.' Amid breathless silence, the part of the platform relating to the money question was read out. 'The Republican Party is unreservedly for sound money. . . . We are unalterably opposed to every measure calculated to debase our currency or impair the credit of our country. We are therefore opposed to the free coinage of silver, except by international agreement with the leading commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to promote; and until such agreement can be obtained, the existing gold standard must be preserved. All our silver and paper money must be maintained at parity with gold; and we favour all measures designed to maintain inviolably the obligations of the United States, and all our money, whether coin or paper, at the present standard, the standard of the most enlightened nations of the earth.' No sooner had the platform been reported to the Convention, than Senator Teller of Colorado rose and offered a substitute for its gold-standard declaration. Mr. Teller's substitute was one which he had tried in vain to induce the Committee to adopt. It declared that 'the Republican Party favours the use of both gold and silver as equal standard money'; and it pledged the party to secure 'the free, unrestricted and independent coinage of gold and silver' in the mints of the United States 'at a ratio of 16 parts of silver to 1 of gold.' This embodied the extreme demand of the free-silvermen and it was certain to be rejected. Many delegates might have favoured the device of a 'straddle,' as a measure of expediency; but Senator Teller had forced the monetary issue in a way which admitted of no compromise. In support of his substitute he spoke with intense feeling, his voice often faltering, and tears of unaffected emotion in his eyes. For him it was a solemn moment. He had been a Republican all his life, and to part with his old associates was unspeakably bitter. . . . The Convention respected Mr. Teller's emotion and listened to his address in sympathetic silence. But when the roll was called, his substitute was rejected by a vote of 818 to 105, and the platform as reported from the Committee was adopted by a vote of 812 to 110. Those delegates who were in full accord with Mr. Teller then rose and left the convention hall. They were only thirty-four in number, yet among them were four Senators of the United States and two members of the House of Representatives. The Convention then proceeded to the nomination of a candidate for the president."—H. T. Peck, *Twenty years of the republic*, pp. 485-489.—W. H. McKinley was nominated on the first ballot by 166½ votes against 240½ divided among several opposing candidates, and the nomination was then made unanimous. For vice president, Garret H. Hobart, of New Jersey, was nominated, also by the first voting.

ALSO IN: S. J. Buck, *Agrarian crusade (Chronicles of America Series, v. 45, p. 174)*.

1896.—Party platforms and nominations.—**Democratic.**—"If the Republican party was split by the silver question, the Democratic party was shattered by it. But there was no doubt where the party stood: it was for free silver. This was made perfectly plain by the action of the thirty-three State conventions which passed resolutions approving the free coinage of gold and silver at a ratio of sixteen to one, while only ten States declared for the gold standard. When the Democratic convention assembled in Chicago in July, it was dominated completely by the silver wing

of the party. The majority, however, had to face the determined opposition of a powerful minority led by such masterful politicians as Gorman and Whitney and Hill. Moreover, the silver delegates were not well organized and they had no visible leader."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 665.—"The convention of one State alone (Florida) had ignored the money issue altogether. It was so plain that the approaching National Convention of the Democratic Party would be controlled by the free-silver men, that many conservative Democrats or 'Cleveland Democrats,' as they were called, were at first inclined to take no part in the Convention's counsels, but to break openly with their party in advance of its assemblage. From this course, however, they were dissuaded by President Cleveland himself, who, on June 16th, caused a letter to be published which may be considered his last official utterance as the head of the Democratic party. [The Democratic national convention was held in Chicago, June 7-11. The delegates who came to it from the Southern states, and from most of the states west of Ohio, were arrayed with a close approach to solid ranks for free silver; while those from New England and the Middle states opposed them in a phalanx almost equally firm. The "Gold Democrats" or "Sound Money Democrats," as the latter were called, ably led by ex-Governor Hill, of New York, fought hard to the end, but without avail.] As soon as the delegates began to arrive, it was plain that only a miracle of management could stem the tide that had set in for free silver. . . . How completely the great majority of the delegates had cast away their old allegiances was made evident when the convention first assembled on July 7th. . . . On the morning of July 8th, it was plain that the silver faction meant to use its power to the full. By a sweeping majority, the representation of each Territory was augmented from two members to six. The delegation from Nebraska, which was pledged to support the gold standard, was unseated, and a contesting delegation of silver men, with Mr. William J. Bryan at its head, was admitted to the Convention. Four gold delegates from Michigan were rejected, and four silver delegates were substituted in their place, thus giving to the silver faction, under the unit rule, the solid vote of Michigan. Having effected these changes, all of which greatly increased the strength of the majority, Senator S. M. White of California was made permanent President of the Convention. On July 9th, the Committee on Resolutions reported a platform devoted almost wholly to the money question, which was declared to be 'paramount to all others at this time.' The platform, after denouncing the demonetisation of silver as being the cause of the prevalent financial distress, went on to say: ['We declare that the act of 1873 demonetizing silver without the knowledge or approval of the American people has resulted in the appreciation of gold and a corresponding fall in the prices of commodities produced by the people; a heavy increase in the burden of taxation and of all debts, public and private; the enrichment of the money-lending class at home and abroad; prostration of industry and impoverishment of the people. We are unalterably opposed to gold monometallism, which has locked fast the prosperity of an industrial people in the paralysis of hard times. Gold monometallism is a British policy, and its adoption has brought other nations into financial servitude to London. It is not only un-American but anti-American, and it can be fastened on the United States only by the stifling

of that spirit and love of liberty which proclaimed our political independence in 1776 and won it in the war of the Revolution. We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver at the present legal ratio of sixteen to one, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation. We demand that the standard silver dollar shall be a full legal tender, equally with gold, for all debts, public and private, and we favor such legislation as will prevent for the future the demonetization of any kind of legal-tender money by private contract.] . . . The resolutions were made to condemn 'the issuing of interest-bearing bonds of the United States in time of peace and . . . the trafficking with banking syndicates'; and to denounce 'arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in local affairs,' and especially 'government by injunction,' which was described as 'a



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new and highly dangerous form of oppression, by which Federal judges become at once legislators, judges and executioners.' Life tenure in the public service' was also disapproved in favour of appointments for fixed terms of office. The Monroe Doctrine was reaffirmed; sympathy was expressed for the people of Cuba in their struggle for independence; and an enlargement of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission was demanded, together with such 'control of railroads as will protect the people from robbery and oppression.' It will be noted that, contrary to all usage, the platform as reported by the majority contained no word of approbation for President Cleveland. More than that, it condemned every important policy with which he had been identified. It was, indeed, precisely what those who wrote it meant that it should be—a repudiation of him and of his administration. A minority of the committee, however, presented a protest to the Convention signed by sixteen members representing sixteen different States. These gentlemen pronounced some of the declarations in the platform, as reported by the majority of the Committee, to be 'wholly unnecessary.' Others were called 'ill-considered and ambiguously

phrased,' while still others were 'extreme and revolutionary.' The minority, therefore, offered in place of the free silver declaration, a substitute to the effect that any attempt on the part of the United States alone to establish free silver coinage would both imperil the national finances and retard or prevent the success of international bimetalism. 'It would place this country at once upon a silver basis, impair contracts, disturb business, diminish the purchasing power of the wages of labour, and inflict irreparable evil upon our nation's commerce and industry' Finally, the minority offered the following resolution as an amendment to the majority's report: 'We commend the honesty, economy, courage and fidelity of the present Democratic national administration.' . . . [In the course of the debate upon the silver question, a speech of impassioned eloquence was made by William J. Bryan, of Nebraska, who had represented his district in Congress for two terms, 1891-4, and who was rising to prominence among the leaders of the free-silver Democracy of the west.] The scene enacted in the Convention, as Mr. Bryan finished speaking, was indescribable. Throughout the latter part of his address, a crash of applause had followed every sentence; but now the tumult was like that of a great sea thundering against the dykes. Twenty thousand men and women went mad with an irresistible enthusiasm. This orator had met their mood to the very full. He had found magic words for the feeling which they had been unable to express. And so he had played at will upon their very heart-strings, until the full tide of their emotion was let loose in one tempestuous roar of passion, which seemed to have no end. When the order was partially restored, the substitute resolutions offered by Senator Hill were rejected with cries of derision, as were two other amendments afterwards proposed by him; and then the free-silver platform was adopted by a vote of 628 to 301. Having taken this action, the delegates, exhausted by the day's exciting scenes, adjourned until the following afternoon. Over night, the question of the candidate to be nominated was earnestly discussed. It was evident that Mr. Bryan had suddenly leaped into a prominence which made him a formidable competitor for the highest honours. . . . When the roll was called for the fifth time, Mr. Bryan lacked only 12 votes of a nomination, and at once 78 delegates changed their votes from other candidates to him, thereby making him the choice of the Convention. Subsequently, Mr. Arthur Sewall, a wealthy ship-builder of Maine, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency."—H. T. Peck, *Twenty years of the republic*, pp. 491, 494-496, 502-503.

ALSO IN: S. J. Buck, *Agrarian crusade (Chronicles of America Series, v. 45, pp. 175-176)*.—*Life and speeches of William J. Bryan*, ed. by Ogilvie.—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, v. 8.

1896.—Party platforms and nominations.—National Silver party.—The considerable body of Republicans who desired an unlimited free coinage of silver, and were prepared to quit their party on that issue, had made efforts to persuade the Democratic convention at Chicago to accept their leader, Senator Teller, of Colorado, for its presidential candidate. Failing in that, they assembled a convention of delegates at St. Louis, July 22-24, and, under the name of the "National Silver Party," took the alternative method of uniting the free-silver Republican vote with that of the free-silver Democracy, by accepting the Democratic

nominations as their own. William J. Bryan and Arthur Sewall were duly nominated for president and vice president, and a "platform" set forth: "First. The paramount issue at this time in the United States is indisputably the money question. It is between the gold standard, gold bonds, and bank currency on the one side and the bimetallic standard, no bonds, and Government currency on the other. On this issue we declare ourselves to be in favor of a distinctively American financial system. We are unalterably opposed to the single gold standard, and demand the immediate return to the constitutional standard of gold and silver by the restoration by this Government, independently of any foreign power, of the unrestricted coinage of both gold and silver into standard money at the ratio of sixteen to one, and upon terms of exact equality, as they existed prior to 1873; the silver coin to be a full legal tender equally with gold for all debts and dues, private and public, and we favor such legislation as will prevent for the future the demonetization of any kind of legal-tender money by private contract. [It held that all currency should be issued and controlled by the general government only, "and should be legal tender." It opposed the issue of "interest-bearing bonds in time of peace," denounced the policy of borrowing gold, and demanded payment of all coin obligations of the United States "in either gold or silver coin, at the option of the government." It stated that] "it stands confessed that the gold standard can only be upheld by so depleting our paper currency as to force the prices of our product below the European and even below the Asiatic level to enable us to sell in foreign markets, thus aggravating the very evils our people so bitterly complain of, degrading American labor, and striking at the foundations of our civilization itself. The advocates of the gold standard persistently claim that the cause of our distress is over-production. . . . We affirm it to be unquestioned that there can be no such economic paradox as over-production, and at the same time tens of thousands of our fellow-citizens remaining half-clothed and half-fed, and who are piteously clamoring for the common necessities of life. Second. That over and above all other questions of policy we are in favor of restoring to the people of the United States the time-honored money of the Constitution—gold and silver, not one, but both—the money of Washington and Hamilton and Jefferson and Monroe and Jackson and Lincoln, to the end that the American people may receive honest pay for an honest product; that the American debtor may pay his just obligations in an honest standard, and not in a standard that has depreciated 100 per cent. above all the great staples of our country, and to the end further that the standard countries may be deprived of the unjust advantage they now enjoy in the difference in exchange between gold and silver—an advantage which tariff legislation alone cannot overcome."

1896.—Party platforms and nominations.—People's or Populist party platform and nominations.—The People's party, more commonly called the Populist party, held its national convention at St. Louis on July 22-25, simultaneously with that of the National Silver party, and with strong influences urging it to act on the same line. One section of the party strove to bring about a complete endorsement of the Democratic nominations made at Chicago. Another section, styled the "Middle-of-the-Road" Populists, opposed any coalition with other parties; while a third wished to nominate Bryan, with a Populist

candidate for vice president, looking to an arrangement with the Democratic organization for a fusion of electoral tickets in various states. The idea of the latter prevailed, and William J. Bryan was nominated for president, with Thomas E. Watson, of Georgia, for vice president. The People's party had little disagreement with the Chicago declarations of the Democratic party, and none at all on financial questions, concerning which its doctrines were set forth as follows: "The influence of European money-changers has been more potent in shaping legislation than the voice of the American people. Executive power and patronage have been used to corrupt our legislatures and defeat the will of the people, and plutocracy has been enthroned upon the ruins of democracy. To restore the government intended by the fathers, and for the welfare and prosperity of this and future generations, we demand the establishment of an economic and financial system which shall make us masters of our own affairs and independent of European control, by the adoption of the following declaration of principles: We demand a National money, safe and sound, issued by the general government only, without the intervention of banks of issue, to be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private, and a just, equitable, and efficient means of distribution direct to the people and through the lawful disbursements of the Government. We demand the free and unrestricted coinage of silver and gold at the present legal ratio of sixteen to one, without waiting for the consent of foreign nations. We demand that the volume of circulating medium be speedily increased to an amount sufficient to meet the demands of the business population of this country and to restore the just level of prices of labor and production. We denounce the sale of bonds and the increase of the public interest-bearing bond debt made by the present administration as unnecessary and without authority of law, and we demand that no more bonds be issued except by specific act of Congress. We demand such legislation as will prevent the demonetization of the lawful money of the United States by private contract. We demand that the Government, in payment of its obligations, shall use its option as to the kind of lawful money in which they are to be paid. . . . We demand a graduated income tax, to the end that aggregated wealth shall bear its just proportion of taxation, and we denounce the recent decision of the Supreme Court relative to the income-tax law as a misinterpretation of the Constitution and an evasion of the rightful powers of Congress over the subject of taxation. We demand that postal savings banks be established by the Government for the safe deposit of the savings of the people and to facilitate exchange. Transportation being a means of exchange and a public necessity, the Government should own and operate the railroads in the interest of the people and on non-partisan basis. . . . The telegraph, like the post-office system, being a necessity for the transmission of news, should be owned and operated by the Government in the interest of the people. . . . All land now held by railroads and other corporations in excess of their actual needs should by lawful means be reclaimed by the Government and held for actual settlers only, and private land monopoly, as well as alien ownership, should be prohibited. . . . We demand that bona fide settlers on all public lands be granted free homes, as provided in the National homestead law, and that no exception be made in the case of Indian reservations when opened for settlement, and that all lands not now patented

come under this demand. We favor a system of direct legislation through the initiative and referendum under proper constitutional safeguards. We demand the election of President, Vice President, and United States Senators by a direct vote of the people."

1896.—Party platforms and nominations.—National Democratic platform and nominations.—An extensive revolt in the Democratic party against the declarations and the action of the party convention at Chicago had been quickly made manifest, and steps were soon taken towards giving it an organized form. These led to the assembling of a convention of delegates at Indianapolis, on September 2-3, which, in the name of the "National Democratic Party," repudiated the platform and the candidates put forward at Chicago, and branded them as false to the historic party name which they assumed. General John M. Palmer, of Illinois was put in nomination for president, and General Simon Bolivar Buckner, of Kentucky, for vice president, of the United States, and a declaration of Democratic principles adopted, the fundamental passages of which are quoted in the following: "The democratic party is pledged to equal and exact justice to all men of every creed and condition; to the largest freedom of the individual consistent with good government; to the preservation of the federal government in its constitutional vigor, and to the support of the states in all their just rights; to economy in the public expenditures; to the maintenance of the public faith and sound money; and it is opposed to paternalism and all class legislation. The declarations of the Chicago convention attack individual freedom, the right of private contract, the independence of the judiciary, and the authority of the president to enforce federal laws. They advocate a reckless attempt to increase the price of silver by legislation, to the debasement of our monetary standard; and threaten unlimited issues of paper money by the government. They abandon for republican allies the democratic cause of tariff reform, to court favor of protectionists to their fiscal heresy. In view of these and other grave departures from democratic principles, we cannot support the candidates of that convention, nor be bound by its acts. The democratic party has survived defeats, but could not survive a victory won in behalf of the doctrine and policy proclaimed in its name at Chicago. The conditions, however, which made possible such utterances from a national convention, are the direct result of class legislation by the republican party. . . . The demand of the republican party for an increase in tariff taxation has its pretext in the deficiency of the revenue, which has its causes in the stagnation of trade and reduced consumption, due entirely to the loss of confidence that has followed the populist threat of free coinage and depreciation of our money, and the republican practice of extravagant appropriations beyond the needs of good government. . . . The Democratic party, in the interests of the masses and of equal justice to all, practically established by the legislation of 1834 and 1853 the gold standard of monetary measurement, and likewise entirely divorced the government from banking and currency issues. To this long-established democratic policy we adhere, and insist upon the maintenance of the gold standard, and of the parity therewith of every dollar issued by the government, and are firmly opposed to the free and unlimited coinage of silver and to the compulsory purchase of silver bullion. But we denounce also the fur-

ther maintenance of the present costly patchwork system of national paper currency as a constant source of injury and peril. We assert the necessity of such intelligent currency reform as will confine the government to its legitimate functions, completely separated from the banking business, and afford to all sections of our country uniform, safe, and elastic bank currency under governmental supervision, measured in volume by the needs of business. The fidelity, patriotism, and courage with which President Cleveland has fulfilled his great public trust, the high character of his administration, its wisdom and energy in the maintenance of civil order and the enforcement of the laws, its equal regard for the rights of every class and every section, its firm and dignified conduct of foreign affairs, and its sturdy persistence in upholding the credit and honor of the nation are fully recognized by the democratic party, and will secure to him a place in history beside the fathers of the republic. We also commend the administration for the great progress made in the reform of the public service, and we indorse its effort to extend the merit system still further."

1896.—Party platforms and nominations.—Prohibition platform and nominations.—The Prohibition party had been the first to open the presidential campaign with candidates placed in the field. Its national convention was held at Pittsburgh, on May 27 and 28, and its nominees for president and vice president were Joshua Levering, of Maryland, and Hale Johnson, of Illinois. But a split in the convention occurred on attempts made to graft free-silver and kindred doctrines on the one-issue platform which the majority of the party desired. Except in a single particular, the latter prevailed.

1896.—Party platforms and nominations.—Socialist-Labor party nominations.—Still another party which placed candidates for the presidency and vice presidency in nomination was the Socialist-Labor organization, which held a convention in New York, July 4-10, and named for the two high offices, Charles H. Matchett, of New York, and Mathew Maguire, of New Jersey. Its platform embodied the essential doctrines of socialism, as commonly understood.—See also SOCIALISM: 1874-1901.

1896.—Party platforms and nominations.—Canvass and elections.—"The campaign was probably the most exciting in the history of the country; there were street parades almost daily, and at noon and night the busy corners of the downtown streets were filled by crowds listening to free-silver orators standing on soap boxes. All outward appearances indicated that silver would win, and good political judges predicted Illinois would give 100,000 majority for Bryan, but second sober thought prevailed."—H. H. Kohlsaar, *From McKinley to Harding*, p. 50.—"Mr. McKinley's managers perceived with genuine alarm that the contest was to be one of the fiercest ever fought in American political history. . . . The Democratic nominations were no sooner made than the whole country perceived the supreme issue of the campaign to be the silver question. Even Mr. McKinley ceased to discourse upon the tariff, and addressed his visiting delegations on the subject of the currency. The Republicans took up the cry of 'sound money,' and made that the party slogan. . . . The excitement which marked this whole extraordinary contest increased in its intensity until the very end. An imposing demonstration in New York City signalled the close of the campaign

on the Saturday before election day. More than 150,000 voters marched up Broadway, under a forest of flags and vivid decorations which covered nearly every building on the famous thoroughfare. . . . The demonstrations had no great political significance, for New York was known to be safely Republican; yet the outpouring was one of the most picturesque as well as one of the most impressive incidents in a contest that was full of life and colour. The election was unexpectedly decisive. Before midnight on November 3d, it was known that Mr. Bryan had been defeated and that he would receive in the Electoral College only 176 votes to 271 for Mr. McKinley. . . . But the solid opposition of the East, the Northwest and the Middle West had overcome his loyal following in the more thinly settled mining and agricultural States. Yet Mr. Bryan had given the Republican party a shock of extreme severity."

—H. T. Peck, *Twenty years of the republic, 1885-1905*, pp. 504-505, 514-515.—With all the excitement of anxiety and the heated conflict of beliefs there was little violence of any kind, from first to last. The critical election day (November 3) passed with no serious incidents of disorder. The verdict of the people, pronounced for the preservation of the monetary standard which the world at large has established in general use, was accepted with the equanimity to which self-governing citizens are trained. Nearly fourteen millions of votes were cast, of which the Republican presidential electors received 7,104,244; electors representing the various parties which had nominated Bryan received, in all, 6,506,835; those on the National Democratic ticket received 132,652; those on the Prohibition ticket, 144,606; those on the Socialist-Labor ticket, 36,416. In the Electoral College, there were 271 votes for McKinley, and 176 for Bryan. The states giving their electoral votes for McKinley were California (excepting 1 vote, cast for Bryan), Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky (except 1), Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin. The states which chose electors for Bryan were Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, besides the single votes won in California and Kentucky. For vice president, Hobart received 271 electoral votes—the same as McKinley; but Sewall received 27 less than Bryan, that number being cast for the Populist candidate, Watson. This was consequent on fusion arrangements between Democrats and Populists in 28 states. In some states, the majority given against silver free coinage was overwhelming, as for example, in New York, 268,000 plurality for McKinley, besides 19,000 votes cast for the "Gold Democratic" candidate; New Jersey, 87,000 Republican plurality and 6,000 votes for General Palmer; Pennsylvania 295,000 and 11,000; Massachusetts, 173,000 and 11,000. On the other hand, Texas gave Bryan a plurality of 202,000, and Colorado 135,000.

Also in: F. Leupp, *National miniatures*, p. 117.—H. Croly, *Marcus A. Hanna*.—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War (United States, v. 3, ch. 16)*.—W. J. Bryan, *First battle*.—J. P. Altgeld, *Live questions*.—C. A. Beard, *Contemporary American history*, pp. 164-191.

1896 (January).—Admission of Utah into the Union. See UTAH: 1895-1896.

1896 (January-February).—Appointment of commission to investigate the Venezuela boundary.—Re-opening of discussion with Great Britain on arbitration of the dispute. See VENEZUELA: 1896-1899.

1896 (February).—New treaty with Great Britain regulating pelagic sealing in Bering sea. See BERING SEA QUESTION.

1896 (March).—Removal of Confederate disabilities.—In 1896, practically the last of the Confederate disabilities was removed. On March 31, the president approved an act of Congress which may properly be called "An Act of Oblivion," which reads as follows: "That section twelve hundred and eighteen of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended by chapter forty-six of the laws of 1884, which section is as follows: 'No person who held a commission in the Army or Navy of the United States at the beginning of the late rebellion, and afterwards served in any capacity in the military, naval, or civil service of the so-called Confederate States, or of either of the States in insurrection during the late rebellion, shall be appointed to any position in the Army or Navy of the United States,' be, and the same is hereby, repealed."—*United States Statutes at Large*, v. 29, p. 84.

1896 (May).—Extension of civil service rules by President Cleveland. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1893-1896.

1896 (June-November).—Presidential election.—Silver question at issue.—"During the last year of his administration . . . [President Cleveland] seemed to live under a cloud of obloquy, blacker and more nearly unrelieved than that of which any other elected President had ever known. The Republicans were never weary of pointing out what they described as the disastrous failure of his policies. A majority of his own party believed him not only to have wrecked it, but to have betrayed it. The free-silver man held him responsible for the financial depression. The capitalists called him rash and utterly unsafe because of his Venezuela message. The labour element detested him for breaking the great Chicago strike by the use of troops. Only here and there was a voice raised in his defence, and the defence was nearly always worded like a half apology, ascribing to him only what was called 'success in defeat.' . . . He encountered such malignity of hatred as would have terrified and sickened a weaker soul than his. There are signs that within his heart even he often winced at the cruel falsehoods which assailed him. Yet none the less, he stood unmoved and magnificently unafraid—a superbly virile figure, holding fast to what he felt to be the right, and looking all opponents squarely in the eye. In the end, he came to know that it was his, not to achieve what he had hoped, but to save that which had been entrusted to him; and he did it bravely, grimly, powerfully. Opinions may differ as to his conception of his duty; but the memory of his devotion to high principle, his strength of will and his dauntless courage must remain to all Americans a source of patriotic pride and an enduring inspiration."—H. T. Peck, *Twenty years of the republic*, pp. 459-460, 463.—A national conference held at Washington, in March, 1895, may be looked upon as the beginning of a widely and powerfully organized movement to force the demand for a free and unlimited coinage of silver, on equal terms, as legal tender money, with gold, into the

front of the issues of the presidential canvass of 1896. The agitation then projected was carried on with extraordinary ardor and skill and had astonishing success. It was helped by the general depression of business in the country, and especially by the long continued ruling of low prices for the produce of the farms,—for all of which effects the gold standard of values was held to be the one relentless cause. In both political parties the free silver propaganda was pushed with startling effect, and there seemed to be doubt, for a time, whether the controlling politicians in either would take an opposing stand. Southern influences proved decisive of the result in the Democratic party; eastern influences in that of the Republicans. The ranks of the former were swept rapidly into the movement for free silver, and the party chiefs of the latter were driven to a conflict with it, not wholly by convictions or will of their own. During the spring and early summer of 1896, the Democratic party in state after state became committed on the question, by declarations for the unlimited free coinage of silver, at the ratio of 16 to 1; until there was tolerable certainty, some weeks before the meeting of the national convention, that its nominee for president must be one who represented that demand. How positively the Republican party would champion the gold monetary standard was somewhat less assured, though its stand on that side had been taken in a general way. "The Supreme Court was not allowed to have the last word on the income tax. Less than a year after its decision was rendered the question was taken to the people and became a theme for discussion in one of the most bitter and exciting struggles in all our history. Next to the contest of 1860, the campaign of 1896 was the most momentous of all our political battles. Conditions for a big fight could hardly have been more favorable. The country was still suffering from the effects of the Panic of 1893; organized labor was seething with unrest; the champions of free coinage were challenging their adversaries to mortal combat; between the rich and the poor, between the millionaires and the lower and middle working classes, there was a gulf that was growing wider and deeper; between the East and the West there was arising a sectionalism produced by the relation of creditor and debtor; throughout the great West there was a popular ferment that resembled hysteria. At the opening of the campaign the public mind was in such a state of agitation that the politicians despaired of finding their bearings, and the leadership of both parties was torn with dissension. Upon one thing, however, there was great unanimity of opinion: everybody believed that the Democrats would be defeated. The Democratic party was surely in a sad plight. It was divided into a silver faction and a gold faction; it was discredited by the Wilson-Gorman Tariff and the bond sales; it was suffering from the rupture which existed between the President and Congress; it was execrated in labor circles because of the use which Cleveland had made of the injunction in the Pullman strike; worse than all, it was being held responsible for four years of financial and industrial distress. The party was not only demoralized but it was leaderless. At the beginning of the campaign it did not have in sight a single available candidate of commanding ability. As for the man who was its titular leader, no former President, not even John Quincy Adams, had ever been so intensely unpopular as Grover Cleveland was in 1896. The Republicans there-

fore entered the campaign in boastful mood. They could elect, they said, a yellow dog. Their confidence, however, was due to the weakness of their adversaries rather than to their own strength, for there was abundant trouble in the Republican camp. The silver issue, like the slavery issue before it, was splitting everything, and the Republican party did not escape fissure. On the silver question, although it overshadowed all others, the Republican leaders at first were disinclined to take a definite stand and say what they meant. For example, the Ohio Republican State convention, which was the first to meet in 1896, resolved that all our currency be 'sound as the Government and as untarnished as its honor,' and that both metals be used as currency and kept at parity by legislative restrictions. Ordinarily such an utterance would have passed muster, but in 1896 the people were in no mood to be put off with ambiguous nonsense. Advocates of the gold standard wanted a platform, that should say gold, and the silverites wanted one that should say silver. In many instances, therefore, the State Republican conventions were constrained to adopt resolutions that were not evasive. In ten States the declaration was for free silver. In only a few States did conventions declare in explicit terms in favor of a single gold standard. In the early stages of the campaign, therefore, the Republicans, hardly knowing whether they were for free silver or against it, were as much at sea on the paramount issue as were the Democrats. Nor was their position in respect to leadership much better, for after the death of Blaine, in 1893 the Republican party had been without a head. At an opportune moment, however, Marcus A. Hanna, a Republican of Ohio, came forward and assisted his party in resolving its doubts on the money question and in choosing a leader. Hanna was a prosperous business man who for many years had been taking an active part in politics. For a long time his interest in public affairs had been manifested chiefly in helping the political fortunes of other men. His ambition was to make a President, and his first efforts in this direction were made in behalf of John Sherman. Failing with Sherman, he turned to William McKinley, for whom he entertained a devoted and sincere friendship."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 662-664.

1896 (November).—Agreement with Great Britain for the settlement of the Venezuela dispute. See VENEZUELA: 1896-1899.

1896-1897.—Immigration Bill vetoed by President Cleveland.—On December 17, 1896, a bill to amend the immigration laws, which had passed the House of Representatives during the previous session of Congress, passed the Senate, with amendments which the House refused to accept. By conferences between the two branches of Congress an agreement was finally reached, in which the House concurred on February 9 and the Senate on February 17. But the president disapproved the measure, and returned it to Congress on March 2, with his objections set forth in the following message: "I herewith return without approval House bill No. 7864, entitled 'An act to amend the immigration laws of the United States.' By the first section of this bill it is proposed to amend section 1 of the act of March 3, 1891, relating to immigration by adding to the classes of aliens thereby excluded from admission to the United States the following: 'All persons physically capable and over 16 years of age who can not read and write the English language or some other lan-

guage; but a person not so able to read and write who is over 50 years of age and is the parent or grandparent of a qualified immigrant over 21 years of age and capable of supporting such parent or grandparent may accompany such immigrant, or such a parent or grandparent may be sent for and come to join the family of a child or grandchild over 21 years of age similarly qualified and capable, and a wife or minor child not so able to read and write may accompany or be sent for and come and join the husband or parent similarly qualified and capable.' A radical departure from our national policy relating to immigration is here presented. Heretofore we have welcomed all who came to us from other lands except those whose moral or physical condition or history threatened danger to our national welfare and safety. . . . A century's stupendous growth, largely due to the assimilation and thrift of millions of sturdy and patriotic adopted citizens, attests the success of this generous and free-handed policy which, while guarding the people's interests, exacts from our immigrants only physical and moral soundness and a willingness and ability to work. A contemplation of the grand results of this policy can not fail to arouse a sentiment in its defense, for however it might have been regarded as an original proposition and viewed as an experiment its accomplishments are such that if it is to be uprooted at this late day its disadvantages should be plainly apparent and the substitute adopted should be just and adequate, free from uncertainties, and guarded against difficult or oppressive administration. It is not claimed, I believe, that the time has come for the further restriction of immigration on the ground that an excess of population overcrowds our land. It is said, however, that the quality of recent immigration is undesirable. The time is quite within recent memory when the same thing was said of immigrants who, with their descendants, are now numbered among our best citizens. It is said that too many immigrants settle in our cities, thus dangerously increasing their idle and vicious population. This is certainly a disadvantage. It can not be shown, however, that it affects all our cities, nor that it is permanent; nor does it appear that this condition where it exists demands as its remedy the reversal of our present immigration policy. The claim is also made that the influx of foreign laborers deprives of the opportunity to work those who are better entitled than they to the privilege of earning their livelihood by daily toil. An unfortunate condition is certainly presented when any who are willing to labor are unemployed, but so far as this condition now exists among our people it must be conceded to be a result of phenomenal business depression and the stagnation of all enterprises in which labor is a factor. With the advent of settled and wholesome financial and economic governmental policies and consequent encouragement to the activity of capital the misfortunes of unemployed labor should, to a great extent at least, be remedied. If it continues, its natural consequences must be to check the further immigration to our cities of foreign laborers and to deplete the ranks of those already there. In the meantime those most willing and best entitled ought to be able to secure the advantages of such work as there is to do. It is proposed by the bill under consideration to meet the alleged difficulties of the situation by establishing an educational test by which the right of a foreigner to make his home with us shall be determined. Its general scheme is to prohibit from admission to our coun-

try all immigrants 'physically capable and over 16 years of age who can not read and write the English language or some other language,' and it is provided that this test shall be applied by requiring immigrants seeking admission to read and afterwards to write not less than twenty nor more than twenty-five words of the Constitution of the United States in some language, and that any immigrant failing in this shall not be admitted, but shall be returned to the country from whence he came at the expense of the steamship or railroad company which brought him. The best reason that could be given for this radical restriction of immigration is the necessity of protecting our population against degeneration and saving our national peace and quiet from imported turbulence and disorder. I can not believe that we would be protected against these evils by limiting immigration to those who can read and write in any language twenty-five words of our Constitution. In my opinion, it is infinitely more safe to admit a hundred thousand immigrants who, though unable to read and write, seek among us only a home and opportunity to work than to admit one of those unruly agitators and enemies of governmental control who can not only read and write, but delights in arousing by inflammatory speech the illiterate and peacefully inclined to discontent and tumult. Violence and disorder do not originate with illiterate laborers. They are, rather, the victims of the educated agitator. The ability to read and write, as required in this bill, in and of itself affords, in my opinion, a misleading test of contented industry and supplies unsatisfactory evidence of desirable citizenship or a proper apprehension of the benefits of our institutions. If any particular element of our illiterate immigration is to be feared for other causes than illiteracy, these causes should be dealt with directly, instead of making illiteracy the pretext for exclusion, to the detriment of other illiterate immigrants against whom the real cause of complaint cannot be alleged. The provisions intended to rid that part of the proposed legislation already referred to from obvious hardship appear to me to be indefinite and inadequate. A parent, grandparent, wife, or minor child of a qualified immigrant, though unable to read and write, may accompany the immigrant or be sent for to join his family, provided the immigrant is capable of supporting such relative. These exceptions to the general rule of exclusion contained in the bill were made to prevent the separation of families, and yet neither brothers nor sisters are provided for. In order that relatives who are provided for may be reunited, those still in foreign lands must be sent for to join the immigrant here. What formality is necessary to constitute this prerequisite, and how are the facts of relationship and that the relative is sent for to be established? Are the illiterate relatives of immigrants who have come here under prior laws entitled to the advantage of these exceptions? . . . The fourth section of this bill provides—'That it shall be unlawful for any male alien who has not in good faith made his declaration before the proper court of his intention to become a citizen of the United States to be employed on any public works of the United States or to come regularly or habitually into the United States by land or water for the purpose of engaging in any mechanical trade or manual labor for wages or salary, returning from time to time to a foreign country.' The fifth section provides—'That it shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, company, or corporation knowingly to em-

ploy any alien coming into the United States in violation of the next preceding section of this act.' The prohibition against the employment of aliens upon any public works of the United States is in line with other legislation of a like character. It is quite a different thing, however, to declare it a crime for an alien to come regularly and habitually into the United States for the purpose of obtaining work from private parties, if such alien returns from time to time to a foreign country, and to constitute any employment of such alien a criminal offense. When we consider these provisions of the bill in connection with our long northern frontier and the boundaries of our States and Territories, often but an imaginary line separating them from the British dominions, and recall the friendly intercourse between the people who are neighbors on either side, the provisions of this bill affecting them must be regarded as illiberal, narrow, and un-American. The residents of these States and Territories have separate and especial interests which in many cases make an interchange of labor between their people and their alien neighbors most important, frequently with the advantage largely in favor of our citizens. This suggests the inexpediency of Federal interference with these conditions when not necessary to the correction of a substantial evil, affecting the general welfare. Such unfriendly legislation as is proposed could hardly fail to provoke retaliatory measures, to the injury of many of our citizens who now find employment on adjoining foreign soil. The uncertainty of construction to which the language of these provisions is subject is a serious objection to a statute which describes a crime. An important element in the offense sought to be created by these sections is the coming 'regularly or habitually into the United States.' These words are impossible of definite and certain construction. The same may be said of the equally important words 'returning from time to time to a foreign country.' A careful examination of this bill has convinced me that for the reasons given and others not specifically stated its provisions are unnecessarily harsh and oppressive, and its defects in construction would cause vexation and its operation would result in harm to our citizens. GROVER CLEVELAND." In the House of Representatives, the bill was passed again, over the veto, by the requisite vote of two-thirds; in the Senate it was referred to the Committee on Immigration, and no further action was taken upon it. Therefore, it did not become a law.

1896-1898.—*Agitation for monetary reforms.*—*Indianapolis Commission.*—*Secretary Gage's plan.*—*Senatorial block in the way.*—On Nov. 18, 1896, the governors of the Indianapolis Board of Trade invited the Boards of Trade of Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Louisville, Cleveland, Columbus, Toledo, Kansas City, Detroit, Milwaukee, St. Paul, Des Moines, Minneapolis, Grand Rapids, Peoria, and Omaha to a conference on the first of December following, to consider the advisability of calling a larger convention from commercial organizations throughout the country for the purpose of discussing the wisdom of selecting a non-partisan commission to formulate a sound currency system. This preliminary conference issued a call for a non-partisan monetary convention of business men, chosen from boards of trade, chambers of commerce, and commercial clubs, to meet in Indianapolis, on Jan. 12, 1897. At the convention there were assembled, with credentials, 299 delegates, representing business organizations and

cities in nearly every state in the Union. The result of its deliberations was expressed in resolutions which opened as follows: "This convention declares that it has become absolutely necessary that a consistent, straightforward, and deliberately planned monetary system shall be inaugurated, the fundamental basis of which should be: First, that the present gold standard should be maintained. Second, that steps should be taken to insure the ultimate retirement of all classes of United States notes by a gradual and steady process, and so as to avoid the injurious contraction of the currency, or disturbance of the business interests of the country, and that until such retirements provision should be made for a separation of the revenue and note-issue departments of the Treasury. Third, that a banking system be provided, which should furnish credit facilities to every portion of the country and a safe and elastic circulation, and especially with a view of securing such a distribution of the loanable capital of the country as will tend to equalize the rates of interest in all parts thereof." Recognizing the necessity of committing the formulation of such a plan to a body of men trained and experienced in these matters, a commission was proposed. In case no commission should be authorized by Congress in the spring of 1897, the executive committee of the convention was authorized to select a commission of eleven members, "to make thorough investigation of the monetary affairs and needs of this country, in all relations and aspects, and to make appropriate suggestions as to any evils found to exist, and the remedies therefor." Congress did not authorize the appointment of a monetary commission; and the executive committee of the convention selected a commission of eleven members, which began its sittings in Washington, Sept. 22, 1897. Early in January, 1898, the report of the monetary commission was made public, and a second convention of delegates from the boards of trade and other commercial organizations of leading cities in the country was called together at Indianapolis, January 20-26, to consider its recommendations. The measures proposed by the commission were approved by the convention, and were submitted to congress by a committee appointed to urge their enactment in law. Secretary of the Treasury Gage had already, in his first annual report and in the draft of a bill which he laid before the House committee on banking and currency, made recommendations which accorded in principle with those of the commission, differing somewhat in details. Both plans, with some proposals from other sources, were now taken in hand by the House committee on banking and currency, and a bill was prepared, which the committee reported to the House on June 15. But the Senate by a vote of 47 to 32 had resolved on January 28 that "all the bonds of the United States issued, or authorized to be issued, under the said acts of Congress hereinbefore recited, are payable, principal and interest, at the option of the government of the United States, in silver dollars, of the coinage of the United States, containing 412 1-2 grains each of standard silver; and that to restore to its coinage such silver coins as a legal tender in payment of said bonds, principal and interest, is not in violation of the public faith, nor in derogation of the rights of the public creditor." The House, by 182 to 132, had rejected this resolution; but the Senate action had demonstrated the evident uselessness of attempting legislation in the interest of a monetary reform. Accordingly

the House bill, after being reported and made public, for discussion outside, was withdrawn by the committee, and the subject rested in Congress, while agitation in the country went on.

1896-1913.—Period of gold inflation. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1896-1913.

1896-1917.—Increase of trade with Japan. See COMMERCE: Commercial age: 1896-1917.

1897.—Consolidation of steel industry.—“In 1865 . . . the United States could certainly excel any European nation in economic competition, and possibly the whole continent combined, if it could utilize its resources. . . . [But a] doubt touched the capacity of the people to organize a system of transportation and industry adequate to attain that end. Failure meant certain bankruptcy. Unappalled by the magnitude of the speculation, the American people took the risk. What that risk was may be imagined when the fact is grasped that in 1865, . . . this people entered on the construction of 160,000 miles . . . [of railway] probably, in excess of \$10,000,000,000. Such figures convey no impression to the mind. . . . It may aid the imagination, perhaps, to say that Mr. Giffen estimated the cost to France of the war of 1870, including the indemnity and Alsace and Lorraine, at less than \$3,500,000,000, or about one-third of this portentous mortgage on the future.”—B. Adams, *New industrial revolution* (*Atlantic Monthly*, Feb., 1901).—“American industrial history presents few groups more brilliant, more resourceful, and more picturesque than that which, in the early seventies, started to turn . . . [the] Minnesota ore fields into steel—and into gold. These men had all the dash, all the venturesomeness, all the speculative and even the gambling instinct, needed for one of the greatest industrial adventures in our annals. . . . But three or four men towered so preëminently above their associates that today when we think of the human agencies that constructed this mighty edifice, the names that insistently come to mind are those of Carnegie, Phipps, Frick, and Schwab.”—B. J. Hendrick, *Age of big business* (*Chronicles of America Series*, v. 39, pp. 65-66).—“In March, 1897, the vast consolidation of mines, foundries, railroads, and steamship companies, centralized at Pittsburg, began producing steel rails at \$18 a ton, and at a bound America bestrode the world. She had won her great wager with fate. . . . The end seems only a question of time. Europe is doomed not only to buy her raw material abroad, but to pay the cost of transport. And Europe knew this instinctively in March, 1897, and nerved herself for resistance. Her best hope, next to a victorious war, lay in imitating America, and in organizing a system of transportation which would open up the East. . . . Carnegie achieved the new industrial revolution in March, 1897. Within a twelvemonth the rival nations had emptied themselves upon the shore of the Yellow Sea. In November Germany seized Kiao-chau, a month later the Russians occupied Port Arthur, and the following April the English appropriated Wei-hai-wei; but the fact to remember is that just 400 miles inland, due west of Kiao-chau, lies Tszzechau, the centre, according to Richthofen, of the richest coal and iron deposits in existence. There with the rude methods used by the Chinese, coal actually sells at 13 cents the ton. Thus it has come to pass that the problem now being attacked by all the statesmen, soldiers, scientific men, and engineers of the two eastern continents is whether Russia, Germany, France, England, and Japan, combined or separately, can ever bring these resources on the market

in competition with the United States.”—B. Adams, *New industrial revolution* (*Atlantic Monthly*, Feb., 1901).

ALSO IN: J. H. Bridge, *Inside history of the Carnegie Steel Company*.—H. N. Casson, *Romance of steel*.

1897.—Review of Cleveland's administration.—His difficulties with Congress.—Loss of leadership.—“Before quitting Cleveland, some general considerations are in order. He proved to possess rare executive ability and during his two terms had widely different matters to deal with. In his first term, he had a surplus in the Treasury; in the second, a deficit; and he proved himself equal to the handling of both. He restored the vanishing gold standard but, by his action for the repeal of the Act of 1890 and by his sale of bonds to maintain gold payments, he alienated his party and lost its leadership. The South and the West were gravitating toward ‘cheap money,’ which now meant the free coinage of silver, while his belief and action were diametrically opposed to this sentiment. They thought that his course in the repeal of the Silver Purchase of the Act of 1890 and in the issuance of bonds to maintain the gold standard was simply carrying out the Wall Street programme. At the close of his last administration he thought that he was the most unpopular of all public men in the South, and he grieved, as any Democrat would, that he had lost his hold upon that section, whose influence was so potent in his party. Entirely consistent as regards a civil service based on merit and a reduction of the tariff, he offended certain leaders of the party by the scolding he gave the Senate pending the tariff bill of 1894; he also gave offence to some prominent senators by official appointments other than they had recommended in their respective districts. . . . Cleveland said to McKinley on vacating the White House, ‘Your great difficulty will be to get on with Congress. You will have to look out for those men at the other end of the avenue.’ Cleveland was a good party man and regretted keenly his loss of leadership. In a moment of depression, he wrote in a private letter, ‘I doubt if I shall advise any one to lose the support of party in the hope of finding support among those who beyond partisanship profess a patriotic desire for good government.’ While the art of facile negotiation might have prevented a certain widening of the party chasm, it is difficult to see how it might wholly have been averted, given the difference between his firmly held ideas and those of the majority of his party on silver. Carlisle in his report for 1894 recommended a scheme for the reform of the currency which was unqualifiedly indorsed by the President, who was in full sympathy with his Secretary of the Treasury. While the Democrats had been repudiated by the people (the autumn elections of 1894 had resulted in the choice of a Republican House by a large majority), this recommendation went to the Democratic Congress that held over until March fourth; but a recommendation by Cleveland was sufficient to line up the Democrats against it. He returned to the subject in December, 1895, but he spoke then to a Republican Congress; nevertheless his recommendations demonstrate his sound ideas. ‘The Government,’ he said, ‘was forced to redeem without redemption and to pay without acquittance.’ His remedy was ‘the retirement and cancellation of our United States notes commonly called greenbacks and the outstanding Treasury notes issued by the Government in payment of silver purchases under the Act of 1890.’ [See also above: 1895; President

Cleveland's special message, etc.] . . . In his first inaugural address Cleveland spoke of his 'supreme and sacred trust' and he consecrated himself to the service of 'a great and free people.' He thoroughly lived up to his promise; and time wrought in his favor. He eventually commanded the admiration and respect of independent thinkers all over the country irrespective of party. The opinions of three of his successors may well fix his place in history. 'As Civil Service Commissioner,' said Theodore Roosevelt while President, 'I was much impressed by Cleveland's high standard of official conduct and his rugged strength of character.' Cleveland 'was a great President,' declared William H. Taft while in the White House, 'because he was a patriot with the highest sense of public duty, a statesman of clear perceptions, of the utmost courage of his convictions and of great plainness of speech' and 'a man of the highest character.' And Woodrow Wilson: Cleveland was 'more man than partisan; hardly a colleague of the Houses so much as an individual servant of the country; exercising his powers like a chief magistrate rather than like a party leader. . . . He called himself a party man but . . . deemed his party better served by manliness and integrity than by chicanery. . . . We need not pretend to know what history shall say of Mr. Cleveland. . . . We know only that he has played a great part. . . . He has made policies and altered parties after the fashion of an earlier age in our history and the men who assess his fame in the future will be no partisans but men who love candor, courage, honesty, strength, unshaken capacity and high purpose such as his.'—J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, v. 8, pp. 457-461.—See also above: 1895: Status of civil service reform.—'If any single attribute was his [President Cleveland's] distinguishing mark, it was a sense of responsibility. And it was no common load, easily borne and felt only on especial occasions. It was a personal sense, keen, burdensome, not to be laid down even for a moment. It was a weight which he could not delegate, even temporarily, to others, because it had been placed upon him by vote of the people. It was a burden which made him lonely and weighted his messages with a heavy weariness. It is, of course, to be expected that the president of a nation will feel his responsibilities, but none whose papers I have ever read impress me quite so insistently. In the first inaugural there is 'responsibility' and 'anxiety' and 'conscience.' Shortly afterward there are 'solemn pledges' and 'plighted faith'; in the first annual message, 'solemn obligations'; in the very last minutes of his first term, 'plain course of official duty.' The second administration is like the first. The inaugural is full of 'gravity of the duties' and 'responsibilities'; the messages to Congress tell of 'exacting obligations and inexorable responsibility'; the close of the administration is burdened with 'official' and 'constitutional' duty. One of his eminent successors in the presidential chair once said of Mr. Cleveland that he had 'a sense of public duty that has been exceeded by no statesman within my knowledge.' . . . From the point of view of the politician interested in the present and the immediate future, with eye focused on the results of an oncoming election, President Cleveland must have been an utterly exasperating candidate. Particularly was this true in the campaign of 1888. The tariff became the chief issue of that memorable battle because of the President's noted message at the opening of Congress on December 6, 1887. As is well known, this document was devoted entirely to advocacy of a lower tariff. 'To some of the

president's own party such unexpected action seemed like political suicide.' Moreover it was not merely unexpected. The Democratic party was far from being a unit in behalf of tariff reform. Its record in Congress for many years previous, the utterances and activities of some of its leaders, had been squarely in the opposite direction; a conservative people, in a conservative period of its history, was not likely to receive with joy a message which, departing from all precedents, concerned itself with a single topic. It is not surprising that outspoken dissatisfaction in the Democratic party had to be stifled. Newspapers and politicians of all shades of belief found in the message ample materials for misunderstanding and dissent, although the Democrats found it necessary to preserve some appearance of unity and renominate the President. But while the campaign was on, the President had another blow for his political supporters. During his term he had aroused bitter hostility by his veto of numerous private pension bills. Now the veto of such measures is sure to be misunderstood, the saving effected is trifling, and out of all proportion to the hostility aroused among the veterans of the war. But in President Cleveland's mind the principle involved bulked big, bigger than any chances of re-election. It must have dismayed his political associates to meet, at the start of the campaign, the veto of July 5, 1888: 'In the discharge of what has seemed to me my duty as related to legislation, and in the interest of all the veterans of the Union Army, I have attempted to stem the tide of improvident pension enactments.' But that was not enough! From July to October of this campaign Mr. Cleveland vetoed no fewer than sixty-seven such measures. To the usual politician, the President must have seemed sadly lacking in even the elements of political prudence. His defeat in the ensuing election has been explained in many ways, and doubtless many slight changes or bits of good fortune would have altered the result. But when it is remembered that Mr. Cleveland received 100,000 more votes than his competitor, it becomes clear that his obstinate adherence to principles did not alienate his following, but rather enlarged it, and also that fundamentally he was defeated by an electoral system which allows the votes of a plurality of the people to be nullified by the more or less accidental location of the strength of the winner."—C. R. Lingley, *Official characteristics of President Cleveland (Political Science Quarterly, June, 1918, pp. 255-260)*.

ALSO IN: H. J. Ford, *Cleveland era (Chronicles of America Series)*.—E. Stanwood, *History of the presidency*, pp. 27-31.—R. McElroy, *Grover Cleveland, the man and the statesman*.

1897.—Dispute with England over Alaska boundary. See ALASKA BOUNDARY QUESTION: 1867-1903.

1897 (January-May).—Arbitration treaty with Great Britain rejected by Senate.—"The Venezuela commission entered upon its work with tact. . . . It suggested to Secretary Olney January 15, 1896, that the governments of Great Britain and Venezuela be informed of the objects of the commission; and expressed the hope that 'they will see a way entirely consistent with their own sense of international propriety' to aid the commission. Assurance was also given that 'the purposes of the pending investigation are certainly hostile to none.' To the surprise of many people, Great Britain complied with this courteous request, and thus removed apprehensions of an immediate break in the friendly relations between the two countries. Great Britain also showed a willingness to accept,

the earlier request of the United States that the boundary be determined by an international tribunal instead of by the United States acting independently. As the United States willingly assented to this, the investigation by the American Commission was abandoned. Meanwhile, far more important negotiations for the promotion of peace were under way. President Cleveland's demand for arbitration aroused fresh interest in this method of settling disputes. Though still firm in adherence to the position taken by the administration, American citizens viewed with alarm the narrow escape from war, and were more disposed to welcome the establishment of international machinery by which it might be averted. In January, 1897, a treaty was signed by Secretary Olney and Sir Julian Pauncefote, providing for the arbitration of all differences between Great Britain and the United States, which could not be adjusted by the diplomatic negotiation. Although ratification by the Senate could not be secured [the treaty was finally rejected in May], the effort advanced the general principle of arbitration, and in the opinion of many was a happy compensation for the temporary alienation between the two countries."—D. R. Dewey, *National problems, 1885-1897*, pp. 311-313.—The treaty thus framed was as follows:

Article I. The High Contracting Parties agree to submit to Arbitration in accordance with the provisions and subject to the limitations of this Treaty all questions in difference between them which they may fail to adjust by diplomatic negotiation.

Art. II. All pecuniary claims or groups of pecuniary claims which do not in the aggregate exceed £100,000 in amount, and which do not involve the determination of territorial claims, shall be dealt with and decided by an Arbitral Tribunal constituted as provided in the next following Article.

Art. III. Each of the High Contracting Parties shall nominate one arbitrator who shall be a jurist of repute and the two arbitrators so nominated shall within two months of the date of their nomination select an umpire. In case they shall fail to do so within the limit of time above mentioned, the umpire shall be appointed by agreement between the Members for the time being of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Members for the time being of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Great Britain, each nominating body acting by a majority. In case they shall fail to agree upon an umpire within three months of the date of an application made to them in that behalf by the High Contracting Parties or either of them, the umpire shall be selected in the manner provided for in Article X. The person so elected shall be the President of the Tribunal and the award of the majority of the Members thereof shall be final.

Art. IV. All pecuniary claims or groups of pecuniary claims which shall exceed £100,000 in amount and all other matters in difference, in respect of which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have rights against the other under Treaty or otherwise, provided that such matters in difference do not involve the determination of territorial claims, shall be dealt with and decided by an Arbitral Tribunal, constituted as provided in the next following Article.

Art. V. Any subject of arbitration described in Article IV shall be submitted to the Tribunal provided for by Article III, the award of which

Tribunal, if unanimous, shall be final. If not unanimous either of the High Contracting Parties may within six months from the date of the award demand a review thereof. In such case the matter in controversy shall be submitted to an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of five jurists of repute, no one of whom shall have been a member of the Tribunal whose award is to be reviewed and who shall be selected as follows, viz:—two by each of the High Contracting Parties, and one, to act as umpire, by the four thus nominated and to be chosen within three months after the date of their nomination. In case they shall fail to choose an umpire within the limit of time above-mentioned, the umpire shall be appointed by agreement between the Nominating Bodies designated in Article III acting in the manner therein provided. In case they shall fail to agree upon an umpire within three months of the date of an application made to them in that behalf by the High Contracting Parties or either of them, the umpire shall be selected in the manner provided for in Article X. The person so selected shall be the President of the Tribunal and the award of the majority of the Members thereof shall be final.

Art. VI. Any controversy which shall involve the determination of territorial claims shall be submitted to a Tribunal composed of six members, three of whom (subject to the provisions of Article VIII) shall be Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States or Justices of the Circuit Courts to be nominated by the President of the United States, and the other three of whom (subject to the provisions of Article VIII) shall be Judges of the British Supreme Court of Judicature or Members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to be nominated by Her Britannic Majesty, whose award by a majority of not less than five to one shall be final. In case of an award made by less than the prescribed majority, the award shall also be final unless either Power shall, within three months after the award has been reported, protest that the same is erroneous, in which case the award shall be of no validity. In the event of an award made by less than the prescribed majority and protested as above provided, or if the members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be equally divided, there shall be no recourse to hostile measures of any description until the mediation of one or more friendly Powers has been invited by one or both of the High Contracting Parties.

Art. VII. Objections to the jurisdiction of an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under this Treaty shall not be taken except as provided in this Article. If before the close of the hearing upon a claim submitted to an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Article III or Article V either of the High Contracting Parties shall move such Tribunal to decide, and thereupon it shall decide that the determination of such claim necessarily involves the decision of a disputed question of principle of grave general importance affecting the national rights of such party as distinguished from the private rights whereof it is merely the international representative, the jurisdiction of such Arbitral Tribunal over such claim shall cease and the same shall be dealt with by arbitration under Article VI.

Art. VIII. In cases where the question involved is one which concerns a particular State or Territory of the United States, it shall be open to the President of the United States to appoint a judicial officer of such State or Territory to be one of the Arbitrators under Article III or Article V or Article VI. In like manner in cases where the question involved is one which concerns a British Colony or

possession, it shall be open to Her Britannic Majesty to appoint a judicial officer of such Colony or possession to be one of the Arbitrators under Article III or Article V or Article VI.

Art. ix. Territorial claims in this Treaty shall include all claims to territory and all claims involving questions of servitudes, rights of navigation and of access, fisheries and all rights and interests necessary to the control and enjoyment of the territory claimed by either of the High Contracting Parties.

Art. x. If in any case the nominating bodies designated in Articles III and V shall fail to agree upon an Umpire in accordance with the provisions of the said Articles, the Umpire shall be appointed by His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway. Either of the High Contracting Parties, however, may at any time give notice to the other that, by reason of material changes in conditions as existing at the date of this Treaty, it is of opinion that a substitute for His Majesty should be chosen either for all cases to arise under the Treaty or for a particular specified case already arisen, and thereupon the High Contracting Parties shall at once proceed to agree upon such substitute to act either in all cases to arise under the Treaty or in the particular case specified as may be indicated by said notice; provided, however, that such notice shall have no effect upon an Arbitration already begun by the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal under Article III. The High Contracting Parties shall also at once proceed to nominate a substitute for His Majesty in the event that His Majesty shall at any time notify them of his desire to be relieved from the functions graciously accepted by him under this Treaty either for all cases to arise thereunder or for any particular specified case already arisen.

Art. xi. In case of the death, absence or incapacity to serve of any Arbitrator or Umpire, or in the event of any Arbitrator or Umpire omitting or declining or ceasing to act as such, another Arbitrator or Umpire shall be forthwith appointed in his place and stead in the manner provided for with regard to the original appointment.

Art. xii. Each Government shall pay its own agent and provide for the proper remuneration of the counsel employed by it and of the Arbitrators appointed by it and for the expense of preparing and submitting its case to the Arbitral Tribunal. All other expenses connected with any Arbitration shall be defrayed by the two Governments in equal moieties. Provided, however, that, if in any case the essential matter of difference submitted to arbitration is the right of one of the High Contracting Parties to receive disavowals of or apologies for acts or defaults of the other not resulting in substantial pecuniary injury, the Arbitral Tribunal finally disposing of the said matter shall direct whether any of the expenses of the successful party shall be borne by the unsuccessful party, and if so to what extent.

Art. xiii. The time and place of meeting of an Arbitral Tribunal and all arrangements for the hearing and all questions of procedure shall be decided by the Tribunal itself. Each Arbitral Tribunal shall keep a correct record of its proceedings and may appoint and employ all necessary officers and agents. The decision of the Tribunal shall, if possible, be made within three months from the close of the arguments on both sides. It shall be made in writing and dated and shall be signed by the Arbitrators who may assent to it. The decision shall be in duplicate, one copy whereof

shall be delivered to each of the High Contracting Parties through their respective agents.

Art. xiv. This Treaty shall remain in force for five years from the date at which it shall come into operation, and further until the expiration of twelve months after either of the High Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same.

Art. xv. The present Treaty shall be duly ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Britannic Majesty; and the mutual exchange of ratifications shall take place in Washington or in London within six months of the date hereof or earlier if possible."—54th Congress, 2d Session, United States Senate Document no. 63.

ALSO IN: J. B. Moore, *American diplomacy*, pp. 218-219.—Idem, *Digest of international arbitrations to which the United States has been a party*, v. 1, pp. 962-989.—Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Compilation of reports*, v. 8, pp. 389-425.—G. Cleveland, *Presidential problems*, pp. 173-281.

1897 (March).—Inauguration of President McKinley.—President's cabinet.—Leading topics of inaugural address.—"Amid more than usual pomp and display William McKinley was duly inaugurated on March 4, 1897. For secretary of state he named Senator John Sherman of Ohio. Sherman was now an old man, whose once keen mind was beginning to show the ravages of age. It was generally believed that he was 'kicked up stairs' in order to make a place in the Senate for 'Mark' Hanna, McKinley's efficient political mentor and manager. At all events, Hanna was soon appointed by the governor of Ohio to fill the vacancy thus created, and the following year, after an exceedingly close and bitter fight, he was elected by the legislature. Judged in the light of after events, the other important cabinet appointments were those of General Russell A. Alger of Michigan as secretary of war, and of John D. Long of Massachusetts as secretary of the navy. Theodore Roosevelt, who for sometime had been a police commissioner of New York City, became assistant secretary of the navy."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times, 1865-1920*, p. 232.—Other members of the cabinet were secretary of the treasury, Lyman J. Gage of Illinois; attorney-general, Joseph McKenna of California; postmaster-general, James A. Gary of Maryland; secretary of the interior, Charles N. Bliss of New York; secretary of agriculture, James Wilson of Iowa. In his inaugural address, the new president laid somewhat less emphasis than might have been expected on the need of measures for reforming the monetary system of the country, but strongly urged that instant steps be taken to increase the revenues of the government by a return to higher tariff charges. "With adequate revenue secured," he argued, "but not until then, we can enter upon such changes in our fiscal laws as will, while insuring safety and volume to our money, no longer impose upon the government the necessity of maintaining so large a gold reserve, with its attendant and inevitable temptations to speculation. Most of our financial laws are the outgrowth of experience and trial, and should not be amended without investigation and demonstration of the wisdom of the proposed changes. We must be both 'sure we are right' and 'make haste slowly.' . . . Economy is demanded in every branch of the government at all times, but especially in periods like the present of depression in business and distress among the people. The severest economy

must be observed in all public expenditures, and extravagance stopped wherever it is found, and prevented wherever in the future it may be developed. If the revenues are to remain as now, the only relief that can come must be from decreased expenditures. But the present must not become the permanent condition of the government. It has been our uniform practice to retire, not increase, our outstanding obligations; and this policy must again be resumed and vigorously enforced. Our revenues should always be large enough to meet with ease and promptness not only our current needs and the principal and interest of the public debt, but to make proper and liberal provision for that most deserving body of public creditors, the soldiers and sailors and the widows and orphans who are the pensioners of the United States. . . . A deficiency is inevitable so long as the expenditures of the government exceed its receipts. It can only be met by loans or an increased revenue. While a large annual surplus of revenue may invite waste and extravagance, inadequate revenue creates distrust and undermines public and private credit. Neither should be encouraged. Between more loans and more revenue there ought to be but one opinion. We should have more revenue, and that without delay, hindrance, or postponement. A surplus in the treasury created by loans is not a permanent or safe reliance. It will suffice while it lasts, but it cannot last long while the outlays of the government are greater than its receipts, as has been the case during the last two years. . . . The best way for the government to maintain its credit is to pay as it goes—not by resorting to loans, but by keeping out of debt—through an adequate income secured by a system of taxation, external, or internal, or both. It is the settled policy of the government, pursued from the beginning and practiced by all parties and administrations, to raise the bulk of our revenue from taxes upon foreign productions entering the United States for sale and consumption, and avoiding, for the most part, every form of direct taxation except in time of war. . . . The country is clearly opposed to any needless additions to the subjects of internal taxation, and is committed by its latest popular utterance to the system of tariff taxation. There can be no misunderstanding either about the principle upon which this tariff taxation shall be levied. Nothing has ever been made plainer at a general election than that the controlling principle in the raising of revenue from duties on imports is zealous care for American interests and American labor. The people have declared that such legislation should be had as will give ample protection and encouragement to the industries and the development of our country. . . . The paramount duty of congress is to stop deficiencies by the restoration of that protective legislation which has always been the firmest prop of the treasury. The passage of such a law or laws would strengthen the credit of the government both at home and abroad, and go far toward stopping the drain upon the gold reserve held for the redemption of our currency, which has been heavy and well-nigh constant for several years. In the revision of the tariff, especial attention should be given to the re-enactment and extension of the reciprocity principle of the law of 1890, under which so great a stimulus was given to our foreign trade in new and advantageous markets for our surplus agricultural and manufactured products." In concluding his address he announced his intention to convene Congress in extra session, saying: "The condition of the public treasury demands the immediate con-

sideration of congress. It alone has the power to provide revenue for the government. Not to convene it under such circumstances, I can view in no other sense than the neglect of a plain duty."

1897 (March-July).—Passage of the Dingley Tariff Act. See *TARIFF*: 1897 (March-July); *SUGAR BOUNTIES*.

1897 (November).—Refusal to negotiate with the insurgent republic of the Philippine islands. —On Nov. 3, 1897, Rounseville Wildman, the United States consul at Hong Kong, addressed the following to the State Department: "Since my arrival in Hongkong I have been called upon several times by Mr. F. Agoncilla, foreign agent and high commissioner, etc., of the new republic of the Philippines. Mr. Agoncilla holds a commission, signed by the president, members of cabinet, and general in chief of the republic of Philippines, empowering him absolutely with power to conclude treaties with foreign governments. Mr. Agoncilla



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offers on behalf of his government alliance offensive and defensive with the United States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon. In the meantime he wishes the United States to send to some port in the Philippines 20,000 stand of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition for the use of his government, to be paid for on the recognition of his government by the United States. He pledges as security two provinces and the custom-house at Manila. He is not particular about the price—is willing the United States should make 25 per cent or 30 per cent profit. He is a very earnest and attentive diplomat and a great admirer of the United States. On his last visit he surprised me with the information that he had written his government that he had hopes of inducing the United States to supply the much-needed guns, etc. In case Señor Agoncilla's dispatch should fall into the hands of an unfriendly power and find its way into the newspapers, I have thought it wise to apprise the State Department of the nature of the high commissioner's proposals. Señor Agoncilla informs me by late mail that he will proceed at once to Washington to conclude

the proposed treaty, if I advise. I shall not advise said step until so instructed by the State Department. . . . [The secretary of state returned the following reply, Dec. 15, 1897]: "You may briefly advise Mr. Agoncilla, in case he should call upon you, that the Government of the United States does not negotiate such treaties and that it is not possible to forward the desired arms and ammunition. You should not encourage any advances on the part of Mr. Agoncilla, and should courteously decline to communicate with the Department further regarding his alleged mission."—*Treaty of peace and accompanying papers (55th Congress, 3rd Session, United States Senate Document no. 62, pt. 1, pp. 333, 334)*.

1897 (November).—Treaty with Russia and Japan to suspend pelagic sealing. See **BERING SEA QUESTION**.

suffering in Cuba, resulting from Spanish methods of dealing with insurrection in that island (see **CUBA: 1868-1895; 1895-1898**), had been gathering intensity for months past, and threatening a rupture of peaceful relations between the United States and Spain. A sudden crisis in the situation was produced, on the morning of Feb. 15, 1898, by news that the United States battleship *Maine* had been totally destroyed. In a subsequent message on the subject to Congress, President McKinley recited the circumstances of the catastrophe, and the proceedings adopted to ascertain its cause, with the conclusions reached, in the following words: "For some time prior to the visit of the 'Maine' to Havana Harbor our consular representatives pointed out the advantages to flow from the visit of national ships to the Cuban waters, in accustoming the people to the presence of our flag



UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP "MAINE" SUNK IN HAVANA HARBOR, 1898

The wreck was raised in 1911

1897 (December).—Act of Congress against pelagic sealing. See **BERING SEA QUESTION**.

1897-1898.—Reports from Cuba of suffering condition of the "reconcentrados." See **CUBA: 1895-1898**.

1897-1899.—Agreements with the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, Cherokee and Seminole tribes of Indians.—Work of the Dawes Commission.—Curtis Act. See **INDIANS, AMERICAN: 1893-1899**.

1897-1900.—Treaty for the annexation of Hawaii.—Its failure of ratification.—Passage of joint resolution to annex, and of an act for the government of the islands. See **HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: Discovery and early history; 1897-1898**.

1898 (February-March).—American sympathy with the Cubans and indignation against Spain.—Destruction of the United States battleship *Maine*.—Investigation and findings of American and Spanish courts of inquiry.—Public feeling in the United States, excited by a terrible state of

as the symbol of good will and of our ships in the fulfillment of the mission of protection to American interests, even though no immediate need therefor might exist. Accordingly on the 24th of January last, after conference with the Spanish minister, in which the renewal of visits of our war vessels to Spanish waters was discussed and accepted, the peninsular authorities at Madrid and Havana were advised of the purpose of this Government to resume friendly naval visits at Cuban ports, and that in that view the 'Maine' would forthwith call at the port of Havana. This announcement was received by the Spanish Government with appreciation of the friendly character of the visit of the 'Maine,' and with notification of intention to return the courtesy by sending Spanish ships to the principal ports of the United States."—*Congressional Record, Mar. 28, 1898*.—"Accordingly the *Maine*, commanded by Captain Sigsbee, was dispatched to Cuba and arrived on the 25th

of January in the harbor of Havana. On the night of the 15th of February, an explosion utterly wrecked the vessel and killed 260 of the crew, besides wounding ninety. The responsibility for this calamity has never been positively determined. It may have resulted from an accidental internal explosion, from the official action of the Spanish authorities, from the unofficial zeal of subordinate Spanish officers, or even—as suggested by Speaker Reed who was an opponent of war—by action of the insurgents themselves with the purpose of embroiling the United States and Spain. The careful investigations which were afterwards made brought to light evidence of both internal and external explosions; it therefore seems probable that an external mine was the prime cause of the disaster and that the internal explosion followed as a consequence. No direct evidence has been discovered which would fix the responsibility for the placing of the mine, but it is reasonable to attribute it to the Spanish hotheads of Havana. It is not impossible that the insurgents were responsible; but it is incredible that the Spanish Government planned the explosion. The hasty, though perhaps natural, conclusion to which American public sentiment at once leaped, however, was that the disaster was the work of Spain, without making any discrimination between the Government itself and the disaffected factions. A general sorrow and anger throughout the United States reinforced the popular anxiety for national interests and the humane regard for the Cubans. Press and public oratory demanded official action. 'Remember the Maine!' was an admonition which everywhere met the eye and ear. The venerable and trusted Senator Proctor, who visited Cuba, came back with the report that conditions on the island were intolerable. . . . No doubt remained in the public mind that war would result unless the withdrawal of Spanish authority from Cuba could be arranged peaceably and immediately."—C. R. Fish, *Path of empire (Chronicles of America Series, v. 41, pp. 107-108)*.

ALSO IN: J. B. Moore, *Digest of international law, v. 1, pp. 242-243; v. 6, pp. 105-236*.—C. D. Sigsbee, *Personal narratives of the battleship "Maine."*

1898 (February-December).—In Chinese "battle of concessions." See CHINA: 1898 (February-December).

1898 (March).—Preparations for war.—"As soon as the possibility of war became apparent, Congress unanimously appropriated \$50,000,000 for national defence, to be expended without restriction by the president."—D. R. Dewey, *Financial history of the United States, p. 466*.—"The battleship *Oregon* was making a 14,000 mile voyage from the Pacific coast round South America to the coast of Florida. Much anxiety existed for her safety, but on May 26 she reached Jupiter Inlet on the coast of Florida in splendid condition, ready for any duty."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times, p. 243*.

ALSO IN: F. E. Chadwick, *Relations of the United States and Spain, v. 1, p. 17*.

1898 (March-April).—Continued discussion of Cuban affairs with Spain.—Message of the president asking Congress for authority to intervene in Cuba.—On April 11, President McKinley addressed another special message to Congress, setting forth the unsatisfactory results with which Cuban affairs had been further discussed with the government of Spain, and formally asking to be authorized and empowered to take measures for securing a "full and final termination of hostilities"

in the oppressed island. In stating the reasons that, in his judgment called for intervention, he said: "In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban war became so onerous that my predecessor made an effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of this Government in any way that might tend to an honorable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed through the refusal of the Spanish Government then in power to consider any form of mediation or, indeed, any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The resistance of the insurgents was in no wise diminished. The efforts of Spain were increased, both by the dispatch of fresh levies to Cuba and by the addition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilized Christian peoples. The policy of devastation and concentration, inaugurated by the captain-general's bando on October 21, 1896, in the province of Pinar del Rio, was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the power of the Spanish arms was able to reach by occupation or by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwelling in the open agricultural interior, were driven into the garrison towns or isolated places held by the troops. The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired, mills destroyed, and, in short, everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support was commanded by one or the other of the contending parties and executed by all the powers at their disposal. . . . The overtures of this Government, made through its new envoy, General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective amelioration of the condition of the island, although not accepted to the extent of admitted mediation in any shape, were met by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase, would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that more humane methods should thenceforth prevail in the conduct of hostilities. Coincidentally with these declarations, the new Government of Spain continued and completed the policy already begun by its predecessor, of testifying friendly regard for this nation by releasing American citizens held under one charge or another connected with the insurrection, so that by the end of November not a single person entitled in any way to our national protection remained in a Spanish prison. While these negotiations were in progress the increasing destitution of the unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed earnest attention. The success which had attended the limited measure of relief extended to the suffering American citizens among them by the judicious expenditure through the consular agencies of the money appropriated expressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the 24th of December last I caused to be issued an appeal to the American people, inviting contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of January by a similar public announcement

of the formation of a central Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York City, composed of three members, representing the American National Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the community. The efforts of that committee have been untiring and have accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and representatives of other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba and cooperated with the consul-general and the local authorities to make effective distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly \$200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the sufferers, and more is forthcoming. . . . The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation or extermination a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies in the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of both—a condition which in effect ended the ten years' war by the truce of Zanjon. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as we are, deeply and intimately, by its very existence. Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true friendliness, no less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring about an immediate termination of the war. In my annual message of December last I said: 'Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.' Thereupon I review these alternatives, in the light of President Grant's measured words, uttered in 1875, when after seven years of sanguinary, destructive, and cruel hostilities in Cuba he reached the conclusion that the recognition of the independence of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible; and that the recognition of belligerence was not warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law. I commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question, pointing out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a recognition of belligerence which, while adding to the already onerous burdens of neutrality within our own jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our influence or effective offices in the territory of hostilities. Nothing has since occurred to change my view in this regard; and I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of belligerents is published, could, of itself and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor—the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island. Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the independence of the present insurgent government in Cuba, we find safe precedents in our history from an early day. They are well summed up in President Jackson's message to Congress, December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the independence of Texas. He said: 'In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of the disputes relating to the Crowns of Portugal

and Spain, out of the separation of the American possessions of both from the European Governments, and out of the numerous and constantly occurring struggles for dominion in Spanish America, so wisely consistent with our just principles has been the action of our Government that we have, under the most critical circumstances, avoided all censure, and encountered no other evil than that produced by a transient estrangement of good will in those against whom we have been by force of evidence compelled to decide. It has thus made known to the world that the uniform policy and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other nations, and eventually to recognize the authority of the prevailing party without reference to our particular interests and views or the merits of the original controversy."—*Congressional Record*, Apr. 11, 1898. —The president then "gave the following as just grounds for intervention: 'First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is, therefore, none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door. Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection. Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island. Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon the government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined; where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.'"

—H. E. Flack, *Spanish-American diplomatic relations preceding the War of 1898* (Johns Hopkins University Studies, Jan.-Feb., 1906, pp. 36-37).

ALSO IN: E. J. Benton, *International law and diplomacy of the Spanish-American War*.—F. E. Chadwick, *Relations of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy*.

1898 (April).—Action of Congress empowering the president to intervene in Cuba.—War with Spain.—On April 13, two days after receiving the president's message (see above: 1898 [March-April]), "the House passed a resolution, by a vote of 324 to 19, authorizing and directing the president to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, with the purpose of 'establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable and independent government of their own in the island.' On the same day the Senate committee on foreign relations made a report, dwelling at length on the *Maine* disaster, and directing the president to demand the immedi-

ate withdrawal of Spain from the island. The minority report, however, urging in addition the immediate recognition of the Cuban Republic as then organized, was finally embodied in the Senate resolution, April 16, by a vote of 67 to 21. The two Houses were thus brought into conflict over the question of recognition of the Cuban republic so-called. After two days of heated controversy the Senate gave way, and on April 19, the anniversary of the battle of Lexington, and of the first bloodshed of the Civil War on the streets of Baltimore, the fateful resolution was adopted.—J. H. Latané, *America as a world power, 1897-1907*, pp. 25-26.—The resolution follows: "Resolved, etc. First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent. Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect. Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people."—*Congressional Record*, Apr. 18, 1898, pp. 4421-4422, 4461-4462.—"These resolutions were, of course, equivalent to a declaration of war. As soon as they were approved by the president, April 20, the Spanish minister asked for his passports, thus severing diplomatic relations, and Woodford left Madrid the following day. The American people entered on this war with enthusiasm, eager to test the national strength. Every movement of army and navy was closely watched, and the public was almost hourly informed by the newspapers, through special editions, of what was going on."—*Ibid.*, p. 27.


1898 (April).—Cabinet changes.—Two resignations from the president's cabinet occurred in April, both occasioned by failing health. James A. Gary was succeeded as postmaster-general by Charles Emory Smith, and John Sherman was followed in the secretaryship of state by his first assistant in that office, Judge William R. Day.

1898 (April-May).—War with Spain.—Military preparations.—Regular and volunteer armies.—"Rough Riders."—At the outbreak of the war, the regular army of the United States numbered but 28,000 officers and men. Under authority given by acts of Congress it was rapidly increased, and returns for May, 1898, show 2,191 officers and nearly 42,000 men in the ranks. At the same time, a volunteer army was being speedily raised and equipped. By proclamation of April 23, the president called for 125,000 volunteers, to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the states and territories, according to population. On May 25 he called for 75,000 more. Before the end of May, 118,580 enlisted volunteers, with 6,224 officers, were reported to have been mustered in. These were assembled in various camps and prepared for service in a more or less hurried way. At the beginning, six army corps were constituted, embracing both the regular and volunteers branches of the army. The First Corps, under Major-General John R.

Brooke, and the Third under Major-General James F. Wade, were organized at Camp Thomas, Georgia. The Second was organized under Major-General William M. Graham, at Camp Alger, near Falls Church, Virginia. The organization of the Fourth Corps, Major-General John J. Coppinger, commanding, was begun at Mobile, Alabama. The Fifth Corp was organized at Tampa, Florida, under Major-General William R. Shafter. A Sixth Corps, which had been provided for, was never organized; but the Seventh was formed, at Tampa, Florida, under Major-General Fitzhugh Lee. Subsequently an Eighth Corps was concentrated at San Francisco, and transported to the Philippine islands. Tampa, Florida, was the port chosen for the shipment of troops to Cuba, and extensive preparations were made for the transport service from that point. The movement waited, first, for the preparation of newly levied troops, and, secondly, for naval operations to make the voyage of transports to Cuba safe from attack.—Based on *Annual report of the adjutant-general to the major-general commanding the army, 1898*.—Among the volunteer regiments organized, one known as that of "the Rough Riders" excited public interest in the greatest degree. "Senator Warren, of Iowa, is responsible for the idea of the Rough Riders. He introduced and carried through Congress, aided by Senators Kyle, Carter, and others, a bill authorizing the enrollment of three regiments, to be made up of expert hunters, riflemen, cow-men, frontiers-men, and such other hardy characters as might care to enlist from the Territories. Captain Leonard Wood, of the Medical Corps, was the President's chief medical adviser, and had had much experience in Indian fighting in the West. Theodore Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and had had some knowledge of men and things on the frontier, through his life on his own and other ranches. It was the President's intention to offer to Wood the colonelcy of one regiment, to Roosevelt the colonelcy of a second, and to Griggsby, of Montana, the colonelcy of a third."—E. Marshall, *Story of the Rough Riders*, ch. 1.—Roosevelt, however, declined the colonelcy. In his history of the regiment he says: "Fortunately, I was wise enough to tell the Secretary that while I believed I could learn to command the regiment in a month, yet that it was just this very month which I could not afford to spare, and that therefore I would be quite content to go as Lieutenant-Colonel, if he would make Wood Colonel. This was entirely satisfactory to both the President and Secretary, and, accordingly, Wood and I were speedily commissioned as Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel of the First United States Volunteer Cavalry. This was the official title of the regiment, but for some reason or other the public promptly christened us the 'Rough Riders.' . . . The only organized bodies we were at liberty to accept were those from the four Territories. But owing to the fact that the number of men originally allotted to us, 780, was speedily raised to 1,000, we were given a chance to accept quite a number of eager volunteers who did not come from the Territories. . . . We drew recruits from Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and many another college; from clubs like the Somerset, of Boston, and Knickerbocker, of New York; and from among the men who belonged neither to club nor to college, but in whose veins the blood stirred with the same impulse which once sent the Vikings over sea. Four of the policemen who had served under me, while I was President of the New York Police Board, insisted on coming—two of them to die, the other two to return unhurt

after honorable and dangerous service."—T. Roosevelt, *Rough Riders*, pp. 6-10.—Alexander Brodie, later major of the regiment, was probably the first man systematically to start towards the organization of this particular regiment.

1898 (April-May: Cuba).—War with Spain.—Blockade of Cuban ports.—On April 21 the following instructions were despatched by the secretary of the navy to Rear-Admiral Sampson, appointed that day to the command of the naval force on the Atlantic station: "You will immediately institute a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, extending from Cardenas on the east to Bahia Honda on the west; also, if in your opinion your force warrants, the port of Cienfuegos, on the south side of the island. It is considered doubtful if the present force at your command would warrant a more extensive blockade. It should be borne in mind that wherever the Army is ready to embark for Cuba the Navy will be required to furnish the necessary convoy for its transports. For this



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reason it does not seem desirable that you should undertake at present to blockade any more of the island than has been indicated. It is believed that this blockade will cut off Havana almost entirely from receiving supplies from the outside. The Navy Department is considering the question of occupying the port of Matanzas by a military force large enough to hold it and to open communications with the insurgents, and this may be done at an early date, even before the main party of the Army is ready to embark. If this operation is decided upon, you are directed to co-operate with the Army and assist with such vessels as are necessary to cover and protect such a movement."—*Report of the Secretary of Navy*, 1898, v. 2, p. 175.

ALSO IN: J. D. Long, *New American navy*, v. 1, pp. 227-228.

1898 (April-May: Philippines).—Activities of Aguinaldo, head of the insurrectionary movement in the Philippines.—About the time of the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, the revolutionary leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, a native of Cavité province, "about twenty-eight years old, of mediocre education, but possessing

much native shrewdness and no little military ability, who had been living at Saigon, Siam, went to Singapore. Here he secured a conference with the United States Consul-General, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, on the 24th of April. The insurgent leader [who had left the islands in compliance with the agreement made in December, 1897 with Primo de Rivera the Spanish governor-general (see PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1896-1898)] expressed a desire to return to the Philippines for the purpose of assuming absolute control over the revolutionary forces, and promised that, if permitted to go to Luzon, he would conduct his troops in strict compliance with the rules of civilized warfare. He also stated, referring to the President, that he would lead his forces 'as our commander would direct.' Aguinaldo's request was communicated to Admiral Dewey, then at Hong-Kong. Hong-Kong for a long time had been the real centre of the Filipino revolutionary headquarters, and here it was that their Junta sat and transacted its business. Members of this body repeatedly presented themselves, at the American Consulate requesting that Aguinaldo be permitted to return to the Philippines, pledging that the revolutionary troops would 'obey the laws of civilized warfare,' and that Aguinaldo would 'obey unquestioningly the commander of the United States Forces in the Philippines.' Moreover, many officers of the revolutionary party in Luzon and about Manila had visited our consul there, Mr. Williams, and voluntarily gave him assurance that they would 'swear allegiance to and cheerfully follow our flag.' These statements had been repeated to Admiral Dewey before he received the despatch from Consul-General Pratt at Singapore conveying Aguinaldo's request that he might be allowed to return to the Philippines. Dewey granted the request, but Aguinaldo did not reach Hong-Kong until after the American fleet had sailed for Manila. He appeared, however, at the American Consulate and renewed his petition for permission to join the insurrectionary forces which were then confronting the Spanish troops in Luzon. Their strength was estimated at about 8,000. Our Consul-General at Hong-Kong, Mr. Rounseville Wildman, secured from Aguinaldo a confirmation of the promises already made by the Junta, and these pledges were later renewed by Aguinaldo after he had landed near Manila. Aguinaldo and thirteen other Filipinos took passage on the *McCulloch* when that vessel was returning to the fleet after filing at Hong-Kong the news of Dewey's victory of May 1st. They arrived in Manila Bay May 10th."—R. A. Alger, *Spanish-American War*, pp. 345-347.

1898 (April-June).—War with Spain.—Movements of the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera, and the blockading of it in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.—Sinking of the collier *Merrimac* in the channel.—The opening of hostilities found a Spanish squadron of four armored cruisers (the *Cristobal Colon*, the *Almirante Oquendo*, the *Vizcaya*, and the *Infanta Maria Teresa*) with three torpedo-boat destroyers (the *Pluton*, *Fuor* and *Terror*) and some lighter craft, assembled at the Cape Verde islands, under Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera. They were in Portuguese waters, and Portugal, though friendly to Spain, was forced to issue a proclamation of neutrality, on April 20, which required the Spanish fleet to depart. Some of the vessels then returned to Spain; but the seven named above sailed westward, and their destination became a mystery, very exciting for some time to the American mind. They might attempt to surprise some American coast

city; they might intercept the battle-ship *Oregon*, then making her way from the Pacific coast, by the long circuit around Cape Horn; they might have some plan for breaking the Cuban blockade. Acting on the latter conjecture, and surmising that Porto Rico would be chosen for the Spanish naval base, Admiral Sampson moved in that direction to seek them. He attacked the forts at San Juan (May 12), and satisfied himself that no fleet was in the bay. A week later the Spaniards took refuge in the inner harbor of Santiago, and on May 29, a blockade of Santiago was established by a flying squadron under Commodore W. S. Schley. "Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago June 1, and assumed direct command of the squadron. The blockade, which lasted for over a month, was eagerly watched by the whole American people. The most thrilling incident was the daring but unsuccessful attempt made by Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson to sink the collier *Merrimac* across the entrance to Santiago harbor, undertaken by direction of Admiral Sampson. Electrical torpedoes were attached to the hull of the ship, sea-valves were cut and anchor chains arranged on deck so that she could be brought to a sudden stop. Early on the morning of June 3, Hobson, assisted by a crew of seven seamen, took the collier into the entrance of the harbor under heavy fire and sunk her. The unfortunate shooting away of her steering-gear and the failure of some of the torpedoes to explode kept the ship from sinking at the place elected, so that the plan miscarried. Hobson and his men escaped death as by a miracle, but fell into the hands of the Spaniards. As soon as Cervera was blockaded in Santiago and the government was satisfied that all his ships were with him, it was decided to send an army to co-operate with the navy. Hitherto the war had been a naval war exclusively, and the two hundred thousand volunteers who had responded to the calls of the president in May had been kept in camp in different parts of the country. Most of the regular infantry and cavalry, together with several volunteer regiments, had been assembled at Tampa and organized as the Fifth Army Corps, in readiness to land in Cuba as soon as the navy had cleared the way."—J. H. Latané, *America as a world power, 1897-1907*, pp. 45-46.

ALSO IN: R. P. Hobson, *Sinking of the "Merrimac,"* pp. 63-124.—A. T. Mahan, *Lessons of the war with Spain*, pp. 111-135.—W. S. Schley, *Forty-five years under the flag*, p. 276.—R. H. Titherington, *History of the Spanish-American War of 1898*, ch. 10.—W. A. M. Good, *With Sampson through the war*.

1898 (April-July).—War with Spain.—Destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila bay.—Dewey's relations with Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief.—Arrival of American troops for the occupation of the city.—Commodore George Dewey, commanding the Asiatic squadron, then awaiting orders at Hong Kong, received on April 25 the following despatch by cable from the secretary of the navy: "War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors." Dewey afterwards described the southward run, the search for the enemy, and the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the battle of Manila bay as follows:—"As we cruised southward after leaving Mirs Bay [China, April 27], the weather was such that we could continue the preparation of crews

and ships for action by drilling the men again in battle drills and their stations in case of fire, and for repairing injuries to the ships by shell-fire, while we built barricades of canvas and iron to shield the gun crews, protected the sides and ammunition hoists with lengths of heavy sheet chain faked up and down over a buffer of awnings, and threw overboard much extra wood-work which, while essential to comfort in time of peace, might become ignited in an engagement. Had the Spaniards disposed of their wood-work their ships would have burned less fiercely both at Manila and at Santiago. . . . Just as the consul was leaving Manila he had learned of the sailing of the Spanish squadron for Subig Bay. Thus Admiral Montojo at the last moment seemed to have realized the strategic advantage of Subig over Manila, which we had hoped he would fail to do. When we sighted land near Cape Boñinao early on the morning of April 30 . . . the *Boston* and *Concord* were signalled to proceed at full speed to reconnoitre




ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY

Subig Bay. . . . The distance from Subig Bay to Corregidor was only thirty miles. As we had decided to run past the batteries at the entrance to Manila Bay under cover of darkness, we slowed down and finally stopped. All the commanding officers were signalled to come on board the flag-ship. When they were in my cabin, and Wildes, of the *Boston*, and Walker, of the *Concord*, had corroborated in person the import of their signals that there were no Spanish vessels in the vicinity, I said: "We shall enter Manila Bay to-night and you will follow the motions and movements of the flag-ship, which will lead." . . . When my captains, after receiving their final orders on board the flag-ship, had returned to their own ships, the squadron resumed its course to Corregidor. . . . When we were ten miles from Boca Grande we judged, as we saw signal lights flash, that we had already been sighted either by small vessels acting as scouts or by land lookouts. . . . As we watched the walls of darkness for the first gun-flash, every moment of our progress brought its relief, and now we began to hope that we should get by without being fired on at all. But about ten minutes after midnight, when all except our rear ships had

cleared it, the El Fraile battery opened with a shot that passed between the *Petrel* and the *Raleigh*. The *Boston*, *Concord*, *Raleigh*, and *McCulloch* returned the fire with a few shots. . . . We were safely within the bay. . . . With the coming of broad daylight we finally sighted the Spanish vessels formed in an irregular crescent in front of Cavité. The *Olympia* headed toward them, and in answer to her signal to close up, the distance between our ships was reduced to two hundred yards. The western flank of the Spanish squadron was protected by Cavité Peninsula and the Sangley Point battery, while its eastern flank rested in the shoal water off Las Pinas. The Spanish line of battle was formed by the *Reina Cristina* (flag),

warc that the premature explosions were due to a desire to clear a space in which their ships might manœuvre. At one time a torpedo-launch made an attempt to reach the *Olympia*, but she was sunk by the guns of the secondary battery and went down bow first, and another yellow-colored launch flying the Spanish colors ran out, heading for the *Olympia*, but after being disabled she was beached to prevent her sinking. . . . Though in the early part of the action our firing was not what I should have liked it to be, it soon steadied down, and by the time the *Reina Cristina* steamed toward us it was satisfactorily accurate. The *Castilla* fared little better than the *Reina Cristina*. All except one of her guns was disabled, she was set on fire by



BATTLE OF MANILA

Admiral Dewey's squadron swinging around the ellipse

(Drawn by W. A. Rogers after a sketch made on the despatch-boat *McCulloch* by John T. McCutcheon)

Castilla, *Don Juan de Austria*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Isla de Luzón*, *Isla de Cuba*, and *Marqués del Duero*. . . . The misty haze of the tropical dawn had hardly risen when at 5.15, at long range, the Cavité forts and Spanish squadron opened fire. Our course was not one leading directly toward the enemy, but a converging one, keeping him on our starboard bow. Our speed was eight knots and our converging course and ever-varying position must have confused the Spanish gunners. . . . At 5.40, when we were within a distance of 5,000 yards (two and one-half miles), I turned to Captain Gridley and said: 'You may fire when you are ready, Gridley.' . . . At about the time that the Spanish ships were first sighted, 5.06 [A.M.], two submarine mines were exploded between our squadron and Cavité, some two miles ahead of our column. On account of the distance, I remarked to Lamberton: 'Evidently the Spaniards are already rattled.' However, they explained after-

our shells, and finally abandoned by her crew after they had sustained a loss of twenty-three killed and eighty wounded. The *Don Juan de Austria* was badly damaged and on fire, the *Isla de Luzón* had three guns dismounted, and the *Marqués del Duero* was also in a bad way. Admiral Montojo, finding his flag-ship no longer manageable, half her people dead or wounded, her guns useless and the ships on fire, gave the order to abandon and sink her, and transferred his flag to the *Isla de Cuba* after seven o'clock [A.M.]. Victory was already ours, though we did not know it. Owing to the smoke over the Spanish squadron there were no visible signs of the execution wrought by our guns when we started upon our fifth run past the enemy. We were keeping up our rapid fire, and the flag-ship was opposite the centre of the Spanish line, when, at 7.35, the captain of the *Olympia* made a report to me which was as startling as it

was unexpected. This was to the effect that on board the *Olympia* there remained only fifteen rounds per gun for the 5-inch battery. . . . In detail the injuries which we had received from the Spanish fire were as follows: The *Olympia* was hulled five times and her rigging was cut in several places. One six-pound projectile struck immediately under the position where I was standing. The *Baltimore* was hit five times. The projectile which wounded two officers and six men pursued a most erratic course. It entered the ship's side forward of the starboard gangway, and just above the line of the main deck, passed through the hammock-netting, down through the deck planks and steel deck, bending the deck beam in a ward-room-stateroom, thence upward through the after engine-room coaming, over against the cylinder of a 6-inch gun, disabling the gun, struck and exploded a box of three-pounder ammunition, hit an iron ladder and finally, spent, dropped on deck. The *Boston* had four unimportant hits, one causing a fire which was soon extinguished, and the *Petrel* was struck once. . . . It was not until May 4, however, when all the aftermath of the details of the victory had been cared for, that I found it convenient to send the *McCulloch* to Hong Kong to transmit to Washington the complete news of what the squadron had accomplished, where already many misleading reports had been received from Spanish sources. . . . But the newspapers of May 2 had had a brief announcement of the victory, one of which had been sent by the operator at the Manila cable station before the cable was cut. . . . Not until many weeks later, when the mails began to arrive, did I fully realize how the victory had electrified the whole United States."—*Autobiography of George Dewey*, pp. 204-207, 209-210, 212-215, 217-218, 220-221, 227-229.—"On the 20th of June, General Anderson, with the first detachment of the army, arrived in Manila Bay. Aguinaldo was requested to evacuate Cavité, which request he unwillingly complied with, although his arsenal had been captured by Dewey. Here our troops encamped, as it was the most suitable place for the purpose. General Anderson says, in an official report, that the Tagalog general 'did not seem pleased at the incoming of our land forces, hoping, as I believe, that he could take the city with his own army, with the co-operation of the American fleet.' The change in Aguinaldo's demeanor now became apparent. His patriotism had been but a veneer to hide his ambition. He moved his 'government' to a neighboring town in the same province—Bacoor—and secretly threw every obstacle he could in General Anderson's way. The latter found it exceedingly difficult to get the necessary horses, buffaloes, and carts for army-transportation purposes. Even when he offered pay for these things, the natives replied that under General Aguinaldo's orders they were not permitted to dispose of their wagons, etc. Aguinaldo himself did not offer to assist our troops when attempting to land under the most difficult circumstances. On the other hand, he assumed such an arrogant and hostile attitude towards the Americans that Admiral Dewey reported to Washington, 'Merritt's most difficult problem will be how to deal with the insurgents under Aguinaldo, who has become aggressive and even threatening towards our army.' The landing, July 17th, of the second detachment of United States troops, under General Greene, was followed by a letter from Aguinaldo to General Anderson, in which the latter was warned not to disembark on Filipino soil any additional troops of the United States without his knowledge and consent. Of

course, no attention was paid to this ridiculous demand."—R. A. Alger, *Spanish-American War*, pp. 347-349.—"Aguinaldo was allowed to establish himself in the arsenal, where he opened negotiations with his compatriots. Soon, however, the marine officer in charge of the guard of the naval station was complaining about the constant traversing of his lines by scores of natives, who, of course, might be friends, but might equally well be enemies. As a result, I [George Dewey] sent for Aguinaldo and informed him that he must leave the arsenal, but I would allow him to take up his quarters in Cavité town. From my observation of Aguinaldo and his advisers I decided that it would be unwise to co-operate with him or his adherents in an official manner. Aside from permitting him to establish himself ashore, the only aid rendered him was a gift of some Mauser rifles and an old smooth-bore gun that had been abandoned by the Spanish. He mounted the gun on a float, but I declined to grant his request that our launches tow it across the bay. In short, my policy was to avoid any entangling alliance with the insurgents, while I appreciated that, pending the arrival of our troops, they might be of service in clearing the long neck of land that stretches out from Cavité Peninsula to the environs of Manila. Their numbers increasing by daily additions, the Filipinos slowly but surely drove the Spaniards back toward the city."—*Autobiography of George Dewey*, pp. 245-247.

1898 (May-August).—Conduct of English and German naval officers at Manila.—"Foreign concern in regard to the fate of the Philippines was shown by the action of Great Britain, Germany, France, and Japan in assigning ships to duty in Manila Bay after the destruction of the Spanish fleet. Germany, the interests of which nation in the islands were comparatively of not much value, mobilized at Manila a force stronger than that under the command of Admiral Dewey. Her officers and men displayed sympathy for the Spaniards, committed breaches of international and naval etiquette, and showed disregard and contempt for the blockade established by Dewey, all of which gave rise to serious friction and might have led to an open rupture. The American commander-in-chief, however, compelled respect for his blockade, and gave it to be plainly understood that he would permit no interference with his rights. Mr. Joseph L. Stickney, a newspaper correspondent, who acted as one of Dewey's aides during the battle of Manila Bay, thus described Dewey's action when informed of the landing of provisions in Manila by a German cruiser. Lieutenant Thomas M. Brumby, Dewey's flag lieutenant, was ordered to present the admiral's compliments to Rear-Admiral von Diederich, to inform him of this 'extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse,' and to tell him that 'if he wants a fight he can have it right now.' This prompt notification was effective. It was followed by a disavowal of the action of the cruiser, and a declaration that it was done without instructions. Aguinaldo was prevented from completing his conquest of Subig Bay by the German cruiser *Irene*, which took *Isla Grande* under her protection. The *Raleigh* and *Concord* were at once sent to that point. The *Irene* hastily retired and the Spaniards surrendered to the American ships. When the joint army and navy operations against Manila began on August 13, the German and French men-of-war, the latter being also in sympathy with the Spaniards, occupied a position northwest of the city, which enabled them to command the

American station. The English and Japanese vessels lay off Cavité, not far from the American squadron. The feeling existed on board our ships that the Germans might fire upon them during the bombardment of the city, but if anything of the kind were contemplated—and let us presume that no such intention existed—it was perhaps blocked by the action of Captain Chichester, the senior British naval officer, in placing his command during the bombardment between them and Dewey. Captain Chichester . . . [later] described his relations with Admiral von Diederich. 'When the German admiral sent me word that he was coming aboard my ship to get me to join in a protest against Dewey's action,' he said, 'I looked up international law and spread the books out on my cabin table with the pages open and marked—all in a row—and when he came, I said: "What can I do? This American admiral is so deadly right in all that he has done and all he proposes to do that if we protest we will merely show that we do not understand the law." Of course, there was nothing to be done, and I did it.'—J. D. Long, *New American navy*, v. 2, pp. 111-113.

ALSO IN: J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time*, v. 1, pp. 96-98.—H. C. Lodge, *War with Spain*, ch. 10.

1898 (June).—Act creating United States Industrial Commission.—During this time, the country was much preoccupied with the revival of business, and while great interest was taken in the course of the war, the industrial life of the nation, and the course of legislation through Congress went on without a break. An Act "authorizing the appointment of a non-partisan Commission to collate information and to consider and recommend legislation to meet the problems presented by labor, agriculture, and capital," was passed by Congress and approved by the president June 18, 1898. It provided: "That a commission is hereby created, to be called the 'Industrial Commission,' to be composed as follows. Five members of the Senate, to be appointed by the presiding officer thereof; five members of the House of Representatives, to be appointed by the speaker, and nine other persons, who shall fairly represent the different industries and employments, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." The Commission thus contemplated was duly appointed by the president, and organized by the election of Senator Kyle for its chairman. For the scope and plan of its investigations a committee on procedure made the following recommendations, which were adopted by the commission and which have been followed in what it has done: "The main work of the Commission may . . . be said to be to study and compare existing laws bearing upon industrial conditions, here and elsewhere, to ascertain by competent testimony wherein they are deficient, defective, inoperative, or oppressive, and to recommend such remedial statutes as will tend not only to make the conditions of industry more uniform as between the several States, but to remove such existing sources or causes of discontent, inequality, and injustice as can be reached and regulated through legislation. . . . In order to secure satisfactory results, it appears to your committee imperatively necessary that the work shall be confined strictly to the main purpose, viz, of ascertaining the nature and effects of existing legislation, and the nature of remedial legislation which may be necessary or desirable to equalize conditions in industry and to remove any just grounds of complaint on the part of either labor or capital or of the people at large. To

facilitate the progress of the work we recommend the division of the Commission into four sub-commissions of five members each, to be severally charged with the investigation of present conditions and the formulation of remedial suggestions in the following branches of industry: 1. On agriculture and agricultural labor. 2. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in manufacturing and general business. 3. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in mining. 4. On transportation. In addition, we recommend a fifth sub-commission, to be known as the subcommission on statistics, in the membership of which there shall be one representative of each of the above sub-commissions. . . . The committee also suggests that there are certain subjects of inquiry which appertain equally to all the groups into which it has recommended that the Commission be segregated. The subjects of immigration, of education, of combinations and trusts, and of taxation at once suggest themselves as belonging in this category. It is therefore recommended that these subjects, one or more of them, be examined into by the full Commission pending the organization of the several sub-commissions." The subject to which the commission gave earliest attention was that of "trusts and industrial combinations," on which it submitted a preliminary report on Mar. 1, 1900. The full report of the commission was published in 1901.

1898 (June).—Act providing for the arbitration of disputes between employers and employees in interstate commerce.—The following are the main sections of a very important act of Congress, approved June 1, 1898, which provides for the arbitration of disputes between railway and other employees engaged in interstate commerce and companies or individuals employing them:

That the provisions of this Act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers and their officers, agents, and employees, except masters of vessels and seamen, . . . engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water, for a continuous carriage or shipment, from one State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, to any other State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States. . . .

Sect. 2. That whenever a controversy concerning wages, hours of labor, or conditions of employment shall arise between a carrier subject to this Act and the employees of such carrier, seriously interrupting or threatening to interrupt the business of said carrier, the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor shall, upon the request of either party to the controversy, with all practicable expedition, put themselves in communication with the parties to such controversy, and shall use their best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to amicably settle the same; and if such efforts shall be unsuccessful, shall at once endeavor to bring about an arbitration of said controversy in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Sect. 3. That whenever a controversy shall arise between a carrier subject to this Act and the employees of such carrier which can not be settled by mediation and conciliation in the manner provided in the preceding section, said controversy may be submitted to the arbitration of a board of three persons, who shall be chosen in the manner

following: One shall be named by the carrier or employer directly interested: the other shall be named by the labor organization to which the employees directly interested belong, or, if they belong to more than one, by that one of them which specially represents employees of the same grade and class and engaged in services of the same nature as said employees so directly interested: Provided, however, That when a controversy involves and affects the interests of two or more classes and grades of employees belonging to different labor organizations, such arbitrator shall be agreed upon and designated by the concurrent action of all such labor organizations; and in cases where the majority of such employees are not members of any labor organization, said employees may by a majority vote select a committee of their own number, which committee shall have the right to select the arbitrator on behalf of said employees. The two thus chosen shall select the third commissioner of arbitration; but, in the event of their failure to name such arbitrator within five days after their first meeting, the third arbitrator shall be named by the commissioners named in the preceding section. A majority of said arbitrators shall be competent to make a valid and binding award under the provisions hereof. The submission shall be in writing, shall be signed by the employer and by the labor organization representing the employees, shall specify the time and place of meeting of said board of arbitration, shall state the questions to be decided, and shall contain appropriate provisions by which the respective parties shall stipulate, as follows: First. That the board of arbitration shall commence their hearings within ten days from the date of the appointment of the third arbitrator, and shall find and file their award, as provided in this section, within thirty days from the date of the appointment of the third arbitrator; and that pending the arbitration the status existing immediately prior to the dispute shall not be changed: Provided, That no employee shall be compelled to render personal service without his consent. Second. That the award and the papers and proceedings, including the testimony relating thereto certified under the hands of the arbitrators and which shall have the force and effect of a bill of exceptions, shall be filed in the clerk's office of the circuit court of the United States for the district wherein the controversy arises or the arbitration is entered into, and shall be final and conclusive upon both parties, unless set aside for error of law apparent on the record. Third. That the respective parties to the award will each faithfully execute the same, and that the same may be specifically enforced in equity so far as the powers of a court of equity permit: Provided, That no injunction or other legal process shall be issued which shall compel the performance by any laborer against his will of a contract for personal labor or service. Fourth. That employees dissatisfied with the award shall not by reason of such dissatisfaction quit the service of the employer before the expiration of three months from and after the making of such award without giving thirty days' notice in writing of their intention so to quit. Nor shall the employer dissatisfied with such award dismiss any employee or employees on account of such dissatisfaction before the expiration of three months from and after the making of such award without giving thirty days' notice in writing of his intention so to discharge. Fifth. That said award shall continue in force as between the parties thereto for the period of one year after the same shall go into practical operation, and no new arbitration upon

the same subject between the same employer and the same class of employees shall be had until the expiration of said one year if the award is not set aside as provided in section four. That as to individual employees not belonging to the labor organization or organizations which shall enter into the arbitration, the said arbitration and the award made therein shall not be binding, unless the said individual employees shall give assent in writing to become parties to said arbitration. . . .

Sect. 7. That during the pendency of arbitration under this Act it shall not be lawful for the employer, party to such arbitration, to discharge the employees, parties thereto, except for inefficiency, violation of law, or neglect of duty; nor for the organization representing such employees to order, nor for the employees to unite in, aid, or abet, strikes against said employer; nor, during a period of three months after an award under such an arbitration, for such an employer to discharge any such employees, except for the causes aforesaid, without giving thirty days' written notice of an intent so to discharge; nor for any of such employees, during a like period, to quit the service of said employer without just cause, without giving to said employer thirty days' written notice of an intent so to do; nor for such organization representing such employees to order, counsel, or advise otherwise. Any violation of this section shall subject the offending party to liability for damages; Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any employer, party to such arbitration, from reducing the number of its or his employees whenever in its or his judgment business necessities require such reduction. . . .

Sect. 10. That any employer subject to the provisions of this Act and any officer, agent, or receiver of such employer who shall require any employee, or any person seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into an agreement, either written or verbal, not to become or remain a member of any labor corporation, association, or organization; or shall threaten any employee with loss of employment, or shall unjustly discriminate against any employee because of his membership in such a labor corporation, association, or organization; or who shall require any employee or any person seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into a contract whereby such employee or applicant for employment shall agree to contribute to any fund for charitable, social, or beneficial purposes; to release such employer from legal liability for any personal injury by reason of any benefit received from such fund beyond the proportion of the benefit arising from the employer's contribution to such fund; or who shall, after having discharged an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent such employee from obtaining employment, or who shall, after the quitting of an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent such employee from obtaining employment, is hereby declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district in which such offense was committed, shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars and not more than one thousand dollars.

—*United States Statutes at Large, v. 30, p. 424.*

1898 (June).—War with Spain.—Seizure of the island of Guam.—The following order, dated May 10, 1898, was addressed by the secretary of the navy to the commander of the *U. S. S. Charles-*

ton: "Upon the receipt of this order, which is forwarded by the steamship 'City of Pekin' to you at Honolulu, you will proceed with the 'Charleston' and 'City of Pekin' in company, to Manila, Philippine Islands. On your way, you are hereby directed to stop at the Spanish Island of Guam. You will use such force as may be necessary to capture the port of Guam, making prisoners of the governor and other officials and any armed force that may be there. You will also destroy any fortifications on said island and any Spanish naval vessels that may be there, or in the immediate vicinity. These operations at the Island of Guam should be very brief, and should not occupy more than one or two days. Should you find any coal at the Island of Guam, you will make such use of it as you consider desirable. It is left to your discretion whether or not you destroy it. From the Island of Guam, proceed to Manila and report to Rear-Admiral George Dewey, U. S. N., for duty in the squadron under his command." In a dispatch dated June 24, Captain Glass, of the *Charleston*, reported the execution of these orders as follows: "I have the honor to report that in obedience to the Department's telegraphic order of May 24, 1898, this ship sailed from Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, on the 4th instant for Manila. . . . When clear of land, I opened the confidential order of May 10, 1898, and changed course for the Island of Guam. . . . Arriving off the north end of the island at daylight, June 20, I first visited the port of Agaña, the capital of Guam, and of the Mariana group, and finding no vessels there of any kind, proceeded to San Luis D'Apra, where it was expected that a Spanish gunboat and a military force would be found, a rumor to that effect having reached me while at Honolulu. Arriving off the port at 8.30 a. m., it was found that Fort Santiago, on Oroté Point, was abandoned and in ruins, and I steamed directly into the harbor, having ordered the transports to take a safe position outside and await instructions. A few shots were fired from the secondary battery at Fort Santa Cruz to get the range and ascertain if it was occupied. Getting no response, ceased firing and came to anchor in a position to control the harbor, and it was then found that this fort also was abandoned. . . . At 8.30 a. m. on June 21 Lieut. William Brauersreuther was sent ashore, under flag of truce, with a written demand for the immediate surrender of the defenses of the Island of Guam and all officials and persons in the military service of Spain. Mr. Brauersreuther was directed to wait half an hour only for a reply, to bring the governor and other officials on board as prisoners of war in case of surrender, or in case of refusal or delay beyond the time given, to return and take command of the landing force, which he would find in readiness, and proceed to Agaña. At 12.15 p. m. Mr. Brauersreuther returned to the ship, bringing off the governor and three other officers, his staff, and handed me a letter from the governor acceding fully to my demand. Having received the surrender of the Island of Guam, I took formal possession at 2.45 p. m., hoisting the American flag on Fort Santa Cruz and saluting it with 21 guns from the 'Charleston.'"—*Annual Reports of the Navy Department*, 1898, v. 2, pp. 151-153.

1898 (June-July).—War with Spain.—Expedition of the army under General Shafter against Santiago de Cuba.—Battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill.—To cooperate with the navy in operations for the capture of Santiago de Cuba, and of the Spanish fleet blockaded in the harbor of that town, orders were issued from Washington

on May 31 by Major-General Miles, commanding the army, "with the approval of the Secretary of War," which directed General Shafter, commanding the forces assembled at Tampa, Florida, to place them on transports and proceed with them, under convoy of the navy, to Santiago. Owing to an extreme lack of both railway and harbor facilities at Tampa, an entire week was consumed in the embarkation of the troops and supplies. When on shipboard, the expedition was delayed another week by false reports of the appearance of Spanish cruisers on the Cuban coast, which seemed to the Washington authorities to call for a stronger naval convoy to guard the transport fleet. It was not until June 14 that the fleet was permitted to sail, with 16,000 men. It arrived off Guantanamo, near Santiago, on the morning of June 20. Meantime, the blockading fleet had bombarded the forts at Santiago twice, on June 6, and on the 16th, and had silenced them, for the time being, on both occasions, but apparently with no permanent effect. With more success, two vessels from the fleet had entered the harbor of Guantanamo on June 7 and taken possession of the lower bay, where a marine battalion was landed on June 10 and established in camp, to hold ground until the army arrived. Meantime, also, communication with General García, commanding Cuban forces, had been opened, and arrangements made, the results of which were subsequently acknowledged by General Miles, in his annual report, as follows: "General García regarded my requests as his orders, and promptly took steps to execute the plan of operations. He sent 3,000 men to check any movement of the 12,000 Spaniards stationed at Holguín. A portion of this latter force started to the relief of the garrison at Santiago, but was successfully checked and turned back by the Cuban forces under General Feria. General García also sent 2,000 men, under Pérez, to oppose the 6,000 Spaniards at Guantánamo, and they were successful in their object. He also sent 1,000 men, under General Ríos, against the 6,000 men at Manzanillo. Of this garrison, 3,500 started to reinforce the garrison at Santiago, and were engaged in no less than thirty combats with the Cubans on their way before reaching Santiago. . . . With an additional force of 5,000 men General García besieged the garrison of Santiago, taking up a strong position on the west side and in close proximity to the harbor, and he afterwards received General Shafter and Admiral Sampson at his camp near that place. He had troops in the rear, as well as on both sides of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival of our troops."—*Annual Reports of the War Department*, 1898, v. 1, pt. 2, p. 16.—The troops from Tampa, under General Shafter, arriving on June 20, were disembarked on June 22, 23 and 24, at Daiquiri, and advanced to Siboney. The first resistance encountered was at La Guasima, three miles from Siboney, on the Santiago road, where the Spaniards were driven from strong entrenchments by a part of Young's brigade of General Wheeler's cavalry division (dismounted). The brigade thus first in the fighting was composed of the 1st and 10th regiments of regular cavalry and the First United States Volunteer cavalry, commonly called the "Rough Riders." After the engagement at La Guasima, six days were occupied in concentrating the army (including the Cuban auxiliaries of General García), mostly at Sevilla, a short distance beyond La Guasima, on the same road, and in overcoming great difficulties of transportation for supplies. On June 30, General Shafter reconnoitered the country around Santiago and

made his plan of attack. "From a high hill," says his subsequent report, "from which the city was in plain view, I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The roads were very poor, and, indeed, little better than bridle-paths, until the San Juan River and El Caney were reached. The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great importance to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be used to assail the right flank and rear of any force operating against San Juan Hill. In view of this I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caney with one division, while sending two divisions on the direct road to Santiago, passing by El Poso House, and, as a diversion, to direct a small force against Aguadores from Siboney along the railroad by the sea, with a view of attracting the attention of the Spaniards in the latter direc-

than had been anticipated, and prevented Lawton from joining the right of the main line during the day, as had been intended. After the battle had continued for some time Bates's brigade of two regiments [3rd and 20th U. S. Infantry] reached my headquarters from Siboney. I directed him to move near El Caney, to give assistance, if necessary. He did so and was put in position between Miles and Chaffee. The battle continued with varying intensity during most of the day and until the place was carried by assault, about 4.30 p. m. As the Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago road, Ludlow's position enabled him to do very effective work and to practically cut off all retreat in that direction. After the battle at El Caney was well opened and the sound of the small-arms fire caused us to believe that Lawton was driving the enemy before him, I directed Grimes's battery to open fire from the heights of El Poso



CAPTURE OF EL CANEY, JULY 1, 1898

(From drawing by Howard Chandler Christy)

tion and of preventing them from attacking our left flank. During the afternoon I assembled the division commanders and explained to them my general plan of battle. Lawton's division [composed of Chaffee's, Miles' and Ludlow's brigades], assisted by Capron's light battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon toward El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning. . . . Early on the morning of July 1, Lawton was in position around El Caney, Chaffee's brigade [7th, 12th, and 13th U. S. Infantry] on the right, across the Guantanamo road; Miles's brigade [1st, 4th, and 25th U. S. Infantry] in the center, and Ludlow's [8th and 22d U. S. Infantry and 2d Massachusetts Volunteers] on the left. The duty of cutting off the enemy's retreat along the Santiago road was assigned to the latter brigade. The artillery opened on the town at 6.15 A.M. The battle here soon became general and was hotly contested. The enemy's position was naturally strong and was rendered more so by blockhouses, a stone fort, and entrenchments cut in solid rock, and the loopholing of a solidly built stone church. The opposition offered by the enemy was greater

on the San Juan blockhouse, which could be seen situated in the enemy's entrenchments extending along the crest of San Juan Hill. This fire was effective and the enemy could be seen running away from the vicinity of the blockhouse. The artillery fire from El Poso was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evidently had the range of this hill, and their first shells killed and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the positions of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery. At this time the cavalry division [of General Wheeler] under General Sumner [commanding temporarily in consequence of the illness of General Wheeler, who returned to duty that day], which was lying concealed in the general vicinity of the El Poso House, was ordered forward, with directions to cross the San Juan River and deploy to the right on the Santiago side, while Kent's division was to follow closely in its rear and deploy to the left. These troops moved forward in compliance with orders, but the road was so narrow as to render it impracticable


to retain the column of fours formation at all points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the long range rifles of the enemy's infantry killed and wounded a number of our men while marching along this road and before there was any opportunity to return this fire. At this time Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to push forward with all possible haste and place their troops in position to engage the enemy. General Kent, with this end in view, forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that stream. A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This information he furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left. . . . After crossing the stream, the cavalry moved to the right with a view of connecting with Lawton's left when he should come up, and with their left resting near the Santiago road. In the meanwhile Kent's division with the exception of two regiments of Hawkins's brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from the forks previously mentioned in the road, utilizing both trails, but more especially the one to the left, and crossing the creek formed for attack in the front of San Juan Hill."—*Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, v. 1, pt. 2, p. 147.*—"The particulars of this gallant attack, which won the hill and decided the fate of Santiago, are given with more clearness in the report of General Kent, who commanded the division which had most of the fighting to do, than in that of General Shafter. Wikoff's 'heroic brigade,' writes General Kent, 'consisting of the 13th, 9th, and 24th U. S. Infantry, speedily crossed the stream and were quickly deployed to the left of the lower ford. While personally superintending this movement Colonel Wikoff was killed, the command of the brigade then devolving upon Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, 13th Infantry, who immediately fell severely wounded, and then upon Lieutenant-Colonel Lisicum, 24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the withering fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, 9th Infantry. Meanwhile I had again sent a staff officer to hurry forward the second brigade [Pearson's] which was bringing up the rear. The 10th and 2d Infantry, soon arriving at the forks, were reflected to the left to follow the Third Brigade [Wikoff's], while the 21st was directed along the main road to support Hawkins [whose brigade was composed of the 6th and 16th U. S. Infantry and the 71st N. Y. Volunteers]. Crossing the lower ford a few minutes later, the 10th and 2d moved forward in column in good order toward the green knoll . . . on the left. Approaching the knoll the regiments deployed, passed over the knoll, and ascended the high ridge beyond, driving back the enemy in the direction of his trenches. I observed this movement from the Fort San Juan Hill. . . . Prior to this advance of the second brigade, the third, connecting with Hawkins's gallant troops on the right, had moved toward Fort San Juan, sweeping through a zone of most destructive fire, scaling a steep and difficult hill, and assisting in capturing the enemy's strong position (Fort San Juan) at 1.30 p. m. This crest was about 125 feet above the general level

and was defended by deep trenches and a loop-holed brick fort surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements. General Hawkins, some time after I reached the crest, reported that the 6th and 16th Infantry had captured the hill, which I now consider incorrect. Credit is almost equally due the 6th, 9th, 13th, 16th, and 24th regiments of infantry. . . . The Thirteenth Infantry captured the enemy's colors waving over the fort, but unfortunately destroyed them. . . . The greatest credit is due to the officers of my command, whether company, battalion, regimental, or brigade commanders, who so admirably directed the formation of their troops, unavoidably intermixed in the dense thicket, and made the desperate rush for the distant and strongly defended crest. . . . The enemy having retired to a second line of rifle pits, I directed my line to hold their positions and intrench. At ten minutes past 3 p. m. I received almost simultaneously two requests—one from Colonel Wood, commanding a cavalry brigade, and one from General Sumner—asking for assistance for the cavalry on my right, 'as they were hard pressed.' I immediately sent to their aid the 13th Infantry, who promptly went on this further mission, despite the heavy losses they had already sustained. Great credit is due to the gallant officer and gentleman, Brig. Gen. H. S. Hawkins, who, placing himself between the two regiments, leading his brigade, the 6th and 16th Infantry, urged and led them by voice and bugle calls to the attack so successfully accomplished."—*Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, v. 1, pt. 2, p. 164.*—The part borne by the dismounted cavalry division in the capture of the Spanish intrenchments on San Juan Hill is described as follows in the report of General Sumner, temporarily in command: "After crossing the creek with sufficient strength to hold it and protect the crossing, I received verbal orders to move by the right flank to connect with Lawton's left. During the execution of this movement a balloon, under command of Colonel Derby, came up the road, forcing open Wood's Brigade and cutting it in two, thereby delaying the movement. The artillery fire of the enemy opened upon the balloon and continued for more than an hour, thereby subjecting part of my command massed and the rest moving by the flank to long shrapnel fire. Many officers and men were wounded here by exploding shells and small arms' firing of the enemy. After completing the deployment the command was so much committed to battle that it became necessary either to advance or else retreat under fire. Lieutenant Miley, representing General Shafter, authorized an advance, which was ordered, Carroll's brigade taking the advance, reinforced on the right by Roosevelt's regiment and supported by the 1st and 10th Cavalry of Wood's Brigade. The advance was made under heavy infantry fire through open flat ground, cut up by wire fences, to the creek, distant about 600 yards. The advance was made in good order, the enemy's fire being returned only under favorable opportunities. In crossing the flat one officer (Captain O'Neil) and several men were killed and several officers and men wounded. Both sides of the creek are heavily wooded for about 200 yards. The creek was swollen, and the crossing through this space and the creek was made with great difficulty. After passing through the thick woods the ground was entirely open and fenced by wire. From this line it was necessary to storm the hill, upon the top of which is a house loop-holed, etc., for defense. The slope of the hill is very difficult, but the assault was made with great gallantry and with much loss to the enemy. In

this assault Colonel Hamilton, Lieutenants Smith and Shipp were killed; Colonel Carroll, Lieutenant Thayer and Myer were wounded. A number of casualties occurred among the enlisted men. After taking this hill the front line advanced to take the Fort San Juan Hill under fire from strong force of the enemy in trenches and house known as 'Blockhouse.' . . . The assault was successful, the line storming the trenches and blockhouse with conspicuous gallantry and coolness, capturing three prisoners, wounding and killing many of the enemy. . . . Connected with my left, Hawkins's brigade of Kent's division carried everything in front of it and captured the house and hill known as 'Fort San Juan' proper."—*Annual Reports of the War Department*, 1898, v. 1, pt. 2, p. 370.—Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt (afterwards president of the United States), who commanded the Rough Riders regiment that day, while Colonel Wood commanded the brigade, tells the story of the fight, and what followed, very tersely, in his report: "After crossing the river at the ford," says the Lieutenant-Colonel, "we were moved along and up its right bank under fire, and were held in reserve at a sunken road. Here we lost a good many men, including Captain O'Neil, killed, and Lieutenant Haskell, wounded. We then received your order to advance and support the regular cavalry in the attack on the intrenchments and blockhouses on the hills to the left. The regiment was deployed on both sides of the road, and moved forward until we came to the rearmost lines of the regulars. We continued to move forward until I ordered a charge, and the men rushed the blockhouse and rifle pits on the hill to the right of our advance. They did the work in fine shape, though suffering severely. The guidons of Troops E and G were first planted on the summit, though the first men up were some A and B troopers who were with me. We then opened fire on the intrenchments on a hill to our left which some of the other regiments were assailing and which they carried a few minutes later. Meanwhile we were under a heavy rifle fire from the intrenchments along the hills to our front, from whence they also shelled us with a piece of field artillery until some of our marksmen silenced it. When the men got their wind we charged again and carried the second line of intrenchments with a rush. Swinging to the left, we then drove the Spaniards over the brow of the chain of hills fronting Santiago. By this time the regiments were much mixed, and we were under a very heavy fire, both of shrapnel and from rifles from the batteries, intrenchments, and forts immediately in front of the city. On the extreme front I now found myself in command with fragments of the six cavalry regiments of the two brigades under me. The Spaniards made one or two efforts to retake the line, but were promptly driven back. Both General Sumner and you sent me word to hold the line at all hazards, and that night we dug a line of intrenchments across our front, using the captured Spaniard's intrenching tools. We had nothing to eat except what we captured from the Spaniards; but their dinners had fortunately been cooked, and we ate them with relish, having been fighting all day. We had no blankets and coats, and lay by the trenches all night. The Spaniards attacked us once in the night, and at dawn they opened a heavy artillery and rifle fire. Very great assistance was rendered us by Lieutenant Parker's Gatling battery at critical moments; he fought his guns at the extreme front of the firing line in a way that repeatedly called forth the cheers of my men. One of the Spanish

batteries which was used against us was directly in front of the hospital so that the red cross flag flew over the battery, saving it from our fire for a considerable period. The Spanish Mauser bullets made clean wounds; but they also used a copper-jacketed or brass-jacketed bullet which exploded, making very bad wounds indeed. Since then we have continued to hold the ground; the food has been short; and until today [July 4] we could not get our blankets, coats, or shelter tents, while the men lay all day under the fire from the Spanish batteries, intrenchments, and guerrillas in trees, and worked all night in the trenches, never even taking off their shoes. But they are in excellent spirits, and ready and anxious to carry out any orders they receive. At the end of the first day the eight troops were commanded, two by captains, three by first lieutenants, two by second lieutenants, and one by the sergeant whom you made acting lieutenant. We went into the fight about 490 strong; 86 were killed or wounded, and there are about half a dozen missing. The great heat prostrated nearly 40 men, some of them among the best in the regiment."—*Annual Reports of the War Department*, 1898, v. 1, pt. 2, p. 684.—The troops which had carried San Juan Hill were intrenched, that night, in the positions they had gained, and those which had taken El Caney were brought into connection with them, Lawton's division on their right and Bates's brigade on the left. The battle was renewed by the Spaniards soon after daylight on the morning of July 2, and raged with more or less fury throughout the day. That evening, about 10 o'clock, a fierce attempt was made to break through the American lines, but without success. Again, on the morning of July 3, the Spaniards reopened battle, but with less vigor than before. General Shafter then sent the following letter to General Toral, the Spanish commander: "I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and all women and children, that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning." In reply, General Toral wrote: "It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message." Several of the foreign consuls at Santiago then came into the American lines and persuaded General Shafter to delay the shelling of the town until noon of July 5, provided that the Spanish forces made no demonstration meantime against his own. This established a truce which was renewed, in a series of negotiations until July 10. "I was of the opinion," reported General Shafter, "that the Spaniards would surrender if given a little time, and I thought this result would be hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand they would be well treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon this presumption I determined to offer to return all the wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not to serve against the forces of the United States until regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates, 27 in all, were sent to their lines under the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with honors, and I have every reason to believe the return of the Spanish prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades. The cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically terminated the battle of Santiago." General Shafter goes on to say that when the battle was fiercest, on July 1, he prob-

ably had no more than 12,000 men on the firing line, not counting a few Cubans who assisted in the attack on El Caney, and who fought with valor. They were confronted by about equal numbers of the enemy, in strong and intrenched positions. "Our losses in these battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers and 1,203 men wounded; missing 79. The missing, with few exceptions, reported later." Up to this time, General Shafter had been unable to complete the investment of the town with his own men, and had depended upon General Garcia with his Cubans, placed on the extreme right of the American lines, to watch for and intercept reinforcements. They failed to do so, and 2,800 Spaniards, under General Escario, entered the city on the night of July 2. The American commander now extended his own lines



WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY

as rapidly as possible and completed the investment of the town.—Based on *Annual Reports of the War Department*, 1898, v. 1, pt. 2, p. 155-157.

ALSO IN: J. D. Wiley, *In Cuba with Shafter*, ch. 6.—J. Wheeler, *Santiago campaign*.—E. E. Britton, *Battles around Santiago, as observed by a Swedish officer (Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, May, 1900)*.—H. C. Lodge, *War with Spain*.

1898 (July).—Annexation of Hawaiian islands. See HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: 1897-1898.

1898 (July 1).—National bankrupt law.—After years of effort on the part of its advocates, a national bankrupt law was enacted by both Houses of Congress and received the president's signature on July 1, 1898.

1898 (July 3).—Destruction of the Spanish squadron at Santiago.—"Admiral Cervera saw himself bottled up in the harbor [of Santiago] with great dismay. He opposed from the first the expedition to the West Indies and would have got

away at the earliest moment, but coaling was slow and General Blanco feared that his army, already near the point of mutiny, would take it for abandonment by their country and break out in disorders, to subdue which must occasion the spilling of much blood. Thus was allowed to pass the first days of the blockade, when a successful sortie was most possible. The army in Cuba thought a second fleet would be sent to drive off Sampson's ships and then to unite with Cervera to sweep all opposition from the seas; but the higher officers, naval and military, knew how futile was this hope. The arrival of Shafter added to their discouragement, and some of the guns of the squadron were landed to strengthen the land defenses. Marines were also sent to the trenches, and Captain Bustamente leading a detachment of 500, lost his life on July 1 in defending San Juan Hill. June 24 Cervera, by cable, had been placed under command of Blanco, who ordered him to aid in the defense of the city until surrender seemed inevitable and then to go out in the best manner possible. This contingency was believed to have arrived on the evening of July 1, but the admiral hesitated on account of what he believed the useless loss of life. At dawn on the 2d he unwillingly directed his fires to be lighted and called his sailors on board. A few minutes later all his doubts were resolved by peremptory instructions from Havana to make the sortie. Blanco felt it would be a blot on Spanish honor to allow the ships to fall into the hands of the enemy without a blow. All day Saturday, July 2, the steam rose in the gauges. Sunday morning it was at the highest point, and all the preparations were complete. Cervera gave the order of proceeding. Like a brave officer he took the lead in the *Maria Teresa*, with the *Vizcaya*, *Colon*, and *Oquendo* following in order at intervals of 800 yards, all armored cruisers of the modern type. Behind them, at 1,000 yards, came the torpedo-boat destroyers, the *Furor* and *Pluton*. . . . He proposed to turn westward when outside, try to ram the *Brooklyn* on the west end of Sampson's line, draw the other American ships to him, and thus give the ships that came later an opportunity to break through and escape. Such tactics would mean the loss of the *Teresa*, but they might save the rest of the squadron. The start was made from the inner harbor at 9:15 A.M. That morning the American ships were in a crescent, the ends three miles apart and two and a half miles respectively from the shore. Farthest west was the *Brooklyn*, Commodore Schley's flagship, a fast and powerful cruiser. . . . At 9:30 o'clock the *Teresa* was sighted going at full speed. Schley, in actual command; signalled, 'Clear ship for action,' and 'Close up.' Sampson soon saw what was happening, signalled the attack, and made all speed for the fray. Only the *Oregon* had full steam up, and for a few minutes the other ships were outstripped by the enemy. The *Teresa* made straight for the *Brooklyn*, which at 1,400 yards turned eastward, made a great loop, and came back to the west in a course parallel to the flying *Teresa*. By this time the other Spanish ships were outside. Instead of scattering, they followed their admiral along the shore, each engaged with the American ship which, sailing in a parallel course farther out at sea, happened to be nearest to her. Thus the action resolved itself into a series of magnificent duels between powerful ironclads, metal ringing on metal, while the cannon roared, the great engines throbbed, and the air was filled by the clouds of smoke, which rushed from the overcharged boilers. The Spaniards' aim was bad, or their powder poor, for

MAP ILLUSTRATING THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN IN THE

Spanish-American War, SHOWING POSITION OF TROOPS DURING THE LAST DAYS OF THE SIEGE, JULY, 1898.

American Troops : ———
 Spanish Troops : ———
 Cuban Troops : ———
 Spanish Forts : ———

SCALE OF MILES

Gen. Shafter's Headquarters, from June 30th until the surrender.


Gen. Wheeler's American position

Gen. Liner's Spanish Position

Gen. Wheeler's position

Gen. Wheeler's position

Gen. Wheeler's position



C A R I B B E A N S E A

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their shots went wild or fell short, while the American gunnery was excellent. It was more than the enemy could stand, and the explosion of shell after shell in his vessels showed that he was losing the fight. The *Teresa*, in the thickest of the battle, first showed signs of weakening. At 10:15 she ran for the beach six and a half miles from the harbor, a complete wreck. Five minutes later the *Oquendo*, in even worse condition, repeated the maneuver and settled in the sand half a mile west of the *Teresa*. The *Furor* and *Pluton*, last out of the harbor, were raked by the small guns of the American ships and engaged by the *Gloucester* at short range with great courage. They quickly succumbed and sank before they could reach the beach. The other Spanish ships, the *Vizcaya* and *Colon*, passed the first danger zone with a faint hope of escape. They were pursued by the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas*, and *Iowa*, whose rising fires ever increased their speed. At 11 o'clock the *Vizcaya*, shot-ridden and sinking, turned to the shore and ended her course twenty miles from Santiago. The *Iowa* and *Texas* halted to receive her surrender and rescue her drowning crew, while the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and *New York*, which was now coming up, held on after the *Colon*, six miles in the lead. The pursuers held their fire and crowded on all possible steam. At 12:23 the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* were in range and opened fire. At 1:15 the *Colon* gave up the struggle and ran toward the shore. She was nearly uninjured, but her crew opened her sea valves, and she sank before the victors could prevent it. Thus four hours after Cervera began his dash the last of his ships was destroyed, 323 of his crew were killed, 151 were wounded, and 1782 were prisoners, he himself being among the last-named and on board of the *Iowa*. Sampson lost one man killed and one wounded, and his ships were uninjured. He himself, because of his unlucky position at the beginning, was not in the fight, but pursued it as fast as his swift cruiser, the *New York*, could move, and came up in time to be present at the surrender of the *Colon*.—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 799-801.—“In the evening the Secretary of War received a dispatch from General Shafter transmitting a message from Captain Cotton, of the *Harvard*, announcing that Admiral Sampson had signaled that Cervera had escaped and that the admiral was in pursuit. . . . Spain's power was destroyed. Santiago's fall was certain. Peace was the inevitable and early outcome. The destruction of the Spanish division released our entire battle fleet. By the annihilation of Cervera's fleet, officers and men had performed their duty. It was now for the nation by practical act to show its appreciation of the stupendous victory—a victory remarkable for the loss of but a single life of the immaterial damage done our men-of-war.”—J. D. Long, *New American navy*, v. 2, pp. 42-43.—The following is a translation, from Admiral Cervera's report, as partly published in newspapers at Madrid, giving his description of the destruction of his flagship and his own rescue from death: “The enemy's fire produced terrible damages on board the ‘Infanta Maria Teresa,’ destroying the elements of defence—among others, the net for protection against fire. In this critical moment the captain of the ship, Señor Concas, fell wounded, and it was necessary to withdraw him, I taking command of the vessel, because it was impossible to find the second commandant of the ‘Maria Teresa.’ Immediately afterwards they reported to me that my cabin was burning in consequence of an explosion. The fire soon became very

great and ignited other parts of the ship. I gave orders to my aid to flood the after magazines, but it was impossible. Dense clouds of smoke impeded walking in the passages and practicing any kind of operations. In this situation I could only think of beaching the ship, and did so, running aground on Punta Cabrera. The contest was impossible on our side, and there was nothing more to be done but to save as much as possible. I thought to lower the flag, but that was not possible on account of the fire, which prevented all operations. In these anxious moments two boats came to the aid of the ‘Maria Teresa,’ into which a number of us jumped. Those that were not dying were saved with nothing. The ‘Teresa’ lowered a small boat, which sank before it could be of any service. Subsequently they succeeded in launching a steam launch, but this also sank after making one voyage to the beach. I succeeded in saving myself with nothing, two sailors helping me, one named Andres Sequeros and the officer D. Angel Cervera, all of us arriving on board the American ship ‘Gloucester’ naked. At this time we were all naked.”—*Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy*, 1898, v. 2, pp. 558-559.

After the battle “a controversy arose between the friends of Admiral Sampson and those of Commodore Schley in reference to the conduct of the latter at Santiago. When Sampson steamed up as the *Colon* was sinking, Schley signaled congratulation and received the curt reply, ‘Report your casualties.’ To the public this seemed ungenerous. Sampson's promotion was not generally approved in the first instance, and his conduct after the battle seemed to support the opinion that he was not only a pet of the bureaucracy but a heartless seeker of his own glory. Such a view did Sampson injustice. He was a good officer and had conducted the campaign well, but the public was in no mood to recognize it. When President McKinley, in distributing the rewards for the commanders of ships at Santiago, recommended that Sampson be advanced eight numbers and Schley six, the controversy became acute. The senate reflected the feeling in the country and deferred consideration. By this time feeling ran high on both sides, and so many charges were made against Schley that in 1901 he demanded an investigation. Admiral Dewey presided over the court of inquiry, whose verdict acquitted Schley of cowardice, which had been freely charged by his critics, but it found that he was vacillating and unenterprising before June 1, 1898. Dewey, in a separate opinion, declared that Schley was in command at the battle of Santiago and deserved the credit for the victory. President Roosevelt, reviewing the verdict, supported the finding of the majority of the court and declared that Sampson was technically in command in the battle, but that it was ‘a captain's fight.’ This disposal of the dispute did not satisfy the public, although McKinley's recommendations were finally accepted by the senate, and the controversy died slowly.”—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, p. 804.

ALSO IN: H. H. Sargent, *Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*.—J. R. Spears, *Our navy in the war with Spain*.

1898 (July 4-17).—Surrender of Santiago and of all the Spanish forces in eastern Cuba.—The following is a continuation of the report made by General Shafter of his operations at Santiago de Cuba, resulting in the surrender of the entire forces of Spain in eastern Cuba: “The information of our naval victory was transmitted under flag of truce to the Spanish commander in Santiago on

July 4, and the suggestion again made that he surrender to save needless effusion of blood. On the same date I informed Admiral Sampson that if he would force his way into the harbor the city would surrender without any further sacrifice of life. Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the navy should not enter the harbor. In the meanwhile letters passing between General Toral and myself caused the cessation of hostilities to continue; each army, however, continued to strengthen its intrenchments. I was still of the opinion the Spaniards would surrender without much more fighting, and on July 6 called General Toral's attention to the changed conditions and at his request gave him time to consult his home Government. This he did, asking that the British consul, with the employees of the cable company, be permitted to return from El Caney to the city. This I granted. The strength of the enemy's position was such I did not wish to assault if it could be avoided. An examination of the enemy's works, made after the surrender, fully justified the wisdom of the course adopted. The intrenchments could only have been carried with very great loss of life, probably with not less than 3,000 killed and wounded. On July 8 General Toral offered to march out of the city with arms and baggage, provided he would not be molested before reaching Holguin, and to surrender to the American forces the territory then occupied by him. I replied that while I would submit his proposition to my home Government, I did not think it would be accepted. In the meanwhile arrangements were made with Admiral Sampson that when the army again engaged the enemy the navy would assist by shelling the city from ships stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every few minutes. On July 10 the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of Columbia arrived, and were placed on the line to the right of the cavalry division. This enabled me to push Lawton further to the right and to practically command the Cobra road. On the afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce was broken off at 4 p. m., and I determined to open with four batteries of artillery, and went forward in person to the trenches to give the necessary orders; but the enemy anticipated us by opening fire with his artillery a few minutes after the hour stated. His batteries were apparently silenced before night, while ours continued playing upon his trenches until dark. During this firing the navy fired from Aguadores, most of the shells falling in the city. There was also some small-arms firing. On this afternoon and the next morning we lost Capt. Charles W. Rowell, 2d Infantry, and 1 man killed, and Lieutenant Lutz, 2d Infantry, and 10 men wounded. On the morning of July 11 the bombardment by the Navy and my field guns was renewed and continued until nearly noon, and on the same day I reported to the Adjutant-General of the Army that the right of Ludlow's brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. Thus our hold upon the enemy was complete. At 2 p. m. on this date, the 11th, the surrender of the city was again demanded. The firing ceased and was not again renewed. By this date the sickness in the army was increasing very rapidly as a result of exposure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and the heavy rains. Moreover, the dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bring the siege to an end, but in common with most of the officers of the army I did not think an assault would be justifiable, es-

pecially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in their preliminary propositions to surrender. On July 11 I wrote General Toral as follows: 'With the largely increased forces which have come to me, and the fact that I have your line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems fitting that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of Santiago and of your excellency's army. I am authorized to state that should your excellency so desire the Government of the United States will transport the entire command of your excellency to Spain.' General Toral replied that he had communicated my proposition to his general-in-chief, General Blanco. July 12 I informed the Spanish commander that Major-General Miles, commander-in-chief of the American Army, had just arrived in my camp, and requested him to grant us a personal interview on the following day. He replied he would be pleased to meet us. The interview took place on the 13th, and I informed him his surrender only could be considered, and that as he was without hope of escape he had no right to continue the fight. On the 14th another interview took place, during which General Toral agreed to surrender, upon the basis of his army, the Fourth Army Corps, being returned to Spain, the capitulation embracing all of eastern Cuba east of a line passing from Acerraderos on the south to Sagua de Tanamo on the north, via Palma Soriano. It was agreed commissioners should meet during the afternoon to definitely arrange the terms. . . . The terms of surrender finally agreed upon included about 12,000 Spanish troops in the city and as many more in the surrendered district. It was arranged the formal surrender should take place between the lines on the morning of July 17, each army being represented by 100 armed men. At the time appointed, I appeared at the place agreed upon with my general officers, staff, and 100 troopers of the Second Cavalry under Captain Brett. General Toral also arrived with a number of his officers and 100 infantry. We met midway between the representatives of our two armies, and the Spanish commander formally consummated the surrender of the city and the 24,000 troops in Santiago and the surrendered district. After this ceremony I entered the city with my staff and escort, and at 12 o'clock noon the American flag was raised over the governor's palace with appropriate ceremonies."—*Annual Reports of the War Department*, 1898, v. 2, pp. 157-159.

ALSO IN: N. W. Wilson, *Downfall of Spain*.

1898 (July-August).—Army administration.—Red-tape and politics.—Their working in the campaign.—"The Cuban campaign had been foreseen by intelligent officers for more than a year, but the department which clothes the army had taken no steps toward providing a suitable uniform for campaigning in the tropics until war was declared. The Fifth Army Corps, a comparatively small body of 17,000 men, was concentrated at Tampa on the railroad within reach of all the appliances for expediting business. Between April 26, when war was declared, and June 6, when the corps embarked for Cuba, sufficient time elapsed to have clothed 1,000,000 men if the matter had been handled in the same manner a wholesale clothing firm would handle similar business. Yet the corps went to Cuba wearing the winter clothing it had brought on its backs from Montana, Wyoming, and Michigan. It endured the heat of the tropics clad in this, and was furnished with light summer clothing by the department to wear for its return to Montauk, where the breezes were so bracing that the teeth chattered even when the

men were clad in winter clothing. The only reason for this absolute failure to properly clothe the army was that the methods of the department are too slow and antiquated for the proper performance of business. There was no lack of money. It was a simple case of red-tape delays. There can be no doubt that the intention was that the summer clothing should be worn in Cuba and that there should be warm clothing issued at Montauk. It was issued after the troops had shivered for days in their light clothes. The delays unavoidably connected with an obsolete method caused great suffering that should not have been inflicted upon men expected to do arduous duty. . . . This is not pointed out in a fault-finding spirit. The men are proud to have been in the Fifth Corps and to have endured these things for the country and the flag; but these unnecessary sufferings impaired the fighting strength of the army, caused much of the sickness that visited the Fifth Corps, and might have caused the failure of the whole expedition. . . . The difficulty here depicted was one which beset the department at every turn in the whole campaign. It is a typical case. Transports, tentage transportation—it was the same in everything. With the most heroic exertions the department was able to meet emergencies only after they had passed. This was caused partly by lack of ready material, but mainly by an inelastic system of doing business which broke down in emergencies. This, in turn, was caused mainly by the illiberal treatment accorded to this, as well as to every other department of the army by Congress. It uniformly cuts mercilessly all estimates of this, as of every other department, and leaves no margin of expenditure or chance of improvement. It dabbles in matters which are purely technical and require the handling of expert executive talent. . . . Plans for war should be prepared in advance. This was especially true of the last war, which had been foreseen for years and considered a probability for several months. All details should have been previously worked out, all contingencies foreseen before hostilities began. Such plans would require some modifications, of course, but would form a working basis. Neither Santiago nor Manila Bay would have been foreseen; but any plans for war would have involved the consideration and solution of the following problems: How to raise, arm, equip, organize, mobilize, clothe, feed, shelter, and transport large bodies of soldiers. The point where the battle might occur would be a mere tactical detail to be worked out at the proper time. The above problems could all be solved in time of peace and should have been solved.”—J. H. Parker, *Our army supply departments and the need of a general staff* (Review of Reviews, December, 1898).

1898 (July-August: Cuba).—War with Spain: Sickness in the American Army at Santiago.—Its alarming state.—Hurried removal of troops to Montauk Point, Long Island.—“After the surrender of General Toral’s army General Shafter urged the War Department from time to time to hasten the shipment of the Spanish prisoners to their homes, in order that the American Army, whose condition was now deplorable, might be transported to the United States. At this time about half the command had been attacked by malarial fever, with a few cases of yellow fever, dysentery, and typhoid. . . . The yellow-fever cases were mainly confined to the troops at Siboney, and the few cases found among the troops at the front were at once transferred to that place. . . . There was great fear, and excellent grounds for it,

that the yellow fever, now sporadic throughout the command, would become epidemic. With the command weakened by malarial fevers, and its general tone and vitality much reduced by all the circumstances incident to the campaign, the effects of such an epidemic would practically mean its annihilation. The first step taken to check the spread of disease was the removal of all the troops to new camping grounds. . . . It was directed that the command be moved in this way every few days, isolating the cases of yellow fever as they arose, and it was expected that in a short time the yellow fever would be stamped out. . . . But the effect produced on the command by the work necessary to set up the tents and in the removal of the camps increased the number on the sick report to an alarming degree. Convalescents from malarial fever were taken again with the fever, and yellow fever, dysentery, and typhoid increased. It was useless now to attempt to confine the yellow-fever cases to Siboney, and isolation hospitals were established around Santiago. It was apparent that to keep moving the command every few days simply weakened the troops and increased the fever cases. Any exertion in this heat caused a return of the fever, and it must be remembered that the convalescents now included about 75 per cent. of the command. The Commanding General was now directed to move the entire command into the mountains to the end of the San Luis railroad, where the troops would be above the yellow fever limit; but this was a physical impossibility. . . . The situation was desperate; the yellow-fever cases were increasing in number, and the month of August, the period in which it is epidemic, was at hand. It was with these conditions staring them in the face, that the officers commanding divisions and brigades and the Chief Surgeon were invited by General Shafter to discuss the situation. As a result of this conference the General sent the following telegram giving his views [and those of the general officers and medical officers. This was popularly known as the “round robin.”] . . . ‘In reply to telegram of this date [August 3], stating that it is deemed best that my command be moved to end of railroad, where yellow fever is impossible, I have to say that under the circumstances this move is practically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired, although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to exceed 1,000 men a day, at the best, and it will take until the end of August to make this move, even if the sick-list should not increase. An officer of my staff, Lieutenant Miley, who has looked over the ground, says it is not a good camping ground. . . . In my opinion there is but one course to take, and that is to immediately transport the Fifth Corps and the detached regiments that came with it, and were sent immediately after it, with the least delay possible, to the United States. If this is not done I believe the death-rate will be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every medical officer present. I called together to-day the General Officers and the senior Medical Officers and telegraph you their views.’ . . . On August 4th instructions were received from the War Department to begin the removal of the command to Montauk Point, Long Island. Some of the immune regiments were on the way to Santiago, and other regiments were at once ordered there to garrison the district as General Shafter’s command was withdrawn. The first of the fleet of vessels to return the Spanish troops arrived in time to be loaded and leave August 9th, and by the end of the month nearly all were transported. After the surrender

the relations between the American and Spanish troops were very cordial. There could be little or no conversation between individuals, but in many ways the respect each had for the other was shown, and there seemed to be no hatred on either side. Most of the Spanish officers remained in their quarters in town, and they shared in the feeling displayed by their men. Salutations were generally exchanged between the officers, and American ways and manners became very popular among the Spaniards. . . . By the 25th of the month General Shafter's entire command, with the exception of a few organizations just ready to embark, had departed, and, turning over the command to General Lawton, he sailed that day with his staff on the 'Mexico,' one of the captured transports, and at noon September 1st went ashore at Montauk Point, Long Island."—J. D. Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter*, ch. 12.

ALSO IN: R. A. Alger, *Spanish-American War*, ch. 16, 23.

1898 (July–August: Philippines).—Correspondence between the general commanding United States forces at Cavite and Manila, and Aguinaldo, the Filipino leader.—On July 4, General Thomas M. Anderson, then commanding the "U. S. Expeditionary Forces" at Cavite arsenal, addressed the following communication to "Señor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, Commanding Philippine Forces": "General: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people co-operate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces. In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing this I do not wish to interfere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and other native citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent with military rule. I would be pleased to be informed at once of any misconduct of soldiers under my command, as it is the intention of my Government to maintain order and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and kindness. I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that they can not visit Cavite without permission." On the following day Aguinaldo replied: "General: Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine people, I have the honor to express to your excellency my most profound gratefulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments with which the natives of these islands inspire the great North American nation and your excellency. I also thank most profoundly your desire of having friendly relations with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special satisfaction whenever occasion represents. I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent their being unfulfilled; hoping that you will inform me of whatever misconduct that may be done by those in my command, so as to reprimand them and correspond with your wishes." To this communication General Anderson returned the following on July 6: "General: I am encouraged by the friendly sen-

timent expressed by your excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and co-operation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country. It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemy. But for a short time we must organize and land supplies, and also retain a place for storing them near our fleet and transports. I am solicitous to avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having two sets of military officers exercising command in the same place. I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary precaution. Your own medical officers have been making voluntary inspections with mine, and fear epidemic diseases if the vicinity is not made clean. Would it not be well to have prisoners work to this end under the advice of the surgeons?" On July 9 General Anderson reported to the War Department at Washington: "General Aguinaldo tells me he has about 15,000 fighting men, but only 11,000 armed with guns, which mostly were taken from the Spaniards. He claims to have in all 4,000 prisoners. When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to co-operate. But he has declared himself dictator and president, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a provisional government." On July 17 the American commander caused another communication to be addressed to "General Emilio Aguinaldo" as follows: "Sir: General Anderson wishes me to say that, the second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Paranaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army and shelter, will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight. General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase 500 horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner. I regret very much that I am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as possible." To this communication there seems to have been no written reply until July 24; and, on July 20, the chief quar-

termaster reported to General Anderson "that it is impossible to procure transportation except upon Señor Aguinaldo's order, in this section, who has an inventory of everything. The natives have removed their wheels and hid them. On July 23 General Anderson repeated his request, as follows: "General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the cause of your people. So far we have received no response. As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts. If you cannot secure these, I will have to pass you and make requisition directly on the people. I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience." The next day Aguinaldo replied: "I have the honor to manifest to your excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the nonreceipt of any response relative to the needs (or aids) that you have asked of me in the way of horses, buffaloes, and carts, because I replied in a precise manner, through the bearer, that I was disposed to give convenient orders whenever you advised me of the number of these with due anticipation (notice). I have circulated orders in the provinces in the proximity that in the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I cannot assure your excellency that we have the number of 500 that is needed, because horses are not abundant in these vicinities, owing to deaths caused by epizootic diseases in January and March last. Whenever we have them united (or collected), I shall have the pleasure to advise your excellency. I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall place at your disposition whenever necessary, always (promising) that you afford me a previous advice of four days in anticipation." On July 24 General Anderson received from the Philippine leader a very clear and definite statement of his attitude towards the "Expeditionary Forces of the United States," and the intentions with which he and the people whom he represented were acting. "I came," he wrote, "from Hongkong to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word to Admiral Dewey to not give place [to allow] to any internal discord, because, [being] a judge of their desires, I had the strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects, establishing a government according to their desires. Thus it is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards, when some of the provinces had already liberated themselves from Spanish domination, I established a revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a democratic and popular character as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, in order that they [the provinces] might be justly represented, and administered to their satisfaction. It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the right of preference to our gratitude. Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the favors we have received through Admiral Dewey, and [being] more desirous than any

other person of preventing any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation but also to that of your excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights. I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity that, before disembarking, you should communicate in writing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent the commission of any transgression against friendship. I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I can not answer for that which another nation whose friendship is not well guaranteed might inspire in it [the people]; and it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always professed for the North American people, in the complete security that it will find itself completely identified with our cause of liberty." In the same strain, on August 1, Aguinaldo wrote to United States Consul Williams, as to a "distinguished friend": "I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the right of the North Americans to our gratitude, for we do not forget for a moment the favors which we have received and are now receiving; but however great those favors may be, it is not possible for me to remove the distrust of my compatriots. These say that if the object of the United States is to annex these islands, why not recognize the government established in them, in order in that manner to join with it the same as by annexation? Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with the Filipino generals and, uniting the forces, render the end more decisive? Is it intended, indeed, to carry out annexation against the wish of these people, distorting the legal sense of that word? If the revolutionary government is the genuine representative by right and deed of the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is it wished to oppress instead of gaining their confidence and friendship? It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots the favors received through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up to the present the American forces have shown not an active, only a passive, co-operation, from which they suppose that the intentions of these forces are not for the best. They assert, besides that it is possible to suppose that I was brought from Hongkong to assure those forces by my presence that the Filipinos would not make common cause with the Spaniards, and that they have delivered to the Filipinos the arms abandoned by the former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save themselves much labor, fatigue, blood, and treasure that a war with Spain would cost. But I do not believe these unworthy suspicions. I have full confidence in the generosity and philanthropy which shine in characters of gold in the history of the privileged people of

the United States, and for that reason, invoking the friendship which you profess for me and the love which you have for my people, I pray you earnestly, as also the distinguished generals who represent your country in these islands, that you entreat the government at Washington to recognize the revolutionary government of the Filipinos, and I, for my part, will labor with all my power with my people that the United States shall not repent their sentiments of humanity in coming to the aid of an oppressed people. Say to the Government at Washington that the Filipino people abominate savagery; that in the midst of their past misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice, and civil life, and that they are not able to lay aside their own wishes when their future lot and history are under discussion. Say also that I and my leaders know what we owe to our unfortunate country; that we know how to admire and are ready to imitate the disinterestedness, the abnegation, and the patriotism of the grand men of America, among whom stands pre-eminent the immortal General Washington."—*56th Congress, 1st Session, United States Senate Document no. 208.*

1898 (July-August: Porto Rico).—Occupation of Porto Rico.—"With the fall of Santiago the occupation of Porto Rico became the next strategic necessity. Gen. Miles had previously been assigned to organize an expedition for that purpose. Fortunately, he was already at Santiago, where he had arrived on the 11th of July with reinforcements for Gen. Shafter's army. With these troops, consisting of 3,415 infantry and artillery, 2 companies of engineers and 1 company of the signal corps, Gen. Miles left Guantanamo on July 21st, having 9 transports, convoyed by the fleet, under Capt. Higginson, with the 'Massachusetts' (flag-ship), 'Dixie,' 'Gloucester,' 'Columbia' and 'Yale,' the two latter carrying troops. The expedition landed at Guanica on July 25th, which port was entered with little opposition. Here the fleet was joined by the 'Annapolis' and the 'Wasp,' while the 'Puritan' and 'Amphitrite' went to San Juan and joined the 'New Orleans,' which was engaged in blockading that port. The major general commanding was subsequently reinforced by General Schwan's brigade of the Third Army Corps, by Gen. Wilson with a part of his division and also by Gen. Brooke with a part of his corps, numbering in all 16,973 officers and men. On July 27th he entered Ponce, one of the most important ports in the island, from which he thereafter directed operations for the capture of the island. With the exception of encounters with the enemy at Guayama, Hormigueros [the Rio Prieto], Coamo, and Yauco and an attack on a force landed at Cape San Juan, there was no serious resistance. The campaign was prosecuted with great vigor and by the 12th of August much of the island was in our possession and the acquisition of the remainder was only a matter of a short time. At most of the points in the island our troops were enthusiastically welcomed. Protestations of loyalty to the flag and gratitude for delivery from Spanish rule met our commanders at every stage."—*Message of the president of the United States to Congress, Dec. 5, 1898.*—See also PORTO RICO: 1898-1899 (August-July).

ALSO IN: B. K. Ashford, *Observations on the campaign in western Porto Rico during the Spanish-American War (Journal of the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States, v. 15, pp. 157-168).*

1898 (July-September).—War with Spain.—

General Merritt's report of capture of Manila.—Relations with the Filipino insurgents.—Aguinaldo declared president of the Philippine republic.—"Immediately after my arrival [July 25] I visited General Greene's camp and made a reconnaissance of the position held by the Spanish, and also the opposing lines of the insurgent forces, hereafter to be described. I found General Greene's command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the great difficulties of landing supplies, the greater portion of the force had shelter tents only, and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season. I was at once struck by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circumstances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American soldier, volunteer and regular alike, accept the necessary hardships of the work they have undertaken to do, has grown and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion. I discovered during my visit to General Greene that the left or north flank of his brigade camp extended to a point on the 'Calle Real' about 3,200 yards from the outer line of Spanish defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at the powder magazine, or old Fort San Antonio, within a hundred yards of the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and stretched away to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward, through swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach to the town and encircling the city completely. The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my arrival in considerable force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men. These troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire extent; and on the particular road called the 'Calle Real,' passing along the front of General Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila, the insurgents had established an earthwork or trench within 800 yards of the powder-magazine fort. They also occupied as well the road to the right, leading from the village of Pasay, and the approach by the beach was also in their possession. This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable."—*Report of General Wesley Merritt, Aug. 31, 1898 (Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, v. 1, pp. 39-45).*—"The arrival of General Merritt, with the forces under General MacArthur, July 25th and 31st, naturally did not tend to make Aguinaldo's attitude towards the Americans any less aggressive. Before General Merritt left the United States he had been enjoined to make no alliance, political or otherwise, with the Tagalog insurgents. Hence his determination to conduct the assault on Manila without the assistance of Aguinaldo or his forces. Moreover, Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt when he

reached Manila Bay; he did not offer his services or the support of his troops; and he did not assist any one of the three expeditions in landing, or in providing their necessary transportation, for which they had to depend entirely upon the country. There was no cooperation and no alliance between the American forces and the insurgents. Manila was taken without their assistance or support. Indeed, as has already been related, General Merritt addressed a note to the Tagalog general requesting that the insurrectionary forces be restrained from taking part in our proposed assault on the city the next day, and asked that they be not allowed to follow the American troops into the city. Whether Aguinaldo was unwilling or unable to check the troops in their anxiety to loot is not known, for they did attempt to enter the city in the wake of our victorious army. Immediately after the fall of Manila, Aguinaldo demanded joint occupation of the city. This was refused, and he later admitted that joint occupation was impossible. He had probably made this request to pave the way for his subsequent demands. General Merritt requested Aguinaldo to withdraw his troops from the suburbs of Manila, where they had followed our forces, and where they had taken up a position with every apparent intention of remaining. To this proposition Aguinaldo reluctantly consented, and his men were finally withdrawn from the suburbs of Manila beyond a certain line, where they took up a position which General Merritt had indicated they would be permitted to occupy. Here they at once threw up intrenchments confronting our lines, their excuse being that this proceeding was necessary in order 'to be prepared to meet the soldier of Spain should she return to her late possessions.'—R. A. Alger, *Spanish-American War*, pp. 350-351.—"Aguinaldo . . . retired to Malalao, about 25 miles to the northward, leaving his troops entrenched round Manila, and there with considerable pomp and ceremony on September 20th, 1898, he was declared First President of the Philippine Republic, and the National Congress was opened with Pedro Paterno as President of that assembly."—G. J. Younghusband, *Philippines and round about*, p. 27.

1898 (July-December).—War with Spain.—Suspension of hostilities.—Negotiation of treaty of peace.—Instructions to American commissioners.—Relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and cession of Porto Rico, the island of Guam and the Philippine islands to the United States.—In his message to Congress, Dec. 5, 1898, President McKinley gave the following account of his reception of overtures from Spain, for the termination of the war, and of the negotiations which resulted in a treaty of peace: "The annihilation of Admiral Cervera's fleet, followed by the capitulation of Santiago, having brought to the Spanish Government a realizing sense of the hopelessness of continuing a struggle now become wholly unequal, it made overtures of peace through the French Ambassador, who, with the assent of his Government, had acted as the friendly representative of Spanish interests during the war. On the 26th of July M. Cambon presented a communication signed by the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish Minister of State, inviting the United States to state the terms upon which it would be willing to make peace. On the 30th of July, by a communication addressed to the Duke of Almodovar and handed to M. Cambon, the terms of this Government were announced, substantially

as in the protocol afterwards signed. On the 10th of August the Spanish reply, dated August 7th, was handed by M. Cambon to the Secretary of State. It accepted unconditionally the terms imposed as to Cuba, Porto Rico and an island of the Ladrones group, but appeared to seek to introduce inadmissible reservations in regard to our demand as to the Philippine Islands. Conceiving that discussion on this point could neither be practical nor profitable, I directed that, in order to avoid misunderstanding, the matter should be forthwith closed by proposing the embodiment in a formal protocol of the terms upon which the negotiations for peace were to be undertaken. The vague and inexplicit suggestion of the Spanish note could not be accepted, the only reply being to present as a virtual ultimatum a draft of protocol embodying the precise terms tendered to Spain in our note of July 30th, with added stipulations of detail as to the appointment of commissioners to arrange for the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles. On August 12th M. Cambon announced his receipt of full powers to sign the protocol submitted. Accordingly, on the afternoon of August 12th M. Cambon, as the plenipotentiary of Spain, and the Secretary of State, as the plenipotentiary of the United States, signed . . . [the] protocol. . . The sixth and last article provided that upon the signature of the protocol hostilities between the two countries should be suspended and that notice to that effect should be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces. Immediately upon the conclusion of the protocol I issued a proclamation of August 12, suspending hostilities on the part of the United States. The necessary orders to that end were at once given by telegraph. The blockade of the ports of Cuba and San Juan de Porto Rico was in like manner raised. On the 18th of August the muster-out of 100,000 Volunteers, or as near that number as was found to be practicable, was ordered."—*Message of the President to Congress*, Dec. 5, 1898.—The instructions given (September 16) by President McKinley to the commissioners appointed to treat for peace with Spain, and the correspondence between the commissioners at Paris and the president and the secretary of state at Washington during the progress of the negotiations, were communicated confidentially to the United States Senate on Jan. 30, 1899, but not published until February, 1901, when the injunction of secrecy was removed and the printing of the papers ordered by the vote of the Senate. The chief interest of these papers lies in their disclosure of what passed between the American executive and the peace commissioners on the subject of the Philippine islands, which led to the demand for their entire surrender by Spain. "In view of what has taken place it is necessary now to determine what shall be our future relations to the Philippines. . . Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to lasting results and to the achievement of the common good under the demands of civilization rather than to ambitious designs. The terms of the protocol were framed upon this consideration. The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that requirement we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged. It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent peace on and near our own territory that

the Spanish flag should remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events and of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the other islands belonging to Spain in this hemisphere. The Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that, without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we can not disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we can not be unmindful that without any desire or design on our part the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization. Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated with his new opening depends less on large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privileges. It is believed that in the practical application of these guiding principles and the present interests of our country and the proper measure of its duty, its welfare in the future, and the consideration of its exemption from unknown perils will be found in full accord with the just, moral, and humane purpose which was invoked as our justification in accepting the war. In view of what has been stated, the United States can not accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the United States shall acquire the right of entry for vessels and merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States into such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded to the United States upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and rates of trade and commerce, together with other rights of protection and trade accorded to citizens of one country within the territory of another. You are therefore instructed to demand such concession, agreeing on your part that Spain shall have similar rights as to her subjects and vessels in the ports of any territory in the Philippines ceded to the United States." On October 7, Judge Day, on behalf of the American commissioners, cabled a long communication from Paris to Secretary Hay, his successor in the United States department of state, summarizing testimony given before the commission by General Merritt, lately commanding in the Philippines, and statements brought by General Merritt from Admiral Dewey, General Greene, and others. In part, the cablegram was as follows: "General Anderson, in correspondence with Aguinaldo in June and July, seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and native authorities, but subsequently changed his tone. General Merritt reports that Admiral Dewey did not approve this correspondence and advised against it. Merritt and Dewey both kept clear of any compromising communications. Merritt expresses opinion we are in no way committed to any insur-

gent programme. Answering questions of Judge Day, General Merritt said insurrection practically confined to Luzon. Tribal and religious differences between the inhabitants of various islands. United States has helped rather than injured insurrection. Under no obligation other than moral to help natives. Natives of Luzon would not accept Spanish rule, even with amnesty. Insurgents would be victorious unless Spaniards did better in future than in past. Insurgents would fight among themselves if they had no common enemy. Think it feasible for United States to take Luzon and perhaps some adjacent islands and hold them as England does her colonies. Natives could not resist 5,000 troops. . . . General Merritt thinks that if United States attempted to take possession of Luzon, or all the group as a colony, Aguinaldo and his immediate followers would resist it, but his forces are divided and his opposition would not amount to anything. If the islands were divided, filibustering expeditions might go from one island to another, thus exposing us to constant danger of conflict with Spain. In answer to questions of Senator Frye, Merritt said insurgents would murder Spaniards and priests in Luzon and destroy their property if the United States withdrew. United States under moral obligation to stay there. He did not know whether the effect of setting up a government by the United States in Luzon would be to produce revolutions in other islands. It might cause reforms in their government. . . . Answering questions of Mr. Gray, Merritt said consequences in case of either insurgent or Spanish triumph made it doubtful whether United States would be morally justified in withdrawing. Our acts were ordinary acts of war, as if we had attacked Barcelona, but present conditions in Philippine Islands were partly brought about by us. Insurgents not in worse condition by our coming. Spaniards hardly able to defend themselves. If we restored them to their positions and trenches, they might maintain themselves with the help of a navy when we withdrew. Did not know that he could make out a responsibility by argument, but he felt it. It might be sentimental. He thought it would be an advantage if the United States would change its policy and keep the islands. (He) thought our interests in the East would be helped by the cheap labor in the Philippines, costing only from 20 to 80 cents a day, according to skill. . . . Answering questions of Mr. Reid, Merritt said he considered capture of Manila practically capture of group. Nothing left of Spanish sovereignty that was not at mercy of the United States. Did not think our humanity bounded by geographical lines. After Dewey's victory we armed insurgents to some extent, but Dewey says it was over-estimated. Insurgents bought arms from Hongkong merchants with Dewey's cognizance, but Dewey was not in favor of allowing this to continue. Spaniards would destroy Aguinaldo and his principal followers, if allowed to do so." October 25, Judge Day cabled a message to Washington, saying: "Differences of opinion among commissioners concerning Philippine Islands are set forth in statements transmitted herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question in joint commission almost immediately." The different statements then transmitted were three in number, the first of them signed by Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid, who said: 'Information gained by commission in Paris leads to conviction that it would

be naval, political, and commercial mistake to divide the archipelago. Nearly all expert testimony taken tends to this effect. As instructions provide for retention at least of Luzon, we do not consider question of remaining in Philippine Islands at all as now properly before us. We therefore ask for extension of instructions. Spain governed and defended these islands from Manila, and with destruction of her fleet and the surrender of her army we became as complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with nothing needed to complete the conquest save to proceed with the ample forces we had at hand to take unopposed possession. The Ladrone and Carolines were also governed from the same capital by the same governor-general. National boundaries ought to follow natural divisions, but there is no natural place for dividing Philippine Islands. . . . If we do not want the islands ourselves, better to control their disposition; that is, to hold the option on them rather than to abandon it. Could then at least try to protect ourselves by ample treaty stipulations with the acquiring powers. Commercially, division of archipelago would not only needlessly establish dangerous rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept." But the president had now arrived at a different state of mind, and directed Secretary Hay to make the following reply, on October 26: "The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, can not be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must therefore be required. The President reaches this conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will entail less trouble than any other and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we can not escape responsibility." Two days later the moral and political reflections of the president on the subject were expressed still further to the commissioners by Secretary Hay, in the following telegram: "While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest, which position must not be yielded, yet their disposition, control, and government the President prefers should be the subject of negotiation as provided in the protocol. It is imperative upon us that as victors we should be governed only by motives which will exalt our nation. Territorial expansion should be our least concern; that we shall not shirk the moral obligations of our victory is of the greatest. It is undisputed that Spain's authority is permanently destroyed in every part of the Philippines. To leave any part in her feeble control now would increase our difficulties and be opposed to the interests of humanity. The sentiment in the United States is almost universal that the people of the Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from Spanish domination. In this sentiment the President fully concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or powers to join the United States in sovereignty over them. We must either hold them or turn them back to Spain. Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and unforeseen as are the difficulties which are before us, the President can see but one plain path of duty—the acceptance

of the archipelago. Greater difficulties and more serious complications—administrative and international—would follow any other course. The President has given to the views of the commissioners the fullest consideration, and in reaching the conclusion above announced in the light of information communicated to the commission and to the President since your departure, he has been influenced by the single consideration of duty and humanity. The President is not unmindful of the distressed financial condition of Spain, and whatever consideration the United States may show must come from its sense of generosity and benevolence, rather than from any real or technical obligation. The terms upon which the full cession of the Philippines shall be made must be left largely with the commission." On November 3, Judge Day cabled: "After a careful examination of the authorities, the majority of the commission are clearly of opinion that our demand for the Philippine Islands can not be based on conquest. When the protocol was signed Manila was not captured, siege was in progress and capture made after the execution of the protocol. Captures made after agreement for armistice must be disregarded and status quo restored as far as practicable. We can require cession of Philippine Islands only as indemnity for losses and expenses of the war. Have in view, also, condition of islands, the broken power of Spain, anarchy in which our withdrawal would leave the islands, etc. These are legitimate factors." On November 4, Senator Davis added a personal telegram as follows: "I think we can demand cession of entire archipelago on other and more valid grounds than a perfected territorial conquest of the Philippine Islands, such as indemnity or as conditions of peace imposed by our general military success and in view of our future security and general welfare, commercial and otherwise. I think the protocol admits all these grounds, and that the ground alone of perfected territorial conquest of the Philippine Islands is too narrow and untenable under protocol." Secretary Hay replied, for the president, on November 5: "The President has no purpose to question the commission's judgment as to the grounds upon which the cession of the archipelago is to be claimed. His only wish in that respect is to hold all the ground upon which we can fairly and justly make the claim. He recognizes fully the soundness of putting forward indemnity as the chief ground, but conquest is a consideration which ought not to be ignored. How our demand shall be presented, and the grounds upon which you will rest it, he confidently leaves with the commissioners. His great concern is that a treaty shall be effected in terms which will not only satisfy the present generation, but what is more important, be justified in the judgment of posterity." Discussion followed, in which Judge Day and Senator Gray repeated the views they had formerly expressed, in dissent from the policy determined upon by the president and his cabinet, the latter saying: "Believing that the result of a failure to obtain a treaty would be the forcible seizure of the whole Philippine Islands group, an event greatly to be deprecated as inconsistent with the traditions and civilization of the United States, I would be willing to take the islands by the cession of a treaty of peace, and I would, to that end make such reasonable concessions as would comport with the magnanimity of a great nation dealing with a weak and prostrate foe. I mean that I would prefer the latter alternative to the former, not that I have changed my mind

as to the policy of taking the Philippine Islands at all." So far as concerned the demands of the United States (which Spain was powerless to resist), the question was settled on November 13 by a telegram from Secretary Hay to Judge Day, in which he said: "We are clearly entitled to indemnity for the cost of the war. We can not hope to be fully indemnified. We do not expect to be. It would probably be difficult for Spain to pay money. All she has are the archipelagoes of the Philippines and the Carolines. She surely can not expect us to turn the Philippines back and bear the cost of the war and all claims of our citizens for damages to life and property in Cuba without any indemnity but Porto Rico, which we have and which is wholly inadequate. . . . You are therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole of the Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain ten to twenty millions of dollars, and if you can get cession of a naval and telegraph station in the Carolines, and the several concessions and privileges and guaranties, so far as applicable, enumerated in the views of Commissioners Frye and Reid, you can offer more."—56th Congress, 2d Session, *Senate Document no. 148 (Papers relating to the treaty with Spain)*.—Discussion between the Spanish and American commissioners at Paris was prolonged until December 10, when the former yielded to what they protested against as hard terms, and the following treaty of peace was signed:

TREATY OF PEACE

ARTICLE I. Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

ART. II. Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrões.

ART. III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line: A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty seventh (127) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes ($4^{\circ} 45'$) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes ($4^{\circ} 45'$) north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes ($119^{\circ} 35'$) east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes ($119^{\circ} 35'$) east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes ($7^{\circ} 40'$) north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes ($7^{\circ} 40'$) north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian

of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

ART. IV. The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.

ART. V. The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed. The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two Governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, live-stock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two Governments on the subject shall be reached.

ART. VI. Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offences, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States. Reciprocally the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. The Government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article.

ART. VII. The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war. The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.

ART. VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty, Spain re-

linquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be. The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to. In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.

ART. IX. Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside. The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress.

ART. X. The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

ART. XI. The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside,

pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.

ART. XII. Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules: 1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out. 2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted therefor. 3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.

ART. XIII. The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

ART. XIV. Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.

ART. XV. The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade. This article may at any time be terminated on six months notice given by either Government to the other.

ART. XVI. It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to assume the same obligations.

ART. XVII. The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. In faith whereof we, the respective plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals. Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred



SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF PARIS, 1898, AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

From left to right: Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Montgomery; M. Thibaut, secretary of French legation; M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador and representative of Spain (seated); Brigadier-General H. C. Corbin; William R. Day, secretary of state (seated); John B. Moore, first assistant secretary of state; A. A. Adce, second assistant secretary of state; President William McKinley; George B. Cortelyou, assistant secretary to the President; O. L. Pruden, assistant secretary to the President; Thomas W. Cridler, third assistant secretary of state; Charles M. Loeffler.

and ninety-eight. [Signed] WILLIAM R. DAY, CUSHMAN K. DAVIS, WILLIAM P. FRYE, GEO. GRAY, WHITELAW REID, EUGENIO MONTERO RIOS, B. DE ABARZUA, J. DE GARNICA, W. R. DE VILLA URRUTIA, RAFAEL CERERO.

That the treaty would be ratified by the Senate of the United States was by no means certain when it was signed, and remained questionable for two months (see below: 1899 [January-February]; SPAIN: 1899.) Some time after the conclusion of the treaty, it was discovered that the boundaries defined in it for the cession of the Philippine Islands failed to include the islands of Cagayan, or Kagayan, and Sibutu, in the southern part of the archipelago. Still later, it was found that several small islands (the Bachi or Bashee group and others) belonging to the Spanish possessions in the East were left lying outside of the northern Philippine boundary, as laid down in the treaty of cession. It is said that the Japanese government called attention to this latter error, desiring to have the islands in question, which are near to Formosa, controlled by the United States, rather than by Spain. By a new treaty with Spain, negotiated in 1900, all these outlying islands were acquired by the United States, for the sum of \$100,000.

ALSO IN: C. R. Fish, *Path of empire*, pp. 182-196.—J. H. Latané, *America as a world power*, ch. 4.—R. H. Titherington, *History of the Spanish-American War of 1898*, p. 380.

1898 (August 21).—War with Spain.—Letter from departing Spanish soldiers to the soldiers of the American army.—The following letter, addressed, on the eve of their departure for Spain, by the Spanish soldiers at Santiago, to the soldiers of the American army, "is surely the most remarkable letter ever addressed by vanquished soldiers to their conquerors: 'Soldiers of the American Army: We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-born men in whose breasts there lives gratitude and courtesy, should we embark on our beloved Spain without sending you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor and with all our strength, endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been vanquished by you, so our generals and chiefs judged in signing the capitulation, but our surrender and the blood-battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for resentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in compliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the power of our respective states. You fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage, as before stated—a quality we had not met with during the three years we have carried on this war against a people without a religion, without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but shot their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of the world; have given honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished; have cured their wounded with great humanity; have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort; and lastly, to us, whose condition was terrible, you have given freely of food and of your stock of medicines, and have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies

mingled with the utmost harmony. With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains but to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in this land, which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours. You have conquered it by force and watered it with your blood, as your conscience called for under the demands of civilization and humanity; but the descendants of the Congos and Guineas, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers—these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized humanity. From eleven thousand Spanish soldiers. (Signed) Pedro Lopez De Castillo, Soldier of Infantry. Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898.'"—J. D. Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter*.

1898 (August-December).—Situation in the Philippines following the occupation of Manila by American forces.—Growing distrust and unfriendliness of Tagalos.—Report of General Otis. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1898 (August-December).

1898 (October).—Outbreak of Indians in Minnesota. See INDIANS, AMERICAN: 1898.

1898 (November).—Race war in North Carolina. See NORTH CAROLINA: 1898.

1898 (December).—Results to Spain of Spanish-American War. See SPAIN: 1898-1906.

1898 (December).—Work of the Y. M. C. A. during the Spanish-American War. See YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: 1854-1905.

1898 (December).—Organization of military government in Cuba. See CUBA: 1898-1899 (December-October).

1898-1899.—Investigation of the conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain.—"The Commission appointed by the President . . . to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain, commonly known as the War Investigation or the Dodge Commission, met on the 24th day of September, 1898. Up to the 21st of December, 1898, this Commission had taken testimony in seventeen towns and cities and in many different camps, granting, wherever it went, to the citizens, soldiers, or ex-soldiers, an opportunity to appear for complaint or testimony of any kind regarding the conduct of the war. The Commission visited numerous camps in which there still were many thousands of soldiers, both regulars and volunteers, who were invited to give their evidence without regard to rank or service. On the 21st of December the major-general commanding the army of the United States appeared before the Commission, then sitting in Washington, and made his statements with respect to the canned, fresh and refrigerated beef furnished to the army during the war. General Miles refused to be sworn or affirmed, as every other of the 495 witnesses had been, declaring in substance that he would 'make his statements without being sworn, and was responsible for what he said.'"—R. A. Alger, *Spanish-American War*, pp. 376-377.—The charges against the war department which excited most feeling and drew most public attention related to the quality of the fresh beef supplied to the army, which was in two forms, refrigerated and canned. Major-General Miles, commanding the army, had declared that much of the refrigerated beef furnished to the soldiers should be called "embalmed beef," maintaining that it had been "apparently preserved with secret chemicals, which destroy its natural flavor" and which were believed to be

"detrimental to the health of the troops." He intimated that hundreds of tons of such beef had been contracted for by the commissary-general "under pretense of experiment." In repelling this serious accusation, Commissary-General Charles P. Eagan read a statement before the commission so violent and unmeasured in its vituperation of the commanding general that it was returned to him for correction; many newspapers declined to publish it, and he was subsequently tried by court-martial in consequence. The conclusion of the commission on the subject of the charges relating to refrigerated beef was stated in its report as follows: "The commission is of the opinion that no refrigerated beef furnished by contractors and issued to the troops during the war with Spain was subjected to or treated with any chemicals by the contractors or those in their employ." On the general management of the quartermaster's department, with which much fault had been found, the commission reported: "The conclusions drawn . . . are as follows: 1. The Quartermaster's Department, a month before war was declared, was neither physically nor financially prepared for the tremendous labor of suddenly equipping and transporting an army over ten times the size of the Regular Army of the United States. 2. That the department devoted the ability, zeal, and industry of its officers to accomplish the herculean task before it so soon as funds were made available and war was declared. 3. That it deserves credit for the great work accomplished, for the immense quantity of materials obtained and issued within so short a period, and for its earnest efforts in reference to railroad transportation and in protecting the great interests of the General Government committed to its charge. Its officers, especially those at the headquarters of the department and at its depots, worked earnestly and laboriously day and night sparing themselves in no possible way. 4. There appears to have been a lack of system, whereby, even as late as October, troops in camps and in the field were lacking in some articles of clothing, camp and garrison equipage; and hospitals, at least at two important localities in the South—Fort Monroe, Va., and Huntsville, Ala.—lacked stoves, while at Huntsville fuel was wanting. 5. There appears to have been lack of executive or administrative ability, either on the part of the Quartermaster's Department or the railroad officials, in preventing the great congestion of cars at Tampa and Chickamauga when these camps were first established, which congestion caused delay, annoyance, and discomfort to the large bodies of troops concentrating at those places. . . . Finally. In the opinion of this commission, there should be a division of the labor now devolving upon the Quartermaster's Department" On the conduct of the Medical Department which was another matter of investigation, the commission reported: "To sum up, in brief, the evidence submitted shows: 1. That at the outbreak of the war the Medical Department was, in men and materials, altogether unprepared to meet the necessities of the army called out. 2. That as a result of the action through a generation of contracted and contracting methods of administration, it was impossible for the Department to operate largely, freely, and without undue regard to cost. 3. That in the absence of a special corps of inspectors, and the apparent infrequency of inspections by chief surgeons, and of official reports of the state of things in camps and hospitals, there was not such investigation of the sanitary con-

ditions of the army as is the first duty imposed upon the Department by the regulations. 4. That the nursing force during the months of May, June and July was neither ample nor efficient, reasons for which may be found in the lack of proper volunteer hospital corps, due to the failure of Congress to authorize its establishment, and to the nonrecognition in the beginning of the value of women nurses and the extent to which their services could be secured. 5. That the demand made upon the resources of the Department in the care of sick and wounded was very much greater than had been anticipated, and consequently, in like proportion, these demands were imperfectly met. 6. That powerless as the Department was to have supplies transferred from point to point, except through the intermediation of the Quartermaster's Department, it was seriously crippled in its efforts to fulfil the regulation duty of 'furnishing all medical and hospital supplies.' 7. That the shortcomings in administration and operation may justly be attributed, in large measure, to the hurry and confusion incident to the assembling of an army of untrained officers and men, ten times larger than before, for which no preparations in advance had been or could be made because of existing rules and regulations. 8. That notwithstanding all the manifest errors, of omission rather than of commission, a vast deal of good work was done by medical officers, high and low, regular and volunteer, and there were unusually few deaths among the wounded and sick."—*Report of the Commission, v. 1.*

1898-1899.—Protests against French demands for extension of settlement grounds in Shanghai. See CHINA: 1898-1899.

1898-1899.—Financial standing.—Bonds.—Debts. See DEBTS, PUBLIC: United States.

1898-1899.—Joint High Commission for settlement of pending questions with Canada. See CANADA: 1898-1899.

1898-1899 (October-October).—Military government of Porto Rico. See PORTO RICO: 1898-1899 (October-October).

1898-1899 (December-January).—Instructions by the president to General Otis, military governor of the Philippines.—Their proclamation by the latter in modified form. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1898-1899 (December-January).

1898-1914.—Influence in international affairs.—"Before the elimination of Spain from the Caribbean, we had asserted, and could probably have enforced our political predominancy in that region. As to Europe, even before 1893, our commercial relations had imperceptibly created ties which forbade that complete political isolation which was our tradition and which for many years had been demanded by our interests. No less keen sighted a statesman than Richard Olney had declared in 1895 that the American people could not assume an attitude of indifference toward European politics and that the hegemony of a single Continental State would be disastrous to their prosperity, if not to their safety. The moral effect of the victory over Spain, however, was enormous. It aroused an interest in foreign politics hitherto almost completely lacking, and it induced a sense of power quite inconsistent with a policy of isolation. . . . The temptation to utilize . . . suddenly realized power is almost irresistible. The United States was just beginning to feel its political oats, and that precisely at the moment when our industry and finance were compelling us to take our place among the great nations of the world. . . . The change was grad-

ual, and it left the interior of the country largely untouched. But on the Atlantic seaboard and at the capital the political atmosphere underwent a transformation after 1898 which was not so subtle as to escape detection by foreign representatives. . . . Theodore Roosevelt, with a vigor not untouched by discreet restraint expressed the new spirit in his speeches and deeds. . . . In his policy there was little of the chauvinistic, but a clearly expressed determination that the United States should serve and where possible lead, exerting an influence commensurate with its material strength. External evidence of the new place assumed by this country under Roosevelt was to be found in the role which he played as peacemaker between Russia and Japan. . . . [When the delegates from St. Petersburg and Tokio met at Portsmouth, N. H., to end the conflict waged in the plains of Manchuria], the traditional isolation of America became a little more of a theory and a little less of a fact. Roosevelt also sent the United States fleet round the world, a futile parade except upon the assumption that the sinking of the Spanish Navy was by no means an accident, and that henceforth America must count for something everywhere in the world; in which case the cruise might prove, as the event demonstrated, a stabilizing factor making for world peace. . . . More significant still, perhaps, was the role played by Henry White, American Ambassador to France, at the Conference of Algeiras in 1906. . . . Not merely was the American delegate instructed to discuss matters of an essentially European and political nature, but the point of view taken by Mr. White, under Roosevelt's guidance, proved the determining factor in the decisions of the Conference. The change in the official attitude under Roosevelt must not be exaggerated. Our mediation between Russia and Japan might have been suggested by our traditional interest in the Far East. Our representatives had previously participated in numerous European conferences, although these had been less narrowly political than that of Algeiras. . . . European diplomats perceived clearly that a new element had entered their immediate political orbit. They began to watch America more closely. They were somewhat shocked by the easy victory over Spain. In some quarters resentment was not untinged with fear as they appreciated the growing strength of America, industrially and politically. The Kaiser talked of a Continental custom union to meet American competition. British statesmen considered the possibility of an Anglo-Saxon political alliance. Events were ripening for change, if not for cataclysm. . . . Despite the fact that after 1898 the United States had come to be regarded by herself and others as a world power, notwithstanding the increasing community of economic interests which linked us to Europe, few Americans perceived either the danger which lay in the complex European crisis during these years, nor the degree to which we were bound to be interested in a great European war. There was one notable exception—Colonel Edward M. House . . . was convinced that the United States . . . must assume responsibilities commensurate with its strength and advantages. . . . Colonel House went to Europe in the Spring of 1914 hoping to work out a plan which would end the Anglo-German rivalry and bring the two nations into an agreement with the United States providing for disarmament and a mutual promise to abstain from aggressive action. He found the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, re-

ceptive and enthusiastic. But the atmosphere at Berlin was belligerent. . . . Nevertheless informal negotiations were in being and Colonel House was on his way to report to the President when the European crisis came to a head, the militarists at Berlin and Vienna gained control, and the war broke forth."—C. Seymour, *America's duty to Europe to-day* (*New York Times Current History*, Nov., 1923).

1899.—Cost of the Spanish-American War.—“The cost of the war is not easily estimated. The actual expenditure during the four months of hostilities was not large, but the ultimate outlays have made an enormous difference in the nation's budget. During the four preceding years of peace, 1894-1897, the expenditures for the army were \$206,000,000 and for the navy, \$122,000,000, a total of \$328,000,000; while during the succeeding years, 1898-1901, the expenditures for the army reached \$603,000,000 and the navy, \$238,000,000, making a total of \$842,000,000 [?]. A portion of this expense is to be charged to the campaign in China and the restoration of peace in the Philippines, operations which are consequent upon the Spanish War. The permanent result has been a higher level of expenditures for military and naval purposes, as well as a higher per capita tax for all federal purposes. New pensions made an increasing draft on the treasury.”—D. R. Dewey, *Financial history of the United States*, pp. 467-468.

1899.—Beginnings of juvenile court work in Denver and Chicago. See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1890-1921.

1899 (January).—Appointment of the first commission to the Philippines. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1890: Problem of governing, etc.

1899 (January-February).—Ratification of treaty of peace with Spain.—“The president transmitted the treaty to the Senate January 4, 1899, together with the protocols and accompanying papers. From that date until February 6 it was the main subject of debate, and attracted the close attention of the entire country. A strong opposition to the treaty developed and the debate took a wide range, involving a discussion of the fundamental principles underlying the American constitutional system. The discussion really began December 6, when Senator Vest, knowing the instructions that had been sent to the commissioners at Paris, introduced a resolution declaring ‘That under the Constitution of the United States no power is given to the federal government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies.’ This resolution was the centre of much of the debate during the weeks that followed. Senator Platt, of Connecticut, who spoke in opposition to this resolution, expressed the extreme views on one side of the question when he said: ‘I propose to maintain that the United States is a nation; that as a nation it possesses every sovereign power not reserved in its Constitution to the states or the people; that the right to acquire territory was not reserved, and is therefore an inherent sovereign right.’ This was a rather startling reversal of the fundamental principle of the Constitution that the powers of the federal government are delegated, and the powers of the states are inherent or reserved. [On January 14] Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, delivered a constitutional argument [in reply] which attracted much attention, declaring that the proposal to acquire and hold the Philippine Islands was in violation of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the whole spirit of American institutions. The opportunist view,

which ultimately prevailed, was voiced by the junior senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Lodge [January 24], who said: 'Suppose we ratify the treaty! The islands pass from the possession of Spain into our possession without committing us to any policy. I believe we can be trusted as a people to deal honestly and justly with the islands and their inhabitants thus given to our care. What our precise policy shall be I do not know, because I for one am not sufficiently informed as to the conditions there to be able to say what it will be best to do, nor, I may add, do I think any one is.' A great many senators felt as Senator Spooner, when he said: 'This Philippine proposition is one of the fruits of the war. To me it is one of the bitter fruits of the war. I wish with all my heart we were honorably quit of it.' He held, however, that the United States had the absolute right to acquire territory, and while as a matter of expediency he did not think that the best interests of the United States would be subserved by 'permanent dominion over far-distant lands and people,' yet he thought it better to vote for the treaty than to continue the war. Many resolutions were introduced defining the future policy in regard to the Philippines, but they were all voted down. [The senators who introduced these resolutions were Senator Mason of Illinois, January 7; Senator Bacon of Georgia, January 11; Senator McLaurin of South Carolina, January 13; Senator Harris of Kansas, February 3; Senator McEnery of Louisiana.] The treaty could not be ratified without the assistance of Democrats, since the Senate contained 46 Republicans, 34 Democrats, 5 Populists, 2 Silverites, and 3 Independents. While the discussion was at white heat, Mr. Bryan went to Washington and advised his followers to vote for ratification in order to end the war, saying that the status of the Philippines could be determined in the next Presidential campaign. Just at this juncture an event occurred which materially affected the situation—the outbreak of an insurrection on February 4 against the American troops in the Philippines. The Senate had already agreed by unanimous consent that the vote should be taken February 6, and the outbreak of the insurrection against the United States removed the last doubt in the minds of many, who now felt that the national honor was involved and that the country could not withdraw from the islands in the face of an uprising. When the vote was taken it stood 57 for the treaty and 27 against. Of those who voted yea, 40 were Republicans, 10 Democrats, 3 Populists, 2 Silverites, and 2 Independents. Of those who voted nay, 22 were Democrats, 3 Republicans, and 2 Populists. Immediately after its ratification the Senate passed, by a vote of 26 to 22 a resolution introduced by Senator McEnery, of Louisiana, one of the Democrats who had supported the treaty, to the effect that the action on the treaty was not to be deemed a final determination of our attitude towards the islands. This resolution, passed by a mere majority of the Senate, had no validity as an act of the treaty-making power, and did not receive the sanction of the House or the approval of the president."—J. H. Latané, *America as a world power, 1897-1907*, pp. 74-78.

ALSO IN: G. F. Hoar, *Autobiography*, v. 2, pp. 315-324.—*Congressional Record*, Dec. 6, 1898-Feb. 6, 1899.—F. E. Chadwick, *Relations of the United States and Spain*, ch. 20-21.

1899 (January-November).—Attack on Americans at Manila by Aguinaldo's forces.—Continued hostilities.—Progress of American con-

quest. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1899: Armed opposition, etc.

1899 (May).—Modification of civil service rules by President McKinley. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1899.

1899 (May-July).—Represented at the peace conference at The Hague. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1899: Constitution.

1899 (June-October).—Arbitration and settlement of Venezuela boundary question. See VENEZUELA: 1896-1899.

1899 (July).—Cabinet change.—General Russel A. Alger resigned his place in the President's cabinet as secretary of war, in July, and was succeeded by the Honorable Elihu Root, of New York.

1899 (July).—Provisional government established in the island of Negros. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1899: Beginnings of acceptance, etc.

1899 (October).—Report on conditions in Cuba by the military governor. See CUBA: 1898-1899 (December-October).

1899 (October).—Modus vivendi fixing provisional boundary line between Alaska and Canada. See ALASKA BOUNDARY QUESTION: 1867-1903.

1899 (November).—Death of Vice President Hobart.—Garret A. Hobart, vice president of the United States, died, November 21. Under the act provided for this contingency, the secretary of state then became the successor to the president, in the event of the death of the latter before the expiration of his term.

1899 (November).—Rearrangement of affairs in Samoan islands.—Acquisition of the eastern group with Pago Pago harbor. See SAMOA; PACIFIC OCEAN: 1800-1914.

1899-1900.—Tariff adjustment in Porto Rico. See PORTO RICO: 1899-1900.

1899-1900 (September - February).—Arrangement with European powers of the commercial policy of the "open door" in China. See CHINA: 1899-1900 (September-February).

1899-1900 (November-November).—Continued military operations in the Philippines.—Final defeat of insurgents. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1899-1900.

1899-1901.—Reciprocity arrangements under the Dingley Tariff Act, not ratified by the Senate.—The Dingley Tariff Act, which became law on July 24, 1897, authorized the making of tariff concessions to other countries on terms of reciprocity, if negotiated within two years from the above date. At the expiration of two years, such conventions of reciprocity had been arranged with France and Portugal, and with Great Britain for her West Indian colonies of Jamaica, Barbadoes, Trinidad, Bermuda, and British Guiana. With France, a preliminary treaty signed in May, 1898, was superseded in July, 1899, by one of broader scope, which opens the French markets to an extensive list of American commodities at the minimum rates of the French tariff, and cuts the American tariff from five to 20 per cent. on many French products, not inclusive of sparkling wines. In the treaty with Portugal, the reduction of American duties on wines is more general. The reciprocal reduction on American products extends to many agricultural and mineral products. The reciprocal agreement with the British West Indies covers sugar, fruits, garden products, coffee and asphalt, on one side, and flour, meat, cotton goods, agricultural machinery, oils, etc., on the other. None of these treaties was acted upon by the United States Senate during the session of 1899-1900, and it became necessary to extend the time for their ratification, which was done. Some additional

reciprocity agreements were then negotiated, by which the following statement was made by the president in his message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1900: "Since my last communication to the Congress on this subject special commercial agreements under the third section of the tariff act have been proclaimed with Portugal, with Italy and with Germany. Commercial conventions under the general limitations of the fourth section of the same act have been concluded with Nicaragua, with Ecuador, with the Dominican Republic, with Great Britain on behalf of the island of Trinidad and with Denmark on behalf of the island of St. Croix. These will be early communicated to the Senate. Negotiations with other governments are in progress for the improvement and security of our commercial relations."

ALSO IN: D. R. Dewey, *Financial history of the United States*.—F. W. Taussig, *Tariff history of the United States*, ch. 7.—*Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Compilation of Reports*, v. 8, pp. 474-635.

20th century.—Federal and local taxation. See TAXATION: Outline in the United States; Local taxation in the United States.

20th century.—Development of education.—Rural schools.—Consolidation.—Administration. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education; United States: Consolidated rural schools; 20th century: General education: United States: Systems of administration, etc.; 20th century: Changing theories.

20th century.—Meaning of democratic government. See DEMOCRACY: Progress in the early part of the 20th century.

1900.—Experiments on malaria in Cuba. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: 19th-20th centuries: Insect transmission of disease.

1900.—Comparison of liquor consumption of England, United States, France and Germany. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: England, United States, France and Germany.

1900.—Suffrage amendment in North Carolina.—Effect on negroes. See NORTH CAROLINA: 1900.

1900 (March).—Visit of Boer peace commissioners. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1900 (March): Boer peace commissioners.

1900 (March-December).—Passage of Financial Bill.—Settlement of monetary standard question.—Working of act.—Legislation in the direction sought by the advocates of the gold standard and of a reformed monetary system for the country (see above: 1896-1898), was attained in the spring of 1900, by the passage of an important "Financial Bill" which became law on March 14. The provisions and the effect of the act were summarized at the time by the secretary of the treasury, Lyman Judson Gage, in a published statement, as follows: "The financial bill has for its first object what its title indicates, the fixing of the standard of value and the maintaining at a parity with that standard of all forms of money issued or coined by the United States. It reaffirms that the unit of value is the dollar, consisting of 25.8 grains of gold, nine tenths fine, but from that point it goes on to make it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain all forms of money issued or coined at a parity with this standard. It puts into the hands of the Secretary ample power to do that. For that purpose, the bill provides in the Treasury bureaus of issue and redemption and transfers from the general fund of the Treasury's cash \$150,000,000 in gold coin and bullion to redemption fund, that gold to be

used for the redemption of United States notes and Treasury notes. That fund is henceforth absolutely cut out of and separated from the cash balance in the Treasury and the available cash balance will hereafter show a reduction of \$150,000,000 from the figures that have heretofore prevailed. This \$150,000,000 redemption fund is to be used for no other purpose than the redemption of United States notes and Treasury notes and those notes so redeemed may be exchanged for the gold in the general fund or with the public, so that the reserve fund is kept full with gold to the \$150,000,000 limit. If redemptions go on so that the gold in this reserve fund is reduced below \$100,000,000, and the Secretary is unable to build it up to the \$150,000,000 mark by exchange for gold in the general fund or otherwise, he is given power to sell bonds and it is made his duty to replenish the gold to the \$150,000,000 mark by such means. The 'endless chain' is broken by a provision which prohibits the use of notes so redeemed to meet deficiencies in the current revenues. The act provides for the ultimate retirement of all the Treasury notes issued in payment for silver bullion under the Sherman act. As fast as that bullion is coined into silver dollars Treasury notes are to be retired and replaced with an equal amount of silver certificates. The measure authorizes the issue of gold certificates in exchange for deposits of gold coin, the same as at present, but suspends that authority whenever and so long as the gold in the redemption fund is below \$100,000,000 and gives to the Secretary the option to suspend the issue of such certificates whenever the silver certificates and United States notes in the general fund of the Treasury exceed \$40,000,000. The bill provides for a larger issue of silver certificates, by declaring that hereafter silver certificates shall be issued only in denominations of \$10 and under except as a 10 per cent. of the total volume. Room is made for this larger use of silver certificates in the way of small bills by another provision which makes it necessary as fast as the present silver certificates of high denominations are broken up into small bills to cancel a similar volume of United States notes of small denominations and replace them with notes of denominations of \$10 and upward. Further room is made for the circulation of small silver certificates by a clause which permits national banks to have only one third of their capital in denomination under \$10. . . . A distinct feature of the bill is in reference to refunding the 3 per cent. Spanish war loan, the 2 per cent. bonds maturing in 1907 and the 5 per cent. bonds maturing in 1904, a total of \$839,000,000, into new 2 per cent. bonds. These new 2 per cent. bonds will not be offered for sale, but will only be issued in exchange for an equal amount, face value, of old bonds. This exchange will save the Government, after deducting the premium paid, nearly \$23,000,000, if all the holders of the old bonds exchange them for the new ones. National banks that take out circulation based on the new bonds are to be taxed only one half of 1 per cent. on the average amount of circulation outstanding, while those who have circulation based on a deposit of old bonds will be taxed, as at present, 1 per cent. There are some other changes in the national banking act. The law permits national banks with \$25,000 capital to be organized in places of 3,000 inhabitants or less, whereas heretofore the minimum capital has been \$50,000. It also permits banks to issue circulation on all classes of bonds deposited up to the par value of the bonds, instead of 90 per cent. of

their face, as heretofore. This ought to make an immediate increase in national bank circulation of something like \$24,000,000, as the amount of bonds now deposited to secure circulation is about \$242,000,000. If the price of the new 2s is not forced so high in the market that there is no profit left to national banks in taking out circulation, we may also look for a material increase in national bank circulation based on additional deposits of bonds. National banks are permitted under the law to issue circulation up to an amount equal to their capital. The total capital of all national banks is \$616,000,000. The total circulation outstanding is \$253,000,000. There is, therefore, a possibility of an increase in circulation of \$363,000,000, although the price of the 2 per cent. bonds, as already foreshadowed by market quotations in advance of their issue, promises to be so high that the profit to the banks in taking out circulation will not be enough to make the increase anything like such a possible total." Upon the working of the act, during the first nine months of its operation, Secretary Gage remarked as follows, in his annual report dated Dec. 14, 1900: "The operation of the act of March 14 last with respect to these two important matters of our finances has well exemplified its wisdom. Confidence in the purpose and power of the Government to maintain the gold standard has been greatly strengthened. The result is that gold flows toward the Treasury instead of away from it. At the date of this report the free gold in the Treasury is larger in amount than at any former period in our history. Including the \$150,000,000 reserve, the gold in the Treasury belonging to the Government amounts to over \$242,000,000, while the Treasury holds, besides, more than \$230,000,000, against which certificates have been issued. That provision of the act which liberalized the conditions of bank-note issue was also wise and timely. Under it, . . . there has been an increase of some \$77,000,000 in bank-note issues. To this fact may be chiefly attributed the freedom from stress for currency to handle the large harvests of cotton, wheat, and corn. In this respect the year has been an exception to the general rule of stringency which for several years has so plainly marked the autumn season. Nevertheless, the measures referred to, prolific as they have been in good results, will yet need re-enforcement in some important particulars. Thus, as to the redemption fund provided for in said act, while the powers conferred upon the Secretary are probably ample to enable a zealous and watchful officer to protect fully the gold reserve, there appears to be lacking sufficient mandatory requirement to furnish complete confidence in the continued parity, under all conditions, between our two forms of metallic money, silver and gold. Upon this point further legislation may become desirable. As to the currency, while the liberalizing of conditions has, as previously noted, found response in a necessary increase of bank-note issues, there is under our present system no assurance whatever that the volume of bank currency will be continuously responsive to the country's needs, either by expanding as such needs require or by contracting when superfluous in amount. The truth is that safe and desirable as is our currency system in many respects, it is not properly related. The supply of currency is but remotely, if at all, influenced by the everchanging requirements of trade and industry. It is related most largely, if not entirely, to the price of Government bonds in the market."—*Annual Report of the Secretary of*

the Treasury, 1900, pp. 72-73.—"The new law with its many excellent features, had improved the machinery for withstanding a pressure on the gold supply, but . . . it had at the same time increased the pressure itself. It must remain for experience to demonstrate how far the dubious provisions of the latter part of the act outweigh the wisdom of its earlier paragraphs."—R. P. Falkner, *Currency law of 1900 (Publications of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 29, 1900, p. 49)*.

ALSO IN: D. R. Dewey, *Financial history of the United States*, pp. 468-469.

1900 (April).—Speech of Senator Hoar in denial of the right of the government of the United States, under the constitution, to hold the Philippine islands as a subject state.—On April 17, the following joint resolution was under consideration in the Senate: "Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the Philippine Islands are territory belonging to the United States; that it is the intention of the United States to retain them as such and to establish and maintain such governmental control throughout the archipelago as the situation may demand." Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, spoke in opposition to the resolution, and some passages from his speech are quoted here, because they are notably representative of the ground and spirit of an opposition which existed within the party controlling the government to the war of subjugation in the Philippine islands, to which the party and the government were finally committed by the adoption of this Congressional declaration. "The American people, so far as I know, were all agreed that their victory [in the Spanish-American war] brought with it the responsibility of protecting the liberated peoples from the cupidity of any other power until they could establish their own independence in freedom and in honor. I stand here to-day to plead with you not to abandon the principles that have brought these things to pass. I implore you to keep to the policy that has made the country great, that has made the Republican party great, that has made the President great. . . . Especially, if I could, would I persuade the great Republican party to come back again to its old faith, to its old religion, before it is too late. There is yet time. The President has said again and again that his is only an ad interim policy until Congress shall act. It is not yet too late. Congress has rejected, unwisely, as I think, some declarations for freedom. But the two Houses have not as yet committed themselves to despotism. The old, safe path, the path alike of justice and of freedom, is still easy. It is a path familiar, of old, to the Republican party. If we have diverged from it for the first time, everything in our history, everything in our own nature calls us back. . . . I, for one, believed, and still believe that the pathway to prosperity and glory for the country was also the pathway to success and glory for the Republican party. I thought the two things inseparable. If, when we made the treaty of peace, we had adhered to the purpose we declared when we declared war; if we had dealt with the Philippine Islands as we promised to deal, have dealt, and expect to deal with Cuba, the country would have escaped the loss of 6,000 brave soldiers, other thousands of wrecked and shattered lives, the sickness of many more, the expenditure of hundreds of millions, and, what is far worse than all, the trampling under foot of its cherished ideals. There would have been to-day a noble

republic in the East, sitting docile at our feet, receiving from us civilization, laws, manners, and giving in turn everything the gratitude of a free people could give—love, obedience, trade. The Philippine youth would throng our universities; our Constitution, our Declaration, the lives of Washington and Lincoln, the sayings of Jefferson and Franklin would have been the text-books of their schools. How our orators and poets would have delighted to contrast America liberating and raising up the Republic of Asia, with England subduing and trampling under foot the republic of Africa. Nothing at home could have withstood the great party and the great President who had done these things. We should have come from the next election with a solid North and have carried half the South. You would at least have been spared the spectacle of great Republican States rising in revolt against Republican policies. I do not expect to accomplish anything for liberty in the Philippine Island but through the Republican party. Upon it the fate of these Islands for years to come is to depend. If that party can not be persuaded, the case is in my judgment for the present hopeless. . . . The practical question which divided the American people last year, and which divides them to-day, is this: Whether in protecting the people of the Philippine Islands from the ambition and cupidity of other nations we are bound to protect them from our own. . . . In dealing with this question, Mr. President, I do not mean to enter upon any doubtful ground. I shall advance no proposition ever seriously disputed in this country till within twelve months. . . . If to think as I do in regard to the interpretation of the Constitution; in regard to the mandates of the moral law or the law of nations, to which all men and all nations must render obedience; in regard to the policies which are wisest for the conduct of the State, or in regard to those facts of recent history in the light of which we have acted or are to act hereafter, be treason, then Washington was a traitor; then Jefferson was a traitor; then Jackson was a traitor; then Franklin was a traitor; then Sumner was a traitor; then Lincoln was a traitor; then Webster was a traitor; then Clay was a traitor; then Corwin was a traitor; then Kent was a traitor; then Seward was a traitor; then McKinley, within two years, was a traitor; then the Supreme Court of the United States has been in the past a nest and hotbed of treason; then the people of the United States, for more than a century, have been traitors to their own flag and their own Constitution. We are presented with an issue that can be clearly and sharply stated as a question of constitutional power, a question of international law, a question of justice and righteousness, or a question of public expediency. This can be stated clearly and sharply by an illustration growing out of existing facts. The constitutional question is: Has Congress the power, under our Constitution, to hold in subjection unwilling vassal States? The question of international law is: Can any nation rightfully convey to another sovereignty over an unwilling people who have thrown off its dominion, asserted their independence, established a government of their own, over whom it has at the time no practical control, from whose territory it has been disseized and which it is beyond its power to deliver? The question of justice and righteousness is: Have we the right to crush and hold under our feet an unwilling and subject people whom we had treated as allies, whose independence we are bound in good faith to respect, who had established their own free government, and who had trusted us? The question of public expediency is:

Is it for our advantage to promote our trade at the cannon's mouth and at the point of the bayonet? All these questions can be put in a way of practical illustration by inquiring whether we ought to do what we have done, are doing, and mean to do in the case of Cuba; or what we have done, are doing, and some of you mean to do in the case of the Philippine Islands. It does not seem to me to be worth while to state again at length the constitutional argument which I have addressed to the Senate heretofore. It has been encountered with eloquence, with clearness and beauty of statement, and, I have no doubt, with absolute sincerity by Senators who have spoken upon the other side. But the issue between them and me can be summed up in a sentence or two, and if, so stated, it can not be made clear to any man's apprehension, I despair of making it clear by any elaboration or amplification. I admit that the United States may acquire and hold property, and make rules and regulations for its disposition. I admit that, like other property, the United States may acquire and hold land. It may acquire it by purchase. It may acquire it by treaty. It may acquire it by conquest. And it may make rules and regulations for its disposition and government, however it be acquired. When there are inhabitants upon the land so acquired it may make laws for their government. But the question between me and the gentlemen on the other side is this: Is this acquisition of territory, of land or other property, whether gained by purchase, conquest, or treaty, a constitutional end or only a means to a constitutional end? May you acquire, hold, and govern territory or other property as an end for which our Constitution was framed, or is it only a means toward some other and further end? May you acquire, hold, and govern property by conquest, treaty, or purchase for the sole object of so holding and governing it, without the consideration of any further constitutional purpose? Or must you hold it for a constitutional purpose only, such as the making of new States, the national defense and security, the establishment of a seat of government, or the construction of forts, harbors, and like works, which, of course, are themselves for the national defense and security. I hold that this acquisition, holding and governing, can be only a means for a constitutional end—the creation of new States or some other of the constitutional purposes to which I have adverted. And I maintain that you can no more hold and govern territory than you can hold and manage cannon or fleets for any other than a constitutional end; and I maintain that the holding in subjection an alien people, governing them against their will for any fancied advantage to them, is not only not an end provided for by the Constitution, but is an end prohibited therein. . . . It is an end which the generation which framed the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence declared was unrighteous and abhorrent. So, in my opinion, we have no constitutional power to acquire territory for the purpose of holding it in subjugation, in a state of vassalage or serfdom, against the will of its people. . . . There are 1,200 islands in the Philippine group. They extend as far as from Maine to Florida. They have a population variously estimated at from 8,000,000 to 12,000,000. There are wild tribes who never heard of Christ, and islands that never heard of Spain. But among them are the people of the island of Luzon, numbering 3,500,000, and the people of the Visayan Islands, numbering 2,500,000 more. They are a Christian and civilized people. They wrested their independence from

Spain and established a republic. Their rights are no more to be effected by the few wild tribes in their own mountains or by the dwellers in the other islands than the rights of our old thirteen States were affected by the French in Canada, or the Six Nations of New York, or the Cherokees of Georgia, or the Indians west of the Mississippi. Twice our commanding generals, by their own confession, assured these people of their independence. Clearly and beyond all cavil we formed an alliance with them. We expressly asked them to co-operate with us. We handed over our prisoners to their keeping; we sought their help in caring for our sick and wounded. We were told by them again and again and again that they were fighting for independence. Their purpose was as well known to our generals, to the War Department, and to the President, as the fact that they were in arms. We never undeceived them until the time when hostilities were declared in 1899. The President declared again and again that we had no title and claimed no right to anything beyond the town of Manila. Hostilities were begun by us at a place where we had no right to be, and were continued by us in spite of Aguinaldo's disavowal and regret and offer to withdraw to a line we should prescribe. If we crush that Republic, despoil that people of their freedom and independence, and subject them to our rule, it will be a story of shame and dishonor. . . . But we are told if we oppose the policy of our imperialistic and expanding friends we are bound to suggest some policy of our own as a substitute for theirs. We are asked what we would do in this difficult emergency. It is a question not difficult to answer. I for one am ready to answer it. 1. I would declare now that we will not take these islands to govern them against their will. 2. I would reject a cession of sovereignty which implies that sovereignty may be bought and sold and delivered without the consent of the people. Spain had no rightful sovereignty over the Philippine Islands. She could not rightfully sell it to us. We could not rightfully buy it from her. 3. I would require all foreign governments to keep out of these islands. 4. I would offer to the people of the Philippines our help in maintaining order until they have a reasonable opportunity to establish a government of their own. 5. I would aid them by advice, if they desire it, to set up a free and independent government. 6. I would invite all the great powers of Europe to unite in an agreement that that independence shall not be interfered with by us, by themselves, or by any one of them with the consent of the others. As to this I am not so sure. I should like quite as well to tell them it is not to be done whether they consent or not. 7. I would declare that the United States will enforce the same doctrine as applicable to the Philippines that we declared as applicable to Mexico and Haiti and the South American Republics. It is true that the Monroe Doctrine, a doctrine based largely on our regard for our own interests, is not applicable either in terms or in principle to a distant Asiatic territory. But, undoubtedly, having driven out Spain, we are bound, and have the right, to secure to the people we have liberated an opportunity, undisturbed and in peace, to establish a new government for themselves. 8. I would then, in a not distant future, leave them to work out their own salvation, as every nation on earth, from the beginning of time, has wrought out its own salvation. Let them work out their own salvation, as our own ancestors slowly and in long centuries wrought out theirs; as Germany, as Switzerland, as France, in briefer

periods, wrought out theirs; as Mexico and the South American Republics have accomplished theirs, all of them within a century, some of them within the life of a generation. To attempt to confer the gift of freedom from without, or to impose freedom from without, on any people, is to disregard all the lessons of history. It is to attempt 'A gift of that which is not to be given by all the blended powers of earth and heaven.' 9. I would strike out of your legislation the oath of allegiance to us and substitute an oath of allegiance to their own country."

ALSO IN: G. F. Hoar, *Autobiography of seventy years*, v. 2, p. 304.

1900 (April).—Hawaiian islands organized as territory. See HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: 1898-1904.

1900 (April).—Act temporarily to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico. See PORTO RICO: 1900.

1900 (April).—Appointment of second commission to the Philippines.—Recommendations for the islands. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1900.

1900 (May).—Civil government organized in Porto Rico.—Governor Allen appointed. See PORTO RICO: 1900 (May).

1900 (May-October).—Twelfth census of the republic.—The twelfth census of the United States was taken between May 1 and Nov. 1, 1900. The accompanying table (see opposite page) gives the population of the United States for each state and organized territory and for Alaska and Hawaii as finally revised, according to the official census report of 1900. The figures purporting to give the number of "persons in the service of the United States stationed abroad" include an estimated population of 14,400 for certain military organizations and naval vessels stationed abroad, principally in the Philippines. No provision was made by the census act for the enumeration of the inhabitants of Porto Rico, but a census for that island, taken as of Oct. 16, 1899, under the direction of the War Department, showed a population of 953,243.

"By the twelfth census the center of population in 1900 was in the following position: Latitude $39^{\circ} 9' 36''$; longitude $85^{\circ} 48' 54''$. In ten years the center of population has moved westward $16' 1''$, or about fourteen miles, and southward $2' 20''$, or about two and one half miles. It rests now in Southern Indiana, at a point about six miles southeast of Columbus, the county seat of Bartholomew county, Indiana. The center of population is the center of gravity of the country, each individual being assumed to have the same weight. . . . The center of area of the United States, excluding Alaska and Hawaii and other recent accessions, is in northern Kansas, in approximate latitude $39^{\circ} 55'$, and approximate longitude $98^{\circ} 50'$. The center of population is therefore about three-fourths of a degree south and more than 13 degrees east of the center of area."—*United States, Twelfth Census, Bulletin no. 62.*

1900 (May-November).—Presidential election.—Party platforms and nominations.—Re-election of President McKinley.—"At one time it seemed that the questions growing out of the war with Spain would be the leading issues of the campaign: the Democratic national convention did, indeed, declare that it regarded imperialism as the 'paramount issue,' but it also adopted a silver plank and again nominated William J. Bryan as its candidate. Many of the thoughtful and conservative men of the country, who were opposed to the military and colonial policies of the Republican party, were even more strongly opposed to the silver tenets of Mr.

TWELFTH CENSUS, NOV. 1, 1900

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	1900.	1890.	Indians not taxed, 1900.
The United States....	76,304,799	63,069,756	134,158
STATES.			
Alabama	1,828,697	1,513,017
Arkansas	1,311,564	1,128,179
California	1,485,053	1,208,130	1,549
Colorado	539,700	412,198	597
Connecticut.....	908,355	746,258
Delaware	184,735	168,493
Florida	528,542	391,422
Georgia	2,216,331	1,837,353
Idaho	161,772	84,385	2,297
Illinois	4,821,550	3,826,351
Indiana	2,516,462	2,192,494
Iowa	2,231,853	1,911,896
Kansas	1,470,495	1,427,096
Kentucky	2,147,174	1,858,635
Louisiana	1,381,625	1,118,587
Maine	694,466	661,086
Maryland	1,190,050	1,042,390
Massachusetts	2,805,346	2,238,943
Michigan	2,420,982	2,093,889
Minnesota	1,751,394	1,301,826	1,768
Mississippi	1,551,270	1,289,600
Missouri	3,106,665	2,679,184
Montana	243,329	132,159	10,746
Nebraska	1,068,539	1,058,910
Nevada	42,335	45,761	1,665
New Hampshire	411,588	376,530
New Jersey	1,883,669	1,444,933
New York	7,268,012	5,997,853	4,711
North Carolina	1,893,810	1,617,947
North Dakota	319,146	182,719	4,692
Ohio	4,157,545	3,672,316
Oregon	413,536	313,767
Pennsylvania	6,302,115	5,258,014
Rhode Island.....	428,556	345,506
South Carolina	1,340,316	1,151,149
South Dakota	401,570	328,808	10,932
Tennessee	2,020,616	1,767,518
Texas	3,048,710	2,235,523
Utah	276,749	207,905	1,472
Vermont	343,641	332,422
Virginia	1,854,184	1,655,980
Washington	518,103	349,390	2,531
West Virginia.....	958,800	762,794
Wisconsin	2,069,042	1,686,880	1,657
Wyoming	92,531	60,705
Total for 45 States.	74,610,523	62,116,811	44,617
TERRITORIES.			
Alaska	63,441	32,052
Arizona	122,931	59,620	24,644
District of Columbia..	278,718	230,392
Hawaii	154,001	89,990
Indian Territory.....	391,960	180,182	56,033
New Mexico.....	195,310	153,593	2,937
Oklahoma	398,245	61,834	5,927
Total	1,604,606	807,663	89,541
Persons in the service of the United States stationed abroad....	89,670
Indians, etc., on Indian reservations, except Indian Territory....	145,282

Bryan. Instead of a clean-cut campaign on the single issue of imperialism, which was new and of transcendent importance, attention was diverted to a discussion of monetary standards, so that to the conservative men of the country it seemed a choice between free silver and imperialism."—J. H. Latané, *America as a world power, 1897-1907*, p. 123.—"That President McKinley was to go before the country for a second term was a foregone conclusion. When the Republican convention met in Philadelphia [June 19] he was unanimously nominated on the first ballot. Theodore Roosevelt, a member of the convention, was named as the candidate for Vice-President, receiving the votes of all the delegates except his own, which he refrained from casting. . . . The Republican platform asserted that the prosperity which the country was enjoying was due to the McKinley administration."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 423.—The platform was in part as follows: "The expectation, in which the American people, turning from the Democratic party, intrusted power four years ago to a Republican Chief Magistrate and a Republican Congress, has been met and satisfied. When the people then assembled at the polls, after a term of Democratic legislation and administration, business was dead, industry paralyzed, and the National credit disastrously impaired. The country's capital was hidden away and its labor distressed and unemployed. The Democrats had no other plan with which to improve the ruinous conditions which they had themselves produced than to coin silver at the ratio of 16 to 1. The Republican Party, denouncing this plan as sure to produce conditions even worse than those from which relief was sought, promised to restore prosperity by means of two legislative measures—a protective tariff and a law making gold the standard of value. . . . The people, by great majorities, issued to the Republican party a commission to enact these laws. This commission has been executed, and the Republican promise is redeemed. Prosperity more general and more abundant than we have ever known has followed these enactments. There is no longer controversy as to the value of any government obligations. Every American dollar is a gold dollar, or its assured equivalent, and American credit stands higher than that of any nation. Capital is fully employed, and labor everywhere is profitably occupied. No single fact can more strikingly tell the story of what Republican government means to the country than this—that while during the whole period of 107 years from 1790 to 1897 there was an excess of exports over imports of only \$383,028,497, there has been in the short, three years of the present Republican Administration an excess of exports over imports in the enormous sum of \$1,483,537,094. . . . We indorse the Administration of William McKinley. Its acts have been established in wisdom and in patriotism, and at home and abroad it has distinctly elevated and extended the influence of the American nation. Walking untried paths and facing unforeseen responsibilities, President McKinley has been in every situation the true American patriot and the upright statesman, clear in vision, strong in judgment, firm in action, always inspiring and deserving the confidence of his countrymen. In asking the American people to indorse this Republican record and to renew their commission to the Republican party, we remind them of the fact that the menace to their prosperity has always resided in Democratic principles, and no less in the general incapacity of the Democratic

party to conduct public affairs. The prime essential of business prosperity is public confidence in the good sense of the Government, and in its ability to deal intelligently with each new problem of administration and legislation. That confidence the Democratic party has never earned. It is hopelessly inadequate, and the country's prosperity when Democratic success at the polls is announced halts and ceases in mere anticipation of Democratic blunders and failures. We renew our allegiance to the principle of the gold standard, and declare our confidence in the wisdom of the legislation of the Fifty-sixth Congress by which the parity of all our money and the stability of our currency upon a gold basis has been secured. We recognize that interest rates are potent factors in production and business activity, and for the purpose of further equalizing and of further lowering the rates of interest, we favor such monetary legislation as will enable the varying needs of the seasons and of all sections to be promptly met in order that trade may be evenly sustained, labor steadily employed, and commerce enlarged. The volume of money in circulation was never so great per capita as it is to-day. We declare our steadfast opposition to the free and unlimited coinage of silver. No measure to that end could be considered which was without the support of the leading commercial countries of the world. However firmly Republican legislation may seem to have secured the country against the peril of base and discredited currency, the election of a Democratic President could not fail to impair the country's credit and to bring once more into question the intention of the American people to maintain upon the gold standard the parity of their money circulation. The Democratic party must be convinced that the American people will never tolerate the Chicago platform. We recognize the necessity and propriety of the honest coöperation of capital to meet new business conditions, and especially to extend our rapidly increasing foreign trade, but we condemn all conspiracies and combinations intended to restrict business, to create monopolies, to limit production, or to control prices, and favor such legislation as will effectively restrain and prevent all such abuses, protect and promote competition, and secure the rights of producers, laborers, and all who are engaged in industry and commerce. We renew our faith in the policy of protection to American labor. In that policy our industries have been established, diversified, and maintained. By protecting the home market competition has been stimulated and production cheapened. Opportunity to the inventive genius of our people has been secured and wages in every department of labor maintained at high rates, higher now than ever before, and always distinguishing our working people in their better conditions of life from those of any competing country. Enjoying the blessings of the American common school, secure in the right of self-government, and protected in the occupancy of their own markets, their constantly increasing knowledge and skill have enabled them finally to enter the markets of the world. We favor the associated policy of reciprocity so directed as to open our markets on favorable terms for what we do not ourselves produce in return for free foreign markets. In the further interest of American workmen we favor a more effective restriction of the immigration of cheap labor from foreign lands, the extension of opportunities of education for working children, the raising of the age limit for child labor, the protection of free labor as

against contract convict labor, and an effective system of labor insurance. . . . President McKinley has conducted the foreign affairs of the United States with distinguished credit to the American people. In releasing us from the vexatious conditions of a European alliance for the government of Samoa his course is especially to be commended. By securing to our undivided control the most important island of the Samoan group and the best harbor in the Southern Pacific, every American interest has been safeguarded. We approve the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. We commend the part taken by our Government in the Peace Conference at The Hague. We assert our steadfast adherence to the policy announced in the Monroe Doctrine. The provisions of The Hague Convention were wisely regarded when President McKinley tendered his friendly offices in the interest of peace between Great Britain and the South African republics. While the American Government must continue the policy prescribed by Washington, affirmed by every succeeding President and imposed upon us by The Hague Treaty, of non-intervention in European controversies, the American people earnestly hope that a way may soon be found, honorable alike to both contending parties to terminate the strife between them. In accepting by the Treaty of Paris the just responsibility of our victories in the Spanish war the President and the Senate won the undoubted approval of the American people. No other course was possible than to destroy Spain's sovereignty throughout the West Indies and in the Philippine Islands. That course created our responsibility before the world, and with the unorganized population whom our intervention had freed from Spain, to provide for the maintenance of law and order, and for the establishment of good government and for the performance of international obligations. Our authority could not be less than our responsibility, and wherever sovereign rights were extended it became the high duty of the Government to maintain its authority, to put down armed insurrection and to confer the blessings of liberty and civilization upon all the rescued peoples. The largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall be secured to them by law. To Cuba independence and self-government were assured in the same voice by which war was declared, and to the letter this pledge will be performed."

"This language of the Republican platform in reference to the trusts was characterized in the Democratic platform 'as dishonest paltering with the trust evil.' The Democratic plank on trusts said: 'Existing laws against trusts must be enforced, and more stringent ones must be enacted providing for the publicity as to the affairs of corporations engaged in interstate commerce and requiring all corporations to show that they have no water in their stock and that they have not attempted to monopolize any branch of business or the production of any articles of merchandise.' In accordance with the wishes of Bryan, but against the wishes of many leaders, coinage of silver in terms as strong as those used in 1896. But free silver was not put to the front as the issue upon which the fight was to be made: the supreme question to be discussed was 'imperialism.'" —S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, p. 696.—The platform was in part as follows: "We, the representatives of the Democratic party of the United States, assembled in national convention on the anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, do

reaffirm our faith in that immortal proclamation of the inalienable rights of man, and our allegiance to the constitution framed in harmony therewith by the fathers of the Republic. We hold with the United States Supreme Court that the Declaration of Independence is the spirit of our government, of which the constitution is the form and letter. We declare again that all governments instituted among men derive their just powers from the consent of the governed; that any government not based upon the consent of the governed is a tyranny; and that to impose upon any people a government of force is to substitute the methods of imperialism for those of a republic. We hold that the constitution follows the flag and denounce the doctrine that an executive or congress, deriving their existence and their powers from the constitution, can exercise lawful authority beyond it, or in violation of it. We assert that no nation can long endure half republic and half empire, and we warn the American people that imperialism abroad will lead quickly and inevitably to despotism at home. Believing in these fundamental principles, we denounce the Porto Rico law, enacted by a Republican Congress against the protest and opposition of the Democratic minority, as a bold and open violation of the Nation's organic law and a flagrant breach of National good faith. It imposes upon the people of Porto Rico a government without their consent, and taxation without representation. It dishonors the American people by repudiating a solemn pledge made in their behalf by the commanding general of our Army, which the Porto Ricans welcomed to a peaceful and unresisted occupation of their land. It dooms to poverty and distress a people whose helplessness appeals with peculiar force to our justice and magnanimity. In this, the first act of its imperialistic programme, the Republican party seeks to commit the United States to a colonial policy inconsistent with republican institutions and condemned by the Supreme Court in numerous decisions. We demand the prompt and honest fulfilment of our pledge to the Cuban people and the world, that the United States has no disposition nor intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the island of Cuba, except for its pacification. The war ended nearly two years ago, profound peace reigns over all the island, and still the Administration keeps the government of the island from its people, while Republican carpet-bag officials plunder its revenue and exploit the colonial theory to the disgrace of the American people. We condemn and denounce the Philippine policy of the present Administration. It has embroiled the Republic in an unnecessary war, sacrificed the lives of many of its noblest sons, and placed the United States, previously known and applauded throughout the world as the champion of freedom, in the false and un-American position of crushing with military force the efforts of our former allies to achieve liberty and self-government. The Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization; they cannot be subjects without imperilling our form of government; and as we are not willing to surrender our civilization, or to convert the Republic into an empire, we favor an immediate declaration of the Nation's purpose to give to the Filipinos, first, a stable form of government; second, independence; and third, protection from outside interference such as has been given for nearly a century to the republics of Central and South America. The greedy commercialism which dictated the Philippine policy of the Republican Administration at-

tempts to justify it with the plea that it will pay, but even this sordid and unworthy plea fails when brought to the test of facts. The war of 'criminal aggression' against the Filipinos entailing an annual expense of many millions, has already cost more than any possible profit that could accrue from the entire Philippine trade for years to come. Furthermore, when trade is extended at the expense of liberty the price is always too high. We are not opposed to territorial expansion, when it takes in desirable territory which can be erected into States in the Union, and whose people are willing and fit to become American citizens. We favor trade expansion by every peaceful and legitimate means. But we are unalterably opposed to the seizing or purchasing of distant islands to be governed outside the Constitution and whose people can never become citizens. We are in favor of extending the Republic's influence among the nations, but believe that influence should be extended not by force and violence, but through the persuasive power of a high and honorable example."

"Bryan accordingly went out proclaiming imperialism as the supreme question of the day; but this time he was unable to force the issue. It was Hanna's idea that the supreme question was prosperity and that the slogan of the Republicans should be the 'full dinner-pail.' So far as his party was concerned Hanna could have his way about the matter, for he was in full command. . . . Since the 'prosperity banner' was to be waved in every doubtful precinct in every doubtful State, a great deal of money would have to be collected for propaganda purposes. Here Hanna's services were as useful as they had been in 1896. But his comb in 1900 did not have such fine teeth as the one he used four years before. . . . In 1900 he [Mark Hanna] solicited and obtained support from Wall Street more explicitly and more exclusively than he had in 1896. The result of this large-scale assessment was a campaign fund of \$2,500,000. This was money enough and to spare. The prosperity idea was spread far and wide. McKinley was everywhere heralded as the promoter of good times, and voters had it dinned into their ears, morning, noon, and night, that they had best 'let well enough alone,' and that a vote for the Republican ticket meant a 'full dinner-pail.' The appeal proved to be so effective and powerful that before the campaign closed the voters felt that the only question they had to decide was whether there should be hard times under the Democrats, or good times under the Republicans. Bryan made a brilliant and earnest campaign, but he failed to arouse any great interest or enthusiasm in the subject which he regarded paramount."—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*, pp. 606-607.—"The campaign of 1900 is remarkable in the history of America for the number of parties in the field; at least twelve conventions met and adopted platforms, though not all of them nominated separate candidates. The People's party was the most significant of the third-party movements, but was soon found to be hopelessly divided into two wings. The Middle-of-the-Road, or Antifusion, Populists met at Cincinnati May 10, and nominated Wharton Barker, of Pennsylvania, for president, and Ignatius Donnelly, of Minnesota, for vice-president. The Fusion Populists, those who wished to act in cooperation with the Democrats, met the same day at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and nominated Bryan for the presidency by acclamation, thus anticipating the action of the Democratic convention; Charles A. Towne, of Minnesota, for several years the recognized head of the Silver Republicans, was

nominated for vice-president, though an effort had been made to keep this place open until the Democratic convention should meet. The most significant plank in the Populist platform, appearing in the platforms of both wings, was the government ownership of railroads as the remedy for trusts. The platform also denounced the gold-standard act, and declared against imperialism. . . . Bryan was also indorsed by the Silver Republicans [sometimes called Lincoln Republicans], who met in Kansas City the same week, and by the Liberty Congress of the American League of Anti-Imperialists, which met in Indianapolis August 16. A number of other parties put candidates in the field such as the Socialist Labor party . . . [which held a convention in New York City on June 2, and nominated Joseph P. Maloney of Massachusetts and Valentine Remmel of Pennsylvania], the social Democratic party . . . [which met in convention in Chicago, on September 29, and placed Eugene V. Debs of Illinois, in nomination for president and Job Harriman of California for vice president]; the Prohibition party [which held its convention in Chicago, on June 27, and chose John G. Woolley of Chicago (already named by the United Christian party for vice president) to be its candidate for president with Henry B. Metcalf of Rhode Island for vice president] and the United Christian party."—J. H. Latané, *America as a world power, 1897-1907*, pp. 124-125, 130.

DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE ON "IMPERIALISM."—The issue which ought to have been supreme in the presidential election, because fundamental principles of government and lasting consequences of policy were bound up in it, but which was unhappily confused by prevailing anxieties in the sensitive region of commercial and industrial affairs, is more broadly and adequately defined in the declarations of the two leading candidates, on their formal acceptance of nominations by the Democratic and Republican parties, than it is in the party platforms quoted above. The first to speak was William Jennings Bryan. Responding to the committee which notified him of his nomination, at Indianapolis, on August 8, he devoted the greater part of his remarks to the policy of colonial acquisition on which the government had embarked. The following passages are fairly representative of the view taken by those who condemned what they termed "imperialism," in the undertaking of the government of the American republic to impose its sovereignty upon the people of the Philippine islands, and to hold their country as a "possession": "When the president, supported by a practically unanimous vote of the House and Senate, entered upon a war with Spain for the purpose of aiding the struggling patriots of Cuba, the country, without regard to party, applauded. Although the Democrats realized that the administration would necessarily gain a political advantage from the conduct of a war which in the very nature of the case must soon end in a complete victory, they vied with the Republicans in the support which they gave to the President. When the war was over and the Republican leaders began to suggest the propriety of a colonial policy, opposition at once manifested itself. When the President finally laid before the Senate a treaty which recognized the independence of Cuba, but provided for the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, the menace of imperialism became so apparent that many preferred to reject the treaty and risk the ills that might follow rather than take the chance of correcting the

errors of the treaty by the independent action of this country. I was among the number of those who believed it better to ratify the treaty and end the war, release the volunteers, remove the excuse for war expenditures, and then give the Filipinos the independence which might be forced from Spain by a new treaty. . . . The title of Spain being extinguished we were at liberty to deal with the Filipinos according to American principles. The Bacon resolution, introduced a month before hostilities broke out at Manila, promised independence to the Filipinos on the same terms that it was promised to the Cubans. I supported this resolution and believe that its adoption prior to the breaking out of hostilities would have prevented bloodshed, and that its adoption at any subsequent time would have ended hostilities. . . . If the Bacon resolution had been adopted by the Senate and carried out by the President, either at the time of the ratification of the treaty or at any time afterwards, it would have taken the question of imperialism out of politics and left the American people free to deal with their domestic problems. But the resolution was defeated by the vote of the Republican Vice-President, and from that time to this a Republican Congress has refused to take any action whatever in the matter. . . . A colonial policy means that we shall send to the Philippine Islands a few traders, a few taskmasters and a few officeholders and an army large enough to support the authority of a small fraction of the people while they rule the natives. If we have an imperial policy we must have a great standing army as its natural and necessary complement. The spirit which will justify the forcible annexation of the Philippine Islands will justify the seizure of other islands and the domination of other people, and with wars of conquest we can expect a certain, if not rapid, growth of our military establishment. . . . Some argue that American rule in the Philippine Islands will result in the better education of the Filipinos. Be not deceived. If we expect to maintain a colonial policy, we shall not find it to our advantage to educate the people. The educated Filipinos are now in revolt against us, and the most ignorant ones have made the least resistance to our domination. If we are to govern them without their consent and give them no voice in determining the taxes which they must pay, we dare not educate them, lest they learn to read the Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the United States and mock us for our inconsistency. . . . Imperialism would be profitable to the army contractors; it would be profitable to the ship-owners, who would carry live soldiers to the Philippines and bring dead soldiers back; it would be profitable to those who would seize upon the franchises, and it would be profitable to the officials whose salaries would be fixed here and paid over there; but to the farmer, to the laboring man and to the vast majority of those engaged in other occupations it would bring expenditure without return and risk without reward. . . . The argument made by some that it was unfortunate for the nation that it had anything to do with the Philippine Islands, but that the naval victory at Manila made the permanent acquisition of those islands necessary, is also unsound. We won a naval victory at Santiago, but that did not compel us to hold Cuba. The shedding of American blood in the Philippine Islands does not make it imperative that we should retain possession for ever. American blood was shed at San Juan Hill and El Caney, and yet the President has promised the Cubans in-

dependence. The fact that the American flag floats over Manila does not compel us to exercise perpetual sovereignty over the islands; the American flag waves over Havana to-day, but the President has promised to haul it down when the flag of the Cuban Republic is ready to rise in its place. Better a thousand times that our flag in the Orient give way to a flag representing the idea of self-government than that the flag of this Republic should become the flag of an empire. There is an easy, honest, honourable solution of the Philippine question. It is set forth in the Democratic platform, and it is submitted with confidence to the American people. This plan I unreservedly indorse. If elected, I will convene congress in extraordinary session as soon as inaugurated and recommend an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose, first, to establish a stable form of government in the Philippine Islands, just as we are now establishing a stable form of government in Cuba; second, to give independence to the Cubans; third, to protect the Filipinos from outside interference while they work out their destiny, just as we have protected the republics of Central and South America, and are, by the Monroe doctrine, pledged to protect Cuba."

REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—The answer of the party controlling the government to the impeachment of its policy of colonial acquisition, and especially of its conduct in the Philippine islands, was given by President McKinley, in a letter of acceptance, addressed, Sept. 8, 1900, to the committee which gave him formal notice of his renomination by the Republican convention. After rehearsing at considerable length the events which preceded, attended and followed the capture of Manila, he continued: "Would not our adversaries have sent Dewey's fleet to Manila to capture and destroy the Spanish sea power there, or, dispatching it there, would they have withdrawn it after the destruction of the Spanish fleet; and, if the latter, whither would they have directed it to sail? Where could it have gone? What port in the Orient was opened to it? Do our adversaries condemn the expedition under the command of Gen. Merritt to strengthen Dewey in the distant ocean and assist in our triumph over Spain, with which nation we were at war? Was it not our highest duty to strike Spain at every vulnerable point, that the war might be successfully concluded at the earliest practicable moment? And was it not our duty to protect the lives and property of those who came within our control by the fortunes of war? Could we have come away at any time between May 1, 1898, and the conclusion of peace without a stain upon our good name? Could we have come away without dishonor at any time after the ratification of the peace treaty by the Senate of the United States? There has been no time since the destruction of the enemy's fleet when we could or should have left the Philippine Archipelago. After the treaty of peace was ratified, no power but Congress could surrender our sovereignty or alienate a foot of the territory thus acquired. The Congress has not seen fit to do the one or the other, and the President had no authority to do either, if he had been so inclined, which he was not. So long as the sovereignty remains in us it is the duty of the Executive, whoever he may be, to uphold that sovereignty, and if it be attacked to suppress its assailants. Would our political adversaries do less? It has been asserted that there would have been no fighting in the Philippines if Con-

gress had declared its purpose to give independence to the Tagal insurgents. The insurgents did not wait for the action of Congress. They assumed the offensive; they opened fire on our Army. Those who assert our responsibility for the beginning of the conflict have forgotten that, before the treaty was ratified in the Senate, and while it was being debated in that body and while the Bacon resolution was under discussion, on February 4, 1899, the insurgents attacked the American Army, after being previously advised that the American forces were under orders not to fire upon them except in defense. The papers found in the recently captured archives of the insurgents demonstrate that this attack had been carefully planned for weeks before it occurred. This unprovoked assault upon our soldiers at a time when the Senate was deliberating upon the treaty shows that no action on our part, except surrender and abandonment, would have prevented the fighting, and leaves no doubt in any fair mind of where the responsibility rests for the shedding of American blood. With all the exaggerated phrase-making of this electoral contest, we are in danger of being diverted from the real contention. We are in agreement with all of those who supported the war with Spain and also with those who counseled the ratification of the treaty of peace. Upon these two great essential steps there can be no issue and out of these came all of our responsibilities. If others would shirk the obligations imposed by the war and the treaty, we must decline to act further with them, and here the issue was made. It is our purpose to establish in the Philippines a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants and to prepare them for self-government when they are ready for it and as rapidly as they are ready for it. That I am aiming to do under my Constitutional authority, and will continue to do until Congress shall determine the political status of the inhabitants of the archipelago. Are our opponents against the treaty? If so, they must be reminded that it could not have been ratified in the Senate but for their assistance. The Senate which ratified the treaty and the Congress which added its sanction by a large approbation comprised Senators and Representatives of the people of all parties. Would our opponents surrender to the insurgents, abandon our sovereignty or cede it to them? If that be not their purpose, then it should be promptly disclaimed, for only evil can result from the hopes raised by our opponents in the minds of the Filipinos, that with their success at the polls in November there will be a withdrawal of our Army and of American sovereignty over the archipelago; the complete independence of the Tagalog people recognized and the powers of government over all the other people of the archipelago conferred upon the Tagalog leaders. The effect of a belief in the minds of the insurgents that this will be done has already prolonged the rebellion and increases the necessity for the continuance of a large army. It is now delaying full peace in the archipelago and the establishment of civil governments and has influenced many of the insurgents against accepting the liberal terms of amnesty offered by Gen. MacArthur under my direction. But for these false hopes, a considerable reduction could have been had in our military establishment in the Philippines, and the realization of a stable government would be already at hand. The American people are asked by our opponents to yield the sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines to a small fraction of the population, a single tribe out of 80 or more inhabiting

the archipelago, a fraction which wantonly attacked the American troops in Manila while in rightful possession under the protocol with Spain, awaiting the ratification of the treaty of peace by the Senate, and which has since been in active, open rebellion against the United States. We are asked to transfer our sovereignty to a small minority in the islands, without consulting the majority, and to abandon the largest portion of the population, which has been loyal to us, to the cruelties of the guerrilla insurgent bands. More than this, we are asked to protect this minority in establishing a government, and to this end repress all opposition of the majority. We are required to set up a stable government in the interest of those who have assailed our sovereignty and fired upon our soldiers, and then maintain it at any cost or sacrifice against its enemies within and against those having ambitious designs from without. This would require an army and navy far larger than is now maintained in the Philippines and still more in excess of what will be necessary with the full recognition of our sovereignty. A military support of authority not our own, as thus proposed, is the very essence of militarism, which our opponents in their platform oppose, but which by their policy would of necessity be established in its most offensive form. . . . No government can so certainly preserve the peace, restore public order, establish law, justice and stable conditions as ours. Neither Congress nor the Executive can establish a stable government in these islands except under our right of sovereignty, our authority and our flag. And this we are doing. We could not do it as a protectorate power so completely or so successfully as we are doing it now. As the sovereign power, we can initiate action and shape means to ends and guide the Filipinos to self-development and self-government. As a protectorate power we could not initiate action, but would be compelled to follow and uphold a people with no capacity yet to go alone. In the one case we can protect both ourselves and the Filipinos from being involved in dangerous complications; in the other we could not protect even the Filipinos until after their trouble had come. Besides, if we cannot establish any government of our own without the consent of the governed, as our opponents contend, then we could not establish a stable government for them or make ours a protectorate without the like consent, and neither the majority of the people or a minority of the people have invited us to assume it. We could not maintain a protectorate even with the consent of the governed without giving provocation for conflicts and possibly costly wars. Our rights in the Philippines are now free from outside interference and will continue so in our present relation. They would not be thus free in any other relation. We will not give up our own to guarantee another sovereignty. Our title is good. Our peace commissioners believed they were receiving a good title when they concluded the treaty. The Executive believed it was a good title when he submitted it to the Senate of the United States for its ratification. The Senate believed it was a good title when they gave it their Constitutional assent, and the Congress seems not to have doubted its completeness when they appropriated \$20,000,000 provided by the treaty. If any who favored its ratification believed it gave us a bad title, they were not sincere. Our title is practically identical with that under which we hold our territory acquired since the beginning of the government, and under which we have exercised full sovereignty

and established government for the inhabitants. It is worthy of note that no one outside of the United States disputes the fulness and integrity of the cession. What then is the real issue on this subject? Whether it is paramount to any other or not, it is whether we shall be responsible for the government of the Philippines with the sovereignty and authority which enable us to guide them to regulated liberty, law, safety and progress, or whether we shall be responsible for the forcible and arbitrary government of a minority without sovereignty and authority on our part and with only the embarrassment of a protectorate which draws us into their troubles without the power of preventing them. There were those who two years ago were rushing us on to war with Spain who are unwilling now to accept its clear consequence, as there are those among us who advocated the ratification of the treaty of peace, but now protest against its obligations. Nations which go to war must be prepared to accept its resultant obligations, and when they make treaties must keep them. Those who profess to distrust the liberal and honorable purposes of the Administration in its treatment of the Philippines are not justified. Imperialism has no place in its creed or conduct. Freedom is a rock upon which the Republican party was builded and now rests. Liberty is the great Republican doctrine for which the people went to war and for which 1,000,000 lives were offered and billions of dollars expended to make it a lawful legacy of all without the consent of master or slave. There is a strain of ill-conceived hypocrisy in the anxiety to extend the Constitutional guarantees to the people of the Philippines while their nullification is openly advocated at home. Our opponents may distrust themselves, but they have no right to discredit the good faith and patriotism of the majority of the people, who are opposing them. . . . Empire has been expelled from Porto Rico and the Philippines by American freemen. The flag of the Republic now floats over these islands as an emblem of rightful sovereignty. Will the Republic stay and dispense to their inhabitants the blessings of liberty, education and free institutions, or steal away, leaving them to anarchy or imperialism? The American question is between duty and desertion—the American verdict will be for duty and against desertion, for the Republic against both anarchy and imperialism."

The Republicans reelected McKinley with 292 electoral and 7,207,386 popular votes; "the Democrats got 155 electoral and 6,358,076 popular votes; the Prohibitionists got 207,174 votes; the Social Democrats 94,173; the 'Middle-of-the-Road' party 49,787; the Socialist-Labor 33,319; the Union Reform, 5,968; and the United Christian 1,059 votes. The votes of the People's party and the Silver Republicans are included in the Democratic total."—W. P. Johnson, *History of Republican party: What it has stood for and what it stands for today*, p. 78.

1900 (June).—Immigration for the year ended June 30.—"The Commissioner-General of Immigration, in the annual report of the operations of his Bureau for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1900, submits tabulated statements showing the arrival in this country during that period of 448,572 alien immigrants, 425,372 through ports of the United States and 23,200 through Canada. Of these 304,148 were males and 144,424 females; 54,624 were under 14 years of age, 370,382 were from 14 to 45 years old, and 23,566 were 45 and over. As to the literacy of persons 14 years of age and over, there were 93,576 who could neither read nor write, and 2,097 who could read but were unable

to write; 54,288 brought each \$30 or over, and 271,821 showed sums less than \$30, the total amounts displayed to inspectors aggregating \$6,657,530. There were returned to their own countries within one year after landing 356, and hospital relief was rendered during the year to 2,417. The total debarred, or refused a landing at the ports, were 4,246, as compared with 3,798 last year. Of these, 1 was excluded for idiocy, 32 for insanity, 2,974 as paupers or persons likely to become public charges, 393 on account of disease, 4 as convicts, 2 as assisted immigrants, 833 as contract laborers, and 7 women upon the ground that they had been imported for immoral purposes. In addition to the foregoing, there were excluded at the Mexican and Canadian borders a total of 1,616 aliens. It appears that the Croatian and Slovenian races sent an increase of 99 per cent over those of the same races who came last year; the Hebrew, an increase of 62 per cent; the South Italian (including Sicilian), 28 per cent; the Japanese, 271 per cent; the Finnish, 106 per cent; the Magyar, 181 per cent; the Polish, 64 per cent; the Scandinavian, 41 per cent; the Slovak, 84 per cent. These nine races, of the total of forty-one races represented by immigration, furnished nearly as many immigrants as the total arrivals for the last year, or 310,444, and their aggregate increase represented 85 per cent of the total increase shown for the year. The total immigration reported, 448,572, is in excess of that for the preceding year, 311,715, by 136,857, or 43.9 per cent. As to countries of origin, 424,700 came from European, 17,946 from Asiatic, 30 from African, and 5,896 from all other sources. The Commissioner-General points out that in addition to the 448,572 immigrants there arrived 65,635 other alien passengers, who, he contends, should be included in conformity to law with those classified as immigrants."—*United States, Secretary of the Treasury, Annual Report, 1900, p. 37.*—See also IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1870-1910.

1900 (June).—Revenues and expenditures of the government for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1900.—The revenues of the government from all sources (by warrants) for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1900, were:


From internal revenue	\$295,327,926.76
From customs	233,164,871.16
From profits on coinage, bullion deposits, etc.	9,992,374.09
From District of Columbia	4,008,722.77
From fees—consular, letters patent, and land	3,291,716.68
From sales of public lands	2,836,882.98
From tax on national banks	1,998,554.00
From navy pension, navy hospital, clothing, and deposit funds	1,621,558.52
From sales of Indian lands	1,384,663.49
From payment of interest by Pacific railroads	1,173,466.43
From miscellaneous	997,375.68
From sales of Government property	779,522.78
From customs fees, fines, penalties, etc..	675,706.95
From immigrant fund	537,404.81
From deposits for surveying public lands	273,247.19
From sales of ordnance material	257,265.56
From Soldiers' Home, permanent fund..	247,926.62
From tax on seal skins, and rent of seal islands	225,676.47
From license fees, Territory of Alaska..	157,234.94
From trust funds, Department of State.	152,794.56
From depredations on public lands	76,307.58
From Spanish indemnity	57,000.00
From sales of lands and buildings	3,842,737.68
From part payment Central Pacific Railroad indebtedness	3,338,016.49
From dividend received for account of Kansas Pacific Railway	821,897.70
From Postal Service	102,354,579.29
Total receipts	669,595,431.18

The expenditures for the same period were:

For the civil establishment, including foreign intercourse, public buildings, collecting the revenues, District of Columbia, and other miscellaneous expenses	\$98,542,411.37
For the military establishment, including rivers and harbors, forts, arsenals, sea-coast defenses, and expenses of the war with Spain and in the Philippines	134,774,767.78
For the naval establishment, including construction of new vessels, machinery, armament, equipment, improvement at navy-yards, and expenses of the war with Spain and in the Philippines ...	55,953,977.72
For Indian Service	10,175,106.76
For pensions	140,877,316.02
For interest on the public debt	40,160,333.27
For deficiency in postal revenues	7,230,778.79
For Postal Service	102,354,579.29
Total expenditures	590,068,371.00
Showing a surplus of	79,527,060.18

"As compared with the fiscal year 1899, the receipts for 1900 increased \$58,613,426.83. . . . There was a decrease of \$117,358,388.14 in expenditures."—*United States, Secretary of the Treasury, Annual Report on the State of the Finances, 1900, pp. 7-9.*

1900 (June-August).—John Hay, as secretary of state.—Attitude toward Boer War.—"The winter and spring of 1900 crowded new business upon



JOHN HAY

[the secretary of state] John Hay. The situation in China, which had grown more and more angry since the Germans pounced upon Kiao-chau in 1897, now threatened an outburst. The Boer War in South Africa indirectly affected American politics by giving Irish and German-Americans an excuse for heckling England at a time when the McKinley Administration was trying to arrange with the English Government a friendly settlement of long-standing disputes. The insurrection of the Filipinos; the status of Cuba; the excitement of the Central American Republics at the prospect of an Isthmian canal; secret negotiations for the purchase of the Danish West Indies, and the campaign for the nomination of presidential candidates,

were among the business on the Secretary's docket. . . . Uninformed historical writers . . . [have] received an old rumor to the effect that the United States made, in Hay's time, a secret alliance with England. . . . [This he denied in a letter to Senator McMillan dated July 3, 1900, in which he says]: 'The Administration has observed the laws of neutrality strictly. . . . You ask me if there is a secret alliance between Great Britain and the United States. You know, of course, that there can be no secret alliance between this country and any other. The Senate of the United States must be a party to it, if any such exists. None exists. None has been suggested on either side. None has been thought of.' [In an earlier letter, written to J. W. Foster on June 23, 1900, he said]: 'Germany we could probably get on our side by sufficient concessions, and perhaps, with England, Germany, and Japan, we might manage to save our skins. . . . We had great trouble to prevent the convention from declaring in favor of the Boers and of the annexation of Canada. Every morning I receive letters cursing me for doing nothing, and others cursing me for being "the tool of England against our good friend Russia." All I have ever done with England is to have wrung great concessions out of her with no compensation.'—W. R. Thayer, *Life and letters of John Hay*, v. 2, pp. 231-232, 234.

1900 (June-December).—Coöperation with the powers in China in the Boxer revolt.—Relief expedition under General Chaffee.—Operations of troops of the powers. See CHINA: 1900.

1900 (July).—Appeal of citizens of Manila to the Congress of the United States for independence. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1900.

1900 (September).—Election of constitutional convention in Cuba. See CUBA: 1900 (June-November).

1900 (December).—Amendment and ratification of the Hay-Pauncefote convention. See PANAMA CANAL: 1889-1903.

1900 (December).—Celebration of the 100th anniversary of the removal of the capital to Washington. See WASHINGTON, D. C.: 1900.

1900 (December).—Exports for the calendar year exceeding those of any other nation.—A press dispatch from Washington, dated February 21, 1901, announced the fact that the "complete figures for the calendar year 1900, when compared with those of other nations, show that American exports of domestic products are greater than those of any other country. The total exports of domestic merchandise from the United States in the calendar year 1900 were \$1,453,013,659; those from the United Kingdom, which has heretofore led in the race for this distinction were \$1,418,348,000, and those from Germany \$1,050,611,000. Additional interest is given to the first rank which the United States now holds as an exporting nation by the fact that a quarter of a century ago she stood fourth in that list. In 1875 the domestic exports of the United States were \$497,263,737; those of Germany, \$607,096,000; those of France, \$747,489,000, and those of the United Kingdom, \$1,087,497,000. To-day the United States stands at the head of the list, the United Kingdom second, Germany third and France fourth, with the figures as follows: United States, \$1,453,013,659; United Kingdom, \$1,418,348,000; Germany, \$1,050,611,000; France, \$787,060,000. All of these figures, it should be remembered, relate to the exports of domestic products. Thus in the quarter century the United States has increased her exports from \$497,263,737 to \$1,453,013,659, or 192

per cent; Germany, from \$607,096,000 to \$1,050,611,000, or 73 per cent; the United Kingdom, from \$1,087,497,000 to \$1,418,348,000, or 34 per cent, and France, from \$747,489,000 to \$787,060,000, or 5 per cent."

1900-1901.—Questions relating to the political status of the new possessions of the nation submitted to the Supreme Court.—Decisions.—Questions of surpassing importance, touching the political status of the new possessions which the nation had acquired from Spain, the relations of their inhabitants to the government and laws of the United States, the source and nature of the authority to be exercised over them by the Congress of the United States, whether exercised under the constitution of the United States or independently of it, were taken, in December and January (1900-1901), into the Supreme Court for authoritative decision, by appeals to that tribunal made in several suits which had arisen from disputed exactions of duty on importations from Porto Rico and the Philippine islands. Argument before the Supreme Court was begun on December 17, 1900, on two cases thus stated in the brief submitted for the government: "On June 6, 1899, Goetze imported from Porto Rico into the port of New York a quantity of leaf or filler tobacco, upon which duty was assessed at 35 cents per pound as filler tobacco not specially provided for, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 213 of the tariff act of 1897, commonly known as the 'Dingley Act.' The importer protested, claiming that the merchandise was not subject to duty, because Porto Rico at the time of the importation was not a foreign country and because, therefore, the imposition of duties on goods brought from a place within the territory of the United States into a port of the United States is not lawful and valid under the Constitution. The Board of General Appraisers sustained the assessment of duty imposed by the collector upon the merchandise in question, and thereupon the importer appealed to the United States circuit court for the southern district of New York, by which court the decision of the Board of General Appraisers was affirmed in an opinion rendered by District Judge Townsend. From the judgment of the circuit court this appeal was taken. Porto Rico was partially occupied by the war forces of the United States during the months of July and August, 1898. By the protocol of August 12, 1898, between the United States and Spain, Spain agreed to cede Porto Rico to the United States and immediately evacuate. The evacuation was effected and full possession of the island assumed by the United States prior to January 1, 1899. From that date until the 1st of May, 1900, Porto Rico was occupied and governed by the military forces of the United States, under the command of the President, as conquered territory, under the law of belligerent right. The treaty of Paris, made in pursuance of the protocol, was signed December 10, 1898, ratified by the Senate February 6, 1899, and ratifications exchanged April 11, 1899. So that the importation in this case was subsequent to the ratification of the treaty, but prior to the establishment of a civil government in the island under act of Congress. It does not appear that the importers are citizens of the United States or of Porto Rico, nor whether or not the imported tobacco was the product of Porto Rico. In the case of Fourteen Diamond Rings, it appears that the claimant, Pepke, is a citizen of the United States and served as a United States soldier in the Island of Luzon; that while there he

purchased or acquired the rings in question and brought them into the United States without paying duty thereon some time in the year 1899, between July 31 and September 25. The rings were seized, on May 18, 1900, at Chicago, by a United States customs officer as merchandise liable to duty which should have been invoiced, and was fraudulently imported and brought into the United States contrary to law. An information for the forfeiture of the rings was filed on behalf of the Government, June 1, 1900, to which the claimant pleaded. Setting up that at the time he acquired said property Luzon was a part of the territory of the United States and that the seizure of said goods was contrary to the claimant's right as a citizen of the United States under the Constitution, and particularly under section 2, Article IV, thereof, and he insisted that under Article I, section 8, Congress is required in laying and collecting taxes to see to it that all taxes and duties shall be uniform throughout the United States. To this plea the United States demurred, and upon hearing of the demurrer, the district court gave judgment of forfeiture for the Government. This judgment the claimant has removed into this court by a writ of error." The contention of the government as set forth in the same brief, and the main contention of the appellants in the case, against which the argument for the government was directed, were partly as follows: "The Tariff Act of 1897 declares that 'there shall be levied, collected and paid upon all articles imported from foreign countries and mentioned in the schedules herein contained, the rates of duty which are by the schedules and paragraphs respectively prescribed.' (30 Stat., 151.) The Government contends, and the circuit court so held, that this act applied to merchandise imported from Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands after their cession to the United States exactly as it did before; that within the meaning of the act these countries are to be regarded as foreign, belonging to but not forming in a domestic sense a part of the United States. That it is within the constitutional province of the treaty-making power to accept the cession of foreign territory upon such terms, conditions, and limitations as to its internal status as may best subserve the interests of the United States, and it is not necessary to invest such territory with the full status of an integral part of the Union. That this is one of the ordinary and necessary sovereign powers of an independent nation, and nothing in the Federal Constitution or in the fundamental principles that underlie our Republic denies to the nation a right to the full exercise of this usual and common sovereign right. That the treaty-making power—the President and the Senate—as evidenced by the language of the treaty of Paris, did not intend to make Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands integral parts of the United States, but intended, in several particulars, to reserve their final status for adjustment by Congress, at the same time making peculiar and special differential provisions for variations and exceptions in customs and port regulations as to Spain and Spanish goods and subjects which are inconsistent with the intention that the ceded countries became upon the ratification of the treaty a part of the United States in all respects and in the fullest sense. The Government contends that the term, 'foreign countries' in the act of 1897 is to be regarded as having been understood by Congress to be subject to the rule of interpretation of the phrase

given by the Supreme Court in the case of *Fleming v. Page*, where it was held that under our revenue laws every port is regarded as a foreign one until expressly established as domestic under the authority and control of the statutes of the United States. That the clause of the Constitution which declares that duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States does not apply to nor govern these cases, because the term 'United States,' as there used, means only the territory comprised within the several States of the Union, and was intended only for their benefit and protection, and not for the benefit or protection of outside territory belonging to the nation; that in the latter sense duties on imports from these islands are uniform throughout the United States, because they are uniformly imposed at every port in the United States, so that there is no preference given to the ports of one State over those of another, nor is any inequality between the several States created. That the right to bring merchandise into the United States is a right entirely within the regulation of Congress; such right in no wise differs as to either citizens or aliens. Citizenship carries with it no special or peculiar privileges at the custom-house. The American, the Spaniard, the Porto Rican, are treated alike. The basis of the customs laws is not ownership, but (1) the geographical origin of the shipment, and (2) the nature of the goods. The duty is imposed against merchandise, not upon the importer. The Government contends, therefore, that in view of the fact that tariff laws are 'in rem,' there is no principle of justice, much less of constitutional restriction, which forbids Congress from taxing in this way the merchandise of out-lying possessions of the United States when brought into the ports of the Union. That the limitations of the Constitution as to customs, etc., were intended to secure equality between the States in the geographical sense, and not to forbid Congress from exercising the ordinary sovereign power of taxation as to the products of other sections of country not included within the geographical boundaries of the States; for which we rely upon the opinion of this court in *Knowlton v. Moore*, as decisive and conclusive. If the foregoing propositions are sound, then it is established (1) that the tariff act of 1897 was intended by Congress to classify as foreign all countries not a part of or belonging to the United States at the time of its passage, and the subsequent cession of the Spanish islands to the United States did not operate to admit imports from those islands free of duty, under that law; (2) that the tariff act so construed and enforced violates no constitutional rule of uniformity. And the case of the plaintiffs in error would seem on these grounds to have no legal foundation. The Government might well be content to rest its argument upon these propositions. But counsel for the plaintiffs in error, in the court below as well as in this court, have gone far beyond these limits, and have challenged and denied the constitutionality of certain provisions of the treaty of Paris, contending that the cession of Porto Rico and the Philippine Archipelago effected a complete incorporation of those countries with the United States, so that they have become a part of the United States in the fullest and largest sense, not only internationally, but organically, so completely, indeed, that no difference or distinction can be made by law between imports from those countries and imports from one of the States of the Union. They

insist that there can be no limited or qualified acquisition of territory by this nation; that when Porto Rico was ceded to the United States it came at once under the obligations of the Constitution and became entitled to the privileges of the Constitution, its inhabitants citizens of the United States, and its territory a part of the United States. They argue, therefore, that the clause of the treaty which says that 'the civil rights and political status of the inhabitants shall be determined by the Congress,' in so far as it is intended to defer the full enjoyment of the rights and privileges of citizenship under the Constitution until Congress shall bestow them hereafter upon the inhabitants, is 'ultra vires' and void, or at least superfluous and ineffective, because the Constitution 'ex proprio vigore' extends at once, as an automatic operation, to all territory ceded to this Government, and no treaty or treaty-making power can hinder or even suspend it. . . . 'In legislating for the Territories Congress would doubtless be subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated in the Constitution and its amendments, but these limitations would exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution than by any express and direct application of its provisions.'—*In the Supreme Court of the United States, October term, 1900, John H. Goetze, Appellant, &c.: Brief for the United States.*

On Jan. 8, 1901, four other causes, involving substantially the same questions, came before the Supreme Court, and, by order of the court, were consolidated, to be dealt with virtually as one case. The titles of the cases were respectively as follows: Elias S. A. De Lima et al., plaintiffs in error, agt. George R. Bidwell; Samuel B. Downes, et al., plaintiffs in error, agt. George R. Bidwell; Henry W. Dooley, et al., plaintiffs in error, agt. the United States; Carlos Armstrong, appellant, agt. the United States, and George W. Crossmon et al., appellants, agt. the United States. For the plaintiffs, in the case of Henry W. Dooley et al., the Hon. John G. Carlisle made an oral argument, in which he said: "What is the Constitution? In the first place it is not only the supreme law of the States composing the union, but the supreme law of the land; supreme over every branch and department of the Government; supreme over every one exercising authority under the Government; supreme over every other law or order or regulation, and supreme over all the people, wherever they may be, within its jurisdiction, and what we claim is, that so long as this Constitution exists absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberties, or property of the people can be exercised nowhere in this Republic. It is now argued that it is supreme only within the boundaries of the several States, unless Congress extends it to the Territories; that it limits the powers of Congress only when legislating for the geographical area embraced in the States; that the inhabitants of the States are the only people who can, as a matter of right, claim the benefit of its guarantees and prohibitions for the protection even of those personal and property rights which have for ages been secured by the common law of England, and that all other people within the jurisdiction of the United States are dependent for the protection of their civil rights substantially upon the will of Congress. The question whether the Constitution should be declared to be the supreme law of the whole land, or only the supreme law of the respective States and their

inhabitants or citizens, was presented in the Federal Convention of 1787, and was finally disposed of by the adoption of the clause as it now stands in the Constitution, which declares it to be the supreme law of the land. It is true that the Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the States, but it created a National Government for national purposes, not a mere league or compact between the States, and jurisdiction was conferred upon that Government over the whole national domain, whatever its boundaries might be. It is not true that the Government was established only for the States, their inhabitants or citizens, but if it were true, then it could exercise no power outside of the States, and this court would have to put a new construction upon that provision which authorizes Congress to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, or other property, belonging to the United States. The necessary construction of that clause would be that it conferred power only to dispose of land or other property, and to make necessary rules and regulations respecting land or other property belonging to the United States; that is, belonging to the several States composing the Union. It would confer no power whatever to govern the people outside of the States."—*Supreme Court of the United States, October term, 1900, Henry W. Dooley [et al.] vs. the United States: Argument of J. G. Carlisle.*—On one point the argument of Charles H. Aldrich, attorney for the plaintiff in the case of the "Fourteen Diamond Rings," was as follows: In "the relation of the United States to other nations, our government is a sovereign state, and has the right, and as such 'free and independent State has full power, to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.' In this relation it is correct, as I conceive, to speak of the United States of America as a unit and use a singular verb. It is such unit and has this power because there was created a government upon which the people conferred these powers. If war is declared it must be under the constitution; if peace is concluded it is in the exercise of a constitutional power; if commerce is established it is because Congress under the constitution was given power to regulate commerce; if alliances are contracted it can only be done under the constitution. In short, the sovereign nation exists through the adoption of the constitution, and its powers are derived from that instrument and must be found, as this court has often declared, in the language thereof or by necessary implication therefrom. We are in the Philippines and Porto Rico and can be rightfully there only in the exercise of some of these enumerated powers, as in the language of the tenth amendment, 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' This amendment designates the constitution as the source of the power of the United States and excludes the idea of power free from constitutional restraint derived by implication from powers delegated by the constitution."—*Supreme Court of the United States, October term, 1900: C. H. Aldrich, Argument in reply.*—"Did the Constitution extend of its own force over newly acquired territory, or was an act of Congress necessary to extend it there? When Congress did act for such territory, was it bound by the limitations imposed by the Con-

stitution upon its powers, or were these limitations confined to acts operative within the territory of the states? Was an extension of the constitution to new territory beyond the repeal of later Congresses? The McKinley administration took the view that the Constitution and laws of the United States did not apply to newly acquired territory unless extended there by Congress. Consequently the collection of duties on goods imported from Porto Rico and the Philippines was continued. A number of cases involving these questions in their various phases, and known as the 'Insular Cases,' were carried to the Supreme Court of the United States in the autumn of 1900, and decided May 27, 1901. The first case was that of *De Lima vs. Bidwell*, to recover duties paid under protest on sugars imported from Porto Rico into the United States after the ratification of the treaty but before the passage of the Foraker Act. The court held that the duties were wrongfully exacted, on the ground that the island of Porto Rico, after its cession to the United States, though it had not formally been embraced within the customs union of the States, was no longer 'foreign country' within the meaning of the Dingley law providing for duties upon articles 'imported from foreign countries.' The court affirmed the right of the United States to acquire territory by treaty, and declared that such territory was acquired as absolutely as if annexed by act of Congress; that a country could not be domestic for one purpose and foreign for another. The opinion of the court was delivered by Justice Brown, and concurred in by Chief-Justice Fuller and Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham. From this opinion Justices Gray, McKenna, Shiras, and White dissented. Justice McKenna delivered a dissenting opinion of some length, holding that Porto Rico occupied a relation to the United States between that of foreign country and domestic territory; that the mere act of cession did not extend the Constitution and laws of the United States over the ceded territory, but that to accomplish this there must be an express provision in the treaty or a subsequent act of Congress; that the products of Porto Rico were, therefore, subject to the Dingley tariff duties. In the case of the 'Fourteen Diamond Rings,' decided December 2, 1901, the same questions were raised as to the status of the Philippine Islands, and the same conclusion reached—namely, that, as the Philippine Islands had ceased to be foreign territory, importations from the Philippines to the United States were not subject to the Dingley law. The decision in the case of *De Lima vs. Bidwell* simply held that duties could not be collected under the Dingley act on goods imported from Porto Rico into the United States. It did not settle the question as to whether Congress had the constitutional right to impose duties on importations from Porto Rico. This issue was adjudicated upon, however, at the same term of the court in the case of *Downes vs. Bidwell*, decided May 27, 1901. In this case the court held that the island of Porto Rico, by the treaty of cession, became a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution, such as that requiring duties, imposts, and excises to be uniform throughout the United States; and further, that the imposition of duties upon imports from Porto Rico by the act of Congress known as the Foraker act was a constitutional exercise of the power of Congress. Justice Brown delivered the decision

in this case, and Justices White, Shiras, McKenna, and Gray concurred in the judgment; but not one of them agreed with Justice Brown in the process of reasoning by which he reached his conclusion. Justice Brown's argument was as follows: 'The Constitution was created by the people of the United States, as a nation of States, to be governed solely by representatives of the States; and even the provision relied upon here, that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, is explained by subsequent provisions of the Constitution that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any States," and "no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another, nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.'" In short, the Constitution deals with States, their people, and their representatives.' The natural and logical conclusion from this argument would seem to be that the territories are entirely without the sphere of the Constitution, but Justice Brown did not go so far; he drew a distinction between certain rights peculiar to our system of jurisprudence guaranteed to citizens of the *states*, and certain natural rights the violation of which is prohibited in general terms in the Constitution. He disclaimed, therefore, 'an intention to hold that the inhabitants of these territories are subject to an unrestrained power on the part of Congress to deal with them upon the theory that they have no rights which it is bound to protect.' Justice White reached the same conclusion, but based it on different grounds. In an assenting opinion, with which Justices Shiras and McKenna agreed, he laid down three propositions: that the United States has the right to acquire territory; that the Constitution confers upon Congress the right to govern such territory; and that in the exercise of this right Congress is bound by the provisions of the Constitution so far as they are applicable. 'In the case of the territories, as in every other instance, when a provision of the Constitution is involved, the question which arises is, not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable.' He held, however, that Congress derives its authority to levy local taxes within the territories, not from the general grant of power to 'lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises,' but from its right to govern territories; therefore, in exercising the power to tax in the territories, Congress is not bound by the provision requiring uniformity. To the view here advanced by Justice White, the objection might be raised that duties collected at the ports of the United States are not local taxes. But, he continues, 'the power just referred to, as well as the qualification or uniformity, restrains Congress from imposing an impost duty on goods coming into the United States from a territory which has been incorporated into and forms a part of United States.' We come back to the question, then, what was the status of Porto Rico? Justice White held that it had not been fully incorporated, 'that the treaty-making power cannot incorporate territory into the United States without the express or implied consent of Congress, that it may insert in a treaty express provisions against immediate incorporation, and that on the other hand, when it has expressed in the treaty the conditions favorable to incorporation, they will, if the treaty be not repudiated by Congress, have the force of the law of the land, and therefore by the fulfill-

ment of such conditions cause incorporation to result. It must follow, therefore, that where a treaty contains no conditions for incorporation, and, above all, where it not only has no such conditions, but expressly provides to the contrary, that incorporation does not arise until in the wisdom of Congress it is deemed that the acquired territory has reached that state where it is proper that it should enter into and form a part of the American family.' Justice Gray concurred in the judgment and in substance agreed with the opinion of Justice White, but prepared an opinion of his own."—J. H. Latané, *America as a world power, 1897-1907*, pp. 144-149.

1900-1903.—Friendly relations with Japan. See JAPAN: 1895-1902.

1900-1915.—Naval expenditures and development. See WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1900-1915.

1901.—Abduction of Eilen M. Stone, missionary, by brigands in Macedonia. See TURKEY: 1901-1902.

1901 (January).—Apportionment of representatives under the twelfth census.—Question of Fourteenth Amendment.—Restrictions of elective franchise in the states.—Section 3 of Article I of the Constitution requires that "Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers. . . . The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years. . . . The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000; but each State shall have at least one." The first meeting of Congress was in 1789; the required first census of the United States was taken in 1790, and, in obedience to the constitutional requirement, the enumeration has been repeated within the closing year of every decade since, to supply the basis for a new apportionment of representatives among the states. The twelfth census, taken in 1900, called for such new distribution, and action upon it was taken in Congress in January, 1901. As the section quoted above stood in the constitution until 1868, it contained a further clause, inserted as one of the original compromises made between the slaveholding and the free states, requiring that the determination of numbers to be represented in the several states should be made "by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons." This original clause of the Constitution was superseded by the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, which introduced this new provision, in its second section: "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, except Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." To many persons

it seemed to be very clear that this provision of the amended Constitution required account to be taken of the qualifications by which a number of states have abridged the suffrage, especially where done for the understood purpose of disfranchising colored citizens (see LOUISIANA: 1898; NORTH CAROLINA: 1900; MARYLAND: 1867-1914; MISSISSIPPI: 1890-1892; SOUTH CAROLINA: 1896), and that Congress was left with no discretion to do otherwise. Those holding this view in the House of Representatives gave support to the following resolution, introduced by Representative Olmstead, of Pennsylvania:

Whereas the continued enjoyment of full representation in the House by any State which has, for reasons other than participation in rebellion or other crime, denied to any of the male inhabitants thereof, being 21 years of age and citizens of the United States, the right to vote for Representatives in Congress, Presidential electors, and other specified officers, is in direct violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which declares that in such case "the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 21 years of age in such State," and is an invasion of the rights and dignity of this House and of its members, and an infringement upon the rights and privileges in this House of other States and their representatives; and Whereas the States of Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, Delaware, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Wyoming, Oregon, and other States do, by the provisions of the constitutions and statutes of said States, and for reasons other than participation in rebellion or other crime, deny the right to vote for members of Congress and Presidential electors, as well as the executive and judicial officers of such States and members of the legislatures, thereof, to male inhabitants 21 years of age and over and citizens of the United States, and such denial in certain of the said States extends to more than one-half of those who prior to the last apportionment of representation were entitled to vote in such States; and Whereas in order that the apportionment of membership of the House of Representatives may be determined in a constitutional manner: Therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives, That the Director of the Census is hereby directed to furnish this House, at the earliest possible moment, the following information: First. The total number of male citizens of the United States over 21 years of age in each of the several States of the Union. Second. The total number of male citizens of the United States over 21 years of age, who by reason of State constitutional limitations or State legislation, are denied the right of suffrage, whether such denial exists on account of illiteracy, on account of pauperism, on account of polygamy, or on account of property qualifications, or for any other reason. Resolved further, That the Speaker of the House of Representatives is hereby authorized and directed to appoint a select committee of five members from the membership of the Census Committee of the House of Representatives, who shall investigate the question of the alleged abridgment of the elective franchise for any of the causes mentioned in all the States of the Union in which constitutional or legislative restrictions on the right of suffrage are claimed to exist, and that such committee report its

findings within twenty days from the date of the adoption of this resolution to the said Census Committee, and that within one week after the said report shall have been received by the Census Committee the Census Committee shall return a bill to the House of Representatives providing for the apportionment of the membership of the House of Representatives based on the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Republicans, hardly less than Democrats, in Congress and outside, were adverse to raising what could not fail to be a burning sectional issue, and grounds for ignoring the constitutional mandate were sought with considerable eagerness on both sides. Strict obedience to the requirement of the constitutional provision was claimed to be impracticable, at least within the time available for proceedings connected with the present apportionment of representatives. But the advocates of obedience to the constitution, supporting the resolutions of Representative Olmstead, planted their argument on the very facts brought against it, as demonstrating the need of measures to check a growing tendency in the country to restrict the elective franchise. Said Representative Shattuck, of Ohio: "We find that in 1870 there were three States that had abridged their electorates—California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. In these three States there was a constitutional provision for an educational qualification, which disfranchised a certain percentage of the electorate—namely, the illiterates. But, in those States, the percentage of illiteracy is very light, averaging about 6 per cent. The basis of representation would hardly have been affected in those States had the fourteenth amendment been conformed with. An examination into the election laws of the various States reveals an astonishing tendency at this time to abridge their electorates. When the Congress which adopted the existing apportionment discussed the matter ten years ago but three States had abridged their electorate by action of the State, and in these the percentage of disfranchised males was but 6 per cent. But since that time similar policies have been adopted by other States, and to-day we face the fact that ten of the forty-five States of this Union have abridged their electorates, and that in these the percentage of males 21 years of age and over, disfranchised, average over 20 per cent. The constitutions of several other States permit such an abridgment. Besides, there are other States preparing to adopt these policies and to disfranchise thousands of men who to-day hold the right of franchise. In view of this remarkable tendency it is inconceivable that Congress can longer permit the fourteenth amendment to remain a dead letter, and to pass a bill making an apportionment based solely upon the population and neglecting the proviso which applies to all States which have abridged their electorate. We will not review the past by any discussion of the question as to whether the provisions of the fourteenth amendment should have been made effective when the last apportionment was made ten years ago. We find to-day conditions existing which make its enforcement imperative. I do not propose to discuss at this time whether the reasons given for these abridgments by the people of the various States are valid or not. . . . I am simply pointing out the conditions as they exist; I am simply pointing out that the time has come when the tendency of the States

to abridge their electorates has grown to such proportions as to demand that this Congress shall proceed in a constitutional manner in making the new apportionment. I do not say that States have not the right to establish educational qualifications for their electors, but I do maintain that when they have done so they must pay the penalty prescribed in the Constitution, and have their representation abridged proportionately. I do not say that we shall punish only Louisiana; I do not say that we shall punish only Massachusetts; I do not say that we shall punish only California; but I do say and insist, as the representative of a State in which every male member 21 years of age and over is guaranteed the sacred right of franchise, that there is a constitutional remedy prescribed for their acts, and I do demand that that remedy be applied."—*Congressional Record*, Jan. 4-5, 1901, pp. 618-620, 662-665.—The resolutions of Representative Olmstead were not adopted. The reapportionment was made on the basis of the totals of the census returns, with no reckoning of any denials of the right to vote. The following is the text of the act, as passed and approved January 16:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That after the third day of March, nineteen hundred and three, the House of Representatives shall be composed of three hundred and eighty-six members [the existing number being 357] to be apportioned among the several States as follows: Alabama, nine; Arkansas, seven; California, eight; Colorado, three; Connecticut, five; Delaware, one; Florida, three; Georgia, eleven; Idaho, one; Illinois, twenty-five; Indiana, thirteen; Iowa, eleven; Kansas, eight; Kentucky, eleven; Louisiana, seven; Maine, four; Maryland, six; Massachusetts, fourteen; Michigan, twelve; Minnesota, nine; Mississippi, eight; Missouri, sixteen; Montana, one; Nebraska, six; Nevada, one; New Hampshire, two; New Jersey, ten; New York, thirty-seven; North Carolina, ten; North Dakota, two; Ohio, twenty-one; Oregon, two; Pennsylvania, thirty-two; Rhode Island, two; South Carolina, seven; South Dakota, two; Tennessee, ten; Texas, sixteen; Utah, one; Vermont, two; Virginia, ten; Washington, three; West Virginia, five; Wisconsin, eleven; and Wyoming, one.

Sect. 2. That whenever a new State is admitted to the Union the Representative or Representatives assigned to it shall be in addition to the number three hundred and eighty-six.

Sect. 3. That in each State entitled under this apportionment, the number to which such State may be entitled in the Fifty-eighth and each subsequent Congress shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous and compact territory and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. The said districts shall be equal to the number of the Representatives to which such State may be entitled in Congress, no one district electing more than one Representative.

Sect. 4. That in case of an increase in the number of Representatives which may be given to any State under this apportionment such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected by the State at large, and the other Representatives by the districts now prescribed by law until the legislature of such State in the manner herein prescribed, shall redistrict such State; and if there be no increase in the number

of Representatives from a State the Representatives thereof shall be elected from the districts now prescribed by law until such State be redistricted as herein prescribed by the legislature of said State; and if the number hereby provided for shall in any State be less than it was before the change hereby made, then the whole number to such State hereby provided for shall be elected at large, unless the legislatures of said States have provided or shall otherwise provide before the time fixed by law for the next election of Representatives therein.

Sect. 5. That all Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.

No existing State quota was reduced by the new apportionment, and the gains were as follows: Illinois, New York and Texas, 3; Minnesota, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 2; Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin, 1. That clause of the third section which requires districts to be "composed of contiguous and compact territory" is intended to be a bar to the partisan trick called "gerrymandering." The vote on the bill in the House (165 against 102) was singularly non-partisan. The minority was said to be composed of exactly the same number of Republicans and Democrats, 51 of each, and in the majority vote there were included 84 Republicans and 81 Democrats. The vote was also non-sectional, except that New England voted almost solidly for the measure. East, South and West the State delegations were almost equally divided.—See also SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: United States: 1864-1921.

1901 (February).—Act to increase the standing army of the nation to 100,000 men.—In his annual message to Congress, December 3, 1900, the President set forth the military needs of the country, created by its new policy of imperial expansion, and recommended that the permanent army be raised to 100,000 in number, from 45,000 to 60,000 of which would be required in the Philippine islands until their people were made submissive to the authority of the United States. In accord with the executive recommendation, Congress passed "an Act to increase the efficiency of the permanent military establishment of the United States," which became law by the President's signature on February 2, 1901. Its first section provides that "from and after the approval of this Act the Army of the United States, including the existing organizations, shall consist of fifteen regiments of cavalry, a corps of artillery, thirty regiments of infantry, one Lieutenant-General, six major-generals, fifteen brigadier-generals, an Adjutant-General's Department, an Inspector-General's Department, a Judge-Advocate-General's Department, a Quartermaster's Department, a Subsistence Department, a Medical Department, a Pay Department, a Corps of Engineers, an Ordnance Department, a Signal Corps, the officers of the Record and Pension Office, the chaplains, the officers and enlisted men of the Army on the retired list, the professors, corps of cadets, the army detachments and band at the United States Military Academy, Indian scouts as now authorized by law, and such other officers and enlisted men as may hereinafter be provided for." A subsequent section enacts that the total enlisted force of the line of the army shall not exceed at any one time 100,000. Section 28, prescribing the rules of promotion and ap-

pointment, is as follows: "That vacancies in the grade of field officers and captain, created by this Act, in the cavalry, artillery, and infantry shall be filled by promotion according to seniority in each branch, respectively. Vacancies existing after the promotions have been made shall be provided for as follows: A sufficient number shall be reserved in the grade of second lieutenant for the next graduating class of the United States Military Academy. Persons not over forty years of age who shall have at any time served as volunteers subsequent to April twenty-first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, may be ordered before board of officers for such examination as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War, and those who establish their fitness before these examining boards may be appointed to the grades of first or second lieutenant in the Regular Army, taking rank in the respective grades according to seniority as determined by length of prior commissioned service; but no person appointed under the provisions of this section shall be placed above another in the same grade with longer commissioned service, and nothing herein contained shall change the relative rank of officers heretofore commissioned in the Regular Army. Enlisted men of the Regular Army or volunteers may be appointed second lieutenants in the Regular Army to vacancies created by this Act, provided that they shall have served one year, under the same conditions now authorized by law for enlisted men of the Regular Army."

Section 36 provides: "That when in his opinion the conditions in the Philippine Islands justify such action the President is authorized to enlist natives of those islands for service in the Army, to be organized as scouts, with such officers as he shall deem necessary for their proper control, or as troops or companies, as authorized by this Act, for the Regular Army. The President is further authorized, in his discretion, to form companies, organized as are companies of the Regular Army, in squadrons or battalions, with officers and non-commissioned officers corresponding to similar organizations in the cavalry and infantry arms. The total number of enlisted men in said native organizations shall not exceed twelve thousand, and the total enlisted force of the line of the Army, together with such native force, shall not exceed at any one time one hundred thousand. . . . When, in the opinion of the President, natives of the Philippine Islands shall, by their services and character, show fitness for command, the President is authorized to make provisional appointments to the grades of second and first lieutenants from such natives, who, when so appointed, shall have the pay and allowances to be fixed by the Secretary of War, not exceeding those of corresponding grades of the Regular Army." Section 38 abolishes the so-called "Army Canteen," in compliance with strenuous demands from temperance organizations in the country, notwithstanding much testimony favorable to the canteen system from well-informed and conscientious witnesses. Prompt obedience to this command of law was given by the War Department, which issued the required general order February 4, 1901.—See also MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 43.

1901 (February-March).—Adoption of the so-called "Spoonier Amendment" to the Army Appropriation Bill empowering the president to establish a civil government in the Philippines. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1901 (March).

1901 (February - March).—Conditions pre-

scribed for independent government in Cuba.—Platt Amendment. See CUBA: 1901 (February-March); WEST INDIES: United States interests.

1901 (March).—Second inauguration of President McKinley.—Inaugural address.—The inauguration of President McKinley, for the second term of office to which he had been elected, was performed with the customary ceremonies, at the capitol, in Washington, on March 4, 1901. He spoke as follows: "My Fellow Citizens: When we assembled here on March 4, 1897, there was great anxiety with regard to our currency and credit. None exists now. Then our treasury receipts were inadequate to meet the current obligations of the government. Now they are sufficient for all public needs, and we have a surplus instead of a deficit. Then I felt constrained to convene the Congress in extraordinary session to devise revenues to pay the ordinary expenses of the government. Now I have the satisfaction to announce that the Congress just closed has reduced taxation in the sum of \$41,000,000. Then there was deep solicitude because of the long depression in our manufacturing, mining, agricultural and mercantile industries, and the consequent distress of our laboring population. Now every avenue of production is crowded with activity, labor is well employed and American products find good markets at home and abroad. Our diversified productions, however, are increasing in such unprecedented volume as to admonish us of the necessity of still further enlarging our foreign markets by broader commercial relations. For this purpose reciprocal trade arrangements with other nations should in liberal spirit be carefully cultivated and promoted. The national verdict of 1896 has for the most part been executed. Whatever remains unfulfilled is a continuing obligation resting with undiminished force upon the Executive and the Congress. But fortunate as our condition is, its permanence can only be assured by sound business methods and strict economy in national administration and legislation. We should not permit our great prosperity to lead us to reckless ventures in business or profligacy in public expenditures. While the Congress determines the objects and the sum of appropriations, the officials of the executive departments are responsible for honest and faithful disbursements, and it should be their constant care to avoid waste and extravagance. Honesty, capacity and industry are nowhere more indispensable than in public employment. These should be fundamental requisites to original appointment and the surest guarantees against removal. Four years ago we stood on the brink of war without the people knowing it and without any preparation or effort at preparation for the impending peril. I did all that in honor could be done to avert the war, but without avail. It became inevitable, and the Congress at its first regular session, without party division, provided money in anticipation of the crisis and in preparation to meet it. It came. The result was signally favorable to American arms and in the highest degree honorable to the government. It imposed upon us obligations from which we cannot escape, and from which it would be dishonorable to seek to escape. We are now at peace with the world, and it is my fervent prayer that if differences arise between us and other powers they may be settled by peaceful arbitration, and that hereafter we may be spared the horrors of war. Intrusted by the people for a second time with the office of President, I enter upon its adminis-

tration appreciating the great responsibilities which attach to this renewed honor and commission, promising unreserved devotion on my part to their faithful discharge and reverently invoking for my guidance the direction and favor of Almighty God. I should shrink from the duties this day assumed if I did not feel that in their performance I should have the co-operation of the wise and patriotic men of all parties. It encourages me for the great task which I now undertake to believe that those who voluntarily committed to me the trust imposed upon the chief executive of the republic will give to me generous support in my duties to 'preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the United States,' and to 'care that the laws be faithfully executed.' The national purpose is indicated through a national election. It is the constitutional method of ascertaining the public will. When once it is registered it is a law to us all, and faithful observance should follow its decrees. Strong hearts and helpful hands are needed, and fortunately we have them in every part of our beloved country. We are reunited. Sectionalism has disappeared. Division on public questions can no longer be traced by the war maps of 1861. These old differences less and less disturb the judgment. Existing problems demand the thought and quicken the conscience of the country, and the responsibility for their presence as well as for their righteous settlement rests upon us all, no more upon me than upon you. There are some national questions in the solution of which patriotism should exclude partisanship. Magnifying their difficulties will not take them off our hands nor facilitate their adjustment. Distrust of the capacity, integrity and high purpose of the American people will not be an inspiring theme for future political contests. Dark pictures and gloomy forebodings are worse than useless. These only becloud, they do not help to point, the way of safety and honor. 'Hope maketh not ashamed.' . . . My fellow citizens, the public events of the last four years have gone into history. They are too near to justify recital. Some of them were unforeseen; many of them momentous and far reaching in their consequences to ourselves and our relations with the rest of the world. The part which the United States bore so honorably in the thrilling scenes in China, while new to American life, has been in harmony with its true spirit and best traditions, and in dealing with the results its policy will be that of moderation and fairness. We face at this moment a most important question—that of the future relations of the United States and Cuba. With our near neighbors we must remain close friends. The declaration of the purposes of this government in the resolution of April 20, 1898, must be made good. Ever since the evacuation of the island by the army of Spain the Executive with all practicable speed has been assisting its people in the successive steps necessary to the establishment of a free and independent government prepared to assume and perform the obligations of international law, which now rest upon the United States under the Treaty of Paris. The convention elected by the people to frame a constitution is approaching the completion of its labors. The transfer of American control to the new government is of such great importance, involving an obligation resulting from our intervention and the treaty of peace, that I am glad to be advised by the recent act of Congress of the policy which the legisla-

tive branch of the government deems essential to the best interests of Cuba and the United States. The principles which led to our intervention require that the fundamental law upon which the new government rests should be adapted to secure a government capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation, of observing its international obligations, of protecting life and property, insuring order, safety and liberty, and conforming to the established and historical policy of the United States in its relation to Cuba. The peace which we are pledged to leave to the Cuban people must carry with it the guarantees of permanence. We became sponsors for the pacification of the island, and we remain accountable to the Cubans no less than to our own country and people for the reconstruction of Cuba as a free commonwealth, on abiding foundations of right, justice, liberty and assured order. Our enfranchisement of the people will not be completed until free Cuba shall 'be a reality, not a name—a perfect entity, not a hasty experiment, bearing within itself the elements of failure.' While the treaty of peace with Spain was ratified on February 6, 1899, and ratifications were exchanged nearly two years ago, the Congress has indicated no form of government for the Philippine Islands. It has, however, provided an army to enable the Executive to suppress insurrection, restore peace, give security to the inhabitants and establish the authority of the United States throughout the archipelago. It has authorized the organization of native troops as auxiliary to the regular force. It has been advised from time to time of the acts of the military and naval officers in the islands, of my action in appointing civil commissions, of the instructions with which they were charged, of their duties and powers, of their recommendations and of their several acts under Executive commission, together with the very complete general information they have submitted. These reports fully set forth the conditions, past and present, in the islands, and the instructions clearly show the principles which will guide the Executive until the Congress shall, as it is required to do by the treaty, determine 'the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants.' The Congress having added the sanction of its authority to the powers already possessed and exercised by the Executive under the constitution, thereby leaving with the Executive the responsibility for the government of the Philippines, I shall continue the efforts already begun until order shall be restored throughout the islands, and as fast as conditions permit will establish local governments, in the formation of which the full co-operation of the people has been already invited, and when established will encourage the people to administer them. The settled purpose, long ago proclaimed, to afford the inhabitants of the islands self-government as fast as they were ready for it will be pursued with earnestness and fidelity. Already something has been accomplished in this direction. The government's representatives, civil and military, are doing faithful and noble work in their mission of emancipation, and merit the approval and support of their countrymen. The most liberal terms of amnesty have already been communicated to the insurgents, and the way is still open for those who have raised their arms against the government for honorable submission to its authority. Our countrymen should not be deceived. We are not waging war against the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. A portion of them are making war

against the United States. By far the greater part of the inhabitants recognize American sovereignty, and welcome it as a guarantee of order and security for life, property, liberty, freedom of conscience and the pursuit of happiness. To them full protection will be given. They shall not be abandoned. We will not leave the destiny of the loyal millions in the islands to the disloyal thousands who are in rebellion against the United States. Order under civil institutions will come as soon as those who now break the peace shall keep it. Force will not be needed or used when those who make war against us shall make it no more. May it end without further bloodshed, and there be ushered in the reign of peace, to be made permanent by a government of liberty under law."

1901 (March).—Death of ex-President Harrison.—Benjamin Harrison, president of the United States, 1889-1893, died at his home in Indianapolis, on the afternoon of Mar. 13, 1901, after an illness of a few days.

1901 (March-July).—Capture of Aguinaldo, Filipino leader.—His oath of allegiance to the United States.—Civil government established. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1901 (July).

1901 (April).—Petition from the workmen of Porto Rico. See PORTO RICO: 1901 (April).

1901 (September).—Assassination of President McKinley.—Theodore Roosevelt becomes president.—Influence of McKinley.—On Sept. 6, 1901, during a public reception at the Buffalo exposition, President McKinley was approached by an anarchist named Leon Czolgosz, and shot. For a week he lingered between life and death, but finally succumbed during the early hours of Saturday, Sept. 14. (See MCKINLEY, WILLIAM: 1901.) "Theodore Roosevelt became President of the United States. The news of McKinley's death, conveyed by messenger, found Roosevelt in the Adirondacks on a tramping expedition just returning from the top of Mount Marcy. A ten-mile walk, a rapid and reckless ride in the storm, and a flight of a mile a minute by railroad brought him to Buffalo, where he took the oath of office on Saturday, September 14."—C. G. Washburn, *Theodore Roosevelt, the logic of his career*, p. 40.—"Between the second inauguration and his death McKinley enjoyed his office and the hold which he had on the people. . . . Elihu Root, McKinley's Secretary of War, said: 'I have talked with him [McKinley] again and again before a Cabinet meeting and found that his ideas were fixed and his mind firmly made up. He would then present the subject to the Cabinet in such a way as not to express his own decision, but yet bring about an agreement exactly along the lines of his own original ideas, while the members often thought the ideas were theirs. . . . He cared nothing about the credit but McKinley always had his way. . . . He had vast influence with Congress. He led them by the power of affectionate esteem not by fear. He never bullied Congress.' Shelby M. Cullom, Senator from Illinois for thirty years, wrote: 'We have never had a President who had more influence with Congress than McKinley. . . . I have never heard of even the slightest friction between him and the party leaders in Senate and House. . . . He looked and acted the ideal President. He was always thoroughly self-poised and deliberate; nothing ever seemed to excite him and he always maintained a proper dignity.' President Roosevelt said in his first message of Congress: 'At the time of President McKinley's death he was the most widely loved man in all the United

States; while we have never had any public man of his position who has been so wholly free from the bitter animosities incident to public life. . . . To a standard of lofty integrity in public life he united the tender affections and home virtues which are all-important in the make-up of national character.' From my point of view it will ever be a regret that the long-standing distrust of and enmity to Spain should have come to a head during McKinley's administration. For he was essentially a peace minister. Coming before the public, the high-priest of protection, he had, through the exercise of executive authority, modified his views. He was diligent in the enforcement of the reciprocity provision of the Dingley Act and named John A. Kasson to negotiate in accordance therewith reciprocity agreements. It was not necessary that these agreements should be ratified by the Senate but some Senators, who were more strongly high tariff than McKinley himself, thought that France had gotten the better of Kasson in the bargain. Nor was McKinley's recommendation of free trade with Puerto Rico immediately adopted."—J. F. Rhodes, *McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, 1897-1909*, pp. 172-173.—A year before the death of McKinley, Mark Hanna had called attention to the fact that there was only one life between Roosevelt, whom he disliked, and the presidency. Now there was only one life between the presidency and the secretary of state, whom the people had not chosen, and who held office at the pleasure of the president.

ALSO IN: R. H. Barry, *True story of the assassination of President McKinley at Buffalo, 1901*.—J. S. Ogilvie, *Life and speeches of William McKinley*.

1901 (September).—Settlement of Boxer indemnity from China. See CHINA: 1901-1908.

1901 (December).—Communication of German claims and complaints against Venezuela.—President's reply.—Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. See VENEZUELA: 1901.

1901-1902.—"Boom years" in trade and investment of capital. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1901-1909.

1901-1902.—Indian affairs.—Five Nations become citizens. See INDIANS, AMERICAN: 1901-1902.

1901-1902.—Efforts of Secretary Hay to maintain the "open door" in Manchuria. See CHINA: 1901-1902.

1901-1902.—Negotiation and ratification of the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.—Purchase of franchise and property of French Panama Canal Company.—Failure of canal treaty with Colombia.—Treaty with Panama. See PANAMA CANAL: 1889-1903.

1901-1902 (October-January).—Second International Conference of American Republics. See AMERICAN REPUBLICS, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF: 1901-1902.

1901-1903.—Effective legislation to control the operation of so-called trusts urged by President Roosevelt. See TRUSTS: United States: 1901-1903.

1901-1905.—Cabinet of President Roosevelt during his first term.—On succeeding the murdered President McKinley, to fill the unexpired term, President Roosevelt retained his predecessor's cabinet, three members of which remained in it throughout the term. These were John Hay, secretary of state, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, secretary of the interior, and James Wilson, secretary of agriculture. Lyman J. Gage, secretary of the treasury, resigned in 1902 and was succeeded by Leslie M. Shaw. Elihu Root, secretary of war, was succeeded by William H. Taft in 1904. John D. Long,

secretary of the navy, retired in 1902, to be succeeded by William H. Moody, who went two years later to the Department of Justice, as attorney-general, taking the place of Philander C. Knox, and being followed in the Navy Department by Paul Morton. Charles E. Smith, postmaster-general, left the cabinet in 1902, and his place was taken by Henry C. Payne, who was succeeded in turn by Robert J. Wynne in 1904. The Department of Commerce and Labor, created in February, 1903, was filled first by George B. Cortelyou, until 1904, then by Victor H. Metcalf.

1901-1906.—Governmental action against corporate wrongdoing.—Summary of legislation, litigation, and court decisions. See TRUSTS: United States: 1901-1906.

1901-1906.—National movement for organized conservation of national resources.—Roosevelt's policy. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1901-1906.

1901-1909.—Progress of civil service reform under President Roosevelt. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1901-1909.

1901-1909.—Harriman system of railroads.—Its creation and magnitude. See RAILROADS: 1901-1909.

1902.—American and British shipping trust formed. See TRUSTS: International: Transatlantic Shipping Company.

1902.—Founding of the Carnegie Institution at Washington. See CARNEGIE INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON.

1902.—Appeal of Secretary Hay to signatories of Berlin Treaty against oppression of Jews in Rumania. See JEWS: Rumania: 1902.

1902.—Coal strike in Pennsylvania. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1902-1920.

1902.—Proposal of Drago Doctrine by Argentina against foreign aggression. See DRAGO DOCTRINE.

1902.—Hay-Bond Treaty with Newfoundland* destroyed in Senate. See NEWFOUNDLAND: 1902-1905.

1902 (February-March).—Visit of Prince Henry of Prussia.—A visit by Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the German emperor, was an event of considerable importance, in what it signified of friendly relations between Germany and the United States. The prince arrived on February 22 and remained in the country until March 11, visiting and being entertained at Washington (and Mt. Vernon), Annapolis, West Point, Philadelphia, New York, and making a six days trip into the West.

1902 (March).—Creation of a permanent census bureau.—After long urging, Congress, in February, 1902, passed a bill authorizing the organization of a permanent census bureau in the Department of the Interior. See CENSUS BUREAU.

1902 (May).—Unveiling of a monument to Marshal de Rochambeau.—A joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress, in the following words, was approved by the president on Mar. 21, 1902: "That the President be, and is hereby, authorized and requested to extend to the Government and people of France and the family of Marshal de Rochambeau, commander in chief of the French forces in America during the war of independence, and to the family of Marquis de Lafayette, a cordial invitation to unite with the Government and people of the United States in a fit and appropriate dedication of the monument of Marshal de Rochambeau to be unveiled in the city of Washington on the twenty-fourth day of May, nineteen hundred and two; and for the purpose of carrying

out the provisions of this resolution the sum of ten thousand dollars is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the same, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of State." The invitation was conveyed to the president of France by an autograph letter from President Roosevelt, while Secretary Hay, at the same time, communicated it officially, through the American ambassador at Paris, to representatives of the families of Marshal de Rochambeau and the Marquis de Lafayette. France, in response, sent a battleship, the *Gaulois*, bearing a general and an admiral, with two aids each, and two officials from the foreign office. The invitation was accepted by the present Count and Countess de Rochambeau; and, as explained by Ambassador Porter in a dispatch, "Mr. Gaston de Sahune de Lafayette and his wife, not being able to proceed to the United States, the invitation is accepted for Mr. Paul de Sahune de Lafayette, who has been living in the United States for the last two years and who speaks English. He is the brother of Mr. Gaston de Sahune de Lafayette." The ceremonies of the unveiling of the monument took place at Washington on May 24, and were followed by official hospitalities to the guests of the occasion at Washington, Annapolis, West Point, New York, Newport, and Boston. With the sailing of the *Gaulois*, on June 1, the formalities of the visit came to an end.

1902 (May).—Establishment of the republic of Cuba.—Transfer of executive authority from United States military governor to President-elect Palma. See CUBA: 1901-1902.

1902 (May-November).—Restoration of the White House. See WHITE HOUSE.

1902 (June).—Reclamation (Irrigation) Act of Congress. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1901-1906.

1902 (October).—Failure of projected purchase of the Danish West Indies. See VIRGIN ISLANDS: United States purchase.

1902 (October).—Settlement of anthracite coal strike.—"The coal strike [in Pennsylvania], which had endured for five months as a result of the operators' refusal to arbitrate, was brought to a close about the middle of October [1902] by the submission of the questions at issue to arbitration. During the whole course of the strike, the miners had vainly struggled for the recognition of this principle, and the retreat of the operators from their untenable position, constituted a clear victory for the men and justified the declaration of the strike. As originally presented in the letter of the operators dated October 13, the offer of arbitration was entirely unacceptable. This defeat, however, being remedied upon the demand of the miners, a return to work was immediately recommended by the District Executive Boards and unanimously approved in general convention on the 21st day of October. The suspension of mining, which for one hundred and sixty-three days had been general throughout the region, thus came to a close. The appointment of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission will remain a landmark in the history of labor. By this act, the President of the United States asserted and upheld the paramount interest of the public in conflicts affecting injuriously the welfare of the community. In a certain sense, the appointment of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission was a signal proof of the power of public opinion, and a clear demonstration of the wise manner in which this power can be exercised at critical periods. The sessions of the Commission

were destined to become historical. Preliminary meetings were held on October 24th and 27th, 1902, and with few intermissions, the Commission sat in Scranton and Philadelphia from the 14th of November, 1902, until the 5th of February, 1903. This period was devoted to the taking of testimony, and was succeeded by five days of argument from February 9th to February 13th inclusive. The sessions aroused the liveliest public interest, and thousands of people attended, while hundreds of others were unable to obtain entrance to these meetings."—J. Mitchell, *Organized labor*, pp. 391-392.—See also ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1902-1920; LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1877-1911.

ALSO IN: H. H. Howland, *Theodore Roosevelt and his times (Chronicles of America Series, v. 47)*.—*Senate Reports, 58th Congress, Special Session, Document no. 6, Serial no. 4556*.—J. B. Bishop, *Coal strike, Panama, Philippines and Cuba (Reprinted from International Quarterly)*.

1902-1903.—Affairs in Panama and Colombia.—Hay-Herran Treaty. See COLOMBIA: 1902-1903.

1902-1903.—German warships off the coast of Venezuela.—Intervention of the United States.—"From this time on, as the Isthmian Canal project came to be a certainty, the Germans redoubled their efforts to get a foothold in the Western Hemisphere and if possible within striking distance of the Canal. In May, 1901, Hay received information that German warships had been inspecting the Santa Margarita Islands, off the coast of Venezuela, with a view to occupying them as a naval base. Later he learned that the Kaiser was secretly negotiating for the purchase of two harbors 'for his own personal use'—whatever that meant—on the desolate coast of Lower California. Both these essays came to nought. In that same year, 1902, one of the periodic outbreaks to which Venezuela was addicted gave him an excuse for putting to the test whether or not the United States would defend the Monroe Doctrine by force of arms. The Venezuelans owed the Germans, the English, and the Italians large amounts which they had put off paying until their creditors began to suspect that they never intended to pay at all. The Kaiser apparently counted on the resistance of the Venezuelans to furnish him a pretext for occupying one or more of their seaboard towns. In order to disguise the fact that this was a German undertaking he looked about for accomplices who would give to it an international semblance. It happened just at that time, that Germany found herself isolated, as France and Russia had renewed their bond of friendship. England, too, always suspicious of Russia, and recently irritated by France, seemed to be looking for a friend. By offers which cannot yet be made public, Germany persuaded the Tory Government to draw closer to her. The immediate result of this adventure in international coquetry was the joint demand of Germany and England on Venezuela to pay them their dues. Venezuela procrastinated. The allies then sent warships and established what they called a 'pacific blockade' on the Venezuelan ports (December 8, 1901). During the following year Secretary Hay tried to persuade the blockaders of the unwisdom of their action. He persistently called their attention to the fact that a 'pacific blockade' was a contradiction in terms and that its enforcement against the rights of neutral nations could not be tolerated. He also urged arbitration. Germany deemed that her opportunity had now come, and on December 8, 1902, she and Great Britain severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela, making

it plain that the next steps would be the bombardment of Venezuelan towns and the occupation of Venezuelan territory. Here came the test of the Monroe Doctrine. If the United States permitted foreign nations, under the pretense of supporting their creditors' claims, to invade a weak debtor state by naval or military expedition, and to take possession of its territory, what would become of the Doctrine? At this point the direction of the American policy passed from Secretary Hay to President Roosevelt. England and Italy were willing to come to an understanding. Germany refused. She stated that if she took possession of territory, such possession would only be 'temporary'; but such possessions easily become permanent. . . . President Roosevelt did not shirk the test. Although his action has never been officially described, there is no reason now for not describing it. One day, when the crisis was at its height, he summoned to the White House Dr. Holleben, the German Ambassador, and told him that unless Germany consented to arbitrate, the American squadron under Admiral Dewey would be given orders, by noon ten days later, to proceed to the Venezuelan coast and prevent any taking possession of Venezuelan territory. Dr. Holleben began to protest that his Imperial master, having once refused to arbitrate, could not change his mind. The President said that he was not arguing the question, because arguments had already been gone over until no useful purpose would be served by repeating them; he was simply giving information which the Ambassador might think it important to transmit to Berlin. A week passed in silence. Then Dr. Holleben again called on the President, but said nothing of the Venezuelan matter. When he rose to go, the President asked him about it, and when he stated that he had received nothing from his Government, the President informed him in substance that, in view of this fact, Admiral Dewey would be instructed to sail a day earlier than the day he, the President, had originally mentioned. Much perturbed, the Ambassador protested; the President informed him that not a stroke of a pen had been put on paper; that if the Emperor would agree to arbitrate, he, the President, would heartily praise him for such action, and would treat it as taken on German initiative; but that within forty-eight hours there must be an offer to arbitrate or Dewey would sail with the orders indicated. Within thirty-six hours Dr. Holleben returned to the White House and announced to President Roosevelt that a despatch had just come from Berlin, saying that the Kaiser would arbitrate. Neither Admiral Dewey (who with an American fleet was then manœuvring in the West Indies) nor any one else knew of the step that was to be taken; the naval authorities were merely required to be in readiness, but were not told what for. On the announcement that Germany had consented to arbitrate, the President publicly complimented the Kaiser on being so staunch an advocate of arbitration. The humor of this was probably relished more in the White House than in the Palace at Berlin. The Kaiser suggested that the President should act as arbiter, and Mr. Roosevelt was ready to serve; but Mr. Hay dissuaded him. Mr. Hay had permitted Mr. Herbert W. Bowen, American Minister to Venezuela, to act as arbitrator for that country, and Mr. Bowen regarded it as improper that the United States, which also had claims against Venezuela, should sit in judgment on the case. Mr. Hay, desirous of validating the Hague Tribunal, saw a further advantage in referring to it this very

important contention. The President acquiesced, therefore, and Venezuela's claims went to The Hague for arbitration. England and Italy, Germany's partners in the naval expedition, gladly complied. England, we presume, had never intended that her half-alliance with Germany should bring her into open rupture with the United States. Although her pact was kept as secretly as possible at home, inklings of it leaked out, and it has since been esteemed, by those who know the details, one of the least creditable items in Lord Salisbury's foreign policy. Whether he or Mr. Balfour originated it, the friends of neither have cared to extol it, or indeed to let its details be generally known."—W. R. Thayer, *Life and letters of John Hay*, v. 2, pp. 284-289.

1903.—Treaty with Panama.—Cession of land for canal. See PANAMA: 1903; PANAMA CANAL: 1889-1903.

1903.—Establishment of joint army and navy board.—Root's report on general staff.—General Staff Act. See MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 19: United States.

1903.—Immigration Act.—Regulations and requirements of immigrants. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1835-1915.

1903.—Supreme Court decision in Northern securities case. See RAILROADS: 1901-1905.

1903.—National guard placed under Federal control. See NATIONAL GUARD, UNITED STATES.

1903 (February).—Creation of the Department of Commerce and Labor in the National Government.—Bureau of Corporations.—"The establishment of the Department of Commerce and Labor, with the Bureau of Corporations thereunder, marks a real advance in the direction of doing all that is possible for the solution of the questions vitally affecting capitalist and wage-workers. The act creating the Department was approved on February 14, 1903, and two days later the head of the Department was nominated and confirmed by the Senate. Since then the work of organization has been pushed as rapidly as the initial appropriations permitted, and with due regard to thoroughness and the broad purposes which the Department is designed to serve. After the transfer of the various bureaus and branches to the department at the beginning of the current fiscal year, as provided for in the act, the personnel comprised 1,289 employees in Washington and 8,836 in the country at large. The scope of the Department's duty and authority embraces the commercial and industrial interests of the Nation. It is not designed to restrict or control the fullest liberty of legitimate business action, but to secure exact and authentic information which will aid the Executive in enforcing existing laws, and which will enable the Congress to enact additional legislation, if any should be found necessary, in order to prevent the few from obtaining privileges at the expense of diminished opportunities for the many."—*Message of the president to Congress, Dec. 7, 1903.*

1903 (February).—Passage of Elkins Anti-Rebate Act regulating commerce. See RAILROADS: 1887-1906.

1903 (October).—Settlement of Alaska boundary question. See ALASKA BOUNDARY QUESTION: 1903.

1903 (October).—Lease from Cuba of two coaling and naval stations. See CUBA: 1903.

1903 (October).—New treaty with China.—Two ports in Manchuria opened to foreign trade. See CHINA: 1903 (May-October).

1903-1904.—Financial crisis.—After panic

years. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1901-1909.

1903-1905.—Investigation and prosecution of beef trust. See TRUSTS: United States: 1903-1906.

1903-1906.—Unearthing of extensive frauds in the Land Office.—Late in December, 1902, the secretary of the Interior Department, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, received information which led him, with the President's approval, to demand the resignation of the commissioner of the Land Office, Binger Hermann, of Oregon. Commissioner Hermann was a man of importance in the Republican party, and he rallied powerful influences to his support. They could not anchor him durably in the Land Office, but they did delay his departure from it for about a month, during which time he is said to have destroyed thousands of letters and documents bearing on land frauds which he was under suspicion of having protected and promoted. Returning to Oregon from Washington he sought and obtained from his party an election to Con-

dition of Secretary Hitchcock and Attorney-General Knox, with neglect of advice from Oregon senators and congressmen. One of the first of the indictments found struck an Oregon Senator, John H. Mitchell, and brought him to a prison sentence, from which death rescued him. Another put a member of the House of Representatives, J. H. Williamson, on trial; a third put its brand on a recently removed United States district attorney, John H. Hall. Binger Hermann, a state senator, and several special agents of the Land Office were among the other subjects of prosecution, besides a large number of private operators in the land-thieves' ring. These proceedings were at the beginning of vigorous measures which have gone far towards, if not fully to the end of arresting the frauds which were rapidly robbing the nation of the last of its valuable public lands.

1903-1912.—Purchase of friar lands in Philippines.—Friar Lands Act. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1902-1903; 1904-1912.

1904.—Asphalt case with Venezuela. See VENEZUELA: 1902-1905.

1904.—Assumption of financial responsibilities of Santo Domingo. See DOLLAR DIPLOMACY.

1904 (May).—Kidnapping of Ion Perdicaris at Tangier, for ransom. See MOROCCO: 1904-1909.

1904 (May-October).—Louisiana Purchase exposition. See ST. LOUIS: 1904.

1904 (May-November).—Presidential election.—Parties, candidates, and platforms.—Election of President Roosevelt.—The questions of leading interest and influence in the canvass preliminary to the presidential election of 1904 were undoubtedly those relating to the governmental regulation of interstate railways and of the capitalistic combinations called "trusts"; but those questions had not yet acquired the height of importance in the public mind which they reached before the next quadrennial polling of the nation occurred. The question of tariff revision and a moderated protective system, in the interest of the great mass of consumers, was rising in interest, especially at the West; but that, too, was but mildly influential in the campaign. As for the imperialistic ambitions that had been excited for a time by the conquests of 1898, they had cooled to so great a degree as to offer no longer much challenge to opposition; opinion in the country now differing on little more than the length of time to which American guardianship over the Philippine islands should be allowed to run. The voters of the United States, in fact, made their election between the men who were offered to it as candidates, far more than between the parties and the policies whom the candidates represented; and President Roosevelt was reelected on personal grounds, in the main, because the kind of vigorous character he had shown was greatly to the liking of a large part of the people. The first nominating convention to be held was that of the Socialist party, whose delegates met at Chicago, May 2, and nominated for president Eugene V. Debs, of Indiana; for vice president Benjamin Hanford, of New York. On the same day the United Christian party, whose declaration of principles appears below, met at St. Louis. The convention of the Republican party, also held at Chicago, came next in time, June 21, and, with Theodore Roosevelt, of New York, for reelection as president, it named for vice-president Charles Warren Fairbanks, of Indiana. The Prohibition party, in convention at Indianapolis, June 29, named Silas C. Swallow, of Pennsylvania, for president, and George W. Carroll, of Texas, for vice president. On July 4, the People's or Populist



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gress, to fill a vacancy which death had caused opportunely, and this seemed to augment his political power. But agents of the Interior Department were in Oregon and other Western states at the same time, gathering evidence which soon removed all doubt of the huge conspiracy of fraud which Commissioner Hermann had been a party to, and which had wide ramifications wherever public lands of value were open to entry, under the Homestead Act, the Desert Land Act, or the Timber and Stone Act. The frauds were carried on under false appearances of compliance with the requirements of law, and the dismissal of Hermann had not cleared from the General Land Office all the treacherous connivance which made them possible. Other allies of the land-thieves were tracked to their official desks, some at Washington, some in the Interior Department, some in Congress, and some out in the land offices at the West. Then the Federal grand jury at Portland, Oregon, began to turn out indictments, on evidence handled by Francis J. Heney, now entering on a famous career, as special prosecutor for the government. Heney was appointed by the president on the recommen-

party held convention at Springfield, Illinois, and nominated Thomas E. Watson, of Georgia, for president, with Thomas H. Tibbles, of Nebraska, for vice president. Meeting two days earlier, in New York City, but in session some days longer, the Socialist Labor party named for president Charles Hunter Corrgan, of New York, and for vice president William Wesley Cox, of Illinois. The convention of the Democratic party opened its session, at St. Louis, on July 6. Its nominee for president was Alton B. Parker, of New York; for vice president Henry G. Davis, of West Virginia. The National Liberty party met at St. Louis on July 7 and put forth its platform of principles. The last of the nominations were presented on August 31 at Chicago, by a convention representing a new party, the Continental, whose candidates then named declined and were subsequently replaced by Austin Holcomb, of Georgia, for president, and A. King, of Missouri, for vice president. With some abridgment, the declarations of principles and pledges of party policy adopted by these several conventions on the main questions at issue are given conveniently for comparison in the following arrangement by subjects:

Trusts.—The Republican party contented itself with a brief boast of “laws enacted by the Republican party which the Democratic party failed to enforce,” but which “have been fearlessly enforced by a Republican President,” and of “new laws insuring reasonable publicity as to the operations of great corporations and providing additional remedies for the prevention of discrimination in freight rates.” The Democratic party condemned with vigor the failure of Republicans in Congress to prohibit contracts with convicted trusts; declared that “gigantic trusts and combinations” “are a menace to beneficial competition and an obstacle to permanent business prosperity;” denounced “rebates and discrimination by transportation companies as the most potent agency in promoting and strengthening these unlawful conspiracies against trade,” demanded “an enlargement of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission,” “a strict enforcement of existing civil and criminal statutes against all such trusts, combinations and monopolies,” and “the enactment of such further legislation as may be necessary to effectually suppress them.” The People’s party set forth the proposition that, “to prevent unjust discrimination and monopoly the Government should own and control the railroads and those public utilities which in their nature are monopolies.” It should “own and operate the general telegraph and telephone systems and provide a parcels post.” Corporations “should be subjected to such governmental regulations and control as will adequately protect the public,” and demand was made for “the taxation of monopoly privileges, while they remain in private hands, to the extent of the value of the privileges granted.” The Continental party contended for a guarded chartering by Congress of “all railroad and other corporations doing business in two or more States,” and for having the “creating of ‘corners’ and the establishing of exorbitant prices for products necessary to human existence . . . made a criminal offence.” The United Christian party declared that “Christian government through direct legislation will regulate the trusts and labor problem according to the golden rule.”

TARIFF.—The Republican party declared “Protection” to be its “cardinal policy,” maintenance of the principles of which policy is insisted upon; wherefore “rates of duty should be readjusted only when conditions have so changed that the public

interest demands their alteration,” and “this work cannot safely be committed to any other hands than those of the Republican party.” The Democratic party, on the contrary, denounced “protection as a robbery of the many to enrich the few;” favored “a tariff limited to the needs of the Government, economically administered,” and called for a “revision and gradual reduction of the tariff by the friends of the masses, for the commonwealth, and not by the friends of its abuses, its extortions and its discriminations.” The People’s party declared for a change in our laws that “will place tariff schedules in the hands of an omni-partisan commission.” The Continental party limited its declaration on this subject to one pronouncing for an “adherence to the principles of reciprocity advocated by that eminent statesman, James G. Blaine, as applied to Canada and all American Republics.”

CAPITAL AND LABOR.—PUBLIC OWNERSHIP.—SOCIALISM.—The Republican party recognized “combinations of capital and labor” as “being the results of the economic movements of the age,” but “neither must be permitted to infringe upon the rights and interests of the people;” “both are subject to the laws, and neither can be permitted to break them.” The Democratic party expressed similar impartiality, in favoring “the enactment and administration of laws giving labor and capital impartially their just rights.” The People’s party pledged its efforts to “preserve inviolate” “the right of labor to organize for the benefit and protection of those who toil.” It would seek “the enactment of legislation looking to the improvement of conditions for the wage-earners, the abolition of child labor, the suppression of sweat shops and of convict labor in competition with free labor;” also the “exclusion from American shores of foreign pauper labor,” and “the shorter work day.” The Continental party adopted these expressions of the People’s party, in identical words. The National Liberty party asked “that the General Government own and control all public carriers in the United States.” The Prohibition party declared itself “in favor of . . . the safeguarding of the people’s rights by a rigid application of the principles of justice to all combinations and organizations of capital and labor.” The United Christian party pronounced simply for “Government ownership of coal mines, oil wells and public utilities.” The Socialist party pledged itself “to watch and work, in both the economic and the political struggle, for each successive immediate interest of the working class”: for “shortened days of labor and increases of wages”; for “insurance of the workers against accident, sickness and lack of employment”; for pensions; for “public ownership of the means of transportation, communication and exchange”; for graduated taxation of incomes, etc.; for “complete education of children and their freedom from the workshops”; for “free administration of justice”; for “the initiative, referendum, proportional representation, equal suffrage for men and women,” etc.; and for “every gain or advantage for the workers that may be wrested from the capitalist system and that may relieve the suffering and strengthen the hands of labor”; but in so doing it proclaims that it is “using these remedial measures as means to the one great end of the co-operative commonwealth.” The Socialist Labor party declared that “the existing contradiction between the theory of democratic government and the fact of a despotic economic system . . . perverts government to the exclusive benefit of the capitalist class;” wherefore, “against such a system the Socialist

Labor Party raises the banner of revolt, and demands the unconditional surrender of the capitalist class."

NOMINATION AND ELECTION.—INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.—The Democratic party declared for the election of United States senators by direct popular vote. The People's party demanded "that legal provision be made under which people may exercise the initiative and referendum, and proportional representation, and direct vote for all public officers, with the right of recall." The Continental party demanded "the enactment by the several States of a primary election law"; the "elimination of the party 'boss'"; "direct legislation by the method known as the initiative and referendum," and the possession by each State of "the sole right to determine by legislation the qualifications required of voters within its jurisdiction, irrespective of race, color or sex." The Prohibition party expressed itself in favor of the popular election of United States senators; of "a wise application of the principle of the initiative and referendum," and of making the right of suffrage "depend upon the mental and moral qualifications of the citizen."

NATURAL RESOURCES.—LAND.—RECLAMATION.—WATERWAYS.—The Republican party pointed simply to the fact that it had "passed laws which will bring the arid lands of the United States within the area of cultivation." The Democratic party congratulated "our western citizens upon the passage of the law known as the Newlands Irrigation Act," claiming it as "a measure framed by a Democrat, passed in the Senate by a non-partisan vote, and passed in the House against the opposition of almost all Republican leaders, by a vote the majority of which was Democratic." It declared for "liberal appropriations for the improvement of waterways of the country," and pronounced its opposition to "the Republican policy of starving home development in order to feed the greed for conquest and the appetite for national prestige." The People's party asserted that "Land, including all the natural sources of wealth, is a heritage of all the people, and should not be monopolized for speculative purposes; and alien ownership of land should be prohibited." Each of the party platforms was fluent on many other topics, such as the protection of citizens at home and abroad, the Panama canal, territories and dependencies, injunctions, public economy, taxation, monetary questions, pensions, the civil service, army and navy, merchant marine, liquor licensing and prohibition (the specialty of the Prohibition party), divorce, polygamy, etc.; but these entered so little into the canvass that the party declarations on them had small effect, if any, on the popular vote. "The total number of votes cast in the election of 1904 was smaller than in the election of 1900—13,528,979, as against 13,961,566. Of these Roosevelt received 7,624,489, and Parker 5,082,754, and the electoral vote was 336 to 140. Roosevelt's popular vote and popular majority were the largest ever recorded for any president. He carried even Missouri, thus breaking the solid South, while Parker did not carry a single state outside the South. A remarkable feature of this election was the success of five Democratic governors in states that gave Roosevelt large majorities: Douglas in Massachusetts, Johnson in Minnesota, Toole in Montana, Adams in Colorado, and Folk in Missouri. This result showed that the individual man was no longer dominated to the same extent as formerly by party organizations. The election of Folk, a young man of thirty-five, who had shown marked ability and courage

in prosecuting numerous bribery cases in St. Louis, was one of the many signs of a great civic awakening that was sweeping over the entire country. This movement, though already under way as the result of conditions that were no longer tolerable, undoubtedly received a great impetus from the action and utterances of President Roosevelt. It was particularly strong in the larger cities, resulting in the overthrow of bosses and political machines, and marking the beginning of a veritable municipal renaissance."—J. H. Latané, *America as a world power, 1897-1907*, pp. 239-240.

1904 (October).—Initial invitation by the president to hold a second peace conference. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1907.

1904 (November).—President Roosevelt's renunciation of third term candidacy.—On the evening of the day of election, as soon as the result was known to have given him a second term in the presidential office, President Roosevelt issued the following acknowledgment and announcement to the country:

"I am deeply sensible of the honor done me by the American people in thus expressing their confidence in what I have done and have tried to do. I appreciate to the full the solemn responsibility this confidence imposes upon me, and I shall do all that in my power lies not to forfeit it. On the Fourth of March next I shall have served three and one-half years, and this three and one-half years constitutes my first term. The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form. Under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination."

1904-1905.—Beginning and organization of work on Panama canal. See PANAMA CANAL: 1904-1905.

1904-1910.—Orinoco steamship case with Venezuela. See ORINOCO STEAMSHIP COMPANY CASE.

1905.—Arbitration treaty with Mexico. See MEXICO: 1904-1915.

1905.—Reopened controversy over American fishing rights on the Newfoundland coast. See NEWFOUNDLAND: 1905-1909.

1905.—Assistance to Santo Domingo against threatening creditors. See DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; SANTO DOMINGO: 1905-1907.

1905.—Interest in Korea. See KOREA: 1905.

1905.—American goods boycotted in China. See CHINA: 1905.

1905.—Union of two organizations to form the Y. W. C. A. See YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: 1905-1913.

1905 (February).—Concentration of forest service in the Department of Agriculture. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1901-1906.

1905 (February-June).—Recovery from France of the body of Admiral John Paul Jones.—On Feb. 13, 1905, President Roosevelt addressed a message to Congress which gave the following information: "For a number of years efforts have been made to confirm the historical statement that the remains of Admiral John Paul Jones were interred in a certain piece of ground in the city of Paris then owned by the Government and used at the time as a burial place for foreign Protestants. These efforts have at last resulted in documentary proof that John Paul Jones was buried on July 20, 1792, between 8 and 9 o'clock P.M., in the now abandoned cemetery of St. Louis, in the north-eastern section of Paris." On April 14, following a telegram from the ambassador at Paris, General

Horace Porter, announced that his "six years' search for the remains of Paul Jones" had resulted in success, and described the identification of the body. This had been verified by Doctors Capitan and Papillault, distinguished professors of the School of Anthropology, who had ample particulars of information from which to judge. Arrangements were made at once for sending a naval squadron, under Admiral Sigsbee, to France, to bring the remains to the United States. This was done in the following June, when the relics of the first of American naval heroes received the high honors that were due to his exploits. They were deposited in a vault on the grounds of the Naval Academy at Annapolis.

ALSO IN: *Address of President Roosevelt on the occasion of the reinterment of the remains of John Paul Jones at Annapolis, Maryland, Apr. 24, 1906.*

1905 (June-October).—Mediation by the president between Russia and Japan.—Treaty of Portsmouth.—"On February 8, 1904, Secretary Hay again assumed leadership by inviting Germany, Great Britain, and France to unite with the United States in urging Japan and Russia to recognize the neutrality of China in the war which they were beginning, and to localize hostilities within fixed limits. This effort was successful. In January, 1905, Russia announced to us that China was not neutral and could not preserve neutrality; hence that she should be forced to consider Chinese neutrality 'from the standpoint of her own interests.' Mr. Hay was able to convince Russia of the inexpediency of such action. His circular note of January 10, 1905, setting forth our hope that the war would not result in any 'concession of Chinese territory to neutral powers,' brought equivalent disclaimers from Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, and Italy. The culmination of his leadership was reached in President Roosevelt's offer, in [June 8] 1905, of our good offices to bring the war to a close. In the treaty of Portsmouth [September 5], which concluded it, both the territorial and the administrative entity of China, as well as the policy of the 'open door,' were formally respected, although a way was left for their subsequent violation in spirit."—C. R. Fish, *American diplomacy*, pp. 458-459.—Of the negotiations undertaken by Roosevelt to bring about peace between "Russia and Japan, the London 'Times' said, in August, 1905: 'Whatever may be the outcome of the negotiations, civilized mankind will not forget or undervalue the part Mr. Roosevelt has played in bringing them about. The issue rests in other hands than his, but the efforts he has made in the cause of peace, whether followed by success or failure, have won for him the gratitude of the world. He has done his duty as peacemaker faithfully and with a single mind. Because of these services, Roosevelt received the Nobel Prize of about \$40,000, which he gave in support of a plan to establish at Washington, a permanent industrial peace committee—a plan which it has not been found practicable to carry out.'"—C. G. Washburn, *Theodore Roosevelt, the logic of his career*, p. 98.—See also JAPAN: PORTSMOUTH, TREATY OF.

1905 (July).—Proclamation on the death of John Hay, secretary of state.—John Hay, secretary of state, died on July 1. As a mark of respect the president issued a proclamation directing the diplomatic representatives of the United States in all foreign countries to display their flags at half mast for ten days. Further, he directed that the flag should be displayed at half mast for the same period on all forts, and military stations, and all vessels of the United States.

1905-1906.—Moroccan controversy.—Plan for agreement suggested by President Roosevelt.—In a letter, addressed on Apr. 28, 1906, to Whitelaw Reid, then American ambassador in London, Roosevelt wrote: "On March 6, 1905, Sternburg [German minister] came to me with a message from the Kaiser [William II] to ask me to join with the Kaiser in informing the Sultan of Morocco that he ought to reform his government, and that if he would do so we would stand behind him for the open door and would support him in any opposition he might make to any particular nation which sought to obtain exclusive control of Morocco."—J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time*, v. 2, p. 468.—It was apparent that "Germany was attempting to intrude in Morocco, where France by common consent had been the dominant foreign influence. The rattling of the Potsdam saber was threatening the tranquillity of the *status quo*. A conference of eleven European powers and the United States was held at Algieras to readjust the treaty provisions for the protection of foreigners in the decadent Moroccan empire. In the words of a historian of America's foreign relations, 'Although the United States was of all perhaps the least directly interested in the subject matter of dispute, and might appropriately have held aloof from the meeting altogether, its representatives were among the most influential of all, and it was largely owing to their sane and ironic influence that in the end a treaty was amicably made and signed [April 6, 1906].' But there was something behind all this. A quiet conference had taken place one day in the remote city of Washington. The President of the United States and the French Ambassador [Jusserand] had discussed the approaching meeting at Algieras. There was a single danger-point in the impending negotiations. The French must find a way around it. The Ambassador had come to the right man. He went out with a few words scratched on a card in the ragged Roosevelt handwriting containing a proposal for a solution. [President Roosevelt suggested that the two governments should consent to go to the conference with no program, and there discuss all questions in regard to Morocco, save where either was in honor bound by a previous agreement with another power. Both governments, France and Germany, agreed on substantially the plan as outlined.] The proposal went to Paris, then to Morocco. The solution was adopted by the conference, and the Hohenzollern menace to the peace of the world was averted for the moment."—H. Howland, *Theodore Roosevelt and his times (Chronicles of America Series, v. 47, pp. 175-176)*.—See also MOROCCO: 1905-1906.

ALSO IN: C. G. Washburn, *Theodore Roosevelt*, pp. 465-466.

1905-1906.—American claims against Venezuela. See VENEZUELA: 1905-1906; 1907-1909.

1905-1906.—Diplomatic assistance in Colombia-Venezuela dispute over navigation of rivers. See COLOMBIA: 1905-1909.

1905-1906.—Part taken in the organization of the International Institute of Agriculture. See AGRICULTURE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF.

1905-1906.—Period of inflated exploitation of capital.—Increased cost of living. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1901-1909.

1905-1907.—Progress on Panama canal under John F. Stevens. See PANAMA CANAL: 1905-1907.

1905-1907.—Receivership of Santo Domingo revenues.—Modus vivendi and the treaty. See SANTO DOMINGO: 1905-1907; DOLLAR DIPLOMACY. 1905-1909.—Cabinet of President Roosevelt

during his second term.—During the second term of President Roosevelt his cabinet underwent the following changes: On the death of John Hay, in July, 1905, Elihu Root became secretary of state, and continued in the office until January, 1909, when he resigned, and was succeeded by the assistant secretary of state, Robert Bacon. Leslie M. Shaw left the Treasury Department in 1907, and the secretaryship was given to George B. Cortelyou. William H. Taft continued in charge of the War Department until his nomination for president, in 1908, when General Luke E. Wright was called to his place. Charles J. Bonaparte, appointed secretary of the navy at the beginning of the president's new term, was transferred in 1907 to the Department of Justice, succeeding Attorney-General Moody, appointed to the bench of the Supreme Court, and being succeeded in the Navy Department by Victor H. Metcalf, previously secretary of commerce and labor. In the Department of the Interior, Secretary Hitchcock resigned in 1907, and James R. Garfield, previously commissioner of corporations, came into his place. George B. Cortelyou had been called to the Post Office Department at the beginning of the new presidential term, and transferred thence to the Treasury Department in 1907. His place in the Post Office was then filled by George von L. Meyer. The secretary of agriculture, James Wilson, remained at the head of that department throughout the term. On the transfer of Mr. Metcalf from the Department of Commerce and Labor to that of the Treasury, in 1907, his place in the former was taken by Oscar S. Straus.

1905-1914.—Organization of the Red Cross. See RED CROSS: American National Red Cross: Various incorporations.

1905-1921.—Negro question. See RACE PROBLEMS: 1905-1921.

1906.—Joint action with Mexico in Central American mediation. See CENTRAL AMERICA: 1906.

1906.—Modus vivendi arranged with Great Britain concerning fishing rights off Newfoundland. See NEWFOUNDLAND: 1905-1909.

1906.—Dealings with Turkey facilitated by making American minister an ambassador. See TURKEY: 1906.

1906.—Adams Act passed, creating agricultural experiment stations. See EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: United States: Experiment stations.

1906.—Commercial treaty with Germany. See TARIFF: 1902-1906.

1906.—Peonage system in Southern states. See PEONAGE: In the United States

1906.—Naturalization Act passed. See NATURALIZATION: United States:

1906.—Visit of Chinese commissioners to study political and economic institutions. See CHINA: 1906.

1906 (March).—Supreme Court decision enforcing the demand of the government for production of books and papers by the so-called tobacco trust before a Federal Grand Jury. See TRUSTS: United States: 1905-1906.

1906 (April).—Laying the corner stone of an office building for congressmen.—On Apr. 14, 1906, the corner stone of a building designed to supply each member of the House of Representatives with an office was laid with ceremony, the president delivering an address. Besides 410 distinct offices, the design of the building contemplated a large assembly room for public hearings before committees of the House. Its estimated cost was something over \$3,000,000. A corresponding office building for the Senate was also in view.

1906 (April).—Final decision of the Alaska boundary line. See ALASKA BOUNDARY QUESTION: 1906-1914.

1906 (June).—Joint Statehood Act.—By the Joint Statehood Bill, approved by the president, June 16, 1906, Indian Territory and Oklahoma were united to form the state of Oklahoma, the people being authorized to adopt a constitution. Arizona and New Mexico were proffered a similar union, in a state to be called Arizona. On the question of such union the bill provided for a vote to be taken in each territory, following which, if a majority in each should be found to favor the union, delegates to be chosen at the same election should meet and frame a constitution for submission to the people. The proposed vote was taken at the election of November 6, and resulted in the rejection of the proposal by Arizona, while New Mexico gave assent. The project was thus defeated. The plan of union was successful, however, in the creation of the state of Oklahoma. Delegates to a convention for framing its constitution were elected Nov. 6, 1906; the convention began its session on November 20, and finished its labors on July 16, 1907. By proclamation of the president the state,—the forty-sixth of the Federal family,—was admitted to the Union on November 16 following, under the constitution which had been ratified by vote of a majority of the citizens of each of the territories now united in it.—See also OKLAHOMA: 1891-1907.

1906 (June).—Hepburn Rate Bill passed. See COMMODITY CLAUSE OF THE HEPBURN ACT; RAILROADS: 1887-1906.


1906 (July-August).—Represented at Third International Conference of American Republics at Rio de Janeiro. See AMERICAN REPUBLICS, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF: 1906.

1906 (August).—Brownsville Affair.—“In 1906, three companies of colored soldiers were discharged from the United States Army without honor because of the shooting-up by some of them of Brownsville, Texas [during which one man was killed and two were wounded]. The guilty men could not be individually determined,—there was a ‘conspiracy of silence’ among their comrades to protect them,—and so the President discharged all and said of his action, ‘If any organization of troops, white or black, is guilty of similar conduct in the future, I shall follow precisely the same course.’ This incident aroused a great deal of criticism and led to an investigation and prolonged debate in the Senate. The matter was finally disposed of in 1909.”—C. G. Washburn, *Theodore Roosevelt, the logic of his career*, pp. 78-79.

ALSO IN: *Survey of the world (Independent, Dec. 27, 1906).*

1906 (August-October).—Insurrection in Cuba.—American intervention called for.—Cuban government dissolved.—Provisional government established by Secretary of War Taft. See CUBA: 1906 (August-October).

1906 (October-November).—Segregation of orientals in San Francisco schools.—Resentment of Japanese.—“On October 11, 1906, the board of education of San Francisco cast a brand into the tinder by passing a resolution that thereafter all Chinese, Japanese, and Korean pupils should be given instruction in an ‘oriental’ school, and not, as previously, in the ordinary schools. Coming at a time when Japanese pride was more than usually exalted, this action was keenly resented. The Tokio authorities made inquiries, and then demanded that Japanese residents in California be protected in the full enjoyment of the rights



"AGGRESSIVE FIGHTING FOR
THE RIGHT IS THE NOBLEST
SPORT THE WORLD AFFORDS"

DEDICATED TO THE AMERICANISM OF
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
BY HIS COMRADES OF THE
UNITED SPANISH WAR VETERANS
DEPARTMENT OF NEW YORK

THE METAL IN THIS TABLET WAS TAKEN FROM THE BATTLESHIP
MAINE, DESTROYED IN HAVANA HARBOR FEB 15, 1898
THE OREGON, OLYMPIA, NEW YORK, AND
BROOKLYN, IT SPEAKS IN PEACE HIS DOCTRINE
WHICH THOSE GALLANT SHIPS THUNDERED IN WAR
ONE FLAG, ONE COUNTRY
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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THEODORE ROOSEVELT TABLET
(At American Legion headquarters, Brooklyn, N. Y.)

guaranteed them by the treaty of 1894."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, p. 308.—See also RACE PROBLEMS: 1904-1909; CALIFORNIA: 1900-1920.

ALSO IN: J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, pp. 776-777.

1906-1908.—American interest in Congo State.—Concessions to American capitalists.—Annexation by Belgium. See BELGIAN CONGO: 1906-1908.

1906-1909.—Provisional government of Cuba.—Reinstatement of the republic. See CUBA: 1906-1909.

1906-1909.—Reform of the consular service. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1906-1909; DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE: Consular service.

1906-1910.—Investigation of Standard Oil Company.—Charges against it as a trust.—Fine.—Suit by the government. See TRUSTS: United States: 1904-1909; 1906-1910.

1906-1910.—Intervention cases in South America in accord with Monroe Doctrine. See MONROE DOCTRINE: Latin American doctrines.

1906-1914.—Development of dreadnoughts for battleships. See WARSHIPS: 1893-1914.

1907.—Enactment of law regarding expatriation. See EXPATRIATION.

1907.—Monetary panic.—Industrial paralysis.—Unemployment. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1901-1909.

1907.—Freight traffic.—Investigation of classification of freight. See RAILROADS: 1907-1922.

1907.—Law against white slave traffic passed. See WHITE SLAVE TRADE.

1907.—Immigration Act.—Further regulations of immigrants.—Physical, moral and educational requirements. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1835-1915.

1907.—National child labor committee.—Duties.—Power. See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1904-1916.

1907 (January).—Act prohibiting corporations from making contributions in connection with political elections.—The following act of Congress was approved by the president, Jan. 26, 1907. "That it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any State legislature of a United States Senator. Every corporation which shall make any contribution in violation of the foregoing provisions shall be subject to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and every officer or director of any corporation who shall consent to any contribution by the corporation in violation of the foregoing provisions shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand and not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court." According to a statement presented to the Senate in February, 1908, the laws of the following nineteen states and territories contain provisions for the publicity of election contributions or expenditures originally enacted at the dates given: Alabama, 1903; Arizona, 1895; California, 1893; Colorado, 1891; Connecticut, 1895; Iowa, 1907; Massachusetts, 1892; Minnesota, 1895; Missouri, 1893;

Montana, 1895; Nebraska, 1897; New York, 1890; Pennsylvania, 1906; South Carolina, 1905; South Dakota, 1907; Texas, 1905; Virginia, 1903; Washington, 1907; Wisconsin, 1897. The laws of the three following states, which contain no publicity provisions, forbid corporations to contribute in any manner for political purposes: Florida, 1897; Kentucky, 1897; Tennessee, 1897.

1907 (February).—Treaty with Santo Domingo. See SANTO DOMINGO: 1904-1907.

1907 (April).—Controversy with Cuba over the possession of the Isle of Pines.—Decision of Supreme Court. See CUBA: 1907 (April).

1907 (June-October).—Represented at second peace conference at The Hague. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1907.

1907 (August).—Free trade with Philippines granted by Payne and Colton Bills. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1907 (August).

1907-1909.—World cruise of the battleships.—"The fleet of sixteen battleships, all of them commissioned since the Spanish-American War, sailed from Hampton Roads on December 16, 1907. Their officers and crews numbered about 12,000 men. They were reviewed before their departure by President Roosevelt, when it was generally supposed that they were going to San Francisco and possibly as far north as Seattle. But after Roosevelt had returned to the White House 'it was announced that the fleet would continue on to our insular possessions and return home by the Suez Canal.' 'I determined on the move,' wrote Roosevelt, 'without consulting the Cabinet. . . . A council of war never fights and in a crisis the duty of a leader is to lead and not take refuge behind the generally timid wisdom of a multitude of councillors. At that time as I happen to know, neither the English nor the German authorities believed it possible to take a fleet of great battle-ships round the world. They did not believe that their own fleets could perform the feat and still less did they believe that the American fleet could. . . . I first directed the fleet of sixteen battle-ships to go round through the Straits of Magellan to San Francisco. From thence I ordered them to New Zealand and Australia, then to the Philippines, China and Japan and home through Suez.' . . . Admiral Evans commanded the fleet to San Francisco; there Admiral Sperry took it. . . . The coaling and other preparations were made in such excellent shape by the Department that there was never a hitch, not so much as the delay of an hour, in keeping every appointment made."—J. F. Rhodes, *McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, 1897-1909*, pp. 371-372, 375.

ALSO IN: F. Matthews, *With the battle fleet*, pp. ix-x, 309-310.—A. H. Lewis, *Life of Roosevelt*, p. 260.

1907-1909.—Interest in Liberia.—Report of commission. See LIBERIA: 1907-1909.

1907-1909.—Railway rebates case against Standard Oil Company. See TRUSTS: United States: 1904-1909.

1907-1912.—Investigation of anthracite coal combination. See TRUSTS: United States: 1907-1912.

1907-1914.—Building of Panama canal.—Progress. See PANAMA CANAL: 1907-1914.

1907-1916.—Trust companies. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1900-1910.

1907-1917.—Immigration.—Economic reasons.—Large proportion from southeastern Europe. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1907-1917.

1907-1917.—Relations with Oriental countries.

—“The California controversy was at its height in the summer of 1907, and sensational newspapers in the United States and Japan vying with each other in inflammatory utterances calculated to promote ill-feeling between the two nations. The President had unhesitatingly taken action in behalf of the Japanese in the controversy. In view of the hostile utterances of the Japanese press he deemed it well . . . that the Japanese people should not think that his action had been taken in fear of Japan, and he accordingly decided to send the battle fleet into the Pacific and around the world to show that the United States earnestly desired peace, but was not in the least afraid of war. ‘This demonstration,’ [said Roosevelt], ‘of combined courtesy and strength nowhere received a heartier response than in Japan, which is itself both strong and courteous.’ No English, German or other battle fleet had ever gone to the Pacific.”—J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time*, v. 2, pp. 65-66.—“Not a few sober-minded Americans were convinced that Japan, having triumphed first over China, then over Russia, had chosen the United States as her third great antagonist; and that through conquests in Latin America, or in some other way, she would bring on a conflict whenever the time seemed ripe. . . . The center of conflicting national interests and policies in the Orient was China. Here the United States found new points of contact with Japan, and was likewise brought into important relations with all of the leading powers of Europe. Chinese affairs in the decade from 1907 group about two principal developments: (1) the revolution which in 1912 overthrew the Manchu dynasty and established a republic; (2) the estrangement from Japan, caused by Japanese aggressions on Chinese rights. In both the United States had deep concern.”—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, pp. 311-312.—“The overthrow of the Chinese monarchy and the Proclamation of a republic in 1911 were viewed with great satisfaction in the United States. It was felt that the awakening of China was due in no small part to American influence. American missionaries and those who supported them were in full sympathy with the political and social revolution that held out such large promises for the future. The new government needed money and American bankers united with British, French, German, Russian, and Japanese bankers in what was known as the Six-Power Consortium. This group was contemplating a loan of \$125,000,000 to China when the American bankers withdrew. . . . In [1915] . . . Japan demanded not only that China should assent to any agreement in regard to Shantung that Japan and Germany might reach at the conclusion of the war, but that she should also grant to her greater rights and concessions in Shantung than Germany enjoyed. China was finally forced to agree to this and to grant the other demands with modifications. While these negotiations were in progress, the United States sent an identic note to China and Japan informing them that it would not recognize any agreement that impaired its treaty rights in China, the integrity of the Republic of China, or the policy of the open door. . . . The Allies were evidently uneasy about Japan and were willing to do anything that was necessary to satisfy her. This uncertainty about Japan may also be the explanation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, signed November 2, 1917, a few months after we entered the war, in which the United States recognized the special interests of Japan in China, and Japan again reaffirmed her adherence to the principle of the open door.”—

J. H. Latané, *Our relations with China and Japan* (*World's Work*, May, 1921, pp. 41-42, 46).—The text of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement is as follows:

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable. The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous. The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers. The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called ‘Open Door’ or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China. Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

ALSO IN: J. F. Abbott, *Japanese expansion and American policies*.—J. F. Steiner, *Japanese invasion*, ch. 3-11.

1907-1922.—Mediation in Central American War of Nicaragua, Honduras, and Salvador.—Treaty renewed.—Washington peace conference. See CENTRAL AMERICA: 1907; 1922 (March-August).

1908.—Growth of poor relief. See CHARITIES: United States: 1863-1908.

1908.—Workmen's Compensation Act passed. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: United States: 1893-1918.

1908.—Operation and ownership of Washington-Alaska cable and telegraph system. See TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES: 1908: United States.

1908.—Represented at maritime conference in London. See LONDON, DECLARATION OF.

1908.—Relations with Brazil.—Brazilian Coffee case. See BRAZILIAN COFFEE CASE.

1908.—Donation of building to Bureau of American Republics.—Andrew Carnegie's gift of \$750,000, in addition to the congressional appropriation of \$200,000, made possible the building of a home for the Bureau of the American Republics. The work of the Pan-American building was entrusted to Cret and Seeler.—See also AMERICAN REPUBLICS, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF: 1906-1908.

1908 (April).—Conditional ratification by the Senate of The Hague Peace Conference Convention. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1907.


1908 (April).—Treaty with Great Britain respecting the demarcation of the international boundary between the United States and Canada. See CANADA: 1908 (April).

1908 (April).—Convention for the preservation and propagation of food fishes in waters

contiguous to the United States and Canada. See FISHERIES: 1908.

1908 (April-November).—Presidential election.—Parties and candidates.—Election of William H. Taft.—“The chief concern of the people as the second Roosevelt administration passed into its final year was not elections, but recovery from business depression produced by the panic of the closing weeks of 1907. Opinion as to the causes of that disaster was divided, but not clearly on party lines. Outside of Wall Street fair-minded men were ready to admit that the Administration could not be held responsible; no great campaign issue could therefore be got out of it. Vast national questions loomed on the horizon; tariff revision, currency reform, railroad and trust regulation, readjustment of the legal status of organized labor, extension of the principles of direct govern-

The financial world, and certain railroad and industrial interests, felt bitterly toward him; but among the masses his popularity was still extraordinary and knew no bounds of party. There was no Republican name like his to conjure with, and it seemed doubtful whether any other man could be depended on to defeat the probable Democratic candidate, William J. Bryan. State and local leaders felt that the President's name at the head of their ticket would be a mighty asset; and in several states plans were laid to call early conventions which should choose delegates pledged to his renomination. The third-term movement was fast advancing when, December 11, 1907, a statement was given out from the White House calling attention to the announcement of 1904, and asserting crisply that the President had not changed, and would not change, the determination voiced therein.



PAN-AMERICAN BUILDING, WASHINGTON

ment. But the two great parties were not ready to push them. Their conscious differences were as yet upon matters of emphasis and detail; on the big issues their minds were not made up. Only the inborn American love of politics keeps an electoral campaign under these conditions from falling utterly flat. The first phase of the contest to excite public interest was the attitude of Roosevelt toward a third term. On the night following his election in November, 1904, the President issued a statement to the effect that he considered himself then to be serving his first term; that 'the wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form'; and that 'under no circumstances' would he be 'a candidate for or accept another nomination.' Until the second administration was far advanced, the country took this declaration to be conclusive. With the approach of election year many observers became convinced that the Republican convention would be stampeded for the President, and that he would be nominated and re-elected in spite of himself.


The decision was at last accepted as final, and interest shifted to the claims of other actual or possible candidates. At all stages of the pre-convention campaign the most prominent of these candidates was the Secretary of War, William H. Taft of Ohio. After serving two years on the supreme bench of his state, and three years as Solicitor-General of the United States, Mr. Taft, in 1892, was made a United States circuit judge. In 1900 President McKinley appointed him chairman of the Second Philippine Commission; and on July 4, 1901, he was inaugurated first civil governor of the Philippines. . . . Called home early in 1904 to succeed Elihu Root as Secretary of War, he became one of the most stalwart supporters of the second Roosevelt administration. From an early date it was known that the President looked on him with favor as a successor; and in the early months of 1908 it was charged that the White House was using undue influence, mainly through federal office-holders, to bring about the Secretary's nomination. Roosevelt entered vigorous denial,

but criticism was not silenced. Other men suggested for the nomination were Governor Hughes of New York, Governor Cummins of Iowa, Vice-President Fairbanks, Speaker Cannon, Senator Knox of Pennsylvania, and Senator La Follette of Wisconsin. No one of them rose above the level of a 'favorite son.' On the Democratic side the nomination of William J. Bryan, candidate of the party in 1896 and 1900, was foreordained. The fiasco of 1904, when the candidate was an eastern conservative barely known to his own state, made it clear that the nominee in 1908 must be a western and well-known radical. More closely than any one else, Bryan fitted this description. His campaign for the nomination in 1908 began as soon as Parker was nominated in 1904. . . . By 1908 the candidate's hold on his party was absolute, both in the sense that the party machinery in most of the states was obedient to his will and in the sense that he had a vast, idolizing personal following whose votes could be transferred to no other person. Two classes of Democrats supported him—those who wanted him and those who accepted him because they had to. The former chiefly dwelt in the Mississippi Valley and on the plains of the Great West; the latter were to be found mainly east of the Alleghenies. Other Democrats mentioned for the nomination were Governor John A. Johnson of Minnesota, Judge George Gray of Delaware, and Judson Harmon of Ohio. Johnson was a moderate; Gray and Harmon were decided conservatives. William R. Hearst, founder and sponsor of the Independence League, caused some anxiety by setting up the standard of revolt. But the nomination of Bryan, to meet the expected nomination of Taft by the Republicans, was never really in doubt. . . . The Republican national convention assembled at Chicago June 16. Flags waved; spectators thronged the streets and packed the galleries; frock-coated statesmen harangued the assemblage in true convention style. But the proceedings were as spiritless as in 1904; for again the guiding influences flowed from the Administration and the real work was done in advance. For several months Arthur Vorys of Ohio and Frank H. Hitchcock, formerly First Assistant Postmaster-General, had carried on a vigorous campaign for the election of Taft delegates, and before the convention opened the Secretary's nomination was a certainty. . . . Party platforms may generally be ignored as having little effect on public policy. The Chicago platform of 1908, however, derives interest from its unconscious prophecy of the coming nationwide controversy in Republican ranks. Fully approved in advance by President Roosevelt and Secretary Taft, the instrument lauded the Administration and pledged the party to the continuance *en bloc* of present policies. There it might have stopped. For the question before the voters was simply whether they wanted four years more of the kind of administrative control under which they were living. . . . The Democratic convention met at Denver, July 7-10. The spectator would hardly have surmised that it was the gathering of a party that had been out of power for fifteen years. . . . The work of the convention seemed more spontaneous than that of the Chicago gathering, but in fact it, too, was prearranged. . . . The Denver platform was packed with vote-catching clauses. It was the platform, furthermore, of a party long out of power, ready to denounce freely and to promise lavishly, because it had lost the habit of accountability. The tariff plank was explicit in asserting that 'articles entering into competition with trust-controlled products should be placed

upon the free list and material reductions should be made in the tariff upon the necessities of life, especially upon articles competing with such American manufacturers as are sold abroad more cheaply than at home; and gradual reductions should be made in such other schedules as may be necessary to restore the tariff to a revenue basis.' The currency was handled more cautiously, but the party pledged itself to compel national banks to establish a guaranty fund for the protection of their depositors. The planks on trusts and railways, embodying peculiarly the ideas of Bryan, displayed a curious mixture of Jeffersonian individualism, state's rights, and federal paternalism. 'A private monopoly,' it was asserted, 'is indefensible and intolerable. We, therefore, favor the vigorous reform of the criminal law against guilty trust magnates and officials, and demand the enactment of such additional legislation as may be necessary to make it impossible for a private monopoly to exist in the United States.' Three specific remedies were advocated: (1) a law preventing the duplication of directors among competing corporations; (2) a federal license system; (3) a law compelling licensed corporations to sell to all purchasers in all parts of the country on the same terms. . . . Of the five minor parties that put tickets in the field, four had participated in earlier campaigns. The Populists, with vitality fast oozing, nominated Thomas E. Watson of Georgia. The Socialists named a candidate of other days, Eugene V. Debs of Indiana. The Socialist Labor group put up August Gillhaus of New York. The Prohibitionists nominated Eugene W. Chafin of Illinois. The newcomer was Hearst's Independence Party, sprung from the Independence League, which in late years had been active in the politics of Massachusetts, New York, California, and some other states. In convention at Chicago, it refused to give Bryan its support and nominated Thomas L. Hisgen of Massachusetts. Its sole reason for existence was to protest against the conservatism of the dominant elements in the major parties. Yet its platform contained little that did not appear in the program of one or the other of these parties. . . . 'The campaign closes,' said the *New York Nation*, October 29, 'with the issues yet undefined and with many thoughtful men still dubious as to the proper way to vote.' The election of Taft, however, was virtually assured when the Vermont election of September 1 yielded a normal Republican majority. The total number of votes cast (November 3) was 14,887,133, which exceeded the number cast in 1904 by the heavy margin of 1,364,025. The vote was distributed as follows: Taft, 7,679,006; Bryan, 6,409,106; Debs, 420,820; Chafin, 252,683; Hisgen, 83,562; Watson, 28,131; Gillhaus, 13,825. The plurality of Taft over Bryan was 1,269,900; the majority of Taft over all other candidates was 470,870. [James S. Sherman of New York was elected vice president.] Bryan's vote exceeded Parker's in 1904 by 1,324,615, but he received a smaller proportion of the total vote than in either 1896 or 1900. To the states carried by Parker—those of the South except Missouri—Bryan added Nebraska, Colorado, and Nevada. It is to be observed, however, that since the election of 1904 Oklahoma had been admitted to the Union; also that the electoral vote of Maryland in 1908 was divided between Bryan and Taft, in the proportion of 6 to 2. The electoral vote stood: Taft, 321, Bryan, 162. Elections to the Sixty-first Congress resulted in the choice of 219 Republicans and 172 Democrats. The Democratic party went into the contest of 1908 with a record of fifteen years of

unbroken defeat. Never for an equal period had it been so completely in eclipse. . . . The outcome in 1908 bore the appearance of a sweeping Republican victory, and on the surface there was little to cheer the losers. In reality, however, it was the harbinger of a shift of party power. Bryan was badly beaten, but his party was not; in all parts of the country Democratic candidates for state and local offices achieved great successes. Five Democratic governors were elected in states which gave Taft substantial majorities: Harmon in Ohio, Johnson in Minnesota, Marshall in Indiana, Burke in North Dakota, and Norris in Montana. In Massachusetts the Republican governor-elect's plurality was but half as large as Taft's, in Connecticut but one-third, in Illinois but one-sixth. In New York Governor Hughes emerged from the most significant state contest of the year with a plurality of but 60,000, as compared with Taft's 200,000."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, pp. 1-11, 15-17.

as to the existing conditions of farm life and work in the country, as to homes and schools; means of communication and intercourse; neighborhood organizations; sales of products and supply of labor; banking, credit and insurance facilities; sanitary conditions; social entertainment, and in fact, to enquire into the conditions of almost every phase of rural life. To the five members above mentioned Walter H. Page, afterwards ambassador to Great Britain, Charles S. Barrett of Georgia and William A. Beard of California were added subsequently to the commission. In his autobiography, Roosevelt tells the story of the inception of the commission and the way in which it went about its work as follows: "In the spring of 1908, at my request, Plunkett conferred on the subject with Garfield and Pinchot, and the latter suggested to him the appointment of a Commission on Country Life as a means for directing the attention of the Nation to the problems of the farm, and for securing the necessary knowledge of the actual



MAP OF UNITED STATES SHOWING THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC VOTE AT THE ELECTION OF 1908

ALSO IN: W. R. Thayer, *Theodore Roosevelt*, ch. 19.—J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time*, v. 2, ch. 7-9.

1908 (May).—Emergency Currency Act passed. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1863-1914.

1908 (July).—Remission to China of part of Boxer indemnity. See CHINA: 1901-1908.

1908 (December).—Extension of the competitive system of appointment to fourth class postmasters. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1908.

1908 (December).—Relief for the survivors of the Messina earthquake. See ITALY: 1908-1909.

1908-1909 (August-February).—Country Life Commission and report.—In August, 1908, President Roosevelt called upon Professor L. H. Bailey, of the New York State College of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, of Wallace's Farmer, Des Moines, Iowa, President Kenyon L. Butterfield, of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, and Gifford Pinchot of the United States Forest Service to form a commission to obtain wide and exact information

conditions of life in the open country. After long discussion a plan for a Country Life Commission was laid before me and approved. The appointment of the Commission followed in August, 1908. . . . The Commission on Country Life did work of capital importance. By means of a widely circulated set of questions the Commission informed itself upon the status of country life throughout the Nation. Its trip through the East, South, and West brought it into contact with large numbers of practical farmers and their wives, secured for the Commissioners a most valuable body of first-hand information, and laid the foundation for the remarkable awakening of interest in country life which has since taken place throughout the Nation. . . . The report of the Country Life Commission was transmitted to Congress by me on February 9, 1909."—*Theodore Roosevelt: An autobiography*, pp. 452-454.—The commission found an unquestionable lack in the country of a well organized rural society, and came to clear conclusions concerning the many causes thereof, which are fully

discussed in its report. The leading specific causes are summarized with brevity at the outset, as follows: "A lack of knowledge on the part of farmers of the exact agricultural conditions and possibilities of their regions; Lack of good training for country life in the schools; The disadvantage or handicap of the farmer as against the established business systems and interests, preventing him from securing adequate returns for his products, depriving him of the benefits that would result from unmonopolized rivers and the conservation of forests, and depriving the community, in many cases, of the good that would come from the use of great tracts of agricultural land that are now held for speculative purposes; Lack of good highway facilities; The widespread continuing depletion of soils, with the injurious effect on rural life; A general need of new and active leadership. Other causes contributing to the general result are: Lack of any adequate system of agricultural credit, whereby the farmer may readily secure loans on fair terms; the shortage of labor, a condition that is often complicated by intemperance among workmen; lack of institutions and incentives that tie the laboring man to the soil; the burdens and the narrow life of farm women; lack of adequate supervision of public health."

1908-1909.—Question of amendment of Sherman anti-trust law. See TRUSTS: United States: 1908-1909: Question of amending.

1908-1909.—Spasmodic process of recovery from the commercial crisis of 1907. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1901-1909.

1908-1909.—Second conference of state governors.—Report of National Conservation Commission.—Its inventory of natural resources. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1907-1910; GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE.

1908-1914.—Relations with Japan.—Root-Takahira Agreement concerning the "open door" policy in China.—Gentlemen's Agreement. See JAPAN: 1905-1914.

1908-1914.—Single tax movement in Oregon. See OREGON: 1908-1914.

1908-1918.—Development of the Kehillah. See JEWS: United States: 1908-1918.

1909.—Existing treaties with China and Japan and enactments relative to their admittance to the United States. See JAPAN: 1908-1914; IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1862-1913; RACE PROBLEMS: 1904-1909.

1909.—Census Bill and President Roosevelt's veto.—Amended bill which became a law. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1909.

1909.—Trouble with Nicaragua. See NICARAGUA: 1905-1911.

1909.—Settlement of case against sugar trust. See TRUSTS: United States: 1907-1909: Thievery of the sugar trust.

1909.—Decision in tobacco trust case.—Restraint of combined companies. See TRUSTS: United States: 1907-1909: Suit of the government against the tobacco trust.

1909.—Assumption of financial responsibilities of Nicaragua. See DOLLAR DIPLOMACY.

1909.—Protective measures for the birds in Hawaii. See HAWAIIAN ISLANDS RESERVATION.

1909.—Reorganization of the State Department. See STATE, DEPARTMENT OF, UNITED STATES.

1909.—Suggestion for prize court of justice at The Hague conference. See ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1909 (October).

1909.—Question of fishing rights in Newfoundland submitted to arbitration at The Hague. See NEWFOUNDLAND: 1905-1909.

1909.—Proposed treaty with Panama and Colombia. See COLUMBIA: 1909.

1909 (January).—Waterways treaty with Great Britain concerning waters between the United State and Canada. See CANADA: 1909 (January).

1909 (February).—Anti-opium Act.—Initiative in securing International Opium Commission at Shantung. See OPIUM PROBLEM: 1909 (February): United States; 1909 (February): International Opium Commission.

1909 (March).—Passage of new Copyright Act. See COPYRIGHT: 1790-1909.

1909 (March).—End of President Roosevelt's term.—Summary of his administrations.—Roosevelt's "administration, speaking now of his service of seven and a half years, was fruitful of legislation by a Republican House and a Republican Senate. The following were among the principal acts passed: The Elkins Anti-Rebate Law applying to railroads; the creation of the Department of Commerce and Labor and the Bureau of Corporations; the law authorizing the building of the Panama Canal; the Hepburn Bill amending and vitalizing the Interstate Commerce Act; the Pure-Food and Meat Inspection laws; the law creating the Bureau of Immigration; the Employer's Liability and Safety Appliance laws, that limited the working hours of employees; the law making the Government liable for injuries to its employees; the law forbidding child labor in the District of Columbia; the reformation of the Consular Service; prohibition of campaign contributions from corporations; the Emergency Currency Law which also provided for the creation of the Monetary Commission."—C. G. Washburn, *Theodore Roosevelt, the logic of his career*, pp. 128-129.—"It is too soon to say which will be considered his greatest service to his country. The destruction of evil conditions and the curbing of selfish powers existing prior to his time, or the constructive work, both material and spiritual, conceived, initiated, and started on its way by himself and his aids. But whether in ripping out the old or the building of the new it was as the leader of men more than as the holder of office that he succeeded. The work he laid down will not live so much in Washington as in the factories, the offices, and the homes of America. The written laws on the statute books are mostly the crystallization of the sentiments he aroused in the consciences of Americans, and the vision he gave to American eyes; old truths re-vivified, old principles re-established, old virtues restored to American life and business."—R. H. Post, *Theodore Roosevelt's practice of government (World's Work, May, 1921, p. 68)*.—The great statesman and historian, James Bryce, wrote to Roosevelt two days after his retirement that he had "done more for the advancement of good causes, more to stir the soul of the nation and rouse it to a sense of its incomparable opportunities and high mission" than any of his predecessors in the last hundred years except Abraham Lincoln himself.

ALSO IN: L. F. Abbott, *Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt*.

1909 (March).—Inauguration of William H. Taft.—Intimations of policy in his inaugural address.—His cabinet.—"On March 4, 1909, when William H. Taft was inaugurated president of the United States, fortune had favored him with better opportunities for acquiring equipment for that office, than were ever given to any of the twenty-five presidents who had preceded him. He was then nearly fifty-two years old, and from his birth, as the son of his eminent father, Judge Alphonzo

Taft, his environment had been almost ideally adapted to equip him for the presidency."—A. H. Walker, *Administration of William H. Taft: A historical sketch*, p. 2.—The ceremonies of the inauguration of President Taft were performed under singularly unfavorable circumstances, in consequence of one of the most dreadful storms that ever visited the capital. Trains blocked by it contained thousands of people who reached Washington too late for what they had traveled far to witness or to take part in, while those who did arrive on the scene were hardly gladdened by their success. The president, however, accepted the untoward conditions with a characteristic high-hearted equanimity. His inaugural address, delivered in the Senate chamber, instead of in the open air at the east front of the capitol, opened with the following words: "Any one who takes the oath I have just taken must feel a heavy weight of re-

(7) The enactment of legislation which will empower the Federal government to enforce treaty promises made to other countries within every State. (8) Such changes in the monetary and banking laws as will insure a greater elasticity of the currency. (9) The enactment of a law providing for postal savings banks. (10) The encouragement of American shipping through the use of mail subsidies. (11) A continuation of work on the Panama canal along the plans which have been adopted for a lock type with such energy as will insure the earliest possible completion of the work. (12) The continuation of a colonial policy which will still further increase the business prosperity of our dependencies. (13) The betterment of the condition of the negro in the South through observance of principles laid down in the Fifteenth Amendment. (14) The promotion of legislation for the protection of labor and the betterment of labor conditions.



WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT AND CABINET

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From left to right, President Taft, Secretaries MacVeagh, Wickersham, Meyer, Wilson, Nagel, Knox, Dickinson, Hitchcock, Ballinger.

sponsibility. If not, he has no conception of the powers and duties of the office upon which he is about to enter, or he is lacking in a proper sense of the obligation which the oath imposes." The following is a summary of the suggestions of future policy conveyed in the address:

(1) Reorganization of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Corporations of the Department of Commerce and Labor and of the Interstate Commerce Commission. (2) Tariff revision in accord with the promises made in the national platform adopted at Chicago. (3) A continuation of scientific experiments in the Department of Agriculture for the improvement of agricultural conditions. (4) The enactment and carrying out of laws for the conservation of the resources of the country. (5) Maintenance of the army and navy in such a state of preparation as will insure a continuance of peace with other countries. (6) A continuation of that treatment of aliens which will insure for the people of the United States respect and fair treatment among the peoples of other countries.

On the day following his inauguration the president named his chosen cabinet to the Senate, and the nominations were duly confirmed, as follows: Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania, secretary of state; Franklin MacVeagh of Illinois, secretary of the treasury; Jacob M. Dickinson of Tennessee, secretary of war; George W. Wickersham of New York, attorney-general; Frank H. Hitchcock of Massachusetts, postmaster-general; George von L. Meyer of Massachusetts, secretary of the navy; Richard A. Ballinger of Washington, secretary of the interior; James Wilson of Iowa, secretary of agriculture; and Charles Nagel of Missouri, secretary of commerce and labor. A few days after the appointment of the cabinet, Jacob M. Dickinson, the new secretary of war, in a speech at Chicago, explained why President Taft had chosen him, a Democrat, for a place in a Republican cabinet, and why he had accepted it. He said that President Taft, as president of the whole country, desired to have a representative of the South among his counsellors. To have chosen a Southern Republican

would have been to perpetuate the bitter sectionalism which it was the president's desire to obliterate. He had therefore chosen a Democrat who had voted against him. Dickinson continued: "That his purpose was broad, magnanimous, and patriotic none can question. The wisdom both of his purpose and his selection must be tried by time, but I have every assurance that his action in appointing me, and my action in accepting, are approved by the South, and, having this approval, I can bear with equanimity any criticism from individual Democrats elsewhere."

1909 (March).—Special session of Congress called.—"President Taft, . . . took the next important step by calling an extra session of the Sixty-first Congress. That session was begun on March 15, 1909, and continued till August 5, 1909, to exclusively attend to the work of amending the tariff laws."—A. H. Walker, *Administration of William H. Taft: A historical sketch*, p. 9.

1909 (March-August).—Tariff revision in the Payne-Aldrich Act. See **TARIFF: 1909**.

1909 (May).—Carnegie gift to hero fund of France. See **CARNEGIE HERO FUNDS**.

1909 (May).—Creation of the Senate Committee on Public Expenditures.—An important incident of the special session of Congress which was called by President Taft immediately after his inauguration, was the creation by the Senate of a new Standing Committee on Public Expenditures, the function of which was indicated in the following resolution of the Senate, adopted May 29: "*Resolved*, That the Committee on Public Expenditures be, and they are hereby, authorized and directed, by subcommittee or otherwise, to make investigations as to the amount of the annual revenues of the Government, and as to the expenditures and business methods of the several departments, divisions, and branches of the Government, and to report to the Senate from time to time the result of such investigations and their recommendations as to the relation between expenditures and revenues and possible improvements in Government methods; and for this purpose they are authorized to sit, by subcommittees or otherwise, during the recesses or sessions of the Senate, at such times and places as they may deem advisable, to send for persons and papers, to administer oaths, and to employ such stenographic, clerical, expert, and other assistance as may be necessary, and to have such printing and binding done as may be necessary, the expense of such investigations to be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate." Seven members of the committee are the chairmen of the seven committees in the Senate to some one of which every bill providing for revenue or carrying an appropriation is submitted. "Thus," as has been remarked, "is provided a medium for better co-ordination and co-operation between what may be termed the revenue and appropriation committees. The powers of existing committees are not affected, but an avenue is provided for concentration and distribution of information—a committee forum for the discussion and recommendation of fundamentals affecting the Government."

1909 (May).—Establishment in the government of a General Supply Committee.—On May 13 the president issued an executive order establishing an Administrative General Supply Committee, which is to purchase all supplies for government use, paying one price instead of several prices for the same supplies.

1909 (June).—Refusal of recognition of Belgian annexation of Congo Free State.—Root's message. See **BELGIAN CONGO: 1909**.

1909 (July).—Proposed constitutional amendment authorizing the levying of an income tax.—Without a dissenting vote, on July 5, 1909, the Senate adopted a joint resolution providing for the submission to the several states of a proposed amendment to the constitution of the United States, as follows:

"Article xvi. The congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without any apportionment among the several states and without regard to any census or enumeration."

In reporting this action, a newspaper correspondent of considerable sagacity remarked that the ease with which the resolution glided through the Senate, and would with certainty pass the House, must be regarded as "an indication of the expectation of the representatives of capital and of high protection that twelve states can be found among the forty-six in the union to refuse their assent to the amendment, in which event it will fail." The endorsement of the House to the resolution was given on July 12, by a vote of 317 to 14, the negative votes being all from Republicans. An attempt to have the resolution amended so that the constitutional amendment would be submitted to state conventions for ratification instead of to legislatures was ruled out of order, and an appeal from Speaker Cannon's ruling was voted down, 185 to 143, on a strict party division. The first state to act on the proposed amendment was Alabama, where it was ratified by the legislature and signed by the governor, August 17. In the state of New York, on Jan. 5, 1910, Governor Hughes addressed a special message to the legislature, recommending that the amendment in its proposed form should not be ratified. He said: "I am in favor of conferring upon the Federal government the power to lay and collect an income tax without apportionment among the States according to population. I believe that this power should be held by the Federal government so as properly to equip it with the means of meeting national exigencies. But the power to tax incomes should not be granted in such terms as to subject to Federal taxation the incomes derived from bonds issued by the State itself, or those issued by municipal governments organized under the State's authority. To place the borrowing capacity of the State and of its governmental agencies at the mercy of the Federal taxing power would be an impairment of the essential rights of the State, which, as its officers, we are bound to defend. . . . The comprehensive words, 'from whatever source derived,' if taken in their natural sense, would include not only incomes from ordinary real or personal property, but also incomes derived from State and municipal securities. It may be urged that the amendment would be limited by construction. But there can be no satisfactory assurance of this. The words in terms are all-inclusive. . . . In order that a market may be provided for State bonds, and for municipal bonds, and that thus means may be afforded for State and local administration, such securities from time to time are excepted from taxation. In this way lower rates of interest are paid than otherwise would be possible. To permit such securities to be the subject of Federal taxation is to place such limitations upon the borrowing power of the State as to make the performance of the functions of local government a matter of Federal grace."

1909 (July).—Question of American participation in the Hankau Sze-chuen railway loan. See **CHINA: 1904-1909**.

1909 (September).—Peary's announcement of

the discovery of the North Pole. See ARCTIC EXPLORATION: 1886-1909.

1909 (September-October).—Tour of President Taft.—Meeting with President Diaz on Mexican soil.—In the fall of 1909 President Taft made an extended tour of the country, from New England to the Pacific coast and southward to Mexico and the Gulf, speaking to great assemblies at many points on all the important questions, political and economical, that were then before the country. In the course of the tour a meeting between President Diaz of Mexico and himself was arranged, and took place on October 16 first at El Paso, on the Texas side of the Rio Grande, and then at Ciudad Juarez, on the Mexican side, formal visits being thus exchanged. This was a second time that a President of the United States had left the soil of his own country while in office, President Roosevelt having done the same at Panama in 1906.

1909 (October-November).—Further disclosures of corruption in the customs service.—The shameful disclosure in 1907-1908 of sugar trust frauds on the Federal treasury (see TRUSTS: United States: 1907-1909: Thievery of the sugar trust) afforded glimpses of a state of corruption in the customs service of the government, at the port of New York especially, which were more than verified within the next year and a half. The collector of customs, William Loeb, Jr., who took charge of the New York office in the spring of 1909, exercised a watchfulness which soon put him on the traces of fraud, and he pursued them with an energy and determination that cannot have been brought into action before. In his annual report, made in December, 1909, Secretary MacVeagh, of the Treasury Department, had this to say of the vigorous reformatory measures thus undertaken at the port of New York, and of the significance of the consequent revelations: "The revelations made and proven were so startling and impressive that opposition was silenced; and in this silence the necessary, clear-cut measures could be carried out without meeting serious obstructions. It soon developed that the frauds of the American Sugar Refining Company, while, perhaps, the most important instances, were as had been apprehended, symptoms of a diseased condition, not universal by any means, but almost general. And difficult as it always is to sufficiently bring to light the facts of such a condition to afford a basis for rehabilitation, this has been already largely accomplished. Much has been discovered to afford an understanding of the situation, with the result of numerous seizures, of numerous prosecutions made or projected, and of important and successful beginnings of a complete rehabilitation. While the recovery of evaded duties, and the prosecution of individuals have been of large significance, the greatest asset to the government of these disgraceful conditions is the knowledge and the light which guarantee in time a wholesome reorganization. The study of the causes of the demoralization which has been revealed is still incomplete, but the main causes are evident. It is clear, for instance, that the influence of local politics and politicians upon the customs service has been most deleterious, and has promoted that laxity and low tone which prepare and furnish an inviting soil for dishonesty and fraud. Unless the customs service can be released from the payment of political debts and exactions, and from meeting the supposed exigencies of political organizations, big and little, it will be impossible to have an honest service for any length of time. Any considerable share of the present cost of this demoralization to the public revenues,

to the efficiency of the service, and to public and private morality is a tremendous amount to pay in mere liquidation of the small debts of political leaders. It is also clear that the widespread disposition of returning American travelers to evade the payment of legal duties has greatly helped to create the conditions which have become intolerable. Those Americans who travel abroad belong to the sections of the people which most readily create public sentiment, and are most responsible for it; and the fact that in so many instances these travelers are willing to defraud the government out of considerable or even small sums creates an atmosphere on the docks that strongly tends to affect the morale of the entire customs service. And when to this is added the frequent willingness upon the part of these responsible citizens to specifically corrupt the government's men, then the demoralization is further accentuated."

1909 (November).—Arbitration of the Alsop claim against Chile. See CHILE: 1909-1911.

1909-1912.—Development of the progressive movement.—Although the progressive party was the natural outcome of the progressive movement, the two are quite distinct, and must not be confused. The movement began years before the short-lived party came into being. Moreover, while the progressive party is associated with a break in the Republican party, the movement began in the Democratic ranks. "The development of the progressive movement in the Democratic party may be divided into three periods, with the year 1893 marking the end of the first and the year 1912 the end of the second. The first period may fitly be called a period of preparation, since during the period from the Civil War to 1893 the forces of discontent and protest that were later to furnish strength to the progressive Democrats were forming and finding themselves, and in that same period the question of free silver, on which these forces were to unite, was becoming more and more acute. One of the first of these forces of protest and revolt that later joined the progressive Democrats, appeared in 1868 under the name of the Greenback party. The men in this party believed that much of the distress of the country was caused by stringency of the currency and advocated the continuance in use of the 'greenbacks' that had come into existence during the war. . . . Although the Greenback party had no subsequent history, it is important because it was the predecessor of the Populist party which united with the Democrats in support of Bryan and free silver in 1896. . . . In 1893 the Sherman Act was repealed, and no substitute was enacted to take its place. . . . The period of preparation was over; the progressive movement in the Democratic party had begun. (In a letter to . . . [P. De Witt] Bryan says: 'The progressive movement began in the Democratic party in 1893. The Populist party was the first indication of a growing dissatisfaction with existing conditions'.) . . . Bryan's defeat in 1896 was a serious blow to himself and to the progressive movement in the Democratic party with which he was so closely identified. . . . Direct legislation, control of corporations, the income tax and many other excellent measures all had to walk the plank with free silver. . . . In 1910 thirty-five progressive Democrats formulated a constitution and organized a Democratic Federation. . . . Meanwhile the progressive Democrats were making their influence felt in several of the states. . . . [The movement in the Democratic party] emphasized the need of freeing government from the . . . [influence] of special interests. . . . In the Republican

party, the progressive movement was fundamentally the same, but . . . took the form primarily of a struggle against corporations. This struggle had several phases: first, and most important, was the attempt to find some adequate means of controlling and regulating corporate activities; second, and almost as important, was the resistance to the efforts by corporations to exploit the natural resources of the nation in their own behalf; and, finally, came the revolt against the impudent, open revision of the tariff in 1909 in the interest of trusts and monopolies."—B. P. De Witt, *Progressive movement*, pp. 27-28, 32, 34-35, 38, 46-47.—"Robert M. La Follette was 'the first among the Republican political leaders to comprehend the character of the irrepressible conflict within the party, between public interests and the present day organization of private business', according to the opinion of Senator Jonathan P. Dolliver expressed in a speech in Wisconsin a few weeks before his death in 1910. La Follette began his reform work in 1894. In 1896 and 1898 he lost the Republican nomination for Governor, after entering the conventions with enough delegates instructed and pledged to vote for him, because the delegates were lured away by money and promises of place by the party machine. His experience led him to study out some substitute for the convention and caucus by which nominations might be made directly by the people. . . . When he entered the Senate he was alone in that body as the representative of a new movement in the Republican party which had 'its beginning in a desire to take party control away from men who, as parts of the managing organization . . . maintained a close corporation in manipulation of party affairs and in distribution of rewards, and were too intimate with and subservient to railroad companies and other capitalistic combinations. It rapidly spread to agitation against the corporations themselves, chiefly railroads. . . . In short, it is a movement to emancipate the party from the domination of the establishment "system," and to make the party more directly responsive to the popular will.' At first La Follette was ignored by the older members of the Senate, but he forced them to recognize him by refusing to be suppressed. He broke traditions by speaking a score of times before the end of his first session as a Senator. His place in the Senate was made, however, by a speech on the railroad rate bill of 1906 which revised the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission. . . . In 1909 he was one of the small group of Republican Senators who refused to vote for the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, which was one of the chief causes for the formation of an insurgent faction in that party, and which finally resulted in the division of 1912. No longer alone in the Senate, he had been joined by Senators Dolliver, Beveridge, and Clapp, who were in the Senate when he came; by Dixon and Bourne who entered in 1907; by Borah and Cummins in 1908; and by Bristow in 1909. . . . The succession of Theodore Roosevelt to the Presidency in 1901 gave an opportunity to the Progressive movement in the national sphere that had not been possible under either Bryan or La Follette. The conjuncture of a man and an occasion made Roosevelt the protagonist for nearly eight years of a veritable revolution in national policy. So many and varied were his activities, so diversified his interests that there was hardly a phase of the national life that was not renovated and stimulated; so completely did he dominate the stage that it was hardly an exaggeration to call his administration, as one writer did, the 'Epoch of Roosevelt.' . . . The first real

division in the Republican party came in the House of Representatives and was directed against the arbitrary power of the Speaker which had grown up since the adoption of the 'Reed Rules' in 1890. Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois had been Speaker since 1903, and had used his power to maintain the established system and in opposition to many Progressive measures. . . . [The most important struggle between the regular Republicans and the Insurgents arose in the Senate over the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, and a break between the Progressives and President Taft, who upheld the bill, rapidly developed. This division in the party brought about its natural result in 1910 when] as was to be expected under such circumstances, the State elections resulted in a 'landslide' for the Democrats. In nine States the Republicans lost the legislature which was to elect a Senator, while they gained only one such legislature, 'thereby reducing their number in the Senate, after 1911, from 59 to 46; and raising the Democratic Senators from 33 to 38.' In the House of Representatives, also, the Republicans lost heavily, returning only one hundred and sixty-three members while the Democrats elected two hundred and twenty-seven members. The apparent strength of the Republicans was reduced by the success of the Progressives who carried most of the western seats for the Republicans. The election was a distinct rebuke to the regular Republicans and President Taft was necessarily involved. It indicated that the country supported the position of the Progressive Republicans: they could no longer be ignored. The political importance of the Progressives was plainly shown in April, 1911, when they demanded representation in the 'Republican membership of the Senate Committees in the ratio of 1 to 4, and that their assignments should be made by the four of their group who were on the Republican steering committee, La Follette, Bourne, Cummins, and Bristow.' Senator La Follette, who made the motion to this effect, mentioned as the Progressives, Senators Clapp, La Follette, Bourne, Borah, Brown, Dixon, Cummins, Bristow, Crawford, Gronna, Poindexter, and Works; 'and declared that the division between them and the Regular Republicans "is recognized in the Senate and throughout the country as based upon clearly defined differences on important legislative measures and questions of great public interest.'" The regular Republicans refused these demands, but agreed to give the Progressives 'their full proportionate share of appointments' insisting, however, that the assignments be made by the caucus, 'and that the Progressive should not be recognized as an organization distinct from the Republican majority of the Senate.' During the special session from April to August, 1911, the Progressives 'acted virtually as a third party, and for a time, by an alliance with the Democrats, practically controlled Congress. As a group they vigorously opposed . . . Canadian reciprocity,' although this measure was proposed and urged by President Taft. . . . A division arose among the Progressives as to the candidate who would be most likely to defeat President Taft's renomination. Senator La Follette was first encouraged to announce himself, but later he was urged to withdraw in favor of Mr. Roosevelt as a more popular leader with a better chance of defeating the President. Dissension and recrimination resulted and became the basis for a bitter personal feud between La Follette and Roosevelt. The former declared that he had been used to test the situation, and when it had been found favorable, Roosevelt announced his willingness to enter the

race as he had all along intended to do. On the other hand, it was declared that La Follette had been supported faithfully until his own physical breakdown, as evidenced in his address in Philadelphia in February, 1912, made it plain that another candidate must be found.—F. E. Haynes, *Third party movement since the Civil War*, pp. 390-392, 398, 420, 422-423, 425-426.

1909-1917.—Treaty discussions with Colombia.—Failure. See COLOMBIA: 1909-1917.

1909-1921.—Negro problem.—Association of negroes formed. See RACE PROBLEMS: 1905-1921.

1910.—Census Bureau transferred to Department of Commerce.—Thirteenth census.—“The United States was the first nation in the world to make provision for periodic censuses; but as late as 1900 the central machinery of control, as well as the staff of local enumerators and supervisors, was set up anew in each decennial year. So long as the range of inquiry was limited, this hand-to-mouth procedure served. But after the Civil War the censuses grew less and less satisfactory. Statisticians urged the need of more numerous, more experienced, and more permanent census officials; and at last Congress was induced to establish (March 6, 1902) a permanent Bureau of the Census, designed to hold in the service persons familiar with census work, and also to make possible the collection of various classes of statistics during the interval between decennial enumerations. Organized originally in the Department of the Interior, the Bureau was transferred in 1903 to the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor; whence, in 1913, it passed to the separate Department of Commerce. The thirteenth census, authorized by Congress July 2, 1909, and taken as of the date April 15, 1910, was the first complete test of the new facilities. The results were very satisfactory. The census of 1910 showed the population of the continental United States to be 91,972,266, and of the United States including Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, 93,402,151.”—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, pp. 116-117.

STATE	POPULATION	INCREASE FROM 1900 TO 1910	
		Number	Per Cent.
West North Central Division	11,637,921	1,290,498	12.5
Minnesota	2,075,708	324,314	18.5
Iowa	2,224,771	17,082	↑0.3
Missouri	3,293,335	186,670	6.0
North Dakota	577,056	257,910	80.8
South Dakota	583,888	182,318	45.4
Nebraska	1,192,214	125,914	11.8
Kansas	1,090,949	220,454	15.0
South Atlantic Division	12,194,895	1,751,415	16.8
Delaware	202,322	17,587	9.5
Maryland	1,295,346	107,302	9.0
District of Columbia	331,069	52,351	18.8
Virginia	2,061,612	207,428	11.2
West Virginia	1,221,119	202,139	27.4
North Carolina	2,206,287	312,477	16.5
South Carolina	1,515,400	175,084	13.1
Georgia	2,609,121	392,790	17.7
Florida	752,619	224,077	42.4
East South Central Division	8,409,901	862,144	11.4
Kentucky	2,289,905	142,731	6.6
Tennessee	2,184,789	164,173	8.1
Alabama	2,138,093	309,396	16.9
Mississippi	1,797,114	458,844	15.8
West South Central Division	8,784,534	2,252,244	34.5
Arkansas	1,574,449	262,885	20.0
Louisiana	1,656,388	274,763	19.9
Oklahoma	1,657,155	866,764	109.7
Texas	3,896,542	847,832	27.8
Mountain Division	2,633,517	958,860	57.3
Montana	376,053	132,724	54.5
Idaho	325,594	163,822	101.3
Wyoming	145,965	53,434	57.7
Colorado	799,024	259,324	48.0
New Mexico	327,301	131,991	67.5
Arizona	204,354	81,423	66.2
Utah	373,351	96,602	34.9
Nevada	81,875	39,540	93.4
Pacific Division	4,192,304	1,775,612	73.5
Washington	1,141,990	623,887	120.4
Oregon	672,765	259,229	62.7
California	2,377,549	892,496	60.1

Population of United States by Geographical Divisions

STATE	POPULATION	INCREASE FROM 1900 TO 1910	
		Number	Per Cent.
Continental United States	91,972,266	15,977,691	21.0
New England Division	6,552,681	960,664	17.2
Maine	742,371	47,995	6.9
New Hampshire	430,572	18,984	4.6
Vermont	355,956	12,315	3.6
Massachusetts	3,366,416	561,070	20.0
Rhode Island	542,610	114,054	26.6
Connecticut	1,114,756	206,336	22.7
Middle Atlantic Division	19,315,892	3,861,214	25.0
New York	9,113,614	1,844,720	25.4
New Jersey	2,537,167	653,498	34.7
Pennsylvania	7,665,111	1,362,996	21.6
East North Central Division	18,250,621	2,265,040	14.2
Ohio	4,767,121	609,576	14.7
Indiana	2,700,876	184,414	7.3
Illinois	5,638,591	817,041	16.9
Michigan	2,810,173	389,191	16.1
Wisconsin	2,333,860	264,818	12.8

See also CENSUS: United States.

1910.—Represented at Fourth Pan-American Congress. See AMERICAN REPUBLICS, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF: 1910.


1910.—Creation of Commerce court. See RAILROADS: 1910-1916.

1910.—Maximum and minimum tariff negotiations with England, Russia, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey. See TARIFF: 1910: United States.

1910 (January).—President Taft's message on trusts and interstate commerce legislation. See TRUSTS: United States: 1910.

1910 (March-June).—Insurgency.—Political unrest.—Overthrow of Speaker Cannon.—Mann-Elkins Act.—Roosevelt's return from Africa.—“Republican complaint in regard to the tariff and the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy were surface indications of a division in the party into conservative or ‘old-guard,’ and progressive or insurgent groups. The same line of demarcation appeared in a quarrel over the power of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Joseph G. Cannon. Cannon had served in the lower branch of Congress almost continuously for twenty-seven years, and in 1910 was filling the position of speaker for the fourth consecutive time. . . . It was widely believed that Cannon, like Aldrich in the Senate,

effectually controlled the passage of legislation, with slender regard to the wishes or needs of the people. 'Cannonism' and 'Aldrichism' were considered synonymous. For several years an influential part of the Republican and Independent, as well as the Democratic press had attacked Speaker Cannon as the enemy of progressive legislation. Many of them laid much of the blame for the character of the Payne-Aldrich [tariff] act at his door. The *Outlook* decried 'government by oligarchy'; *The Nation* declared that he belonged to another political age; Bryan queried what Cannon was selling and how much he got; Gompers, the head of the American Federation of Labor, pointed him out as the enemy of all reforms. The outcry against the Speaker in the House itself, reinforced by the gathering opposition



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outside, found effective voice in a coalition of the Democrats and the insurgent Republicans. . . . The result of the change was to compel the speaker to be a presiding officer rather than the determining factor in the passage of legislation. About the time that Cannon's domination in the House was being broken, the announcement that Senator Nelson W. Aldrich and his staunchly conservative associate, Eugene Hale, of Maine, were about to retire indicated a similar change in the Senate. These men had served for long periods in Congress and were looked upon as the ablest and most influential of the 'reactionary' element in the upper house. Coincidentally with the partial disintegration of the conservative wing of the Republican party in Congress, there was passed a large volume of legislation of the type desired by the insurgents. The public land laws were improved; acts requiring the use of safety appliances on railroads were strengthened; a Bureau of Mines was established to study the welfare of the miners; a postal savings

bank system was erected [see *POSTAL SAVINGS BANKS: 1910*]; and an Economy and Efficiency Commission appointed to examine the several administrative departments so as to discover wasteful methods of doing business. Of especial importance was the Mann-Elkins Act of June 18, 1910, which further extended the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission. [See also *RAILROADS: 1910-1916*.] . . . An act of June 25, 1910, which was amended a year later, required the publication of the names of persons contributing to the federal campaign funds of the political parties, and the amounts contributed, as well as a detailed account of the expenditures of the committees and the purposes for which the expenses were incurred. President Taft also urged the passage of an income tax amendment to the federal Constitution and indicated that he was in favor of an amendment providing for the popular election of senators. Amendments for both these purposes passed Congress; but they were not ratified and put into effect until 1913. In June, 1910, Roosevelt returned from Africa whither he had gone for a hunting trip, after the inauguration of President Taft. Both elements in the Republican party were anxious for his sympathy and support. Roosevelt himself seems to have desired to remain outside the arena, at least for a time, but for many reasons permanent separation from politics was impossible. He became a candidate for the position of temporary chairman of the New York Republican State Convention against Vice-President James S. Sherman."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War (United States, v. 3, pp. 484-488)*.

Also in: C. A. Beard, *Contemporary American history*, pp. 326-329.—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, ch. 10.—C. R. Atkinson, *Committee on Rules and the overthrow of Speaker Cannon*.

1910 (April).—Final decision of Brownsville affair.—The military court affirmed the guilt of the negro soldiers in the Brownsville case (1906). See above: 1906 (August).

1910 (May).—Changes in the Organic Act of Hawaii, by President Taft.—Land laws. See *HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: 1910*: Changes made, etc.

1910 (August-September).—New York Republican state convention.—Rift in party.—The New York congressional campaign in 1910 was significant of the coming split in the Republican party. On August 16, the contest began when the state committee indorsed Vice President Sherman for the position of temporary chairman. "In the fall of 1910 a new demand arose that Roosevelt should enter actively into politics. Though it came from his own State, he resisted it with energy and determination. Nevertheless the pressure from his close political associates in New York finally became too much for him, and he yielded. They wanted him to go as a delegate to the Republican State Convention at Saratoga and to be a candidate for Temporary Chairman of the Convention—the officer whose opening speech is traditionally presumed to sound the keynote of the campaign. Roosevelt went and, after a bitter fight with the reactionists in the party, led by William Barnes of Albany, was elected Temporary Chairman over Vice-President James S. Sherman. The keynote was sounded in no uncertain tones, while Mr. Barnes and his associates fidgeted and suffered."—H. Howland, *Theodore Roosevelt and his times (Chronicles of America Series, v. 47, p. 199)*.

1910 (August-November).—Growth of Republican insurgency toward formation of Progressive party.—New Nationalism.—Congressional

elections give Progressives balance of power.—“During the summer and autumn of 1910 . . . [Roosevelt] made extensive political tours. At Ossawatimie, Kansas, he developed the platform of the ‘New Nationalism,’ which included more thorough control of corporations, and progressive legislation in regard to income taxes, conservation, the laboring classes, primary elections at which the people could nominate candidates for office, and the recall of elective officials before the close of their terms. He urged such vigorous use of the powers of the federal government that there should be no ‘neutral ground’ between state and nation, to serve as a refuge for law-breakers. Critics pointed out that these proposals had been urged by the insurgents and the followers of Bryan, and there could be no doubt where the sympathies of Roosevelt lay in the factional dispute within the Republican party. While conditions within the organization were such as were indicated by the hostile criticism of the Payne-Aldrich act, by the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy, the overturn of Speaker Cannon and the disintegration of the Aldrich-Hale group, the congressional election of 1910 took place. Signs of impending change had already become evident [and Progressives were hurrying toward the formation of a new party]. Insurgent Republicans were carrying the party primaries; and the Democrats, who were plainly confident, emphasized strongly the tariff act, Cannonism and the high cost of living as reasons for the removal of the Republicans. The result was a greater upheaval than even the Democrats had prophesied. In nine states the Republicans were ousted from legislatures that would elect United States senators; the new Senate would contain forty-one Democrats and fifty-one Republicans—too narrow a Republican majority in view of the strength of the insurgents. In the choice of members of the lower branch of Congress there was a still greater revolution; the new House would contain 228 Democrats, 161 Republicans and one Socialist, while Cannon would be retired from the Speakership. In eastern as well as western states, Democratic governors were elected in surprising numbers. Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Ohio and Oregon were among them. Of particular importance, as later events showed, was the success in New Jersey of Woodrow Wilson, former President of Princeton University.”—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War (United States, v. 3, pp. 488-489)*.

ALSO IN: R. M. La Follette, *La Follette's autobiography, p. 477*.—H. Howland, *Theodore Roosevelt and his times (Chronicles of America Series, v. 47, p. 195)*.

1910 (September).—Hague Tribunal decision in Newfoundland Fisheries case. See FISHERIES: 1909-1910; NEWFOUNDLAND: 1910.

1910-1911.—Dawson Agreement with Nicaragua.—Loan. See NICARAGUA: 1905-1911; CENTRAL AMERICA: 1911.

1910-1911.—Proposed reciprocity treaty with Canada. See CANADA: 1910-1911.

1910-1912.—Coal conservation under Taft and Ballinger. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1910-1912.

1910-1919.—Statistics for trade unions. See LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1910-1919.

1910-1920.—Housing problem. See HOUSING: United States: National Housing Association.

1911.—Dissolution of trusts. See TRUSTS: United States: 1911: Supreme court decisions; 1911: Du Pont Powder Company dissolved.

1911.—Requests of Persia for financial administrator.—W. Morgan Shuster appointed. See PERSIA: 1910-1911.

1911.—Member of consortium for financial aid to China. See RAILROADS: 1905-1921.

1911.—Creation of military district in Hawaiian islands.—Dredging of Pearl harbor. See HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: 1911.

1911.—Raising of the battleship *Maine* from Havana harbor. See CUBA: 1911-1912.

1911.—Panama canal fortified. See PANAMA CANAL: 1910-1914.

1911.—Treaty of commerce and navigation with Japan. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: 1862-1913.

1911 (March).—Act authorizing surveys of headwaters and establishment of national forests in eastern states. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1911.

1911 (August).—New Mexico admitted to Union. See NEW MEXICO: 1910-1911.

1911-1912.—President Taft's efforts for international peace.—“The establishment of a world court promoted the formation of treaties between nations by which they agreed to submit their differences to the Hague or to similar courts especially formed. A model, or as it was called a ‘mondial’ treaty was drawn up by the conference for this purpose. Secretary Hay proceeded to draw up treaties on such general lines with a number of nations, and President Roosevelt referred them to the Senate with his warm approval. That body, however, exceedingly jealous of the share in the treaty-making power given it by the Constitution, disliked the treaties, because it feared that under such general agreements cases would be submitted to The Hague Court without its special approval. Yet, as popular sentiment was strongly behind the movement, the Senate ventured only to amend the procedure in such a way as to make every ‘agreement’ a treaty which would require its concurrence. President Roosevelt, however, was so much incensed at this important change that he refused to continue the negotiations. President Taft was perhaps more interested in this problem than in any other. His Secretary of State, Elihu Root, reopened negotiations and, in 1908 and 1909, drew up a large number of treaties in a form which met the wishes of the Senate. Before the Administration closed [1912], the United States had agreed to submit to arbitration all questions, except those of certain classes especially reserved, that might arise with Great Britain, France, Austro-Hungary, China, Costa Rica, Italy, Denmark, Japan, Hayti, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Spain, Sweden, Peru, San Salvador, and Switzerland.”—C. R. Fish, *Path of empire (Chronicles of America Series, v. 46, pp. 281-283)*.

ALSO IN: W. H. Taft, *United States and peace, ch. 4*.

1911-1912 (January-June).—Beginnings of Progressive party.—La Follette and Roosevelt.—Preliminary campaign for the Republican nomination.—“For nearly a year the formation of a national league to promote progressive legislation in the different states had been under discussion among a few of the Progressive Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. And during the holiday recess in the last days of December, 1910, I drafted a Declaration of Principles and form of constitution for the organization of such a league, and submitted the same to Senators Bourne and Bristow. With some modifications suggested by the Senators in our conference, the

declaration and constitution were prepared for signatures and copies mailed to Senators and Members who had returned to their homes for the recess, and to leading Progressives in different states. The organization was effected at a meeting held . . . on the twenty-first day of January, 1911. Jonathan Bourne was elected President; Frederic C. Howe, Secretary; Charles R. Crane, Treasury. Following is the Declaration of Principles adopted: We, the undersigned, associate ourselves together as The National Progressive Republican League. The object of the League is the promotion of popular government and progressive legislation. Popular government in America has been thwarted and progressive legislation strangled by the special interests, which control caucuses, delegates, conventions, and party organizations; and, through this control of the machinery of government, dictate nominations and platforms, elect administrations, legislatures, representatives in Congress, United States Senators, and control cabinet officers. . . . Under existing conditions legislation in the public interest has been baffled and defeated. . . . The Progressive Republican League believes that popular government is fundamental to all other questions. To this end it advocates: (1) The election of United States Senators by direct vote of the people. (2) Direct primaries for the nomination of elective officials. (3) The direct election of delegates to national conventions with opportunity for the voter to express his choice for President and Vice-President. (4) Amendment to state constitutions providing for the Initiative, Referendum and Recall. (5) A thoroughgoing corrupt practices act. Roosevelt was invited to become a member of the National Progressive Republican League, founded upon this simple declaration of elementary principles, but he had not become enough of a Progressive at that time to be willing to identify himself with the organization, and therefore declined. He was urged to join the League for several reasons. The name of a former President would give strength to the organization. It would help, sooner or later, to place him in open opposition to the Taft administration. It would commit him to a clear-cut and definite position upon the five propositions embodied in the Declaration of Principles. This would be very important, as it is his political habit so to state and qualify his positions that you are never quite sure of him. I think it is fair to say that the activities of this League resulted in the enactment of the presidential preference laws in the several states during the legislative sessions of 1912. Oregon had already adopted its statute. Wisconsin, five years before, had enacted a law under which the delegates to the National Republican Convention of 1908 were elected by direct vote of the people. This law was supplemented by the legislature of 1912 providing for a direct vote on presidential and vice-presidential candidates. North Dakota, Nebraska, California, New Jersey, Illinois, and Massachusetts enacted similar statutes, and in South Dakota steps were taken to elect delegates by direct vote under an existing primary law, though the provision authorizing such election of delegates had not previously been invoked. The League, under the direction of its president, Senator Bourne, did . . . effective work in advancing the principles to promote which it was organized. That the Progressive Republicans should present a candidate for nomination for the presidency in opposition to Mr. Taft had long been considered by the leaders of that element of the party, and with

the beginning of the new year (1911) many conferences were held on that subject. These gatherings were attended not only by Progressive members of the Senate and House, but also by representative Progressives who visited Washington from time to time. The interest of the Progressive cause was the controlling thought in all of those deliberations. None of the men whose availability as candidates was discussed manifested any eagerness to undertake the contest, though all were agreed that Progressive Republicans were in duty bound to oppose the renomination of President Taft."—R. M. La Follette, *La Follette's autobiography*, pp. 494-499. —"A division arose among the Progressives as to the candidate who would be most likely to defeat President Taft's renomination. Senator La Follette was first encouraged to announce himself, but later he was urged to withdraw in favour of Mr. Roosevelt as a more popular leader with a better chance of defeating the President. Dissension and re-creation resulted and became the basis for a bitter personal feud between La Follette and Roosevelt."—F. E. Haynes, *Third party movements since the Civil War*, p. 426. —"Not only because of the division which had arisen in the Republican party upon principle was it conceded that his nomination must be opposed, but because whatever the outcome, the integrity and perpetuity of the Progressive movement demanded that it should present for the support of Progressive Republicans throughout the country a candidate who represented its principles. It was well understood that owing to the peculiar conditions existing in the south, which made it certain that the administration through patronage could control the selection of practically all delegates from that section of the country, Mr. Taft had a very great advantage at the outset. Even in the northern states the federal machine is a powerful factor in the election of delegates, though the candidate may be personally weak, or even obnoxious, and the power of the President's steam roller had been demonstrated so thoroughly in the previous convention that every one familiar with that campaign accepted it as a tremendous force to be reckoned with. Taft had almost no individual strength or following in 1908. But President Roosevelt put his personality behind an army of federal officials and nominated him against all opposition. . . . Incredible as it may seem, it is nevertheless a fact in political history, that Roosevelt planned and consummated Taft's succession to the presidency. The campaign of 1912 witnessed the publication by Roosevelt of a letter written to him by President Taft shortly after his inauguration which contained this startling acknowledgment: 'I can never forget that the power I now exercise was voluntarily transferred from you to me, and that I am under obligation to you to see that your judgment in selecting me as your successor and bringing about the succession shall be vindicated according to the standards which you and I in conversation have always formulated.' . . . This was given to the public by the former President, in a speech at Worcester, Mass., April 26, 1912."—R. M. La Follette, *La Follette's autobiography*, pp. 499-502. —"A conference was held in Chicago [Feb. 10, 1912], which was attended by seven Republican Governors and seventy Republican leaders representing twenty-four States. The purpose of this meeting was to promote the nomination of Roosevelt. The Governors present were Stubbs of Kansas, Osborn of Michigan, Hadley of Missouri, Alrich of Nebraska, Bass of New Hampshire, Glass-

cock of West Virginia, and Carey of Wyoming. These seven Governors addressed a letter to Colonel Roosevelt stating their belief that 'a large majority of the Republican voters of the country favor your nomination and a large majority of the people favor your election as the next President of the United States.' They asked him to 'declare whether, if the nomination was offered to him unsolicited and unsought, he would accept it.' Two weeks later Mr. Roosevelt replied that he would accept the nomination 'if it were tendered to him,' and 'expressed the hope that as far as possible the people might be given a chance, through direct primaries, to express their preference as to who should be the nominee of the Republican National Convention.' Three days earlier Mr. Roosevelt had delivered 'a notable address before the Ohio Constitutional Convention' at Columbus in which he declared himself a Progressive and announced his support of 'all governmental devices which will make the representatives of the people more easily and certainly responsible to the people's will.' Among these devices he included the 'recall of judicial decisions,' which he 'explained to mean that when a court decides a constitutional question . . . the people should have a right to recall the decision if they think it wrong.' He distinctly limited the use of the recall to the States. He also favored the initiative and referendum, the short ballot, popular election of Senators, direct nominations, presidential preference primaries, and popular election of delegates to national nominating conventions. He closed the address 'with an earnest plea for social justice, for the moralization not only of political conditions, but of industrial conditions.' This speech was regarded as his political platform, and with the announcement of his candidacy in reply to the letter of the Governors 'an active and by no means friendly campaign' for the Republican nomination was begun. President Taft and Mr. Roosevelt waged a vigorous campaign against each other by means of public addresses during the interval before the assembling of the nominating convention in June. The ex-President accused Taft of being 'a reactionary and of being in league with bosses and the beneficiary of their crooked politics.' The President replied by referring to direct primaries as 'soap-box' primaries and their advocates as 'political emotionalists or neurotics.'—F. E. Haynes, *Third party movements since the Civil War*, pp. 426-427.

Also in: C. G. Washburn, *Theodore Roosevelt*, pp. 171-195.—B. P. De Witt, *Progressive movement*.—S. J. Duncan-Clark, *Progressive movement*.

1911-1913.—Relations with Colombia.—Final treaty. See LATIN AMERICA: 1911-1914.

1911-1915.—Struggle against monopoly.—"The story of the struggle against monopoly is for the most part told in the record of legislative enactments, state and federal, and of judicial decisions. . . . As the occasions for conflict with open monopoly have passed, the spirit of conflict has gone over into the search for monopolistic tendencies, in the attempt, to quote the language of the President, 'to kill monopoly in the seed.' Within the sphere of federal legislation there has been direct sequence of action, from the Sherman Anti-Trust law of 1890, through the Interstate Commerce act made effective by the amendment of 1906, through the various enactments for the conservation of the national resources, to the more recent acts creating a Federal Reserve Board to restore 'democracy of credit,' and a Federal Trade Commission to attempt the restoration of free com-

pensation in business. . . . Under the plea of 'tariff reform' the Democratic party came into power, and within two years the cry of 'tariff and prosperity' very nearly brought back the Republican party into power. The essential tariff reform is to take the tariff out of politics. . . . The campaign against monopoly produced certain indirect results, affecting the working of the political system and the method of administering the government. . . . It gave the people of this country what English writers call 'the sense of the state,'—not necessarily more devotion to it, but the sense of its power as a political instrumentality. . . . Powerful interests, often representing non-resident capital, as in California and in some parts of the West, had gained control of state legislatures. Suspicion was rife regarding the financial legislation of Congress. It was charged in particular that the Senate had become the seat of privilege. The evident remedy for this state of affairs was to prevent the possible alliance of corrupt politics with corrupt business. Two measures were devised for the accomplishment of this purpose: the primary [see PRIMARIES IN THE UNITED STATES], to do away with the party manager or 'boss,' through whom political deals were made; and the recall, to keep the official representative of the people within their reach while in office. Election to the United States Senate was taken from the state legislatures and put directly into the hands of the people. The movement for more direct government as a safeguard against monopoly was widespread and gave rise to a vast amount of political experimentation."—W. J. Tucker, *Progress of the social conscience (Atlantic Monthly, September, 1915, pp. 292, 294)*.—See also TRUSTS: United States: 1912; 1912-1914.

1912.—Agreement with England, Russia and Japan regarding seal fishing. See FISHERIES: 1911-1912; PRIBILOV ISLANDS.

1912.—Completion of oversea railroad to Key West. See RAILROADS: 1912-1915.

1912.—Creation of Industrial Relations Commission. See INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION.

1912.—Creation of office of public defender. See PUBLIC DEFENDER: Adoption in United States.

1912.—Ratification of Declaration of London. See LONDON, DECLARATION OF.

1912.—Election.—National convention of Republican party.—Split in the party.—"During the whole decade preceding the . . . presidential campaign [of 1912], the progressive and reactionary forces within both the Republican and Democratic parties . . . [struggled] for the ascendancy in their respective party organizations. Neither the progressive nor the reactionary faction of either the Republican or the Democratic party seemed strong enough to gain complete possession or control of either one of the old party organizations. The bitter struggle between the progressive and reactionary elements of the Republican party reached its climax at the National Convention of that party, held at Chicago on June 18, 1912."—G. H. Payne, *Birth of the new party*, p. 13.—"In the great Republican states Roosevelt secured a large majority of the delegates; the Taft forces controlled all the territorial and insular delegates and most of those from the southern states, none of which had cast a Republican ballot in the electoral college since 1876. From many places the Roosevelt forces sent contesting delegations, some confessedly for the sake of the effect on public opinion, others with more merit behind them. To the contention of the Roosevelt adherents that so

clear a manifestation of the will of the rank and file ought to be decisive the Taft supporters retorted that they were under no obligation to change the rules of the game while the game was in progress. Backed up by the influence of many citizens of a conservative cast of mind who stood aghast at the idea of breaking the 'third term' precedent or feared such innovations as the initiative, referendum and recall, and the recall of judicial decisions, the conservative leaders, controlling the convention machinery, determined to make full use of their power. They realized that Roosevelt might bolt and form a new party, but it is incredible that they foresaw that such a movement might attain large proportions. Regularity on the part of the rank and file had so long been the rule that it was accepted as an immutable principle. The fact that the feeling of party loyalty had become greatly weakened, that a spirit of revolt was abroad, had largely escaped them. So the national committee seated enough doubtful Taft delegates to give him a bare control of the convention and to secure for him the nomination. The Roosevelt delegates for the most part refused to vote for any candidate, and through their spokesman, Henry J. Allen of Kansas, announced that 'we shall sit in protest, and the people who sent us here shall judge us.' The same night, in another hall, these delegates informally nominated Roosevelt."—P. L. Haworth, *America in ferment*, pp. 383-384.—"It was not a struggle for the nomination of individual candidates for the presidency, but a life-and-death struggle between divergent and diametrically opposed ideals struggling for the control of the name and trademark of the old Republican party. The final result of the Republican National Convention at Chicago was that the reactionary forces held the name 'Republican' as their party emblem and wrote a reactionary platform rightfully expressing their views of American politics. Heretofore the contending factions had been held together by compromise platforms and compromise candidates, but, in the struggle at Chicago, there was no thought of compromise. Quarter was neither asked nor given. With the triumph of the reactionary element within the Republican party, all men realized that the hour had struck. There was no longer any valid reason or excuse why those of us who had heretofore called ourselves 'Republican' should remain with or longer hold party allegiance to a political party which was openly, avowedly, and deliberately reactionary both as to its candidates and its platform."—G. H. Payne, *Birth of the new party*, pp. 13-14.—The important sections of the platform are as follows: "We believe in our self-controlled representative democracy, which is a government of laws, not of men, and in which order is the prerequisite of progress. The principles of constitutional government, which made provision for orderly and effective expression of the popular will, for the protection of civil liberty and the rights of men, and for the interpretation of the law by an untrammelled and independent judiciary, have proved themselves capable of sustaining the structure of a Government which, after more than a century of development, embraces 100,000,000 of people, scattered over a wide and diverse territory, but bound by common purpose, common ideals, and common affection to the Constitution of the United States. Under the Constitution and the principles asserted and vitalized by it, the United States has grown to be one of the great civilized and civilizing powers of the earth. It offers a home and an opportunity to the

ambitious and the industrious from other lands. Resting upon the broad basis of a people's confidence and a people's support, and managed by the people themselves, the Government of the United States will meet the problems of the future as satisfactorily as it has solved those of the past. The Republican party is now, as always, a party of advanced and constructive statesmanship. It is prepared to go forward with the solution of those new questions which social, economic, and political development have brought into the forefront of the Nation's interest. It will strive, not only in the Nation but in the several States, to enact the necessary legislation to safeguard the public health; to limit effectively the labor of women and children; to protect wage-earners engaged in dangerous occupations; to enact comprehensive and generous workman's compensation laws in place of the present wasteful and unjust system of employers' liability, and in all possible ways to satisfy the just demand of the people for the study and solution of the complex and constantly changing problems of social welfare. . . . The Republican party reaffirms its intention to uphold at all times the authority and integrity of the courts, both State and Federal, and it will ever insist that their powers to enforce their process and to protect life, liberty and property shall be preserved inviolate. An orderly method is provided under our system of government by which the people may, when they choose, alter or amend the constitutional provisions which underlie that government. Until these constitutional provisions are so altered or amended, in orderly fashion, it is the duty of the courts to see to it that when challenged they are enforced. That the courts, both Federal and State, may bear the heavy burden laid upon them to the complete satisfaction of public opinion, we favor legislation to prevent long delays and the tedious and costly appeals which have so often amounted to a denial of justice in civil cases and to a failure to protect the public at large in criminal cases. Since the responsibility of the judiciary is so great the standards of judicial action must be always and everywhere above suspicion and reproach. While we regard the recall of judges as unnecessary and unwise, we favor such action as may be necessary to simplify the process by which any judge who is found to be derelict in his duty may be removed from office. Together, with peaceful and orderly development at home, the Republican party earnestly favors all measures for the establishment and protection of the peace of the world and for the development of closer relations between the various nations of the earth. It believes most earnestly in the peaceful settlement of international disputes and in the reference of all justiciable controversies between nations to an international court of justice. . . . We reaffirm our belief in a protective tariff. . . . We hold that the import duties should be high enough, while yielding a sufficient revenue, to protect adequately American industries and wages. Some of the existing import duties are too high and should be reduced. Readjustment should be made from time to time to conform to changing conditions and to reduce excessive rates, but without injury to any American industry. To accomplish this correct information is indispensable. The information can best be obtained by an export commission, as the large volume of useful facts contained in the recent reports of the Tariff Board has demonstrated. The pronounced feature of modern industrial life is its enormous diversification. To apply tariff rates justly to these changing

conditions requires closer study and more scientific methods than ever before. The Republican party has shown by its creation of a Tariff Board its recognition of this situation and its determination to be equal to it. We condemn the Democratic party for its failure either to provide funds for the continuance of this board or to make some other provision for securing the information requisite for intelligent tariff legislation. . . . We rejoice in the success of the distinctive Republican policy of the conservation of our natural resources, for their use by the people without waste and without monopoly. We pledge ourselves to a continuance of such a policy. We favor such fair and reasonable rules and regulations as will not discourage or interfere with actual bona fide homeseekers, prospectors, and miners in the acquisition of public lands under existing laws. In the interest of the general public, and particularly of the agricultural or rural communities, we favor legislation looking to the establishment, under proper regulations, of a parcels post, the postal rates to be graduated under a zone system in proportion to the length of carriage. . . . We believe in the maintenance of an adequate navy . . . and we condemn the action of the Democratic House of Representatives in refusing to authorize the construction of additional ships. We believe that one of the country's most urgent needs is a revived merchant marine. There should be American ships, and plenty of them, to make use of the great American interoceanic canal now nearing completion. . . . We pledge the Republican party to the enactment of appropriate laws to give relief from the constantly growing evil of induced or undesirable immigration, which is inimical to the progress and welfare of the people of the United States. . . . We invite the intelligent judgment of the American people upon the Administration of William H. Taft. The country has prospered and been at peace under his Presidency. During the years in which he had the co-operation of a Republican Congress an unexampled amount of constructive legislation was framed and passed in the interest of the people and in obedience to their wish. That legislation is a record on which any Administration might appeal with confidence to the favorable judgment of history. We appeal to the American electorate upon the record of the Republican party and upon this declaration of its principles and purposes. We are confident that under the leadership of the candidates here to be nominated our appeal will not be in vain; that the Republican party will meet every just expectation of the people whose servant it is; that under its administration and its laws our nation will continue to advance; that peace and prosperity will abide with the people, and that new glory will be added to the great Republic."—*Republican campaign text-book, 1912, pp. 271-277.*

ALSO IN: *Fifteenth Republican national convention (Official Report of Proceedings)*.—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917, ch. 11.*

1912.—**Formation of Progressive party.**—The party insurgency which had shown itself so plainly in 1911 (see above: 1911-1912 [January-June]), was brought to a head in the summer of 1912 by the formation of the Progressive party. "On July 6th, a call signed by sixty-two men, some of them formerly holding allegiance to the Republican and some to the Democratic parties, representing forty States of the Union, was sent forth 'to the people of the United States, without regard to past political divisions' and 'who believe that the time has come for a national progressive move-

ment—a nation-wide movement—on non-sectional lines, so that the people may be served in sincerity and truth by an organization unfettered by obligations to conflicting interests, who believe in the right and capacity of the people to rule themselves and effectively control all the agencies of their government, and who hold that only through social and industrial justice thus secured can honest property find permanent protection; who believe that only through the movement proposed can we obtain in the Nation and in the several States the legislation demanded by modern industrial evolution; who believe that wholesome party management in a spirit of service to the whole country and who hold that the commandment delivered at Sinai, "Thou shalt not steal" applies to politics as well as business—to send from each State a number of delegates, whose votes in the convention shall count for as many votes as the States have Senators and Representatives in Congress, to meet in mass convention in Chicago on August 5, 1912, for the purpose of nominating candidates for President and Vice-President of the United States.' In response to that national-wide call, approximately 1,800 delegates and alternates, men and women, met in Chicago on August 5th. After three days of serious and earnest deliberation, in the presence of an audience approximating 15,000 people and amid scenes never to be forgotten by its eye-witnesses, a new declaration of human rights, as applied to modern social and industrial conditions, was brought forth. Based upon that declaration of principles denominated by the Convention as a 'covenant' with the people, the new Progressive party offered as its candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt and Hiram W. Johnson. No such ticket of strong, virile men of accomplishment standing upon such a human-interest platform had been placed before the people of the Nation in more than half a century."—G. H. Payne, *Birth of the new party, pp. 14-15.*—"Albert J. Beveridge . . . sounded the keynote of the Progressive movement at the Chicago convention in August 1912 [when he said]: 'We stand for a nobler America. We stand for an individual Nation. We stand for a broader liberty, a fuller justice. We stand for social brotherhood as against savage individualism. We stand for intelligent cooperation instead of a reckless competition. We stand for mutual helpfulness instead of mutual hatred. We stand for equal rights as a fact of life instead of a catchword of politics. We stand for the rule of the people as a practical truth instead of a meaningless pretense. We stand for a representative government that represents the people. We battle for the actual rights of man.'"—S. J. Duncan-Clark, *Progressive movement, p. 37.*—The convention officially selected for the party the name "Progressive" and adopted a platform of which the most important sections follow:

"Political parties exist to secure responsible government and to execute the will of the people. From these great tasks both of the old parties have turned aside. Instead of instruments to promote the general welfare, they have become the tools of corrupt interests, which use them impartially to serve their selfish purposes. Behind the ostensible government sits enthroned an invisible government, owing no allegiance and acknowledging no responsibility to the people. To destroy this invisible government, to dissolve the unholy allegiance between corrupt business and

corrupt politics is the first task of the statesmanship of the day. . . . Unhindered by tradition, uncorrupted by power, undismayed by the magnitude of the task, the new party offers itself as the instrument of the people to sweep away old abuses, to build a new and nobler commonwealth. This declaration is our covenant with the people, and we hereby bind the party and its candidates in State and Nation to the pledges made herein. The Progressive Party, committed to the principle of government by a self-controlled democracy expressing its will through the representatives of the people, pledges itself to secure such alterations in the fundamental law of the several states and of the United States as shall insure the representative character of the government. In particular, the Party declares for direct primaries for the nomination of state and national officers, for nationwide preferential primaries for candidates for the presidency, for the direct election of United States senators by the people, and we urge on the states the policy of the short ballot, with responsibility to the people secured by the initiative, referendum and recall. . . . [It] pledges itself to provide a more easy and expeditious method of amending the Federal constitution. Up to the limit of the constitution, and later by amendment of the constitution, if found necessary, we advocate bringing under effective national jurisdiction those problems which have expanded beyond reach of the individual states. . . . The extreme insistence on States' rights by the Democratic Party in the Baltimore Platform demonstrate anew its inability to understand the world into which it has survived or to administer the affairs of a union of states which have in all essential respects become one people. The Progressive Party, believing that no people can justly claim to be a true democracy which denies political rights on account of sex, pledges itself to the task of securing equal suffrage to men and women alike. We pledge our Party to legislation that will compel strict limitation of all campaign contributions and expenditures, and detailed publicity of both before as well as after primaries and elections. We pledge our Party to legislation compelling the registration of lobbyists; publicity of committee hearings except on foreign affairs, and recording of all votes in committee; and forbidding federal appointees from holding office in State or National political organizations, or taking part as officers or delegates in political conventions for the nomination of elective State or National officials. The Progressive Party demands such restriction of the power of the courts as shall leave to the people the ultimate authority to determine fundamental questions of social welfare and public policy. To secure this end, it pledges itself to provide: 1. That when an act, passed under the police power of the State, is held unconstitutional under the State constitution, by the Courts, the people, after an ample interval of deliberation, shall have an opportunity to vote on the question whether they desire the act to become law, notwithstanding such decision. 2. That every decision of the highest appellate court of a state declaring an act of the Legislature unconstitutional on the ground of its violation of the federal constitution shall be subject to the same review by the Supreme Court of the United States, as is now accorded to decisions sustaining such legislation. The Progressive party, in order to secure to the people a better administration of justice and by that means to bring a more general respect for the law and the courts, pledges itself

to work unceasingly for the reform of legal procedure and judicial methods. We believe that the issuance of injunctions in cases arising out of labor disputes should be prohibited, when such injunctions would not apply when no labor disputes existed. We also believe that a person cited for contempt in labor disputes, except when such contempt was committed in the actual presence of the court or so near thereto as to interfere with the proper administration of justice, should have a right to trial by jury. The supreme duty of the nation is the conservation of human resources through an enlarged measure of social and industrial justice. We pledge ourselves to work unceasingly in state and nation for—Effective legislation looking to the prevention of industrial accidents, occupational diseases, overwork, involuntary unemployment, and other injurious effects incident to modern industry; The fixing of minimum safety and health standards for the various occupations, and the exercise of the public authority of state and nation, including the federal control over interstate commerce, and the taxing power, to maintain such standards; The prohibition of child labor; Minimum wage standard for working women, to provide a living wage in all industrial occupations; The prohibition of night work for women and the establishment of an eight-hour day for women and young persons; One day's rest in seven for all wage workers; The eight-hour day in continuous twenty-four-hour industries; The abolition of the convict contract labor system, substituting a system of prison production for governmental consumption only, and the application of prisoners' earnings to the support of their dependent families; Publicity as to wages, hours and conditions of labor, full reports upon industrial accidents and diseases, and the opening to public inspection of all tallies, weights, measures and check systems on labor products. We pledge our party to establish a department of labor with a seat in the cabinet, and wide jurisdiction over matters affecting the conditions of labor and living. . . . We pledge our party to foster the development of agricultural credit and co-operation, the teaching of agriculture in schools, agricultural college extension, the use of mechanical power on the farm and to re-establish the Country Life Commission. . . . To remedy . . . [rural] conditions requires the fullest information and, based on this information, effective government supervision and control to remove all the artificial causes. We pledge ourselves to such full and immediate inquiry and to immediate action to deal with every need such inquiry discloses. We favor the union of all the existing agencies of the federal government dealing with the public health into a single national health service without discrimination against or for any one set of therapeutic methods, school of medicine or school of healing, with such additional powers as may be necessary to enable it to perform efficiently such duties in the protection of the public from preventable diseases as may be properly undertaken by the federal authorities; including the executing of existing laws regarding pure food; quarantine and cognate subjects; the promotion of appropriate action for the improvement of vital statistics and the extension of the registration area of such statistics, and co-operation with the health activities of the various states and cities of the nation. We . . . demand a strong national regulation of interstate corporations. The corporation is an essential part of modern business. The concentration of modern

business, in some degree, is both inevitable and necessary for national and international business efficiency. But the existing concentration of vast wealth under a corporate system, unguarded and uncontrolled by the nation, has placed in the hands of a few men enormous secret, irresponsible power over the daily life of the citizen—a power insufferable in a free government and certain of abuse. . . . To that end we urge the establishment of a strong federal administrative commission of high standing, which shall maintain permanent active supervision over industrial corporations engaged in interstate commerce, or such of them as are of public importance, doing for them what the government now does for the national banks, and what is now done for the railroads by the interstate Commerce Commission. Such a commission must enforce the complete publicity of those corporation transactions which are of public interest; must attack unfair competition, false capitalization and special privilege, and by continuous trained watchfulness guard and keep open equally to all the highways of American commerce. Thus the business man will have certain knowledge of the law, and will be able to conduct his business easily in conformity therewith; the investor will find security for his capital; dividends will be rendered more certain, and the savings of the people will be drawn naturally and safely into the channels of trade. . . . We pledge ourselves to the enactment of a patent law which will make it impossible for patents to be suppressed or used against the public welfare in the interests of injurious monopolies. We pledge our party to secure to the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to value the physical property of railroads. In order that the power of the commission to protect the people may not be impaired or destroyed, we demand the abolition of the Commerce Court. We believe there exists imperative need for prompt legislation for the improvement of our national currency system. We believe the present method of issuing notes through private agencies is harmful and unscientific. The issue of currency is fundamentally a government function and the system should have as basic principles soundness and elasticity. The control should be lodged with the government and should be protected from domination or manipulation by Wall street or any special interests. We are opposed to the so-called Aldrich currency bill, because its provisions would place our currency and credit system in private hands, not subject to effective public control. The time has come when the federal government should cooperate with manufacturers and producers in extending our foreign commerce. To this end we demand adequate appropriations by Congress, and the appointment of diplomatic and consular officers solely with a view to their special fitness and worth, and not in consideration of political expediency. It is imperative to the welfare of our people that we enlarge and extend our foreign commerce. . . . In every way possible our federal government should co-operate in this important matter. Any one who has opportunity to study and observe first-hand Germany's course in this respect must realize that their policy of co-operation between government and business has in comparatively few years made them a leading competitor for the commerce of the world.

"We heartily favor the policy of conservation, and we pledge our party to protect the national forests without hindering their legitimate use for the benefit of all the people. Agricultural lands in the national forests are, and should remain,

open to the genuine settler. Conservation will not retard legitimate development. The honest settler must receive his patent promptly, without hindrance rules or delays. We believe that the remaining forests, coal and oil lands, water powers, and others natural resources still in state or national control (except agricultural lands) are more likely to be wisely conserved and utilized for the general welfare if held in the public hands. . . . We demand that such resources shall be retained by the state or nation, and opened to immediate use under laws which will encourage development and make to the people a moderate return for benefits conferred. In particular we pledge our party to require reasonable compensation to the public for water power rights hereafter granted by the public. We pledge legislation to lease the public grazing lands under equitable provisions now pending which will increase the production of food for the people and thoroughly safeguard the rights of the actual homemaker. Natural resources whose conservation is necessary for the national welfare should be owned or controlled by the nation. We recognize the vital importance of good roads and we pledge our party to foster their extension in every proper way, and we favor the early construction of national highways. We also favor the extension of the rural free delivery service. The coal and other natural resources of Alaska should be opened to development at once. . . . We demand that they shall neither be sold nor given away except under the homestead law, but while held in government ownership shall be opened to use promptly upon liberal terms requiring immediate development. . . . We demand also that extortion or monopoly in transportation shall be prevented by the prompt acquisition, construction, or improvement by the government of such railroads, harbor and other facilities for transportation as the welfare of the people may demand. We promise the people of the territory of Alaska the same measure of legal self-government that was given to other American territories, and that the federal officials appointed there shall be qualified by previous bona-fide residence in the territory. The rivers of the United States are the natural arteries of this continent. We demand that they shall be opened to traffic as indispensable parts of a great nation-wide system of transportation in which the Panama canal will be the central link, thus enabling the whole interior of the United States to share with the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard in the benefit derived from the canal. It is a national obligation to develop our rivers, and especially the Mississippi and its tributaries, without delay, under a comprehensive general plan. . . . We pledge our party to the immediate preparation of such a plan, which should be made and carried out in close and friendly co-operation between the nation, the states and the cities affected. . . . The Panama canal, built and paid for by the American people, must be used primarily for their benefit. We demand that the canal shall be so operated as to break the transportation monopoly now held and misused by the trans-continental railroads by maintaining sea competition with them; that ships directly, or indirectly owned or controlled by American railroad corporations shall not be permitted to use the canal, and that American ships engaged in coast-wise trade shall pay no tolls. The Progressive party will favor legislation having for its aim the development of friendship and commerce between the United States and Latin-American nations. We

believe in a protective tariff which shall equalize conditions of competition between the United States and foreign countries, both for the farmer and the manufacturer, and which shall maintain for labor an adequate standard of living. . . . We demand tariff revision because the present tariff is unjust to the people of the United States. Fair dealing toward the people requires an immediate downward revision of those schedules wherein duties are shown to be unjust or excessive. We pledge ourselves to the establishment of a non-partisan scientific tariff commission, reporting both to the President and to either branch of Congress, which shall report, first, as to the costs of production, efficiency of labor, capitalization, industrial organization and efficiency and the general competitive position in this country and abroad of industries seeking protection from Congress; second, as to the revenue producing power of the tariff and its relation to the resources of government; and, third, as to the effect of the tariff on prices, operations of middlemen, and on the purchasing power of the consumer. . . . We believe in a graduated inheritance tax as a national means of equalizing the obligations of holders of property to government, and we hereby pledge our party to enact such a federal law as will tax large inheritances, returning to the states an equitable percentage of all amounts collected. We favor the ratification of the pending amendment to the constitution, giving the government power to levy an income tax. . . . We favor an international agreement for the limitation of naval forces. Pending such an agreement, and as the best means of preserving peace, we pledge ourselves to maintain for the present the policy of building two battleships a year. We pledge our party to protect the rights of American citizenship at home and abroad. No treaty should receive the sanction of our government which discriminates between American citizens because of birthplace, race, or religion, or that does not recognize the absolute right of expatriation. Through the establishment of industrial standards we propose to secure to the able-bodied immigrant and to his native fellow workers a larger share of American opportunity. . . . We favor governmental action to encourage the distribution of immigrants away from the congested cities, to rigidly supervise all private agencies dealing with them and to promote their assimilation, education and advancement. We pledge ourselves to a wise and just policy of pensioning American soldiers and sailors and their widows and children by the federal government. . . . We pledge our party to the immediate creation of a parcels post, with rates proportionate to distance and service. We condemn the violations of the civil service law under the present administration, including the coercion and assessment of subordinate employes, and the President's refusal to punish such violation after a finding of guilty by his own commission; his distribution of patronage among subservient congressmen, while withholding it from those who refuse support of administration measures; his withdrawal of nominations from the Senate until political support for himself was secured, and his open use of the offices to reward those who voted for his renomination. To eradicate these abuses, we demand not only the enforcement of the civil service act in letter and spirit, but also legislation which will bring under the competitive system postmasters, collectors, marshals, and all other nonpolitical officers, as well as the enactment of an equitable retirement law, and we also insist

upon continuous service during good behavior and efficiency. We pledge our party to readjustment of the business methods of the national government and a proper co-ordination of the federal bureaus, which will increase the economy and efficiency of the government service, prevent duplications, and secure better results to the taxpayers for every dollar expended. . . . On these principles and on the recognized desirability of uniting the Progressive forces of the nation into an organization which shall unequivocally represent the Progressive spirit and policy we appeal for the support of all American citizens, without regard to previous political affiliations."—E. Stanwood, *History of the presidency, 1897-1909*, v. 1, pp. 281-291.

ALSO IN: G. H. Payne, *Birth of the new party*, ch. 21.

1912.—Woodrow Wilson and the election.—Democratic convention.—“Meanwhile a spirited contest was being waged for the Democratic nomination, but it lacked the dramatic qualities of the Republican conflict and absorbed a lesser share of the public attention. Yet there were certain points of similarity. The forces of conservatism had determined to control the Democratic convention at Baltimore just as they controlled the Republican convention at Chicago so that, whichever party might win at the polls, the administration would certainly be conservative. The pre-convention fight was, therefore, in a sense a struggle between the conservative and progressive wings of the party, though, for a number of reasons, the lines were not so clearly drawn. The leading progressive candidate for the Democratic nomination was Governor Woodrow Wilson. As a pedagogue and publicist Wilson expressed marked conservative opinions, but his experiences while governor with machine politics in New Jersey had caused him to modify his academic views and to withdraw his criticism of such devices as the initiative, referendum and recall. He was decidedly the candidate of the more intelligent and public-spirited section of the Democratic party, and he had a following in every state.”—P. L. Haworth, *America in ferment*, p. 386.—“The whole course of affairs leading up to the several conventions indicated that 1912 was to be a Democratic year. Nevertheless, from the moment when, at the Washington meeting of the National Committee, January 8-10, Bryan sought fruitlessly to exclude from membership a Pennsylvania reactionary, it was evident that the Democrats would have to face the same issue of progressivism that had disrupted their opponents. One of the first Democratic candidates in the field was Governor Judson Harmon of Ohio, a conservative. Missouri had two candidates, ex-Governor Joseph W. Folk and Speaker Champ Clark, both regarded as progressives; but at an early date Folk withdrew. A candidate of whose progressiveness there could be no doubt was Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey. Other persons mentioned were Governor Marshall of Indiana, Governor Burke of North Dakota, Governor Foss of Massachusetts, Governor Baldwin of Connecticut, Congressman Underwood of Alabama, and Mayor Gaynor of New York City. Bryan was not a candidate, but his power in the party promised to be a leading factor in the contest. In the pre-convention campaign the advantage lay distinctly with Clark. His victories in the primaries of Illinois, Nebraska, Iowa, and California were matched by Wilson triumphs in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Oregon, and New Jersey. But when all primaries and conventions had been held the Speaker was found to have

the pledges of more delegates than any other candidate, although far from the two-thirds required by Democratic rules for nomination. The Democratic convention, which assembled at Baltimore June 25, proved not only the longest, but also, like the Republican gathering of the preceding week, one of the most dramatic, since the Civil War. Violent controversy arose at the outset over the temporary chairmanship. The National Committee put forward Alton B. Parker, Democratic candidate for president in 1904. Bryan opposed him as a reactionary, and after a hard fight barely failed to prevent his election. To ease the situation the Nebraskan was offered the permanent chairmanship. This, however, he refused, contenting himself with a fresh demand that the convention purge itself of reactionary influences. Eventually the position went to an ardent Bryan follower, Senator Ollie James of Kentucky. On the second day the progressive element scored an important victory by securing the adoption of instructions to the chairman to make exceptions, in the enforcement of the unit rule, in favor of states which had provided by statute for 'the nomination and election of delegates and alternates to national political conventions in congressional districts.' The tensest moments of the session came on the evening of the 27th, when Bryan strove to carry a resolution which (1) reaffirmed the party's position as 'the champion of popular government and equality before the law'; (2) declared against the nomination of any candidate representing, or under obligation to, any member of the 'privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class'; (3) demanded the withdrawal from the convention of certain capitalists alleged to belong to this class. After angry debate, the third section of the resolution was given up; the other two were adopted. In these proceedings Bryan rose to greater heights of leadership than he had attained in any of his own three candidacies for the presidency. At his further suggestion the usual convention procedure was reversed, and the nominations were made before the platform was adopted. The convention contained 1,092 delegates, and 728 votes were necessary to nominate. The balloting continued from June 28 to July 2. On the first ballot Clark received 440½ votes, Wilson 324, Harmon 148, Underwood 117½, with 56 scattering. On the tenth, New York transferred its vote from Harmon to Clark. After the fourteenth, Bryan, who as a member of the Nebraska delegation had been voting for Clark, created a fresh sensation by announcing in an impassioned speech that he would thereafter withhold his vote from the Missouri candidate as long as New York's vote, alleged to be contaminated by plutocratic influences, should be cast for him. Despite the best efforts of the Speaker and his friends to overcome the effect of this move, the balance began to turn; and on the twenty-eighth ballot Wilson's vote for the first time pushed ahead of Clark's. The end came with the forty-sixth ballot, on which Wilson received 990 votes, Clark 84, and Harmon 12. After two ballots on the vice-presidential candidates failed to yield a choice, Governor Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana was nominated by acclamation. The figures recording the results of the balloting are dry enough; the ballots themselves were taken amidst convention pandemonium perhaps unequalled in American political history. 'It was halloing,' says a journalist describing the scene, 'yelling, screaming, roaring, raised to the nth power; they "hollered," simply hollered, for an hour at a time.

When a telling speech was successfully shouted or a significant vote was cast, they carried banners up and down and around the aisles; they reared mammoth pictures of candidates against the galleries; they sent up toy balloons, and tossed pigeons into the air; they carried a girl about the hall; men and women shied hats through the air; horns, whistles, and infernal contrivances without name contributed to the diabolical din. . . . "Demonstration" followed "demonstration" and passed into "counter-demonstration" without altering a vote. Uproar that shattered the voice of a new chairman every five minutes, and wore out fresh platoons of police every hour; the efforts of bands drowned under the vocal din, and the chromatic clamor of banners assailed the delegates and left them stubborn at their posts. At Chicago they stood pat to the end. At Baltimore they changed, but they refused to stampede. They changed slowly, and only under the slowly increasing realization that Woodrow Wilson was the right man.' It was never charged that the Baltimore convention was a cut-and-dried affair, or that it was boss-ruled. Once more the platform was mainly the work of Bryan.—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, pp. 197-201.—The platform was in part as follows: "The high Republican tariff is the principal cause of the unequal distribution of wealth; it is a system of taxation which makes the rich richer and the poor poorer; under its operations the American farmer and laboring man are the chief sufferers; it raises the cost of the necessities of life to them but does not protect their product or wages. . . . We favor the immediate downward revision of the existing high and in many cases prohibitive tariff duties, insisting that material reductions be speedily made upon the necessities of life. Articles entering into competition with trust-controlled products and articles of American manufacture which are sold abroad more cheaply than at home should be put upon the free list. . . . We believe in the preservation and maintenance in their full strength and integrity of the three co-ordinate branches of the Federal Government—the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial—each keeping within its own bounds, and not encroaching upon the just powers of either of the others. Believing that the most efficient results under our system of government are to be attained by the full exercise by the States of their reserved sovereign powers, we denounce as usurpation the efforts of our opponents to deprive the States of any of the rights reserved to them, and to enlarge and magnify by indirection the powers of the Federal Government. We insist upon the full exercise of all the powers of the Government, both State and National, to protect the people from injustice at the hands of those who seek to make the Government a private asset in business. . . . We congratulate the country upon the triumph of two important reforms demanded in the last national platform, namely, the amendment of the Federal Constitution authorizing an income tax and the amendment providing for the popular election of Senators, and we call upon the people of all the States to rally to the support of the pending propositions and secure their ratification. . . . We favor a single Presidential term, and to that end urge the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution making the President of the United States ineligible for reelection, and we pledge the candidate of this convention to this principle. . . . We favor the efficient supervision and rate regulation of railroads, express companies, telegraph

and telephone lines engaged in interstate commerce. . . . We favor such legislation as will effectually prohibit the railroads, express, telegraph and telephone companies from engaging in business which brings them into competition with their shippers or patrons; also legislation preventing the overissue of stocks and bonds by interstate railroads, express companies, telegraph and telephone lines, and legislation which will assure such reduction in transportation rates as conditions will permit. . . . We condemn the present methods of depositing Government funds in a few favored banks, largely situated in or controlled by Wall Street, in return for political favors, and we pledge our party to provide by law for their deposit by competitive bidding in the banking institutions of the country, National and State, without discrimination as to locality, upon approved securities and subject to the call of the Government. . . . We recommend that an investigation of agricultural credit societies in foreign countries be made, so that it may be ascertained whether a system of rural credits may be devised suitable to conditions in the United States; and we also favor legislation permitting national banks to loan a reasonable proportion of their funds on real estate security. We recognize the value of vocational education and urge Federal appropriations for such training and extension teaching in agriculture in cooperation with the several States. We renew the declaration in our last platform relating to the conservation of our natural resources and the development of our waterways. . . . We hold that the control of the Mississippi River is a national problem. The preservation of the depth of its water for the purpose of navigation, the building of levees to maintain the integrity of its channel and the prevention of the overflow of the land and its consequent devastation . . . imposes an obligation which alone can be discharged by the general government. . . . We favor national aid to State and local authorities in the construction and maintenance of post roads. We repeat our declarations of the platform of 1908 as follows: The courts of justice are the bulwarks of our liberties and we yield to none in our purpose to maintain their dignity. Our party has given to the bench a long line of distinguished justices who have added to the respect and confidence in which this department must be jealously maintained. We resent the attempt of the Republican party to raise a false issue respecting the judiciary. It is an unjust reflection upon a great body of our citizens to assume that they lack respect for the courts. . . . We believe in fostering, by constitutional regulation of commerce, the growth of a merchant marine. . . . We favor a reorganization of the civil service, with adequate compensation, commensurate with the class of work performed, for all officers and employees; we also favor the extension to all classes of civil service employees of the benefits of the provisions of the Employers' Liability law; we also recognize the right of direct petition to Congress by employees for the redress of grievances. We recognize the urgent need of reform in the administration of civil and criminal law in the United States, and we recommend the enactment of such legislation and the promotion of such measures as will rid the present legal system of the delays, expense and uncertainties incident to the system as now administered. We reaffirm the position thrice announced by the Democracy in National Convention assembled against a policy of imperialism and colonial exploitation in the Philippines, or else-

where. We condemn the experiment in imperialism as an inexcusable blunder which has involved us in enormous expense, brought us weakness instead of strength and laid our nation open to the charge of abandonment of the fundamental doctrine of self-government. We favor an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can be established. . . . Our platform is one of principles which we believe to be essential to our national welfare. Our pledges are made to be kept when in office as well as relied upon during the campaign, and we invite the cooperation of all citizens, regardless of party, who believe in maintaining unimpaired the institutions and traditions of our country."—*Democratic national convention of 1912 (Official Report of Proceedings, pp. 365-376)*.—See also CAUCUS: United States: 1910-1915.—"The main outcome of the campaign became almost a foregone conclusion the moment the Democratic convention nominated a candidate reasonably satisfactory to the popular wing of the party. . . . With the choice of Wilson disappeared the Progressive hope of large scale successions from the Democratic ranks. A few rather prominent Democrats did indeed join the Bull Moose herd, and an analysis of the election figures seems to show that some hundreds of thousands of the Democratic rank and file did the same, but there were no wholesale desertions from Wilson's banner. . . . Colonel Roosevelt swept through many states speaking to great crowds until seriously wounded by a half-crazed fanatic, being able to appear subsequently only at two monster meetings in New York City. But the bullet he received in the breast at Milwaukee probably made him more votes than all the speeches he was forced to cancel would have done, for it aroused sympathy in his behalf and the admiration which every real human being feels for a 'game man.' Governor Wilson made a leisurely campaign, more as a matter of form than of necessity, and spoke with much dignity and perspicacity to large audiences. The brunt of the campaign fell upon Bryan and lesser lights."—P. L. Haworth, *America in ferment, pp. 392-394*.—"Aside from the Progressives no new party appeared in the campaign of 1912; and the existing minor parties played unimportant roles. The Socialists held their convention at Indianapolis May 12-18, and adopted a platform which was the product of ingenious compromise between the moderate and revolutionary wings of the party. Their nominees were Eugene V. Debs of Indiana and Emil Seidel of Wisconsin. The Socialist Labor party held a convention in New York City in early April and nominated Arthur E. Reimer of Massachusetts and August Gilhaus of New York. The Prohibitionists assembled at Atlantic City and re-nominated their candidates of 1904 and 1908, Eugene W. Chafin, now of Arizona, and Aaron S. Watkins of Ohio. It was not to be expected that the intense public interest aroused by the spectacular Republican and Democratic conventions would be sustained throughout the campaign. Considering the novelty of the situation, however, the post-convention contest was extraordinarily tame. The defeat of Taft and the triumph of the Democrats over a divided opposition seemed inevitable, and the tenseness which accompanies a contest felt to be really close did not develop. The chief element of uncertainty was the showing of the new Progressive party, and especially of its presidential candidate. Probably at no other

national election in the country's history have so many people voted for a cause felt to be already lost, or in a spirit of revenge, or for a candidate supported under protest. . . . The management of the Democratic campaign was placed in the hands of a committee under the chairmanship of William F. McCombs, who had looked after the candidate's pre-convention interests. During September and October Wilson made extensive speaking tours through the West, emphasizing the changed economic condition of the country; declaring himself to be favorable to 'big business' which should not seek to stifle competition nor to control the government, but opposed to trusts; advocating tariff revision which should eliminate 'cunningly devised and carefully concealed special favors'; and proclaiming the gospel of a 'new freedom,' by which was meant the liberation of private enterprise from domination by trusts and other corporate powers. On more specific lines, he advocated popular election of senators; the initiative and referendum, were likely to be found useful as 'a gun behind the door'; and the recall of administrative officers. To the recall of judges he, like Taft, was strongly opposed."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, pp. 201-202, 205.

1912 (February).—Arizona admitted to Union. See ARIZONA: 1908-1911.

1912 (July).—Rumor of Japanese acquisition of naval base in vicinity of Magdalena bay.—"The year 1912 was marked with a highly interesting extension of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. Occasion was given for this by the rumors of Japanese aggressions at Magdalena Bay, in Mexico. . . . The Senate in April asked the President for information on the subject, and in reply was assured, on the highest authority, that neither the Japanese government nor any Japanese corporation had acquired, or had ever attempted or purposed to acquire, any land at Magdalena Bay for any purpose. An American syndicate, however, had been attempting to sell to Japanese citizens some tracts of land in that region, but had been estopped from continuing those efforts by an intimation from the state department that such a transaction would not be pleasing to our Government. The accuracy of this report from the state department was amply confirmed by senatorial investigation [made in July, 1912]."—W. F. Johnson, *America's foreign relations, v. 2*, pp. 351-352.—See also MONROE DOCTRINE: 1911-1914.

1912 (August).—Alaska created a territory. See ALASKA: 1884-1912.

1912 (August).—Panama Canal Act exempting American coastwise ships from payment of tolls.—In the summer of 1912, when it was seen that the Panama canal was approaching successful completion, Congress passed an act "to provide for the opening, maintenance, protection and operation of the Panama Canal, and the sanitation and government of the Canal Zone." "The most difficult questions dealt with in the Canal Act of 1912 was tolls. It was understood from the beginning that the Canal was not to be so managed as to yield the United States a large net revenue. But it was always expected that commercial shipping would pay enough for the use of the waterway to cover upkeep, and perhaps interest charges. In two reports submitted to President Taft, August 7, 1912, Emory R. Johnson, an expert on transportation, recommended a charge of \$1.20 per net ton for loaded merchant vessels (with a reduction of forty per cent. In the case of vessels in ballast), and that the same

rate be imposed on American and foreign vessels. The Canal Act [which was approved by the president on August 24] practically carried out this suggestion, and the President was given power to fix a rate not to exceed \$1.25 per ton; but free use of the Canal was granted to vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, pp. 270-271.—See also COMMERCE: Commercial age: 1789-1920.—"The portion of the Act . . . of particular interest from an international standpoint . . . is Section 5, relating to the question of tolls. . . . A considerable portion of the report of the minority, in favor of preferential treatment for American coastwise ships, is devoted to the argument that such treatment is not a violation of the [Hay-Pauncefote treaty (see PANAMA CANAL: 1889-1903)], the opinions of President Taft, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor and the State Department being quoted in support of their contention. The argument may be summed up in the following paragraph: It is manifest, from the reading of the treaty, that its purpose was to prevent discrimination against other nations. That free tolls to our coastwise vessels would not discriminate against the vessels of other countries becomes apparent when we reflect that under our navigation laws foreign vessels are prohibited from engaging in our coastwise trade. That being true, it is of no concern to foreign nations, their citizens or subjects, what treatment we accord to our coastwise trade. The opponents of uniform tolls were successful, and the bill as finally passed, contained the provision specifically providing that 'No tolls shall be levied upon vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States.'"—Editorial comment, *Panama Canal Act (American Journal of International Law, October, 1912, pp. 976, 978, 980)*.—Section 5 of the act which provided for preferential treatment of American coastwise ships read as follows: "That the President is hereby authorized to prescribe and from time to time change the tolls that shall be levied by the Government of the United States or the use of the Panama Canal: *Provided*, That no tolls, when prescribed as above, shall be changed, unless six months' notice thereof shall have been given by the President by proclamation. No tolls shall be levied upon vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States. That section forty-one hundred and thirty-two of the Revised Statutes is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 4132. Vessels built within the United States and belonging wholly to citizens thereof; and vessels which may be captured in war by citizens of the United States and lawfully condemned as prize, or which may be adjudged to be forfeited for a breach of the laws of the United States; and seagoing vessels, whether steam or sail, which have been certified by the Steamboat-Inspection Service as safe to carry dry and perishable cargo, not more than five years old at the time they apply for registry, wherever built, which are to engage only in trade with foreign countries or with the Philippine Islands and the islands of Guam and Tutuila, being wholly owned by citizens of the United States or corporations organized and chartered under the laws of the United States or of any State thereof, the president and managing directors of which shall be citizens of the United States or corporations organized and chartered under the laws of the United States or of any State thereof, the President and managing directors of which shall be citizens of the United States, and no others, may be registered as directed

in this title. Foreign-built vessels registered pursuant to this Act shall not engage in the coastwise trade; *Provided*, That a foreign-built yacht, pleasure boat, or vessel not used or intended to be used for trade admitted to American registry pursuant to this section shall not be exempt from the collection of ad valorem duty provided in section thirty-seven of the Act approved August fifth, nineteen hundred and nine, entitled 'an Act to provide revenue, equalize duties, and encourage the industries of the United States, and for other purposes.' That all materials of foreign production which may be necessary for the construction or repair of vessels built in the United States and all such materials necessary for the building or repair of their machinery and all articles necessary for their outfit and equipment may be imported into the United States free of duty under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe: *Provided further*, That such vessels so admitted under the provisions of this section may contract with the Postmaster General under the Act of March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, entitled 'An Act to provide for ocean mail service between the United States and foreign ports, and to promote commerce,' so long as such vessels shall in all respects comply with the provision and requirements of Said Act. Tolls may be based upon gross or net registered tonnage, displacement tonnage, or otherwise, and may be based on one form of tonnage for warships and another for ships of commerce. The rate of tolls may be lower upon vessels in ballast than upon vessels carrying passengers or cargo. When based upon net registered tonnage for ships of commerce the tolls shall not exceed one dollar and twenty-five cents per net registered ton, nor be less, other than for vessels of the United States and its citizens, than the estimated proportionate cost of the actual maintenance and operation of the canal subject, however, to the provisions of article nineteen of the convention between the United States and the Republic of Panama, entered into November eighteenth, nineteen hundred and three. If the tolls shall not be based upon net registered tonnage, they shall not exceed the equivalent of one dollar and twenty-five cents per net registered ton as nearly as the same may be determined, nor be less than the equivalent of seventy-five cents per net registered ton. The toll for each passenger shall not be more than one dollar and fifty cents. The President is authorized to make and from time to time amend regulations governing the operation of the Panama Canal, and the passage and control of vessels through the same or any part thereof, including the locks and approaches thereto, and all rules and regulations affecting pilots and pilotage in the canal or the approaches thereto through the adjacent waters. Such regulations shall provide for prompt adjustment by agreement and immediate payment of claims for damages which may arise from injury to vessels, cargo, or passengers from the passing of vessels through the locks under the control of those operating them under such rules and regulations. In case of disagreement suit may be brought in the district court of the Canal Zone against the Governor of the Panama Canal. The hearing and disposition of such cases shall be expedited and the judgment shall be immediately paid out of any moneys appropriated or allotted for canal operation. The President shall provide a method for the determination and adjustment of all claims arising out of personal injuries to employees thereafter occurring while

directly engaged in actual work in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, or sanitation of the canal, whether such injuries result in death or not, and prescribe a schedule of compensation therefor, and may revise and modify such method and schedule at any time; and such claims, to the extent they shall be allowed on such adjustment, if allowed at all, shall be paid out of the moneys hereafter appropriated for that purpose or out of the funds of the Panama Railroad Company, if said company was responsible for said injury, as the case may require. And after such method and schedule shall be provided by the President, the provisions of the Act entitled 'An Act granting to certain employees of the United States the right to receive from it compensation for injuries sustained in the course of their employment,' approved May thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eight, and of the Act entitled 'An Act relating to injured employees on the Isthmian Canal,' approved February twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred and nine, shall not apply to personal injuries thereafter received and claims for which are subject to determination and adjustment as provided in this section.'—*United States, Panama Canal Act, Aug. 24, 1912 (American Journal of International Law, Oct., 1812, Supplement, pp. 279-281)*.—A protest was presented by the British government against the exemptions in favor of the United States, on the ground that it was a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. It was overruled, however, and on November 23 President Taft issued a schedule of rates in accordance with the act.—See also below: 1914 (March-June); PANAMA CANAL: 1912-1914; RAILROADS: 1912-1914.


ALSO IN: M. W. Williams, *Anglo-American Isthmian diplomacy, 1815-1915*, pp. 311-312.—J. H. Latané, *Neutralization features of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1920, v. 1, pp. 280-303)*.—E. Root, *Obligations of the United States as to Panama canal tolls (World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet series, 3, no. 3)*.

1912 (October).—Fourth class postmasters placed in civil service.—By an executive order President Taft placed all fourth class postmasters in the civil service.—See also CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1910-1913.

1912 (November).—Results of the election of 1912.—"The closing incidents of the [presidential] campaign foreshadowed Democratic victory; and in the election, November 5, Taft carried but two states (Vermont and Utah), yielding eight electoral votes. Roosevelt carried five states—Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Washington—and received 11 of the 13 electoral votes of California, giving him 88 electoral votes in all. Wilson carried all of the remaining 40 states, with a total of 435 votes, which represented the largest vote, and also the largest majority, in the electoral college ever obtained by a party candidate. The popular vote presented, however, a different aspect. The figures were: Wilson, 6,286,214; Roosevelt, 4,126,020; Taft, 3,483,922; Debs, 897,011; Chafin, 208,923; and Reimer, 29,079. The outstanding fact is that in a large proportion of the states in which the Democrats were victorious—in all indeed, except those in the South—they won by pluralities, not by majorities; and that while Wilson had a plurality of 2,160,194 votes over his closest competitor, his total fell short of the combined votes for all other candidates by 2,458,741, and of the combined votes for Roosevelt and Taft by 1,323,728.

It is further to be observed that the Wilson vote was 181,732 smaller than the Bryan vote of 1896, and 122,892 smaller than the Bryan vote of 1908. The stay-at-home vote was large; and the Socialists drew from the major parties to such an extent that their vote was more than doubled over that of 1908.—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, pp. 205-206.—“In the election of 1912 the electorate was not convinced that a vital issue was involved, no appreciable gains were made by the Democracy with the elimination of Bryan as a candidate, and the Progressive strength was Republicanism of a modified form. Yet, notwithstanding the decline in the total vote, the stability of the Democratic vote and the powerful influence of the Republican organizations, the distribution of the vote of 1912 does reveal the strength of the independent voter. For the greater part of the Progressive vote was won by an appeal made to the wider interest that the Middle

1912-1916.—Decline of the Progressive party. —“During the four years which succeeded the Presidential election of 1912 the Progressive party, as a national organization, continued steadily to ‘dwindle, peak, and pine.’ More and more of its members and supporters slipped or stepped boldly back to the Republican party. Its quondam Democratic members had largely returned to their former allegiance with Wilson, either at the election or after it. Roosevelt once more withdrew from active participation in public life, until the Great War, with its gradually increasing intrusions upon American interests and American rights, aroused him to vigorous and aggressive utterance on American responsibility and American duty. He became a vigorous critic of the Administration. Once more a demand began to spring up for his nomination for the presidency; the Progressive party began to show signs of reviving consciousness. . . . All these groups wanted



ELECTION MAP OF THE UNITED STATES, 1912

West has been accustomed of recent years to take in matters of government. Here has been a long-felt desire to break the rule of the party machine. The bolt of a former Republican leader seemed to offer a favorable opportunity. Yet fundamentally there was even in this instance a remarkable expression of regular voting. Few voters crossed the traditional line to the Democracy. The division remained within the Republican party. Moreover this division was due primarily to the campaign of the Insurgent Republicans against the forces dominant in the Taft administration, and this fact must minimize the significance of the immediate independence apparently displayed by a great body of voters in the presidential vote of 1912.—E. E. Robinson, *Distribution of the presidential vote of 1912* (*American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1914, p. 30).

1912-1913.—Federal reserve system inaugurated. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1912-1913.

1912-1913.—Eight hour day laws passed. See LABOR LEGISLATION: 1862-1920.

1912-1914.—Threatened intervention in Cuba. See CUBA: 1912-1914.

Roosevelt as President. They united to hold a convention of the Progressive party at Chicago in 1916 on the same days on which the Republican Convention met there. Each convention opened with a calculating eye upon the activities of the other. But both watched with even more anxious surmise for some sign of intention from the Progressive leader back at Oyster Bay. He held in his single hand the power of life and death for the Progressive party. His decision as to cooperative action with the Republicans or individual action as a Progressive would be the most important single factor in the campaign against Woodrow Wilson, who was certain of re-nomination. Three questions confronted and puzzled the two bodies of delegates: Would the Republicans nominate Roosevelt or another? If another, what would Roosevelt do? If another, what would the Progressives do? For three days the Republican National Convention proceeded steadily and stolidly upon its appointed course. . . . That Convention did not know what it wanted. It only knew that there was one thing that it was afraid of, and another thing it would

rather not have and was afraid it would have to take. It wanted neither Theodore Roosevelt nor Charles E. Hughes, and its members were distinctly uncomfortable at the thought that they might have to take one or the other. . . . They could nominate one of two men, and to nominate either of them was to fling open the gates of the citadel of party regularity and conformity and let the enemy in. Was it to be Roosevelt or Hughes? When the balloting began in the Republican Convention, the only candidate who received even a respectable block of votes was Hughes, but his total was hardly more than half of the necessary majority. . . . Thus began the final scene in the Progressive drama, and a more thrilling and intense occasion it would be difficult to imagine. It was apparent that the Progressive delegates would have none of it. They were there to nominate their own beloved leader and they intended to do it. A telegram was received from Oyster Bay proposing Senator Lodge as the compromise candidate, and the restive delegates in the Auditorium could with the greatest difficulty be held back until the telegram could be received and read at the Coliseum. . . . Doubtless more thrilling moments may come to some men at some time, somewhere, but you will hardly find a delegate of that Progressive Convention to believe it. Then the Convention adjourned, to meet again at three to hear what the man they had nominated would say. At five o'clock in the afternoon, after a couple of hours of impatient and anxious marking time with routine matters, the Progressive delegates received the reply from their leader [declining the nomination]. . . . Probably few of them as they went out of those doors realized that they had taken part in the last act of the romantic and tragic drama of the National Progressive party. But such was the fact, for the march of events was too much for it. Fate, not its enemies, brought it to an end.—So was born, lived a little space, and died the Progressive party. At its birth it caused the nomination, by the Democrats, and the election, by the people, of Woodrow Wilson. At its death it brought about the nomination of Charles E. Hughes by the Republicans. It forced the writing into the platforms of the more conservative parties of principles and programmes of popular rights and social regeneration. The Progressive party never attained to power, but it wielded a potent power.”—H. Howland, *Theodore Roosevelt and his times* (*Chronicles of America Series*, v. 47, pp. 231-234, 235-239).

ALSO IN: J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time*, ch. 24.

1913.—Bryan-Wilson treaties. See ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1913.

1913.—Extradition treaty with Paraguay. See PARAGUAY: 1913.

1913.—Henyey-Webb land law in California to reduce Japanese menace. See CALIFORNIA: 1900-1920; RACE PROBLEMS: 1913-1921.

1913.—President Wilson's proposal of international commission. See LATIN AMERICA: 1913.

1913.—Valuation Act for regulation of railroad rates. See RAILROADS: 1910-1916.

1913.—Webb-Kenyon law.—Text. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1913.

1913 (January).—Parcel post law goes into effect. See PARCEL POST.

1913 (March).—Inauguration of Woodrow Wilson.—His address.—Wilson's position on assumption of office.—His cabinet.—On Mar. 4, 1913, Woodrow Wilson began his eventful ad-

ministration. In his inaugural address he said: “The feelings with which we face this new age of right and opportunity sweep across our heart-strings like some air out of God's own presence, where justice and mercy are reconciled and the judge and the brother are one. We know our task to be no mere task of politics, but a task which shall search us through and through, whether we be able to understand our time and the need of our people, whether we be indeed their spokesmen and interpreters, whether we have the pure heart to comprehend and the rectified will to choose our high course of action. This is not a day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here muster, not the forces of party, but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us; men's lives hang in the balance; men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do. Who shall live up to the great trust? Who dares fail to try? I summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men, to my side. God helping me, I will not fail them, if they will but counsel and sustain me.”—*First Inaugural*, Mar. 4, 1913.—Mr. Wilson's position on his assumption of office in March, 1913, was in one respect strong, in another equivocal. He was under the disadvantage, more apparent indeed than real, of being a minority President. Apart from the million odd votes divided between the Socialist and other minor candidates, he had polled a good million and a third less than the combined totals of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft. On the other hand, he found himself supported in the Sixty-third Congress, which succeeded to power simultaneously with himself, by a Democratic majority in both Houses. The importance of that backing lay in the fact that all bills must be passed by both Houses and approved by the President, and a difference in political colour between President and Congress, or between the two branches of the latter, makes inevitably for legislative delay and friction. . . . The announcement of the composition of the new Cabinet tended to confirm the President's hold over his party, and so over Congress. The two chief posts were filled by Mr. Bryan and Mr. W. G. McAdoo, of New York, who in 1914 married the President's youngest daughter. Mr. Bryan's selection as Secretary of State was a foregone conclusion in view of the part he had played in securing Mr. Wilson's nomination in the Democratic Convention; while Mr. McAdoo's claim to the Secretaryship of the Treasury was based largely on the impression he had created as a practical business man in carrying through the work of constructing the Hudson River tunnels. Mr. W. B. Wilson, the first Secretary of the newly constituted Department of Labour, was a miner and trade union leader of Scotch birth. . . . The other places were filled as follows: Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison (New Jersey); Attorney-General, J. C. McReynolds (Tennessee); Postmaster-General, Albert S. Bursleson (Texas); Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels (North Carolina); Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane (California); Secretary of Agriculture, W. F. Houston (Missouri); Secretary of Commerce, W. C. Redfield (New York).”—H. W. Harris, *President Wilson, his problems and his policy*, pp. 78-80.—J. C. McReynolds, who was promoted to the Supreme Court in 1914 was followed by Thomas W. Gregory as attorney-general.

1913 (March).—Department of Labor created. See LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF, UNITED STATES.

1913 (April-December).—Extra session of Congress.—“President Wilson called Congress to

meet in extra session in April, 1913, and appeared before the two houses to urge in person the revision of the tariff to which the platform had pledged the party. [By this personal appearance to read his own message, he broke the precedent of sending a written message which had been followed by all the presidents since it was established by Jefferson in 1801.] The Underwood Act, which became law October 3, 1913 [see TARIFF: 1913], was a revision downward of the existing tariff and was framed with a view to encouraging rather than restricting foreign trade. [A graduated income tax was also introduced.] The Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, radically revised the financial system which had grown up under the National Banking Act of 1863. Its object was to decentralize credits by establishing reserve banks in convenient centers throughout the country and thus preventing the accumulation of reserve currency in the New York banks. It has made the currency more elastic and greatly diminished the danger of financial panics to which the old system frequently gave rise."—J. H. Latané, *History of the United States*, p. 549.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1913-1919; INDEPENDENT TREASURY: United States.

ALSO IN: C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War (United States, v. 3, pp. 545-553)*.

1913 (June).—Minnesota rate case.—On June 9, 1913, the Supreme Court handed down an important decision in the Minnesota rate case. The essential part of the decision was the declaration that in matters which do not require uniformity of regulation, a state may fix interstate railway rates, even where such action indirectly affects interstate commerce.—See also RAILROADS: 1910-1916.

1913 (August).—Relations with Mexico.—President Wilson's address to Congress.—Mission of John Lind.—Owing to the revolution in Mexico, relations with that country had become difficult. "In accordance with [his policy of non-recognition] Wilson in August, 1913, sent a special but informal agent, John Lind, to convey his terms to Huerta. These were immediate amnesty, security for an early and a free election, and the assurance that Huerta would not be a candidate for the presidency and that all parties would agree to abide by the results. These terms were rejected."—C. R. Fish, *American diplomacy*, p. 485.—On August 27, the president delivered an address, at a joint session of both houses of Congress regarding the situation, as follows: "Gentlemen of the Congress, it is clearly my duty to lay before you, very fully and without reservation, the facts concerning our present relations with the Republic of Mexico. The deplorable posture of affairs in Mexico I need not describe, but I deem it my duty to speak very frankly of what this Government has done and should seek to do in fulfillment of its obligation to Mexico herself, as a friend and neighbor, and to American citizens whose lives and vital interests are daily affected by the distressing conditions which now obtain beyond our southern border. . . . Mexico has a great and enviable future before her, if only she choose and attain the paths of honest constitutional government. The present circumstances of the Republic, I deeply regret to say, do not seem to promise even the foundations of such a peace. We have waited many months, months full of peril and anxiety, for the conditions there to improve, and they have not improved. They have grown worse, rather. The territory in some sort controlled by the provisional authorities at

Mexico City has grown smaller not larger. The prospect of the pacification of the country, even by arms, has seemed to grow more and more remote; and its pacification by the authorities at the capital is evidently impossible by any other means than force. Difficulties more and more entangle those who claim to constitute the legitimate government of the Republic. They have not made good their claim in fact. Their successes in the field have proved only temporary. War and disorder, devastation and confusion, seem to threaten to become the settled fortune of the distracted country. As friends we could wait no longer for a solution which every week seemed further away. It was our duty at least to volunteer our good offices—to offer to assist, if we might, in effecting some arrangement which would bring relief and peace and set up a universally acknowledged political authority there. Accordingly, I took the liberty of sending the Hon. John Lind, formerly



OSCAR WILDER UNDERWOOD

governor of Minnesota, as my personal spokesman and representative, to the City of Mexico. Mr. Lind executed his delicate and difficult mission with singular tact, firmness, and good judgment, and made clear to the authorities at the City of Mexico not only the purpose of his visit but also the spirit in which it had been undertaken. But the proposals he submitted were rejected, in a note the full text of which I take the liberty of laying before you. I am led to believe that they were rejected partly because the authorities at Mexico City had been grossly misinformed and misled upon two points. They did not realize the spirit of the American people in this matter, their earnest friendliness and yet sober determination that some just solution be found for the Mexican difficulties; and they did not believe that the present administration spoke, through Mr. Lind, for the people of the United States. The effect of this unfortunate misunderstanding on their part is to leave them singularly isolated and without friends who can effectually aid them. So long as the misunder-

ing continues we can only await the time of their awakening to a realization of the actual facts. We can not thrust our good offices upon them. The situation must be given a little more time to work itself out in the new circumstances; and I believe that only a little while will be necessary. For the circumstances are new. The rejection of our friendship makes them new and will inevitably bring its own alterations in the whole aspect of affairs. The actual situation of the authorities at Mexico City will presently be revealed. Meanwhile, what is it our duty to do? Clearly, everything that we do must be rooted in patience and done with calm and disinterested deliberation. Impatience on our part would be childish, and would be fraught with every risk of wrong and folly. We can afford to exercise the self-restraint of a really great nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it. It was our duty to offer our active assistance. It is now our duty to show what true neutrality will do to enable the people of Mexico to set their affairs in order again and wait for a further opportunity to offer our friendly counsels. The door is not closed against the resumption, either upon the initiative of Mexico or upon our own, of the effort to bring order out of the confusion by friendly cooperative action, should fortunate occasion offer. While we wait the contest of the rival forces will undoubtedly for a little while be sharper than ever, just because it will be plain that an end must be made of the existing situation, and that very promptly; and with the increased activity of the contending factions will come, it is to be feared, increased danger to the noncombatants in Mexico as well as to those actually in the field of battle. The position of outsiders is always particularly trying and full of hazard where there is civil strife and a whole country is upset. We should earnestly urge all Americans to leave Mexico at once, and should assist them to get away in every way possible—not because we would mean to slacken in the least our efforts to safeguard their lives and their interests, but because it is imperative that they should take no unnecessary risks when it is physically possible for them to leave the country. We should let everyone who assumes to exercise authority in any part of Mexico know in the most unequivocal way that we shall vigilantly watch the fortunes of those Americans who can not get away, and shall hold those responsible for their sufferings and losses to a definite reckoning. That can be and will be made plain beyond the possibility of a misunderstanding. For the rest, I deem it my duty to exercise the authority conferred upon me by the law of March 14, 1912, to see to it that neither side to the struggle now going on in Mexico receive any assistance from this side the border. I shall follow the best practice of nations in the matter of neutrality by forbidding the exportations of arms or munitions of war of any kind from the United States to any part of the Republic of Mexico—a policy suggested by several interesting precedents and certainly dictated by many manifest considerations of practical expediency. We can not in the circumstances be the partisans of either party to the contest that now distracts Mexico or constitute ourselves the virtual umpire between them. . . . The steady pressure of moral force will before many days break the barriers of pride and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we could triumph as her enemies—and how much more handsomely, with how much higher and finer satisfactions of conscience

and of honor!"—*Congressional Record*, Aug. 27, 1913.—See also MEXICO: 1913-1914.

ALSO IN: H. W. Harris, *President Wilson, his problems and his policy*, pp. 120-121.

1913 (October).—Non-recognition of Huerta as president of Mexico.—When "on October 9, 1913, Huerta 'purged' the Mexican Congress by imprisoning over a hundred of its members, Wilson informed him that the United States would not accept the result of the election which was soon to be held. Already in August the United States had warned Americans to leave Mexico, the administration had sent war-vessels to assist their departure, and Congress had appropriated money for the same purpose."—C. R. Fish, *American diplomacy*, p. 485.—See also MEXICO: 1913-1914.

1913-1914.—Conversations with Great Britain on the Mexican situation.—In 1912 "American and British oil operators in Mexico were objects of general suspicion in both continents. They were accused of participating too actively in Mexican politics and there were those who even held them responsible for the revolutionary condition of the country. One picturesque legend insisted that the American oil interests looked with jealous hostility upon the great favours shown by the Diaz Administration to Lord Cowdray's company, and that they had instigated the Madero revolution in order to put in power politicians who would be more friendly to themselves. The inevitable complement to this interpretation of events was a prevailing suspicion that the Cowdray interests had promoted the Huerta revolt in order to turn the tables on 'Standard Oil', to make safe the concessions already obtained from Diaz and to obtain still more from the new Mexican dictator. To determine the truth in all these allegations, which were freely printed in the American press of the time, would demand more facts than are at present available; yet it is clear that these oil and other 'concessions' presented the perpetual Mexican problem in a new and difficult light. [See also MEXICO: 1918; TRUSTS: International: Struggle for oil concessions.] The Wilson Administration came into power a few days after Huerta had seized the Mexican Government. The first difficulty presented to the State Department was to determine its attitude toward this usurper. A few days after President Wilson's inauguration Mr. Irwin Laughlin, then Charge d'Affaires in London . . . was instructed to ask the British Foreign Office what its attitude would be in regard to the recognition of President Huerta. . . . The unequivocal answer that Mr. Laughlin received was that the British Government would not recognize Huerta, either formally or tacitly. Mr. Laughlin sent his message immediately to Washington, where it apparently made a favourable impression. The Administration then let it be known that the United States would not recognize the new Mexican regime. Whether Mr. Wilson would at this time have taken such a position, irrespective of the British attitude, is not known, but at this stage of the proceedings Great Britain and the United States were standing side by side. . . . A few weeks afterward, Great Britain changed its mind and recognized the new government in Mexico. Its action produced the most unpleasant impression upon the new Administration. . . . Mr. Wilson, Mr. Bryan, and their associates in the cabinet easily found an explanation that was satisfactory to themselves and to the political enthusiasms upon which they had come into power. They believed that the

sudden change in the British attitude was the result of pressure from British commercial interests which hoped to profit from the Huerta influence. . . . It was not necessary to believe all the rumours that were then afloat in the American press to conclude that a Huerta administration would be far more acceptable to the Cowdray Company than any headed by one of the military chieftains who were then disputing the control of Mexico. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan believed that these events proved that certain 'interests' similar to the 'interests' which, in their view, had exercised so baleful an influence on American politics, were also active in Britain. . . . Mr. Wilson presently formulated an entirely new principle for dealing with Latin American republics. There could be no permanent order in these turbulent countries and nothing approaching a democratic system until the habit of revolution should be checked. One of the greatest encouragements to revolution, said the President, was the willingness of foreign governments to recognize any politician who succeeded in seizing the executive power. He therefore believed that a refusal to recognize any government 'founded upon violence' would exercise a wholesome influence in checking this national habit; if Great Britain and the United States and the other powers would set the example by refusing to have any diplomatic dealings with General Huerta, such an unfriendly attitude would discourage other forceful intriguers from attempting to repeat his experiment. . . . Mexico and other Latin-American countries would . . . establish a constitutional system, and select their governments by constitutional means. . . . General Huerta, who, in his own eyes, was merely another in the long succession of revolutionary chieftains, was translated into an epochal figure; he became . . . representative of the order which was to come to an end, the man who . . . was to point the new way not only in Mexico, but in all Latin-American countries. The first diplomatic task imposed upon Page [the new ambassador], therefore, . . . was to persuade Great Britain . . . to withdraw its recognition of Huerta, and to join hands with the United States in bringing about his downfall. . . . [Affairs were complicated by an interview with Sir Lionel Carden, the new British minister to Mexico, and an interview with him which was published in one of the New York newspapers, in which he was reported as criticising President Wilson's policy in Mexico.] The British Government promptly denied the authenticity of the Carden interview [on Carden's own flat denial], but that helped matters little for the American public insisted on regarding such denials as purely diplomatic. . . . [In November, Sir Walter Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, who was in the United States on a visit, had an interview with the president.] Sir William succeeded in persuading the President that the so-called oil interests were not dictating the policy of Sir Edward Grey. That British oil-men were active in Mexico was apparent; but they were not using a statesman of so high a character as Sir Edward Grey for their purposes and would not be able to do so. The British Government entertained no ambitions in Mexico that meant unfriendliness to the United States. . . . In fact, the British recognized the dominant character of the American interest in Mexico and were willing to accept any policy in which Washington would take the lead. All it asked was that British property and British lives be protected; once these were safeguarded Great Britain was ready to stand

aside and let the United States deal with Mexico in its own way. . . . A few days after this White House interview Sir Lionel Carden . . . led a procession of European diplomats to General Huerta, formally advised that warrior to yield to the American demands and withdraw from the Presidency of Mexico. The delegation informed the grim dictator that their governments were supporting the American policy and Sir Lionel brought him the unwelcome news that he could not depend upon British support. About the same time Premier Asquith made conciliatory remarks on Mexico at the Guildhall banquet. He denied that the British Government had undertaken any policy 'deliberately opposed to the United States. There is no vestige of foundation for such a rumour.' These events changed the atmosphere at Washington. [Carden at Mexico City was not persona grata to the United States, and in proof of friendliness he was recalled in January, 1914, and sent to Brazil].—H. B. Hendrick, *Life and letters of Walter H. Page*, pp. 179-183, 199, 204, 209.—See also MEXICO: 1913-1914.

1914.—Relations with Mexico.—Removal and replacement of arms embargo.—Early in 1914, the President removed the embargo on arms and ammunition to Mexico, which had been in effect from March, 1912. "Whereas, by a proclamation of the President issued on March 14, 1912, under a Joint Resolution of Congress approved by the President on the same day, it was declared that there existed in Mexico conditions of domestic violence which were promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States; and Whereas, by the Joint Resolution above mentioned it thereupon became unlawful to export arms or munitions of war to Mexico except under such limitations and exceptions as the President should prescribe: Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, hereby proclaim that, as the conditions on which the Proclamation of March 14, 1912, was based have essentially changed, and as it is desirable to place the United States with reference to the exportation of arms or munitions of war to Mexico in the same position as other Powers, the said Proclamation is hereby revoked." [Since, however, conditions did not improve, but on the contrary grew considerably worse, the embargo was again put in force on October 19.] 'Whereas, a Joint Resolution of Congress, approved March 14, 1912, provides: "That whenever the President shall find that in any American country conditions of domestic violence exist which are promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States, and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export except under such limitations as the President shall prescribe any arms or munitions of war from the United States to such country until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress"; Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim that I have found that there exist in Mexico such conditions of domestic violence promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States as contemplated by the said Joint Resolution above set forth, hereby made applicable to Mexico, and I do hereby warn them that all violations of such provisions will be rigorously prosecuted. . . .' On the same day (October 19) the President ordered that an exception be made in favor of the Carranza de facto government, by permitting arms shipments into the territory under that govern-

ment's control."—Woodrow Wilson, *State papers and addresses*, pp. 55-57.

1914.—Americanization work started by the Bureau of Naturalization. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1910-1920.

1914.—Coal lands opened in Alaska. See ALASKA: 1914.

1914 (March-June).—Panama canal tolls exemption repealed.—"On March 5, 1914, President Wilson appeared before Congress with a formal request for the repeal of the tolls exemption clause urging 'the justice, the wisdom, and the large policy of such a repeal with the utmost earnestness.' He asserted his belief that the exemption policy was not only unsound in an economic way, but was 'in plain contravention' of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. [Great Britain had sent a second and more formal protest against the Canal Act.] . . . I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the Administration. . . . The canal itself, meanwhile, was finished. On April 1, 1914, General Goethals became civil governor of the Canal Zone and a few days later a barge service was inaugurated through the canal. The date for the formal opening was set for August 15. The tolls repeal act passed the House before the end of March and in the Senate was officially defended by Hoke Smith, of Georgia, formerly Secretary of the Interior under Cleveland. Its ablest support came from Elihu Root, while the non-partisan nature of the debate was revealed by the fact that O'Gorman, of New York, chairman of the Senate Committee on Oceanic Canals led in opposing it. Some Senators who were reluctant to repeal the clause and to concede its inequity urged that the matter be referred to arbitration under the existing treaty with England. On June 15 the repeal act became a law."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, pp. 428-429.—See also PANAMA CANAL: 1912-1914; 1913-1914.

ALSO IN: M. W. Williams, *Anglo-American Isthmian diplomacy*, pp. 313-314.—*Yale Law Journal*, v. 23, pp. 389-396.

1914 (April).—Mexican situation.—Porfirio Diaz, who had been president of Mexico since 1884 and who had given to his country peace but not hope, was forced to retire in May, 1911, and Francisco Madero was elected president. Madero was murdered by Huerta troops. (See MEXICO: 1910-1913.) "In spite of the continued pressure of the United States and the passive support of its anti-Huerta policy by Great Britain, the Mexican usurper refused to resign. President Wilson now began to espouse the interests of Villa and Carranza. His letters to Page [ambassador to England] indicate that he took these men at their own valuation, believed that they were sincere patriots working for the cause of 'democracy,' and 'constitutionalism' and that their triumph would usher in a day of enlightenment and progress for Mexico. It was the opinion of the Foreign Office that Villa and Carranza were worse men than Huerta and that any recognition of their revolutionary activities would represent no moral gain. . . . [In this opinion the President did not concur. In a letter to the ambassador, dated May 18, 1914, he said] 'As to the attitude of mind on that side of the water toward the Constitutionalists, it is based upon prejudices which cannot be sustained by the facts.' . . . [He enclosed a copy of an interview which had appeared in one of the afternoon papers, which, he said, summed up as well as they could be summed up his own conclusions] with regard to the issues and the

personnel of the pending contest in Mexico [and went on to say]: 'I can verify it from a hundred different sources, most of them sources not in the least touched by predilections for such men as our friends in London have supposed Carranza and Villa to be.'"—B. J. Hendrick, *Life and letters of Walter H. Page*, v. 1, pp. 227-229.—See also MEXICO: 1914-1915.

ALSO IN: *Congressional Record*, Apr. 6, 1914.

1914 (April).—Occupation of Vera Cruz, following Tampico incident.—A B C Conference.—On April 6, President Wilson delivered before Congress an address on the state of affairs in Mexico, where confusion had become great. He said, in part: "In international law it is a safe rule that every government which actually represents a nation is entitled to recognition and to diplomatic intercourse. But amid the dust and gore of Mexico it is difficult to distinguish a figure which seems to deserve official recognition by the United States of America. . . . The only question of international law and practice which the Department of State has been called upon to decide is whether the man who calls himself President of Mexico is either de jure or de facto the President of Mexico. Geographically, he is plainly not the President of all Mexico, for at least a third of its area is outside of his authority. From a military point of view he is not the head of the Mexican Republic, because his forces have been defeated by rebel armies in every pitched battle for many months. Constitutionally he is not President of Mexico, for he should be flanked by a Congress chosen in an open election. As the wielder of supreme authority for the time being he is not entitled to recognition, because he is visibly afraid to leave his capital even to defend his Government against armed enemies. . . . The truth is that there is no constitutional or international reason why anybody must be recognized in Mexico. It would have been well had earlier administrations been less hasty in recognizing dictators whose career was destined to be short. If there are two organizations in Mexico, neither of which can show any proof that it is desired by the Mexican people, the obvious common-sense course would seem to be to recognize neither of them. . . . The prospect of a genuinely popular government is discouraging. Apparently most of the Mexican people would accept a just and moderate Government, which was once firmly seated, but, with the single exception of Diaz, the 'strong men' have never furnished anything approaching a just and moderate government, certainly not Huerta. So long as recognition waits upon the existence of a stable government, it may have long to wait. And there is a positive and pressing need for official understanding with some authority in Mexico, because the property and lives of foreigners, including many American citizens, are in daily danger. Some of that property arises from questionable dealings with defunct governments; much of it is fairly and honestly won against great difficulties. Most of the Americans who have established themselves in Mexico did so under a government which seemed likely to retain its authority and keep the peace. Our Government owes to those people moral support at all times, and protection in case of need. Of course, that protection can be offered without recognition of this or that Mexican Government, and it is difficult to see how a constitutional president who can not defend the lives and property of his own adherents in the north, could, by recognition, become suddenly powerful enough to defend

Americans. The main difficulty is not dependent on recognition, nor even on the weakness of Mexican government, but in an instability of Mexican character, which seems to make good government impossible. Leaving the Diaz administration out of account, no government in Mexico has ever been much aided by American recognition, or much marred by the lack of it. Then, what is to be done? How is the United States to protect its nationals, or to make effective those claims for millions of dollars which will soon come pouring in and which in the last resort will have to be paid by the Mexican taxpayer. Failing recognition, intervention has been demanded. If by intervention is meant the military occupation of Mexico, with a view to the pacification of the country and then the withdrawal of troops, there have been some experiences that seem like precedents. A military force was sent to Paraguay in 1859 and to China in 1900. But Buchanan vainly sought from Congress in 1859 authority to send an army into Mexico to break up the Miramon government, and thus open the way for the Juarez government. Even when the French were in Mexico, no American troops ever crossed the border. It seems tolerably clear that any American expedition would forthwith bring about some approach to a real national government by making every decent Mexican ready to meet the Americans, as Tom Corwin put it in 1846, 'to welcome them with bloody hands to hospitable graves.' For, strange as it may seem, the Mexicans, who have never learned how to develop the resources of their country or to give it dignity among nations, have an inveterate love of their own land, a furious hatred of those who attempt to diminish their territory, and a willingness to die in its defense, which, among more highly organized nations, might be called patriotism. Allowing that intervention should begin, when and how is it to end? That is a question of more significance to us than to the Mexicans. Excellent military authorities think that a force of 200,000 men would not be too large for the purpose, which would be by far the largest army ever moved from one country to another in America. And when would that country be ready to take care of itself again? Sixteen years we have been civilizing the Filipinos up to the point where they are unanimous only on one thing, namely, that they want us to leave. Nothing less than a similar experience of education in language, science, and self-government would much affect the disposition of the Mexican people. Supposing that our physical means are sufficient for the task of holding down Mexico, have we not sufficient race and color questions already? Are we so far advanced in the amalgamation of European races, much nearer to us than the Mexicans are in culture and standards, that we can undertake a similar task at long range upon an unwilling people? Is Cuba so certain to remain a dependency instead of to become an integral part of the United States that we can undertake a problem many times more difficult? Have we been so successful in the fair treatment and civilization of our own 300,000 Indians that we wish to be responsible for 14,000,000 more? Is the government of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia so firmly established on principles of truth and righteousness that we can now transfer our energies to the uplift of Tampico and Mazatlan and the City of Mexico? Von Moltke used to say that he had worked out three different detailed plans for the invasion of England by a German army, but he never could contrive a plan for getting the army

back again. A stroke of the pen can send an army into Mexico. How many strokes of the sword will be needed to keep it there?"—*Congressional Record*, Apr. 6, 1914.—"In April an unexpected incident precipitated a crisis. Early in that month a party of United States sailors who had landed at Tampico, the port of the Mexican oil-fields, to obtain petrol, were put under arrest by a Huertist colonel. They were subsequently released with an apology, but Huerta, faced with a demand that the Mexican authorities should salute the American flag as an apology, prevaricated and offered an unacceptable compromise. An ultimatum was dispatched by Mr. Bryan, as Secretary of State, and the President appealed to Congress to invest him with power to take such armed action as the situation might demand."—H. W. Harris, *President Wilson, his problems and his policy*, pp. 122.—The President said: "Gentlemen of the Congress, it is my duty to call your attention to a situation which has arisen in our dealings with Gen. Victoriano Huerta at Mexico City which calls for action, and to ask your advice and cooperation in acting upon it. On the 9th of April a paymaster of the U. S. S. *Dolphin* landed at the Iturbide Bridge landing at Tampico with a whale-boat and boat's crew to take off certain supplies needed by his ship, and while engaged in loading the boat was arrested by an officer and squad of men of the army of Gen. Huerta. Neither the paymaster nor anyone of the boat's crew was armed. Two of the men were in the boat when the arrest took place, and were obliged to leave it and submit to be taken into custody, notwithstanding the fact that the boat carried, both at her bow and at her stern, the flag of the United States. The officer who made the arrest was proceeding up one of the streets of the town with his prisoners when met by an officer of higher authority, who ordered him to return to the landing and await orders; and within an hour and a half from the time of arrest orders were received from the commander of the Huertista forces at Tampico for the release of the paymaster and his men. The release was followed by apologies from the commander and later by an expression of regret by Gen. Huerta himself. Gen. Huerta urged that martial law obtained at the time at Tampico; that orders had been issued that no one should be allowed to land at the Iturbide Bridge; and that our sailors had no right to land there. Our naval commanders at the port had not been notified of any such prohibition. . . . Admiral Mayo regarded the arrest as so serious an affront that he was not satisfied with the apologies offered, but demanded that the flag of the United States be saluted with special ceremony by the military commander of the port. The incident can not be regarded as a trivial one, especially as two of the men arrested were taken from the boat itself—that is to say, from the territory of the United States—but had it stood by itself it might have been attributed to the ignorance or arrogance of a single officer. Unfortunately it was not an isolated case. A series of incidents have recently occurred which can not but create the impression that the representatives of Gen. Huerta were willing to go out of their way to show disregard for the dignity and rights of this Government and felt perfectly safe in doing what they pleased, making free to show in many ways their irritation and contempt. A few days after the incident at Tampico an orderly from the U. S. S. *Minnesota* was arrested at Vera Cruz while ashore in uniform to obtain the ship's mail and

was for a time thrown into jail. An official dispatch from this Government to its embassy at Mexico City was withheld by the authorities of the telegraphic service until peremptorily demanded by our chargé d'affaires in person. So far as I can learn, such wrongs and annoyances have been suffered to occur only against representatives of the United States. I have heard of no complaints from other Governments of similar treatment. Subsequent explanations and formal apologies did not and could not alter the popular impression, which it is possible it had been the object of Huertista authorities to create, that the Government of the United States was being singled out, and might be singled out with impunity, for slights and affronts in retaliation for its refusal to recognize the pretensions of Gen. Huerta to be regarded as the constitutional provisional President of the Republic of Mexico. The manifest danger of such a situation was that such offenses might grow from bad to worse until something happened of so gross and intolerable a sort as to lead directly and inevitably to armed conflict. It was necessary that the apologies of Gen. Huerta and his representatives should go much further; that they should be such as to attract the attention of the whole population to their significance and such as to impress upon Gen. Huerta himself the necessity of seeing to it that no further occasion for explanations and professed regrets should arise. I therefore felt it my duty to sustain Admiral Mayo in the whole of his demand and to insist that the flag of the United States should be saluted in such a way as to indicate a new spirit and attitude on the part of the Huertistas. Such a salute Gen. Huerta has refused, and I have come to ask you approval and support in the course I now propose to pursue. . . . I earnestly hope that war is not now in question. I believe that I speak for the American people when I say that we do not desire to control in any degree the affairs of our sister Republic. Our feeling for the people of Mexico is one of deep and genuine friendship, and everything that we have so far done or refrained from doing has proceeded from our desire to help them, not to hinder or embarrass them. We would not wish even to exercise the good offices of friendship without their welcome and consent. The people of Mexico are entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own way, and we sincerely desire to respect their right. The present situation need have none of the grave implications of interdependence if we deal with it promptly, firmly, and wisely. No doubt I could do what is necessary in the circumstances to enforce respect for our Government without recourse to the Congress and yet not exceed my constitutional powers as President but I do not wish to act in a matter possibly of so grave consequence except in close conference and cooperation with both the Senate and House. I therefore come to ask your approval that I should use the armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from Gen. Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States [applause], even amidst the distressing conditions now unhappily obtaining in Mexico. There can in what we do be no thought of aggression or of selfish aggrandizement. We seek to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States only because we wish always to keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both in the United States and wherever else it may be employed for

the benefit of mankind."—*Congressional Record*, Apr. 20, 1914.—"While our government refused to recognize either Huerta or Carranza as officially representative of Mexico, it was in constant relationship with both. In April, 1914 its relations with Huerta became so strained that it was decided to undertake a military occupation of Vera Cruz. [Gen. Funston, with a division of regulars, was sent to relieve the naval landing parties.] This was accomplished [Apr. 21] not without bloodshed. Although the administration announced that hostilities would not be carried farther, the opinion was widespread that war and at least temporary conquest would result. The people of the United States were strongly divided as to the probability and wisdom of such action, Europe was deeply interested. Spanish America was still more intensely aroused, and its press and public men were very generally convinced of the ambitions of the United States. In this crisis, Argentina, Brazil, and Chili known as the A B C powers, offered their mediation. This the Wilson administration promptly accepted, subject to certain restrictions, and a conference was arranged at Niagara [Ontario]. The Mexican factions showed themselves less amenable to suggestion than the United States, and practically nothing was done towards solving the internal problems of Mexico. The attitude of the United States, however, was made clear to Spanish America, and the subsequent withdrawal of the American troops from Vera Cruz confirmed the impression, that it was guided by no motives of territorial aggrandizement."—C. R. Fish, *American diplomacy*, p. 490.—Meanwhile the minister of foreign affairs in Mexico City handed G. F. O'Shaughnessy, the American Chargé d'Affaires, his passport, and on the following day, April 23, the Mexican Chargé d'Affaires in Washington demanded that his passport be given to him.—See also A B C CONFERENCE; MEXICO: 1913-1914; 1914-1915.

ALSO IN: *Congressional Record*, Apr. 6 and 20, 1914.—H. Morris, *Our Mexican muddle*.—F. K. Lane, *President's Mexican policy*.

1914 (May).—Smith-Lever Act passed providing for more land grant colleges. See EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: United States: Smith-Lever Act.

1914 (July).—Gerard's letter desiring arbitration to prevent war.—Telegram of German emperor to President Wilson.—Its partial truth. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 39; 40.

1914 (August).—Outbreak of war in Europe.—President Wilson's offer of mediation to belligerent nations. See WORLD WAR: 1914: XII. Neutral nations: a; Diplomatic background: 65.

1914 (August).—Condition of Y. M. C. A. associations at beginning of World War. See YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: World War Activities: 1914: Condition of the Association.

1914 (August).—State of American opinion on the World War.—President Wilson asks for neutrality.—"Despite the wars and rumors of wars in Europe after 1910, few Americans perceived the gathering of the clouds, and probably not one in ten thousand felt more than an ordinary thrill of interest on the morning of June 29, 1914, when they read that the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria had been assassinated. Nor, a month later, when it became obvious that the resulting crisis was to precipitate another war in the Balkans, did most Americans realize that the world was hovering on the brink of momentous events. Not even when the most dire forebodings were realized and the great powers of Europe were

drawn into the quarrel, could America appreciate its significance. Crowds gazed upon the Bulletin boards and tried to picture the steady advance of German field-gray through the streets of Liège, asked their neighbors what were these French 75's, and endeavored to locate Mons and Verdun on inadequate maps. Interest could not be more intense, but it was the interest of the moving-picture devotee. Even the romantic voyage of *Kronprinzessin Cecilie* with her cargo of gold, seeking to elude the roving British cruisers, seemed merely theatrical. It was a tremendous show and we were the spectators. Only the closing of the Stock Exchange lent an air of reality to the crisis."—C. Scymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War* (*Chronicles of America Series*, v. 43, pp. 27-28).—On Aug. 4, 1914, the president issued a proclamation of neutrality as follows:

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA—A PROCLAMATION:

Whereas, a state of war unhappily exists between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and between Germany and Russia, and between Germany and France; and whereas the United States is on terms of friendship and amity with the contending powers and with the persons inhabiting their several dominions; And, whereas, there are citizens of the United States residing within the territories or dominions of each of the said belligerents and carrying on commerce trade or other business or pursuits therein; And, whereas, there are subjects of each of the said belligerents residing within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States and carrying on commerce, trade or other business or pursuits therein; And whereas, the laws and treaties of the United States, without interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy or with the commercial manufacture or sale of arms or munitions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be within their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial neutrality during the existence of the contest; And, whereas, it is the duty of a neutral government not to permit or suffer the making of its waters subservient to the purposes of war; Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, president of the United States of America, in order to preserve the neutrality of the United States and of its citizens and of persons within its territory and jurisdiction, and to enforce its laws and treaties, and in order that all persons, being warned of the general tenor of the laws and treaties of the United States in this behalf, and of the law of nations, may thus be prevented from any violation of the same, do hereby declare and proclaim that by certain provisions of the act approved on the 14th day of March, A. D., 1909, commonly known as the penal code of the United States, the following acts are forbidden to be done, under severe penalties, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, to wit:

"1. Accepting and exercising a commission to serve either of the said belligerents by land or by sea against the other belligerents.

"2. Enlisting or entering into the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine, or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

"3. Hiring or retaining another person to enlist or enter himself in the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine, or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

"4. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

"5. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be entered into the service as aforesaid.

"6. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

"7. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be entered into service as aforesaid. (But the said act is not to be construed to extend to a citizen or subject of either belligerent who, being transiently within the United States, shall, on board of any vessel of war, which, at the time of its arrival within the United States, was fitted and equipped as such vessel of war, enlist or enter himself or hire or retain another subject or citizen of the same belligerent who is transiently within the United States, to enlist or enter himself to serve such belligerent on board such vessel of war, if the United States shall then be at peace with such belligerent.)

"8. Fitting out and arming, or attempting to fit out and arm, or procuring to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly being concerned in the furnishing, fitting out or arming of any ship or vessel with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of either of the said belligerents.

"9. Issuing or delivering a commission within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States for any ship or vessel to the intent that she may be employed as aforesaid.

"10. Increasing or augmenting, or procuring to be increased or augmented, or knowingly being concerned in increasing or augmenting the force of any ship of war, cruiser or other armed vessel, which at the time of her arrival within the United States was a ship of war, cruiser or armed vessel in the service of either of the said belligerents, or belonging to the subjects of either by adding to the number of guns of such vessels or by changing those on board of her for guns of a larger caliber, or by the addition thereto of any equipment solely applicable to war.

"11. Beginning or setting on foot or providing or preparing the means for any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from the territory or jurisdiction of the United States against the territories or dominions of either of the said belligerents."

And I do hereby further declare and proclaim that any frequenting and use of the waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States by the armed vessels of a belligerent, whether public ships or privateers, for the purpose of preparing for hostile operations, or as posts of observation upon the ships of war or privateers or merchant vessels of a belligerent lying within or being about to enter the jurisdiction of the United States, must be regarded as unfriendly and offensive and in violation of that neutrality which it is the determination of this government to observe; And to the end that the hazard and inconvenience of such apprehended practices may be avoided, I further proclaim and declare that from and after the 5th day of August inst., and during the continuance of the present hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and Germany and Russia, and Germany and France, no ship of war or privateer of any belligerent shall be permitted to make use of any port, harbor, roadstead or waters subject

to the jurisdiction of the United States from which a vessel of an opposing belligerent (whether the same shall be a ship of war, a privateer or a merchant ship) shall have previously departed, until after the expiration of at least twenty-four hours from the departure of such last mentioned vessel beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. . . . And I do further declare and proclaim that the statutes and the treaties of the United States and the law of nations alike require that no person, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, shall take part, directly or indirectly, in the said waters, but shall remain at peace with all of the said belligerents, and shall maintain a strict and impartial neutrality. And I do hereby enjoin all citizens of the United States, and all persons residing or being within the territory or the jurisdiction of the United States, to observe the laws thereof, and to commit no act contrary to the provisions of the said statutes or treaties or in violation of the law of nations in that behalf. . . . And I do hereby give notice that all citizens of the United States and others who may claim the protection of this government, who may misconduct themselves in the premises, will do so at their peril, and that they can in no wise obtain any protection from the government of the United States against the consequences of their misconduct. In Witness Whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this fourth day of August in the year of our Lord one [SEAL] thousand nine hundred and fourteen and of the independence of the United States of America the one hundred and thirty-ninth.

WOODROW WILSON.

By the President:

WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN,
Secretary of State.

—By the President of the United States of America: Proclamation, Aug. 4, 1914 (*Statutes at Large of the United States of America from March, 1913, to March, 1915, v. 38, pt. 2, Private laws, etc., 63rd Congress, pp. 2001-2002*).

1914 (August).—Opening of the Panama canal. —The Panama canal, which had been in course of construction since 1904 was officially opened for traffic on August 15. "The purchase of the rights of the French company was consummated, and the way was thus finally cleared for digging the 'big ditch.' Many practical problems, however, had to be solved before the work could be completed. Yellow fever and malaria began their old-time ravages among the canal workers, but under the energetic direction of the chief sanitary officer, Colonel William C. Gorgas, . . . the Canal Zone was made 'as safe as a health resort.' Difference of opinion existed as to whether it would be better to construct a lock or a sea-level canal. In November, 1905, a board of American and European engineers . . . declared in favor of a sea-level canal. But . . . after careful investigation President Roosevelt wisely decided in favor of a lock canal, and Congress ratified the decision. Congressional insistence upon having the construction work managed by a commission delayed the enterprise, . . . [but] upon the whole, the enterprise was conducted on a high plane, without corruption or notable waste. . . . In February, 1907, President Roosevelt announced that he had decided to put the

undertaking in charge of army engineers. Lieutenant Colonel George W. Goethals was appointed chief engineer, with Majors William L. Sibert and David DuB. Gaillard as assistants. . . . Thenceforward the enterprise moved forward more rapidly. . . . On October 10, 1913, not quite a decade after the Panama revolt, water was turned into the Culebra Cut, and soon after small boats were able to navigate the whole length of the canal. The first commercial use of the water way was made May 19, 1914, when three barges, loaded with sugar from Hawaii, passed through from the Pacific to the Atlantic."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*, pp. 307-308.—See also PANAMA CANAL: 1913-1914.

1914 (September).—Federal Trade Commission created.—"By Act of Congress approved September 26, 1914, a non-partisan Federal commission was created, which is directed to 'prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, excepting banks and common carriers subject to the acts to regulate commerce, from using unfair methods of competition in commerce.' To carry out the provisions of the act, the Federal Trade Commission, composed of five members appointed by the President, is empowered to conduct hearings in any city of the United States. If unfair methods are shown, the Commission shall direct the offenders to desist therefrom, and may apply to the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the enforcement of its orders. The Commission is also empowered to enforce compliance with certain sections of the Clayton Act; to conduct investigations into business practices and management; to investigate the enforcement of decrees under the Sherman Act; and to investigate and report to Congress on foreign trade combinations. Maximum penalties of imprisonment for six months, a fine of \$1,000 or both, are provided for refusal to testify before the Commission, falsification of evidence, and failure to submit required reports. The Federal Trade Commission, as established by this act of September, 1914, has not only the functions of investigation and publicity exercised from 1903 to 1914 by the Bureau of Corporations, but it has additional functions of investigation, publicity, and recommendation, and further, it has powers of a quasi-judicial character. Among the new powers of investigation, publicity, and recommendation are notable: Authority to require corporations to make annual or special reports in such form as the Commission may prescribe; general power to investigate corporations; authority, under direction of the President or of either House of Congress to investigate and report concerning any alleged violations of the anti-trust acts by any corporation; authority to investigate trade conditions in other countries with reference to combinations or other conditions affecting foreign trade of the United States; authority to make recommendations to the attorney-general for readjustment of any corporation found to be violating the anti-trust acts; authority to investigate the manner in which any court decrees, restraining corporations from violating the anti-trust laws, are being carried out; and authority to make public such portions of the information obtained in its investigations as it shall deem expedient, except trade secrets and names of customers. The quasi-judicial functions of the Commission may be thus summarized: It has authority to enforce the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act relative to unfair competition, and the provisions of the Clayton Act, notably those relative to price discrimination, tying con-

tracts, holding companies, and interlocking directorates, as to all corporations which come under its jurisdiction. There has thus been created and broadly empowered a Federal administrative agent to deal with great industrial corporations which do business beyond the borders of a single state. Such an agent is indispensable if the difficult trust problem of the United States is to be solved scientifically. Men of vision, such men as Justice Harlan, began to point out the need for such an administrative body as soon as the Sherman Law began to be applied. The Bureau of Corporations was a forerunner, which demonstrated the high value of official expert determination of the facts about Trusts. The Federal Trade Commission is the fully developed, fact-finding, and administrative body, all too slowly evolved through the urgent necessities of the situation."—J. W. Jenks, *Trust problem*, pp. 266-268.—See also TRUSTS: United States: 1914.

ALSO IN: H. R. Seager, *New anti-trust acts (Political Science Quarterly, September, 1915, pp. 448-463)*.—F. A. Magruder, *American government in 1921*, pp. 187-188.

1914 (September).—Belgian mission to the United States. See BELGIUM: 1914: Belgian mission, etc.; WORLD WAR: 1914: I. Western front: x.

1914 (October-December).—Formation of societies for relief of Belgium and northern France. See INTERNATIONAL RELIEF: Relief in Belgium and northern France.

1914 (November).—Congressional elections.—The congressional elections in 1914 showed a marked falling off in the Democratic vote. Though the Democrats retained control of both Houses of Congress, their majority was greatly reduced. The Progressive party had almost disappeared.—See also above: 1912-1916.

1914 (November-December).—Discussion with Great Britain on contraband of war.—Notes were exchanged with the government of Great Britain on the subject of the interruption and restriction of American trade following on British orders in council relative to contraband of war and visit and search, and on the proclamation of the North sea as a war zone.—See also WORLD WAR: 1914: XII. Neutral nations: b.

1914-1916.—Price control. See PRICE CONTROL: 1914-1916.

1914-1916.—Naval preparations. See WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1914-1916.

1914-1916.—Effect of World War on tariff. See TARIFF: 1914-1916.

1914-1917.—German plots in the United States during the period of neutrality.—Efficiency of American Secret Service Bureau.—"Besides undoubtedly many matters which from reasons of public policy the Government has still kept hidden, the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, when it presented the war resolution [in April, 1917] following the President's message, went on formal record as listing at least 21 crimes or unfriendly acts committed upon our soil with the connivance of the German Government since the European war began. Among these were: Inciting Hindoos within the United States to stir up revolts in India, and supplying them with funds, for that end, contrary to our neutrality laws. Running a fraudulent passport office for German reservists. This was supervised by Capt. von Papen of the German Embassy. Sending German agents to England to act as spies, equipped with American passports. Outfitting steamers to supply German raiders, and sending them out of American

ports in defiance of our laws. Sending an agent from the United States to try to blow up the International Bridge at Vaneboro, Me. Furnishing funds to agents to blow up factories in Canada. Five different conspiracies, some partly successful, to manufacture and place bombs on ships leaving United States ports. For these crimes a number of persons . . . [were] convicted, also Consul-General Bopp, of San Francisco (a very high German official accredited to the United States Government), . . . [was] convicted of plotting to cause bridges and tunnels to be destroyed in Canada. Financing newspapers in this country to conduct a propaganda serviceable to the ends of the German Government. Stirring up anti-American sentiment in Mexico and disorders generally in that country, to make it impossible for the United States to mix in European affairs. (N. B.—This last, from a humanitarian standpoint, seems peculiarly outrageous. Germany had not the slightest grievance against the helpless Mexicans. To incite them to revolt against their own Government and to make war on the United States simply involved their misery and probably destruction, in return for a very doubtful and round-about gain for Germany. The greatest wrong was not to the United States but to Mexico.) German military usage has been quite in this spirit, however, and approves of such doings. . . . Bribery of enemies' subjects, acceptance of offers of treachery, utilization of discontented elements in the population, support of pretenders and the like, are permissible; indeed, international law is in no way opposed to the exploitation of crimes of third parties."—Committee on Public Information, *War message and the facts behind it (War Information Series, no. 101)*.—"The most comprehensive and successful effort to provoke strikes was made by Labor's National Peace Council, an organization financed by Franz von Rintelen, who came to the United States early in April, 1915. The alleged purpose of the Council was to express the pacific sentiments of the workers and to prevent the United States from entering the war. . . . Along with Lamar, Buchanan, ex-Congressman Fowler, Martin, Monett, and two others, all of whom had assisted in the work of the Council, Rintelen was indicted by the Grand Jury on December 28, 1915, for 'conspiracy to restrain the manufacture, transportation, and export of munitions of war.' . . . Rintelen, Lamar, and Martin were found guilty, and on May 21, 1917, were each sentenced to one year's imprisonment. The indictment against Monett was dismissed and the jury disagreed as to the others. . . . The hand of the German Government was extended to America to influence members of Congress through German-American voters and their sympathizers. The German-American National Alliance had long endeavored to weld persons of German descent in the United States into a compact body, to be used, when desirable, in the interests of Germany. After the war began, in July, 1914, prominent German-Americans organized and supported other societies which aimed to persuade or intimidate members of Congress into adopting pro-German policies. . . . One of these organizations was the American Embargo Conference, established to prevent the export of munitions. . . . If strikes should fail to close American munitions plants, if money were lacking to buy up all their products, and if the Government refused an embargo, Germany's agents had yet another resource—to destroy war materials and other supplies for the Entente States while in

course of shipment by sea. One project of this kind was carried out under the direction of Captain von Papen and Wolf von Igel. It consisted in placing in the holds of steamers incendiary bombs which, at a fixed time, would explode and ignite the surrounding cargo. The bomb shells were manufactured from designs by Dr. Walter T. Scheele, a German chemist of Hoboken, on the *Friedrich der Grosse* of the North German Lloyd line, and were then taken to Dr. Scheele's laboratory and filled with combustibles. . . . Robert Fay, a former officer in the German army, who came to the United States in April, 1915, endeavored to prevent the traffic in munitions by sinking the laden ships at sea. . . . Germany's official representatives on the Pacific coast were engaged in similar enterprises. The leader was Franz Bopp, German Consul-General at San Francisco. His chief assistants were Baron Eckhardt von Schack, the vice-consul, lieutenant Wilhelm von Brincken of the consulate, and Charles C. Crowley, a detective employed by Bopp as secret investigator."—E. E. Sperry, *German plots and intrigues (Committee on Public Information, Red, White and Blue Series, no. 10, pp. 11-12, 14-15, 17-19, 21)*.—"Another military enterprise against Canada was undertaken by a prosperous citizen of the German Empire living in Detroit, Albert Kaltschmidt. He was a leader among the German-Americans of his city, had organized the *Deutscherbund* there and was its secretary. . . . Kaltschmidt was arrested in April, 1917, and his trial completed during December of the same year. The jury found him guilty on all charges in the indictment, and he was sentenced to four years in the Federal prison at Leavenworth, Kansas, and to pay a fine of \$20,000. His sister, Ida K. Neef, was sentenced to three years in the Detroit House of Correction and to pay a fine of \$15,000. Her husband, Fritz A. Neef, was sentenced to two years at Leavenworth and to pay a fine of \$10,000. Two other accomplices received lighter sentences. Another and more successful attack on the Grand Trunk Railway was made at Vanceboro, Maine, where it crosses the international bridge between the United States and Canada. Captain von Papen ordered Werner Horn, a German reserve lieutenant, to blow up the bridge and supplied him with \$700. Horn was arrested immediately after the explosion which partly damaged the bridge. [He was brought to trial in Boston during June, 1917.] Horn was found guilty and sentenced to eighteen months at Atlanta penitentiary and the payment of a fine of \$1,000. In order to have at hand an adequate supply of counterfeit passports, the German Embassy maintained an office in New York City, directed by Captain von Papen, where they were forged wholesale. German consuls in distant cities, as Chicago and St. Paul, were informed concerning this office and sent there for passports the reservists from their several localities. These operations were known almost from the first to the United States Secret Service. Hans A. von Wedell, who managed the office, took alarm and fled in November, 1914, supplied with money by von Papen. In [a] letter, found on one of his associates, who was arrested before he had an opportunity to post it, von Wedell exonerates himself from the charge of deserting his post and shows the complicity of the German Ambassador [Bernstorff] in the business of forging passports. . . . German agents in the United States also endeavored to give military aid to their country by sending coal and other supplies to German warships which were raiding commerce in both the

Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Such action was a violation of American neutrality, and in order to evade the law the conspirators took false oaths before Federal officials concerning the ownership of vessels, the nature of their cargoes, and their destination. These acts, even more than the use of forged passports, were likely to cause friction between the United States and countries with which it was at peace. The Hamburg-American Line, through its high officials in New York, repeatedly defrauded the United States by procuring false manifests. Among those involved were Dr. Buenz, managing director, George Koetter, superintending engineer, Adolph Hachmeister, purchasing agent, and Joseph Pappinghaus, who together worked up an elaborate machinery to deceive the Government. They confessed at their trial that they had sent out twelve ships, which were proved by the Government to have fraudulent papers and all of which were captured and interned before reaching their destination. The Indian Nationalist Party has long aimed to overthrow British rule in India by means of armed rebellion. When the war began, this party was represented in Berlin by a committee which was directed and largely financed by the German Government. . . . The following persons were indicted in March, 1917, 'for feloniously conspiring to set on foot a military enterprise to be carried on from within the territory of the United States against India . . . the object and purpose being to initiate mutiny and armed rebellion in India and to overthrow the Government': Franz Bopp, Eckhart H. von Schack, William von Brincken, Hans Tauscher, F. von Papen, George Rodiek (German Consul at Honolulu), Earnest Sekunna, Wolf von Igel, Har Dayal, Ram Chandra, Bhagwan Singh, Chandra Kanta Chakrabarty, and Haramba Lal Gupta. The case was tried in the Federal Court at San Francisco, California, in March, 1918. All were convicted, except one American of very minor importance and two Hindus, one of whom killed the other and in turn was killed in the court room by a court official. . . . By rebellion in Ireland, as well as in India and Egypt, Germany hoped to paralyze the military strength of England; and in carrying out this plan her diplomatic officials in the United States had the cooperation of some of the Irish revolutionists here. Their close connection with the rebellion which ended so disastrously for Sir Roger Casement and other Irish leaders, and the kind of aid they gave to it, are shown by several communications found among Captain von Papen's papers in the German Military Information Bureau at 60 Wall Street. . . . The aims of German propagandists in the United States were to prove the justice of Germany's cause and the warmth of her friendship for the American people; to procure from Congress an embargo on munitions shipped to the Allies (although Germany sent to the United States a commission with ample funds to buy such supplies for her own use, which commission organized or bought out steamship companies and chartered many vessels to transport its purchases to Germany); to encourage pacifism by teaching the waste and wickedness of war; to provoke strife between America and the Allied states, especially England and Japan. So eager . . . [had] German agents been to cause friction between the United States and England that Paul Koenig attempted through perjury to manufacture evidence that supplies were being sent from New York to British warships. Ambassador von Bernstorff took a direct and active part in purchasing the services of those who would aid Germany by creating opin-

ion in her favor. Franz von Rintelen, according to his own statement, spent many thousands of dollars in carrying on a pacifist propaganda in American newspapers and other publications. He had prepared and widely circulated a small pamphlet, lauding the glory and happiness of peace and denouncing the corrupt and greedy Americans who for the sake of profit were forcing the United States into the present war. . . . The publications which were maintained in the United States by the German Government or were subsidized by it, supported in general the following measures: Enactment by Congress of a law forbidding Americans to travel on the ships of the belligerent states; an embargo on munitions; prohibition by the Government of loans to the Allied powers and the boycott of banks which made them; defeat of Wilson for reelection in 1916 and also of Senators and Representatives who would not vote for bills favored by the German Government; pacifism in the sense that the United States should not defend the lives and property of its citizens from attack by Germany. They also systematically defamed our Government and the public men of the United States. Letters and checks prove that the Austrian Embassy paid subsidies to several foreign language newspapers, among them Polish, Roumanian, and Hungarian publications. The German War Office, acting through Ambassador von Bernstorff and the Austrian Consul-General in New York, von Nuber, directed the American Correspondence Film Company, the purpose of which was to distribute German war films in the United States. The German films apparently had a wide circulation, for Secretary Zimmermann [telegraphed] to von Bernstorff, 'Spread films through all big cities'; and Baron Burian, Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, telegraphed to the president of the film company, 'Send films no longer used in United States to South America, China, and Siam.'—E. E. Sperry, *German plots and intrigues (Committee on Public Information, Red, White and Blue Series, no. 10, pp. 29-30, 32-33, 35-36, 38, 42, 47, 53, 55, 57-58)*.—See also PAN-GERMANISM: Pan-German League.—'The alertness of the American Secret Service and the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice prevented the consummation of these plans. There was need for a shifting of the Germanic spies. Immediately after the publication of Count von Bernstorff's warning an exodus of known spies to South America began.'—J. P. Jones, *America entangled, pp. 223-224*.—See also WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: II. Espionage: a, 4; a, 7; III. Press reports and censorship: d, 1.

ALSO IN: J. P. Jones and P. M. Hollister, *German secret service in America*.

1914-1918.—World War taxes, direct and indirect. See TAXATION: World War taxation.

1914-1918.—Relief work in Belgium and France under Hoover. See INTERNATIONAL RELIEF: Relief in Belgium and northern France.


1914-1918.—Effect of the World War on newspapers.—Censorship. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1914-1920; WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: III. Press reports and censorship: a, 7.

1914-1920.—Mercantile marine.—'It required a war to call the national mind to consider what a Mercantile Marine means to a country. The Spanish war of 1898 did this to the extent that there was aroused a strong support for the Panama Canal project. The Act permitting this dates from 1892, and it is really from this year that the new phase begins, though only gradually. If you make direct

and shorter roads on land leading to important trading centres, you obviously at once attract trade. If in the same manner you shorten communications by sea, it will have a similar effect. Quite apart from its warlike strategic value, which is outside our subject, the theory of the Panama Canal was based on the fact that it would reduce the sea route from New York to San Francisco by most of 8000 miles, and to Sydney and Yokohama by about 4000 miles. The 1892 Act also authorised admission to American registry of foreign-built vessels not more than five years old. Then again came another war, the Great War, which began on August 4, 1914, the year in which the canal was opened. Too late America had begun to learn the value of a Mercantile Marine, and now she foresaw that there would be an inadequate supply of shipping to carry her trade across the ocean. Immediately she tried to make up for this by passing a law a fortnight after the outbreak of war removing the age limit in the Act of 1892. And now it becomes necessary to look into the matter somewhat closely, otherwise what followed is not intelligible. When the European War broke out, America, having regard to her population, wealth, overseas trade and length of littoral, was in a curious position. The following figures are for June, 1914, and are eloquent. In that month, of all the world's sea-going steel and iron steam tonnage the British Empire owned 47.7, Germany, 12, Scandinavia 8.7, France 4.5, the United States 4.3 and Japan 3.9 per cent. As the war went on America realised at least that 71 per cent. of the world's steamships were in the hands of belligerents, and therefore the means of transport for American exports and imports—in other words, the exchange of wealth—had been taken away. Even farmers and cotton-growers who had never seen the sea in their lives began to take an interest in the subject when they suffered losses. It took the Great War to wake up the great American nation, as it had taken American clippers to make our sailing ship-owners become active. Shipbuilding in America suddenly began to revive, for from the end of 1915 ships were required by Britain, France and Norway. Mines and submarines had caused losses to the two first, while the third required more ships than ever for the profitable trade she was doing with Great Britain and France. Moreover, the American Mercantile Marine needed ships for herself; and the result was that in 1915 there was a net increase of nearly 500,000 tons added to its commercial service. . . . In 1917 with America a participant in the war, and about to send armies to Europe together with necessary military supplies, the need for American merchant tonnage became positively acute. In the whole of the United States there were not more than sixty-one shipyards of which only thirty-seven were building steel craft.'—E. K. Chatterton, *Mercantile marine, pp. 223-226*.—As a war measure, Congress, on October 6, 1917, opened the coastwise trade to ships qualified for the foreign trade under the act of 1914; but under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 the coasting trade is restricted to American-built ships and to ships acquired by or from the United States Shipping Board. The limited 'free-ship' provision of 1912 failed to attract foreign-built steamships prior to the outbreak of the war in Europe. Under the more liberal provisions of 1914, a large foreign-built tonnage was added to American registry, consisting for the most part of the property of American citizens previously under foreign flags and seeking greater security

under the American flag during the period of neutrality of the United States. . . . Congressional investigations in regard to shipping conferences had emphasized the need for regulation of ocean carriers, and the war in Europe brought home to the American business world the disadvantage of dependence upon the ships of belligerent nations. Essential lines of trade and communication were disturbed, freight rates became prohibitive, and cargo space unavailable. Diverse proposals were advanced for the rapid development of shipping under the American flag. Subsidies would not prove effective under existing freight rate conditions and overcontracted shipyards, and were not likely to be adopted by the party in power, long committed to opposition to them. The effect of 'free-ship' legislation was soon counteracted by laws and decrees of foreign nations forbidding sale of their merchant vessels during the war. The Wilson administration decided in favor of building

it was empowered to have constructed and equipped or to 'purchase, lease, or charter vessels suitable, as far as the commercial requirements of the United States marine trade may permit, for use as naval auxiliaries or army transports, or other naval and military purposes'; (4) the President was authorized to transfer to the Board such vessels of the War or Navy Department as are suitable for commercial uses and not required for military or naval use in time of peace, and 'to cause to be transferred to the Board vessels owned by the Panama Railroad Company and not required in its business; (5) the Board was empowered, with the approval of the President, to charter, lease, or sell to any citizen of the United States any vessel so purchased, constructed, or transferred; (6) it was also authorized to form under the laws of the District of Columbia one or more corporations for the purchase, construction, equipment, lease, charter, maintenance, and operation of



SHIPYARD AT HOG ISLAND, WHILE UNDER CONSTRUCTION

and purchasing ships to be owned by the government, and, after long controversy, this policy was embodied in the Shipping Act of September 7, 1916. The purpose of this law was twofold: to regulate carriers by water in interstate and foreign commerce and to develop a naval auxiliary and naval reserve and a merchant marine adequate to the needs of our insular and foreign trade. The United States Shipping Board was created, consisting of five members named by the President and approved by the Senate and invested with large powers: (1) it was given regulative control over the port-to-port business of carriers by water similar to that of the Interstate Commerce Commission over inland transportation; (2) it was charged with the investigation of the relative cost of building merchant vessels in the United States and other countries, the comparative advantages of operating under American or foreign registry, the rules under which vessels are constructed in the United States and abroad, marine insurance, domestic and foreign methods of classifying and rating vessels, navigation laws and regulations, and the legal status of mortgage loans on vessels; (3)

merchant vessels in the commerce of the United States. The capital stock of such corporations was not to exceed \$50,000,000, of which the United States through the Board was to purchase and vote not less than a majority. Under the terms outlined above, the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation was organized April 16, 1917. After the United States entered the war, the government undertook the colossal task of securing a merchant fleet commensurate with the unprecedented emergency need. Under the shipping act, greatly reinforced by extraordinary legislation, the Shipping Board acquired a vast tonnage, at first by requisitioning ships already under construction in American yards, seizing enemy ships in our ports, commandeering certain neutral ships, and chartering ships from other foreign powers, but later and in the main by unparalleled development of American shipbuilding. Construction continued long after the armistice, and the entire enterprise involved an expenditure of three or four billion dollars. By 1920 the American fleet had risen from insignificant proportions to a size second only to that of Great Britain, and about two

thirds of the total tonnage was owned and controlled by the government through the shipping Board. With this magical transformation had come new pride and interest in our overseas shipping and new aspects of the question of merchant marine policy. The problem now was so to dispose of government-owned ships and so to shape legislation as to assure to the United States a permanent place of importance in overseas shipping."—G. M. Fisk and P. M. Peirce, *International commercial policies*, pp. 280-283.—See also below: 1920 (June-September); COMMERCE: Commercial Age: 1789-1920; 1914-1921.

1914-1921. — Colombian Treaty. — From 1914 onward the ratification of a treaty with Colombia was periodically before the Senate; but was still pending when the Harding administration came into power. The questions which it was designed to settle lay far back of the Wilson administration, however. "Under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty [1901], it was explicitly provided that the United States should build the [Panama] canal, should control, police and protect it, and keep it open to the vessels of all nations on equal terms. [See PANAMA CANAL: 1889-1903.] We had assumed the position of guarantor of the canal, including, of course, the building of the canal, and of its peaceful use by all the world. . . . The United States had assumed in connection with the canal certain responsibilities not only to its own people, but to the civilized world which imperatively demanded that there should be no further delay in finishing the work. [In August, 1903 the Hay-Herran Treaty was rejected by the Colombian Senate. (See COLOMBIA: 1902-1903.)] On November 3 [1903], the revolution occurred. Practically everybody on the Isthmus, including all the Colombian troops that were already stationed there, joined in the revolution, and there was no bloodshed. But on that same day four hundred new Colombian troops were landed at Colon. Fortunately, the gunboat *Nashville*, under Commander Hubbard, reached Colon almost immediately afterwards, and when the commander of the Colombian forces threatened the lives and property of the American citizens, including women and children, in Colon, Commander Hubbard landed a few score sailors and marines to protect them. By a mixture of firmness and tact he not only prevented any assault on our citizens, but persuaded the Colombian commander to reembark his troops for Cartagena. On the Pacific side a Colombian gunboat shelled the City of Panama, with the result of killing one Chinaman—the only life lost in the whole affair. The report of the Panama Canal Committee of the Colombian Senate on October 14, 1903, on the proposed treaty with the United States, proposed that all consideration of the matter should be postponed until October 31, 1904, when the next Colombian Congress would have convened, because by that time the new Congress would be in condition to determine whether through lapse of time the French company had not forfeited its property and rights. 'When that time arrives,' the report significantly declared, 'the Republic, without any impediment, will be able to contract and will be in more clear, more definite and more advantageous possession, both legally and materially.' The naked meaning of this was that Colombia proposed to wait a year, and then enforce a forfeiture of the rights and property of the French Panama Company, so as to secure the forty million dollars our Government had authorized as payment to this company. . . . [The president] recognized Panama forthwith on behalf

of the United States, and practically all the countries of the world immediately followed suit. The State Department immediately negotiated a canal treaty with the new Republic. One of the foremost men in securing the independence of Panama, and the treaty which authorized the United States forthwith to build the canal, was M. Philippe Bunau-Varilla, an eminent French engineer formerly associated with De Lesseps and then living on the Isthmus."—*Theodore Roosevelt: An autobiography*, pp. 520-524.—In April, 1914, the treaty, which Roosevelt called "the Panama Blackmail Treaty," was signed by the American minister at Bogotá and promptly ratified by Colombia. The American Senate, however, refused its approval. While the treaty was pending in the Senate, Senator Fowler, of Illinois, introduced the defense of the treaty by Hannis Taylor; which said in part: "The delay occasioned by the exercise of Colombia's constitutional right to deliberate upon a treaty before its ratification precipitated the *opéra bouffe* revolution of November, 1903. Colombia had been at that time an independent State for 93 years, and for 77 years had been so recognized by us. On November 3, 1903, the Republic of Colombia was at peace with the United States, and 'the treaty of peace, amity, navigation, and commerce' of 1846, expressly guaranteeing, in a very solemn manner, her sovereignty over the Isthmus of Panama, was in full force. But despite all those things, the time had now arrived when the pen was to be superseded by the sword. . . . All that Colombia has ever asked of the United States [is] a fair hearing before an impartial international tribunal, either The Hague court or a tribunal specially constituted. No more conclusive argument was ever made than that in which Senator Bacon—at the time of his death the able chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations—demonstrated Colombia's right to arbitration under the law of nations. Colombia's claim for the value of the territory of Panama, the Panama Railway, the railroad annuities, the contract with the French Canal Co., and other advantages exceeded twofold the pecuniary sum agreed upon in the pending treaty. Not until after her right to have the amount of the damages due her ascertained by an arbitral court had been denied her was the settlement embodied in the pending treaty entered into. An attempt has been made to create prejudice against the treaty by the false statement that Colombia has agreed to pay me a contingent fee of \$1,000,000 upon its ratification. I am her only counsel and our contract is in writing and subject to inspection by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations whenever that body may see fit to call for it. It simply provides that I am to receive just and reasonable compensation for my services when they are concluded; and, in the event of a difference between us as to the amount, such difference shall be adjusted by arbitration. And here, in conclusion, I feel it my duty to say that my zeal in this matter as counsel for Colombia has been increased by the fact that after an exhaustive study of all the antecedents I have been as profoundly impressed as I could ever be of anything of the justice of her cause, not only in morals but under the principles of international law. Therefore, as an American citizen, I feel that a great good has been accomplished for my country in this grave matter by the making of a settlement which will reestablish the ancient and cordial friendship with a neighboring State, in which the commerce and industry of the United States will find a region most favorable for its development."—H. Taylor,

Why the pending treaty with Colombia should be ratified (*Congressional Record*, July 20, 1914, pp. 13500-13503).—See also **COLOMBIA**: 1909-1917.—On Apr. 20, 1921, the treaty was at length ratified by the Senate, and the claims of Colombia arising from the rebellion and secession of Panama were laid to rest. "The chief provision of the treaty covers the payment of \$25,000,000 in annual instalments of \$5,000,000 each to Colombia. Colombia is also granted the right to transport mails, products of the soil and war materials over the Panama Railway and the Canal route on the same terms as the United States. On the other hand, Colombia agrees to grant formal recognition to the independence of Panama. One clause that stood in the treaty as brought before the Senate [1914] during the Wilson administration expressed the 'sincere regret' of the United States at the interruption of friendly relations between the two countries on account of the canal controversy. This was later eliminated, as it might be construed as an admission that President Roosevelt had acted contrary to international law in obtaining the Canal route. . . . The struggle over the Colombia treaty was the hardest fight the Harding administration . . . [had] yet experienced, and the decisive victory in which it ended . . . [increased] the prestige of the new President. He . . . succeeded in persuading the senate to ratify a treaty which President Wilson [had] labored in vain . . . [from] 1914 to secure."—*Colombia Treaty ratified* (*Independent*, May 7, 1921, pp. 484-485).—"Some idea of the efforts required to achieve this treaty's ultimate passage may be derived from the following record: April 6, 1914—Signed at Bogota. June 16, 1914—Transmitted to the Senate for ratification by President Wilson. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. June 18, 1914—Injunction of secrecy removed. July 15, 1914—Resolution for public hearings introduced by Senator Borah. Dec. 16, 1915—Again referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. Feb. 3, 1916—Again reported to the Senate. March 8, 1917—Again referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. March 14, 1917—Reported by Senator Stone with amendments, March 15, 1917—Motion to consider in open session defeated. March 16, 1917—Further consideration postponed. April 16, 1917—Called for consideration and again postponed. May 29, 1919—Again referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. July 2, 1919—Reported with amendments. Aug. 7, 1919—Motion of Senator Lodge referred back to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Aug. 8, 1919—Referred to subcommittee. June 3, 1920—Reported to the Senate and ordered printed. March 9, 1921—President Harding, in a message, urged ratification."—*New York Times Current History*, June, 1921.

ALSO IN: *Pan-American Magazine*, Sept., 1919, pp. 235-237.—*Theodore Roosevelt: An autobiography*, pp. 518-526.—*Congressional Record*, July 20, 1914, pp. 13500-13501, 13503.—J. H. Moore, *Colombian viewpoint* (pamphlet).

1914-1922.—Trade relations with India. See **INDIA**: 1912-1922.

1915.—Relief work in Serbia. See **INTERNATIONAL RELIEF**: Serbian relief.

1915 (January).—Capture of the *William P. Frye* by the German raider, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. See **WILLIAM P. FRYE**.

1915 (January-December).—Expositions at San Francisco and San Diego.—In 1915 the opening of the Panama canal was fitly celebrated by great expositions held at San Francisco and San Diego. "At San Francisco a salt marsh . . . was

transformed into a fairy land of tropical beauty. . . . The [Panama Pacific International] Exposition opened on February 20, and closed December 4. . . . The Panama-California Exposition at San Diego was devoted mainly to the great southwest. . . . [It] opened on January 1 and continued throughout the year."—*American Year Book*, 1915, pp. 735-736.—See also **CALIFORNIA**: 1915.

1915 (February).—**Controversy over contraband of war.**—**The *Wilhelmina*.**—The question of contraband had from the beginning of the war been a subject of controversy with the British government. "The tone of the discussion was notably sharpened [early in 1915] by the seizure of the *Wilhelmina*, supposedly an American ship, though, as later developed, she had been chartered by a German agent in New York, Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, in order to bring the Anglo-American dispute to a head."—C. Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War* (*Chronicles of America Series*, v. 48, p. 43).—"January 26 she [Germany] took over all the corn, wheat, and flour in the empire and appointed officials to distribute it to the people. . . . February 9 the American steamer *Wilhelmina* laden with foodstuffs and bound for Hamburg, came into Falmouth, England, under stress of weather. She was seized and it seemed that the case would afford an opportunity to test the British contention that foodstuffs bound for Germany were contraband. Great interest in the decision of the prize court was aroused in the United States. But the case progressed slowly and long before it was decided the international controversy had taken on other complications."—J. S. Bassett, *Our war with Germany*, p. 23.—The true significance of the *Wilhelmina* case, and the German purpose in chartering the boat have been fully revealed by the German ambassador to this country. "An important part of the [German] economic propaganda was the institution of the so-called 'Issues', i. e., the attempt by carefully construing individual incidents to make clear to public opinion the fundamental injustice of the English encroachments and their far-reaching consequences in practice. . . . Herr Albert therefore induced an American firm to ship foodstuffs for the civil population of Germany on the American steamer *Wilhelmina*, bound for Hamburg, by himself undertaking the whole risk from behind the scenes. This was arranged in such a way as to preserve in appearance the good faith of the American firm, and to make the shipment seem purely American in the eyes of the American Government and the English."—Count Bernstorff, *My three years in America*, pp. 91-92. Ultimately the ship was released and her cargo was purchased by the British government.—See also **WORLD WAR**: 1915: XI. Politics and diplomacy: a, 1; **WILHELMINA**.

ALSO IN: J. B. Scott, *Diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Germany*.

1915 (February).—**Protest against submarine campaign.**—"In an effort to overcome the naval supremacy of Great Britain, which was never more conclusive than on February 1, 1915, the German government decided to risk upon the sea a decided departure from the rules of international law and to justify it as retaliation against the British restrictions upon neutral commerce. On February 4, 1915, the German Admiralty issued a proclamation declaring a 'war zone' about the British Isles and warning neutrals of the dangers therein. After February 18, 1915, it was the intention that German submarines should destroy every merchant vessel without making provision for safety of crews or passengers. In warfare of such

a nature neutral vessels were subject to peril within the 'war zone', the peril inherent in a situation where mistakes must occur. There was further complication in the fact that British vessels were upon occasion using neutral flags, which placed the neutral vessels in a dangerous position, in view of the fact that a submarine could not visit and search to make sure of identity, but must sink without warning, as the proclamation explained. . . . Keenly alive to the dangerous possibilities inherent in the new situation, the American government, on February 10, 1915, expostulated, particularizing upon the possible destruction of any merchant vessel of the United States or the death of American citizens. The Imperial German government would be held 'to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities'. On the same day the American government protested to Great Britain against the reported use of the American flag on a British vessel while travelling through the war zone."—E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, *Foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917*, p. 55.

ALSO IN: A. Shaw, *President Wilson's state papers and addresses*.—J. B. McMaster, *United States in the World War*.—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*.

1915 (March).—Indictment of Hamburg-American line.—Fraudulent passports and other German plots.—"March 1, 1915, Dr. Karl Bueuz, managing director of the Hamburg-American Steamship Co. in New York, was arrested with some of the other officials of the company, on a charge of obtaining clearance papers for vessels taking coal and supplies to warships by false assertions. A trial followed, resulting in the conviction of the officials, who, in fact, hardly denied the charges. Dr. Bueuz and two associates were sentenced to serve eighteen months and another for twelve months in a federal prison. Dr. Bueuz, however, was permitted to remain in his own home for a time on account of alleged ill health. In 1918 the public was shocked to learn that he was living in New York in great comfort, receiving visits from his friends, returning them in some cases, attending dinners and walking and riding through the streets. A quick examination revealed that his health was good and he was sent to the federal prison in Atlanta at once. Information obtained in this trial showed that a comprehensive plan had been made by the German government before war was declared by which the German merchant ships in our harbors were organized into a unit under direction of the home war office, with the purpose of sending them to sea in aid of German cruisers. This action virtually made the port of New York a base of German operations in violation of neutrality. It was shown that twelve ships had thus been loaded with the purpose of taking naval supplies out of the borders of the United States, but that only one had eluded the vigilance of the customs officers and the active watchfulness of the allied cruisers. It was also shown in the trial that Captain Karl Boy-ed, German naval attaché, was at the head of these operations."—J. S. Bassett, *Our war with Germany*, p. 33.

1915 (March).—Blockade of German commerce.—Notes sent to warring nations.—Question of ultimate destination.—Germany's submarine blockade quickly led to opposing measures on the part of Great Britain and France. On March 1, they announced their policy. "Germany, they said, had declared the waters around the British Isles, the English Channel and the north and west coasts of France a war zone, and had claimed the right to torpedo without warning any

merchant vessel under any flag. . . . The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for regulated capture. Her opponents are, therefore, driven to retaliation in order to prevent commodities of any sort reaching Germany. These measures, however, will be enforced without risk to neutral property or the lives of non-combatants. The British and French Governments will be free to detain and take into ports ships carrying goods of presumed enemy declaration, but will not confiscate such vessels and cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to confiscation. Great opposition was made to this announcement in our country."—J. B. McMaster, *United States in the World War*, p. 77.—"On March 11 [Great Britain] advanced another stage in her restrictive policy by issuing a series of regulations tantamount to a general blockade of the German Empire, and carrying the doctrine of continuous voyage so far as to impose on the shippers of all goods to Holland and the Scandinavian countries the burden of proving, on peril of confiscation, that the goods were not destined for Germany. On account of the control of the Baltic by Germany, the so-called blockade could not be made applicable to the Baltic ports directly. Hence it was devised and enforced on novel lines, and in such manner as to embrace many neutral ports and coasts capable of serving as approaches to the German seats of trade. . . . The issue with Great Britain involved only property; that with Germany involved both property and life."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, pp. 336-337.—A note of protest was sent to Great Britain on March 30, through the United States ambassador in London; and a further exchange of notes between the Department of State and the belligerent governments followed. (See WORLD WAR: 1915: XI. Politics and diplomacy: a, 1; b.) Although the term "blockade" was commonly used to describe Great Britain's restrictive measures, yet she did not establish a blockade in the usual sense. "A realization of this fact will clear up much that is obscure in the naval warfare of the next two years. At the beginning of the Civil War, President Lincoln laid an interdict on all the ports of the Confederacy; the ships of all nations were forbidden entering or leaving them: any ship which attempted to evade this restriction, and was captured doing so, was confiscated, with its cargo. That was a blockade, as the term has always been understood. A blockade, it is well to keep in mind, is a procedure which aims at completely closing the blockaded country from all commercial intercourse with the world. . . . Great Britain, when she declared war on Germany, did not follow President Lincoln's example and lay the whole of the German coast under interdict. Perhaps one reason for this inaction was a desire not unduly to offend neutrals, especially the United States; but the more impelling motive was geographical. The fact is that a blockade of the German seacoast would accomplish little in the way of keeping materials out of Germany. A glance at the map of northwestern Europe will make this fact clear. . . . Great Britain based her blockade measures upon the American principle of 'ultimate destination,' but it was necessary considerably to extend that doctrine in order to meet the necessities of the new situation. President Lincoln had applied this principle to absolute contraband, such as powder, shells, rifles, and other munitions of war. Great Britain now proceeded to apply it to that nebulous class of commodities known as 'conditional contraband,' the chief of which was food-stuffs. If the United States, while a war was

pending, could evolve the idea of 'ultimate destination' and apply it to absolute contraband, could not Great Britain, while another war was pending, carry it one degree further and make it include conditional contraband? Thus reasoned the British Foreign Office. To this Mr. Lansing replied that to stop foodstuffs on the way to Germany through a neutral port was simply to blockade a neutral port, and that this was something utterly without precedent. Seizing contraband is not an act of war against the nation whose ships are seized; blockading a port is an act of war; what right therefore had Great Britain to adopt measures against Holland, Denmark, and Sweden which virtually amounted to a blockade? This is the reason why Great Britain, in the pronouncement of March 1, 1915, and the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, did not describe these measures as a 'blockade.' President Wilson described his attack on Mexico in 1914 as 'measures short of war,' and now someone referred to the British restrictions on neutral commerce as 'measures short of blockade.' The British sought another escape from their predicament by justifying this proceeding, not on the general principles of warfare, but on the ground of reprisal. Germany declared her submarine warfare on merchant ships on February 4, 1915; Great Britain replied with her announcement of March 1st, in which she declared her intention of preventing 'commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany.' . . . Great Britain now proposed to purchase cargoes of conditional contraband discovered on seized ships and return the ships themselves to their owners, and this soon became the established practice. Not only did the Foreign Office purchase all cotton which was seized on its way to Germany, but it took measures to maintain the price in the markets of the world."—B. J. Hendrick, *Life and letters of Walter H. Page*, v. 2, pp. 56-57, 61-63.

1915 (March-May).—Mission of Colonel House.—Violation of American rights.—United States citizens killed.—*Lusitania*.—"Early in the winter of 1914-1915 President Wilson apparently foresaw something of the complications likely to arise from the measures and counter-measures taken by the belligerents to secure control of oversea commerce, and sent his personal adviser, Colonel House, across the Atlantic to study the possibilities of reaching a *modus vivendi*. There was no man so well qualified for the mission. . . . Courteous and engaging, Colonel House was an unexcelled negotiator: he had a genius for compromise, as perfect a control of his emotions as of his facial expression, and a pacific magnetism that soothed into reasonableness the most heated interlocutor. . . . But even the skill of Colonel House was not sufficient to induce Germany to hold her hand, and, as spring advanced, it became increasingly clear that she was resolved to carry her threats of unrestricted submarine warfare into effect. The quality of Wilson's pacifism was about to be put to the test. In March a British steamer, the *Falaba*, was sunk and an American citizen drowned; some weeks later an American boat, the *Cushing*, was attacked by a German airplane; and on the 1st of May, another American steamer, the *Gulflight*, was sunk by a submarine with the loss of two American lives. When was Wilson going to translate into action his summary warning of 'strict accountability?' Even as the question was asked, we heard that the Germans had sunk the *Lusitania*. . . . The German Government had given frigid warning, in a newspaper advertisement, of its intention to affront the custom of nations and the

laws of humanity."—C. Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War (Chronicles of America Series, v. 48, pp. 47-50)*.—See also LUSITANIA CASE.

ALSO IN: W. L. McPherson, *Short history of the Great War*.—F. A. Ogg, *National progress*.

1915 (May).—Pan-American financial conference in Washington. See PAN-AMERICAN FINANCIAL CONFERENCE.

1915 (May).—American steamship, *Nebraskan*, torpedoed.—"On May 25th the American steamer *Nebraskan* had a hole blown in her bow off Fastnet Rock. The captain thought he was the victim of a submarine attack, though no submarine was seen. No lives were lost and the vessel reached port. . . . On July 12th the German Foreign Office delivered a memorandum to Ambassador Gerard admitting that the *Nebraskan* had been torpedoed by a German submarine, apologizing for the 'unfortunate accident' and offering to pay damages."—W. L. McPherson, *Short history of the Great War*, pp. 162, 164.

1915 (May-September).—*Lusitania* notes.—Resignation of Bryan and appointment of Lansing.—Unsatisfactory German replies.—"The destruction of the *Lusitania* brought many to demand that a stern ultimatum be sent to Germany, calling for reparation and apology in default of which we should declare war. President Wilson took a less defiant course. He called on Germany for explanations. They were not given in a frank manner, and he sent a second note, only to receive another dilatory reply. Convinced that Germany was flouting him, he then sent a sharp note in which he said that repetition of such acts would be regarded as 'deliberately unfriendly.'"—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, p. 876.—"Sober afterthought has generally agreed that Wilson was right. But he was himself led into a serious error that produced consequences which were not soon to be dissipated. Speaking three days after the event, when the world looked to him to express the soul of America, and dealing with the spirit of Americanism, he permitted an unfortunate phrase to enter his address and to cloud his purpose. 'There is such a thing,' he said, 'as a man being too proud to fight.' . . . Wilson, the phrase-maker, was betrayed by a phrase, and it was to pursue him like a Fury. The chorus of indignation and shame aroused by this phrase covered completely the determination and skill with which he entered upon the diplomatic struggle with Germany. . . . At the very outset of the diplomatic controversy with Germany, before the second *Lusitania* note was dispatched, the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, resigned, in the belief that the President's tone was too peremptory. . . . [Robert Lansing, counsellor for the Department of State, was appointed in Bryan's place.] From the very beginning of his attempts to obtain from Germany a disavowal for the sinking of the *Lusitania* and a promise not to sink without warning, the President took his stand upon high ground. Not merely did he insist upon the rights guaranteed to neutrals by the law of nations: he took the controversy out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion and contended 'for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity.' . . . The exchange of notes consumed much time and proved a severe test for American patience. The first *Lusitania* note was sent on the 13th of May and it was not until the 1st of September [and after the sinking of the *Arabic*] that the German Government finally gave a pledge that was acceptable to Wilson . . . that 'Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and with-

out safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."—C. Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War (Chronicles of America Series, v. 48, pp. 51-52, 53-56)*.—See also LUSITANIA CASE; WORLD WAR: 1915: XI. Politics and diplomacy: c; 1.

1915 (June).—First German reply to American protests.—Excuses and regrets.—"The German Government took its time about replying [to American notes], and not until May 28 did it transmit its answer [which reached us in June]. Reparation was promised for the attack on the *Gulflight*, on the ground that a mistake had been made by the submarine commander, but ruthless submarine warfare and the sinking of the *Falaba* and *Lusitania* were defended on the ground of 'just self-defense.' The evidence seems to show that the Germans did not take our protest very seriously."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times, p. 404*.—The verity of the attack on the *Cushing* was doubted, and evidence was asked for.

1915 (June).—League to Enforce Peace.—"As the outgrowth of a series of meetings held in the Century Club, New York, terminating in a call for a conference signed by a National Provisional Committee of 109 members headed by ex-president Taft, an organization known as the League to Enforce Peace, American Branch, was formed on June 17, 1915, in Independence Hall, Philadelphia."—*New York Times Current History, July, 1915, p. 667*.—A foreshadowing of the post-war League of Nations appeared in the resolutions, which included as a main clause, the following: "We, therefore, believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations."

1915 (June).—Protests by Central Powers against trade with Allies.—Volume of trade.—Return of prosperity.—As the war progressed, "enforcement of a strict neutrality became very difficult. The chief problems arose from the pro-German demand for an embargo on munitions, and from a series of acts of violence intended to frustrate the government's well-reasoned policy of permitting the exportation of munitions under the usual rules of international law. As matters stood, the Entente powers were reaping from their control of the seas the tremendous advantage of being able, as their opponents were not, to import munitions from America in unlimited quantities; and it is not surprising that all of the resources of Teutonic argument, organization, and diplomacy were brought to bear to overcome the handicap. . . . In notes of April 4 and June 29, 1915, the Berlin and Vienna governments pressed this point with ail possible ingenuity. Sound objections could be brought against the trade in munitions, but the contention that it was unneutral failed to carry conviction. . . . As was explained by Secretary Lansing in his reply to the Austrian protest, August 12, 1915, the United States, accustomed to rely on small defensive forces and on the right and power to purchase arms and ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack, was the last nation in the world that could afford to establish a precedent of the kind that was asked. The refusal of the government to modify its attitude was followed by a campaign of violence, intended to check by direct action the manufacture and exportation of munitions. Incendiary fires destroyed or damaged munitions plants; bombs were concealed aboard British, French, and Italian merchant-vessels, and several ships were damaged or sunk; strikes were fomented among seamen and employees of arms and ammunition factories. Re-

sponsibility for these acts was often impossible to fix [though both the German and the Austrian ambassadors in Washington, Von Bernstorff and Dumba are now known to have been instigators]."

—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917, pp. 331-333*.—The munition trade of which the Central Powers complained had by this time reached enormous proportions. "After the paralyzing effect of the news that war was declared had worn away, business men here realized the great opportunity about to be afforded them of furnishing war supplies which must soon be in demand. Their expectations were soon fulfilled, as almost immediately most of the Governments sent commissions to the United States. . . . It was not long until mills and factories were being operated to capacity, turning out boots and shoes, blankets, sweaters, socks, underwear. . . . The situation was different in relation to filling orders for arms and ammunition. At first, as was natural, this business was placed with concerns engaged in the manufacture of these commodities. Shortly they were swamped with orders, and to be able to fill them plants were enlarged, new equipment added, and additional help employed. More and more orders came pouring in, and, as the arms and munition houses were by this time up to and some over capacity, acceptance by them of further business was impossible. Here, then, was the opportunity for the manufacturers of rails, rivets, electrical and agricultural machinery, locomotives, . . . to secure their share of this enormous business being offered."—G. W. Porter, *American war supplies, European War (New York Times Current History, v. 4, 1915, p. 961)*.—See also COMMERCE: Commercial age: 1914-1921.

1915 (July).—Final *Lusitania* note to Germany. See WORLD WAR: 1915: XI. Politics and diplomacy: c, 2.

1915 (July).—German wireless plant taken over by United States government.—In the early summer of 1915, the *Providence Journal* was able to furnish the government with evidence which connected the German embassy in Washington with revolutionary elements in Mexico, and which led to the arrest of Huerta, the ex-president of Mexico. Huerta had come from Spain to America in April, and established himself on Long Island. When arrested, he was on his way to Mexico, where, with the aid of the German embassy, he was to stir up another revolution, and, if possible, bring on war with the United States. Huerta's death occurred early in July soon after his arrest. The plot was exposed through wireless messages which came into the possession of the *Providence Journal*. Accordingly, "on July 8 the wireless station at Sayville, Long Island, owned apparently by the Atlantic Communication Company, but really by the great Telefunken Company of Berlin, was taken over by the Federal Government."—J. B. McMaster, *United States in the World War, p. 169*.

1915 (August).—*Arabic* torpedoed.—Incidents which tended to show Germany's contempt for American rights on the sea continued. On July 9, the *Orduna* with twenty-one Americans aboard was attacked by a submarine; on July 25, the *Leelanaw*, an American freighter, was sunk. "The climax of German effrontery came on August 20th. The White Star liner *Arabic*, bound from Liverpool to New York, was sunk off the coast of Ireland. Forty-four passengers, of whom two were American citizens, lost their lives. Ambassador Bernstorff made a public statement on August 24th, serving notice that he had asked the American Government to withhold judgment on this case. 'If Americans should actually have lost their lives,'

he said, 'this would naturally be contrary to our intentions.' The sinking of the *Arabic* raised a storm of indignation in the United States."—W. L. McPherson, *Short history of the Great War*, p. 165.—See also ARABIC.—Eventually, the German government disavowed the act of the submarine commander who sank the *Arabic*, and offered indemnity for the lives of the Americans.

1915 (August-September).—**Revolution in Haiti.**—**American protectorate.**—Revolutionary disorders which broke out in Haiti early in 1915 made it necessary for American marines from the gunboat, *Wheeling*, to occupy Plaines, Ouanamethes, Fort Liberte, and Limonade, in protection of American interests. "Financial bankruptcy of the Government and the efforts of the United States to remedy it were the principal causes of the revolutionary disturbances recounted above. The United States stood ready to take charge of the financial situation, but there was much opposition to this plan. . . . The continued revolution forced the United States to intervene actively and take possession of the custom houses in August and September. Greater pressure was then brought to bear upon the Government to secure a convention, which would put an end to the conditions of anarchy. The treaty which was signed on Sept. 16, provided for the establishment of a receivership of customs and supervision of the finances under American control, and the formation of American constabulary under command of American officers. The treaty, which was for ten years, was ratified by the Haitian Congress in November."—R. R. Hill, in *American Year Book*, 1915, p. 129.—The American Senate ratified the treaty in February, 1916.—See also DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; HAITI, REPUBLIC OF: 1911-1916.

1915 (August-October).—**Pan-American conference.**—**Recognition of Carranza as president of Mexico.**—"In June, 1915, when the entire northern section of Mexico had been made desolate by conflict, and when even in the capital the people were starving because of the stoppage of railway traffic, President Wilson invited the diplomatic representatives of six Central and South American states—the 'A B C powers' [Argentina, Brazil, and Chile] and Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala—to meet to formulate plans for a provisional Mexican government. By October Carranza was again in possession of Mexico City, with a fair chance of bringing the entire country under control; and the new inter-American conference, sitting at Washington, decided to recommend his recognition. Accordingly, on October 19 the United States and eight of the republics of Central and South America formally recognized 'the de facto government of Mexico of which General Carranza is head.' An American embargo on arms designed for use against the triumphant chieftain was reimposed, and diplomatic relations, after a break of more than two and a half years, were resumed. Recognition by the principal European nations speedily followed."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, pp. 295-296.—See also MEXICO: 1914-1915.

1915 (September).—Attempts to promote strikes in munition plants.—Recall of Austrian ambassador requested.—German intrigue in the United States made itself even more manifest as the year progressed. "It was becoming plain that German and Austrian officials were definitely promoting the attacks on munition plants. . . . The specific evidence that was lacking was discovered when on August 30 the British authorities arrested at Falmouth, James F. J. Archibald, an American

citizen traveling on a neutral ship to Vienna by way of Amsterdam. On his person was found a letter from the Austrian ambassador, Dr. Dumba, to the Austrian foreign minister, Baron Burian, describing plans for strikes in American munition plants by which it was thought 'we can disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, which, in the opinion of the German Military Attaché, is of great importance and amply outweighs the expenditure of money involved.' The writer asked for authority to proceed with the plans and suggested that he be informed by wireless telegraph. When this document reached the United States the president [September 9] caused a prompt demand to be made for the recall of Dr. Dumba."—J. S. Bassett, *Our war with Germany*, pp. 36-37.—The note sent to the Austro-Hungarian government read in part, as follows: "Believing that the Imperial and Royal Government will realize that the Government of the United States has no alternative but to request the recall of Mr. Dumba on account of his improper conduct, the Government of the United States expresses its deep regret that this course has become necessary and assures the Imperial and Royal Government that it sincerely desires to continue the cordial relations which exist between the United States and Austria-Hungary." . . . "Dr. Dumba, to escape humiliation, asked to be allowed to depart on a leave of absence, but the president did not consider such a mode of withdrawal sufficiently striking under the circumstances and denied the request. Then the Austro-Hungarian government formally recalled their ambassador, who set sail for a neutral port in Europe after the British government had granted a safe conduct through the region patrolled by their navy. The departure of this meddling diplomat occasioned great satisfaction in the United States, where pro-German espionage had excited much feeling. Still greater relief was felt when in the following December the government demanded the recall of Captain von Papen, the military attaché, and Captain Boy-ed, the naval attaché, of the German government on the ground that they were not acceptable to our government."—J. S. Bassett, *Our war with Germany*, p. 37.—"It was not only in the East that such deeds had been done. Agents of Germany had been busy on the Pacific coast, falsifying manifests to clear ships laden with supplies for German cruisers, plotting the destruction of bridges and tunnels in Canada, and hiring men to place bombs on board of ships carrying munitions of war. In December, in San Francisco, Charles C. Crowley, a detective in the employ of the German consulate, Baron George William von Brincken, the Vice Consul General, and a woman were indicted for conspiracy to interfere with and destroy commerce with the Allies, and use the mails to incite arson, murder and assassination by burning certain buildings of munition making firms at Ishpeming, Michigan, and Pinole, California. . . . More arrests followed as the plot developed until in February, 1916, thirty-two conspirators were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury."—J. B. McMaster, *United States in the World War*, p. 190.

1915 (October).—Warning to travelers.—In October the secretary of state issued a warning against unnecessary travel in European countries, which read in part, as follows: "American citizens are advised to avoid visiting unnecessarily countries which are at war, and particularly to avoid, if possible, passing through or from a belligerent country to a country which is at war therewith. It is especially important that naturalized Ameri-

can citizens refrain from visiting their countries of origin and countries which are at war therewith. It is believed that Governments of countries which are in a state of war do not welcome aliens who are traveling merely for curiosity or pleasure. Under the passport regulations prescribed by the President January 12, 1915, passports issued by this Government contain statements of the names of countries which the holders expect to visit and the objects of their visits thereto. The department does not deem it appropriate or advisable to issue passports to persons who contemplate visiting belligerent countries merely for 'pleasure,' 'recreation,' 'touring,' 'sight-seeing,' etc."

1915 (October-December).—Growth of societies for relief in Belgium and northern France. See INTERNATIONAL RELIEF: Relief in Belgium and northern France.

1915 (December).—Controversy with Austria-Hungary over sinking of *Ancona*.—"Late in 1915 an issue arose with Austria-Hungary over the *Ancona* case. On November 7th this Italian liner was attacked in the Mediterranean by an Austro-Hungarian submarine. She tried to escape, and was halted. Later she was sunk and the boats to which the crew and passengers took were fired on. [See also ANCONA.] Nine American passengers were drowned. Ambassador Penfield was instructed to ask for an explanation. On November 14th the Austro-Hungarian Admiralty issued a statement exculpating itself. The United States was not satisfied with this *ex parte* justification and on December 6th demanded that the government of the Dual Monarchy 'denounce the sinking as an illegal and indefensible act,' punish the U-boat commander, and offer reparation. Vienna assumed a haughty tone at first, barely noticing the suggestion of the American note. On December 10th our State Department renewed its demands. Germany didn't want the submarine issue reopened in an aggravated form. She brought pressure to bear on her ally. The government at Vienna then reversed itself. On December 29th a note was sent to the United States, agreeing that the obligations of humanity must be lived up to, even in war; accepting the principle that 'hostile private vessels, in so far as they do not flee or offer resistance, may not be destroyed without the persons on board having been placed in safety'; announcing the punishment of the U-boat commander, and promising reparation. The year ended, therefore, with a partial renunciation by both Germany and Austria-Hungary of the illegal practices against which the United States had protested."—W. L. McPherson, *Short history of the Great War*, pp. 162-167.

1915 (December).—Pan-American Scientific Congress in Washington. See PAN-AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS.

1915 (December).—Henry Ford's "Peace Ship."—Pacifist activities were steadily on the increase in 1915. Many associations were formed; but probably the strangest manifestation of pacifism was the "Peace Ship." "Late in 1915 Mr. Henry Ford, wealthy philanthropist of Detroit, announced a commission to go to Europe 'to get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas.' He chartered a ship and sailed on December 4 with a party of well meaning guests who had little idea of the magnitude of the task they had assumed. Mr. Ford seems to have thought that the only thing necessary was to give every government an opportunity to say that it had fought as long as it wished, whereupon by common consent all would suspend their combats and go home. He was too practical to hold this view after arriving on the

other side of the ocean and seeing what the world war was. He abandoned his scheme and his party came home ingloriously. The ridicule with which the newspapers overwhelmed it served to take the edge off our too enthusiastic pacifism. We came to see that human nature was what it had ever been and that enthusiasm could not change it over-night. But all the time the concept widened that as a nation we had a vital interest in the struggle and were concerned with its settlement."—J. S. Bassett, *Our war with Germany*, p. 65.

1915 (December).—President's marriage.—On Dec. 18, 1915, the president was married to Mrs. Edith Bolling Galt.

1915-1920.—Anti-trust decisions. See TRUSTS: United States: 1915-1920: Recent anti-trust decisions; 1915-1920: Steel corporation decisions.

1915-1921.—Rural recreation. See RECREATION: 1915-1921.

1915-1921.—Rapid deforestation.—Snell Bill. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1915-1921.

1916.—Events in the Caribbean.—"The year 1916 may be taken as marking the end of a definite period of American foreign policy toward the Caribbean and the beginning of a new. It was in that year that the 'military occupation' of Santo Domingo was announced. That same year first saw the Panama Canal in full operation. Then the Haitian treaty of 1915 was actually ratified and put into effect. During 1916 the United States ratified the Nicaraguan treaty of 1913, and refused to pay heed to the protests of Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and Colombia and to the decision—adverse to the treaty—rendered by the Central American Court of Justice. During 1916 proceedings for the purchase of the Virgin Islands were brought to a head, though formally closed early in the following year. Except for minor instances involving territory, and curious disputes with Panama . . . we have since then acquired no land nor have we used armed force involving internal interference. It will further be noted that the beginning of 1917 marked the withdrawal of American troops from Mexico, and the major portion of them even from the Mexican border. After 1916 came the war. The Caribbean was virtually empty of ships of war save those of the United States. . . . 'The heretofore practically landlocked and internationally unimportant Caribbean republics,' it has been said, 'have acquired a strategic importance which has brought them into international prominence.' St. Thomas, 'one of the finest protected harbors in the West Indies and admirably suited for a naval base, known as 'the Gibraltar of the West Indies,' was acquired at this time, 'particularly for strategic purposes,' as is generally recognized. While American troops in France were helping to push the frontiers of freedom eastward across Europe, the United States Navy was extending its sway southward over the waters of the blue Caribbean. The heavy fortifications established at the Panama Canal, the exclusive privileges gained over the Nicaraguan route, and the possession of Guantanamo were all taken advantage of to insure American strategic control of these seas. . . . All the wartime talk about the 'frontiers of freedom' and 'the rights of small nations' and 'self-determination' and 'making the world safe for democracy' . . . was accepted as the true political faith in tropical waters. These people never thought of looking upon it—as less philosophical and more practical nations might have done—as mere belligerent propaganda enunciated simply 'for the period of the emergency.' Some

of their liberal elements have continued to believe in the high moral qualities of our foreign policy. Cuban liberals in 1916 suggested that the United States supervise and insure fair elections."—E. Colby, *United States paramount in the Caribbean* (*New York Times Current History*, November, 1923).

1916.—Founding of National Research Council. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL.

1916.—Migratory bird treaty with England. See TREATIES, MAKING AND TERMINATION OF: Treaty making power.

1916.—Bryan-Chamorro Treaty with Nicaragua signed. See NICARAGUA: 1913-1916.

1916 (January-April).—Status of armed merchant vessels.—Through the early months of 1916 a controversy was carried on over the status of armed merchant vessels of the Allies, which the Central Powers insisted should be treated as war vessels. On January 18, Secretary Lansing addressed a note to the Allies, suggesting that merchant vessels should not be armed. This document read, in part, as follows: "Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against enemy commerce on the high seas had been conducted with cruisers carrying heavy armaments. In these conditions international law appeared to permit a merchant vessel to carry armament for defensive purposes without lessening its character as a private merchant vessel. This right seems to have been predicated on the superior defensive strength of ships of war, and the limitation of armament to have been dependent on the fact that it could not be used effectively in offensive against enemy naval vessels, while it could defend the merchantmen against the generally inferior armament of piratical ships and privateers. The use of the submarine, however, has changed these relations. Comparison of the defensive strength of a cruiser and a submarine shows that the latter, relying for protection on its power to submerge, is almost defenseless in point of construction. Even a merchant ship carrying a small-caliber gun would be able to use it effectively for offense against the submarine. . . . If a submarine is required to stop and search a merchant vessel on the high seas, and in case it is found that she is of an enemy character and that conditions necessitate her destruction and the removal to a place of safety of persons on board, it would not seem just nor reasonable that the submarine should be compelled, while complying with these requirements, to expose itself to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the merchant vessel. . . . I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the character of the submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent Government and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly."—*Congressional Record*, Mar. 2, 1916.—"To these suggestions the allies replied in identic memoranda on March 23, 1916, declining to leave human life, without guarantees, 'to the mercy of an enemy who, in circumstances of this kind, as in many others, has shown himself to be both faithless and lawless.' The following day the *Sussex* was sunk by a submarine, confirming the position taken by the allies. . . . The armament problem was settled in a note issued on April 7 to the satisfaction of the Entente allies. . . . It was agreed that armed merchantmen were to be allowed in our ports when the authorities were convinced that the guns were to be used for defense only; and the presence of guns on a

merchantman at sea was not to be taken as evidence that it was a warship."—J. S. Bassett, *Our war with Germany*, pp. 55-56.—See also ARMED MERCHANTMEN.

1916 (February).—McLemore resolution.—The notice of the German and Austrian governments, February 10, that armed merchant ships would be sunk on sight, caused considerable alarm in certain factions of Congress. "Despite the general approval of the President's firm stand against Germany, there was an inclination in some quarters to do everything possible to avoid a conflict, even if the effort necessitated the relinquishment of rights that had hitherto been well recognized. In February, 1916, Representative McLemore introduced a resolution requesting the President to warn American citizens to refrain from traveling on armed belligerent vessels, whether merchantmen or otherwise and to state that if they persisted they would do so at their own peril. The House, according to the Speaker, was prepared to pass the resolution. The positions taken on this subject by the administration had not been entirely consistent, but the President was now holding that Americans had the right under international law to travel on such vessels and that the government could not honorably refuse to uphold them in exercising their right. 'Once accept a single abatement of right,' he asserted, 'and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece.' Moreover he felt that the conduct of international relations lay in the hands of the executive and that divided counsels would embarrass him in dealing with Germany. He therefore asked the House to discuss the McLemore resolution at once and come to a vote. Under this pressure the House gave way and tabled the resolution, ninety-three Republicans joining with 182 Democrats against thirty-three Democrats and 102 Republicans."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War* (*United States*, v. 3, p. 565).—See also McLEMORE RESOLUTION.

1916 (February-October).—Case of the *Appam*.—"On February 1, the British steamer, *Appam*, arrived at Newport News in charge of a German crew. She carried also, in addition to her passengers and certain Germans whom she had been taking to England as prisoners, the crews of seven other British vessels."—*American Year Book*, 1916, p. 76.—The *Appam* was made the subject of legal proceedings and finally adjudged the property of her owners.—See also APPAM; WORLD WAR: 1916: IX. Naval operations: c.

ALSO IN: J. B. Scott, *Case of the Appam* (*American Journal of International Law*, October, 1916).


1916 (February-November).—Political issues.—Conventions and platforms for the presidential election.—Attitude of Roosevelt.—Large popular votes.—"At the dawn of the presidential year 1916 the political situation was confused. The country was very prosperous, and the people were in a money-getting, rather than a heroic, mood. The Administration was fortified by a brilliant record of reform. Never had platform pledges been redeemed so faithfully; never had such a mass of constructive legislation been put on the statute book in a period so brief. Foreign relations, however, had not been so well handled; and in the differences of opinion on foreign policy, and on internal questions whose roots ran back into the foreign situation, lay the basis of a stirring contest. 'Watchful waiting' in Mexico invited discussion; on the government's attitude toward Germany and

other European belligerents opinion was already deeply divided; in the background lowered the problem of national 'preparedness.' Still, there was much reason for supposing that the unhealed breach in the Republican party would give the Democrats another easy, perhaps inglorious, victory. As the national conventions approached, it became more certain that the campaign would turn on questions of foreign policy. The attack of Villa's bandits on Columbus, New Mexico, March 9, gave the Mexican situation a serious turn [see MEXICO: 1916-1917]; the position of the United States as a neutral in the world war offered fresh difficulties and humiliations; the mobilization of the National Guard on the Rio Grande border disclosed the nation's inability to meet such emergencies; the President's belated conversion to preparedness yielded legislation which many well-informed people judged inadequate. In articles in the *Metro-politan Magazine*, and in addresses, Roosevelt belabored the Administration for inconsistency and timidity."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress*, pp. 367-368.—"The Republicans and the Progressives planned to meet in Chicago on June 7 for the nomination of candidates, in the hope that the two parties might unite upon a single nominee and platform, and thus defeat Wilson who was sure to be the Democratic candidate. At first, however, the two wings of the Republican party were in complete disagreement. As far as principles went they had not thoroughly recovered from the schism of 1912. For their candidate the Progressives looked only to Roosevelt, whom the Republicans would not have. Roosevelt himself refused to enter any fight for a nomination and announced, 'I will go further and say that it would be a mistake to nominate me unless the country has in its mood something of the heroic.' After conferences between Republican and Progressive leaders which failed to bring about unanimity, the Republican convention nominated Justice Charles E. Hughes of the Supreme Court [with Chas. W. Fairbanks for vice president], and the Progressives chose Roosevelt [with John M. Parker as vice presidential nominee]. Hughes was a reformer by nature, recognized as a man of high principles, courageous, able and remembered as a vigorous and popular governor of New York. The Republican platform called for neutrality in the European war, peace and order in Mexico, preparedness for national defence, a protective tariff and women's suffrage. It also advocated some of the economic legislation favored by the Progressives in 1912. The Progressive platform laid most emphasis on preparation for military defence—a navy of at least second rank, a regular army of 250,000 and a system for training a citizen soldiery. It also urged labor legislation, a protective tariff and national regulation of industry and transportation. The Republican platform severely denounced the administration, but the Progressives stated merely their own principles. . . . Subsequently Roosevelt issued a declaration expressing his satisfaction with Hughes, condemning Wilson and urging all Progressives to join in defeating the Democrats. Such an action would, of course, spell the doom of the Progressives as a political organization, but he declared that the people were not prepared to accept a new party and that the nomination of a third party candidate would merely divide the Republicans and ensure a Democratic victory. The action of Roosevelt commended itself to a majority of the National Committee, but a minority were displeased and supported Wilson. The Democrats met at St. Louis on June 14 and renominated President Wil-

son [and Vice President Thomas R. Marshall] in a convention marked by harmony and enthusiasm."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War (United States, v. 3, pp. 567-568)*.—The Socialist nominee for the presidency was Allen L. Benson, of Yonkers, New York, known as a writer of books and magazine articles on economic and political subjects. The platform of the Socialist party declared, as usual, for a reorganization of economic life, and denounced preparedness for national defense as false, unnecessary, and dangerous. The Socialist Labor party chose for its presidential candidate Arthur E. Reimer, with Caleb Harrison as his running mate. The Prohibition party, which held its convention in St. Paul in July, nominated J. Frank Hanly of Indianapolis for president, and Dr. Ira Landrith, of Nashville, for vice president. "Wilson and his campaign managers were slow to open the struggle. Vance McCormick was his manager; Josephus Daniels, a veteran of many party struggles, lent a hand at times; and Colonel House, still a new figure in public affairs, kept in touch with the Democratic headquarters. Mr. Bryan canvassed the Western states for many weeks, thus performing a service which Clay had refused for Taylor in 1848 and Seward had only grudgingly done for Lincoln in 1860. Francis J. Heney of California, Bainbridge Colby of New York, and others of the former Progressive party gave public support to Wilson. In this team-play of the Democrats and positive assistance of leaders who had formerly worked with Roosevelt there was evidence of good political ability as well as genuine progressiveness in the President. . . . Early in September, Wilson took up his residence at Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, whence he sent forth his notification speech. In that document he said: 'We have in four years come very near to carrying out the platform of the Progressive party as well as our own.' He declared that Labour had been emancipated, rehearsed the long list of economic reforms, and then took up the more delicate matter of the American foreign relations. . . . The German-American Alliance did its utmost to bring Wilson to disaster. Their influence had been made manifest in the Republican convention."—W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, pp. 168, 190-192.—The Wilson campaign received considerable impetus early in the fall by what is known as the O'Leary incident. "An Irish agitator named Jeremiah O'Leary, who had been organizing and speaking against the President and trying to array the Irish vote against him, wrote an offensive letter to the President, calling attention to the results of the Maine elections and to the New Jersey primaries, and to his anticipated defeat in November. The President handed to the newspaper men the following reply to O'Leary: 'I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them.' This sharp and timely rebuke to the unpatriotic spirit to which O'Leary gave expression won the hearty and unanimous approval of the country to the President. Nothing like this bold defiance came from Hughes until a few days before the election. . . . While the Republican candidate was busily engaged in invading the West in his swing around the circle, the Democratic candidate each week from his porch at Shadow Lawn was delivering sledge-hammer blows at the Republican breast-works."—J. P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I know him*, pp. 214-215.—"Beyond appealing to their legislative record, the Democrats gave attention chiefly to answering the charges brought

against their conduct of foreign affairs. They freely admitted that Mexican relations were in an unsatisfactory state; but they argued that a firmer course would have meant war and probable annexation, which the people did not want. They asserted that, without making unreasonable concessions to the belligerents of Europe, the country had been saved from the disaster of war with any one of them. . . . In speech-making tours which reached every important section of the country except the far South, the [Republican] candidate failed to develop any constructive program of domestic and foreign policy to which the party could summon the country on lofty lines."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress*, pp. 376, 378.—"The result of the balloting on November 7 was in doubt for several days because the outcome hinged on the votes of California and Minnesota, either of which would turn the scale. In the end Wilson was found to have received 9,128,837 votes and Hughes 8,536,380. The

1916 (March).—Renewed trouble in Mexico.—Villa's raid across the border.—United States military expedition.—In Mexico, Carranza, whose de facto government the United States had recognized, "proved wholly unable to maintain order, and the northern states continued to be overrun by brigands, threatening such American and other foreign interests as remained. Villa kept up vigorous opposition; he was furious at the recognition of Carranza and, with everything to gain and nothing to lose, was ready to bring on a general war of his country with the United States. To this end he swept with a force of several hundred bandits across the Rio Grande, and on March 9, 1916, fell on the little town of Columbus, New Mexico, and inflicted considerable losses of both life and property before retreating into Chihuahua. . . . [Marcilino Danalas, Carranza's foreign minister, at once offered his government's regrets, and asked for patience on the part of the American



ELECTION MAP OF THE UNITED STATES, 1916

vote in the electoral college was 277 to 254. The outcome was remarkable in several respects. Each candidate received a larger popular vote than had ever before been cast; Wilson won without New York or any of the other large eastern states, finding his support in the South and the Far West; each side was able to get satisfaction from the result, the Republicans because their party schism was sufficiently healed to enable them to divide the House of Representatives evenly with their opponents, and the Democrats because their candidate was successful in states which elected Republican senators and governors by large majorities."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War* (*United States*, v. 3, p. 573).—For the first time in the history of the United States, a woman, Miss Jeannette Rankin of Montana, was sent to Congress by this election.

ALSO IN: *Nineteenth Century*, Dec., 1916.—W. E. Dodd, *Social and economic background of Woodrow Wilson* (*Journal of Political Economy*, May, 1917).—J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time*.

people.] On March 10 President Wilson announced that, 'in aid of the constituted authorities of Mexico', and 'with scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of that republic', an adequate force would at once be sent in pursuit of Villa; and General Funston, commander of the Southern Department, was ordered to organize and despatch a punitive expedition. Carranza reluctantly gave his consent. . . . On March 15 two columns, numbering six thousand men, moved across the New Mexican boundary under command of Brigadier-General Pershing. Other troops were sent in succeeding weeks to hold a line that in a month's time reached Parrall, four hundred miles from the point of departure. It was a matter of no difficulty, however, for the bandits to keep out of reach."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress*, 1907-1917, pp. 297-298.—On April 19, Generals Scott and Funston met General Obregon, Mexican secretary of war, on the Mexican border. A conference was held, and an agreement reached, which provided for the policing of the border by Mexican forces. Carranza, however, refused to sign it. "Many of the Mexican

people viewed the expedition as a 'Gringo invasion,' and Carranza repeatedly protested against the continued presence of the troops on Mexican soil. In the middle of June General Trevino announced that he would not permit the movement of American troops in any direction except toward the border. Soon afterward a clash took place at Carrizal, and a force of American colored cavalry were defeated and scattered, with a loss of about twenty killed and seventeen captured. The immediate release of the prisoners was demanded and was soon conceded. In view of the threatening state of Mexican affairs, President Wilson had ordered out practically all of the National Guard, and he sent most of them to the border to do patrol duty. The mobilization was badly conducted, and the weakness of the American military system was again revealed. It was expected by many that vigorous action would at last be taken in Mexico, but the administration resumed its 'watchful waiting.' General Pershing was condemned to inaction, and early in 1917 his force was withdrawn from Mexico altogether."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*, p. 394.—See also MEXICO: 1916-1917; YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: World War activities: 1916-1917.

1916 (March)—Creation of Council of National Defense. See NATIONAL DEFENCE, COUNCIL OF.

1916 (March-May).—Further submarine sinkings.—Attack on the *Sussex*.—Unsatisfactory German reply to American protest.—"The lawlessness of German submarine practices was illustrated again in the case of the passenger-boat *Sussex*, which was entirely unarmed, mounting not even a signal-gun, and used on the English Channel route from Folkestone to Dieppe. She was carrying over four hundred passengers, including twenty-five American citizens, and was attacked on March 24 by a German submarine about three o'clock in the afternoon, killing or injuring eighty persons, two of whom were Americans. The questions involved were clear. . . . In the latter half of March a number of boats with Americans on board were torpedoed without warning, including the *Eagle Point*, the *Englishman*, and the *Manchester Engineer*. With regard to the *Sussex*, therefore, the State Department immediately directed an inquiry to Berlin to ascertain officially whether a German submarine had been responsible for the sinking. . . . After establishing the facts in the case, Washington sent a note to Berlin. . . . [which concluded as follows:] 'Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations.' . . . [In reply] Germany, though making a definite promise not to sink merchantmen without warning or without saving human lives, attempted to make this promise contingent upon some action on our part against Great Britain. . . . [In another note sent from the State Department, May 8, the Government of the United States made clear its attitude that it could not admit that the newly announced policy of Germany in regard to the rights of citizens of the United States was in any way dependent upon the conduct of any other Government.] If Germany was unwilling to accept this interpretation it

would be necessary for her to reopen the question. She did not do so and this, therefore, meant that she accepted the American position. In spite of past experiences the United States accepted this promise in good faith."—C. Gauss, *Why we went to war*, pp. 196-199, 201-204, 206.—See also SUSSEX.

1916 (May).—President Wilson's address before the League to Enforce Peace.—On May 27, President Wilson spoke at Washington before the League to Enforce Peace. His address, which indicated an important development in his attitude toward the European conflict and America's relation to it, contained the following significant passages: "We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and Asia. One observation on the causes of the present war we are at liberty to make, and to make it may throw some light forward upon the future, as well as backward upon the past. It is plain that this war could have come only as it did, suddenly and out of secret counsels, without warning to the world, without discussion, without any of the deliberate movements of counsel with which it would seem natural to approach so stupendous a contest. It is probable that if it had been foreseen just what would happen, just what alliances would be formed, just what forces arrayed against one another, those who brought the great contest on would have been glad to substitute conference for force. If we ourselves had been afforded some opportunity to apprise the belligerents of the attitude which it would be our duty to take, of the policies and practises against which we would feel bound to use all our moral and economic strength, and in certain circumstances even our physical strength also, our own contribution to the counsel, which might have averted the struggle, would have been considered worth weighing and regarding."—Woodrow Wilson, *Address delivered before the League to Enforce Peace (Independent, June 5, 1916)*.

1916 (June).—Army Act.—More preparedness agitation.—"With the Army and Navy Bills before Congress, both the general preparedness campaign and the controversy on Army reform methods were vigorously sustained. A monster preparedness parade in New York in May, headed by Mr. Edison, was followed by similar demonstrations at Chicago, Boston, and Washington. President Wilson, carrying a United States flag, marched at the head of the Washington procession. Under such stimulus the Army Bill [the Hay Act] became law in June. In its final form it provided for a larger force than had at first been proposed. The regular Army was raised from a nominal strength of 100,000 to 175,000, with reserves."—H. W. Harris, *President Wilson*, p. 201.

1916 (July).—Federal Aid Road Act.—Rural Credits Bill.—An important act signed by the president in July, 1916, authorized the secretary of agriculture to cooperate with the states in the construction of roads, provided that the legislature of any state has given assent to the provisions of the act. "The Federal Road Building Act provides that state and national governments shall contribute equally to construction. This law will develop good road building along right lines, stimulate larger farm production and better marketing, promote a fuller and more attractive rural life, and add greatly to the convenience and economic welfare of all the people."—*Wilson and labor* (Labor pamphlet, p.

16).—On July 17, the president signed the Rural Credits Bill. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1916-1922; RURAL CREDIT: United States: Federal Farm Loan Act.

1916 (July).—Preparedness parade in San Francisco.—Mooney case.—During a Preparedness Day parade in the city of San Francisco, on July 22, 1916, bombs were thrown, causing the death of ten persons and the injury of many others. "It will be remembered that in July, 1916, a preparedness parade was in progress in San Francisco, thousands of patriotic citizens being participants therein. During its progress, and while a portion of the parade was passing a corner of two streets, a bomb was exploded killing a number of people and wounding many more. [Thomas J.] Mooney and others were charged with these murders and one was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Mooney was also tried and convicted and sentenced to death. It was not denied that the woman, of whose murder Mooney was convicted, was the victim of a foul crime, but it was claimed that the defendant was not guilty. The record shows that while the parade was in progress a bomb was exploded causing a death-dealing explosion. The explosive was contained in a suitcase and operated by some sort of time device which took effect after the container had been deposited on the sidewalk near the site of the explosion. It was not possible to prove by direct evidence that this suitcase was deposited by Mooney, but the circumstances pointed to Mooney as the owner of the suitcase and that he with others had planned this diabolical occurrence with a view of terrorizing the people, who believed in preparedness and desired to make a demonstration of their convictions."—*Docket (American Law Review, May-June, 1918, p. 467)*.—Charges and counter charges were freely made, and the case attracted nation-wide attention for a number of years. Claims that evidence was manufactured against Mooney were set up both during and after the proceedings. Moreover, it was claimed that the trial was unfair. "Eye witnesses testified that they had seen an object thrown from the roof of a building at this corner, and that the explosion resulted immediately thereafter. The police began at once to search for the person who had thrown the bomb. Two hours after the explosion this search ended. A private detective, one Martin Swanson, who had previously been employed by the street-railway interests, appeared on the scene and took over the search. Testimony at the trials growing out of the crime brought out the fact that after the entrance of Swanson into the case, the police search came to an end. Swanson at once fixed the crime on Tom Mooney, a member of the International Molders' Union and a labor agitator who had been active in organizing the street railway workers. . . . Swanson made no investigation in his attempt to connect Mooney with the crime. He merely made the accusation against Mooney, Mrs. Mooney, Weinberg, and Billings, a member of the Machinists' Union, who had previously been convicted of carrying dynamite. He alleged that a conspiracy existed to kill the President of the United States, the governor of California and others; that this crime of July 22 was the beginning of a long series of similar crimes; that this plot was formed by Mooney and the others in carrying out their 'anarchistic doctrines.' . . . The case of Billings came to trial first. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Mooney's case was the next one called. No motive beyond that of the anarchistic conspiracy was alleged, nor was it proved that Mooney was an

anarchist; it was in fact proved that he was opposed to anarchism. . . . The star witness in the Mooney case was a man named Oxman who called himself a cattle dealer, and a millionaire. He claimed that he saw Mooney in Weinberg's car. In the back seat were Rena Mooney, the wife of T. J. Mooney, and Billings with a suitcase. At Stewart and Market Streets the party got out and Billings deposited the suitcase on the sidewalk. All this occurred after 1:40. . . . [Unbiased witnesses, however, stated that the explosion was caused by a falling object, and photographs were introduced to show that for some time before 1:40, and until after the parade was over, all traffic was kept off Market Street. Mooney was convicted and sentenced to be hung on May 17. An appeal was made at once, and was granted when it was shown conclusively that Oxman who was a resident of Illinois, not of Texas as he had claimed], had come to California at the invitation of his brother-in-law specifically to deliver certain testimony for money."—*American Labor Year Book, 1917-1918, pp. 80-83*.—In 1917, President Wilson appointed a Federal commission to enquire into the case. This commission reported on Jan. 16, 1918, as follows: "1. . . . Without question the explosion was murder—designed on a large scale, and its purpose was effectuated. Six people were killed outright and about forty wounded, of whom three or four subsequently died. Indisputably a most heinous crime had been committed, and the identification of its perpetrators alone had to be established. 2.—The community was deeply stirred. Aggressive activity was at once undertaken by the police department, and the press was filled with clues and theories for solution of the tragic mystery. No premonitory acts furnished a clue, except that a number of letters were mailed, prior to the parade, to prominent citizens and leaders in the parade threatening destruction if the parade was undertaken. These letters undoubtedly had a common source. They all vowed pacifist purposes, threats against such manifestations of 'militarism' as a preparedness parade was conceived by them to be. The public authorities, however, did not deem the letters significant and the identity of their writers has never been established. 3.—The police and district attorney turned for an explanation to a different quarter. Arrests were made of Thomas J. Mooney and his wife, Rena Mooney, Warren K. Billings, Israel Weinberg and Edward D. Nolan. 4.—The antecedents of these five persons, particularly of Thomas J. Mooney, have occasioned the war importance of the case. Mooney, at the time of his arrest, was a well-known labor radical on the Coast [and with his wife had been successful, in the spring of 1916, in organizing the car men of the United Railroads in San Francisco.] . . . 5.—The utilities against which Mooney directed his agitation or who suspected him of mischievous activities undoubtedly sought 'to get' Mooney. Their activities against him were directed by Swanson, private detective. It was Swanson who had engineered the investigation which resulted in Mooney's prosecution. It was Swanson who was active in the attempts to implicate Mooney in the dynamiting of electric towers in 1916, attempts which failed, it appears, because Billings and Weinberg refused offers of a 'reward' by Swanson to implicate Mooney. Shortly thereafter the Preparedness parade explosion occurs. Immediately Swanson takes a leading part, acting for the district attorney and the police in the investigation of the crime. Within four days, under Swanson's leadership, the arrest of Mooney and the others is made. 6.—

Instead of an ordinary criminal case, or even a case of extraordinary interest, there thus emerge elements of a clash of forces of wide significance. On the one hand, a community long in the grip of bitter labor struggles and outraged by peculiarly wicked murders. Accusation is made against a group whose leader has been widely associated with views which justify violence, at least in industrial conflict. The public mind was therefore easily aroused to a belief in the guilt of the accused. An attitude of passion was stimulated by all the arts of modern journalism. It is not surprising, then, that Billings and Mooney were tried in an impregnating atmosphere of guilt. On the other hand, just as Mooney symbolized labor for all the bitter opponents of labor, so he came to symbolize labor, irrespective of his personal merits, in the minds of workers and their sympathizers. 'The Mooney case' soon resolved itself into a new aspect of the old industrial feud instead of a subject demanding a calm search for the truth. 7.—Billings was tried first, undoubtedly in the hope that the pressure of his conviction would lead him to implicate Mooney. He was convicted. His conviction has been sustained. He has been sentenced to life imprisonment. He has not implicated Mooney and protests his innocence. Mooney was tried early in January, 1917, and in February, 1917, was convicted of murder in the first degree. Mrs. Mooney was tried and acquitted. . . . [Weinberg also was tried and acquitted. Nolan was not tried.] 8.— . . . Following the trials of Billings and Mooney there was a change in the evidence, which not only resulted in the acquittal of Mrs. Mooney and Weinberg, but also cast doubt upon the prior convictions of Billings and Mooney. Thus it is that evidence submitted on four trials, taken together, aimed as it was at the establishment of a single issue—their joint participation in the crime—leaves the mind in the greatest uncertainty as to the complicity of the accused. While each record in itself presents evidence which would justify the Appellate Court in sustaining the verdict of the jury, the evidence of the four cases in their entirety must shake confidence in the justice of the conviction. This is due to the dubious character of the witnesses, subsequent revelations concerning them and conflict in the testimony of the same witnesses as the need for change in the testimony developed to fit new theories of the prosecution or new evidence by the defense. . . . 9.—We find in the atmosphere surrounding the prosecution and trial of the case ground for disquietude. This feeling has been reinforced by one factor of controlling importance. The most damaging testimony produced against Mooney came from a witness named Oxman. It was Oxman who testified, with convincing detail, to the presence of Mooney and Billings at the place and at the time where it was essential for them to have been if proof of their participation in the crime was to be established. After Mooney's conviction there came to light letters confessedly written by Oxman prior to his having been called to testify. The plain import of these letters is an attempt by Oxman to suborn perjury in corroboration of vital testimony which he was to give and which he did give against Mooney. It is true Oxman was tried for attempted subornation of perjury and acquitted, but this is beside the present consideration. The fact is he did write letters which tend completely to discredit any testimony he might give, and no testimony from Oxman, in the light of the letters, would receive credence necessary to lead to conviction. In fact, after the exposure of Oxman the district attorney did not

call him, though available, as a witness in the trial of Mrs. Mooney. When Oxman was discredited, the verdict against Mooney was discredited. 10.—As soon as the Oxman letters were disclosed, the judge who presided at Mooney's trial called upon the Attorney General of California to take steps toward a retrial of the case. We quote from Judge Griffin's letter to Attorney General Webb: 'As you will at once see, they bear directly upon the credibility of the witness and go to the very foundation of the truth of the story told by Oxman on the witness stand. Had they been before me at the time of the hearing of the motion for a new trial, I would unhesitatingly have granted it. Unfortunately the matter is now out of my hands jurisdictionally, and I am therefore addressing you, as the representative of the people on the appeal to urge upon you the necessity of such action on your part as will result in returning the case to this court for retrial. The letters of Oxman undoubtedly require explanation, and, so far as Mooney is concerned, unquestionably the explanation should be heard by a jury which passes upon the question of his guilt or innocence.—I fully appreciate the unusual character of such a request coming from the trial court in any case and I know of no precedent therefor. In the circumstances of this case, I believe that all of us who were participants in the trial concur that right and justice demand that a new trial of Mooney should be had in order that no possible mistake shall be made in a case where a human life is at stake.' The Attorney General asked the Supreme Court that, in view of the Oxman exposure, the case should be returned to the trial court for a new trial. The Supreme Court, however, under the laws of California, found itself without jurisdiction to consider matters outside the record. The case now before the Court of Appeals is to be disposed of solely on errors appearing from the record of the trial. If the Supreme Court should find an error, reverse and grant a new trial, relief the situation needs would be provided. If the court finds the record discloses no reversible error, and, therefore, confirms the conviction, relief will have to be supplied through executive action of the Governor of California and co-operation of the prosecuting officers."—*Federal Commission condemns the frame-up in the "Mooney Case" (Commission's report, together with comments by the press of the nation, state officials and defense attorneys, pamphlet, 1918, pp. 1-3.)*—In 1919, the governor of California refused to listen to a plea for the release of Mooney, on the ground that he was convinced of the prisoner's guilt. But in September, 1920, a story was printed in the newspapers which tended to associate the German Consulate with the bomb outrage, and to exculpate Mooney. "Judge Griffith, of the Superior Court, before whom Mooney had been tried, sprung a sensation on November 16 when he announced that he had never been convinced of Mooney's guilt. He urged a re-trial. . . . [The District Attorney declared in November that he would re-open the case, and two members of the jury which had convicted the prisoner asked for a re-trial. The case was brought before the Grand Jury in December, when some sensational evidence was given. One witness, W. H. Taylor, stated that he had been an eye-witness to the explosion and that the man who carried the suit-case was not T. J. Mooney. Frank Macdonald, who at the trial had sworn that he had seen Mooney carrying the suit-case now confessed that he had committed perjury in so saying. Furthermore, he stated that Fickert, the district attorney

who had prosecuted Mooney, had induced him to say that he had seen Mooney place the bomb.] The Macdonald confession forced the Grand Jury to act, and on February 22, 1921, an official investigation was begun. Macdonald was called before the Grand Jury on March 1, but he refused to testify unless he was granted immunity. This the Grand Jury refused to grant. On March 9 District Attorney Brady announced that there would be no retrial of Mooney 'unless his friends succeed in bringing to the attention of the Grand Jury some new evidence that will show conclusively that the case was framed.' . . . [Mooney was brought into court in May. An order was issued for a re-trial on the ground that the prisoner had been convicted on perjured testimony, but the judge denied the application for a new trial], saying that he believed Mooney should have a new trial, but that the writ was not technically applicable to the case."—*American Labor Year Book, 1921-1922, pp. 201, 202.*—In October, 1923, the annual convention of the American Federation of Labor urged that the prisoner should be released; but no further action was taken.

ALSO IN: *Congressional Record, June 27, 1919, pp. 2037-2040.*—J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time.*

1916 (July).—*Voyage of the Deutschland.*—“On July 9 the German merchant submarine *Deutschland* entered the Chesapeake to discharge a cargo of German dyestuffs at Baltimore and take back a cargo of nickel and rubber to Germany.”—*American Year Book, 1916, p. 62.*—See also SUBMARINES: 1913-1920; DEUTSCHLAND.

1916 (August).—*Jones Act for the Philippines.*—On August 29, the president signed a bill, known as the Jones Act, which bestowed a far greater measure of self-government upon the inhabitants of the Philippine islands than they had hitherto enjoyed. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1913-1917.

1916 (August).—*Federal child labor law.*—“By 1916 the position of state child-labor regulation and of public sentiment upon the subject was wholly favorable to . . . long-delayed federal legislation. All of the leading parties demanded it in their national platforms, and when Congress showed a disposition to postpone action President Wilson intervened with complete success to turn the scale.”—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917, p. 93.*—“The Keating-Owen Child Labor Bill, as passed, provides that it is unlawful to ship from one State to another: (1) The product of any quarry or mine employing children under 16 years of age. (2) The products of any mill, cannery, workshop or factory employing children under 14 years of age or children from 14 to 16 years of age who work more than 8 hours per day, more than six days per week, or later than 7 p. m. or require such children to get to work before 7 a. m. President Wilson directly intervened on behalf of the passage of this bill, insisting that it be not deferred until the December session, and through his efforts it has become law.”—*Wilson and labor* (Labor pamphlet, p. 13).—This law was later declared unconstitutional.—See also CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1916-1922.

1916 (August-September).—*Threatened railroad strike prevented by Adamson law.*—“In the midst of the [election] campaign the demands of railway engineers, firemen, conductors, and trainmen for an eight-hour day and other concessions precipitated a serious crisis. Suggestions were made that the dispute should be submitted to the Federal Board of Mediation and Conciliation, a body created in 1913, but the brotherhoods re-

fused. Late in August President Wilson called a conference of the brotherhood chairmen and railway managers, but he was unable to persuade them to compromise. On August 28 the brotherhood representatives left the capital bearing orders for a strike to begin on September 4. On the 29th Wilson asked Congress for remedial legislation. A hundred hours later a measure known as the Adamson Eight-Hour Law was ready for his approval.”—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times, p. 415.*—See also ADAMSON LAW; ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1888-1921; RAILROADS: 1916.

1916 (September).—*Permanent tariff commission created.* See TARIFF: 1916: United States.

1916 (September).—*Federal Workmen's Compensation Act.* See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: United States: 1893-1918.

1916 (October).—*German U-Boat 53.*—Public opinion was roused to a high pitch when on October 7 the *U-53* appeared in Newport harbor, ostensibly to deliver a letter for the German ambassador, and on her journey back sank five steamers off Nantucket light ship, in the presence of a United States destroyer.—See also WORLD WAR: 1916: IX. Naval operations: b.

1916 (October).—*Correspondence with Great Britain regarding her "black list."*—In accordance with her Trading with the Enemy Act, Great Britain had drawn up a "black list" of persons with whom trade was forbidden. This action drew a strong protest from the United States government. The reply of the British government was forwarded On October 12. See BLACKLIST, COMMERCIAL.

1916 (December).—*German proposal for peace conference.*—President Wilson's request for definition of war aims.—*Effect of note at home and abroad.*—“His reflection gave to the President an opportunity for bringing before the world his international aims. He purposed not merely to end the existing conflict but also to provide a basis for permanent peace and the securing of democracy. During the early summer of 1916 he had received from Berlin hints that his mediation would not be unacceptable and it is possible that he planned at that time new efforts to bring the war to a close. But such a step was bound to be regarded as pro-German and in the state of opinion immediately after the *Sussex* crisis would have produced a storm of American protests. . . . Early in December, the President prepared to issue his note. But Germany acted more rapidly. Warned of Wilson's purpose the Berlin Government, on December 12, 1916, proposed negotiations. . . . The German note itself contained no definite terms. But its boastful tone permitted the interpretation that Germany would consider no peace which did not leave Central and Southeastern Europe under Teuton domination; the specific terms later communicated to the American Government in secret, verified this suspicion. A thinly veiled threat to neutral nations was to be read between the lines of the German suggestion of negotiations. Although it was obvious that he would be accused of acting in collusion with Germany, President Wilson decided not to postpone the peace note already planned. . . . Issued on December 18, 1916, his note summed up the chief points of his recently developed policy. It emphasized the interest of the United States in the future peace of the world, the irreparable injury to civilization that might result from a further continuance of the existing struggle, the advantages that would follow an explicit exposure of belligerent purposes, and the possibility of making 'the perma-

ment concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable."—C. Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War (Chronicles of America Series, v. 48, pp. 99-102)*.—The note was not received abroad, particularly in England, as the president had hoped. Walter H. Page, ambassador to Great Britain, "had informed the President, in the course of [an] interview of September 22nd [while on a visit to Washington], how unfavourably Great Britain regarded his efforts in the direction of peace; he had in fact delivered a message from the Foreign Office that any Presidential attempt to 'mediate' would be rejected by the Allies. Yet his earnest representation on this point had produced no effect upon Mr. Wilson. The pressure which Germany was bringing to bear upon Washington was apparently irresistible. Count Bernstorff's memoirs, with their accompanying documents, have revealed the intensity of the German efforts during this period; the most startling fact revealed by the German Ambassador is that the Kaiser, on October 9th, notified the President, almost in so many words, that, unless he promptly moved in the direction of peace, the German Government 'would be forced to regain the freedom of action which it has reserved to itself in the note of May 4th last.' It is unlikely that the annals of diplomacy contain many documents so cool and insolent as this one. It was a notification from the Kaiser to the President that the so-called 'Sussex pledge' was not regarded as an unconditional one by the Imperial Government; that it was given merely to furnish Mr. Wilson an opportunity to bring the war to an end; and that unless the Presidential attempt to accomplish this were successful, there would be a resumption of the indiscriminate submarine campaign. The curious developments of the next two months are now a familiar story. Possibly because the British Government had notified him, through Page, that his proffer of mediation would be unacceptable, Mr. Wilson moved cautiously and slowly, and Germany became impatient. . . . At any rate, on December 12th, just as Mr. Wilson was preparing to launch his own campaign for mediation, Germany herself approached her enemies with a proposal for a peace conference. . . . That President Wilson resented this German interference with his own plans is well known; he did not drop them, however, but on December 18th, he sent his long-contemplated peace communication to all the warring powers. . . . The popular indignation which this caused in Great Britain was so intense that it alarmed the British authorities. The publication of this note in the British press was withheld for several hours, in order to give the Government an opportunity to control the expression of editorial opinion; otherwise it was feared that this would be so unrestrained in its bitterness that relations with the United States might be imperilled."—B. J. Hendrick, *Life and letters of Walter H. Page, v. 2, pp. 199-201, 204-205*.—The president's note read, in part, as follows: "The President . . . feels altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world, which all desire and in which the neutral nations as well as those at war are ready to play their full responsible part. If the contest must continue to proceed towards undefined ends by slow attrition until the one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted, if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the

other there are no more to offer, if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle. The life of the entire world has been profoundly affected. Every part of the great family of mankind has felt the burden and terror of this unprecedented contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can be said in truth to stand outside its influence or to be safe against its disturbing effects. And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitely stated. The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definitive results, what actual exchange of guarantees, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success even, would bring the war to an end. It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable."—See also *WORLD WAR: 1916: XI. Peace proposals: b; b, 1; b, 2*.

1916-1917.—Campaign for preparedness.—Efforts of Roosevelt to arouse nation to a sense of its peril.—Resignation of Secretary of War Garrison.—Development of president's policy.—"Very early in the war, prominent Americans, among them Theodore Roosevelt, Congressman Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts, and General Leonard Wood, began urgently to advocate the need of a stronger army and navy to protect American rights. But the mass of the people proved apathetic, while pacifists and pro-Germans strongly opposed preparedness. Secretary Bryan declared that in case of need 'the United States could raise a million men between sunrise and sunset.' In his annual message of December 4, 1914, President Wilson argued at length against the need of special preparation, though he favored the development of the militia, and the extension of voluntary training. . . . Roosevelt had long been a biting critic of the administration, more especially of its foreign policy, both with regard to Mexico and Germany. He ardently advocated thorough military preparedness as the best insurance against war, and favored a vigorous enforcement, in the old-fashioned way, of American rights. . . . He declared that Wilson was strong in words but weak in action, that he had met a policy of 'blood and iron with a policy of milk and water'—that his course was 'worthy of a Byzantine logothete—but not of an American statesman.'"—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times, pp. 409, 412-413*.—Roosevelt's vigorous and persistent appeals to American pride and patriotism bore fruit in a continually increasing demand for military preparedness. "On the other hand, Wilson was assailed by pro-Germans [active in the German-American Alliance] and die-hard pacifists; the former believed that the British blockade justified Germany's submarine warfare; the latter were afraid even of strong language in diplomatic notes, lest it lead to war. . . . The President himself can-

not escape a large share of the blame for America's blindness to the issue. During the first twelve months of the war, when the country looked to him for leadership, he had, purposely or otherwise, fostered the forces of pacifism and encouraged the advocates of national isolation. He had underlined the separation of the United States from everything that went on in Europe and insisted that in the issues of the war the American people had no interest. In deference to the spirit of pacifism that engrossed the Middle West, he had opposed the movement for military preparedness. When, late in 1915, Wilson changed his attitude and attempted to arouse the country to a sense of American interest in world affairs and to the need of preparing to accept responsibility, he encountered the opposition of forces which he himself had helped to vitalize. . . . The 'preparedness movement' . . . was crystallized by the formation of the National Security League, designed to organize citizens in such a way 'as may make practical an intelligent expression of public opinion and may ensure for the nation an adequate system of national defense.' Pacifists and pro-Germans immediately organized in opposition; and the movement was hampered by President Wilson's unwillingness to cooperate in any way. He was flatly opposed, in the autumn of 1914 and the spring of the following year, to compulsory military service. . . . The preparedness movement, none the less, spread through the country and the influence of the National Security League did much to inform the public. In the summer of 1915 there was organized at Plattsburgh, New York, under the authority of General Wood, a civilian camp designed to give some experience in the rudiments of military science. It was not encouraged by the Administration, but at the end of the year the President himself confessed that he had been converted. He was about to abandon his policy of isolation for his new ideal of international service, and he realized the logical necessity of supporting it by at least a show of force. Mere negative 'neutrality' no longer sufficed. His fear that greater military strength might lead to an aggressive spirit in the country had been obliterated by the attacks of submarines and by the German plots. He admitted frankly that he had changed his mind."—C. Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War (Chronicles of America Series, v. 48, pp. 53, 68, 81-82)*.—"Well aware that his plan would be bitterly opposed in Congress, in his own party and by a large part of the people, especially in the Middle West, the President in January, 1916, set forth on a speaking tour that he might in this way explain the need of national preparedness and appeal for support directly to his fellow countrymen. The first speeches were made at New York City on January 27. . . . January 28, the President set off on his tour of the Middle West, spoke at Pittsburgh and Cleveland, and on the thirty-first reached Milwaukee. There he was in the hotbed of Socialism, in a city whose population was largely German-American and strongly pro-German. To them he said: 'I know that you are depending upon me to keep this nation out of war. So far I have done so, and I pledge you my word, that, God helping me, I will—if it is possible. You have laid another duty upon me. You have bidden me see that nothing stains or impairs the honor of the United States. And that is a matter not within my control. That depends upon what others do, not upon what the Government of the United States does, and therefore there may be at any moment a time when I cannot both preserve the honor and the peace of the United

States. Do not exact of me an impossible and contradictory thing, but stand ready, and insist that everybody who represents you should stand ready, to provide the means for maintaining the honor of the United States.' . . . When St. Louis was reached the tour came to an end. There the President said: 'So far as America is concerned, no man need go about preaching peace. We are disciples of peace already. But suppose my neighbor's house is on fire, and my roof is of combustible shingles, and the fire eats into the wood?' . . . The return of the President to Washington [on February 4] was quickly followed by the resignation of Mr. Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War. Since the opening of the year the House Committee on Military Affairs had been busy on a bill for national defense. . . . As to what should be the strength of the Regular Army differences in opinion were slight. But great differences existed as to the character of the force by which it was to be supported. General Scott, Chief of Staff, was for a continental army raised according to the plan of Secretary Garrison. . . . Mr. Hay, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, and the National Guard Association, which maintained an active lobby, were for the federalization of the National Guard. Against this plan Mr. Garrison, January 12, 1916, protested in a letter to the President. . . . The President replied, in substance, that he was ready to abandon the plan of the Secretary for a continental volunteer force and accept that of Mr. Hay for a Federalized militia if it would accomplish the desired result. Mr. Garrison then, January 14, 1916, restated his position briefly and forcibly, and January 17 the President replied that he understood his views. 'You believe, as I do, that the chief thing necessary is that we should have a trained citizen reserve, and that the training, organization and control of that reserve should be under immediate Federal direction. But apparently I have not succeeded in making my own position equally clear to you, though I feel sure that I have made it perfectly clear to Mr. Hay. It is that I am not irrevocably or dogmatically committed to any one plan of providing the nation with such a reserve, and am certainly willing to discuss alternative proposals.'—J. B. McMaster, *The United States in the World War, pp. 237-240*.—After some further correspondence, Secretary Garrison resigned, on Feb. 10, 1916, and the president appointed in his place Newton D. Baker.

1916-1917.—Negro migrations from South to North. See RACE PROBLEMS: 1905-1921.

1916-1917.—German refusal to state terms.—Allied war aims.—"It was natural in view of the recent German overtures for peace that there should have been some thought that the President's action favoured the German cause. Such a view overlooked the President's previous acts and oft repeated statements of purpose, as well as the pending controversies between the two countries. However, the nature of the President's action became more clear when the German response of December 26, 1916, was found to be a general acceptance only and decidedly not a response in the spirit of the President's request. On the other hand, the response of the Entente Allies, on January 10, 1917, in spite of . . . earlier manifestation of disapproval in England, was more detailed in statement of aim and purpose, and thus came much nearer meeting the President's request. Their definiteness, however, in conjunction with the rejection by the Entente of the German proposal of December 12, 1916, gave opportunity to the Ger-

man government to declare that 'the full responsibility for the continuation of bloodshed' rested upon its enemies."—E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, *Foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917*, p. 133.

ALSO IN: G. Creel, *War, the world, and Wilson*.—H. J. Ford, *Woodrow Wilson, the man and his work*.—A. D. H. Smith, *Real Colonel House*.—E. W. Young, *Wilson administration and the Great War*.—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy, political and industrial*.—D. S. Muzzey, *American history*.—J. M. Beck, *Evidence in the case*.—T. Roosevelt, *Foes of our own household*.—Idem, *Fear God and take your own part*.—Idem, *America and the World War*.—H. Morris, *Our Mexican muddle*.—W. Archer, *Peace-president*.—E. C. Brooks, *Woodrow Wilson as president*.—A. M. Low, *Woodrow Wilson, an interpretation*.—G. Creel, *Wilson and the issues*.

1916-1917.—Opposition to Owen-Keating child labor law.—Adverse decision in North Carolina.—"In spite of the warnings of foreign experience in permitting the exploitation of children under the stress of war conditions, in several of the states efforts were made to pass laws suspending or relaxing child labor laws during the period of the war. More of these attempts would probably have been successful had it not been for the fortunate circumstance that the Federal child-labor act adopted . . . [in 1916] became effective Sept. 1. It was made evident early in the year [1917] that the government intended to enforce it vigorously. An appropriation of \$150,000 was made by Congress on April 17 for the enforcement of the act and the necessary work preliminary to its actual operation. By direction of the Secretary of Labor the administration of the law was placed in the Federal Children's Bureau and a special child labor division was created in that bureau with Miss Grace Abbott as director. As a working basis of cooperation between Federal and state officials the Secretary of Labor appointed as inspectors under the Federal act the state labor officials charged with the enforcement of child-labor laws in the 23 states whose requirements for working certificates were regarded as acceptable under the Federal act. In the other states agents were sent out by the Bureau to issue Federal certificates. It was not to be expected, however, that the new law would be allowed to go into effect unchallenged. An injunction was applied for in the District Court of the western district of North Carolina, and on Aug. 29 Judge Boyd in his decision declared the law unconstitutional."—*American Year Book*, 1917, p. 379.—The case was immediately appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, where it was heard the following year, when the decision of the Carolina court was sustained.—See also CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1916-1922.

1916-1918.—Legislation to stimulate foreign trade.—For the purpose of increasing foreign trade, a bill to exempt exports from the restrictions of the Sherman Act and other anti-trust acts, passed the House of Representatives twice in 1916. But the Senate was slow to act, and did not pass the bill until April, 1918, when slight changes were made in the original measure. The text of the bill was, in part, as follows: "Sec. 2. That nothing contained in the Act entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, shall be construed as declaring to be illegal an association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and actually

engaged solely in such trade, or an agreement made or act done in the course of export trade by such association, provided such agreement or act is not in restraint of trade within the United States. Sect. 3. That nothing contained in section seven of the Act entitled 'An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes,' approved October fifteenth, nineteen hundred and fourteen, shall be construed to forbid the acquisition of ownership by any corporation of the whole or any part of the stock or other capital of any corporation organized solely for the purpose of engaging in export trade, and actually engaged solely in such export trade. Sect. 4. That the words 'unfair methods of competition' wherever used in the Act entitled 'An Act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to define its powers and duties, and for other purposes,' approved September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred and fourteen, shall be construed as extending to unfair methods of competition used in export trade, even though the acts constituting such unfair methods are done without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Sec. 5. That every association now engaged solely in export trade, within sixty days after the passage of this Act, and every association entered into hereafter for the sole purpose of engaging export trade, within thirty days after its creation, shall file with the Federal Trade Commission a written statement setting forth the location of its offices or places of business, and the names and addresses of all its officers, and of all its stockholders, or members, and if a corporation, a copy of its certificate or articles of incorporation and by-laws, and if unincorporated, a copy of its articles or contract of association."—J. W. Jenks, *Trust problem*, pp. 456-458.

ALSO IN: W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, pp. 198-200.—*Literary Digest*, Feb. 10, 1917.

1916-1920.—Federal control of railroads.—Army Appropriation Act.—Railroads War Board.—Aid from Council of National Defense. See RAILROADS: 1916-1920.

1916-1920.—Labor legislation. See LABOR LEGISLATION: 1862-1920.

1916-1920.—Growth of cooperation. See COOPERATION: United States.

1917.—Organization of War Work Council of Y. M. C. A.—Its work. See YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: World War activities: 1917-1919: Organization of War Work Council.

1917.—Burnett Act passed restricting immigration.—Effect on Asiatic immigration. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1917.

1917.—Ransdell-Humphreys Bill passed for control of Mississippi river floods. See MISSISSIPPI RIVER: 1917.

1917 (January).—President Wilson's speech advocating Arabian autonomy. See ARABIA: 1916 (June).

1917 (January).—Allied reply to President Wilson's note on the termination of the World War.—Germany's note to neutral nations.—American note to neutrals. See WORLD WAR: 1917: XI. Efforts toward peace: a; b; c.

1917 (January).—American aims defined by President Wilson.—Application of Monroe Doctrine.—Self-determination.—Peace without victory.—"The replies of the belligerents [to the President's peace proposals] gave to Wilson an opportunity to inform the world more definitely of the aims of the United States, in case it should be drawn into the war. This he did in a speech delivered to the Senate on January 22, 1917. America would play her part in world affairs, he said,

but the other nations must clearly understand the conditions of our participation. The basis of peace must be the right of each individual nation to decide its destiny for itself without interference from a stronger alien power. 'I am proposing as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.'—C. Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War (Chronicles of America Series, v. 48, pp. 103-104)*.—See also *WORLD WAR: 1917: XI. Efforts toward peace: d.*—"This speech, despite the unfortunate phrase, 'peace without victory,' was hailed in all liberal circles, amongst the Allies and in the United States, as a noble charter of the new international order. Wilson had expressed the hope that he was 'speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.' This hope was doubtless realized. The first reaction in France and England was one of rather puzzled contempt, if we may judge by the press. But the newspaper writers soon found that what Wilson said many people had been thinking, and waiting for some one to say."—*Ibid.*, p. 105.

ALSO IN: J. B. Scott, *Survey of international relations between the United States and Germany, Aug. 1, 1914-April 6, 1917*.—Committee on Public Information, *How the war came to America*, pp. 17-21.

1917 (January).—Militant suffragists in Washington.—"In January, 1917, the Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage began a picketing of the White House to influence the President to support the [Equal Suffrage Amendment] in Congress."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, pp. 464-465.

1917 (January).—Germany declares unrestricted submarine warfare.—German intrigues in Mexico exposed in Zimmerman note.—"Discussion of peace, and the terms of peace, and ways to enforce peace came to a sudden end when, on January 31, 1917, the German Ambassador [Bernstorff] presented a note announcing the immediate resumption of ruthless submarine warfare. The Imperial Government, the Ambassador said, had carefully considered the message of the President to the Senate on January 22, and was gratified to know that 'the main tendencies of this important statement corresponded largely to the desires and principles professed by Germany. These principles especially included self-government and equality of rights of all nations. Germany would be sincerely glad if, in recognition of this principle, countries like Ireland and India, which do not enjoy the benefits of political independence, should now obtain their freedom.'"—G. B. McMaster, *United States in the World War*, p. 315.—"A wide area surrounding the British Isles, France, and Italy, and including the greater part of the eastern Mediterranean Sea was declared to be a barred zone. [See *WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: a, 1; a, 2*] All sea traffic, neutral as well as belligerent, the note warned, would be sunk, except that one American ship would be allowed to pass through the zone each week provided that it followed a designated, narrow lane to the port of Falmouth, England, that it was

marked with broad red and white stripes, and carried no contraband."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War (United States, v. 3, p. 579)*.—"Already, on January 19, 1917, unknown to the people of Germany, Herr Zimmermann, their Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had secretly dispatched a note to their minister in Mexico, . . . instructing him to offer to the Mexican Government New Mexico, Texas and Arizona if Mexico would join with Japan in attacking the United States. . . . The famous 'Zimmermann note,' exposed by our Government March 1, is a document that should stick in the memories of all Americans. Remember, it was composed on January 19, 1917, at a time when Germany and America were officially very good friends and the date was just three days before Mr. Wilson appeared in the Senate with his scheme for a league to assure peace and justice to the world. Zimmermann admitted the authenticity of the note, and only deplored that it had been discovered. The significant parts were these: 'BERLIN, JANUARY 19, 1917. On February 1 we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to keep neutral the United States of America. If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.' The rest of the dispatch tells the German minister in Mexico to open secret negotiations with Carranza the moment war with us is certain, and to get Carranza to draw in Japan. . . . The whole dispatch was so gross a revelation of international immorality that German-American papers immediately denounced it as a forgery, only to have its genuineness brazenly acknowledged and defended by Berlin."—Committee on Public Information, *War message and the facts behind it (War Information Series, no. 1)*.

ALSO IN: Count Bernstorff, *My three years in America*.—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*.—T. F. Millard, *Democracy and the Eastern Question*.—K. K. Kawakami, *Japan in world politics*.—E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, *Foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson*.—J. P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I know him*.

1917 (January-March).—Withdrawal of troops from Mexico.—Carranza recognized.—The joint American and Mexican Commission, proposed by Carranza, had reported a settlement by which each country was to patrol its own side of the border with the right on the part of the United States to cross the border, if Mexico failed to keep order there. To this decision "Carranza would not agree, and the joint commission was dissolved on January 15, 1917. By this time the relations of the United States and Germany were such that it was not wise to be in a quarrel with Mexico. . . . President Wilson's patience with Mexico was to some extent due to the conviction that we could not afford to begin a war on this side of the Atlantic until we were assured we should not be drawn into the war then being waged on the other side of it. January 28, 1917, three days before Germany announced that she would embark on ruthless submarine warfare, the president gave notice that he would withdraw troops from Mexico, and on February 5 the last of them had recrossed the Rio Grande."—J. S. Bassett, *Short history of the United States*, p. 871.—On January 30 the United States decided to grant Carranza full recognition

and diplomatic intercourse was restored.—See also MEXICO: 1916-1917.

1917 (February).—Aid given vocational education by passage of Smith-Hughes Act. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Vocational education: Industrial education in the United States.

1917 (February-March).—Mexican note expressing desire to arbitrate for the warring countries.—American reply to Mexico. See MEXICO: 1917-1918.

1917 (February-April).—Steps toward war.—Diplomatic relations broken.—Armed neutrality.—Further submarine outrages.—Inauguration.—Promptly following Germany's announcement of unrestrained submarine warfare, the ambassador from that country was formally dismissed. On the same day, February 3, 1917, the President addressed both Houses of our Congress and announced the complete severance of our relations with Germany. The reluctance with which he took this step was evident in every word. But diplomacy had failed, and it would have been the hollowest pretense to maintain relations. At the same time, however, he made it plain that he did not regard this act as tantamount to a declaration of war. Here for the first time the President made his sharp distinction between government and people in undemocratic lands: 'We are the sincere friends of the German people,' he said, 'and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the Government which speaks for them.'—Committee on Public Information, *How the war came to America*, p. 13.—President Wilson "recounted the substance of his earlier correspondence with Germany in regard to submarine warfare and recalled the promise of the German government that merchant vessels would not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives. He declared that the American government had no alternative but to sever relations, although refusing to believe that Germany would ruthlessly use the methods which she threatened, until convinced of her determination by 'overt acts.' Information of the move made by the United States was sent to American diplomatic representatives in neutral countries with the suggestion that they take similar action."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War* (*United States*, v. 3, pp. 579-580).—See also WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the War: a; b.—"Just as the President began his address, the German Ambassador received from the Secretary of State a note of dismissal and his passports. The affairs of the German Embassy were then taken over by the Swiss Minister and preparations were made for the departure of Count von Bernstorff. France and Great Britain each gave a safe conduct; passage was secured, with the consent of the Danish Government, on the *Frederick VIII.*; the German consuls scattered over the United States, and their families, were summoned to Washington; and on February 14 the Ambassador and his party, one hundred and forty-nine persons in all, sailed from the port of New York. . . . At Berlin the break in diplomatic relations and the recall of Ambassador Gerard was followed by the placing of a police guard before the Embassy; but it was not needed as no unfriendly demonstrations of any kind were made. The Ambassador, however, was treated much like a prisoner. His telephone was cut, his mail was stopped, he could not communicate with American consuls, and he was denied permission to cable Washington in cipher. No passports were furnished Americans desirous of leaving Berlin,

nor would the police allow them to set out for Denmark, Holland or Switzerland. Mr. Gerard, it was suggested, should use his good offices with Washington to induce the Government to endeavor to obtain from France and Great Britain safe conducts for the return of German merchantmen from America to German ports. When he refused it was intimated that his help might hasten the departure of Americans, to which he answered, it was reported, that he would sit where he was till Kingdom come before he would go without them. The restraint imposed on Ambassador Gerard was explained by Dr. von Stumm, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. We had, he said, no reports from the United States. We knew not how our Ambassador, consuls and subjects were faring. . . . Not until the good treatment given to Germans in this country were known in Berlin was it arranged that the Ambassador, the Secretaries, *attachés*, members of the consular service, and American newspaper men should go to Switzerland by way of Berne. Thence Mr. Gerard traveled to Paris, Madrid and Barcelona, whence he sailed for Havana and home. The effort to persuade Ambassador Gerard to sign a protocol confirming and enlarging the privileges of German subjects in our country in case of war having failed, the document was sent to Washington and delivered to the Secretary of State by the Swiss Minister on February 10, 1917."—J. B. McMaster, *United States in the World War*, pp. 324, 334-335.—"The expressed hope of the President that the conduct of Germany would be less offensive than its declaration, and that no overt acts would be directed against the United States to drive the country from non-intercourse to war, produced a period of delay following the breach. On February 26 the President appeared before Congress to ask for specific power to defend merchant ships in case they should be attacked by submarines in the course of the unrestricted warfare. The status of the submarine was no more nearly accepted than it had been when the warfare against merchant ships began in 1915. The clear rule of international law, requiring the belligerent to search the enemy ship before destroying it, and requiring condemnation before the prize court as a part of the process, was flagrantly violated by the submarine blockade. The Allied Powers maintained that the submarine blockade, which was never effective, and at no time stopped the commerce that it pretended to cut off, was in itself an act of piracy. International law guarantees safety for the passenger and crew of the merchant vessel that does not attempt flight from an enemy warship, and permits the merchant vessel at its own risk to flee or to try to defend itself. The execution by Germany of Captain Fryatt in 1916 for having attempted to ram a German submarine that sought to torpedo his ship was in violation of accepted law. [See WORLD WAR: 1916: IX. Naval operations: d.] Allied merchantmen were armed by their Governments for the purpose of defending themselves against such piratical attacks, and President Wilson now asked specific authority to defend American vessels by similar methods."—F. L. Paxton, *Recent history of the United States*, pp. 471-472.—"March 1, the House passed an Armed Ships bill, by a vote of 403 to 13, giving the President authority to supply merchant ships of American registry with defensive arms and ammunition. A bill of similar purport, but adding a blanket grant of power, was held up in the Senate by eleven members styled by the President 'a group of willful men'; and the session closed, March 4, without action. March 8,

the new Senate, in special session, adopted by a vote of 76 to 3 a *clôture* amendment bringing to an end the chamber's time-honored rule of unlimited debate. Backed by high legal authority, the President came to the conclusion that he already had most of the power which he desired. Accordingly the announcement was made that guns would be mounted on American merchant ships bound for European waters, and that expert gunners would be supplied by the navy. The decision brought war perceptibly nearer; for the arrangements were almost certain to lead to encounters with submarines, and such encounters would be difficult to view in any light other than as hostile acts. Further session was called for April 16; and lowering clouds caused the date to be set back to April 2. During the interval the country drifted rapidly

Series, no. 1.—See also *WORLD WAR: 1917: IX. Naval operations: c.*—"President Woodrow Wilson took the oath of office for his second term at the National Capitol at noon March 5, 1917, in the presence of 50,000 people. He had previously gone through the formality of taking the oath at noon on Sunday, March 4. The parade was not as long as usual, consisting of about 20,000 soldiers and sailors. There was no inauguration ball, and a general air of solemnity marked the whole occasion on account of the critical international situation. The President was very carefully guarded, but no untoward incident marred the occasion. The inaugural address was short and referred chiefly to international affairs."—*New York Times Current History, Apr., 1917, p. 36.*—The president retained his old cabinet, which was composed sub-



WOODROW WILSON AND CABINET

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From left to right, President Wilson, Secretaries McAdoo, Lane, Daniels, Gregory, Lansing, Wilson, Baker, Burleson, Houston, Redfield.

toward war. American vessels were sunk without warning and with loss of life."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, pp. 394-395.—Besides the eight or more American vessels which had been sunk or attacked earlier, the following ships were also sunk by Germany in 1917, after the repudiation of her pledges: February 3, *Housatonic*; February 13, *Lyman H. Law*; March 2, *Algonquin*; March 16, *Vigilancia*; March 17, *City of Memphis* and *Illinois*; March 21, *Headton*; April 1, *Aztec*. "In all, up to declaration of war by us, 226 American citizens, many of them women and children, had lost their lives by the action of German submarines, and in most instances without the faintest color of international right. . . . The United States Government made an official estimate that by April 3, 1917, no less than 686 neutral vessels had been sunk by German submarines since the beginning of the war."—Committee on Public Information, *War message and the facts behind it (War Information*

stantially of the men whom he had appointed in 1913. Robert Lansing had succeeded W. J. Bryan, as secretary of state, in 1915; Newton D. Baker had replaced L. M. Garrison as secretary of war in 1916; T. W. Gregory had become attorney-general in 1914 in succession to J. C. McReynolds. Otherwise no change had been made.

ALSO IN: P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*.—J. W. Gerard, *My four years in Germany*.—J. S. Bassett, *Our war with Germany*.—W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*.

1917 (February-May).—Roosevelt's offer to raise troops for immediate service.—Popularity of proposal here and abroad.—Rejection by secretary of war.—Before the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany, Theodore Roosevelt offered, in the event of war, to raise two divisions of volunteer troops for immediate service in France; and early in February, he began earnest efforts through correspondence with Newton D. Baker,

secretary of war, to receive permission for such action. "In view of the moral effect which this must have produced, it was strongly urged on the President by Monsieur Clemenceau in a letter and by Marshal Joffre in an interview; but it was rejected upon alleged military ground."—Lord Charnwood, *Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 185.—"Colonel Roosevelt and his friends . . . argued that France needed help immediately, and promised to start one division toward France within four months. They agreed to accept no volunteers subject to the draft. They even promised the army would be financed at the start—armed and equipped—from private funds. And the War Department was assured that the Colonel did not want to lead the army; that he would be satisfied to be the junior brigadier-general in command of one of the brigades. Congress, in passing the draft law, included in the law a provision which left the way open for the Colonel to raise his army, provided the Administration would consent. But President Wilson declined to avail himself of this provision, and the Colonel stayed at home. Colonel Roosevelt thereupon urged those who had volunteered to go with him to enlist in the regular army."—E. Thwing, *Life and meaning of Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 193.—In a public statement in which he declared that purely military reasons led him to reject the Roosevelt plan, the president said, "This is not the time or the occasion for compliment or for any action not calculated to contribute to the immediate success of the war. The business now in hand is undramatic, practical, and of scientific definiteness and precision. I shall act with regard to it at every step and in every particular under expert and professional advice from both sides of the water."—J. B. McMaster, *United States in the World War*, pp. 377-378.

ALSO IN: W. R. Thayer, *Theodore Roosevelt*.—J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time*.—J. P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I know him*.—G. Creel, *War, the world and Wilson*.—W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*.

1917 (March).—Pledge of American Federation of Labor to support the government. See AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR: 1917-1919.

1917 (March).—Jones Act providing civil government for Porto Rico.—Granting of citizenship. See PORTO RICO: 1917.

1917 (March).—Purchase of Danish West Indian, or Virgin, islands.—On Aug. 4, 1916, a treaty was signed with Denmark for the purchase by the United States of the Danish West Indies, known as the Virgin islands, and for the relinquishment of American claims by right of discovery in Greenland. Strategic reasons made it highly desirable for the United States to possess these islands which include the three large islands of St. John, Santa Cruz and St. Thomas with its protected harbor of Charlotte Amalie, capable of accommodating a large fleet, besides about fifty very small islands. The group is situated a little to the east of Porto Rico. "The exchange of ratifications of the treaty took place on January 17, [1917]. On March 3 Congress passed an act to provide a temporary government for the islands. The act appropriated the sum of \$25,000,000 for the purchase of the islands and \$100,000 for the purpose of taking over and occupying the islands and carrying the act into effect. . . . It provided that the military, civil and judicial power should be vested in a governor and such other persons as the President may appoint. . . . The purchase price was paid March 31 to the Danish Minister at Washington, and on that date the islands were

formally taken over by the United States Government, Commander Edwin T. Pollock, U. S. N., commanding the Hancock, officiating as the senior officer present. Commander Pollock acted as governor until April 9, when Rear-Admiral James H. Oliver assumed his duties as Governor."—*American Year Book*, 1917, p. 226.—See also VIRGIN ISLANDS: United States purchase; DENMARK: 1917; WEST INDIES: United States interests.

1917 (March).—Recognition of provisional government in Russia. See RUSSIA: 1917 (March-April).

1917 (March).—New railway strike threatened.—"At the moment the President issued the new call, the country was again threatened with a great railroad strike. The Adamson law, passed the previous September, was supposed to go into effect on January 1, 1917, but a federal district court held it unconstitutional. [See ADAMSON LAW; SUPREME COURT: 1917.] The railroads entered into an agreement with the attorney-general to continue on the old basis but to give the men the back pay due them in case the Supreme Court upheld the law. The men were dissatisfied, and on March 15, in the midst of the crisis with Germany, the brotherhoods called a nation-wide strike to begin on the 17th, but consented to postpone it until the 19th. On that day the managers, following an appeal to their patriotism, yielded, and on the same day the Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, upheld the act. Later in the year the men began an agitation for radical increases in their pay and again were victorious."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*, pp. 422-423.—See also RAILROADS: 1916; 1916-1920.

1917 (April).—President Wilson asks Congress to declare that a state of war with Germany exists.—War aims defined.—Autocracy the enemy.—On April 2, 1917, President Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress in a message recommending war with Germany. He said: "Gentlemen of the Congress: I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy . . . to be made, and made immediately which it is neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making. On the 3rd of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government, that on and after the 1st day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft, in conformity with its promise, then given to us, that passenger boats should not be sunk, and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken were meager and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was observed. The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand,

have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy, for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle. I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any Government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up with meager enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. . . . This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these, which it is impossible to employ, as it is employing them, without throwing to the wind all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have always even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people can not be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to hear of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a Nation. We must put excited feelings away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the Nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion. . . . When I addressed the Congress on the 26th of February last I thought it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws, when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks, as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity indeed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. The German Government denies the right of neu-

trals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed even in the defence of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we can not make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life. With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war. What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable coöperation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany, and as incident to that, the extension to those Governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs.

"It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the Nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the Navy in all respects but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States, already provided for by law in case of war, of at least 500,000 men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well-conceived taxation. I say sustained so far as may be equitable by taxation, because it seems to me that it would be most unwise to base the credits, which will now be necessary, entirely on money borrowed. It is our duty, I most respectfully urge, to protect our people, so far as we may, against the very serious hardships and evils which would be likely to arise out of the inflation which would be produced by vast loans. In carrying out the measures by which these things are to be accomplished we should keep constantly in mind the wisdom of interfering as little as possible in our own preparation and in the equipment of our own military forces with the duty—for it will be a very practical duty—of supplying the nations

already at war with Germany with the materials which they can obtain only from us or by our assistance. They are in the field, and we should help them in every way to be effective there. I shall take the liberty of suggesting, through the several executive departments of the Government, for the consideration of your committees, measures for the accomplishment of the several objects I have mentioned. I hope that it will be your pleasure to deal with them as having been framed after very careful thought by the branch of the Government upon whom the responsibility of conducting the war and safeguarding the Nation will most directly fall.


"While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world, what our motives and our objects are. My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the Nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 22d of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed Congress on the 3d of February and on the 26th of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power, and to set up among the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments, backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states. We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering the war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old unhappy days, when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor States with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs. A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic Government could be trusted

to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would, and render account to no one, would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free people can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end, and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own. Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew her best to have been always in fact democratic at heart in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationship of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude toward life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose, and now it has been shaken off and the great generous Russian people have been added, in all their native majesty and might, to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honor. . . . One of the things that have served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities, and even our offices of government, with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries, and our commerce. Indeed it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proven in our courts of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country, have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal directions of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States. Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them we have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that their source lay not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people toward us (who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no real friendship for us, and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors, the intercepted note to the German minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence. We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a Government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic Governments of the world. We are now about to accept the gage of battle with the natural foe to liberty, and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace

of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations, great and small, and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquests, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them. . . . Just because we fight without rancor and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with

postponing a discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights. It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not with enmity toward a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible Government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early reestablishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us, however hard it may be for them for the time being to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present Government through all these bitter months because of that friendship, exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall happily still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions toward the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live among us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it toward all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are most of them as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few. It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things, which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free people as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.”—Committee on Public Information, *War message and the facts behind it* (War Information Series, no. 1, June, 1917, pp. 5-28).

1917 (April).—War declared against Germany.—“In both houses a war resolution was introduced, as follows: ‘Whereas the German Imperial Government has committed repeated acts of war against the government and the people of the United States of America; Therefore be it resolved . . . that the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German government which has been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared.’ The full resources of the country



JOINT RESOLUTION FOR WAR WITH
GERMANY

Signed April 6, 1917

all free people, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for. I have said nothing of the Governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honor. The Austro-Hungarian Government has, indeed, avowed its unqualified indorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare, adopted now without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has therefore not been possible for this Government to receive Count Tarnowski, the ambassador recently accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of

were pledged to bring the conflict to a successful end. The Senate passed this resolution, April 4, by a vote of 82 to 6; the House at 3 A. M. April 6, by a vote of 373 to 50; and thus the United States became a party to the greatest armed conflict in history. . . . The United States had ample cause for war in the attacks upon her lawful commerce, the slaughter of more than two hundred of her citizens upon the high seas, and the intrigues against her neutrality and her security, carried on both within the country and elsewhere. Yet the nation went into the conflict on account of no one of these things, nor all of them together, but rather to combat the spirit of autocracy and ruthlessness that lay behind them."—F. A. Ogg, *National progress, 1907-1917*, v. 27, pp. 396, 398-399.—See also WORLD WAR: 1917: I. Summary: b, 6; VIII. United States and the war: d.—On April 8, the Austrian chargé d'affaires asked for his passports. It was not however, until Dec. 7, 1917, that war was formally declared against Austria-Hungary.

1917 (April).—President Wilson's regulations regarding alien enemies. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: e.

1917 (April).—President Wilson's address to American people regarding entrance into the war. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: f.

1917 (April).—Establishment of Committee on Public Information.—Duties. See COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION; CENSORSHIP: World War.

1917 (April).—Reaction of America to war prospect.—Last pacifist efforts.—Great rally to the government.—Support by labor.—"The breach with Germany brought to a focus all the elements in America opposing war in general or this war in particular, as the persons and organizations concerned brought pressure upon Congress to prevent the opening of hostilities. William J. Bryan led in the opposition with the advice: 'Wire immediately to the President, your Senators and your Congressmen. A few cents now may save many dollars in taxation and possibly a son.' The pacifist organizations that had grown up under the names of the American Union against Militarism, the Women's Peace Party, the American Neutrality League, and the Anti-Conscription League, opened headquarters in New York on the Monday following the breach under the name of the Emergency Peace Federation. Delegations of pacifists were appointed to wait upon the President and advertisements were run in newspapers that had no sympathy with the obstructive movement. 'Shall we allow the United States to be dragged into the European quarrel?' queried one of these, which bore the signature of R. S. Bourne, Max Eastman, Paul U. Kellogg, Winthrop D. Lane, and Amos R. Pinchot. Within a few days the peace movement took the form of a demand for a national war referendum. Pilgrimages to Washington were organized to bring pressure to bear upon individual Congressmen. . . . [But the final break brought a change of sentiment.] The declaration of war on April 6 was accepted with a high degree of national unity in which the expressed convictions of organized labor had a large share. The degree of this unity was measured in part by the roar of condemnation that greeted the action of an emergency convention of the Socialist Party held at Chicago on April 7. Here the majority of the convention, presided over by a Russian immigrant and supported by other foreign-born leaders, passed resolutions attacking the war as a conspiracy of capitalism. A minority of the party left it on

this issue under the leadership of American Socialists."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, pp. 470-471, 479-480.—"Splendid was the awakening of America, following on the President's call. The pacifist Bryan . . . promptly declared, 'The quickest road to peace is through the war to victory'; and he telegraphed the President an offer of his services in any capacity. Henry Ford . . . now placed his huge automobile factories absolutely at the disposal of the government, and became a valued worker in one of the new War Boards. Charles Edward Russell, 'choosing to be an American rather than a socialist if he could not be both,' served on a great Commission to Russia, and on his return supported and explained the war with voice and pen. Upton Sinclair in his *Weekly* eloquently defended the war and championed the President as the leader of the world's moral sentiment. The great majority of Americans of German birth or descent also rallied promptly to the flag of the land they had chosen. Most important of all, the organized wage-earners spoke with emphasis and unity for America and democracy: in November the American Federation by a vote of 21,579 local unions as against 402, organized the *Alliance for Labor and Democracy* to support the war."—W. M. West, *Story of American democracy*, p. 716.

ALSO IN: P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*.

1917 (April-May).—War missions from England, France, and Italy.—Hastening of army plans.—The news that the United States had declared war was joyfully received by the Allied nations, and they immediately prepared to cooperate with America in order to secure the best results for all. "In the latter part of April, British and French missions visited the United States. The British mission was headed by Arthur J. Balfour, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Heading the French mission were Marshal Joffre and former Prime Minister Viviani. Under Marshal Joffre's urgings the military plans of the government were modified. It had not been intended to send American troops to France on any considerable scale before the end of 1918. But Joffre advised training them in France, instead of at home. His suggestion was sound. It started the small but steady flow of American reinforcements to France which materially heartened the French in the period of depression which set in in the summer of 1917. It also produced, eventually, the strategic reserve which enabled Foch to end the war in the autumn of 1918."—W. L. McPherson, *Short history of the Great War*, p. 252.—Another "object of the British and French missions was to bring technical assistance to our army. Both missions contained trained experts on military and naval matters with the knowledge of the newest methods. These experts went into conferences with American experts, showing us all they knew and helping to give our organization the right turn from the first. Without their direct aid we could not have had an army of nearly four million men in a little more than a year, nor could we have constructed it on such excellent models in a greater time."—J. S. Bassett, *Our war with Germany*, p. 116.—"The Italian War Commission, headed by the Prince of Udine, a cousin of the King, was officially received by President Wilson May 24. . . . The first conferences with the American Government were held May 28."—*Italian Diplomatic Commission (New York Times Current History, July, 1917, pp. 62-63)*.

ALSO IN: F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the*

United States.—J. B. McMaster, *United States in the World War.*

1917 (May).—Aircraft Production Board established. See *WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war:* i, 9; *Miscellaneous auxiliary services:* IV. Aviation; *AVIATION:* Development of airplanes and air service: 1914-1918.

1917 (May).—**Military unpreparedness.**—Utilization of General Staff.—Passage of Selective Draft Act.—Pershing in France.—Development of national army.—Naval defense.—Although the declaration of war effected a remarkable unity of sentiment in its favor, "the country was completely unprepared for war in a military sense, and must now pay the penalty for President Wilson's opposition to adequate improvement of the military system in 1915 and for the half-hearted measures taken in 1916. Total military forces, including regular army, national guard, and reserves

essential. Thus with a President and War Secretary, both of whom had been instinctively opposed to a large army and who had expressed their fear of the development of a militaristic spirit, and with a majority in Congress favoring the traditional volunteer system, adherence to which had cost the British thousands of lives that might better have been used at home, the building of an effective army seemed a matter of extreme doubt. Great credit must go to both President Wilson and Secretary Baker for sinking their instincts and seeking, as well as following, the advice of the military experts, who alone were capable of meeting the problems that arose from a war for which the nation was not prepared. . . . President Wilson, as historian, was well aware of the tremendous price that had been paid in past wars for such decentralization, accompanied as it was, inevitably, by delays, misunderstandings, and



PRESIDENT WILSON BEING BLINDFOLDED TO DRAW THE FIRST NUMBER IN THE DRAFT OF SOLDIERS, 1917

amounted to hardly three hundred thousand men and less than ten thousand officers. Even the regular army was by no means ready for immediate participation in the sort of fighting demanded by the European war; and, even if adequate troops were raised, the lack of trained officers would create the most serious difficulties. No wonder that the German General Staff ranked the United States, from the military point of view, somewhere between Belgium and Portugal. Furthermore, military experts had been discouraged by the attitude of the Administration. The Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, had failed, either through lack of administrative capacity or because of pacifistic tendencies, to prepare his department adequately. He had done nothing to rouse Congress or the nation from its attitude of indifference towards preparation. By faith a pacifist, he had been opposed to universal military service. An extreme liberal, he distrusted the professional military type and was to find it difficult to cooperate with the captains of industry whose assistance was

mistakes. He was determined to create a single coördinating command, and his war policies were governed from beginning to end by this purpose. He set up no new machinery, but utilized as his main instrument the General Staff, which had been created in 1903 as a result of the blunders and confusion that had been so painfully manifest in the Spanish War. When the United States entered the World War the General Staff had by no means acquired the importance expected by those who had created it. But to it the President turned, and it was this body enlarged in size and influence that ultimately put into operation Wilson's policy of centralization. It was in accordance with the advice of the men who composed the General Staff that the President elaborated the larger lines of the military programme, and they were the men who supervised the operation of details. . . . The plea [of the foreign missions] determined the President to send General Pershing immediately with a force of about two thousand, who were followed in June and July, 1917, by a sufficient

additional forces to make up a division. Wilson had been authorized by Congress, under the Selective Service Act, to send four volunteer divisions abroad under the command of Roosevelt. But he refused to interfere with the plans of the military experts, who strongly objected to any volunteer forces whatever. . . . The problem of man-power had been carefully considered during the weeks that preceded our entrance into the war and the declaration of war found the Government prepared with a plan for a selective draft. On the 7th of April, the day after the declaration of war, President Wilson insisted that 'the safety of the nation depended upon the measure.' Congress, however, was slow to accept the principle of conscription, and the President encountered fierce opposition. . . . Finally, on May 18, 1917, what is popularly known as the Selective Service Act became law. This Act gave to the president power to raise the regular army by enlistment to 287,000 men, to take into the Federal service all members of the national guard, and to raise by selective draft, in two installments, a force of a million troops. All men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty, both inclusive, were registered on the 5th of June; this with the subsequent registration of men coming of age later, produced an available body of more than ten millions. And when in the following year, the draft age was extended to include all men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, both inclusive, thirteen millions more were added. From this body the names of those who were to serve were drawn by lot. All men registered were carefully classified, in order that the first chosen might be those not merely best fitted for fighting, but those whose absence on the firing line would least disturb the essential economic life of the nation. Liberal exemptions were accorded, including artisans employed in industries necessary to war production and men upon whom others were dependent. On the 20th of July the first drawings were made, and by the end of the year about half a million of the drafted men, now called the National Army, were mustered in. In the meantime enlistments in the regular army and the national guard had raised the total number of troops to about a million and a quarter and of officers to more than one hundred thousand."—C. Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War (Chronicles of America series, v. 48, pp. 117-118, 119-120, 122, 126-128)*.—See also WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: g.—"On the ninth of July the President, acting under the power given to him by the Constitution, called the National Guard into the service of the United States. In eleven States it was to mobilize on the fifteenth of July and gather in such places as might be chosen by the Secretary of War. In eighteen States and the District of Columbia the men were to assemble on the twenty-fifth of the month, and on August fifth those in all States were to be drafted into the new army under provisions of the act of May eighteenth. . . . Mobilization of the young men drawn for selective service began in September. On the fifth of the month five per cent. of the white men enrolled in the first quota of the National Guard were to begin their journey to the sixteen instruction camps scattered over the country. That there might be no congestion on the railroads they were to go in five daily detachments of equal number, and, as far as possible, were to consist of men with some military experience. September nineteenth, forty per cent and October third, another forty per cent were to set out, and

the remaining fifteen per cent were to go as soon thereafter as possible. Never before in the history of our country had such an event occurred. Hundreds of thousands of young men, drawn from every walk in life, physicians, lawyers, business men, clerks, laborers, rich and poor were to leave their homes in every city, town and hamlet the country over, and go into training that they might be made fit to fight on European soil to make 'the world safe for democracy.'—J. B. McMaster, *United States in the World War, pp. 390, 396*.—"From various parts of the country plots and conspiracies to avoid or oppose the draft were reported. In many places those who had failed to register were rounded up and given another chance to enroll. There were also some arrests. Anarchist agitators were the most troublesome, and one of them, Louis Kramer, was sentenced . . . in New York to three years' imprisonment for conspiracy to dissuade men of conscript age from registering."—*Putting the conscription law into operation (New York Times Current History, July, 1917, pp. 13-14)*.—"To provide places for training it was necessary to construct sixteen cantonments, with barracks, hospitals, storage houses and various other necessary buildings. This vast work had to be done from the very beginning, even to the purchase of the sites of the camps and the provision of water supplies and sewerage systems. It was a triumph of construction that it was so far advanced that the first of the drafted men could be received on September 5. During the course of the war the number of training camps was largely increased, and there existed for the various kinds of training as many as thirty-seven when the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918. Under the act of May 18 the president called on the authorities directing the draft to assemble 687,000 men for training as rapidly as they could be received after September 5, and by the end of the year 480,000 had been mustered in. But the National Army, as this body was called, was not the only measure of the recruiting zeal of the country; for the two other services had been increased largely under the act of congress. The Regular Army now included 10,250 officers and 475,000 enlisted men, and the National Guard contained 16,031 officers and 400,900 enlisted men. With a considerable number of reserve officers and men the entire army at the end of 1917 contained 110,856 officers and 1,428,650 men. April 1 it had contained 9,524 officers and 110,856 men. . . . Meanwhile, the navy was undergoing a similar process of expansion. The naval defense act of August 20, 1916, authorized a three year program of construction with sixty-six new ships of various kinds and an increase of personnel to 87,000 in the navy and 17,400 in the marine corp. Like the army act of the same year it contained a number of far-sighted measures that rounded out its various parts and gave opportunity to expand them to suit the demands of war."—J. S. Bassett, *Our war with Germany, pp. 120-121*.—The entrance of the United States into active participation in the War was marked by sending a part of the Navy to European waters. Admiral William S. Sims had been sent to Great Britain soon after the severance of diplomatic relations, and after the declaration of war he was placed in command of American vessels in foreign waters. He worked in close harmony with his Allied associates. Three weeks after the war was declared a small American force was abroad, co-operating with the Allies in combating the dreaded submarine. The American Navy, although small, was well

equipped and prepared for war when it actually came."—W. H. Hudson and I. S. Guernsey, *United States, from the discovery of the American continent to the end of the World War*, p. 566.

ALSO IN: P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*.—Theodore Roosevelt, *Great adventure*.

1917 (May).—War-time Prohibition Act embodied in Selective Draft Act. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1913-1919.

1917 (May).—Mobilization of civilian forces.—Council of National Defense.—Advisory commission.—Financing the war.—Coöperation of representative business men.—"The stupendous energy with which the United States went into the war was an impressive example of what a great democracy could do once its enthusiasm was aroused and its course was clear. . . . Huge appropriations and loans hastened the training and equipment of troops and their dispatch over seas, and transportation, food supply and distribution, and war manufactures were taken under federal control. Enormous shipments of supplies for armies and civilians were poured into Europe, and loans aggregating more than ten billion dollars were advanced to the allied governments. Opposition to the war, both public and private, was ruthlessly suppressed, newspapers and mails passed under a censorship, enemy property was sequestered, and German sympathizers and pacifists were effectually cowed. The stimulation of industry was unparalleled and wages, prices, and profits rose by leaps and bounds."—W. MacDonald, *Three centuries of American democracy*, pp. 274-275.—"The central agency round which the huge machine was created was the Council of National Defense, which had been created in August 1916, when it was fairly evident that the United States was going to be drawn into the vortex of war. [See NATIONAL DEFENSE, COUNCIL OF; WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: i, 11.] This was composed of seven Cabinet members, with the Secretary of War as chairman. It was assisted by an advisory commission of experts, familiar with the industries that would be of most importance in the prosecution of the war. [Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was chairman.] Several boards and commissions were established to conduct efficiently certain phases of the conflict. The United States Shipping Board was to provide ships for cargoes and troops and was to build ships 'faster than the submarines could sink them.' The Committee on Public Information disseminated news concerning the War and maintained a corps of speakers who took part in campaigns to raise money, etc. The War Industries Board was responsible for developing and producing the vast supplies needed to support the war machine. The National Research Council gathered the scientific talent of the country and directed its efforts toward bringing the War to a successful conclusion. A Labor Commission [with Samuel Gompers as chairman] was created to induce labouring men and women to forget their difficulties with capital and to work whole-heartedly toward successfully terminating the struggle. One of the most important agencies created was the United States Food Administration. It was placed in the charge of Herbert C. Hoover, who had had considerable experience in connexion with relief measures for Belgium. Through widespread advertising, by urging conservation, and by co-operating with the individual families throughout the country he was able to send thousands of tons of food-products to Europe. The work of the Food Administration

was doubly important, because the activities of the submarine had left Europe sorely in need of supplies. A Fuel Administration was established to economize in the use of fuel, so that the maximum amount could be used for military purposes. [See FOOD REGULATION: 1917-1918.] As soon as it was shown that the railroads of the country were not able to solve the vast transportation thrust upon them by the War they were taken over by the Government and put in the hands of the United States Railroad Administration, under the direction of W. G. McAdoo, the Secretary of the Treasury. He merged the railways of the country into one great system, abolished competition, standardized equipment, and managed them solely with a view to efficiency. Rates were raised and passenger services curtailed, but the roads were an effective adjunct in the building of the war machine. [See RAILROADS: 1916-1920.] A War Risk Insurance Bureau was established. Allowances were made to dependents of men on service. Provision was made for taking care of men injured on service, and a Government insurance was provided in case of death or total disability. [See also INSURANCE: Government.] This was designed to do away with the pension abuses that had usually followed in the wake of previous wars. The problem of financing the War was a stupendous one. It was inevitable that the creation of a war machine on a gigantic scale would require unprecedented sums of money. Not only would vast sums of money be used at home, but provision had to be made for the lending of considerable sums abroad. From the outset it was seen that it would be impossible to raise the money by taxation, and that borrowing would have to be largely resorted to. Certificates of indebtedness, war savings stamps, and bonds were the means used to borrow money."—W. H. Hudson and I. S. Guernsey, *United States, from the discovery of the American continent to the end of the World War*, pp. 564-565.—See also below: 1917-1919: Taxation and expenditures.—"One of the pleasant reflections on the work of the council of national defense is its success in obtaining the coöperation of the best representative American business men. . . . As the president . . . began to appoint large business men to the important committees under the council of national defense, cautiously at first, lest he should be embarrassed by an upflare of popular distrust, his action was generally applauded. Eventually he called to his assistance the most powerful 'trust magnates,' giving them the widest authority, and aroused no protest from that portion of his own party to whom the trusts and 'Wall Street' had formerly been the personification of political inequality."—J. S. Bassett, *Our war with Germany*, pp. 132-133.

ALSO IN: W. F. Willoughby, *Government organization in war time and after*.—J. M. Clark, W. H. Hamilton, H. J. Moulton, ed., *Readings in the economics of war*.—E. L. Bogart, *Direct and indirect costs of the Great World War*.—F. H. Dixon, *Federal operation of railroads during the war* (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Aug., 1919).—E. W. Young, *Wilson administration and the Great War*.

1917 (June).—Espionage Act passed. See ESPIONAGE ACT; CENSORSHIP: World War; WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: II. Espionage: a, 4.

1917 (June).—American mission to Russia.—Opposing influences.—"In two senses Russia took herself out of the war before the United States got in. The Russian Revolution antedated our declaration of April 6th and the Russian armies

ceased to fight long before our first troops reached the front lines in France."—W. L. McPherson, *Short history of the Great War*, p. 253.—"The United States welcomed the new Russian Republic. Elibu Root was sent to Petrograd [in June] at the head of a special mission to congratulate the Provisional Government, and to offer aid and counsel. He was accompanied by specialists in the fields of industry and war, including the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, Major-General Hugh L. Scott [and Charles Edward Russell, socialist. But] before he reached Petrograd, other missions arrived there from the United States to render Root's success impossible. The refuge offered by the United States to political immigrants from all the world had brought to America in large numbers Russians after the revolutionary movements of 1905. The Russian immigrants accumulated in increasing numbers, their children grasped eagerly the opportunities for education in the American schools, and the sense of grievance that had driven them from Russia was directed against the Government of the land of refuge. The new Russian Government called the exiles home, and one of them, Leon Trotzky, speaking in New York before his departure, warned the United States against assuming 'that the revolution was necessarily pro-Ally,' and avowed that it was 'for an early peace and a better form of government.' Trotzky and his associates carried back into Russia the conventional Socialist belief that the United States was a corrupt capitalistic nation, and that Root, who had been among the most prominent of conservative Republicans in 1912, was the incarnation of capitalism. When the Root Mission reached Petrograd it found that anti-American influences had already been started by the returned exiles."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, p. 475.—See also *WORLD WAR: 1917: III. Russia and the Eastern front: m.*—Nevertheless in an effort to sustain the new republic the United States made a loan of \$100,000,000 to the new Russian government. "A Red Cross mission was later sent, and Raymond Robbins, a representative of the Roosevelt Republicans, was placed at its head. Perhaps two score men of all shades of opinion composed the two delegations to Russia. They carried the best of wishes and the promise of all the assistance the country could give, if the Russians would continue the fight against Germany."—W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, p. 234.

ALSO IN: C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War* (*United States*, v. 3).

1917 (June).—Export Council formed. See EXPORT COUNCIL.

1917 (June).—Food and Fuel Control Act.—While the Food Administration, under Hoover, was urging economy upon the nation, Congress was busy with a Food Control Bill, from June until early in August, when it was approved. The following is the text of the act, which is known as the Lever Act:

Be it enacted, etc., That by reason of the existence of a state of war, it is essential to the national security and defense, for the successful prosecution of the war, and for the support and maintenance of the Army and Navy, to assure an adequate supply and equitable distribution, and to facilitate the movement, of foods, feeds, fuel, and articles required for their production, hereafter in this act called necessities; to prevent, locally or generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulations, and private con-

trols, affecting such supply, distribution, and movement; and to establish and maintain governmental control of such necessities during the war. For such purposes the instrumentalities, means, methods, powers, authorities, duties, obligations, and prohibitions hereinafter set forth are created, established, conferred, and prescribed.

Sect. 2. That words used in this act shall be construed to import the plural or the singular, as the case demands. The word "person," wherever used in this act, shall include individuals, partnerships, associations, and corporations. When construing and enforcing the provisions of this act, the act, omission, or failure of any official, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any partnership, association, or corporation within the scope of his employment or office shall, in every case, also be deemed the act, omission, or failure of such partnership, association, or corporation as well as that of the person.

Sect. 3. That there is hereby established a governmental control of necessities which shall extend to and include all the processes, methods, activities of, and for the production, manufacture, procurement, storage, distribution, sale, marketing, pledging, financing, and consumption of necessities, which shall be exercised and administered by the President for the purposes of this act; and all such necessities, processes, methods, and activities are hereby declared to be effected with a public interest. And in carrying out the purposes of this section the President is authorized to enter into any voluntary arrangements or agreements, to use any agency or agencies, to accept the services of any person without compensation, to cooperate with any agency or person to utilize any department or agency of the Government, and to coordinate their activities so as to avoid any preventable loss or duplication of effort or funds: *Provided*, That none of the penalties of this act shall apply to this section.

Sect. 4. That it is hereby made unlawful for any person willfully to destroy any necessities for the purpose of enhancing the price or restricting the supply thereof; knowingly to commit waste or willfully to permit preventable deterioration of any necessities in or in connection with their production, manufacture, or distribution; to hoard, as defined in section 6 of this act, any necessities; to monopolize or attempt to monopolize, either locally or generally, any necessities; to engage in and discriminatory and unfair, or any deceptive or wasteful practice or device, or to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge, in handling or dealing in or with any necessities; to conspire, combine, agree, or arrange with any other person (a) to limit the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, supplying, storing, or dealing in any necessities; (b) to restrict the supply of any necessities; (c) to restrict distribution of any necessities; (d) to prevent, limit, or lessen the manufacture or production of any necessities, or to enhance the price thereof, or (e) to exact excessive prices for any necessities; or to aid or abet the doing of any act made unlawful by this section.

Sect. 5. That, from time to time, whenever the President shall find it essential to license the importation, exportation, manufacture, storage, or distribution of any necessities, in order to carry into effect any of the purposes of this act, and shall publicly so announce, no person shall, after a date fixed in the announcement, engage in or carry on any such business specified in the announcement of importation, exportation, manufacture, storage, or

distribution of any necessities as set forth in such announcement, unless he shall secure and hold a license issued pursuant to this section. The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations governing the conduct of the business of licenses as may be essential to prevent uneconomical manufacture and inequitable distribution of necessities and otherwise to carry out the purposes of this act. Such regulations may also include requirements for the issuance of licenses and requirements for systems of accounts and auditing of accounts to be kept by licenses, submission of reports by them, with or without oath or affirmation, and the entry and inspection by the President's duly authorized agents of the places of business of licenses. Whenever the President shall find that any rate, charge, or practice of any license is unjust, or unreasonable, or discriminatory and unfair, or wasteful, and shall order such licensee, within a reasonable time fixed in the order to discontinue any such unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory and unfair, or wasteful rate, charge, or practice, thereafter, unless such order is revoked or suspended, such licensee shall, within the time prescribed in the order, discontinue such unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory and unfair, or wasteful rate, charge, or practice. The President may, in lieu of any such unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory and unfair, or wasteful rate, charge, or practice, find what is a just, reasonable, nondiscriminatory and fair, or economical rate, charge, or practice; and in any suit in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction such finding of the President shall be prima facie evidence. Any person who, without a license issued pursuant to this section, knowingly engages in or carries on any business for which a license is required under this section, or willfully fails or refuses to discontinue any unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory and unfair, or wasteful rate, charge, or practice, in accordance with the requirement of an order issued under this section, or willfully violates any provision of this section or any regulation prescribed under this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding \$5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both: *Provided*, That this section shall not apply to any farmer, gardener, or other person with respect to the products of any farm, garden, or other land owned, leased, or cultivated by him, nor to any retailer with respect to the retail business actually conducted by him, nor to any common carrier, nor shall anything in this section be construed to authorize the fixing or imposition of a duty or tax upon any article imported into or exported from the United States or any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia.

Sect. 6. That any person who willfully hoards any necessities shall upon conviction thereof be fined not exceeding \$5,000 or be imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. Necessaries shall be deemed to be hoarded within the meaning of this act when either (a) held, contracted for, or arranged for by any person in a quantity in excess of his reasonable requirements for use or consumption by himself and dependents for a reasonable time; (b) held, contracted for, or arranged for by any manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, or other dealer in a quantity in excess of the reasonable requirements of his business for use or sale by him for a reasonable time, or reasonably required to furnish necessities produced in surplus quantities seasonably throughout the period of scant or no production; or (c) withheld, whether by possession or under any contract or arrangement, from the mar-

ket by any person for the purpose of unreasonably increasing or diminishing the price: *Provided, however*, That any accumulating or withholding by any farmer, gardener, or any other person, of the products of any farm, garden, or other land owned, leased, or cultivated by him shall not be deemed to be hoarding within the meaning of this act.

Sect. 7. That whenever any necessities shall be hoarded as defined in section 6 they shall be liable to be proceeded against in any district court of the United States within the district where the same are found and seized by a process of libel for condemnation, and if such necessities shall be adjudged to be hoarded they shall be disposed of by sale in such manner as to provide the most equitable distribution thereof as the court may direct, and the proceeds thereof, less the legal costs and charges, shall be paid to the party entitled thereto. The proceedings of such libel cases shall conform as near as may be to the proceedings in admiralty, except that either party may demand trial by jury of any issue of fact joined in any such case, and all such proceedings shall be at the suit of and in the name of the United States. It shall be the duty of the United States attorney for the proper district to institute and prosecute any such action upon presentation to him of satisfactory evidence to sustain the same.

Sect. 8. That any person who willfully destroys any necessities for the purpose of enhancing the price or restricting the supply thereof shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding \$5,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.

Sect. 9. That to carry into effect the purposes of this act the President is authorized to purchase, provide for the production or manufacture of necessities; to store them and to provide storage facilities for them by construction, purchase, lease, or otherwise; to sell them; and to require any person having the control of any necessities, or any storage space suitable for the storing of necessities, to furnish the whole or any part of such necessities or storage space to the Government in such quantities, at such times, and at such prices as shall be determined by the President to be reasonable. Upon failure of the person to comply with such requirement, the President is authorized to requisition and take possession of any such necessities or storage space, and to pay for them at the price so determined. If the price so determined be not satisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid the amount prescribed by the President, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to the amount so paid, will be just compensation for such necessities or storage space, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the United States district court to hear and determine all such controversies: *Provided*, That nothing in this section shall be construed to require any natural person to furnish to the Government any necessities held by him and reasonably required by himself and dependents for a reasonable time. Any moneys received by the United States from or in connection with the disposal by the United States of necessities under this section may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for further carrying out the purposes of this section. Any balance of such moneys not used as part of such revolving fund shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

Sect. 10. That whenever the President shall find that it is impossible by license or by voluntary

arrangement or agreement to assure an adequate and continuous supply of necessities, he is authorized to requisition and take over, for use or operation by the Government, any factory, mine, or other plant, or any part thereof, in which any necessities are or may be manufactured, produced, prepared, or mined. Whenever the President shall determine that the further use or operation by the Government of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, is not essential for the national security or defense, the same shall be restored to the person entitled to the possession thereof. The United States shall make just compensation, to be determined by the President, for the taking over, use, occupation, and operation by the Government of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof. If the amount so determined be unsatisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid the amount prescribed by the President, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to the amount paid, will be just compensation, in the manner provided by section 24, paragraph 20, and section 145 of the Judicial Code. The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations as he may deem essential for carrying out the purposes of this section, including the operation of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, the purchase, sale, or other disposition of articles used, manufactured, produced, prepared, or mined therein, and the employment, control, and compensation of employees. Any moneys received by the United States from or in connection with the use or operation of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for the purpose of the continued use or operation of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, and the accounts of each such factory, mine, plant, or part thereof, shall be kept separate and distinct. Any balance of such moneys not used as part of such revolving fund shall be paid into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

Sect. 11. That, whenever the President finds it essential in order to prevent undue enhancement or fluctuation of prices of, or in order to prevent unjust market manipulation or unfair and misleading market quotations of the prices of necessities, hereafter in this section called evil practices, he is authorized to prescribe such regulations governing, or may either wholly or partly prohibit, operations, practices, and transactions at, on, in, or under the rules of any exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of business as he may find essential in order to prevent, correct, or remove such evil practices. Further, for the purposes of this section, the President may require all persons coming within its provisions to keep such records and statements of account, and may require such persons to make such returns, verified under oath or otherwise, as will fully and correctly disclose all transactions at, in, or on, or under the rules of any such exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of business, including the making, execution, settlement, and fulfillment thereof. He may also require all persons acting in the capacity of a clearing house, clearing association, or similar institution, for the purpose of clearing, settling, or adjusting transactions at, in, or on, or under the rules of any such exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of business, to keep such records and to make such returns as will fully and correctly disclose all facts in their pos-

session relating to such transactions, and he may appoint agents to conduct the investigations necessary to enforce the provisions of this section and all rules and regulations made by him in pursuance thereof, and may fix and pay the compensation of such agents. Any person who willfully violates any regulation made pursuant to this section, or who knowingly engages in any operation, practice, or transaction prohibited pursuant to this section, or who willfully aids or abets any such violation or any such prohibited operation, practice, or transaction, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding \$10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than four years, or both.

Sect. 12. That, whenever the President shall find that an emergency exists requiring stimulation of production and that it is essential that the producers of any nonperishable agricultural products produced within the United States shall have the benefits of the guaranty provided for in this section in order to stimulate production of such products, he is authorized, from time to time, seasonably and as far in advance of seeding time as practicable, to determine and fix and to give public notice of what, under specified conditions, is a reasonable guaranteed price for any such products, in order to assure such producers a reasonable profit. Thereupon, the Government of the United States hereby guarantees every producer of any merchantable nonperishable agricultural products produced within the United States, for which a guaranteed price shall be fixed by notice in accordance with this section, that, upon compliance by him with the regulations prescribed by the President, he will receive for any such products produced in reliance upon this guaranty within the period, not exceeding three years, prescribed in the notice, a price not less than the guaranteed price therefor as fixed pursuant to this section. In such regulations the President shall prescribe the terms and conditions upon which any such producer shall be entitled to the benefits of such guaranty. When the President finds that the importation into the United States of any such products produced outside of the United States seriously interferes or is likely seriously to interfere with the practical operation of any guaranteed price therefor fixed pursuant to this section, or materially enhances or is likely materially to enhance the liabilities of the United States under guarantees of prices therefor made pursuant to this section, and shall so proclaim, there shall be levied, collected, and paid a rate of duty, upon the products so imported, the amount of which rate of duty shall be ascertained and proclaimed by the President, which amount shall, when added to the value of the product at the time it is offered for entry, be sufficient to bring the price thereof at which imported up to the price which shall have been fixed therefor pursuant to this section; but in no case shall any such rate of duty be fixed at an amount which will effect a reduction of the rate of duty upon any such products under any then existing tariff law of the United States. For the purpose of making any guaranteed price effective under this section, or whenever he deems it essential in order to protect the Government of the United States against material enhancement of its liabilities arising out of any guaranty under this section, the President is authorized also, in his discretion, to purchase any such products for which a guaranteed price shall be fixed under this section, and to hold, transport, or store them, or to

sell, dispose of, and deliver the same to any person or to any Government engaged in war with any country with which the Government of the United States is or may be at war or to use the same as supplies for any department or agency of the Government of the United States. Any moneys received by the United States from or in connection with the sale or disposal of any products under this section may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for further carrying out the purposes of this section. Any balance of such moneys not used as part of such revolving fund shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

Sect. 13. That whenever the President shall find that limitation, regulation, or prohibition of the use of foods, food materials, or feeds in the production of alcohol or of alcoholic or nonalcoholic beverages, or such nonalcoholic beverages as he shall determine, or that reduction of the alcoholic content of any beverage, is essential, in order to assure an adequate and continuous supply of food, he is authorized, from time to time, to prescribe, and give public notice of, the extent of the limitation, regulation, prohibition, or reduction so necessitated. Whenever such notice shall have been given and shall remain unrevoked, no person shall, after a reasonable time, which shall be prescribed in the notice, use any foods, food materials, or feeds in the production of alcohol or nonalcoholic beverages, except in accordance with the limitations, regulations, and prohibitions prescribed in such notice, or produce any beverage having an alcoholic content in excess of the amount prescribed therefor in such notice. Any person who willfully violates this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding \$5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

Sect. 14. That in carrying out the purposes of this act the President is authorized to create an agency or agencies, to accept the services of any person without compensation, to cooperate with any agency or person, to utilize any department or agency of the Government, and to coordinate their activities so as to avoid any preventable loss of funds or duplication of work.

Sect. 15. That under regulations to be prescribed by the President the use of the mails of the United States free of charge for postage for exclusively official business in carrying out the purposes of this act shall be extended to any agency or person designated by the President.

Sect. 16. That the President is authorized to make such regulations and to issue such orders as are essential effectively to carry out the provisions of this act.

Sect. 17. That every person who willfully assaults, resists, impedes, or interferes with any officer, employee, or agent of the United States in the execution of any duty authorized to be performed by or pursuant to this act shall upon conviction thereof be fined not exceeding \$1,000 or be imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

Sect. 21. That the provisions of this act shall cease to be in effect when the national emergency resulting from the existing state of war shall have passed, the date of which shall be ascertained and proclaimed by the President; but the date when this act shall cease to be in effect shall not be later than one year after the termination, as ascertained by the President, of the present war between the United States and Germany. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the

fulfillment by the United States of any legal obligation incurred pursuant to this act which shall be in force when this act ceases to be in effect.

—*Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, 1st Session, June 14, 1917, pp. 3890-3892.—See also FOOD REGULATION: 1917-1918.

1917 (June).—First American troops in France.—“Early in June dispatches from London reported the safe arrival in England of General Pershing and staff. The White Star liner Baltic brought them to Liverpool with such secrecy that not a man in the guard of honor drawn up on the landing stage knew why he had been paraded. . . . A special train carried the Americans to London where Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for War, Field-Marshal Lord French and a host of distinguished officers waited to bid them welcome. . . . June 13 the General reached Paris whither a part of his staff had preceded him. ‘From early afternoon,’ said the London Times, ‘Parisians of all sorts and conditions began to line the two mile route along which the cortege was to pass. Thousands upon thousands of workers left shops, offices and factories in time to swell the ranks. The Stars and Stripes were waving in countless windows.’ . . . The departure of Pershing and his staff was no secret, but the people knew nothing of the sailing of the first contingent of fighting men until they heard with pride of its safe arrival on the twenty-fifth of June at a port in France. A second contingent arrived a few days later, and as July drew to a close a third landed at ‘a European port.’ So secretly did they come that no demonstration attended their landing. Only a few spectators saw them as they quickly entrained and left for parts unknown.”—J. B. McMaster, *United States in the World War*, pp. 394-396.—See also WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: j; AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

ALSO IN: L. Jerrold, *American army in France* (*New York Times Current History*, Dec., 1917, p. 391).

1917 (July).—Embargo on food to neutral countries. See EMBARGO: During World War.

1917 (August).—Pope Benedict's proposal for peace terms.—Decisive reply from America.—“Germany was in her strongest position as Russia fell away broken and helpless. Yet she called upon the Pope to appeal to the world for a settlement. Benedict XV, bitterly hostile to the Italian Government and angered at the French for breaking the connection of Catholicism with the French Government, called upon Wilson and the other representatives of the allied powers to enter into *pour-parlers* for peace upon the basis then existing. It was August 1, 1917. Germany was the master everywhere and threatening to break with all her power into the plains of northeastern Italy. The moment was well chosen. . . . Wilson alone spoke with confidence. He would have no peace with the Kaiser; he regretted that the Pope had been willing to come to the aid of autocracy.”—W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, pp. 235-236.—See also WORLD WAR: 1917: XI. Efforts toward peace: g; h, 1.

ALSO IN: E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, *Foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson*.

1917 (August).—Priority law passed, giving control of railroads to president. See RAILROADS: 1916-1920.

1917 (August).—War measures and purposes. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: h.

1917 (October).—War Risk Insurance Bill passed. See INSURANCE: Government.

1917 (October).—Trading with the Enemy Act.—German industrial power.—“When the United States became a belligerent, April 6, 1917, a new phase of the problem was soon brought to view. At this date probably no one realized the extent to which the Germans had progressed in their peaceful industrial penetration and occupation of this country. Gradually the officials, and after them the citizens as a whole came to understand that great basic industries here, having to do in one way, or another with the manufacture of munitions, were German-controlled, in some cases subsidized by the German Imperial Treasury and in every case the centre of propaganda, intrigue and espionage of the worst sort. First there was the chemical industry, in which, according to popular legend, the Germans were invincible. Nine-tenths of the dyes used in this country were supplied by six German concerns, and a large proportion of the medicines and other chemicals. Struggling American companies were undersold and their workmen bribed by the six American subsidiaries of the parent German houses. The manufacture of munitions and explosives of all sorts relied heavily upon the related chemical industry, and the situation was intolerable. In the metal world German corporations, consisting of three large combinations, controlled in 1914 the metal markets of Europe and of Australia, especially in zinc and lead. The German influence in the metal industries was not controlling in the United States, though each of the three German corporations owned not only a house directly representing it in this country, but also many subsidiaries. . . . In the field of wireless telegraphy, closely allied to industry, German money had built two high-powered stations, one at Sayville, Long Island, and the other at Tuckerton, N. J. . . . The Bosch Magneto Company and another German company, both owned by one man, controlled 50 per cent. of the country’s battery ignition business. In addition to the companies from Germany operating in the United States, there were many manufacturing concerns here owned wholly or in part in Germany, but quite independent of any control by parent German companies. . . . Six large worsted mills were thus controlled; and enemy subjects owned a majority of the stock in four of them. Other American textile manufactures were owned in Germany. . . . Finally twenty German insurance companies could be added to the list. . . . The Germans had penetrated into every avenue and by-way of trade in the Philippine Islands, and laid quite extensive plans to resume their industrial hold on the islands as soon as the war was over. They owned the most important export and import houses, the chief electrical supply houses, a large proportion, if not a majority, of the tobacco factories of Manila, and were heavily interested in vegetable oil, rubber and cocoanut as well as tobacco plantations. It was found that Germans, when the United States entered the war, owned 30 per cent. of the sugar business of the Hawaiian Islands, the principal business of the islands. There were German interests in the Samoan Islands and in Porto Rico, while in the Virgin Islands, the latest territorial acquisition of the United States [see above: 1917 (March): Purchase, etc.], through the Hamburg-American Line, Germans owned a valuable coaling station, wharves and docks in the port of St. Thomas, the best natural harbor in the West Indies. . . . This German

industrial power in the United States and its possessions was a knife at the throat of the Government, capable on occasions of working incalculable harm; and the implied threat was all the more portentous, since many of the German-controlled interests, such as those in the metals, in chemistry and in dyestuffs, were directly related to the production of munitions and were more or less controlled by German State officials. Therefore it was that the United States, rudely awakened in the crisis, quickly disregarded the tendency of the times, which seemed to be set against the confiscation of enemy property by a belligerent power, and on Oct. 6, 1917, passed the Trading with the Enemy act, which among other things created the office of Alien Property Custodian, who was to have the power to seize and administer enemy property as a common law trustee. [See ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN.] On March 28, 1918, the real sting was put into the law when the custodian received power to sell enemy property. [See also CENSORSHIP: World War.] How to make the provisions of the new law known was comparatively easy, but how to uncover the enemy property proved to be very difficult. . . . There were many tricks to cover up enemy ownership, many transfers of property quietly effected which were not transfers at all, because the real owners retained the right to repurchase after the war. Here the same test was applied by the officers of the Government as is applied in international law to transfers of vessels in time of war by citizens of a belligerent to citizens of a neutral country. Has the transfer been made in good faith? If so, it is allowed.”—E. D. Fite, *Germany's losses in America* (New York Times Current History, Feb., 1921, pp. 267-270).

1917 (November).—Mission to consult with Allies.—“American Commissioners to consult with the Allies arrived at London, Nov. 7, 1917. . . . Colonel E. M. House of New York, . . . [was] the Chairman; the other members [were] Admiral Benson, Chief of Naval Operations; General Bliss, Chief of the General Staff; a representative of the Treasury in the person of Assistant Secretary Crosby; Vance C. McCormick, Chairman of the War Trade Board; Bainbridge Colby of the Shipping Board, Dr. Alonzo E. Taylor of the Food Administration, and Thomas Nelson Perkins, representing the Priority Board.”—*Colonel House's mission to the Allies* (New York Times Current History, December, 1917, p. 437).

1917 (November).—Lansing-Ishii Agreement with Japan concerning China and the “open door.” See above: 1907-1917; CHINA: 1917 (November).

1917 (November-December).—Aid desired by Soviet Russia. See RUSSIA: 1917 (November-December).

1917 (December).—Military preparations. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: i.

1917 (December).—American blacklist of German controlled banks in Central and South America. See BLACKLIST, COMMERCIAL: American.

1917 (December).—President Wilson’s message to Congress.—On December 4, the president made his annual address to Congress, in which he stated the aims of the people of the United States in the war, as he understood them, and asked for a declaration of a state of war against Austria. President Wilson spoke, in part, as follows:

"Gentlemen of the Congress: Eight months have elapsed since I last had the honor of addressing you. They have been months crowded with events of immense and grave significance for us. I shall not undertake to retail or even to summarize those events. The practical particulars of the part we have played in them will be laid before you in the reports of the executive departments. I shall discuss only our present outlook upon these vast affairs, our present duties, and the immediate means of accomplishing the objects we shall hold always in view. . . . Our object is, of course, to win the war; and we shall not slacken or suffer ourselves to be diverted until it is won. But it is worth while asking and answering the question, When shall we consider the war won? From one point of view it is not necessary to broach this fundamental matter. I do not doubt that the American people know what the war is about and what sort of an outcome they will regard as a realization of their purpose in it. As a Nation we are united in spirit and intention. I pay little heed to those who tell me otherwise. I hear the voices of dissent—who does not? I hear the criticism and the clamor of the noisily thoughtless and troublesome. I also see men here and there fling themselves in impotent disloyalty against the calm, indomitable power of the Nation. I hear men debate peace who understand neither its nature nor the way in which we may attain it with uplifted eyes and unbroken spirits. But I know that none of these speaks for the Nation. They do not touch the heart of anything. They may safely be left to strut their uneasy hour and be forgotten. But from another point of view I believe that it is necessary to say plainly what we here at the seat of action consider the war to be for and what part we mean to play in the settlement of its searching issues. We are the spokesmen of the American people and they have a right to know whether their purpose is ours. . . . I believe that I speak for them when I say two things: First, that this intolerable thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a thing without conscience, or honor, or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed, and if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations; and, second, that when this thing and its power are indeed defeated and the time comes that we can discuss peace—when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe and when those spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the bases of law and covenant for the life of the world—we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace, and pay it ungrudgingly. We know what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice—justice done at every point and to every nation that the final settlement must affect our enemies as well as our friends. You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the

formula 'no annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities.' Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray—and the people of every other country their agents could reach, in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson, and the people of the world put in control of their own destinies. But the fact that a wrong use has been made of a just idea is no reason why a right use should not be made of it. It ought to be brought under the patronage of its real friends. Let it be said again that autocracy must first be shown the utter futility of its claims to power or leadership in the modern world. It is impossible to apply any standard of justice so long as such forces are unchecked and undefeated as the present masters of Germany command. Not until that has been done can Right be set up as arbiter and peacemaker among the nations. But when that has been done—as, God willing, it assuredly will be—we shall at last be free to do an unprecedented thing, and this is the time to avow our purpose to do it. We shall be free to base peace on generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors. Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource we possess, whether of men, of money, or materials, is being devoted and will continue to be devoted to that purpose until it is achieved. Those who desire to bring peace about before that purpose is achieved I counsel to carry their advice elsewhere. We will not entertain it. We shall regard the war as won only when the German peoples say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done. They have done a wrong to Belgium which must be repaired. They have established a power over other lands and peoples than their own—over the great Empire of Austria-Hungary, over hitherto free Balkan states, over Turkey, and within Asia—which must be relinquished. . . . The peace we make must remedy that wrong. It must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans, and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and in Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy. We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. We shall hope to secure for the peoples of the Balkan peninsula and for the people of the Turkish Empire the right and opportunity to make their own lives safe, their own fortunes secure against oppression or injustice and from the dictation of foreign courts or parties. And our attitude and purpose with regard to Germany herself are of a like kind. We intend no wrong against the German Empire, no interference with her in-



WOODROW WILSON

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ternal affairs. We should deem either the one or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the principles we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred throughout our life as a nation. The people of Germany are being told by the men whom they now permit to deceive them and to act as their masters that they are fighting for the very life and existence of their Empire, a war of desperate self-defense against deliberate aggression. Nothing could be more grossly or wantonly false, and we must seek by the utmost openness and candor as to our real aims to convince them of its falseness. We are, in fact, fighting for their emancipation from fear, along with our own—from the fear as well as from the fact of unjust attack by neighbors or rivals or schemers after world empire. No one is threatening the existence or the independence or the peaceful enterprise of the German Empire. The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this, that if they should still, after the war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, men or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of governments. It might be impossible, also, in such untoward circumstances, to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that; and such a situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself, by processes which would assuredly set in. The wrongs, the very deep wrongs, committed in this war will have to be righted. That of course. But they can not and must not be righted by the commission of similar wrongs against Germany and her allies. The world will not permit the commission of similar wrongs as a means of reparation and settlement. Statesmen must by this time have learned that the opinion of the world is everywhere wide-awake and fully comprehends the issues involved. No representative of any self-governed nation will dare disregard it by attempting any such covenants of selfishness and compromise as were entered into at the Congress of Vienna. The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in this midday hour of the world's life. German rulers have been able to upset the peace of the world only because the German people were not suffered under their tutelage to share the comradeship of the other peoples of the world either in thought or in purpose. They were allowed to have no opinion of their own which might be set up as a rule of conduct for those who exercised authority over them. But the congress that concludes this war will feel the full strength of the tides that run now in the hearts and consciences of free men everywhere. Its conclusions will run with those tides.

"All these things have been true from the very beginning of this stupendous war; and I can not help thinking that if they had been made plain at

the very outset the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once for all enlisted on the side of the Allies, suspicion and distrust swept away, and a real and lasting union of purpose effected. Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution and had they been confirmed in that belief since, the sad reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs toward an ordered and stable government of free men might have been avoided. The Russian people have been poisoned by the very same falsehoods that have kept the German people in the dark, and the poison has been administered by the very same hands. The only possible antidote is the truth. It can not be uttered too plainly or too often. From every point of view, therefore, it has seemed to be my duty to speak these declarations of purpose, to add these specific interpretations to what I took the liberty of saying to the Senate in January. Our entrance into the war has not altered our attitude toward the settlement that must come when it is over. When I said in January that the nations of the world were entitled not only to free pathways upon the sea but also to assured and unmolested access to those pathways, I was thinking, and I am thinking now, not of the smaller and weaker nations alone, which need our countenance and support, but also of the great and powerful nations, and of our present enemies as well as our present associates in the war. I was thinking, and am thinking now, of Austria herself, among the rest, as well as of Serbia and of Poland. Justice and equality of rights can be had only at a great price. We are seeking permanent, not temporary, foundations for the peace of the world and must seek them candidly and fearlessly. As always, the right will prove to be the expedient. What shall we do, then, to push this great war of freedom and justice to its righteous conclusion? We must clear away with a thorough hand all impediments to success, and we must make every adjustment of law that will facilitate the full and free use of our whole capacity and force as a fighting unit. One very embarrassing obstacle that stands in our way is that we are at war with Germany but not with her allies. I therefore very earnestly recommend that the Congress immediately declare the United States in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. Does it seem strange to you that this should be the conclusion of the argument I have just addressed to you? It is not. It is, in fact, the inevitable logic of what I have said. Austria-Hungary is for the time being not her own mistress, but simply the vassal of the German Government. We must face the facts as they are and act upon them without sentiment in this stern business. The Government of Austria-Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instrument of another nation. We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way. The same logic would lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria. They also are the tools of Germany. But they are mere tools, and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary action. We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry us, but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical considerations lead us and not heed any others. The financial and military measures which must be adopted will suggest themselves as the war and its undertakings develop,

but I will take the liberty of proposing to you certain other acts of legislation which seem to me to be needed for the support of the war and for the release of our whole force and energy. It will be necessary to extend in certain particulars the legislation of the last session with regard to alien enemies; and also necessary, I believe, to create a very definite and particular control over the entrance and departure of all persons into and from the United States. Legislation should be enacted defining as a criminal offense every wilful violation of the presidential proclamation relating to alien enemies promulgated under Section 4067 of the Revised Statutes and providing appropriate punishments; and women as well as men should be included under the terms of the acts placing restraints upon alien enemies. It is likely that as time goes on many alien enemies will be willing to be fed and housed at the expense of the Government in the detention camps, and it would be the purpose of the legislation I have suggested to confine offenders among them in penitentiaries and other similar institutions where they could be made to work as other criminals do. Recent experience has convinced me that the Congress must go further in authorizing the Government to set limits to prices. The law of supply and demand, I am sorry to say, has been replaced by the law of unrestrained selfishness. While we have eliminated profiteering in several branches of industry it still runs impudently rampant in others. The farmers, for example, complain with a great deal of justice that, while the regulation of food prices restricts their incomes, no restraints are placed upon the prices of most of the things they must themselves purchase; and similar inequities obtain on all sides. It is imperatively necessary that the consideration of the full use of the water power of the country, and also the consideration of the systematic and yet economical development of such of the natural resources of the country as are still under control of the Federal Government, should be immediately resumed and affirmatively and constructively dealt with at the earliest possible moment. The pressing need of such legislation is daily becoming more obvious. The legislation proposed at the last session with regard to regulated combinations among our exporters, in order to provide for our foreign trade a more effective organization and method of cooperation, ought by all means to be completed at this session. And I beg that the members of the House of Representatives will permit me to express the opinion that it will be impossible to deal in any but a very wasteful and extravagant fashion with the enormous appropriations of the public moneys which must continue to be made, if the war is to be properly sustained, unless the House will consent to return to its former practice of initiating and preparing all appropriation bills through a single committee, in order that responsibility may be centered, expenditures standardized and made uniform, and waste and duplication as much as possible avoided. Additional legislation may also become necessary before the present Congress again adjourns in order to effect the most efficient coordination and operation of the railway and other transportation systems of the country; but to that I shall, if circumstances should demand, call the attention of the Congress upon another occasion. If I have overlooked anything that ought to be done for the more effective conduct of the war, your own counsels will supply the omission. What I am perfectly clear about is that in the present

session of the Congress our whole attention and energy should be concentrated on the vigorous, rapid, and successful prosecution of the great task of winning the war. We can do this with all the greater zeal and enthusiasm because we know that for us this is a war of high principle, debased by no selfish ambition of conquest or spoliation; because we know, and all the world knows, that we have been forced into it to save the very institutions we live under from corruption and destruction. . . . I have spoken plainly because this seems to be the time when it is most necessary to speak plainly, in order that all the world may know that even in the heat and ardor of the struggle and when our whole thought is of carrying the war through to its end we have not forgotten any ideal or principle for which the name of America has been held in honor among the nations and for which it has been our glory to contend in the great generations that went before us. A supreme moment of history has come. The eyes of the people have been opened and they see. The hand of God is laid upon the nations. He will show them favor, I devoutly believe, only if they rise to the clear heights of His own justice and mercy."

—Woodrow Wilson, *Address to Congress, Dec. 4, 1917*.—The resolution of a state of war against Austria was passed unanimously by the Senate on December 7, by a vote of 363 against 1 by the House, and was signed the same day.

ALSO IN: R. J. Beamish and F. A. March, *America's part in the World War*.—S. E. Forman, *Our republic*.—H. C. Lodge, *War addresses*.—A. D. H. Smith, *Real Colonel House*.—G. Creel, *World, the war, and Wilson*.—F. F. Kelly, *What America did*.—J. P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I know him*. A. B. Hart, ed., *America at war: A handbook of patriotic education references*.—Theodore Roosevelt, *Foes of our own household*.

1917 (December).—Activities of navy in the war. See **WORLD WAR: 1917: IX. Naval operations: d.**

1917 (December).—Work of War-camp Community Service during the year. See **WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: IX. War relief: g.**

1917-1918.—Organization of army.—Transportation. See **WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: VI. Military and naval equipment: b, 2; b, 2, ii.**

1917-1918.—Tariff legislation.—Trade situation.—War Trade Council and War Trade Board. See **TARIFF: 1917-1919.**

1917-1918.—Aid of England in transporting American troops to France. See **WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: V. Moving men and material.**

1917-1918.—General strikes.—Munition strikes at Bridgeport. See **LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1917-1918: General strikes; 1917-1918: Munitions strikes.**

1917-1918.—Railroad construction by Americans in France. See **RAILROADS: 1917-1918; WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: V. Moving men and material: c, 1; c, 2, ii.**

1917-1918.—Relief in Persia. See **PERSIA: 1917-1918.**

1917-1919.—Location of cantonments. See **CANTONMENTS.**

1917-1919.—Loan to India.—Pittman Act. See **INDIA: 1917-1919.**

1917-1919.—Price control during World War. See **PRICE CONTROL: 1917-1919.**

1917-1919.—Effect of the War.—Mobilization of material resources.—Council of National Defense.—National Research Council.—Naval con-

sulting Board.—Committee on Public Information.—War Industries Board.—Food administration.—Railroads War Board.—Government requisition of railroads.—Morale in training camps.—Welfare activities.—Cost of war.—Loans.—Enemy aliens.—“It was said that the nation would not go to war on a scale commensurate with its strength. It . . . [went] to war in the grand manner. It was said that the selective draft law would be a failure, and would occasion riots. It did not occasion riots, and it was not a failure; on the contrary, it enrolled 10,000,000 men in one day. It was said that the \$2,000,000,000 loan would be a failure. The \$2,000,000,000 loan was greatly oversubscribed, by over three million people, and the bulk of it was subscribed in small sums. . . . The speeches of all American leaders of opinion . . . [showed] a complete grasp of the moral issues of the war, a complete adherence to . . . democratic principles . . . and a complete determination to achieve the definite triumph of those principles. And if the general conduct of the nation . . . [showed] anything, it . . . [showed] that the nation and the leaders are in admirable unity.”—A. Bennett, *Effect of the United States in the war (New York Times Current History, December, 1917, p. 446)*.—“America had need of her unity and her enthusiasm. The size of the conflict, the number of men that must be raised and trained, the quantity of materials required, the amount of money needed, and above all, the mental readjustment necessary in a nation that had hitherto buried itself in the pursuits of peace—all these considerations emphasized the importance of the task that the United States was undertaking. Into Washington there poured a bewildering stream of offers of assistance; organizations had to be built up over night to take hold of problems that were new to this country; men found themselves hurried into tasks for which they must prepare as best they might, and under crowded working conditions, changing circumstances, and confusion of effort that beggar description. In many cases, America could learn valuable lessons from European experience, and to that end commissions of eminent statesmen and soldiers were sent to this country to give us the benefit of their successes and failures. An important step had already been taken in the creation of the Council of National Defence on August 29, 1916, an act which indicated a realization that the United States might at any time be drawn into the European struggle. [See NATIONAL DEFENSE, COUNCIL OF.] . . . State councils of defense were likewise organized to arouse the people to the performance of their share in the nation's work, to circulate information and to assist the several agencies of the federal government. A National Research Council mobilized the scientific talent of the country and brought it to bear on certain of the problems of warfare. [See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL.] A Naval Consulting Board examined inventions offered to the Navy Department. The Committee on Public Information furnished condensed war news to town and country explaining the causes of the war and upholding America's purposes in it, and directing speakers who aided people in their duty during the crisis. [See also COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION.] The War Industries Board developed plans for the problem of building sufficient ships to transport troops and cargoes, and to replace vessels sunk by submarines. By means of a Committee on Labor the laboring men gave their support to the conduct of the war and agreed

to delay controversies until the war was over. The exhausted condition of the supplies of food among the Allies, and the size of the armies which America decided to raise, made the Food Administration one of importance. At that time when the United States entered the war there was a dangerous shortage of food in Europe due to the decrease in production and to the lack of the vessels necessary to bring supplies from distant parts of the world. . . . Accordingly, legislation was passed on August 10, 1917, which made it unlawful to destroy or hoard food; it provided for the stimulating of agriculture; and it authorized the President to purchase and sell foods and fix the price of wheat. Wilson appointed as the chief of the Food Administration Herbert C. Hoover, whose experience with the problem of Belgian relief enabled him to act promptly and effectively. Hoover's one great purpose was to utilize all food supplies in such a way as would most help to win the war. He cooperated with the Department of Agriculture which had already started a campaign for stimulating the cultivation of farms and gardens on all available land. [See also FOOD REGULATION: 1917-1918: Food control in the United States.] . . . The vital relation of the transportation system of the country to the winning of the war was apparent at the start. As soon as war was declared, therefore, nearly 700 representatives of the railroads formed a Railroads' War Board to minimize the individual and competitive activities of the roads, coordinate their operation, and produce a maximum of transportation efficiency. The attempt of the railroad executives, however, quickly broke down. In the first place, . . . our entire body of railroad legislation is based upon the idea of separating the several systems and compelling them to compete rather than cooperate. The habits and customs thus formed could hardly be done away with in an instant. In the second place the cost of labor and materials was constantly mounting, and the demand for more equipment was insistent. The railroads could meet these greater costs only by raising rates, a process which involved obtaining the assent of the Interstate Commerce Commission and required a considerable period for its accomplishment. The roads were also embarrassed by an unprecedented congestion of traffic on the eastern seaboard, from which men and cargoes must be shipped to Europe. Accordingly, on December 26, 1917, the President took possession of the railroad system for the government and appointed the Secretary of the Treasury, William G. McAdoo, as Director General. [See also RAILROADS: 1916-1920.] . . . An important part of American preparation for war was the attention paid to the ‘morale’ organizations, which were designed to maintain the courage and spirit of the fighting man. As far as legislation could do it, the most flagrant vices were kept away from the camps. Moreover the Commissions on Training Camp Activities attempted to supply wholesale entertainment and associations. Under their direction, various organizations established and operated theatres, libraries and writing-rooms encouraged athletics in the camps, and offered similar facilities for soldiers and sailors when on leave in towns and cities near by. [See also WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: IX. War relief: g.] The Red Cross conducted extensive relief work both in this country and abroad; surgical dressings were made, clothing and comfort kits supplied, and money contributed. In France, Belgium, Rus-

sia, Roumania, Italy and Serbia the Red Cross conducted a fight against the suffering incident to war. [See also RED CROSS: American National: 1917-1919; INTERNATIONAL RELIEF.] The legislation which established the system of allotments, allowances and War Risk Insurance was also designed in part to maintain the *morale* of the army and navy. [See INSURANCE: Government.] The total direct money cost of the war from April, 1917, to April, 1919, was estimated by the War Department at \$21,850,000,000, an average of over a million dollars an hour, and an amount sufficient to have carried on the Revolutionary War a thousand years. In addition, loans were extended to the Allies at the rate of nearly half a million dollars an hour. This huge amount was raised in part through increased taxes. Income taxes were heavily increased; levies were made on such profits of corporations as were in excess of profits made before the war, during the three years 1911-1913; additional taxes were laid upon spirits and tobacco, on amusements and luxuries; and the postage rates were raised. In part, also, the cost of the war was defrayed through loans. A portion of the amount borrowed was by the sale of War Savings Stamps. . . . Most of the borrowed money, however, was raised through the five 'Liberty Loans,' a series of popular subscriptions to the needs of the government. In each case the government called upon the people to purchase bonds, ranging from two billions at first to six billions at the time of the fourth loan. There were four and a half million subscribers for the first loan, but after a little experience the number was readily increased until 21,000,000 people responded to the fourth call. Popular campaigns such as never have been seen in America, campaigns of publicity, house-to-house canvassing and appeals to the win-the-war spirit resulted in unprecedented financial support. Isolated communities in the back country and people of slender means in the cities, no less than the great banks and wealthy corporations cooperated to make the Liberty loans of social and economic as well as financial importance."—C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War (United States, v. 3, pp. 584-590)*.—See also WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XIV. Costs of war.—"It was, of course, necessary for the American authorities to keep close watch on the immense numbers of enemy aliens resident in the United States. Acts of Congress required that Germans and Austro-Hungarians must register as enemy aliens and carry certificates of identification. They were forbidden to go near army camps, navy-yards, and other military and naval establishments without special permits; they were not permitted to reside in, or visit, certain districts. These provisions at first only applied to men, but it was soon discovered that women subjects of enemy countries were, if anything, more dangerous than the men, and by a bill approved by the President the provisions of the espionage act were extended to them. [See also ESPIONAGE ACT; WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: II. Espionage: a, 4; III. Press reports, etc.; d, 5.] The registration revealed the fact that there were about 500,000 German 'enemy aliens,' and between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000 Austro-Hungarian enemy aliens in the United States. In addition, there were some Bulgarians and Turks, to say nothing of millions of naturalized citizens from the Central Powers, and millions more of their descendants. There had been much uneasiness lest trouble might be caused by this population, particularly by the German

alien enemies. Germans in Germany had even boasted that the United States dare not go to war because to do so would provoke a civil conflict at home. Beyond question there were many disloyal utterances, and some actual damage was done by German spies and sympathizers in the way of blowing up munition plants and causing 'accidents' of one sort or another. Still there were fewer such outrages than many people had expected. In fact, there were not so many after we entered the war as there had been before. [See above: 1915 (July); (September).] Altogether it was found necessary to arrest about 6,000 persons under personal warrants. . . . There were thousands . . . [of] enemy aliens [see ALIEN ENEMIES] and even some citizens of the United States who secretly sympathized with the Central Powers, but when the final test came it is to the credit of citizens of German and Austro-Hungarian origin that the vast majority, whatever their sympathies had been before the United States entered the war, whole-heartedly decided that America was their country, and gave her loyal support. Hundreds of thousands fought valiantly in battle, and many laid down their lives in the contest. The entrance of the United States into the war caused a split in the Socialist party. Some leaders, such as Charles Edward Russell and John Spargo, believed that Germany must be beaten, and supported the war. Others opposed the war, and some seemed really to sympathize with Germany. The Industrial Workers of the World, who had their counterpart in the European Syndicalist [caused the country more serious trouble]. . . . They advocated that workers force the owners of factories to turn their possessions over to the employees. To bring about that object they favored strikes and all manner of damage to property—in short, what is known as 'sabotage.' This word is said to have been derived from the custom of French Syndicalists of throwing their wooden shoes, or *sabots*, into machinery in order to injure it. A favorite form of sabotage in the United States was the putting of emery dust or carborundum into the bearings of machinery. Some of the I.W.W.'s were really in German pay, and did all they could to hamper American war efforts. They put bombs in munition factories, injured machinery, incited strikes, especially among shipbuilders, and set fire to forests, grain elevators, and crops. Many of the I.W.W.'s were arrested, and some, including one of their chief leaders, William D. Haywood, were sentenced to the penitentiary. Others, of foreign origin, were interned as dangerous to the peace and safety of the country. After the armistice was signed, many foreign I.W.W.'s and other radicals, including Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, were arrested and deported."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*, pp. 450-453.—See also below: 1919 (September-December); INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD: Recent tendencies.

ALSO IN: F. L. Paxson, *American war government (American Historical Review, October, 1920, pp. 54-76)*.—*First Annual Report of the Council of National Defense, 1917*.—J. A. Fitch, *Reveille to American industry (Survey, Mar. 17, 1917, pp. 691-693)*.—M. Thelen, *Federal control of railroads in wartime (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1918, p. 14)*.—G. Creel, *How we advertised America*.

1917-1919.—Taxation and expenditures.—"In spite of its late entrance into the war, the expenditures of the United States, by reason of their

magnitude, at once rivalled those of the leading European belligerents. The country was well prepared to take a leading part in the struggle. As a result of the production of supplies for the European belligerents during the two and a half years preceding, the industries of the country were in a measure adjusted to the herculean task now to be laid upon them. The finances of the country were in good condition. The installation of the federal reserve system had created the financial machinery necessary to handle the enormous loans which were soon to be floated. The tax machinery, too, had been organized and was in good working order, for the income tax was by now running smoothly, and together with the excise taxes, formed the foundation of an easily expanded and lucrative revenue system. . . . The normal peace expenditures of the United States . . . from 1913 to 1916, . . . [for the civil, military and naval establishments, and the pension list, respectively, were as follows:] 1913, \$682,770,705; 1914, \$700,254,489; 1915, \$730,103,591; 1916, \$724,492,998. From the very day of its entrance into the struggle on April 6, 1917, the expenditures of the United States showed a startlingly rapid growth. From an average monthly expenditure of \$65,000,000 during 1916, the ordinary expenditures rose [to \$134,304,040 in June, 1917, with a daily average of \$4,776,801]. . . . The First Liberty Loan Act, passed April 24, 1917, provided for an issue of bonds to the amount of \$5,000,000,000, of which \$3,000,000,000 was to be used to purchase the obligations of government at war with Germany. A popular loan of \$2,000,000,000 fifteen-thirty year gold bonds was issued by the United States in May, 1917, dated June 15, 1917, bearing interest at the rate of 3½ per cent. The bonds were tax exempt, both as to principal and interest, from all taxation except estate and inheritance taxes, and carried conversion privilege into future issues which might be put out at higher rates of interest. Pending the floatation of the loan, the Treasury was authorized to issue one year certificates of indebtedness. The use of such certificates to anticipate the yield of war loans and taxes has characterized the financing of the war in the United States from the beginning. Provision was also made for the convertibility into this issue of the outstanding Panama Canal bonds, of which \$63,945,460 were later actually converted. By this act, as by subsequent loan acts, the responsibility for the success of the bond issue was imposed very largely upon the Secretary of the Treasury. He was given great power and authority under the act and may fairly be held responsible for its success or failure. One of the first steps taken was the organization of the machinery for the sale and distribution of the loan. For this purpose the federal reserve banks formed an admiral base. Under the federal reserve system the United States was divided into twelve districts, and in each district a federal reserve bank was established in a selected city as the head office of the banks in that district. All national banks in each of the twelve districts were required to become members, and all State banks and trust companies were permitted to do so. At the time of the issue of the First Liberty Loan there were 7,581 national banks and 40 State banks and trust companies in the system. Under section 15 of the Federal Reserve Act, it was provided that the federal reserve banks could act as fiscal agents of the United States when required by the Secretary of the Treasury, and an order providing for

this had already been issued. A circular of May 14, 1917, designated the Treasury Department and the twelve federal reserve banks as agents to receive applications for the First Liberty Loan. Each of the twelve banks appointed a central committee of five representative business men to act as a central Liberty Loan committee in the respective districts, and they in turn appointed subcommittees in each of the larger towns and cities. [See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1912-1913; 1913-1919.] Extensive subscription and publicity campaigns were inaugurated and carried through by these committees which acquired the voluntary cooperation of many persons in the prosecution of the work. Special women's Liberty Loan committees were formed and the aid of the Boy Scouts was secured, both of which gave valuable assistance. The American Bankers' Association offered its services. The vigorous cooperation of the press was secured, and many valuable editorials and news items were devoted to the promotion of Liberty Loan sales. Experienced bond salesmen were enlisted in the work of selling Liberty Bonds. Arrangements were made by banks and trust companies to carry on a reasonable margin large amounts of these bonds for their customers at the same rate of interest as the bonds. The same general procedure was followed in the subsequent Liberty Loan issues. . . . The results of the loan [of which the banks subscribed very large amounts] were regarded as a sort of earnest of the intentions of the United States in the prosecution of the war, and every effort was made to insure its success. The subscriptions amounted to \$3,035,226,850, but only \$2,000,000,000 was accepted. Allotments were made in full to subscribers in amounts up to \$10,000 and over that sum in such proportions as to net the exact amount asked for. The number of subscribers was about 4,500,000. . . . While no new war revenue measure was enacted in the period from April 6, 1917, to the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1917, the yield during this fiscal year was greatly increased over pre-war normal revenue by the enactments of September 8, 1916, and March 3, 1917, and as these revenue measures, though preceding actual belligerency, were enacted to provide a 'preparedness fund' and carry out an increased naval program, and were diverted to or merged in current war expenditure, they may fairly be regarded, at least in the excess over normal, as war revenues. . . . The Treasury Department had estimated the expenditures for the fiscal year 1917-1918 at \$18,775,010,995. Congress promptly followed the estimate by an appropriation of \$18,870,177,015, or slightly more than the executive estimates, with an additional appropriation of \$2,511,553,925 for contract obligations. The end of the fiscal year showed that actual ordinary disbursements amounted to only \$8,966,532,266 and advances to Allies, \$4,739,434,750, or a total of \$13,705,967,016. The discrepancy between the estimated and the actual disbursements seems to have been due to the assumption that the total productive capacity of the United States for war materials could be used at once and to the full for government purposes. Events of the year proved this assumption to be erroneous; in fact, a full year was to elapse before the necessary adjustments were effected in American industry and trade which made it possible to direct the major resources of the country into war channels. . . .

"As the tax legislation to provide additional revenue was not passed until October, 1917, it


soon became necessary to resort again to borrowing in order to meet the increased demands occasioned by the war and also the need of foreign countries to which the United States was extending credit. Accordingly, the Second Liberty Loan Act was passed on September 24, 1917. This authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue bonds, in addition to the \$2,000,000,000 already issued under the first loan act, to the amount of \$7,538,945,460. This sum included the unissued balances authorized under the previous act and a new authorization for \$4,000,000,000. The rate of interest was fixed at 4 per cent, and the bonds were dated November 15, 1917, and made redeemable in 1927 and payable in 1942. They were convertible into the next issue of bonds bearing a higher interest rate, the conversion privilege to cease six months after the next issue (November 9, 1918) if not then exercised, and the bonds of the first issue converted into the new 4s had only coeval conversion rights. The tax exemption privilege of the first issue lapsed if converted (except for a block exemption of \$5,000 principal) and the new 4s were made subject to the estate and inheritance taxes, and to the surtaxes under the income tax law, as well as to excess profits and war profits taxes. The withdrawal of the tax exemption feature was the result of the strong disapproval directed against this provision in the first issue, based on the ground that tax exemption granted a privilege which grew in value as new taxes were imposed and the burden resting upon accumulated wealth became heavier. . . . The lowest denomination of both issues had been placed at \$50. But in order that subscriptions might be obtained from persons of small means who would not be able to take even a \$50 bond, war savings certificates were authorized by the act of September 24, to an amount not exceeding \$2,000,000,000. These were patterned after the British model and were issued in the form of a stamp costing from \$4.12 to \$4.23, according to the month in which purchased, and having a maturity value at the end of five years of \$5. Thrift stamps costing 25 cents each and not bearing interest were also sold which were exchangeable for war savings certificates. The sale of the stamps and certificates was made the occasion for a campaign of education to instill principles of thrift and loyalty. Educational work thus done may be regarded as probably the most valuable result, though the financial return from these stamps was by no means inconsiderable. The sale was begun in December, and by the end of the fiscal year June 30, 1918, the revenue from this source amounted to \$307,092,391. The Third Liberty Loan Act provided for the issue of \$3,000,000,000 4¼ per cent ten year bonds maturing in 1928. Bonds were dated May 9, 1918, and offered on April 6, 1918, subscriptions closing May 4. The tax exemption provisions were the same as in the second loan, but the third issue differed from the previous ones in several respects. In the first place, the optional bond was rejected in favor of a straight ten year bond, which, moreover, was inconvertible. Prior issues converted into the new 4½s also became inconvertible. The Secretary of the Treasury announced that all oversubscriptions would be accepted. Finally, the act provided for a bond purchase fund out of which the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized, until one year after the termination of the war, to purchase bonds to the amount of one-twentieth of the outstanding issues in each year, for the

purpose of sustaining the market price of the bonds. By October 31, bonds to the amount of \$244,036,500 had been purchased under this provision. The act also provided for the issuance of certificates of indebtedness to an amount not exceeding \$8,000,000,000 of the same maturities and for the same purposes as under the previous act. The sum of \$5,500,000,000 was also authorized to be used for the establishment of credits for foreign governments. The subscription to this loan amounted to \$4,176,516,850. . . . The number of subscribers . . . almost doubled, increasing to 18,376,815. This was about one subscriber in every six persons in the United States, or practically one to the normal family. . . . On October 3, 1917, was passed the first war revenue act, which was estimated to raise \$3,400,000,000. It included a drastic addition to the existing surtaxes on income, and added an excess profits tax. Additions were also made in the system of indirect taxes. The old excess profits tax which had been provided for under the act of March 3, 1917, . . . was repealed. Similarly the munition manufacturers' tax was lowered to 10 per cent and was made to cease entirely on January 1, 1916. The backbone of the new act consisted of the income and excess profits provisions. In the former the exemption minimum was lowered to \$1,000 for a single person and \$2,000 for married persons and a normal tax of 2 per cent was levied on all incomes in excess of these sums. This was in addition to the tax of 2 per cent on incomes in excess of \$3,000 for single persons and \$4,000 for married persons which had been established by the act of October 3, 1913, as amended by subsequent acts of September 8, 1916, and March 3, 1917. A scale of additional surtaxes was also prescribed in addition to those imposed by the act of September 8, 1916, on incomes of individuals, which ranged from 1 per cent on incomes from \$5,000 to \$7,500, up to 50 per cent on incomes over \$1,000,000. The highest combined rate which was levied under this act reached 67 per cent in the case of incomes over \$2,000,000. For corporations a normal tax of 4 per cent was prescribed in addition to the existing normal rate of 2 per cent on net income. The excess profits tax was supplementary to the income tax, and provided for an excess profits tax upon the income of individuals, partnerships, and corporations. A specific exemption of \$3,000 in the case of corporations, and \$6,000 in the case of partnerships and individuals, was allowed and also the deduction of an amount of net income equal to 7 to 9 per cent of the invested capital used in the business during the prewar period. The years 1911, 1912, and 1913 were defined as the 'prewar' period. In case the business was not in existence during that time, the deductible income was fixed at 8 per cent. Beginning at this point a graduated tax was placed upon the profits in excess of the amounts exempted. The lowest rate was 20 per cent on excess profits up to 15 per cent; 25 per cent on the excess from 15 to 20 per cent; 35 per cent on the excess from 20 to 25 per cent; 45 per cent on the excess from 25 to 33 per cent; and 60 per cent on the excess profits over 33 per cent. In the case of excess profits derived chiefly from personal or professional services, the rate was a flat one of 8 per cent on the net income in excess of the exemption of \$3,000 for corporations and \$6,000 for partnerships and individuals. Doubt as to the meaning of the law and apprehension as to the effect upon the industry of the country which an unwise in-

terpretation or enforcement might entail, led the Secretary of the Treasury to organize a group of business and professional men designated as 'excess profits tax advisers.' They were able after some months of effort to issue regulations interpreting the principal features of the excess profits tax provisions and establishing the administrative procedure with reference thereto. In spite of this effort to give a working interpretation to a clumsily drawn law, it met with serious and continued criticism. About three-fourths of the internal revenue receipts levied under this act were secured from the sources just described, but in addition a number of other taxes were provided for. Next in importance to the income and excess profits taxes was the war tax on distilled spirits, which was raised from \$2.20 to \$3.20; and that on beer, which was raised from \$1.50 to \$3 per barrel. Other beverages were taxed at more moderate rates. The taxes on tobacco were more carefully classified and considerably raised. War stamp taxes were imposed upon certain legal or business documents, playing cards, parcel post packages, transfers of shares of stock and sales of produce for future delivery. Additions were made to a large number of existing taxes such as the 'war tax on facilities furnished by public utilities and insurance.' New taxes were imposed known as 'war excise taxes' on automobiles, musical instruments, jewelry, sporting goods, cameras, cosmetics, toilet articles and patent medicines, moving picture films, motor boats and yachts. The tax on admissions and dues was also introduced for the first time. An additional war tax on estates graduated from one-half of 1 per cent on estates below \$50,000 to 10 per cent on estates over \$10,000,000 was added to the already existing inheritance tax. This resulted in raising the total rates on inheritance to a scale graduated from 2 per cent to 25 per cent. Finally, the postal rates were increased 50 per cent in the case of first class mail and a zone system at increased rates, was introduced in the case of second class mail. . . . The Treasury Department had estimated the expenditures for the fiscal year 1918-1919 at \$20,687,938,691 ordinary, and advances to Allies at \$4,475,565,250, or a total of \$25,000,000,000, on the assumption that the war would continue during the whole year. The expenditures for the first nine months of the year (to March 31, 1919), totaled \$15,164,224,227, those for December exceeding \$2,000,000,000, including advances to Allies. . . .

"The armistice was declared on November 11, 1918, but this did not at once diminish expenditures, but rather increased it, due to the heavy costs involved in the cancellation of war contracts, the expenses of transporting troops from France, and other charges incident to demobilization. In January, however, a gradual decline set in which continued steadily to the end of the fiscal year. The estimated expenditure of \$25,000,000,000, with estimated revenues of \$8,000,000,000 left a deficit of \$17,000,000 to be met by loans, had the war continued. Accordingly, in July an act was passed authorizing an issuance of \$8,000,000,000 additional bonds, and providing for a further advance of \$1,500,000,000 to Allies. Treasury certificates in anticipation of the fourth loan began at once to be sold. By August the amount outstanding was \$2,183,835,000. The sale continued until they reached \$4,659,820,000 on October 1, 1918, when the Fourth Liberty Loan was offered, which took them up. The sale of war savings certificates had grown steadily since

its inauguration in December, 1917, amounting, as before stated, to \$307,092,391 during the prior fiscal year. In July, 1918, the demand became so great that for a time the Bureau of Engraving and Printing had to cease the work on postage stamps in order to supply enough war savings and thrift stamps to meet the demand. It was estimated about the middle of July that the number of persons who had invested or were 'pledged' to invest in war savings stamps was 34,410,000. For the month of July the total sales amounted to \$211,417,943. This was the highwater mark, however, and during the next months the sales fell off. In September, 1918, Congress extended the prior limitation of \$2,000,000,000 to \$4,000,000,000 and the Secretary of the Treasury prepared a new 1919 series to go on sale January 1, 1919, with a maturity in 1924. Curiously enough, in spite of subscriptions



LIBERTY LOAN POSTER
(Drawn by E. M. Ashe)

to this form of investment, and the purchase of Liberty Bonds, the savings banks of the country reported increased deposits. The same was true of the postal savings banks. In order to meet this latter growth, the maximum amount of money which a depositor might have on deposit was raised on July 22 to \$2,500. This originally had been \$500, and in May, 1917, had been increased to \$1,000. The Fourth Liberty Loan in the amount of \$6,000,000,000 4¼ per cent fifteen-thirty year gold bonds dated October 24, 1918, was offered for subscription on September 28, 1918. The right to allot bonds up to the full amount of the oversubscriptions was reserved, as in the third loan. The tax exemption provisions were the same as in the second and third loans, but in addition there was an exemption from surtaxes and excess profits and war profits taxes allowed on the income of bonds up to \$30,000 principal, and a further exemption from these taxes on the income derived from an

aggregate of \$45,000 principal on the three prior loans. This latter exemption, however, was contingent upon the taxpayer who claimed it being an original subscriber to the Fourth Liberty Loan of an amount of one and one-half times the amount of the three prior loans owned by him on the date of his tax return. The two latter block tax exemptions were for a period ending two years after the war only. This exemption privilege was double barreled, having the effect almost of compulsion in securing additional subscriptions to the fourth loan from holders of prior ones who could thereby secure additional tax exemptions for their holdings, and at the same time it induced subscribers to the new loan to purchase on the market a sufficient amount of prior loans in case they did not then own them, to get the full benefit of the additional exemption. . . . The subscriptions to the fourth loan amounted to \$6,989,047,000 and, according to the announcement, the Treasury accepted the whole amount. This was an oversubscription of 16.48 per cent which . . . represented a total about 60 per cent higher than the largest previous loan. The number of subscribers grew to 21,000,000, or almost one in every five of the population. . . . The first payment of the income tax was made on March 15 and permitted the retirement of about \$1,000,000,000, but it was necessary to provide further funds. . . . Accordingly, on March 3, 1919, the fifth loan was authorized. As the legislation authorizing it was passed so long in advance of its issue, great latitude was granted to the Secretary of the Treasury in fixing the details, even more so than in the case of the previous loans. The act practically determined only the limit, which was set at \$7,000,000,000. The Victory Liberty Loan, as it was called, was offered for popular subscription on April 21, 1919, and consisted of \$4,500,000,000 4¾ per cent three-four year convertible gold notes. The tax-exemption provisions were similar to those of the previous acts, but the notes were made convertible at the option of the holder into wholly tax-exempt (save for estate and inheritance taxes) 3¾ per cent notes. . . . [An additional] exemption was allowed in the interest on notes to a principal amount of \$20,000, provided no noteholder should be entitled to this exemption unless he owned one-third of the amount in Victory Loan notes as an original subscriber. The Treasury announced that no oversubscription would be accepted. . . . A cumulative sinking fund to an amount annually of 2½ per cent of the aggregate of Liberty Bonds outstanding July 1, 1920 (less the amount of obligations of foreign governments held by the United States) was authorized, which it was calculated would expunge the net debt in twenty-five years. Authorization was also given for making further loans to foreign governments for a period of eighteen months after the termination of war, and for converting the short time obligations of foreign governments evidencing such loans into long time obligations maturing not later than 1938. Finally, the War Finance Corporation was authorized, in order to promote commerce with foreign nations, to grant credits to American exporters to a total amount of \$1,000,000,000. The subscriptions to the Victory Liberty Loan totaled \$5,249,908,300—an oversubscription of nearly \$750,000,000, or 16.66 per cent. The number of subscribers was about 12,000,000. . . . The announced policy of the administration and of Congress had been the raising of a quarter to a third of the expenditures by taxation. At the rate expenditures were increas-

ing, it was evident that new revenue would have to be provided, and accordingly a new revenue bill was introduced in the summer of 1918. It was designed to yield about \$8,000,000,000 [which would be one third of the \$24,000,000,000] that it was estimated the Treasury would need for the fiscal year 1919. A tax measure calculated to yield this amount was finally matured at the time the armistice was declared. . . . Immediately upon this event the Secretary of the Treasury suggested to Congress the desirability of reducing the amount of revenues to be raised by taxation from \$8,000,000,000 to \$6,000,000,000 for the fiscal year 1918-1919, and to \$4,000,000,000 for the following year. . . . The existing bill was amended so as to reduce the revenue to the sums suggested. The final act was passed February 24, 1919. . . . The 1919 act greatly changed and distinctly improved the excess profits tax. In this enactment it is styled 'war profits and excess profits' tax, and the distinction between war profits and excess profits is established. Individuals and partnerships were relieved from the excess profits tax, and the act also permits deduction of losses in transactions not directly connected with trade or business, and removes the limitations upon the deduction of interest upon indebtedness. As in the former act, invested capital forms the basis of all computation. More careful definitions are given of such terms as 'net income,' 'invested capital,' 'tangible and intangible property,' 'inadmissible assets,' and special provision is made for exceptional cases, for reorganizations, and for difficulties in interpreting the law. After invested capital is determined, net income must be calculated according to prescribed rules. Excess profits and war profits are differentiated and subjected to slightly different treatment. In the former a deduction of \$3,000 and 8 per cent of the net income on invested capital is allowed to the taxpayer before division with the government. In the latter, a deduction of \$3,000 is allowed, and in addition, an amount equal to 10 per cent of net income on invested capital, or, average pre-war net income on invested capital and 10 per cent on any additional invested capital used in the taxable year. . . . Broadly speaking the legislative intent is to declare normal profits due to the taxpayer to be \$3,000 and 8 per cent of the income on his investment, and in war industry \$3,000 and 10 per cent on his investment. . . . This rate applies for the calendar year 1918, but for 1919 and thereafter the above 30 per cent rate is reduced to 20 per cent, and the 65 per cent rate is reduced to 40 per cent. Profits on United States war contracts are subject to special taxation computation. . . .

"The estate tax was considerably revised. In the first place, a somewhat finer graduation was introduced in the classes between \$450,000 and \$2,000,000; in the second place, the smaller estates from \$50,000 up to \$2,000,000 were taxed at rates beginning with 1 per cent and progressing until at \$2,000,000 they reached 12 per cent. From this point the progression was similar to that of the previous act, running up as high as 25 per cent on estates over \$10,000,000. The fifth title of the act embraced a number of taxes on transportation and other facilities and on insurance. Few changes were made in this group from the taxes imposed by the act of October, 1917. The tax on Pullman tickets was reduced from 10 per cent to 8 per cent, but on the other hand, telephone, telegraph, and radio message charges were considerably increased, and a 10 per cent tax was imposed on leased wires. The greatest change took place in the two next

groups of taxes—those on beverages and tobacco. In general, it may be said of these without going into detail that the tax on distilled spirits and fermented liquors, and on wines and soft drinks, was doubled. Those on cigars, cigarettes and tobacco were subjected to an increase of about 50 per cent. The taxes on admissions and dues were continued, but a more careful classification was made of admission prices and different classes of amusements which tended on the whole to raise the rates of this group. The tax was made to apply to all club dues over \$10 per annum instead of \$12 as in the previous act. The ninth title of the act embraced a miscellaneous assortment of excise taxes. This group was now greatly enlarged by the addition of a number of nonessentials and luxuries. The following were some of the articles taxed: automobiles, motorcycles, motor accessories, pianos and other musical instruments, sporting goods, chewing gum, cameras, photo films, candy, firearms, hunting knives, swords and similar articles, electric fans, thermos bottles, cigarette holders, humidors, slot machines, liveries, riding habits and boots, articles made of fur, yachts, motor boats and canoes, toilet soaps and powders. In addition to these, sumptuary taxes were laid on a large number of luxuries or high priced articles. A tax of 10 per cent was imposed on prices in excess of specified minimums in the case of carpets, rugs, picture frames, trunks, valises, purses, lamps, umbrellas, fans, smoking jackets, waistcoats, hats, footwear, neckwear, silk stockings, men's shirts, night-gowns, kimonos. And finally, a small group of articles evidently regarded as pure luxuries was taxed a certain percentage irrespective of their price. This group included jewelry, precious stones, watches, moving picture films, perfumes, toilet compounds. Under the head of 'special taxes' provision was made for the taxation of brokers, commission merchants, capital stock of corporations and proprietors of amusements. The taxes on brokers were greatly increased; that on corporate capital stock was doubled in rate and the exemption minimum reduced from \$99,000 to \$5,000. The tax on proprietors of theaters, museums and concert halls, circuses, bowling alleys and billiard rooms was doubled, and some new classes subjected thereto, such as street fairs, shooting galleries, riding academies, and automobiles for hire. On the whole, these taxes were in line with those described in the previous paragraph, and were designed to place a heavy burden, even to the point of discouragement, upon activities or transactions regarded as nonessential. In similar fashion the taxes on manufacturers of tobacco were drastically raised by a finer classification according to the sales, which resulted in much heavier taxes on the larger dealers. Stamp taxes under existing laws were evidently found satisfactory, for practically no change was made in this group. There was written into this tax measure a new federal child labor law, which proposed by resort to taxation to prevent the employment in certain specified industries of children under fourteen years of age, and to prohibit the employment in others of children between fourteen and sixteen years for more than eight hours a day, and in the night time. This was done by imposing an excise tax equivalent to 10 per cent of the entire net profits of such employer. Heavy penalties, ranging from \$1,000 to \$10,000 were imposed for infraction of the law. The purpose of the act was of course not revenue, but the prohibition of child labor, and an effort was made by the weapon of taxation

to frame a law which might escape the fate which overtook the Child Labor Law of 1916, which was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in June, 1918. The returns from the new tax measure began immediately, for within three weeks of its passage the first instalment of the income tax fell due. For the first time this tax was now made payable in four instalments. The first payment on March 15 amounted to over \$1,000,000,000 and gave promise that the new act would raise the anticipated revenue. For the calendar year 1918 the total revenue receipts amounted to \$4,707,532,307, and for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, to \$5,152,257,136, or somewhat less than was anticipated."—E. L. Bogart, *Direct and indirect costs of the Great World War*, pp. 161-165, 167-181.—See also WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XIV. Costs of war.

1917-1920.—Activities of Boys' Working Reserve. See UNITED STATES BOYS' WORKING RESERVE.

1917-1920.—Currency inflation.—Reduction in legal reserves. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1913-1920.

1918.—Possessions in the Pacific. See PACIFIC OCEAN: 1918.

1918.—Canadian War Mission at Washington. See CANADA: 1918: Canadian War Mission.

1918.—Friendly relations with Brazil. See LATIN AMERICA: 1918.

1918.—Extent of holdings in Mexico. See MEXICO: 1918.

1918.—Intervention in Russia. See RUSSIA: 1918-1920; SIBERIA: 1917-1919; WORLD WAR: 1918: III. Russia: b; d; f.

1918.—Irrigation projects for reclamation of land. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1918.

1918.—New Balance of Power.—United States one of the Great Powers. See EUROPE: Modern: New balance of power.

1918 (January).—Declaration of the "Fourteen Points" by President Wilson.—"Germans, Italians, and Frenchmen looked at that time to the President of the United States as the hope of the world. Thus Wilson came to the greatest of all his war messages, that in which he formulated the fourteen points [which was sent to Congress on Jan. 8, 1918]. It was the climax of Wilson's moral leadership. . . . The fourteen points laid down a magnificent programme of world peace. . . . Last and greatest in the mind of the President was the covenant of 'free Peoples' for a league of nations that should not only prevent future conflicts but serve as a sort of federal constitution of the world and guarantee the enforcement of the terms outlined above."—W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, pp. 245-247.—See also WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: b. ALSO IN: Committee on Public Information, *War, labor, and peace* (Red, White and Blue Series, no. 9).—A. G. Hays, *What is meant by freedom of the seas* (*American Journal of International Law*, April, 1918).

1918 (January-February).—Shortage of coal.—Measures for relief.—"Shortage of coal, or rather shortage of facilities to transport coal, was the cause of the first serious economic crisis which the United States had to face after its entry into the war. Coal production for 1917 showed a considerable increase over 1916, but the shortage of cars and the general condition of congestion at terminals continued to make it increasingly difficult to move coal from the sources of production to the centres of consumption."—*New York Times*

Current History, Mar., 1918, p. 473.—“War’s first drastic home regulation, Fuel Commissioner [H. A.] Garfield’s coal-conservation order, brought home to everybody, worker or employer, the grim reality of the coal famine, and many who were hit hardest accepted it as a necessary measure to be obeyed with patriotic self-denial. To relieve the coal famine in the eastern states, . . . all factories in the United States east of the Mississippi River and in Minnesota and Louisiana, with some exceptions, were directed to shut down for five days beginning January 18. Moreover, Monday for ten weeks was decreed a holiday on which offices, factories, and stores, except drug and food stores, must use only such fuel as is necessary to prevent damage. The order under which these restrictions were made, according to the Fuel Administration’s statement to the press, was ‘designed to distribute with absolute impartiality the burden,’ and it added that the Fuel Administration ‘counts upon the complete patriotic cooperation of every individual, firm, and corporation affected by the order in its enforcement.’ We read further that the government aims to carry out its plan without ‘undue interference with the ordinary course of business’ and earnestly desires to ‘prevent entirely any dislocation of industry or labor.’ . . . While the five-day suspension order meant the loss of millions of dollars to the wage-earning classes, the *Register* believed the measure would cheer our Allies and depress Germany, and it urged the people to show their determination by accepting without complaint any sacrifices they are called upon to make. . . . From Fuel Administrator Garfield’s explanation of the necessity of the order we cull the following: ‘The most urgent thing to be done is to send to the American forces abroad and to the Allies the food and war supplies which they vitally need. War munitions, food, manufactured articles of every description, lie at our Atlantic ports in tens of thousands of tons, while literally hundreds of ships, waiting, loaded with war goods for our men and the Allies, can not take the seas because their bunkers are empty of coal. The coal to send them on their way is waiting behind the congested freight that has jammed all the terminals. It is worse than useless to bend our energies to more manufacturing when what he have already manufactured lies at tidewater, congesting terminal facilities, jamming the railroad yards and sidetracks for a long distance back into the country. No power on earth can move this freight into the war zone, where it is needed, until we supply the ships with fuel. Once the docks are cleared of the valuable freight for which our men and associates in the war now wait in vain, then again our energies and power may be turned to manufacturing, more efficient than ever; so that a steady and uninterrupted stream of vital supplies may be this nation’s answer to the Allies’ cry for help. . . . This is war. Whatever the cost, we must pay it, so that in the face of the enemy there can never be the reproach that we held back from doing our full share. Those ships, laden with our supplies of food for men and food for guns, must have coal and put to sea.”—J. M. Clark, W. H. Hamilton and H. G. Moulton, eds., *Readings in the economics of war*, pp. 330-334.—See also FOOD REGULATION: 1917-1918; PRICE CONTROL: 1917-1919.

1918 (January-April).—Senator Chamberlain’s attack on the War Department.—President’s defense.—Overman Bill, to provide extraordinary powers for president, enacted into law.—“There were critics of the war measures that had been

passed and the way they had been administered, who recited in Congress facts that they had gathered from the factories and on January 19 Senator G. E. Chamberlain, Democratic chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, attended a luncheon of the National Security League in New York, and there ‘undertook to show that since the battle of Bunker Hill we had never had a proper military organization or policy.’ In conclusion, he said that ‘the military establishment of America has fallen down. There is no use to be optimistic about a thing that does not exist. It has almost stopped functioning . . . because of inefficiency in every bureau and in every department of the government of the United States.’ The charge of Senator Chamberlain evoked an indignant and point-blank denial from the President, who asserted that it was ‘an astonishing and absolutely unjustifiable distortion of the truth. As a matter of fact, the War Department has performed a task of unparalleled magnitude and difficulty with extraordinary promptness and efficiency.’ A few days later Secretary Baker appeared before the Committee on Military Affairs with an impressive statement of the work done and doing. Senator Chamberlain introduced a bill for the creation of a Munitions Ministry, which received support in principle from Colonel Roosevelt, many of the preparedness organizations, and many members in both parties. An attempt was made by Senator Stone to show that the demand for a Munitions Ministry was in effect a censure of the President inspired by partisan politics. The President announced that he would veto any measure that attempted to take from him or lessen his responsibility for the conduct of the war. When the advocates of a Munitions Ministry insisted that the existing laws on military coordination were inadequate, he suggested that, if they desired to speed up the war, they should give him power to rearrange the agencies of government as need should indicate.”—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, pp. 519-520.—“It was now that Wilson made one of his quickest and most masterly moves. The Democrats in both houses had suffered themselves to be frightened or at any rate, disorganized by the extraordinary attacks . . . just described. . . . Democrats were giving increasing support to the Roosevelt plan for a war cabinet. . . . Wilson suddenly sent in a bill asking for all the powers that were proposed for the new war cabinet and many more. [Senator Overman] . . . introduced the bill early in February, 1918. It would give the President power to rearrange the bureaus and fix duties to suit himself. It would empower him to set up new machinery for war work which the President thought necessary. . . . Hoke Smith and Reed, of the judiciary committee of the Senate, persisted in their opposition to anything Wilson proposed. Sherman of Illinois was quite as bitter. . . . The irreconcilables continued obstructive tactics till April 29th when by a vote of 63 to 13 the bill was passed. The House acted quickly and the issue was closed. [On May 20 the Overman bill was enacted into a law to coordinate or consolidate executive bureaus, agencies and offices.]”—W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, pp. 263-264.

ALSO IN: *United States Statutes at Large*, 65th Congress, v. 40, pp. 1, 556-557.

1918 (February).—President Wilson on war aims.—“The fourteen points were already christened the fourteen commandments which all conservative interests must combat. . . . [President Wilson]

said to the Senate on February 11, 1918, that we fought for a 'new international order' and without that new order at the end of the war the world would be without peace. And likewise disconcerting was the closing remark of the same address that the power of the United States 'will never be used in aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interest of our own.' It was the language of the Mobile address and a self-denial which great numbers of people were unwilling to make and which many newspapers had denounced when it was first made."—W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, p. 266.—See also WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: e.

1918 (February).—Victor Berger and other socialists indicted for conspiracy.—Representative Berger expelled from the House. See SOCIALISM: 1919-1920.

1918 (February).—Pershing's report on American supply service and its work. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: V. Moving men and material: a.

1918 (February-October).—Aircraft shortage.—Official enquiries.—"Of all the branches of war activity of the United States none gave so much trouble or produced such unsatisfactory results as aircraft production. This was not due to any lack of appreciation on the part of the Government of the importance of military aviation. . . . The failure of the Government to meet expectations in respect to the actual construction of airplanes was due to a number of causes, one of which was its failure to work out a proper system of administration for the handling of aircraft matters. It is with this phase only of the question that we are here concerned. . . . The Aircraft Board was constituted with Mr. Coffin, who had been Chairman of the old Aircraft Production Board, as its Chairman. . . . The difficulties in the way of providing for the production in this country of foreign motors made it imperative that something be done toward producing a motor which, while fulfilling the requirements of service at the front, should at the same time be designed for quantity production in this country. The designing of a standard motor was the engineering objective of the original Aircraft Production Board. Two of the best engineer experts in aviation-motor design in the country were brought together at Washington, and the problem of producing an all-American engine at the earliest possible moment was presented to them. Their first conference was held on June 3, 1917. In consultation with engineers and draftsmen from various sections of the country, they worked continuously until June 30, when the new engine, known as the 'Liberty Motor' was practically complete. For months an acute controversy raged over the merits of this engine. As finally modified under the Aircraft Board it undoubtedly possessed merits of a high order, and although not adapted for all classes of airplanes, it proved to be of great value both to ourselves and to our allies, the latter calling for practically as many motors as could be produced. The delay in the perfection of this motor, or at least to put it into production upon a large scale, the failure of the Government to secure the production of other motors and airplanes, and the widespread belief that there had been great inefficiency, if not positive fraud, in the expenditure of the huge sums, amounting to over \$600,000,000, which had been voted for aviation purposes in 1917, led to the demand for a searching inquiry into the whole subject."—W. F.

Willoughby, *Government organization in war time and after* (F. G. Wickware, ed., *Problems of war and of reconstruction*, pp. 328, 335, 336).—"On June 8, 1917, the official announcement was made that a fleet of 25,000 airplanes would be created. The American program called for enormous quantities of bombing planes and fighting planes which could cope with the Germans and, with overwhelming numbers, drive them from the sky. . . . According to the testimony of Colonel Edgar Gorrell and the tables of statistics submitted from the War Department, the total number of American-built airplanes available for use in the American Expeditionary Forces on Nov. 11, 1918, was 798 De Haviland-4s, of which 196 were on the front, 270 were being used for training in flying schools and 332 were in the air depots. (House Hearings, Aviation, p. 3457.) It will thus be seen that the greatest contribution of American aircraft production was the De Haviland-4s, which, could not be used for fighting or pursuit. . . . The first substantial efforts from the outside to call attention to the fact that the American aircraft program was doomed to failure unless the situation was promptly remedied, were those of Gutzon Borglum, . . . who, prior to the war had been interested in aeronautics. . . . Mr. Borglum's investigations were begun with the consent of the President, and his charges were generally supported in a report by the investigating committee of the Aeronautical Society of America (Congressional Record, vol. 56, pp. 5920 to 5928). . . . His work resulted in disclosures and charges sufficient to attract the attention of the President and the Senate. Finally, the matter was taken up by the Senate, and hearings were begun before what is known as the Thomas Committee. . . . About the same time an independent investigation was undertaken at the request of the President by Hon. Charles E. Hughes. . . . [The investigation] was made with the co-operation of the Department of Justice, and the report was submitted, through the Attorney-General, to the President. To this work Judge Hughes devoted five months, taking testimony in different parts of the country, and it is said that for his services he refused to accept pay. The last major investigation of the Air Service was that by the House Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, the testimony taken by the subcommittee on aviation, known as the Frear Committee, comprising more than 4,000 printed pages. Unfortunately, while this committee was sitting, a political campaign was coming on, and in the findings, charges of bias were bandied back and forth. In all the subcommittees investigating war expenditures, majority reports, subscribed by all the Republican members, and minority reports subscribed by all the Democratic members were filed. Hon. Clarence F. Lea, the Democratic member of the subcommittee on aviation, frankly made the following statement in the hearings (House Hearings, Aviation, p. 450). 'The Hughes investigation was strictly a nonpartisan investigation and as free from political influence as an investigation could be. Here we have a bipartisan investigation. Personally, I am inclined to believe that perhaps Congress made a mistake in making it a bipartisan investigation. I think an investigation similar to the Hughes investigation would have been a preferable method of developing the facts, and the results would have been accepted by the country as a correct disclosure.' . . . Judge Hughes reported that there was no question that grossly misleading statements were published with official authority, and

he recommended that they deserved the prompt attention of the military authorities. That a certain number of training planes were produced, and that the Liberty motor reached large quantity production, as well as that many other things were accomplished, there appears to be no doubt; but as to the main thing—the building of planes that could be used in fighting and sweeping the Germans from the sky—it is now established that the score was zero. . . . In brief, instead of the 20,000 airplanes . . . the only planes of American manufacture on the front when the war ended were the 196 De Haviland-4s. . . . The report of the House Committee on Expenditures in the War Department (Report No. 637, 66th Congress, 2d session, p. 2) shows that the total amount expended or obligated for Signal Corps and aviation purposes . . . to June 30, 1919, was \$1,051,511,988, and that the expenditures or commitments for aviation alone amounted to *over one billion dollars*. . . . Judge Hughes reported that the *estimated profits* . . . by several of the large aircraft contractors, if their schedules were carried out, would be as follows: The Ford Motor Company, \$5,375,000; the Lincoln Motor Company (partly owned by the Dayton Metal Products Company), \$11,250,000, and the Packard Motor Car Company, \$15,000,000. Large sums of Government money were advanced to various contractors on which to operate. In the case of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Company the paid-in capital was \$1,000,000 invested in the plant, and . . . advances by the Government to the extent of \$2,500,000 were authorized. The sum of \$10,800,000 was advanced to the Lincoln Motor Company. The profits which the Dayton-Wright Airplane Company would have received under its original contracts were estimated . . . to be more than \$6,350,000, not including profits on its experimental contract and its contract for spare parts of De Haviland-4s, but it was explained that agreements, contained in letters, for the reduction of the bogie price, would make the profits . . . not less than \$3,500,000. Contracts were made on both the fixed-price and the cost-plus basis, and the report alleges that, while it is probable that large profits were made on the fixed-price contracts, definite information as to their extent would not be available without a survey in detail of manufacturing conditions and tests, . . . an undertaking impracticable in the inquiry. . . . Subjects of criticism in the Hughes findings were business relations of the equipment division, of which Colonel Edward A. Deeds became the active head on Aug. 2, 1917, with former business associates and corporations with which he was connected at the time he entered the Government's service. It was alleged in the findings that a tract of 2,245 acres of land was leased to the Government by the Miami conservancy district, of which Colonel Deeds was the head, and that upward of \$3,000,000 was expended by the Government in its development. . . . The McCook Field, on which \$949,085.35 had been expended by the Government to Aug. 14, 1918, according to the Hughes report, was owned by Colonel Deeds and a business associate to whom Deeds conveyed his interest, after which the land was conveyed to the Dayton Metal Products Company, which then leased the tract to the Government (*ibid.*, pp. 890-893, and Senate Report, pp. 11-13). The Dayton Metal Products Company, of which it was stated that Deeds originally owned one-fourth of the stock, became variously interested in Government contracts . . . under the administration of Colonel Deeds, and it was . . .

further reported that Deeds was one of the incorporators of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Company, . . . owned by the Dayton Metal Products Company. The specifications of the Liberty Motor called for the installation of the Delco ignition system in the first 20,000 engines . . . [which] had not been used before in an airplane engine. The system was controlled by the Dayton Engineering Laboratories Company, . . . owned by the United Motors Corporation, of which Deeds was Vice President and a Director, until Aug. 16, 1917, and on Oct. 13, 1917, he transferred his holdings in the United Motors Corporation to his wife. . . . Among other contracts which caused comment was that of the Engel Aircraft Company, which was organized in August, 1917, by Harry E. Baker, a brother of the Secretary of War. . . . The company received a contract for 1,200 sets of spare parts at a price of about \$1,000,000. When it came to the attention of the Secretary of War, the contract was canceled and arrangements were made for . . . [his brother's] withdrawal from the company upon the payment of his salary and \$15,000 for his promotion services. The contract was then reinstated, and an additional order was given to this concern for 500 sets of spare parts for De Haviland-4s at an estimated cost of \$2,275,000 (Congressional Record, Vol. 57, p. 901, and Senate Hearings, Vol. II, pp. 974-984). . . . In the closing paragraphs of the report by Judge Hughes were the following findings and recommendations, which were submitted to the President, through the Attorney General, on Oct. 25, 1918: . . . '2. The evidence discloses conduct, which, although of a reprehensible character, cannot be regarded as affording a sufficient basis for charges under existing statutes; but there are certain acts shown, not only highly improper in themselves, but of especial significance, which should lead to disciplinary measures. The evidence with respect to Colonel Edward A. Deeds should be presented to the Secretary of War to the end that Colonel Deeds may be tried by court-martial . . . for his conduct (1) in acting as confidential adviser of his former business associate, H. E. Talbott of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Company, and in conveying information to Mr. Talbott in an improper manner with respect to the transaction of business between that company and the division of the Signal Corps of which Colonel Deeds was the head; and (2) in giving to the representatives of the Committee on Public Information a false and misleading statement with respect to the progress of aircraft production for the purpose of publication, with the authority of the Secretary of War. 3. The absence of proper appreciation of the obvious impropriety of transactions by Government officers and agents with firms or corporations in which they are interested compels the conclusion that public policy demands that the statutory provisions bearing upon this conduct should be strictly enforced. It is therefore recommended that the officers found to have had transactions on behalf of the Government with corporations in the pecuniary profits of which they had an interest should be prosecuted under section 41 of the Criminal Code.' On Oct. 31, 1918, Hon. T. W. Gregory, Attorney General, in transmitting this report to the President, stated that at the conclusion of the taking of testimony both he and Judge Hughes, without conference with each other, considered the evidence, and that in this manner each reached his own conclusion and prepared a report; that he found it unnecessary to present the report which had been

prepared in the Department of Justice, and that he found himself in accord with the conclusions presented by Judge Hughes on questions of dishonesty and malversation."—R. L. Scaife, *What was the matter with the air service?* (*New York Times Current History*, April, 1921).—The Senate committee was not unanimous, and two reports were presented on April 12, 1918, differing as to the causes of delay in the execution of the airplane program. The majority report says, in part: "The Signal Corps has established and is now conducting twenty aviation training schools in the United States. Four additional schools are in process of construction and are expected to be finished in June next. The aggregate capacity of the schools now in operation is something over 3,000 cadets; 1,926 have thus far been graduated from this primary training course and commissioned as reserve military aviators. Very few of these have received their advanced training in this country. In addition to the above, the Signal Corps, acting upon the invitation of the several Entente Governments, dispatched some 1,200 cadets to England, France, and Italy last year, who were to receive primary and advanced training in aviation schools of those countries. The experience of a great many of these men has been most fortunate in that at some of the schools a very serious delay has occurred in providing them with the training planes, which it was expected would be manufactured in foreign factories in sufficient numbers. As a result, several hundred of the American cadets have been practically idle and have made no progress. About 450 of them are reported as having completed the primary training, after long delay. The Signal Corps is giving serious consideration to the advisability of bringing the remainder back to the United States to be trained. With the exception of this severe disappointment, the primary training of our aviators, according to the testimony of the aviation officials, appears to be progressing favorably. For some time after the inception of the work the output of primary training planes . . . gave ground for grave concern. . . . The advanced training planes are being turned out in accordance with the schedule. . . . In advanced training planes four types are being made, the total number . . . manufactured being 342. . . . It is apparent from the evidence that the twelve-cylinder Liberty motor is just emerging from the development or experimental stage. . . . A large number of changes have been found necessary, many of them causing delay in reaching quantity production. . . . Twenty-two thousand five hundred Liberty motors have been ordered, 122 have been completed for the army, and 142 for the navy. Four have been shipped overseas. Some of those already delivered are being altered to overcome the defects ascertained during the last few weeks. . . . The production of Liberty planes to date is, of course, gravely disappointing. . . . Government officials . . . in charge . . . have made the mistake of leading the public and the allied nations to the belief that thousands of these motors would be completed in the spring of 1918. . . . The production of combat planes in the United States for use in actual warfare has thus far been a substantial failure. . . . We had no design of our own; neither did we adopt any one of the European designs until months after we entered the war."—*New York Times Current History*, May, 1918, pp. 245-246.—"The President by an executive order dated May 20, 1918, issued under the authority granted to him by the Overman Act of the same date, com-

pletely reorganized the Air Service and provided for the distribution of the duties of the Signal Corps among a number of distinct services. . . . At the same time provision was made for a new 'executive agency' designated the Bureau of Aircraft Production which, as set forth in the order, should have 'full, complete and exclusive jurisdiction and control over the production of airplanes, airplane engines and aircraft equipment for the use of the Army.' . . . There can be no question regarding the great improvement from the organization standpoint resulting from this order. At the time of the cessation of hostilities most of the troubles that had interfered so seriously with the carrying out of the ambitious airplane programme of the Government had been largely overcome, and airplanes and airplane motors were being produced in quantity and shipped to our army and our allies in France. In the meantime our deficiencies had been met, in part at least, by drawing upon the production resources of France and England."—W. F. Willoughby, *Government organization in war time and after* (F. G. Wickware, ed., *Problems of war and of reconstruction*, pp. 337-338).—See also AVIATION: Development of airplanes and air service: 1914-1918.

ALSO IN: A. Sweetser, *American air service* (F. G. Wickware, ed., *Problems of war and of reconstruction*, pp. 210-221).

1918 (March).—Calder Daylight Saving Bill passed. See DAYLIGHT SAVING MOVEMENT: 1918.

1918 (March).—World War: Battle of Cantigny. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: f.

1918 (March-April).—Battle of Picardy. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: b.

1918 (April).—Webb-Pomerene Act passed repealing Sherman Anti-Trust Act in regard to export business. See TRUSTS: United States: 1918-1921.

1918 (April).—National War Labor Board created to adjust industrial disputes. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1917-1919; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR: 1917-1919.

1918 (April).—President Wilson's speech stating peace terms. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: g.

1918 (April).—World War: Fighting in the Lys region.—Foch made commander-in-chief of all armies. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: e; e, 4.

1918 (April-October).—President Wilson's attitude toward freedom of all branches of the Slav race. See JUGO-SLAVIA: 1918 (April-October); AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1917-1918.

1918 (May).—Anti-Sabotage Bill passed. See INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD: Recent tendencies.

1918 (May).—Commercial treaty with Norway. See NORWAY: 1914-1921.

1918 (May).—World War: Operations in Woëvre region. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: g, 10.

1918 (June).—World War: Battles of Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood.—Attack on Vaux. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: a, 4; g, 4; g, 4, i; g, 8; g, 9; v, 10.

1918 (June).—World War: Second battle of the Marne. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: g, 2, iii; g, 12.

1918 (June).—Vocational Rehabilitation Act passed. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: World War and education: Re-education.

1918 (July).—World War: Meuse-Argonne offensive.—Battle of the Vesle. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: g, 9; h; i.

1918 (July).—Speech of President Wilson at Mt. Vernon stating terms of peace. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: h.

1918 (July).—World War: American troops sent to Italy. See WORLD WAR: 1918: IV. Austro-Italian, theater: c, 16.

1918 (August).—Man-power bill passed and signed.—In August it was thought necessary to increase the size of the American army, and a new draft law was passed, calling for the registration of men between the ages of 18 and 45.

1918 (August).—Represented at interallied conference on enemy propaganda. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: III. Press reports and censorship: d, 2.

1918 (August-September).—World War: Operations in St. Mihiel sector. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: n; n, 3.

1918 (September).—Recognition of independence of Slav nations. See AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1917-1918; JUGO-SLAVIA: 1918 (April-October).

1918 (September-October).—World War: Operations in Meuse-Argonne region. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: u; v; p.

1918 (September-November).—Austrian peace proposal.—President's address on duties of peace conference.—German appeal to President Wilson.—German revolution.—Armistice of November 11.—On Sept. 15, 1918, the Austrians "proposed a conference for a 'preliminary and non-binding' discussion of war aims. [See WORLD WAR: 1918: Statement of war aims: k.] The President refused the next day, with the observation that America's war aims had been stated so often that there could be no doubt what they were. But it was evident that more peace proposals would follow and on Sept. 27 the President delivered an address in the Metropolitan Opera House in New York in which his latest conception of the duties of the Peace Conference was set forth. He had realized that peace without victory was unsafe in view of the character of the German Government; it must be a peace with guarantees, for nobody would trust the Germans. But it must be a peace of impartial justice, involving no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just, and the guarantee must be provided by a League of Nations which the Peace Conference itself—and not a subsequent general conference, as the President had held in the days of his neutrality—must organize. The development was logical: nearly all the American powers had entered the war, and neutrals were far less numerous than in 1916. And he argued that the League of Nations must be formed at the Peace Conference, to be 'in a sense the most essential part' of its work, because it was not likely that it could be formed after the conference, and if formed during the war it would only be an alliance of the powers associated against Germany. [See also WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: l.] The Germans apparently thought these pronouncements offered some hope. Their Government was hastily being covered with a false front of democratic institutions to suit his insistence, and on Oct. 4 the new Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, appealed to the President to call a peace conference at once, the basis of peace to be the Fourteen Points and conditions set forth in the President's later addresses, specifically that of Sept. 27. There ensued an interchange of notes

lasting throughout an entire month, in which the President acted nominally as intermediary between the Germans and the Allies, though actually he was in constant touch with allied statesmen. What began as a duel of diplomatic dexterity presently developed into a German diplomatic rout as the German armies, retreating everywhere, drew nearer and nearer German soil. Positions which the German Government had hoped to defend were successively abandoned; the Germans agreed to accept without argument the Fourteen Points, with discussion at the conference limited only to details of their practical application, and to recognize the alterations which had been made in some of them by subsequent decisions of the American Government. They accepted the President's insistence that a peace conference must be conditional on an armistice which would imply complete evacuation of allied territory and the assurance of the present supremacy of the allied armies, and they strove desperately to convince him that the democratization of the German Government was real. Delegates went to Marshal Foch to discuss the armistice terms, and on Nov. 5 the Allies formally notified the President that they accepted the Fourteen Points, with the reservation of the freedom of the seas and subject to a definition of the restitution which the Germans must make for damage done. On the same day sailors of the German High Sea Fleet, ordered out to die fighting in a last thrust at the British, mutinied and began a revolution that spread all over the empire. From the balcony of the Imperial Palace in Berlin Karl Liebknecht proclaimed the republic; the Kaiser fled across the Dutch border between two days; and on Nov. 11 the fighting ended and the Germans submitted to the terms imposed by Marshal Foch."—*New York Times Book Review*, Feb. 27, 1921, p. 9.—See also GERMANY: 1918 (March-November); (November); (November-December); WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: I. Armistices: a, 12; f.

ALSO IN: W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, pp. 272-282.—*American Year Book*, 1918, pp. 110-121.—E. Palmer, *America in France*.

1918 (October).—World War: American troops in Flanders.—Second battle of Cambrai.—Strength of the army.—At Kriemhilde line. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: q, 3; q, 4; r; v, 3; v, 5.

1918 (October).—Settlement of debt with Brazil. See BRAZIL: 1918 (October).

1918 (October).—Wilson's reply to Germany and Austria regarding an armistice.—Reply to Solf. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: n; o.

1918 (October).—German note of Solf to Wilson regarding peace terms. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: p.

1918 (October).—Note of Wilson to Germany regarding peace terms. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: q.

1918 (October).—Germany's reply to Wilson regarding peace terms.—Acceptance of his terms for armistice. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: r.

1918 (October).—Austria-Hungary's reply to Wilson accepting terms for an armistice. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: s.

1918 (October-November).—Represented at London and Paris scientific conferences. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.

1918 (November).—World War: Summary of

last operations of troops on western front.—In Forest of Bourgogne. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: x, 1; x, 6.

1918 (November).—President Wilson's note to Germany regarding armistice terms. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: t.

1918 (November).—Armistice with Germany.—Councils at Versailles before signing.—Terms.—Armistice with Austria-Hungary and its terms.—See WORLD WAR: 1918: XI. End of the war: a, 4; Miscellaneous auxiliary services: I. Armistices: e; f.

1918 (November).—President Wilson's speech announcing armistice. See WORLD WAR: 1918: XI. End of the war: b.

1918 (November).—World War: Allied armies pass through Belgium after armistice. See WORLD WAR: 1918: XI. End of the war: c.

1918 (November).—Passage of the War Time Prohibition Bill. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1913-1919.

1918 (November).—Elections.—Women voters.—Democrats defeated.—Non-partisan League.—National Security League.—President's appeal.—“The most noteworthy results of the thirty state elections in November were the reelection of Governor Cox (Democrat) in Ohio and the . . . election of Senator Alfred E. Smith (Democrat) in New York. Although the statewide prohibition amendment was adopted in Ohio by a majority not far from 15,000, Governor Cox, the candidate of the ‘wet’ interests, defeated ex-Governor Willis (Republican), the ‘dry’ candidate, by about 10,000 majority. . . . In New York on the face of the returns, Senator Smith had a plurality around 12,000. . . . For the first time in New York history, women participated in a general election on a footing of equality with male voters. In New York City nearly half a million women took the trouble to register, and in the state as a whole it is estimated that not far from a million women qualified as voters. Full suffrage for women was adopted in Michigan and in South Dakota. In Oklahoma there was a large majority in favor of full suffrage. . . . Despite obstacles rendering it difficult if not impossible for voters absent with the American expeditionary forces in Europe to take advantage of the absent-voting laws enacted by a large number of states, it appears that a good many thousand soldiers voted in the various cantonments in this country. An investigation of the operation of both civilian and military absent-voting laws in this election might furnish material for an interesting study. Until ten days before the election, the congressional campaign was extraordinarily dull and lifeless, due in part to popular interest in the war, the liberty loan campaign, the influenza epidemic, and to the absence of any outstanding issue between the two leading parties. In the house elections there was a total of 51 party changes, in which the Republicans gained 38 seats (mainly in the middle west) and the Democrats 13 (mainly in the east). In the senatorial contests the Democrats lost seats in Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and New Jersey. In Massachusetts ex-Governor Walsh (Democrat) defeated Senator Weeks, the first time that a Democrat has been elected to the senate from that state since Robert Rantoul was elected . . . in 1850. This Democratic success in New England was offset by the Republican success in Missouri, where Judge S. P. Spencer defeated ex-Governor John W. Folk. As a result of these changes, the next Congress will comprise in the house 238 Re-

publicans, 193 Democrats, 2 Independents, 1 Socialist, and 1 Prohibitionist, giving the Republicans a clear majority of 41; in the senate the party division will be 49 Republicans and 47 Democrats, a Republican majority of 2 replacing the present Democratic majority of 8. This party overturn is in reality less impressive than might be inferred from the size of the Republican house majority. In no section of the country unless Ohio and Kansas may be regarded as exceptions, occurred anything which may fairly be called a Republican landslide, and the Democratic mortality does not appear to be far from the normal expectancy for the party in power in an ‘off-year’ election. To produce this party change in the control of Congress so many factors contributed in such varying degrees and combinations in different sections as to preclude the confident offering of any simple formula by way of explanation. Insufficient data is at hand to warrant even a very satisfactory tentative appraisal of the various factors. They may be indicated, however, and some suggestion made respecting their possible influence. In the enumeration which follows, the less important factors or those whose influence seems to have been confined to relatively small areas will be noted first. (1) Resentment at the treatment accorded by the administration to General Leonard Wood, in command at Camp Funston, has been mentioned as not without its influence in Kansas and possibly other states. (2) Opposition on the part of influential publishers’ organizations to the enactment of the postal zone law was an inconspicuous factor, but one which, in the opinion of an important official in such organizations, assisted in the defeat of 59 congressmen. (3) The Socialist party seems to have been a factor of only negative importance. Fear of its possible success had much to do with the fusion of Republicans and Democrats in certain New York City districts. The Socialist congressional candidates in twelve Manhattan districts were all defeated, including Meyer London, the only Socialist in the present Congress, and Morris Hillquit who ran for mayor of New York in 1917. Victor Berger of Milwaukee . . . [was] the only Socialist in the 66th Congress. (4) The Non-Partisan League was undoubtedly a factor of importance in state elections, and apparently also in congressional elections in North Dakota, Montana, Minnesota, Nebraska, and perhaps in other states. In spite of the charges of disloyalty which have been preferred against some of the officials of the league, its influence [did] not appear to be growing less, at least not in North Dakota, the state of its earliest successes. (5) Woman suffrage organizations were active in several senatorial contests, but it is difficult to find justification for the claim that the general result of the election is a strong rebuke to the Democratic party for its treatment of the federal suffrage amendment. The opposition of the suffragists seems to have contributed in some measure to the defeat of Senator Weeks (Republican) in Massachusetts and Senator Saulsbury (Democrat) in Delaware, both of whom had opposed the federal amendment. Suffragist opposition to the reelection of Senators Baird of New Jersey (Republican) and Borah of Idaho (Republican) and to the election of Mr. Moses (Republican) in New Hampshire, whose position was doubtful, apparently caused these candidates to run behind their party tickets. At the same time new senators favorable to the new suffrage amendment were elected in South Carolina, Kentucky and New Jersey. (6)

The voting record of congressional candidates for reelection, on the principal preparedness and war measures in the 64th Congress and two such measures in the 65th Congress, figured prominently in many districts, including at least three Iowa districts where unsuccessful efforts were made to defeat the present Republican members of the house on the ground that they had not supported all the war measures. The work of the National Security League deserves mention in this connection. The league circulated widely a chart showing the voting records of members of the house on preparedness and war legislation. On the league's 'Roll of Honor,' which included the names of those who had voted 'right' on all the eight test measures, were 47 names, of whom 43 were Republicans and 4 were Democrats; 7 of these were renominated, 3 were defeated and 37 were elected. Of the 117 candidates who voted 'wrong' on from five to eight of the test measures in both Congresses, 24 were not renominated, 79 were elected, of whom 53 came from the South, and 14 were defeated. Of the 20 members of the 65th Congress only, who voted 'wrong' on the two measures coming before that Congress, 7 were not renominated, 10 were elected, of whom 5 were from the South, and 3 were defeated. (7) Resentment at congressional price-fixing for wheat was clearly a factor in Kansas, and probably in other wheat-producing states. This legislation was associated in the public mind with Southern influence in Congress which prevented price-fixing legislation for cotton, and with the operation of the seniority rule in house committee assignments whereby Southern representatives who held more or less pronounced pacifist views were at the head of important committees. Republican gains were mainly in the rural districts of the middle-west. (8) Taxation is never relished, and the policy of imposing heavy war taxes inevitably incurred opposition. To this was added charges of sectionalism in the revenue measures. The indiscreet declaration of the Southern chairman of the committee on ways and means to the effect that the North having forced the country into the war should pay the bill, was given wide circulation by the Republican press and leaders, and it probably had something, and in the opinion of the *New York Times* had much, to do with the Democratic defeat. Mention may also be made of the wide dissatisfaction in business circles with the present Congress for its dilatoriness during the last session in preparing the new war revenue act, a circumstance which led one of the most loyal of administration newspapers to characterize Congress as 'our one great slacker.' (9) Presidential influence was openly exerted in the congressional primaries and elections to defeat Democratic senators and representatives who had voted against administration measures or who had been more or less outspoken in their criticisms of administrative policies. Apparently in large measure as a result of executive condemnation, ex-Governor Blease of South Carolina, running for the senatorial nomination, and Senators Vardaman of Mississippi and Hardwick of Georgia, and also Representatives McLemore and Slayton of Texas were defeated in the primaries. On the other hand, Representative Huddleston of Alabama won renomination and reelection in spite of executive opposition vigorously expressed. The President likewise actively but unsuccessfully intervened in behalf of Democratic senatorial candidates in Rhode Island, New Jersey, New Mexico and Michigan. In other

states senatorial candidates appealed for support on the ground that they were loyal administration candidates. The President indorsed the reelection of Senator Nelson (Republican) from Minnesota, and no Democratic candidate was formally nominated in that state. The foregoing enumeration is believed to include the principal factors in the campaign until shortly before the election. Taken singly, or even in certain possible combinations, they hardly account for the party overturn either in Congress as a whole or in more than a few states and districts. In the aggregate there was a good deal of dissatisfaction with the record of Congress and with some actions of the administration; but it was widely diffused and generally uncrystallized. The administration had been in the main accorded loyal support by Republican as well as Democratic party leaders, while among the rank and file party lines had become indistinct. Even the President's activity in particular cases in the primaries and elections occasioned little more than local resentment, for the public has come to regard such action as a defensible exercise of the President's functions as a party leader. Such seemed to be the state of the public mind that thousands of more or less dissatisfied voters might have allowed the election to go by default or have voted for Democratic candidates. But new factors entered during the last few weeks of the campaign. The correspondence with the German government was openly criticized, and as the prospects for peace developed it became more evident that the President could not count on the same degree of united support for the problems of peace and reconstruction as for the conduct of the war. Under these circumstances the President issued a frank appeal for the election of a Democratic Congress, in order to maintain unity of action in the government. This appeal had the immediate effect of arousing the open antagonism of Republican leaders, dispelled the apathy which had characterized the campaign up to that time, and tended to stiffen party lines and to arouse party zeal and enthusiasm. To some it has seemed the main factor in crystallizing the latent elements of dissatisfaction, and in repelling Republican and independent voters who were hesitating as to the course they should follow. It appears that, at least in some sections, Democratic managers regarded the President's action as a liability rather than an asset. On the other hand it has been argued that the President's appeal served to prevent a still more serious defeat for his party. Reference was made to similar appeals by Republicans, as in the campaign of 1898 and Lincoln's adage about swapping horses, in the campaign of 1864. As between these conflicting interpretations it is difficult, if not impossible, to make a clear decision. But the sectional distribution of party gains and losses indicates that local rather than general factors were of most importance in the result. If any single generalization seems justified, the result of the election should be regarded less as a Republican victory than as a rebuke to the Democratic party."—P. O. Ray, *November elections (American Political Science Review, February, 1919, pp. 78-84).*

ALSO IN: W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, pp. 268-275.—J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time*, v. 2, pp. 446-447, 465-468.—J. M. Mathews, *Political parties and the war (American Political Science Review, May, 1919, pp. 213-216, 223-226).*

1918 (November-December).—Announcement

of the president's intention to attend the peace conference.—Reasons given in his message to Congress.—His departure for Europe.—On November 18, it was reported that the president would attend the peace conference. An official announcement of his intention was made November 29, and in his annual message to Congress he stated his reasons for so doing. The following is the text of his address:

"Gentlemen of the Congress: The year that has elapsed since I last stood before you to fulfill my constitutional duty to give Congress from time to time information on the state of the Union has been so crowded with great events, great processes, and great results, that I cannot hope to give you an adequate picture of its transactions or of the far-reaching changes which have been wrought in the life of our nation and of the world. You have yourselves witnessed these things, as I have. It is too soon to assess them; and we who stand in the midst of them and are part of them are less qualified than men of another generation will be to say what they mean, or even what they have been. But some great outstanding facts are unmistakable, and constitute in a sense part of the public business with which it is our duty to deal. To state them is to set the stage for the legislative and executive action which must grow out of them, and which we have yet to shape and determine. A year ago we had sent 145,198 men overseas. Since then we have sent 1,905,513, an average of 162,542 each month, the number, in fact, rising in May last to 245,951, in June to 278,850, in July to 307,182, and continuing to reach similar figures in August and September—in August 289,570, and in September 257,438. No such movement of troops ever took place before across 3,000 miles of sea, followed by adequate equipment and supplies, and carried safely through extraordinary dangers of attack—dangers which were alike strange and infinitely difficult to guard against. In all this movement only 758 men were lost by enemy attacks—630 of whom were upon a single English transport which was sunk near the Orkney Islands. I need not tell you what lay back of this great movement of men and material. It is not invidious to say that back of it lay a supporting organization of the industries of the country and of all its productive activities more complete, more thorough in method and effective in results, more spirited and unanimous in purpose and effort than any other great belligerent had ever been able to effect. We profited greatly by the experience of the nations which had already been engaged for nearly three years in the exigent and exacting business, their every resource and every executive proficiency taxed to the utmost. We were the pupils. But we learned quickly and acted with a promptness and readiness of co-operation that justify our great pride that we were able to serve the world with unparalleled energy and quick accomplishment. But it is not the physical scale and executive efficiency of preparation, supply, equipment, and dispatch that I would dwell upon, but the mettle and quality of the officers and men we sent over and of the sailors who kept the seas, and the spirit of the nation that stood behind them. No soldiers or sailors ever proved themselves more quickly ready for the test of battle or acquitted themselves with more splendid courage and achievement when put to the test. Those of us who played some part in directing the great processes by which the war was pushed

irresistibly forward to the final triumph may now forget all that and delight our thoughts with the story of what our men did. Their officers understood the grim and exacting task they had undertaken and performed it with an audacity, efficiency, and unhesitating courage that touch the story of convoy and battle with imperishable distinction at every turn, whether the enterprises were great or small—from their chiefs, Pershing and Sims, down to the youngest Lieutenant; and their men were worthy of them—such men as hardly need to be commanded, and go to their terrible adventure blithely and with the quick intelligence of those who know just what it is they would accomplish. I am proud to be the fellow-countryman of men of such stuff and valor. Those of us who stayed at home did our duty; the war could not have been won or the gallant men who fought it given their opportunity to win it otherwise, but for many a long day we shall think ourselves 'accurs'd we were not there, and hold our manhood cheap while any speaks that fought' with these at St. Mihiel or Thierry. The memory of those days of triumphant battle will go with these fortunate men to their graves; and each will have his favorite memory. 'Old men forget; yes, all shall be forgot, but he'll remember with advantages what feats he did that day.' What we all thank God for with deepest gratitude is that our men went in force into the line of battle just at the critical moment when the whole fate of the world seemed to hang in the balance, and threw their fresh strength into the ranks of freedom in time to turn the whole tide and sweep of the fateful struggle—turn it once for all, so that thenceforth it was back for their enemies, always back, never again forward. After that it was only a scant four months before the commanders of the Central Empires knew themselves beaten, and now their very empires are in liquidation.

"And throughout it all, how fine the spirit of the nation was, what unity of purpose, what untiring zeal, what elevation of purpose ran through all its splendid display of strength, its untiring accomplishment. I have said that those of us who stayed at home to do the work of organization and supply will always wish that we had been with the men whom we sustained by our labor; but we can never be ashamed. It has been an inspiring thing to be here in the midst of fine men who had turned aside from every private interest of their own and devoted the whole of their trained capacity to the tasks that supplied the sinews of the whole great undertaking. The patriotism, the unselfishness, the thoroughgoing devotion and distinguished capacity that marked their toilsome labors day after day, month after month, have made them fit mates and comrades of the men in the trenches and on the sea. And not the men here in Washington only. They have but directed the vast achievement. Throughout innumerable factories, upon innumerable farms, in the depths of coal mines and iron mines and copper mines, wherever the stuffs of industry were to be obtained and prepared, in the shipyards, on the railways, at the docks, on the sea, in every labor that was needed to sustain the battle lines, men have vied with each other to do their part, and do it well. They can look any man at arms in the face and say, We also strove to win and gave the best that was in us to make our fleets and armies sure of their triumph. And what shall we say of the women—of their instant intelligence, quickening every task that they touched; their

capacity for organization and co-operation, which gave their action discipline and enhanced the effectiveness of everything they attempted; their aptitude at tasks to which they had never before set their hands; their utter self-sacrifice alike in what they did and in what they gave? Their contribution to the great result is beyond appraisal. They have added a new lustre to the annals of American womanhood. The least tribute we can pay them is to make them the equals of men in political rights, as they have proved themselves their equals in every field of practical work they have entered, whether for themselves or for their country. These great days of completed achievements would be sadly marred were we to omit that act of justice. Besides the immense practical services they have rendered, the women of the country have been moving spirits in the systematic economies by which our people have voluntarily assisted to supply the suffering peoples of the world and the armies of every front with food and everything else that we had that would serve the common cause. The details of such a story can never be fully written, but we carry them at our hearts, and thank God that we can say that we are the kinsmen of such. And now we are sure of the great triumph for which every sacrifice was made. It has come—come in its completeness, and with the pride and inspiration of these days of achievement quick within us, we turn to the tasks of peace again—a peace secure against the violence of irresponsible monarchs and ambitious military coteries, and made ready for a new order, for new foundations of justice and fair dealing. We are about to give order and organization to this peace, not only for ourselves but for the other peoples of the world as well, so far as they will suffer us to serve them. It is international justice that we seek, not domestic safety merely. Our thoughts have dwelt of late upon Europe, upon Asia, upon the Near and the Far East, very little upon the acts of peace and accommodation that wait to be performed at our own doors. While we are adjusting our relation with the rest of the world, is it not of capital importance that we should clear away all grounds of misunderstanding with our immediate neighbors and give proof of the friendship we really feel? I hope that the members of the Senate will permit me to speak once more of the unratified treaty of adjustment with the Republic of Colombia. I very earnestly urge upon them an early and favorable action upon that vital matter. I believe that they will feel, with me that the stage of affairs is now set for such action as will be not only just but generous, and in the spirit of the new age upon which we have so happily entered.

“So far as our domestic affairs are concerned, the problem of our return to peace is a problem of economic and industrial readjustment. That problem is less serious for us than it may turn out to be for the nations which have suffered the disarrangements and the losses of the war longer than we. Our people, moreover, do not wait to be coached or led. They know their own business, are quick and resourceful at every readjustment, definite in purpose, and self-reliant in action. Any leading strings we might seek to put them in would speedily become hopelessly tangled, because they would pay no attention to them, and go their own way. All that we can do as their legislative and executive servants is to mediate the process of change here, there, and elsewhere, as we may. I have heard much coun-

sel as to the plans that should be formed, and personally conducted to a happy consummation, but from no quarter have I seen any general scheme of ‘reconstruction’ emerge which I thought it likely we could force our spirited business men and self-reliant laborers to accept with due pliancy and obedience. While the war lasted we set up many agencies by which to direct the industries of the country in the services it was necessary for them to render, by which to make sure of an abundant supply of the materials needed, by which to check undertakings that could for the time be dispensed with, and stimulate those that were most serviceable in war, by which to gain for the purchasing departments of the Government a certain control over the prices of essential articles and materials, by which to restrain trade with alien enemies, make the most of the available shipping, and systematize financial transactions, both public and private, so that there would be no unnecessary conflict or confusion—by which, in short, to put every material energy of the country in harness to draw the common load and make of us one team in the accomplishment of a great task. But the moment we knew the armistice to have been signed we took the harness off. Raw materials, upon which the Government had kept its hand for fear there should not be enough for the industries that supplied the armies, have been released and put into the general market again. Great industrial plants whose whole output and machinery had been taken over for the uses of the Government have been set free to return to the uses to which they were put before the war. It has not been possible to remove so readily or so quickly the control of foodstuffs and of shipping, because the world has still to be fed from our granaries and the ships are still needed to send supplies to our men overseas, and to bring the men back as fast as the disturbed conditions on the other side of the water permit. But even these restraints are being relaxed as much as possible, and more and more as the weeks go by. Never before have there been agencies in existence in this country which knew so much of the field of supply, of labor, and of industry as the War Industries Board, the War Trade Board, the Labor Department, the Food Administration, and the Fuel Administration have known since the labors became thoroughly systematized, and they have not been isolated agencies. They have been directed by men that represented the permanent departments of the Government, and so have been the centres of unified and co-operative action. It has been the policy of the Executive, therefore, since the armistice, (which is in effect a complete submission of the enemy,) to put the knowledge of these bodies at the disposal of the business men of the country, and to offer their intelligent mediation at every point and in every matter where it was desired. It is surprising how fast the process of return to a peace footing has moved in the three weeks since the fighting stopped. It promises to outrun any inquiry that may be instituted and any aid that may be offered. It will not be easy to direct it any better than it will direct itself. The American business man is of quick initiative. The ordinary and normal processes of private initiative will not, however, provide immediate employment for all of the men of our returning armies. Those who are of trained capacity, those who are skilled workmen, those who have acquired familiarity with established business, those who are ready and willing to go to the farms, all those whose aptitudes are known or

will be sought out by employers, will find no difficulty, it is safe to say, in finding place and employment. But there will be others who will be at a loss where to gain a livelihood unless pains are taken to guide them and put them in the way of work. There will be a large floating residuum of labor which should not be left wholly to shift for itself. It seems to me important, therefore, that the development of public works of every sort should be promptly resumed, in order that opportunities should be created for unskilled labor in particular, and that plans should be made for such developments of our unused lands and our natural resources as we have hitherto lacked stimulation to undertake. I particularly direct your attention to the very practical plans which the Secretary of the Interior has developed in his annual report, and before your committees for the reclamation of arid, swamp, and cut-over lands, which might, if the States were willing and able to cooperate, redeem some three hundred million acres of land for cultivation. There are said to be fifteen or twenty million acres of land in the West, at present arid, for whose reclamation water is available, if properly conserved. There are about two hundred and thirty million acres from which the forests have been cut, but which have never yet been cleared for the plow, and which lie waste and desolate. These lie scattered all over the Union. And there are nearly eighty million acres of land that lie under swamps or subject to periodical overflow, or too wet for anything but grazing, which it is perfectly feasible to drain and protect and redeem. The Congress can at once direct thousands of the returning soldiers to the reclamation of the arid lands which it has already undertaken, if it will but enlarge the plans and the appropriations which it has intrusted to the Department of the Interior. It is possible in dealing with our unused land to effect a great rural and agricultural development, which will afford the best sort of opportunity to men who want to help themselves, and the Secretary of the Interior has thought the possible methods out in a way which is worthy of your most friendly attention.

"I have spoken of the control which must yet for a while, perhaps for a long while, be exercised over the shipping because of priority of service to which our forces overseas are entitled and which should also be accorded the shipments which are to save recently liberated peoples from starvation and many devastated regions from permanent ruin. May I not say a special word about the needs of Belgium and Northern France? No sums of money paid by way of indemnity will serve of themselves to save them from hopeless disadvantage for years to come. Something more must be done than merely find the money. If they had money and raw materials in abundance tomorrow, they could not resume their place in the industry of the world tomorrow—the very important place they held before the flame of war swept across them. Many of their factories are razed to the ground. Much of their machinery is destroyed or has been taken away. Their people are scattered, and many of their best workmen are dead. Their markets will be taken by others, if they are not in some special way assisted to rebuild their factories and replace their lost instruments of manufacture. They should not be left to the vicissitudes of the sharp competition for materials and for industrial facilities which is now to set in. I hope, therefore, that the Congress will not be unwilling, if it should become necessary, to grant to some such agency

as the War Trade Board the right to establish priorities of export and supply for the benefit of these people whom we have been so happy to assist in saving from the German terror and whom we must not now thoughtlessly leave to shift for themselves in a pitiless competitive market. For the steadying and facilitation of our own domestic business readjustments nothing is more important than the immediate determination of the taxes that are to be levied for 1918, 1919, and 1920. As much of the burden of taxation must be lifted from business as sound methods of financing the Government will permit, and those who conduct the great essential industries of the country must be told as exactly as possible what obligations to the Government they will be expected to meet in the years immediately ahead of them; it will be of serious consequence to the country to delay removing all uncertainties in this matter a single day longer than the right processes of debate justify. It is idle to talk of successful and confident business reconstruction before those uncertainties are resolved. If the war had continued it would have been necessary to raise at least \$8,000,000,000 by taxation payable in the year 1919; but the war has ended and I agree with the Secretary of the Treasury that it will be safe to reduce the amount to six billions. An immediate rapid decline in the expenses of the Government is not to be looked for. Contracts made for war supplies will, indeed, be rapidly canceled and liquidated, but their immediate liquidation will make heavy drains on the Treasury for the months just ahead of us. The maintenance of our forces on the other side of the sea is still necessary. A considerable proportion of those forces must remain in Europe during the period of occupation, and those which are brought home will be transported and demobilized at heavy expense for months to come. The interest on our war debt must, of course, be paid and provision made for the retirement of the obligations of the Government which represent it. But these demands will, of course, fall much below what a continuation of military operations would have entailed, and six billions should suffice to supply a sound foundation for the financial operations of the year.

"I entirely concur with the Secretary of the Treasury in recommending that the two billions needed in addition to the four billions provided by existing law be obtained from the profits which have accrued and shall accrue from war contracts and distinctively war business, but that these taxes be confined to the war profits accruing in 1918 or in 1919 from business originating in war contracts. I urge your acceptance of this recommendation that provision be made now, not subsequently, that the taxes to be paid in 1920 should be reduced from six to four billions. Any arrangements less definite than these would add elements of doubt and confusion to the critical period of industrial readjustment through which the country must now immediately pass, and which no true friend of the nation's essential business interests can afford to be responsible for creating or prolonging. Clearly determined conditions, clearly and simply charted, are indispensable to the economic revival and rapid industrial development which may confidently be expected, if we act now and sweep all interrogation points away. I take it for granted that the Congress will carry out the naval program which was undertaken before we entered the war. The Secretary of the Navy has submitted to your committees for authorization that part of the pro-

gram which covers the building plans for the next three years. These plans have been prepared along the lines and in accordance with the policy which the Congress established, not under the exceptional conditions of the war, but with the intention of adhering to a definite method of development for the navy. I earnestly recommend the uninterrupted pursuit of that policy. It would clearly be unwise for us to attempt to adjust our program to a future world policy as yet undetermined. The question which causes me the greatest concern is the question of the policy to be adopted toward the railroads. I frankly turn to you for counsel upon it. I have no confident judgment of my own. I do not see how any thoughtful man can have who knows anything of the complexity of the problem. It is a problem which must be studied, studied immediately, and studied without bias or prejudice. Nothing can be gained by becoming partisans of any particular plan of settlement. It was necessary that the administration of the railways should be taken over by the Government so long as the war lasted. It would have been impossible otherwise to establish and carry through under a single direction the necessary priorities of shipment. It would have been impossible otherwise to combine maximum production at the factories and mines and farms with the maximum possible car supply to move the products to the ports and markets; impossible to route troop shipments and freight shipments without regard to the advantage of the roads employed; impossible to subordinate, when necessary, all questions of convenience to the public necessity; impossible to give the necessary financial support to the roads from the public treasury. But all these necessities have now been served, and the question is, What is best for the railroads, and for the public in the future? Exceptional circumstances and exceptional methods of administration were not needed to convince us that the railroads were not equal to the immense tasks of transportation imposed upon them by the rapid and continuous development of the industries of the country. We knew that already. And we knew that they were unequal to it partly because their full co-operation was rendered impossible by law and their competition made obligatory, so that it has been impossible to assign to them severally the traffic which could best be carried by their respective lines in the interest of expedition and national economy. We may hope, I believe, for the formal conclusion of the war by a treaty by the time Spring has come. The twenty-one months to which the present control of the railways is limited, after formal proclamation of peace shall have been made, will run at the farthest, I take it for granted, only to the January of 1921. The full equipment of the railways which the Federal Administration had planned could not be completed within any such period. The present law does not permit the use of the revenues of the several roads for the execution of such plans except by formal contract with their Directors, some of whom will consent while some will not, and therefore does not afford sufficient authority to undertake improvements upon the scale which it would be necessary to undertake them. Every approach to this difficult subject-matter of decision brings us face to face, therefore, with this unanswered question: What is it right that we should do with the railroads, in the interest of the public and in fairness to their owners? Let me say at once that I have no answer ready. The only thing that is

perfectly clear to me is that it is not fair either to the public or to the owners of the railroads to leave the question unanswered, and that it will presently become my duty to relinquish control of the roads, even before the expiration of the statutory period, unless there should appear some clear prospect in the meantime of a legislative solution. Their release would at least produce one element of a solution, namely, certainty and a quick stimulation of private initiative.

"I believe that it will be serviceable for me to set forth as explicitly as possible the alternative courses that lie open to our choice. We can simply release the roads and go back to the old conditions of private management, unrestricted competition, and multiform regulation by both State and Federal authorities; or we can go to the opposite extreme and establish complete control, accompanied, if necessary, by actual Government ownership; or we can adopt an intermediate course of modified private control, under a more unified and affirmative public regulation and under such alterations of the law as will permit wasteful competition to be avoided and a considerable degree of unification of administration to be effected, as, for example, by regional corporations, under which the railways of definable areas would be in effect combined in single systems. The one conclusion that I am ready to state with confidence is that it would be a disservice alike to the country and to the owners of the railroads to return to the old conditions unmodified. These are conditions of restraint without development. There is nothing affirmative or helpful about them. What the country chiefly needs is that all its means of transportation should be developed, its railways, its waterways, its highways, and its countryside roads. Some new element of policy, therefore, is absolutely necessary—necessary for the service of the public, necessary for the release of credit to those who are administering the railways, necessary for the protection of their security holders. The old policy may be changed much or little, but surely it cannot always be left as it was. I hope that the Congress will have a complete and impartial study of the whole problem instituted at once and prosecuted as rapidly as possible. I stand ready and anxious to release the roads from the present control, and I must do so at a very early date, as by waiting until the statutory limit of time is reached I shall be merely prolonging the period of doubt and uncertainty which is hurtful to every interest concerned. I welcome this occasion to announce to the Congress my purpose to join in Paris the representatives of the Governments with which we have been associated in the war against the Central Empires for the purpose of discussing with them the main features of the treaty of peace. I realize the great inconveniences that will attend my leaving the country, particularly at this time, but the conclusion that it was my paramount duty to go has been forced upon me by considerations which I hope will seem as conclusive to you as they have seemed to me. The allied Governments have accepted the bases of peace which I outlined to the Congress on the 8th of January last, as the Central Empires also have, and very reasonably desire my personal counsel in their interpretation and application, and it is highly desirable that I should give it in order that the sincere desire of our Government to contribute without selfish purpose of any kind to settlements that will be of common benefit to all the nations concerned may be made fully manifest. The peace settlements

which are now to be agreed upon are of transcendent importance, both to us and to the rest of the world, and I know of no business or interest which should take precedence of them. The gallant men of our armed forces on land and sea have conspicuously fought for the ideals which they knew to be the ideals of their country. I have sought to express those ideals; they have accepted my statements of them as the substance of their own thought and purpose, as the associated Governments have accepted them; I owe it to them to see to it, so far as in me lies that no false or mistaken interpretation is put upon them, and no possible effort omitted to realize them. It is now my duty to play my full part in making good what they offered their life's blood to obtain. I can think of no call to service which would transcend this. I shall be in close touch with you and with affairs on this side of the water, and you will know all that I do. At my request the French and English Governments have absolutely removed the censorship of cable news which until within a fortnight they had maintained, and there is now no censorship whatever exercised at this end, except upon attempted trade communications with enemy countries. It has been necessary to keep an open wire constantly available between Paris and the Department of State, and another between France and the Department of War. In order that this might be done with the least possible interference with the other uses of the cables, I have temporarily taken over the control of both cables in order that they may be used as a single system. I did do so at the advice of the most experienced cable officials, and I hope that the results will justify my hope that the news of the next few months may pass with the utmost freedom, and with the least possible delay from each side of the sea to the other. May I now hope, gentlemen of the Congress, that in the delicate tasks I shall have to perform on the other side of the sea, in my efforts truly and faithfully to interpret the principles and purposes of the country we love, I may have the encouragement and the added strength of your united support? I realize the magnitude and difficulty of the duty I am undertaking. I am poignantly aware of its grave responsibilities. I am the servant of the nation. I can have no private thought or purpose of my own in performing such an errand. I go to give the best that is in me to the common settlements which I must now assist in arriving at in conference with the other working heads of the associated Governments. I shall count upon your friendly countenance and encouragement. I shall not be inaccessible. The cables and the wireless will render me available for any counsel or service you may desire of me, and I shall be happy in the thought that I am constantly in touch with the weighty matters of domestic policy with which we shall have to deal. I shall make my absence as brief as possible, and shall hope to return with the happy assurance that it has been possible to translate into action the great ideals for which America has striven."—*New York Times*, Dec. 3, 1918.

"President Wilson's decision to go to Paris as a member of the Commission aroused . . . [fierce] opposition. . . . The decision was one of tremendous significance. At the moment when domestic problems of reconstruction would be most acute, an American President was going to leave the country because of the interest of America in European affairs. The United States was now so

much a part of the world system that domestic issues seemed of less importance than the danger that Europe might fall back into the old international system which had proved unable to keep the peace. The President's voyage to France was the clearest manifestation yet vouchsafed of the settled position of the United States as a world power. . . . But the decision of the President to attend the Peace Conference furnished fresh material for criticism at home. It was a new thing in our history; people did not understand the importance of the issues involved and attributed his voyage to vanity. Unquestionably it weakened Wilson in America as much as it strengthened him abroad. When on the 4th of December, the presidential ship, *George Washington*, sailed out of New York harbor, . . . external enthusiasm was apparently at its height. But Wilson left behind him glowing embers of intense opposition which, during the next six months, were to be fanned into a dangerous flame."—C. Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War* (*Chronicles of America Series*, v. 48, pp. 250, 252-253).

1918 (December).—Senator Lodge's views on the treaty-making power of the president, and terms of peace with Germany.—Opposition to League of Nations.—The president had scarcely reached Paris before smoldering opposition to him and his views broke out into speech. In the Senate, on December 21, Senator Lodge, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, voiced the growing discontent in a speech which reads, in part, as follows:

"Peace being our object, the first step toward peace is to make a peace with the country with which we have been and are at war—that is, with Germany. If the peace with Germany is to be durable, terms must be exacted which will make it, so far as human foresight goes, impossible for Germany to break out again upon the world with a war of conquest. This can not be done by treaty engagements and signatures to documents. At this juncture of affairs Germany would sign anything, and her pledge would be as worthless as the guaranties she gave to Belgium. . . . Physical guaranties which when taken would make signatures to treaties negligible can alone assure a durable peace with Germany. I do not need to rehearse what those physical guaranties should be, for I have stated my views upon them more than once to the Senate, and I think there is a general agreement upon them not only in the Senate but among the American people. They include the restoration of Belgium, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, of the Italia Irredenta to Italy, the establishment of a Jugo-Slav State, and of an independent State formed by the Czecho-Slovaks. They include also the security of Greece, the settlement of Albania and Montenegro, the restoration of Roumania, the consolidation of all the Roumanian people under one government, as well as the neutralization of the straits, the putting of Constantinople under international protection, with Greece perhaps as the mandatory of the powers to administer the affairs of the city, the independence of Armenia, the return of those portions of Asia Minor where Greeks are predominant to Greece, the protection of Syria and Palestine from the Turks, a large, powerful, and independent Polish State, the independence of Russia's Baltic Provinces, the return of Danish Slesvig to the Danes, and the neutralization of the Kiel Canal. These physical guaranties which I have thus far sug-

gested all have one object, and that is so to hem Germany in that she can not attempt conquest in Russia or in the East, and that the Slavic populations, which she has mercilessly used in her wars, can never be used by her again. In addition to these guaranties, there must be heavy indemnities paid by Germany for the ruin she has wrought in Belgium and northern France and in Italy, and for her destruction of vessels, both neutral and belligerent, through the use of submarines. In those indemnities the United States must have its proper and proportional share, not only direct indemnity for its ships destroyed by submarines and its people murdered on the *Lusitania* and other vessels but a suitable restitution, in part at least, of the vast expenses forced upon us by Germany. . . . It will be for the peace conference to determine what disposition should be made of the German colonies, but one thing is essential, and that is that they should not be returned to the tyrannical misgovernment of Germany and that she should be deprived of those means for extending her commerce and building up military outposts in all parts of the world. The payment of the indemnities will be a work of time, and it will be necessary to take and hold ample security for the extinction of these debts. It is the duty of the allies and the United States to meet and determine what terms they will impose upon Germany, and then, and not until then, call in the representatives of Germany and impose the terms upon them. When this is done, the first great step will be taken toward the establishment of the world's peace. If we eliminate Germany from the opportunity to make war, the only source from which a great war is likely to come would be closed for generations. . . . [Referring to the League of Nations, he said:] The words 'the league of nations' are captivating and attractive. Everybody would like to bring about a world condition in which wars would be impossible. . . . We all are deeply in sympathy with the purposes which the words 'league of nations' are supposed to imply. But we ought to be extremely careful that in our efforts to reach the millennium of universal and eternal peace we do not create a system which will breed dissensions and wars. It is difficult to discuss it at this time, because no definite plan of any kind has yet been put forward by any responsible person. . . . We all share in aspirations for complete world peace and for its maintenance; but the attempt to convert these aspirations into the hard, dry, and exact formulas of laws and treaties is a very arduous task. . . . And yet it is essential that before we can pass upon a league of nations we must have the most precise definitions of what is intended. A league of nations is not a bill which can pass by title. A league is an agreement. We must know what we are to agree to, and no one has yet thought it worth while to tell the people of the United States what they are to agree to when a league of nations is formed. If, however, there is to be a league of nations in order to enforce peace, one thing is clear. It must be either a mere assemblage of words, an exposition of vague ideals and encouraging hopes, or it must be a practical system. If such a league is to be practical and effective, it can not possibly be either unless it has authority to issue decrees and force to sustain them. It is at this point that the questions of great moments arise. . . . What nations are to be members of the league? Is Germany to be one of the members? If so, when? How are these nations thus joined in a league to vote in

determining the operations of the league? Theoretically, in international law every independent sovereign nation is the equal of any other nation. Are the small nations to have an equal vote with the great nations in the league, a vote equal to that of the United States or England or France? . . . This system seems open to some objections at first glance, and they are objections which will have to be considered. All the plans which have been put forward tentatively for a league of nations, so far as I know, involve the creation of a court. We must remember that we have carried voluntary arbitration as far as it can practically go. Assuming that there is a distinction between justiciable and nonjusticiable questions, who is to decide whether a question is justiciable or not? Is it to be done by the league, voting in some manner hitherto undefined, or is each nation to decide for itself whether a question affecting its own interest is or is not justiciable? Let me give an example, to make my meaning clearer. We have recently purchased the Virgin Islands. Suppose that that purchase had not been effected and that Denmark undertook to sell those islands to Germany or some other great power. Is that a justiciable question? If it is and it went before a court there can be no doubt that any court would be obliged to hold that Denmark had the right to sell those islands to whom she pleased. In the past the United States would never have permitted those islands to pass out of Denmark's hands into any other hands, because we consider their possession of vital importance to our safety and to the protection of the Panama routes. The same will be true in regard to Magdalena Bay—a case in which the Senate passed a resolution, with unanimity, I think, stating that on the plain doctrine of self-preservation we could not allow Magdalena Bay, or any other similar position of advantage, to be turned into a naval base or military post by another power. Would that be justiciable? And if not justiciable, then is the league of nations to compel, nevertheless, its submission?"—*Congressional Record*, Dec. 21, 1918, pp. 757-762.

1918 (December).—Abolition of food regulation.—Appeal for continued economy. See FOOD REGULATION: 1918.

1918 (December).—National transportation conference for solution of railroad problem. See RAILROADS: 1918-1919.

1918.—Propaganda.—Committee of Public Information and their reports. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: III. Press reports, etc.: d, 5.

1918.—Number of ships sunk by German submarines during the World War.—Number of merchant ships destroyed.—Lives lost.—Summary of American vessels sunk. See WORLD WAR: 1918: IX. Naval operations: c, 9; d; e; f; i, 1.

1918.—Operations of Atlantic fleet during World War.—Patrol force organized for protection of commerce. See WORLD WAR: 1918: IX. Naval operations: c.

1918.—Cost of the World War.—Amount spent for war relief.—Total casualties. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XIV. Cost of war: a; b, 3, ii; b, 8.

1918-1919.—Settlement of strikes by War Labor Board. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1918-1919.

1918-1919.—Interest in Fiume Question. See FIUME: 1919: Attitude of President Wilson.

1918-1919 (December-February).—Reception

of the president abroad.—Opposition of public and secretary of state.—Opening of the peace conference.—In Europe the president was received everywhere with enthusiasm, was acclaimed as the chief representative of the United States, and given all the old-time royal honors. At home, opposition to his views hardened, especially to his desire for the formation of the League of Nations. He also encountered strong opposition from the secretary of state, a member of the peace commission. Secretary Lansing said: "The principal subjects, concerning which President Wilson and I were in marked disagreement, were the following: His presence in Paris during the peace negotiations and especially his presence there as a delegate to the Peace Conference; the fundamental principles of the constitution and functions of a League of Nations as proposed or advocated by him; the form of the organic act, known as the 'Covenant,' its elaborate character and its inclusion in the treaty restoring a state of peace; the treaty of defensive alliance with France; the necessity for a definite programme which the American Commissioners could follow in carrying on the negotiations; the employment of private interviews and confidential agreements in reaching settlements, a practice which gave color to the charge of 'secret diplomacy'; and, lastly, the admission of the Japanese claims to possession of German treaty rights at Kiaochow and in the Province of Shantung. Of these seven subjects of difference the most important were those relating to the League of Nations and the Covenant, though our opposite views as to Shantung were more generally known and more frequently the subject of public comment. . . . I pointed out certain provisions which appeared to me objectionable in principle or at least of doubtful policy. Mr. Wilson, however, clearly indicated—at least so I interpreted his words and manner—that he was not disposed to receive these criticisms in good part and was unwilling to discuss them. He also said with great candor and emphasis that he did not intend to have lawyers drafting the treaty of peace. Although this declaration was called forth by the statement that the legal advisers of the American Commission had been, at my request, preparing an outline of a treaty, a 'skeleton treaty' in fact, the President's sweeping disapproval of members of the legal profession participating in the treaty-making seemed to be, and I believe was, intended to be notice to me that my counsel was unwelcome. Being the only lawyer on the delegation I naturally took this remark to myself, and I know that other American Commissioners held the same view of its purpose. If my belief was unjustified, I can only regret that I did not persevere in my criticisms and suggestions, but I could not do so believing as I then did that a lawyer's advice on any question not wholly legal in nature was unacceptable to the President, a belief which, up to the present time, I have had no reason to change."—R. Lansing, *Peace negotiations*, pp. 8-9, 107-108.—The peace conference opened in Paris, January 18, 1919. See PARIS, CONFERENCE OF; also VERSAILLES, TREATY OF; LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

ALSO IN: R. S. Baker, *What Wilson did at Paris, 1918-1920*.—Reconstruction begins.—Railroads returned to owners.—New powers given to Interstate Commerce Commission.—Fuel administration revived.—Settlement of bituminous coal strike.—Efforts to combat rising cost of living.—"After the signing of the armistice many of the

war organizations wound up their affairs and passed out of existence. Food control, regulation of industries under the War Industries Board, war control of foreign commerce, among others, rapidly disappeared. Meanwhile the railroads and telegraphs were returned to their owners. In the spring of 1920 Congress repealed many of the war measures, but the President declined to sign the Act and thus the war laws remained on the statute books. Meanwhile Congress enacted a new Railway Act designed to put the roads on a permanent peace basis. The powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission were enlarged and the body was charged with new duties. The Commission was increased to eleven members and the jurisdiction of the body was extended to export rates used by any vessels registered under the lead of the United States. Recognizing the increased cost of operating the roads, Congress authorized the Commission to increase the railroad rates and to make other financial provisions for the roads."—I. Lippincott, *Economic development of the United States*, p. 664.—See also RAILROADS: 1916-1920.—"Although the United States . . . [had] not officially made peace, numerous war agencies, created while the war was in progress . . . [were] dissolved. This began shortly after the signing of the armistice in November, 1918. Some of these agencies . . . [were continued, however], though on a greatly diminished scale. The United States Employment Service was abandoned on October 10 [1919] because of a lack of funds. The Department of Labor, however, continued to supply information to state employment agencies. Late in September the War Department announced that the placing of soldiers had been practically completed. Francis P. Garvan . . . continued to act as Alien Property Custodian. When the strike of 400,000 bituminous coal miners threatened, late in October [1919], the President revived the Fuel Administration and restored the regulations dealing with the fixing of coal prices at the mines and the fixing of dealers' commissions. These regulations were again administered by the Fuel Administrator, Harry A. Garfield. The appeal of President Wilson to the miners, urging them to rescind their strike order, having proved unsuccessful, Attorney General Palmer secured, on October 31, a temporary injunction from Judge Anderson of the U. S. District Court at Indianapolis, restraining the officers and leaders of the miners from sending out further strike orders and the officers of the United Mine Workers from disbursing union funds for strike benefits. Authority for the issuance of this injunction was derived from the Food and Fuel Control Act, which made it a penal offence to conspire to prevent the production of coal during the war. Nevertheless, on November 1, more than 400,000 miners quit work. A week later another injunction was obtained, ordering the officials of the miners union to withdraw the previous strike order. This they did on November 11, but the men refused to return to the mines. The Secretary of Labor finally succeeded in bringing the parties together for a conference at Washington on November 14. The Government was represented by Secretary of Labor Wilson, Fuel Administrator Garfield, Attorney General Palmer and Director General Hines. The miners were represented by John L. Lewis, acting president of the United Mine Workers. During this and succeeding conferences it developed that the Fuel Administrator and the Secretary of Labor entertained different opinions relative to the conditions that should be

offered the miners. The Secretary favored a wage increase of 31.6 per cent. Considering this excessive, the Fuel Administrator proposed a 14 per cent increase with the proviso that operators were not to increase the price of coal to meet the wage increase. On December 9 the President offered as a compromise an immediate increase in wages of 14 per cent and the establishment of a commission to consider further concessions—this commission to consist of three persons to represent, respectively, the miners, the operators and the general public. On the day following, a conference of the district representatives of the miners accepted these terms. Dr. Garfield, dissatisfied with the President's method of settling the strike, resigned on December 13. On December 22 the President named as members of the Coal Strike Commission, Henry M. Robinson, John P. White, former president of the United Mine Workers, and Rembrandt Peale, an independent coal operator. On March 11 the commission submitted a majority report in favor of a general wage increase of 27 per cent without any change in working hours and conditions. On March 29 the joint conference of miners and operators agreed that the award of the commission should become effective on April 1. Early in March the Operators' and Miners' Wage Scale Committee of the anthracite mine districts began negotiations for a new wage agreement. Early in June both sides agreed to the President's plan for the appointment of a commission similar to the bituminous coal commission. The President thereupon appointed William O. Thompson, President of Ohio State University, to represent the public, William L. Connell, an independent operator of Scranton, to represent the operators, and Neil Ferry, of the United Mine Workers, to represent the workers. [See also LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1919: Bituminous coal strike.] . . . On February 28 President Wilson issued an executive order providing for the continuation of the powers of the Fuel Administration, dividing them however, between the Director General of Railroads and a commission of four. The government's control of bituminous prices was ordered to terminate on April 1.—The Food Administration came to an end early in 1919. However, there remained in existence until June 1, 1920, the Sugar Equalization Board and the Grain Corporation, . . . the chairman of which was Julius H. Barnes. On August 23 [1919] the American Relief Administration closed its Paris Office, thus formally terminating its work. The feeding of 4,000,000 underfed children in various European countries continued to be carried on by a charitable organization formed by Mr. Hoover. During the six months of its existence, ending May 31, 1919, the American Relief Administration distributed supplies valued at over \$800,000,000 in seventeen countries. [See INTERNATIONAL RELIEF.] The War Labor Board ended its existence on August 12 on account of lack of funds. During the fifteen months of its existence the board adjusted over 1,200 labor controversies. In August President Wilson ordered the transfer of the Records of the Committee on Public Information and of the War Industries Board to the Council of National Defense, to be catalogued and preserved for future emergencies. The annual report of the Council, issued in November [1919], summarized the work accomplished since its organization in the winter of 1916. Its total cost was only \$1,500,000. On February 18 [1920] Grosvenor B. Clarkson, director of the Council, resigned. . . . During the pe-

riod under review the Administration made efforts to combat the rising cost of living. Early in August [1919] the President asked Congress for additional legislation. He stated that wheat shipments and credits to facilitate the purchase of our wheat would be controlled so as to lower the price of flour here; that surplus stocks of both food and clothing in the hands of the government would be sold without profit; that foodstuffs would be drawn out of storage and sold by legal action whenever necessary; that combinations of producers and distributors formed to control prices would be vigorously prosecuted; and that publicity would be employed by agencies of the government to inform the public of supplies not available because of hoarding and price manipulation. The Attorney General announced that since investigations by the Federal Trade Commission had disclosed a 'clear violation of the anti-trust laws' by the Chicago meat packers, vigorous action would at once be brought against these combinations. The government's attitude resulted in an agreement between the 'Big Five'—Armour and Company, Swift and Company, Morris and Company, Wilson and Company and the Cudahy Packing Company—and the Department of Justice, under the terms of which the packers and their subsidiaries agreed to sell all their holdings in public stockyards, stockyard railroads and terminals and their interests in market newspapers and public cold-storage warehouses, and forever to disassociate themselves from the retail meat business and such food lines as are unrelated to meat packing. This agreement, it was asserted, would avert the danger of a monopoly in food supplies."—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, *Supplement*, pp. 22-25, 30-31.—See also PRICE CONTROL: 1917-1919; TRUSTS: United States: 1919-1923.

1918-1920.—Growth of labor parties.—Farmer Labor party. See LABOR PARTIES: 1918-1920.

1918-1921.—Relations with the Philippine islands.—President Wilson's recommendation to Congress for their independence.—General Wood's investigation. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1918-1921.

1918-1922.—American Relief Administration.—Administration of European relief.—Work of Hoover. See INTERNATIONAL RELIEF: American Relief Administration.

1919.—New South.—"The end of Reconstruction [in 1876] found the tenant system and the 'crop lien' firmly fastened upon the South. . . . Few of the landless whites and practically none of the negroes had sufficient money reserve to maintain themselves for a year and hence no capital to apply to the land on which they were tenants. Yet the land was there ready to produce, the labor was there, more or less willing to work if it could but live while the crop was growing. The country merchant had already assumed the office of banker to the tenant farmer, and his position he still holds [written in 1919] in spite of all efforts to dislodge him. His customers include not only tenants but some landowners, white or black. They buy from him, during the months before the crop is gathered, the . . . supplies necessary for existence, and as many simple luxuries as he will permit. When the crops are gathered, he buys them, or at least the share of them belonging to the tenants, subtracts the store accounts, and turns over the surplus, if any, to the farmers. With thousands of these merchants selling to hundreds of thousands of farmers over a wide area, it is of

course impossible to state the average difference between credit and cash prices. . . . The merchant is supposed to be protected against loss by the institution of the crop lien and the chattel mortgage. . . . As a result of this system in some sections, years ago, nine-tenths of the farmers were in debt. Undoubtedly the prices credited for the crops have been less than might have been obtained in a market absolutely free. If the crops a farmer raises bring less than the advances, the balance is carried over to the next year and no other merchant will give credit to a man whose accounts with his former creditor are not clear. In the past the signing of one of these legal instruments has often reduced the farmer to a state of peonage. Naturally the merchant who has begun to extend credit, sometimes before the seed is in the ground, has a voice in deciding what crops shall be planted. The favorite crops in the past have been tobacco and cotton, particularly the latter. . . . Only winter wheat, sown in the fall and reaped in early summer, is grown in the South, and the crop is somewhat uncertain. A tenant who has secured advances on a crop of wheat during the fall and winter may easily move to an adjoining county or State in the spring and plant cotton there. Half a crop of corn may easily be stolen, eaten by animals, or consumed by the tenant while still green. A further reason for not encouraging the production of corn and wheat is the profit the merchant makes by the sale of imported flour, meal, and bacon. Cotton is therefore almost the only product of sections admirably suited to the growing of corn or to the raising of hogs. The country merchant has helped to keep the South poor. These relations between landlord and tenant show much diversity, but certain conditions prevail everywhere. Few tenants can sustain themselves until the crop is gathered, and a very large percentage of them must eat and wear their crops before they are gathered—a circumstance which will create no surprise unless the reader makes the common error of thinking of them as capitalists. Though the landlord in effect takes his tenants into partnership, they are really only laborers, and few laborers anywhere are six or eight months ahead of destitution. . . . There is a brighter side to this picture, however. Of all the cultivated land in the South 65 per cent is worked by owners (white 60.6 per cent; colored 4.4 per cent) and this land is on the whole much better tilled than that let to tenants. It is true that some of the landowners are chronically in debt, burdened with mortgages and with advances for supplies. Some of them probably produce less to the acre than tenants working under close supervision, but the percentage of farms mortgaged is less in the South than in any other part of the country except the Mountain Division, and unofficial testimony indicates that few farms are lost through foreclosure. . . . The General Education Board, which, with its large resources, had been seeking the best way to aid education in the South, was forced to the conclusion that any educational development must be preceded by economic improvement. . . . 'Dr. Knapp endeavored to teach his hearers not only how to raise cotton and corn, but how to conduct farming as a business—how to ascertain the cost of a crop, how to find out whether they were making or losing money. As rapidly as possible the scope was broadened for the purpose of making the farmer more and more independent. He was stimulated to raise stock, to produce feed and forage for his stock, and to

interest himself in truck gardening, hog-raising, etc.' . . . Throughout the South there are thousands of homes into which no newspaper comes, certainly no agricultural paper, and in which there are few books, except perhaps school books. The cooking is sometimes done with a few simple utensils over the open fire. Water must be brought from a spring at the foot of the hill, at an expenditure of strength and endurance. The cramped house has no conveniences to lighten labor or to awaken pride. The overworked wife and mother has no social life, except perhaps attendance at the services at the country church to which the family rides in a springless wagon. Such families see their neighbors prosper without attempting to discover the secret for themselves. Blank fatalism possesses them. They do not realize that they could prosper. New methods of cultivation, they think, are not for them since they have no capital to purchase machinery. On the other hand, one sees more Ford cars than teams at many country churches, and many larger automobiles as well. Some Southern States are spending millions for better roads, and the farmer or his son or daughter can easily run into town in the afternoon carrying a little produce which more than pays for any purchases. Tractors are seen at work here and there, and agricultural machinery is under the sheds. Many houses have private water systems and a few farmers have harnessed the brooks for electric lights. The gas engine which pumps the water runs the corn sheller or the wood saw. The rural telephone spreads like a web over the countryside. Into these houses the carrier brings the daily or semi-weekly paper from the neighboring town, agricultural journals, and some magazines of national circulation; a piano stands in the parlor; and perhaps a college pennant or two hang somewhere, for many farm boys and girls go to college. In spite of the short terms of the public schools, many manage to get some sort of preparation for college, and in the South more college students come from farm homes than from town or city. This encouraging picture is true, no less than the other, and the number of such progressive farm homes is fortunately growing larger. A greater range of products is being cultivated throughout the South. . . . The output of corn, wheat, hay, and pork has increased in recent years, though the section is not yet self-sufficient. The growing of early vegetables and fruits for Northern markets is a flourishing industry in some sections where land supposedly almost worthless has been found to be admirably adapted for this purpose. An increasing acreage in various legumes not only furnishes forage but enriches the soil. Silos are to be seen here and there, and there are some excellent herds of dairy cattle, though the scarcity of reliable labor makes this form of farming hazardous. The cattle tick is being conquered, and more beef is being produced. Thoroughbred hogs and poultry are common. . . . The mills of the South have continued to increase until they are now much more numerous than in the North. They are smaller in size, however, for in 1915 the number of spindles in the cotton-growing States was 12,711,000 compared with 19,396,000 in all other States. The consumption of cotton was nevertheless much greater in the South and amounted to 3,414,000 bales, compared with 2,770,000 bales in the other States. This difference is explained by the fact that Southern mills, generally spin coarser yarn and may therefore easily consume twice or even three times as much cotton

as mills of the same number of spindles engaged in spinning finer yarn. Some Southern mills, however, spin very fine yarn from either Egyptian or sea-island cotton, but time is required to educate a considerable body of operatives competent to do the more delicate tasks, while less skillful workers are able to produce the coarser numbers. Southern mills have paid high dividends in the past and have also greatly enlarged their plants from their earnings. They had, years ago, several advantages, some of which persist to the present day. The cost of the raw material was less where a local supply of cotton could be obtained, since freight charges were saved by purchase in the neighborhood; land and buildings for plant and tenements cost less than in the North; fuel was cheaper; water power was often utilized, though sometimes this saving was offset by the cost of transportation; taxes were lower; the rate of wages was lower; there was little or no restriction of the conditions of employment; and there were comparatively few labor troubles."—H. Thompson, *New South*, pp. 60-64, 70, 74-76, 82-84, 95-96.

1919.—Represented at Conference of Paris. See PARIS, CONFERENCE OF: Outline of work.

1919.—International trade conference.—Formation of International Chamber of Commerce. See COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF.

1919.—Tariff recommendations.—Retaliatory duties.—Free port policy. See TARIFF: 1918-1919.

1919.—Problem of Japanese immigration into California. See RACE PROBLEMS: 1913-1921.

1919.—Food Production Act passed. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1913-1919.

1919.—Child welfare legislation of the states. See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1919; also CALIFORNIA: 1919.

1919.—Edge Act put into Federal Reserve Act. See below: 1922: Economic situation.

1919 (January).—Death of Theodore Roosevelt.—Memorial address by Senator Lodge.—"Theodore Roosevelt died peacefully in his sleep at his home in Oyster Bay, at 4 o'clock in the morning of January 6, 1919. . . . He died as he would have wished to, in the home that he loved, with his family about him, in the full possession of his faculties, in the midst of work that was nearest to his heart, and at the summit of his fame."—J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his time*, v. 2, p. 475.—On February 9, Senator Lodge, who had long been his close friend, delivered a memorial address in the presence of both Houses of Congress.

1919 (January).—Recognition of Polish independence. See POLAND: 1919.

1919 (February-March).—Attitude of the Senate toward Covenant of the League of Nations.—Conference of Committee on Foreign Relations with the president.—"The first part of the treaty text to be made public was the Covenant of the League of Nations approved by the Peace Conference on February 14, 1919, which, under the resolution adopted by the Conference on January 25, 1919, 'should be treated as an integral part of the general treaty of peace.' Opposition to the Covenant was expressed in the Senate soon after the text became known in the United States and, when the President returned from Paris to Washington in February, 1919, he invited the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to the White House for the purpose of discussing the terms of the Covenant. This took place at a dinner on February 26, 1919. According to one of the Senators present on that occa-

sion, attention was directed to 'what were considered to be vital defects and infringements of our Constitution and form of government. Great changes of our traditional policies were pointed out and discussed, and the President was informed that those changes would be absolutely necessary, and that the Covenant in the form in which it then stood was absolutely unsatisfactory to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.' The objections thus pointed out informally to the President were given more definite form on March 4, 1919, the last day of the Sixty-Fifth Congress, when . . . [a] resolution, the consideration of which was prevented by lack of unanimous consent, was inserted in the record."—G. A. Finch, *Treaty of peace with Germany in the United States Senate*, pp. 4-5.—The following is the text of the resolution:

Whereas, under the Constitution, it is a function of the Senate to advise and consent to, or dissent from the ratification of any treaty of the United States, and no such treaty can become operative without the consent of the Senate expressed by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Senators present, and

Whereas, owing to the victory of the arms of the United States and of the nations with whom it is associated, a Peace Conference was convened, and is now in session at Paris for the purpose of settling the terms of peace; and,

Whereas, a Committee of the conference has proposed a constitution for a League of Nations, and the proposal is now before the Peace Conference for its consideration;

Now, therefore, be it resolved, by the Senate of the United States in the discharge of its constitutional duty of advice in regard to treaties, that it is the sense of the Senate that, while it is the sincere desire that the nations of the world should unite to promote peace and general disarmament the Constitution of the League of Nations in the form now proposed to the Peace Conference should not be accepted by the United States.

And be it resolved further, that it is the sense of the Senate that the negotiations on the part of the United States should immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany satisfactory to the United States and the nations with whom the United States is associated in the war against the German Government, and the proposal for a League of Nations to insure the permanent peace of the world should be then taken up for careful and serious consideration.

(Signed) HENRY CABOT LODGE, of Massachusetts, and thirty-eight other Senators and Senators-elect, as follows:

California, JOHNSON.
Colorado, PHIPPS.
Connecticut, BRANDEGEE AND McLEAN.
Delaware, BALL.
Idaho, BORAH.
Illinois, SHERMAN AND McCORMICK.
Indiana, NEW AND WATSON.
Iowa, CUMMINS.
Kansas, CURTIS.
Maine, HALE AND FERNALD.
Maryland, FRANCE.
Michigan, TOWNSEND AND NEWBERRY.
Missouri, SPENCER.
New Hampshire, MOSES AND KEYES.
New Jersey, FRELINGHUYSEN AND EDGE.
New Mexico, FALL.
New York, WADSWORTH AND CALDER.

North Dakota, GRONNA.
Ohio, HARDING.
Pennsylvania, KNOX AND PENROSE.
South Dakota, STERLING.
Utah, SMOOT.
Vermont, DILLINGHAM AND PAGE.
Washington, POINDEXTER.
West Virginia, SUTHERLAND AND ELKINS.
Wisconsin, LENROOT.
Wyoming, WARREN.

—D. J. Hill, *Present problems in foreign policy*, pp. 325-326.

1919 (March).—President Wilson defends the League in speech in New York.—Returns to Paris.—“The President’s reply to the request of the thirty-seven Senators for the separation of the Covenant from the treaty was given in his speech at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City on March 4, 1919, in which, after vigorously defending the Covenant, he said: ‘When that treaty comes back gentlemen on this side will find the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure.’ President Wilson evidently did not at that time doubt his ability to secure the approval of the treaty by the United States, including the Covenant of the League of Nations. His course was warmly defended by Senators of his own party. Some peace societies, notably the League to Enforce Peace, undertook a nation-wide propaganda to develop public sentiment for the League, and the President no doubt felt justified in relying upon the traditionally favorable disposition of the American people and government toward the substitution of peaceful methods for war in the settlement of international disputes. He publicly expressed his confidence in the popular support of his program at home in his speech at New York above referred to, made on the eve of his return to Paris. In opening that address he said: ‘The first thing I am going to tell the people on the other side of the water is that an overwhelming majority of the American people is in favor of the League of Nations. I know that this is true. I have had unmistakable intimations of it from all parts of the country, and the voice rings true in every case.’”—G. A. Finch, *Treaty of peace with Germany in the United States Senate*, p. 6.—Ex-President Taft spoke for the League from the same platform. The following day the president sailed again for Paris.

ALSO IN: W. H. Taft, *Paris Covenant for a League of Nations (American Political Science Review, May, 1919, pp. 181-198)*.—W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, pp. 326-327.

1919 (May).—Law passed aiming to promote greater production of foodstuffs. See FOOD REGULATION: 1918-1920.

1919 (May).—Interest in China.—Consortium Agreement with the powers. See CHINA: 1919: Consortium Agreement.

1919 (May).—Represented at Conference for International Union of Academies. See INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ACADEMIES: Conference called by French Academy.

1919 (May-June).—Special session of Congress.—While in France, the president called a special session of the Sixty-sixth Congress to meet on May 19. A review of the activities of the House during the first month of the session follows: “The special session of the Sixty-sixth Congress has been in session one month. During that time the

House of Representatives has considered and passed the six general supply bills and the railroad deficiency bills which failed in the closing hours of the last Congress at the end of a three months’ session. In the consideration and the passage of these bills the House has effected a saving of approximately a billion dollars in the amounts carried in the same bills which failed in the session that expired March 4 last. These savings were in the main on three bills, though there were some reductions on all, and on these three bills, the Army, Navy, and sundry civil, the reductions were in round figures approximately as follows: On the Army appropriation bill, \$400,000,000. On the Navy appropriation bill, \$225,000,000. On the sundry civil appropriation bill, \$835,000,000. In addition to these reductions the bill to supply deficiencies in railway revenues, as it passed the House, carried \$750,000,000 instead of \$1,200,000,000, as estimated by the Railroad Administration—a reduction of \$450,000,000. These savings, taken altogether, total nearly one and one-half billion dollars as the approximate net reduction on appropriations by this first session of the Republican Congress below the proposed appropriations of the closing session of the Democratic Congress and the estimates. Not only has the House made an unprecedented record during the 30 days of the session in disposing of appropriation bills, but the bills have received careful and businesslike consideration both in committee and on the floor. The reductions have not been made recklessly but after due consideration. Notwithstanding the very great savings that have been accomplished in the appropriations, it can be said without fear of successful contradiction that no legitimate, essential, or useful public service has been injuriously curtailed by the reductions that have been made. The Army and the Navy and the civil services of the Nation will all be adequately cared for and provided for under the appropriations that have been made by the House. At the beginning of the session the Republican majority of the House in conference promised speedy action on these appropriation bills and also prompt consideration of a program of legislation and investigation. There can be no question but what this pledge has been splendidly kept as far as appropriations are concerned, and in the matter of legislation the House has considered and passed the woman suffrage resolution, the daylight-saving repeal, and the bill returning the wires to their owners, and the various committees of the House are actively engaged in the consideration of other important legislation. A committee has been constituted to make an audit and study of the expenditures of the War Department during the period of the war, totaling \$16,000,000,000. This committee has organized, subdivided into subcommittees, and is prepared for work.”—*Congressional Record, June 27, 1919, pp. 2032-2033.*

1919 (June).—Woman Suffrage Bill passed by Congress. See SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: United States: 1851-1920.

1919 (June).—Principle of a free Poland laid down in President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. See POLAND: 1919 (June).

1919 (June 28).—Represented at Conference of Versailles.—Signing of treaty.—Text of treaty.—Treaty of Allies with Poland. See VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Conditions of peace; POLAND: 1919 (June 28).

1919 (June-December).—Mexican bandits cross border and fire into El Paso, Texas.—Pursued by American forces into Mexico.—Kid-

napping of American Consul, W. O. Jenkins. See MEXICO: 1919 (June-December).

1919 (July-September).—Discussion over League of Nations.—Peace treaty in the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations.—“An animated debate was taking place in the United States over the league of nations. Practically all Americans were eager to prevent war in the future, but many doubted whether the league would secure that desirable result. The issue was also confused by political considerations. Many Democrats forthwith declared themselves favorable to the league without having actually studied the covenant. Many Republicans took an exactly contrary course. However, some Democrats opposed the league, while a number of Republicans, the most notable of whom was ex-President Taft, ardently favored it. Those who opposed the league made much of the fact that it would involve us in European affairs and meant throwing away for ever Washington’s advice against entangling alliances. Many men did not oppose the general idea of a league, but criticised various features of the one proposed. Amendments adopted by the peace conference removed some of these objections. The most notable of these amendments was the one affirming the continued validity of the Monroe doctrine.”—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*, p. 493.—“Such was the situation when President Wilson on July 10, 1919, personally submitted the peace treaty with Germany to the Senate with an earnest appeal for its prompt ratification. Under the rules of the Senate, the treaty was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The Committee decided to hold public hearings, which began July 31, and ended on September 12. During its consideration of the treaty the Committee met on 37 days, sitting sometimes in the morning and afternoon. In the course of the hearings the Committee had before it Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State and one of the American Peace Commissioners, and several of the technical advisers to the American Peace Commission, including Mr. B. M. Baruch, economic adviser, Mr. Norman H. Davis, financial adviser, and Mr. David Hunter Miller, legal adviser. In addition to these officials who took part in the formulation and drafting of the treaty, the Committee heard a number of private persons interested in particular sections of the treaty, especially those relating to geographical distribution of territories and the self-determination of peoples. The presentation of such subjects was made by American citizens as, under the rules of the Committee, only American citizens could be heard by it. The proposed transfer of Shantung to Japan was opposed by Mr. Thomas F. Millard, who styled himself the unofficial friendly counsellor of China, and Mr. John C. Ferguson, official adviser to the President of China. A statement on this subject was also made by Professor E. T. Williams, technical adviser on Far Eastern affairs to the American Peace Commission. . . . The most important part of the hearings was a conference with the President at the White House, which took place on August 19, 1919. It would be impossible within a short space to give an adequate summary of the conversation between the President and the sixteen Senators who participated. The President’s views were presented in writing at the opening of the conference, of which the following extract contains the material part: ‘Nothing, I am led to believe, stands in the way of the ratification of the treaty except certain doubts with regard to the meaning and implication of certain articles of the Covenant of the

League of Nations; and I must frankly say that I am unable to understand why such doubts should be entertained. You will recall that when I had the pleasure of a conference with your committee and with the Committee of the House of Representatives on Foreign Affairs at the White House in March last the questions now most frequently asked about the League of Nations were all canvassed with a view to their immediate clarification. The Covenant of the League was then in its first draft and subject to revision. It was pointed out that no express recognition was given to the Monroe Doctrine; that it was not expressly provided that the League should have no authority to act or to express a judgment on matters of domestic policy; that the right to withdraw from the League was not expressly recognized; and that the constitutional right of the Congress to determine all questions of peace and war was not sufficiently safeguarded. On my return to Paris all these matters were taken up again by the Commission on the League of Nations and every suggestion of the United States was accepted. The views of the United States with regard to the questions I have mentioned had, in fact, already been accepted by the Commission and there was supposed to be nothing inconsistent with them in the draft of the Covenant first adopted—the draft which was the subject of our discussion in March—but no objection was made to saying explicitly in the text what all had supposed to be implicit in it. . . . The right of any sovereign State to withdraw had been taken for granted, but no objection was made to making it explicit. Indeed, so soon as the views expressed at the White House conference were laid before the Commission it was at once conceded that it was best not to leave the answer to so important a question to inference. No proposal was made to set up any tribunal to pass judgment upon the question whether a withdrawing nation had in fact fulfilled “all its international obligations and all its obligations under the Covenant.” It was recognized that that question must be left to be resolved by the conscience of the nation proposing to withdraw; and I must say that it did not seem to me worth while to propose that the article be made more explicit, because I knew that the United States would never itself propose to withdraw from the League if its conscience was not entirely clear as to the fulfilment of all its international obligations. It has never failed to fulfil them and never will.

“Article 10 is in no respect of doubtful meaning when read in the light of the Covenant as a whole. The Council of the League can only “advise upon” the means by which the obligations of that great article are to be given effect to. Unless the United States is a party to the policy or action in question, her own affirmative vote in the Council is necessary before any advice can be given, for a unanimous vote of the Council is required. If she is a party, the trouble is hers anyhow. And the unanimous vote of the Council is only advice in any case. Each Government is free to reject it if it pleases. Nothing could have been made more clear to the conference than the right of our Congress under our Constitution to exercise its independent judgment in all matters of peace and war. No attempt was made to question or limit that right. The United States will, indeed, undertake under Article 10 to “respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League,” and that engagement constitutes a very grave and solemn moral obligation.

But it is a moral, not a legal, obligation, and leaves our Congress absolutely free to put its own interpretation upon it in all cases that call for action. It is binding in conscience only, not in law. Article 10 seems to me to constitute the very backbone of the whole Covenant. Without it the League would be hardly more than an influential debating society."—G. A. Finch, *Treaty of peace with Germany in the United States Senate*, pp. 7-13.

ALSO IN: W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his work*, ch. 15.

1919 (July-September).—President Wilson's endeavors to obtain unconditional ratification of the treaty.—Speech-making tour.—Illness of the president.—"Debate in the Senate continued while the treaty was under consideration by the Committee on Foreign Relations. It increased in volume and diversity until the Senators became divided into three groups. A small number of Senators absolutely opposed the ratification of the treaty in any form, and because of their insistent opposition they became known as the 'irreconcilables.' A larger group supported the President's demand that the treaty be ratified as signed, but later indicated their willingness to accept reservations of an 'interpretative character.' The third group was made up of Senators who favored the ratification of the treaty on condition that it contain reservations safeguarding what they believed to be the substantial rights and interests of the United States. This group itself did not remain compact, but developed a schism of so-called 'mild reservationists' who favored a larger participation of the United States in world affairs and therefore a minimum of reservations, as against the more restricted participation and maximum program of reservations advocated by the main group of reservationists. As the debate progressed in the Senate and individual Senators expressed their views, it became apparent that the treaty could not obtain the necessary votes for ratification even with 'interpretative reservations.' President Wilson endeavored to save the situation by personal conferences at the White House with mild reservation Senators; but the serious probability that the Senate would not fully approve his work at Paris forced him to play what he evidently relied upon as his strongest hand, namely, a direct appeal to the people to support the treaty and to bring sufficient pressure to bear upon the opposing Senators to obtain its ratification in form acceptable to him. Accordingly the President undertook to accomplish this purpose in a speech-making tour of the West. . . . His physical exertions on this strenuous 9,500 mile trip to bring about their ratification, in the course of which he made thirty-seven addresses of an average length of 5,000 words each in twenty-nine cities on eighteen days, exclusive of Sundays, spending his nights and the intervals between speeches in his Pullman car, came near resulting unfortunately in the tragic fulfilment of the declaration made in the course of his address at Spokane, Washington, on September 12, 1919, that 'I am ready to fight from now until all the fight has been taken out of me by death to redeem the faith and promises of the United States.'"—G. A. Finch, *Treaty of peace with Germany*, pp. 14-15.—"To be ratified by the United States the treaty must receive the votes of two-thirds of the senators voting upon it. A majority of the senators were Republicans, and feelings in the Senate against Wilson had come to be very bitter. . . . A number of senators, including Johnson and Borah, who opposed the League altogether, fol-

lowed a few days behind him [President Wilson], speaking at the same places, and they . . . were greeted by large crowds. On his way back from the Pacific Coast the President had an apoplectic stroke and was forced to give up the rest of his tour. For several months he was confined to the White House and was able to see only a few persons and to consider only extremely important questions. Meanwhile the mass of the people were kept in ignorance of his exact condition."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*, pp. 493-494.

ALSO IN: 66th Congress, 1st Session, *Senate Document no. 106.—American Journal of International Law*, July, 1919, pp. 554-576.

1919 (August).—Plumb plan proposed for solving problem of nationalization of railroads. See RAILROADS: 1919: Plumb plan.

1919 (August).—Repeal of daylight saving law. See DAYLIGHT SAVING MOVEMENT: 1919.

1919 (August-November).—Problems of living.—Labor difficulties.—Railway strikes.—Settlement through government intervention.—"Hectic conditions prevailed in the United States. Shortage of commodities of almost all kinds had soon stimulated industry and solved the problem of unemployment, but prices soared to heights hitherto undreamed of, profiteers reaped rich harvests at the public expense, and there was great unrest among laborers. Increased prices provoked demands for increased wages and vice versa, and no one could say when this pyramiding would end. Great strikes among steel-workers, bituminous coal miners, and railway men deranged industry and threatened the welfare of the country. It was clear that the question of industrial peace was one of the most serious that confronted the country. Our industrial society had become so complicated and the parts so interdependent that it was possible for a comparatively small minority of workers to bring want and misery to the whole country."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*, p. 497.—"In spite of the large increases in the wages of railroad employees the last seven months of government control were notable for serious labor difficulties. These difficulties were complicated by the insistence of the brotherhoods upon the so-called 'Plumb Plan.' [See RAILROADS: 1919: Plumb plan.] On August 1 a strike occurred among the railway shopmen, who demanded an increase of 17 cents an hour over their previous wage of 68 cents. The strike was not authorized by the national officers of the shopmen's union. Early in the year the men had presented their grievances to the official Wage Adjustment Board, but no decision had been reached. In July the Director General asked Congress to create a new wage board. This request, however, was refused. Thereupon the President, on August 7, directed Mr. Hines to use the authority vested in him to adjust wage differences, on condition that the strikers return to work. In the meantime the strike had spread from the Chicago district to New York and Boston, causing freight embargoes and the cancellation of numerous trains. The President directed the Railroad Administration to use its full authority to move the trains in the southwestern states where unauthorized strikes had occurred. District attorneys were ordered to arrest persons interfering with traffic. The Director General sent an ultimatum stating that all employees not reporting for duty on August 30 would be regarded as having terminated their employment. On August 25 President Wilson in a statement appealed to the men to postpone their

demands. He offered, however, to grant the shopmen an increase of 4 cents an hour so that their wages would correspond with those of other classes of railroad employees. On September 21 it was announced that the shopmen's union had accepted the offer. On November 15 Director General Hines submitted to the representatives of the four railway brotherhoods propositions increasing the wage scale approximately \$36,000,000 a year. This increase, which was accepted in lieu of the workers' demands, affected trainmen, firemen, engineers and conductors, but more particularly those employed in the slow-freight service. As a result of a conference of the Railroad Administration and the Brotherhood of Maintenance-of-way Employees and Railway Track Laborers on November 24, a new wage and working agreement was signed. Approximately 400,000 men were affected. While the demands of the union were not fully met, the eight-hour basic day was established for track laborers, and time and a half pay for overtime was granted."—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, *Supplement*, pp. 25-26.

1919 (August-December).—Administration endeavors to deal with the high cost of living.—Fair price committees.—Sugar Control Bill.—"On August 10 [1919] the Attorney General in a dispatch to former state food administrators urged that fair price committees be appointed to secure accurate information relative to charges of profiteering in necessary commodities, such information to be reported to the Department of Justice. A vigorous campaign against hoarding food in cold storage for speculative purposes was at once instituted. Government prosecutors in many localities began filing libels for the seizure of eggs, sugar, rice, meat, etc. On November 21 the President again placed the government in control of the nation's food supply by transferring the authority of the Food Administration to the Attorney General. The immediate cause of the revival of these war functions was the effort to avert a sugar famine. Immediate steps were taken to allocate the sugar stocks in the country. On the last day of the year the President signed the McNary Sugar Control Bill, under which the Sugar Equalization Board was continued for one year."—*Ibid.*, p. 31.

1919 (September).—Credit extended to Belgium for reconstruction. See BELGIUM: 1919: Reconstruction.

1919 (September).—Signing of Treaty of St. Germain ending war with Austria. See ST. GERMAIN, TREATY OF.

1919 (September-November).—Treaty of peace in the Senate.—Rejection of resolutions of ratification.—On September 10, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the treaty of peace with Germany to the Senate with recommendations of a number of amendments and reservations. "The treaty of peace [Treaty of Versailles] became the regular business before the Senate on September 15. On the following day its consideration was begun section by section. On September 27, the first 111 articles had been read and the reading was interrupted to take up the amendments proposed by the Committee to eliminate the United States from participation in certain work connected with the execution of the treaty. The amendments eliminated the American representatives from the commissions to run the frontiers between Belgium and Germany, Poland and Germany, and Czecho-Slovakia, and from the commissions to administer the Saar Basin, Upper Silesia, East Prussia and Schleswig during the pe-

riods of the plebiscites and to carry out their results. They also eliminated the participation of the United States in future negotiations regarding the status of Luxemburg and from the proposed agreements with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia regarding the protection of minorities. The United States was further eliminated from any part in the appointment of the manager of the Central Rhine Commission, and from the acceptance of any right or title in Memel and Danzig or participation in the future settlement of their status. The above amendments were debated until October 2, when they were put to a vote under a unanimous-consent agreement. All were rejected by votes ranging from 58 yeas to 30 nays to votes without the formality of a roll call. The reading of the treaty was resumed on October 7 and 8, when the amendments were reached transferring to China instead of Japan the German lease and rights in Shantung. Debate on these amendments continued until October 16, when they were also voted upon under a unanimous-consent agreement, and rejected by a vote of 35 yeas to 55 nays. The reading of the treaty was immediately resumed and on the following day, October 17, the Committee's amendment was reached restricting the participation of the American member of the Reparation Commission to matters arising under Annex 3 to the reparation clauses, unless otherwise specifically instructed by his government to take part. The amendment was promptly voted upon and rejected by a *viva voce* vote. The reading of the treaty then proceeded until October 20 when it was completed. On October 22 the Senate took up the first amendment, which had been passed over, intended to secure equality of voting of the United States in the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations. This amendment proposed to insert the following proviso at the end of Article 3 of the Covenant: 'Provided, that when any member of the League has or possesses self-governing dominions or colonies or parts of empire, which are also members of the League, the United States shall have votes in the Assembly or Council of the League numerically equal to the aggregate vote of such member of the League and its self-governing dominions and colonies and parts of empire in the Council or Assembly of the League.' The amendment was rejected on October 27 by a vote of 38 yeas to 40 nays. The second Committee amendment on the same subject was then taken up. It proposed to insert the following paragraph in Article 15 of the Covenant: 'Whenever the case referred to the Assembly involves a dispute between one member of the League and another member whose self-governing dominions or colonies or parts of empire are also represented in the Assembly, neither of the disputant members nor any of their said dominions, colonies, or parts of empire shall have a vote upon any phase of the question.' . . . On October 30, Senator La Follette moved to strike out Part XIII of the treaty dealing with the International Labor Organization. This motion was defeated on November 5 by a vote of 34 yeas to 47 nays. On November 4, Senator Lodge moved to strike out Articles 156, 157, and 158 of the treaty dealing with the question of Shantung. This proposal was immediately rejected by a vote of 26 yeas to 41 nays. On November 5, Senator Gore proposed to insert at the end of the first paragraph of Article 12 of the Covenant a proviso that members of the League should not resort to war until an advisory vote of the people shall have been taken, which was rejected on November 6 by a vote of 16 yeas to 67 nays. The argument

chiefly used by the opponents of textual amendments was that their adoption would necessitate a resubmission of the treaty to the Peace Conference, including Germany. As shown by the votes upon the amendments, the majority of the Senate was opposed to such a course. The opposition to amendments was so evident that on the same day that they were taken up in the Senate for consideration (October 22), the Committee on Foreign Relations met for the purpose of substituting reservations for them. On October 24, Senator Lodge, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported a new draft of the reservations already reported, together with certain additional reservations, making fourteen in all, preceded by a preamble. On November 6, after the Senate had rejected all of the proposed amendments, Senator Lodge moved the adoption of the new reservations and preamble. Voting upon them began the following day. . . . [The "Lodge reservations" were adopted.] After all of the reservations had been acted upon on November 18, those adopted in the Committee of the Whole were reported to the Senate and concurred in as adopted, except No. 4, which was amended. . . . The resolution of ratification, including the reservations adopted, was presented by Senator Lodge immediately upon the convening of the Senate on November 19, when ninety-three of the ninety-six Senators answered the roll call. After a number of Senators had explained why they intended to vote for or against the resolution of ratification, the vote was taken and resulted in 39 for and 55 against, so that the resolution of ratification was rejected, two-thirds of the Senators present not having voted in favor of it. A formal motion to reconsider the vote was adopted. . . . Senator Lodge's resolution of ratification was then reconsidered and again rejected by 41 yeas to 51 nays. A resolution of unconditional ratification offered by Senator Underwood was also rejected, the vote being 38 yeas and 53 nays. Whereupon the Senate adjourned." G. A. Finch, *Treaty of peace with Germany in the United States Senate*, pp. 22-24, 39-41.

"For many weeks the struggle over the treaty dragged along in the Senate. All amendments to the League of Nations Covenant were voted down, but the committee of the whole adopted fourteen 'reservations' limiting America's liability under the Covenant. President Wilson strongly opposed the reservations, and a situation developed which resulted (November, 1919) in the defeat of the treaty by a vote of 55 to 39. Four Democrats voted for ratification with reservations and 13 Republicans against ratification. The special session of Congress then adjourned. Each side to the controversy sought to throw the blame for the failure upon the other. Meanwhile the United States continued to be technically at war with Germany. When Congress met in December the treaty was again submitted to the Senate, and a new struggle ensued. As in the special session, the main battle raged over the reservation to Article X of the Covenant. This article bound members of the League 'to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.' On March 15, 1920, after days of debate, the Senate, by a vote of 56 to 26, voted the following reservation to Article X: 'The United States assumes no obligation to employ its military or naval forces, its resources or any form of economic discrimination to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country, or to interfere in

controversies between nations—whether members of the League or not—under Article X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose unless in any particular case the Congress, in the exercise of full liberty of action, shall by act or joint resolution so declare.' Supporters of the reservation contended that it did little more than reaffirm the Constitution of the United States, which reserves to Congress the right 'to declare war.' But President Wilson took the view that Article X must not be touched. Of a milder reservation adopted the previous autumn he had declared that it was a 'knife-thrust at the heart of the covenant,' and he now reiterated the view that any reservation which sought 'to deprive the League of Nations of the force of Article X cuts at the very heart and life of the covenant itself.' In a letter addressed to his party on January 8, 1920, he said that, if the treaty could not be adopted as it stood, it should be submitted to a solemn referendum at the coming election. Not all Democrats took this view. William Jennings Bryan, for example, declared in favor of compromise, and many Democratic senators refused to support the Wilsonian stand. Fourteen joined the Republicans in adopting the reservation, and 23 voted for the ratification of the treaty with reservations, of which there were 15 in all. The final vote on ratification (March 19, 1920), counting pairs, stood: for ratification, 34 Republicans, 23 Democrats; against ratification, 15 Republicans, 24 Democrats. The vote for ratification lacked seven of the necessary majority, and thus the treaty again failed. A joint resolution declaring the war at an end passed both houses in April and May but was vetoed by the President."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*, pp. 494-496.

ALSO IN: 66th Congress, 1st Session, *Senate Report*, no. 176, pt. 1.—Q. Wright, *Amendments and reservations to the treaty (Minnesota Law Review, December, 1919)*.—D. J. Hill, *Present problems in foreign policy*.

1919 (September - December). — Campaign against Communist agitators.—Deportation of alien "Reds."—"During the year [1919] the government conducted a vigorous campaign against radical agitators. The campaign was carried on mainly through the Department of Justice and the Post-Office Department in the enforcement of the Espionage Act and the laws denying the use of the mails for distributing improper publications. On November 7 simultaneous arrests were made of several hundred officers and members of radical organizations in a dozen cities of the United States on warrants charging them with advocating the forcible overthrow of the government. The authorities also secured possession of large quantities of radical literature. A week later, government agents disclosed the fact that much 'red' propaganda had been carried on in the United States via Mexico, and on the following day Attorney General Palmer, in response to a Senate resolution asking for a statement regarding the activities of his Department, requested further legislation to strengthen his hands in dealing with dangerous persons. He presented statistics relative to radical and seditious literature distributed in the country, much of which, he said, was in open advocacy of the destruction of the United States government. During the summer and autumn of 1919 a considerable number of alien agitators had been collected at Ellis Island for deportation. Although the federal court of New York had held that the government had authority to deport them, it ap-

peared that Immigration Commissioner Frederic C. Howe failed to act vigorously in their deportation. For this he was severely criticized. On December 22 the *Buford* or '*Soviet Ark*' sailed from New York for Russia, carrying 249 alien residents of the United States found guilty of revolutionary agitation. All were former citizens of Russia. Among those deported were Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman. The campaign against the 'red' agitators has been continued. Wholesale arrests have been made and many incriminating papers seized. Drastic sedition bills were introduced in Congress. There has been widespread criticism of the Department of Justice for the methods used in its campaign against the radicals. Nor has this criticism come solely from the radicals themselves."—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, *Supplement*, pp. 32-33.

ALSO IN: M. Beard, *Short history of the American labor movement*, pp. 165-166.—G. S. Watkins, *Revolutionary communism in the United States* (*American Political Science Review*, February, 1920, pp. 14-33).

1919 (October).—Volstead Act passed over president's veto. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1919-1920.

1919 (November).—Treaty of Neuilly signed with Bulgaria. See NEULLY, TREATY OF (1919).

1919-1920.—Changes in cabinet.—Return of American peace delegation.—"The year under review witnessed numerous changes in President Wilson's cabinet. On August 20 the Senate confirmed the nomination as Attorney General of A. Mitchell Palmer, who since March 5 had been serving under a recess appointment. To succeed William C. Redfield, who resigned November 1, President Wilson nominated as Secretary of Commerce, Joshua Willis Alexander, who took office on December 16. On January 31 David Franklin Houston succeeded Carter Glass as Secretary of the Treasury, the latter having been chosen Senator from Virginia. On the same day Edwin Thomas Meredith became Secretary of Agriculture, succeeding Mr. Houston. Franklin Knight Lane resigned as Secretary of the Interior on February 7. He was succeeded by John Barton Payne, chairman of the United States Shipping Board. On February 13, following correspondence with the President, who charged him with usurping executive power by calling cabinet meetings during the President's illness, Robert Lansing resigned the office of Secretary of State. Late in the month President Wilson nominated Bainbridge Colby of New York to succeed him. From September 2 to April 14 the President was unable on account of illness to meet with his cabinet. Frank Lyon Polk resigned on June 15 as Under-Secretary of State. He was succeeded by Norman Davis, who in November had succeeded Leo S. Rowe as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. . . . In June, 1919, the Federal Civil Service Commission was completely reorganized. The three former commissioners resigned, and Martin L. Morrison and George R. Wales succeeded them. On March 22 the President appointed as the third member of the Commission Mrs. Helen Hamilton Gardener. . . . On December 20 the last of the members of the American Peace Delegation, Frank Polk, General Tasker H. Bliss and Mr. Henry White, returned to the United States. After that date American interests in Paris were in charge of Ambassador Wallace."—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, *Supplement*, pp. 22-23.

1919-1920.—National industrial conferences.

See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1919-1920.

1919-1920.—Great steel strike.—Causes.—Failure of strike. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1919-1920.

1919-1920.—High cost of living.—"The balance of trade [which, during the war, had turned in favor of the United States (see below: 1922: Economic situation)] had not only created great debts owed to the United States, but it had caused alarming decline in foreign exchange that acted as an automatic embargo on the American export trade. On February 4, 1920, the pound sterling could be bought in New York for \$3.19 instead of its ordinary \$4.84; and French and Belgian francs fell to between seven and eight cents, while the German mark, under the influence of defeat as well as balance of trade, incited speculation at over forty to the dollar, instead of four. After February the foreign condition gradually improved, as Europe got again to work. But American prices remained at the peak caused by the various forces of actual scarcity, high cost of labor, impeded transportation, inflation of the currency, and the spendable savings of citizens whose Liberty bonds were thrown on the market now the emergency was over. Retail food prices averaged 207 in the first six months of 1920 as against 146 in 1917, and 100 in 1913. The continuance of high prices exasperated citizens, who felt that they were in some way the fault of the Administration, and gave basis for the renewed demands of workers in every field for higher pay. In the schools and colleges, where salaries were low at best, a fear of the decay of scholarship and instruction inspired a general effort to correct the pay schedules."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, p. 580.—John Hays Hammond and Jeremiah W. Jenks (writing in 1920) give a graphic account of the plight of small salaried workers, who felt the situation keenly. "A survey [they said] made in 1919 of the annual earnings in a number of different classifications of service reveals the gravity of the situation of the average salaried employee. The compensation of a large number of college professors was shown to be \$1300 and less, and the average salary of high school teachers in cities of 100,000 and over between \$1200 and \$1400. In this same salary group are found many government employees, salaried officials in the smaller municipalities, railroad clerks and the less fortunate office employees. In the corresponding wage group are found some of the lower paid day workers in the iron and steel, coal mining and manufacturing industries and the building trades. In other words, from the standpoint of earning capacity, these professors, teachers, school principals and others . . . are now on a level with loaders, oilers, car runners, trackmen and others in the coal mines, the lower paid operatives in the textile industry, and freight handlers. Many skilled workers . . . receiving wages far above this level. Marine captains and engineers earn between \$3000 and \$4000 a year. Rollers and pourers in the steel mills and superintendents and managers in several of the manufacturing industries are also in this class. Train dispatchers and passenger engineers, as well as a number of craftsmen in the steel industry, average between \$2500 and \$3000 annually,—more than many university professors now receive. The medium salary of professors in colleges listed by the Carnegie Foundation is \$2000. The yearly earnings of boilermakers in railway work average \$2059. A number of other steel workers receive between \$1800 and

\$2000, as do railroad passenger firemen, machinists, motormen and engineers in the anthracite coal mines, and tinsmiths and sheet metal workers. Since 1914 practically all these wage-earners have received increases of from 75 to 150 per cent. The compensation of the salaried class has meanwhile in many cases practically remained stationary. From the standpoint of income, the relative positions of the two classes have been reversed. In a lower group, with annual earnings from \$1000 to \$1200, the elementary school teachers of the National Capital and certain government clerical employes are found on a financial level with railroad section men, street railway conductors and motormen, coal mine laborers and members of other unskilled occupations. The average yearly wage of the 100,000 packing house employees included in this group is \$1163. Even lower still is the stipend of the teacher in elementary schools in the cities, the average being between \$800 and \$1000, on the same level as the annual wage of the common laborers in the building trades and saleswomen in department stores. Still farther down the scale, on a parity with office boys, messengers, janitors, charwomen and the like, are the clergymen and school-teachers in villages and rural communities, with incomes below \$800 a year. The inadequacy of these incomes in the light of the present day prices is apparent. Recent estimates by well-known economists place the amount necessary for the maintenance of the average family in health and reasonable comfort at from \$1700 to \$2500 a year. The Federal Department of Labor stated that in April, 1920, the cost of living was practically double what it was in 1914. No doubt a considerable proportion of the great body of wage-earners is still below a proper living standard; a majority of these were underpaid before the war and their increases have only served to keep them on the same plane as before. Many others, however, have realized advances in rates of pay which more than compensate for the higher cost of living. Figures . . . published concerning the earnings of more than half a million employees engaged in various industries indicate that the average wage of industrial workers for 1920 will be approximately \$1450. This, of course, means that many will earn less than this amount and that a considerable number will receive more. In 1915 the average earnings of these same workers was only \$595; their wages, therefore, have increased nearly 150 per cent, so that they are in reality better off than before the war. The salaried employes, on the other hand, have received relatively small advances—often none at all—and prices have cut their earnings in half. There is every evidence that high prices have brought unusual prosperity to business managers as well as to the small shopkeepers of the country; but while some good is mixed with the evil, no one can doubt that the world would be happier and better off if we could maintain a certain degree of stability in the prices of the articles in most common use.”—J. H. Hammond and J. W. Jenks, *Great American issues*, pp. 89-91.—“It is unquestionably the middle class that were the chief victims of the war-time high cost of living. Labor was no worse off than it had been before; probably it was somewhat better off, especially during the early part of 1920; though there were great bodies of unskilled laborers, like those in steel manufacturing, whose earnings remained decidedly below the lowest possible standard of living. As for the organized skilled trades, they were relatively prosperous. Most business managers were favored by the trend of prices,

some were made into profiteers, and some of the big corporations realized fabulous profits. But the middle class suffered. Salaries responded to the price curve more slowly than wages, and much more slowly than profits. Ministers perhaps suffered as badly as anybody. Thousands of capable middle-aged men left the teaching profession, discouraged and in many cases embittered.”—R. L. Finney, *Causes and cures for the social unrest*, p. 82.—See also PRICE CONTROL: 1917-1919.

1919-1920.—Industrial arbitration laws. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1919-1920.

1919-1921.—Relations with Japan.—Shantung transfer in Treaty of Versailles.—Immigration question.—Anglo-Japanese Alliance.—“In the Treaty of Versailles Germany renounced, in favor of Japan, all her rights, titles, and privileges in Shantung acquired by the treaty of March 6, 1898. . . . [See VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Part IV: Section VIII.] The transfer of the German interests in Shantung to Japan raised a storm of indignation. The reason was that President Wilson had in his Fourteen Points set up a new standard of international morality, and public opinion was disposed to hold him strictly to that standard. The secret treaties of the Allies upholding Japanese claims were not revealed until the disposition of the German islands in the Pacific was under discussion at the Peace Conference. When informed by Baron Makino that the islands north of the Equator had been pledged to Japan by treaties signed two years before, President Wilson inquired whether there were other secret agreements, and was informed that the German rights in Shantung had also been promised to Japan. As the other powers were pledged to support Japan's claims, President Wilson found himself in a very embarrassing situation, especially as he had also to oppose Japan's demand that a clause recognizing racial equality be inserted in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This was a moral claim that Japan urged with great strategic effect. In pushing her claims to Shantung she ignored all moral considerations and relied entirely upon her legal status, secured (1) by the secret treaties with the Allies, (2) by the treaty of 1915 with China, and (3) by right of conquest. When charged with having coerced China into signing the treaty of 1915, Japan replied with truth that most of the important treaties with China had been extorted by force. Japan urged her demand for racial equality until her claims to Shantung were recognized. She then dropped a demand which she probably never had much hope of securing, for she must have known that the United States would never consent to have the status of Japanese in California brought within the jurisdiction of the League. Japan gave an oral promise at the Conference to restore Shantung to China in full sovereignty, retaining only the economic privileges transferred from Germany. . . . [Our relations with Japan were further complicated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was still in effect.]”—J. H. Latané, *Our relations with China and Japan* (*World's Work*, May, 1921).—See also CHINA: 1919: Shantung controversy; JAPAN: 1922 (December).

1919-1922.—Post-war financial supremacy.—Falling price level. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1913-1920; 1910-1922.

1919-1923.—Events in the Caribbean.—“A Venezuelan revolutionary representative in 1919 asked for the American Minister, the American Army and the American Navy . . . [to insure fair

elections]. In March of the same year, after constitutional guarantees had been suspended and martial law declared in Cuba, the request was repeated. In 1920 and in 1921 the deposed President of Guatemala appealed to President Wilson to secure his release from prison. In 1922, after the Government of Panama had amended the Constitution, the Opposition asked Secretary Hughes to pass upon the propriety of the alteration. . . . It is indeed on purely idealistic principles that the State Department has proclaimed its policy ever since the famous declaration of President Wilson that he would not recognize any ruler who offered for the diplomatic clasp a hand stained with the blood of revolution. 'So long as the power of recognition rests with me,' he said, in accepting renomination in 1916, 'the Government of the United States will refuse to extend the hand of welcome to any one who obtains power in a sister republic by treachery and violence.' This raises a difficult question, and a frequent one, for it is well known that Latin-American States are subject to revolutions. . . . Let us not minimize the financial interests we now have in the Caribbean. In money alone the figures are astounding, even without securing the data for oil investments and fruit developments. A region that has a commercial business amounting to \$2,000,000,000 annually is important. Fruit forms a large part of that; and the Americans are the greatest fruit eaters in the civilized world. European finance is feeble and weak from the strain of war and reconstruction, not to speak of preparation. Capital must flow in from somewhere. The war may have turned the military minds of Europe away from the Caribbean. It has also turned the European money away. American money replaces it. 'In the northern countries of Latin America,' it is said, 'such as Mexico, Cuba, Central America and Santo Domingo, American money has predominated for some time.' For instance, in 1918, Cuba secured a loan of fifty millions from the United States Government. In 1920 Nicaragua borrowed nine millions in New York for a transcontinental railway. In 1922 Guatemala secured fifteen millions; Colombia arranged for eighty millions and Haiti for sixteen millions, though this last was most arranged so as to retire a French franc loan at a 60 per cent. saving. This borrowing affects diplomacy, here as elsewhere. Nicaragua is stated to have paid up all her current obligations 'as a result of diplomatic aid extended by the United States.' The Haitians chiefly object to their existing treaty because it permits uses of funds and pecuniary resources in ways other than they desire. The Venezuela episode and Olney's famous dictum about the fiat of the United States being law hereabout all arose from a financial tangle. Where an influential man invests his money, or big bankers lend it, they will see that the State Department attends to their interests. All the more is this true now, and all the easier, since the State Department has made it plain that Washington wishes to scrutinize and 'approve' of foreign loans before they are consummated. There is another illuminating instance in the matter of the Colombian treaty, drawn up in 1914, and ratified in 1921. After the first turmoil in the Senate over the apology clause had passed, the treaty was presented again and discussion revived in 1920. About this time President Suarez issued some decrees nationalizing oil supplies. North American oil interests objected; the Colombian Supreme Court declared the measures unconstitutional; and the Senate Committee in Washington

promptly re-reported the Treaty to the Senate. You may scoff at this and call it dollar diplomacy or what you will, but it is modern diplomacy just the same."—E. Colby, *United States paramount in the Caribbean (New York Times Current History, November, 1923)*.—See also DOLLAR DIPLOMACY.

1920.—Birth and death rates. See STATISTICS: Birth and death rates, etc.

1920.—Represented in Commission of the Straits for Control of the Dardanelles. See SÈVRES, TREATY OF (1920): Part III. Political clauses: The Straits.

1920.—Intervention in behalf of Albania to prevent her partition among Greece, Italy and Serbia. See BALKAN STATES: 1921: Albania.

1920.—Workmen's compensation laws enacted in various states. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: United States: 1920.

1920.—Construction of railroads in Alaska. See RAILROADS: 1920: Alaskan railroads.

1920.—Aid sent to China during famine. See CHINA: 1920: Severe famine.

1920.—Member of International Health Bureau. See PUBLIC HEALTH: League of Nations.

1920.—Administration of Samoa since 1900. See SAMOA: 1900-1920.

1920.—Dillingham Act passed regulating immigration. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1920-1921: Efforts to check immigration.

1920.—Final rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the Senate.—"Lodge's refusal to accept Wilson's treaty was as unshakable as Wilson's refusal to accept Lodge's treaty. When the special session ended and the regular session began the President eventually yielded a little and consented to interpretative reservations proposed by Senator Hitchcock. But this would not satisfy the Republicans; and on March 20 the rejected treaty was finally sent back to the White House."—*New York Times Book Review and Magazine, Feb. 27, 1921, p. 11*.—"Congress convened in regular session on December 2, 1919, but no formal action was taken upon the peace treaty until February 9, on which date the Senate recommitted the treaty to the Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions to report it back immediately, together with the resolution of ratification rejected in November, including the reservations previously adopted. These instructions were complied with on the following day. On February 11 Senator Lodge presented certain proposed amendments to the reservations which he stated had been discussed by an informal bipartisan committee during the last two weeks of January. . . . The vote was then taken on the resolution of ratification, including the fifteen reservations as a part and condition thereof. . . . [This was on March 19.] Upon roll call there were 49 yeas and 35 nays, and the resolution, not having received the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the Senators present, was not agreed to and the Senate did not advise and consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. . . . The Senators were divided generally into three groups, namely, those who opposed the ratification of the treaty, those who advocated the ratification of the treaty either unqualifiedly or with 'interpretative reservations,' and those who favored substantial reservations. In voting upon the reservations adopted, the treaty opponents invariably voted for the reservations and then voted against the ratification of the treaty. On the other hand, the treaty advocates generally voted against the reservations and after they had been adopted, voted against the resolu-

tions of ratification of which the reservations formed a part. The third group, namely the reservationists, with one or two exceptions, voted throughout in favor of the reservations adopted and also in favor of the resolutions of ratification. . . . The reasons of the advocates of the treaty in voting against the resolutions of ratification may probably best be taken from a letter written by President Wilson to Senator Hitchcock on November 18, in which he said that, in his opinion, the resolution containing the reservations adopted by the Senate 'does not provide for ratification but, rather, for the nullification of the treaty.' He added: 'I sincerely hope that the friends and supporters of the treaty will vote against the Lodge resolution of ratification. I understand that the door will probably then be open for a genuine resolution of ratification.' After finally voting upon the treaty on March 19, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution by a vote of 47 yeas to 37 nays, instructing the secretary of the Senate to return the treaty to the President and inform him that the Senate has failed to ratify it, being unable to obtain the constitutional majority therefor."—G. A. Finch, *Treaty of peace with Germany in the United States Senate*, pp. 41, 55, 59, 64.

ALSO IN: *Congressional Record*, Nov. 19, 1919, pp. 8768-8775.—66th Congress, 2nd Session, *Senate Document no.* 193.

1920.—Controversy between Admiral Sims and Secretary Daniels.—Investigations into conduct of war.—Army Act.—Attacks on administration.—Attitude of labor.—Federal Reserve Board policy.—In March, 1920, "a serious controversy developed between Admiral W. S. Sims, formerly in command of the American naval forces in European waters, and Secretary of the Navy Daniels. The former claimed that the inefficiency and delay in the Navy Department at Washington actually prolonged the war. He stated that his recommendations as commander of the fleet overseas had not been followed and that the morale of the navy had been 'shot to pieces' because of 'flagrant injustices' in conferring decorations. These charges brought forth vigorous denials from the Secretary of the Navy before the Senate Naval Investigating Committee."—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, *Supplement*, p. 34.—"The artificial state of war, prolonged in the United States by the failure of the peace treaty, did not prevent steps toward the restoration of normal conditions. The series of loans, by which the United States supplemented her military effort in the war, was stopped with nearly all the authorized ten billion dollars advanced to the Allies. 'The United States could not, if it would, assume the burdens of all the earth,' said Secretary Houston when he announced that loans would cease. . . . Congress brought its regular session to a close a few days before the Republican Convention [in June]. It had failed to end the state of war. On March 19 the treaty had been defeated for the second time, and on May 27 Wilson had vetoed a joint resolution repealing the war declaration. The session had done less in reconstruction than the Republican advocates had promised in the campaign of 1918, and had spent months of time in patient though fruitless search for official misconduct in the war. Since March it had engaged in a naval investigation growing out of criticisms advanced by Sims. The investigation of the War Department, begun a year earlier, brought forth much testimony to the unreadiness of the country when war came, and to the blundering and waste that accompanied the hurried mobilization of in-

dustry and society. But no scandals were uncovered equal to those that followed the war with Spain. Appropriations were pared down to bring expenditures to a peace basis, and at the very end of the session laws were approved relating to the army and the merchant marine. The Army Act of June 4, 1920, revised the National Defense Act of 1916 in the light of the experience of the years of war. It authorized a strength of about three hundred thousand for the regular army, and left the organization of the forces largely in the hands of the War Department. The General Staff was directed to confine itself more strictly to coordination than had been the practice during the war, but was left large enough to operate, and able to conduct the various schemes of professional education that had been found indispensable in the A. E. F. The post-graduate courses developed in the Roosevelt-Root administration of the army had justified themselves, and were now made the basis of advancement for all officers. For the enlisted men new schemes of education and specialized training were provided. Compulsory service or training in peace-time failed to find a majority. The National Guard was continued, but in closer and more organic relations with the regular army than ever before. And the three field armies, which the armistice had found in Germany, were perpetuated in a new military arrangement for the United States under which the old departments were to disappear. The Jones Merchant Marine Act, passed June 5, 1920, rearranged the powers of the United States Shipping Board and withdrew many of the emergency powers granted for the time of war. [See below: 1920 (June-September).] In the same spirit the Republican Convention adopted a plank reopening the Panama Canal tolls controversy, and favoring the repeal of the law secured by President Wilson in 1914 whereby the merchant ships of all nations were put upon an even footing. The Democratic Administration was under continuous attack by the Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, and only occasionally did President Wilson intervene openly from his seclusion in the White House. . . . Labor continued uneasy during the summer of 1920, with many outlaw strikes, which labor leaders could not or would not restrain. Farmers were in protest against the fall of prices that became visible after July. To them the conduct of the Federal Reserve Board in raising the discount rate, and in refusing credit to borrowers who wanted it for the purpose of hoarding necessities for a higher price, was a sort of treason. But the Federal Reserve Board justified its creation by preventing panic as prices started back to normal. Sugar, which had been extensively hoarded, dropped from thirty-five to under ten cents per pound. In the early summer the textile mills noted a decline in orders and laid off hands. When Henry Ford cut his prices to a pre-war basis in the autumn there was no resulting crisis, although the act was generally accepted as proof of the post-war decline."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, pp. 579-580, 584-585, 587.

1920.—Status of the army. See WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1919-1923.

1920 (January).—Volstead Act put into effect. See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1919-1920.

1920 (January-March).—Troops withdrawn from Siberia. See SIBERIA: 1920-1922.

1920 (February).—Esch-Cummins Act.—"Under the Railroad act of 1918, which fixed the terms of Government control, it was provided that the roads must be returned to their owners twenty-

one month after the war. Director-General McAdoo asked to have this period lengthened in order to have an opportunity to test the system in times of peace. This was refused by Congress, which seemed indisposed either to allow Government control, or to turn the roads back. Under the stimulus of presidential threat to deliver the roads to their owners at the earliest date unless Congress should act, the Esch-Cummins bill was passed in February for the return of the roads on March 1, 1920."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, p. 581.—See also RAILROADS: 1920: United States.

1920 (February).—Railroad Labor Board created to settle labor disputes. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1888-1921.

1920 (March).—Supreme Court decision upholding validity of the Prohibition Amendment. See AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTIONS: Court decisions.

1920 (March).—Intervention in dispute of Bolivia and Chile over seaport. See BOLIVIA: 1920-1921.

1920 (March-June).—Charges against Board for Vocational Education.—"In March serious charges of incompetency were brought against the Federal Board for Vocational Education by Harold Littledale, a reporter for the *New York Evening Post*. It was charged that, while the board had 209,000 cases registered with it on January 17, nineteen months after its creation, it had placed in training only 24,000 men and had trained and placed in employment only 217. Charges of undue harshness were also made. The House Education Committee thereupon made an investigation. In its report filed on June 4, the committee recommended that the rehabilitation service be placed under the supervision of the Treasury Department as a bureau, or that it, together with the War Risk Insurance Bureau and the health service, be transferred to the Interior Department, each to constitute a bureau in that department."—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, *Supplement*, pp. 33-35.

1920 (May).—Compulsory old age insurance law passed.—Old age pensions. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: United States: 1920.

1920 (May).—Passage of bill to abolish sub-treasury system. See INDEPENDENT TREASURY, UNITED STATES.

1920 (May).—Mandate for Armenia offered and declined.—"The mandate over Armenia was offered to the United States. President Wilson had said at Paris that the offer would be accepted, but in this, as in some other matters, he promised more than he could perform. A commission sent out by him to Armenia estimated that acceptance would necessitate the use of 59,000 troops as a police force and that five years' occupation would cost \$756,000,000. Congress considered that these and other objections outweighed humanitarian arguments, and voted to reject the mandate."—P. L. Haworth, *United States in our own times*, p. 492.—"The tale of the relations of the outgoing Administration with the League is concluded by a reference to mandates. Wilson's request made in May, 1920, for permission to accept a mandate over Armenia had been refused. Later the Council of the League asked Wilson to mediate between Kemal and the Armenians to save Armenia. In consenting to do so, and in appointing Mr. Henry Morgenthau as his mediator, President Wilson acted only in his personal capacity. But it was

too late for any mediation by the United States to be effective. The Near East was aflame, and Armenia was soon lost in conflagrations that it was beyond the power of the United States to quench."—T. H. Dickinson, *United States and the League*, p. 30.—See also ARMENIA: 1919-1920.

1920 (May-November).—Presidential elections.—Senate pre-convention expense investigation.—Republican convention.—Party platform.—Democratic convention.—Party platform.—Other party conventions.—Presidential campaign.—Results of elections.—Party movements from 1908 to 1920.—"Before the return of the railroads was accomplished, the preliminaries of the new presidential campaign were so far advanced that all public acts were directly affected by it. It was the wish of President Wilson that public attention should be kept fixed upon the treaty and the League of Nations, making the election a 'solemn referendum' on that issue. 'The United States enjoyed the spiritual leadership of the world,' he wrote, 'until the Senate of the United States failed to ratify the treaty by which the belligerent nations sought to effect the settlements for which they had fought throughout the war.' His own health was too uncertain to permit him to take any active part in the struggle, and in the absence of his aggressive leadership his party ranged in opinion from those who supported his views to those who accepted Bryan's policy of ratification with any amendments that might be needed to secure action, and even to those who believed with Reed, of Missouri, that there should be no league at all. Among the Republicans opinion was equally divided, with a tendency for the treaty opponents to receive support from League advocates who thought the failure of the treaty due to the stubbornness of Wilson. In this uncertainty the candidacy of Herbert Hoover had an immediate appeal when his friends announced it in January. As a mining engineer, living much outside the United States, Hoover had no known political affiliations. The *Democratic New York World* supported him none the less, as did the liberal *New Republic*, the Republican *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, and the non-partisan but ubiquitous *Saturday Evening Post*. His supporters came largely from those who were unorganized in politics, the women and college professors, and business men, large and small. He appeared to represent a wave of thought that was tired of politicians and wanted the National Government administered upon the same high and impartial ideals that had made the Commission for the Relief of Belgium an international triumph. Moreover, he wanted a League of Nations, and was a proper continuator of American war policies. The Hoover boom came to nought. Its supporters lacked cohesion and experience, and the powerful cement that comes from wanting something for themselves. So long as Hoover remained outside both parties he could expect no aid from active politicians. So soon as he was forced to admit that it was the Republican nomination he desired, he lost at once the support of such Democrats as had been willing to adopt him. The Republican leaders did not want him, as they had not wanted Roosevelt in 1900. They preferred instead some one in harmony with the senatorial associates who had fought the treaty under the leadership of Lodge. Instead of Hoover, the opponents of Wilson gathered around the names of Leonard Wood, who was supposed to embody something of the spirit of Roosevelt; Hiram Johnson, who had made himself the personification of irreconcilable opposition to any

league; or Governor Frank O. Lowden, of Illinois, whose appeal was that of a business man turned into an admirable executive. . . . 'Any good republican can be nominated for president and can defeat any democrat,' said Senator Boies Penrose, who knew as much as any one about the organization of the party."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, pp. 581-583.—"On May 20 the Senate adopted the Borah resolution calling for an investigation of pre-convention campaign expenditures by presidential candidates. Senator Kenyon of Iowa was chairman of the committee. This committee's exposure reacted unfavorably toward the candidacies of General Wood and Governor Lowden, in whose behalf the largest sums had been spent. It appeared that considerably over \$1,000,000 had been raised for Wood, more than half of that amount being contributed by Colonel William Cooper Procter, his campaign manager. Governor Lowden's campaign fund was found to be over \$400,000, most of which he himself had contributed; that of Senator Harding, \$113,000; Senator Johnson's, \$200,000 and that of Governor Cox, \$22,000."—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, *Supplement*, p. 43.—"Although the national nominating conventions of the two major political parties were preceded by a number of strenuous primary campaigns, the great majority of the delegates to both conventions were uninstructed. Hence, in no real sense did the voters play a determining rôle in the nomination of presidential candidates. The prediction that through the development of the primary system nominations would be secured by popular referendum and that the nominating conventions would merely ratify the choice of the party voters failed signally of fulfilment. The Republican National Committee met in Washington on December 10 and 11 and decided to hold the National Convention at Chicago on June 8. The 'call' for the convention issued by Chairman Hays provided for the election of 984 delegates from the several states and territories. A new method of platform drafting was initiated late in January by Mr. Hays when he appointed a large committee of representative Republicans to aid the National Committee in 'ascertaining the needs of the nation, and frankly, honestly, and definitely stating the fundamentals of the party's plan for the solution of problems in a comprehensive program of constructive measures.' Under the direction of Mr. Ogden L. Mills of New York as Chairman, a list of topics was made out, subcommittees were appointed, and the general line of inquiry determined upon. Based in part upon the returns received from questionnaires, which were widely distributed, Mr. Mills and his associates prepared a series of reports for the platform committee. . . . Senator Watson of Indiana was chosen chairman of the Committee on Resolutions over Ogden L. Mills of New York. The report of this committee was anxiously awaited, for it was known that there was decided difference of opinion relative to the League of Nations plank. The irconcilables, headed by Senators Johnson, Borah and McCormick, opposed the Treaty in any form. Others favored the Treaty with reservations of various kinds. There were rumors that a bolt was unavoidable. After a forty-eight hour session the committee submitted a unanimous report which the convention accepted on June 10 with enthusiasm."—*Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.—At the Friday session of the convention four prominent candidates were presented. "These were General Leonard Wood,

son of California, and Senator Harding . . . [whose] name was presented to the convention by his friend Frank B. Willis [governor of Ohio. By this time, Herbert C. Hoover was completely out of the running, and Hiram C. Johnson, who had also been put forward, was found too outspoken]. . . . The leading candidates on the first ballot were General Wood and Governor Lowden, and it is possible that one of them might have been successful on a subsequent ballot had it not been for the . . . aspersions which were cast upon them . . . [by Democrats]. It was discovered that William C. Procter, of Cincinnati . . . [had issued] informative literature in the interest of General Wood's campaign. [There was no hint of corruption] but the cry was raised that it was a monstrous thing to spend so much money in a campaign, and that General Wood had—or his friends had—been trying to 'purchase the nomination.' . . . A somewhat similar attack was made upon Governor Lowden . . . [some of whose supporters had paid considerable sums of money to certain party leaders in Missouri, for campaign purposes]. On the first ballot Wood and Lowden were the leaders, though neither came near having a majority. Hiram Johnson stood third, and Harding fourth, with only 65½ ballots. That order was maintained with slight changes for ballot after ballot until the seventh, when some of Lowden's votes changed to Harding, giving him 105, and putting him in third place, ahead of Johnson, though still a long way behind the leaders. . . . [On the eighth ballot he received 133½ votes.] On the ninth ballot a large part of Lowden's vote went to Harding, giving him 374½, and on the tenth he received 602, and was nominated; the nomination being immediately made unanimous. Calvin Coolidge, Governor of Massachusetts, was promptly nominated for Vice-President, and the convention adjourned."—W. F. Johnson, *Life of Warren G. Harding*, pp. 78-81.

The text of the Republican platform was in part as follows: "The Republican party stands for agreement among the nations to preserve the peace of the world. We believe that such an international association must be based upon international justice, and must provide methods which shall maintain the rule of public right by the development of law and the decision of impartial courts, and which shall secure instant and general international conference whenever peace shall be threatened by political action, so that the nations pledged to do and insist upon what is just and fair may exercise their influence and power for the prevention of war. We believe that all this can be done without the compromise of national independence, without depriving the people of the United States in advance of the right to determine for themselves what is just and fair when the occasion arises, and without involving them as participants and not as peace-makers in a multitude of quarrels, the merits of which they are unable to judge. The covenant signed by the President at Paris failed signally to accomplish this great purpose, and contains stipulations, not only intolerable for an independent people, but certain to produce the injustice, hostility, and controversy among nations which it proposed to prevent. That covenant repudiated, to a degree wholly unnecessary and unjustifiable, the time-honored policies in favor of peace declared by Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe, and pursued by all American administrations for more than a century, and it ignored the universal sentiment of America for generations past in favor of international law and arbitration, and

it rested the hope of the future upon mere expediency and negotiation. The unfortunate insistence of the President upon having his own way, without any change and without any regard to the opinions of a majority of the Senate, which shares with him the treaty-making power, and the President's demand that the Treaty should be ratified without any modification, created a situation in which Senators were required to vote upon their consciences and their oaths according to their judgment against the Treaty as it was presented, or submit to the commands of a dictator in a matter where the authority and the responsibility under the Constitution were theirs, and not his. . . . We pledge the coming Republican administration to such agreements with the other nations of the world as shall meet the full duty of America to civilization and humanity, in accordance with American ideals, and without surrendering the right of the American people to exercise its judgment and its power in favor of justice and peace. We favor a liberal and generous foreign policy founded upon definite moral and political principles, characterized by a clear understanding of and a firm adherence to our own rights, and unflinching respect for the rights of others. . . . We feel the deepest pride in the fine courage, the resolute endurance, the gallant spirit of the officers and men of our army and navy in the World War. They were in all ways worthy of the best traditions of the nation's defenders, and we pledge ourselves to proper maintenance of the military and naval establishments upon which our national security and dignity depend. . . .

"Never has our nation been confronted with graver problems. The people are entitled to know in definite terms how the parties purpose solving these problems. To that end, the Republican party declares its policies and program to be as follows: We undertake to end executive autocracy and to restore to the people their constitutional government. The policies herein declared will be carried out by the Federal and state governments, each acting within its constitutional powers. . . . As a matter of public policy, we urge all banks to give credit preference to essential industries. The Federal Reserve System should be free from political influence, which is quite as important as its independence of domination by financial combinations. The burden of taxation imposed upon the American people is staggering; but in presenting a true statement of the situation we must face the fact that, while the character of the taxes can and should be changed, an early reduction of the amount of revenue to be raised is not to be expected. . . . The whole fiscal policy of the Government must be deeply influenced by the necessity of meeting obligations in excess of five billion dollars which mature in 1923. But sound policy equally demands the early accomplishment of that real reduction of the tax burden which may be achieved by substituting simple for complex tax laws and procedure; prompt and certain determination of the tax liability for delay and uncertainty; tax laws which do not, for tax laws which do, excessively mulct the consumer or needlessly repress enterprise and thrift. We advocate the issuance of a simplified form of income return; authorizing the Treasury Department to make changes in regulations effective only from the date of their approval; empowering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the consent of the taxpayer, to make final and conclusive settlements of tax claims and assessments barring fraud, and the creation of a Tax Board consisting of at least three

representatives of the tax-paying public and the heads of the principal divisions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to act as a standing committee on the simplification of forms, procedure and law, and to make recommendations to the Congress. The annual expenses of the Federal Government can be reduced hundreds of millions of dollars without impairing the efficiency of the public service. We pledge ourselves to a carefully planned readjustment to a peace-time basis and to a policy of rigid economy, to the better co-ordination of departmental activities, to the elimination of unnecessary officials and employees, and to the raising of the standard of individual efficiency. . . . We pledge ourselves to earnest and consistent attack upon the high cost of living by rigorous avoidance of further inflation in our government borrowing, by courageous and intelligent deflation of over-expanded credit and currency, by encouragement of heightened production of goods and services, by prevention of unreasonable profits, by exercise of public economy and stimulation of private thrift and by revision of war imposed taxes unsuited to peace-time economy. . . . The uncertain and unsettled condition of international balances, the abnormal economic and trade situation of the world, and the impossibility of forecasting accurately even the near future, preclude the formation of a definite program to meet conditions a year hence. But the Republican party reaffirms its belief in the protective principle and pledges itself to a revision of the tariff as soon as conditions shall make it necessary for the preservation of the home market for American labor, agriculture and industry. . . . The farmer is the backbone of the nation. . . . The crux of the present agricultural condition lies in prices, labor and credit. The Republican party believes that this condition can be improved by: practical and adequate farm representation in the appointment of governmental officials and commissions; the right to form co-operative associations for marketing their products, and protection against discrimination; the scientific study of agricultural prices and farm production costs, at home and abroad, with a view to reducing the frequency of abnormal fluctuations; the uncensored publication of such reports; the authorization of associations for the extension of personal credit; a national inquiry on the co-ordination of rail, water and motor transportation with adequate facilities for receiving, handling and marketing food; the encouragement of our export trade; an end to unnecessary price-fixing and ill-considered efforts arbitrarily to reduce prices of farm products which invariably result to the disadvantage both of producer and consumer; and the encouragement of the production and importation of fertilizing material and of its extensive use. . . . Conservation is a Republican policy. It began with the passage of the Reclamation Act signed by President Roosevelt. . . . The Republican party has taken an especially honorable part in saving our national forests and in the effort to establish a national forest policy. . . . We are using our forest resources faster than they are being renewed. . . . The Federal Government, the States and private interests must unite in devising means to meet the menace. . . .

"We recognize the justice of collective bargaining as a means of promoting good will, establishing closer and more harmonious relations between employers and employees, and realizing the true ends of industrial justice. The strike or the lockout, as a means of settling industrial disputes, inflicts such loss and suffering on the community as to justify

government initiative to reduce its frequency and limit its consequences. We deny the right to strike against the government; but the rights and interests of all government employees must be safeguarded by impartial laws and tribunals. In public utilities we favor the establishment of an impartial tribunal to make an investigation of the facts and to render a decision to the end that there may be no organized interruption of service necessary to the lives, health and welfare of the people. The decisions of the tribunals should be morally but not legally binding, and an informed public sentiment be relied on to secure their acceptance. The tribunals, however, should refuse to accept jurisdiction except for the purpose of investigation, as long as the public service be interrupted. For public utilities we favor the type of tribunal provided for in the Transportation Act of 1920. In private industries we do not advocate the principle of compulsory arbitration, but we favor impartial commissions and better facilities for voluntary mediation, conciliation and arbitration, supplemented by that full publicity which will enlist the influence of an aroused public opinion. The Government should take the initiative in inviting the establishment of tribunals or commissions for the purpose of voluntary arbitration and of investigation of disputed issues. We demand the exclusion from interstate commerce of the products of convict labor. We urge Congress to consider the most effective means to end lynching in this country which continues to be a terrible blot on our American civilization. We welcome women into full participation in the affairs of government and the activities of the Republican party. We earnestly hope that Republican legislatures in states which have not yet acted on the Suffrage Amendment will ratify the amendment, to the end that all of the women of the nation of voting age may participate in the election of 1920 which is so important to the welfare of our country. The supreme duty of the nation is the conservation of human resources through an enlightened measure of social and industrial justice. . . . We pledge the Republican party to the solution of these problems through national and state legislation in accordance with the best progressive thought of the country. The Republican party stands for a Federal child labor law and for its rigid enforcement. If the present law be found unconstitutional or ineffective, we shall seek other means to enable Congress to prevent the evils of child labor. . . . The principle of equal pay for equal service should be applied throughout all branches of the Federal government in which women are employed. Federal aid for vocational training should take into consideration the special aptitudes and needs of women workers. We demand Federal legislation to limit the hours of employment of women engaged in intensive industry, the product of which enters into interstate commerce. We endorse the principle of Federal aid to the States for the purposes of vocational and agricultural training. Wherever Federal money is devoted to education, such education must be so directed as to awaken in the youth the spirit of America and a sense of patriotic duty to the United States. . . . The public health activities of the Federal government are scattered through numerous departments and bureaus, resulting in inefficiency, duplication and extravagance. We advocate a greater centralization of the Federal functions, and in addition urge the better co-ordination of the work of the Federal, State and local health agencies. We hold in imperishable remembrance the valor and patriotism of

the soldiers and sailors of America who fought in the great war for human liberty, and we pledge ourselves to discharge to the fullest the obligations which a grateful nation justly should fulfill, in appreciation of the services rendered by its defenders on sea and on land. . . . We are opposed to government ownership and operation or employee operation of the railroads. . . . We endorse the Transportation Act of 1920 enacted by the Republican Congress as a most constructive legislative achievement. We favor liberal appropriations in co-operation with the States for the construction of highways, which will bring about a reduction in transportation costs, better marketing of farm products, improvement in rural postal delivery, as well as meet the needs of military defense. . . . The national defense and our foreign commerce require a merchant marine of the best type of modern ship flying the American flag, manned by American seamen, owned by private capital, operated by private energy. We endorse the sound legislation recently enacted by the Republican Congress that will insure the promotion and maintenance of the American merchant marine. We favor the application of the Workmen's Compensation Acts to the merchant marine. We recommend that all ships engaged in coastwise trade and all vessels of the American merchant marine shall pass through the Panama Canal without payment of tolls. . . . We declare it to be our policy to encourage and develop water transportation service and facilities in connection with the commerce of the United States. We renew our repeated declaration that the civil service law shall be thoroughly and honestly enforced and extended wherever practicable. The recent action of Congress in enacting a comprehensive civil service retirement law and in working out a comprehensive employment and wage policy that will guarantee equal and just treatment to the army of government workers, and in centralizing the administration of the new and progressive employment policy in the hands of the Civil Service Commission is worthy of all praise. We favor a fixed and comprehensive policy of reclamation to increase national wealth and production. We recognize in the development of reclamation through Federal action with its increase of production and taxable wealth a safeguard for the nation. We commend to Congress a policy to reclaim lands and the establishment of a fixed national policy of development of natural resources in relation to reclamation through the now designated government agencies. We approve in general the existing Federal legislation against monopoly and combinations in restraint of trade, but since the known certainty of a law is the safety of all, we advocate such amendment as will provide American business men with better means of determining in advance whether a proposed combination is or is not unlawful. . . . We pledge the party to an immediate resumption of trade relations with every nation with which we are at peace. . . . The Republican party pledges itself to a consistent, firm and effective policy towards Mexico that shall enforce respect for the American flag and that shall protect the rights of American citizens lawfully in Mexico to security of life and enjoyment of property in accordance with established principles of international law and our treaty rights. . . . We deeply sympathize with the people of Armenia and stand ready to help them in all proper ways, but the Republican party will oppose now and hereafter the acceptance of a mandate for any country in Europe or Asia. "For Hawaii we recommend Federal assistance

in Americanizing and educating their greatly disproportionate foreign population; home rule; and the rehabilitation of the Hawaiian race. . . . The immigration policy of the United States should be such as to insure that the number of foreigners in the country at any time shall not exceed that which can be assimilated with reasonable rapidity, and to favor immigrants whose standards are similar to ours. . . . The existing policy of the United States for the practical exclusion of Asiatic immigrants is sound, and should be maintained. There is urgent need of improvement in our naturalization law. No alien should become a citizen until he has become genuinely American, and adequate tests for determining the alien's fitness for American citizenship should be provided for by law. We advocate, in addition, the independent naturalization of married women. An American woman, resident in the United States, should not lose her citizenship by marriage to an alien. . . . We demand that every American citizen shall enjoy the ancient and constitutional right of free speech, free press and free assembly and the no less sacred right of the qualified voter to be represented by his duly chosen representatives; but no man may advocate resistance to the law, and no man may advocate violent overthrow of the government. Aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States are not entitled of right to liberty of agitation directed against the government or American institutions."—*Republican campaign textbook*, 1920.

"The first reaction was disappointment over the Presidential nominee. Among the group of Republicans affiliated previously with the progressive wing of the party it was charged that the convention had been finally controlled by 'standpatters' and 'the Old Guard Senators.' There was also visible disappointment among the active supporters of the other candidates. However, three or four days later, it was evident that the Republicans as a whole were thoroughly united for the first time in twelve years and that the nominee would receive strong support from all wings of the party. The selection of Governor Coolidge for Vice President was enthusiastically received throughout the country, and his choice was regarded as a distinct help to the ticket. Warren G. Harding started life as a printer's devil in Marion, Ohio, and worked there as printer, reporter, circulation manager, business manager, editor and publisher before he entered politics. . . . He placed President Taft in nomination for President before the Republican National Convention in 1912 and was Chairman of the Republican Convention, making the keynote speech, in 1916. He supported the Lodge reservations to the Peace Treaty in the Senate. Governor Coolidge was born in Plymouth, Vt., July 4, 1872; graduated from Amherst College in 1895, studied law at Northampton, Mass., and opened a law office there. . . . He leaped into national fame in the Winter of 1919-20 when he defied the Boston police strikers and by his firmness in installing a volunteer police force saved the city from riots and lawlessness, becoming the chief factor, by his example, in ending the strike tendency of municipal functionaries, such as police and firemen."—*New York Times Current History*, July, 1920, p. 554.

"The Democratic National Committee at its meeting in Washington on January 7-8 decided to hold the Democratic National Convention at San Francisco on June 28. Chairman Homer S. Cummings of the National Committee issued the formal call on January 13. It provided for the election of 1092 delegates. The preconvention campaign of

the Democrats did not arouse so much interest as the Republican campaign. The preference primaries were of relatively small importance, there being no candidates making such nation wide campaigns as those of General Wood and Senator Johnson. Several states, however, instructed their delegations for favorite sons. Thus the Oklahoma convention instructed for Senator Owen; the North Carolina convention for Senator Simmons; the Nebraska primary for Senator Hitchcock; the Ohio primary for Governor Cox; and the Pennsylvania primary for Attorney General Palmer. The number of delegates instructed was something like 300.—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1923, *Supplement*, p. 39.—President Wilson had announced "no choice for his successor, but it was believed that William G. McAdoo would be a welcome selection. . . . A Mitchell Palmer was an aggressive aspirant for the nomination. As Alien Property Custodian during the war, and as Attorney-General after it, he had gained much prominence. Under his direction the federal anti-red campaign was waged, and an attack was made upon the profiteers. He was opposed by most of the radical Democrats on the ground that he had gone beyond reasonable limits in the restriction of freedom of speech and opinion. Outside the Administration group were Governor Edwards, of New Jersey, with aspirations founded upon his defense of 'personal liberty' in his opposition to the Eighteenth Amendment, and Governor James D. Cox, of Ohio, who had the distinction of three elections to that office in a doubtful State. William J. Bryan was again a leading figure at the Democratic Convention, held in San Francisco at the end of June; not as a candidate, but as the champion of peace and prohibition. He failed to secure action for the latter cause, for this convention, like the Republican, treated the 'dry' amendment as a closed issue and said nothing to stir up either side of the long fight. Ireland was present at San Francisco, as it had been at Chicago, demanding planks in support of the pretensions of the Sinn Fein Republic to independence."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, pp. 585-586.—"The outstanding candidates were William G. McAdoo, former Secretary of the Treasury, A. Mitchell Palmer, Attorney General, and Governor James M. Cox of Ohio. The opening session of the Democratic National Convention on June 28 resolved itself into an enthusiastic demonstration in favor of President Wilson. A message acclaiming him as the unquestioned leader of his party and praising the accomplishments of his administration was sent the President by a unanimous vote of the convention. Chairman Cummings in his 'keynote' speech attacked the party responsible for the rejection of the Treaty, thus bringing the Treaty and the League of Nations forward as the major issue of the coming campaign. He reviewed the achievements of the Wilson Administrations which, he said: 'Republican managers and the Chicago platform seek to shame and besmirch.' He condemned the appointment of numerous congressional 'smelling committees' to ascertain 'whether or not there was any graft in the conduct of the great war.' 'Through the hands of a Democratic Administration,' he declared, 'there have passed more than 40 billions of dollars, and the finger of scorn does not point to one single Democratic official in all America.' This record he contrasted with the record of the conduct of the Spanish-American war and asserted that 'not one single Democratic official has either been indicted or accused or even suspected; and the only

dignitary in America, of any outstanding political significance, who is moving in the direction of the penitentiary, is Truman Newberry [Republican] of Michigan.' Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas was selected as permanent chairman of the convention and Senator Carter Glass of Virginia as chairman of the important Committee on Resolutions. For several days the Committee on Resolutions held hearings at which divergent views were advanced, chiefly on three important issues, viz., prohibition enforcement, the Treaty and the League of Nations, and the Irish question. The Committee on Resolutions reported the platform on July 2. As reported it contained no reference to prohibition. This satisfied neither the 'drys' led by Mr. Bryan nor the 'wets' led by Mr. W. Bourke Cockran of New York. Hence minority reports were presented and debated before the convention. Mr. Bryan's 'bone dry' plank was defeated, 929½ to 155½, and Mr. Cockran's wet plank, 726½ to 356. Mr. Bryan's League of Nations plank, urging ratification with reservations, was lost overwhelmingly, as was a minority report proposing to go beyond the committee's expression of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people. After all amendments had been decisively defeated, the platform as it came from the committee was adopted unanimously. While the platform was being drafted by the Committee on Resolutions the several candidates were placed in nomination before the convention. On June 30, in an eight-hour session, the following ten candidates were presented. Senator Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma, ex-Ambassador James W. Gerard of New York, Homer S. Cummings of Connecticut, Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer of Pennsylvania, Secretary of Agriculture Edwin T. Meredith of Iowa, Governor James M. Cox of Ohio, Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York, ex-Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo of New York and Governor Edward I. Edwards of New Jersey. On the following day four more candidates were nominated: Senator F. M. Simmons of North Carolina, Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, Ambassador John W. Davis of West Virginia and Francis Burton Harrison, Governor General of the Philippines. The convention went on record in favor of full sex equality, deciding that henceforth the National Committee should be composed of one man and one woman from each state. Balloting began [on June 2] immediately after the platform was adopted. . . . On the forty-fourth ballot [on the evening of July 5] Governor Cox secured the nomination. The vote necessary to nominate was 729. When Cox had 699 votes to his credit, Vice-Chairman Amidon of the National Committee and manager of the McAdoo followers, moved to make the nomination unanimous. On July 6 Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was chosen by acclamation as the party's candidate for Vice-President."—E. D. Graper and H. J. Carman, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, *Supplement*, pp. 39-40.—"The deadlock of the Democratic Convention over the leading candidates lasted longer than it had done at Chicago. In each case no one of the leaders could command the support of the tested professional politicians of the party; and as the Republican Senators swung to Harding at the end, so the Democratic city politicians swung the convention to Cox on the forty-fourth ballot, and gave him the two thirds needful for a nomination. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy was named for Vice-President."—F. L.

Paxon, *Recent history of the United States*, p. 586.

The text of the Democratic platform was, in part, as follows: "The Democratic Party favors the League of Nations as the surest, if not the only, practicable means of maintaining the peace of the world and terminating the insufferable burden of great military and naval establishments. . . . It was upon this basis that the President of the United States, in pre-arrangement with our Allies, consented to a suspension of hostilities against the Imperial German Government. . . . We not only congratulate the President on the vision manifested and the vigor exhibited in the prosecution of the war, but we felicitate him and his associates on the exceptional achievement at Paris involved in the adoption of a League and Treaty so near akin to previously expressed American ideals and so intimately related to the aspirations of civilized peoples everywhere. . . . We endorse the President's view of our international obligations and his firm stand against reservations designed to cut to pieces the vital provisions of the Versailles Treaty and we commend the Democrats in Congress for voting against resolutions for separate peace which would disgrace the nation. We advocate the immediate ratification of the Treaty without reservations which would impair its essential integrity; but do not oppose the acceptance of any reservations making clearer or more specific the obligations of the United States to the League Associates. . . . We reject as utterly vain, if not vicious, the Republican assumption that ratification of the Treaty and membership in the League of Nations would in any wise impair the integrity or independence of our country. The fact that the Covenant has been entered into by twenty-nine nations, all as jealous of their independence as we are of ours, is a sufficient refutation of such charge. The President repeatedly has declared, and this convention reaffirms, that all our duties and obligations as a member of the League must be fulfilled in strict conformity with the Constitution of the United States.

"A review of the record of the Democratic Party during the administration of Woodrow Wilson presents a chapter of substantial achievements unsurpassed in the history of the republic. For fifty years before the advent of this administration periodical convulsions had impeded the industrial progress of the American people and caused inestimable loss and distress. By the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act the old system, which bred panics, was replaced by a new system, which insured confidence. . . . Under Democratic leadership the American people successfully financed their stupendous part in the greatest war of all time. The Treasury wisely insisted during the war upon meeting an adequate portion of the war expenditure from current taxes and the bulk of the balance from popular loans, and, during the first full fiscal year after fighting stopped, upon meeting current expenditures from current receipts. . . . We advocate tax reform and a searching revision of the War Revenue Acts to fit peace conditions so that the wealth of the nation may not be withdrawn from productive enterprise and diverted to wasteful or non-productive expenditure. We demand prompt action by the next Congress for a complete survey of existing taxes and their modification and simplification with a view to secure greater equity and justice in tax burden and improvement in administration. . . . The last Democratic Congress enacted legislation reducing the taxes from eight billions, designed to be raised, to six billions for the first year after the armistice,

and to four billions thereafter; and there the total is left undiminished by our political adversaries. Two years after Armistice Day a Republican Congress provides for expending the stupendous sum of \$5,403,390,327.30. . . . We pledge the Democratic party to a policy of strict economy in government expenditures, and to the enactment and enforcement of such legislation as may be required to bring profiteers before the bar of criminal justice. We reaffirm the traditional policy of the Democratic party in favor of a tariff for revenue only and we confirm the policy of basing tariff revisions upon the intelligent research of a non-partisan commission, rather than upon the demands of selfish interests, temporarily held in abeyance. In the interest of economy and good administration, we favor the creation of an effective budget system that will function in accord with the principles of the Constitution. The reform should reach both the executive and legislative aspects of the question. The supervision and preparation of the budget should be vested in the Secretary of the Treasury as the representative of the President. The budget, as such, should not be increased by the Congress except by a two-thirds vote, each House, however, being free to exercise its constitutional privilege of making appropriations through independent bills. The appropriation bills should be considered by single Committees of the House and Senate. The audit system should be consolidated and its powers expanded so as to pass upon the wisdom of, as well as the authority for, expenditures. . . . We favor such alteration of the rules of procedure of the Senate of the United States as will permit the prompt transaction of the nation's legislative business. . . . We favor such legislation as will confirm to the primary producers of the nation the right of collective bargaining and the right of cooperative handling and marketing of the products of the workshop and the farm and such legislation as will facilitate the exportation of our farm products. We favor comprehensive studies of farm production costs and the uncensored publication of facts in such studies. . . . The nation depends upon the products of labor; a cessation of production means a loss and, if long continued, disaster. The whole people, therefore, have a right to insist that justice shall be done to those who work, and in turn that those whose labor creates the necessities upon which the life of the nation depends must recognize the reciprocal obligation between the worker and the State. They should participate in the formulation of sound laws and regulations governing the conditions under which labor is performed, recognize and obey the laws so formulated and seek their amendment when necessary by the processes ordinarily addressed to the laws and regulations affecting the other relations of life. Labor, as well as capital, is entitled to adequate compensation. Each has the indefeasible right of organization, of collective bargaining and of speaking through representatives of their own selection. Neither class, however, should at any time nor in any circumstances take action that will put in jeopardy the public welfare. Resort to strikes and lockouts which endanger the health or lives of the people is an unsatisfactory device for determining disputes, and the Democratic party pledges itself to contrive, if possible, and put into effective operation a fair and comprehensive method of composing differences of this nature. In private industrial disputes, we are opposed to compulsory arbitration as a method plausible in theory but a failure in fact. With respect to government service, we

hold distinctly that the rights of the people are paramount to the right to strike. However, we profess scrupulous regard for the conditions of public employment and pledge the Democratic party to instant inquiry into the pay of Government employees and equally speedy regulations designed to bring salaries to a just and proper level.

"We indorse the proposed 19th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States granting equal suffrage to women. We congratulate the legislatures of the 35 States which have already ratified said Amendment and we urge the Democratic Governors and legislatures of Tennessee, North Carolina and Florida and such States as have not yet ratified the Federal Suffrage Amendment to unite in an effort to complete the process of ratification and secure the 36th State in time for all the women of the United States to participate in the Fall election. We commend the effective advocacy of the measure by President Wilson. We urge co-operation with the States for the protection of child life through infancy and maternity care; in the prohibition of child labor and by adequate appropriations for the Children's Bureau and the Women's Bureau in the Department of Labor. We advocate full representation of women on all commissions dealing with women's work or women's interests and a reclassification of the Federal Civil Service free from discrimination on the ground of sex; a continuance of appropriations for education in sex hygiene; Federal legislation which shall insure that American women residents in the United States, but married to aliens, shall retain their American citizenship and that the same process of naturalization shall be required for women as for men. Co-operative Federal assistance to the States is immediately required for the removal of illiteracy, for the increase of teachers' salaries and instruction in citizenship for both native and foreign-born; increased appropriation for vocational training in home economics, re-establishment of joint Federal and State employment service with women's departments under the direction of technically qualified women. The Federal Government should treat with the utmost consideration every disabled soldier, sailor and marine of the world's war, whether his disability be due to wounds received in line of action or to health impaired in service; and for the dependents of the brave men who died in line of duty the government's tenderest concern and richest bounty should be their requital. . . . The Federal Board for Vocational Education should be made a part of the War Risk Insurance Bureau, . . . and this machinery of protection and assistance must receive every aid of law and appropriation necessary to full and effective operation. We believe that no higher or more valued privilege can be afforded to an American citizen than to become a free-holder in the soil of the United States and to that end we pledge our party to the enactment of soldier settlements and home aid legislation which will afford to the men who fought for America the opportunity to become land and home owners under conditions affording genuine Government assistance unencumbered by endless difficulties of red tape or advance financial investment. The Esch-Cummins bill went to the President in the closing hours of the time limit prescribed, and he was forced to a choice between the chaos of a veto and acquiescence in the measure submitted however grave may have been his objections to it. There should be a fair and complete test of the law and until careful and mature action by Congress may cure

its defects and insure a thoroughly effective transportation system under private ownership without Government subsidy at the expense of the taxpayers of the country. Improved roads are of vital importance not only to commerce and industry, but also to agriculture and rural life. . . . We favor a continuance of the present Federal aid plan under existing Federal and State agencies amended so as to include as one of the elements in determining the ratio in which the several states shall be entitled to share in the fund, the area of any public lands therein. . . . We strongly favor the increased use of the motor vehicle in the transportation of the mails and urge the removal of the restrictions imposed by the Republican Congress on the use of motor devices in mail transportation in rural territories. . . . We pledge the policy of our party to the continued growth of our Merchant Marine under proper legislation so that American products will be carried to all ports of the world by vessels built in American yards, flying the American flag. The urgent demands of the war for adequate transportation of war material as well as for domestic need, revealed the fact that our port facilities and rate adjustment were such as to seriously affect the whole country in times of peace as well as war. We pledge our party to stand for equality of rates, both import and export, for the ports of the country, to the end that there may be adequate and fair facilities and rates for the mobilization of the products of the country offered for shipment. . . . We pledge ourselves to the further development of adequate transportation facilities on our rivers and to the further improvement of our inland waterways; and we recognize the importance of connecting the Great Lakes with the sea by the way of the Mississippi River and its tributaries, as well as by the St. Lawrence River. We favor an enterprising Foreign Trade Policy with all nations, and in this connection we favor the full utilization of all Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Ports, and an equitable distribution of shipping facilities between the various ports. . . . We . . . favor a liberal and comprehensive policy for development and utilization of our harbors and interior waterways. We commend the Democratic Congress for the redemption of the pledge contained in our last platform by the passage of the Flood Control Act of March 1, 1917, and point to the successful control of floods of the Mississippi River and the Sacramento River, California, under the policy of that law, for its complete justification. We favor the extension of this policy to other flood control problems wherever the Federal interest involved justifies the expenditure required. By wise legislation and progressive administration, we have transformed the Government reclamation projects, representing an investment of \$100,000,000, from a condition of impending failure and loss of confidence in the ability of the Government to carry through such large enterprises, to a condition of demonstrated success. . . . We favor ample appropriations for the continuation and extension of this great work of home-building and internal improvement along the same general lines, to the end that all practical projects shall be built, and waters now running to waste shall be made to provide homes and add to the food supply, power resources, and taxable property, with the Government ultimately reimbursed for the entire outlay. The Democratic party heartily endorses the creation and work of the Federal Trade Commission in establishing a fair field for competitive business, free from restraints of trade and monopoly, and


recommends amplification of the statutes governing its activities so as to grant it authority to prevent the unfair use of patents in restraint of trade. For the purpose of insuring just and fair treatment in the great interstate live stock market, and thus instilling confidence in growers through which production will be stimulated and the price of meats to consumers be ultimately reduced, we favor the enactment of legislation for the supervision of such markets by the national Government. . . .

"When the new Government of Mexico shall have given ample proof of its ability permanently to maintain law and order, signified its willingness to meet its international obligations and written upon its statute books just laws under which foreign investors shall have rights as well as duties, that Government should receive our recognition and sympathetic assistance. . . . The Democratic party recognizes the importance of the acquisition by Americans of additional sources of supply of petroleum and other minerals and declares that such acquisition both at home and abroad should be fostered and encouraged. We urge such action, legislative and executive, as may secure to American citizens the same rights in the acquirement of mining rights in foreign countries as are enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of any other nation. . . . The importance of Hawaii as an outpost on the Western Frontier of the United States demands adequate appropriations by Congress for the development of our harbors and highways there. We favor granting to the people of Porto Rico the traditional territorial form of government, with a view to ultimate statehood. . . . We commend the Democratic Administration for inaugurating a new policy as to Alaska as evidenced by the construction of the Alaska railroad and opening of the coal and oil fields. We declare for the modification of the existing coal land law, to promote development without disturbing the features intended to prevent monopoly. For such changes in the policy of forestry control as will permit the immediate initiation of the paper pulp industry. For relieving the territory from the evils of long distance government by arbitrary and interlocking bureaucratic regulation, and to that end we urge the speedy passage of a law containing the essential features of the Lane-Curry bill now pending co-ordinating and consolidating all Federal control of natural resources under one department to be administered by a non-partisan board permanently resident in the territory. . . . The policy of the United States with reference to the non-admission of Asiatic immigrants is a true expression of the judgment of our people, and to the several states whose geographical situation or internal conditions make this policy and the enforcement of the laws enacted pursuant thereto of particular concern, we pledge our support. . . . Believing that we have kept the Democratic faith and resting our claims to the confidence of the people not upon grandiose promises, but upon the solid performances of our party, we submit our record to the nation's consideration and ask that the pledges of this platform be appraised in the light of that record."—*Democratic campaign textbook, 1920, pp. 1-42.*

"The passions aroused in the canvass of 1920 were inspired less by the candidates than by the idea of punishing either the President for his arrogance or the Senate for its defeat of the treaty. The hopes of third-party reformers were aroused by the apathy of the campaign. An attempt was made in July, by a committee of forty-eight progressives, to unite the labor parties, the Non-Parti-

san League, and all the other discontented elements in a new party of reform. The Socialists had already [in convention held in New York, May 8-14] nominated Eugene V. Debs for the fifth time, although he was now behind the bars in the Atlanta penitentiary [for violation of the Espionage Act. Seymour Stedman was nominated for vice-president. The platform, which was presented to the convention by Morris Hillquit of New York, represented the views of the more conservative wing of the party. The convention declared the adherence of the party to the Third International.] The other dissenting groups proved non-fusible; the farmers captured the convention of the 'Forty-Eighters' and made so radical a platform that most of the callers of the convention repudiated the result. La Follette declined to accept a nomination from the group, and P. P. Christenson, of Utah, headed their ticket."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, pp. 586, 587.—"The debate of 1920 centered upon the

ran third, but a better third than ever because of the radical reaction against war restraint and the protest against suppression of opinion. His votes measure in part the lack of interest in the two great parties. In both houses of Congress the Republican majorities were greatly increased. Like the Civil War, but for different reasons, the World War had driven the Democratic Party out of power, and left the future, whose outlines were but faintly visible, in the hands of the party of the North and West."—F. L. Paxson, *Recent history of the United States*, pp. 587-588.—"It is characteristic of the unostentatiousness of Warren G. Harding that when the call came to him to become the standard bearer of the party, he chose for his rostrum his own front porch. There he addressed delegations who came from near and far, and the small town of Marion, Ohio, became famous overnight. . . . It was something new in campaigning and it got the attention of the populace. . . . When the time came to face the country



ELECTION MAP, 1920.

League of Nations, but with a majority of voters determined to vote without reference to its logic. Cox supported the League with enthusiasm, visiting nearly every State. Harding, speaking generally from his front porch in manner reminiscent of the campaign of 1896, varied his emphasis from day to day in the determination not to offend beyond recall either Root and Taft who wanted the League, or Borah and Johnson to whom it was anathema. But whatever he said, the underlying current was that of the majority party determined to return to power after two administrations of self-incurred defeat. In his favor were the habitual Republican votes, the anti-Wilson votes, and the support of the multitude of Americans who had chafed under the unusual restrictions and penetrating taxation of the World War. Harding and Coolidge were elected in November, with a popular plurality of 6,998,964 over Cox and Roosevelt, with every Northern State supporting them, and with Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and all the border States, except Kentucky and Virginia, in the Republican column. Debs

he said frankly that he was not a great man. He proposed to seek advice from the 'best minds' without respect to party. His own attribute that he relied upon principally was his power of conciliation, the fruit of his graciousness and gregariousness. He believed that he could do good work in bringing together the minds that had been torn asunder in the controversies of the latter days of the Wilson administration, and that out of the harmony of those minds would come a sound policy for the country. He believed also, that he could restore harmony between the executive and the legislative departments of the country. . . . Senator Johnson and Senator Borah said the Republican party stood outright against the League of Nations; Elihu Root, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Taft, and others of the party's intellectuals, said it stood for the League of Nations with reservations. In his pre-election speeches Mr. Harding took no definite stand on controversial issues. He hoped for unity within his party, and was determined to be as conciliatory as possible. Toward the latter part of the campaign, in his Des Moines speech,

he seemed to turn his back on the League and to side definitely with Mr. Borah and Mr. Johnson, but he still was for an 'association of nations.' On such issues as the tariff, he took the traditional position of his party. . . . The popular vote for Harding was 16,152,200; the vote for the Democratic candidate, James M. Cox, 9,147,353. The socialists gave some 900,000 votes for their candidate, and the Farmer-Labor party over 260,000 for theirs. The electoral vote for Harding and Coolidge was 404."—W. F. Johnson, *Life of Warren G. Harding*, pp. 93, 95, 98.—"It is . . . fair to say that the enormous size of President Harding's plurality was a great surprise. . . . The actual extent of the Republican victory, as compared with previous political landslides, is obscured by the increase in the number of votes brought about by woman suffrage. Unless we make an actual calculation, we cannot tell how far the larger plurality of Harding is a matter simply of more votes on both sides and how far it is a real shift of strength from the Democratic to the Republican side. It is this shift in which we are most interested and this is a matter of percentage of the total vote. . . . The great outstanding facts as to the strength of political parties since 1908 are: 1. In 1912 the Democrats merely held their own; they were, as they had long been, a minority party, having only 45 per cent. of the total vote of the two parties. They won the election in 1912 simply because the opposing party was temporarily divided. 2. In 1916 the Democrats won over about one-fifth of the disintegrating Progressive Party (really the radical wing of the Republican Party) and became a majority party, securing 51 per cent. of the total Republican-Democratic votes. 3. In 1920 the old Progressive bolters returned largely to the Republican fold and many former Democrats voted for Harding, leaving the Democrats not only again a minority party but in a smaller minority than at any time since the Civil War, their total for the whole country being only 36 per cent., which is the same as the percentage for Vermont in 1916, the minimum percentage for any State in that year. The following table gives in full the percentages which the Democratic vote formed of the total (of the major parties) beginning in 1864:

	Per Cent.
1864—Lincoln—McClellan	45
1868—Grant—Seymour	47
1872—Grant—Greeley	44
1876—Hayes—Tilden	52
1880—Garfield—Hancock	50
1884—Cleveland—Blaine	50
1888—Harrison—Cleveland	50
1892—Cleveland—Harrison	52
1896—McKinley—Bryan	48
1900—McKinley—Bryan	47
1904—Roosevelt—Parker	40
1908—Taft—Bryan	45
1912—Wilson—Taft—Roosevelt	45
1916—Wilson—Hughes	51
1920—Harding—Cox	36

"Harding's was the largest swing between the two parties which ever occurred in four years. . . . If we regard the pendulum as in its normal stationary state in 1908 and 1912, Wilson's first term sent it flying to the left, and his second term sent it flying to the right, not only the 6 per cent. back to stationary, but 9 per cent. beyond. But what was the secret of this tremendous rightward swing of the pendulum? Was it 'desire for a change,' 'hatred of Wilson,' disapproval of the

League of Nations, disapproval of some other features of the Versailles Treaty, the effect of the women's vote or of prohibition, the 'H. C. L.,' the powers of persuasion of the large Republican campaign chests and the large Republican press, or what? Undoubtedly most of these factors played some part . . . [but probably] the dominant factors were two. The natural reaction against the party in power, which inevitably accumulates enemies in proportion to its length of office holding, its activities and aggressiveness and the historical untoward accidents for which the party in power is always held responsible by unthinking masses of men. Some of the Italian-Americans were disgruntled over Fiume. Some of the Irish-Americans were angry because Irish freedom had not been provided for and because England was supposed to have six votes in the League. The German-Americans and the Austrian-Americans hated the reparation features of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the special disgruntlement of the foreign-born, there was probably a general disgruntlement among unthinking people because of the numerous discomforts which our country had suffered [since 1916], . . . including especially the high cost of living. . . . [The natural reaction probably accounted for] about half of the landslide. The mere return of the Republican votes lost in 1916 would account for 40 per cent. It is significant that, in comparing the different States, we find, in general, the larger the left shift in 1916, the larger the right shift in 1920. . . . It is interesting to observe that the high cost of living, besides being a thorn in the flesh, gave an accidental lift to the Republicans. It was one reason for their large campaign fund! When prices are rising, as they did during recent years, the process creates profits to business men, and the Republican Party had a greater constituency among business men than the Democratic Party. But it was the foreign-born defection which most hurt the Democratic Party. We find that the shift of votes in the States with a large element of Germans, Austrians, Italians and Irish . . . [was] large and the shift in the States where such elements were small . . . [was] small. The larger the foreign-born element in any State, the more the votes gained by the Republican Party. . . . The closest connection is that between the German population and Harding's gains. These are correlated 49 per cent. of a perfect accord. The Austrian Republican connection is found to be 45 per cent., the Irish Republican 21 per cent. and the Italian Republican 12 per cent. To find the effect of woman suffrage the best statistical index of the extent of the new woman's vote is the ratio of increase in the total vote in each State. Where there was no increase, as in California, Oregon, Washington, Montana, Nevada, Colorado, Illinois and Mississippi, we may assume that the Nineteenth Amendment had little or no influence. Where the vote was swelled 75 per cent. or more over the 1916 vote, as in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Delaware, Minnesota, Indiana, New Hampshire, West Virginia, North Dakota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, North Carolina, and Alabama, we may assume that the influence of that amendment was greatest. The other States range between. Now the statistical connection between this ratio of increase of the vote in any State and the slide toward the Republican Party is found to be a correlation of minus 23 per cent.; that is, so far as statistical indications tell the tale, the new woman's vote helped Cox rather than Harding. We may guess that the reasons were the belief that the Democrats were more

sympathetic than the Republicans toward the League of Nations and that they had done more for woman suffrage. . . . The prohibition question . . . [does not seem to have] cut any appreciable figure in the statistics of the election. The shifts in the States which had had State prohibition showed no marked difference from the shifts in the States which had their first taste of prohibition under the Eighteenth Amendment. It seems impossible to analyze the minor causes of the Republican sweep. There are always currents and counter currents, and probably in the election of 1920 there were more than usual."—I. Fisher, *Explaining the nation's vote* (*New York Times*, Mar. 6, 1921).

1920 (June).—Stringent law against alien anarchists passed.—"On May 31 the Senate Immigration Committee, in ordering the House . . . [Immigration Bill] favorably reported, made certain modifications broadening the Government's powers to deport alien anarchists and to prevent their admission to the country. As amended the bill was finally passed on June 5 and was signed the same day by the President. The new law, which embodies the Sterling and Johnson bills, provides for the exclusion or deportation of all aliens who belong to organizations that advocate sabotage, revolution, or destruction of property. This means that all foreigners who are members of the Industrial Workers of the World, the Communist Party and the Communist Labor Party are subject to deportation on the mere evidence that they are active members of such organizations. The law also provides that no persons belonging to these revolutionary parties shall be allowed to land here as immigrants. It excludes likewise all aliens who write, publish or distribute any written or printed matter advocating the overthrow of the United States Government by violence, the assaulting or killing of officials, the injury of property, or other acts of sabotage. Representative Johnson of Washington, Chairman of the House Immigration Committee, who had sponsored the bill in the House, said after its passage: 'The act means that these foreign revolutionists shall not preach their doctrines, circulate their literature or contribute their money for these purposes. It is aimed at aliens in such revolutionary organizations as the I. W. W., the Communist and Communist Labor Parties. Deprive these organizations of their aliens and they will either become American or fade away. The United States is not going to be run by aliens who do not vote, and if officers in charge of the deportation of these aliens will not carry out the intent of Congress, expressed in previous laws, perhaps they will do better under more explicit legislation.' Mr. Wallis, the new Commissioner of Immigration at New York, stated on June 6 that . . . there were only 58 persons of the anarchist class at Ellis Island at that time, . . . but there were 600 or 800 in Federal prisons."—*New York Times Current History*, July, 1920, p. 703.

1920 (June).—Naval oil reserves transferred to Navy Department.—In consequence of the fact that oil was coming largely into use as a fuel for warships, the administration decided in 1920 that the Navy Department should have control of the oil producing public lands which had been reserved for its use. In furtherance of this decision a proviso for the transfer of the lands was incorporated into the Naval Appropriation Act of June, 1920, which declared that the secretary of the navy should "take possession of all properties within the naval petroleum reserves as are or may become subject

to the control and use by the United States for naval purposes, and on which there are no pending claims or applications for permits or leases under the provisions of an Act of Congress approved February 25, 1920, entitled 'An Act to provide for the mining of coal, phosphate, oil, oil shale, gas, and sodium on the public domain,' or pending applications for United States patent under any law; to conserve, develop, use, and operate the same in his discretion, directly or by contract, lease, or otherwise, and to use, store, exchange, or sell the oil and gas products thereof, and those from all royalty oil from lands in the naval reserves, for the benefit of the United States: And provided further, That the rights of any claimant under said Act of February 25, 1920, are not affected adversely thereby."—*United States Statutes at Large, Public Laws of the United States of America*, v. 41, pt. 1, passed by the 66th Congress, 2nd Session, ch. 228, 1920, p. 813.

1920 (June).—Industrial and Vocational Rehabilitation Acts passed. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: World War and education: Reeducation.

1920 (June 4).—Treaty of Trianon with Hungary ending World War signed. See TRIANON, TREATY OF (1920).

1920 (June 24).—Recognition given to new government of Guatemala. See GUATEMALA: 1920.

1920 (June 30).—Table showing proportion of appropriations spent for war during the fiscal year. See PEACE MOVEMENT: Peace, arbitration and disarmament.

1920 (June-September).—Merchant marine.—Jones Act.—Refusal by the president to carry out provisions incompatible with commercial treaties.—"The Jones Act, approved June 5, 1920, declared that it was 'necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States' and that it was 'the policy of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine.' With a view to the attainment of this object, (1) the Shipping Board was increased to seven members at a salary of \$12,000 each, was intrusted with all vessels and related properties acquired by the government under war legislation, and was given a fairly free hand as to the sale of them and as to the determination and operation of lines deemed essential to the development of foreign and coastwise trade and the provision of postal service; (2) a loan fund was authorized to give financial encouragement to the building of approved types of ships; (3) American-built vessels of approved types were granted partial exemption from excess and war profits taxes; (4) provision was made for the extension of our coastwise laws to all our insular possessions when adequate American steamship service to them should be established; (5) as far as practicable, all United States mails were to be carried on ships of American registry; (6) preferential railway rates on imports or exports were to be limited to goods carried in American ships, provided suitable American shipping facilities to and from the points involved were available; (7) the President was directed to give notice of the termination of such articles or

provisions of existing treaties as restricted the imposition of discriminating customs duties on imports brought in foreign ships and discriminating tonnage duties on foreign ships entering our ports; (8) and provisions were enacted in regard to ship mortgages, marine insurance, and classification of vessels owned by the government—all of which are calculated to encourage investment in American shipping. The outstanding characteristic of this law is its emphasis upon indirect aid and upon discrimination as means of conserving and upbuilding the merchant marine, though the free hand given the Shipping Board and the Postmaster General in the matter of mail contracts implies also the possibility of postal subvention.”—G. M. Fisk and P. M. Pierce, *International commercial policies*, pp. 283-284.—“Section 34 of the Merchant Marine Act, commonly called the Jones Act, . . . is as follows: ‘In the judgment of Congress, articles or provisions in treaties or conventions to which the United States is a party, which restrict the right of the United States to impose discriminating customs duties on imports entering the United States in foreign vessels and in vessels of the United States, and which also restrict the right of the United States to impose discriminatory tonnage dues on foreign vessels and on vessels of the United States entering the United States should be terminated, and the President is hereby authorized and directed within ninety days after this Act becomes law to give notice to the several governments, respectively, parties to such treaties or conventions, that so much thereof as imposes any such restriction on the United States will terminate on the expiration of such periods as may be required for the giving of such notice by the provisions of such treaties or conventions.’ The period of ninety days thus specified expired September 5 without any such notices of termination by the President. In explanation of the failure to act, the Secretary of State issued, September 25, the following statement: ‘The Department of State has been informed by the President that he does not deem the direction contained in section 34 of the so-called Merchant Marine Act an exercise of any constitutional power possessed by Congress.’ Under the provisions of the section referred to, the President was directed within ninety days after the act became law to notify the several governments with whom the United States had entered into commercial treaties that this country elected to terminate so much of said treaties as restricted the right of the United States to impose discriminating customs duties on imports and discriminating tonnage dues, according as the carrier were domestic or foreign, quite regardless of the fact that these restrictions are mutual, operating equally upon the other governments which are parties to the treaties, and quite regardless also of the further fact that the treaties contain no provisions for their termination in the manner contemplated by Congress. The President, therefore, considers it misleading to speak of the ‘termination’ of the restrictive clauses of such treaties. The action sought to be imposed upon the Executive would amount to nothing less than the breach or violation of said treaties, which are thirty-two in number, and cover every point of contact and mutual dependence which constitute the modern relations between friendly states. Such a course would be wholly irreconcilable with the historical respect which the United States has shown for its international engagements and would falsify every profession of our belief in the binding force and the reciprocal obligation of treaties in general.”—J. S.

Reeves, *Jones Act and the denunciation of treaties* (*American Journal of International Law*, v. 15, 1921, p. 33).

Also 18: H. T. Kingsbury, *Refusal of the president to give notice of termination of certain treaty provisions under Jones Act* (*American Journal of International Law*, v. 15, 1921, p. 41).

1920 (July).—Fisheries treaty with Canada.—“The conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Canada for the protection and conservation of the great salmon fisheries of the Fraser River and Puget Sound was announced by the State Department at Washington on July 26. The necessity for such a treaty is seen in the fact that the output of these fisheries had dwindled from 2,300,000 cases of canned salmon in 1913 to about 65,000 cases in 1918, and has now reached an even lower figure. The treaty will come before the Senate at its next session for ratification. The whaling industry is also the subject of consideration by the two Governments, and a world-wide conference is proposed, with the object of saving the remnants of the once mighty herds that roamed the seas in the great days of the whaling industry. These facts were disclosed by publication of the report of the International Commission, which in 1918 assembled to study the outstanding fisheries questions of the United States and Canada.”—*New York Times Current History*, September, 1920, p. 1013.

1920 (July).—President Wilson’s formal proclamation opening the Panama canal. See PANAMA CANAL: 1920-1922.

1920 (August).—Woman Suffrage Amendment ratified. See SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: United States: 1851-1920.

1920 (September-December).—Pilgrim Centenary Celebrations in England and America. See MASSACHUSETTS: 1921.

1920 (October).—International consortium for China agreed among powers. See JAPAN: 1918-1921.

1920 (November).—Foreign policy at close of Wilson administration.—Mexican affairs.—President announces Armenian boundaries.—“During 1920 old issues that had long been hidden behind the war clouds came out into the open again. Obregon overthrew Carranza and entered into power in Mexico, but the Wilson Administration maintained neutrality during the brief struggle. Ambassador Fletcher had resigned, but Henry Morgenthau, appointed to succeed him, did not obtain the confirmation of the Senate, and the new Administration had not been formally recognized at the end of President Wilson’s term. A controversy over the status of American oil rights was one of the chief impediments to recognition, though Obregon’s general attitude was far more friendly to America than that of Carranza. [See also MEXICO: 1920-1921.] The President in November announced the boundaries of Armenia, which he had drawn at the request of the European Allies. But these boundaries were of no particular interest by that time, since the Turks and the Bolsheviki were already partitioning Armenia; and the mediation between the Turks and Armenians which the Allies requested the President to undertake was forestalled by the Bolshevik conquest of the remnant of the country.”—*New York Times Book Review*, Feb. 27, 1921, p. 11.—See also ARMENIA: 1919-1920.

1920 (November).—Note to Great Britain on oil policy.—Influence of oil on foreign affairs.—“Although the United States produces about 70

per cent. of the world's oil, it already consumes 25 per cent. more than it produces. Moreover, American oil fields are becoming exhausted. Our reserves are estimated to be only 9,150,000,000 barrels, which, at our present rate of consumption, will be exhausted in twenty years. . . . In contrast with our own situation, the world's oil reserves are calculated to last 250 years. . . . Even before the terms of the San Remo agreement were made public the oil policy of Great Britain had irritated American operators. When our oil concerns entered foreign countries for the purpose of securing concessions they repeatedly found themselves blocked by foreign financial and commercial influence. . . . [In 1919 a question was raised by the arrest in Palestine of an American oil prospector who was working under a concession given by the Turkish government to the Standard Oil Company. In answer to a protest by the United States government, the British Foreign Office declared that], pending the establishment of a local government in Palestine, all operations had been forbidden to Britishers and foreigners alike. In Mesopotamia, several American claimants contested the concessions of the Turkish Petroleum Company, among them the Chester concession. (See Trustr: International: Struggle for oil concessions.)] . . . Thus neither the Turkish Petroleum Company nor the Chester interests had a clear title to the fields. Another group of claimants representing American capital were the twenty-two heirs of Abdul Hamid, II. . . . Certain American interests acquired part of these claims and were represented at the Lausanne conference. . . . After Great Britain's oil policy was brought to the attention of the United States Senate in the Spring of 1920 it adopted a resolution asking the State Department to report on the measures foreign governments had taken to exclude Americans from oil fields. In April 1920, Congress passed the Public Lands Leasing Act, which provided that no public lands should be leased to an alien unless his country extended the same right to Americans. The following month, President Wilson sent a special message to the Senate which declared that the policy of the British was to exclude foreigners from owning or operating oil-producing properties throughout most of the empire, and also for the Government itself to participate in oil undertakings. This message was indirectly denied by Lord Curzon, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in a Memorandum to Ambassador Geddes, dated July 5, 1921, in which it was stated that the British Government was not co-operating with British commercial interests to secure 'an undue share' of the petroleum resources. Lord Curzon also insisted that there was an absence of a 'general policy of exclusion of foreigners from British fields.' In 1920 the Philippine Legislature passed a law barring aliens from the exploitation of the public oil lands of the Philippines. Some months later the State Department supported the Costa Rican Government in cancelling the Amory concession, an oil grant given to a British concern by the Tinoco Government. . . . During the Summer of 1920 a vigorous correspondence was carried on between the United States and Great Britain over the question of oil. On Nov. 20, 1920, Secretary of State Colby dispatched another note protesting against the San Remo oil agreement and the exclusion of American oil interests from mandates established under the League of Nations."—R. L. Buell, *Oil interests in the fight for Mosul* (*New York Times Current History, March, 1923*). —The note also gives a clear statement of the stand taken by the administration on the subject

of mandates in general. It reads, in part, as follows:

"My Lord: I have the honor to refer to your note of August 9th, regarding the application of the principle of equality of treatment to the territories of the Near East to be placed under mandates, and specifically to the petroleum resources of those territories as affected by that principle. Before considering the observations of His Majesty's Government on the general principles advocated by the United States and agreed to by the Allied Powers for application to the mandates over former Turkish territory, as outlined in the notes of May 12th and July 28th, addressed to you on behalf of this Government, I think it will clarify the discussion to indicate certain of your statements and assurances which this Government has been pleased to receive. Thus, I note that the assignment to Great Britain of the mandate for Mesopotamia was made and accepted, subject to no friendly arrangement whatever with any third Government regarding economic rights, which, of course, would have been wholly at variance with the purpose and contemplation of any mandate. It is also gratifying to learn that His Majesty's Government is in full sympathy with the several propositions formulated in the note of May 12th, above referred to, which embody or illustrate the principles which this Government believes should be applied in the mandated regions, and which are essential to the practical realization of equality of treatment. . . . This Government welcomes your pledges to the effect that the natural resources of Mesopotamia are to be secured to the people of Mesopotamia and to the future Arab State to be established in that region, and that it is the purpose of the British Government, fully alive to its obligation as a temporary occupant, not only to secure these resources to the Mesopotamia State, but also its absolute freedom of action in the control thereof, and in particular that it is far from the intention of the mandatory power to establish any kind of monopoly or preferred position in its own interest. . . . Adverting at this point to the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the nature of the responsibility of mandatory powers under the League of Nations, I desire to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the fact that while the draft mandate, Form A, was not adopted at Paris, it was the understanding of the American representative there present that the British Government entertained and had expressed convictions favorable to said form and that presumably its representatives would exercise their influence in conformity with those convictions. I need hardly refer again to the fact that the Government of the United States has consistently urged that it is of the utmost importance to the future peace of the world that alien territory, transferred as a result of the war with the Central Powers, should be held and administered in such a way as to assure equal treatment to the commerce and to the citizens of all nations. Indeed, it was in reliance upon an understanding to this effect, and expressly in contemplation thereof, that the United States was persuaded that the acquisition under mandate of certain enemy territory by the victorious powers would be consistent with the best interests of the world. It is assumed, accordingly, that your statements with reference to Mandate A, together with the statement that the draft mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine have been prepared with a view to secure equality of treatment for the commerce and citizens of all States which are members of the League of Nations,

do not indicate a supposition on your part that the United States can be excluded from the benefits of the principle of equality of treatment. This Government is pleased to find that His Majesty's Government is in full sympathy with the principles, formulated in its communication of May 12th and July 28th. But it is unable to concur in the view contained in paragraph 15 of your note, that the terms of the mandates can properly be discussed only in the Council of the League of Nations and by the signatories of the covenant. Such powers as the allied and associated nations may enjoy or wield, in the determination of the governmental status of the mandated areas, accrued to them as a direct result of the war against the Central Powers. The United States, as a participant in that conflict and as a contributor to its successful issue, cannot consider any of the associated powers, the smallest not less than itself, debarred from the discussion of any of its consequences or from participation in the rights and privileges secured under the mandates provided for in the Treaties of Peace. This Government notes with interest your statement that the draft mandates for Mesopotamia and for Palestine, which have been prepared, with a view to secure equality of treatment and opportunity for the commerce, citizens and subjects of all States which are members of the League of Nations will, when approved by the interested allied powers, be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations. The United States is undoubtedly one of the powers directly interested in the terms of the mandates, and I therefore request that the draft mandate forms be communicated to this Government for its consideration before their submission to the Council of the League. It is believed that His Majesty's Government will be the more ready to acquiesce in this request in view of your assurance that His Majesty's Government is in full sympathy with the various principles contained in the two previous notes of this Government upon this subject. The establishment of the mandate principle, a new principle in international relations, and one in which the public opinion of the world is taking a special interest, would seem to require the frankest discussion from all pertinent points of view. It would seem essential that suitable publicity should be given to the drafts of mandates, which it is the intention to submit to the council, in order that the fullest opportunity may be afforded to consider their terms in relation to the obligations assumed by the mandatory power and the respective interests of all Governments, which are or deem themselves concerned or affected. The fact cannot be ignored that the reported resources of Mesopotamia have interested public opinion of the United States, Great Britain and other countries as a potential subject of economic strife. Because of that fact they become an outstanding illustration of the kind of economic question with reference to which the mandate principle was especially designed and, indeed, a peculiarly critical test of the good faith of the nations which have given their adherence to the principle. This principle was accepted in the hope of obviating in the future those international questions that grow out of a desire for the exclusive control of the resources and markets of annexed territories. To cite a single example, because of the shortage of petroleum, its constantly increasing commercial importance and the continuing necessity of replenishing the world's supply by drawing upon the latent resources of undeveloped regions, it is of the highest importance to apply to the petroleum in-

dustry the most enlightened principles recognized by nations as appropriate for the peaceful ordering of their economic relations. This Government finds difficulty in reconciling the special arrangement, referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 of your note and set forth in the so-called San Remo petroleum agreement, with your statement that the petroleum resources of Mesopotamia, and freedom of action in regard thereto, will be secured to the future Arab State, as yet unorganized. Furthermore, it is difficult to harmonize that special arrangement with your statement that concessionary claims relating to those resources still remain in their pre-war position, and have yet to receive, with the establishment of the Arab State, the equitable consideration promised by His Majesty's Government. This Government has noted in this connection a public statement of His Majesty's minister in charge of petroleum affairs to the effect that the San Remo agreement was based on the principle that the concessions granted by the former Turkish Government must be honored. It would be reluctant to assume that His Majesty's Government has already undertaken to pass judgment upon the validity of concessionary claims in the regions concerned and to concede validity to certain of those claims which cover apparently the entire Mesopotamian area. Indeed, this Government understands your note to deny having taken, and to deny the intention to take any such *ex parte* and premature action. In this connection I might observe that such information as this Government has received indicates that, prior to the war, the Turkish Petroleum Company, to make specific reference, possessed in Mesopotamia no rights to petroleum concessions or to the exploitation of oil; and in view of your assurance that it is not the intention of the mandatory power to establish on its own behalf any kind of monopoly, I am at some loss to understand how to construe the provision of the San Remo agreement that any private petroleum company which may develop the Mesopotamia oil fields shall be under permanent British control. Your Lordship contrasts the present production of petroleum in the United States with that of Great Britain, and some allusion is made to American supremacy in the petroleum industry. I should regret any assumption by His Majesty's Government or any other friendly power that the views of this Government as to the true character of a mandate are dictated in any degree by considerations of the domestic need or production of petroleum or any other commodity. I may be permitted to say, however, for the purpose of correcting a misapprehension which your note reflects, that the United States possesses only one-twelfth, approximately, of the petroleum resources of the world. The oil resources of no other nation have been so largely drawn upon for foreign needs, and your Lordship's statement that any prophecies as to the oil-bearing resources of unexplored and undeveloped countries must be accepted with reserve hardly disposes of the scientific calculation upon which, despite their problematical elements, the policies of States and the anticipations of world production are apparently proceeding. The Government of the United States assumes that there is a general recognition of the fact that the requirements for petroleum are in excess of production, and it believes that opportunity to explore and develop the petroleum resources of the world, wherever found, should without discrimination be freely extended, as only by the unhampered development of such resources can the

needs of the world be met. But it is not these aspects of oil production and supply in so far as they are of domestic interest to the United States with which I am concerned in this discussion. I have alluded to them in order to correct confusing inferences, liable to arise from certain departures, which I believe I discern in your Lordship's communication, from the underlying principles of a mandate, as evolved and sought to be applied by the allied and associated powers to the territories brought under their temporary dominion by their joint struggle and common victory. This dominion will be wholly misconceived, not to say abused, if there is even the slightest deviation from the spirit and the exclusive purpose of a trusteeship as strict as it is comprehensive."—*Contemporary Review*, Feb., 1912, pp. 245-250.

ALSO IN: T. H. Dickinson, *United States and the League*, pp. 94-97.

1920 (November).—Anti-Japanese law in California.—Japanese population in the West. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1920-1921: Anti-Japanese law; ALIEN LAND LAWS.

1920 (December).—Cost of the war announced by secretary of the treasury.—President Wilson submits peace commission expenses.—"The net cost of the war to the American Government was fixed by Secretary of the Treasury Houston, December 8, at \$24,010,000,000. This, he said, represented the 'adjusted' expenditure of the Treasury, excluding all outlays which had no relation to the actual prosecution of the war during the period from April 6, 1917, to June 30, 1920, covering the extremes of the Government's wartime fiscal operations. The Treasury figures showed that total expenditures by the Government during the period indicated, excepting postal disbursements from postal revenues, totaled the sum of \$38,830,812,895. Of this amount \$16,078,844,097 was obtained in taxes and revenue from sources other than borrowed money. Mr. Houston said that a deduction of \$9,523,000,000—the amount loaned to foreign Governments—should be made from the grand total, since these loans would be repaid and consequently could not be charged as an actual expenditure. The Secretary made other deductions, aggregating about \$4,500,000,000, which, he said, represented the excess cost of Government operations for the three years and three months over what they would have been in normal times. President Wilson in an official communication informed the Senate on Dec. 8 that the actual expenses incurred by the American Peace Commission in Paris totaled \$1,651,191.09. The President submitted an itemized expense bill which covered the smallest details. The largest single item in the bill was \$283,560.47 for food, hotel and kitchen supplies, and the smallest was \$166.17 for telephone hire. The mission of William C. Bullitt to Soviet Russia cost \$5,000."—*New York Times Current History*, Jan., 1921, p. 21.

1920 (December).—Treaty with Siam. See SIAM: 1917-1922.

1920-1921.—Export trade.—"In the postwar peak year, 1920, the volume of United States exports was almost double that of 1914, and the import tonnage was more than 50 per cent greater; but in 1921 there was a general decline in volume of our oversea trade, particularly in exports. In regional distribution of this trade there was a shift in favor of Mexico and South America at the expense of Europe and the Mediterranean region. The middle American region, in each of the years under consideration, accounted for considerably

over half of the entire tonnage of oversea imports into the United States. . . . This increase in total imports is accounted for mainly by the enormous expansion in receipts from Mexico. . . . Considerable expansion in trade with the United States . . . [took] place also in the South American region. . . . The United States trade with Europe and the Mediterranean region in 1914 constituted slightly over three-fifths of our oversea exports and almost two-fifths of our imports. In 1920 this region took 71 per cent of the oversea exports, but contributed less than 8 per cent of our oversea imports. . . . The world-wide industrial depression in 1921 was reflected in the general decline in volume of United States oversea trade from the peak year of 1920, particularly in exports. . . . The principal exports from the United States to [Middle America] were coal and coke, foodstuffs, wood and its manufactures, iron and steel products, oils, greases, and fertilizers. The falling off in shipments of coal to this region in 1921 accounted for most of the decline from exports recorded in 1920. Middle America, in each of the four years specified, accounted for over half of the entire tonnage of our oversea imports. . . . Because of the density of population and its relatively high purchasing power, the countries included in the European and Mediterranean region have been and continue to be our greatest market. To this district the United States sent well over half of its total oversea exports in all of the four years included . . . the percentage ranging from 61 in 1914 to 71 in 1920. In 1921 Europe took 69 per cent of the volume of our oversea exports, more than half of this going to the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium."—F. E. Benjamin, *Transportation (Commerce Reports, United States Department of Commerce*, no. 20, May 14, 1923, pp. 456-457).—See also below: 1922: Economic situation.

1920-1921.—Efforts to check immigration. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1920-1921: Efforts to check immigration.

1920-1921.—Trade relations with Russia. See RUSSIA: 1920-1921: Difficulties of establishing peace with Allies.

1920-1921 (April-July).—Resolution of peace with Germany passed by Congress.—Vetoed by President Wilson.—Resolution re-introduced in 1921, passed by Congress and signed by President Harding.—In April, 1920, resolutions to repeal the declarations of war against Germany and Austria were introduced in both Houses of Congress. The House resolution was passed on Apr. 9, 1920, by a vote of 242 to 150, but was dropped in favor of the resolution introduced in the Senate, on May 5, by Senator Knox of Pennsylvania. In his address in support of the resolution, Senator Knox maintained that the Treaty of Versailles, which was signed by the president, terminated the war, even though the treaty had not been ratified by the Senate. He claimed that "by the treaty itself, which [he said] is now with our consent and by virtue of our stipulation come, in that respect, into full force and effect, the war has terminated; and in this connection I venture to observe that if . . . the making of the peace is an Executive function, then the Executive has already acted. If it is not an Executive function, then Congress may, as to appropriate matters, act in a manner to bring peace. It has resulted furthermore from the deposit of ratifications as above outlined that Germany and the other powers concerned are observing and carrying out the terms of the treaty in full detail. . . . Committees and organi-

zations provided for by the treaty have been organized and are functioning. . . . The various measures of Germany's disarmament, demobilization and evacuation of territory, of the holding of plebiscites, of the surrender of territory, of the adjustment of territorial rights are being carried out to the letter save as they are modified by the mutual consent of the parties. The privileges and advantages stipulated in the treaty for nationals of the allied and associated powers . . . are being carried out and enjoyed by the nationals of all the powers, including our own, save only where our own citizens are being injuriously curbed by the restrictions imposed by our own government. . . . There is everywhere outside of the United States itself, with all the great powers, including ourselves (save only Russia), peace from the recent conflict. . . . Internationally, therefore, we are at peace. . . . All are going forward on a peace time basis under terms and conditions of a treaty negotiated by our associates and us, and ratified by them and the enemy. . . . The war is at an end by virtue of the armistice of Nov. 11, 1918, . . . such armistice being in fact a capitulation ending hostilities by the virtual surrender of the enemy. The war is at an end by the silent cessation of hostilities, which concluded the war in fact. The war is at an end because the Government against which we specifically declared war has ceased to exist. . . . The war is at an end because we, together with our associates in the hostilities, negotiated with the people with whom we had been fighting, . . . a new treaty of peace which provided in terms that the war should terminate and diplomatic relations be resumed when the treaty came into force; and because the treaty, pursuant to its provisions, did come into force in January last (1920) when it was ratified by Germany on the one hand and three of the allied and associated powers on the other hand." On May 21, 1920, the House of Representatives adopted the Knox resolution which was supported by nineteen Democrats, and by all the Republicans except two. The following is, in part, the text of the resolution: ". . . That the joint resolution of Congress, passed April 6, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between the Imperial German Government and the Government and people of the United States, and making provisions to prosecute the same, be, and the same is hereby, repealed, and said state of war is hereby declared at an end: Provided, however, that all property of the Imperial German Government, or its successor or successors, and all of the German nationals, which was, on April 6, 1917, or has since that date come into possession or under the control of the Government of the United States or any of its officers, agents, or employees, from any source or by any agency whatsoever, shall be retained by the United States and no disposition thereof made, except as shall have been heretofore, or specifically hereafter be provided by Congress, until such time as the German Government has, by a treaty with the United States, ratification whereof is to be made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, made suitable provisions for the satisfaction of all claims against the German Government of all persons, wheresoever domiciled, who owe permanent allegiance to the United States and who have suffered, through the acts of the German Government or its agents since July 31, 1914, loss, damage, or injury to their persons or property, directly or indirectly, whether through ownership of shares of stock in German, American, or other corporations, or in consequence of hostilities or of any operations

of war, or otherwise, and also provisions granting to persons owing permanent allegiance to the United States, most favored nation treatment, whether the same be national or otherwise, in all matters affecting residence, business, profession, trade, navigation, commerce and industrial property rights, and confirming to the United States all fines, forfeitures, penalties and seizures imposed or made by the United States during the war, whether in respect to the property of the German Government or German nationals, and waiving any and all pecuniary claims based on events which occurred at any time before the coming into force of such treaty, any existing treaty between the United States and Germany to the contrary notwithstanding. Sect. 2. That until by treaty or act or joint resolution of Congress it shall be determined otherwise, the United States, although it has not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, reserves all of the rights, powers, claims, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages to which its nationals have become entitled, including the right to enforce the same under the terms of the armistice signed Nov. 11, 1918, or any extensions or modifications thereof or which under the Treaty of Versailles have been stipulated for its benefit or to which it is entitled as one of the principal allied and associated powers. Sect. 3. That the joint resolution of Congress approved Dec. 7, 1917, 'declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government and the Government and the people of the United States are making provisions to prosecute the same,' be and the same is hereby repealed, and said state of war is hereby declared at an end."—*Knox peace resolution (New York Times Current History, May, 1921, p. 106)*.—On May 27, the president returned the resolution to the House of Representatives with a veto message in which he said: "I have not felt at liberty to sign this resolution because I cannot bring myself to become party to an action which would place ineffaceable stain upon the gallantry and honor of the United States. The resolution seems to establish peace with the German Empire without exacting from the German Government any action by way of setting right the infinite wrongs which it did to the peoples whom it attacked and whom we professed it our purpose to assist when we entered the war. Have we sacrificed the lives of more than 100,000 Americans and ruined the lives of thousands of others and brought upon thousands of American families an unhappiness that can never end for purposes which we do not now care to state or take further steps to attain? The attainment of these purposes is provided for in the Treaty of Versailles by terms deemed adequate by the leading statesmen and experts of all the great peoples who were associated in the war against Germany. Do we now not care to join in the effort to secure them? We entered the war most reluctantly. Our people were profoundly disinclined to take part in a European war, and at last did so only because they became convinced that it could not in truth be regarded as only a European war, but must be regarded as a war in which civilization itself was involved and human rights of every kind as against a belligerent Government. Moreover, when we entered the war we set forth very definitely the purposes for which we entered, partly because we did not wish to be considered as merely taking part in a European contest. This Joint Resolution which I return does not seek to accomplish any of these objects, but in effect makes a complete surrender

of the rights of the United States so far as the German Government is concerned. . . . Notwithstanding the fact that upon our entrance into the war we professed to be seeking to assist in the maintenance of common interests, nothing is said in this resolution about the freedom of navigation upon the seas, or the reduction of armaments, or the vindication of the rights of Belgium, or the rectification of wrongs done to France, or the release of the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire from the intolerable subjugation which they have had for so many generations to endure, or the establishment of an independent Polish State, or the continued maintenance of any kind of understanding among the great powers of the world which would be calculated to prevent in the future such outrages as Germany attempted and in part consummated. We have now, in effect, declared that we do not care to take any further risks or to assume any further responsibilities with regard to the freedom of nations or the sacredness of international obligations or the safety of independent peoples. Such a peace with Germany—a peace in which none of the essential interests which we had at heart when we entered the war is safeguarded—is, or ought to be, inconceivable, as inconsistent with the dignity of the United States, with the rights and liberties of her citizens, and with the very fundamental conditions of civilization.' The day following a motion to override the veto was lost by a vote of 219 yeas to 152 nays, 29 less than the necessary two-thirds; 17 Democrats voted yea, 2 Republicans nay. This action definitely ended all chances of final action on the Peace Treaty and League of Nations at that session of Congress, as it adjourned sine die on June 5; moreover it had the effect of making the question squarely a dominant political issue in the Presidential campaign."—*New York Times Current History, July, 1920, pp. 707-709.*—Thus the matter stood until April, 1921, when in his first message to Congress, President Harding included a recommendation that Congress should establish the state of technical peace without delay. (See below: 1921 [April].) "Almost immediately Congress took up the question of peace with Germany and passed a resolution declaring the war at an end, but expressly reserving to the United States and its citizens whatever rights or advantages which had been accorded to them by the armistice, by the Treaty of Versailles, or as a result of the war."—W. F. Johnson, *Life of Warren G. Harding, p. 112.*—On April 13 the Knox resolution was re-introduced, and on April 30 it was passed by the Senate by a vote of 49 to 23. No change was made by the Senate in the resolution as reported by the Foreign Relations Committee. It would repeal the war resolutions affecting Germany and Austria-Hungary, impound alien enemy property, and reserve to the United States all rights and privileges under the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties. In May, because of an attempt by Germany to evade payment of reparations, President Harding requested the House to suspend action on the resolution. After the question of the reparations had been settled for the time, however, it was again brought up. It passed the House on June 30 by a vote of 263 to 59, was sent back to the Senate, which passed it on July 1 by a vote of 38 to 19, and on July 2 it received the signature of the president. The text of the resolution as passed is as follows:

"JOINT RESOLUTION TERMINATING THE STATE OF

WAR BETWEEN THE IMPERIAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND BETWEEN THE IMPERIAL AND ROYAL AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Sect. 1. That the state of war declared to exist between the imperial German Government and the United States of America by the joint resolution of Congress approved April 6, 1917, is hereby declared at an end. Sect. 2. That in making the declaration, and as a part of it, there are expressly reserved to the United States and its nationals any and all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages, together with the right to enforce the same, to which it or they have become entitled under the terms of the armistice signed Nov. 11, 1918, or any extension or modification thereof; or which are acquired by or are in the possession of the United States of America by reason of its participation in the war or to which its nationals have thereby become rightfully entitled; or which, under the treaty of Versailles, have been stipulated for its or their benefit; or to which it is entitled as one of the principal allied and associated powers; or to which it is entitled by any act or acts of Congress or otherwise. Sect. 3. That the state of war declared to exist between the imperial and royal Austro-Hungarian Government and the United States of America . . . is hereby declared at an end. Sect. 4. That in making this declaration . . . [all advantages, as above, to which the nationals of the United States are entitled under the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye] or by virtue of any act or acts of Congress . . . are reserved. Sect. 5. All property of the imperial German Government or its successor or successors and of all German nationals which was on April 6, 1917, in or has since that date come into the possession or under the control of . . . the United States of America . . . and all property of the imperial and royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or its successor or successors, and of all Austro-Hungarian nationals which was on Dec. 7, 1917, in or has since that date come into the possession or under the control of . . . the United States of America . . . shall be retained by the United States of America and no disposition thereof made except as shall have been heretofore or specifically hereafter shall be provided by law until such time as the imperial German Government and the imperial and royal Austro-Hungarian Government or their successor or successors, shall have respectively made suitable provision for the satisfaction of all claims against said Governments respectively, of all persons wheresoever domiciled, who owe permanent allegiance to the United States of America and who have suffered through the acts of the imperial German Government or its agents, or the imperial and royal Austro-Hungarian Government or its agents, or the imperial and royal Austro-Hungarian Government or its agents, since July 31, 1914, loss, damage or injury to their persons or property, either directly, or indirectly, . . . and also shall have granted to persons owing permanent allegiance to the United States of America most favored nation treatment, whether the same be national or otherwise, in all matters affecting residence, business, profession, trade, navigation, commerce and industrial property rights and until the imperial German Government and the imperial and royal Austro-Hungarian Government or their successor or successors shall have respectively confirmed to the United States of America all fines, forfeitures, penalties and seizures imposed or made by the United States of America during the war,

whether in respect to the property of the imperial German Government or German nationals or the imperial and royal Austro-Hungarian Government or Austro-Hungarian nationals, and shall have waived any and all pecuniary claims against the United States of America."

1920-1922.—Coal strike in West Virginia.—Conflicts in Mingo county. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1920-1922: Warfare in West Virginia.

1920-1922.—Famine relief in Russia. See INTERNATIONAL RELIEF: Russian famine relief.

1921.—Secretary Colby's mission to South America.—Late in the year 1920, Bainbridge Colby, the secretary of state, accompanied by Admiral Basset and General Cronkhite, set out on an official visit to South America, from which he returned at the end of January, 1921. The object of his visit, as stated by him, was as follows: "I am primarily commissioned to represent President Wilson in returning the visits of President Pessoa of Brazil and President Brum of Uruguay to the United States. My visit is, of course, official, and yet is strictly friendly and social. Both parts of our continent are conscious of the similarity of their political and social aims, and each is working toward the realization of those aims under dissimilar and, in many instances, entirely distinct conditions. To deepen our understanding of each other must always be the aim of enlightened policies. The friendship between our countries has been developing more than a century, and is acquiring every day a firmer foundation and a deepening mutual respect. I shall be very happy and contented if my short calls at the capitals of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina serve pleasantly to emphasize the respect and cordial good will which is felt toward those Governments by the people of the United States." He sailed on the *U. S. S. Florida*, and, after having paid a visit to the island of Barbados, Dec. 9, 1920, he arrived on December 21 at Rio de Janeiro, where he was officially received by President Pessoa with every evidence of cordiality. At Rio de Janeiro he reiterated the Latin American policy of the United States, when, in his speech at the Brazilian president's official banquet on the evening of his arrival he said. "We want no gains, we covet no prizes which are the reward of craft or oppression." "Mr. Colby was formally received by the Brazilian congress next day, and in a speech of welcome Senator Alfredo Ellis took occasion to praise the Monroe Doctrine, by which 'the American government became the champion of liberty throughout the New World.' . . . [He left Rio de Janeiro on December 24, and proceeded to Montevideo, where he was again received with enthusiasm, which, however, was tempered, by] a tendency to resent any assumed superiority of the United States as a protector. This sentiment ran through every address of welcome heard. As Brum expressed it, Uruguay believes in the Monroe Doctrine, but she wants it to be for reciprocal protection and is willing to do her full share in enforcement of the doctrine. . . . [The secretary left Montevideo on December 31, on board the Argentina cruiser *Libertad*, for Buenos Aires, the capital of Argentina, where he arrived on New Year's Day.] At Buenos Aires there was an absence of popular enthusiasm in decided contrast to his reception in Uruguay. Several reasons are adduced for this: resentment at the unsolicited protection provided by the Monroe Doctrine, a feeling of distrust caused by America's occupation of several republics, the passage of the Fordney Tariff bill in the House of Representatives, which

[it was declared would] . . . almost prohibit the importation of Argentine products, and the enmity of the German element. President Irigoyen received Mr. Colby very cordially, however. . . . Secretary Colby left Buenos Aires on Jan. 3 aboard a Uruguayan cruiser . . . [from which he transferred] to the *Florida* in Uruguayan waters for return to the United States. During his stay he conveyed an invitation from President Wilson for President Irigoyen to visit Washington. During his trip Mr. Colby heard references to mutterings against the United States and doubts of its sincerity. These arose from the fact that he had been preceded in Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo by Dr. Federico Henriquez Carbajal, formerly President of Santo Domingo, and his nephew, Max Henriquez Urena, an author, on a mission of propaganda charging the United States with atrocities in Haiti and Santo Domingo and trying to persuade South America to take up the cause of the islanders."—*New York Times Current History, February, 1921, pp. 346-347.*

1921.—Pan-American Postal Union.—Early in 1921 announcement was made of a Pan-American Postal Union to include all the American states except Canada and the British colonies, and providing that domestic rates should prevail in all countries within the union.

1921.—Tariff policy.—Laws to offset dumping. See TARIFF: 1921: United States; 1904-1922.

1921.—Snell Bill passed. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1915-1921.

1921.—Refusal of permission to other nations to have unauthorized cable landings in the United States. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Telegraphy and telephony: Telegraph: 1915-1922.

1921.—Reorganization of shipping board. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XII. Reconstruction: g, 3.

1921.—Plans for arbitration to supersede strikes.—San Francisco plan of arbitration in building trades. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1920-1921: One national, etc.

1921.—Ku Klux Klan re-organized in the South. See KU KLUX KLAN.

1921.—Direct trade established with Paraguay. See PARAGUAY: 1921.

1921.—Control in Guam since 1900. See GUAM: 1900-1921.

1921.—Packers and Stockyards Act passed. See TRUSTS: United States: 1919-1923: Recent significant legislation.

1921.—Attitude toward Philippines used as a party issue. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1921.

1921.—Court martial law passed. See MILITARY LAW: 1921.

1921.—Employment of children in agricultural pursuits. See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1873-1921.

1921.—Clash with Japan over Siberia.—Vanderlip concession. See JAPAN: 1921.

1921.—Housing problem.—"One of the most serious consequences of the World War is the housing situation in many countries. Its magnitude is such that a period of intense application to the subject will be necessary. . . . The effect upon housing in the United States became sharply noticeable after the war. . . . The war swelled the populations of cities and towns. Many rural residents went there to work, attracted by the high wages in the war industries, while numerous relatives of those drafted into the army, not caring to stay alone in the country, sought quarters in the cities. When the soldiers returned from Europe,

many, instead of going back to the country districts, stayed in the cities. Meanwhile the natural increase of resident population was going on, and rents precipitately rose, yet in 1919 only about 70,000 houses were built throughout the United States. . . . It was estimated that the accumulated deficit by the beginning of 1921 amounted to about 147 per cent of the normal annual building program. . . . Many families were forced to 'double up' in a single house or apartment, or to take in lodgers. . . . The housing shortage has caused rents to increase enormously. . . . According to the United States Department of Labor the percentage of increase by June, 1919, was 14.2. In the next six months it rose to 25.3, and to 34.9 by June, 1920. By December, 1920, it was 51.1 per cent. over the 1913 figures, and was still rising. The table shows that while rents made 'deeper and deeper inroads into the average family's budget, the prices of food, clothing and other goods, were going down.'—G. Myers, *World's housing shortage* (*New York Times Current History*, July, 1921, p. 612-613).—See also HOUSING: United States: National housing association.

1921.—Results of 1920 census announced.—Relative numbers of foreign-born.—According to the census of 1920 Germany, Austria, Ireland and Russia, natives of which made up more than 59 per cent of the country's total foreign-born population in 1910, showed losses, which, for the ten years aggregated almost two million, and are believed to have been due largely to the war, with its consequent exodus of belligerent nationals, and the stoppage of immigration. Notwithstanding those losses, the country's total foreign-born population showed an increase of 358,442, or 2.6 per cent, the total number of foreign-born being 13,703,987. The increase is believed to have been the smallest, both in number and percentage, ever recorded for any decade. Germany led as the country of birth of the foreign-born in the United States ten years ago, with a total of more than 2,500,000, and still leads, although the number was reduced to 1,683,298, a decrease of 818,035. Russia had taken third place from Ireland, but showed a decrease of 203,783, compared with an increase of about 1,000,000 in the decade 1900-1910. Natives of Russia in the United States number 1,398,999. Poland had gone into fourth place, which was occupied by Italy, with an increase of 195,797 in the ten years, bringing her total to 1,139,578. Ireland, which had shown decreases in each decade since 1800, had a larger decrease during the decade than in any previous one, the loss having been 316,571, compared with a decrease of 263,208 for 1900-1910. The total number of Irish born in the United States in 1920 was 1,035,680, ranking that country fifth. Canada showed a decrease of 87,501 in the ten years, compared with an increase of 27,000 the previous decade, and dropped from fifth to sixth place. Total Canadians number 1,117,136. French Canadians numbered 307,681 and showed a loss of 77,402, while other Canadians showed a loss of 10,099. Persons born in England numbered 812,414, which was a decrease of 65,305 in the ten years, compared with an increase of 37,000 the previous ten years. England, however, still ranked seventh. Sweden continued to hold eighth place, with a total of 624,759. That was a decrease of 40,448 in the ten years, compared with an increase of 83,000 the previous decade. Austria, with the second largest numerical loss of any country during the ten years, dropped into ninth place from the sixth position. The decrease in the number of

her natives in the United States was 600,014, compared with an increase of 683,000 during the previous decade. Austria's total natives in the United States numbered 574,959. The number of Mexican-born increased more than 100 per cent during the ten years, the number having been 254,761, bringing her total to 476,676. There was an increase of 118,000 in the previous decade. Hungary, with a total of 397,081, showed a decrease of 98,528, compared with an increase of 349,000 from 1900 to 1910. Norway showed a decrease of 40,278, compared with an increase of 67,000 in the previous ten years, bringing her total down to 363,599. Scotland, with a total of 254,482, showed a decrease of 6,594, compared with an increase of 27,000 in 1910. Denmark had an increase of 7,402, compared with an increase of 28,000 in 1910, bringing her total to 185,051. Greece showed a large percentage of increase, but it was not so large numerically as in 1910. Her increase was 74,419, bringing her total to 175,701. France's increase was larger than during the previous ten years. It was 35,374, compared with 13,000 in 1910, bringing her total to 152,051. Finland increased 19,991 to 149,671. Netherlands increased 11,199 to 131,262. Switzerland decreased 6,201 to 124,848. Rumania increased 37,078 to 103,007. Asia increased 80,898 to 191,484. Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Newfoundland and Australia showed increases, while Wales and Bulgaria showed decreases.

1921.—Urban population of the United States according to census of 1920.

POPULATION OF STATES

STATE	POPULATION 1920	POPULATION 1910
New York	10,384,144	9,113,614
Pennsylvania	8,720,159	7,665,111
Illinois	6,485,098	5,638,591
Ohio	5,759,368	4,767,121
Texas	4,661,027	3,896,542
Massachusetts	3,852,356	3,366,416
Michigan	3,667,222	2,810,173
California	3,426,536	2,377,549
Missouri	3,403,547	3,293,335
New Jersey	3,155,374	2,537,167
Indiana	2,980,544	2,700,876
Georgia	2,894,683	2,609,121
Wisconsin	2,631,839	2,333,860
North Carolina	2,556,486	2,206,287
Kentucky	2,416,013	2,289,905
Iowa	2,403,630	2,224,771
Minnesota	2,386,371	2,075,708
Alabama	2,347,295	2,138,093
Tennessee	2,337,459	2,184,789
Virginia	2,306,361	2,061,612
Oklahoma	2,027,564	1,657,155
Louisiana	1,797,798	1,656,388
Mississippi	1,789,384	1,797,114
Kansas	1,769,257	1,690,949
Arkansas	1,750,995	1,574,449
South Carolina	1,683,662	1,515,400
West Virginia	1,463,610	1,221,119
Maryland	1,449,610	1,295,346
Connecticut	1,380,585	1,114,756
Washington	1,356,316	1,141,990
Nebraska	1,295,502	1,192,214
Florida	966,296	752,619
Colorado	939,376	799,024
Oregon	783,389	672,765
Maine	768,014	742,371
North Dakota	645,730	577,056
South Dakota	635,839	583,888
Rhode Island	604,397	542,610

STATE	POPULATION 1920	POPULATION 1910
Montana	547,593	375,053
Utah	449,446	373,351
New Hampshire	443,083	430,572
District of Columbia	437,571	331,069
Idaho	431,826	325,594
New Mexico	360,247	327,301
Vermont	352,421	355,956
Arizona	333,273	204,354
Delaware	223,003	202,322
Wyoming	194,402	145,965
Nevada	77,407	81,875
Total	105,683,108	91,972,266

POPULATION OF CITIES		POPULATION 1920
CITY		
New York		5,621,151
Chicago		2,701,705
Philadelphia		1,823,158
Detroit		993,739
Cleveland		796,836
St. Louis		772,897
Boston		748,060
Baltimore		733,826
Pittsburg		588,193
Los Angeles		576,673
San Francisco		508,410
Buffalo		506,775
Milwaukee		457,147
Washington		437,571
Newark		414,216
Cincinnati		401,247
New Orleans		387,219
Minneapolis		380,582
Kansas City, Mo.		324,410
Seattle		315,652
Indianapolis		314,194
Jersey City		297,864
Rochester		295,750
Portland, Ore.		258,288
Denver		256,369
Toledo		243,109
Providence		237,595
Columbus		237,031
Louisville		234,891
St. Paul		234,595
Oakland		216,361
Akron		208,435
Atlanta		200,616
Omaha		191,601
Worcester, Mass.		179,754
Birmingham, Ala.		178,270
Syracuse, N. Y.		171,717
Richmond, Va.		171,667
New Haven, Conn.		162,519
Memphis, Tenn.		162,351
San Antonio, Tex.		161,379
Dallas, Texas		158,976
Dayton, Ohio		152,559
Bridgeport, Conn.		143,538
Houston, Texas		138,076
Hartford, Conn.		138,036
Scranton, Pa.		137,783
Grand Rapids		137,634
Paterson, N. J.		135,866
Youngstown, Ohio		132,358
Springfield, Mass.		129,563
Des Moines, Ia.		126,468
New Bedford, Mass.		121,217
Fall River, Mass.		120,485

Trenton, N. J.	119,289
Nashville, Tenn.	118,342
Salt Lake City	118,110
Camden, N. J.	116,309
Norfolk, Va.	115,777
Albany, N. Y.	113,344
Lowell, Mass.	112,759
Wilmington, Del.	110,168
Cambridge, Mass.	109,694
Reading, Pa.	107,784
Fort Worth, Tex.	106,482
Spokane, Wash.	104,437
Kansas City, Kan.	101,177
Yonkers, N. Y.	100,226

One fourth of our population dwell in cities of 100,000 and over. Another fourth dwell in cities of from 2500 to 100,000 population. Hence one half (51.9%) of our population dwell in cities.—Based on F. A. Magruder, *American government in 1921*.

1921 (January).—Relations with Cuba.—General Crowder sent to Cuba. See CUBA: 1920-1921 (November-January).

1921 (January-February).—Naval program.—Report by Senate committee against naval holiday.—Defeat of naval appropriation.—“The United States Senate on Jan. 25 unanimously adopted a resolution of Senator Borah of Idaho, which directed the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs to inform the Senate whether or not it was feasible to suspend the present American naval program for six months, so that an investigation might be had to determine what constitutes a ‘modern fighting navy.’ An emphatic negative to this proposal was recommended in the report filed with the Senate Feb. 9 by the Committee on Naval Affairs. The report was practically an endorsement of the position taken by the Naval General Board. All the members of that board defended the capital ship and took issue with those naval experts, for the most part foreign, who contended that the modern battleship was nearly obsolete and that submarines and aircraft would be determining factors in sea battles of the future. The substance of the Senate report was that the United States should maintain a navy equal at least to that of any other nation in the world; that the capital ship still maintains its primacy among naval vessels and that since universal disarmament had not been established it would be a wrong to the American people and no service to the cause of peace for the United States to disarm. If the proposed six months’ suspension of building were adopted, the actual loss that would result would be between \$15,000,000 and \$30,000,000. Large numbers of workmen would be thrown out of employment, rendering difficult or impossible the re-assembling of these forces should work be resumed. Any such result would give an immense advantage to such other powers as should continue uninterruptedly the construction of their fleets or those already supplied with superior naval power. The report read in part: ‘The value and importance of submarines, aircraft and high explosives are admitted and the committee recommends that the scientific study and development of all these means of naval warfare be actively continued. Depth bombs, mines, aerial torpedoes and high explosive shells fired from great guns, whether of the howitzer or other types, are all important agencies of attack and defense at sea, and intensive studies of their potential uses should be continued with a view of utilizing them to the greatest possible

advantage. If we assume, however, a naval power armed with all these devices and with destroyers and swift light cruisers, but with no battleships or battle cruisers—and an enemy power equipped with all these and with battleships and battle cruisers in addition—there can be no doubt that in any conflict the power equipped with capital ships would be victorious over its enemy not so equipped. The rival forces of light craft, whether on or below the surface or in the air, would neutralize each other, leaving the power which possessed the heavy ships armed with great guns in undisputed control of the sea.' The committee recommended that twelve destroyers and six submarines in the present program, for which contracts had not been let, be eliminated and at the same time, and as a substitute therefor, authority be given for the construction of two airplane carriers of the most modern type and equipment and most advantageous size. [The Naval Appropriation Bill, however, was defeated in the Senate, by the opposition led by Senator Borah, and the measure was laid over for the incoming Congress]."—*New York Times Current History*, Mar., 1921, p. 385.—See also AVIATION: Development of airplanes and air service: 1921.

1921 (February).—*Yap controversy*.—A controversy over the island of Yap, formerly a German possession, and important as the landing place of three cables, began at the peace conference, and became acute in February, 1921, when Secretary Colby addressed a note on the subject to the Council of the League of Nations.—See also YAP; WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

1921 (March).—*Inauguration of President Harding*.—"Described as 'the simplest in modern times,' the inauguration of Warren Gamaliel Harding as President of the United States on March 4, 1921, was characteristic of the modesty of 'the man from Main Street.' The front porch at Marion, Ohio, had become famous in the campaign, and in accordance with the wishes of the President elect a small portico, resembling the front porch, was set up on the east steps of the Capitol; and there he took the oath of office in the presence of a vast gathering. . . . His inaugural speech was not addressed to the peoples of the world; it was rather an intimate talk with the home folks who had elected him Chief Executive. As the Paris *Figaro* said at the time, 'Most of the new President's address was a declaration of faith in God and a hymn to the greatness and wisdom of America.' Harding could do no other. To him America stood for the finest things achieved by mankind, and he would have all mankind emulate. None the less, he sympathized with the plight of Europe, and he believed the Europeans capable of setting their own house in order. It may be said that he had no desire that America should use the 'big stick,' but rather that the standard of fair dealing and love of peace which it had set up, and which had permitted it to remain on terms of the utmost good-fellowship with the neighboring Dominion of Canada for a century, might be an example which would be copied by the nations of Europe."—W. F. Johnson, *Life of Warren G. Harding*, pp. 100-101.—The president's address was, in part, as follows:

"We are ready to associate ourselves with the nations of the world, great and small, for conference, for counsel, to seek the expressed views of world opinion, to recommend a way to approximate disarmament and relieve the crushing burdens of military and naval establishments. We elect to participate in suggesting plans for mediation, con-

ciliation and arbitration, and would gladly join in that expressed conscience of progress which seeks to clarify and write the laws of international relationship, and establish a world court for the disposition of such justiciable questions as nations are agreed to submit thereto. . . . Our supreme task is the resumption of our onward normal way. Reconstruction, readjustment, restoration—all these must follow. I would like to have them. If it will lighten the spirit and add to the resolution with which we take up the task, let me repeat for our nation, we shall give no people just cause to make war upon us. We hold no national prejudices, we entertain no spirit of revenge, we do not hate, we do not covet, we dream of no conquest, nor boast of armed prowess. If, despite this attitude, war is again forced upon us, I earnestly hope a way may be found which will unify our individual and collective strength and consecrate all America, materially and spiritually, body and soul, to national defense. I can vision the ideal republic, where every man and woman is called under the flag for assignment to duty, for whatever service, military or civic, the individual is best fitted, where we may call to universal service every plant, agency or facility, all in the sublime sacrifice for country, and not one penny of war profit shall inure to the benefit of private individual, corporation or combination, but all above the normal shall flow into the defense chest of the nation. There is something inherently wrong, something out of accord with the ideals of representative democracy when one portion of our citizenship turns its activity to private gain amid defensive war while another is fighting, sacrificing or dying for national preservation. Out of such universal service will come a new unity of spirit and purpose, a new confidence and consecration, which would make our defense impregnable, our triumph assured. Then we should have little or no disorganization of our economic, industrial and commercial systems at home, no staggering war debts, no swollen fortunes to flout the sacrifices of our soldiers, no excuse for sedition, no pitiable slackerism, no outrages of treason. Envy and jealousy would have no soil for their menacing development and revolution would be without the passion which engenders it.

"A regret for the mistakes of yesterday must not, however, blind us to the tasks of today. War never left such an aftermath. There has been staggering loss of life and measureless wastage of materials. Nations are still groping for return to stable ways. Discouraging indebtedness confronts us like all the war-torn nations, and these obligations must be provided for. No civilization can survive repudiation. We can reduce the abnormal expenditures and we will. We can strike at war taxation and we must. We must face the grim necessity, with full knowledge that the task is to be solved, and we must proceed with a full realization that no statute enacted by man can repeal the inexorable laws of nature. Our most dangerous tendency is to expect too much of government and at the same time do for it too little. We contemplate the immediate task of putting our public household in order. We need a rigid and yet sane economy combined with fiscal justice, and it must be attended by individual prudence and thrift, which are so essential to this trying hour and reassuring for the future. The business world reflects the disturbance of war's reaction. Herein flows the lifeblood of material existence. The economic mechanism is intricate and its parts interdependent, and has suffered the shocks and jars incident to abnormal de-

mands, credit inflations and price upheavals. The normal balances have been impaired, the channels of distribution have been clogged, the relations of labor and management have been strained. We must seek the readjustment with care and courage. Our people must give and take. Prices must reflect the receding fever of war activities. Perhaps we never shall know the old levels of wage again, because war invariably readjusts compensations and the necessities of life will show their inseparable relationship, but we must strive for normalcy to reach stability. All the penalties will not be light nor evenly distributed. There is no way of making them so. There is no instant step from disorder to order. We must face a condition of grim reality, charge off our losses and start afresh. It is the oldest lesson of civilization. I would like Government to do all it can to mitigate them. In understanding, in mutuality of interest, in concern for the common good our tasks will be solved. No altered system will work a miracle. Any wild experiment will only add to the confusion. Our best assurance lies in efficient administration of our proved system. The forward course of the business cycle is unmistakable. Peoples are turning from destruction to production. Industry has sensed the changed order, and our own people are turning to resume their normal onward way. The call is for productive America to go on. I know that Congress and the Administration will favor every wise Government policy to aid the resumption and encourage continued progress. I speak for administrative efficiency, for lightened tax burdens, for sound commercial practices, for adequate credit facilities, for sympathetic concern for all agricultural problems, for the omission of unnecessary interference of Government with business, for an end to Government's experiment in business, and for more efficient business in Government administration. With all of this must attend a mindfulness of the human side of all activities, so that social, industrial and economic justice will be squared with the purposes of a righteous people.

"With the nation-wide induction of womanhood into our political life we may count upon her intuitions, her refinement, her intelligence and her influence to exalt the social order. We count upon her exercise of the full privileges and the performance of the duties of citizenship to speed the attainment of the highest state. I wish for an America no less alert in guarding against dangers from within than it is watchful against enemies from without. Our fundamental law recognizes no class, no group, no section. There must be none in legislation or administration. The supreme inspiration is the common weal. Humanity hungers for international peace, and we crave it with all mankind. My most reverent prayer for America is for industrial peace, with its rewards, widely and generally distributed amid the inspirations of equal opportunity. . . . We would not have an America living within and for herself alone, but we would have her self-reliant, independent and ever nobler, stronger and richer. Believing in our higher standards, reared through constitutional liberty and maintained opportunity, we invite the world to the same heights. But pride in things wrought is no reflex of a completed task. Common welfare is the goal of our national endeavor. Wealth is not inimical to welfare, it ought to be its friendliest agency. There never can be equality of rewards or possession so long as the human plan contains varied talents and differing degrees of industry and thrift,

but ours ought to be a country free from great blotches of distressed poverty. We ought to find a way to guard against the perils and penalties of unemployment. We want an America of homes, illumined with hope and happiness, where mothers, freed from the necessity for long hours of toil beyond their own doors, may preside as befits the hearthstone of American citizenship. We want the cradle of American childhood rocked under conditions so wholesome and so hopeful that no blight may touch it in its development, and we want to provide that no selfish interest, no material necessity, no lack of opportunity shall prevent the gaining of that education so essential to best citizenship. There is no short cut to the making of ideals into glad realities. The world has witnessed again and again the futility and the mischief of ill-considered remedies for social and economic disorders. But we are mindful today as never before of the friction of modern industrialism, and we must learn its causes and reduce its evil consequences by sober and tested methods. Where genius has made for great possibilities, justice and happiness must be reflected in a greater common welfare. Service is the supreme commitment of life. I would rejoice to acclaim the era of the golden rule, and crown it with the autocracy of service. I pledge an Administration wherein all the agencies of government are called to serve and ever promote an understanding of government purely as an expression of the popular will. One cannot stand in this presence and be unmindful of the tremendous responsibility. The world upheaval has added heavily to our tasks. But with the realization comes the surge of high resolve, and there is reassurance in belief in the God-given destiny of our Republic. If I felt that there is to be sole responsibility in the Executive for the America of tomorrow I should shrink from the burden. But here are a hundred millions, with common concern and shared responsibility, answerable to God and country. The Republic summons them to their duty and I invite co-operation."

1921 (March).—President Harding's cabinet.—"Within an hour after his inauguration President Harding appeared before the executive session of the Senate and announced the selections he had made for his Cabinet. He chose for secretary of state Charles E. Hughes, of New York, associate justice of the United States Supreme Court and Republican nominee for President in 1916. For secretary of commerce he chose Herbert Clark Hoover, of California, United States Food Commissioner from 1917 to 1919, whose exceptional public service had made him known both at home and abroad. For secretary of the treasury he selected Andrew W. Mellon, of Pennsylvania, a banker and developer of coal and iron industries. For postmaster-general he chose Will H. Hays, of Indiana, chairman of the National Republican Committee; for secretary of agriculture, Henry Cantwell Wallace, of Iowa, an agricultural editor; for secretary of the interior, Senator Albert Bacon Fall, of New Mexico; for secretary of labor, James John Davis, of Pennsylvania, director-general of the Loyal Order of Moose; for secretary of war, Senator John Wingate Weeks, of Massachusetts; for secretary of the navy, Edwin Denby, of Michigan, who participated in the service of the navy during the war; and for attorney-general, his personal friend Harry M. Daugherty, of Ohio. Vice-President Coolidge, on the invitation of the President, became an ex-officio member of the Cabinet and took part in its counsels."—W. F. Johnson, *Life of Warren G. Harding*, pp. 110-111.

—This was the first time in the history of the United States that the vice-president was officially called into counsel by the president.

1921 (March).—Note from Soviet government and reply.—In his inaugural address, President Harding touched upon the difficult problems in foreign relations with which the new administration had to deal. Not the least difficult of these problems was the question of the recognition or non-recognition of the Russian soviet republic, which was raised immediately by an appeal, by the soviet government, for the establishment of friendly relations, and the opening of trade. The overture came in the form of a note dated March 20, sent, through the Russian representative to Esthonia at Reval, to Congress and the president, which reads as follows: "From the first days of her existence Soviet Russia had nourished the hope

Soviet Russia hopes that the American Republic will not persist in obdurately following this path and that the new American Government will clearly see the great advantage for the two republics of the re-establishment of business relations and will consider the interests of both peoples which imperatively demand that the wall existing between them should be removed. The Soviet Republic, entirely absorbed in the work of internal reconstruction and of building up its economic life, has not the intention of intervening in the internal affairs of America, and the All Russian Central Executive Committee makes herewith a categorical declaration to this effect. At the present time, after Soviet Russia has concluded treaties and established regular relations with numerous States, the absence of such relations with America seems to Soviet Russia particularly abnormal and harmful to both



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PRESIDENT HARDING AND CABINET

In the group, left to right (seated): Weeks, Mellon, Hughes, Harding, Coolidge, Denby; (standing): Fall, Hays, Daugherty, Wallace, Hoover, Davis.

of the possibility of a speedy establishment of friendly relations with the great Republic of North America and had firmly expected that intimate and solid ties would be created between the two republics to the greater advantage of both. At the time when the Entente Powers had begun their invasion of Soviet Russia unprovoked and without declaration of war the Soviet Government repeatedly addressed itself to the American Government with the proposal to adopt measures for the cessation of bloodshed. Even when the American troops, together with the others, participated in the attack upon Soviet Russia the Government of the Russian Republic still expressed the hope of a speedy change of America's policy toward her, and demonstrated this by its particularly considerate treatment of the Americans in Russia. But President Wilson, who, without cause and without any declaration of war, had attacked the Russian Republic, showed during his whole administration a growing hostility towards the Russian Republic.

The All Russian Central Executive Committee addresses to you the formal proposal of opening trade relations between Russia and America, and for that purpose the relations between the two republics have to be on the whole regularized. The All Russian Central Executive Committee therefore proposes to send a special delegation to America which will negotiate upon this matter with the American Government in order to solve the question of business relations and of resumption of trade between Russia and America. M. KALENIN, *President of the All Russian Executive Committee*. P. ZALUTSKY, *Secretary*. . . .

"[On Mar. 25, 1921, Secretary Hughes cabled the following reply:]

"The Government of the United States views with deep sympathy and grave concern the plight of the people of Russia and desires to aid by every appropriate means in promoting proper opportunities through which commerce can be estab-

lished upon a sound basis. It is manifest to this Government that in existing circumstances there is no assurance for the development of trade, as the supplies which Russia might now be able to obtain would be wholly inadequate to meet her needs, and no lasting good can result so long as the present causes of progressive impoverishment continue to operate. It is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for the Russian people, and it is idle to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition by firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contract and the rights of free labor. If fundamental changes are contemplated, involving due regard for the protection of persons and property and the establish-

National Industrial Conference reported as follows: "The proponents of the measure find their cause clearly and concisely stated in the declaration of the Senate committee: In plain, simple English, its purpose is to give to the soldier who offered his life with his service a compensation that will approach that of the laborer who remained at home, secure from danger, and whose compensation increased from 200 to 300 per cent., and, measured by the amount of labor actually performed, a percentage beyond those figures. It is further argued that similar donations were made by our Government in previous wars and have been made by all the allied Governments in the present war. To this the opponents answer: That it is economically impossible; that with the present heavy burden of taxation, the outstanding private and public loans



THE PRESIDENT'S DESK IN THE WHITE HOUSE

Made of the timbers from the ship *Resolute*, which was sent in search of Sir John Franklin. It was presented to the United States by Queen Victoria.

ment of conditions essential to the maintenance of commerce, this Government will be glad to have convincing evidence of the consummation of such changes, and until this evidence is supplied this Government is unable to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations."—*New York Times Current History*, May, 1921, pp. 189-190.

1921 (March).—Note of Secretary Hughes to Costa Rica and Panama concerning their boundary disputes. See COSTA RICA: 1921.

1921 (March).—Failure of first Farmers' Emergency Tariff Bill. See TARIFF: 1921 (March).

1921 (March-July).—War Bonus Bill.—Opposed by president.—Discussion on the subject of granting a bonus to all the men and women who served in the war, which had been a burning question during the elections, came to a head in March, 1921. At the first session of Congress a bill was introduced, to provide for the bonus, on which the

to foreign and domestic creditors, the pressing need of new capital, the inevitable Treasury deficit, the general depressed industrial and financial condition of the country, and the necessity within the very period fixed for the beginning of bonus payments to meet maturing Government obligations of \$7,000,000,000, the plan would ultimately injure those it is intended to benefit. It represents the desires and determination of a highly organized and active minority. More than a majority of ex-service men, in the opinion of competent observers and by their own expression, are either indifferent to the bonus proposals or actively opposed to them."—*New York Times*, Apr. 24, 1921.—"President Harding appeared in person before the Senate on July 12 to make a presentation of the reasons why the soldiers' bonus bill, already condemned by Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, ought not to be passed at . . . [that time] lest it contribute to 'the paralysis of the Treasury.' He spoke forcibly of the need of appropriate action

for disabled soldiers and sailors, which he urged was a primary consideration as a matter of national gratitude. The enactment of the adjusted compensation bill in the midst of the struggle for readjustment and restoration, however, he said, would hinder every effort and greatly imperil the financial stability of the country. In addition this menacing effort to expend millions in gratuities would imperil our capacity to discharge our first obligations to those we must not fail to aid."—*New York Times Current History, August, 1921, p. 733.*—The bill was referred back to the finance committee.

1921 (April).—President Harding's first message to Congress.—"The first (special) session of the Sixty-seventh Congress, called by President Harding, convened on April 11. The House re-elected Frederick H. Gillett of Massachusetts as speaker by a vote of 298 as against 122 for Claude Kitchin, the Democratic choice, who thus became 'minority leader.' The old rules were readopted and the Committee on Committees presented the majority list of standing committee appointments. More than 2,000 local and private bills were introduced, 'captured German cannon' measures predominating. The Emergency Tariff Bill was also introduced.—On April 12 the President delivered his message to a joint session of the two houses. He called for economy in expenditures; the adoption of a national budget system; the reform of internal tax laws, and the abolition of the excess profits tax; the protection of agricultural interests; emergency tariff legislation and a thorough study preliminary to permanent tariff revision."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly, 1921, Supplement, p. 31.*—Following the precedent set in the previous administration, President Harding addressed the members in joint session. His address reads in part as follows:

"I know of no more pressing problem at home than to restrict our national expenditures within the limits of our national income, and at the same time measurably lift the burdens of war taxation from the shoulders of the American people. . . . The staggering load of war debt must be cared for in orderly funding and gradual liquidation. . . . In the fever of war our expenditures were so little questioned, the emergency was so impelling, appropriation was so unimpaired, that we little noted millions and counted the Treasury inexhaustible. It will strengthen our resolution if we ever keep in mind that a continuation of such a course means inevitable disaster. Our current expenditures are running at the rate of approximately \$5,000,000,000 a year, and the burden is unbearable. There are two agencies to be employed in correction: One is rigid resistance in appropriation and the other is the utmost economy in administration. Let us have both. I have already charged department heads with this necessity. I am sure Congress will agree, and both Congress and the Administration may safely count on the support of all right-minded citizens, because the burden is theirs. . . . Unless [he went on to say] there are striking cuts in the important fields of expenditure, receipts from internal taxes cannot safely be permitted to fall below \$4,000,000,000 in the fiscal years 1922 and 1923. This would mean total internal tax collections of about \$1,000,000,000 less than in 1920 and \$500,000,000 less than in 1921. The most substantial relief from the tax burden must come for the present from the readjustment of internal taxes and the revision or repeal of those taxes which have become unproductive and are so

artificial and burdensome as to defeat their own purpose. A prompt and thoroughgoing revision of the internal tax laws, made with due regard to the protection of the revenues, is, in my judgment, a requisite to the revival of business activity in this country. It is earnestly hoped, therefore, that the Congress will be able to enact without delay a revision of the revenue laws and such emergency tariff measures as are necessary to protect American trade and industry. . . .

"The urgency for an instant tariff enactment, emergency in character and understood by our people that it is for the emergency only, cannot be too much emphasized. I believe in the protection of American industry, and it is our purpose to prosper America first. . . . Moreover, imports should pay their fair share of our cost of government. . . . To-day American agriculture is menaced, and its products are down to pre-war normals, yet we are endangering our fundamental industry through the high cost of transportation from farm to market and through the influx of foreign farm products, because we offer, essentially unprotected, the best market in the world. It would be better to err in protecting our basic food industry than paralyze our farm activities in the world struggle for restored exchanges. The maturer revision of our tariff laws should be based on the policy of protection. . . . It is agreed that we cannot sell unless we buy, but ability to sell is based on home development and the fostering of home markets. There is little sentiment in the trade of the world. Trade can and ought to be honorable, but it knows no sympathy. . . .

"A very important matter is the establishment of the government's business on a business basis. There was toleration of the easy-going, unsystematic method of handling our fiscal affairs, when indirect taxation held the public unmindful of the Federal burden. But there is knowledge of the high cost of government to-day, and high cost of living is inseparably linked with high cost of government. There can be no complete correction of the high living cost until government's cost is notably reduced. Let me most heartily commend the enactment of legislation providing for the national budget system. Congress has already recorded its belief in the budget. It will be a very great satisfaction to know of its early enactment, so that it may be employed in establishing the economies and business methods so essential to the minimum of expenditure. I have said to the people we meant to have less of government in business as well as more business in government. It is well to have it understood that business has a right to pursue its normal, legitimate and righteous way unimpeded, and it ought [to] have no call to meet government competition where all risk is borne by the public treasury. There is no challenge to honest and lawful business success. But government approval of fortunate, untrammelled business does not mean toleration of restraint of trade or of maintained prices by unnatural methods. It is well to have legitimate business understand that a just government . . . has a right to expect the cooperation of that legitimate business in stamping out the practices which add to unrest and inspire restrictive legislation. . . . One condition in the business world may well receive your inquiry. Deflation has been in progress but has failed to reach the mark where it can be proclaimed to the great mass of consumers. Reduced cost of basic production has been recorded, but high cost of living has not yielded in like

proportion. For example, the prices on grains and livestock have been deflated, but the cost of bread and meats is not adequately reflected therein. . . . I have asked the Federal Trade Commission for a report of its observations and its attributes, in the main, the failure to adjust consumers' cost to basic production costs to the exchange of information by 'open-price associations,' which operate, evidently, within the law, to the very great advantage of their members and equal disadvantage to the consuming public. Without the spirit of hostility or haste in accusation of profiteering, some suitable inquiry by Congress might speed the price readjustment to normal relationship, with helpfulness to both producer and consumer. . . . The great interest of both the producer and consumer . . . in the problems of transportation will find its reflex in your concern to aid reestablishment, to restore efficiency and bring transportation cost into a helpful relationship rather than continue it as a hindrance to resumed activities. . . . No improvement will be permanent until the railways are operated efficiently at a cost within that which the traffic can bear. If we can have it understood that Congress has no sanction for government ownership, that Congress does not levy taxes upon the people to cover deficits in a service which should be self-sustaining, there will be an avowed foundation on which to rebuild.

"Freight-carrying charges have mounted higher and higher until commerce is halted and production discouraged. Railway rates and costs of operation must be reduced. . . . Transportation over the highways is little less important, but the problems relate to construction and development, and deserve your most earnest attention, because we are laying a foundation for a long time to come. . . . There is begun a new era in highway construction, the outlay for which runs far into hundreds of millions of dollars. Bond issues by road districts, counties and states mount to enormous figures and the country is facing such an outlay that it is vital that every effort shall be directed against wasted effort and unjustifiable expenditure. The Federal government can place no inhibition on the expenditure in the several states, but since Congress has embarked upon a policy of assisting the states in highway improvement, wisely, I believe, it can assert a wholly becoming influence in shaping policy. With the principle of Federal participation acceptably established, probably never to be abandoned, it is important to exert Federal influence in developing comprehensive plans looking to the promotion of commerce, and apply our expenditures in the surest way to guarantee a public return for money expended. . . .

"The laws governing Federal aid should be amended and strengthened. The Federal agency of administration should be elevated to the importance and vested with authority comparable to the work before it. And Congress ought to prescribe conditions to Federal appropriations which will necessitate a consistent program of uniformity which will justify the Federal outlay. . . . Highways, no matter how generous the outlay for construction, cannot be maintained without patrol and constant repairs. Such conditions insisted upon in the grant of Federal aid will safeguard the public which pays and guard the Federal government against political abuses, which tend to defeat the very purposes for which we authorize Federal expenditure.

"Linked with rail and highway is the problem of water transportation—inland, coastwise and

transoceanic. It is not possible on this occasion to suggest to Congress the additional legislation needful to meet the aspirations of our people for a merchant marine. In the emergency of war we have constructed a tonnage equaling our largest expectations. Its war cost must be discounted to the actual values of peace and the large difference charged to the war emergency, and the pressing task is to turn our assets in tonnage to an agency of commerce. It is not necessary to say it to Congress, but I have thought this to be a befitting occasion to give notice that the United States means to establish and maintain a great merchant marine. Our differences of opinion as to a policy of up-building have been removed by the outstanding fact of our having builded. If the intelligent and efficient administration under the existing laws makes established service impossible the Executive will promptly report to you. . . .

"It is proper to invite your attention to the importance of the question of radio communication and cables. To meet strategic commercial and political needs active encouragement should be given to the extension of American-owned and operated cable and radio services. Between the United States and its possessions there should be ample communication facilities providing direct services at reasonable rates. Between the United States and other countries not only should there be adequate facilities, but these should be, so far as practicable, direct and free from foreign intermediation. . . . Government-owned facilities, wherever possible without unduly interfering with private enterprise or government needs, should be made available for general uses. Practical experience demonstrates the need for effective regulation of both domestic and international radio operation. . . . International communication by cable and radio requires coöperation between the powers concerned. Whatever the degree of control deemed advisable within the United States, government licensing of cable landings and of radio stations transmitting and receiving international traffic seems necessary for the protection of American interests and for the securing of satisfactory reciprocal privileges.

"Aviation is inseparable from either the army or the navy, and the government must, in the interests of national defense, encourage its development for military and civil purposes. . . . The air mail service is an important initial step in the direction of commercial aviation. . . . The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, in a special report, . . . has recommended the establishment of a bureau of aeronautics in the Department of Commerce for the Federal regulation of air navigation, which recommendation ought to have legislative approval. I recommend the enactment of legislation establishing a bureau of aeronautics in the Navy Department to centralize the control of naval activities in aeronautics, and removing the restrictions on the personnel detailed to aviation in the navy. The army air service should be continued as a coördinate combatant of the army and its existing organization utilized in coöperation with other agencies of the government in the establishment of national transcontinental airways and in coöperation with the states in the establishment of local airdromes and landing fields. . . .

"Conscious of the generous intent of Congress and the public concern for the crippled and dependent, I invited the services of a volunteer committee to inquire into the administration of the

Bureau of War Risk Insurance, the Federal Board for Vocational Training and other agencies of government in caring for the ex-soldiers, sailors and marines of the World War. This committee promptly reported the chief difficulty to be the imperfect organization of governmental effort, the same lack of coordination which hinders government efficiency in many undertakings, less noticed because the need for prompt service is less appealing. This committee has recommended, . . . that all government agencies looking to the welfare of the ex-service men should be placed under one directing head. . . . It may be well to make such an official the director general of service to war veterans, and place under his direction all hospitalization, vocational training, war insurance, rehabilitation and all pensions. . . . During the recent political canvass the proposal was made that a Department of Public Welfare should be created. It was indorsed and commended so strongly that I venture to call it to your attention and to suggest favorable legislative consideration. . . . In the realms of education, public health, sanitation, conditions of workers in industry, child welfare, proper amusement and recreation, the elimination of social vice and many other subjects the government has already undertaken a considerable range of activities. I assume the maternity bill, already strongly approved, will be enacted promptly, thus adding to our manifestation of human interest. But these undertakings have been scattered through many departments and bureaus without coordination and with much overlapping of functions, which fritters energies and magnifies the cost. . . . To bring these various activities together in a single department, where the whole field could be surveyed and where their inter-relationships could be properly appraised, would make for increased effectiveness, economy and intelligence of direction. . . . Congress ought to wipe the stain of barbaric lynching from the banners of a free and orderly representative democracy. . . . One proposal is the creation of a commission embracing representatives of both races, to study and report on the entire subject. . . . It is needless to call your attention to the unfinished business inherited from the preceding Congress. The appropriation bills for army and navy will have your early consideration. . . .

"The government is in accord with the wish to eliminate the burdens of heavy armaments. . . . We are ready to cooperate with other nations to approximate disarmament, but merest prudence forbids that we disarm alone. . . . The War Department is reducing the personnel of the army from the maximum provided by law in June, 1920, to the minimum directed by Congress in a subsequent enactment. . . . Nearly two and a half years ago the World War came to an end, and yet we find ourselves to-day in the technical state of war, though actually at peace, while Europe is at technical peace, far from tranquillity and little progressed toward the hoped-for restoration. . . . In the existing League of Nations, world governing with its super powers, this Republic will have no part. There can be no misinterpretation and there will be no betrayal of the deliberate expression of the American people in the recent election; and, settled in our decision for ourselves, it is only fair to say to the world in general, and to our associates in war in particular, that the league covenant can have no sanction by us. The aim to associate nations to prevent war, preserve peace and promote civilization our people most cordially applaud. We yearned for this new instrument of justice, but

we can have no part in a commital to an agency of force in unknown contingencies; we can recognize no super-authority. Manifestly the highest purpose of the League of Nations was defeated in linking it with the treaty of peace and making it the enforcing agency of the victors of the war. International association for permanent peace must be conceived solely as an instrumentality of justice, . . . and not so constituted as to attempt the dual functions of a political instrument of the conquerors and of an agency of peace. . . . In the plight of policy and performance we told the American people we meant to seek an early establishment of peace. The United States alone among the Allied and associated powers continues in a technical state of war against the Central Powers of Europe. This anomalous condition ought not to be permitted to continue. To establish the state of technical peace without further delay I should approve a declaratory resolution by Congress to the effect, with the qualifications essential to protect all our rights. Such action would be the simplest keeping of faith with ourselves, and could in no sense be construed as a desertion of those with whom we shared our sacrifices in war, for these powers are already at peace. Such a resolution should undertake to do no more than thus to declare the state of peace which all America craves. It must add no difficulty in effecting, with just reparations, the restoration for which all Europe yearns and upon which the world's recovery must be founded. Neither former enemy nor ally can mistake America's position, because our attitude as to responsibility for the war and the necessity for just reparations already has had formal and very earnest expression.

"It would be unwise to undertake to make a statement of future policy with respect to European affairs in such a declaration of a state of peace. In correcting the failure of the Executive, in negotiating the most important treaty in the history of the nation, to recognize the constitutional powers of the Senate we would go to the other extreme, equally objectionable, if Congress or the Senate should assume the function of the Executive. . . . It would be idle to declare for separate treaties of peace with the Central Powers on the assumption that these alone would be adequate, because the situation is so involved that our peace engagements cannot ignore the Old World relationship and the settlements already effected, nor is it desirable to do so in preserving our own rights and contracting our future relationships. The wiser course would seem to be the acceptance of the confirmation of our rights and interests as already provided, and to engage under the existing treaty, assuming, of course, that this can be satisfactorily accomplished by such explicit reservations and modifications as will secure our absolute freedom from advisable commitments and safeguard all our essential interests. . . ."

1921 (April-May).—Comments on President Harding's foreign policy.—German reparations discussions.—"It is clear that, while the Administration does not object to a Congressional declaration that war no longer exists, the actual settlement of the war must be made in cooperation with the Allies under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, although modifications, including the elimination of the League Covenant, are to be made. The important point, however, is that Harding has committed himself to a settlement under the existing treaty and in cooperation with the Allies. After this he commits himself to an effort to create

some machinery to take the place of the League. The President's message and the informal note to Germany announcing that we agree with the Allies as to Germany's guilt in the war and the necessity of her making reparations to the full extent of her ability are efforts to provide an antidote for the weakening of the Allies' position which our attitude has caused. In the meanwhile the State Department has announced that as long as we are not in the League we do not necessarily accept the League's decisions as binding, and that we intend to negotiate concerning our rights with any nation whose acts affect those rights, whether that nation is acting in accordance with the dictates of the League, the agreements of the Big Three, or on its own initiative. It is, however, fairly clear that the new Administration, while refusing to use the League machinery, does, through the old channels of diplomacy, intend to maintain close and sympathetic relations with Great Britain, France, and Italy, and with these relations to take a more informed interest in world affairs—all of which affect us now more or less directly—than we ever have done heretofore. To do this, Mr. Hughes evidently intends to make a very strenuous effort to reorganize the diplomatic and consular services, not only in personnel, and continuity of service, but also in their relations with the State Department. The reform in the State Department itself, headed by Secretary Hughes with Henry Fletcher and Robert Bliss as assistants, will mean more in giving morale and purpose to the whole service than any other single thing. Mr. Hughes's definiteness of mind and administrative ability are well known. Mr. Fletcher is the only man who ever rose through the grades of the diplomatic service to the rank of ambassador and his experience and that of Mr. Bliss cover many of the capitals of the world. It is an encouraging sign that the new State Department is not on the defensive, merely trying to settle troubles that have arisen, but that it has already taken the initiative and is trying to direct the course of events into channels which shall be safe and beneficial to the United States—the only method by which diplomatic crises can be averted before they arise."—*World's Work*, May, 1921, p. 3.

1921 (April-May).—German appeal for mediation in reparation question.—American reply.—Official paraphrase of German memorandum.—Second German note.—Refusal by president to mediate.—Early in April, Germany appealed to the United States to act as arbiter in the dispute concerning reparations. "The American reply is the important part of the correspondence. Secretary Hughes in his note, for the consideration of Dr. Simons, German Foreign Minister . . . [made] it clear that this Government . . . [expected] Germany to assume moral responsibility for the war and . . . to pay to the full extent of her ability. The refusal to enter into any argument with the German Governmental representative is significant. . . . The American memorandum said: 'The American Government is pleased to note in the informal memorandum of Dr. Simons the unequivocal expression on the part of the German Government of its desire to afford reparation up to the limit of German ability to pay. This Government stands with the governments of the Allies in holding Germany responsible for the war and therefore, morally bound to make reparation, so far as may be possible. The recognition of this obligation, implied in the memorandum of Dr. Simons, seems to the Government of the United States the only

sound basis on which can be built a firm and just peace under which the various nations of Europe can achieve once more economic independence and stability. This Government believes that it recognizes in the memorandum of Dr. Simons a sincere desire on the part of the German Government to reopen negotiations with the Allies on a new basis and hopes that such negotiations, once resumed, may lead to a prompt settlement which will at the same time satisfy the just claims of the Allies and permit Germany hopefully to renew its productive activities.' Following is a paraphrase prepared by the State Department of the memorandum given by Dr. Simons to Mr. Dresel, American Commissioner in Berlin: 'It is the earnest desire of the Government of Germany to reach an accord with the governments of the allied and associated Powers, and it is sincere in its purpose to meet their requirements as far as possible. That an agreement was not reached at the conference of London on the question of reparations is a matter of extreme regret to the Government of Germany. In their efforts to reach an agreement, the delegates from Germany went far beyond the limit considered possible for Germany in the judgment of an overwhelming majority of her economic experts. It has been asserted that Germany is reluctant to recognize her obligations to make reparations. This is not correct. It is entirely clear not only to the Government of Germany but to the German people also that Germany must make reparation to the limit of her ability to pay. This realization on the part of Germany will not be altered in any way by any changes which may take place in the internal politics of the country. Every responsible group, particularly the workmen, of Germany are imbued with the determination to do all that lies in their power to help in reconstructing the regions which have been devastated. Fundamental to this determination is the sober conviction on the part of responsible circles in Germany that an early removal of all traces of the devastation caused in France is to be the best interests of Germany. It is the consensus of opinion also that the proposals made by Germany in regard to reparation must consider fully the financial necessities of the allied and associated governments and particularly of France. In view of the foregoing, two considerations in regard [to] reparations present themselves both of which are of importance. These considerations are, first, the matter of the rehabilitation of the devastated regions, and, second, the immediate establishment by Germany of an actual sum of cash money, in foreign exchange, of important proportions. In addressing ourselves to the first particular, namely, the rehabilitation of the devastated regions, certain facts are at once apparent. For four years ten of the eighty-six departments of France served as the theatre of the war and sustained the severest blows of the conflict. In these ten departments a number of cities, towns and villages were either partly or entirely destroyed, and wide stretches of fertile farming lands were laid waste. Only a little has been accomplished toward the rebuilding of homes, the reoccupation and the recultivation of the land in the two years that have elapsed since the ending of the war. For the immediate rehabilitation of these devastated regions, Germany has repeatedly proffered labor, technical advice and material assistance. These offers have not been accepted, nor have they even reached the point of diplomatic exchange. The reason is not far to seek. Pecuni-

liar though it may seem, there exists in France only a limited degree of concern for the rehabilitation of the devastated regions. Advanced indemnities have been given to the former occupants of the soil, and these occupants have removed to other parts of the country and taken up their abode there. The salvaging of the abandoned war materials and the cleaning up of the war areas has been undertaken by influential groups of promoters, who are making no effort to expedite the performance of their contracts. The fact that influential opinion in France sees in the devastated region a remarkable opportunity for a political agitation which will always make a deep impression in the minds of the people of France and on foreigners has an important bearing on the issue. The German Government does not desire to see hate perpetuated between nations. In accordance with this purpose it intends to submit fresh proposals on this subject to the Government of France, the details of which are now under consideration and the subject of discussion with the laborers of Germany. Should the Government of France entertain objections to the employment of numbers of German laborers in the areas undergoing reconstruction the Government of Germany stands ready to offer to France good offices and resources in whatever form is acceptable. In respect to the second consideration, namely, the immediate establishment by Germany of an actual sum of cash money, in foreign exchange, of important proportions, it is obvious that Germany can fulfil this obligation only through large increases in the volume of her exports. The memorandum prepared by the economic experts of Germany for use at the conference at London demonstrated how huge this increase in Germany's exports necessarily would be if great sums of money were thereby to be obtained, and the menace this great increase would imply to the economic life of their countries. Conceding even this, it further remains that the sums in cash required could not be immediately realized. Other considerations have been advanced at various times, among them the proposal that our former opponents in the great war should participate in the returns from German industry, either through taking shares of the capital stock of German companies or by other forms of the sharing of profits. Such a proposal would produce only proceeds in paper marks, valueless to foreign creditors. Indeed, the allied and associated governments themselves negated these proposals in the Treaty of Versailles by taking for themselves a first mortgage on the total wealth and all sources of income of the German commonwealth and states. In addition to this the allied and associated governments, in their deliberations at Paris, reserved for themselves the decision as to what opportunity, if any, Germany may in any instance be given to obtain credit abroad because England and France are themselves in debt beyond their limit, and the granting of a credit to Germany by a neutral Power is blocked by the general mortgage. An international loan, in favor of which the allied and associated Governments would waive their general mortgage, constitutes the only solution of the problem. The Government of Germany is prepared to offer the necessary securities for the safety of such a loan. It is the opinion of the German Government that if the loan were properly organized and offered and if those who have evaded taxation be granted a general amnesty, the large sums of German capital which have been secretly withdrawn from Ger-

many could again be drawn in for the loan and thereby become available for the reparations. It has been reiterated by the allied and associated Governments that the situation of Germany is better than that of many of the allied and associated countries, due to the fact that Germany has no foreign debts. Germany would not be unwilling to assume the obligation of the interest and the amortization of the foreign debts of the allied and associated Powers, within the limit of her capacity, should this measure be entertained by the allied and associated Governments and their creditors. Germany stands ready to meet any proposal which appears feasible for the solution of the economic and financial problems of Europe, and would invite the examination by unbiased experts of its own ability to make payment. It is the opinion of Germany that the heavy weight of debt now borne by all the states which were participants in the world war and the damages which were wrought in the course of that war cannot be laid upon the shoulders of a single people. Germany believes also that a policy of duress and coercion would not bring about the reconstruction of international economic life, and that only by way of peaceful discussion and understanding can such reconstruction be obtained. The German Government considers it important to give, with solemn emphasis, the assurance that for its part it is honestly willing to follow the path which it has suggested.'—*New York Herald*, Apr. 5, 1921.—On April 21, a new note was received from the German Government, dated April 20, in which the president was asked to mediate the reparation question. President Harding refused, but expressed a desire for the resumption of negotiations between Germany and the Allied Powers. The German note is as follows: "In the name of the German government and the German people, the undersigned, notwithstanding the still existing technical state of war, respectfully petition the President of the United States of America to mediate the reparation question and to fix the sum to be paid by Germany to the Allied Powers and eagerly to urge him to secure the consent of the Allied powers to such mediation. They solemnly declare that the German government are ready and willing to agree without qualification or reservation to pay to the Allied powers as reparation such sums as the President, after examination and investigation, may find just and right. They formally pledge themselves to fulfill in letter and spirit all the provisions of any award that may be made by him. With abiding faith in the righteousness of this request and with undeniable sincerity of purpose, the German people, through their constituted government, submit their appeal to the President of the United States with the confident hope that it be granted, to the end that a final award may be made in accordance with right and justice to meet the heartfelt wishes of all civilized nations, to avoid the immeasurable consequence of imminent coercive measures and to promote the peace of the world. FEHRENBACH (Chancellor), SIMONS, (Foreign Minister). [The president's refusal to mediate, which was forwarded on April 21, was couched by Secretary Hughes in the following terms:] 'This government could not agree to mediate the question of reparations with a view to acting as umpire in its settlement. Impressed, however, with the seriousness of the issues involved as they affect the whole world, the government of the United States feels itself to be deeply concerned with the question of obtaining an early and just

solution. This government strongly desires that there should be an immediate resumption of negotiations, and reiterates its earnest hope that the German government will promptly formulate such proposals as would present a proper basis for discussion. Should the German government take this course, this government will consider bringing the matter to the attention of the Allied governments in a manner acceptable to them in order that negotiations may speedily be resumed.' [The reparation terms proposed by the German government, in response to this note, were unacceptable as a basis of discussion. This information was conveyed to the German government, by Secretary Hughes in another note, in which he said:] 'The government of the United States has received the memorandum left by Dr. Simons with the commissioner of the United States under date of April 24, relating to reparations. In reply, this government states that it finds itself unable to reach the conclusion that the proposals afford a basis for discussion acceptable to the Allied governments, and that these proposals cannot be entertained. This government, therefore, again expressing its earnest desire for a prompt settlement of this vital question, strongly urges the German government at once to make directly to the Allied governments clear, definite and adequate proposals which would in all respects meet its just obligations.'"—*New York Tribune*, May 3, 1921.—On May 11 Germany accepted the terms proposed by the Allies.

1921 (April-July).—Djambi oil question.—"The contest between American and British oil interests [see above: 1920 (November): Note to Great Britain], also became acute in Djambi. This territory, located in the Dutch East Indies, has another extremely valuable oil field. In 1912 the Netherlands received bids of six different companies for this concession, and in 1915 the Government decided to grant it to the Batavian Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell . . . [a combination which had come under British control]. The Dutch Parliament failed to ratify the concession and it hung fire until 1921. When the matter was brought up again, the American State Department asked that the Standard Oil Company be allowed to participate in the fields."—R. L. Buell, *Oil interests in the fight for Mosul* (*New York Times Current History*, March, 1923).—Under instructions from Secretary Hughes, a vigorous note was delivered to the government of the Netherlands by William Phillips, the minister from the United States at The Hague. The note which was dated Apr. 19, 1921, reads as follows: "Excellency: During the last twelve months I have on several occasions presented to Your Excellency the very great interest of my Government in the participation by American capital in the development of the mineral oil deposits of The Netherlands East Indies. With your approval I have also had frequent interviews with the Minister of the colonies on the same subject. . . . I have pointed out that the United States has for years carried the burden of supplying a large part of the petroleum consumed by other countries; that Dutch capital has had free access to American oil deposits, and that the petroleum resources of no other country have been so heavily drawn upon to meet foreign needs as the petroleum resources of the United States. I have pointed out that in the future ample supplies of petroleum have become indispensable to the life and prosperity of my country as a whole, because of the fact that the United States is an industrial na-

tion, in which distance renders transportation difficult, and agriculture depends largely on labor-saving devices using petroleum products. In these circumstances my Government finds no alternative than the adoption of the principle of equally good opportunity, with the proviso that no foreign capital may operate in public lands unless its Government accords similar or like privileges to American citizens: and, furthermore, I have submitted that in the light of the future needs of the United States such very limited and purely defensive provisions as the above might become inadequate should the principle of equality of opportunity not be recognized in foreign countries. During the month of January, 1921, I again had an opportunity to discuss the situation with your Excellency, and on this occasion I advised you that in my interviews with the Minister of the Colonies I had gained the impression that the Colonial Department, at least, was inclined to favor the participation of American capital in the development of the Djambi fields. . . . I have now the honor to inform your Excellency that I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State to the effect that the Government of the United States is still mindful of the assurances that have been given by you and by the Minister of Colonies relating to the favorable attitude of her Majesty's Government toward American participation in the development of the Djambi fields. While I am not acting on behalf of any particular American company, I am glad of this opportune moment to point out that certain definite propositions which have been made during the last twelve months furnish sufficient evidence that responsible and experienced American interests are ready and desirous to cooperate with the Netherlands Government in oil developments in the Netherlands Indies. It is perhaps needless to say that my Government is fully aware of the laws and regulations in the Indies which prohibit foreign companies as such from entering the colonies for the development of mineral oils. On the other hand my Government is very greatly concerned when it becomes apparent that the monopoly of such far-reaching importance in the development of oil is about to be bestowed upon a company in which foreign capital other than American is so largely interested."—*New York Times*, Apr. 30, 1921.—The reply from the government of the Netherlands, received on May 12, stated that the note had been received too late, as the question had been settled. "The First Chamber of the Dutch Parliament, by 27 to 8, passed the Djambi Oil bill on July 1, providing for exploitation of valuable oil fields in Sumatra, Dutch East Indies, for forty years, by a combination of the Dutch Indian Government and the Batavia Oil Company, an offshoot of the Royal Dutch Shell combine, which is controlled in London. . . . [This made the measure law], the Second Chamber having passed it on April 29. Under the bill the combination . . . [was required to have] a capital of 10,000,000 guilders (\$40,200,000 at parity), to be divided equally, but the company is under the control of the Dutch Government, and the Directors must all be Dutchmen. By adoption of the bill American interests . . . were excluded from exploitation in the Djambi fields. This . . . was Holland's answer to Secretary Hughes's notes. . . . In reply to the note of May 27 the Dutch Government denied that its act closing the Djambi fields to American participation was contrary to the principles of reciprocity. Moreover, the Dutch Government objected to the representing of its policy toward

foreign nations as less liberal than that of the United States. The contrary, the note declared, was rather the case."—*New York Times Current History*, Aug., 1921, p. 834.—See also TRUSTS: International: Struggle for oil concessions.

ALSO IN: *New York Times Current History*, June, 1921, p. 404; July, 1921, p. 687.

1921 (April-September).—**Mesopotamia oil controversy.—Attitude on mandates.**—The diplomatic exchanges, on account of the Mesopotamian oil concessions, which had been dropped in March by Secretary Colby, were taken up in April, 1921, by Secretary Hughes. "In March, 1921, Lord Curzon . . . [had answered] the Colby note by reiterating that the oil concession in Mesopotamia had been granted before the war, and should therefore be protected—a statement which the United States would not accept, on the ground that the concession had never actually been completed."—R. L. Buell, *Oil interests in the fight for Mosul* (*New York Times Current History*, Mar., 1923).—To take a clear view of this disputed point, and of the attitude of the administration to the question of mandates in general, with which it is more or less complicated, it is necessary to go back into history. "At San Remo, in April, 1920, England and France reviewed their pre-war concessions received from the Rumanian, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Governments for working oil wells in those countries, and decided upon a readjustment, particularly in the Turkish concessions in Mesopotamia, so that the New Mesopotamian Government and not Turkey might reap some benefit therefrom. [See also SAN REMO CONFERENCE.] Accordingly, the interests in this region were pooled—62 per cent. was to go to Great Britain, 18 per cent. to France and the remainder, 20 per cent., to the new Government of Mesopotamia. The contention of the British Government is that at San Remo a readjustment of concessions received before the war was made by it and France, and that therefore the matter is beyond the jurisdiction of the League of Nations, and hence not open to the criticism made by Washington. In continuing the correspondence dropped by Secretary Colby, Secretary Hughes incorporated with the criticism of the Mesopotamian matter the matter of other arrangements made between the Allies without consultation with the United States. This . . . complicated the matter in the press reports, but in his . . . note to the State Department on April 5 Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, isolated the Mesopotamian question, presented its entire history dating back to 1906, and proved that the San Remo arrangement was not based on the result of the war, except in so far as it benefited Mesopotamia and not Turkey—the rest was merely a readjustment of pre-war concessions made to Great Britain and France."—*New York Times Current History*, May, 1921, p. 354.—As a matter of fact, the question had already been complicated by Secretary Colby, in his notes of May and November, 1920, in which he introduced the questions of mandates in general, and the island of Yap in particular. "After our decision to remain outside the League, American interest in the mandate principle was both general and particular. In general, we were interested in all the codes of international law which were created for the control of mandate territories. In particular, we had special interests to protect in certain of the territories. These interests brought us into early contact with the League of Nations, and this resulted in a short and sharp struggle between the Council of the League and the State

Department. In this struggle the United States came off clearly the victor. . . . It was not easy to ignore the League when the League Council was taking action on matters which were of direct concern to the United States. On May 7, 1919, the Council of Four, of which President Wilson was a member, had allocated the mandate territories to the Great Powers. At the time this action was taken President Wilson had entered a reservation to the assignment of Yap to the Japanese. As this island was an important cable and wireless station lying midway between our shores and Asia, it was his opinion that the island should be internationalized as a communication base and not assigned to any one nation. Yap came to be the chief point in the contentions between the United States and the Great Powers in the matter of mandates. Second only to our interest in the mandate over the island of Yap assumed by the Japanese was our interest in the mandate over Mesopotamia which had been granted to Great Britain. Later our interest developed to cover almost all of the mandate territories. After the withdrawal of the United States from Europe mandate matters moved slowly and under a cloak of silence. In May, 1920, the Secretary of State addressed a note to the British Foreign Office touching upon questions which had arisen in connection with the administration of Mesopotamia. At the same time the Secretary of State pushed further in communications to the Foreign Offices of Great Britain and Japan inquiries regarding the plans for the internationalizing of the communications systems of Yap. An international communication congress was impending which would consider among other things Pacific communications. To American inquiries on these subjects the Great Powers paid no attention. . . . [In his note of Nov. 20, 1920, to the British Foreign Office (see above: 1920 [November]: Foreign policy), on the ground that the United States is undoubtedly one of the powers interested in the terms of the mandates Secretary Colby requested] that the draft mandate forms be communicated to this government for its consideration before their submission to the Council of the League. Communications were made to Japan to the same effect. In spite of these demands the League Council on December 17, 1920, officially ratified the allocation of the C Mandates which covered the assignment of Yap to Japan, without showing the copies of the mandates to the United States or giving official heed to our demand that we be consulted. At the same time it postponed the consideration of A and B Mandates until a later date. The precise questions at issue in the cases of these mandates are for our purposes of minor importance. Of greater importance than the concrete questions involved is the trial of strength that ensued between the United States and the great powers. . . . The United States had refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty. In what position did this refusal leave the United States with reference to matters covered in the Treaty? For the clarification of the points at issue the Great Powers undertook to hold the position that in repudiating the Treaty and the Covenant the United States had put itself out of court in matters covered by these documents. . . . Great Britain informed the United States that 'the terms of the mandate can properly be discussed only in the Council of the League of Nations and by the signatories of the Covenant.' The issue was definitely joined. . . . [But] the end of President Wilson's Administration was approaching. It was desirable that when the Department of

State was turned over to the new Secretary measures should have been taken for the protection of all American interests throughout the world. At the same time, the Administration which had made the repudiated Treaty and was now going out of office had no desire to discuss with foreign powers any of the consequences of the American failure to ratify the Treaty. On its side the Department of State spent no breath in discussing the consequences of our failure to ratify the Treaty. On February 21 Secretary Colby addressed a letter to the Council of the League of Nations in which he outlined in full the demands of the United States and the grounds upon which they were pressed. Secretary Colby held that, aside from the ratification or non-ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, the United States had rights in the victory as one of the leading associated nations which could not be alienated. He called attention to the fact that the assignment of the Mandate to Japan of former German Pacific possessions 'in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers' was not accurate, as the United States had not been consulted in this action. His note declared that consent had never been given for the inclusion of Yap among the territories assigned to Japan, that indeed express reservations had been made against this assignment. He took the position that no mandate draft would be valid without the agreement of the United States, asked that drafts of all proposed mandates be submitted to the United States, and called for publicity in mandate discussions. Holding that 'as one of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the United States had an equal concern and an inseparable interest with the other principal Allied and Associated Powers in the overseas possessions of Germany and conceded an equal voice in their disposition,' he concluded that the United States could not be bound by the action of December 17, 1920, and requested that the matter be reconsidered. When the Great Powers had forced the United States to address the League, they had won a diplomatic victory. But it was a hollow victory. For the League Council was not qualified to deal with the questions raised by the Department of State. All the Council could do, therefore, was to indicate its willingness to hold the matters in dispute open until they could be treated by the Great Powers to which the Council referred them. In pursuit of their earlier design of forcing conversations between the United States and the League, the Council asked the United States to send a representative to discuss the various matters at issue. The reply of the Council was despatched on March 1, 1921, and arrived immediately before the inauguration of the new President. The matter was thus laid on the doorstep of the new Administration. By Secretary Hughes the request for the appointment of a representative to discuss matters directly with the League was ignored. . . . [and] the mandate questions were taken up direct with the Great Powers concerned as mandatories. . . . On April 5, 1921, Secretary Hughes replied to the League note of March 1 in notes to Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, taking the broad ground that the Allied Powers had no power to make a 'valid or effective disposition of the overseas possessions of Germany now under consideration without the assent of the United States'; that the right to dispose 'of the overseas possessions of Germany was acquired only through the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers' in which there is no disposition to deny the United States a place; that the Council of the League has been

vested with no authority to bind the United States or to act in its behalf; that the fact that the United States has not ratified the Treaty of Versailles cannot detract from rights already acquired."—T. H. Dickinson, *United States and the League*, pp. 96-104.—On Sept. 6, 1921, "a new note on the subject of mandates . . . [was] sent by the American Government to all the principal allied powers, reiterating the stand taken by Secretary Hughes for American rights and insisting upon the open door and equality of opportunity in all mandated territories. . . . The new note was addressed to all the principal allied powers in practically identical form. . . . The main points . . . [related to] the question of discrimination in the administration of the mandates. For example, the mandate forms in several instances . . . [referred to] certain rights and benefits . . . to accrue to nationality of members of the League of Nations. While . . . [our Government assumed] that these references . . . [were] the result merely of locution employed upon the assumption that the United States was to be a member of the League, the American note . . . [reiterated] its contention that the open door, or principle of equal opportunity for the nationals of all countries, should be recognized. The nationals of the United States, the note insists, must be protected from discrimination. . . . It is understood that the note offers no objection to the existing allocation of the former Turkish possessions or the former German colonies in Africa, but merely insists upon the right of equal opportunity for American nationals in those areas."—*New York Times*, Sept. 7, 1921.—See also TRUSTS: International: Struggle for oil concessions.

1921 (April-December).—Special session of Sixty-seventh Congress.—Influence of agricultural bloc.—"Beginning on March 4, 1921, the Republican party, for the first time in ten years, was in complete control of the executive and both branches of Congress. . . . Campaign pledges had been made that legislation would be speedily passed relieving the country of the ill effects of what President Harding called 'war's involvements'; economy and efficiency were to be secured; more business in government and less government in business were among the promises, and the reorganization of the administration, long talked of, was to be achieved. . . . During the campaign, Mr. Harding said that 'government is a simple thing,' and that, if he was elected President, Congress would be allowed to play its proper part under the Constitution. He pledged the Republicans to inaugurate 'party government, as distinguished from personal government, individual, dictatorial, autocratic, or whatnot.' . . . There were unmistakable signs that President Harding regretted his self-denying ordinance and realized that he should—on occasion he even tried to—lead Congress, and there developed a powerful revolt by members representing the agricultural sections of the country against the more conservative leadership of the party. . . . The Emergency Tariff Act was passed, with some of its provisions changed from the form in which it was vetoed by President Wilson. The Tax Revision Law went through the House in four days and was considered by the Senate for six weeks, and as passed it satisfied no one. Senator Penrose, its chief author, called it 'a temporary or transitional measure.' A permanent tariff bill was passed in the House but failed to receive consideration in the Senate. . . . President Harding's intention, announced in his campaign, was to be a 'constitutional executive.' . . . The President was to announce a party

program and give Congress his advice, but in no case was he to try to impose his on that of the legislature. . . . There were no differences between the executive and legislature that resulted in vetoes, but that, probably, was due to the failure of Congress to do more and the desire of the President to avoid an open break, rather than to any meeting of minds. The President, for example, was beaten decisively on the question of surtaxes. He sent a letter to Representative Fordney asking a compromise of 40 per cent, but the House, even with a Republican majority of two-thirds, ignored his wishes. The House committee refused to accept Secretary Mellon's tax proposals, even though they had President Harding's approval and Secretary Mellon's foreign debt refunding bill was materially modified before it passed the House on October 24. Even with a commission, instead of the uncontrolled authority of the secretary of the treasury which the administration proposed, the House accepted the measure with unfeigned reluctance. The President's attitude on the bonus was courageous, but here Congress was only too ready to shift responsibility to the executive and postpone the evil day of decisive action. [See above: 1921 (March-July).] In one respect, President Harding took a very interesting attitude. . . . He seemed to play the House of Representatives, which he could control, against the Senate which he could not. Thus, the emergency peace resolution was held up in the House in accordance with the President's wishes and was finally passed in the form that he desired. On disarmament, he was not so successful in having his own way. The Borah resolution, authorizing and requesting the President to invite Great Britain and Japan to a naval conference, was added to the naval appropriation bill by a unanimous vote in the Senate. The phraseology seemed to the President to be too definite, to give the Congress the initiative, if a conference was held. . . . [One of the most interesting and important developments of this special session] was the power and activity of the so-called agricultural 'bloc.' This is simply a group of senators and representatives who decided to act together in matters affecting the farmer, to force concessions from the Republican leaders as the price of their support of the party, and to act as a unit in putting on the statute books measures of importance to the agricultural interests which the party leaders desired to delay or hesitated to sponsor. In the Senate 22 members, mostly from western states, can be listed as the minimum of the agricultural 'bloc,' but its proportions have on occasion grown to 55—28 Republicans and 27 Democrats. In the House there are about 100 members. Their most spectacular action was to agree with the Senate surtax amendment over President Harding's objecting letter. The influence of the 'bloc' in the Senate was shown by the Emergency Tariff Act, the law regulating the packers, the provisions of a billion dollars credit for farm exports, the regulation of grain exchanges dealing in futures, the Curtis bill appropriating \$25,000,000 as a revolving fund for farm loan banks, and the Kenyon bill, providing an increased rate of interest for farm loan bank bonds, without an increase of interest rates to the farmers. On the tax revision bill, the agricultural 'bloc' gave the Senate leaders notice that certain changes would have to be made, and they were made. The surtax of 50 per cent on incomes, the repeal of the transportation taxes, and the increase of estate taxes, are schedules on which they forced concessions."—L. Rogers, *American government and politics* (*American Political*

Science Review, Feb., 1922, pp. 41-43, 46-49).—See also BLOC: United States agricultural bloc.—"After years of agitation in behalf of budget reform Congress finally enacted a budget law . . . similar to the bill vetoed in 1920 by President Wilson . . . [but with the clause which limited the power of the executive removed]. The Senate adopted the McCormick Budget Bill on April 26 without a roll-call and after little debate. The House passed the Budget Bill with amendments on May 5 by a vote of 344 to 9. The conference measure was accepted on May 26-27 by the two houses and was signed by the President on June 10. [See below: 1921 (June): Budget law.] . . . The Navy Appropriation Bill which was passed by the House during the previous session but was not voted on in the Senate was again passed by the House on April 28 by a vote of 212 to 15. As passed by the House, the bill carried \$396,000,000 and provided for the execution of the 1916 building program. The bill was reported in the Senate on May 5 and was passed with amendments on June 1 by a vote of 54 to 17. Some of the amendments proposed in the Senate brought forth protracted debates between the advocates and opponents of a larger navy. On May 24 the Senate adopted by a vote of 45 to 23 an amendment to the House bill proposed by the Committee on Naval Affairs increasing the appropriation for 'pay of the navy' from \$72,421,647, the House figures, to \$87,798,447. The most important amendment, however, was that presented by Senator Borah, providing for an international conference on armaments. Although this amendment was at first opposed by the Committee, it was adopted by the Senate on May 25, without a dissenting vote. The amendment read as follows: 'That the President is authorized and requested to invite the governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference, which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval expenditures and building programs of each of said governments, to wit, the United States, Great Britain and Japan, shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years to such an extent and upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which understanding or agreement is to be reported to the respective governments for approval.' [See below: 1921 (July-August).] The amendment offered by Senator Pomerene, providing for the temporary suspension of the naval ship-building program during the disarmament conference, was rejected by a vote of 29 to 36. The navy bill as passed by the Senate carried appropriations amounting to \$494,000,000, an increase of \$98,000,000 over the House measure. The bill went to conference and was finally approved by both houses on July 11. The President approved it the next day. As finally enacted the Navy Law appropriated \$417,000,000. It carried out the President's recommendation relative to the establishment of a Bureau of Aeronautics in the navy department. The Army Appropriation Bill, passed by the House on May 10 by a vote of 241 to 23, carried appropriations amounting to \$331,000,000 and provided for an army of 150,000 men. The Senate on June 7 by a vote of 35 to 30 refused to reduce the army to that figure but on the following day reversed itself and agreed to the House proposal by a vote of 36 to 32. The bill . . . was signed by the President on June '30."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1921, Supplement, pp. 32, 34-35.—"The special session of the Sixty-seventh Congress . . . continued until November

23. One of the most important measures adopted during the session was the one to regulate interstate and foreign commerce in live-stock and dairy products, generally known as the Packers Bill. For several years the Western farmers had insisted upon curbing the monopolistic tendencies exhibited by the great packing corporations. Bills designed to remedy existing conditions were pending in both houses many months before either house took definite action. Early in June the House adopted the Haugen Bill which Senator Kenyon declared satisfactory to the packers and which Senator La Follette charged had been practically drafted by them. This bill struck a deadly blow at the Federal Trade Commission by depriving it of all regulating authority over the packing industry except when called upon by the Secretary of Agriculture to make particular investigations. Great powers of regulation were vested in the Secretary of Agriculture. In the Senate a strong attempt was made by the members of the 'agricultural bloc,' led by Senator Norris, Kendrick, Kenyon and La Follette, to substitute the Norris Bill for the Haugen Bill. . . . The substitute amendment was lost by a vote of 34 for to 37 against. One important amendment introduced by Senator Kenyon was, however, adopted by the Senate. This provided for uniform accounting and considerable publicity in regard to the packing industry. The bill which was reported by the conference committee, adopted by both houses, and signed by the President on August 15 was practically the Haugen Bill. Administrative control was vested in the Secretary of Agriculture. The Federal Trade Commission was deprived of most of its regulatory power over the packing industry and the uniform accounting amendment of the Senate was rejected. . . . The Good Roads Bill provided for the appropriation of \$75,000,000 to aid state highway construction, and the Sheppard-Towner Bill established machinery and provided funds to the amount of \$1,500,000 for the year to aid the states in the protection of maternity and infancy. A Board of Maternity and Infant Hygiene, consisting of the Chief of the Children's Bureau, the Surgeon-General of the United States Public Health Service, and the United States Commissioner of Education, was established, and the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor was charged with the administration of the act. The amount allotted to the several states was made to depend on population and was made available only in case the states provided equal sums for the maintenance of the services and facilities provided by the act. . . . The President approved the bill on November 23. . . . The Revenue Act of 1921 was one of the chief accomplishments of the session. . . . The House bill provided for the repeal of the excess-profits tax and the reduction of the maximum surtax on individual incomes from sixty-five per cent to thirty-two per cent. The transportation taxes and the luxury taxes on wearing apparel and soda fountain sales were also abolished. The exemption for heads of families from the normal income tax was raised from \$2000 to \$2500 and the exemption for dependents from \$200 to \$400. The tax of 10 per cent on the net income of corporations was increased to 12½ per cent. The bill was estimated to reduce the national revenues by about \$600,000,000. Early in September, Secretary of the Treasury Mellon appeared before the Senate Finance Committee and made a number of important recommendations relative to tax revision. He urged the repeal of the excess profits and transportation taxes, the reduction of the maximum

income surtaxes to twenty-five per cent, the increase of the corporation income tax to fifteen per cent, and a tax on proprietary medicines and cosmetics, and the elimination of the capital stock tax. . . . Almost seven weeks were spent on the bill . . . [by the Senate] and more than eight hundred amendments were adopted. Senator Penrose reported the bill from the Finance Committee with the House surtax rates of thirty-two per cent. There was such a storm of protest, however, from the 'agricultural bloc' that the leaders were forced to compromise. The bill was recommitted and reported back with the rate increased to fifty per cent. This was finally accepted by the Senate and although attacked in conference was finally written into the law. . . . The bill with many amendments passed the Senate on November 7 . . . [and] was sent to conference on November 10. . . . The House agreed to the conference report on November 21 and the Senate followed suit two days later. The bill was signed by the President on November 23. . . . Although there was much discussion of the proposed bonus or 'adjusted compensation' for veterans no action was taken by Congress on this matter. However, the Sweet Law, approved August 9, provided for the establishment of an independent Veterans' Bureau to take over the work of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, the Rehabilitation Division of the Federal Board for Vocational Education, and some of the services relating to ex-soldiers performed by the United States Public Health Service.—On August 24 the urgent Deficiency Appropriation Bill for the year 1922 was approved by the President. It carried among other items, \$48,500,000 for the Shipping Board and specifically provided that not more than six officers or employees of the Board should be paid an annual salary in excess of \$11,000.—By a law approved November 18 Congress appropriated \$4,000,000 for completing the Alaskan railroad."—*Ibid.*, pp. 30-33.—"The first regular session of the Sixty-seventh Congress convened on December 5. The following day President Harding delivered in person his annual message before a joint session of the two houses. . . . He was in favor of the funding of foreign debts and expressed the hope that changes would be made in the Merchant Marine Act. . . . On the first day of the session the President submitted to Congress the budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1923, prepared by General Dawes as Director of the Budget in accordance with the provisions of the Budget act of 1921. The estimates for 1922 and 1923, as compared with expenditures for 1921, showed substantial decreases. In only two departments were large increases contemplated. . . . Some important changes in congressional procedure were made in carrying out the budget law. In the House a single Committee on Appropriations was substituted for the eight separate committees previously reporting spending proposals. A similar change was made by the Senate."—*Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

1921 (May).—Dillingham Immigration Bill and its operation. See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States: 1920-1921: Efforts to check immigration; 1921.

1921 (May).—Fordney Tariff Bill passed. See TARIFF: 1921 (May).

1921 (May).—Acceptance of invitation to be represented at Allied conferences, on Ambassadors' Council and on the Reparations Commission.—"For a year or more America's interests in the Council of Ambassadors, the Reparations Commission, and the Rhineland Commission had been watched by unofficial observers. After the election

of 1920 these observers were withdrawn. No representative of the United States was sent to the meeting of the First League Assembly in Geneva."—T. H. Dickinson, *United States and the league*, p. 27.—In May, 1921, however, an invitation to resume attendance at these meetings was extended by the Allies and accepted. The following is the text of the note which was sent by Lloyd George, as president of the London Conference, by the hand of Sir Auckland Geddes, the British ambassador at Washington. "As president of the Allied Conference, which is just completing its sittings in London, I am authorized, with the unanimous concurrence of all the powers here represented, to express to the United States government our feeling that the settlement of the international difficulties in which the world is still involved would be materially assisted by the cooperation of the United States; and I am therefore to inquire whether that government is disposed to be represented in the future, as it was at an earlier date, at Allied conferences, wherever they may meet; at the Ambassadors' Conference, which sits at Paris, and on the Reparations Commission. We are united in feeling that American cognizance of our proceedings and, where possible, American participation in them, will be best facilitated by this." [To this note, Charles Evans Hughes, the secretary of state, replied as follows:] "The government of the United States has received through the British Ambassador the courteous communication in which you state that, with the unanimous concurrence of the powers represented at the Allied conference in London, you are to inquire whether this government is disposed to be represented in the future, as it was in the past, at the Allied conferences, at the conferences of ambassadors in Paris and on the Reparations Commission. The government of the United States, while maintaining the traditional policy of abstention from participation in matters of distinctly European concern, is deeply interested in the proper economic adjustments and in the just settlement of the matters of world wide importance which are under discussion in the conferences and desires helpfully to cooperate in the deliberation upon these questions. Mr. George Harvey, appointed Ambassador to Great Britain, will be instructed on his arrival in England, to take part as the representative of the President of the United States in the deliberations of the Supreme Council. The American Ambassador to France will be instructed to resume his place as unofficial observer on the conference of ambassadors, and Mr. Roland W. Boyden will be instructed to sit again in an unofficial capacity on the Reparations Commission. The government of the United States notes with pleasure your expression of the belief of the representatives of the Allied governments assembled in London that American cooperation in the settlement of the great international questions growing out of the World War will be of material assistance."—*New York Tribune*, May 12, 1921.

1921 (May).—Hughes rejects Polish appeal for support in Upper Silesia.—On May 18, the government published the fact that Poland had asked that the influence of the United States should be used to aid her in obtaining the disputed districts in Upper Silesia. (See POLAND: 1921: Upper Silesian complication.) The following is the text of the note sent to Prince Lubomirski, the Polish Ambassador, by Secretary Hughes in reply: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of May 11, in which you recite the reasons why, in your opinion, certain districts

of Upper Silesia should be assigned to Poland and urge that the representatives of the Government of the United States on the Supreme Council, the Council of Ambassadors and the Reparation Commission be instructed to exert their influence in favor of a settlement of the matter strictly in accord with the Treaty of Versailles and the result of the recent plebiscite. In the reply I have the honor to inform you that, in my opinion, the settlement of such boundary disputes as arise in the case under consideration is a matter of European concern, in which, in accord with the traditional policy of the United States, this Government should not become involved. The attitude of the Government in this matter is clearly understood by its representatives in Europe, who will, therefore, as far as at present may be seen, take no part in the discussion concerning Upper Silesia, and will express no opinion as to the settlement."—*New York Times*, May 19, 1921.

1921 (May).—Unemployment figures.—Agricultural distress.—"Throughout 1919 and the spring of 1920 there was apparent prosperity with continued demand for goods, based on the high wages of the war period and the expenditure by people of small means of their accumulated capital in the form of Liberty bonds and war savings stamps. This demand, however, was not based on income alone; it resulted from the expenditure of capital. Naturally, there came an end to such spending, and it was then seen that the so-called shortage of goods was not real. The freight blockade was lifted about the same time, releasing great quantities of goods, and people soon discovered that the market was flooded and that the buying power had gone out of it. Meanwhile, plants had been expanded and business men had borrowed freely. Now they had to stop. Their notes were falling due; and further extension of credit was impossible. The inevitable result was a collapse in commodity markets and prices, which seriously affected the whole business machinery of the nation and caused acute distress in the agricultural districts. The prices of farm products declined rapidly and farmers generally were unable, without considerable sacrifice, to dispose of the crops and live stock which they had produced at high costs."—E. Meyers, Jr., *Emergency credit for agriculture* (Survey, Graphic number, January, 1922).—There was great resulting distress throughout the winter and spring of 1920-1921. The bold figures in a statement published in the *New York* daily papers in May, 1921, are eloquent. "Unemployment figures compiled by Secretary Frank Morrison of the American Federation of Labor, from reports reaching him show that today in 210 cities there are 1,325,061 persons, both union and non-union, out of employment, as compared with 1,391,396 the last of March. A statement embodying the reports by cities was made public here tonight. Figures for Chicago had not been tabulated, but Greater New York and vicinity, according to the report, have 400,000 unemployed, or the same number as on the last of March. Cleveland has 125,000, against 108,017 in March; Boston 40,000, against 35,000; Milwaukee 34,500, against 40,000; St. Louis 50,000, against 37,500; Pittsburgh 60,000, against 20,000; Indianapolis 25,000, against 20,000; Cincinnati 20,000, against 35,000, and Los Angeles 18,000, against a similar number in March. Other cities included in the report are: Grand Rapids, Mich., with 2,500, against 7,500 in March; Schenectady, N. Y., 15,000, against 5,000; Waterbury, Conn., 22,500, against 18,000; Wilmington, Del., 13,500, against 9,870; Akron,

Ohio, 20,000, against 12,000; Altoona Pa., 15,000, against 2,500; . . . Butte, Mont., 10,000, against 25,000; Flint, Mich., 12,000, against 19,000."—*New York Times* May 21, 1921.—"The debacle of prices in 1920 and 1921 reduced the farmer to a condition worse than he . . . [had] suffered under for 30 years. Prices of farm products are relatively far below the prices of other groups of commodities. . . . [In these years] the products the farmer . . . [had to sell bought] less of the products the farmer had to buy to-day than at any time in the . . . [preceding] two decades. Farm indebtedness . . . [had] doubled in the last 10 years, and the drop in prices . . . [had] the effect of again doubling this indebtedness. Farmers . . . [had great] difficulty in paying the debts incurred in producing the crops of 1920 and in securing credit necessary for new production. . . . In the spring of 1920 evidences that deflation was at hand began to multiply. Exports of farm products, particularly, continued to decline in volume. Domestic consumption in many lines also began to decline; the stream of production flowing from the farmer to the consumer began to back up in the channels of distribution, although higher discount rates and tight money, like dikes erected along the banks of the stream, served as influences to keep goods flowing in the channels of trade, notwithstanding the obstacles of declining prices and slackening demand. As demand fell off the difficulties of disposing of the crop of 1920 increased. Prices fell far below the costs of production, which were higher in 1920 than in any preceding year. The receipts from farm products grew constantly less and less adequate to liquidate the indebtedness against them and to provide for new production. More and still more credit was required to finance new production and to carry goods of 1920 production until they could be moved. The process of forcing these goods upon the market, in the face of lessening demand, served to still further force down prices, and as prices dropped the proceeds of the sales of goods became less and less adequate to pay the accumulated debts made in producing them. Thus customary credit requirements were embarrassed because costs of production could not be liquidated at current selling prices, and the interest costs of carrying the goods until a better market could be obtained had to be added to the losses incident to declining prices. Toward the end of 1919 the demands of the consuming public reached such proportions as to develop on the part of the retailers a kind of buyers' panic. . . . This led to a runaway market, a purely sellers' market, and gave a wholly fictitious impression of the probable demands of the coming year. . . . It was inevitable that this bubble of inflated prices must burst at some time, and the first warnings that it was coming were found in the cancellation of . . . duplicated orders. These cancellations, moderate at first, soon became, as the fall in prices progressed, simply an avalanche, and so far as the most careful investigation discovers, it was this wave of cancellation, and the fright which preceded it, which were the main or precipitating causes which carried prices down in such a headlong fashion. While there were probably many to anticipate a fairly drastic reaction from the unexampled boom of 1919-20, there were few probably, and possibly none, really to anticipate the tremendous decline which actually took place. Records of price changes . . . [ran back] to the beginning of the nineteenth century. In this period of 120 years the debacle of 1920-21 was without parallel."—S. Anderson, *Credit Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry*

(67th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Report no. 408, pt. 2, Oct. 15, 1921, pp. 7, 45-46).

1921 (June).—Withdrawal from Santo Domingo.—On June 14, a proclamation announced to Santo Domingo that the United States forces, which had been in occupation from 1916, would be withdrawn within eight months from the date of the proclamation.—See also SANTO DOMINGO: 1920-1922.

1921 (June).—Receives first payment from Germany for war costs. See GERMANY: 1921 (May-June).

1921 (June).—Arbitration with Norway. See NORWAY: 1921-1923.

1921 (June).—The budget law.—Prior to June, 1921, the budget system of the United States was inadequate. "The United States government does not have a finance minister who is responsible for raising and expending its revenues, hence it has not a true budget. However, Congress devotes a large portion of its time to the creation and consideration of a so-called budget. The Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives prepares bills for raising all revenue, and nine other distinct committees of the House prepare bills appropriating the revenue. The head of each of the ten administrative departments prepares an estimate of its needs for the succeeding year and transmits it to the Secretary of the Treasury. When the Secretary has collected these ten estimates, he sends them to the Speaker of the House as he received them. The Speaker, in turn, separates these estimates into eight groups, referring one group to each of the eight committees having power to prepare appropriation bills."—F. A. Magruder, *American government in 1921*, p. 97.—To remedy this state of affairs a law to create, in the Treasury Department, a Bureau of the Budget, and a general accounting office was passed by Congress on June 5, and approved by the president on June 10, 1921. The act reads in part as follows: "The President shall transmit to Congress on the first day of each regular session, the Budget, which shall set forth in summary and in detail (a) Estimates of the expenditures and appropriations necessary in his judgment for the support of the Government for the ensuing fiscal year . . . the estimates for the legislative branch and the Supreme Court to be transmitted to the president on or before Oct. 15 in each year, and included by him in the budget without revision. (b) His estimates of the receipts of the Government during the ensuing fiscal year. . . . (c) The expenditures and receipts of the Government during the last completed fiscal year. (d) Estimates of the expenditure and receipts of the Government during the fiscal year in progress. (e) The amount of annual permanent or other appropriations, including balances of appropriations for prior fiscal years, available for expenditure . . . during the fiscal year in progress, as of Nov. 1 of each year. (f) Balanced statements of (1) the condition of the Treasury at the end of the last completed fiscal year, (2) the estimated condition of the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year in progress and (3) the estimated condition of the Treasury at the end of the ensuing fiscal year if the financial proposals contained in the Budget are adopted; (g) All essential facts regarding the bonded and other indebtedness of the Government and (h) such other financial statements and data as in his opinion are necessary, or desirable in order to make known in all practicable detail the financial condition of the Government. . . . If the estimated funds available for any

year are insufficient to meet the requirements of the budget," the president is empowered to make recommendations to Congress for "new taxes, loans, or other appropriate action to meet the estimated deficiency. No estimate or request for an appropriation and no request for an increase in an item of any such estimate or request and no recommendation as to how the revenue needs of the government shall be met, shall be submitted to Congress . . . by any officer . . . of any department or establishment, unless at the request of either House of Congress. . . . The head of each department and establishment shall revise the departmental estimates and submit them to the Bureau on or before September 15 of each year. In case of his failure so to do, the President shall cause to be prepared such estimates and data as are necessary to enable him to include in the Budget estimates and statements in respect to the work of such department or establishment. There is hereby created in the Treasury Department a Bureau to be known as the Bureau of the Budget. There shall be in the Bureau a Director and an assistant Director who shall be appointed by the President. . . . The Bureau under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe, shall prepare for him the Budget and to this end shall have authority to assemble, correlate, revise, reduce or increase the estimates of the several departments or establishments. There is created an establishment of the Government to be known as the General Accounting Office, which shall be independent of the Executive Departments and under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States. The office of the Comptroller of the Treasury and Assistant Comptroller of the Treasury are abolished to take effect July 1, 1921. . . . There shall be in the General Accounting Office a Comptroller General of the United States and an Assistant Comptroller General of the United States, who shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. . . . The Comptroller-General and Assistant Comptroller-General shall hold office for fifteen years. . . . The Comptroller General or the Assistant Comptroller-General may be removed at any time by joint resolution of Congress. . . . The balances certified by the Comptroller General shall be final and conclusive upon the Executive branch of the Government. The Administrative examination of the accounts and vouchers of the Postal Service . . . shall be performed . . . by a bureau in the Post Office department to be known as the Bureau of Accounts which is hereby established for the purpose. The Bureau of Accounts shall be under the direction of a Comptroller who shall be appointed by the President on the advice and consent of the Senate." The comptroller general is given wide powers of control over records of accounts and expenditure and is required to "make to the President when requested by him, and to Congress at the beginning of each regular session, a report in writing of the work of the General accounting office." President Harding appointed Charles G. Dawes of Chicago as director of the budget to carry out the provisions of the new law. Mr. Dawes was comptroller of the currency, 1897-1902, and had served on the administrative staff of the commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Forces.

1921 (July-August).—Conference for the limitation of armaments.—Preliminary steps.—On July 10, 1921, after some discussion in Congress and in the public press, it was officially announced

that the President, in view of the far-reaching importance of the question of limitation of armament, had approached with informal but definite inquiries the group of powers heretofore known as the principal allied and associated powers, that is, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a conference on this subject, to be held in Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon. If the proposal was found to be acceptable, formal invitations for such a conference would be issued.—See also BRITISH EMPIRE: Colonial and imperial conferences: 1921: Foreign affairs debate.—"The general interest of the Powers, and the special interest of some, centers in the Pacific. Hence, Secretary of State Hughes, speaking for and by the direction of President Harding, added in his first note to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers: 'It is manifest that the question of limitation of armament has a close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and the President has suggested that the Powers especially interested in these problems should undertake in connection with this conference the consideration of all matters bearing upon their solution with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East.' This meant that China was to be invited to the Conference, and it was so stated. The four Powers thus sounded by Secretary Hughes were willing to attend the proposed conference. China was more than willing. They were therefore invited to confer with the United States and one another, on armament, and all with China on the problems of the Pacific. Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal let it be known that they had interests in the conference which could not be overlooked by themselves, and should not be by the conferees. No one who has not forgotten the exciting month of August, 1914, would deny to Belgium a very present interest in the armament of its neighbors, although some people questioned its right to discuss the limitation of armament of the military nations. And Holland and Portugal are Far Eastern Powers. By common consent these three Powers were invited to take part in the discussion of the Pacific problems. Therefore, on August 11th, Secretary Hughes invited the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to a conference on both subjects, and China on Pacific problems, to which were added, on October 4th, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal to send representatives to Washington to confer."—

J. B. Scott, *Conference on the limitation of armament and problems of the Pacific (American Journal of International Law, v. 15, 1921, pp. 503-504)*.

On August 11 the following formal invitation was sent to the four big powers: "The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his suggestion that there should be a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be discussed. Productive labor is staggering under an economic burden too heavy to be borne unless the present vast public expenditures are greatly reduced. It is idle to look for stability, or the assurance of social justice, or the security of peace, while wasteful and unproductive outlays deprive effort of its just reward and defeat the reasonable expectation of progress. The enormous disbursements in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; and avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature is not only without economic justification, but is a constant menace to the peace of the world rather

than an assurance of its preservation. Yet there would seem to be no ground to expect the halting of these increasing outlays unless the powers most largely concerned find a satisfactory basis for an agreement to effect their limitation. The time is believed to be opportune for these powers to approach this subject directly and in conference; and while, in the discussion of armament, the question of naval armament may naturally have first place, it has been thought best not to exclude questions pertaining to other armament to the end that all practicable measures of relief may have appropriate consideration. It may also be found advisable to formulate proposals by which in the interest of immunity the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled. It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove cause of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to the principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this Government that through an interchange of views with the facilities afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems of unquestioned importance at this time, that is, such common misunderstandings with respect to matters which have been and are of international concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples. It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East, but rather to leave this to be the subject of suggestions to be exchanged before the meeting of the conference in the expectation that the spirit of friendship and a cordial appreciation of the importance of the elimination of sources of controversy will govern the final decision. Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made, and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the President invites the Government of Great Britain to participate in a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921."

The invitation to China was as follows: "The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his suggestion that there should be a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be discussed. It is quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this Government that through an interchange of views, with the facilities afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned importance at the time—that is, such common misunderstandings with respect to matters which have been and are of internal concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples. It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East, but, rather, to leave this to be the subject of suggestions to be exchanged before the meeting of the conference, in the expectation that the spirit of friendship and a cordial appreciation

of the importance of the elimination of sources of controversy, will govern the final decision. Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the President invites the Government of the Republic of China to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions, in connection with the conference on the subject of limitation of armament, to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921."—*New York Times Current History, September, 1921, pp. 917-919.*—See also WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

1921 (July-August).—Peace with Germany and Austria.—Following the adoption of the peace resolution (see above: 1921 [April-December]) E. L. Dresel and A. H. Frazier were accredited to Germany and Austria, respectively, as commissioners, and negotiations with both countries were entered into and successfully carried out. On August 23 a treaty of peace with Austria was signed in Vienna, and on the following day (August 24) the treaty with Germany was signed in Berlin. (See TREATIES, MAKING AND TERMINATION OF: Treaty making power.) "The treaty of peace between Germany and the United States, negotiated at Berlin between representatives of the two Governments, was made public . . . [on August 25] by Secretary Hughes, after he had been advised that the document had been signed at [Berlin]. . . . The compact assures to the United States all the rights accruing to this country under the Treaty of Versailles, but provides specifically that the United States shall not be bound by the clauses of the Versailles compact relating to the League of Nations, as is shown by the following statement issued by the State Department: 'The treaty . . . was signed on behalf of the President of the United States by Ellis Loring Dresel, Commissioner of the United States, who had received full powers for the purpose; and on behalf of the President of Germany by Dr. Friedrich Rosen, Minister of Foreign Affairs. The treaty with Germany is in accord with the peace resolution adopted by Congress and approved by the President on July 2, 1921. The preamble of the treaty recites Section 1, 2 and 5 of the resolution, which relate to Germany. Article 1 of the treaty provides that the United States shall have all the rights and advantages specified in the resolution, including those stipulated for the benefit of the United States in the Treaty of Versailles. Article 2 of the treaty defines more particularly the obligations of Germany with respect to certain provisions in the Treaty of Versailles. Thus it is provided that the rights and advantages stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles for the benefit of the United States which it is intended the United States shall enjoy are those defined in Section 1 of Part IV. and Parts V., VI., VIII., IX., X., XI., XII., XIV., and XV. Section 1 of Part IV. contains the provisions by which Germany renounced her former overseas possessions in favor of the principal allied and associated powers. This confirms the rights of the United States with respect to Yap and the other former German overseas possessions upon an equality with the other powers. The other parts of the Treaty of Versailles above mentioned embrace the military clauses, the reparation, financial and economic clauses, the parts relating to aerial navigation, ports, waterways and railways, guarantees and miscellaneous provisions. The result is to put the United States on a footing with the other allied and associated powers with respect to all the rights defined in all these clauses. . . . The treaty provides that the United

States shall not be bound by any of the provisions of the treaty which relate to the League of Nations. The United States also assumes no obligations under Parts II., III., Sections 2 to 8, inclusive, of Part IV., and Part XIII. of the Treaty of Versailles. Part II. relates to the boundaries of Germany; Part III. to the political clauses for Europe; Sections 2 to 8, inclusive, of Part IV. embrace certain provisions with respect to China, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Bulgaria and Shantung, and Part XIII. relates to the international organization of labor under the League of Nations. The United States is entitled to participate in the Reparations Commission and other commissions set up under the Treaty of Versailles, but is not bound to participate in any such commission unless it elects to do so."—*New York Times*, Aug. 26, 1921.—The text of the treaty with Germany reads as follows:

Considering that the United States, acting in conjunction with its co-belligerents, entered into an armistice with Germany on Nov. 11, 1918, in order that a treaty of peace might be concluded:

Considering that the Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919, and came into force according to the terms of its Article 440, but has not been ratified by the United States;

Considering that the Congress of the United States passed a joint resolution approved by the President July 2, 1921, which reads in part as follows:

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war declared to exist between the Imperial German Government and the United States of America by the joint resolution of Congress approved April 6, 1917, is hereby declared at an end. [For text of resolution see above: 1920-1921 (April-July).]

Being desirous of restoring the friendly relations existing between the two nations prior to the outbreak of war, have for that purpose appointed their plenipotentiaries: The President of the United States of America, Ellis Loring Dresel, Commissioner of the United States of America to Germany, and the President of the German Empire, Dr. Friedrich Rosen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Who, having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE ONE. Germany undertakes to accord to the United States, and the United States shall have and enjoy, all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages specified in the aforesaid joint resolution of the Congress of the United States of July 2, 1921, including all the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States in the Treaty of Versailles which the United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such treaty has not been ratified by the United States.

ARTICLE TWO. With a view to defining more particularly the obligations of Germany under the foregoing article with respect to certain provisions in the Treaty of Versailles, it is understood and agreed between the High Contracting Parties: (1) That the rights and advantages stipulated in that treaty for the benefit of the United States, which it is intended the United States shall have and enjoy, are those defined in Section One, Part Four, and Parts Five, Six, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Fourteen and Fifteen. The United States, in availing itself of the rights and advantages stipulated in the provisions of that treaty mentioned in this paragraph will do so in a manner consistent with

the rights accorded to Germany under such provisions. (2) That the United States shall not be bound by the provisions of Part One of that treaty, nor by any provisions of that treaty including those mentioned in Paragraph One of this Article, which relate to the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor shall the United States be bound by any action taken by the League of Nations, or by the Council or by the Assembly thereof, unless the United States shall expressly give its assent to such action. (3) That the United States assumes no obligations under or with respect to the provisions of Part Two, Part Three, Sections Two to Eight inclusive of Part Four, and Part Thirteen of that Treaty. (4) That, while the United States is privileged to participate in the Reparation Commission, according to the terms of Part Eight of that Treaty, and in any other commission established under the Treaty or under any agreement supplemental thereto, the United States is not bound to participate in any such commission unless it shall elect to do so. (5) That the periods of time to which reference is made in Article 440 of the Treaty of Versailles shall run with respect to any act or election on the part of the United States from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE THREE. The present Treaty shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional forms of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect immediately on the exchange of ratifications, which shall take place as soon as possible at Berlin.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate in Berlin, this 25th day of August, 1921.

1921 (July-December).—Merchant marine.—Reorganization of Shipping Board.—Depression in shipping industry.—Cost and tonnage.—“In July [1921] the President approved Chairman Lasker’s Shipping Board reorganization plans. Three operating vice-presidents were selected: J. Barston Smull and William J. Love of New York, and A. J. Frey of San Francisco. The seriousness of the depression in the shipping industry was shown by an announcement of the Shipping Board on October 3 stating that of the 1464 vessels under its control only 240 were in service and that 1019 were scheduled for dead mooring upon discharging their cargoes. The Board’s attempt to dispose of the wooden fleet constructed during the war has been unsuccessful. It was stated on September 29 that the bid of the Ship Construction and Trading Company had been rejected. The company put in a bid of \$2,100 per vessel, as compared with the original cost of from \$300,000 to \$500,000. Last fall the Shipping Board made an inventory of all surplus material and supplies left over from the war period. It was found that the cost value of the materials and supplies was \$389,780,000 and that its present value was approximately \$75,000,000, exclusive of real estate in New York, fuel oil stations in various parts of the world, and ships and drydocks. . . . According to the annual report of the Commissioner of Navigation, issued December 15 [1921], the tonnage of American vessels engaged in foreign trade at the beginning of the fiscal year 1922 was eleven times greater than at the beginning of the Great War. The total number of vessels under American registry was 28,012, with a total gross tonnage of 18,282,136. This was an increase of 12 per cent over the previous fiscal year. The report stated

that there were 5,951 vessels with a tonnage of 11,077,000 engaged in foreign trade; 21,478 vessels with a tonnage of 7,163,000 in the coastal trade; and 583 vessels with a tonnage of 41,600 in the fisheries. There were built during the year 1,361 vessels of 2,265,115 gross tons."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1922, *Supplement*, p. 27.

1921 (August).—Agricultural Credits Act passed. See RURAL CREDIT: United States: Agricultural Credits Act.

1921 (September-December).—Unemployment conference.—Depreciation in value of crops.—Throughout the summer, the large number of unemployed continued to cause great uneasiness. In an effort to meet the situation, and to contrive means to alleviate the distress before the approach of winter, President Harding called an unemployment conference, "which began its sessions in Washington on September 26 [1921]. The proceedings were conducted under the direction of Secretary Hoover. An emergency program was recommended on September 30 for the relief of the unemployed, whose number was estimated at from three to five millions. . . . A few weeks later a program for the permanent recovery from the present depression was issued. . . . In spite of some improvement in industry there was a serious unemployment problem in many cities throughout the year."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1922, *Supplement*, p. 28.—"Measured in terms of purchasing power, the farmer's dollar in 1920 was worth 89 cents. In May, 1921, it was worth 77 cents. During the . . . 12 months [ending September, 1921, it was] . . . worth less than in any preceding 12 months in 30 years. The prices of farm products during the war period were higher than the prices of some groups of commodities and lower than others. On the whole, they about kept pace with the prices of all commodities combined. In the . . . perpendicular decline [which followed], the prices of farm products declined more rapidly and went to a lower level than the prices of other commodities. This fact increased the disadvantage of the farmer during the period of deflation. . . . In the rise and fall of commodity prices during the cycle through which we have just passed the farmers profited but little in a few years and lost heavily in recent months. The profits made by the farmer during the war were only slightly greater than those of 1913 and were swept away by the decline in prices of 1920 and 1921. . . . The costs of production for the 1920 crop were greater than the costs of any preceding crop in the history of the country. During 1919 and the first half of 1920 costs of production of agricultural products rose more rapidly than prices of agricultural products and . . . [after] June, 1920, costs of production . . . declined less rapidly than prices of agricultural products. . . . In the . . . 10 years [prior to October, 1921], the total number of mortgages on farm lands and buildings owned by their operators has more than doubled and has increased proportionately more than the value of lands and buildings."—S. Anderson, *Agricultural crisis and its causes* (Report of Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, 67th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Report no. 408, pt. 1, Oct. 15, 1921, pp. 13-14, 19-20).—"On December 30 Secretary Wallace of the Department of Agriculture issued at the President's request a call for a national agricultural conference to consider means for alleviating the prevailing agricultural depression. The Department estimated the value of the important farm crops for 1921 at

\$5,675,877,000, almost three and a half billion dollars less than the value of the 1920 crops and eight billion dollars less than that of the 1919 crops."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1922, *Supplement*, p. 28.

1921 (October).—Report of commissioners on condition of Philippines. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1918-1921.

1921 (October-November).—Ratification and proclamation of peace with Germany, Austria and Hungary.—The treaties of peace which had been negotiated with Germany, Austria and Hungary, and which were all in the same terms, were sent to the Senate on September 21. They came to a vote and were ratified on October 18, and on November 14, peace was proclaimed. "The President's power to recognize the termination of war may be clearly deduced from his power as the representative organ and has been admitted by the Supreme Court in the case of the Civil War. His proclamation or his reception or dispatch of diplomatic representatives from or to a former enemy therefore seems the proper method for recognizing peace in the absence of treaty, though, as in the case of recognizing new states, he is of course free to solicit the advice of Congress, which action would usually be desirable. This was the course actually followed in terminating the wars with Germany, Austria, and Hungary. By his proclamation, issued on November 14, 1921, after exchange of ratifications of the treaty with Germany of August 25 (and similar treaties with other powers) President Harding recognized that the war terminated on July 2, 1921, the date on which Congress had passed a resolution declaring the war 'at an end.' The antedating of the proclamation indicates that the war terminated, not by express treaty, but by tacit agreement, recognized in the United States by the President, when, in his opinion, there was sufficient evidence that Germany had concurred in the opinion expressed by the United States on July 2."—O. Wright, *Control of American foreign relations*, p. 293.

1921 (December).—Use of the Island of Yap for cable and wireless shared with Japan and other powers. See YAP.

1921 (December).—Treaty with England, France and Japan with respect to insular possessions. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

1921-1922.—Represented at Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments.—Treaties regarding insular possessions, and interest in the Pacific. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

1921-1922.—Federal labor legislation.—Maternity and Infancy Protection Bill. See LABOR LEGISLATION: 1921-1922: United States.

1921-1922.—Meat packers' strike. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1921-1922: Meat packers' strike.

1921-1922.—Anti-Semitic agitation.—Senate resolution favoring Palestine as home for Jews. See JEWS: United States: 1921-1922.

1921-1922.—Investigation of packing industry.—Report of Federal Trade Commission.—Packers and Stockyards Act. See FOOD REGULATION: 1921-1922.

1921-1923.—Government of the Philippine islands.—Governor-General Wood and his policy.—Their desire for independence. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1921-1923.

1921-1923.—Beginnings of rural credit. See RURAL CREDIT: United States: Beginnings.

1922.—Economic situation.—Effect of the World War on foreign trade, finance and industry in the United States.—National debt.—For-

eign loans and re-payment.—Exports.—Edge Act.—Finance of export trade.—Collapse of 1920.—War Finance Corporation revived.—Agricultural coöperation societies.—Development of water power.—Steel and iron industry.—Importance of automobile industry.—Industrial research.—Revival of domestic business.—Strikes.—By the year 1922, the effect of the World War on trade and industry in the United States could be fairly well estimated. Even a casual glance shows that it was very great. But, fully to realize the result, it is necessary to look back over a hundred years prior to 1914, the year when the war began. It will be seen that, prior to this time, the balance had begun to turn in favor of the United States, but that the process was greatly accelerated by the war there can be no doubt. "During the years 1898-1914 the *foreign trade* of the United States was in a position of comparatively stable equilibrium. Each year we exported nearly half a billion dollars' worth of goods more than we imported. In addition, our net exports of gold and silver amounted to the inconsiderable average of eight millions a year. During these seventeen years, our total trade experienced a steady expansion, the value of imports more than doubling, and that of exports increasing in somewhat less proportion. The relation of export to import values, however, changed scarcely at all. An export excess, taking both merchandise and metals into account, averaging \$584,000,000 during 1898-1901, was succeeded by an average of \$451,000,000 during the next decennium, only to be followed by an average of \$603,000,000 during the three years preceding the outbreak of the war. The changing character of our trade during these years has been the subject of frequent comment. Foodstuffs and raw materials formed an increasing proportion of imports, while our growing exports contained a constantly rising proportion of manufactured goods. Business was done at steadily rising prices, too, so the increase of trade was less in volume than in value. For the present purpose, however, the important fact is the comparatively fixed difference between export and import values. Excess exports of merchandise, gold and silver averaging half a billion a year were scarcely sufficient to balance the annual charges we had to meet on account of interest and current services, chiefly freight, tourists' expenditures, and the remittances made by immigrants to friends and relatives abroad. . . . While the net flow of capital was inward up to the very eve of the war, American investors had large and growing holdings abroad, chiefly in Canada and Mexico. Paish put our foreign investments in 1909 at a billion and a half, and Charles F. Spears in the same year estimated them at something between a billion and three quarters and two billions, of which he credited a third to Mexico and a quarter to Canada. American capital, he declared, had been flowing into Mexico during the preceding ten years at the rate of from fifty to seventy-five millions a year. The revolutionary disturbances for a time checked this flow of money southward, but our investment in Canadian lands, forests, mines and industrial enterprises rose rapidly during the years just preceding the war. Our Middle Western farmers alone, emigrating to the prairie provinces, took with them large sums for land purchase, while American capitalists invested heavily in farm and timber lands, and American factories opened Canadian branches. At the outbreak of the war American investments in Canada were placed at \$600,-

000,000 or more. These capital exports helped other countries to buy goods from us on credit, and thus swelled the favorable trade balance of the years preceding the war; yet we were not, during this time, actually passing from a debtor to a creditor position. Despite our enormous wealth, our highly developed industry, and our growing financial strength, we were still a financially young country at the outbreak of the war. Investment opportunities here, by comparison with those in other countries, were still so attractive that the net flow of capital was inward. Even by sending out goods and specie to an excess value of half a billion yearly we did not succeed in meeting the annual charges against us on other than merchandise account. The war changed this situation primarily by leading Americans to sell abroad, during the war period, goods to a value of eighteen billion dollars in excess of their foreign purchases during the same time. This was made possible by unprecedented credit operations on both public and private account."—H. R. Mussey, *New normal in foreign trade* (*Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1922).

"Authorities treat of the history of the international trade balance of the United States from 1820 to 1896 in four main periods. During the first period, from 1820 to 1837, foreign capital flowed into the country, causing an annual excess of imports over exports amounting on an average to \$11,000,000. The interest payable on that capital brought about a small excess of exports over imports (annual average \$3,000,000) during the second period from 1838 to 1850. Then followed the period from 1850 to 1874, during which the population of the country was rapidly increasing, the resources of the Middle West were being developed and the country opened up by railway construction, requiring large amounts of foreign capital whose influx, checked for a while by the Civil War, but again stimulated by the process of readjustment succeeding that war and by the sale of United States Government bonds abroad, again created an excess of imports over exports averaging over \$60,000,000 a year. During the ensuing period, from 1874 to 1896, the rate of foreign investment in American enterprise again slackened and, although the physical volume of imports grew largely, the volume of exports underwent still greater increases, which helped the country to meet maturing external loans and to pay interest charges on American industrial and other securities in foreign hands. In the years 1889 and 1890 and again in 1893, when special circumstances existed, there was a small excess of imports over exports, but in each of the remaining years of the period the total value of the exports exceeded that of the imports by an average of more than \$100,000,000. . . . In the period which elapsed between 1896 and the outbreak of the European War—a period of very rapid industrial and commercial expansion—the total annual value of American foreign commerce reached figures twice as great as those of any year in the preceding twenty, and showed a yearly excess of merchandise exports amounting to an average of \$466,000,000, but averaging nearly \$567,000,000 during the four years ended in July, 1914. Thus at the outbreak of the European War in 1914 the United States was still a 'debtor' nation heavily indebted to foreign and especially to European countries for interest on invested capital, for tourist expenditures, for immigrants' remittances and other items, the annual charges on those accounts being liquidated

every year by the shipment abroad of over five hundred million dollars worth of American products and manufactures. . . . The estimates of the invisible items included in the 1914 balance are, of course, only approximations, but they are based on the calculations of the best-known authorities and they probably represent as near an approach to accuracy as can be secured. The statement shows an adverse true balance of \$10,000,000, more or less, against the United States—a margin small enough to permit of easy adjustment without undue disturbance of the exchanges. In other words, the American international account practically balanced itself from year to year up to August, 1914. The European war produced a radical and almost immediate change in this situation. At first imports of merchandise declined in total value, dropping from \$1,894,000,000 in 1914 to \$1,674,000,000 in 1915, but they recovered in the succeeding year and showed a steady increase from that time until the beginning of the year 1921. Exports, on the other hand, which stood at \$2,364,000,000 in 1914, showed from the very beginning of the war a heavy increase in value, continuing almost without intermission until the end of 1920 and resulting in an enormous excess of exports, which culminated at more than \$4,000,000,000 in the calendar year 1919. . . . In the seven and one-half years beginning with the outbreak of the European war and ending at the close of the calendar year 1921, the United States exported merchandise, silver and gold to an aggregate value of over \$20,000,000,000 which were not offset by imports of merchandise, gold and silver, but were left to be liquidated by invisible items normally present in the international balance and by emergency financing of various kinds.”—J. J. Bricker, *Report on the economic, financial and industrial conditions of the United States of America in 1922* (Department of Great Britain Overseas Trade, pamphlet, pp. 7-10).

“Williams points out that the export figures of 1920 are probably two hundred millions too large, owing to the abrupt drop of values during that year, which led to the actual sale of some goods at prices below those stated in the manifests. On the other hand, Thomas W. Lamont calls attention to the fact that ‘during the period of our participation in the war our government exported great quantities of goods not only for its own use but also for sale to its Allies. These government exports are unrecorded.’ It is to be observed, however, that the Treasury on November 15, 1921, held obligations of foreign governments received from the Department of War and the Navy, representing sales of surplus war materials, of an aggregate value of \$574,673,710.21, thus covering the item mentioned by Mr. Lamont. . . . Leaving all corrections aside, our excess exports, taking both merchandise and metals into account, amounted to somewhat more than eighteen billion dollars, during the war period. Turning to invisible items, the account for interest and services during the same period, contrary to the popular idea, ran heavily against us, though not at the pre-war rate.”—H. R. Mussey, *New normal in foreign trade* (*Political Science Quarterly*, Sept., 1922).—See also COMMERCE: Commercial age: 1914-1921.

“Chief amongst the emergency measures were the loans extended by the United States Government to the Governments of the Allied countries; purchases of foreign currencies by the United States Government to meet expenses incurred in obtaining supplies for the American army in Europe; credits extended to European countries on account of sales of surplus war supplies and European relief; and

finally, advances by the War Finance Corporation in aid of American export trade. . . . There were two other expedients of permanent importance, to which some allusion must here be made. The first was the repatriation of American securities, large blocks of which, previously held by private European investors, were sent to the United States during the war period and resold on the American market as part of the means adopted by European Governments to prevent an embarrassing depreciation of the Allied exchanges on New York. No exact figures showing the total volume of this movement of securities appear to exist, but it continued for some time after the Armistice, as the heavy decline in exchange rates, which took place as soon as the Allied Governments ceased to support the exchanges, made it very profitable for private European holders of such securities to ship them across the Atlantic, and they arrived in considerable volume during the year 1919 and 1920. Several American economists agree on an estimate of \$2,350,000,000 as representing the total par value of domestic railroad, industrial and other issues returned to this country between August, 1914, and December, 1920. In addition to this homeward movement of American securities, there has been a notable outflow of American capital through the sale on the United States market of the internal obligations of foreign countries and of foreign municipal, industrial and other issues as well as through the purchase, establishment and extension abroad by American concerns of factories, mills, warehouses, mines and industrial plant of various kinds. Calculations made by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States indicated that the loans floated by foreign Governments through investment banks in the United States and outstanding on December 31, 1920, barely fell short of \$2,000,000,000. Allowing for repayments made in the meantime as well as for the additional foreign loans, both governmental and private, that have since been placed here, it is probable that the net outflow of American capital under this head between 1914 and 1922 exceeds \$2,000,000,000. Professor Williams, who has devoted much expert attention to this matter, is quoted as authority for the statement that the total investment in foreign countries at the beginning of 1921, was approximately \$3,500,000,000, and the total investment of foreign capital in the United States approximately \$1,500,000,000. Assuming the substantial correctness of these figures it will be seen that the net pre-war indebtedness of the United States to foreign countries under the head of interest in the invisible account has now been permanently reversed, and that the balance of interest charges in future will show an annual sum, variously estimated at \$100,000,000 to \$150,000,000, payable to the United States. . . .

“The American investing public has, by this time, become quite familiar with foreign issues, and that the former reluctance of investors to place their money outside of the country has largely disappeared—a very fortunate development for the future of American export trade, since it is quite evident that only by a continuous export of capital can that trade be maintained in anything like the volume required by the great expansion of industrial productivity which the war has witnessed in the United States. The need for new and enlarged export markets for surplus production is evidenced by many developments in this country to which attention cannot now be given. Amongst those developments are the

extraordinary activity of commercial and industrial associations like the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Merchants' Association of New York, and similar bodies throughout the country, all of which have special departments devoted entirely to the promotion of the interests of their members in the foreign field. Then there is the National Foreign Trade Council, an association founded shortly before the war broke out to educate the American public generally to an intelligent interest in foreign trade and to instruct manufacturers and exporters in its technique. Most important of all is the excellent commercial intelligence work done by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce which, under the able guidance of Mr. Hoover, has secured from Congress greatly increased appropriations and expanded its organization during the last few years by establishing nearly a score of commodity divisions, each superintended by a man who is an expert in his line and who has been practically selected by the trade itself. . . .

"When the great war broke out in 1914 the United States was a debtor on the world's balance sheet to the extent of some \$4,000,000,000, representing amounts due on current accounts and foreign investments in this country. Until the beginning of 1915 the United States had always been a borrowing nation. Enormous sums of money required to develop the resources of the country had not only made the export of capital impossible but European investors had been induced to place their funds here and contributed to a considerable extent to the economic strength of the Republic. . . . The influx of foreign capital not only ceased but Europe made large demands for funds, with the result that the United States is now a creditor nation for a vast amount. Many countries engaged in the war obtained large loans with which to meet the enormously increased calls made upon their respective exchequers. Munitions and supplies had to be furnished by the Allied Powers, and while the very volume of the quantities demanded represented heavy outlays rising market prices added to the financial burden of the borrowers. . . . The public debt of the United States, which on June 30th, 1914, amounted to \$1,388 million rose to \$3,129 millions by June 30th, 1917. During the following two years its augmentation was accelerated and on June 30th, 1919, it stood at \$25,635 millions. By the addition of a further 1,000 millions the peak was reached in August of that year, since which date reductions have been effected, the aggregate of the public debt on June 30th, 1922, having amounted to nearly \$23,000,000,000, classified as follows:

Bonds, Pre-war Loans	\$ 883,840,470
Bonds, Liberty Loans	15,081,612,550
Notes, Victory Liberty Loan	1,991,183,400
Treasury Notes	2,246,596,350
Tax and Loan Certificates	1,828,787,500
Treasury (War) Saving Securities	679,015,317
All Others	285,380,528
Total	\$22,996,416,115

In a statement . . . issued by the United States Treasury it was pointed out that on April 30th, 1921, when the Treasury first announced its refunding programme, the gross public debt amounted to some \$24,000,000,000, of which 7½ millions would mature in about two years. On September 30th, 1922, the total gross debt stood at \$22,800,-

000,000, and of the early maturing debt about \$4,000,000,000 had already been retired or refunded, chiefly into short-term Treasury notes with maturities spread over the next four fiscal years. During the present fiscal year to June 30th, 1923, some 1,100 million dollars worth of Treasury certificates of indebtedness will fall due as well as about 625 millions of War Savings certificates, 1918 series, and about 1,800 million dollars of Victory notes. Of the Treasury certificates about 48 million dollars represent Pittman Act certificates . . . [to be retired in 1922] through the recoinage of silver bullion, while about 1,000 million dollars of loan certificates have been met out of funds in hand. . . . The total of the obligations of foreign governments under the Liberty Bond Acts held by the United States Government amounted, on June 30th, 1922, to \$9,386,422,556, the principal debtor nations being:

Great Britain	\$4,135,818,358
France	2,933,516,448
Italy	1,648,034,051
Belgium	347,251,013
Russia	187,729,750

Other securities held by the United States Treasury, emanating from several foreign governments other than that of Great Britain, represented, on June 30th, 1922, the following amounts:

Foreign obligations received on account of sale of surplus war supplies	\$574,876,885
Foreign obligations received on account of relief afforded by the American Relief Administration, pursuant to Act approved February 25th, 1919	84,093,963

. . . Up to November 15th, 1921, the total repayments of principal derived from credits established under the Liberty Bond Acts were as follows:

British Government	\$110,681,641
French Government	46,714,862
Roumanian Government	1,794,180
Belgian Government	1,522,902
Cuban Government	1,425,000
Serbian Government	605,326
Total	\$162,743,911

. . . [See also DEBTS, PUBLIC: World War and after.]

"During the war the trade of the United States with other countries passed through several stages of evolution, the last being the period when American exports to Europe were financed through credits extended by the United States Government, and the extent to which export trade was financed by the Treasury after the Armistice has been put at \$2,500,000,000. Subsequently it became necessary for American exporters to find other means of financing their transactions, and it was realized that the usual credits of from 60 to 90 days designed to cover the period while goods were in transit were much too short to maintain the continuance of trade. . . . The demands on a vast scale made by Europe for raw materials and foodstuffs made the need of a financing system imperative, and in order to co-ordinate American capital and banking facilities in those transactions, Congress enacted what is commonly known as the Edge Act. . . . By means of corporations organized under the *Edge Act*, long-term credits may

be granted to finance exports not only from the United States, but from other countries as well, and the real purpose of the Act, which, it should be mentioned, was passed in December, 1919, and embodied in the Federal Reserve Act as Section 25 (a), is to provide for the establishment of a Federal system of international banking or financial corporations working under Federal supervision with ample enough powers to enable them to compete effectively with similar foreign institutions and to afford to American exporters and importers a means of financing their foreign business. . . . Two international financial corporations . . . [had, in 1922, been] incorporated under its provisions. . . . The situation has been explained so clearly by the Director of the War Finance Corporation that the following passages from a recent address of his may here be quoted:—'The collapse of 1920 was due, in no small measure, to the pressure upon the agricultural producer and the stockman to liquidate loans in a shorter time than he required to market his output in an orderly manner. The prices received by the farmer for his products under forced liquidation and hasty selling impaired his buying power; and this, in turn, brought about a serious decline in the demand for manufactured products, a falling off in freight movement, and a general demoralization in industry and business. . . . Before the war a considerable part of the money required to finance the harvesting and marketing of our agricultural commodities was furnished by Europe. Let us take cotton as an illustration. In the spring and summer of each year, American banks were accustomed to draw 90-day bills on European bankers in anticipation of the harvest. The proceeds of the drafts were added to the reservoir of banking capital and found their way into the cotton growing districts. As the drafts became due, in the autumn and early winter, they were paid off by exports. This worked smoothly and well, because Europe had liquid capital and a modern banking system, which we then lacked. . . . Since the war only about 50 per cent. of our cotton exports has been going forward in the same six months, leaving 50 per cent. to be exported in the other six. And essentially the same situation has existed with reference to our other staple agricultural commodities.' The situation was complicated by the presence of many other influences besides the mere lack of credits, but the farming community placed most of the emphasis on the latter, and Congress, hoping that increased exports might help the situation to some extent, revived the War Finance Corporation, early in 1921, and restored its power to make advances in aid of the exportation of American produce. It was not until July, 1921, that serious advantage was taken of the Corporation's revived export financing resources and such relief as was then brought by its activities was mostly confined to the cotton growing States, so, in August, 1921, at the instance of its Director, Mr. Eugene Meyer, the War Finance Corporation received from Congress (by the Agricultural Credits Act) power and funds to make loans for agricultural purposes to banks, co-operative marketing associations, etc., for a period not exceeding one year. . . . [See also RURAL CREDIT: United States: Agricultural Credits Act.] Under these extended powers the War Finance Corporation . . . played a most important part in tiding the farmers of the country over the worst of their difficulties. Between November, 1921, and January, 1922, the advances made by the Corporation averaged more than

\$2,000,000 a day and, according to a . . . statement . . . [made by] Mr. Meyer, some 7,000 loans totalling \$183,000,000 . . . [had, in 1922,] been extended to 4,400 banks throughout the country, in addition to advances of \$72,000,000 to livestock loan companies and \$175,000,000 to co-operative marketing associations. In all, the advances made out of the Corporation's resources for agricultural and livestock purposes, including those extended for the financing of cotton and other agricultural exports [had, before the end of 1922, amounted] to \$470,000,000. . . . Particular attention must also be called to the extension amongst American farmers during the last few years of co-operative marketing schemes. *Co-operation* had already been carried to a point of efficiency by the fruit growers of California, whose organizations not only handle the distribution of the product, but also deal with the problems of production and engage in the purchase and, in some cases, the manufacture, of supplies needed by the growers. The California Fruit Growers' Exchange . . . [had in 1922] 10,500 members whose product, to an annual value estimated at nearly \$100,000,000, it distributes to the wholesale trade throughout the country. The members of the Exchange . . . [had] formed about 200 local associations, each owning and operating its own packing house and directing all local activities, the local units being federated into a central agency for the preparation, grading, advertising and sale of the fruit. The economies effected by these methods, as well as the improvement they have brought about in the product itself, are considerable. . . . The establishment of co-operative elevators throughout the grain belt . . . [had] proceeded so rapidly that more than 50 per cent. of all grain now received at Chicago . . . [was] said to come from farmers' elevators. In the southern States, the formation of co-operative organizations amongst the cotton growers was greatly stimulated by the War Finance Corporation activities, since the law provided that the Corporation's advances should not be made directly to the individual farmers but only to banks or associations which had extended credits to the farmers. In this way, co-operative cotton selling associations . . . [had been] set up in 10 States including Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi and Arizona, the associations in the last two States handling long-staple cotton. The membership of each society is limited to the cotton farmers of the State to which the society belongs and all the societies are federated in a central body known as the American Cotton Growers' Exchange. . . . The general character and functions of the societies may be gathered from a description of one of the largest of them, the Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Association, given . . . by Mr. Sloan Simpson, Treasurer of that body. The basis of the plan, Mr. Simpson explained, is a contract which each individual grower signs obliging himself to hand over to the Association for sale every bale of cotton raised or acquired by him for a period of five years. In former times the farmer's financial necessities compelled him to dispose of this cotton in two months. The Association now takes it and distributes its sale over a period of nine or ten months. . . . A co-operative society, organized along lines almost identical with those of the cotton farmers, was established . . . [in 1921] by the growers of burley tobacco in Kentucky, Southern Indiana, West Virginia, Northern Tennessee and Southern Ohio. It

is known as the Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association. . . . It was in connection with negotiations for an advance from the War Finance Corporation that this Association also was formed, but its mere establishment and the added financial strength its farmer members derived from co-operative action enabled them . . . to raise the needed funds from the banks and to cancel their application for a loan from the War Finance Corporation. . . . In contrast to the downward trend of food exports, already referred to, the American foreign trade in other important agricultural commodities . . . tended to increase both in quality and value. Raw cotton has, for many years, been by far the most valuable item in the American export list. . . . In 1921, the foreign shipments of raw cotton made up 12.20 per cent. of the total value of American domestic merchandise exports. . . . Next after raw cotton and wheat in the descending list of American export values comes unmanufactured leaf tobacco. The trade in this commodity is carried on chiefly with the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, Holland, Spain, Canada and Australia. [See also COOPERATION: United States.] . . .

"An important feature of the movement for the conservation of natural resources, which may be said to have begun during the presidency of the late Theodore Roosevelt, was the wide attention given to the question of *water-power development*. . . . It was natural that the development of water-power should proceed most rapidly in the regions farthest removed from coal deposits. [See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1902-1919.] Thus, though the installed capacity in the New England States is only 14.94 per cent. of the total for the whole country it exceeds the minimum and represents over 86 per cent. of the maximum development possible on the streams that flow through those States themselves. Water-power in New England is still the chief source of the energy used by the pulp, paper, woollen and cotton mills, and by the public utilities of that area. Similarly, in California, where two-thirds of the energy employed in public utilities, in irrigation, in mining, and in manufacturing industries is hydro-electric. . . . In other sections of the country also, notably in the basin of the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers, where there is a large market for power for industrial uses, considerable development work [took place]. . . . The Aluminium Company of America, in 1921, had completed a programme for the erection of a series of plants on Little Tennessee River, with an aggregate capacity of 400,000 h.p., and work had actually been begun on two of the plants. The most interesting single enterprise in that area, however, was the project for the construction of a power plant at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River in the State of Alabama. . . . Congress in the year 1916 had appropriated \$20,000,000 to be used by the United States Government in the development of power for producing nitrogen from the air. The Government decided to use the greater part of the appropriation in building a dam on the Tennessee River at Muscle Shoals. . . . The termination of the war in the autumn of 1918 rendered the completion of the project unnecessary so far as the immediate demand for nitrates was concerned, but work was nevertheless continued until April, 1921, when it was stopped owing to the refusal of Congress to make further appropriations for its prosecution. Over \$15,000,000 had been expended on the undertaking when

this event happened, the dam had been almost half completed and progress had been made towards the completion of the power house and the locks. The additional cost required for completion . . . [was] estimated at about \$11,000,000. . . .

"The advancement of the American *iron and steel industry* during the last half century was an almost continuously progressive one. The industry was heavily affected by the general industrial slump of 1914. . . . The first result of the outbreak of the European war was to increase the depression, and by the end of the year the steel works in this country were running at only about 40 per cent. of their then existing capacity. . . . The year 1915, however, witnessed toward its close, the beginnings of a remarkable recovery occasioned directly by orders from the European belligerents amounting in value to hundreds of millions of dollars for barbed wire, shrapnel bars, machine tools for ordnance work, and all kinds of war supplies. These and other foreign war orders had the effect of enlarging greatly the domestic demand for steel products. . . . By July, 1917, the enormous price advances which had taken place all along the line had brought the average 'weighted' price of iron and steel products to a peak point representing 370 per cent. of the pre-war normal. European war orders were not solely responsible for this advance. The intervention of the United States in the hostilities—foreseen quite early in 1917—the probable requirements of the United States forces for munitions and other war supplies, the American Government's programme of naval and mercantile shipbuilding—all these factors, added to foreign war orders, to the orders for railway equipment then coming in large volume from France, Italy, Russia, and Spain, and to the heavy demand for ship-plates from Japan, operated during the first six or seven months of 1917 to cause the most rapid rise of prices and the most extensive expansion of productive capacity the industry has ever known. . . . Production, which . . . reached its highest point between 1916 and 1918, fell considerably in volume in 1919 as the result of cancellations of Government orders, strikes and the general uncertainties of the period immediately following the Armistice. The post-war boom, however, soon overcame those difficulties; prosperous conditions, accompanied by increased output, revived, and lasted until the autumn of 1920, when the first effects of the general slump in prices and of the depression in the railroad and shipping business and other steel-consuming industries began to make themselves definitely felt. . . . Production of iron ore during the twelve months ended December 31st, 1921, was the lowest recorded for 17 years, while the output of pig iron, ingots and finished products in the same period was even smaller than that of 1914 and comparable only with the output of the year succeeding the panic of 1907. . . .

"The most important and extensive branch of the iron and steel industry . . . is that relating to the manufacture and maintenance of *automobiles*. Starting on a modest scale about 1893 and extending slowly for the first ten years of its existence, the total output of this industry in 1904 amounted to less than 22,000 vehicles of all kinds, valued at about \$25,000,000. After that time, however, the domestic demand for the gasoline car grew steadily each year. In 1909 the total production was almost 130,000 cars of a wholesale value of nearly \$160,000,000. The

following year the number of vehicles manufactured was close on 200,000, and by the year 1914 the industry was well established with a broad and constantly expanding domestic market, which enabled manufacturers to organize on a sound economic basis, and with an increasing foreign demand which helped to stabilize it. The total capital invested in the industry in 1914 exceeded \$300,000,000 and the total output in that year, including bodies and parts, was valued at more than \$650,000,000. . . .

"In view of the importance of *industrial research* for the future of American manufacture and commerce, brief mention should be made in this report of the remarkable extension which research work has undergone in this country. . . . The attention paid by the Federal Government to this matter is no new development and the excellence and wide scope of the work done by the Bureau of Standards under the U. S. Department of Commerce as well as by the Bureau of Mines and other branches of the Department of Interior are well known, but what is perhaps not so generally realized in other countries is the close contacts they maintain with American manufacturers and producers, and the immense amount of assistance they give to private industrial concerns in the solution of their technological problems. They have established, moreover, an excellent liaison not only with universities and other educational institutions but with individual students in colleges and institutes of technology. . . . In 1916 a National Research Council was founded [see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL] under the Congressional Charter of the National Academy of Sciences, for the purpose of prosecuting and encouraging research in industry. . . . There are Committees on such subjects as the fatigue phenomena of metals, heat treatment of carbon steel, high-speed tool steels, hardness testing of metals, pulverization, welding, etc. The Division of Research Extension carries on widely diversified activities. In 1920 it helped to found an 'Alloys Research Association,' assisted the Tanners' Council in the establishment of a 'School of Tanning,' and initiated investigations in connection with the tobacco plant, macaroni, glass, etc. . . . The Council is supported by funds derived from other than Government sources. In 1920 the Carnegie Corporation donated \$170,000 for current expenses while the Rockefeller Foundation, the Commonwealth Fund and other similar institutions contributed largely to its upkeep and expansion. To support the investigation on the fatigue phenomena of metals, the General Electric Company in 1920 gave \$30,000 while the Du Pont de Nemours and the General Motors Corporation provided \$5,000 and \$2,500 respectively for the special use of the Council's research information service. The most notable feature of the industrial research movement, however, is the great amount of investigation work which is being carried on by various manufacturing firms and trade associations quite independently of official support. In a very interesting publication issued by the National Research Council particulars are given of the work done and the staff employed in the private laboratories of some 526 firms and organizations throughout the country."—J. J. Broderick, *Report on the economic, financial and industrial conditions of the United States of America in 1922* (Department of Great Britain Overseas Trade, pamphlet, pp. 10-15, 26-27, 34-39, 42, 43, 59-61, 64-65, 79, 133-134).

"Prior to the war, the conditions affecting the outflow of American capital were, in many re-

spects, quite different from those that . . . [have prevailed since that period]. Then, the investment of American capital abroad was induced almost entirely by the desire of individual American enterprises to extend the field of operations primarily for the protection of their position in international trade. . . . A cursory study of our pre-war foreign investments indicates that they were made chiefly by our large oil, mining, meat packing, fruit, and timber concerns, and by companies manufacturing special types of machinery. To a very large degree, too, these investments were concentrated in adjacent or near-by countries, such as Canada, Mexico, and Cuba. . . . To meet strong international competition, to be better placed for the distribution of their product, and, in some cases, to secure the benefit of lower labor costs, certain American corporations . . . invested large sums in foreign establishments in other parts of the world. In the pre-war period other considerations determined the investment of American capital abroad in certain cases, but the factors named were the most influential. Other factors of a more potent character . . . [went into operation in the post-war epoch] to induce the outflow of American capital. Among these may be mentioned the following: The United States . . . [became] the world's chief source of floating as well as of fixed capital. The United States has reached the stage in its economic development at which a portion of its capital savings can profitably be exported. The development of many manufacturing industries has reached the point at which, if these industries are to be fully and efficiently operated, a certain proportion of their production must be exported regularly. This exportation must be facilitated in many cases by loans placed in this country. . . . The manufacturing industry of the United States has, moreover, become so extensive and diversified that it must draw increasingly upon foreign countries for a wide range of materials. . . . Other nations are looking to this country for capital for the development of their natural resources and for other purposes."—Address by G. M. Jones, quoted in *Exporting American capital* (Commerce Reports, United States Department of Commerce, no. 21, May 21, 1923, pp. 485-486).

"After passing through a period of severe depression, extending to all branches of enterprise, *domestic business* experienced decisive revival during the year . . . [1922]. . . . Despite failures unprecedented in number, the main economic trend was almost steadily forward, and even protracted strikes in leading industries only partially checked progress. . . . Both from the standpoint of production and value, the results of 1921 were considerably exceeded and the general agricultural situation, although marked by some unsatisfactory phases, reflected a turn for the better. . . . The general movement was unmistakably in the right direction and previous records were surpassed in certain instances. . . . Nearly all of the statistical barometers that measure the rise or fall of business pointed upward. . . . Records of bank clearings, freight car loadings, pig iron production and unfilled steel tonnage, among the principal indices, reflected the increased commercial activities, while the noteworthy expansion of building operations was evidenced by the pronounced gains in permits issued and contracts awarded. . . . The great iron and steel industry not only felt the stimulus of the enlarged demand for structural material but also of the heavy buying of railroad equipment, and output of pig iron during the month of De-

ember reached 3,000,000 tons for the first time in more than two years. . . . The great strikes of 1922, prevailing simultaneously in some of the principal industries, were a serious obstacle to the commercial revival. Labor troubles in the New England textile field were of prolonged duration, while the coal mining and railroad controversies, which attracted more general attention, continued for several months. . . . Not only was the employment of workers appreciably curtailed in the lines directly affected, but output in other channels also was restricted and difficulty was experienced in securing adequate supplies of some raw materials and manufactured products. The causes of the strikes were varied, with questions of wages prominent among the issues involved, and progress in many quarters were impeded at a time when business was beginning to respond actively to forces of a constructive nature. Recovery came quickly, however, when the disputes were settled, and the year ended with the industrial situation and outlook much improved."—*Year 1922 (Dun's Review, v. 31, no. 1529, Jan. 13, 1923, pp. 15-16)*.—See also LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1922: Nation-wide coal strike.

1922.—Fordney-McCumber Tariff Bill passed. See TARIFF: 1922.

1922.—Report on Haiti exonerating marines from charges of oppression. See HAITI, REPUBLIC OF: 1922.

1922.—Protest of Indians in New Mexico against the Bursum Bill. See INDIANS, AMERICAN: 1922.

1922.—Relations between the states and the Federal power.—Coöperation between states.—"Twelve acts providing for national aid to the states in some form or another are today [written in 1922] on the statute books. These acts may be divided into three groups: (1) The laws enacted from 1862 to 1906, giving aid to the states with comparatively few conditions; (2) the recent acts which provide for the return to the state by the national government of a portion of the income from leases, royalties, etc., accruing from natural resources owned by the national government and located within the state; (3) the acts from 1914 to . . . [August, 1922] providing for conditional subsidies and placing a large amount of supervisory power in the national agencies. In the first group belong the following: the Morrill Land Grant Act, July 2, 1862; Additional Aid Act, August 30, 1890; Adams Act, March 16, 1906, supplementing and amending the Hatch Act of March 2, 1887. The following are in the second group: The National Forest Fund Act, March 4, 1907; as amended May 23, 1908, March 1, 1911, and June 30, 1914; the Oil Leasing Act, February 25, 1920; the Federal Water Power Act, June 10, 1920. Acts providing for subsidies with detailed conditions are: the Smith-Lever Act, May 8, 1914; the Federal Aid for Roads Act, July 11, 1916, as amended November 9, 1921; the Smith-Hughes Act, February 23, 1917; the Industrial Rehabilitation Act, June 2, 1920; the Chamberlain-Kahn Act, July 9, 1918; the Sheppard-Towner Act, November 23, 1921. The three acts in the first group were enacted for the purpose of encouraging agriculture and mechanical education. In the Morrill Act, which was the first law to grant national aid to the states, certain lands were set aside for the use of agricultural and mechanical colleges. The additional act passed twenty-eight years later provided for the annual payment of \$25,000 to each state for the purposes set forth in the original act. The annual pay-

ment was later changed to \$50,000. These grants are comparatively free from conditions, and yet there are certain fundamental principles, such as the requirement of military training and the equal treatment of races, which the states are required to follow in order to receive the funds. [See also EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: United States: Land grant colleges.] The Adams Act gives \$30,000 to each state for the use of agricultural experiment stations. Here too the conditions imposed are easily met, and the national agency has but little power compared with that enjoyed under the acts of the third type, which will be described presently. . . . The laws of the second type provide for unconditional grants to the states. Under the National Forest Fund Act, 25 per cent. of the proceeds from forest reserves are turned over to the state in which the reserve is located to be spent for schools and roads under the direction of the state legislature. Over a million dollars was turned back to the states under this law during the first year ending June 30, 1921. The Oil Leasing Act returns 37½ per cent. of bonuses and royalties from oil wells on public lands to the states. The director of the budget estimated that the amount returned during the last fiscal year would total one and one-half million dollars. As in the case of the forest funds, the state legislature has charge of the expenditure which must be for roads and education. The Water Power Act returns to the several states 37½ per cent. of the proceeds from licenses for the use of water power on national lands. None of these acts conditions the payments to the state, outside of the proviso that the money received shall be expended for schools and roads. Neither is there any attempt on the part of the national government to supervise the details of expenditure. It is the third type of national aid that is particularly interesting to the student of government. The six acts of this group, while turning national money into the state treasury, impose conditions upon the states, the fulfillment of which is passed upon by national officials. The Smith-Lever Act not only inaugurated the idea of close coördination of national and state agencies but also established the 'fifty-fifty' practice (duplication by state of national funds). Its purpose is to encourage instruction and practical demonstration in agriculture and home economics to persons not attending college. The original act appropriated \$1,080,000 to be allotted to the various states, with the proviso that the appropriation should be increased from year to year. In addition to the continuing appropriations provided for in the law, a special appropriation was made in 1919 which has brought the total appropriation for the fiscal year 1921-22 up to \$5,580,000. This sum is apportioned among the states in the following manner: \$480,000 is divided equally, \$10,000 to each state; while the remainder is allotted to the several states according to rural population. In order to secure its allotment a state must duplicate all moneys received above \$10,000. The duplication need not be from the state treasury, as all contributions from county or local authorities, from colleges, and from private individuals are credited to the state. In 1919-20, 67 per cent. of the duplication came from state treasuries, 28 per cent. from counties and the remaining 5 per cent. from colleges and local governments. But the state cannot fulfill the requirements of the law merely by duplicating the allotment of national money. All work done under the law is subject to the

supervision of the department of agriculture and all plans and methods must be approved by the national government. . . . The land grant colleges are made the state cooperating agencies, the state legislature designating what college is to act in states that have more than one land-grant college. . . . About 50 per cent of the amount spent under the Smith-Lever Act is for county agricultural agents, about 20 per cent. for demonstrations in the field of home economics, and the remainder for agricultural specialists, boys' and girls' clubs, and publications. [See also EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: United States: Smith-Lever Act.] . . . [The] Federal Aid for Roads Act . . . followed the Smith-Lever Act by two years and was a further application for the dual principle of extending national control through state agencies, combined with the 'fifty-fifty' scheme of appropriations. As the name indicates, the purpose of this law is to aid the states in the construction (but not the maintenance) of rural highways. . . . This act carries a larger appropriation than all the other acts put together. Seventy-five million dollars was appropriated for the fiscal year 1921-22, and the report of the director of the budget makes provision for \$125,000,000 for the year ending June 30, 1923. . . . The fund is divided into three equal parts. One part is apportioned according to population, one according to area, and one according to mileage of rural and star mail routes. Under this arrangement Texas receives the largest apportionment, with New York second, Pennsylvania third and Illinois fourth. No state is to receive less than one-half of one per cent. of the total, and this stipulation increased the amount available to Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont. The state must meet the national appropriation dollar for dollar. . . . [The purpose of the Smith-Hughes Act] is to aid the states in the promotion of vocational education. There are three separate and distinct appropriations under this act. The first is to be used for salaries of educators in agriculture, and varies in amount from \$500,000 in 1918 to \$3,000,000 in 1926 and thereafter. This fund is allotted to the several states on the basis of rural population. The second appropriation is for salaries of educators in the field of trade and industry, including home economics. The amounts under this head coincide with the appropriation under the first head. The moneys under this head are allotted to the states on the basis of urban population, and not more than 20 per cent. of the total can be used for teachers in home economics. . . . The third set of appropriations is for the training of teachers in the field of vocational education, and the amounts vary from \$500,000 in 1918 to \$1,000,000 in 1926 and thereafter. This fund is apportioned to the states on the basis of total population. The state directly, or through local government appropriations, is required to duplicate all national moneys, and both state and national funds must be spent for salaries only, except in connection with teacher training where money may be expended for buildings and grounds and other necessary expenses as well as for salaries. . . . [The Industrial Rehabilitation Act which] aims to cooperate with the states in the rehabilitation of persons disabled in industry, should not be confused with the so-called vocational rehabilitation act which provides for the training of ex-soldiers. [See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: World war and education: Reeducation.] . . . The purpose of . . . [the Chamberlain-Kahn

Act] is to cooperate with the states in fighting venereal disease. The work under this act . . . [was practically] discontinued during the year 1921-22 because of lack of funds. The director of the budget [however] recommended an appropriation of \$500,000 for the year ending June 30, 1923, and it would be improper to consider the law a dead letter. . . . [The Sheppard-Towner Act], . . . commonly known as the Maternity Bill, aims to cooperate with the states 'in the promotion of the welfare and hygiene of maternity and infants.' . . . Less than a month after its final passage the states began to accept its provisions and to apply for a share in the appropriations. The act appropriates two funds: (1) \$480,000 for the fiscal year 1921-22, to be divided equally among the states. For the following year and for four years thereafter \$240,000 is annually appropriated for equal distribution. The state need not duplicate this fund but its officials must submit to national supervision in order to obtain its equal share. (2) An additional appropriation of \$1,000,000 annually for the next five years is to be apportioned to the states on the basis of population, after each state is allowed \$5,000 regardless of population. The national moneys from this fund must be duplicated by the states by direct appropriation. The children's bureau of the department of labor is charged with administering the law, and the child welfare division of the state board of health is named as the state cooperating agency." —B. A. Arneson, *Federal aid to the states* (*American Political Science Review*, Aug., 1922).—"For many years there had been a growing demand for the suppression of the lottery evil. . . . In 1890 Congress passed an act for the suppression of the lottery traffic, under its power to control foreign and interstate commerce and the postal service. The law not only prohibited any person from bringing into the United States or depositing in the mails any lottery ticket or lottery advertisement, but forbade these things being carried from one State to another. For the first time the power of Congress to regulate commerce under the Federal Constitution was used to infringe upon the police power of the States. Thereby Congress entered a legislative field that had in the whole history of the Constitution been thought to be reserved entirely to the states. In the last three decades this doctrine has been widely extended. . . . In 1799 Congress enacted a law directing Federal customs revenue officers duly to observe the quarantine laws of any State and faithfully aid in their execution, thus recognizing the power of the States in the exercise of their police powers to establish quarantine regulations. In 1808 Congress enacted a law which empowered and authorized State quarantine officers to act as officers of the National quarantine system and provided that they should be clothed with all the powers of United States officers for quarantine purposes. . . . The Quarantine Act went so far as to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury, in the event that the quarantine regulations of any State or municipality were not, in his opinion, sufficient to prevent the introduction of infectious or contagious diseases from foreign countries, to promulgate rules and regulations which would supersede State laws. . . . The law was . . . passed because the people of the country demanded it, there being no other effective method of protecting themselves against the introduction of contagious diseases. From time to time the several States had enacted laws against the adulteration and misbranding of

foods and drugs. These State enactments proved to be ineffective. Again the power of Congress under the Interstate Commerce clause of the Constitution was invoked. In 1902 a law was enacted which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to establish standards of food and food products and to determine what are regarded as adulterations therein, for the guidance of the officers of the various States and the courts of justice. . . . The system of rebates, discrimination in service, and other similar evils connected with railway transportation built up great trusts and monopolies, which resulted in the enactment of anti-trust laws. These laws have been amended from time to time and the powers of the Federal officers extended in many respects. The Federal Trade Commission was created for the purpose of investigating and accumulating a mass of material as to the manner in which the business of the country is conducted, for the purpose no doubt of furnishing a basis for further legislation. On the ground that controversies between employers and employees were likely to interrupt the operations of interstate commerce carriers, the Board of Mediation and Conciliation was created by act of July 15, 1913. It was practically superseded by the Labor Board, created by the provisions of the Esch-Cummings Act. . . . Activities of the Department of Labor and of the Department of Agriculture, benefits to be secured under rivers and harbors bills, the demand for public buildings and national highways, have all served to emphasize the power of the Federal Government. Great areas of public land have been reserved from entry and are now held by the General Government for water power, mining, and other purposes. The instances enumerated by no means exhaust the list of Federal activities. Mention of the activities of the Government in the World War is not made because we are not yet far enough away from it to determine with any degree of certainty what its ultimate effect upon the extension of Federal power will be. To the constitutional lawyer perhaps the most startling innovation was the enactment of the Mann Act . . . By the passage of the Mann Act, the transportation or obtaining for transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or any other immoral purpose was forbidden. Persuading, inducing, enticing or coercing any woman or girl to go from one State to another for acts thus made illegal is prohibited under heavy penalties. . . . The law has been upheld by at least four decisions of the United States Supreme Court. [See also *WHITE SLAVE TRADE*.] . . . The constitutionality of the Migratory Bird Act has been upheld on the ground that the law being enacted in the fulfillment of a treaty obligation is valid. . . . The creation of the Postal Savings Bank, of the Federal Farm Loan Banks, the enactment of the Eight Hour Law, the creation of the Federal Reserve Board by the Federal Reserve Act, all have had a profound influence upon the country as a whole. . . . The Federal Reserve Board was created for the express purpose of . . . expanding the currency of the country so as to meet changing conditions, and to contract it when the necessity for expansion is passed. There is no doubt that this act was passed to meet a pressing demand from the people. The experience of the country, particularly in the panics of 1893 and 1907, demonstrated the necessity for some means of meeting the exigencies of financial crises. [See also *MONEY AND BANKING*:

Modern: 1913-1919.] . . . The enactment of the Federal Income Tax has brought home to the people of the country more sharply than any other single act their relationship to the Federal Government. From 1880 to 1900 a man might have conducted a very large and extensive business in many fields without coming in contact with any representative of the Federal Government save perhaps the postal authorities. That condition is not likely to prevail again in this country. The regulatory measures enacted by Congress (under one pretext or another) touch the life of the people at almost every point. . . . The significant thing is that the States as such and the people as a whole no longer question the rights of the Federal Government or seek to limit its activity. Given an apparent necessity for the enactment of a Federal statute, all other questions seemed to disappear from the mind of the people. Because their interest is not adversely affected by this increasing exercise of Federal power, the rights of the States as such, theoretically or practically, no longer interest the people. . . . The Constitution has from time to time been so extended by construction as to give Congress authority over subjects which theretofore were supposed to be wholly within the jurisdiction of the several States. With the adoption of the Prohibition Amendment, Congress, by express sanction of the people themselves, was given authority in a field theretofore expressly reserved to the States. However widely the power of Congress might be extended under the Interstate Commerce clause, it would not effect prohibition, either in the manufacture, transportation or sale of intoxicating liquors within the States. Because of the fact that State and local regulations were ineffective, the Eighteenth Amendment was sought and procured. The Constitution was thus amended, not by construction or interpretation, but in the manner provided in that instrument, to give Congress powers in a strictly police power field in respect to intoxicating beverages. The enforcement of this constitutional provision, which confers concurrent powers upon the State and Federal Governments, has served to disclose in a most startling manner the changed attitude of the people of the wealthiest and most populous States in the Union in respect to State and Federal activity in the police power field. The State of New York adopted an enforcement act known as the Mullan-Gage law. On May 5, 1923, the Legislature by a decisive vote passed a bill repealing the enforcement act. The Governor withheld executive approval of the bill until all parties in interest could be heard. While the voice of protest against the repeal of the act was loud and insistent both in the Legislature and before the Governor, it was not urged by anyone that, as has been pointed out by the President, the repeal of the law amounted to an abdication by the State of its rights and duties in respect to the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment. [See also *NEW YORK: 1923.*] . . . We think more and more as citizens of the United States and less and less as citizens of a particular State. In 1919 the legislature of Wisconsin had before it for consideration more than twenty-five resolutions dealing directly with Federal subjects. This is only one of many things which confirms the student in the belief that the change which is evidenced in so many ways is fundamental and to a large extent will be permanent. There has come into existence during recent years, by accident or design, an extraconstitutional method, by which

the Federal Government has sought to influence and control State Governments. Stated in plain terms, the Federal Government says to the States: Here is an appropriation which is available to you upon certain conditions. As a rule these conditions are that a like amount shall be appropriated by the State Government for the purpose indicated in the bill making the Federal appropriation. There is a further stipulation that certain conditions relating to intra-State affairs are to be complied with as a condition of receiving Federal aid. This scheme, by which the Federal Government in effect exercises legislative power in relation to education, public health, and other kindred subjects strictly within the police power of the States, is an innovation upon our constitutional system. There seems to be no limit to the activities of the Federal Government when the matter is approached from this angle. . . . Since the Civil War our population has been largely increased by foreign immigration. These foreign peoples have been accustomed to strong central governments, and are not attached, as were the early colonists, to the principle of local self-government. The changed attitude of our people as a whole toward the Federal as opposed to the State Government, has been due in part to the altered character of our population. . . . Powers once exercised by the Federal Government are seldom if ever voluntarily surrendered. In the police power field the powers of the Federal and the State Governments are to a certain extent concurrent, but under Article VI of the Constitution of the United States, in case of conflict the Federal law is supreme. Practically speaking, any increase of Federal power, either by way of amendment, interpretation or construction, or by the exercise of powers granted but not heretofore exercised, must result in a like diminution of the powers of the respective States, and so lessen the people's sense of civic responsibility."—M. B. Rosenberry, *Development of the Federal idea* (*North American Review*, Aug., 1923). —"The increasing importance of the states as coöperative administrative agents of the nation has been illustrated during the past two years by the relationship which has developed between the federal power commission and the water power agencies of various states. The federal power commission, which is an independent national agency composed of the secretaries of war, interior, and agriculture, was created by the Federal Water Power Act of June 10, 1920. . . . Many states had administered their water power affairs through commissions and other agencies prior to the creation of the national agency, and since that time several of the state commissions have taken direct steps to coöperate with the federal power commission. The enactment of the Federal Water Power law was immediately followed by coöperative acts on the part of private organizations, state officials, and state legislatures. Particularly active was the short-lived water power league of America which during the preceding January had been chartered under the laws of Delaware 'to assist in the revision and codification of existing laws and passage of new laws and coördinating federal and state jurisdiction over waters and water ways.' In July following the Act of June 10, 1920 the league announced that its aim was 'to establish working harmony between the states, municipalities, and the federal government,' in the matter of water power development. It accordingly called a convention in Washington 'to afford an opportunity to the several states that

are interested in water power development to have their representatives come in contact with the federal power commission with a view that there may be evolved a workable program which will coördinate the activities in those states with that of the federal government.' . . . The Water Power League wrote letters to the governor of each state asking his opinion of the effect of the Federal Water Power Act. Most of the replies expressed a wholesome spirit of state coöperation. For instance, Governor Morrow of Kentucky, replied there were 'no adverse laws in Kentucky upon this subject.' Answering for Governor Shoup of Colorado the state engineer stated that they would be pleased to have suggestions as to water power legislation. . . . In 1921, Oregon and New York, created water power commissions for the specific purpose of co-operating with the federal power commission. Oregon made the governor *ex officio* commissioner of hydroelectric power and directed him to collect data concerning the hydroelectric resources 'and to present same to the federal power commission.' . . . The New York legislature of 1921 created a state water power commission which was not only to coöperate with the federal agency but also to resemble it in organization and legal power."—M. Conover, *Federal and state power commissions* (*American Political Science Review*, November, 1922).—"An agreement was arrived at on November 25, 1922, in a conference at Santa Fé, N. M., under the direction of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, between the seven States in which the Colorado River basin lies. . . . [This constitutes,] with one or two minor exceptions, the first instance in more than 140 years of States of the Union being permitted by the Federal Government to enter into a treaty among themselves. The treaty has to do with the allocation of the rights to the waters of the Colorado River. The States involved . . . are Colorado, Nevada, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona and California. . . . Even the privilege of considering the question of the water rights . . . required a special act of Congress. The treaty, as finally signed, [terminated] a full year of debates and public hearings . . . [both in Washington and the West]. It brought to at least a temporary halt an interstate controversy, bitter and partisan, that . . . [had] lasted more than a quarter of a century, while its adoption by Congress and the seven States would eliminate the final obstacle in the path of the Government's . . . huge plan of flood control, reclamation and hydroelectric development on the Colorado River."—E. H. Hampton, *Seven-State Irrigation Treaty* (*New York Times Current History*, March, 1923).

1922 (January).—Represented at Cannes conference by Colonel Harvey as official observer. See CANNES CONFERENCE.

1922 (January-September).—Agricultural conference.—Withdrawal of army of occupation from Germany.—Naval appropriation.—Naval Scrapping Act.—Soldiers' Bonus Bill.—Married Women's Citizenship Act.—Return of alien property.—"The Agricultural Conference met in Washington on January 23 and continued its sessions for five days. It was made up of 325 delegates and included farmers, representatives of agricultural associations, bankers, packers, manufacturers of implements, middlemen and government officials. President Harding in his opening address recommended provision for greater working capital for farmers, the extension of coopera-

tive marketing, wider dissemination of scientific information, the protection of farmers and consumers from violent price fluctuations, and the further development of waterways and reclamation projects. The farmers passed a resolution calling for the limitation of crop acreage until agricultural conditions should improve, and urged the necessity that labor and capital should share in the deflation which had overtaken the farming interests. The Ford Muscle Shoals project and the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Canal project were approved. Relative to the railway situation, the conference passed a resolution stating: 'We insist that the railroad corporations and railroad labor should share in the deflation in charges now affecting all industry. This is essential to the restoration of normal conditions in agriculture, and it is essential to the welfare of the entire community.'—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1922, *Supplement*, p. 28.—'In February [1922] the War Department ordered a further reduction of 203 officers and 3,000 men in the American forces in Germany, leaving the Coblenz fewer than 200 officers and slightly more than 2,000 men. However, one month later the President issued an order for the recall of all those remaining, the withdrawal to be completed by July 1.—The Army appropriation act for 1923 provided for a total expenditure of \$256,411,169 and an army of 125,000 men.—According to an official statement of the United States Bureau of Budget the government is now paying out over \$1,000,000 in cash every day into the hands of ex-service men and their dependents; is providing hospital care and treatment to 30,000 veterans at an annual cost of \$60,000,000; is giving vocational training to more than 100,000 disabled veterans at an expenditure of \$30,000,000 per annum; is conducting over 50,000 medical examinations every month; and is spending in behalf of disabled ex-service men a total of more than \$500,000,000 annually. The report shows that up to February 1, 1922, the government had spent for ex-service men a total of \$2,702,321,185. On February 13 Secretary of the Navy Denby recommended to the House Naval Affairs Committee a reduction of the enlisted personnel of the Navy from 100,000 to 90,000 exclusive of apprentices. He indicated that his program would effect a saving of about \$70,000,000 in the 1923 budget. A few days before, the President had ordered all work stopped on naval construction without waiting for the ratification of the Five Power agreement to limit navies. . . . The annual Navy bill reported to the House on April 8 proposed to reduce the enlisted personnel to 67,000 men, a force sufficient, according to the committee, to man the eighteen battleships and auxiliary fleet and maintain the 5—5—3 ratio. . . . The proposed reduction was condemned by Admiral Sims. The bill as passed carried appropriations amounting to \$294,336,577, sufficient to provide for a personnel of 86,000 men.'—*Ibid.*, p. 26.—'The Naval Scrapping Act gave legislative effect to the treaty limiting naval armaments by authorizing the President to take the steps necessary to scrap a portion of the ships under construction. . . . By joint resolution, approved April 6, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to extend, for a period not to exceed twenty-five years, the term of payment of the principal and interest of the debt incurred by Austria for the purchase of flour from the United States Grain Corporation. . . . There was much discussion both in and out of Congress

of the bonus or adjusted compensation question. On March 16 Chairman Fordney of the Ways and Means Committee reported the Bonus Bill to the House. In his report it was estimated that the entire cost of the proposed legislation would be \$4,098,719,350 at the end of twenty years and that almost four and one-half million men would be entitled to select one of the optional plans. The greatest cost in any single year of the adjusted compensation payments was estimated at more than \$3,150,000,000 in the fiscal year 1943, when outstanding certificates would mature. While the committee was considering the bonus question the President, Secretary Mellon and the Controller of the Currency, Crissinger, took a determined stand against the proposed legislation. In a letter to Chairman Fordney, dated February 16, the President said, 'It continues to be my best judgment that any compensation legislation enacted at this time ought to carry with it the provisions for raising the needed revenues, and I find myself unable to suggest any commendable plan other than that of a general sales tax.' In spite of this opposition the House on March 23 passed the Bonus Bill by a vote of 333 to 70, after a four hours' debate.'—*Ibid.*, pp. 35-37.—'The Soldiers' Bonus Bill which had passed the House on March 23, 1922, was reported in an amended form to the Senate on June 8. It was discussed from time to time during the tariff debates and was finally approved by the Senate on August 31 by a vote of 47 for (27 Republicans and 20 Democrats) and 22 against (15 Republicans and 7 Democrats). The House had passed the bill without providing the means for raising the required revenues. The Senate adopted an amendment to the effect that the bonus should be paid from the interest received from foreign governments on the war indebtedness to the United States. Another Senate amendment provided for the reclamation of swamp lands to create homesteads for veterans. This would have involved an additional expenditure estimated at \$350,000,000. On September 11 the conferees agreed to strip the bill of the two features just mentioned and to limit applications for compensation to five years. The report was approved by both houses, but on September 19 the President returned the bill with a veto message stating his accord with the avowed purpose of the bill but disapproving its provisions. He said: 'In legislating for what is called adjusted compensation Congress fails, first of all, to provide the revenue from which the bestowal is to be paid. Moreover, it establishes a very dangerous precedent of creating a Treasury covenant to pay which puts a burden variously estimated between four and five billions upon the American people, not to discharge an obligation which the Government always must pay but to bestow a bonus which the soldiers themselves while serving in the World War did not expect.' On the next day the House passed the bill over the veto by a vote of 258 to 54, but the Senate sustained the veto. . . . On August 18 [1922] President Harding appeared before a joint meeting of the two houses of Congress to urge legislation necessary to meet the crisis caused by the coal strike. . . . In response to this request Congress enacted two laws. One of them provided for the establishment of the United States Coal Commission composed of not more than seven members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. It was made the duty of the commission to investigate and ascertain fully the facts and conditions of the coal

industry and study the problems relative to it in order to aid Congress in matters of legislation designed to assure a supply of coal to the country and maintain the uninterrupted flow of commerce among the states. The commissioners were provided with salaries of \$7,500 and \$200,000 was appropriated for the carrying out of the act. [See also LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1922: Nationwide coal strike.] The other act, known as the Government Coal Distribution and Price Control Bill, declared a national emergency in the production and transportation of coal, increased the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission during the emergency to include authority to issue orders for priorities in car service and for embargoes and to prevent purchases and sales of coal at unjust prices. A Federal Fuel Distributor, appointed by the President, was provided to act under the direction of the President in enforcing the law. For the purposes of the act \$250,000 was appropriated. Both of these measures were approved by the President on September 22.—Another law approved on the last day of the session was that allowing alien married women to become naturalized independently of their husbands' naturalization. The act further provided against the automatic loss of an American woman's citizenship by her marriage to an alien, and for the restoration to citizenship of such women as may have heretofore lost their citizenship by such marriages."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1923, *Supplement*, pp. 34-35.—See also NATURALIZATION: United States: Laws relating to women.—"On July 1 [1922] President Harding ordered the Alien Property Custodian, Colonel Thomas W. Miller, to secure the return of all German dye and drug patents and the proceeds therefrom from the Chemical Foundation of New York, to which concern the previous alien custodian had sold the seized property. The head of the Chemical Foundation was Francis P. Garvin, [Garvan] formerly Alien Property Custodian. In Congress charges had been made to the effect that patents worth from fifteen to twenty millions had been sold for the sum of \$250,000. Mr. Garvin declared that the order followed a conference at Washington between representatives of the German chemical industry and representatives of the Attorney-General, and that it was all the result of a trick on the part of the Germans to regain control of important drug and dye processes. The government instituted a suit for the dissolution of the Chemical Foundation and the reclamation of German patents in the Federal district court at Wilmington, Delaware [which was still pending in December, 1923]. . . . Congress passed and the President signed on March 5 [1923] a bill providing for the return of alien trusts up to \$10,000 in value. There was much criticism of the three per cent. immigration law on the part of large employers of labor, and also considerable sentiment in favor of still further restriction, but the law was not modified. . . . One of the most discussed questions of the year was the prohibition enforcement issue. The particular questions that caused legal difficulties were those relative to the sale of liquor on American ships, on the high seas and the transportation of liquor by foreign ships within the three-mile limit."—*Ibid.*, p. 30.

1922 (February).—Foreign war debts.—Debt Funding Act.—One of the most important measures passed in the first year of the Harding administration was the "Foreign Debt Funding Act, approved on February 9, [1922]. The bill had

passed the House during the previous session and was reported to the Senate by the Finance Committee about the middle of January. The Senate passed it in an amended form on the last of January by a vote of 39 to 26, all those favoring the bill being Republicans. . . . The bill as passed provided for a debt commission of five members with the Secretary of the Treasury as Chairman. Subject to the approval of the President, the commission may refund or convert and extend the time of payment of the principal or the interest or both of 'any obligation of any foreign Government now held by the United States or any obligation of any foreign government hereafter received by the United States (including obligations held by the United States Grain Corporation, the War Department, the Navy Department, or the American Relief Administration), arising out of the World War, into bonds or other obligations of such foreign Government.' It was provided, however, that the time of maturity of any obligation should not be extended beyond 1947, and that the rate of interest should not be less than $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. The commission was given no authority to cancel any debt. The efforts to attach to the bill a rider providing for a soldiers' bonus failed."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1922, *Supplement*, p. 36.—The prohibition against cancellation, contained in the act, destroyed all hope that the proposals for cancellation, which had been put forward from time to time, might be complied with. "Any further appeals to the United States for cancellation must . . . be based upon the hope of having the Act of February 9 amended in that respect. A glance at the cost of the American taxpayer involved in such an amendment will show the improbability of the success of any agitation in favor of the amendment. The portion of the war loans raised in the United States which was applied to meet in part America's cost of the war is roughly one-half of the total loans, which aggregated in round numbers \$20,000,000,000, the other half having been loaned to the Allies. For the service of the loans the Victory Liberty Loan Act established a sinking fund on July 1, 1920 and the law permanently appropriates for each fiscal year until the debt is discharged an amount equal to the sum of '2½ per centum of the aggregate amount of such bonds and notes outstanding on July 1, 1920, less an amount equal to the par amount of any obligations of foreign Governments held by the United States on July 1, 1920,' plus 'the interest which would have been payable during the fiscal year for which the appropriation is made on the bonds and notes purchased, redeemed, or paid out of the sinking fund during such year or in previous years.' It will be noted that the indebtedness incurred by the United States to make the foreign loans is not cared for by the sinking fund, as Congress contemplated that foreign repayments would provide for that part of the debt. The Treasury Department calculates that the cumulative sinking fund will retire the funded war debt of the United States, less the amount representing the foreign obligations held by the United States on July 1, 1920, in about twenty-five years. It has been further calculated that the amounts required to meet the sinking fund and interest charges on the half of the debt applied to American war expenses will average an aggregate payment of \$685,000,000 annually for a period of twenty-five years."—G. A. Finch, *Revision of the reparation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the cancellation of inter-*

Allied indebtedness (American Journal of International Law, October, 1922).

1922 (February).—Treaty with Belgium, England, China, France, Italy and Japan regarding affairs in the Far East, including China. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

1922 (February).—Treaty with England, France, Italy and Japan limiting naval armament.—Treaty regarding submarines and poison gases. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

1922 (February).—Treaty with Japan regarding the island of Yap. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

1922 (March).—Treasury officials dismissed from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing by President Harding. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1922.

1922 (March).—Invitation to take part in Genoa conference declined.—“The decision of the United States Government not to participate in the Genoa Economic and Financial Conference was announced by Secretary Hughes on March 8, [1922] following the delivery to Rolando Ricci, the Italian Ambassador to Washington, of a note containing the reply to the invitation tendered by Italy to the United States, asking it to take part in the conference, which . . . [convened] on April 10. The declination had been expected, for it had been known that the Harding Administration was of the opinion that the continental nations of Europe should ‘set their own houses in order’ before seeking to involve the United States in any measures for the promotion of the economic rehabilitation of Europe. . . . ‘This Government cannot be unmindful of the clear conviction of the American people, while desirous, as has been abundantly demonstrated, suitably to assist in the recovery of the economic life of Europe, that they should not unnecessarily become involved in European political questions. It may be added, with respect to Russia, that this government anxious to do all in its power to promote the welfare of the Russian people, views with the most eager and friendly interest every step taken toward the restoration of economic conditions which will permit Russia to regain her productive power; but these conditions in the view of this Government, cannot be secured until adequate action is taken on the part of those chiefly responsible for Russia’s present economic disorder.’”—*New York Times Current History, April, 1922, p. 133.*—See also GENOA CONFERENCE (1922).

1922 (March-August).—Renewal of treaty of peace and amity of 1907 between Nicaragua, Honduras and Salvador. See CENTRAL AMERICA: 1922 (March-August).

1922 (April).—Protest of Honduras against occupation of Swan island by an American corporation. See HONDURAS: 1922.

1922 (April).—Recognition of new Guatemala government. See GUATEMALA: 1922.

1922 (April 27).—Recognition of independence of Egypt. See EGYPT: 1922 (April-September).

1922 (May).—French proposal to send commission to discuss payment of her debt. See FRANCE: 1922 (April-July).

1922 (May).—Child labor law declared invalid.—An important decision bearing upon State rights was reached by the Supreme Court in May, 1922, on the appeal against the Federal child labor law which it declared unconstitutional in that it usurps state functions. The decision was handed down on May 15. See CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION: 1912-1922; SUPREME COURT: 1921-1922.

1922 (May-December).—Fiscal policy.—Re-

duction of national debt.—Tax reduction proposal.—Success of budget system.—Agricultural loans by War Finance Corporation.—“The Treasury Department made considerable progress in the reduction of the war debt. The peak was reached on August 3, 1919, when the total debt was \$26,596,000,000. On July 1, 1922, the debt had been reduced to \$22,903,000,000. The Victory Loan of \$4,250,000,000 matured in May. Secretary Mellon took advantage of the change in interest rates and accounted for \$2,000,000,000 of the Victory Loan partly by redemption and partly by conversion into new obligations due in a few years. In August it was announced that the $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent 4-year Treasury loan had brought \$475,000,000 in subscriptions. Victory Bonds to the amount of \$130,000,000 were exchanged for these new securities. In October Secretary Mellon called for subscriptions to a loan of \$500,000,000, the first long-term loan floated in the country since the war. The bonds bore $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent interest and were to run for 25 to 30 years. This was largely oversubscribed. When early in May the Secretary announced an issue of Treasury notes amounting to \$400,000,000 to be used in retiring the outstanding Victory Bonds, he made a report on the year’s debt-refunding operations. His policy had been to pay off and refund short-time notes in a manner that would bring their maturity dates at convenient times before the maturity of the Third Liberty Loan in 1928. A week after the notes were offered the Secretary was able to announce that they had been oversubscribed two and one-half times. Moreover, it was believed that the total debt at the close of the fiscal year would be reduced to \$22,400,000,000, and that instead of a deficit of something like \$500,000,000 that had been generally anticipated, the Treasury would show a substantial surplus at the end of the fiscal year. The results were even better than this, for on June 30, [1922] General Lord, Director of the Budget, was able to announce that the year just closing showed an excess of about \$310,000,000 of receipts over expenditures. The Director said: ‘One year ago the estimated receipts and expenditures indicated a deficit of \$823,000,000 for the fiscal year 1923. The difference of \$1,133,000,000 between this estimated deficit and the present estimated surplus of \$310,000,000 is accounted for by an increase in receipts of \$767,000,000, and a reduction in the total expenditures of \$366,000,000. The difference in receipts was occasioned by an increase of \$213,000,000 in customs receipts, \$423,000,000 in internal revenue receipts, and \$131,000,000 in miscellaneous receipts.’ The Treasury issued a statement on July 1 stating that the public debt had been reduced to \$22,349,707,365.—Secretary of the Treasury Mellon in his annual report to Congress in December [1922] recommended a reduction of the maximum income surtaxes from 50 per cent, the then existing rate, to 25 per cent, on the ground that the higher rates by encouraging large taxpayers to reduce their taxable income rendered them less productive than the lower rates would be.”—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1923, *Supplement*, p. 28.—One of “the most outstanding achievements of the Harding administration was the institution of the Budget System. The President chose Charles G. Dawes to be Budget Director and gave him the full support and authority necessary. That started the system auspiciously. With the resignation of Mr. Dawes after the foundation work was done, the President appointed Gen-

eral Herbert M. Lord to be Budget Director. . . . The result unquestionably was far-reaching improvement in routine fiscal administration and very substantial economies. . . . Characterized as 'the greatest reform in our financial history,' the Budget Bureau was the means of cutting down government expenses in three years from a six-billion-dollar to a three-billion-dollar basis. At the end of 1922 Secretary of the Treasury Mellon was able to announce that it would be possible to balance the budget for the fiscal year 1922 and to close the year with a surplus, amounting to about \$321,000,000."—W. F. Johnson, *Life of Warren G. Harding*, p. 114.—"The War Finance Corporation showed, in the annual report submitted to Congress on December 22, that it was doing business at the rate of several millions of dollars a day. Up to November 30, the date of the report, the corporation said, its advances for agricultural and live stock purposes totaled more than \$82,000,000, of which the principal items were loans on cotton aggregating \$22,000,000; on grain, \$16,000,000; live stock, \$13,000,000, and for general agricultural purposes, \$34,000,000. In addition to the agricultural financing, advances were reported aggregating \$51,500,000 on exports, of which the largest items were \$28,000,000 on cotton and \$11,500,000 on grain."—*New York Times Current History*, February, 1922, p. 857.

1922 (June).—Agreement with Mexico on debt question.—Terms of payment. See MEXICO: 1922.

1922 (June-July).—Represented unofficially at Allied Economic Conference at The Hague. See HAGUE (ALLIED) CONFERENCE (1922).

1922 (July).—Strike of railway shopmen.—Baltimore agreement. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1922: Strike of railway shopmen.

1922 (August).—Contract with Persia to send administrator-general of finances. See PERSIA: 1911-1923.

1922 (August).—German Claims Commission.—"An agreement between the United States and Germany providing for the determination of the amount of American claims against that State, signed at Berlin August 10, 1922, is not without significance. . . . The arrangement takes its place among the so-called executive agreements of the United States; it does not purport to be a treaty. The compact provides for a mixed commission (comprising a commissioner to be appointed by each party, and an umpire, to decide upon cases where the commissioners may disagree), to determine the amount to be paid by Germany in satisfaction of the financial obligations of that State under the treaty with the United States of August 25, 1921, securing to the United States and its nationals rights specified under the Resolution of the Congress approved July 2, 1921, and embracing rights under the Treaty of Versailles. The right of the Executive, incidental to his management of the foreign relations of the United States, to adjust international controversies involving the ascertaining of the amount of pecuniary claims against a foreign State, and by recourse to arbitral procedure, is not to be questioned. This is believed to be true regardless of the will of the individual claimant (when a private one), and irrespective of the public or private aspect of the particular claim, and for most purposes, without reference to the causes giving rise to complaint. The right of the President is thus not sharply defined according to whether the particular claim arose as an incident of war, or whether the government rather than a national happens to be the

aggrieved party, or whether a national whose cause has been espoused by his government is satisfied with the procedure or result. . . . Despite arguments to the contrary, it may be gravely doubted whether the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, purported to deprive the executive of any right possessed by him to conclude an agreement such as that of August tenth. That Act did declare that after the end of the war, any claim of an enemy or of an ally of an enemy to any money or other property received and held by the Alien Property Custodian or deposited in the United States Treasury, should be settled as Congress might direct. This was far from an assertion of control over American claims against Germany or its nationals, and still less over the mode of ascertaining their extent. It should be observed that it is the determination of the amount, rather than of the basis or mode of satisfaction of those claims, which is made the function of the commission established under the convention. It would be difficult to maintain that any existing contractual arrangement with Germany tied the hands of the President, forbidding an executive agreement such as that which he has concluded. The treaty with Germany of August 25, 1921, conferring upon the United States comprehensive and specified privileges under the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919, made careful provision that the United States was not to be bound to participate in any commission established under that treaty or any agreement supplemental thereto. Moreover, it did not prescribe that should the United States and Germany elect to agree to have recourse to a mixed arbitral tribunal such as that outlined in Article 304 of the Treaty of Versailles, the compact should assume the form of a treaty, or that any mixed commission to be established as a means of ascertaining the amount of American claims against Germany, should be necessarily governed by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. It should be noted, however, that the Senate in its resolution of October 18, 1921, advised and consented to the ratification of the treaty of August 25, 1921, subject to the understanding made a part of the resolution of ratification, that 'The United States shall not be represented or participate in any body, agency or commission, nor shall any person represent the United States as a member of any body, agency or commission in which the United States is authorized to participate by this treaty, unless and until an Act of the Congress of the United States shall provide for such representation or participation.' The action taken during the last days of the Second Session of the Sixty-seventh Congress, in appropriating funds for American participation in and representation on the Claims Commission, would appear to satisfy the requirement in respect to Congressional authorization. . . . Simultaneously with the signing of the agreement, the German Government expressed a desire to have an American citizen appointed as umpire, and requested the President of the United States to make the designation accordingly. Pursuant to that request, the President named the Honorable William R. Day, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, to serve in that capacity."—C. C. Hyde, *Claims agreement with Germany* (*American Journal of International Law*, Oct., 1922).—See also GERMANY: 1922 (July-August).

1922 (October).—Mingo coal strike called off by union. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1920-1922: Warfare in West Virginia.

1922 (November).—Supreme Court decision

against naturalization of Asiatics.—“One of the interesting elements in the big problem of American citizenship . . . is the growing number of American citizens of Asiatic blood, for the most part of Japanese blood. . . . The crux of the problem lies in California, for here we have some 80,000 Japanese, . . . according to the census of 1920. . . . The California State Board of Health reports show that between 1906 and 1921 there were born in that State in the neighborhood of 30,000 Japanese boys and girls, American citizens by the ‘law of the soil.’”—R. Malcolm, *Problem of American-born Japanese* (*New York Times Current History*, April, 1923).—Although native born Americans of Asiatic race are by right of birth citizens of the republic, their parents cannot become naturalized. “In two cases on November 13 [1922], the United States Supreme Court decided that Japanese could not become citizens of the United States. Both opinions were written by Justice Sutherland, a new member of the court, and the first he had handed down since his appointment. Justice Sutherland, after reading the hearings and debate on the act of 1906 to show no alteration in the original law was contemplated, concluded: ‘In all of the naturalization acts from 1790 to 1906 the privilege of naturalization was confined to white persons (with the addition in 1870 of those of African nativity and descent), although the exact wording of the various statutes was not always the same. . . . There is not implied—either in the legislation or in our interpretation of it—any suggestion of individual unworthiness or racial inferiority. These considerations are in no manner involved.’”—*New York Times Current History*, Jan., 1923, p. 685.—See also NATURALIZATION: United States: Naturalization act; SUPREME COURT: 1921-1922.

1922 (November).—Mid-term elections.—“The elections held on November 7 [1922] increased greatly the number of Democrats in both houses of Congress. The Sixty-seventh Congress was overwhelmingly Republican. In the House there were 300 Republicans, 131 Democrats and one Socialist; in the Senate there were 60 Republicans and 36 Democrats. The membership of the Sixty-eighth Congress, on the other hand, comprised in the House 223 Republicans, 206 Democrats, one Independent, one Farmer-Labor, and one Socialist; and in the Senate 53 Republicans, 42 Democrats, and one Farmer-Labor. Democratic Senators were elected to succeed Republicans in Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, West Virginia and Washington, while Republicans succeeded Democrats in Nebraska and Ohio.”—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1923, *Supplement*, pp. 35-36.

1922-1923.—Represented at Near East Conference by “observers.” See NEAR EAST CONFERENCE (1922-1923).

1922-1923.—Migrations of negroes from South to North. See RACE PROBLEMS: 1922-1923.

1922-1923 (April-December).—Lease of naval oil land reserve.—Under President Roosevelt’s administration a movement to preserve certain public oil lands for the use of the navy was set in motion. Two of these were situated in California, and another in Wyoming. This last, known as the Teapot Dome, is “a great natural pocket of oil, the capacity of which is estimated as low as 12,000,000 barrels and as high as 135,000,000. . . . The importance of an adequate oil supply for the navy in time of emergency was so well understood and agreed upon that the issue became a non-partisan

one, Republicans and Democrats alike supporting it. [Under President Taft, and later under President Wilson, the movement came to success and the fields were reserved for the use of the navy.] In 1914 Secretary Daniels said, in a report to President Wilson: ‘Henceforth all the fighting ships which are added to the fleet will use oil. . . . I am of the opinion that the navy should own its own oil lands and ultimately produce, transport, refine and store its own supply of oil, in order that the Navy Department may at all times be assured of an adequate and dependable supply of fuel oil at reasonable cost.’ [At the close of the war, the secretary of the navy again wrote], ‘the war on sea and in the air, as well as on land, has depended so much on transportation that it can be laid down as a basic principle that no nation that does not control an adequate oil supply can successfully maintain its forces. . . . That the navy may be justified in building oil-burning vessels, and to assure an adequate future supply of fuel, the President set aside Reserves 1 and 2 in California, and 3 in Wyoming, the Teapot Dome.’ [Bills which had been introduced into Congress looking to the withdrawal of these fields from public control had been defeated, and on one occasion Secretary Daniels threatened to send a force of marines to the oil fields to safeguard the naval reserve against exploitation of outside wells which threatened to draw oil from it. In 1920 an act to place the reserves under the control of the Navy Department was passed by Congress. (See above: 1920 [June]: Naval oil reserves, etc.) In the Harding administration, however, renewed efforts made by oil companies to obtain control of the lands for exploitation were successful, and in 1922 the reserves were leased. The leases were signed by the secretary of the interior and the secretary of the navy. Prior to this time, the lands had been transferred (in May, 1921) from the Navy Department to the Department of the Interior, in spite of opposition raised by officials of the navy when advised of the move by Edwin Denby, the secretary of the Navy Department.]”—*New York Times*, Jan. 27, 1923, *Sec. 8*, p. 1.—The executive order for the transfer reads as follows:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

Under the provisions of the act of Congress approved February 25, 1920 (41 Stat., 437), authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to lease producing oil wells within any naval Petroleum Reserve; authorizing the President to permit the drilling of additional wells or to lease the remainder or any part of a claim upon which such wells have been drilled, and under authority of the act of Congress approved June 4, 1920 (41 Stat., 912), directing the Secretary of the Navy to conserve, develop, use and operate, directly or by contract, lease, or otherwise, unappropriated lands in Naval Reserves, the administration, and conservation, of all oil and gas bearing lands in Naval Petroleum Reserves Nos. 1 and 2, California, and Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 3 in Wyoming, and Naval Shale Reserves in Colorado and Utah, are hereby committed to the Secretary of the Interior subject to the supervision of the President, but no general policy as to drilling or reserving lands located in a Naval Reserve shall be changed or adopted except upon consultation and in cooperation with the Secretary or Acting Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to perform any and all acts necessary for the pro-

tection, conservation and administration of the said Reserves subject to the conditions and limitations contained in this order and of the existing laws or such laws as may hereafter be enacted by Congress pertaining thereto.

WARREN G. HARDING.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
MAY 31, 1921.

[No. 3474].—United States President, Warren G. Harding, *Executive Order no. 3474, May 31, 1921.*

The first public announcement or record "of the Teapot Dome lease was on the financial pages of New York papers of April 14, 1922, when, in two short paragraphs, it was stated that the Sinclair interests had closed a contract with the Government for development of the navy Wyoming reserve. Two days later Senator Kendrick of Wyoming offered a resolution calling upon the Secretaries of the Navy and the Interior to inform the Senate whether negotiations were in progress to lease the last of the oil reserves set aside for the navy. [On April 18] . . . the Interior Department announced that a contract had been made with the Mammoth Oil Company, headed by Harry F. Sinclair. The next to move in the matter was Senator La Follette, who . . . charged that advance information of the signing of the oil lease had netted speculators \$30,000,000 on the New York Stock Exchange . . . [and demanded a sweeping enquiry. The demand was supported by public opinion, and the Senate voted] to inquire into the Teapot Dome lease and also into the circumstances connected with the contracts for opening the California naval oil reserves. Secretary Fall sent the committee a long letter describing his side of the controversy, and this communication was accompanied by a letter from President Harding, in which the President said: 'I think it is only fair to say in this connection that the policy which has been adopted by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Interior in dealing with these matters was submitted to me prior to the adoption thereof, and the policy decided upon and the subsequent acts have at all times had my entire approval.'—*New York Times, Jan. 27, 1923, Sect. 8, p. 1.*

In the report which was enclosed in the president's message, the secretary of the interior outlined the various steps taken in dealing with the reserves as follows:

"In the latter part of 1909, in fact on September 27, the orders known as the Taft withdrawals were made by the Secretary of the Interior. Those orders covered 3,000,000 acres in California and Wyoming. Subsequent withdrawals were made by the Secretary of the Interior, as follows: October 12, 1909, 124,000 acres in Utah and 88,540 acres in Wyoming; December 20, 1909, 87,474 acres in Colorado; January 18, 1910, 147,887 acres in California; February 2, 1910, 448,000 acres in California; February 11, 1910, 9,109 acres in Wyoming; April 8, 1910, 29,736 acres in Wyoming; April 14, 1910, 407,314 acres in Utah; May 4, 1910, 419,901 acres in New Mexico; January 18, 1910, 3,600 acres in Wyoming. These were designated as temporary petroleum withdrawals Nos. 5 to 17, inclusive. Some restorations were made during the period. These withdrawals were all made under the Executive authority of the President of the United States, without direct legislative authority or confirmation. On June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 847), Congress enacted a law directly authorizing the President to make withdrawals of lands for classi-

fication and for various purposes, and confirming his authority as to the withdrawals already made. Following this, on July 2, 1910, the President confirmed and ratified the outstanding withdrawals and withdrew lands subject to the conditions and limitations of the act. . . . Many restorations were made from time to time as heretofore noted, but the total area remaining in the petroleum reserves under the different orders so reported by this department on December 1, 1921, was 230,400 acres in Arizona, 1,178,392 acres in California, 469,030 acres in Louisiana, 1,345,151 acres in Montana, 84,894 acres in North Dakota, 1,962,768 acres in Utah, 1,120,526 acres in Wyoming, a total of 6,612,138 acres. (Note.—It is to be kept in mind that the areas given include lands title to which is not in the United States.) There has been no direct ratification by Congress of these petroleum withdrawals. . . . Such large withdrawals of the public domain by Executive order from 1909 aroused great opposition in the public-land States, and Congress considered various bills providing for the disposition of such withdrawn lands, either by directing the restoration thereof or by providing some other method of acquiring title to or the development of the oils supposed to underlie the same, through sale, lease, or otherwise. Proposed legislation reserving the lands to the United States in toto, or providing for the rental or lease thereof, the funds derived therefrom to be placed in the United States Treasury solely for governmental purposes, was strongly opposed in Congress by those who insisted that the States in which the lands were located should be entitled to at least a portion of the proceeds of such rentals or royalties, in lieu of the rights of the States to tax the same under State and municipal laws, as under the old practice said lands became the property of individual owners under the general mining laws. . . . At the request of . . . [Edward Denby] Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, and thereafter directly to the President of the United States, the President, on May 31, 1921, directed the Secretary of the Interior to administer such naval reserves for the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Interior has proceeded under this order in constant communication and consultation and coöperation with the Secretary of the Navy, and is so continuing at the present time. Prior to the Executive order just referred to, in the discharge of my duties with reference to private claims within the two naval reserves in California, my attention was called to the drainage of oil and the depletion of the naval reserves in the two California reserves particularly. Evidently the attention of the officials of the Navy Department had finally been directed to the same subject, as shortly prior to the signing of this Executive order the latter department had given notice that bids would be received for the drilling of offset wells in naval reserve No. 1, along the entire north boundary of section 1, to offset the drainage, the extent of which was then unknown because of the production of Standard Oil wells on the south boundary of section 36. These latter wells had been drilled and producing for some months or more, and were at the time very large and extensive producers of oil. The bids received by the Navy at that time were, by your direction and that of the Secretary of the Navy, opened in this department, and in consultation with the Navy Department, its experts, and by the assistance of the experts of this department it was finally determined that the bid of the Pan American Oil Co. of 55 per cent royalty for such offset wells was the

highest and best bid, and the contract for the drilling was tentatively awarded to that company. Meantime private claimants insisted upon their equitable rights, and there was transmitted to this department directly from your office a petition which had been in the archives of the Executive Office for Executive adjustment of such private claims. This petition was filed in the office of your predecessor. At your direction I took the matter up and ascertained that the petition had been filed within the statutory limit and must be passed upon. In so doing I ascertained that the parties petitioners had expended very large amounts of money in the attempt to develop private claims, including all of section 1 and portions of other sections in naval reserve No. 1. My predecessors had determined that these claimants were not entitled to patents, nor to outright leases, and the petition in question had been filed requesting Executive action under the terms of the leasing bill of 1920. I presented to the highest bidders, the Pan-American Petroleum Co., this matter, and my desire to obtain a release of all private claims upon school section 1 and other sections and asked the cooperation of the Pan American Co. in arriving at some solution of the difficulty. It was finally agreed between the private claimants and the highest bidders, the Pan American Co., that if the drilling permits were awarded to the latter company they would, with my consent, surrender 10 of the 22 wells to be drilled in favor of the United Midway Oil Co., claimants upon the same terms of royalty; that is to say, 55 per cent, and the same terms of drilling as to time, etc. I agreed to a part of this course provided the United Midway Co. would execute good and sufficient quitclaim deeds to the United States for all claim of right, title, interest, or equity in and to all of section 1 and the other sections covered by their claims, approximating something like 900 acres of land, thus obtaining a clear title to the United States as against such claimants and for the benefit of the Navy. During the course of these negotiations I had reports from the petroleum experts of the Bureau of Mines constantly in the field taking oil production for the Navy, both in reserve No. 2 and reserve No. 1. Shortly thereafter I made a personal visit to California, and there called into consultation Commander Landis, of the United States Navy, representing that department in oil matters, and our oil experts located at San Francisco and in the Bakersfield district. There was no divergence of opinion—in fact, entire unanimity—that the drainage from wells not owned by the United States Government constituted not only a menace but an actual and long-continuing loss to the Navy of its oils in both reserves, and that immediate steps were necessary to save any oils in any amount for the Government, and particularly for the Navy. Naval reserve No. 1, in California, contains a total area of 37,760 acres. . . . Naval reserve No. 2 has a total area of 30,080 acres, of which 20,640 acres are covered by private holdings. . . . Under the administration of your predecessor a lease was made on 120 acres to the Consolidated Mutual Oil Co. in naval reserve No. 2, because, as is shown by the record, the remaining oil deposits were in danger of destruction by water intrusion. Leases were also authorized for similar or other reasons to the Boston Pacific Oil Co. Prior to March 4, 1921, there had been drilled on patented lands within naval reserve No. 2, in the State of California, 408 oil and gas wells; on Government lands within the reserve claimed under the mining law, 141 wells. On patented lands immediately adjacent to the reserve

there had been drilled prior to March 4, 1921, 142 wells; on Government land adjacent to the reserve, 33 wells; and despite wild statements to the contrary, as far as I have been able to ascertain, no marines of the United States Navy had been called out to prevent such drilling for any reason whatsoever, nor had any other force been used to preserve at any cost the oils to the Navy Department. It will be noted that the grand total of wells drilled in this one reserve aggregated 724 prior to the incoming of your administration."—Message from the President of the United States, Warren G. Harding, *Naval reserve oil leases (67th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document no. 210, referred to Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Apr. 20, 1922, pp. 3-7)*.

"One of the objects of the Senate investigating committee was to find out why the Navy Department turned over to Secretary Fall's control these valuable oil reserves. . . . The investigation, instituted as a result of the clamor of public disapproval, took on at first the nature of a controversy among experts over the question whether or not the naval reserve had been in danger of exhaustion from the adjoining oil field. Before many weeks testimony began to creep in that had no bearing on the scientific phase of the subject. The relations between Mr. Fall, former Secretary of the Interior, and . . . [the lessees] came to have paramount importance."—*New York Times, Jan. 27, 1923, sect. 8, p. 1*.—Suspicion was cast on these transactions when in the course of the investigation it was brought out that Albert B. Fall obtained from Edward L. Doheny a loan of \$100,000 in cash in November, 1921, a few weeks before his company obtained control of the lands in California known as Naval Reserve No. 1. This loan, Doheny claimed, was made in consideration of his lifelong friendship with the secretary, and had no relation to the lease.

1922-1923 (June - February).—*Ship Subsidy Bill*.—Effect of Panama canal on West coast shipping.—"During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1922, the world-wide business depression grew more acute, export and import business and ocean freight rates continued to decline, great losses were incurred, and it became necessary to make still further reductions in the [shipping board's] vessels on the seas. The number of these vessels was reduced from 744 on June 30, 1921, to 394 on June 30, 1922. Of the vessels in ocean trade at the beginning of the fiscal year, about 300 were in the so-called tramp service and the remainder in the regular line service. The tramp steamers became so unprofitable that they were all withdrawn and laid up. . . . Despite the continued decline in freight rates the corporation instituted between New York and London another line of combination passenger and freight steamers, with weekly sailings. . . . New freight services were established. Offices were set up of various interior points to acquaint the public with Shipping Board lines in world trade routes, sailing dates, rates, and so forth. The corporation secured an agreement with shippers of Egyptian cotton by which half of the quantity intended for shipment to the United States would be carried in board vessels. British ships had been carrying all the cotton shipments from Egypt to the United States. . . . The 23 combination passenger and cargo vessels constructed by the corporation were delivered during the year and assigned as follows: Seven to operate in the service between New York, Cherbourg, and London; four between New York, Rio de Janeiro,

Montevideo, and Buenos Aires; five between San Francisco, Honolulu, Yokohama, Kobe, Shanghai, Manila, and Hongkong; five between Seattle, Yokohama, Shanghai, Hongkong, and Manila; two were being reconditioned when the fiscal year closed. Five more ex-German ships were put in service during the year. . . . Definite schedules were established in many cargo services, a monthly freight service being operated from the Pacific coast to Australia. For this service there were six board vessels operated as feeders between Shanghai, Hongkong, and Calcutta, and four for the Seattle service between Hongkong and Java ports. . . . The Shipping Board [stated in its] report for the year ending June 30, 1922, that the construction cost of the vessels it owned on that date was \$2,351,505,875.92."—*Senate (Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 4th Session of the 67th Congress of the United States of America, v. 64, pt. 2, Jan. 3, 1923, pp. 1225-1226, 1232)*.—"It soon became apparent that the law of 1920 would not bring the government-owned fleet promptly into the hands of private owners nor assure to American registry a merchant marine carrying the desired percentage of American foreign trade. Upon the urgent recommendation of the Shipping Board and of President Harding [who called a special session in November, 1920, for this purpose], a supplementary measure was introduced simultaneously in both houses of Congress which is popularly known as the Ship Subsidy Bill of 1922. This is, however, an inadequate designation, since the bill . . . [was] concerned in large part with the strengthening of the indirect-aid features of the merchant marine law. But a distinctive feature was the provision for a general navigation bounty to vessels conforming to certain requirements, securing approval of the Shipping Board, and entering into contracts with that Board for a period not exceeding ten years. To be entitled to such compensation, vessels were to have a specified minimum gross tonnage and the highest classification by the American Bureau of Shipping, must be of American registry and ownership and be manned by crews two thirds of whom are American citizens, and, as a rule, be American built. [It contained provisions whereby fifty per cent of all immigrants coming by sea were to be carried in American ships.] Payment was to be based on a combination of speed, tonnage, and distance covered in our foreign trade or in certain lines of trade with the more distant possessions of the United States. The minimum rate—one half cent per gross ton per hundred miles—was fixed for ships with a speed of less than thirteen knots; the general maximum, two and one tenth cents per gross ton per hundred miles, for those having a speed of twenty-three knots or over. The fund for meeting these payments was to be derived from the following sources: (1) one-tenth of the customs duties on all imports; (2) the total tonnage dues collected in American ports on all vessels American and foreign; and (3) one half the amount by which the net earnings of bounty-receiving vessels should exceed ten per cent per annum of the capital invested."—G. M. Fisk and P. S. Peirce, *International commercial policies*, pp. 284-285.—"The Government continued to lose money on its merchant marine but the losses were greatly reduced. This was indicated by the Shipping Board's announcement on March 1 that the loss during the last four months' operation of its vessels had amounted to \$16,000,000. It was because of this regular deficit and the enormous depreciation of

idle ships that the President favored the subsidy scheme. On September 12 [1922] the Government's fleet of 226 wooden ships built during the war was sold at a private competitive sale by the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation to George D. Perry of San Francisco for \$750,000. The cost of each vessel was about \$700,000. The ships had been idle since the war and had suffered serious depreciation. The degree to which the Government's ships were idle was indicated in a statement made on January 21 by J. B. Smull, President of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. There were then 1,379 vessels under the control of the corporation. Their combined tonnage was 9,846,611. During the previous month 386 ships with a tonnage of 3,297,451 were assigned to trade while among those not in operation were 874 steel steamers with a tonnage of 5,585,160. . . . On November 21 [1922] the President appeared before a joint session of the two houses and delivered a plea for his ship subsidy plan which he had urged from time to time but which had not been acted on by either house. He said: 'We have the unavoidable task of wiping out a \$50,000,000 annual loss in operation, and losses aggregating many hundreds of millions in worn-out, sacrificed, or scrapped shipping.' His plan would, he believed, provide for an American merchant marine, privately owned and privately operated, but serving all the people and always available to the Government in any emergency. He denied that the measure would aid special interests and enrich a few at the expense of the Treasury. The Ship Subsidy Bill was passed by the House on November 29, by a vote of 208 to 184. Sixty-nine Republicans voted against the bill and only four Democrats voted for it. Several far-reaching amendments were made by the House, however. Among them were the following: exclusion from the subsidy provisions of vessels owned by large corporations, such as Standard Oil, United Fruit, and United States Steel, when engaged in transporting their own products solely; elimination of a section giving a rebate from income taxes equal to five per cent of freight money paid American vessels; the increase from two to four and one-half per cent in interest to be charged on loans made under the construction loan fund; prohibition of the sale of ships by the Shipping Board without advertisement and competitive bids; and a provision against expenditures from the Merchant Marine fund except under annual congressional appropriations. . . . On December 9 the Senate committee reported the bill favorably. It was debated frequently in the Senate but it never had a good chance of passage. In spite of the President's repeated pleas for favorable action on this proposal, the Senate on February 28, just a year after the President had first advocated it before Congress, voted by 63 to 7 to displace that measure and to make the Filled Milk Bill the unfinished business. The Subsidy Bill had been laid aside on January 15 to make way for agricultural credits legislation. The opposition to the bill came chiefly from the agricultural regions."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1923, *Supplement*, pp. 28-29, 37, 39.—"The most signal defeat met with by Mr. Harding in his dealings with Congress was the failure of the Ship Subsidy Bill. In his advocacy of this measure he was not upon such safe ground, however. The matter was controversial and had been for many years. The farmers had long been suspicious as to the merits of the idea, and an impression prevailed quite

generally that if such a measure came into effect a few would benefit at the expense of the many. It is also true that there are a great many people in the United States who are opposed in principle to a Government subsidy for an industrial or commercial undertaking."—J. D. Whelpley, *Late President Harding and the succession (Fortnightly Review, Sept., 1923, p. 357)*.—"When the great ditch across the Isthmus was opened to traffic, the distance by water to New York was reduced by more than half, and to the United Kingdom and Europe by nearly half. . . . The distance from Seattle to New York is still approximately twice as far by water as by rail, but because of the cheapness of ocean transportation, intercoastal steamship lines can carry goods at a rate far below the rail rate, even though they must pay Panama Canal tolls of \$1.20 per registered ton. Because of the Interstate Commerce Commission rulings, the railroads cannot meet the steamship price and as a result, most of those commodities which do not require express train speed, are moving from coast to coast by cargo vessel instead of by freight car. It is not surprising, therefore, that there are now ten steamship lines operating from Puget Sound and the Colombia to the United Kingdom and Europe, and eight lines in the intercoastal service to the Gulf ports and New York, Boston, and other Atlantic points. In the European service only two lines are under the American flag, the others being British, French, and Norwegian. In the inter-coastal trade . . . only American vessels are permitted. . . . During the war it was felt that a real restoration of an American Merchant Marine depended upon the return of the American seaman; and with this end in view, the Board established a training service for men, and various navigation and engineering schools for officers. Several such schools were established in the Northwest, and a training ship was operated between Puget Sound and the Hawaiian Islands. More than five hundred officers and several thousand men were prepared for sea service. As many of them came from interior points, a great deal of good was undoubtedly done in interesting our inland population in American shipping. . . . The University of Washington, which is situated at Seattle [continued] the educational work begun by the Shipping Board, and besides courses in navigation and marine engineering, . . . [give] a four year training in the steamship business. . . . On January 13, 1923, for the first time in history a combination passenger and cargo vessel [the *President Hayes*] left Puget Sound ports for Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, Buenos Aires and other ports of eastern South America, via the Panama Canal. The ship was one of three vessels being operated in the new service."—H. T. Lewis and S. I. Miller, *Economic resources of the Pacific Northwest, p. 523*.

1922-1923 (December-July).—Funding of British war debt.—"In December, 1922, a commission was sent over from Great Britain with instructions to reach an agreement on the funding of the War Debt owed by that country. The agreement arrived at was reported to the president by the World War Foreign Debt Commission, under date, and was transmitted by the president to Congress in a special message delivered at a joint session . . . [on February 7, 1923]. The Report [which tells the full story of the transaction] reads as follows: 'The British Government designated as its representatives the Right Honorable Stanley Baldwin, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Montagu Norman, the governor of the Bank of England,

who have conferred with the commission in Washington and presented facts relating to the position of the British Government. The commission has also met frequently in separate sessions and has given the fullest consideration to the problems involved in the funding of the British debt to the United States. It became manifest at the outset that it would not be possible to effect an agreement for funding within the limits of the act approved February 9, 1922, and the commission has, therefore, considered the practicability of a settlement on some other basis, and though it has not been able, in the absence of authority under the law, to conclude negotiations, it unanimously recommends for submission to Congress a settlement with the British Government, as follows:

Principal of notes to be refunded.	\$4,074,818,358.44
Interest accrued and unpaid up to Dec. 15, 1922, at the rate of 4½ per cent.	629,836,106.90
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	4,704,654,465.43
Deduct payments made Oct. 16, 1922, and Nov. 15, 1922, with interest at 4½ per cent thereon to Dec. 15, 1922.	100,526,379.69
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	4,604,128,085.74
To be paid in cash.	4,128,085.74
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Total principal of indebtedness as of Dec. 15, 1922, for which British Government bonds are to be issued to the United States Government at par. . . .	\$4,600,000,000.00

The principal of the bonds shall be paid in annual installments on a fixed schedule, subject to the right of the British Government to make these payments in three-year periods. The amount of the first year's installment will be \$23,000,000 and these annual installments will increase with due regularity during the life of the bonds until, in the sixty-second year, the amount of the installment will be \$175,000,000, the aggregate installments being equal to the total principal of the debt. The British Government shall have the right to pay off additional amounts of the principal of the bonds on any interest date upon 90 days' previous notice. Interest is to be payable upon the unpaid balances at the following rates, on December 15 and June 15 of each year: 3 per cent semiannually, June 15, 1923, to December 15, 1932, inclusive; 3½ per cent semiannually, June 15, 1933, until final payment. For the first five years one-half the interest may be deferred and added to the principal, bonds to be issued therefor similar to those of the original issue. And payment of interest or of principal may be made in any United States Government bonds issued since April 6, 1917, such bonds to be taken at par and accrued interest. The commission believes that a settlement of the British debt to the United States on this basis is fair and just to both Governments, and that its prompt adoption will make a most important contribution to international stability. The extension of payment, both of the principal and interest, over a long period will make for stability in exchange and promotion of commerce between the two countries. The payment of principal has been established on a basis of positive installments of increasing volume, firmly establishing the principal of repayment of the entire capital sum. The payment of interest has been

established at the approximately normal rates payable by strong governments over long terms of years. It has not been the thought of the commission that it would be just to demand over a long period the high rate of interest naturally maintained during the war and reconstruction, and that such an attempt would defeat our efforts at settlement. Beyond this the commission has felt that the present difficulties of unemployment and high taxation in the United Kingdom should be met with suitable consideration during the early years, and therefore the commission considers it equitable and desirable that payments during the next few years should be made on such basis and with such flexibility as will encourage economic recuperation not only in the countries immediately concerned but throughout the world. This settlement between the British Government and the United States has the utmost significance. It is a business settlement fully preserving the integrity of the obligations, and it represents the first great step in the readjustment of the inter-governmental obligations growing out of the war. Respectfully submitted, A. W. Mellon, *Chairman*. Charles E. Hughes, Herbert Hoover, Reed Smoot, Theodore E. Burton.' [In his address to the Senate, the president said:] 'In its comments upon the arrangements negotiated the commission itself has said essentially everything necessary to commend the agreement to your sanction. . . . Here is the first clearing of the war-clouded skies in a debt-burdened world, and the sincere commitment of one great nation to validate its financial pledges and discharge its obligations in the highest sense of financial honor. There is no purpose to report that your commission has driven a hard bargain with Great Britain, or to do a less seemly thing in proclaiming a rare generosity in settlement. Amid widespread clamor for the cancellation of World War debts, as a fancied but fallacious contribution toward peace—a clamor not limited to the lands of debtor nations but insistent among many of our own people—the British commission came to make acknowledgement of the debt, to put fresh stamp of approval upon its validity, and agree upon terms for its repayment. It was manifest from the beginning that Great Britain could not undertake any program of payment which would conform to the limitations of time and interest rates which the commission had been authorized to grant. But here was a great nation acknowledging its obligations and seeking terms in which it might repay. So your commission proceeded to negotiate in a business way for a fair and just settlement. Such a settlement had to take into consideration the approximately normal interest rates payable as the commission suggests, "by strong governments over a long term of years," with a temporary interest rate and suitable options adjusted to the tremendous problems of readjustment and recuperation. Your commission went so far as it believed the American sense of fair play would justify. Even then the British debt commission did not feel justified by its instructions to accept the proposal. Only after submission to the British Cabinet was the proposal of your commission accepted [the commission returned to England on Jan. 20, 1923, for the purpose of submitting it], and I bring it to you, with the earnest recommendation that it be given, so far as legislative procedure will admit, a cordial and prompt approval.'—*House of Representatives (Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 4th Session of the 67th Congress of the United*

States of America, v. 64, pt. 3, Feb. 7, 1923, p. 3213).—The act to ratify the agreement was passed on Feb. 28, 1923, in the form of an amendment to the Refunding Act of February 9, 1922, "for the reason that the latter limited the authority of the commission to extend the time of maturity of the bonds or other obligations to be refunded beyond June 15, 1947, or to fix the rate of interest at less than 4¼ per centum per annum. The settlement approved by Congress extended the maturity of the bonds for sixty-two years and reduced the rate of interest to 3 per cent per annum for the first ten years and 3½ per cent thereafter until final payment. . . . Although there was some criticism in Great Britain of the terms of the settlement before they were formally approved by the British Cabinet, Chancellor of the Exchequer Baldwin, one of the two British representatives who negotiated the settlement in America, is reported by the Associated Press to have made the following statement at a dinner given in his honor in London by the Pilgrims on [February 28, 1923]: The debt funding commission could not have dealt with men more competent, more fair or more desirous of helping to a settlement. . . . I would only say of the debt that we stand in this country as we have always done, and as America stands, for the sanctity of contracts. We have concluded with America the first settlement since peace. We are glad to have done it. We made a fair settlement; we have been fairly met, and we will rejoice that it has been done. As pointed out by President Harding . . . this settlement put an end to the clamor which originated in Paris at the Peace Conference . . . for the cancellation of the inter-Allied indebtedness provided the United States would forego the amount owing to her without any set-off from any other source."—G. A. Finch, *Settlement of the British debt to the United States (Journal of International Law, April, 1923)*.—"The final proceeding incident to the carrying through of the agreement for the funding of Great Britain's war debt to the United States was witnessed on July 5, when the Counsellor of the British Embassy at Washington turned over to the Treasury Department \$4,600,000,000 United Kingdom bonds, the Treasury at the same time surrendering demand obligations of Great Britain held by the Treasury Department since the loans were advanced. Acting Secretary Gilbert in making this known July 5 said: "The Treasury this afternoon received the \$4,600,000,000 aggregate principal amount of bonds of the United Kingdom issued pursuant to the proposal dated June 18, 1923, for funding the debt of Great Britain to the United States, and the acceptance thereof, dated June 19, 1923. The Treasury thereupon cancelled and surrendered to the British Government, through the Counsellor of the British Embassy at Washington, demand obligations of Great Britain in the principal amount of \$4,074,818,358.44, in accordance with the provisions of the proposal and acceptance."—*United Kingdom bonds to amount of \$4,600,000,000 turned over to United States in debt funding settlement—Stanley Baldwin on debt adjustment (Commercial and Financial Chronicle, v. 117, July 7, 1923, p. 210)*.—The British government adopted the plan of purchasing large numbers of Liberty Bonds to be applied in payment of the semi-annual instalments of the debt. The administration in turn adopted the policy of cancelling these bonds as received, thus reducing the amount of the national debt by the amount paid in.

1923.—Protest against British rubber monopoly.—Needs of the United States for rubber. See TRUSTS: International: Rubber industry.

1923.—Changes in workmen's compensation laws. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: United States: 1923.

1923.—Status of railroads under the Esch-Cummins or Transportation Act. See RAILROADS: 1923: United States.

1923.—Laws restricting export and import of opium passed. See OPIUM PROBLEM: 1921-1923.

1923 (January).—Failure of attempt to pass Dyer Bill making lynching a Federal crime. See LYNCH LAW: National aspects.

1923 (January).—Foreign relations.—Mandates and oil concessions.—At the beginning of 1923 "after two years of direct negotiations with Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, the United States . . . obtained everything it demanded, in Yap the right to operate the Guam-Yap cable and to establish a wireless station, in Mesopotamia and in Syria full rights of League members and in addition special concessions to our own particular opinions respecting missionary activities. Not only have we secured all rights belonging to us as co-victors over Germany with which we were at war; we have also claimed and obtained the right to be consulted with respect to the territory of Turkey, with which we were not at war, on the ground . . . that had it not been for America's help the Allies would not have defeated Turkey. . . . There is every reason to respect the validity of our claims regarding the mandate territories. And yet the circumstances under which these claims have been pushed to acceptance and some of the consequences growing out of this acceptance of our claims on the part of the mandate-holding countries, are worthy of some thought. The United States has repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and the Government of the League. It has, therefore, no part in the responsibilities imposed by the one, the duties involved in membership in the other. We have demanded the right of review over the relations between the Great Powers and their mandated dependencies without participating in the general machinery set up to control this relationship. We have demanded that we be shown the reports submitted to the Mandate Commission without ourselves coöperating in that Commission. We . . . [have insisted] on treating mandates as national relationships whereas the justification and ideal of the mandate principle is that it is an international relationship. In refusing to recognize, much less to coöperate with, the Mandate Commission, we have to this extent weakened the prestige of a valuable agency for the improvement of colonial administration."—T. H. Dickinson, *United States and the league*, pp. 104-106.—"After the disarmament conference the oil fog began to clear. The Anglo-Persian and the Standard Oil Companies . . . agreed to form a joint company to explore for oil in Northern Persia, in the districts which had not been included under the Anglo-Persian concession. Opposition to this Anglo-American combination, however, developed largely through the insistence of the Russian Soviet upon the former Russian sphere of influence in Northern Persia. The Persian Government which had virtually repudiated the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919, wished to strengthen American influence there. But an Anglo-American combination was quite a different thing, and so the Persian Government carried on negotiations with the Sinclair Oil Group. . . . In the Spring of 1920 the

Standard Oil Company of New York had been allowed to proceed with prospecting on concessions which it had previously received from the Turkish Government. . . . Fifty per cent. of the interests of the various Standard Oil Companies now lie in foreign countries—in Mexico, China, Canada, and elsewhere; and one or more of them have sought concessions in Fiume and the Caucasus. . . . The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey bid against the Royal-Dutch Shell for a concession in Czechoslovakia; and in November, 1921, it was given the right to bore. In Central and South Africa this Standard Oil Company was also . . . active. In January, 1922, the Standard Oil Company of California purchased one-quarter of the Vanderlip concession in Siberia. . . . In April, 1922, the Sinclair group secured oil in Portuguese West Africa, and another from the Soviet Government for the fields in Northern Sakhalin. . . . After protracted negotiations, settlement . . . [of the dispute between American and British interests over the oil field of Mosul was reached] in November, 1922, in which the British and French agree to modify the San Remo oil pact so as to give American interests 20 per cent. of the Mesopotamia concessions. (An American corporation, the Barnsdell Corporation, was given a concession in the Baku fields in January, 1923)."—R. L. Buell, *Oil interests in the fight for Mosul* (*New York Times Current History*, Mar., 1923).—See also TRUSTS: International: Struggle for oil concessions.

1923 (January-March).—Agricultural Credits Act.—Bursum Pension Bill.—Civil Service Classification Act.—The Agricultural Credit Act, "passed by Congress on the last day of the session . . . was a compromise measure based on a number of bills that had been discussed for several months. The act as approved provided for government credit to farmers and for the making of loans by private organizations on live-stock and farm products on their way to market. [See also RURAL CREDIT: United States: Agricultural Credits Act.] . . . On January 3, 1923, President Harding vetoed the Bursum Pension Bill, which provided pensions at the rate of \$50 a month to all widows of veterans of the Civil War and increased the pensions of the veterans themselves from \$50 to \$72 a month. The bill if approved would have required an immediate annual expenditure of more than \$100,000,000. The President concluded his veto message with the following statement: 'The compensation paid to the widows of World War veterans, those who shared the shock and sorrows of the conflict, amount to \$24 per month. It would be indefensible to insist on that limitation upon actual war widows if we are to pay \$600 per year to widows who marry veterans sixty years after the Civil War.' . . . The Classification Act of 1923, approved by the President on March 4, was designed to bring about a more satisfactory relation between the work done and the salaries received by civil servants. The act provided for the establishment of an ex-officio board to be known as the Personnel Classification Board and to consist of the Director of the Budget or someone designated by the Director, a member of the Civil Service Commission, designated by the Commission, and the Chief of the United States Bureau of Efficiency, or someone designated by him. The board was to make the necessary rules and regulations and provide such subdivisions of the grades established by the act as it deemed necessary according to the kind and difficulty of the work. Its regulations were to provide for ascertaining and recording the

duties of position and the qualifications required of incumbents. Department heads were required to report the duties and responsibilities of new positions to the board. After consultation with the board, and in accordance with a uniform procedure prescribed by it, the head of each department must allocate all positions in his department to their appropriate grades on the compensation schedules. In determining the rate of compensation to be received by an employee, the principle of equal compensation for equal work irrespective of sex was prescribed."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1923, *Supplement*, p. 38, 40.

1923 (February).—Payment of claims for ships requisitioned from Norway during World War. See NORWAY: 1921-1923.

1923 (March).—Exoneration of A. E. F. by Senate.—In March, 1923, a Senate investigating committee exonerated the American Expeditionary Force from charges which had been rumored against it and which finally had been openly made in the Senate. "The committee of the Senate, appointed on the 4th day of November, 1921, under the provisions of Senate Resolution No. 166, to investigate charges made by the late Senator Thomas E. Watson, of Georgia, that members of the American Expeditionary Forces abroad were executed without trial or court-martial, respectfully reports that it has performed the duty imposed upon it by said resolution and is of opinion that the charges are not sustained by the testimony. . . . The fact that but 11 soldiers were executed in France . . . is evidence not only of considerate and merciful treatment of the military lawbreaker by the military authorities but of the good conduct and discipline of the American soldiers who served abroad in the World War. The charge of 'illegal executions in France' having been solemnly made on the floor of the Senate and seriously investigated, and the evidence before the committee failing to support the charge but indicating as strongly as circumstances permit that the charge is false, it is due to the Army that served in France as well as the people of the United States of which the Army was a part that there be a finding to the effect not only that the charge is not proven but that it is untrue. The importance of such a finding may not be great at present for the reason that the people of the United States do not believe the charge to be true. But if the matter is left undecided coming generations may doubt the falsity of the accusation, for there was some evidence, however, unreliable in support of the charge. For history's sake there should be a determination. W. A. BETHEL, *Colonel, Judge Advocate*."—F. B. Brandegee, *Report of Special Committee on Charges of Alleged Executions without Trial in France (67th Congress, 4th Session, Report no. 1256, pp. 1, 7-8)*.

1923 (March - September).—Ratification of Four Power Treaty.—Opposition to participation in Court of International Justice.—Embargo on sale of surplus war equipment to foreign powers.—"The leading 'bitter-enders' of the League fight, Senators Borah, Johnson, and Reed, directed the fight against the Four Power Treaty, in which they were ably seconded by Senators La Follette and Robinson. Indeed, the latter, an ardent friend of the League, led the Democratic opposition to the new treaty. The day before the treaty was signed by the delegates the attack was opened in the Senate by Senator Borah, who declared that while meeting, as provided for in Article II, to 'discuss fully and frankly' the 'most efficient

measures to be taken' in case of 'aggressive action,' the powers could commit the United States to war just as much as the League of Nations could under Article X, and that the moral obligation, acknowledged by President Wilson under Article X, would be even more binding than the legal obligation. In his opinion we were entering the League of Nations by the back door. Senator La Follette followed with a declaration that Article II was a half brother to Article X and Senator Reed denounced the whole treaty as a 'gold brick.' . . . It does not require us or any power to surrender a worthwhile tradition. . . . The world has been hungering for a better relationship for centuries since it has attained its larger consciousness. The conception of the League of Nations was a response to a manifest world hunger. Whatever its fate, whether it achieves the great things hoped for, or comes to supersedure, or to failure, the American unwillingness to be a part of it has been expressed. That unwillingness has been kept in mind, and the treaties submitted to-day have no semblance or relationship save as the wish to promote peace has been the common inspiration. . . . In the committee on foreign relations Senator Brandegee, who had fought the League of Nations very bitterly, offered a reservation which raised a storm in the committee and caused some consternation at the White House, but finally secured its adoption in a modified form. After two full weeks of discussion the committee reported the treaties for ratification with the Brandegee reservation to the Four Power Treaty. . . . The chief attack was still leveled at Article II, the opponents holding that it was an alliance and would commit us to war, the supporters denying both. Senator Hitchcock, who had led the fight for the League of Nations, accepted the Four Power Treaty, as did Senator Williams. The latter declared that, had the League been proposed and sponsored by a Republican President, it would have been supported by the Republican Senators and that the Four Power Treaty would have been supported by the Democrats, had it been proposed by President Wilson. He then appealed to senators to lay aside their partisanship at the shoreline. But many Democrats, led by Senator Robinson, opposed the treaty to the last. Senator Robinson tried to secure an amendment and a reservation to the effect that the high contracting parties agree not to take any aggressive action and to refer all disputes not settled by diplomacy to a conference of all the nations. In common with Senators Borah, Reed, and others he held that it was an alliance and demanded to know who wrote it, implying that our delegates had been hoodwinked or overreached by the others. In reply to this charge Secretary Hughes admitted that he was mainly responsible for the draft of the treaty and closed by saying that failure to adopt it would be 'nothing short of a national calamity.' Senator Robinson persisted, but his amendment was defeated 30 to 55. By this time public opinion had begun to make itself felt. The country had received the treaty for the reduction of naval armaments with acclaim. On the others there was not much enthusiasm, but the people did not care to see the naval treaty endangered by rejection of the others and began to call for ratification, numerous organizations and many noted individuals calling upon the Senate to act favorably. . . . When the day for the final vote arrived (March 24) the opponents used every possible device to secure amendments or reservations. . . . [Finally the Brandegee reservation was adopted by a vote of

91 to 2.] The vote on the ratification followed and resulted in adoption, 67 to 27, 2 not voting. . . . The other treaties were disposed of in short order, the naval treaty being ratified (March 29) 74 to 1, the submarine and poison gas treaty unanimously, the Nine Power Treaty on the open door policy in China (March 30) 66 to 0, 30 not voting, and the treaty affecting the Chinese tariff 58 to 1, 37 not voting. [See also WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.] The last named treaty would have been defeated, had those not voting cast their votes against it. . . . One significant thing about the debate is that while the opponents of the treaty were trying to make sure that the United States was in no way committed to the aid of Japan when threatened by 'the aggressive action of any other power,' they utterly failed to see that the treaty ties our hands against any joint intervention with Great Britain in the East. If China or Siberia should attack Japan, then the United States must 'communicate . . . fully and frankly' with the other contracting powers 'concerning the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation,' but if Japan should attack China or Siberia, the United States and Great Britain may not intervene jointly. . . . Some doubts having arisen whether the Lansing-Ishii Agreement had been canceled in the Treaty on the Limitation of Armaments, the matter was finally settled in the affirmative [on April 14, 1923], by an exchange of notes between Secretary Hughes and Ambassador Hanihara. . . . Before the Court [of International Justice] was a year old it became clear that unofficial American opinion was . . . in favor of participation by the United States. As Article XIV [of the Versailles Treaty, under which the court was established] had never been attacked by the opponents of the League and the court was open to nations not members of the League, there was no insuperable difficulty to official sanction of the court by the administration elected on the issue of rejection of the Covenant. In his Boston speech (October 30, 1922) Secretary Hughes indicated that the administration was seriously considering the matter, but nothing more was heard of it until near the close of the session. . . . [On February 24] President Harding startled the Senate with a message asking its assent to the ratification of the protocol. In a report accompanying the message Secretary Hughes gave a survey of the historic attitude of the United States toward arbitration and judicial procedure, explained the statute providing for the court, and maintained that participation in the court by the United States would in no way involve her in the League of Nations, but suggested that ratification might be accompanied by a reservation that the United States would not assume any of the obligations of the League; also, he insisted that ratification should be conditioned on representation both in the Council and the Assembly for the selection of Judges; also, that the statute creating the court should not be amended without the assent of the United States. Such conditions President Harding said he believed would be acceptable to the League, but he could not tender them until the Senate approved. This approval he hoped the Senate would now give. . . . Senator King introduced a resolution endorsing the proposal, but the committee on foreign relations sought a delay by asking Secretary Hughes several questions, some of which he had already answered. They related mainly to obligatory jurisdiction and to whether

the United States would have to recognize as binding the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles relating to labor. All of these were answered in the negative. They also wanted to know what reservations, if any, had been made by the states ratifying the protocol. Secretary Hughes knew of none. Some outside pressure—letters from individuals and resolutions of organizations—was brought to bear on the Senate, but it refused to take up the King resolution for ratification by 24 to 49, 23 not voting [and consideration was postponed until the next session]. The next day Congress adjourned, but this did not end the discussion. Indeed, discussion had only begun. Some friends and many foes of the League of Nations objected to President Harding's plan. In the case of the former the objection was based mainly on the idea that we should enter the League and not simply the court. In general the objections raised by the latter were in line with those brought against the League when it was under fire. Senator Johnson and some others warned against the court as the back-door entrance to the League and would have none of it or anything like it. Senator Borah clung to his plan as furnishing a 'real court with obligatory powers,' once it was accepted, while this one did not. He further declared that it was impossible to enter the court and stay out of the League and denounced the attempt to do as a mark of intellectual hypocrisy and of moral bankruptcy for any party backing it. It would be political cowardice to try to gather the fruits of the court created by the League and to continue to fight the League. President Harding and his friends did not remain silent. On several occasions the former spoke in defense of his proposition and indicated that he would appeal to the country for final decision. Secretary Hughes also took up the cudgel in behalf of the court, answering objections point by point and showing that there was great need for a separate court established on a sound basis and declaring that the International Court of Justice met these conditions."—D. Y. Thomas, *One hundred years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1923*, pp. 477-484, 486-488, 539, 541-543.—"In a speech before the Associated Press, . . . New York City, on April 24, President Harding firmly reiterated his advocacy of the United States joining the International Court of Justice. . . . He declared that the issue . . . did not involve foreign political entanglements, and that it was not a step toward entering the League of Nations. He unequivocally stated his opposition to the League, and stated that the United States would not enter it by any indirect method."—*New York Times Current History*, June, 1923, p. 501.—"John Bassett Moore, for twenty years professor of international law and diplomacy at Columbia University, was chosen by the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations in September to be one of the eleven members of the international court of justice."—F. A. Ogg, ed., *News and notes, personal and miscellaneous (American Political Science Review, Nov., 1921, p. 595)*.—See also INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT COURT OF.

Some months previous "the President directed that no American guns, weapons or other war material be sold to any foreign power. He now prohibited the sale of guns or other war material to any American citizens without guarantees that such supplies were not to be transferred to any foreign power, so as to make sure that none of our surplus equipment was employed in encouraging

warfare in any part of the world. President Harding was known to regard his decision as one of the most important ones of his administration."—*New York Times Current History*, June, 1923, p. 501.

ALSO IN: J. B. Scott, *United States of America: A study in international organization*, pp. xix, 605.—*Idem*, *Cancellation of Lansing-Ishii Agreement (American Journal of International Law, July, 1923)*.

1923 (May).—Agreement as to payment of costs of American army of occupation.—"There was signed at Paris on May 25, 1923, an agreement between the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, of the one part, and the United States of America, of the other part, for the reimbursement of the costs of the American army of occupation maintained on the Rhine from the date of the armistice on November 11, 1918, until January 27, 1923. . . . Article 249 of the Treaty of Versailles provides that 'there shall be paid by the German Government the total cost of all armies of the Allied and Associated Governments in occupied German territory from the date of the signature of the armistice of November 11, 1918,' and by Article 251 of the same treaty 'the costs of the armies of occupation as defined under Article 249 during the armistice and its extensions' and 'after the coming into force of the present treaty' were given priority of payment in the apportionment of reparations and all other costs arising under the treaty, which by Article 248 were made a first charge upon all the assets and revenues of the German Empire and its constituent states. In March, 1922, there was held in Paris a meeting of the Finance Ministers of Belgium, France, Italy, Great Britain and Japan to settle various questions raised in dealing with the distribution of Germany's payments. On the 11th of that month the Finance Ministers signed an agreement apportioning among themselves the payments made by Germany in 1921 and the payments to be made by Germany for the year commencing May 1, 1922. No provision was made in these apportionments for any payments on account of the costs of the American army of occupation and the United States was, so to speak, left to whistle for its share. When the intention of the Finance Ministers to ignore the American costs became known, the American unofficial observer on the Reparation Commission reminded them of America's bill, but the only effect of the reminder was the insertion of an article at the end of the agreement stating that 'the present agreement is made subject to any rights of the United States of America.' . . . When the action of the Finance Ministers at Paris became known to the State Department at Washington, Secretary Hughes promptly addressed identic communications to the Governments of Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, setting forth the right of the United States to be paid, upon an equal footing with them, the actual cost of its army of occupation, which the Secretary stated had been repeatedly set forth. . . . The Government of the United States in the same note expressed the belief that the right to the payment of its army costs on an equal footing with the Allied Powers was in no way affected by the American refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles which, it pointed out, went into effect upon ratification by Germany and three of the principal Allied Powers and made specific provision, as above quoted, for the payment of the cost of all armies of occupation. . . . On November

8, 1922, the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy invited the United States Government to send a representative to meet Allied delegates in Paris in order to arrive at a solution of the question satisfactory to all parties concerned. The invitation was accepted by the Government of the United States and Mr. Eliot Wadsworth, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was designated as its representative. The negotiations resulted in the signature of the agreement on May 25, 1923."—G. A. Finch, *Payment of the costs of the American army of occupation on the Rhine (American Journal of International Law, July, 1923, pp. 513-515)*.

1923 (May-August).—Relations with Mexico.—**Recognition of Obregón government.**—"In May [1922] former Ambassador Warren and John Barton Payne, formerly chairman of the United States Shipping Board and Secretary of the Interior in the Wilson administration, were selected to confer with representatives of the Mexican government at Mexico City with a view to the settlement of the outstanding differences between the two governments."—H. J. Carman and E. D. Graper, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1923, *Supplement*, p. 27.—"On August 31, 1923, the State Department announced that the Government of the United States and the Government of Mexico, in view of the reports and recommendations that their respective Commissions submitted as a result of the American-Mexican Conferences, held at the City of Mexico, from May 14 to August 15, 1923, has resolved to renew diplomatic relations."—*Renewal of diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico (American Journal of International Law, October, 1923)*.—In the spring of 1923 "through the efforts of one of the American oil operators in Mexico, who during the preceding troublesome period had succeeded in gaining the confidence of the Government, proposals for a conference on recognition were laid simultaneously before both Governments. In this way each was saved the disadvantage of having taken the first step. The proposal was gladly accepted by both Governments. The conference was welcomed by the Harding Administration because of the political situation in the United States. Representing the conservative wing of the Republican Party, it had found itself harassed during the previous eighteen months not only by the Democrats, but by the Republican Radicals, led by Senator Borah. The failure of its Mexican policy was one of the charges brought against it. The United States Commissioners, Charles Beecher Warren and John B. Payne, arrived in Mexico City in May to meet the Mexican representatives, Fernando Gonzalez Roa and Ramon Ross. The American Commissioners came with a program based on the twin questions of oil lands and agrarian lands as dealt with by Article 27. [See MEXICO: 1918.] There was not included, as incorrect press reports asserted, discussion of the Chamilzal question (relating to the Rio Grande border) or of the settling of claims of Americans against Mexico. The decisions granting title to subsoil deposits and to land purchases, where intention to exploit had been registered prior to 1917, had already been handed down. On this point there was no controversy. The instructions of the American Commissioners were to insist that all subsoil mineral deposits should be included in the same category, so that were a farmer to discover oil on his property he might, as in the United States, drill for it without restriction, or sell his land, including such oil deposits, to any purchaser. On the other hand, the

Commissioners were to require guarantees of a more equitable land policy. No obstacles should be put in the way of the Mexican program of restoring the ejidos, but injustice should be avoided, and the value of the lands should be judged by expert appraisers. Proceedings in which local commissions confiscated land outright without question of compensation, on the basis of old, almost forgotten grants of the Spanish kings, which had been superseded by later surveys and grants, were to be completely disallowed. . . . The one point on which there was unalterable difference was the question of subsoil oil and mineral deposits. The American demands relating to agrarian reform were not widely divergent from the views of the Mexican Government. The National Agrarian Commission had long sought to check the radical State action along the very lines laid down by the American Commissioners. The American position on the restoration of the old Spanish grants was allowed by the Mexican negotiators without much controversy. Similarly, the Commissioners were informed that the general partition of estates was not a program of the central administration, and it was pointed out that no enabling act had been passed authorizing such partition. On the other hand, much was conceded to the Mexican Government in its program of restoring lands to the Indian villages. Arable land, up to a maximum of 1,755 hectares (about 4,400 acres), may be confiscated from any one estate and added to the ejido of a village. This land shall be paid for in bonds. When any land in excess of this figure is taken it must be paid for in cash. The American request, that the value of the land be decided by expert appraisal, was granted. The American demands relative to oil lands raised a most delicate question. Were they to be granted, Article 27 would be, in effect, nullified. President Obregon had stated definitely that Mexico would never buy recognition at the cost of sacrificing her Constitution. Consequently, there was no yielding on this point. Eventually a compromise was effected. While not yielding on the principle of Article 27, President Obregon gave assurance that personal permits for drilling would be issued in cases covered by the controversy. The American Commissioners, while accepting this arrangement, reserved all the rights of their position. Practically the whole question is left open for further negotiation. To the agreement of the Commissioners were appended conventions providing for two commissions. One, a Revolutionary Claims Commission, will handle all claims of American citizens against Mexico arising out of the disturbances of the revolutionary period. The other, the Mixed Claims Commission, is to deal with all other claims of nationals of either country against the other. Each commission will be composed of three members, one chosen by each Government, and the third by both Governments jointly. If the two Governments cannot agree, the choice of the third member shall be made by the President of The Hague Court of Arbitration. It must be understood that these agreements were not signed by the Commissioners of either country. Officially the conclusions arrived at had no bearing on the question of recognition. Actually, of course, they are the basis for it, for they settle, temporarily at least, the problems at issue between the two Governments. Before the American Commissioners left Mexico City the State Departments of the two Governments had approved of the agreements."—*New York Times Current History, Dec.*,

1923, pp. 396-398.—See also MEXICO: 1922; 1923 (February).

1923 (June).—Renewal of Arbitration Treaty with Great Britain.—"The United States and Great Britain on June 23 [1923] renewed their Treaty of Arbitration, which expired in June by limitation, for another period of five years. . . . The agreement of renewal was signed by the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador; it simply provides for renewal without change in the terms of the treaty. . . . Notes were exchanged to the effect that in case [the United States should participate] in the Permanent Court of International Justice, the two Governments . . . [would] consider the making of an agreement providing for the submission of disputes, of the nature described in the treaty, to the Permanent Court."—*New York Times Current History, August, 1923, p. 860.*—"The Treaty, executed in 1908, was signed by Elihu Root as Secretary of State and James Bryce as British Ambassador; it provided for practically unqualified arbitration of all issues between the United States and Great Britain. It was renewed for five years in 1913 and again for a similar period in 1918."—*Commercial and Financial Chronicle, July 21, 1923, p. 278.*

1923 (June-August).—Visit to Alaska and death of President Harding.—On June 20, 1923, President Harding set out for a visit to Alaska accompanied by Mrs. Harding, the secretaries of commerce, of the interior and of agriculture, and the speaker of the House of Representatives. On his way across the continent he made a number of speeches, in which he outlined the policy of the administration. He arrived in Alaska in July, and reached a point farther north than that attained by any other president. On his way back he landed at Victoria, British Columbia, and paid the first official visit to Canada ever made by a president of the United States. While on board the *U. S. S. Henderson*, on the return voyage from Seattle to San Francisco the president was taken seriously ill, and on his arrival at San Francisco he was too weak to attempt the journey across the continent. The anxiety felt, however, had gradually abated as the bulletins given out by the physicians described his apparent progress toward recovery. The shock to the country was all the greater therefore when it was announced on the evening of August 2 he had quite suddenly died. The President had been respected, even by his political opponents, because of his high-mindedness, and fine traits of character, and unusual expressions of regret were heard on every side, regret which was made more poignant by the fact that it was generally believed that his end was hastened by fatigue caused by the close attention which he paid to the duties of his office. He was comparatively young, only 57. On the day following his death, the body of the late President was conveyed to the train in which it was to make the long journey from San Francisco to Washington. The state funeral was held in Washington on August 8, and the burial took place with simple ceremonies on August 10, at Marion, Ohio.

1923 (August).—Effect of treaties with Turkey on capitulations and rights of citizens of the United States in Turkish territories.—"The separate treaty of commerce and amity between the United States and Turkey negotiated at Lausanne by Mr. Joseph C. Grew, the American representative, and Ismet Pasha, after the close of the protracted Near East Conference, was signed Saturday, Aug. 4. . . . On behalf of Turkey the treaty



CALVIN COOLIDGE

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was signed by Ismet Pasha, Riza Nur Bey and Hassan Bey. . . . Two treaties were signed, one comprising a general treaty and the other relating to extradition and containing the usual provisions of such treaties. . . . Negotiating alone from a distance, the United States inevitably acceded to Turkish contentions more or less similar to those conceded by the allies, notably the abolition of capitulations. . . . [This ends the jurisdiction of American consular courts.] Americans may be arrested by Turkish police and tried by Turkish courts; but the Turkish Government voluntarily promises to appoint a few foreign legal advisers, from nations neutral in the World War, who will be informed of such arrests after the incarceration of the victims. Then, if the American Ambassador thinks the arrest unjustified, he can argue the case as he would, for instance, in England or France. . . . Americans are no longer tax-exempt in Turkey, and must hereafter pay the same taxes as are paid by the Turks. . . . American schools, hospitals and charities have the same rights as those of any other foreign power, that is, they have the same rights as Turkish institutions. In winning the point of the open door for commerce and industry, without discrimination, the United States scored a gain; the allied powers were never more than lukewarm toward the subject. The matter of indemnity for damage suffered by American interests through 'arbitrary or illegal acts' . . . [was] left for later discussion. . . . As to the Straits, the United States, without signing the Straits convention, receives all the privileges accorded to the allied powers, on a most-favored nation basis."—*New York Times Current History*, Sept., 1923, pp. 1049-1050.—See also TURKEY: 1923 (July-August).

1923 (August - December).—Succession of President Coolidge.—Cabinet undisturbed.—Foreign policy of the administration.—Tax reduction proposals.—"When the tragic news of President Harding's death reached him at midnight, August 2, 1923, Mr. Coolidge was at his father's home in Plymouth, Vermont, where he had been spending a quiet vacation. From the Attorney-General in Washington word came that the President should take his oath of office as soon as possible, and that any person duly authorized by law to administer oaths could perform this service. The President's father being a notary public, it was at once decided that he should administer the oath of office to his son. Never since the foundation of the Republic had such a situation arisen, and it will always remain one of the most dramatic events in American history."—W. F. Johnson, *Life of Warren G. Harding*, p. 252.—"President Coolidge paid an eloquent tribute to the qualities and character of President Harding on December 10, his address being transmitted to millions of people by radio. The occasion was the opening of a Harding commemorative week set apart under the auspices of a commission appointed to erect a fitting memorial at Marion, President Harding's Ohio home. This was one of three noteworthy public utterances occurring within the same week that resulted in giving President Coolidge a more definite position in the public mind than he had previously held. The first of these three utterances was his regular message to the new Congress, which assembled for its opening session on Monday, December 3. Owing to . . . a protracted dispute over the election of the speaker and delay in organizing the House of Representatives, President Coolidge did not appear before Congress in joint session to deliver his message in person until Thursday [December 6]. The second

utterance was his message accompanying the budgetary estimates; and this was transmitted to Congress on Monday, December 10. . . . Mr. Harding had regarded his colleague, the Vice-President, as an understudy from the very beginning, and had provided a seat for him at the Cabinet table. Mr. Coolidge had been faithful not only to his official duties as President of the Senate, but also to his opportunities as an informal but actual member of the President's group of Cabinet counsellors. What we may now properly call the Harding-Coolidge Administration has lost none of its momentum . . . [by President Harding's death. C. E. Hughes, the secretary of state], presented an outline of American foreign policy in an address at Philadelphia before the American Academy of Political and Social Science in November that was, of course, endorsed in advance by President Coolidge and . . . [later] sustained by the President in his message to Congress. Secretary Mellon, also in November, had drawn up for Chairman Green of the Ways and Means Committee of the House an outline of his views regarding tax reduction and public expenditure; and the Mellon proposals had secured the adherence of business men throughout the country to a very unusual extent. President Coolidge . . . endorsed the Secretary's proposed changes in the tax laws—dealing with the subject briefly in his general address to Congress, and more fully in his message on the budget. . . . It was wholly within the discretion, as it was also within the legal right of President Coolidge to reorganize his Administration and to assert opinions regarding domestic and foreign policies that are known to be held by certain Senators and other public men [in the Republican party]. . . . But the new President . . . chose to identify himself with the recognized Harding policies, and to work in accord with the Cabinet as he found it. The presumptions thus created in the public mind regarding Mr. Coolidge's attitudes were fully confirmed by his official utterances during the opening days of the . . . [first session of the sixty-eighth Congress]."—*Progress of the world (American Review of Reviews, January, 1924, pp. 3-6)*.—The following is a resumé of the address made by C. E. Hughes, in Philadelphia, on November 30: "We are still opposed to alliances. We refuse to commit ourselves in advance with respect to the employment of the power of the United States in unknown contingencies. We reserve our judgment to act upon occasions as our sense of duty permits. We are opposed to discriminations against our nationals. We ask fair and equal opportunities in mandated territories as they were acquired by the Allies through our aid. We desire to cooperate according to our historic policy in the peaceful settlement of international disputes which embraces the policy of judicial settlement of such questions as are justiciable. It is our purpose to cooperate in those varied humanitarian efforts which aim to minimize or prevent those evils which can be met adequately only by community of action. In short, our cooperation as an independent state in the furtherance of the aims of peace and justice has always been and still is a distinctive feature of our policy. There is plainly no inconsistency between these policies and the Monroe Doctrine. Our position as a world power has not affected it. The question is whether that doctrine is still important under changed conditions. The answer must be in the affirmative.' As to the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the present situation of the world, Mr. Hughes admits that the spread of democratic ideas and the

resulting change in governments have removed the danger of organized effort to extend to this Continent the European 'political system' of one hundred years ago. But Europe still has a set of primary interests which are not ours. As Washington said: 'She must be engaged in political controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concern.' Mr. Hughes points out that unity in war did not avail to change the divergent national policies in peace. So far as the Pacific and Far East are concerned, Mr. Hughes said, the United States has developed the 'policies of the Open Door, the maintenance of the integrity of China, coöperation with other powers in the declaration of common principles, coöperation of other powers by conference and consultation in the interests of peace, limitation of naval armament and the limitation of fortifications and naval bases.' All these policies, he declared, were entirely consistent with the policy of Monroe. Since the Monroe Doctrine simply states a principle of opposition to action by non-American powers, Mr. Hughes recognizes our obligation as a nation to formulate affirmative policies as to our conduct in relation to other American states, and not merely our policy with respect to the conduct of non-American powers. Those affirmative policies he maintains, while distinct from the mere principle of exclusion set forth in the Monroe Doctrine, are not inconsistent with that doctrine, but rather constitute its fitting complement. Mr. Hughes . . . [enumerated] nine such policies, as follows: 'First—We recognize the equality of the American Republics and their equal rights under the law of nations. Second—It follows that it is a part of our policy to respect the territorial integrity of the Latin-American republics. We have no policy of aggression; we do not support aggression by others; we are opposed to aggression by any one of the Latin American republics upon any other. Third—States have duties as well as rights. Every state on being received into the family of nations accepts the obligations which are the essential conditions of international intercourse. Among these obligations is the duty of each state to respect the rights of citizens of other states which have been acquired within its jurisdiction in accordance with its laws. A confiscatory policy strikes not only at the interests of particular individuals but at the foundations of international intercourse, for it is only on the basis of the security of property validly possessed under the laws existing at the time of its acquisition that the conduct of activities in helpful coöperation is possible. Each state may have its conception of domestic policy, but rights acquired under its laws by citizens of another state it is under an international obligation appropriately to recognize. It is the policy of the United States to support these fundamental principles. Fourth—It is the policy of this Government to make available its friendly assistance to promote stability in those of our sister republics which are especially afflicted with disturbed conditions involving their own peace and that of their neighbors. Fifth—The United States aims to facilitate the peaceful settlement of difficulties between the governments in this hemisphere. This policy has had notable illustration in our own relation to our neighbor on the north, the Dominion of Canada, which is justly proud of its position in 'the community of nations known as the British Empire.' We have a boundary with Canada, including that of Alaska, of about 5,500 miles unfortified. Through arbitration we have disposed of such serious controversies as those relating to the Behring Sea fisheries rights, the Alaska

boundary and the North Atlantic coast fisheries. With respect to the Latin American republics it is our policy not only to seek to adjust any differences that may arise in our own intercourse but, as I have said, to extend our good offices to the end that any controversy they may have with each other may be amicably composed. We are seeking to establish a Pan-America maintained not by arms but by mutual respect and good will and the tranquilizing processes of reason. We have no desire to arrogate to ourselves any special virtue, but it should constantly be recognized that the most influential and helpful position of the United States in this hemisphere will not be that of the possessor of physical power but that of the exemplar of justice. Sixth—In seeking to promote peace, as well as to aid in the reduction of unproductive expenditures, this Government has sought to encourage the making of agreements for the limitation of armament. Through our treaty with the great naval powers we have limited our capital ships, and we have voluntarily reduced our land forces. Seventh—The policies which have been described are not to secure peace as an end in itself, but to make available the opportunities of peace—that is, to open the way to a mutually helpful coöperation. This is the object of the Pan-American Conferences. Eighth—It should also be observed that in our commercial relations the United States is seeking unconditional, most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters. Not only does the Monroe Doctrine not mean that the United States has a policy of seeking in the Latin American republics economic advantages denied to other countries, but it is not the general policy of the United States to seek preferential rights. Ninth—We have certain special policies of the highest importance to the United States. We have established a waterway between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans—the Panama Canal. Apart from obvious commercial considerations, the adequate protection of this canal—its complete immunity from any adverse control—is essential to our peace and security. We intend in all circumstances to safeguard the Panama Canal. We could not afford to take any different position with respect to any other waterway that may be built between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Disturbances in the Caribbean region are therefore of special interest to us, not for the purpose of seeking control over others, but of being assured that our own safety is free from menace. With respect to Cuba, we have the special interests arising from our treaty and our part in the securing of her independence. It is our desire to see her independence not weakened but safeguarded, and her stability and prosperity assured. Our friendly advice and aid are always available to that end.' After sketching these affirmative policies of the United States in this hemisphere, Mr. Hughes concluded his address with a friendly word to the other republics of both North and South America: 'We rejoice in the progress of our sister republics, and at the enhanced prosperity which is at their call. The Monroe Doctrine stands, as it has always, as an essential part of our defensive policy, but we are no less but rather more interested in the use of the opportunity which it created and has conserved. We desire no less than they themselves the independence, the peace and progress of all the American republics, and we seek to enjoy to the fullest extent possible the blessings bestowed by the spirit of confraternity, those mutual benefits which should result from our intimate association and our common political ideals.' "

—Leading articles of the month (*American Review of Reviews*, January, 1924, pp. 85-86).

"Probably no action on the part of our Government officials, unless it be the proposed bonus legislation of [1922], aroused at once greater interest than the publication in November of a plan for a reduction of the taxes by the Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon. This plan was submitted to the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of Congress with an accompanying letter of explanation. A month later, almost to a day, President Coolidge confirmed in a measure the proposals of his cabinet officer by calling for a \$300,000,000 tax cut, and a reduction of \$132,000,000 in the expenditures of the National Government. These were the principal proposals to be found in his annual budget message to Congress. . . . [Later] proposals and counterproposals . . . [were] coupled to a certain extent with the question of the bonus, but the question of tax revision or tax reduction . . . completely overshadowed that of the bonus. Republicans and democrats . . . [made] it their main consideration and bills . . . [were] drafted to be laid before Congress. This move by Secretary Mellon and the administration at Washington . . . [was] accompanied by similar efforts on the part of some of the States to reduce and readjust the tax burden. Governor Alfred Smith . . . proposed to the New York State Legislature a 25 per cent. cut in the State income tax, and just across the border in New Jersey, Governor George S. Silzer in his . . . message . . . [pleaded] for a better equalization of the tax burden. . . . The last two years . . . [had] shown a considerable surplus of revenue over expenditure. The President . . . [therefore] deemed the time ripe for some measure of relief from the demands made upon the taxpayer by the Federal Government. Governor Smith. . . [was] prompted by the high cost of living, which he . . . [attributed] in part to the heavy taxation, and by the success of certain plans for the reorganization of the State Administration to suggest a modification of State burdens. 'The ultimate consumer,' . . . [he said] 'who usually bears the brunt of this taxation is now entitled to the best thought we can give to decreasing the cost of government.' Federal retrenchment . . . [was] made possible in no small measure by the budget system which enables taxpayer and public official not only to see just what is needed but just how his money is spent. In the charts which accompanied the President's . . . budget message it was apparent that a large proportion of his dollar goes for wars, past, present, and future . . . According to the President's estimates 37.32 per cent. . . . [would] go for military activities in 1924, but if to this be added the interest and the principal of the debt piled up by war the amount would approximate, at a conservative estimate 75 per cent. of the whole. One authority places it at 94.2 per cent. Almost 75 per cent. of the money needed to maintain the Government comes from some form of internal taxation. Only 13.35 per cent. comes from customs duties. When to these sums are added the various amounts needed to carry on the State and local governments the receipts from taxation reach enormous figures. It . . . [was] estimated that in 1923 our total government expenditure . . . [was] more than seventeen times as large as it was a half a century [earlier], and our per capita expenditure more than five times as great. 'Taxation,' said Colbert, the great finance minister of Louis XIV, 'is the art of so plucking the goose as to procure the largest amount of

feathers with the least possible squawking.' Although the attitude of government has radically changed since his day, with the advent of democracy, in the popular mind, taxes are still looked upon as an oppressive burden. . . . Like the sword of Damocles . . . [it is] suspended over our heads, and one of the main problems of government in a democracy is to soften or temper the blow when it does fall, for fall it will and must. To quote the old saying, 'Nothing in this life is sure but death and taxes.' The main question raised by any new tax proposal is, 'Who is to pay?' Although this . . . [was] not the only vital issue involved, it . . . [was] more or less the crux of the situation as regards the present proposals. . . . The relief proposed in the Mellon plan . . . [would] affect approximately fourteen million taxpayers, or if we figure five persons to every individual making a return, seventy millions out of our total population of 110,000,000. Thirteen of these fourteen million . . . [had] incomes ranging from \$1,000 to \$6,000. They . . . [would] benefit by the proposed reduction in the rate from 4 to 3 per cent. and from 8 to 6 per cent. with an additional 25 per cent. cut in case the income . . . [represented] a salary or wages as contrasted with the returns from a business or investments. It would mean that a man with a gross income of \$4,000 who was the head of a family and had two children dependent upon him would pay \$15.75 as against \$28.00 under the present law. This would represent a saving of \$12.25. This \$4,000 would have to represent earned income. The small taxpayer also would benefit somewhat by the proposed repeal of the taxes on telegrams and telephones, on admissions to moving-picture houses and other places of amusement and by the repeal of many nuisance taxes as they are called. The 331,000 taxpayers with incomes of \$10,000 or more . . . [would] be relieved of the heavy additional tax or surtax as it is called, which has heretofore been collected. It . . . [was] proposed to scale the rate progressively upward to 25 per cent. at \$100,000. These extra deductions by the Government formerly became effective with incomes of \$6,000. Mr. Mellon . . . [maintained] that the effect was to gradually dry up the revenue available by men of large incomes investing their funds in tax-exempt securities, the number of which . . . [had] greatly multiplied since the close of the war. The simplification of the taxing machinery too, he . . . [maintained] would make it easy to secure from those who are taxable the amounts called for under the new plan. Mr. Mellon finally . . . [laid] great stress upon the larger amounts of capital which . . . [would] be invested in industrial and productive enterprises, thus affording more employment and better wages and possibly a reduction in living costs. If Governor Smith and others like him are right, this is likely to be one of the greatest benefits conferred."—D. C. Knowlton, *Adjusting the tax burden*.

See also ADMIRALTY LAW; AMERICAN LITERATURE; ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States; ARCHITECTURE: Modern: United States; CANALS: American; CHARITIES: United States; CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States; COLONIZATION: United States; CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES; CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States; COÖPERATION: United States; COURTS: United States; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States; Modern developments: 20th century: General education: United States;

EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: United States; EDUCATION, ART: Modern: United States; ELECTIONS, PRESIDENTIAL: United States; ENTANGLING ALLIANCES; FLAGS: United States; GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE; HISTORY: 28; 29; 30; 32; 33; HOUSING: United States; IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: United States; INDEPENDENT TREASURY; INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: Development in United States; INTERVENTION; INSURANCE: Fire: Development in the United States; Life: Development in the United States; Marine: Development in the United States; Government; LIBRARIES: Modern: United States; LYNCH LAW; MASONIC SOCIETIES: United States; MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 43; 45; MONROE DOCTRINE; MUSIC: Folk music and nationalism: United States; NATURALIZATION: United States; PAINTING: American; POSTAL SAVINGS BANKS: 1910; PRESIDENT: United States; PRISON REFORM: United States; PUBLIC HEALTH: United States; RAILROADS; RECALL: Definition; RURAL CREDIT; SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: United States; SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: United States; SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: United States; SUPREME COURT; TAXATION; TRAILS; TRUSTS: United States; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES; WEST INDIES: United States interests; VIRGINIA DYNASTY; WOMAN'S RIGHTS: 1644-1852; 1800-1875; 1861-1910.

ALSO IN: D. W. Harmon, *Journal of voyages and travels in the interior of North America between the 47th and 58th degree of north latitude.*—C. G. Dawes, *First year of the budget of the United States.*—W. F. Willoughby, *Reorganization of the administrative branch of the national government.*—M. James, *History of the American Legion.*—T. H. Dickinson, *United States and the League.*—A. M. Schlesinger, *New viewpoints in American history.*—P. J. Treat, *Japan and the United States, 1853-1921.*—W. M. West, *History of American democracy.*—J. F. Rhodes, *McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, 1896-1909.*—E. P. Oberholzer, *History of the United States since the Civil War.*—C. Jensen, *Pardoning power in the United States.*—T. H. Mahoney, *Monroe Doctrine.*—S. Daggett, *Chapters on the history of the Southern Pacific.*—C. L. Becker, *Declaration of Independence: A study in the history of political ideas.*—T. W. Van Metre, *Economic history of the United States.*—I. Lippincott, *Economic development of the United States.*—O. S. Straus, *Under four administrations.*—A. Capper, *Agricultural bloc.*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Constitution of: 1781.—Articles of Confederation. See U. S. A.: 1777-1781, 1783-1787.

1787-1789, and 1791-1870.—A sketch of the history of the framing and adoption of the Federal Constitution of the United States will be found under U. S. A.: 1787, and 1787-1789. The following text of the original instrument, with the first fifteen amendments to it, is one prepared by Professor Albert Bushnell Hart, and is the result of a careful comparison with the original manuscripts, preserved in the State Department at Washington. "It is intended to be absolutely exact in word, spelling, capitalization and punctuation." A few headings and paragraph numbers are inserted for convenience of reference. "Those parts of the Constitution which were temporary in their nature, or which have been superseded or altered by later amendments, are included within the signs []." This text, originally printed in the "American History Leaflets," is reproduced with Professor Hart's consent.

"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,

insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

ARTICLE I.

Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. [See also CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.]

Sect. 2. 1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.¹

2. No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

3. Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, [which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.]² The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; [and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.]³

4. When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

5. The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Sect. 3. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.⁴

2. Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next

¹ Modified by Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.

² Superseded by Fourteenth Amendment.

³ Temporary clause.

⁴ Modified by the Seventeenth Amendment.

Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.¹

3. No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

4. The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

5. The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

6. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

7. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Sect. 4. 1. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

Sect. 5. 1. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

2. Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

3. Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

4. Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Sect. 6. 1. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

¹ Modified by the Seventeenth Amendment.

2. No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

Sect. 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

2. Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Cases it shall not be a Law.

3. Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

Sect. 8. The Congress shall have Power.

1. To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

2. To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

3. To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

4. To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

5. To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

6. To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

7. To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

8. To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

9. To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

10. To define and punish Piracies and Felonies

committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

11. To declare War [see WAR POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES], grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

12. To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

13. To provide and maintain a Navy;

14. To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

15. To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

17. To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States [see DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Constitutional status] and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And

18. To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Sect. 9. 1. [The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.]¹

2. The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

3. No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.² [See ATTAINDER; EX POST FACTO LAW.]

4. No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.³ [See CENSUS: United States.]

5. No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

6. No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

7. No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

8. No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present,

Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.⁴

Sect. 10. 1. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder [see ATTAINDER], ex post facto Law [see EX POST FACTO LAW], or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

2. No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controll of the Congress.

3. No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.⁵

ARTICLE II.

Section 1. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. [See PRESIDENT: United States.] He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows

2. Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector. [The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the

¹ Temporary provision.

² Extended by the first eight Amendments.

³ Extended by Ninth and Tenth Amendments.

⁴ Modified by Sixteenth Amendment.

⁵ Extended by Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.]¹

3. The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

4. No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

5. In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

6. The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

7. Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, "protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Sect. 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

2. He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

3. The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Sect. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagree-

¹ Superseded by Twelfth Amendment.

ment between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Sect. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

ARTICLE III.

Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Sect. 2. 1. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

2. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

3. The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

Sect. 3. 1. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

2. The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attained.

ARTICLE IV.

Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

² Limited by Eleventh Amendment.

Sect. 2. 1. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.¹

2. A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

3. [No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour. but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Services or Labour may be due.]²

Sect. 3. 1. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

2. The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or any particular State.

Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

ARTICLE V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that [no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and]³ that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

ARTICLE VI.

1. All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.⁴

2. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

¹ Extended by Fourteenth Amendment.

² Superseded by Thirteenth Amendment.

³ Temporary provision.

⁴ Extended by Fourteenth Amendment, Section 4.

3. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

ARTICLE VII.

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

DONE in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our names.

G° WASHINGTON.

Presidt and deputy from Virginia.

DELAWARE.

Geo: Read John Dickinson
Gunning Bedford jun Richard Bassett

JACO: BROOM

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

John Langdon Nicholas Gilman

MASSACHUSETTS.

Nathaniel Gorham Rufus King

MARYLAND.

James McHenry Dan of St. Thos. Jenifer
Danl Carroll

CONNECTICUT.

Wm. Saml. Johnson Rogcr Sherman

VIRGINIA.

John Blair James Madison Jr.

NEW YORK.

Alexander Hamilton

NORTH CAROLINA.

Wm. Blount Richd. Dobbs Spaight
Hu Williamson

NEW JERSEY.

Wil: Livingston David Brearley
Wm: Paterson. Jona: Dayton

SOUTH CAROLINA.

J. Rutledge, Charles Pinckney
Charles Cotesworth Pierce Butler.
Pinckney

PENNSYLVANIA.

B Franklin Thos. Fitz Simons
Thomas Mifflin Jared Ingersoll
Robt. Morris James Wilson.
Geo. Clymer Gouv Morris

GEORGIA.

William Few Abr Baldwin⁵

ARTICLES IN ADDITION TO AND AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PROPOSED BY CONGRESS, AND RATIFIED BY THE LEGISLATURES OF THE SEVERAL STATES, PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH ARTICLE OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION.⁶

ARTICLE I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

⁵ These signatures have no other legal force than that of attestation.

⁶ This heading appears only in the joint resolution submitting the first ten amendments.

free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

ARTICLE II. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

ARTICLE III. No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

ARTICLE IV. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

ARTICLE V. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

ARTICLE VI. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

ARTICLE VII. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

ARTICLE VIII. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

ARTICLE IX. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

ARTICLE X. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.¹

ARTICLE XI. The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.²

ARTICLE XII. The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall

make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The person having the greatest number of votes as vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.” [See also ELECTIONS, PRESIDENTIAL: United States: Electoral college.]

ARTICLE XIII. Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Sec. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.⁴

ARTICLE XIV. Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for partici-

¹ Amendments First to Tenth appear to have been in force from Nov. 3, 1791. [See U. S. A.: 1791.]

² Proclaimed to be in force Jan. 8, 1798.

³ Proclaimed to be in force Sept. 25, 1804.

⁴ Proclaimed to be in force Dec. 18, 1865. [See U. S. A.: 1865 (January).]

pation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sect. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Sect. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sect. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.¹

ARTICLE XV. Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Sect. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.²

ARTICLE XVI. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.³

ARTICLE XVII. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures. When vacancies happen in the representation of any state in the Senate, the executive authority of such state shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: *Provided*, That the legislature of any state may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointment until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.⁴

ARTICLE XVIII. Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Sect. 2. The Congress and the several States

¹ Proclaimed to be in force July 28, 1868. [See U. S. A.: 1865-1866 (December-April); 1866 (June), and 1866-1867 (October-March).]

² Proclaimed to be in force Mar. 30, 1870. [See U. S. A.: 1869-1870.]

³ Proclaimed to be in force Feb. 25, 1913. [See also U. S. A.: 1913 (April-December).]

⁴ Proclaimed to be in force May 31, 1913.

shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Sect. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years of the date of the submission hereof to the States by Congress.⁵

ARTICLE XIX. Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Sect. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.⁶

See also CONSTITUTIONS: Essentials of a written constitution; AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTIONS; CANADA, CONSTITUTION OF: Comparison with Constitution of United States.

Also in: J. M. Beck, *Constitution of the United States*.—C. K. Burdick, *Law of the American constitution*.—A. B. Hall, *Teaching of constitutional law (American Political Science Review, August, 1922)*.—J. W. Jenks, and R. D. Smith, *We and our government*.—E. O. Lowden, *Fundamentals of government (American Bar Association Journal, August, 1922)*.—A. B. Parker, *American constitutional government (Central Law Journal, Aug. 25, 1922)*.—C. W. Pierson, *Our changing constitution*.—K. H. Porter, *County and township government of the United States*.—E. Root, *Experiments in government and the essentials of the constitution*.

UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL. See BRAZIL: 1889-1891.

UNITED STATES OF CENTRAL AMERICA. See CENTRAL AMERICA: 1895-1902.

UNITED STATES OF COLOMBIA. See COLOMBIA: 1830-1836.

UNITED STATES RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION. See U.S.A.: 1917 (May): Mobilization of civilian forces.

UNITED STATES SANITARY COMMISSION. See SANITARY COMMISSION.

UNITED STATES SENATE. See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: Senate; U.S.A., CONSTITUTION OF.

UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD. See U.S.A.: 1914-1920.

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION. See TRUSTS: United States: 1901; 1907: Chief existing combinations; 1912.

UNITED STATES VS. ANDERSON (1869-1870). See U.S.A.: 1869-1872.

UNITED STATES VS. ARMOUR AND CO. See TRUSTS: United States: 1903-1906.

UNITED STATES VS. HARRIS (1883). See U.S.A.: 1869-1890.

UNITED STATES VS. HERMAN SIELKEN (1912). See BRAZILIAN COFFEE CASE.

UNITED STATES VS. JUDGE PETERS (1800). See SUPREME COURT: 1789-1835.

UNITED STATES VS. KEEHLER. See U.S.A.: 1869-1872.

UNITED STATES VS. KRAFT. See ESPIONAGE ACT: Trials under the Espionage Act.

UNITED STATES VS. MIDWEST OIL COMPANY (1915). See SUPREME COURT: 1914-1916.

UNITED STATES VS. MILLER. See U.S.A.: 1869-1872.

UNITED STATES VS. SWIFT & CO. See TRUSTS: United States: 1903-1906.

⁵ Proclaimed to be in force Jan. 16, 1920. [See also LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1913-1919; 1919-1920.]

⁶ Proclaimed to be in force Aug. 26, 1920.

UNITED STATES VS. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION (1915). See **TRUSTS**: United States: 1915-1920.

UNITED TRIBE OF NEW ZEALAND. See **NEW ZEALAND**: 1825-1840.

UNITIES, Dramatic, "three principles governing the structure of drama and supposedly derived from Aristotle's 'Poetics.' . . . They are known as the unities of time, place and action, respectively, and require that 'the action of a play should be represented as occurring in one place, within one day, and with nothing irrelevant to the plot.'"—R. C. Flickinger, *Greek theater and its drama*, p. 246.

UNITY, The. See **MORAVIAN**, OR **BOHEMIAN**, **BRETHREN**.

UNITY CENTER. See **EDUCATION**: Modern: 20th century: Workers' education: United States.

UNITY OF CHURCHES. See **PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH**: 1910-1920.

UNIVERSAL BROTHERHOOD AND THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETY. See **THEOSOPHY**.

UNIVERSAL JUBILEE (1900). See **PAPACY**: 1900-1901.

UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE. See **INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE**.

UNIVERSALISM, **UNIVERSALISTS**.—"Universalism, using the word in its present theological meaning, is the doctrine or belief that it is the purpose of God, through the grace revealed in our Lord Jesus Christ, to save every member of the human race from sin. The word suggests nothing with regard to any human founder, any place where it was first promulgated, any particular form of church polity, any rite or ordinance, any opinion of the equality or the subordination of the Son to the Father. Universalism is not dependent on these. It may be, and to some extent has been, and is still, embraced by those in Christian sects whose denominational titles emphasize these respective peculiarities. . . . The presence of Universalism may be traced to the earliest period of Christian history. The existence of the Universalist denomination reaches but little beyond

a century. . . . Organized Universalism, the creation and establishment of the Universalist Church, had its chief, but not exclusive incitement in the ministry of Rev. John Murray, who, born in Alton, England, December 10 (O.S.), 1741, landed in America in the latter part of September, 1770."—R. Eddy, *History of Universalism*, ch. 1, 4 (*American Church History Series*, v. 10).—"Mr. Murray arrived in America in 1770, and after much going to and fro organized, in 1779, at Gloucester, Mass., the first congregation in America on distinctly Universalist principles. But other men, along other lines of thought, had been working their way to somewhat similar conclusions. In 1785 Elhanan Winchester, a thoroughly Calvinistic Baptist minister in Philadelphia, led forth his excommunicated brethren, one hundred strong, and organized them into a 'Society of Universal Baptists,' holding to the universal restoration of mankind to holiness and happiness. The two differing schools fraternized in a convention of Universalist churches at Philadelphia in 1794, at which articles of belief and a plan of organization were set forth, understood to be from the pen of Dr. Benjamin Rush; and a resolution was adopted declaring the holding of slaves to be 'inconsistent with the union of the human race in a common Saviour, and the obligations to mutual and universal love which flow from that union.'"—L. W. Bacon, *History of American Christianity*, ch. 13 (*American Church History Series*, v. 13).—"Even more influential [than Winchester] was Hosea Ballou (1771-1852), long a pastor in Boston. Murray and Winchester had been Trinitarians. Ballou was an Arian, and in this Unitarian direction American Universalism . . . followed him. . . . By 1790 the Universalists were sufficiently numerous to hold a convention in Philadelphia. Three years later a New England convention was organized which in 1803 met in Winchester, New Hampshire, and adopted a brief creed which, though modified in 1900, is the historic basis of American Universalism."—W. Walker, *History of the Christian church*, pp. 576-577.

UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES

In the ancient world.—"The ancient world may fairly be said to have possessed universities, that is, institutions in which all the learning of the time was imparted. Such institutions existed at Alexandria (Museum and Serapeum), Athens, Constantinople, and later at Beirut, Bordeaux, Lyons, Edessa, Nisibis, etc. But the growth of Christian supernaturalism and mysticism, and the inroads of the barbarians from North and South had mostly put an end to these before A. D. 800."—T. Davidson, *History of education*, p. 166.—See also **EDUCATION**: Ancient: B. C. 7th-A. D. 3rd centuries: Greece: University of Athens.

In ancient China. See **EDUCATION**: Ancient: B. C. 22nd-6th centuries: China.

Moslem.—**El-Azhar**.—"After the coming of the Arabs, and more especially in the ninth and tenth centuries of our era, schools and colleges were established in most of the Spanish cities; and at Cordova especially an admirable system of public instruction anticipated much that was excellent in the Christian Universities of modern Europe. . . . In the Universities of Moslem Spain, not only at the capital, but at Seville, at Saragossa, at Toledo, at Granada, arithmetic, algebra, trigo-

nometry, astronomy, the entire circle of the sciences occupied the attention of the students. The professors gave lectures also on philosophy, on natural history, on literature, on rhetoric, and composition. The language which, it was their boast, was the most perfect ever spoken by man, was studied with peculiar care. But others were by no means excluded from the course. Grammars and Lexicons, not only of the Arabic, but of Greek, of Latin, of Hebrew, were prepared and re-edited. . . . [These universities] were the resort of students, from the tenth to the twelfth centuries, from every part of Europe [and the forerunners of the medieval Christian university. In the same period the eastern Moslems established universities at Bagdad, Basra and Cairo]."—U. R. Burke, *History of Spain*, v. 1, pp. 263, 265.—See also **EDUCATION**: Medieval: 9th-15th centuries: Saracen and Moorish learning.—"The oldest and most famous educational institution in Egypt is El-Azhar University, attached to the great mosque at Cairo. This important institution . . . was established in the tenth century. It has [written in 1923] an attendance of between twelve and fourteen thousand students of all ages, drawn from many Moslem

countries. Originally the curriculum consisted of the study of the Koran, with grammar, rhetoric and oriental philosophy as subsidiary studies. Gradually it has been modernized, though the university still lacks laboratories and facilities for individual research. Through the thousands of pupils who have been under their charge the sheiks or teachers have a tremendous influence, not only in Egypt but in the entire Arab world. Around these teachers, who wear thick white bands encircling their tarbooshes, groups of students sit on straw mats in the shadows of many columns, occasionally halting the drone of lessons to pray, eat or stretch out and sleep."—J. B. Wood, *New page in Egyptian history (Asia, July, 1923)*.

Nature of mediæval universities.—Survey of the beginnings.—"The mediæval universities . . . were never, in any strict sense of the word, 'founded' at all. All the ideas which we associate with the beginning of a great higher school, . . . the raising of great sums of money, the securing of a corps of professors in the various lines of study, the building of structures appropriate to the purposes of teaching and investigation, the preparation of a complete course of study, to say nothing of skillful presentation to the public of the advantages of the new foundation, all these ideas are wholly out of place when we try to understand the origin of a mediæval university. To us the term 'university' suggests something complete, a school which offers all possible subjects of learning and which, in so far as it fails in this requirement, falls short of the true definition. It suggests also something very high, and we are apt to say of some one of the many institutions of learning which call themselves universities, 'this is nothing but a college,' meaning that its grade of teaching is largely elementary. Now neither of these ideas fits the mediæval institution. The term *universitas* meant nothing more than 'all of them,' or 'all of us,' or 'all of you.' It did not, at first, have even that notion of corporate unity which we connect with the word 'corporation,' meaning by that a body so far organized that it can act as a unit, and be dealt with by others as a thing having a distinct existence for itself. This word '*universitas*' was used quite as often for the whole body of the citizens of a town, or of the members of a guild, as it was for those who made up the body of scholars at a given seat of learning. These persons were teachers and learners who had come together, each for his own purposes, the one set to teach and the other to learn, without organization and without any regular connection of the body of the teachers with the body of the taught. Each scholar sought the teacher from whom he wished to learn and paid him for his instruction. Remnants of this idea still linger as, for instance, in the primitive custom of the 'Stuhlgeld' in the German universities to-day. The essence of the mediæval university, is, therefore, to be found in this idea of free association. It very soon passed out of its disorganized condition and became regulated by more or less strict customs. Such regulation became, of course, necessary as soon as the number of scholars and teachers became great. Living as they did without buildings of their own, either for teaching or living purposes, they were thrown into the community of the city as a class not subject to the ordinary jurisdiction of the place, nor yet provided with any effective jurisdiction of their own. They were an element of difficulty in any mediæval town, and yet an element which no town would like wholly to lose. The process of organization was different in different

places. Sometimes, as at Bologna, the '*universitas*' included all scholars and all teachers. Elsewhere, as at Paris, it was the teachers who formed the responsible body. Sometimes a large part of the university authority was in the hands of the so-called 'nations,' groups of landsmen, into which the whole body of university members was divided. Sometimes the nations were nothing more than convenient groupings for lesser administrative purposes. At some universities there was a single recognized head,—the 'rector,' usually chosen from among the teachers for a short term. At others the chief executive power was divided among a 'college' of elected persons. From a very early day we can trace distinct differences of purpose in these higher schools. In some, as for instance, Paris and Oxford, the main purpose was what we should call 'general culture.' This included, first, the so-called '*quadrivium*,' the group of scientific studies, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music, which rested upon a previous school study of the '*trivium*,' the grammatical studies, grammar, rhetoric and logic. After the regular quadrivium, the one culture study pursued with special zeal during our period was that of dialectics, the art of reasoning about anything. Naturally the things best worth reasoning about were . . . [theological matters and we have] to remind ourselves that reasoning was not for the purpose of finding out whether the church doctrines were true, or even whether they were more or less true, but only to confirm their truth by an intellectual process. The great reputation of Paris and Oxford, in their respective countries, drew to them not only young men, but also mere children, who came for the trivial as well as the higher studies, and this probably accounts for the almost incredible reports of the immense numbers of students. In so far as these two schools had a specialty beyond the culture studies, it was theology. Paris, in fact, became throughout the middle period, and for long after, the recognized authority on all points of theological dispute. At the other great universities more distinct specialization prevailed. At Bologna, for instance, there was a school of law going back, we cannot tell how far, but surely farther than the organization into a university. The law here studied was the ancient Roman code, the only body of law, in fact, which was in shape to be studied. During the whole of the twelfth century we find this study increasing, and drawing to itself much of that youthful energy which until then had been turned to the study of theology. At first this was opposed by the church on the ground that it was a heathenish study, likely to turn men against established institutions, but it was not long before the church recognized its interest here, as it did everywhere else, and made use of this new impulse for its own purposes. The law was also studied elsewhere, as for instance, at Orleans and Montpellier in France, but none of these lesser schools was able to dim the reputation of the Bolognese doctors. What we have just said of law at Bologna is true also of medicine at Salerno. It is quite possible that the claim of Salerno to be the oldest of the European universities is well-founded. At all events no one knows when the study of medicine began there. It is probably connected with the Arab influence in southern Italy; certainly the Arabs were far in advance of Europeans in the knowledge of physical life. The methods of the school at Salerno were in the last degree unscientific and crude. The knowledge of anatomy and physiology was based, not upon actual observation,

but upon the writing of early Greek physicians filtered through Arab tradition. . . . Yet the reputation of the school of Salerno persisted and grew so that when Frederic II in 1224 organized the University of Naples, Salerno was left intact as the medical department of that national institution. [See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Ancient: 10th century.] The forms of administration and of instruction at the universities seem to have grown up by a natural process through the action of the members themselves; but it early became evident that a higher sanction would be useful, and the universities turned to some power outside of themselves to seek it. The municipal governments within which they were living claimed and exercised more or less of the ordinary rights of police, and they could not be thought of as a source of law. There were two other powers, the state and the papacy, from which such sanction might come, and both were appealed to. We have here one of the most curious cases of that mingling of legal with religious ideas which prevailed throughout our period. The university stood in this respect very much like a monastery. It lay within a state and was therefore primarily subject to its laws; but it had also something of the clerical character, and this bound it, more or less as the case might be, to the interest of the papacy. Every such grant by a pope was a renewed declaration of right and a new opportunity for asserting authority. The recognition of the universities by the states was generally earlier than that by the church. Salerno received privileges from Robert Guiscard who died in 1085, and from his son Roger before 1100. King Roger II ordered state examinations in medicine in 1137. Naples, a new creation, was organized by Frederic II in 1224. The first formal recognition of Bologna was by the emperor Frederic I in 1158, though it is certain that there was organized teaching of law there long before. Pope Honorius II in 1216 defended the students against attacks of the city magistrates on the basis of long established usages. The university statutes were confirmed by the pope in 1254. Paris received its first distinctive university privileges from Louis VII, who died in 1180; it was recognized in two bulls of Alexander III (died 1181); it was much favored in 1200 by Philip Augustus; and it was on questions of privilege that the tumults of 1229 broke out, which resulted in a permanent crippling of its resources. In England there was, undoubtedly, a collection of higher teachers at Oxford as early as 1130, and at Cambridge, probably, as early as 1200; how much earlier at both places we cannot say, though the tradition of extreme antiquity, say from the days of Alfred, is now entirely rejected. The English universities profited by the overturn in Paris in 1229, and we may certainly date from this time their active corporate life."—E. Emerton, *Medieval Europe*, pp. 465-470.—See also EDUCATION: Medieval: 11th-12th centuries.

Also IN: G. Compayre, *Abelard and the origin of universities*.—R. S. Rait, *Life in the medieval university*.—H. Rashdall, *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*.—S. S. Laurie, *Rise and early constitution of universities*.—H. Malden, *On the origin of universities*.

University customs in the Middle Ages.—Wandering scholars.—Methods of instruction.—Curriculum and equipment.—"Besides special protection and autonomy, the medieval students were granted numerous other privileges. They were relieved from taxation of all sorts, and, except in case of an armed invasion of the country, they

were exempt from military service. The universities were also given the right of licensing their graduates to teach anywhere without further examination (*ius ubique docendi*), and the right of 'striking' (*cessatio*) or suspending lectures, whenever they felt that their prerogatives or privileges had been infringed. In the latter case, unless their wrongs were at once redressed, the suspension was followed by migration of the entire university body to some other town and possibly country. And a 'strike' could easily be engineered in medieval days when the universities did not have any buildings of their own and there was no need of expensive libraries, laboratories and other equipment. The students had simply to gather up their professors and go rent some buildings elsewhere. Sometimes the king of another country would issue a special invitation to a 'striking' university, to coax the students to his land. Thus the University of Oxford in 1229 met with its most substantial increase through King Henry III., who promised the striking students of Paris: 'If it shall be your pleasure to transfer yourselves to our kingdom of England and to remain there to study, we will for this purpose assign to you cities, boroughs, towns, whatsoever you may desire to select, and in every fitting way will cause you to rejoice in a state of liberty and tranquillity.' The main motive for these extraordinary privileges granted to the medieval universities seems to have been the same material one that often animates a city or state to-day in undertaking to lure a college or university into its midst. Such an institution proved ground for distinction and a source of considerable revenue to a town or a country. Naturally every effort and inducement were used to build up and encourage a university, and the country was most reluctant to lose the institution when once started. If a strike arose, they hastened to mollify the enraged students and keep them from migrating, although their conduct was often difficult to endure and many complications arose in winning them back, when once they had gone on a strike. Realizing their position of advantage, the students became exceedingly independent and imprudent, and their liberties soon degenerated into recklessness and license. They seem to have become both dissipated and quarrelsome. Clashes with the townspeople, known as 'town and gown riots,' were not uncommon. In these disorders the king, not wishing to lose his university, usually took the side of the students, and often punished severely and unjustly the tradespeople or even the police who had ventured to interfere with the pranks, whims or lawlessness of the students. . . . The freedom and license of the medieval university are best illustrated by the wild life of the so-called *scholare vagantes* ('wandering students'). These groups were able to secure social approval for their migratory habits through the example of the orders of friars, who began their noble work in preaching and teaching during the thirteenth century. With quite a different purpose, these students begged their way, like the friars, as they wandered from university to university. They became rolicking, shiftless, pilfering and even vicious, and many found the life so attractive that they made it permanent and organized a mock 'order' known as *Goliardi*, with Goliath, the Philistine giant, as their professed patron saint. . . . The one compensating feature of this degeneracy was the production of jovial Latin and German songs to voice their frank appreciation of forbidden pleasures, and their protest against restraint. Various collections of these songs have come down to us."—

F. P. Graves, *Evolution of our universities (School and Society, Dec. 14, 1918, pp. 693-696)*.—"The work done in the mediæval universities by the candidates for the bachelorship was . . . the trivial curriculum of monastery and cathedral schools, but somewhat more extensive and better organized. . . . It was in the higher development and specialization of medicine, civil law, and theology (with philosophy) that the university movement broke away from the mediæval and monkish system. At the university seats, the more important parts of the grammars of Donatus and Priscian were, as at the monastery and cathedral schools, dictated, explained, and learned by heart; and this after the boys had left the grammar school and become 'arts' students. . . . The tendency of universities was at first, and for long, away from literature and humanism. Grammar and rhetoric were formal,—a study of rules and inaccurate etymologies. Dialectic was logic in its most barren form. The true intellectual life of universities was to be found in the specialized studies of medicine, theology, including philosophy or the higher dialectic, and law. . . . Humane studies were entirely overshadowed in Paris and the universities which followed that model, by philosophy, which was generally limited to dialectic disputations on definitions, the nature of ideas, and the relative questions of metaphysical theology. . . . In giving instruction, the order of the day was generally as follows: The regent usually met his pupils three times daily—at sunrise, at noon, and towards the evening—and at one of these meetings determining (defining) and disputation occupied the time. There can be no doubt that the want of books gave great opportunities to a regent of high teaching capacity to show what he could do. It also compelled in the pupil an amount of memory-work, and of reflection on the lessons dictated, which must have been highly effectual for the formal discipline of the mind. Robert de Courcon, the papal legate, fixed in the earlier part of the thirteenth century the books to be lectured on in the Paris faculty of arts for the mastership—viz. Aristotle, in so far as he bore on dialectic and ethics; 'Topics' (fourth book); Priscian; . . . and other works, by authors now unknown, on philosophy, rhetoric, mathematics, and grammar. The *Metaphysics* and *Physics* of Aristotle were proscribed, but the interdiction was subsequently removed. The most popular text-book of logic was, for centuries, the 'Summulæ' of Petrus Hispanus. The reforms of the papal legate were carried out before a distinct faculty of theology was formed. But theology was, yet, recognized by him as a separate study (*facultas* in its earlier sense), and none allowed to lecture in it 'publicly' till they were thirty-five years of age. The highest study of the Universities of Paris and England was theology; but let us never forget that theology comprehended philosophy, and indeed frequently touched the whole range of knowledge. . . . Text-books of theology, or 'Sentences,' had come from various hands long before this time; the science had been thoroughly systematized and reduced to a corpus by the famous Peter the Lombard, after many attempts by others. His 'Liber Sententiarum' became, from 1150, the universal text-book of the schools—text-book of philosophy as well as of theology."—S. S. Laurie, *Rise and early constitution of universities*, pp. 268-271.—See also EUROPE: Middle Ages: Scholastic revival.—Throughout the Middle Ages the disputations of scholastic philosophy continued to occupy the place of prominence in the universities (see EDUCATION: Mediæval: 9th-

15th century: Scholasticism), but gradually the humanistic studies introduced by the Renaissance gained a foothold. (See EDUCATION: Modern: Influence of Renaissance and Reformation.) "A prominent source of information on . . . [the curriculum during the Reformation period] is to be found in the statutes of the University of Wittenberg, revised by Melancthon, in the year 1545. The theological faculty appears, by these statutes, to have consisted of four professors, who read lectures on the Old and New Testaments,—chiefly on the Psalms, Genesis, Isaiah, the Gospel of John, and the Epistle to the Romans. They also taught dogmatics, commenting upon the Nicene creed and Augustine's book, 'De spiritu et litera.' The Wittenberg lecture schedule for the year 1561, is to the same effect; only we have here, besides exegesis and dogmatics, catechetics likewise. According to the statutes, the philosophical faculty was composed of ten professors. The first was to read upon logic and rhetoric; the second, upon physics, and the second book of Pliny's natural history; the third, upon arithmetic and the 'Sphere' of John de Sacro Busto; the fourth, upon Euclid, the 'Theoria Planetarum' of Burbach, and Ptolemy's 'Almagest'; the fifth and sixth, upon the Latin poets and Cicero; the seventh, who was the 'Pedagogus,' explained to the younger class, Latin Grammar, Linacer 'de emendata structura Latini sermonis,' Terence, and some of Plautus; the eighth, who was the 'Physicus,' explained Aristotle's 'Physics and Dioscorides'; the ninth gave instruction in Hebrew; and the tenth reviewed the Greek Grammar, read lectures on Greek Classics at intervals, also on one of St. Paul's Epistles, and, at the same time, on ethics. . . . Thus the philosophical faculty appears to have been the most fully represented at Wittenberg, as it included ten professors, while the theological had but four, the medical but three. . . . We have a . . . criterion by which to judge of the limited nature of the studies of that period, as compared with the wide field which they [covered later], . . . in the then almost total lack of academical apparatus and equipments. The only exception was to be found in the case of libraries; but, how meager and insufficient all collections of books must have been at that time, when books were few in number and very costly, will appear from the fund, for example, which was assigned to the Wittenberg library; it yielded annually but one hundred gulden, (about \$63,) with which, 'for the profit of the university and chiefly of the poorer students therein, the library may be adorned and enriched with books in all the faculties and in every art, as well in the Hebrew and Greek tongues.' Of other apparatus, such as collections in natural history, anatomical museums, botanical gardens, and the like, we find no mention; and the less, inasmuch as there was no need of them in elucidation of such lectures as the professors ordinarily gave."—K. von Raumer, *Universities in the sixteenth century (Barnard's American Journal of Education, v. 5, pp. 535-540)*.—See also EDUCATION: Modern: 16th century: Melancthon; EUROPE: Renaissance and Reformation: Melancthon an aid to Luther.

890-1345. — Italy. — REVIVED STUDY OF ROMAN LAW.—"It is known that Justinian established in Rome a school of law, similar to those of Constantinople and Berytus. When Rome ceased to be subject to Byzantine rule, this law-school seems to have been transferred to Ravenna, where it continued to keep alive the knowledge of the Justinian system. That system continued to be known and used, from century to century, in a tradition never

wholly interrupted, especially in the free cities of Northern Italy. . . . [At Pavia there grew up a famous school of Lombard law, which was the forerunner of the University of Pavia. The study of law] was destined to have, at the beginning of the twelfth century, a very extraordinary revival. This revival was part of a general movement of the European mind which makes its appearance at that epoch. The darkness which settled down on the world, at the time of the barbarian invasions, had its midnight in the ninth and tenth centuries. In the eleventh, signs of progress and improvement begin to show themselves, becoming more distinct towards its close, when the period of the Crusades was opening upon Europe. Just at this time we find a famous school of law established in Bologna [about 890], and frequented by multitudes of pupils, not only from all parts of Italy, but from Germany, France, and other countries. The basis of all its instruction was the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. [See *CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS*.] Its teachers, who constitute a series of distinguished jurists extending over a century and a half, devoted themselves to the work of expounding the text and elucidating the principles of the *Corpus Juris*, and especially the Digest. From the form in which they recorded and handed down the results of their studies, they have obtained the name of glossators. On their copies of the *Corpus Juris* they were accustomed to write glosses, i. e., brief marginal explanations and remarks. These glosses came at length to be an immense literature. . . . Here, then, in this school of the glossators, at Bologna, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the awakened mind of Europe was brought to recognize the value of the *Corpus Juris*, the almost inexhaustible treasure of juristic principles, precepts, conceptions, reasonings, stored up in it."—J. Hadley, *Introduction to Roman law*, lecture 2.

BOLOGNA.—"In the twelfth century the law school of the University of Bologna eclipsed all others in Europe. The two great branches of legal study in the middle ages, the Roman law and the canon law, began in the teaching of Irnerius and Gratian at Bologna in the first half of the twelfth century. At the beginning of this century the name of university first replaces that of school; and it is said that the great university degree, that of doctor, was first instituted at Bologna, and that the ceremony for conferring it was devised there. . . . A bull of Pope Honorius, in 1220, says that the study of 'bonæ literæ' had at that time made the city of Bologna famous throughout the world. Twelve thousand students from all parts of Europe are said to have been congregated there at once. The different nations had their colleges, and of colleges at Bologna there were fourteen. These were founded and endowed by the liberality of private persons; the university professors, the source of attraction to this multitude of students, were paid by the municipality, who found their reward in the fame, business, and importance brought to their town by the university."—M. Arnold, *Schools and colleges on the continent*, ch. 9.—"The first formal recognition of the *universitas* of Bologna was by Frederick I., in 1158, when the leading juridical doctors were Bulgarus, Jacob, Martin, and Hugo. This 'privilege,' however, was based on the assumption that the school was already a flourishing one, with recognized usages, and it directed itself mainly to securing protection for travelling students and resident aliens, giving them the right of being judged by their own dominus or magister, or by the bishop. This right extended to criminal as well as civil cases, and long existed. It was only

after this date that Bologna was a formally privileged studium. . . . Irnerius had distinguished pupils, who, as doctors of law, maintained the reputation of the school after his death. It became known as the 'Mother of Laws,' and attracted ever-increasing numbers from all Europe. . . . [The foreign students organized themselves into 'nations,' which finally combined into two bodies—*universitas citramontanorum* and *universitas ultramontanorum*. (See also below: 1231-1339.)] The students had now virtually superseded the doctors in the government. Accordingly, at the instigation of the latter, the magistrates of Bologna endeavoured by a civil enactment to restrict the student organizations. Hence many strifes. . . . The students, being hard pressed by the doctors of civil law and magistrates combined, finally resolved to appeal to the pope, who would be (as may be supposed) very ready to interfere, as he thereby had his own supreme authority over the rising university school acknowledged. The students boldly alleged that their customary rights were being interfered with, and that the magistrates, and not they, were infringing the law. Pope Honorius III. (died 1216), a man reputed learned and pious, took the part of the students, and ordered the magistracy of Bologna to respect their rights. In the pope's epistle, he says that the new municipal statutes were unjust and in the teeth of scholastic liberty, and of ancient freedom up to that time exercised. Rights and privileges, and a certain constitutional organization, had been simply assumed by the rising school; . . . the civic power had either aided and abetted the organizations in their claims, or acquiesced in their acts. It was now too late to interfere."—S. S. Laurie, *Rise and early constitution of universities*, pp. 131, 133-134.—"The Bologna school of jurisprudence was several times threatened with total extinction. In the repeated difficulties with the city the students would march out of the town, bound by a solemn oath not to return; and if a compromise was to be effected, a papal dispensation from that oath must first be obtained. Generally on such occasions, the privileges of the university were reaffirmed and often enlarged. In other cases, a quarrel between the pope and the city, and the ban placed over the latter, obliged the students to leave; and then the city often planned and furthered the removal of the university. King Frederic II., in 1226, during the war against Bologna, dissolved the school of jurisprudence, which seems to have been not at all affected thereby and he formally recalled that ordinance in the following year. Originally the only school in Bologna was the school of jurisprudence, and in connection with it alone a university could be formed. . . . Subsequently eminent teachers of medicine and the liberal arts appeared, and their pupils, too, sought to form a university and to choose their own rector. As late as 1295 this innovation was disputed by the jurists and by the city, so that they had to connect themselves with the university of jurisprudence. But a few years later we find them already in possession again of a few rectors, and in 1316 their right was formally recognized in a compromise between the university of jurisprudence and the city. The students called themselves 'philosophi et medici' or 'physici'; also by the common name of 'artistæ.' Finally a school of theology, founded by pope Innocent VI., was added in the second half of the 14th century; it was placed under the bishop, and organized in imitation of the school at Paris, so that it was a '*universitas magistrorum*,' not '*scholarium*.' As, however, by this arrange-

ment the students of theology in the theological university had no civil privileges of their own, they were considered individually as belonging to the 'artistæ.' From this time Bologna had four universities, two of jurisprudence, the one of medicine and philosophy, and the theological, the first two having no connection with the others, forming a unit, and therefore frequently designated as one university."—F. C. Savigny, *Universities of the Middle Ages* (Barnard's *American Journal of Education*, v. 22, pp. 278-279).—The University of Bologna exercised a far-reaching influence throughout the Middle Ages. Its method of government by students was in marked contrast to the system developed at the University of Paris, where the control was in the hands of the masters alone.

OTHER ITALIAN UNIVERSITIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES.—"In early times . . . [the prosperity of the University of Bologna] depended greatly on the personal conduct of the principal professors, who, when they were not satisfied with their entertainment, were in the habit of seceding with their pupils to other cities. Thus high schools were opened from time to time in Modena, Reggio, and elsewhere by teachers who broke the oaths that bound them to reside in Bologna, and fixed their centre of education in a rival town. To make such temporary changes was not difficult in an age when what we have to call an university, consisted of masters and scholars, without college buildings, without libraries, without endowments, and without scientific apparatus. The technical name for such institutions seems to have been 'studium scholarium,' Italianised into 'studio' or 'studio pubblico.' Among the more permanent results of these secessions may be mentioned the establishment of the high school at Vicenza by translation from Bologna in 1204, and the opening of a school at Arezzo under similar circumstances in 1215; the great University of Padua first saw the light in consequence of political discords forcing the professors to quit Bologna for a season [1222]. The first half of the thirteenth century witnessed the foundation of these 'studi' in considerable numbers. That of Vercelli was opened in 1228, the municipality providing two certified copyists for the convenience of students who might wish to purchase text-books. In 1224 the Emperor Frederick II., to whom the south of Italy owed a precocious eminence in literature, established the University of Naples by an Imperial diploma. With a view to rendering it the chief seat of learning in his dominions, he forbade the subjects of the Regno to frequent other schools, and suppressed the University of Bologna by letters general . . . [but later revoked the edict]. Political and internal vicissitudes, affecting all the Italian universities at this period, interrupted the prosperity of that of Naples. In the middle of the thirteenth century Salerno proved a dangerous rival. . . . [Salerno was placed in the front rank as a specialized medical school by Constantine, the Carthaginian scholar, about 1065. Robert Guiscard and his son Roger conferred privileges on the school before 1100. In 1137 Roger II instituted the first state examinations in medicine there. The degree given at Salerno was a *licencia medendi* instead of the *licencia docendi* of the other medieval universities.] An important group of 'studi publici' owed their origin to Papal or Imperial charters in the first half of the fourteenth century. That of Perugia was founded in 1307 by a Bull of Clement V. That of Rome dated from 1303, in which year Boniface VIII. gave it a constitution by a special edict; but the translation of the Papal Sea to

Avignon caused it to fall into premature decadence. The University of Pisa had already existed for some years, when it received a charter in 1343 from Clement VI. That of Florence was first founded in 1321."—J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy: The revival of learning*, ch. 3.—"Few of the Italian universities show themselves in their full vigour till the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the increase of wealth rendered a more systematic care for education possible. At first there were generally three sorts of professorships—one for civil law, another for canonical law, the third for medicine; in course of time professorships of rhetoric, of philosophy, and of astronomy were added, the last commonly, though not always, identical with astrology. The salaries varied greatly in different cases. Sometimes a capital sum was paid down. With the spread of culture competition became so active that the different universities tried to entice away distinguished teachers from one another, under which circumstances Bologna is said to have sometimes devoted the half of its public income (20,000 ducats) to the university. The appointments were as a rule made only for a certain time, sometimes for only half a year, so that the teachers were forced to lead a wandering life, like actors. Appointments for life were, however, not unknown. . . . Of the chairs which have been mentioned, that of rhetoric was especially sought by the humanist; yet it depended only on his familiarity with the matter of ancient learning whether or no he could aspire to those of law, medicine, philosophy, or astronomy. The inward conditions of the science of the day were as variable as the outward conditions of the teacher. Certain jurists and physicians received by far the largest salaries of all, the former chiefly as consulting lawyers for the suits and claims of the state which employed them. . . . Personal intercourse between the teachers and the taught, public disputations, the constant use of Latin and often of Greek, the frequent changes of lecturers and the scarcity of books, gave the studies of that time a colour which we cannot represent to ourselves without effort."—J. Burckhardt, *Civilisation of the period of the Renaissance in Italy*, v. 1, pt. 3, ch. 5.

912-1257.—England.—EARLY OXFORD.—"The University of Oxford did not spring into being in any particular year, or at the bidding of any particular founder: it was not established by any formal charter of incorporation. Taking its rise in a small and obscure association of teachers and learners, it developed spontaneously into a large and important body, long before its existence was recognised by prince or by prelate. There were certainly schools at Oxford in the reign of Henry I., but the previous history of the place does not throw much light on their origin, or explain the causes of their popularity. The town seems to have grown up under the shadow of a nunnery, which is said to have been founded by St. Frideswyde as far back as the eighth century. Its authentic annals, however, begin with the year 912, when it was occupied and annexed by Edward the Elder, King of the West Saxons. . . . There can be little doubt . . . that the idea of a university, the systems of degrees and faculties, and the nomenclature of the chief academical officers, were alike imported into England from abroad . . . the University of Oxford is mentioned as such in writs and ordinances of the years 1238, 1240, and 1253. . . . The system of academical degrees dates from the second half of the twelfth century."—H. C. M. Lyte, *History of the University of Oxford*,

ch. 1.—As to the university's origin, "we know absolutely nothing. . . . Master [Robert] Puleyn began to lecture there in 1133 . . . and it is not likely that he would have chosen Oxford if Oxford had possessed no schools. [Master Puleyn came from Paris, where he had attained a high reputation as a lecturer in divinity.] In the early Oxford . . . of the twelfth and most of the thirteenth centuries, colleges with their statutes were unknown. The University was the only corporation of the learned, and she struggled into existence after hard fights with the town, the Jews, the Friars, the Papal courts. The history of the University begins with the thirteenth century. She may be said to have come into being as soon as she possessed common funds and rents, as soon as fines were assigned, or benefactions contributed to the maintenance of scholars. Now the first recorded fine is the payment of fifty-two shillings by the townsmen of Oxford as part of the compensation for the hanging of certain clerks. In the year 1214 the Papal Legate, in a letter to his 'beloved sons in Christ, the burgesses of Oxford,' bade them excuse the 'scholars studying in Oxford' half the rent of their halls, or hospitia, for the space of ten years. The burghers were also to do penance, and to feast the poorer students once a-year; but the important point is, that they had to pay that large yearly fine 'propter suspendium clericorum'—all for the hanging of the clerks. Twenty-six years after this decision of the Legate, Robert Grosseteste, the great Bishop of Lincoln, organized the payment and distribution of the fine, and founded the first of the chests, the chest of St. Frideswyde. These chests were a kind of Mont de Piété, and to found them was at first the favourite form of benefaction. Money was left in this or that chest, from which students and masters would borrow, on the security of pledges, which were generally books, cups, daggers, and so forth. Now, in this affair of 1214 we have a strange passage of history, which happily illustrates the growth of the University. The beginning of the whole affair was the quarrel [of the University] with the town, which in 1209, had hanged the two clerks, 'in contempt of clerical liberty.' [Thousands of students seceded from the university in protest.] The matter was taken up by the Legate—in those bad years of King John, the Pope's viceroy in England—and out of the humiliation of the town the University gained money, privileges, and halls at low rental. These were precisely the things that the University wanted. About these matters there was a constant strife, in which the Kings as a rule, took part with the University. . . . Thus gradually the University got the command of the police, obtained privileges which enslaved the city, and became masters where they had once been despised, starveling scholars."—A. Lang, *Oxford*, ch. 2.—As a result of the disruption of the University of Paris in 1229, Oxford gained many students. In 1238 a quarrel between the university scholars and the papal legate drew English sympathy to the university. University College founded on a bequest made in 1249 by William, Archdeacon of Durham, has some claims to be called the oldest college in Oxford. The first house established on this bequest was founded in 1253. The first statute, however, was not issued until 1280. Merton, which marks the new era of the college system in the University, was opened in 1264 on a benefaction made by Walter de Merton, who "founded a house for scholars at Oxford," and the college was regularly constituted in 1270. "There is no question, that during this Middle

Age the English Universities were distinguished far more than ever afterwards by energy and variety of intellect. Later times cannot produce a concentration of men eminent in all the learning and science of the age, such as Oxford and Cambridge then poured forth, mightily influencing the intellectual development of all Western Christendom. . . . In consequence of this surpassing celebrity, Oxford became the focus of a prodigious congregation of students, to which nothing afterwards bore comparison. . . . A tolerably well authenticated account fixes [the number of] those of Oxford at thirty thousand, in the middle of the thirteenth century. The want indeed of contemporary evidence must make us cautious of yielding absolute belief to this: in fact we have no document on this matter even as old as the Reformation. . . . That the numbers were vast, is implied by the highly respectable evidence which we have, that as many as three thousand migrated from Oxford on the riots of 1209; although the Chronicler expressly states that not all joined in the secession. In the reign of Henry III, the reduced numbers are reckoned at fifteen thousand. After the middle of the fourteenth century, they were still as many as from three to four thousand; and after the Reformation they mount again to five thousand. . . . While in the general, there was a substantial identity between the scholastic learning of Oxford and of Paris, yet Oxford was more eager in following positive science;—and this, although such studies were disparaged by the Church, and therefore by the public. Indeed originally the Church had been on the opposite side; but the speculative tendency of the times had carried her over, so that speculation and theology went hand in hand. In the middle of the thirteenth century we may name Robert Grosseteste and John Basingstock, as cultivating physical science, and (more remarkable still) the Franciscan Roger Bacon . . . [who joined the order in 1257]. A biography of Roger Bacon should surely be written! Unfortunately, we know nothing as to the influence of these men on their times, nor can we even learn whether the University itself was at all interested in their studies. . . . [We have, however], a strange testimony to the interest which in the beginning of the fourteenth century the mass of the students took in the speculation of their elders; for the street rows were carried on under the banners of Nominalists and Realists. . . . The coarse and ferocious manners prevalent in the Universities of the Middle Ages are every where in singular contrast to their intellectual pretensions: but the Universities of the Continent were peaceful, decorous, dignified,—compared with those of England. The storms which were elsewhere occasional, were at Oxford the permanent atmosphere. For nearly two centuries our 'Foster Mother' of Oxford lived in a din of uninterrupted furious warfare; nation against nation, school against school, faculty against faculty. Halls, and finally Colleges, came forward as combatants; and the University, as a whole, against the Town; or against the Bishop of Lincoln; or against the Archbishop of Canterbury."—V. A. Huber, *English universities*, v. 1, ch. 3.—See also OXFORD.

CAMBRIDGE.—"Various facts and circumstances . . . lend probability to the belief that, long before the time when we have certain evidence of the existence of Cambridge as a university, the work of instruction was there going on. The Camboritum of the Roman period, the Grantebrycgr of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, the Grentebryge of

Domesday, must always have been a place of some importance. . . . [Shortly after the Norman conquest], the Norman sheriff, Picot by name, founded the Church of St. Giles, and instituted in connection with it a small body of secular canons. . . . [In 1112] the canons of St. Giles, attended by a large concourse of the clergy and laity, crossed the river, and took up their abode in a new and spacious priory at Barnwell . . . [which] seems from the first to have been closely associated with the university." . . . In the year 1133 was founded the nunnery of St. Rhadegund, which, in the reign of Henry VII., was converted into Jesus College; and in 1135 a hospital of Augustinian canons, dedicated to St. John the Evangelist, was founded by Henry Frost, a burgess of the town. . . . [It was] a very important foundation, inasmuch as it not only became by conversion in the sixteenth century the College of St. John the Evangelist, but was also . . . the foundation of which Peterhouse, the earliest Cambridge college, may be said to have been in a certain sense the offshoot. . . . In the year 1229 there broke out at Paris a feud of more than ordinary gravity between the students and the citizens. Large numbers of the former migrated to the English shores; and Cambridge, from its proximity to the eastern coast, and as the centre where Prince Louis, but a few years before, had raised the royal standard, seems to have attracted the great majority. . . . The university of Cambridge, like that of Oxford, was modelled mainly on the university of Paris. Its constitution was consequently oligarchic rather than democratic, the government being entirely in the hands of the teaching body, while the bachelors and undergraduates had no share in the passing of new laws and regulations."—J. B. Mullinger, *History of the University of Cambridge*, ch. 1-2.—"The earliest existing college at Cambridge is St. Peter's, generally called Peterhouse, historically founded A. D. 1257, in the reign of Henry III. . . . [date of formal founding 1284]. All the colleges except one were founded before the reign of James I. . . . The seventeen colleges . . . are distinct corporations. Their foundations, resources, buildings, governing authorities and students, are entirely separate from each other. Nor has any one college the least control in any other. The plan, however, is much the same in all. The presiding authority is in most cases called the Master, or speaking more generally, the Head; while the net proceeds of all the college funds—for the vast wealth supposed to belong to the University really is in the hands of the separate colleges—are distributed among certain of the graduates, called Fellows, who with the Head constitute the corporation."—W. Everett, *On the Cam*, lecture 1.

1201-1679.—France.—UNIVERSITY OF PARIS.—"At Paris the universitas arose *directly out of* the Arts school, and from the first enjoyed such privileges as were possessed by the claustral or cathedral school. . . . In the Paris school, in the beginning of the eleventh century, a learned monk, William of Champeaux, taught theology. . . . Abelard could not have been more than a boy when he came to Paris to pursue his studies there. For, as early as 1102, when he was only twenty-three years of age, we find that, after having questioned the doctrines of his master, and incurred his serious displeasure by his independence of opinion, . . . he opened a school of dialectic of his own at Melun. In 1113 we find him, after many successes and reverses, teaching theology as well as dialectic, as the head of the Paris school. [See EDUCATION: Medieval: 9th-15th centuries: Scholasticism; 11th-

12th centuries: Rise of the universities.] . . . The impulse . . . [Abelard] had given to philosophic disputation remained, and Paris, under his pupils and their rivals, became the centre of a higher *specialized* school of philosophy and theology, to which students continued to flock from all parts of Europe. In this way the University of Paris, as distinguished from the Arts school, began. . . . Peter the Lombard lectured 1145-1159. The marking of the progress of studies by means of degrees seems to have begun during his regency, but this as yet in a somewhat irregular fashion. Nations existed about 1150 in some form more or less lax; but they were certainly not yet organized. . . . The numerous masters of arts, with the addition of the masters of theology and canon law, constituted the starting-point of the university as an organization. . . . And this beginning of the university in a consortium magistrorum influenced the organization of the universitas throughout its whole history. Paris, in fact, was commonly differentiated as a universitas magistrorum, although it called itself in its official documents as universitas magistrorum et scholarium, and the pope so addressed it."—S. S. Laurie, *Rise and early constitution of universities*, pp. 141, 143, 145, 152-153.—"The name of Abelard recalls the European celebrity and immense intellectual ferment of this school [of Paris] in the 12th century. But it was in the first year of the following century, the 13th, that it received a charter from Philip Augustus, and thenceforth the name of University of Paris takes the place of that of School of Paris. . . . Four nations composed the University of Paris,—the nation of France, the nation of Picardy, the nation of Normandy, and . . . the nation of England. The four nations united formed the faculty of arts. The faculty of theology was created in 1257, that of law in 1271, that of medicine in 1274. Theology, law, and medicine had each their Dean; arts had four Procurators, one for each of the four nations composing this faculty. Arts elected the rector of the University, and had possession of the University chest and archives. . . . The importance of the University in the 13th and 14th centuries was extraordinary. Men's minds were possessed with a wonderful zeal for knowledge, or what was then thought knowledge, and the University of Paris was the great fount from which this knowledge issued. The University and those depending on it made at this time, it is said, actually a third of the population of Paris; when the University went on a solemn occasion in procession to St. Denis, the head of the procession, it is said, had reached St. Denis before the end of it had left its starting place in Paris. It had immunities from taxation, it had jurisdiction of its own, and its members claimed to be exempt from that of the provost of Paris; the kings of France strongly favoured the University, and leaned to its side when the municipal and academical authorities were in conflict; if at any time the University thought itself seriously aggrieved, it had recourse to a measure which threw Paris into dismay,—it shut up its schools and suspended its lectures. In a body of this kind the discipline could not be strict, and the colleges were created to supply centres of discipline which the University in itself,—an apparatus merely of teachers and lecture-rooms,—did not provide. The 14th century is the time when, one after another, with wonderful rapidity, the French colleges appeared. Navarre, Montaignu, Harcourt, names so familiar in the school annals of France, date from the first quarter of the 14th century. The College of Navarre was

founded by the queen of Philip the Fair, in 1304; the College of Montaigu, where Erasmus, Rabelais, and Ignatius Loyola were in their time students, was founded in 1314 by two members of the family of Montaigu, one of them Archbishop of Rouen. The majority of these colleges were founded by magnates of the church, and designed to maintain a certain number of bursars, or scholars, during their university course."—M. Arnold, *Schools and universities on the continent*, ch. 1.—The University of Paris acquired the name of "the Sorbonne" "from Robert of Sorbon, aulic chaplain of St. Louis, who established one of the 63 colleges of the University [about 1257]. . . . The name of Sorbonne was first applied to the theological faculty only; but at length the whole University received this designation."—J. Alzog, *Manual of universal church history*, v. 3, p. 24, footnote.—"The above view of the rise of the University of Paris furnishes an explanation of many of its peculiarities. For example; it was because it was the centre of theological learning that it received so many privileges from the pope, and was kept in such close relation to the papal see by a continuous succession of bulls: again, it was because

the provost of the town and his subordinates with great severity, and gave fresh privileges to the university which should protect them from exercises of civic authority in the future. The popes, too, supported this view of university privilege. . . . The next most important events, after the extension of privileges by Philip Augustus in 1200, were unquestionably the disruption of 1229 and the separation of the theological faculty from that of arts; or rather, let us say, the formal institution for the first time, of a specific theological faculty, which took place in 1270. . . . The disruption to which we have above alluded, and which preceded the formal institution of the theological faculty by forty years, was caused by a town-and-gown riot, in which Queen Blanche, under the advice of the bishop and the papal legate, unfortunately opposed the university, and indeed committed herself to the infliction of unmerited castigation on certain students. The provost of Paris, proceeding to punish the students, under her direction, attacked them while at their games outside the city, and slew several who had taken no part in the previous riot. The university authorities were violently excited: they demanded satisfaction, and, this hav-



AT THE SORBONNE IN PARIS

Thomas Aquinas defending a thesis against Albertus Magnus before Louis IX

(After painting by Otto Knille)

it remained an arts school that its students were so young. . . . At Paris, above all—the centre of theological thought and ecclesiastical jurisprudence—it was felt to be necessary to protest against . . . [the study of civil law]. Accordingly Pope Honorius III. (1216-1227) prohibited the teaching of it in Paris; and it was authoritatively taught there only after 1679. . . . In evolving itself, the rising studium generale school carried, . . . with it the privileges of the Paris arts school. How else can we explain the reference to 'ancient' privileges by Pope Alexander III. (1159)? But it also carried with it the superintendence of the Chancellor of Notre Dame. In the . . . history of the *universitas*, the question of the respective rights of the *universitas magistrorum et scholarium* and the chancellor were a matter of constant contention, until the latter were restricted to the merely formal conferring of degrees [1229]. Circumstances [rising out of a tavern quarrel and consequent friction between the university and the town authorities] led to a ratification and further extension by Philip Augustus, in 1200, of the privileges already enjoyed by the University of Paris under the edicts of Louis VII. and the Papal Letters, or simply assumed without being questioned. . . . The teachers of the university . . . indignantly sought satisfaction from the king; and he, fearing that the masters and their scholars would leave Paris in disgust, punished

ing been refused, a large number of masters and their pupils left Paris in disgust, and settled at various younger university seats which had begun to arise in France, such as Orleans and Toulouse, and even reopened independent schools at Angers, Poitiers, and Rheims. . . . It is said that not a single master of any eminence remained in Paris. . . . Those who, yielding to royal and papal pressure, ultimately returned to Paris, did so only on receiving the most solemn promises that satisfaction would be given. And as the Bishop and Chancellor of Paris had been among the chief offenders, the pope (Gregory IX.) restricted in all time coming the powers previously exercised by them over the university, but astutely made it, at the same time, more dependent on himself. . . . That Paris should have been regarded throughout the Middle Ages as the mother of universities arose mainly from its cultivation of philosophy. For philosophy was then understood in a wide sense, including the rational interpretation of the phenomena of both mind and matter. . . . [Down to the period of the Great Schism (1378), the popes showed great favor to the University of Paris and discouraged the teaching of theology in other universities. The effect of the schism was an almost complete disruption of the university, and from this time on its status was very low. The papal legate, Cardinal D'Estouteville, in 1452, gave the univer-


sity statutes, by which it continued to be governed for over a hundred years without modification by the influences of the Renaissance. In 1578 new statutes were given by Richter. The civil wars in France during the last thirty years of the sixteenth century had a disintegrating effect, and at the beginning of the seventeenth century the forty colleges of the University were completely deserted. The Edict of Blois, promulgated in 1579, had organized the twenty-one existing universities under one system, but did nothing toward the reorganization of university studies. During the seventeenth century the Jesuits gained control of both higher and lower education throughout France.]—S. S. Laurie, *Rise and early constitution of universities*, pp. 153-154, 157-158, 160-163, 166.

OTHER FRENCH UNIVERSITIES.—Of the French medieval universities aside from Paris, Montpellier was a recognized school of medicine as early as the twelfth century and was raised by Nicholas IV to the rank of *studium generale* in 1280. The University of Toulouse, first founded anywhere by a papal charter, was established in 1233, by Gregory IX, in the effort to suppress the Albigensian heresy. It was a strong center of Dominican teaching. Orleans, known as a school in the thirteenth century, was endowed with new university privileges by Clement V, in 1305, and was famous for the teaching of civil law, which was not taught at Paris. Other French universities founded in the fourteenth century were Angers (1305), Avignon (1303), Cahors (1332), and Grenoble (1339). In the fifteenth century were founded Aix in Provence (reorganized as *studium generale* in 1409), Poitiers (1431), Caen (1437), Bordeaux (1441), Valence (1452), Nantes (1463) and Bourges (1465).

1231-1339.—Nations at Paris, Bologna and other universities.—“The precise date of the organization at Paris of the four Nations which maintained themselves there until the latest days of the university escapes the most minute research. Neither for the Nations nor for the Faculties was there any sudden blossoming, but rather a slow evolution, and insensible preparation for a definite condition. Already at the close of the twelfth century there is mention in contemporary documents of the various provinces of the school of Paris. The Nations are mentioned in the bulls of Gregory IX. (1231) and of Innocent IV. (1245). In 1245, they already elect their attendants, the beadles. In 1249, the existence of the four Nations—France, Picardy, Normandy, and England—is proved by their quarrels over the election of a rector. . . . Until the definitive constitution of the Faculties, that is, until 1270 or 1280, the four Nations included the totality of students and masters. After the formation of the Faculties, the four Nations comprised only the members of the Faculty of Arts and those students of other Faculties who had not yet obtained the grade of Bachelor of Arts. The three superior Faculties, Theology, Medicine, and Law, had nothing in common thenceforward with the Nations. . . . At Bologna, as at Paris, the Nations were constituted in the early years of the thirteenth century, but under a slightly different form. There the students were grouped in two distinct associations, the Ultramontanes and the Citramontanes, the foreigners and the Italians, who formed two universities, the Transalpine and the Cisalpine, each with its chiefs, who were not styled procurators but counsellors; the first was composed of eighteen Nations and the second of seventeen. At Padua twenty-two Na-

tions were enumerated. Montpellier had only three in 1339,—the Catalans, the Burgundians, the Provençals; each sub-divided, however, into numerous groups. Orleans had ten: France, Germany, Lorraine, Burgundy, Champagne, Picardy, Normandy, Touraine, Guyanne, and Scotland; Poitiers had four: France, Aquitaine, Touraine, and Berry; Prague had four also, in imitation of Paris; Lerida had twelve, in imitation of Bologna, etc. But whether more or less numerous, and whatever their special organization, the Nations in all the universities bore witness to that need of association which is one of the characteristics of the Middle Ages. . . . One of the consequences of their organization was to prevent the blending and fusion of races, and to maintain the distinction of provinces and nationalities among the pupils of the same university.”—G. Compayré, *Abelard*, pt. 2, ch. 2.—“The oldest German universities (Prague and Vienna, the former imitated by Leipzig, and Leipzig in turn by Frankfort) adopted the dual organization into ‘faculties’ and ‘nations’ from still older models. . . . But this organization soon became obsolete. It was supplanted by the faculties, who gradually assumed the functions of administration also. The later foundations, even Heidelberg and Erfurt, simply had the division into faculties.”—F. Paulsen, *German universities and university study* (tr. by F. Thilly and W. W. Elwang), p. 17.

1240-1510.—Spain and Portugal.—“Salamanca was founded in the 13th century [about 1240], and received its statutes in the year 1422, out of which was developed the following constitution. The rector, with eight ‘consiliarii,’ all students, who could appoint their successors, administered the university. The doctors render the oath of obedience to the rector. The ‘domscholaster’ is the proper judge of the school; but he swears obedience to the rector. A bachelor of law must have studied six years, and after five years more he could become licentiate. In filling a paid teachership, the doctor was chosen next in age of those holding the diploma, unless a great majority of the scholars objected, in which case the rector and council decided. This liberal constitution for the scholars is in harmony with the code of Alphonzo X., soon after 1250, in which the liberty of instruction was made a general principle of law. This constitution continued in Salamanca into the 17th century, for Retes speaks of a disputation which the rector held at that time under his presidency. Alcala university was established by cardinal Ximenes, in 1510, for the promotion of the study of theology and philosophy, for which reason it contained a faculty of canon, but not of civil law. The center of the university was the college of St. Ildefonso, consisting of thirty-three prebendaries, who could be teachers or scholars, since for admission were required only poverty, the age of twenty, and the completion of the course of the preparatory colleges. These thirty-three members elected annually a rector and three councilors, who controlled the entire university. Salaried teachers were elected, not by the rector and council alone, but by all the students. It had wide reputation. . . . Francis I., while a prisoner of Spain, . . . was welcomed by 11,000 students. The Coimbra university, in Portugal, received statutes in 1309, from king Dionysius, with a constitution similar to those just mentioned.”—F. C. Savigny, *Universities of the Middle Ages* (*Barnard's American Journal of Education*, v. 22, p. 324).—Two centuries before the University of Alcala was officially es-



AERIAL VIEW OF OXFORD UNIVERSITY, ENGLAND


established by Cardinal Ximenes, it had been "founded by a formal charter or ordinance of Sancho the Bravo in 1293. Valladolid was first endowed, if not first established, by Ferdinand IV. in 1304, and the institution was gratified with Papal sanction by a Bull of Clement VI. in 1346. These High Schools, or *Maestrescuelas*—for the word University was not as yet applied to them—are mentioned repeatedly in the Laws of the *Siete Partidas*, which contain the first legal or public provisions for the foundation or government of the new institutions. The earliest and most celebrated of the Universities of Aragon was that established in the territory to the north of the Pyrenees, which still survives at Montpellier. Founded, it would seem, in the first instance, as a School of Medicine, and recognised by Papal authority in 1220 as an institution already respectable, it was not formally constituted a University until 1289, in the reign of Alfonso III., by Bull of Nicholas IV. From this time it continued to enjoy the special protection of the Bishop, as opposed to that of the Crown, until Montpellier ceased to be a Spanish city in 1392. . . . When Ticknor states that 'in the year 1300, although there were five Universities established in Italy, Spain possessed not one, except Salamanca, which was in a very unsettled state,' he might fairly have added that in that year, the foundations at least of no less than four other Universities had already been laid—that is to say, at Alcalá (1293), at Palma (1280), at Seville (1256), and at Valencia (1245); and that the Universities of Montpellier and of Lerida were fully established, making, together with Salamanca, not one but seven in all Spain. . . . The University [of Valencia] does not appear to have been founded until 1411; the status of *nobility* was conferred on the Doctors of Law by Alfonso V. of Aragon in 1426, and confirmed by two Bulls of Alexander VI.—the constant patron of his native Valencia—both dated in 1500, and approved by Ferdinand the Catholic, February 16, 1502. . . . A College or University at Gerona was endowed in 1446 by John II. of Aragon, and the more celebrated institution at Barcelona was recognised rather than founded by a royal grant in 1450, and confirmed by Bull of Nicholas V. in the same year. . . . with all the privileges of the University of Toulouse. The University of Saragossa stands on a somewhat similar footing, having been recognised as existing in 1474 by a Bull of Sixtus IV. . . . All these institutions, as well in Aragon as in Castile, were in their origin rather Royal than Papal, in spite of the Bulls of establishment obtained by the Spanish kings from Rome. . . . Thus the influence of the Court was paramount in the Spanish Universities at the commencement of the fifteenth century, and so remained during the long reign of John II. . . . Yet, as regards the privileges enjoyed by residents in the University towns, Ferdinand asserted the power of the Crown without hesitation or hindrance. By the year 1492 numerous abuses had crept into the Spanish Universities, and notably into the great establishment at Salamanca. . . . Ferdinand the Catholic was not a man to endure such assaults upon the supreme power, and a royal ordinance with the cuphemic name of a *Concordia* was promulgated in 1492, confirmed by Bull of Alexander VI. in 1493, and followed up by still more trenchant rescripts of Ferdinand in 1494 (Medina del Campo) and 1497 (Alcalá de Henares), by which the jurisdiction of the University Courts was grievously curtailed, and the matriculation of any but *bona-fide* stu-

dents condemned and prohibited."—U. R. Burke, *History of Spain*, v. 1, pp. 269-270, 272-275.

1258-1921.—England.—Oxford and Cambridge.—The first royal recognition of Oxford was given the university in 1258 in a charter from Henry III. "The most momentous event in the history of Oxford and Cambridge was the foundation of the Colleges, yet none saw its significance, so quietly and naturally did it come about. The youthful students lodged with the townspeople, or in hostels kept for them by the graduates. Neither plan worked satisfactorily. The students complained of the exactions of the townspeople. The townspeople retorted disagreeably of the disorderly conduct of the students and of the non-payment of their just and lawful debts. Thus began the age-long quarrel between 'town' and 'gown.' The hostels too, so it was alleged, were not always what they should have been, in that they were conducted for the benefit of the Heads rather than for that of the Students. Above all it was necessary to help the poor and struggling members of the University through their long and arduous course. Hence the idea occurred to two pious founders almost simultaneously, to Walter de Merton, at Oxford, in 1270, and to Hugh de Balsham, Bishop of Ely, at Cambridge, in 1284, to found a House for the reception of students. This was the origin of the Collegiate system. . . . [which was to overshadow the university itself]. The College system once started speedily grew in riches and importance. New Colleges were constantly being founded and received endowments from their founders, from their benefactors, and from the Royal Bounty. . . . The instruction passed into the hands of the colleges. . . . This process of the University decreasing and the Colleges increasing was helped on by the course of events."—A. I. Tillyard, *History of university reform from 1800 A.D. to the present time*, pp. 7, 10.—"The importance of . . . [the English universities] in the eyes of Europe was increased during the fourteenth century by two causes, the decline of the University of Paris, and the vigorous protest of Oxford schoolmen against the spiritual despotism of the Papacy. . . . [In the period] a compact was made between Oxford and Cambridge for their mutual protection against competition, and the dual monopoly of the two ancient Universities was henceforth established. . . . The famous riot of St. Scholastica's Day, 1354, may be regarded as the sequel of a similar fray of 1297. Both were simply violent eruptions of a deep-seated feud between the University and city of Oxford, which had been growing for several generations. . . . [In 1354] the Church took up the quarrel of the University as her own. After due inquiry an interdict was laid upon the city by the Bishop of Lincoln, and all the municipal authorities, if not all the lay inhabitants, were visited with 'the major excommunication.' At last [in 1357] the city made a complete and humble submission and accepted a penance. . . . [consisting of] the signature of a compact under which the mayor, bailiffs, and sixty leading citizens were obliged to attend mass every year in St. Mary's Church on St. Scholastica's Day, and to offer at the high altar one penny each, of which sum two-thirds was to be distributed at once by the proctors among poor scholars. . . . In the meantime, however, the mayor and burgesses had formally resigned their ancient franchises into the King's hands, and the University received a new charter or privileges and immunities as a reward for the indignities to which it had been subjected on

St. Scholastica's Day. Under this charter [1354], the Chancellor of the University obtained the sole control over the 'assize' or bread, wine, ale, and beer; over the 'assay' of weights and measures, with jurisdiction in all cases of 'forestalling,' 're-grating,' and selling unwholesome food; over the assessment of rates and taxes, the management of the streets, and like municipal affairs. He was also empowered to expel all disorderly students, and the provision for the forfeiture of their arms shows how generally arms were carried in those turbulent days. Moreover, though he was not as yet permitted to rescue and sit in judgment on

permanent results of the [reform] movement which he initiated. . . . During the reign of Henry VII. . . . [both Oxford and Cambridge were] strongly agitated by the struggle between the old scholastic philosophy and the new learning of the Renaissance. . . . It was from Italy that England caught the new impulse, and that Oxford imported numerous MSS. of classical authors, while printing was still almost a fine art. . . . Writing in 1497, Erasmus, who is sometimes described as the father of classical studies in England, speaks of a 'rich harvest of classical literature' as already flourishing at Oxford on every side, and declares that



AERIAL VIEW OF CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY, ENGLAND

scholars accused of treason, murder, or 'mayhem,' this privilege was afterwards conceded by letters patent of 1407; but it was provided that academical prisoners should be tried before a mixed jury of gownsmen and townspeople. . . . [The influence of the two great mendicant orders of friars, which had become prominent at Oxford from the thirteenth century on, was the occasion of much controversy during this period.] In 1365 the Pope entered the lists against the University on behalf of the friars, and directed the Archbishop of Canterbury and bishops to insist upon the Chancellor's procuring the repeal of . . . [certain] obnoxious statutes [directed against them]. . . . One main source of [John] Wyclif's popularity in the University was his unsparing denunciation of the Mendicants, and their decline was among the most

he could well nigh forget Italy in the society of Colet, Crocyn, Lynacre, and More. . . . [Erasmus also spent some time at Cambridge where he did most of the work in his new Latin edition of the New Testament, with the result that Cambridge became a center of Reformation doctrine.] The first endowed lectureship of the Greek language at Oxford was instituted by Richard Fox, Bishop of Winchester, in 1516, as part of his new foundation of Corpus Christi College. . . . That movement had already provoked a strange outbreak of academical barbarism in the University of Oxford. The faction of 'Trojans,' as they called themselves, from their enmity to Greek letters, seems to have been partly animated by a popular aversion to change, and partly by a far-sighted appreciation of the anti-Catholic tendencies in-

herent in the Renaissance. . . . [But] in the early part of Henry VIII's reign, . . . the classics had won powerful friends at Court, and the 'Greeks' were protected by a peremptory Royal order, issued in 1519. . . . [The Royal injunctions of 1535 at Cambridge representing the plans and theories of Thomas Cromwell, mark the end of the old scholastic methods of study at both universities. Trinity College, Cambridge, founded in 1547, was the earliest institution of its kind in England free from Roman Catholic tradition.] At the beginning of Edward VI's reign [1547, the universities were] . . . far less prosperous than [they] had been under Wolsey. The number of degrees continued to fall off, and the number of halls to dwindle, as religious controversy usurped the place of education, and the University was used as an instrument to advance the political or ecclesiastical aims of the Sovereign. . . . The 'Edwardine' code, as it was afterwards called, was of course so framed as to eliminate everything which favoured Popery from the constitution of the University. . . . The amount of destruction wrought . . . [at Oxford by order of the visitors appointed at this time] among the libraries and chapels of colleges cannot now be estimated, but it was certainly enormous, and 'cart-loads' of classical and scientific manuscripts were consigned to the flames, together with many an illuminated masterpiece of scholastic literature. At the same time, while the study of canon law was virtually suppressed, that of civil law, ancient philosophy, Hebrew, mathematics, logic, rhetoric, and medicine was expressly encouraged by the Visitors. . . . The accession of Mary, in 1553, ushered in a short-lived reaction. . . . Oxford became the scene of those Protestant martyrdoms which have left an indelible impression of horror and sympathy in the English mind. Several victims of Catholic intolerance had already perished at the stake, when Crammer, Ridley, and Latimer were brought to Oxford for the purpose of undergoing the solemn force of an academical trial, and thus implicating the University in the guilt of their intended condemnation. . . . The judicial sentence soon followed, and on October 15, 1555, Ridley and Latimer were led out to be burned in Canditch, opposite Balliol College."—G. C. Brodric, *History of the University of Oxford*, pp. 33-35, 40, 43, 46-47, 49-55, 70-73, 80, 81, 83, 84.—See also EDUCATION: Modern: 14th-16th centuries: England.—"After the Reformation . . . Queen Elizabeth and her advisers had come to the conclusion that the University as a single and unified body was more dangerous than the several Colleges in their individual capacity were likely to be. They therefore decided to favour the component parts at the expense of the corporate whole. Elizabeth's second Code [1570] effected what was practically a revolution. . . . Under James the First both the Universities were more effectively closed against all who were not members of the Church of England. . . . It was Laud who, in the reign of Charles I., by his Code, known as the Laudian or Caroline Statutes (which were practically a confirmation of those of Elizabeth), put the final impress of character on Oxford. He attempted the visitation of Cambridge, but the Puritans [who had gained control there] rose in arms against him and he was compelled to retire. At Oxford he worked his will to the full [with extreme decentralization as the result]. . . . Oxford and Cambridge have undergone great vicissitudes of fortune, as they have been affected by pestilence, civil war, and revolution either in Church or State. The Reformation was a temporary disaster. . . . The Restoration

brought peace, but it can hardly be said to have brought prosperity. A period of lethargy set in during which Oxford fell to almost incredible depths. The old examination system had become obsolete, and nothing had been put in its place. . . . Oxford in fact gave its Degrees without any examination to all who had paid their fees and kept the required number of terms. Cambridge was saved from falling quite so low by the influence of Sir Isaac Newton and his successors. It required a certain amount of mathematics before granting a degree. . . . [After the Restoration, Cambridge became the center of what was known as the Cambridge Platonist movement, in which Henry More, Cudworth and Whichcote were the leaders. Later the rise of Methodism was associated with the names of the two Wesleys and Whitefield at Oxford, and Berridge at Cambridge. The eighteenth century was in the main a period of low levels for both universities. In the early part of the nineteenth century Oxford became the center of a movement known as Tractarianism (see OXFORD, OR TRACTARIAN, MOVEMENT).] "In 1800 there was at Cambridge the same number of Colleges, 17, as there is now [written in 1913], the youngest of them, Downing, having been incorporated into the University on September 22nd of the same year. The list of Colleges in order of foundation is St. Peter's or Peterhouse (A. D. 1284), Clare (1326), Pembroke (1347), Gonville and Caius (1348), Trinity Hall (1350), Corpus (1352), King's (1441), Queens' (1448), St. Catherine's (1473), Jesus (1496), Christ's (1505), St. John's (1511), Magdalene (1519), Trinity (1546). These 14 may be accounted pre-Reformation Colleges. The remaining are Emmanuel (1584), Sidney Sussex (1596), and Downing (1800). There was but one examination for a Degree, the Mathematical Tripos, the first list of which is for the year 1737-8. Classics had been encouraged by the institution of the Chancellor's Medals, first given by the Duke of Newcastle in 1751. Until 1871 inclusive, candidates for these medals were required to have passed the Mathematical Tripos and to have gained a place among the Senior Optimes at least. . . . At Oxford in 1800 there were 20 Colleges—Merton (founded A. D. 1270), University (1280), Exeter (1314), Oriel (1326), Balliol (1340), Queen's (1340), New (1386), Lincoln (1417), All Souls (1438), Magdalen (1457), Brasenose (1509), Corpus Christi (1516), Christ Church (1525). These may be counted as the pre-Reformation Colleges. There followed Trinity (1555), St. John's (1555), Jesus (1571), Wadham (1612), Pembroke (1624), Worcester (1714), and Hertford (1740). The last-mentioned College subsequently became extinct, but by an Act of Parliament passed in the year 1874 Magdalen Hall was re-endowed under this name as a close Church of England foundation. Keble College, another close Church of England foundation, was admitted into the University in 1871. It enjoys all the privileges of a College except as regards the status of its Head, who is not eligible for the office of Vice-Chancellor. It is also the only College at Oxford which has no Fellows, while All Souls has Fellows but no undergraduates."—A. I. Tillyard, *History of university reform from 1800 A. D. to the present time*, pp. 11, 13-18.—See also OXFORD.—Regulations passed in 1800 finally "effected a grand reform in the method of examination. Candidates were to offer themselves either for what has since been known as a 'pass,' or for Honours, and the Honour-list was to be divided into two classes, in which the names were to be arranged

in order of merit. . . . Moreover, the examiners were thenceforth to be paid by salary, and chosen by responsible officers to serve for considerable periods. . . . Material changes were introduced into this system by statutes of 1807, modified again in 1809, 1825, 1826, and 1830. The general effect of these changes was to substitute, in the main, written papers for oral questions, to establish two stated times in the year for examination, to subdivide the list of honours into three classes, to relegate mathematics to a 'School' by itself, to abrogate the examination for the M.A. degree, and to make the Greek and Latin languages, philosophy, and history, the staple of examination in what now came to be called the *Literæ Humaniores* School. . . . Such was the Oxford examination-system when it was transformed afresh in 1850, by a statute which has been amended and extended by many supplementary measures. A 'First public Examination,' popularly known as 'Moderations,' was interposed between Responsions and the final examination for the B.A. degree, thenceforth officially designated the 'Second Public Examination.' . . . The Honour School of Mathematics was retained, and two new Schools were established, the one for Natural Science, the other for Law and Modern History. This last School was afterwards divided into two schools, of Jurisprudence and of Modern History, respectively, while a sixth Honour School was added for Theology. . . . The important examination statutes of 1850 were in contemplation, but not yet in operation, when a Royal Commission was issued, on August 31, in that year, 'for the purpose of inquiring into the state, discipline, studies, and revenues' of the University and colleges. . . . This Commission . . . recommended various important reforms, of which some were effected by an Act of Parliament enacted in 1854, and the others through Ordinances framed by executive commissioners, therein appointed, for the several colleges. . . . A profound and most beneficial reform was wrought in the whole spirit and working of the University system by the Act of 1854, and the College Ordinances framed under its provisions. The Hebdomadal Board [of heads of houses] was replaced by an elective Council, on which Heads of colleges, professors, and resident Masters of Arts were equally represented. A new 'Congregation' was created, embracing all resident members of Convocation, and soon became a vigorous deliberate assembly, with the right of speaking in English. The monopoly of colleges was broken down, and an opening made for ulterior extension by the revival of private halls. The professoriate was considerably increased, reorganised, and re-endowed. . . . The number and value of scholarships was largely augmented, and many, though not all, of the restrictions upon them were abolished. . . . The relaxation of the 'classical monopoly' and the opening of scholarships was supplemented, in 1871, by a still more important reform—the complete abolition of [religious] University Tests, already reduced by the Act of 1854. . . . The Conservative Government which came into office in the spring of 1874 . . . introduced a Bill expressly designed to enrich the University at the expense of the colleges. This Bill was passed, with some amendments, in 1877. . . . In the course of the last fifty years [written in 1886], a profound though almost unseen change has gradually passed over the face of the old University. [These changes are typical of Cambridge as well as Oxford.] The introduction of representative government into the academical constitution has not only cleared away

many abuses, but has at once popularized and centralised University administration. The recognition of Unattached Students has broken down the monopoly of colleges; the abolition of close fellowships has infused new blood and new ideas into the more backward collegiate bodies; the spontaneous development of numerous clubs and associations—athletic, literary, or political—has created many new ties among under-graduates, and weakened the old exclusive spirit of college partisanship. The 'Combined Lecture System,' under which the inmates of one college may receive instruction in another, has also favoured a division of labour among tutors which is directly conducive to specialism and teaching."—G. C. Brodrick, *History of the University of Oxford*, pp. 192-194, 196, 198, 200-201, 220-221.—"The Senate of Cambridge University, England, on Dec. 8 [1920], rejected the proposal to admit women to full university membership. The vote was 904 against 712. . . . By this vote, Cambridge, which was the first English university to admit women to its courses, remains [1921], the only one to refuse them full membership. Oxford, with all its conservatism, has already let down the bars. . . . The Cambridge authorities, on Feb. 12 [1921], rejected a proposal to convert the women's institutions—Girton and Newnham Colleges—into a separate university allied with Cambridge. The vote of the university senate stood 146 to 450. A compromise movement has already been started, under which the university would be empowered to confer degrees on women, without the right to sit in the senate, while the university would retain the power of limiting the power of women students."—*New York Times Current History*, Apr., 1921, p. 69.

ALSO IN: *Medieval archives of the University of Oxford*.—H. C. M. Lyte, *History of Oxford from the earliest times to the year 1530*.—C. Headlam, *Oxford and its story*.—A. D. Godley, *Oxford in the eighteenth century*.—J. B. Mullinger, *History of the University of Cambridge*.—D. A. Winstanley, *History of Cambridge in the eighteenth century*.—J. W. Clark, *Cambridge, brief historical and descriptive notes*.—C. H. Cooper, *Annals of Cambridge, 695-1849*.—F. Seebohm, *Oxford reformers*.—C. W. Boase, *Oxford*.

1348-1826.—Early German and Danish universities.—Reformation.—Effect of the Thirty Years' War.—Later foundations.—University of Copenhagen.—"While the oldest universities of France and Italy, as well as of Spain and England, date back to the thirteenth, and even as far back as the twelfth century, the oldest German institutions do not go beyond the second half of the fourteenth century. . . . Unlike the first French Italian institutions, the German universities did not originate spontaneously, but were the result of a definite scheme in which, as a rule, the civil and ecclesiastical authorities were both interested. The actual founders were the territorial governments, or perhaps the municipalities. The ruler called the school into being, supplied it with buildings and endowments, and, at the same time, granted the *universitas* certain corporate rights, such as autonomy, jurisdiction over its own members, and exemption from duties and taxes. . . . Prague and Vienna were the first foundations. The former was established in 1348 by the house of Luxemburg, the later in 1365 by the house of Hapsburg. Both were located on the eastern border of the German sphere of culture, manifestly because in that region the most extensive independent territorial jurisdictions had been built up, and probably, because Paris, with which the old ecclesiastical

schools along the Rhine, notably Cologne, already sustained intimate relations, was readily accessible to the west. Toward the end of the century the west followed with the universities of Heidelberg (1385) and Cologne (1388), and Middle Germany with Erfurt (1392), the two last named being municipal foundations. The establishment of these three universities was in part due to the disintegration of the university of Paris by the great ecclesiastical schism [1378]. Cologne had long been one of the most important seats of ecclesiastical learning. Here, in the Dominican school, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas had taught, while Duns Scotus had given instruction in that of the Minorities. Erfurt also had an organized school long before 1392, . . . which soon laid claim to the title of *studium generale*. By way of compensation for the loss of the university

teenth century. . . . During this entire time there was a bitter struggle between the old and the new. The entire traditional university instruction, especially as it prevailed in the faculties of arts and philosophy, and theology, was attacked with extreme violence by the representatives of the new poetic and literary culture. . . . The new culture triumphed all along the line. By 1520 it had taken root in all the larger universities, new curriculums everywhere admitted the new branches at first by the side of the old, into the course as well as into the examinations. . . . Classical Latin superseded the old scholastic Latin of ecclesiastical usage. . . . Greek found a place in the universities. . . . Ancient Roman and Greek authors, particularly the poets and orators, were included in the courses, essentially with a view to tempting the student to literary imitation. . . . Just as the new



HEIDELBERG UNIVERSITY, GERMANY

of Prague—lost to German culture by reason of the Hussite disorders—the dukes of Saxony founded a university in Leipzig (1409) for the numerous masters and scholars who had immigrated to that city. In 1419 the municipality of Rostock, in cooperation with the rulers, established the last university founded during this period. With two exceptions [Cologne and Erfurt] the seven universities of this first period are still in existence [1906]. . . . A second foundation period began with the rise of the humanistic movement. It witnessed the establishment of no less than nine new German universities: Greifswald (1456), Freiburg (1460), Basel (1460), Ingolstadt (1472), Treves (1472), Mainz (1477), Tübingen (1477), Wittenberg (1502) . . . and Frankfurt-on-the-Oder (1506). With the exception of Greifswald and Basel these were all government foundations. . . . The conquest of the German universities by the new culture [of the Renaissance] was accomplished during the first two decades of the six-

poetical-literary culture seemed to have won the victory over the old scholastic system, it was itself in turn overtaken by a movement of an entirely different kind and origin: the Reformation. . . . [For a time] the universities and other schools came almost to a stand-still during the storms of the second decade of this century, so that Erasmus could declare that knowledge perished wherever Lutheranism became dominant. But the final result was different. In a certain sense the alliance between the Reformation and Humanism was restored, even with Luther's assistance. But it was most thoroughly represented in Melancthon. With persistent but quiet efficiency this labor-loving man planted and fostered the humanistic studies at the German universities. . . . With the fourth decade of the century Wittenberg became the most popular of the German universities. Young men flocked to it from all the countries of Germany, yes, of Europe. . . . Long after his death . . . [Melancthon] controlled, through his method and

text-books, the instruction in the Protestant schools and universities. . . . [See also EDUCATION: Modern: 16th century: Melancthon.] [At] the close of the Peasants' War, the second stage [of the religious conflict in Germany] followed with the organization of established churches upon a Protestant basis, and for two hundred years the universities stood in closest relations with these establishments. . . . The first new Protestant foundation was the Hessian university of Marburg (1527). It was followed (1544) by Königsberg, for the secular duchy formed out of the territory of the Teutonic order, and by Jena (1556), for that portion of the old electorate of Saxony which remained in the possession of the Ernestinian line after the Albertians had obtained Wittenberg with the electoral dignity. . . . In 1576 a university with considerable equipment was established at Helmstädt for the duchy of Brunswick. . . . The two foundations of the free-cities of Altdorf and Strassburg must also be numbered among the more important universities of the seventeenth century. . . . The Catholic countries also show a large number of new foundations. The first one was Dillingen, established by the Bishop of Augsburg (1549). It was for quite a while the focus of scientific study for Catholic Germany. Würzburg, established with considerable equipment by the Prince-Bishop Julius, came next. Then, in order, Paderborn (1615), Salzburg (1623), Osnabrück (1630), Bamberg (1648), all episcopal foundations; and in the Hapsburg domains: Olmütz (1581), Graz (1586), Linz (1636), Innsbruck (1672), and Breslau (1702). . . . The chief impetus leading to these numerous foundations was the accentuation of the principle of territorial sovereignty from the ecclesiastical as well as the political point of view. The consequence was that the universities began to be *instrumenta dominationis* of the government as professional schools for its ecclesiastical and secular officials. . . . The universities of this period lacked the universality so noticeable in those of the Middle Ages. The inter-territorial, not to say international freedom of transfer from one institution to another, so characteristic of the old *studium generale* was gone. Territorial boundaries, or at least the boundaries of creed, also marked the limits of a university's field. . . . At the end the seventeenth century the German universities had sunk to the lowest level which they ever reached in the public esteem and in their influence upon the intellectual life of the German people. . . . In fact, university life at this time presents a lamentable aspect. Academic science was no longer in touch with reality and its controlling ideas; it was held fast in an obsolete system of instruction by organization and statutes, and toilsome compilation was the sole result of its activity. Added to this was the prevailing coarseness of the entire life."—F. Paulsen, *German universities and university study* (tr. by F. Thilly and W. W. Elwang), pp. 14-15, 32-36, 42.—"German studentdom took its revenge in a licence which, as of its nature local and temporary, was readily tolerated by authority, and of which in most of the German universities, even after it had been repressed, the traces were not altogether extinguished. . . . It was *pennalism* which brought German universities of the 17th century into a contempt and alienation from the intellectual and moral progress of the nation. . . . *Pennalism* (the derivation of the word is obscure) was the treatment administered to students during their first year by their seniors. . . . [It meant] a year of mingled debauchery and tribulation, under the

organized direction of . . . [the entering student's] seniors, and lucky he if he could pass on to the later stages of his university career without a load of debt, a ruined constitution, and perhaps a half-broken heart. . . . Of the German universities, that which had taken the lead in cherishing the new birth of humanistic learning was Erfurt, whose geographical position, . . . had forced it into the front of the religious conflict, and thus brought about a decay of its academical prosperity which seemed to be completed by the Thirty Years' War. . . . Gustavus Adolphus [during the period of his power in Germany] made an attempt to restore to Erfurt . . . its former academical greatness and promoted a number of reforms which shortly after his death (1634) were formulated in a new code. But the War made it impossible to carry out these attempted changes, nor was it till a generation later—in 1664—that a reorganization, under which Erfurt's prosperity revived could be carried into effect. . . . The ancient Ruperta Carolina of Heidelberg had, after a long period of fidelity to the Papal traditions of her foundation, in which she rivalled even her rather younger sister Cologne, continued to flourish both under the Lutheran Elector Otto Henry, . . . and under the Calvinist Frederick the Pius, the magnanimous prince, under whom . . . Heidelberg became the first German university to which we may ascribe an international character. [During the next few years the University of Heidelberg passed through many vicissitudes and suffered greatly from the violent struggles of Catholics and Protestants who sought to control it.]—A. W. Ward, *Effects of the Thirty Years' War (Institution of Great Britain Proceedings, v. 20, Mar. 8, 1912)*.—"Treves and Mainz, the two archiepiscopal universities, which were never of great importance, succumbed toward the end of the eighteenth century, with the ecclesiastical states to which they belonged. . . . Ingolstadt was removed, first to Landshut (1800), and then to Munich (1826); Wittenberg was combined with Halle (1817), and Frankfort-on-the-Oder with Breslau (1811)."—F. Paulsen, *German universities and university study* (tr. by F. Thilly and W. W. Elwang), p. 15.—Many universities that attained prominence in neighboring countries during this period show the influence of German models. In Denmark "the University of Copenhagen, authorized by Pope Martin V in 1419, actually founded by Christian I in 1478 with three professors only, of law, theology and medicine, first became important under Christian II. He founded a Carmelite House in Copenhagen which was to maintain a graduate in divinity who should lecture daily in the University 'and instituted other progressive measures.'"—W. E. Collins, *Scandinavian north (Cambridge modern history, v. 2, pp. 605-606)*.—See also GERMANY: 1817-1820; EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Denmark.

1348-1922.—Universities in Central Europe.—Baltic states and Scandinavia.—"One of the older educational institutions in Europe is the University of Prague, chartered by Charles IV in 1348. (See above: 1348-1826.) Originally Czech, it became under the Austrian domination German in language and spirit. Constant friction between the Czechs and the Germans led in 1882 to the organization of Czech faculties parallel in rank with the older institution. After the revolution of independence the ancient university was pronounced a national institution and is known at present [written in 1922] as the Charles IV University of Prague. The German division forms a detached university.

. . . The T. G. Masaryk University at Brno [Czech], organized in 1919 after the pattern of the Czech University at Prague, opened with two faculties, law and medicine. To these were added two more faculties in 1920, those of natural science and philosophy. The Komensky University at Bratislava [Slovak] was established at the end of the year 1919 with only one faculty of medicine, to which was added about a year later the faculty of law. In all the higher institutions [in Czecho-Slovakia] there were registered on December 31, 1920, 28,155 students, 25,655 (91.1 per cent) men and 2,500 (8.9 per cent) women."—T. Bach, *Education in Czechoslovakia (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 30, 1922, pp. 25-26)*.—"Poland has a number of higher institutions of learning. These are the older universities of Cracow [founded 1384], Warsaw [1816], and Lemberg (Lwow) [1661], and the newly constituted universities at Lublin [1919], Posen (Poznan) [founded 1612, reestablished 1910], and Wilno [founded 1592, reestablished, 1919]. . . . The universities are State institutions, with the exception of the Lublin University, which is a Catholic institution under the auspices of the Polish Episcopate. . . . In addition to the institutions mentioned in the foregoing, the Free Polish University, founded in 1905, under the name of the Association of Scientific Courses, is worth noting. Its aim is to offer higher education to wider circles of society and to facilitate scientific investigations to persons with proper educational preparation."—T. Bach, *Education in Poland (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 41, 1922, pp. 19-20)*.—See also EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Poland.—Switzerland had in 1922, seven universities organized on the German model—Basel (founded as an academy in 1460), Zurich (1832), Bern (1832), Geneva (1559 as an academy, 1873 as a university), Lausanne (1537, as an academy, 1890 as a university), Fribourg (1889) and Neuchâtel (1866 and 1909). Austria had three universities maintained by the state—Vienna (1364), Graz (1586) and Innsbruck. Hungary had four universities, also state-maintained institutions—the University of Budapest (about 1475), Kolozsvár (1872, for many years the chief Magyar center) and Pozsony and Debreczen (founded in 1912). In the Serb, Croat and Slovene state there are three universities—at Belgrade (1838), at Zagrab or Agram (1776, reopened 1874) and at Ljubliana (1920). Most of these universities are similar to those in Germany.—See also EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Austria; Hungary.—In Greece there are the National University of Athens (1836) and the Capodistria University of Athens; in Bulgaria the University of Sofia (1888); in Rumania the universities of Bucharest (1864), Iasi or Jassy (1860), Cluj in Transylvania (1919) and Cernauti or Czeronowitz (1920). In the newly independent Baltic states, the Riga Polytechnic was in 1919 raised to be the Latvian University; Dorpat University, founded in 1632, was reopened in 1919 by the Estonian government and the University of Kovno was opened in 1922 as the center of higher education in Lithuania. Sweden had in 1922 two universities—at Upsala (1477) and Lund (1668); Norway a single university at Christiania founded (1811); Denmark, the University of Copenhagen (see above: 1348-1826); Finland three universities, at Helsinki (1640 and 1827), at Turku (Swedish, opened 1919) and at Turku (Finish, opened 1922); Iceland, the University of Reykjavik.—See also EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Sweden; Norway.

1361-1921.—Italy after the Middle Ages.—The University of Pavia was founded in 1361 by virtue of a charter granted by the emperor Charles IV. For a time it was moved to Piacenza, but in 1412 it entered upon a brilliant period at Pavia, during which it was especially noted for civil law. The Italian universities in general replaced the study of logic by that of rhetoric and so successfully avoided much of the religious controversy which disturbed the course of other European universities during the Renaissance and Reformation periods. Few important universities were founded in Italy after medieval times, but the older universities, for the most part, existed with few noteworthy changes until the modern period of struggle for the union of Italy. "The educational system of Italy is centralized [written in 1921] under the control of the State. Professors in the Universities are state officials, who are appointed, and supervised by the government under the direction of the Ministry of Public Instruction. . . . The Universities and other institutions of higher learning have for their double purpose to train for official and professional occupations, and to maintain and develop the literary and scientific culture of the nation. . . . The requirements for the degrees, including the prescribed studies, are identical in all Universities. . . . This educational system is based on the so-called Legge Casati, a law approved by the King of Sardinia on Nov. 13, 1859, . . . modified and extended by subsequent enactments; all the provisions relating to higher education were codified in the Testa Unico delle Leggi sull' Istruzione Superiore, approved by Royal Decree on August 9, 1910. . . . The law of 1859 applied only to the Kingdom of Sardinia, which included the island of that name, Piedmont, Lombardy, Genoa, and Savoy. The Universities concerned were those of Turin, the capital of Piedmont; Genoa; Pavia, in Lombardy, joined to Piedmont earlier in the same year; and Cagliari and Sassari on the island of Sardinia. Provision was made for establishing institutions of University grade in Milan and also in Chambéry, the capital of Savoy. Within the next two years, the Kingdom of Italy was formed by the union of Central and Southern Italy, including Sicily but excluding Rome, with the regions named. Savoy, however, was annexed to France. Thus the number of Universities in the kingdom was increased by Bologna and Macerata, as well as the four 'free' Universities of Ferrara, Urbino, Camerino and Perugia, in the former States of the Church; by Parma and Modena in the former Duchies; by Pisa and Siena in Tuscany, as well as the Institute of Higher Studies established in Florence in 1860; and by Naples, Palermo, Messina, and Catania in the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In 1866, Venetia, with the University of Padua, joined Italy; and in 1870, the city of Rome with its University. . . . Thus there are seventeen Royal Universities (Regie Università) in Italy, beside the four 'free' Universities. The latter are supported not by the State, but by local or provincial bodies; and they have a certain autonomy. Their courses and degrees are accepted, however, as equivalent in legal effect to those of the Royal Universities. . . . Theology, once the chief study in many of the Universities, is since 1873, excluded from them all, and is taught in Church Schools, of which the most important are in Rome."—K. McKenzie, *Opportunities for higher education in Italy (Institute of International Education, 2nd series, Bulletin no. 2, Mar. 1, 1921)*.

1411-1917.—Scotland.—"In the three most an-

cient places of study, St. Andrew's, Glasgow, and Aberdeen, the original universities . . . [were later] superseded by colleges. . . . The University of St. Andrew's was founded by Henry Wardlaw, bishop of the diocese, in 1411. The king, James I. of Scotland, the bishop, and the heads of the Augustinian priory at St. Andrew's, requested the papal sanction; and accordingly a bull was issued in 1413, by Benedict XIII. by which it was made a university, and a general study for all the faculties. It received other benefactions from the church, which were ratified by the king in 1432. . . . The bishop of the see was always chancellor of the university. . . . The University of Glasgow was established in 1450, by a bull of Pope Nicholas V. issued at the request of James II. Authority was given for the institution of a general study for all faculties, and the university was empowered to grant degrees which should be valid throughout Christendom. The members of it were endowed with 'all the liberties, immunities, and honours enjoyed by the masters, doctors, and students of the University of Bologna.' . . . In 1453 a royal charter was granted by James II. with an exemption from taxes and all civil burthens; and certain local privileges, of a similar nature, by the bishop of the diocese. The Archbishop of Glasgow was the chancellor of the university, and by his authority all its honours were to be conferred. . . . The University of Old Aberdeen was founded in 1494, according to the models of Paris and Bologna. The example of Paris seems to have been mainly followed. . . . The college was founded in 1505, and new-modelled in 1531. In its constitution it closely resembled the colleges of St. Andrew's and Glasgow, especially St. Mary's college at St. Andrew's. The relation between the college and the university is distinctly marked in the foundation charter, in which it is recommended that the permanent and higher offices of the college should be supplied from the inferior members of it, if they be qualified; if not, from members of the University of Aberdeen; and if none of them be qualified, from members of other universities. The rector and his assessors were empowered to visit the college annually. As elsewhere, however, the university has disappeared, except the incorporated and endowed college. The college is as extensive as the university; or rather, the university is limited to the extent of the college; nor is any distinction preserved, as at Glasgow. The university and college are governed by the *senatus academicus*. Marischal college in New Aberdeen, which claims to be a separate university, was founded in 1593."—H. Malden, *On the origin of universities and academical degrees*, pp. 144, 147-148, 153, 166-167.—"From the beginning the Scotch universities have been preeminently national and in recent times increasingly State institutions. . . . There has been a constant support and supervision of the universities, first by the church and then by the state. . . . The unification of the universities [including Edinburgh (see below: 1583)] with the preservation of their individual autonomy, secured by the parliamentary act of 1889, and the impulse given to modern subjects further developed by the conferences and joint boards of the universities themselves has been stimulated by the Carnegie Trust [founded in 1901]. The Trust, with its \$500,000 a year to distribute, has become an influence second only to the Government. . . . One-half of the net income . . . [was to] be applied toward the improvement and expansion of the universities of Scotland. . . . The other half of

the income was to be devoted to assisting students of Scottish birth or extraction in the payment of university class fees. . . . The Scotch universities, intertwined with the imperial treasury, with the Scottish education department and national school system, with the Trust, and touched by a cosmopolitanism due to an international attendance in medicine and applied science, and the scattering of their alumni through all lands, may well be declared by Maurice Hewlett 'fiercely modern.' [But] paradoxically . . . they are [also] medieval in that colleges never choked the strong central government of the universities, the dominance of the professoriate was never lost, the professorial class lecture was not supplanted by the collegiate tutorial instruction, and the sacred seven subjects of the trivium and quadrivium have retained their prominence almost till to-day [written in 1917]. . . . Since the royal commission (1889) not less than 22 chairs and 146 lectureships in scientific and modern subjects have been added."—G. E. MacLean, *Studies in higher education in England and Scotland (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin, no. 16, 1917, pp. 49-50, 55)*.

ALSO IN: J. M. Bulloch, *History of the University of Aberdeen, 1495-1895*.

1425-1922.—Belgium and Holland.—"Established [in 1425] in the chief town of Brabant, which was situated in the diocese of Liège [the national university at Louvain] (*or studium generale*, as it was then described) was the product of co-operation between ducal power in the person of John IV, ecclesiastical authority, represented by the chapter of the church of Saint-Peter at Louvain, and communal authority, that is, the magistracy of the town. The duke, in conjunction with the chapter and magistracy of Louvain, solicited and secured from Pope Martin V authority to establish his foundation (1425), which at first did not contain a faculty of theology, since the pope was not prepared to deprive the University of Paris of the care of the future theologians of the Belgian provinces. . . . The University of Louvain preserved its triple character down to the time of its suppression at the end of the eighteenth century. Originally intended for the training of clerks (masters of arts), jurists, and doctors, it was authorized by Pope Eugenius IV to add a faculty of theology (1432). Alike from the ecclesiastical and from the political point of view, this institution tended to unify the Belgian provinces."—H. V. Linden, *Belgium, the making of a nation*, pp. 124-126.—After the founding of the University of Leyden in Holland (see below: 1575) came those of Franeker in 1585 and Härderwijk in 1600. These two universities continued to exist until the settlement of 1814-1815 and consequent formation of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, at which time they were suppressed, the universities of Ghent and Liège were created, and a uniform constitution was given to both Dutch and Belgian universities. These included aside from those already mentioned, Groningen, founded in 1614, and Utrecht in 1634. After fifteen years Holland and Belgium were separated. "On 4th November, 1834, the Catholic hierarchy, led by the Belgian Primate, the Archbishop of Malines, founded in that city a new Catholic University. The three existing Universities left by the Dutch at Louvain, Ghent, and Liège—were non-Catholic, and subject to the State. . . . But this step stirred up the Liberals. . . . If the Catholics established a University at Malines, the Liberals would have one for themselves,

proudly dubbed 'Free,' at Brussels. . . . [But] it was clear . . . that Belgium could not support five Universities. In 1835 the Government therefore brought in its new measure, which became law on 27th September, 1835. It suppressed the University of Louvain, which King William had founded in 1816, and reorganised those at Ghent and Liège. Shortly after the suppression of Louvain the Catholic University was removed from Malines to that city, where it has remained ever since [written in 1909], reviving the famous traditions of Louvain in the Middle Ages as a seat of learning. The two State Universities established by this law and the two non-endowed Universities founded by the private munificence of Belgian citizens of the opposite political parties still constitute the highest form of education in the country."—D. C. Boulger, *History of Belgium*, pt. 2, pp. 277-278.—"The Dutch universities are comparatively modern in point of time, and fully modern in equipment, methods and scientific results. None of them date back to the Middle Ages, but several owe their existence to the struggle for independence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. . . . There are three ordinary state universities, viz., Leiden, Utrecht, and Groningen [and] a municipal and private university . . . at Amsterdam [founded 1877]. . . . The state universities are governed by a board of curators, who propose appointments and appropriations to the government, while internal affairs are regulated by a senate, composed of the staff of professors. They have five faculties,—theology, law, science, medicine and literary, while the University of Amsterdam has besides these a department of commerce."—A. Osterheerdt, *Universities and educational institutions of the Netherlands (Open Court, Dec., 1922)*.

1526-1922.—Spain and Portugal.—The University of Santiago was founded in 1526, that of Granada in 1531 and Ovideo in 1609, and for a time there was a revival of the old scholastic studies in Spanish universities, followed by a period of Jesuit influence. After the beginning of the seventeenth century the universities declined with the political status of the country and were of little importance. Finally by an act passed in 1857 a state system of education similar to the French was established. The entire kingdom was divided into ten university districts with the rector of the university in each district as chief authority. The plan of instruction was still, in 1922, similar in all ten universities, which were located at Madrid, Barcelona, Granada, Ovideo, Salamanca, Santiago, Seville, Valencia, Valladolid and Saragossa. In Portugal, the University of Coimbra was reorganized and received new statutes in 1772, and the University of Lisbon was established in 1858. There is also a university at Oporto.

1551-1912.—Latin America.—"In less than a half century from the date of the first permanent [Spanish] settlement [in America], schools for advanced education . . . [were established] and by the end of the century there existed a chain of colleges or universities extending from Mexico and the West Indies to the southernmost colony of Argentina. . . . As regards their foundation Latin-American universities fall naturally into three groups. The first comprises the colonial establishments. . . . The date of the colonial universities may be stated approximately as follows: Mexico and Lima, 1551; Santo Domingo, 1558; Bogotá, 1572; Cordoba, 1613; Sucre, 1623; Guatemala, about 1675; Cuzco, 1692; Caracas, 1721; Santiago de Chile, 1738; Habana, 1782; Quito, 1787. . . . It is needless to look for individuality in these

stitutions. All owe their origin to the same influence, and their organization was essentially uniform. The church was the prime mover in their establishment, although influential laymen holding high political positions contributed notably to their foundation. The principal object of each university was to promote the cause of religion in the colonies by providing an educated clergy numerous enough to care for the spiritual welfare of the settlers and to further the work of evangelization among the natives. The central department of the institution was the faculty of letters and philosophy, through which all students must pass on their way to the professional schools. The latter were exceedingly limited in the colonial university. There was a department of civil and canon law, but the former was overshadowed in the ecclesiastical organization of the institution, and had to await the era of national independence before coming to its own. The university usually contained a professorship of medicine, but prior to the nineteenth century it was the medicine of the medieval school men, academic and empirical. The one professional school that flourished was the faculty of theology. It was for it that the university was created, and to it led all academic avenues. Clerical in its origin and purpose, the colonial university was also clerical in its government. . . . The professors were almost exclusively members of the priesthood, and as such owed implicit obedience to the bishop, and, in addition, the election of officers and new professors required the confirmation of the prelate. . . . A second group of institutions of higher education sprang into existence in the era of national independence. After several abortive attempts extending over a period of 20 years, the University of Buenos Aires was definitely organized in 1821 by the consolidation of existing academies of law and medicine, and the erection of other faculties. In Peru the University of Trujillo was chartered in 1824, although not opened until 1831, and the University of Arequipa was founded in 1835. [See also PERU; 1901.] An institution was established at Medellin, in Colombia, in 1822. The famous Restrepo had conducted classes in philosophy there as early as 1814. . . . In Brazil the university form of organization did not find favor. Professional schools were established, each independently of the other. Schools of medicine were founded at Rio de Janeiro and Bahia in 1808, and law schools at Sao Paulo and Recife (formerly Pernambuco) in 1827. The failure to establish professional or other schools of higher learning in Brazil during the colonial epoch is perhaps due to closer and easier communication with the mother country than existed between Spain and her continental American possessions. . . . Institutions of higher education . . . founded in recent times in Latin America owe their existence to a variety of circumstances and motives. The University of Montevideo, beginning with a law school in 1849, marks the final crystallization of Uruguayan nationality. . . . A movement looking to the establishment of a university in Uruguay was started as early as 1830, and the institution was almost a fact in 1836, when internal dissensions caused the postponement of the project. The university contained no other faculty than that of law until 1876. In this year a school of medicine was organized, and in the following decade a school of engineering. . . . Educational progress has followed material advance, and groups of professional schools have grown up in Bahia, Bello Horizonte, Sao Paulo, Recife, and Porto Alegre. . . .

The foundation of such universities as that of Santa Fé, in Argentina, in 1890; of Guayaquil and Cuenca, in Ecuador; and of Los Andes, at Mérida, in Venezuela [was] . . . due to local pride and ambition, coupled with difficulties of communication with older university centers. This latter consideration has led to the establishment of many independent faculties in Bolivia, where there are schools of law at La Paz, Cochabamba, and Potosí, and a medical faculty at La Paz, in addition to faculties of law, medicine, and theology at Sucre, the old capital. The latter in colonial times were combined, forming the old historic Universidad Mayor de Francisco Xavier, but are now independent schools. Panama has not as yet [written in 1912] established any school of university grade. . . . [The Instituto Nacional, dedicated in 1911, was not until later classed as a university. However] all the Republics of Central America possess colleges of law (in Nicaragua there are no less than three) and all except Costa Rica maintain medical schools. These institutions are of comparatively recent foundation except those of Guatemala, the old official metropolis of Central America under the colonial régime. They owe their origin to the dissolution of the Central American Confederation about the middle of the nineteenth century and the subsequent development of local nationalities. . . . There is an unmistakable tendency in Latin America to increase the number of higher educational institutions, although conditions economic and otherwise do not always warrant the new foundations. New centers of population are zealous to complete their attractiveness by adding a university to their civic advantages. Regional jealousies and local politics contribute also to strengthen the movement."—E. E. Brandon, *Latin-American universities (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 30, 1912, pp. 11-13, 15-16)*.

1575.—Holland.—Leyden University.—To commemorate the deliverance of Leyden from the Spanish siege in 1574 (see NETHERLANDS: 1573-1574), "and as a reward for the heroism of the citizens, the Prince of Orange, with the consent of the Estates of the province, founded the University of Leyden. Still, the figment of allegiance remained; the people were only fighting for their constitutional rights, and so were doing their duty to the sovereign. Hence the charter of the university ran in the name of Philip, who was credited with its foundation, as a reward to his subjects for their rebellion against his evil counsellors and servants, 'especially in consideration of the differences of religion, and the great burdens and hardships borne by the citizens of our city of Leyden during the war with such faithfulness.' Motley calls this 'ponderous irony,' but the Hollanders were able lawyers and intended to build on a legal basis. This event marks an epoch in the intellectual history of Holland and of the world. . . . The new university was opened in 1575, and from the outset took the highest rank. Speaking, a few years ago, of its famous senate chamber, Niebuhr called it 'the most memorable room of Europe in the history of learning.' The first curator was John Van der Does, who had been military commandant of the city during the siege. He was of a distinguished family, but was still more distinguished for his learning, his poetical genius, and his valor. Endowed with ample funds, the university largely owed its marked pre-eminence to the intelligent foresight and wise munificence of its curators. They sought out and obtained the most distinguished scholars of all nations, and

to this end spared neither pains nor expense. Diplomatic negotiation and even princely mediation were often called in for the acquisition of a professor. Hence it was said that it surpassed all the universities of Europe in the number of its scholars of renown. These scholars were treated with princely honors. . . . But it was not alone in scholarship and in scientific research that the University of Leyden gave an impetus to modern thought. Theological disputes were developed there at times, little tempests which threatened destruction to the institution, but they were of short duration. The right of conscience was always respected, and in the main the right of full and public discussion. . . . When it was settled that dissenters could not be educated in the English universities, they flocked to Leyden in great numbers, making that city, next to Edinburgh, their chief resort. Eleven years after the opening of the University of Leyden, the Estates of democratic Friesland, amid the din of war, founded the University of Franeker, an institution which was to become famous as the home of Arminius. . . . Both of these universities were perpetually endowed with the proceeds of the ecclesiastical property which had been confiscated during the progress of the war."—D. Campbell, *Puritan in Holland, England, and America, ch. 2, 20, 3*.

1583.—Scotland.—Edinburgh University.—"The youngest of the universities [of Scotland], Edinburgh, placed at the royal capital, in contrast to the oldest, St. Andrews, at the ecclesiastical capital, was established as the 'Town's College' in 1583 by the town council of Edinburgh, under powers granted by King James VI. Gradually in acts of the general assembly, of the town council, and of Parliament, 'The College of James VI,' which from the beginning possessed the privilege of conferring degrees, came to be styled the 'University of Edinburgh.' Remaining under the patronage and control of the town council down to 1858, it was not only intensely national but also the forerunner of the great municipal universities in England."—G. E. MacLean, *Studies in higher education in England and Scotland (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 16, 1917, p. 47)*.

ALSO IN: A. Grant, *Story of the University of Edinburgh during its first three hundred years*.

1591-1917.—Ireland.—"In March, 1591-92, Queen Elizabeth granted a charter or letters patent incorporating a college—"the Mother of an University" (unum Collegium Mater Universitatis)—under the style and title of 'The College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity, near Dublin, founded by Queen Elizabeth.' Trinity College is an anomaly in English history of a college that has exercised all the functions of a university. It is plain that the charter, in accordance with the example of Cambridge and Oxford, anticipated that other colleges would be founded, and these incorporated with Trinity College would make her the 'mother of an university.' . . . Trinity college also is a variant from Oxford and Cambridge in that it did not, like them, grow from a gathering of scholars, about masters but was deliberately planted by church and state; and has suffered from the interference of each. The purpose of the founders was not simply to spread learning but to strengthen the Established Irish (Protestant Episcopal) Church to Anglicize the Irish nation. . . . [For two centuries Roman Catholics were barred from the university, but] in 1794 a royal letter in accordance with the Roman Catholic relief act of the preceding year admitted Roman Catholics and dissenters to all privileges


of study and of graduation and to sizarships, but scholars and fellows remained under the old restrictions. . . . Dublin has been a leader in many of the features now characteristic of the new or modern universities. At an early date it enforced matriculation examination and conducted genuine examinations under its own teachers and not by external examiners. The curriculum was widened at a much earlier date than in its sister universities. It was the first university in the Kingdom to establish chairs of modern languages. It was the first in the world probably to give instruction in Irish, and it has been reintroduced into its curriculum. . . . In 1841 the university established the first school of engineering in Ireland. In 1873 the university abolished all religious tests for all offices except for teachers in divinity. . . . Reforms in the constitution of the university, moving in the direction of representative government, began in 1857. . . . A full measure of reform was made possible by letters patent of the present King in 1911. . . . The alumni have been strong enough to defeat every attempt to make Trinity a constituent college in a larger university of Dublin or of Ireland. . . . [In 1854 a short-lived Catholic university was put into operation under a brief from the pope.] The National University of Ireland is the latest organization outside South Africa of a national and federal university [written in 1917]. Retarded by the University of Dublin (Trinity College), indirectly accelerated by the Catholic University, complicated by political changes, it has been not less than 70 years in the making. The genealogy of the university may be traced from the system of national education which resulted in the creation in 1831 of the Board of Commissioners of National Education. From this scheme sprang (1845-1849) the Queen's College of Belfast, Cork, and Galway, which began in 1850 the Queen's University, which began in 1882 the Royal University of Ireland, which began in 1909 the National University of Ireland and the Queen's University of Belfast. . . . In 1850 Queen's University was incorporated to complement the three Queen's colleges. The function of the university was to examine for degrees students who had qualified by attending the colleges. . . . The continued agitations and religious difficulties surrounding Queen's University resulted in its being succeeded by the Royal University of Ireland, chartered in 1880. It was empowered to confer degrees in all faculties except theology upon the passing of its examinations. No residence in any college was required nor attendance upon any lectures except in the case of medical students. . . . The reaction against a university as a mere examining body with non-residential students, which resulted in the reconstruction of the University of London in 1900, swept into Ireland. It combined with other factors and resulted in the setting up of a royal commission (1901-3). . . . Under the Irish universities act of 1908, King Edward VII chartered the National University of Ireland, having its seat in Dublin, and the Queen's University of Belfast. He dissolved the Royal University of Ireland on October 31, 1909, and founded a new college known as the University College, Dublin, into which were received the University College (Catholic), St. Stephen's Green, and the Cecelia Street Medical School. From the same date Queen's College, Cork, and Queen's College, Galway, became University College, Cork, and University College, Galway, and they were made with the new University College, Dublin, constituent colleges of the National University. . . . The transition from the Royal Uni-

versity to the National University of Ireland was gradual. . . . Under the Irish Universities Act of 1908, the Queen's University of Belfast was established simultaneously with the National University of Ireland, but by a separate commission. It is a 'single college' university like the Scotch and new English universities, with the general plan and terminology for its organization taken from the University of London. Its predecessor was the strongest of the three Queen's colleges whose continuity it preserved even in its title."—G. E. MacLean, *Studies in higher education in Ireland and Wales* (United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 15, 1917, pp. 11-15, 24-25, 28, 31).—See also EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Ireland.

1619-1819.—United States.—Virginia.—College of William and Mary.—"In 1610—one year before the Pilgrim Fathers came to the land named New England by Captain John Smith—Sir Edwin Sandys, president of the Virginia Company in old England, moved the grant of ten thousand acres of land for the establishment of a university at Henrico. The proposed grant, which was duly made, included one thousand acres for an Indian college; the remainder was to be 'the foundation of a seminary of learning for the English.' The very same year the bishops of England, at the suggestion of the King, raised the sum of fifteen hundred pounds for the encouragement of Indian Education. . . . Tenants were sent over to occupy the university lands, and Mr. George Thorpe, a gentleman of His Majesty's Privy Chamber, came over to be the superintendent of the university itself. This first beginning of philanthropy toward the Indians and of educational foundations for the Indians in America was suspended by reason of the Indian massacre, in the spring of 1622, when Mr. Thorpe and three hundred and forty settlers, including tenants of the university, were cut off by an insurrection of savages. . . . But the idea of a university for Virginia was not lost. . . . In 1660, the colonial Assembly of Virginia took into their own hands the project of founding educational institutions within their borders. . . . The Virginians voted 'that for the advance of learning, education of youth, supply of the ministry, and promotion of piety, there be land taken upon purchase for a college and free schoole, and that there be, with as much speede as may be convenient, housing erected thereon for entertainment of students and schollers.' . . . Some writers would have us believe that the college was actually planted as early as 1661, but this is highly improbable. Early educational enactments in Virginia were like many of those early towns—on paper only. . . . In 1691 the colonial Assembly sent the Rev. James Blair, the commissary or representative of the Bishop of London, back to England to secure a charter for the proposed college. Virginia's agent went straight to Queen Mary and explained the educational ambition of her colony in America. The Queen favored the idea of a college, and William wisely concurred. The royal pair agreed to allow two thousand pounds out of the quitrents of Virginia toward building the college. . . . The English Government concluded to give not only £2,000 in money, but also 20,000 acres of land, with a tax of one penny on every pound of tobacco exported from Maryland and Virginia, together with all fees and profits arising from the office of surveyor-general, which were to be controlled by the president and faculty of the college. . . . Even after the Revolution, one-sixth of the fees to all public surveyors continued to be paid

into the college treasury down to the year 1819, when this custom was abolished."—H. B. Adams, *College of William and Mary (United States Circular of Information, Bureau of Education, 1887, no. 1)*.—"As Harvard College represented the English traditions, William and Mary represented the Scotch. The first president, James Blair, was deeply influenced in the making of the course of study by the University of Edinburgh. . . . The charter and method of government of William and Mary were unique. It embodied the English tradition more fully and definitely than any other college. It represented government by the president and faculty; the president and faculty were constituted the Corporation. . . . It is not difficult . . . to trace a certain origin of the elective system back to the year 1779 and to the college of William and Mary. . . . In this year, a certain reorganization of William and Mary was accomplished. Jefferson . . . at the time the Governor of Virginia and a visitor of the College . . . abolished the grammar school. He also abolished the chairs of divinity and of oriental languages. He established

thousand in number, and scattered along the shores of Massachusetts Bay in sixteen hamlets, they were, nevertheless, able to engage in such an enterprise before adequate provision had been made for food, raiment, shelter, a civil government, or divine worship; at a time when soil and climate had disappointed them, and their affairs were in a most critical condition; for, not only were they called to face famine, disease, and death, but the mother country and the surrounding savage tribes were threatening them with war. . . . It was near the close of 1636, a little more than six years after the landing of the Puritans, when this first step was taken by the General Court of the Massachusetts colony. At this assembly, presided over by Sir Henry Vane, governor of the colony, the General Court agreed to give £400 (a munificent sum for the time) towards the founding of a school or college, but left the question of its location and building to be determined by the Court that was to sit in September of the following year. This, it is said, was the first assembly in which the people by their representatives ever gave their



HARVARD COLLEGE IN 1795

At the right, Massachusetts Hall, then seventy-five years old; at the left, Hollis Hall

a chair of law and politics, a chair of anatomy and medicine, a chair of modern languages. To the duties of the professor of moral philosophy he added a requirement of instruction touching the law of nature and of nations and of the fine arts, and to the duties of the professor of mathematics and of natural philosophy he added the requirement of the duty of instruction in natural history. The faculty also voted that a student on certain payment (one thousand pounds of tobacco) might be entitled to attend the instruction of any two of three professors."—C. F. Thwing, *History of higher education in America*, pp. 59, 311.—In 1906 the College of William and Mary became a state institution. Government under a board appointed by the governor of the state was inaugurated at that time.

1622.—Founding of College of the Propaganda. See PAPAcy: 1622.

1636.—United States.—Harvard College.—"The first settlers in New England, recognizing the importance of a higher education than could be given in the common schools, began at once the founding of a university. The avowed object of this university was the training of young men for the ministry. Nothing could show clearer the spirit of these early colonists. Though less than four

own money to found a place of education.' At the next Court it was decided to locate the college at 'Newtown, or 'the New Towne,' and twelve of the principal magistrates and ministers were chosen to carry out his design. A few months later, they changed the name of the town to Cambridge, not only to tell their posterity whence they came, but also, as Quincy aptly says, to indicate 'the high destiny to which they intended the institution should aspire.' Another year, however, passed before the College was organized. The impulse given to it then was due to aid which came from so unexpected a quarter that it must have seemed to the devout men of New England as a clear indication of the divine favor. The Rev. John Harvard, a Non-conformist minister, was graduated, in 1635, from the Puritan college of Emmanuel, at Cambridge, England, and came, two years later, to America and settled in Charlestown, where he immediately took a prominent part in town affairs. . . . When his health failed, he determined to bequeath one-half of his estate, probably about £800, besides his excellent library of three hundred and twenty volumes, towards the endowment of the college [which was then engrossing the thoughts of a number of his friends]. This bequest rendered possible the immediate organiza-

tion of the college, which went into operation 'on the footing of the ancient institutions of Europe,' and, out of gratitude to Harvard, the General Court voted that the new institution should bear his name."—G. G. Bush, *Harvard*, pp. 12-15.—"Six years, to the very day, after the passing of the vote founding the college, in the year of 1642, was passed an act by the General Court at Boston establishing the Overseers of Harvard College. . . . After eight years, therefore, a charter was granted by the General Court which made the college a Corporation. . . . The Corporation has the power of initiative; its field of action covers the entire field of collegiate administration, intellectual and material; but its acts are subject to revision by the Board of Overseers. Thus there was introduced into the organization of the American college the double system of control. . . . [After 1865 the board of overseers was chosen by alumni, who therefore exercise large control over the management of the university.] For almost two hundred years after the foundation of Harvard College its course of study remained, in essential elements, unchanged. . . . But beginning with the first decades of the nineteenth century the course received significant enlargement. From that time to the present the development . . . [has been] constant. [Under the leadership of President C. E. Eliot, who held office from 1869 to 1909, Harvard made many educational experiments and exerted a wide influence on the development of the American university.]"—C. F. Thwing, *History of higher education in America*, pp. 12, 300.—See also LIBRARIES: Modern: United States: University libraries.

ALSO IN: J. Quincy, *History of Harvard University*.—S. A. Eliot, *Sketch of the history of Harvard College*.

1683-1791.—United States.—University of Pennsylvania.—"The first movement to establish an educational institution of a high grade [in Pennsylvania] was in the action of the Executive Council which proposed, November 17, 1683, 'That Care be Taken about the Learning and Instruction of Youth, to wit: A School of Arts and Sciences.' It was not until 1689, however, that the 'Public Grammar School' was set up in Philadelphia. This institution, founded upon the English idea of a 'free school,' was formally chartered in 1697 as the 'William Penn Charter School.' . . . [A half-century later] feeling the importance for some provision to supplement the education then given in the established schools, Benjamin Franklin as early as 1743 drew up a proposal for establishing an academy. . . . The Academy comprised three schools, the Latin, the English, and the mathematical, over each of which was placed a master, one of whom the rector of the institution. . . . The success of the Academy was so gratifying to all interested in it that it was determined to apply for a charter. This was granted to the trustees by Thomas and Richard Penn, the proprietors, on July 13, 1753. Desirous at the same time of enlarging the course of instruction, the trustees elected Mr. William Smith teacher of logic, rhetoric, natural and moral philosophy."—J. L. Stewart, *Historical sketch of the University of Pennsylvania (United States Bureau of Education, Circular of Information, 1892, no. 2: Benjamin Franklin and the university, ch. 4)*.—In 1755 the charter was changed to read "Trustees of the College, Academy and Charitable School" and the following year a liberal curriculum was organized. In 1779 on the grounds that a trustees' declaration of 1764 was "narrowing the foundation" the state legislature confiscated the property of the college

and bestowed it upon a new organization, the "Trustees of the University of the State of Pennsylvania." In 1789 the property was restored to the old organization and in 1791 the two were amalgamated under the present name. The site of the university was moved in 1802 and again in 1872.

ALSO IN: T. H. Montgomery, *History of the University of Pennsylvania from its foundation to A. D. 1770*.—J. B. McMaster, *University of Pennsylvania*.—E. P. Cheyney, *University of Pennsylvania*.

1694-1906.—Later German universities.—"Two important new foundations introduced the new period [the eighteenth century]: Halle (1694) and Göttingen (1737), to which Erlangen (1743), the university of the Franconian principalities, must be added. . . . All three of these institutions are still [1906] flourishing. The first two opened the doors of the German university to modern philosophy and science, as well as to modern enlightenment and culture, and made these things a part of the life of the German people. Halle, the university of the rising Brandenburg-Prussian state, received an impress especially from three men: the jurist Christian Thomasius,—who introduced the study of jurisprudence,—the theologian A. H. Francke, and the philosopher Christian Wolff. Thomasius, a pupil of Samuel Pufendorf, the first teacher of the theory of natural rights at a German university (the first chair for the new treatment of law was established at Heidelberg in 1662), was a man of the new culture represented at the French court. He was the editor of the first monthly magazine in the German language (1688), as well as the first to use that language in the lecture room. A despiser of the scholastic philosophy and humanistic eloquence, theological orthodoxy and the old pedantic jurisprudence, he came into violent conflict with his own university of Leipzig, in which he taught as a *private docent*. He was compelled to yield and went to Halle, where he was favorably received. The circle of students which he gathered about him became the nucleus of the university founded there in 1694. The theological faculty received its impress from Francke, the chief representative of pietism, who was also excluded from orthodox Leipzig; his efforts were directed towards the devout study of the Bible and practical Christianity. . . . During the second half of the century Joh. Sal. Semler taught in the theological faculty. He was the founder of the critical-historical treatment of the sacred Scriptures. Of greatest significance, finally, was the philosopher Christian Wolff, who taught in the philosophical faculty at Halle from 1707-1723 and again from 1740-1754, and in the interim at Marburg. His banishment by Frederick William I, and his triumphant restoration by Frederick the Great mark the turn of the times. Wolff's success really indicates the end of the scholastic philosophy; its place was taken by modern philosophy, which, in the form of the Wolffian system, assumed the control of the German universities. . . . Wolff's *Vernünfftige Gedanken*, the general title of his German works, positively denies the dependence of philosophy upon theology. Basing himself upon the modern sciences of mathematics and physics, he declares that philosophy should seek the truth free from all assumptions, regardless of what may happen to the theologians. . . . During the eighteenth century the Wolffian philosophy prevailed at all the Protestant universities. . . . Halle has the honor of being the first modern university: it was the first one founded

on the principle of *libertas philosophandi*, of free research and instruction. . . . During the second half of the eighteenth century the university of Halle was confronted by a rival in Göttingen that ultimately surpassed it. At the close of the century Göttingen was looked upon as the fashionable university; here the German counts and barons of the Holy Roman Empire studied politics and law under Schlözer and Pütter. Here Mosheim taught church history and the elegancies of pulpit diction, and J. D. Michaelis oriental languages. Here labored Albrecht von Haller and his successor Blumenbach, in their day the chief representatives of the science of man, or physical anthropology; as well as the celebrated astronomer Tobias Mayer, the brilliant physicist Lichtenberg, and the able mathematician Kästner. Finally, the newly awakened study of antiquity found its first nursery at this university; the philologists, J. M. Gesner and J. G. Heyne, to whom is due the reintroduction of Greek into the university, found a new point of view for the treatment of the classical authors."—F. Paulsen, *German universities and university study* (tr. by F. Thilly and W. W. Elwang), pp. 44-47.—"Among all the losses which befell Prussia by the Peace of Tilsit [1807] none was felt more bitterly than the loss of the University of Halle, where Wolf himself had made his fame. Immediately after the blow fell, two of the Professors of Halle made their way to Memel and laid before the King a proposal to establish a High School at Berlin. This was on August 22nd, 1807. . . . On September 4th came an Order of Cabinet, in which it was declared to be one of the most important objects to compensate the loss of Halle. It was added that neither of the two Universities which remained to Prussia, those of Königsberg and Frankfurt-on-the-Oder, could be made to supply the place of Halle, Königsberg being too remote from the seat of Government and Frankfurt not sufficiently provided with means. At Berlin a University could best, and at least expense, be established. Accordingly all funds which had hitherto gone to Halle were to go for the future to Berlin, and assurances were to be given to the expelled Professors which might prevent their talents being lost to the country. . . . Humboldt sent in his Report on May 12, 1809, and on August 16th followed the Order of Cabinet assigning to the new University, along with the Academies of Science and Art, an annual donation of 150,000 thalers, and the Palace of Prince Henry as its residence. During the rest of his term of office Humboldt was occupied in negotiations with eminent men of science all over Germany, whose services he hoped to procure. He was certainly not unsuccessful. He secured Fichte for Philosophy; Schleiermacher, De Wette, and Marheineke for Theology; Savigny and Schmalz for Jurisprudence; Friedländer, Kohlrausch, Hufeland, and Reil for Medicine; Wolf, Buttman, Böckh, Heindorf, and Spalding for the Study of Antiquity; Niebuhr and Rühs for History; Tralles for Mathematics (Gauss refused the invitation). The University was opened at Michaelmas of 1810, and as the first result of it the first volume of Niebuhr's Roman History, opening so vast a field of historical speculation, was published in 1811."—J. R. Seeley, *Life and times of Stein*, v. 2, pt. 6, ch. 3.—In this same period "a large number of German universities, some of which had been languishing for a long time, finally went under about the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries during the storms of the French revolution and the subsequent reconstruction of the Ger-

man States. Among them are some celebrated names: Erfurt, Wittenberg, and Helmstädt; and, among the Catholic institutions, Köln, Mainz, and Dillingen. Thus the political fate of states can be traced by the changes suffered by the universities. . . . Almost immediately after [the founding of the University of Berlin] . . . occurred the removal of the old *Viadrina* from Frankfort-on-the-Oder to Breslau, where it was combined with the local institution and transformed into a great new university (1811). After the treaty of peace a new university on a large scale was established for the western provinces at Bonn (1818). The kingdom of Bavaria also provided itself with a great central university at Munich (1826), in which the old territorial university of Ingolstadt, which had been removed to Landshut in 1800, continued to exist. A long line of prominent scholars from Middle and North Germany was called to Munich during the reigns of the first three Bavarian kings and did much to assist in planting the sciences in a field which had been, up to this time, controlled by the ecclesiastical orders. . . . The close of the period was marked by the revival of the old university of Strassburg by the new German Empire (1872). . . . [During this period German universities underwent a rapid development and exerted a far-reaching influence on education throughout the world]. Jena, Weimar's neighbor, was the first center of the new philosophy [of German idealism]; here Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel began their important labors as academic teachers. Then the new university of Berlin took the lead, with Fichte among its intellectual founders and its first rector, and, subsequently, with Hegel, as its foremost teacher for more than a decade. . . . At Giessen, Liebig founded, with modest equipment, his chemical laboratory, the mother-laboratory of all those great laboratories which . . . secured for Germany the leadership in the domain of chemical research and technology. Johann Müller, who taught at Berlin, was the founder of the new school of physiology. . . . The triumph of the principle of the purely scientific explanation of the phenomena of life, as opposed to the natural-philosophical speculative explanation, was the work of Müller and his school; it placed medicine upon a scientific basis. . . . The general trend of development may be summed up in a few words: from the practical-dogmatic to the theoretic-academic. First of all, the conception of the university teacher's function which had begun to obtain during the eighteenth century was consistently carried out: not the mere transmission of a definite body of accepted truths, but rather the independent acquisition and augmentation of knowledge is now the goal. Even the students are to be trained as independent thinkers, and, whenever possible, as coöperating scholars. . . . The course of study at a German university is [1906] based upon the principle of learning (*Lernfreiheit*), which is the correlate of freedom of teaching (*Lehrfreiheit*). Aside from a fixed period of study, almost everything is left to individual choice; there is no prescribed course of study, with intermediate examinations . . . each student selects the branches which he wishes to study in each semester, and attendance upon the lectures depends solely upon his own volition; the freedom of learning is so extensive that it actually includes the freedom not to learn or do anything."—F. Paulsen, *German universities and university study* (tr. by F. Thilly and W. W. Elwang), pp. 50-51, 57, 63.—See also EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Germany.

1701-1717.—United States.—Yale College.—“For sixty years the only school for higher education in New England had been Harvard College, at Cambridge. The people, and especially the clergy, of Connecticut naturally desired the benefit of a similar establishment nearer home. . . . Ten ministers, nine of them being graduates of Harvard College, met at Branford [1701] and made a contribution from their libraries of about forty volumes in folio ‘for the founding of a college.’ Other donations presently came in. An Act of Incorporation was granted by the General Court. It created a body of trustees, not to be more than eleven in number nor fewer than seven, all to be clergymen and at least forty years of age. The Court endowed the College with an annual grant, subject to be discontinued at pleasure, of one hundred and twenty pounds in ‘country pay,’—equivalent to sixty pounds sterling. . . . The first president was Abraham Pierson, minister of Killingworth [and

ALSO IN: F. B. Dexter, *Sketch of the history of Yale University*.—L. S. Welch and W. Camp, *Yale, her campus, class room and athletics*.

1746-1787.—United States.—King’s College, now Columbia University.—“The establishment of a college in the city of New York was many years in agitation before the design was carried into effect. At length, under an act of Assembly passed in December, 1746, and other similar acts which followed, moneys were raised by public lottery ‘for the encouragement of learning and towards the founding a college’ within the colony. These moneys were, in November, 1751, vested in trustees. . . . The trustees, in November, 1753, invited Dr. Samuel Johnson, of Connecticut, to be president of the intended college. Dr. Johnson consequently removed to New York in the month of April following, and in July, 1754, commenced the instruction of a class of students in a room of the school-house belonging to Trinity Church;



OLD KING'S COLLEGE, 1760

the college was situated first at Killingworth, then at Milford and Saybrook and finally at New Haven, where] with money obtained by private gifts, and two hundred and fifty pounds accruing from a sale of land given by the General Assembly, a building was begun [1717], which finally cost a thousand pounds sterling. . . . The chief patronage came from Elihu Yale, a native of New Haven, but long resident in the East Indies, where he had been Governor of Fort St. George. He was . . . [then] a citizen of London, and Governor of the East India Company.”—J. G. Palfrey, *History of New England*, v. 4, bk. 4, ch. 11, bk. 5, ch. 4.—The collegiate school was named Yale College in 1718. The school of medicine was chartered in 1810, instruction was begun in the divinity school in 1822, the law school was affiliated with Yale College in 1824 and graduate courses in philosophy and arts were organized in 1846. The organization of the Yale Scientific School in 1854 and of the Sheffield Scientific School in 1869 marked the growth of scientific influence. In 1867 the name of Yale University was authorized. Yale-in-China, an affiliated Chinese college, was started in 1906.

but he would not absolutely accept the presidency until after the passing of the charter. This took place on the 31st of October in the same year, 1754; from which period the existence of the college is probably to be dated. The governors of the college, named in the charter, are the Archbishop of Canterbury and the first Lord Commissioner for Trade and Plantations, both empowered to act by proxies; the Lieutenant-governor of the province, and several other public officers; together with the rector of Trinity Church, the senior minister of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church, the ministers of the German Lutheran Church, of the French Church, of the Presbyterian Congregation, and the President of the college, all ex officio, and twenty-four of the principal gentlemen of the city. The college was to be known by the name of King’s College. Previously to the passing of the charter, a parcel of ground to the westward of Broadway, bounded by Barclay, Church, and Murray streets and the Hudson River, had been destined by the vestry of Trinity Church as a site for the college edifice; and, accordingly, after the charter was granted, a grant of the land

was made on the 13th of May, 1755. . . . The part of the land thus granted by Trinity Church, not occupied for college purposes, was leased, and became a very valuable endowment to the college. . . . In May, 1760, the college buildings began to be occupied. In 1763 a grammar school was established. . . . On the breaking out of the Revolutionary War the business of the college was almost entirely broken up, and it was not until after the return of peace that its affairs were again regularly attended to. In May, 1784, the college, upon its own application, was erected into a university; its corporate title was changed from King's College to Columbia College, and it was placed under the control of a board termed Regents of the University . . . [with the intention of creating a state university of which it should be the basis. The plan was not successful.] The college continued under that government until April, 1787, when the Legislature of the State restored it to its original position under the . . . name of Columbia College."—*Columbia College Handbook*, pp. 5-9.—The college was extensively reorganized in 1857 and its scope considerably broadened. In this year it was moved to a site on Madison Avenue between 49th and 50th Streets, where it remained until 1897 when the site on Morningside Heights was chosen. The administration of the college had been centralized from 1890 to 1895 and in 1896 the title of Columbia University was adopted. In 1922 the university included Columbia College, the College of Physicians and Surgeons, founded 1767, the school of law, 1858, the schools of applied science including a school of mines and schools of chemistry and engineering, 1896, the school of architecture, 1881, the graduate schools of political science, 1880, philosophy, 1890, and pure science, 1892, and the school of journalism, 1912. The College of Pharmacy, Teachers College and Barnard are very closely affiliated, and the General Theological Seminary and the Union Theological Seminary have also affiliations with the university.—See also NEW YORK CITY: 1753; LIBRARIES: Modern: United States: University Libraries; EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Training teachers; 20th century: General Education: United States: Experimental schools.

ALSO IN: *History of Columbia University by members of the faculty.*

1746-1896.—United States.—Princeton College.—In 1739 a movement . . . [had been] set on foot by the Synod of Philadelphia to establish a college in the Middle Colonies. . . . In 1746 the project . . . was again taken up [by Jonathan Dickinson, John Pierson, Ebenezer Pemberton, Aaron Burr and others who planned to found an institution 'in which ample provision should be made for the intellectual and religious culture of youth desirous to obtain a liberal education and more especially for the thorough training of such as were candidates for the holy ministry']. . . . A charter was granted to the applicants on Oct. 22, 1746. . . . The original charter not being entirely satisfactory, Governor Belcher granted a second, which passed the seal of the Province on Sept. 14, 1748. . . . After the Revolution the Charter of 1748 was confirmed and renewed by the Legislature of the State of New Jersey. . . . The first Commencement was held at Newark Nov. 9, 1748. . . . The College was completed and the students removed from Newark to Princeton in the fall of 1756."—*History of the university (Catalogue of Princeton University, 1922-1923, pp. 23-26)*.—In October, 1896, on the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the first charter, the

title was changed to Princeton University. In 1905, Woodrow Wilson, who had become president in 1902, introduced the preceptorial system, which was modeled somewhat on the college system of Oxford and Cambridge and was unique in American higher education.

1748-1813.—United States.—University of the State of New York.—"Soon after the close of the revolutionary war, new state systems of education began to be established. . . . The earliest and most remarkable of these was the University of the State of New York [not an ordinary university but simply a state system of education], erected in 1748 and remodeled in 1787. This institution is a notable example of the strong and increasing influence which French thought then exercised in American affairs. . . . The New York university embraced the whole provision for secondary and higher education within the state, with the exception of schools of a purely private character. [It had no teaching facilities and offered no courses.] . . . The university was placed under the control of a board of regents, consisting of the governor and the lieutenant-governor of the state, *ex officio*, together with nineteen others, elected by the state legislature. . . . In 1813 the legislature of the state established a permanent fund known as the literature fund, the income of which was to be applied wholly to the support of secondary schools. The distribution of this fund was made subject to the control of the regents of the university."—E. D. Perry, *American university* (N. M. Butler, ed., *Education in the United States*, pp. 150-151).

1754-1769.—United States.—Dartmouth College, and the "Dartmouth College case."—"Dartmouth College . . . was originally a charity school for the instruction of Indians in the Christian religion, founded by the Rev. Eleazer Wheelock, D.D., about the year 1754, at Lebanon, in Connecticut. Its success led Dr. Wheelock to solicit private subscriptions in England, for the purpose of enlarging it, and of extending its benefits to English colonists. Funds having been obtained for this purpose from various contributors, among whom the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary for the Colonies, was a large donor, Dr. Wheelock constituted that nobleman and other persons trustees, with authority to fix the site of the College. The place selected was on the Connecticut River, at what is now the town of Hanover, in New Hampshire, where large donations of land were made by the neighboring proprietors. A charter for the college was obtained from the crown, in 1769, creating it a perpetual corporation. The charter recognized Dr. Wheelock as founder, appointed him to be the president, and empowered him to name his successor, subject to the approval of the trustees; to whom was also imparted the power of filling vacancies in their own body, and of making laws and ordinances for the government of the college, not repugnant to the laws of Great Britain or of the province, and not excluding any person on account of his religious belief. Under this charter, Dartmouth College had always existed, unquestioned and undisturbed in its rights as a corporation, down to the Revolution and subsequently until the year 1815. Whether from political or personal motives springing up outside of the board of trustees of that period, or from some collisions arising within the body itself, it appears that . . . legislative interference with the chartered rights of this college was threatened. . . . In the following year (1816), the difficulties, which had become mixed with political interests, culminated in a direct interference by the Legis-

ture. In that year an act was passed, changing the corporate name from 'The Trustees of Dartmouth College' to 'The Trustees of Dartmouth University,' enlarging the number of trustees, vesting the appointment of some of them in the political bodies of the State, and otherwise modifying the ancient rights of the corporation as they existed under its charter derived from the crown of England. A majority of the existing trustees refused to accept or to be bound by this act, and brought an action of trover in the Supreme Court of the State, in the name of the old corporation, against a gentleman, Mr. W. H. Woodward, who was in possession of the college seal and other effects, and who claimed to hold them as one of the officers of the newly-created 'university.' The argument in this case was made in the State court, for the college, by Mr. Mason and Mr. Jeremiah Smith, assisted by Mr. Webster. The decision was against the claim of the college. It was then determined to remove the cause, by writ of error, to the Supreme Court of the United States, under the provisions of the Federal Constitution and laws creating in that tribunal an appellate jurisdiction in cases which, although originating in a State court, involved the construction and operation of the Federal Constitution. This was supposed to be such a case because it was claimed by the college that the act of the Legislature, modifying its charter, impaired the obligation of a contract; an exercise of power which the Constitution of the United States prohibits to the Legislature of a State. [Daniel Webster, argued the case for the college in the United States Supreme Court.] . . . On the conclusion of the argument the Chief Justice [John Marshall] intimated that a decision was not to be expected until the next term. It was made in February, 1819, fully confirming the grounds on which Mr. Webster had placed the cause. From this decision, the principle in our constitutional jurisprudence, which regards a charter of a private corporation as a contract, and places it under the protection of the Constitution of the United States, takes its date."—G. T. Curtis, *Life of Daniel Webster*, v. 1, ch. 8.—See also COMMON LAW: 1819.—The Thayer school of engineering was founded in 1867. The Amos Tuck school of administration and finance (founded in 1900) was the first and for a long time the only commercial school in the country whose work was largely postgraduate.

ALSO IN: F. Chase, *History of Dartmouth College and the town of Hanover*.

1755-1920.—Russia.—"In 1755, the government established the University of Moscow, and . . . founded a gymnasium in connection with it. This new University had three faculties, philosophy, law and medicine, all students for the latter two studies being required first to pass through the course in philosophy. The professors were bound to deliver public as well as university lectures, but as Latin, until 1768, was the language used, the public profited little. Strict supervision was exercised by the State over the actual instruction. . . . Every incentive was given to raise the number of students at the universities. Each student, regardless of his social station by birth, was presented with a sword upon entrance to the university and received the proper 'chin', assured a good position upon entrance into the service of the State, and allowed to count the years of his study as years of service. . . . [During the first quarter of the nineteenth century] three more Universities were founded and three others projected, their constitutions being framed on German models. . . . [The University of

Charkov was founded in 1804 for New Russia and that of Kazan the same year, for countries about the Volga. St. Peterburg was founded in 1819, and Kiev in 1832. The influence of German idealism was very strong and] the university students of that period found that Hegel and Schelling formed the basis of the teachings of many of the better professors of science, history and literature. At Moscow University was a small group of men, destined to play an immense part in the intellectual development of Russia,—Belinsky, Aksakov, Bakunin, Granovsky and Herzen. . . . [Moscow University was the center of a brilliant intellectual movement known as "the Renaissance of the Forties." But the government distrusted foreign influence and] the universities . . . [had come] under new regulations, embodied in the Statute of 1835, by Uvarov. The Dekabrist Uprising had resulted in a degeneration of the universities, for many of the professors and other university officials had been implicated in the rebellion, and the temporary measures to relieve the situation, even in the sending of students to study abroad and so meet the requirements for the various chairs in the universities, had not resulted in entire success. To prevent the universities from again becoming centers of revolutionary disturbances, their autonomy was taken away and they were deprived of all control over other parts of the educational system. The most severe expression, however, of autocracy in education came after the events of 1848, when university students were required to wear a special uniform and follow certain regulations when appearing in public, courses in European public law, comparative constitutional law, social statistics, were abolished, and philosophy and psychology might be taught only by orthodox (Greek) professors of theology and strictly in accordance with the creed of the church. Professors were required to submit to the government the actual lectures which they intended to give as well as the lists for further reading on the part of students, and deans were required to report the smallest deviations from the approved copies of lectures. . . . [By the middle of the century] the universities had fallen below even the Russian standard, and in comparison with those of Western Europe they were quite evidently inferior. This condition was due to the lack of sufficient good teachers from Russian sources, the prohibition against inviting foreign instructors, the lowness of salaries, the difficulty of the examinations for the necessary higher degrees, the complexity and consequent superficiality with which the course of study was followed in the universities, the defective preparation afforded by the gymnasia in Latin and modern languages, which were necessary for adequate work in the universities, and finally the poverty of the universities and the indifference of the public of the period preceding the reforms. Vacancies in some chairs, unsatisfactory incumbents of others, disorders on the part of the students were the outward signs of this unsatisfactory condition. The reform of '63 . . . aimed at greater self-government of the universities and consequently placed the authority in the Council of the University; and a University Court, for the trial of students in connection with university order, was established, consisting of three professors. A new class of university lectures, Privat-Doctents, was created, in short to afford a supply of professors [and] salaries were raised. . . . Governing the whole scheme of reform was a new definition of the purpose of the universities, —contrasting greatly with that of the regulations

of 1804 and 1835. Where the former had considered the universities as a branch of the system for preparation for civil service in the interests of the state, the new attitude emphasized 'learning for its own sake' and strove to make the universities centers of research and scholarship. . . . The new university regulations had been in force only three years when [Count Dmitri] Tolstoy became Minister of Education, and began his determined plans once more to subject the universities to centralization and complete control. . . . [New regulations in line with Count Tolstoy's views were ultimately put into operation in 1884.] The universities had now reached the lowest limit of self-control, for at no time, not even in the period of Nicholas I, had the control been so strict, nor university freedom, of both students and officers, so circumscribed. All members of the universities now became state appointed officials, and through examining commissions and examination syllabuses control of the course of study and the right to graduate was insured to the government. Under Bogolepov, some additions to the field of the university work were made,—a new Faculty of Law at Tomsk [1888], a new faculty of Medicine at Odessa, and the establishment of the famous Oriental Institute at Vladivostok. But the serious student disorders in the universities during 1899 put an end to constructive work, and turned the attention of the government to the necessity of suppressing the organizations which had grown up among the students. [See RUSSIA: 1899; 1900-1901.] . . . As a consequence the government summoned the usual conference to consider the matter, but the only measures were additional precautions against the recurrence of the outbreak. The number of inspectors for the universities was increased to three times the former number, making about one inspector to each 50 students, and students were restricted in their choice of universities. Exactly the same outbreaks took place in 1905-06 [see RUSSIA: 1904-1905: Outline, etc.], when some little measure of freedom was obtained, only to be abruptly taken away again in 1910 under Schwarz and by his successor Kasso. [See RUSSIA: 1909-1914.] The year 1911 saw the same strikes and the same police methods. This time the government tried to solve the difficulty by a closer scrutiny of the university professors, more than a hundred of whom the very best, resigned under pressure, and their places were taken by those 'desirable politically' to the government."—D. B. Leary, *Education and autocracy in Russia* (pamphlet), pp. 36-37, 63-66, 74-76, 78-79, 87-88, 106-107.—After the Russian revolution in 1917, the entire system of Russian university education was reorganized by the Bolsheviks. The following universities, in existence before the revolution, were taken over for administration by the Peoples' Commissariat for Education—Moscow, Petrograd, Kazan, Saratov, Tomsk, Perm, Irkutsk. In addition, the universities of Dorpat and Warsaw, evacuated during the war, were reorganized in 1918 as the Voronezh and Don Universities (Dorpat was later reopened as an Esthonian institution) and in the same year another was founded at Nizhni Novgorod. In 1919, universities were set up at Yaroslav, Smolensk, Kostroma, Tambov, Astrakhan, Tashkent, Samara, Simbirsk, Orel; and in 1920 at Ekaterinburg, Ekaterinodar, and Veliki Usting. The soviet universities are said to have four faculties—medicine, law, agriculture and "workers." Sverdlov's University was founded in memory of Sverdlov who died in 1920.

1761-1921.—Modern France.—"The constitution

of the University of Paris, given by Crevier as existing in his own time (1761), had been for so long substantially the same as he gives it, that it may well be inserted here as a help to knowledge of the constitution of universities generally. The University of Paris is composed of seven companies, viz.: The Faculty of Theology, with the oldest of its secular doctors for its chief, under the name of dean. The Faculty of Law, which had been established for canon law only, but which is authorized by the Ordinance of 1679 to teach civil law also. It has its dean, who is chosen annually from its professors, following the order of seniority. The Faculty of Medicine, which has an elected dean whose office lasts two years. The Nation of France. The Nation of Picardy. The Nation of Normandy. The Nation of Germany, formerly of England. These four Nations have each their chief, who is called procurator, and is changed yearly. All these together form the Faculty of Arts; but they no less constitute four distinct communities, each of which has its vote in the general affairs of the university. The rector chosen by the Nations or their representatives, and drawn from the body of the Faculty of Arts, is chief of the whole university and chief of the Faculty of Arts especially. Three principal officers who are perpetual, viz.: The Syndic—the Secretary and Registrar—the Treasurer—all three officers of the university, and all three drawn from the Faculty of Arts."—S. S. Laurie, *Drawn and early constitution of universities*, pp. 170-171.—During the greater part of the eighteenth century the Jesuits controlled higher education in France (see EDUCATION: Modern: 16th-17th centuries: Jesuit teaching, etc.), but in 1762 the Parliament of Paris issued a decree for their banishment from the city and placed their colleges at the disposal of the universities. "The French Monarchy possessed, at the time of the Revolution, twenty-one universities. All of them were feeble, some in a state of almost complete collapse. The vigour which had animated them during the Middle Ages had gradually died away. Shut up in their traditional formalism, they had been unable or unwilling to accept the new learning; and the whole philosophic and scientific spirit of the eighteenth century had grown and borne fruit outside their walls. So it is not surprising that the Revolution, produced by this very spirit, had suppressed them or allowed them to disappear. [On Sept. 15, 1793, a decree of convention abolished the colleges and universities throughout France. In 1808 Napoleon established the University of France as a complete state system of education (see FRANCE: 1801-1809), but higher education remained in a chaotic state until the latter part of the century.] . . . The fifteen Faculties established within the French Republic . . . [were] made into Universities by an Act, dated July 10th, 1896. They are, Paris, Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Montpellier, Nancy, Toulouse, Aix-Marseille, Caen, Dijon, Grenoble, Poitiers, Rennes, Basançon and Clermont. Their functions in reference to learning, their relation to schools, their civil and financial organisation . . . [were] settled by six administrative Decrees, dated, three on July 21st, two on July 22nd, and one on July 31st, 1897. This Act and these Decrees mark an epoch in the history of higher education in France."—L. Liard, *French universities* (British Education Department, *Special Reports on Educational Subjects*, v. 2, p. 603).—"Three ministerial decrees (July 31, September 20, and September 21, 1920) have brought . . . [reforms in French universities] to a head. . . . The present reform [written in

1921] falls into three distinct chapters. The first contains a definition of the duties and functions of the *Faculté des Lettres* in modern French society [with a view to reinstating French degrees into their former authority and prestige]. The second prescribes several measures likely to insure the intellectual welfare of French and foreign students. The last deals with the management of French university affairs in the face of new conditions and needs. . . . Every department in a French *Faculté des Lettres*, at Paris or Strasbourg, Lyons or Toulouse, Bordeaux or Montpellier, is standing to-day wide open and freely accessible to French and foreign students alike. . . . The truth is that the French universities have been granted a new charter. They have assumed a life of their own; on July 31, 1920, they ceased to be so many identical pieces of state machinery."—J. J. Champenois, *University reform in France* (*Educational Review*, Sept., 1921, pp. 107, 109-110, 114).

1762-1769.—United States.—Brown University.—"Brown University, the oldest and best endowed institution of learning connected with the Baptist denomination, dates back for its origin to a period anterior to the American Revolution. . . . At the meeting of the Philadelphia Association, held on the 12th of October, 1862 . . . [it was voted] 'practicable and expedient to erect a College in the Colony of Rhode Island, under the chief direction of the Baptists, in which education might be promoted and superior learning obtained, free from any sectarian tests.' . . . The first commencement of the college, was held in the then new Baptist meeting-house of the town of Warren, on the 7th of September, 1769. . . . Five years previous, the General Assembly . . . had granted a charter for a 'College or University in the English Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, in New England in America.' . . . At the second annual meeting of the corporation, held in Newport, Wednesday, September 3d . . . [1765, James Manning had been] formally elected, in the language of the records, 'President of the College, Professor of Languages and other branches of learning, with full power to act in these capacities at Warren or elsewhere.'"—R. A. Guild, *First commencement of Rhode Island College* (*Rhode Island Historical Society Collections*, v. 7, pp. 269-271).—Six years after the founding of the university it was removed from Warren to Providence, and its name changed from Rhode Island College to Brown University, in honor of John Brown, of Providence, who was its most liberal benefactor.—G. W. Greene, *Short history of Rhode Island*, p. 196.—Although founded by the Baptist Church, the charter of the University "expressly forbids the use of religious tests. The corporation is divided into two Boards—the Trustees, 36 in number, of whom 22 must be Baptists, 5 Quakers, 5 Episcopalians, and 4 Congregationalists, and the Fellows, 12 in number, of whom 8, including the President, must be Baptists, and the remainder of other denominations. Twelve Trustees and 5 Fellows form a quorum. The college estate, the students, and the members of the faculty, with their families, are exempt from taxation and from serving as jurors."—S. G. Arnold, *History of the state of Rhode Island*, v. 2, ch. 18.—See also RHODE ISLAND: 1764.

1769-1884.—United States.—Sectarian institutions of learning.—A large proportion of the very great number of educational institutions in the United States which have a collegiate or a university rank, in some high or low degree, were

created and are maintained and governed by sectarian religious bodies. They are too numerous to be named; but the following may be cited as being, perhaps, the most notable in this class: under Baptist auspices, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, founded in 1769; Colby University, at Waterville, Maine, founded in 1820; Colgate University, at Hamilton, New York, founded in 1816; Columbian University, at Washington, founded in 1821; Rochester University, at Rochester, New York, founded in 1851. Under Congregationalist auspices: Bowdoin College, at Brunswick, Maine, founded in 1794; Iowa College, at Grinnell, Iowa, founded in 1843. Under Episcopalian auspices: Hobart College, at Geneva, New York, founded (as a college) in 1822; Kenyon College, at Gambier, Ohio, founded in 1824; Lehigh University, at South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, founded in 1867; Trinity College, at Hartford, Connecticut, founded in 1823; University of the South, at Sewanee, Tennessee, founded in 1857. Under the Methodist auspices: Allegheny College, at Meadville, Pennsylvania, founded in 1815; Boston University, at Boston, Massachusetts, founded in 1869; De Pauw University, at Greencastle, Indiana, founded in 1837; Dickinson College, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, founded in 1783; Northwestern University, at Evanston and Chicago, Illinois, founded in 1855; Syracuse University, at Syracuse, New York, founded in 1871; Vanderbilt University, at Nashville, Tennessee, founded in 1873; Wesleyan University, at Middletown, Connecticut, founded in 1831. Under Presbyterian auspices: Beloit College, at Beloit, Wisconsin, founded in 1843; Cumberland College, at Lebanon, Tennessee, founded in 1827; Lafayette College, at Easton, Pennsylvania, founded in 1832; Lake Forest University, at Lake Forest and Chicago, founded in 1857. Under Roman Catholic auspices: The Catholic University of America, at Washington, founded in 1884; the Georgetown University, at Washington, founded in 1815; University of Notre Dame, at Notre Dame, Indiana, founded in 1842. Under Universalist auspices: Tufts College, at Boston, founded in 1857.

1770.—United States.—Rutgers College.—"Rutgers College, located at New Brunswick [New Jersey], was chartered by George III. in 1770, and was called Queen's College, in honour of his consort. The present name was substituted by the legislature of the State, in 1825, at request of the trustees, in honour of Col. Henry Rutgers, of New York, to whom the institution is indebted for liberal pecuniary benefactions. The charter was originally granted to such Protestants as had adopted the constitution of the reformed churches in the Netherlands, as revised by the national synod of Dordrecht, in the years 1618 and 1619. . . . The Theological College of the Reformed Dutch Church [was also] . . . established here and intimately blended with the literary institution."—T. F. Gordon, *Gazetteer of the state of New Jersey* (*bound with "History of New Jersey"*), p. 86.

1790-1920.—Canada.—"The University of Toronto and McGill University, Montreal, are [written in 1911] in the front rank of educational institutions on the American continent. . . . Founded by Royal Charter in 1827 as a Church of England institution the University of Toronto has become undenominational and is substantially supported by the Provincial Legislature. . . . While certain departments of instruction are classed particularly under the University College, it has been found possible by legislative enactment to secure a more

uniform standard of higher education by the union of various denominational universities of Ontario. . . . Federated with the University of Toronto are Victoria University and the University of Trinity College, . . . Knox College (Presbyterian), Wycliffe College (Anglican) and St. Michaels College (Roman Catholic) [while thirteen other colleges, many of them professional, are affiliated with the university]. . . . McGill College and University takes the name from its founder, the Hon. James McGill. . . . A Royal Charter was obtained in 1821, but it was not until an amended charter was secured in 1852 and the Governor-General Sir Edmund Head interested himself in the institution that it started its career of progress and prosperity. . . . The supreme authority of the University . . . is vested in the Crown and is exercised by the Governor-General for the time being, by which means the University possesses a national character and is at the same time removed from any local or party influence. Educational work of the University is carried on in McGill College, the Royal Victoria College for Women and other university buildings in Montreal and in [eight affiliated colleges of which five are located outside Montreal]. . . . Another important and successful center of learning is the University of Queens College at Kingston, Ontario. Founded by Royal Charter in 1841 it has . . . attained an enviable reputation. . . . McMasters University was formed by the incorporation of the Toronto Baptist College and Woodstock College, which were united by an act of the Ontario Legislature passed in 1887. . . . [In 1888 the Baptists decided to develop McMasters University and Woodstock College as separate institutions.] Laval University at Quebec was founded in 1852, but the Seminary of which it was the outcome was established in 1663 by Bishop Laval. This, the most important Roman Catholic seat of learning in Canada has a branch at Montreal [and a number of affiliated colleges in the province of Quebec. The Montreal branch of Laval University was incorporated as the University of Montreal, in 1920. The University of Ottawa founded in 1848 as the College of Bytown and created a university in 1889 is also Roman Catholic]. . . . In the Maritime Provinces are the University of Kings College, Windsor, Nova Scotia, founded in 1790; Dalhousie College and University, Halifax, Nova Scotia [founded 1818, reorganized 1863]; the University of Acadia College, Wolfville, Nova Scotia [founded 1838, incorporated 1840]; the University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick founded as a college 1800, as a university 1859]; and the University of St. Josephs College, St. Josephs, New Brunswick. . . . The University of Bishops College, Lennoxville, province of Quebec, founded in 1843, is an Anglican institution. . . . The University of Manitoba at Winnipeg was incorporated in 1877 by an act of the local legislature [and has a number of affiliated colleges. Other provincial universities in western Canada are the University of Saskatchewan, at Saskatoon, founded 1907, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, incorporated 1908, and opened in 1915, and the University of Alberta, at Edmonton, created by an act of the provincial legislature in 1906].”—W. L. Griffith, *Dominion of Canada*, pp. 295-300.—See also EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Canada.

Also in: *Universities of Canada, Great Britain and the United States (Ontario Education Department)*.

1793.—United States.—Williams College.—“Williams College, at Williamstown, Berkshire

County, Mass., was chartered in 1793. The town and the college were named in honor of Col. Ephraim Williams, who had command of the forts in the Hoosac Valley, and was killed in a battle with the French and Indians, September 8, 1755. By his will he established a free school in the township which was to bear his name. The most advanced students of this free school became the first college class, numbering 4, and received the regular degree of bachelor of arts in the autumn of 1795. . . . The college was put under the care of 12 trustees, who elected . . . [Reverend Ebenezer] Fitch the first president of the college.”—E. B. Parsons, *History of higher education in Massachusetts (United States Bureau of Education, Circular of Information, 1891, no. 6, ch. 9)*.

1794.—United States.—Bowdoin College.—“An act of the Legislature of the province of Maine, approved in 1794, incorporated [Bowdoin College]. . . . Five townships of land, each six miles square, were granted to the college for its endowment and vested in the trustees, provided that fifteen families be settled in each of the said townships within a period of twelve years, and provided further that three lots containing 320 acres each be reserved, one for the first settled minister, one for the use of the ministry, and one for the support of schools within the township where it is located.”—F. W. Blackmar, *History of federal and state aid to higher education in the United States (Bureau of Education, Circular of Information, 1890, no. 1, pp. 123-124)*.—The college was named in honor of Governor James Bowdoin, of Massachusetts, whose son made valuable gifts to it.

1795.—United States.—Union College.—Union College, founded at Schenectady, in 1795, had a struggle for existence until the Rev. Dr. Eliphalet Nott was called to its presidency, 1804. By the energy and influence of Dr. Nott, state aid was obtained and funds were raised by other means, until a fairly substantial endowment was secured.—Based on C. F. Richardson and H. A. Clark, *College Book, Union College*.

1803-1825.—United States.—University of Virginia.—The establishment of the University of Virginia introduced a new and important trend into higher education in America. It traces its beginning to an act of legislature in January, 1803, for incorporating the “Trustees of Albemarle Academy.” The cornerstone of Central College was laid in 1817, and Thomas Jefferson, who was rector of its board of trustees, drew up plans for its development as the University of Virginia which were adopted by the legislature in 1818 and 1819. In 1825 seven independent schools were opened. “The University of Virginia was based on what is now known as the elective system. Its system of schools was and is an elaborate and distinct application of this system. Jefferson’s conception of the elective principle breathes the spirit of the Declaration of Independence; but this conception was reinforced by his later knowledge of educational conditions obtaining in Germany and France. . . . In an age when colleges were usually founded by and under the control of a church, Jefferson, himself a man of free notions in religion, founded a university absolutely free from sectarian or similar conditions. In a time when what is now known as the required system of studies usually prevailed, he established a university in which the elective system rules. In a new world free from architectural traditions, the buildings of his university embodied varying types of classical architecture. In a country and nation which was seeking to build itself up apart from European

models, he called into the service no less than four professors from England. Scholarly prestige, an advantage which the New England colleges had long enjoyed, he sought to transfer by the election of George Ticknor, of Harvard College, and of Nathaniel Bowditch. . . . At last, in the year 1825, was consummated the long process of the establishing of the University of Virginia. It embodied the life work of one of the greatest of Americans, and also the influence of the French nation over the higher education in America. From the time of its foundation until the present, it has represented a unique and precious influence in all America, and especially in the Southern States."—C. F. Thwing, *History of higher education in America*, pp. 316, 200.

ALSO IN: J. S. Patton, *Jefferson, Cabell and the University of Virginia*.

1804-1837.—United States.—University of Michigan.—"In 1804, when Michigan was organized as a Territory, Congress granted a township of land for a seminary of learning, and the university to be established in 1817 was to be in accordance with this grant. . . . The act establishing a university was framed. A portion of this most curious document of the early history of Michigan will be given. It is entitled 'An act to establish the Catholepistemiad or University Michigania.' 'Be it enacted by the Governor and Judges of the Territory of Michigan, That there shall be in the said Territory a catholepistemiad or university denominated the Catholepistemiad or University Michigania. The Catholepistemiad or University of Michigania shall be composed of thirteen didaxum or professorships; first, a didaxia or professorship catholepistemia, or universal science, the dictator or professor of which shall be president of the institution; second, a didaxia or professorship of anthropoglossica, or literature embracing all of the epistemum or sciences relative to language; third, a didaxia or professorship of mathematica or mathematics; four, a didaxia or professorship of physiognostica or natural history, etc.' The act thus continues through the whole range of the 'thirteen didaxum'; the remaining nine are as follows: Natural philosophy, astronomy, chemistry, medical sciences, economical sciences, ethical sciences, military sciences, historical sciences, and intellectual. The university was to be under the control of the professors and president, who were to be appointed by the Governor, while the institution was to be the center and controlling power of the educational system of the State. . . . This remarkable document was not without its influence in shaping the public school policy of Michigan, but it was many years before the State approximated its learned provisions. Impracticable as this educational plan appears for a handful of people in the woods of Michigan, it served as a foundation upon which to build. The officers and president were duly appointed, and the work of the new university began at once. At first the university appeared as a school board, to establish and maintain primary schools which they held under their charge. Then followed a course of study for classical academies, and finally, in October, 1817, an act was passed establishing a college in the city of Detroit called 'The First College of Michigania.' . . . An act was passed on the 30th of April, 1821, by the Governor and Judges establishing a university in Detroit to take the place of the catholepistemiad and to be called the 'University of Michigan.' In its charter nearly all the powers of the former institution were substantially confirmed. . . . The second corporation, known

as the 'University of Michigan,' carried on the work of education already begun from 1821 to the third organization, in 1837. . . . The boards of education kept up and transmitted the university idea to such an extent that it may be said truly and legally that there was one University of Michigan, which passed through three successive stages of development marked by the dates 1817, 1821, and 1837," at which time it was removed to Ann Arbor.—F. W. Blackmar, *Federal and state aid to higher education* (*United States Bureau of Education, Circular of Information*, 1890, no. 1, pp. 209-241).—The first class graduated in 1845. Under the leadership of the first president, Henry Philip Tappan (1852-1863), the institution adopted the progressive policy which made it the leading western university for many years. The elective system was introduced in 1878 and the seminar method about the same time.—See also MICHIGAN: 1804-1884; EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Training teachers.

ALSO IN: E. M. Farrand, *History of the University of Michigan*.—A. Ten Brook, *American state universities*.—B. A. Hinsdale and I. N. Demmon, *History of the University of Michigan*.

1812.—United States.—Hamilton College.—"In the constant westward movement of population, Hamilton College . . . [at Clinton, New York], sprang into being. It . . . was the successor of Hamilton-Oneida Academy. In its establishment, as in the establishment of almost every institution, appears a great personality. Samuel Kirkland was, like Wheelock of Lebanon and of Dartmouth, an educational pioneer and hero. Burning with enthusiasm to convert the Indians, he went from Princeton College, at about the age of twenty-four, to bear the gospel to the Six Nations. But this purpose broadened into a work of the higher education of all men. The College, when finally founded in 1812, bore the name not of Kirkland but of Hamilton, but into it had passed the life of the great founder."—C. F. Thwing, *History of higher education in America*, p. 206.

1818-1821.—United States.—Amherst College.—"Amherst College originated in a strong desire on the part of the people of Massachusetts to have a college near the central part of the State, where the students should be free from the temptations of a large city, where the expenses of an education should not be beyond the means of those who had but little money, and where the moral and religious influences should be of a decidedly Christian character. . . . In the year 1818 a constitution was adopted by the trustees of Amherst Academy, for the raising and management of a fund of at least \$50,000, for the classical education of indigent young men of piety and talents for the Christian ministry. . . . This charity fund may be said to be the basis of Amherst College. . . . Although the charity fund of \$50,000 had been received in 1818, it was not till 1820 that the recipient felt justified in going forward to erect buildings for a college in Amherst. . . . This first college edifice was ready for occupation and dedicated on the 18th of September, 1821. In the month of May, 1821, Rev. Zephaniah Swift Moore, D. D., was unanimously elected by the trustees of Amherst Academy president of the new institution."—T. P. Field, *History of higher education in Massachusetts* (*United States Bureau of Education, Circular of Information*, 1891, no. 6, ch. 11).—Barret Hall, erected in 1850, was the first college gymnasium in the country.

ALSO IN: W. S. Tyler, *History of Amherst College*.

1826-1922.—United States.—Western Reserve University.—“The Presbytery of Grand River . . . in 1824 . . . appointed commissioners to establish a literary and theological institution. . . . Hudson seemed to be the best location for a country college. . . . A board of trustees, composed of seven clergymen and seven laymen, was organized in 1825, and a charter secured from the State of Ohio, February 1, 1826. Subscriptions made by churches throughout the Western Reserve provided the additional funds needed to construct the first building, called ‘Middle College,’ which was completed in August, 1827. . . . Western Reserve College opened in Hudson in the autumn of 1827. . . . In 1843 a Medical School was organized in Cleveland. The college charter contained no ecclesiastical limitations, and financial necessities forced the trustees to look for a larger constituency, with the result that the denominational character of the college gradually disappeared. . . . After the Civil war . . . the city of Cleveland was close at hand and was developing into a great industrial centre, while some of its citizens were hoping to possess a university and a technical school. In view of this situation, in March, 1880, Amasa Stone of Cleveland offered the college five hundred thousand dollars upon the following conditions: that it be removed to Cleveland, that it occupy a suitable site to be given by citizens, and that its name be changed to ‘Adelbert College of Western Reserve University.’ . . . The offer was accepted, and in September, 1882, Adelbert College opened its doors on a new campus of twenty-two acres, opposite a park which had been given to the city by Jephtha H. Wade. . . . In 1884, the trustees incorporated the Western Reserve University ‘to organize, establish and maintain in said city of Cleveland a university for the promotion of learning by means of Departments of Medicine, of Philosophy, of Art, of Music, and of such other means as may be deemed advisable by the Board of Trustees of the corporation.’ A College for Women, and the professional schools of Law, Dentistry, Library Science, Pharmacy, and Applied Social Sciences have since been organized [written in 1922] and a University chair of Religious Education established.”—*Western Reserve University in the city of Cleveland, Catalogue, 1921-1922, pp. 31-32.*

1828-1922.—England.—University of London.—“The University of London is sui generis, and still in the making. Despite an attempt in the sixteenth century, London is almost the last of world capitals to found a university, and it is still [written in 1917] in the hands of a departmental committee following the royal commission. During the four-score years of its existence it has been repeatedly reconstituted and has tried manifold experiments, making it prolific of suggestions. It was the first of modern universities in the Empire, and more specifically of the new or civic universities. In its primordial germ, University College, may be traced the Scotch influence of the Universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow. . . . University College, under the title The University of London, was opened in 1828 without a charter. University College was the first to open English university education to students of all religions, races, and nationalities. At that time, naturally, a rival institution was founded in King’s College, ‘as a college in which instruction in the doctrines and duties of Christianity as taught by the Church of England should be forever combined with other branches of useful education.’ . . . The same day on which University College received its charter

[1836], a third body politic by the name of the University of London was sealed with power to examine and confer degrees on certificated students from University and King’s Colleges and other institutions. . . . Thus the university became known as the Examining Body of students from numerous and unequal schools privileged to grant certificates of attendance. The result was the charter of 1853, practically abolishing the exclusive connection of the university with the affiliated institutions and opening its degrees to all males able to pass its examination, excepting that in the case of medical degrees evidence of attendance and clinical practice at some medical institution was still required. . . . An era of expansion immediately followed. Candidates for matriculation rapidly increased. The university, which from the beginning had required English in addition to Latin and Greek for matriculation, now included English philology and literature in the examinations for degrees and honors in arts. It was the first to confer the degrees of doctor of literature. It organized for the first time in England a faculty of science, and in 1860 began to hold examinations for the degrees of bachelor and doctor in that faculty. . . . In 1878, under another supplemental charter, the university became the first academic body in the United Kingdom to admit women as candidates for degrees. Despite these changes, there was constant agitation for further reforms in the university. . . . A new royal commission reported in 1894 that there should be one, not two, universities and that teaching and external examinations could be combined without injury to the students. They decided that the problem was still that stated by the commissioners of 1888, viz., how to coordinate the recognized teaching institutions of London under a central university. After four years of further discussion in 1898 Parliament passed an act for the complete reconstitution of the university in general harmony with the recommendations of the last commission. The act was put into effect in 1900. . . . [The next step was] the incorporation of the colleges into the university. University College led the way and was transferred to the university in 1907 and King’s in 1910. At the same time the Women’s Department of King’s College, founded in 1881, was incorporated into the University as King’s College for Women. [In 1922, over seventy-five distinct bodies were more or less closely connected with the University of London.]”—G. E. MacLean, *Studies in higher education in England and Scotland (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 16, 1917).*

1829-1919.—South Africa.—The South African College, founded at Cape Town in 1829, for many years occupied the leading place in higher education in South Africa. In 1873 “an Act was passed creating a new University [the University of the Cape of Good Hope] which was to supersede the Board of Examiners and to institute various examinations leading to degrees. This University was, to a great extent, modelled after the University of London, and was to be purely an examining University, with no provision for teaching and with no connection with any teaching institution, no distinction being made between the private student and the student from any College. The University . . . continued to exist and to be in many ways the central pivot of higher education in South Africa until this year [1916].”—W. Ritchie, *University development in South Africa (Aberdeen University Review, June, 1917)*.—Legislative measures passed by the Parliament of the Union of South Africa in

1916 and "put in operation April 2, 1918, . . . [reorganized the system of university education] on the following basis: 1. The South African College became the University of Cape Town. 2. The Victoria College at Stellenbosch [founded 1874] was granted a separate charter and became the University of Stellenbosch. The six remaining colleges—those at Grahamstown, Wellington, Bloemfontein, Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Pietermaritzburg—were federated in the University of South Africa, a successor of the University of the Cape of Good Hope, with the administrative seat at Pretoria. . . . Stellenbosch specialized in agriculture, while the University of Cape Town . . . [developed] the faculties of engineering and medicine, . . . law and education."—*Education in parts of the British empire (United States Department of Education, Bulletin no. 49, 1919, p. 61)*.

ALSO IN: *Education in Africa (Report prepared by T. J. Jones under auspices of Phelps-Stokes fund)*.

1832.—United States.—Oberlin College.—"Oberlin is a development from the missionary and reform movements of the early quarter of our century. . . . The founders were themselves home missionaries in the West and among the Indians, and Oberlin . . . [was from the first] vital with the missionary spirit. . . . Oberlin was the first college in the world to admit young women to all its privileges on equal terms with young men. . . . In 1831 John J. Shipherd, under commission from the American Home Missionary Society, entered upon his work as pastor of the church at Elyria, Ohio. . . . In the summer of 1832 he was visited by Philo P. Stewart. . . . [They] concluded that the needs of the new country could best be met by establishing a community of Christian families with a Christian school, . . . the school to be conducted on the manual labor system, and to be open to both young men and young women. It was not proposed to establish a college, but simply an academy for instruction in English and useful languages, and, if Providence should favor it, in 'practical theology.' In accordance with this plan the corporate name 'Oberlin Collegiate Institute' was chosen. Not until 1851 was a new and broader charter obtained, this time under the name of 'Oberlin College.' The name 'Oberlin' was chosen to signify the hope that the members of the new enterprise might be moved by the spirit of the self-sacrificing Swiss colporteur and pastor, John Friederich Oberlin."—J. R. Commons, *Oberlin College (Bureau of Education, Circular of Information, 1891, no. 5, pp. 55-56)*.—The teachings of Charles Grandison Finney, who became professor of theology in 1835 and president, 1851-1866, became widely known under the name of "Oberlin theology." Dr. Finney emphasized perfect freedom of will as opposed to strict Calvinist doctrine.

ALSO IN: J. H. Fairchild, *Oberlin, the college and the colony*.

1832-1917.—England.—Durham.—"Durham . . . was founded in 1832, in its Durham division it is an inchoate Oxford or Cambridge, the third of the ancient universities in England, brought forth after an interval of 700 years as one born out of due time. In its Newcastle division it is an inchoate newer university, anticipating all the other new universities. One of the most interesting things is the blending of the ancient and modern in education and the extension of the principle of the federation of colleges in one city to those in another city. After a half century of experiments in various forms of affiliation, what

appears to be a final solution of the problem was accomplished by the statutes approved by King Edward VII in council in 1909 under the University of Durham parliamentary act of 1908. These statutes created two divisions of the university to be called respectively 'the Durham division' and 'the Newcastle division.' The Durham division comprises the colleges in Durham, and the Newcastle division comprises the college of medicine and Armstrong College. Thus all the colleges became integral parts of the tripartite university, each retaining its local faculties, governing boards, and property, and all under the one chancellor, vice chancellor and other university officers, and represented in and subject to the university's senate as the supreme governing and executive body of the university."—G. E. MacLean, *Studies in higher education in England and Scotland (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 16, 1917)*.

1842.—England.—First college for workingmen founded. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Workers' education: England.

1847.—United States.—Iowa University founded. See IOWA: 1847-1857.

1848.—United States.—University of Wisconsin.—Relations to the state.—Extension work.—"From 1838, when at the solicitation of the legislature the first grant of land for the University of Wisconsin was made by the United States Government, to 1848, when the State was admitted into the Union, pioneer conditions prevented the institution from being anything more than a hope of the future. In 1848 the sale of land began, and in 1850 [1849?] the first instruction was given. . . . In 1866, the higher and more intelligent patriotism engendered by the war caused the University to be recognized as having an important function to fulfill for the State, while a fresh impulse was given by the renewed bounty of the United States. . . . The year 1866 was a year of new birth for the University. Its finances were established on a solid foundation [under the presidency of Dr. Paul A. Chadbourn, 1867-1870]. . . . By the reorganization women were given rights to equal educational opportunities with the men."—H. B. Lathrop, *University of Wisconsin* (pamphlet), pp. 8-9, 11, 13.—The connection between the university and the state government is unusually close. "The State university properly includes all that the State is doing for the higher education of its people, and it is the glory of Wisconsin that it is interpreting this definition in the widest sense. The government of a Western State has four parts—executive, judicial, legislative, and educative. But these are not distinct, and in the development of the system the fourth is as closely connected with the other three as they are with each other. The aim of some State universities is to keep out of politics. The University of Wisconsin is in politics and feels that it belongs there, not in the sense of being a football of opposing parties or attached to the fortunes of a political boss, but as taking an active part in administrative work and in guiding the policies of the State. . . . In beauty of situation Wisconsin's only rivals are California and Cornell. Its campus circles along Lake Mendota for a mile, while from its hills there is a magnificent view of the city and the farms, woods, and lakes round about it. But the campus owed its attractiveness to nature, not to art."—E. E. Slosson, *Great American universities*, pp. 213, 237.—Wisconsin has been a pioneer in the work of university extension. "Beginning in 1907 with a direct

appropriation of \$20,000, university extension was rapidly developed in a manner and on a scale never before tried. The novelty and magnitude of the experiment and its consistency with the other undertakings for which Wisconsin was becoming famous drew increased attention to the university and the state. . . . The Extension Division quickly became one of the largest, and from the nature of its activities—necessarily one of the most elaborately organized departments of the university. It has had, since 1907-8, its separate appropriations and budget, and its annual expenditures now approximate \$300,000. This is in addition to about half that sum annually expended for similar purposes by the College of Agriculture. The association of its staff with the regular instruction of the university is almost negligible. In a certain sense, the Extension Division is not so much a department of the university as a special bureau of the state administered in close association with the university. That there is a definite advantage in this association, however, seems to be indicated by the practice in the College of Agriculture [see EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: United States], whose present management insists upon maintaining control of Agricultural Extension instead of permitting it to be absorbed by the general division."—J. F. A. Pyre, *Wisconsin*, pp. 358, 382.—See also EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Extension work.

ALSO IN: S. H. Carpenter, *Historical sketch of the University of Wisconsin*.—R. G. Thwaites, *University of Wisconsin, its history and its alumni*.—C. McCarthy, *Wisconsin idea*.—F. C. Howe, *Wisconsin, an experiment in democracy*.—L. Steffens, *Sending a state to college* (*American Magazine*, Mar., 1909).—J. Corbin, *Which college for the boy?*

1850-1922.—Australia.—"The universities of Australia are British. They are British in their origin, legal; British in their conditions, political and social; British in their primary influence from civilization. The members of the teaching and research staffs bear the degrees of Oxford and Cambridge, of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and of the Midlands universities. The constituency whence students are drawn is also British. In a recent census more than 82 per cent were Australian born, and more than 13 per cent were natives of the United Kingdom. More than 95 per cent therefore represent British extraction. In such a racial and social condition flourish the six universities. Three of the six are the University of Sydney, founded in 1850, a year before the inrush of the gold seekers; the University of Melbourne, founded in 1853, in the midst of the gold excitement; and the University of Adelaide, founded in 1874. These three universities bear the name of as well as are established in the capital of each of their respective States of New South Wales, of Victoria, and of South Australia. The three remaining universities, too, are established in their respective capitals of their States, but they bear the names of the State itself. The University of Tasmania, at Hobart, was founded in 1890. The University of Queensland, situated at Brisbane, and the University of Western Australia, at Perth, were each founded in the year 1911. . . . The higher education of New Zealand is concentrated in the University of New Zealand and in its four affiliated or constituent colleges. Its history begins in the year 1869, with the establishment and endowment of a university by the Province of Otago through its Provincial Council. A year after the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church took

upon itself to lay the foundation of another university in and for New Zealand. Until 1874, these two foundations remained as separate units. In that year the University of Otago surrendered, or at least put into abeyance, its right to confer degrees, and became affiliated with the University of New Zealand itself. It was, in this consolidation, or absorption, agreed that the university of the State should have for its chief function the conferring of degrees, and that the other institution, or institutions, should give instruction without conferring degrees. Distinct and notable additions were made at this time to the forces of the higher education. Canterbury College at Christchurch—an English ecclesiastical and educational colony—was founded in 1873. Auckland University College at the largest city, was founded in 1882, and Victoria College at the capital city of Wellington, in 1897. Thus the University of Otago, Canterbury College, the University College at Auckland, and Victoria at Wellington came to constitute, as teaching forces, the University of New Zealand. . . . Perhaps the most outstanding element in the interpretation of the history or the present condition of the University of New Zealand relates to the matter of examinations and of degrees. With certain exceptions, the examinations are external, and the degrees are granted upon the basis of such external tests."—C. F. Thwing, *Higher education in Australia and New Zealand* (*United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 25*, 1922, pp. 5, 15-16, 18).—See also EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: Australia; EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Australasia.

1853.—Endowment of Washington State College. See WASHINGTON: 1880.

1854.—United States.—First university for negroes established. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: United States: Negroes.

1857-1920.—India.—"The arrival of Macaulay in India gave a fresh impetus to English education. With his support and assistance Lord William Bentinck passed the famous Resolution of March 7, 1835, by which the English language was established as the language of superior education in India. . . . Lastly came the famous Educational Despatch of 1854, which virtually accepted the system built up by Bentinck and Hardinge, and laid down rules for a system of education in the vernaculars of India, leading up to higher education in English. . . . For the promotion of higher education in English the Despatch approved of the establishment of Universities in India. 'The time had now arrived for the establishment of universities in India, which may encourage a regular and liberal course of education by conferring academical degrees as evidence of attainment in the different branches of art and science, and by adding marks of honour for those who may desire to compete for honorary distinction. The Council of Education, in the proposal to which we have alluded, took the London University as their model; and we agree with them, that the form, government, and functions of that University, (copies of whose Charters and Regulations we enclose for your reference), are the best adopted to the wants of India, and may be followed with advantage, although some variation will be necessary in points of detail.' . . . The Universities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay were founded accordingly by Lord Canning [1857] and the system sketched out in this famous Despatch is the system which is pursued in India to the present day

[1917].”—R. Dutt, *Economic history of India in the Victorian age (Trübner's Oriental Series)*, pp. 201-203.—“The new universities of India—those of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, the Punjab [founded 1882], and Allahabad [1887]—were founded within the first 30 years of British rule, and until five years ago [written in 1919] were considered as meeting all demands for the country. Their constitutions are modeled largely upon those of the English universities: They are governed by a chancellor (the Viceroy or the governor of the Province), a vice chancellor, a senate diversely made up but along the lines laid down at Oxford and Cambridge, faculties and boards of studies, and finally syndicate in whom are vested extraordinary powers of appeal and review. With the enormous increase in secondary education . . . came the awakening of a need for additional universities of various kinds. [In 1902 a commission was appointed by Lord Curzon's government to inquire into conditions in the Indian universities. The result was embodied in the Universities Act of 1904, which left them examining bodies but strengthened the tie between the university and its affiliated colleges by organizing an inspection system and laying down certain definite stipulations.] The Hindu university at Benares and the university at Patna opened their doors in October, 1917; the university of Mysore, under legislative incorporation of the Province [an Indian native state], in July, 1917. The Indian university for women, a private institution, with scattered branches whose administrative center is at Poona, was founded in 1917. The constitution and aims of the first mentioned are significant. It is frankly denominational, admitting persons of all classes, castes, and creeds, but imparting religious instruction in the Hindu tenets. It is sustained by large private and popular contributions, and begins on a more independent plane than any other hitherto known. [The Central Hindu College at Benares which formed the nucleus of the Hindu University was established in 1898. In 1920 the Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College, which had been founded in 1875, became under the Aigarh Moslem University Act a unitary residential university. It is chiefly Moslem, but is open to all without distinction.]”—*Education in parts of the British empire (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 49, 1919)*.

1857-1922.—**Philippines.**—**Porto Rico.**—The University of Manila was founded by Spanish royal decree in 1857, although it had existed at the College of St. Thomas, founded by the Dominicans since the early years of the seventeenth century. The institution has been developed under American rule and in 1922 was in good university standing. The University of Porto Rico comprises a number of colleges located at Rio Piedras and the colleges of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts at Mayaguez.

1858.—**United States.**—**Minnesota University** established. See MINNESOTA: 1849-1899.

1862-1886.—**United States.**—**Cornell University.**—“On the second of July, 1862 . . . [President Lincoln] signed the act of congress, donating public lands for the establishment of colleges of agriculture and mechanic arts. This act had been introduced into congress by the Hon. Justin S. Morrill. . . . The Morrill act provided for a donation of public land to the several states, each state to receive thirty thousand acres for each senator and representative it sent to congress. States not containing within their own borders public land subject to sale at private entry received land scrip instead. But this land scrip the recipient states were not allowed to

locate within the limits of any other state or of any territory of the United States. The act laconically directed ‘said scrip to be sold by said states.’ The proceeds of the sale, whether of land or scrip, in each state were to form a perpetual fund. . . . In the execution of this trust the State of New York was hampered by great and almost insuperable obstacles. For its distributive share it received land scrip to the amount of nine hundred and ninety thousand acres. The munificence of the endowment awakened the cupidity of a multitude of clamorous and strangely unexpected claimants. . . . But the all-compelling force which prevented the dispersion and dissipation of the bounty of congress was the generous heart of Ezra Cornell. While rival institutions clamored for a division of the ‘spoils,’ and political tricksters played their base and desperate game, this man thought only of the highest good of the State of New York. . . . When the legislature of the State of New York was called upon to make some disposition of the congressional grant, Ezra Cornell sat in the senate. . . . By a gift of half a million dollars (a vast sum in 1865, the last year of the war!) he rescued for the higher education of New York the undivided grant of congress; and with the united endowments he induced the legislature to establish, not merely a college of applied science, but a great modern university—‘an institution,’ according to his own admirable definition, ‘where any person can find instruction in any study.’ . . . To secure . . . [this end] Ezra Cornell added to his original gift new donations of land, of buildings, and of money. . . . But one danger threatened this latest birth of time. The act of congress donating land scrip required the states to sell it. The markets were immediately glutted. Prices fell. New York was selling at an average price of fifty cents an acre. Her princely domain would bring at this rate less than half a million dollars! Was the splendid donation to issue in such disaster? If it could be held till the war was over, till immigration opened up the Northwest, it would be worth five times five hundred thousand dollars! So . . . Ezra Cornell made that wonderful and dramatic contract with the State of New York! He bound himself to purchase at the rate of sixty cents per acre the entire right of the commonwealth to the scrip, still unsold; and with the scrip, thus purchased by him as an individual, he agreed to select and locate the lands it represented, to pay the taxes, to guard against trespasses and defend from fires, to the end that within twenty years, when values had appreciated, he might sell the land and turn into the treasury of the State of New York for the support of Cornell University, the entire net proceeds of the enterprise. Within a few years Ezra Cornell had located over half a million acres of superior pine land in the Northwestern states, principally in Wisconsin. Under bonds to the State of New York to do the state's work, he had spent about \$600,000 of his own cash to carry out the trust committed to him by the state, when, alas, in the crisis of 1874, fortune and credit sank exhausted, and death came to free the martyr-patriot from his bonds. The seven years that followed were the darkest in our history. . . . Ezra Cornell was our founder; Henry W. Sage followed him as wise masterbuilder. The edifices, chairs, and libraries which bear the name of ‘Sage’ witness to [his] later gifts; but though these now aggregate the princely sum of \$1,250,000, [his] management of the university lands has been [his] greatest achievement. From these lands, with which the generosity and foresight of Ezra Cor-


nell endowed the university, there have been netted under [Mr. Sage's] administration, not far short of \$4,000,000, with over 100,000 acres still to sell. Ezra Cornell's contract with the state was for twenty years. It expired August 4, 1886, when a ten years' extension was granted by the state."—J. G. Schurman, *Address at inauguration to the presidency of Cornell University*, Nov. 11, 1892.

1863-1918.—Turkey and the Near East.—In 1863 Robert College on the Bosphorus was opened at Babek under American auspices. It was incorporated the following year and was given official recognition by an *Irade* from the Sultan in 1869. In 1871 it moved to its present site in Constantinople and from that date played a leading rôle in higher education in the Near East. The University of Constantinople, a distinctly Turkish institution, was founded in 1900 in honor of the sultan's succession and reorganized in 1918. There are a number of other mission colleges of high rank in the Near East aside from Robert College, among

their appeal. Especially strong has been the development of the school of business in the evening session. . . . The courses of study have been formulated in consultation with a committee of men, prominent in big business, engineering and public service. The teaching staff is made up of men who are not only skillful as teachers but who are also actual practitioners in the business community."—*Evening class of the College of New York (School and Society)*, Oct. 1, 1921, pp. 246-247).

1867.—United States.—First Jewish college established. See JEWS: United States: 19th century.

1867.—United States.—Johns Hopkins University.—"By the will of Johns Hopkins, a merchant of Baltimore, the sum of \$7,000,000 was devoted to the endowment of a university [chartered in 1867] and a hospital, \$3,500,000 being appropriated to each. . . . To the bequest no burdensome conditions were attached. . . . It was therefore determined that the Johns Hopkins should be



ROBERT COLLEGE, CONSTANTINOPLE

Founded in 1863 by James A. and William B. Dwight, sons of an American missionary to Turkey

which may be mentioned the American college for Girls at Constantinople and the Syrian Protestant College at Beirut.

1865.—United States.—Founding of the University of Maryland. See MARYLAND: 1865-1868.

1865.—United States.—Vermont University enlarged. See VERMONT: 1791-1914.

1866-1921.—United States.—College of the City of New York.—In the year, 1866, a free academy which had been founded in New York in 1848 and empowered to grant degrees in 1854, became the College of the City of New York. It "occupies a position unique in the educational world [written in 1921]. It . . . [was] the first institution of a collegiate character established by a city under a new charter and not built on a private foundation to give educational advantages free to qualified male residents. Also it was the first American college to establish courses in the mechanical arts without detriment to the liberal or cultural course that was insisted upon. . . . Art, biology, chemistry, mechanical engineering, economics, the languages, mathematics, philosophy, public speaking, these and many other courses have

primarily a university, with advanced courses of lectures and fully equipped laboratories; that the courses should be voluntary, and the teaching not limited to class instruction. . . . [The University was formally opened October 3, 1876.] As the studies are elective, it is possible to follow the usual college course if one desires. Seven different courses of study are indicated, any of which leads to the Baccalaureate degree, thus enabling the student to direct and specialize his work. The same standard of matriculation and the same severity of examinations are maintained in all these courses. A student has the privilege of extending his study beyond the regular class work, and he will be credited with all such private and outside study, if his examiners are satisfied of his thoroughness and accuracy."—S. B. Herrick, *Johns Hopkins University (Scribner's Monthly, Dec., 1870)*.—Johns Hopkins University was a pioneer in the use of seminar courses and laboratories and the emphasis placed upon the graduate school. Its influence over university development throughout the country was marked. In 1893 a medical department was established in affiliation with Johns

Hopkins Hospital. In 1902 the University moved to a new site.

ALSO IN: D. C. Gilman, *Launching of a university*.

1868.—United States.—University of California.—The University of California was chartered as a state institution in 1868, and opened at Oakland the following year. It took the place of the College of California, which had been founded in 1855. In 1873 it moved to its present site, at Berkeley, an exceptionally beautiful location. Its growth has been steady, and it ranks as one of the largest and most progressive universities in the country. In the year 1921 to 1922, the total number of students in all departments was 19,234. The University includes the Colleges of Letters and Science, Commerce, Agriculture, Mechanics, Mining, Civil Engineering, and Chemistry; and the Schools of Architecture, Education, Jurisprudence, and Medicine. There are also the University Ex-

of whom can see and hear perfectly. What this means can be appreciated by those universities which have auditoriums of inadequate size or of impossible audition on account of the echo. The Greek theater is built of concrete, at a cost of \$50,000, the gift of William Randolph Hearst.—E. E. Slosson, *Great American universities*, pp. 116, 117, 159.

ALSO IN: C. F. Thwing, *History of higher education in America*.—M. Caullery, *Universities and scientific life in the United States*.

1871-1913.—Japan.—“There are four Imperial universities in Japan [written in 1913]: The University of Tokio, founded in 1871, had six faculties—Medicine, Law, Agriculture, Engineering, Science and Literature—and an attendance of more than 6,000 students; the University of Kyoto [founded 1897] has four faculties—Literature, Law, Medicine, Science and Engineering being combined; and an attendance of between 2,000 and 3,000



STEPHENS UNION BUILDING, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Recently erected for student organizations and activities

tension Division, and the Lick Astronomical Department, with stations at Mount Hamilton and Santiago, Chile. There is no distinction of sex in the opportunities offered by the University. “In 1898 Mrs. Phoebe Hearst instituted an international competition for new buildings on a scale of unexampled magnificence for the University of California at Berkeley, in which the prize was won by the French architect Bénard.”—A. D. F. Hamlin, *American college architecture* (R. M. La Follette, ed., *Making of America*, v. 1, p. 274).—“The University of California has a long list of humanistic, scientific, and technical publications. It extends its influence throughout the State by means of lecture courses. It is closely connected with the public school systems. Its summer school is large and prosperous. It sends abroad archaeological and scientific expeditions. It has been an important factor in the remarkable agricultural development of California. . . . The building of the Greek theater has done much to promote the musical and dramatic interests of the University of California. It is the largest of its kind in the world, seating seven or eight thousand, every one

students. . . . The two other Imperial universities are not yet fully developed; that in the south at Fukuoka, in the province of Kyushu, has faculties of Medicine and Engineering; while that in the north has a faculty of Agriculture at Sapporo, in the province of Hokkaido, and a faculty of Science in Sendai. [The imperial University of Tokoku dates from 1907. Kyushu was given official university rank in 1910 and Hokkaido, in 1918, making five imperial universities in all.] There are also three privately endowed universities, founded in every case by men of exceptional ability, public spirit and far sighted vision. Waseda University, in the city of Tokio, recently celebrated its thirtieth anniversary; its founder, Count Okuma, one of the most interesting and progressive men in the Far East, was honored as one of the leaders of modern Japan, and messages of friendship were received from many European and American institutions. Keio University, in the same city, is a large and vigorous institution which has, through its graduates, exerted a decided influence on the later political life of the nation. It was founded by Mr. Fukuzawa, one of the makers of modern

Japan. . . . He and Count Okuma, the founder of Waseda, were close friends and will be remembered as kindred spirits in their service to education in Japan. The Doshisha in Kyoto, founded in 1875, by Mr. Neesima, one of the first generation of Japanese students educated in the United States, is the oldest and largest Christian institution of college rank in Japan. Under the presidency of Dr. Harada, it has taken its place as a university, with faculties of Literature, Theology and Politics and Economics. . . . Among institutions of the higher learning for women the Woman's University in Tokio, under the energetic leadership of Dr. Naruse, has large and attractive grounds and an attendance of more than a thousand students. [In 1922, aside from the five imperial universities, Japan had admitted twenty-one other institutions to university rank.]—H. W. Mabie, *Educational exchange with Japan* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, no. 3, pp. 2-3).—See also EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Japan.

1877-1917.—English municipal universities.—Manchester.—Leeds.—Liverpool.—Birmingham.—Sheffield.—“The universities that have grown in the twentieth century out of the Victorian era were not manufactured at a single stroke, but, after the British fashion, were a growth from some form of pre-existent local school or college and the amalgamation of several under some external influence. . . . The municipalities induced by the endowments given by citizens came to the support of technical institutions devoted to the training of skill in local industries. This led to the rapid development of a local complete educational system crowned by its university. . . . The university fits itself closely into the [public school] system by evening schools of classes, or by arrangements for part-time students in industrial, commercial, or domestic subjects, and oftentimes with a correlation as far as possible of work with the evening continuation classes. . . . Before the local and general creative forces could bring the new universities to full birth, certain traditional political and legal difficulties had to be overcome. Battles had to be fought for charters. In 1877 after 25 years of successful life, Owens College petitioned the Privy Council to grant a charter converting the college into the University of Manchester. Opposition to the project was raised in various quarters, particularly in Manchester's rival neighboring cities, Leeds and Liverpool. Yorkshire College, Leeds, sent up a memorial praying, if a new university was to be created, that it should be a new corporation with powers to incorporate Owens College and other institutions, and that the university should not bear the name of a town or of any person that would give it a purely local aspect. The result was a charter in 1880 constituting Victoria University at Manchester, with Owens College as a constituent college, and with powers to admit other colleges in different localities. In 1884 the University College, Liverpool, was admitted, and the Yorkshire College, Leeds in 1887. Victoria University was helped to overcome resistance by the vague notion that it was in some sense a federation of colleges, remotely analogous to Oxford and Cambridge, and the university of the north of England. The idea of a ‘single-college university’ had yet to make its way. Victoria as the university of the north of England was suggestive of the thought of a university for the Midlands. The new departure was really made when, in 1900, a charter was granted to the University of Birmingham. . . . Encouraged by this

precedent, University College, Liverpool, the corporation of the city, and other corporations of large and important towns in the district petitioned the King to grant a charter incorporating a University in Liverpool. This involved secession from Victoria University and its probable dissolution. The petition was referred by the crown to a committee of the Privy Council. Counter petitions and memorials were presented by those in favor of continuing Victoria University. Leeds and some advocates of the external examination system strongly opposed the policy of ‘what were nicknamed Lilliputian universities.’ After an extended hearing of experts and deliberations by the committee, on February 10, 1903, an order in council pronounced that a case had been made out for a grant of university charters to Liverpool and Manchester. . . . Victoria University, for certain legal and historical purposes, remains as a name of Manchester. . . . The plan of government for these universities is practically the same and thoroughly representative. Their buildings are, of course, new. They are substantial, compact, with architectural features and modern equipment, and located generally near the heart of the cities. . . . All the six universities have faculties of arts, of science, of medicine, and departments for the training of teachers. With the exception of Birmingham, they have a faculty of applied science or engineering or technology. Manchester, Liverpool, and Sheffield have faculties of law, which is included in the faculty of arts in Leeds. Manchester alone has a faculty of theology and one of music. Birmingham and Manchester have faculties of commerce and Leeds and Liverpool departments. Taking the departments together in all these universities, they cover broadly modern languages and literatures, historical, economic, and social sciences, and the physical and biological sciences and their applications. The enumeration of the degrees, diplomas, and certificates which may be secured in one or more of these universities makes conspicuous the range of subjects taught. . . . These universities have clearly added a fifth type to the previous types of British universities.”—G. E. MacLean, *Studies in higher education in England and Scotland* (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 16, 1917).

1881.—United States.—Massachusetts Metaphysical College organized. See CHRISTIAN SCIENCE: First step towards organization.

1885.—United States.—Leland Stanford Junior University.—Leland Stanford Junior University was established at Palo Alto, California, by Governor and Mrs. Leland Stanford, as a memorial to their only child who died in 1884. Mr. Stanford “had his own university ideal, and taking what counsel he could get, he tried to set the standard at Palo Alto higher than he had seen it elsewhere. A special Act of the Legislature was sought, and in November, 1885, the Act of Endowment, embodying the charter of the institution and the gift of eighty thousand acres of land in the rich valleys of California, was made public. . . . It was 1801 before a President was chosen or buildings sufficiently advanced to warrant the starting of the University. . . . The Charter of the University was drawn with great breadth and liberality. Lowell's playful definition of a university as ‘a place where nothing useful is taught’ had no countenance in Mr. Stanford's plans. In many ways he emphasized the practical nature of the higher education. His idea of a university would have been more nearly stated as ‘a place where nothing that is *not* useful is taught.’ . . . The in-

initial point of departure is in the matter of entrance requirements. . . . It leaves the applicant and the school to determine (among the twenty-two subjects) what shall constitute the preparatory course.

But it aims to exact of the student and the school the same quality of work in each subject chosen."


—O. L. Elliott and O. V. Eaton, *Stanford University and thereabouts*, pp. 27-29, 34, 40.—"Stanford University during its formative period was free from most of the restraints of other institutions. Unlike the State universities it was not subject to the caprices of a legislature or bound by its duty toward all the people of a certain district. It was held by no dead hands of charters, testaments, and traditions. It had no alumni body to dominate it. It was not dependent upon the fees of students, for it gave them all and asked them nothing. It was

they are qualified to enter and to watch their progress and tendencies in the preparatory school."

—E. E. Slosson, *Great American universities*, pp. 112-113, 121-122.

ALSO IN: M. Caullery, *Universities and scientific life in the United States*.

1887. — United States. — Clark University. — "Clark university [at Worcester, Massachusetts] was founded in 1887 by the generous gift of Mr. Jonas G. Clark, and the work of instruction was begun in 1889. From the first the range of the future university was strictly limited; there was to be no college, no technical school, no professional schools pure and simple. Only those who had taken a first degree were to be admitted, and of these only such individuals as should give promise of high attainments in some specialty of



CHAPEL OF LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY

The architecture is an adaptation of early mission design

not cramped into a few city blocks; it had an 894-acre campus to grow in. [Notably beautiful and harmonious buildings have been erected.] It had a larger free endowment [estimated at \$30,000,000] than any other university ever had. The ideas of the founders were on the whole liberal and progressive. They selected as president a man of powerful personality, with independent and radical views on education, and gave him an amount of authority unprecedented even among American college presidents. . . . Stanford is distinguished from other universities in that it does not want more students. It has all the women its charter allows it to have, five hundred, and it has nearly all the men it can do justice to. . . . It is therefore in a unique position to dictate what students shall enjoy its advantages. It has a waiting list of women and will soon have a waiting list of men. It will then be able to pick out its students, like colts for the Derby, years before

scientific research. The design and organization of the new institution were intrusted to Mr. Stanley G. Hall, for some years professor of philosophy at Johns Hopkins university in Baltimore. Only a few departments were organized, and these were intended to cover subjects closely and organically connected, viz.: mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology (including anatomy, physiology and paleontology) and psychology (including neurology, anthropology, criminology and history of philosophy). It was strongly emphasized in the scheme of foundation that so far as possible the line of demarcation between professor and student should be wiped out; the professors and other instructors were to feel themselves as merely older students, the students were to be expected to lecture occasionally on topics connected with their chosen specialties."—E. D. Perry, *American university* (N. M. Butler, ed., *Education in the United States: A series of monographs*, pp. 7-8).

1889.—United States.—Founding of Agricultural and Mechanical college at West Raleigh. See NORTH CAROLINA: 1870-1802.

1892.—United States.—University of Chicago.—“In 1855, only eighteen years after the town became the city of Chicago, Senator Stephen A. Douglas gave a tract of ten acres of land as a site for a university. In 1857 the (old) University of Chicago was founded, a result of this gift and of the interest which it created. Inadequately endowed, weakened by disagreements among its friends, hampered by debts, harassed by panics and by the two great fires which consumed the wealth of citizens and changed the social conditions of many thousands of people, the old University was at length obliged to yield to the inevitable, and in 1886 its doors were closed. . . . Meanwhile to Mr. John D. Rockefeller had been presented the needs of Chicago for a new institution of learning. The American Baptist Education Society had been organized in May, 1888. . . . At the annual meeting of the Society held in Boston in May, 1889, it was unanimously voted ‘to take immediate steps toward the founding of a well-equipped college in the City of Chicago.’ Mr. Rockefeller, in order to make possible the founding of this institution of learning, offered to contribute \$600,000 of a proposed \$1,000,000 fund, provided the remaining \$400,000 should be subscribed before June 1, 1890. . . . At the first meeting of the Board after its incorporation in September, 1890, Professor William Rainey Harper, of Yale University, was elected President; and he entered on the duties of his office July 1, 1891. . . . The University opened its doors to students without spectacular exercises on October 1, 1892. . . . During the thirty-two years of history which began with the election of President Harper, Mr. Rockefeller, who would not permit his name to be given to the University, has contributed to establish it upon an enduring financial basis the magnificent total of \$34,873,360.90, including his final gift. . . . The University has, since its doors opened October 1, 1892, furnished ‘opportunities’ to students in many departments of higher education. Including those in attendance during the academic year 1921-22 more than 84,000 students have been in attendance upon its classes for at least one quarter. Degrees to the number of 16,196 have been conferred, inclusive of those conferred at the Summer Convocation, June, 1922, upon 14,531 persons, including 1,396 who have received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.”—*Historical sketch of the University of Chicago (Annual Register of the University of Chicago, 1921-1922, pp. 3-5, 8-9)*.—Among the unique features inaugurated by the University of Chicago were the division of the academic year into four quarters, the system of junior and senior colleges and the relationship with affiliated colleges outside the university. The university extension movement was a feature from the beginning.

ALSO IN: T. W. Goodspeed, *History of the University of Chicago*.

1893-1920.—Wales.—“The movement for the creation of a University of Wales was continuous and persistent from 1887 until the charter was granted in 1893. . . . Under English influence Wales had been a battle field between the preparation of candidates for degrees given merely upon the passing of the examinations of the University of London and the preparation for admission to the residential colleges of Oxford and Cambridge. The advocates of a teaching university prevailed on the whole in the charter. Those who pleaded for a system of examinations and inspection of schools

by the university, similar to the practice of Oxford and Cambridge, gained only a permissive clause, the legal inspection being reserved to the oncoming central Welsh board. . . . The charter of the university did not set up strictly speaking a federal university. It established a confederation of the three previously incorporated and self-governing colleges: [University College of Wales at Aberystwyth, University College of North Wales, at Bangor and University College of South Wales, at Cardiff.] ‘An association,’ Principal Roberts called it, ‘of the three university colleges for the training of their students.’ . . . Every precaution was taken to preserve the equality of the colleges, and to preclude the misapprehension that the institution entailed ‘a separate place of instruction to be styled par excellence, “The University,” located either in one of the university towns or in some other center. The university, so far as its higher teaching and examining functions are concerned, is the three constituent colleges.’ . . . Like a court it has a circuit. Its examinations are held at each of the three colleges on the same days. Its degrees are conferred annually at that one of the colleges whose principal is vice chancellor at the time. The university court meets once in each year in one of the university college towns taken in rotation. Each of the principals of the three colleges serves in rotation as vice chancellor of the university for a term of two years. The national character of the university appears in the wide representation of the people themselves in the constitution of the university court, in which the entire legislative and executive power of the institution is vested. . . . The formative period of the university, beginning with the first concrete movement for a charter in 1888, may be considered as closed with the appointment of the royal commission in 1916. . . . [As a result of the inquiry of the Royal Commission held in 1916-1918, the university received a supplemental charter in 1920, which effected the reconstruction of the University Court, the institution of a University Council and greater freedom of the constituent colleges, which were increased to four by the addition of Swansea.]—G. E. MacLean, *Studies in higher education in Ireland and Wales (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 15, 1917)*.


1898-1907.—Sudan.—“The educational system of the Sudan . . . centres in the Gordon College at Khartum, an institution which owes its existence to the response of the British public to the appeal made to them at the end of 1898 by Lord Kitchener. . . . [The college] stands on the west bank of the Blue Nile, a little above Khartum. . . . Lord Kitchener’s general idea was, ‘to give the most practical, useful education possible to the boys for their future in the Sudan,’ and he intended Arabic to be the basis of education. . . . The College now [written in 1907] consists of three sections: a Primary School, a Training School for schoolmasters and judges in the Muhammadan Courts, and the instructional Workshops. . . . The curriculum extends over four years, and is intended to fit a boy for some minor Government post. . . . The Military School and the Training College are flourishing.”—E. A. W. Budge, *Egyptian Sudan, its history and monuments, v. 2, p. 492*.

1898-1922.—China.—China had, in 1922, three government universities: the National University at Peking, founded in 1898 and reorganized in 1917, Peiyang University at Tientsen and Shansi University at Taiyinanfu. There were four universities supported by private funds well established, three of these, Chung Kuo, Ming Kuo and Ch’ao

Universities in Peking, and Chung Hua University in Wuchang. In addition Amoy, Southeastern and Southwestern universities were gaining a firm foothold. There was a modern British university at Hong Kong. The old system of Chinese education with its emphasis on rote learning and formal examinations prevented the development of universities until recent years. "In 1905, the old examination system was abolished. . . . The present system [of education] was actually established at the close of 1905 when a Ministry of Education was created by edict. This was approved by the Imperial Throne in 1906. . . . The two most important institutions are [written in 1922] the national University at Peking and the Southeastern University at Nanking. The National University had an attendance in 1920-21 of about 2,000 students. . . . The work of the National University is limited chiefly to the field of philosophy, art, and science; law, medicine, engineering, and agriculture are represented by separate institutions in Peking. There is a movement to amalgamate these into one institution, but

the Boxer Indemnity."—P. Monroe, *Report on education in China (Institute of International Education, 3rd series, Bulletin no. 4, Oct. 20, 1922, pp. 8-15, 17-18)*.—See also HONG KONG: 1911-1912.

19th-20th centuries.—American university development.—Curriculum.—Elective system.—Graduate school.—Degrees.—State universities.—Municipal universities.—"Till the middle of the nineteenth century America did not use the larger word 'university,' and was content with 'college.' Universities practically did not exist, or rather they existed, but were called colleges. . . . Colleges developed into universities along three lines of evolution. While continuing to teach the 'liberal arts,' some advanced further and established special professional schools of theology, law, and medicine. Thus they became training grounds for professional men. Further, there was a considerable development in pure and applied science. The establishment of the degree of B.Sc. corresponded with the building up of schools of engineering and other strictly professional courses. But perhaps the prin-



PEKING UNIVERSITY

Founded in 1898, and reorganized in 1917 by Tsai Yuan-pei, the eminent Chinese educator

since the student bodies are quite large and the plants are far apart, their independent existence is preferred for the present. The faculty and the student body of the University probably exert more influence upon the thought life and the literary activity of the people than do those of any other institution. This is largely due to the personality of the Chancellor, Tsai Yuan Pei who has mastered the old learning to the highest degree and is also sympathetic to western learning and well versed in it. The Southeastern University was organized in 1920 on the basis of the Nanking Teachers College, which had been in existence since 1916 and was the largest of the higher normal schools. Here also had developed a small School of Engineering and a strong College of Agriculture. These three were combined to form the university. . . . In making a survey of the Chinese educational system, particularly of the higher institutions, account must be taken of the fact that a number of such institutions exist outside the control of the Ministry of Education. The most famous of these is Tsing Hua College, under the control of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and supported out of funds released by the American government from

principal change of the last fifty years has been the foundation of numerous post-graduate schools, largely moulded by German influence."—A. E. Shipley, *University education in the United States (Living Age, June 7, 1919)*.—"In the first quarter of the nineteenth century all students of all the colleges [in the United States] were pursuing practically the same course. The common branches were Latin, Greek and Mathematics, including, in some colleges, on the one side Arithmetic, and in some, on the other side Calculus. Of the classical authors a larger part was read than is now usually read except by those who specialize in this department. The two chief ancient languages and mathematics represented the leading pursuits of the first three years. In the Senior year philosophy became dominant. Butler's 'Analogy,' Paley's 'Evidences,' Stewart's or Brown's 'Philosophy,' and Locke's 'Essay on Human Understanding' were the more common books read. In most institutions natural philosophy was required in at least a single year. Logic still held a place, but the place was not so large as in the former time. In a few colleges Hebrew was yet retained, although in most colleges it had been dropped. French,

Spanish, Political Economy, Chemistry, Geology and Botany had begun to appear. The most conspicuous and impressive addition made to the course of study in the first decade of the last century [1800-1810] we find in the field of science. Chemistry was the first to secure a more worthy place. . . . The first teaching of chemistry in American institutions was professional; it formed a part of the instruction in *Materia Medica* in medical schools. . . . At Harvard, a generation later, Josiah P. Cooke, enthusiastic, laborious, having some knowledge of Liebig's methods and meeting the cost of his apparatus from his own purse, taught the subject for seven years before his laboratory course was formally admitted to the regular curriculum. . . . The first laboratory in physics of the United States was built at the Institute of Technology in Boston, through the suggestion of Prof. W. B. Rogers. Slowly the subject found its way into the colleges. . . . The incoming of German [tendencies] into American life and the academic course was due more to personal than to literary influences. . . . The most direct effect of this residence [of American students at German universities] is seen in the changes wrought in the Harvard curriculum through George Ticknor. . . . The vast enlargement of the field of knowledge . . . had one most significant academic consequence. It . . . resulted in the establishment of what is commonly known as the elective system of studies. . . . The institutions most directly and intimately associated with the development of the voluntary system were William and Mary College, the University of Virginia, Harvard, and Brown; and the men most vitally connected with this development were Thomas Jefferson, George Ticknor, Francis Wayland, and Charles W. Eliot. These institutions and personalities represented a powerful quartette. . . . [The spread of German influence and of the elective system led to the development of the graduate school and the introduction of new degrees.] The first important endeavor made to offer instruction to graduates occurred at Yale in the fifth decade of the last century. . . . In the year 1872, when Yale was reorganizing its Department of Graduate Instruction, Harvard was making also a formal beginning. This beginning was the result, in part at least, of the enlargement of the elective system of studies. The elective system necessitated at Harvard, as it always necessitates, an increase in the number of teachers. The system also encouraged, if it did not oblige, students to pursue their work to an extent which had not formerly been possible. The system created a scholastic atmosphere; it gave birth to scholarly aspirations. Out of such conditions arose the movement for graduate instruction. It represented the culmination of the German influence in the higher education of America. The Graduate School stood and stands for the Philosophical Faculty of the German university. . . . The progress of graduate instruction received a great impulse in the establishment of Johns Hopkins University in the year 1876. . . . Clark University at Worcester, established in 1889, continued the tradition established at Baltimore. . . . State universities were able to persuade legislatures that it was the duty of the community to provide facilities for research. . . . Down to the middle of the nineteenth century the two degrees of Bachelor of Arts and of Master of Arts were the only ones conferred as standing for specific intellectual attainments. The degrees of Doctor of Divinity and of Doctor of Laws were also the only honorary degrees. But with the enlargement of the field of

knowledge, and with the increasing specialization in the cultivation of this field, began the creation of new degrees to represent these diverse and special attainments. The first degree of Bachelor of Science was conferred by Harvard in 1851. The growth in the study of modern languages, as well as the enlargement of the field of science, prompted the creation of a literary degree, which has taken the form usually of Bachelor of Literature or of Bachelor of Philosophy. The specialization in degrees has proceeded to a high degree of detail. . . . The most important of all degrees of recent creation is the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This degree, introduced from the German university, was the first conferred in the United States in the beginning of the seventh decade. It has in twenty-five and more years come to be regarded as almost exclusively a professional degree [written in 1906]. . . . The peculiar contribution which Charles W. Eliot made in and through Harvard University to the higher education was the promotion of the elective system of studies. . . . The elective system has in the last third of the last century become a prevailing condition in all well-equipped colleges. Its basis in Psychology and Sociology, as well as its relationship to the promotion of scholarship, has resulted in its general and free adoption. Under it, as both a condition and a force, have occurred the changes wrought in the curriculum of the colleges in the last generation. These changes have in certain subjects of study been slight but in most profound."—C. F. Thwing, *History of higher education in America*, pp. 300-303, 310-312, 418-420, 428-429, 436, 441.—"The virus of the elective system, as put into practice by Harvard, was making itself felt. . . . [In a few years] it had swept the United States, and the reaction against it in its extreme form had begun to set in. Having been freed through the elective system from the shackles of an antiquated and outworn scheme of studies, institutions now began to grope for some new unifying principle to guard against the dangers of intellectual license which appeared in the general working out of the elective system. The new mechanism is the group system [written in 1919]. Under various manifestations this principle of curriculum formation has been generally adopted in the public and nonsectarian institutions of the country."—S. P. Capen and W. C. John, *Survey of higher education, 1916-1918 (United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin no. 22, 1919)*.

"The oldest existing American State University is the University of Georgia, founded by the General Assembly of that state the twenty-seventh of January, 1785, and opened to receive students in 1801. The University of Michigan is generally regarded as the pioneer State University of the West for it dates its inception with the year 1817. Indiana University and the Universities of Wisconsin and Missouri all originated with state grants of land in the late thirties of the last century. The University of Illinois came into being by legislative order in the year 1867. All the earlier State Universities of the West began on the basis of public land gifts or small appropriations. These and others of the Trans-Mississippi region which have come into being more recently have been encouraged to grow or become established under the stimulus of the Morrill Land Grant Law passed by the Federal Congress in 1862. These typical State Universities are regarded as the consummation of the Public School System in their several states and are controlled by the state through boards of trustees or regents, chosen by widely

differing methods. . . . Every State University is regarded as a popular institution answerable to the people of the state, either directly or indirectly, for the service rendered and is supported in whole or in part by public funds—federal and state. There are but two institutions of the State University type in New England—the University of Vermont and the University of Maine. . . . The University of Maine, the only other institution of this type in New England, is of much more recent origin than the University of Vermont. It found its inspiration for the beginning of institutional existence in the Morrill law of 1862. The original name of the institution, the State Agricultural College and College of Mechanic Arts, changed by legislative action to the University of Maine in 1897, was made effective on Commencement day, the twenty-third of June in that year. . . . Ohio has three State Universities—Ohio University at Athens, Miami University at Oxford and Ohio State University at Columbus. Since the state recognizes all three of these institutions, each one of them has membership in the National Association of State Universities. . . . Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut are without State Universities, but Colleges of Agricultural and Mechanic Arts have been established under the provisions of the Federal Land Grant Law of 1862 [see NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1693-1910] and there has been agitation in at least two of these states for the enlargement of their state colleges to permit their designation as State Universities.”—G. P. Benton, *State university* (*Education*, Jan., 1916). —“Some of our modern municipal universities . . . [have developed] a system introduced a few years ago by Dean Herman Schneider, of the University of Cincinnati. This system is called ‘The co-operative method.’ According to the co-operative method the students attend lectures and recitations in the university and during alternate fortnights, under the supervision of the staff, they work for pay in the city at the application of their special subjects. The students are divided into two sections and relieve one another in the class rooms and the shops, so that the work of the college and of the employers is uninterrupted. . . . All municipal universities aim to meet the increasing need of citizens trained for civic usefulness. They study the special wants of the city in which they are located, and aim to fill them by offering appropriate courses. They aim to co-operate with the various municipal departments and institutions by rendering them expert service, and by receiving corresponding benefit. . . . President Parke R. Kolbe of the Akron municipal university, defines a municipal university as “an institution of higher learning supported in greater part by municipal taxation, requiring graduation from a first-grade high school for entrance, and maintaining a four-year course in arts and letters, around which a greater or less number of other schools or departments may be grouped. Its participation in technical, professional, and graduate work or in civic co-operation will naturally vary with city and institution.’ Under a strict application of this definition according to President Kolbe, there are seven municipal universities or colleges in the United States: the University of Cincinnati, the College of the City of New York, the Municipal University of Akron, Hunter College of the City of New York, Toledo University, the College of Charleston, and the University of Louisville.”—J. L. Patterson, *Municipal universities of the United States* (*National Municipal Review*, Oct., 1916, pp. 553-555).

ALSO IN: C. W. Dabney, *Municipal university*.—F. W. Clark, *Evolution of the American university* (*Forum*, Sept., 1901).—T. Veblen, *Higher learning in America*.—J. H. Baker, *American university progress*.—C. F. Thwing, *Universities of the world*.—Idem, *American colleges and universities in the Great War, 1914-1918*.—E. R. Holme, *American university: An Australian view*.—E. E. Slosson, *Great American universities*.—C. W. Eliot, *University administration*.—A. Flexner, *American college, 19th-20th centuries*.—Higher education for women in the United States.—Independent colleges for the higher education of women began with the founding of Mount Holyoke Seminary (now Mount Holyoke College) at South Hadley, Massachusetts, in 1837, as the result of a campaign by Mary Lyon. But it was not until after the Civil War that the period of the establishment of women's colleges began. Elmira was chartered as a college in 1855. In 1861, Vassar College was founded, followed by Wells, 1868, Smith, 1871, Wellesley, 1875, Bryn Mawr, 1880, Mills, 1885, Goucher, 1888, and Rockford, 1892. “Independent colleges for women of the same grade as those for men are peculiar to the United States. . . . Of the independent colleges for women . . . the so-called ‘four great colleges for women’ Vassar, Smith, Wellesley, Bryn Mawr . . . are included among the fifty-eight colleges of the United States [written in 1906].”—M. C. Thomas, *Education of women* (N. M. Butler, ed., *Education in the United States: A series of monographs*, pp. 18, 19).—“The coeducation of men and women in colleges, . . . and at the same time the college education of women, began in Ohio, the earliest settled of the western states. In 1833 Oberlin Collegiate Institute (not chartered as a college until 1850) was opened, admitting from the first both men and women. Oberlin was at that time . . . hampered by maintaining a secondary school as large as its college department, but it was the first institution for collegiate instruction in the United States where large numbers of men and women were educated together, and the uniformly favorable testimony of its faculty had great influence on the side of coeducation. In 1853 Antioch college, also in Ohio, was opened, and admitted from the beginning men and women on equal terms. Its first president, Horace Mann, was one of the most brilliant and energetic educational leaders in the United States, and his ardent advocacy of coeducation, based on his own practical experience, had great weight with the public. From this time on it became a custom, as state universities were opened in the far west, to admit women. Utah, opened in 1850, Iowa, opened in 1856, Washington, opened in 1862, Kansas, opened in 1866, Minnesota, opened in 1868, and Nebraska, opened in 1871, were coeducational from the outset. Indiana, opened as early as 1820, admitted women in 1868. The state University of Michigan was, at this time, the most important western university, and the only western university well known in the east before the war. When, in 1870, it opened its doors to women, they were for the first time in America admitted to instruction of true college grade. . . . The example of the University of Michigan was quickly followed by all the other state universities of the west. . . . All the state universities of the west, organized since 1871, have admitted women from the first [written in 1900]. In the twenty states which, for convenience, I shall classify as western, there are now twenty state universities open to women, and, in four territories, Arizona, Oklahoma, Indian and New Mexico,

the one university of each territory is open to women. Of the eleven state universities of the southern states the two most western admitted women first, as was to be expected. . . . The greater part of the college education of the United States, however, is carried on in private, not in state universities. In 1897 over 70 per cent of all the college students in the United States were studying in private colleges, so that for women's higher education their admission to private colleges is really a matter of much greater importance. The part taken by Cornell university in New York state in opening private colleges to women was as significant as the part taken by Michigan in opening state universities. . . . The example set by Cornell was followed very slowly by the other private colleges of the New England and middle states. For the next twenty years the colleges in this section of the United States admitting women might be counted on the fingers of one hand. In Massachusetts Boston university opened its department of arts in 1873, and admitted women to it from the first; but no college for men followed the example of Boston until 1883, when the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the most important technical and scientific school in the state, and one of the most important in the United States, admitted women. . . . In 1892, Tufts College was opened to women. In the west and south the case was different, and the list of private colleges that one after another have become coeducational is too long to be inserted here. Among new coeducational foundations the most important are, on the Pacific coast, the Leland Stanford Junior University, opened in 1891, and, in the middle west, Chicago University, opened in 1892."—M. C. Thomas, *Education of women (Education in the United States: A series of monographs, pp. 6, 9)*.—"In addition to the education of women through coeducation and through separate colleges, the community has, in a few of its older institutions, determined to make use of these institutions for the giving of an education to women. . . . Among the more significant of these institutions are: Radcliffe College, affiliated with Harvard, which was opened in the year 1879; Barnard, affiliated with Columbia; the Woman's College of Brown University, of Providence; the College for Women of Western Reserve University, of Cleveland; and the H. Sophia Newcomb College, affiliated with Tulane University, of New Orleans. In certain of these colleges like Radcliffe, Barnard, and Brown, the larger part of the instruction is given by members of the Faculty of the older college for men. In the College for Women of Western Reserve University, the Faculty is coördinate with the Faculty of the Adelbert College for men in the same University."—C. F. Thwing, *History of higher education in America, p. 350*.—See also EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Secondary education; WOMAN'S RIGHTS: 1673-1800; 1861-1910.

ALSO IN: J. M. Taylor, *Before Vassar opened*.

1912-1921.—British empire.—Congress of Universities.—Higher institutions in Ceylon, Malta, Singapore and Trinidad.—The fifty-eight recognized universities of the United Kingdom and the Dominions are organized into the Congress of Universities of the British Empire, delegates to which met in England in 1912 and in 1921 to consider university problems of common interest. Other universities in the British empire than those mentioned elsewhere in this article include University College at Colombo, Ceylon [1921]; the University of Malta [1769, reconstituted, 1921]; the King

Edward VIII College of Medicine at Singapore [c. 1916], and the West Indian Agricultural College at St. Augustine, Trinidad (1921).—See also EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: England and Wales.

ALSO IN: *Yearbook of the Universities of the Empire, 1922*.

1914-1916.—National organizations in the United States.—Standard for the American university.—"The colleges and universities have maintained a department in the [National Education] Association, but it has never represented the best effort of the higher institutions. . . . The Association of State Universities, . . . the oldest of these organizations [considering the problems of higher education nationally] . . . has passed through the stage of merely traditional views, discussion of minor problems, and promotion of the class of institutions represented, and is taking up broad questions. It has done something to mark the form and function of the university, its relation to the school system and to the state, and is now [1916] considering 'economy of time' as affecting the college and the university. It has consistently promoted the idea of a national university. . . . The Association of American Universities represents the great historic institutions of the country and the older state universities. The formal basis of institutional membership is a well-developed graduate school. . . . In 1914 an Association of Urban Universities was organized in Washington, D. C., to consider problems peculiar to this class of institutions. . . . In January, 1915, the Association of American Colleges was organized in Chicago. . . . The Association of University Professors was formed in New York City, January 1, 1915. . . . Some standardizing of the college has been done by the U. S. Bureau of Education, the Carnegie Foundation, and other agencies. The National Association of State Universities within a few years has defined a standard for the American university [of which the substance is as follows]: . . . An institution having a four-year college course based on a four-year high school—two years in continuation of the high school and two years looking toward the university; a graduate school based on the four-year college; one or more professional schools requiring two years of college for admission. The earlier completion of the college and of entrance to the university was more than suggested. This definition was merely tentative, applying to existing conditions, and is already regarded as antiquated. President Butler's definition, made several years ago, remains essentially right to-day: 'Any institution where students, adequately trained by previous study of the liberal arts and sciences, are led into special fields of learning and research by teachers of high excellence and originality; and where, by the agency of libraries, museums, laboratories, and publications, knowledge is conserved, advanced, and disseminated.'"—J. H. Baker, *American university progress and college reform, pp. 139, 142, 143, 35, 73*.

1914-1922.—Latin-American universities.—Recent foundations.—In 1914 the Professional Institute of Santo Domingo was formed into a university by presidential decree. In 1918 a university of Guatamala to be known as Universidad Nacional was established by government decree. Brazil's single university, the University of Rio de Janeiro, was founded in 1920, with twenty-five faculties which confer degrees. It is a state institution. Argentina established a national university of the Litoral in Rosario in 1920 and a provincial University of Cuyo in 1921 for the provinces of Mendoza, San Juan and San Luis. In 1922 the

Central University of Venezuela at Caracas was reopened after being closed since 1912. In addition to the National University of Mexico at Mexico City, which was reorganized in 1910, Mexico established the National University of the Southeast at Merida (Yucatan) in 1922.

1916.—**Modern tendencies in American universities and colleges.**—In connection with the study, "American University Progress," made by J. H. Baker in 1916, inquiries on modern trends in higher education were submitted to the leading colleges and universities. The results may be summarized as follows: Such few changes as were reported in the graduate schools showed a tendency to develop graduate work slowly on a sound and discriminating basis and to build up a few strong departments rather than many weak ones. Changes in professional schools were indicative of higher standards. Minnesota reported the development of graduate work in medicine with a view to training medical scientists, teachers and specialists, the placing of pharmacy on a full high-school entrance basis, and the organization of a combined six-year course in arts and dentistry. A number of the leading colleges of pharmacy had increased the length of their minimum courses to three full university years and reported increased attendance upon their four-year courses leading to the degree B. S. in pharmacy. Ohio State University had lengthened the dental course from three to four years with a view to advancing the cultural tone of the dental profession. The University of Cincinnati was organizing a scientific school of dentistry and was proposing to develop a school for sanitarians in cooperation with the Board of Health. The College of Medicine of this university had just been opened in the new General Hospital, which had been built with special reference to teaching and research. At Johns Hopkins, full-time clinical professorships in surgery, medicine and pediatrics had been established. Oberlin Theological School had been put on a graduate basis and Teachers College (Columbia University) was on a graduate basis with the exception of the departments for kindergarten and elementary school supervisors. In regard to the efficiency of teaching many institutions reported that they were raising the standards of scholarship and research. Oberlin was making efficiency tests of its college work. The Harvard department of economics had invited the division of education to inspect its work and report upon its methods and efficiency. There was a general movement to place law and medicine on the two-year college basis. The tendency to improve standards, add special schools and increase "extension" service was marked. Technological schools of commerce, agriculture, engineering and household arts were developing facilities of public service. Conservative institutions of the East as well as younger western universities were experimenting with the university extension movement. (See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century; Extension work.) Replies to inquiries regarding student problems showed a general tendency to adopt some form of student government (see ACADEMIC FREEDOM) including the honor system.—Based on J. H. Baker, *American university progress and college reform*, pp. 175-176.—See also EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century; Correspondence schools; United States: Junior college; EDUCATION, ART: Modern Period: United States: Universities.

See also AVIATION: Development of airplanes and air service: 1918-1921: Aerial law; YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: 1858-1885; 1885-1890;

Post war activities: 1919-1923; YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: 1872-1905.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, London. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1828-1922.

UNIVERSITY EXTENSION. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Extension work; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1848; PRISON REFORM: United States: Results of prison reform movement.

UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Regents of the. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1748-1813.

UNIVERSITY TEST ACT (1871). See CHURCH OF ENGLAND: 19th century; ENGLAND: 1871.

UNKIAR-SKELESSI, Treaty of (1833). See TURKEY: 1821-1840; 1831-1840; BOSPORUS: 1832-1878; DARDANELLES: 1833-1914.

UNLEARNED PARLIAMENT. See PARLIAMENT: English: 1404.

UNSTRUTT, Battle of the (1075). See SAXONY: 1073-1075.

UNTERMYER, Samuel (1858-), American lawyer. Chief counsel of the New York state legislative committee on housing in 1920. See HOUSING: United States: New York State legislation.

UNTERWALDEN, one of the three original Swiss cantons. It is bounded by Lucerne, the Lake of Lucerne, Uri and Bern. See SWITZERLAND: Three forest cantons.

UNUM SANCTUM, Decretal of (1301). See PAPACY: 1294-1348.

UNYORO, part of the Uganda protectorate, northwest of Uganda, Africa. See UGANDA: 1897-1898.

UNZAGA, Luis de (1720-1790), Spanish soldier. Governor of Louisiana, 1772-1777. See LOUISIANA: 1770-1797.

UPANISHADS, philosophical treatises forming the third division of the Vedas. "The earliest Upanishads date back to some six hundred years before our era. On these early Upanishads rests almost all of the philosophic, and much of the religious, thought of India to-day. . . . Respecting the transcendental ideas of God and the Soul the Upanishads teach doctrines which at times appear opposed one to the other. . . . Sometimes God is declared to be a personal God presiding over the world and the soul of man. Sometimes God is held to transcend the world, abiding above and apart from the world of phenomena. Finally God becomes purely spiritual and the world unreal in a spiritual unity of all. The question which Upanishad thought set itself to solve was how, if in the Beginning there was One only, he had resolved himself in a known world of phenomena. What was the material out of which a spiritual Being had created a world of reality? If there existed matter, how had that matter been created by a God who was One only? The answers of the Upanishads are held by orthodox thought in India not to rest solely on abstract metaphysical reasoning, but to be divine revelations. The Upanishads, however, contain many solutions of the universe, idealistic, pantheistic, and theistic. The question, therefore, which Indian thought had to answer was how, if the Upanishads hold a divine revelation, their speculations respecting God and the soul can be reconciled one with the other and be shown to contain only one consistent divine revelation. Whatever the answer may be, orthodox thought in India holds that the nature of God is known and can be explained only through the correct interpretation of texts of Vedas and

Upnishads, or of other works as are of such undisputed authority as to be considered revelation. . . . In India of to-day, to orthodox thought, the Upnishads are held to be as full of spiritual life and philosophic thought as they were through the past ages."—R. W. Frazer, *Indian thought, past and present*, pp. 47-50.—See also HINDU LITERATURE.

Also in: A. E. Gough, *Philosophy of the Upnishads*.

UPCHURCH POTTERY.—The Upchurch marshes, on the Medway, above Sheerness, were the site of extensive potteries in the time of the Roman occupation of Britain, and remains of the ware are abundant in the neighborhood.

UPINGTON, Battle of. See **WORLD WAR: 1914: VI. Africa: b, 2; SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1914.**

UPPER LOUISIANA. See **MISSOURI.**

UPPER PERU. See **BOLIVIA: 1825-1826; CHARCAS, LAS.**

UPPER RHINE. See **GERMANY: 1789.**

UPSALA, Battle of (1520). See **SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 1397-1527.**

UPSAKOKAS, or CROWS, North American Indian tribe. See **SIQUAN FAMILY.**

UPSHUR, Abel Parker (1790-1844), American statesman. Secretary of the navy, 1841-1843; Secretary of state, 1843-1844. See **U. S. A.: 1841-1844.**

UR OF THE CHALDEES, early Babylonian city mentioned in the Bible as the home of Abraham. "The Ur Kasdim, i. e. 'Ur of the Chaldeans' in the Hebrew Scriptures, is the modern Mugheir, southeast of Babylon; on clay-tablets discovered in the ruins of this place we find cuneiform symbols, which are to be read as Uru."—M. Duncker, *History of antiquity*, bk. 2, ch. 1.—See also **LIBRARIES: Ancient: Babylonia and Assyria.**

URAL-ALTAIC LANGUAGE. See **PHILOLOGY: 20.**

URAL-ALTAIC RACE. See **PAN-TURANISM.**

URANUS, seventh major planet in the solar system. See **ASTRONOMY: 1781-1846.**

URARDA. See **ALARODIANS; ARARAT.**

URBAN (Saint), (d. 230), pope 222-230.

Urban II (Odo or Otho or Eudes de Lagary) (d. 1099), pope, 1088-1099. Preached the First Crusade at the Council of Clermont in 1095. See **CRUSADES: 1095; EUROPE: Middle Ages: Crusades, etc.**

Urban III (Uberto Crevelli) (d. 1187), pope, 1185-1187.

Urban IV (Jacques Pantaléon) (d. 1264), pope, 1261-1264. Transferred the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to Charles of Anjou. See **ITALY (Southern): 1250-1268.**

Urban V (Guillaume Grimoard or Grimaud de Beauvoir) (1309-1370), pope, 1362-1370. See **PAPACY: 1352-1378; ROME: Modern city: 1367-1369.**

Urban VI (Bartolommeo Prignano) (1318-1389), pope, 1378-1389. The Great Schism, which divided the church for half a century, began during his pontificate; attempted to seize Naples, 1380-1389. See **PAPACY: 1377-1417; ITALY (Southern): 1343-1389.**

Urban VII (Giovanni Battista Castagna) (1521-1590), pope, September 15-27, 1590.

Urban VIII (Maffeo Barberini) (1568-1644), pope, 1623-1644. Annexed the duchy of Urbino, 1631, and supported the policy of France in the Thirty Years' War. See **PAPACY: 1605-1700.**

URBAN LEAGUE. See **RACE PROBLEMS: 1905-1921.**

URBARIUM OF MARIA THERESA (1849). See **AUSTRIA: 1849-1859.**

URBINO, city and archiepiscopal see of the Marches, Italy, in the province of Pesaro and Urbino. It was the capital of the duchy of the same name during the Middle Ages. It was taken by Cesare Borgia in 1499 and annexed to the states of the Church in 1631. See **ITALY: 1499-1507; PAPACY: 1605-1700.**

URFA, modern name for Edessa. See **EDESSA. 1916 (May).**—Declared independent with French and English spheres of influence. See **SYRIA: 1908-1921.**

URGA, capital of Outer Mongolia, about 700 miles northwest of Peking. It is the holy city of the Mongols and the residence of the Hutuktu or "Living Buddha" of the Lamaist church. Its population in 1920 was estimated at 40,000.

URI, one of the three original Swiss cantons. See **SWITZERLAND: Three forest cantons.**

URICONIUM, or Viroconium, important Roman town in Britain, extensive remains of which have been unearthed at modern Wroxeter. It was totally destroyed by the West Saxons in 583. "A British poet in verse still left to us sings piteously the death-song of Uriconium, 'the white town in the valley,' the town of white stones gleaming among the green woodlands."—J. R. Green, *Making of England*, ch. 5.

URMIA, or URUMIAH, town of Azerbaijan in northwestern Persia on Lake Urumiah. It was captured by the Turks in 1918. See **WORLD WAR: 1918: VI. Turkish theater: a, 9.**

UROSH. See **STEPHEN UROSH.**

URQUHART, David (1805-1877), British diplomat and political writer. Secretary of the British embassy at Constantinople, 1835-1836. See **TURKEY: 19th century.**

URQUIZA, Justo José (1800-1870), Argentine soldier and political leader. First president of the Argentine confederation, 1853-1859. See **ARGENTINA: 1810-1874.**

URSCINUS, or Ursinus, antipope, 366-384. See **PAPACY: 42-461.**

URSINI. See **ORSINI.**

URSULINES, religious order. The origin of the order of the Ursulines "is ascribed to Angela di Brescia, about the year 1537, though the Saint from whom it received its name, Ursula Benincasa, a native of Naples, was born ten years afterwards. . . . The duties of those holy sisters were the purest within the circle of human benevolence—to minister to the sick, to relieve the poor, to console the miserable, to pray with the penitent."—G. Waddington, *History of the church*, ch. 19, sect. 6.

URUGUAY, smallest republic in South America. In 1920 the population was 1,494,953. "The official name 'La Republica Oriental del Uruguay', or Republic of the eastern bank of the River Uruguay, very clearly locates the position of this small South American state, lying south of Brazil between the 30th and 35th degrees of south latitude and 52nd and 58th degrees of west longitude. On three sides it is bounded by water, on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, and on the south and west by the rivers Plate and Uruguay which form the division between it and the Argentine Republic."—H. R. Mill, *International geography*, p. 856.—"Uruguay has an area of 72,210 square miles, . . . and is the smallest republic in South America. . . . The most notable feature of Uruguay is its extent of long rolling plains, comprising almost the entire length of the country, occasionally broken by low mountain ranges and copiously

watered by numerous streams. It is naturally suited for both sheep and cattle, the raising of which is the principal industry. Agriculture is also followed to a considerable extent, nearly all of the cereals being grown."—Pan American Union, *Uruguay*, p. 3.—See also LATIN AMERICA: Agriculture; Map of South America; also Map of Communications and commercial languages of America.

Ancient name. See BANDA ORIENTAL.

Aborigines.—"In pre-Columbian times Uruguay was occupied by several distinct ethnical groups, all living in a state of nature, or at least a low stage of culture little removed from sheer savagery. Such were the *Minuanos*, the *Boanes* (*Bohanes*), *Yaros*, and *Chanos* (*Chanases*), some of whom were, no doubt, of Guarani stock, but others, perhaps the majority, were either allied to the Pampean Querandies, or else distinctly connected with the Parana and Gran Chaco natives. All these were confined to the western and northern districts—the banks and islands of Uruguay and the wooded tracts towards the present Brazilian frontier—while the rest of the land was roamed by the numerous and powerful *Charrua* nation. The Guarani tribes, for the most part of a mild and gentle disposition, were soon reduced and absorbed by the Spanish settlers, or else exterminated by the Charruas, who were dominant in the whole region from the Atlantic to the Uruguay."—*Stanford's compendium of geography and travel: Central and South America*, v. 1, p. 429.—See also PAMPAS TRIBES.

1515-1624.—Discovery by Juan Diaz de Solis.—Settlement.—"Juan Diaz de Solis discovered the Rio de la Plata in the year 1515, and it was he who first landed on Uruguayan soil and took possession of the country in the name of the King of Spain. This act cost him his life, for the savage Charruas, who at that time inhabited the country, attacked and killed him and all his party. The country was explored by several other Spaniards and Portuguese, but it was not until the Jesuits arrived in the year 1624 that permanent settlements were established. The territory was then placed under the jurisdiction of the governor of Paraguay."—Pan American Union, *Uruguay*, p. 3.

1714-1777.—Contest between Spain and Portugal.—Relinquishment by the latter.—Inclusion in vicerealty of Buenos Ayres. See ARGENTINA: 1580-1777.

1806-1815.—Montevideo captured by the British.—Declaration of independence from Spain.—"In the year 1806, Great Britain being at war with Spain, a fleet was dispatched to the Rio de la Plata, under Sir Home Popham, who attacked Montevideo, but was repulsed. A second attempt, made in the year following, with a stronger force, was more successful, and on January 23, 1807, the British captured the fort of Montevideo after a siege of eight days. They were obliged, however, to evacuate their position a few months later, when General Whitelocke was defeated at Buenos Aires. The movement for independence in Uruguay began with the declaration of independence at Buenos Aires on May 23, 1810. Uruguay was declared a part of the United Province of Rio de la Plata and on May 18, 1811, the Spanish troops were defeated and utterly routed by the Uruguayan general, José Artigas."—Pan American Union, *Uruguay*.—"The War of Independence (A.D. 1814) released all this part of South America from the Spanish yoke, thanks to the efforts of Admiral Brown, who destroyed the Spanish fleet, and to General Alvear, who took Monte Video by land.

One year afterwards, however,—the same year which saw the battle of Waterloo—Uruguay broke away from the Argentine Federation under José Artigas."—P. E. Martin, *Through five republics*, p. 362.—See also ARGENTINA: 1806-1820.

1821-1905.—Annexation to Brazil.—Independence established.—Internal strife.—War with Paraguay.—Rapid succession of presidents.—Colorados and Blancos.—"In 1821 the country was annexed to Brazil as the Province Cis-Platino [and passed under Portuguese rule], but naturally the new order of things did not prosper. Four years afterwards—viz., 1825, thirty-three patriots, the famous 'treinte-tres,' after whom a whole Province and numerous towns and streets have been named, under the leadership of one Lavalleja, set out from Buenos Aires to raise the standard of revolt, and in the following two years the Argentinos, again under General Alvear, having forgotten the old dispute with their neighbors, helped them to shake off the hated Brazilian yoke, and the Republic of Uruguay, thus aided, emerged triumphant."—P. F. Martin, *Through five republics*, p. 362.—"The war between Argentina and Brazil culminating in the battle of Huzaingo . . . was followed by the Argentine-Brazilian treaty of 1828 that guaranteed the independence of the region upon the east bank of the Uruguay River. A clause of this treaty provided that the proposed constitution of Uruguay should be approved by representatives of both Argentine and Brazil before it should be put into operation. . . . In November 1828 a Constitutional Assembly for Uruguay assembled at San José. It appointed a provisional Governor, who on December 13, 1828 issued a decree announcing that all foreign officials should cease to exercise authority within the territory of Uruguay . . . after some debate the Assembly decided to designate the new state *La Republica Oriental del Uruguay*. A Constitution for this state was approved by the Constituent Assembly on September 10, 1829. . . . The Uruguayan Constitution of 1830 provided for a centralized form of government. It vested executive authority in a President, a cabinet and a permanent Committee of Congress. The President, who was to be elected by Congress for four years, was vested with important powers. . . . The unit of local government was the department. In the chief town of each department a *jefe politico* appointed by the President, should act as the executive magistrate. . . . The Congress of Uruguay elected General Rivera as President of the Republic; and he was installed in office . . . on November 6, 1830. In July 1832 General Lavalleja started a revolt against President Rivera; but two months later the President routed the insurrectionists at Tupambay. Lavalleja was consequently forced to seek a refuge in Brazil. The hero of 1825 started another uprising two years later, only to be routed again. . . . [A general named Rosas, sent soldiers under Lavalleja to aid Oribe against Rivera.] On September 19, 1836 Oribe defeated Rivera at the battle of Carpinteria. This battle—where Oribe's soldiers carried white pennants, while Rivera's soldiers bore red pennants—marked the first appearance in the interneine struggles of Uruguay of the *Blancos* and the *Colorados*—factions or parties which have divided the sympathies of the Uruguayan people from 1836 until the present day [written in 1922]. On March 10, 1839 Rivera, who was assured of support from the French and from Argentine *émigrés*, issued a proclamation declaring war against the tyrant Rosas but not upon the people of Argentine. . . . The years from 1843 to 1851 in

which Montevideo was besieged, are known in Uruguayan history as *la guerra grande*. Upon the eve of the downfall of Rosas on Oct. 8, 1851, in accordance with an agreement between himself and the government at Montevideo, General Urquiza made a treaty with Oribe which provided for the cessation of the war and left the *Colorados* in power. . . . Shortly after the close of the struggle Brazilian diplomacy scored a triumph by the negotiation of a group of treaties with the Uruguayan minister in Rio de Janeiro. By the second article of the treaty signed on October 12, 1851, an agreement was reached . . . in regard to the boundaries between Uruguay and Brazil. . . . General Venancio Flores, a *Colorado* who became president in 1854, asked Brazil to intervene in the distracted republic; hence for three years Brazilian soldiers were stationed upon Uruguayan soil. In 1857 a short-sighted politician named Juan Gomez formed a chimerical plan for the annexation of Uruguay to the province of Buenos Aires and the creation of a republic designated the 'United States of la Plata.' A band of invaders from Argentine that aimed to carry out the plan was eventually defeated and its leaders were ruthlessly shot. During the presidency of Gabriel A. Pereira some administrative reforms were made and the Jesuits were expelled from Uruguay. Bernardo Berro, who became president . . . in 1860, also essayed certain reforms, but during his administration General Flores invaded the republic and war flared up again.—W. S. Robertson, *History of the Latin-American nations*, pp. 257-259.—"General Flores, introduced by the Brazilians, came into office in 1864, and declaring himself 'Provisional President', seems to have organized a fairly liberal kind of government, for under his auspices the country commenced to recover slowly from its painful trials and even to prosper. Shortly afterwards, however, General Flores entered into a war with Paraguay, having as his allies both Brazil and Argentine. In 1866 General Vidal became president, and two years afterwards General Flores was killed in an insurrection at Monte Video. One month after that General Lorenzo Batlle became President, but he was not allowed to remain in peace very long. In 1870 a new civil war broke out, which lasted several years, when a President, *mirabile dictu*, elected by both sides, came into power. Again, however, peace proved of only a transitory nature, for the representatives of the 'Reds' (*Colorados*), under the leadership of Colonel Latorre, broke out into rebellion, and made Pedro Varela President but deposed him the following year. Then Colonel Latorre proclaimed himself Dictator. With a rod of iron he ruled until 1880, when, throwing up the Presidency in disgust, and declaring that 'the Uruguayans were wholly ungovernable,' he relinquished the reins of office to Colonel Santos, who had risen from the ranks to become a creature of Colonel Latorre. He made an excellent deputy-tyrant. Numerous attempts to assassinate Colonel Santos finally resulted in his being seriously wounded, so that he was compelled to relinquish the Presidency, his place being taken by General Tajés. . . . General Tajés . . . did not reign very long, and was succeeded [March, 1890] by Dr. Herrera y Obes, [the first president of Uruguay whose term was undisturbed by armed insurrection]. In due course he gave way to General Idiarte Borda [1894], during whose Presidency the 'Whites' (*Blancos*) rose in rebellion, headed by Colonel Sarivia, the result of which was that Borda was assassinated on his return from the Cathedral on the anniversary of National Independence Day

[1897]. Borda was succeeded by Cuestas, who diplomatically divided the government into two sections, the Whites and the Reds, and, seeking to be 'all things to all men,' continued to keep peace for the time being. . . . Señor Cuestas was President for five and a half years, during which time he worked energetically for the good of his country."—P. F. Martin, *Through five republics*, pp. 362-364.—In 1904 a "Nationalistic" revolt under President Batle of Ordóñez disturbed the country (see below: 1904), but by 1905 peace was established.

1890.—Represented at First International American Conference. See AMERICAN REPUBLICS, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF: 1890.

20th century.—Governmental provisions for education. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: Latin America.

1901-1906.—Participation in Second and Third International conferences of American Republics. See AMERICAN REPUBLICS, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF: 1901-1902; 1906.

1904.—Rebellion and prolonged civil war.—On January 8, 1904, the American minister at Montevideo reported by telegram to the State Department at Washington "that another crisis is at hand in Uruguay; that encounters have taken place between groups of 'Blanco,' and the Government forces, and that the former, who were neither concentrated nor well organized, have been dispersed. A number were killed and wounded. The Government is making an aggressive campaign and demands obedience to the constituted authority as a condition before peace negotiations will be entered into." This was the beginning of a state of civil war that was prolonged through nine months, with infinite harm to the country. When peace came, at the end of September, it was practically bought from the insurgents, the terms of submission, as officially announced, including the following: "Sixth. Incorporation into the army of all the chiefs and officers included in the amnesty law. Seventh. A mixed committee appointed by agreement by the Government and insurgents will distribute the sum of \$100,000 between the chiefs, officers, and soldiers of the rebel forces."

1907.—Administration of Williman.—"The administration of Claudio Williman, a leader of the *Colorado* party, who was inaugurated on March 1, 1907, was signalized by significant reforms. He soon issued a decree reorganizing the cabinet. A supreme court was established and other reforms carried out. . . . So carefully did President Williman husband the nation's revenues that he left in the treasury an unprecedented surplus of nine million pesos."—W. S. Robertson, *History of the Latin-American nations*, p. 268.

1910.—Agreement with Argentina concerning the River Plate. See ARGENTINA: 1910.

1910.—Represented at Fourth International American conference. See AMERICAN REPUBLICS, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF: 1910.

1911.—Batle y Ordóñez, second term as president.—"On March 1, 1911, Batle y Ordóñez became president for the second time. [He had been president from 1905 to 1907.] Notable among plans that were formed for public improvement was a project for a splendid capitol. . . . Political persecutions ceased, freedom of the press was observed, and significant reforms were enacted. The government began a serious study of the social welfare of its citizens."—W. S. Robertson, *History of the Latin-American nations*, p. 268.

1915.—Viera made president.—"After his inauguration in 1915 President [Feliciano] Viera an-

nounced his intention to follow the policies of his predecessor. He sanctioned various bills that aimed to promote the social welfare of the Uruguayans. Among those was an act establishing an eight-hour day, a law containing regulations designed to prevent accidents to workmen, a law providing for industrial education in primary and secondary schools, a law concerning old-age pensions, a law providing for a national inheritance tax, and another law that established government control of telegraph and telephone lines."—W. S. Robertson, *History of the Latin-American nations*, p. 269.

1915.—Pan-American Conference. See U. S. A.: 1915 (August-October).

1916.—Treaty with Peru. See PERU: 1914-1916.

1917.—Election.—Part in World War.—"A general election was held in this republic on January 15. The result was curious. The Ministerialist, or so-called 'Official' Party secured 67 out of 123 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, but they received only a minority of the votes cast by the electors, that is only 63,514 as against 65,171 cast for the opposition. The new legislature was opened on February 15."—*Annual Register*, 1917, p. 334.—"In reply to the announcement of the United States government that war existed between it and the Imperial German Government, Baltasar Brum, the Uruguayan secretary of foreign relations, declared that his government protested against Germany's submarine policy, that while determined to maintain her neutrality, yet his nation expressed her 'sympathy and moral solidarity' with the United States cause. . . . On Oct. 7, 1917 in secret session both houses of the Uruguayan Congress voted by overwhelming majorities that diplomatic relations with Germany should be severed."—W. S. Robertson, *History of the Latin-American nations*, p. 269.

1919.—Presidential election.—New constitution adopted.—Baltasar Brum inaugurated president.—"After considerable discussion about constitutional reform both inside and outside of legislative halls, a Congress assembled at Montevideo for the express purpose of revising the constitution. On October 15, 1917 it adopted a new constitution. This went into effect on March 1, 1919—the very day on which Baltasar Brum was inaugurated president. Uruguay's second constitution preserved many features of the centralized form of government established in 1830. The chief administrative unit remained the department. . . . It provides that the President shall be chosen by direct popular vote. [See ELECTIONS, PRESIDENTIAL: South American republics.] Instead of a permanent committee of Congress it provides for a national council of administration, which is composed of nine members chosen by the people to serve for six years. The council is granted jurisdiction over all administrative matters which are not expressly reserved to the President or other authorities, such as public instruction, public works, labor, agriculture, charities and sanitation. It is to prepare the budget as well as supervise elections. . . . Local government is vested in representative assemblies and in autonomous administrative councils elected in the departments by popular vote. More than a score of articles are concerned with the rights and guaranties of citizens."—W. S. Robertson, *History of the Latin-American nations*, pp. 269-270.

1919.—Represented at Paris conference. See PARIS, CONFERENCE OF: Outline of work; also VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Conditions of peace.

1919 (November).—Treaty with Paraguay. See PARAGUAY: 1919 (November).

1921.—Secretary Colby's diplomatic mission. See U. S. A.: 1921.

1922.—José Serrato elected president.—Reforms.—José Serrato, leader of the Colorado party was elected president on Nov. 26, 1922, and succeeded President Brum on Mar. 1, 1923. The year 1922 was marked by railway development, educational reform and social welfare legislation.—See also RAILROADS: 1912-1922.

See also HOUSING: South America; MASONIC SOCIETIES: Central and South America; RURAL CREDIT; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1551-1912.

URUGUAY, Constitution of. See URUGUAY: 1919.

URUMIAH. See URMIA.

URVILLE, Jules Sébastien César Dumont D'. See DUMONT D'URVILLE.

USBEGS, Turkish branch of the Tatars of Turkestan.

USCOCKS.—"During the reign of Ferdinand [emperor, 1558-1564], several bodies of Christians, quitting the provinces which had been recently conquered by the Turks, obtained from the Austrian sovereigns a refuge at Clissa, in Dalmatia, under the condition of forming themselves into a frontier militia continually in arms against the infidels, and, from their emigration, received the name of Uscocks, which, in the language of the country, signifies wanderers. They fulfilled the purpose of their establishment; and, being at length expelled by the Turks, received a new asylum at Segna, a ruined fortress in Croatia, on the coast of the Ardiatic gulph. Here, their numbers increasing by the accession of Italian banditti and other marauders, they were rendered more formidable than before; for they no longer confined their predatory incursions to the land, but became pirates by sea. . . . Their audacity increasing with success and plunder, they pillaged, without distinction, the vessels of all the nations who traded in the Adriatic." They were attacked by the Turks and the Venetians, and the latter, at length, in the early part of the 17th century, forced the Duke of Styria, who had protected the freebooters, to allow their stronghold at Segna to be demolished. "The Uscocks, being transplanted to Carlstadt, soon lost their name and distinction."—W. Coxe, *History of the House of Austria*, v. 2, ch. 42.

USDIAE, early Celtic tribe. See IRELAND: Tribes of early Celtic inhabitants.

USES, Statute of. See EQUITY LAW: 1169; COMMON LAW: 1535; 1557.

USHANT, Naval battle of. See FRANCE: 1794 (March-July).

USIPETES AND TENCTHERI.—The Usipetes and Tenctheri, two German tribes, whose home was on the lower course of the Rhine, north and south of the Lippe, being hard pressed by the Suevi, crossed the Rhine, 55 B.C., and began to spread themselves along the Valley of the Meuse. Cæsar marched against them with great promptitude, refused to parley with them, accused them of treacherous attempts to gain time, and was himself charged with wicked treachery, in seizing their chiefs who met him with pacific propositions. It is certain, at all events, that he was able to attack them when they were deprived of leaders, and to slaughter them with so little resistance that not one Roman soldier was killed. Those who escaped the sword were driven into the Rhine (probably at its point of junction with the Moselle) and almost the entire mass of 180,000 are said to have perished. The remnant took refuge with the Sicambri or Sigambri, on the farther shore of the Rhine. Cæsar demanded the surrender of

them, and, when refused, he caused his engineers to bridge the river in ten days, led his army across it and laid waste the country of the Sigambri. This was the first crossing of the Rhine by the Romans. The Suevi offered battle to the Roman invaders, but Cæsar prudently returned, and destroyed the bridge.—Cæsar, *Galic Wars*, bk. 4, ch. 1-19.—See also GERMANY: B. C. 12-9; B. C. 58-51; 3rd century.

ALSO IN: C. Merivale, *History of the Romans*, v. 1, ch. 10.

USKUB, Uscup, or Skopia, town of Serbia, capital of the department of the same time, 160 miles northwest of Salonika, on the Vardar river. It was taken from the Turks during the Balkan War and was ceded to Serbia in 1912. During the World War it was captured by the Bulgars in 1915 and retaken by the Serbians in 1918. See SERBIA: 1200-1321; TURKEY: 1912-1913; WORLD WAR: 1915; V. Balkans: b, 4; 1918; V. Balkan theater: c, 8, iii.

USURY. See CAPITALISM: 12th-16th centuries; also JEWS: England: 11th century; FRANCE: 12th-15th centuries.

UTAH, southwestern state of the United States. It has an area of 84,090 square miles and a population, in 1920, of 449,446. Its territory is cut up by numerous mountain ranges of which the most important is the Wasatch range ("the backbone of the state"). On the western side of this are the Great Salt Lake and the desert. Although it is primarily an agricultural state, mining and stock-raising are also of considerable importance. (See U. S. A.: Economic Map.) Only about twenty-five per cent of the church membership is non-Mormon.

Origin of name.—"The word Utah originated with the people inhabiting that region. Early in the 17th century, when New Mexico was first much talked of by the Spaniards, the principal nations of frequent mention as inhabiting the several sides of the locality about that time occupied were the Navajos, the Yutas, the Apaches, and the Comanches. Of the Utah nation, which belongs to the Shoshone family, there were many tribes. . . . The early orthography of the word Utah is varied." "Yuta" "was a common spelling by the early Spaniards, and might be called the proper one. Later we have 'Youta,' 'Eutaw,' 'Utaw,' and 'Utah.'"—H. H. Bancroft, *Utah (History of the Pacific states, v. 21, footnote, p. 34)*.—See also INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in North America: Southwest area; SHOSHONEAN FAMILY.

1540-1776.—Spanish explorers.—"As Francisco Vasquez de Coronado was journeying from Culiacan to the North and East in 1540 he rested at Cibola, and while waiting for the main army to come forward expeditions were sent out in various directions. One of these consisting of twenty men under Pedro de Tobar . . . proceeded northwestward. . . . Among other matters of interest information was here given of a large river [the Colorado] yet farther north. . . . Whereupon Captain García Lopez de Cárdenas was sent with twelve men to explore it. . . . A more extended and pronounced exploration was that of two Franciscan friars . . . Francisco Atanasio Domingues and Silvestre Velez de Escalante who set out from Santa Fé July 26, 1776 for the purpose of discovering a direct route to Monterey. . . . The party consisted in all of nine persons. . . . [After nearly a month's travel] they proceeded westward following up the Uintah, across Duchesne, and over the mountains with no small difficulty, to a river which they called Purísima and which they followed till on the 23rd they came in sight of the lake which the natives

called Timpanogos but which is known now as Utah Lake. . . . The Spaniards were . . . told by the Yutas of a large and wonderful body of water toward the northwest and this is what Father Escalante reports of it. . . . 'The other lake with which this communicates,' he says, 'occupies as they told us, many leagues, and its waters are injurious and extremely salt; because the Timpanois assure us that he who wets any part of his body with this water immediately feels an itching in the wet part. We are told that in the circuit of this lake there live a numerous and quiet nation called Pauguampe, which means in our language sorcerers; they speak the Comanche language, feed on herbs and drink from the various fountains or springs which are about the lake.'"—H. H. Bancroft, *Utah (History of the Pacific states, v. 21, pp. 8-9, 11, 15)*.

1825-1843.—Fur hunters and trappers.—"Half a century passes and we find U. S. fur hunters standing on the border of the Great Salt Lake, tasting its brackish waters, and wondering if it is an arm of the sea. First among these, confining ourselves to authentic records, was James Bridger, to whom belongs the honor of discovery [1825]. . . . All [trappers] were interested to know if there emptied into this sheet other streams in which they might find beavers, and if there was an outlet; hence in the spring of 1826 four men explored the lake in skin boats. . . . During this memorable year of [1825] . . . William H. Ashley of the Rocky Mountain Fur Co. at the head of one hundred and twenty men and a train of well packed horses came out from St. Louis through South Pass, and down by Great Salt Lake to Lake Utah. There he built a fort [Fort Ashley]. . . . From Great Salt Lake in August 1826 Jedediah S. Smith set out on a trapping and Exploring tour of fifteen men. Proceeding southward he traversed Utah Lake called for a time Ashley Lake [and finally appeared in California]. . . . From southeast to northwest a portion of Utah was traversed in the autumn of 1830 by a trapping party under William Wolfskill. . . . During the winter of 1832 B. L. E. Bonneville made his camp on the Salmon River and in July following was at the Green River rendezvous. Among the several trapping parties sent by him in various directions was one under Joseph Walker who with some thirty six men . . . went to trap on the streams falling into the Great Salt Lake. . . . The early immigrants to Oregon did not touch this territory and those to California via Fort Bridger for the most part merely passed through leaving no mark. . . . In 1843 John C. Fremont followed the emigrant trail through the south pass and on the 6th of September stood upon an elevated peninsula on the east side of the Great Salt Lake. . . . He was in no sense a discoverer and though he says he was the first to embark on that inland sea he is again in error."—H. H. Bancroft, *Utah (History of the Pacific states, v. 21, pp. 18-25, 28)*.

1846.—Mormon plans for moving westward.—"Mormon battalion in the Mexican War.—The first permanent settlement in Utah was made by the Mormons. By 1846 persecutions in Missouri and Illinois had caused their leaders to make serious plans for moving into the far west. (See MORMONISM: 1830-1846.) "President Young . . . wrote to Elder J. C. Little who was presiding over the Saints in the New England States on the 20th of January 1846 as follows: 'If our government should offer facilities for emigrating to the western coast embrace those facilities if possible. . . .' On receipt of this letter Elder Little . . . obtained an interview with President Polk, and also called upon

Hon. Amos Kendall, Ex-Postmaster General, who promised to take an interest in his case and see the President about it. Two days subsequently he was informed by Mr. Kendall that the President designed to take possession of California by the aid of the 'Mormons' who would receive orders to push through, take the country and fortify it in the name of the United States. . . . Before leaving, however, the Elder learned in a subsequent interview that the design of the President had been changed. . . . He also learned that the President had instructed the Secretary of War to make out dispatches to Colonel Kearney, commander of the Army of the West, relative to the contemplated Mormon Battalion. . . . Acting upon orders, Captain Allen proceeded to Mount Pisgah one of the camps of the Saints and explained the object of his visit by issuing the following: 'I have come among you instructed by Colonel S. F. Kearney . . . to visit the Mormon camps and to accept the service for twelve months of four or five companies of Mormon men who may be willing to serve their country for that period in our present war with Mexico; this force to unite with the Army of the West at Santa Fe and be marched thence to California, where they will be discharged. . . .' The Saints were in peculiar circumstances. They were scattered all the way from Nauvoo to Council Bluffs and even west of there for some had crossed the Missouri. . . . They were destitute. They had hostile Indians in advance of them and more hostile Missouri and Illinois mobocrats in their rear. . . . On receiving the call President Young and those associated with him in council decided almost instantly that the Battalion should be raised. . . . On the 11th day of July, 1846, four companies of over four hundred men, all told, and part of the fifth were mustered into the service of the United States, at Council Bluffs, Iowa territory. . . . The fifth company was soon afterwards filled."—D. Tyler, *Concise history of the Mormon battalion in the Mexican War*, pp. 111-112, 114-118.

1847.—Migration of Mormons from Nauvoo and their settlement on the Great Salt Lake. See MORMONISM: 1846-1848.

1847-1849.—Reasons of Mormon settlement.—Foundations for a strong community laid.—Utah was chosen by the Mormons as a refuge "in preference to Oregon or California, because the saints wanted to be left to themselves until they would be so strong they need fear no mobs. It was chosen because it was unoccupied and because it was too uninviting to be soon desired by others. . . . For two years after the advent of the pioneers in the Great Basin, they had no need to consider any problems connected with the establishment of civil government, nor any problem concerning their immediate intercourse with other people except with a few travelers going through the settlements. The organization and institutions of the church met all requirements. For a lawmaking power there was the edict of Brigham Young. For courts they had a complete system—bishops' courts corresponding to justice courts, a high court corresponding to a county court, and the first presidency corresponding to a county court. For a law-executing arm there was the same military organization they had in Nauvoo, and still called the Nauvoo Legion. For revenue they had church tithes and offerings. In these two years the foundations were laid for the future economic prosperity of the saints, and the policy of territorial expansion peculiar to the Mormons was inaugurated. With respect to this policy we need to make some explanation. The Mormons might have expanded

gradually as pressure of population would demand. But that would not serve their purpose as well as a rapid settlement of strategic points within the limits marked out by Brigham Young for his empire. This empire took in what is now Utah, Nevada, most of New Mexico and Arizona, and parts of Colorado, Wyoming, and California; included a seacoast, the harbor of San Diego, and the freedom of the seas for a Mormon fleet. Too many immigrants were coming west to leave the most desirable places within this area unoccupied if the saints wanted to be the first settlers."—*Utah (Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1917, pp. 335-336)*.


1848.—Acquisition from Mexico. See MEXICO: 1848.

1849-1850.—Hardships of early settlers.—Proposed state of Deseret.—Organization of territory of Utah.—During the winter of 1848-1849 there was such a scarcity of food among the settlers that many lived on roots, thistles and even on rawhides. This famine lasted until the harvest of 1849 which was unusually plentiful. "Until the year 1849 the Mormons were entirely under the control of their ecclesiastical leaders, regarding the presidency not only as their spiritual head, but as the source of law in temporal matters. . . . There was already in their midst a small percentage of gentile citizens, gathered . . . from nearly all the civilized nations of the earth. . . . Not infrequently litigation arose among the gentiles, or between Mormon and gentile; and though strict justice may have been done by the bishops, it was difficult for the latter to believe that such was the case. . . . Thus it became advisable to establish for the benefit of all some judicial authority that could not be questioned by any, whether members of the church or not, and this authority must be one that, being recognized by the government of the United States, would have the support of its laws and the shield of its protection. Further than this, if the Mormons neglected to establish such government, the incoming gentiles would do so ere long. Early in 1849, therefore, a convention was summoned of 'the inhabitants of that portion of Upper California lying east of the Sierra Nevada Mountains,' and the 4th of March assembled at Salt Lake City. A committee was appointed to draught a constitution, under which the people might govern themselves until congress should otherwise provide by law. A few days later the constitution was adopted, and a provisional government organized, under the name of the State of Deseret. An immense tract of country was claimed, extending from latitude 33° to the border of Oregon, and from the Rocky Mountains to the Sierra Nevada, together with a section of the territory now included in southern California, and the strip of coast lying between Lower California and 118° 30' of west longitude. The seat of government was to be at Salt Lake City. [In July Almon W. Babbitt was elected delegate to Congress, and that body was petitioned to admit the provisionally organized state into the Union. The delegate and his petition met with a cool reception at Washington; but in September, 1850, Congress passed an act organizing the territory of Utah, and Brigham Young was appointed Governor.] The act to establish a territorial government for Utah placed the southern boundary at the 37th parallel, the section between that limit and the 33d parallel being included in the Territory of New Mexico [organized at the same time], with the exception of the part transferred to California, by which State Utah was to be bounded on the

west. On the north, Oregon was to remain as the boundary, and on the east the Rocky Mountains."—H. H. Bancroft, *Utah (History of the Pacific states, v. 21, ch. 17)*.—See also U.S.A.: 1850 (April-September).

1849-1855.—Gold fever.—Growth of towns.—Adoption of spiritual marriages.—When the first news of gold in California reached Utah, Brigham Young counselled the Mormons not to go, but when fuller accounts were brought back by the men returning from the Mexican battalion, people prepared to leave. By 1849 a dozen families had departed and the following year many more emigrated to California. Between 1849 and 1851 numerous towns were founded: Centerville (1849), Ogden (1850), Provo (1850), Evansville (1851).

territorial governor [1851-1857] and by 1857, when a Democratic President showed the disposition to apply the usual temporal rule of rotation to the office, Young was rebellious, and the whole Mormon population, refusing allegiance to any one but their consecrated head, began to drill and gird on their armor for resistance. Judges of the territorial courts had to flee for their lives; justice, which had long been tampered with to absolve church members from punishment, was deprived of process. It was charged that the Mormon hierarchy had leagued with Indian tribes to impel them to atrocities against the Gentile inhabitants, while their own Danites, or destroying angels, were secretly set apart and bound by horrid oath to pillage and murder such as made themselves obnoxious to the



MORMON TEMPLE AND TABERNACLE, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

The temple, in the foreground, was built 1853-1893. The tabernacle is noted for its unique architecture and acoustics.

In 1850 the population of Utah was 11,380. In that year the *Deseret News* was established at Salt Lake City. (See also MORMONISM: Coöperative polity.) "The Mormons . . . officially adopted the doctrine of 'spiritual marriages' by an ordinance of 1851, which incorporated the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The transition into a territory did not affect polygamy, because the church had sufficient strength to control the offices and acts of the territory. In 1855 an act to revise the laws in force, duly passed by the territorial legislature and signed by the governor, Brigham Young, also prophet of the Mormon church, openly permitted polygamy as a legal practice."—E. E. Sparks, *National development, 1877-1885*, p. 259.

1857-1859.—Mormon rebellion.—Mountain Meadow massacre.—"To this would-be 'State of Deseret' President Fillmore had assigned Brigham Young, the spiritual head of the church, as terri-

theocracy. . . . [In 1857] President Buchanan appointed as the new governor of Utah Alfred Cumming, a man combining courage with discretion, and filled the judicial and other vacancies which existed. To protect those new officers and aid them in discharging their functions, he ordered a detachment of regulars to accompany them to the Salt Lake region. The need of this was soon apparent. Early in September, 1857, a part of the troops left Fort Laramie, and on the 15th of the same month Brigham Young, parading audaciously the commission he still held from the United States, forbade all armed forces from entering the territory, and called upon his people to defend themselves against the 'armed mercenary mob' of invaders. His legislature, meeting later, sustained him. . . . A Mormon force had meanwhile advanced to impede the approach of . . . [the] regulars. . . . The dispatches of General Johnston,

who commanded this important post . . . showed the President that unless a large force was quickly sent out, a long conflict would be inevitable. Buchanan and his Secretary of War asked from the present Congress ten new regiments, of which five might be used to bring the Mormons to subjection. But the Lecompton controversy was raging; and the use of Federal troops to put down the free-State movement in Kansas had caused such mistrust and irritation that none but the President's unshaken supporters felt inclined to place more troops at his disposal. The bill for an army increase was lost, though both Houses passed a measure authorizing the President to accept for the Utah disturbances two regiments of volunteers. The volunteers were not called out; but Buchanan mustered a military force out of the regulars strong enough to overawe and overpower Utah's rebellious inhabitants. Two peace commissioners also bore to Utah a proclamation from the President, dated April 6th, which offered free pardon, except to those who persisted still in disloyal resistance. Governor Cumming, upon his arrival, made a like announcement. These conciliatory efforts, backed by an irresistible show of military strength, brought the Mormons to a speedy acknowledgment of allegiance. . . . On the last day of . . . [June], the new governor, accompanied by Brigham Young, came back to Salt Lake city to assume functions which were fully recognized. . . . In military circles it was still generally believed that . . . force must be used. . . . Such views were entertained by General Albert Sidney Johnston, the military commander at Utah, destined to later distinction in the art of war. But Cumming, the governor, who had the temporizing instincts of a civilian, thought differently. The two came into collision when Mormons were brought to trial in the courts for a slaughter of emigrants in 1857, known as the Mountain Meadow massacre. [This was the massacre, by Indians and Mormons, of a party of 136 emigrants, from Arkansas and Missouri, who were passing through Utah, to California. It occurred in September, 1857, in a valley called the Mountain Meadows, about 300 miles south of Salt Lake City. Only 17 young children were saved from the slaughter. The Mormons protested that the massacre was the action of individuals and not sanctioned by the church.] At the request of the Federal judge, Johnston furnished a military detachment to guard the prisoners; and when Cumming, the governor, interposed because of the angry remonstrance of the people, Johnston would not remove them. Buchanan, being appealed to, sustained the governor's authority."—J. Schouler, *History of the United States*, v. 5, ch. 22.

ALSO IN: H. H. Bancroft, *History of the Pacific states*, v. 21, ch. 18-21.—W. P. Johnston, *Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston*, ch. 13.—Mrs. T. B. H. Stenhouse, *Tell it all*, ch. 23.—*Report of United States Secretary of the Interior, 36th Congress, 1st session, Senate Executive Document*, v. 11, no. 42.

1861-1865.—Mines and telegraphs.—Attempt to secure admission as a state.—Attitude toward the Civil War.—In October, 1861, a telegraph line was completed to Salt Lake City and Brigham Young telegraphed to Lincoln "Utah has not seceded." Two years later General P. E. Conner while prospecting in Bingham canyon located the first mine. "At this period another effort was being made to obtain admission as a state, and on the 17th of March, 1862, the legislature being then in session, a proclamation was issued, in

which, styling himself governor-elect, Brigham convened the general assembly and ordered the election of Senators to congress. . . . The choice for Senators fell on William H. Hooper and George Q. Cannon. . . . The two elders labored diligently in their cause, but failed of success. It was claimed, however, on the part of the Mormons, that they won the respect of congress by accepting their defeat and adhering to the union at a time when it was believed throughout Europe that the war would result in favor of the south, and when the sympathies of England and France were strongly in favor of the southern states. . . . Though the saints may have had some few friends in congress at this time, it is certain that they had numerous and bitter enemies, who were constantly working against their interests. In April 1862 a bill was introduced by Justin S. Morrill of Vermont 'to punish and prevent the practice of polygamy in the territories of the United States, and for other purposes, and to disapprove and annul certain acts of the territorial legislature of Utah.' The objectionable acts referred to included all those which tended to establish or support polygamy, and especially an ordinance incorporating the church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, passed in 1851, and reenacted in 1855, whereby all members of the church were included in the body corporate, trustees being appointed to control the church property, and church empowered to make laws with regard to marriage. . . . Ostensibly for protection against Indians, though in fact because the mail and telegraph line were not considered secure in the hands of the saints, and perhaps also for the purpose of holding the territory under military surveillance, Colonel Connor was ordered to Utah in May 1862, his command consisting of the third California infantry and a part of second California cavalry, afterward joined by a few companies from Nevada, and mustering in all about seven hundred strong."—H. H. Bancroft, *History of Utah*, pp. 605-607, 611.—"In 1862, a constitution for the State of Deseret was adopted, and upon the application for admission being rejected, the machinery for a State government was created and continued in operation for at least 6 years. Once a year 'Governor' Young of the 'State' of Deseret would read his message to the 'State' legislature, which would solemnly re-enact the laws that had been passed by the Territorial legislature, and adjourn."—*Utah (Annual Report of American Historical Association, 1917, p. 341)*.—In spite of the presence of Conner's troops the state continued to sympathize with the Union cause until the end of the war in 1865.

1867-1896.—Organization of the "Liberal party."—Its purpose.—Union Pacific railroad.—Prosecutions against polygamy.—"In 1867 there were comparatively few Gentiles either in Salt Lake City or the Territory. After business hours certain Gentile business men were in the habit of meeting at the office of Abel Gilbert, a merchant. . . . At these meetings the state of affairs in Utah was often discussed. . . . At one of these meetings in 1867 . . . [R. N. Baskin] stated that if . . . [the non-Mormons] intended to stay in the Territory . . . [they] should organize to oppose the political control of the priesthood. . . . [The group nominated Mr. McGroarty as candidate for the office of delegate to Congress.] At the election McGroarty received 105 votes. McGroarty contested Hooper's seat, the main purpose of the contest being to direct the attention of Congress and the nation to existing conditions in Utah. . . . Before the next election for delegate to Congress a convention

of Gentiles convened, . . . organized more formally a political party and christened it the 'Liberal Party.' That party continued to gain strength from its organization until the admission of the Territory as a state, when it was dissolved [the following year, 1896]."—R. N. Baskin, *Reminiscences of early Utah*, p. 23.—Mining really began, with the advent of the railroad in 1869 and 1870. Brigham Young had systematically discouraged mining on the ground that food was more important to a new state, and consequently the people should hold to agricultural pursuits. Furthermore, he wished to avoid the undesirable immigration which attends the opening of mining fields. But the Union Pacific railroad, building from Omaha westward and Sacramento eastward, met on May 10, 1869 at Promontory. The junction was almost immediately moved to Ogden and the Utah Central was built in 1870 connecting them. Brigham Young became a director of the Union Pacific and built nearly a hundred miles of roadbed. "By act of June 23, 1874, Congress reorganized the territorial courts of Utah and retained additional supervision over the acts of the territorial legislature; writs of error were allowed, to bring a person convicted of bigamy from the territorial supreme court to the United States Supreme Court. Under this law, a case appeared in the latter court and a decision in 1879 disposed of the argument that federal interference with polygamy was an infringement on freedom of religious worship. Nevertheless, difficulty was encountered in prosecuting persons accused of bigamy under the law of 1862 because a wife could not be compelled to testify against her husband. Prosecution was also delayed because the federal and territorial courts had not concurrent jurisdiction. Mormon lawyers claimed that the phrase 'every person having a husband or wife living who marries another' did not cover a simultaneous marriage to two or more wives. Only three final convictions were obtained, it was claimed, between 1862, when the first anti-polygamy law was passed, and 1882, when it was amended to correct these deficiencies."—E. E. Sparks, *National development, 1877-1885*, pp. 260-261.

1882-1893.—Edmunds Act and its enforcement.—Abandonment of polygamy by the Mormons.—Proclamation of amnesty for past offenses against the law.—In March, 1882, an act of Congress (known as the Edmunds Act) was passed for the purpose of making efficient the law against polygamy in the territories, which had stood among the statutes of the United States for twenty years, without power on the part of the Federal courts or officials in Utah to enforce it, as against the Mormon juries. Besides repeating the penalties prescribed in the Act of 1862, the Act of 1882 provides, in its eighth section, that "no polygamist, bigamist, or any person cohabiting with more than one woman, and no woman cohabiting with any of the persons described as aforesaid in this section, in any Territory or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, shall be entitled to vote at any election held in any such Territory or other place, or be eligible for election or appointment to or be entitled to hold any office or place of public trust, honor, or emolument in, under, or for any such Territory or place, or under the United States." The ninth and last section is as follows: "Sec. 9. That all the registration and election offices of every description in the Territory of Utah are hereby declared vacant, and each and every duty relating to the registration of voters, the conduct of elections, the receiving or rejection

of votes, and the canvassing and returning of the same, and the issuing of certificates or other evidence of election, in said Territory, shall, until other provisions be made by the legislative assembly of said Territory, as is hereinafter by this section provided, be performed, under the existing laws of the United States and said Territory, by proper persons, who shall be appointed to execute such offices and perform such duties by a Board of five persons, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, not more than three of whom shall be members of one political party, and a majority of whom shall be a quorum. The members of said Board so appointed by the President shall each receive a salary at the rate of three thousand dollars per annum, and shall continue in office until the legislative assembly of said Territory shall make provision for filing said offices as herein authorized. The Secretary of the Territory shall be the secretary of said Board and keep a journal of its proceedings, and attest the action of said Board under this section. The canvass and return of all the votes at elections in said Territory for members of the legislative assembly thereof shall also be returned to said Board, which shall canvass all such returns and issue certificates of election for those persons who, being eligible for such election, shall appear to have been lawfully elected, which certificates shall be the only evidence of the right of such persons to sit in such assembly: Provided, That said Board of five persons shall not exclude any person otherwise eligible to vote from the polls on account of any opinion such person may entertain on the subject of bigamy or polygamy, nor shall they refuse to count any such vote on account of the opinion of the person casting it on the subject of bigamy or polygamy, but each house of such assembly, after its organization, shall have power to decide upon the elections and qualifications of its members. And at or after the first meeting of said legislative assembly whose members shall have been elected and returned according to the provisions of this act, said legislative assembly may make such laws, conformable to the organic act of said Territory, and not inconsistent with other laws of the United States, as it shall deem proper concerning the filling of the offices in said Territory declared vacant by this act." "Under this act the commissioners revised the registration of voters in the territory, appointed election officers, and supervised an election of a territorial delegate to Congress, November 7, 1883. Although they excluded about twelve thousand men and women from voting because they practised polygamy, the Mormon delegate was elected over the Gentile by a vote of 23,000 to 4,000. The Mormons also carried the elections for local officers, although the officials elected were required to be monogamists. In 1884 the commissioners reported that polygamous relations had decreased in the cities of the territory but not in the country. Under supervision of this 'Utah commission' a Gentile jury was formed by putting to every venireman the question, 'Do you believe it right for a man to have more than one living and undivorced wife at the same time?' The Mormons unanimously replied 'Yes' and were excluded for cause. Ruder Clawson was tried for bigamy before this kind of a jury in 1884. . . . The trial caused intense interest throughout the country, and the decision of the supreme court of the territory, followed by that of the United States in 1884 confirming the sentence of Clawson, was a triumph for federal regulation of polygamy in the terri-

torial courts. Another prominent Mormon, Angus M. Cannon, was sentenced under the Edmunds act by the territorial courts for the practice of polygamy; he appealed the case; and in 1885 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of the act. In 1888 the commission reported over a thousand convictions under the Edmunds act."—E. E. Sparks, *National development, 1877-1885*, pp. 263-264.—"Public opinion did not stop . . . [with prosecution] and the Edmunds-Tucker act of March 3, 1887, authorized the Federal government to seize and administer the property of the corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Harsh as was this measure, which might be used as a precedent for confiscation of other church property, it passed by large majorities. This determined action had its effect, and in July, 1887, the citizens of Utah framed a constitution in which penalties were prescribed for polygamy. In addition, it was provided that the constitution should not be changed by any subsequent act of the state without the consent of Congress. The public at large was slow to be convinced of the sincerity of the Mormons; there was a suspicion that, as soon as Utah was admitted as a separate state, officers would be elected who would ignore the law. As it was plainly unconstitutional for a state to bind itself in advance by a proviso requiring congressional sanction, for all states as sovereign units must stand on a basis of equality, the action of the framers was regarded as hypocrisy. Opponents cited the missionary activity of the Mormon church which, in the very year of the constitutional convention, at its semiannual conference denounced the enforcement of the law against polygamy and termed it persecution. This perverse position, however, was speedily abandoned, and in 1890, Woodruff, the president of the Church of the Latter-Day Saints, declared that, inasmuch as laws had been enacted by Congress forbidding plural marriages, and as these laws had been declared constitutional he intended to submit to them, and to use all his influence with the members of his church to persuade them to follow his example. This statement [known as the Woodruff manifesto] was speedily indorsed at a general conference of the church, October 6. In the same year the Gentiles won in the local elections in Salt Lake City. For two years longer the sincerity of the Mormons was put to the test. Finally convinced that the Mormons would abide by the law, President Harrison on January 4, 1893, issued a proclamation granting amnesty to all persons liable to the penalties of the act of 1882 who, since November 1, 1890, had abstained from unlawful cohabitation. Congress also, in the same year, restored the escheated funds to the church. With polygamy thus put under the ban, Utah had better claims to become a state."—D. R. Dewey, *National problems, 1885-1897*, pp. 159-160.—Following is the proclamation issued by President Harrison: "Whereas Congress, by a statute approved March 22, 1882, and by statutes in furtherance and amendment thereof, defined the crimes of bigamy, polygamy, and unlawful cohabitation in the Territories and other places within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and prescribed a penalty for such crimes; and Whereas, on or about the 6th day of October, 1890, the Church of the Latter-Day Saints, commonly known as the Mormon Church, through its president, issued a manifesto proclaiming the purpose of said church no longer to sanction the practice of polygamous marriages and calling upon all members and adherents of said church to obey the laws of the

United States in reference to said subject-matter; and Whereas it is represented that since the date of said declaration the members and adherents of said church have generally obeyed said laws and have abstained from plural marriages and polygamous cohabitation; and Whereas, by a petition dated December 19, 1891, the officials of said church, pledging the membership thereof to a faithful obedience to the laws against plural marriage and unlawful cohabitation, have applied to me to grant amnesty for past offenses against said laws, which request a very large number of influential non-Mormons, residing in the Territories, have also strongly urged; and Whereas, the Utah Commission, in their report bearing date September 15, 1892, recommended that said petition be granted and said amnesty proclaimed, under proper conditions as to the future observance of the law, with a view to the encouragement of those now disposed to become law abiding citizens; and Whereas, during the past two years such amnesty has been granted to individual applicants in a very large number of cases, conditioned upon the faithful observance of the laws of the United States against unlawful cohabitation; and there are now pending many more such applications: Now therefore, I, Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested, do hereby declare and grant a full amnesty and pardon to all persons liable to the penalties of said act by reason of unlawful cohabitation under the color of polygamous or plural marriage, who have since November 1, 1890, abstained from such unlawful cohabitation; but upon the express condition that they shall in the future faithfully obey the laws of the United States hereinbefore named, and not otherwise. Those who shall fail to avail themselves of the clemency hereby offered will be vigorously prosecuted. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington this 4th day of January, in the year of our Lord 1893, and of the Independence of the United States the 117th. Benjamin Harrison."

1894-1895.—Provision for admission to the Union as a state. See U.S.A.: 1894-1895.

1895-1896.—Prohibition of polygamous marriages.—Proclamation of admission to the Union.—On Jan. 4, 1896, a proclamation by the president of the United States, after reciting the provisions of the act of Congress approved July 16, 1894, and the action taken by a convention of the people of Utah, held in accordance with the said act, in March, 1895, which convention "did, by ordinance irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of said State, as required by said act, provide that perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured and that no inhabitant of said State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship, but that polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited," thereupon declared and proclaimed the creation of the state of Utah and its admission into the Union to be accomplished. The constitution of the new state had some radical features, providing for an eight-hour labor day, and giving to women equal rights with men in suffrage and in eligibility to public office.—See also SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: United States: 1851-1920.

1896.—Industrial arbitration board created. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1886-1920.

1900.—Initiative adopted. See INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: Development in the United States.

1902.—Law limiting hours of adult labor in mines. See LABOR ORGANIZATION: United States: 1902.

1913-1920.—Legislation.—Part in World War.—Irrigation.—In 1913 Utah passed a mothers' pension act and an indeterminate sentence law. In 1917 a budget system was adopted, an industrial commission was created and a workmen's compensation law was passed. The state furnished 17,361 men for service in the World War or .46% of the whole force. The Eighteenth Federal Amendment (Prohibition) was ratified in 1919. A number of educational reforms were carried through in 1919 and by 1920 legal provisions had been made for public schools, including kindergartens, for all children from four to eighteen, and for supervision of the activities of children of school age throughout the entire year. The most important irrigation undertaking in the state, the Strawberry project, which had been begun in 1906 was completed in 1918 and by 1920 a total of 70,000 acres were irrigated from it.

1915.—Eccles case.—“When the present United States Senator, Reed Smoot, was elected from Utah [written in 1916], it was charged that the Mormons were again practising polygamy, and a committee of the Senate investigated the charge and returned a majority report to the Senate that the Mormons were guilty and that Reed Smoot should be refused his seat. Among the witnesses called to testify before the committee was Margaret Geddes Eccles, who was . . . [declared] to be the third wife of a prominent Mormon polygamist named David Eccles. She swore that she was not his wife, and that he was not the father of her son. By so doing she helped to protect the Mormon Church, but she swore away her son's right to his share in the Eccles estate, which was valued at twenty-five million dollars. When Eccles died . . . without leaving a will, the other heirs prepared to divide the inheritance without providing for Margaret Geddes Eccles and her child. She entered the suit [in 1915]. In that suit Margaret Geddes Eccles swore that she had committed perjury at Washington and that she had been married, as a plural wife, to David Eccles by Apostle Merrill of the Mormon Church. There are twelve apostles, and they are the governing body of the church, by whom, and from whose ranks, the president of the church and his two councilors are elected. Senator Reed Smoot . . . [was] one of these twelve apostles. The secretary of the president swore that the marriage of Margaret Geddes Eccles to David Eccles had been recognized by the presidency of the church as authentic.”—*Liberty in Utah (Century, January, 1916)*.

1920.—Agreement concerning Colorado river. See U. S. A.: 1922: Relations between the states, etc.

ALSO IN: F. A. M. Bailey, *My summer in a Mormon village*.—J. H. Beadle, *Life in Utah*.—J. Bonwick, *Mormons and the silver mines*.—A. E. Winship, *Utah's educational leadership*.—H. Stansbury, *Expedition to the valley of the Great Salt Lake*.—O. F. Whitney, *History of Utah*.—W. A. Linn, *Story of the Mormons*.—C. Ellis, *Utah, 1847 to 1870*.

UTAHS, UTES, PIUTES, North American Indian Tribe. See SHOSHONEAN FAMILY.

UTICA, city of ancient Africa, about fifteen miles northwest of Carthage. “The most ancient Phœnician colonies were Utica, nearly on the northernmost point of the coast of Africa, and in the same gulf (now known as the gulf of Tunis) as Carthage, over against Cape Lilybæum in Sicily, —and Gades, or Gadeira, on the south-western coast of Spain; a town which, founded perhaps

near one thousand years before the Christian era, has maintained a continuous prosperity, and a name (Cadiz) substantially unaltered, longer than any town in Europe. How well the site of Utica was suited to the circumstances of Phœnician colonists may be inferred from the fact that Carthage was afterwards established in the same gulf and near to the same spot, and that both the two cities reached a high pitch of prosperity.”—G. Grote, *History of Greece, pt. 2, ch. 18*.

Relations to Carthage. See CARTHAGE: Dominions.

Taken by Agathocles. See SYRACUSE: B. C. 317-289.

Siege in the Second Punic War. See PUNIC WARS: Second.

Curio's defeat.—Curio, the legate or lieutenant sent first by Cæsar to Africa (B. C. 49), to attack the Pompeian forces in that quarter, undertook with two legions to reduce the city of Utica, which had become the capital of the Roman province. Juba, king of Numidia, who was personally hostile to both Curio and Cæsar, came to the assistance of the Pompeians and forced Curio to withdraw from its besieging lines into the neighboring Cornelian camp, which was a famous military entrenchment left by Scipio Africanus. There he might have waited in safety for reinforcements; but the wily Numidian tempted him out by a feigned retreat and then overwhelmed him. Curio and most of his men were slain.—Based on C. Merivale, *History of the Romans, ch. 16*.

Last stand of the opponents of Cæsar. See ROME: B. C. 47-46.

Later history.—Utica was the seat of a bishopric of the African church and was the scene of many martyrdoms in the third century. The Vandals under Genseric captured it in 439, but it was retaken by the Byzantine empire in 534. In 698 the Arabs seized the city and depopulated it.

UTILITARIANISM. See ETHICS: 18th-19th centuries.

UTILITIES, Public. See PUBLIC UTILITIES.

UTOPIA. See SOCIALISM: Utopias; DEMOCRACY: Genesis of modern democracy; also PARAGUAY: 1890.

UTRAQUISTS. See CALIXTINES.

UTRECHT, capital of the province of the same name in the Netherlands, twenty-two miles south-east of Amsterdam. It is the seat of a famous university. In 1921 the population of the province was 351,279, and that of the city 140,309. See NETHERLANDS: Map.

Episcopal principality.—“At the last ford of the Rhine a hamlet had in Roman times been built, possibly a fort also. Nothing is preserved regarding it but the name, which, in the mutations of language, passed from Ultrajectum into Utrecht. Towards the conclusion of the 7th century, Clement Willebrod, an English priest, who had been educated at the monastery of Ripon, coming as a missionary into those parts, succeeded, with the aid of eleven of his fellow-countrymen, in winning over the Frisian people to the Christian faith. He fixed his abode at Utrecht, of which he was afterwards appointed bishop; and gifts of land, at the time of little worth, were made to his successors by Pepin and Charlemagne. Such was the commencement of the temporal grandeur of the prince-bishops, whose dynasty attained to a power little less than sovereign during the middle ages. . . . With ready access to the sea, and not without an early disposition towards these pursuits which their kinsmen of the Rhineland towns were beginning to follow, the inhabitants of Utrecht soon became

good sailors and good weavers, and their city throve apace. Enriched by successive grants of privileges and lands, the bishops of Utrecht gradually became powerful feudal lords."—W. T. McCullagh, *Industrial history of free nations*, v. 2, ch. 8.

1456.—**Bishopric grasped by the House of Burgundy.**—"Utrecht was still a separate state, governed by its sovereign bishop, who was elected by the votes of the chapter, subject to the approval of the Pope. On the vacancy which occurred towards the end of the year 1455, the choice of the canons fell upon Gisbert van Brederode, who had previously been archdeacon of the cathedral, and was held in general esteem amongst the people as well as the clergy. The Duke of Burgundy coveted so rich a prize, rather for its political importance, however, . . . than for any direct or immediate gain." The Duke appealed to Rome; Gisbert was put back into his archdeaconry, with an annuity for life, and David, a natural son of Duke Philip, was made bishop. "Thus the foundation was laid for the permanent union of Utrecht to the other provinces, although its final accomplishment was destined to be deferred yet many years."—W. T. McCullagh, *Industrial history of free nations*, v. 2, ch. 10.

1474.—**Restoration of old Hanseatic privileges in England by Peace of Utrecht.** See HANSA TOWNS.

1576.—**Spanish fury.** See NETHERLANDS: 1575-1577.

1579.—**Union of the seven provinces.** See NETHERLANDS: 1577-1581.

1712-1714.—**Treaties which ended the War of the Spanish Succession: Peace of Utrecht and the Treaty of Rastadt.**—The long War of the Spanish Succession was brought to a close (except as between Germany and France) by negotiations at Utrecht, which resulted in the concluding of a number of treaties between the several powers concerned, constituting collectively what is known as the Peace of Utrecht. Negotiations to this end were begun by England and France early in 1711, and preliminaries were settled between them and signed in October of that year. This action of the English compelled the other allies to consent to a general conference, which opened at Utrecht, January 29, 1712. The discussion of terms lasted more than a year, while the war went on. Between Germany and France the war still continued and it was at Rastadt (March, 1714), not Utrecht, that the last named powers came to their agreement of peace. The several treaties concluded at Utrecht were most of them signed on the 31st day of March, O. S., or April 11, N. S., in the year 1713, "by the plenipotentiaries of France, England, Portugal, Prussia, Savoy, and the United Provinces; the emperor resolving to continue the war, and the king of Spain refusing to sign the stipulations until a principality should be provided in the Low Countries for the princess Ursini, the favourite of his queen [a demand which he subsequently withdrew]. The chief articles of this memorable pacification were to the following purport: It was stipulated that . . . Philip, now established on the Spanish throne, should renounce all right to the crown of France; that the dukes of Berry and Orléans, the next heirs to the French monarchy after the infant dauphin, should in like manner renounce all right to the crown of Spain, in the event of their accession to the French throne; that, on the death of Philip, and in default of his male issue, the succession of Spain and the Indies should be secured to the duke of Savoy; that the island

of Sicily should be instantly ceded by his Catholic majesty to the same prince, with the title of king; that France should also cede to him the valleys of Pragelas, Oulx, Sezanne, Bardonnache, and Château-Dauphin, with the forts of Exilles, and Fenestrelles, and restore to him the duchy of Savoy and the county of Nice; and that the full property and sovereignty of both banks and the navigation of the Marañon, or river of Amazons, in South America, should belong to the king of Portugal. It was declared that the king of Prussia should receive Spanish Guelderland, with the sovereignty of Neufchâtel and Valengin, in exchange for the principality of Orange and the lordship of Châlons, and that his regal title should be acknowledged; that the Rhine should form the boundary of the German empire on the side of France; and that all fortifications, beyond that river, claimed by France, or in the possession of his most Christian majesty, should either be relinquished to the emperor or destroyed; that the kingdom of Naples, the duchy of Milan, and the Spanish territories on the Tuscan shore, should be ceded to the house of Austria; that the sovereignty of the Spanish Netherlands should likewise be secured to that family; but that the elector of Bavaria (to whom they had been granted by Philip) should retain such places as were still in his possession, until he should be reinstated in all his German dominions, except the Upper Palatinate, and also be put in possession of the island of Sardinia, with the title of king: that Luxemburg, Namur, and Charleroy should be given to the states-general as a barrier, together with Mons, Menin, Tournay, and other places; and that Lisle, Aire, Bethune, and St. Venant, should be restored to France. It was agreed that the French monarch should acknowledge the title of queen Anne, and the eventual succession of the family of Hanover to the British throne; that the fortifications of Dunkirk (the cause of much jealousy to England, and raised at vast expense to France) should be demolished, and the harbour filled up; that the island of St. Christopher (which had long been possessed jointly by the French and English, but from which the French had been expelled in 1702) should be subject to this country [England]; that Hudson's Bay and Straits (where the French had founded a settlement, but without dispossessing the English, and carried on a rival trade during the war), the town of Placentia, and other districts of the island of Newfoundland (where the French had been suffered to establish themselves, through the negligence of government), and the long-disputed province of Nova Scotia (into which the French had early intruded, out of which they had been frequently driven, and which had been finally conquered by an army from New England in 1710), should be considered as the dependencies of the British crown: that Minorca and the fortress of Gibraltar (conquered from Spain) should remain in the possession of Great Britain; and that the Assiento, or contract for furnishing the Spanish colonies in South America with negroes, should belong to the subjects of Great Britain for the term of thirty years. That these conditions, especially on the part of Great Britain, were very inadequate to the success and expense of the war, will be allowed by every intelligent man, whose understanding is not warped by political prejudices. . . . The other confederates had greater cause to be satisfied, and the emperor [Charles VI] as much as any of them; yet was he obstinate in refusing to sign the general pacification, though two months were allowed him to deliberate on the terms. But he had soon reason to repent his rash-

ness in resolving to continue the war alone. . . . The imperial army on the Rhine, commanded by prince Eugene, was not in a condition to face the French under Villars, who successively took Worms, Spire, Keiserlautern, and the important fortress of Landau. He forced the passage of the Rhine . . . and reduced Freyburg, the capital of the Breisgau. Unwilling to prosecute a disastrous war, the emperor began seriously to think of peace; and conferences, which afterward terminated in a pacific treaty, were opened between prince Eugene and Villars, at Rastadt. The terms of this treaty, concluded on the 6th of March (N. S.) 1714 [but ratified at Baden the next September, and sometimes called the Treaty of Baden], were less favourable to the emperor than those which had been offered at Utrecht. The king of France retained Landau, which he had before proposed to cede, with several fortresses behind the Rhine, which he had agreed to demolish [but restored Freiburg]. He procured the full re-establishment of the electors of Bavaria and Cologne in their dominions and dignities; the former prince consenting to relinquish Sardinia to the emperor, in return for the Upper Palatinate. . . . The principal articles in regard to Italy and the Low Countries were the same with those settled at Utrecht. Relaxing in his obstinacy, the king of Spain also acceded to the general pacification."—W. Russell, *History of modern Europe*, v. 3, pt. 2, letter 23.—See also BRITISH EMPIRE: Treaties promoting expansion: 1713; CANADA: 1713; EUROPE: Map of Central Europe: 1715;

ITALY: 1701-1713; NEWFOUNDLAND, DOMINION OF: 1713; SLAVERY: 1698-1776; U. S. A.: 1754.

ALSO IN: J. W. Gerard, *Peace of Utrecht*, ch. 24-29.—T. Macknight, *Life of Bolingbroke*, ch. 8-9.—G. W. Cooke, *Memoirs of Bolingbroke*, v. 1, ch. 13.—W. Coxe, *Memoirs of Marlborough*, ch. 108-110.—J. C. Collins, *Bolingbroke*, sect. 1.—A. Hassall, *Life of Bolingbroke*, ch. 3.

UTRECHT UNIVERSITY. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1425-1922.

UXBRIDGE, Attempted treaty of. See ENGLAND: 1645 (January-February).

UXELLODUNUM, Siege of (51 B. C.). See GAUL: B. C. 58-51.

UXMAL, deserted city of the Mayas in the state of Yucatan, Mexico, about seventy miles south of Merida. The ruins are scattered over several square miles, but only a few of the buildings have the walls still standing. See MEXICO: Ancient; Aboriginal peoples; INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in Mexico and Central America: Maya.

UZES, Turkish nomads who came into south-eastern Europe during the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries. See PATCHINAKS.

UZSOK PASS, route through the Carpathians from Galicia (since 1919 part of Poland but formerly Austrian) to Hungary. The Russians seized the pass in 1914 and held it until Mackensen's Galician campaign in the summer of 1915.—See also CARPATHIANS; WORLD WAR: 1914: II. Eastern front: d, 3.

V

VAAL, tributary of the Orange river, South Africa. It forms the chief boundary between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. See BOER.

VACA, Cabeza de. See CABEZA DE VACA.

VACALUS, ancient name of the River Waal.

VACCÆI, one of the tribes of the Celtiberians in ancient Spain.—Based on T. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, bk. 4, ch. 1.

VACCINATION, Discovery of. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern: 18th century: Preventive inoculation against small pox; 1914-1918.

VACOMAGI, tribe in ancient Caledonia, whose territory extended along the border of the Highlands, from the Moray Firth to the Tay. See BRITAIN: Celtic tribes.

VACSLAV. See WENCESLAUS.

VACUUM CLEANER, Invention of. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: 1879-1917.

VACUUM TUBES, Perfecting of. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Survey of late inventions.

VADIMONIAN LAKE, Battle of (283 B. C.). See ROME: Republic: B. C. 295-191.

VAISYAS, members of the Hindu third caste in India, the farmers and tradespeople, as distinguished from the Brahmans, or priests, and the Katriyas, or warriors. See CASTE SYSTEM.

VALAIS, canton of southern Switzerland. It was made a canton of the Helvetic republic in 1798 and became a separate republic in 1802. Annexed to France in 1810, and added to the Swiss Confederation in 1815 it joined the Sonderbund in 1845. See FRANCE: 1810 (February-December); SWITZERLAND: 1803-1848; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF; SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: Switzerland: 1830-1848.

VALAORITES, Aristotle (1824-1879), Greek poet. See GREEK LITERATURE: Modern.

VALCOUR ISLAND, Battle of (1776). See U. S. A.: 1776-1777: Washington's retreat through New Jersey; CANADA: 1775-1776.

VALDEMAR, I (Waldemar) (1131-1182), king of Denmark, 1157-1182. Annexed Jutland, Zealand, and the South Swedish provinces to Denmark; subdued the Wends, 1169.

Valdemar II (1170-1241), king of Denmark, 1202-1241. Conquered Holstein, 1201; acquired Lübeck, 1202; defeated at battle of Bornhöved, 1227, which resulted in the destruction of Danish dominion over the Baltic; acquired Danish Estonia, 1238; compiled Danish laws in the Jutland Code, 1241. See DENMARK: Survey of history; SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 1018-1397; also FLAGS: Denmark.

Valdemar IV (c. 1320-1375), king of Denmark, 1340-1375. Waged war against Sweden and the Hanseatic towns, 1362; attacked by the Hanseatic towns and the counts of Holstein, 1368; recovered greater part of Holstein, 1375. See DENMARK: Survey of history.

VALDÉS, or Valdez, Juan de (c. 1500-1541), Spanish theologian. Criticised papal policies and Roman Catholic doctrines. See EUROPE: Renaissance and Reformation: Catholic Reformation.

VALDEVEZ, Tourney of (1140). See PORTUGAL: 1095-1325.

VALDEZ, Ramon (1867-1918), president of Panama, 1916-1918. See PANAMA: 1916: Presidential election.

VALDIVIA, Pedro de (1500-1554), Spanish soldier and conqueror of Chile. Led expedition into Chile, 1540; first to explore the eastern base of the Andes in what is now known as Argentine Patagonia; founded Santiago, 1541, and Valparaiso,

1544; attacked and defeated by the Indians, 1554. See CHILE: 1535-1724.

VALE OF KASHMIR. See KASHMIR.

VALE ALBA, Battle of (1476). See RUMANIA: 13th-18th centuries.

VALENCIA, Spain, Mediterranean seaport of eastern Spain, capital of the province of the same name, 185 miles southeast of Madrid, on the right bank of the Guadalquivir. It was the capital of the former kingdom of Valencia and still retains vestiges of the Moorish occupation. The population of the town in 1920 was 243,783.

711.—Taken by the Moors. See SPAIN: 711-713.

1238.—Conquest by James I of Aragon. See ARAGON; SPAIN: 1212-1238.

1707.—Surrender to the French during the War of the Spanish Succession. See SPAIN: 1707.

1808.—Revolt against Spanish government. See SPAIN: 1808 (May-September).

VALENCIA, Venezuela, capital of the state of Carabobo, Venezuela, twenty-four miles south of Puerto Cabello. It was the scene of a battle between the Venezuelans and the Colombian liberals in 1898. See COLOMBIA: 1898-1902.

VALENCIA UNIVERSITY. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1240-1510.

VALENCIENNES, city of northeastern France, near the Belgian border, in the department of Nord, on the river Scheldt, thirty miles southeast of Lille.

1566.—Crushing of the first revolt against Spanish tyranny in the Netherlands. See NETHERLANDS: 1566.

1576.—Spanish Fury. See NETHERLANDS: 1575-1577.

1583.—Submission to Spain. See NETHERLANDS: 1584-1585.

1656.—Siege and failure of Turenne. See FRANCE: 1653-1656.

1677.—Taken by Louis XIV. See NETHERLANDS: 1674-1678.

1679.—Cession to France. See NIMEGUEN, PEACE OF.

1793.—Siege and capture by the Austrians. See FRANCE: 1793 (July-December): Progress of the war.

1794.—Recovery by the French. See FRANCE: 1794 (March-July).

1918.—Taken from Germans by the Allies during World War. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: w, 1; x, 3.

VALENS (c. 328-378), Roman emperor (Eastern), 364-378. Defeated and put to death his rival, Procopius, 366; fought with Persia, 371-377; permitted Goths to settle south of the Danube, 376; defeated and slain during the revolt of the Goths, 378. See ROME: Empire: 363-379; GOTHs: 376; 378.

VALENTIA, one of the Roman provinces formed in Britain, extending from the wall of Hadrian to the wall of Antoninus, covering southern Scotland. It was named in honor of the Emperor Valentinian. See BRITAIN: 323-337; 367-370.

VALENTINIAN I (321-375), Roman emperor (Western), 364-375. Chose his brother, Valens, as his colleague, 364; fought against the Alemanni, the Saxons and Quadi, 360-375. See ROME: Empire: 363-379; QUADI: 374-375.

Valentinian II (372-392), Roman emperor (Western), 375-392. Made associate emperor of the West with his brother Gratian, 375; assassinated by his general, Arbogast, 392. See ROME: Empire: 363-379; 379-395.

Valentinian III (419-455), Roman emperor

(Western), 425-455. During his reign Rome lost Africa to the Vandals (439), Britain, and parts of Gaul and Spain, 446. See ROME: Empire: 423-450.

VALENZA, town of Italy, in Piedmont, seven miles north of Alessandria, on the Po. It was captured by the French in 1656. See ITALY: 1635-1659.

VALERA, Edward de. See DE VALERA, EDWARD (EAMONN).

VALERA Y ALCALÁ GALIANO, Juan (1824-1905), Spanish novelist. See SPANISH LITERATURE: 19th-20th centuries.

VALERIAN LAWS (509 B.C.). See ROME: Republic: B.C. 509.

VALERIANUS, or Valerian, Publius Licinius, Roman emperor, 253-260. Became chief of the Senate, 238; censor, 251; attacked by the Goths, Alemanni, and Persians; captured by the Persians, 260. See ROME: Empire: 192-284.

VALERIO-HORATIAN LAWS (449 B.C.). See ROME: Republic: B.C. 449.

VALERIUS MAXIMUS (fl. 1st century A.D.), Roman prose writer. See LATIN LITERATURE: B.C. 43-A.D. 14.

VAL-ES-DUNES, Battle of (1047). See NORMANDY: 1035-1063.

VALHALLA, in Scandinavian mythology, the abode of the god Odin, in which he received the souls of heroes slain in battle. See MYTHOLOGY: Scandinavian.

VALIAHD, title of the heir-apparent to the Persian throne. Until 1906 the Valiahd always held the governorship of the province of Azerbaijan. See PERSIA: 1905-1907.

VALKYRIES, in Scandinavian mythology, the maidens who attended the god Odin, and chose the warriors slain in battle for Valhalla. See MYTHOLOGY: Scandinavian.

VALLA, Lorenzo (c. 1406-1457), Italian humanist and historian. See EUROPE: Middle Ages: Science; HISTORY: 22.

VALLACHIA. See WALLACHIA.

VALLADOLID, town in the state of Yucatan, Mexico, ninety miles southeast of Merida. It was founded by the Spaniards in 1544 and was the scene of fighting between the royalists and the revolutionists under Hidalgo in 1813. See MEXICO: 1535-1822; 1810-1819.

VALLADOLID UNIVERSITY. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1240-1510.

VALLANDIGHAM, Clement Laird (1820-1871), American politician. Member of the House of Representatives from Ohio, 1858-1863; leader of the Copperheads during the Civil War; arrested by United States troops, 1863, and banished to the Confederate lines; not being received there, he went to Canada. See U.S.A.: 1863 (May-June); CENSORSHIP: United States.

VALLEY FORGE, small village in Chester county, Pennsylvania, on the Schuylkill river, about twenty miles northwest of Philadelphia. It was occupied by American troops under Washington in the winter of 1777-1778 under conditions of great suffering and privation. See U.S.A.: 1777 (January-December).

VALLUM, wall or rampart in a fortified camp set with a palisade of stakes. See CASTRA, ROMAN; BRITAIN: 117-145.

VALMIKI, Hindu poet, the reputed author of the Ramayana. See HINDU LITERATURE: Epic poetry.

VALMY, Battle of. See FRANCE: 1793 (September-December).

VALOIS, Henry of. See HENRY III, OF VALOIS.

VALOIS, House of.—The direct line of the Capetian kings of France, descendants of Hugh Capet, ended in 1328, with the death of Charles IV. The crown then passed to the late king's cousin, Philip of Valois, son of Charles Count of Valois, who was the second son of Philip III. He became Philip VI in the series of French kings, and with him began the royal dynasty or House of Valois, which came to an end in 1589, on the assassination of Henry III, yielding the throne to the Bourbon family. See FRANCE: 1314-1328; 1593-1598: Genealogical table.

VALONA. See AVLONA.

VALORIZATION CASE. See BRAZILIAN COFFEE CASE.

VALOUTINA, Battle of. See RUSSIA: 1812 (June-September).

VALPARAISO, capital of a province of the same name in Chile and the main seaport of the republic. (See LATIN AMERICA: Map of South America.) "The 'Vale of Paradise' sits in a queenly fashion upon the shores of the Pacific. Spread upon a series of mounting slopes, its roofs rise in tiers that start from the edge of the profound blue of the ocean. The hills beyond present a rolling vista to the right and left, while to the back, they sweep in an almost unbroken series to the foothills of the Andes themselves. . . . It is a town of sudden precipices that stand out here and there in places where one would least have expected them. One may walk along a street, for instance, to find, after rounding a sharp curve in the roadway, that further progress is blocked to all appearance by a lofty wall of rock, hung here and there with clumps of verdure and festoons of flowers, that heaves itself upwards as a barricade across the end of the thoroughfare."—W. H. Koebel, *Modern Chile*, p. 27.—In 1920 the population was 182,242.

1536-1906.—History marked by calamities.—Balmaceda revolutionists.—"The city of Valparaiso was founded by Juan de Saavedra in 1536. . . . It was captured and sacked by Drake in 1578; again by Hawkins the Buccaneer in 1596. It was plundered by the Dutch pirate, Van Noort, in 1600. There were severe earthquake shocks in 1730, 1822, 1839, and 1851. It was destroyed by fire in 1858, bombarded by the Spanish Admiral in 1866, and suffered by a severe earthquake in 1873. It suffered horribly in the Balmaceda revolution."—G. F. S. Elliot, *Chile*, pp. 271, 275.—"On the evening of the 28th [August, 1891], Valparaiso was in possession of the revolutionists and the Balmaceda government was overthrown. . . . That night Valparaiso was the scene of a Bacchanalian rabble that would have shamed Rome in the reign of Nero. The city was in possession of a mob, intoxicated with success, drunk upon wine and athirst for blood, that murdered with impunity and sacked the town without restraint. Drunken men and women reeled through the streets, shooting at each other as a matter of sport, and on the following morning four hundred victims of the mob's violence were found dead in the streets."—R. E. Mansfield, *Progressive Chile*, p. 67.—The history of the city was uneventful from the time of the Balmaceda revolution until the earthquake of 1906.

1891.—United States sailors attacked by mob. See CHILE: 1891-1892; U. S. A.: 1891.

1906.—Great earthquake.—"The most terrible crisis in the history of Valparaiso began on Thursday, 16th August, 1906. . . . There was a sudden, unexpected shock immediately followed by another. . . . Then there was a terrible jolt and whole rows of buildings . . . fell with a terrific crash. The gas, electric light and water-mains were at once

snapped, and the whole city was plunged in darkness. . . . Great fires started in the ruined buildings. . . . Between the earthquake and the subsequent fire ninety per cent of the houses are said to have been destroyed. The Arsenal, station, custom-house, hospitals, convents, banks, club-houses, and Grand Hotel were for the most part ruined. . . . The telegraph lines were destroyed; the railways were wrecked for miles—bridges had twisted, and tunnels had caved in—but communication with Santiago seems to have been re-established within a wonderfully short time. . . . Some 60,000 [inhabitants] were encamped on the barren hills above the town without food or clothing; others took refuge on boats or steamers in the bay, for mercifully there was no tidal wave such as commonly accompanies great earth tremors on that coast, and no damage was done to the shipping in harbour. The number of people killed has been variously estimated at from 300 to 10,000 persons; it is probable that from 500 to 1,000 were killed and another 1,000 wounded. The damage done was at least £20,000,000."—G. F. S. Elliot, *Chile*, pp. 275-277.—See also CHILE: 1906: Earthquake at Valparaiso.

1906-1921.—Development of the modern city.—Economic improvements.—There are few traces of the destruction wrought in 1906 today. The modern Valparaiso is the second port of the Pacific, ranking next to San Francisco in wealth and power. English is generally spoken in the streets but during the decade preceding the World War, German influence was noticeably and steadily undermining British industry and commerce in the Chilean coast city. For many years Valparaiso has been one of the most insecure harbors on the west coast of the South American continent due to its lack of a breakwater in its bay and to the prevalence of severe storms. "Modernizing and improving the port of Valparaiso . . . has been considered as the most spectacular task confronting the engineer in any South American harbor. Yet about seven years ago, works were commenced there to provide during all seasons a safe zone covering about 220 acres. The construction of a 1,000 ft. breakwater, a quay wall 2,000 ft. long, an extension of the wharf to 1,000 ft., a jetty 920 ft. long and 328 ft. wide and other works preliminary to the construction of new warehouses, meant an investment of about \$12,000,000."—*Chilean ports (Pan-American Magazine, Jan., 1920, pp. 160-161)*.—Valparaiso was one of the first South American centers of labor disturbances involving problems of radicalism and anarchy with which modern Chile has had to deal and as a result of which Alessandri was elected president.—"A presidential law of April 29, 1919, authorized the expenditure of 25,000,000 pesos, gold, for the electrifying of the first zone of national railways and approved the project for construction and repairs . . . the Valparaiso-Santiago Railroad [being] comprised in the zone."—*Chile (Latin-American Year Book for Investors and Merchants, 1920, pp. 179, 220)*.—The work was begun in 1921 on the line between these two cities, a distance of 117 miles.

1923.—Partial completion of electrified railroad.—The first test of the partially completed electrified railroad was made by President Alessandri, Apr. 16, 1923. The first train ran on July 14.

ALSO IN: J. P. Canto, *Chile: An account of its wealth and progress*.—F. J. G. Maitland, *Chile: Its land and people*.

VALTELLINA, district in Lombardy, Italy, corresponding to the province of Sondrio. It consists of the upper valley of the Adda enclosed by

the Alps. There were many struggles for its possession during the Thirty Years' War. It was annexed to the Cisalpine Republic in 1797. See FRANCE: 1624-1626; 1797 (May-October).


VAN, chief town of a vilayet of the same name in Armenia, Asiatic Turkey, about a mile from the eastern shore of Lake Van. (See TURKEY: Map of Asia Minor.) The population of the vilayet in 1914 was estimated at 379,000. It was the scene of a massacre by the Turks in 1915. During 1920 it figured in the Armenian-Turkish boundary settlement. See ARMENIA: 1919-1920; SEVRES, TREATY OF (1920): Part III. Political clauses: Armenia; WORLD WAR: 1915: VI. Turkey: d, 1.

VAN ARTEVELDE, Jacques. See ARTEVELDE, JACQUES VAN.

VAN BUREN, Martin (1782-1862), eighth president of the United States. State senator in the New York legislature, 1812-1820; United States

pieces of eight' (three hundred dollars), erected these two tracts into a manor, named Cortlandt, and constituted Stephen Van Cortlandt its lord."—G. W. Schuyler, *Colonial New York*, v. 1, pp. 198-199.—When Stephen Van Cortlandt died his property was divided among fourteen children, so that the manor of to-day is much smaller than the original. Washington and other famous men were entertained in the manor house during the Revolution. Jacobus Van Cortlandt, a brother of Stephanus, settled beyond Spuyten Duyvil. His estate, on which a substantial stone house was built, was bought by the city of New York for use as a park.

VANCOUVER, George (c. 1758-1798), English naval officer and explorer. Commanded Pacific expedition, 1791-1795, during which he explored Vancouver island, 1792. See PACIFIC OCEAN: 1764-1850.



INDIAN VILLAGE, NORTH PACIFIC COAST

(From a print in "A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean, 1790-1795," by Captain George Vancouver).

senator, 1821-1828; governor of New York, 1828; secretary of state, 1829-1831; president of the United States, 1836-1840; renominated in 1840, but was defeated; candidate for Democratic presidential nomination, 1844, but was defeated; nominated for the presidency by the Free Soil party, 1848.

Political leader of New York. See NEW YORK: 1835-1837.

Presidential election and administration. See U. S. A.: 1836, to 1841.

Campaign for reelection. See U. S. A.: 1845-1846.

Nominated by the Free Soilers. See U. S. A.: 1848.

VAN CORTLANDT MANOR.—"In 1683, Stephanus Van Cortlandt purchased, by license, of the Indians, a tract of land lying on the east side of the Hudson beginning at the mouth of the Croton River. . . . Van Cortlandt about the same time purchased another tract on the west side of the river. In 1697, Governor Fletcher, in consideration of his fees, amounting to 'three hundred

VANCOUVER, city and port in British Columbia, Canada, on the Burrard Inlet. It was established in 1886 and is the terminus of the Canadian-Pacific railway. The population in 1921 was 117,217. See BRITISH COLUMBIA: 1886-1888.

VANCOUVER ISLAND, island belonging to British Columbia, Canada, west of the mainland of that province and northwest of the state of Washington. It is bounded on the south by the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and is separated from the mainland of the province by the Strait of Georgia and Queen Charlotte sound. (See CANADA: Map.) It was explored by Vancouver in 1792. Settled by the Hudson's Bay Company in 1843, it was united with British Columbia in 1866. See BRITISH COLUMBIA; CANADA: 1805-1866; NOOTKA SOUND CONTROVERSY.

VANDAL, Albert (1853-1910), French historian. See HISTORY: 32.

VANDALIA, capital of Fayette County, Illinois, on the Kaskaskia, sixty-five miles southwest

Springfield. It was the state capital of Illinois from 1820 to 1839. See ILLINOIS: 1809-1839.

VANDALIA, Proposed state of. See WEST VIRGINIA: 1773-1820.

VANDALS: Origin and early movements.—“Gibbon declares that a striking resemblance, in manners, complexion, religion, and language, indicates that the Goths and Vandals were originally one great people; and he cites the testimony of Pliny and Procopius in support of this belief. According to this theory, therefore, the Vandals are of the Teutonic stock. Other learned men have endeavoured to identify them with the Wendes; and the Wendes, as we have seen, according to the authority of Jornandes and others, were members of the Slavic race. The question has been examined, with great learning and ingenuity, by M. L. Marcus, Professor at the College of Dijon, in a work upon Vandal history. His conclusion, drawn from a comparison of what Tacitus, Pliny, Procopius, and Jornandes have left us upon the subject, is favourable to the hypothesis of Gibbon. Between the Wendes and the Vindili of Pliny, who were undoubtedly Vandals, he considers that no nearer point of union can be found than that of the Asiatic origin common to all nations of Slavic and Teutonic blood. He accounts for the fact that some confusion upon the subject subsists in ancient writers, by the supposition that the Slavs, after the great migration of Goths and Vandals to the South, occupied the locality they had abandoned on the coasts of the Baltic, and became inheritors of the name, as well as of the land, of their predecessors. Hence they were commonly, though incorrectly, called Vindili, or Vandals. . . . The earliest locality of the tribe, so far as authentic history can trace them, seems to have been the district between the Vistula and the Elbe. Here they were found by the Langobardi, in their migration towards the South. . . . In the time of Pliny, we have that writer's testimony to the fact that the Vandals were still to be found between the two rivers. But during the next two centuries their unwarlike habits must have tended to diminish their importance among their fierce and active neighbours, of whom the Goths were the most formidable, and probably the most aggressive. Tacitus, at any rate, in his tractate upon the Germans [100], merely notices them by name. . . . Another half-century finds them in a strong position among the mountains which form the northern frontier of Bohemia. It is certain that they took part in the great Marcomannic war [168-180]. . . . In the treaty made by Commodus, the son of Marcus Aurelius, with the Marcomanni [180], the Vandals are one of the tribes secured from the hostility of those persevering enemies of the Roman empire. At this time, Ptolemy informs us that the Vandals occupied the districts lying around the sources of the Elbe; and all other investigation confirms the statement. [A hundred years later, the Vandals appear to have been planted in a district on the Danube, east of the Theiss; from which they were soon afterwards driven by the Goths. They were then permitted by the emperor Constantine to pass the frontiers of the empire and settle in Pannonia, where they accepted Christianity and exhibited “the greatest aptitude for commerce and the arts of peace.” Despite their Christianity, however, and despite their aptitude for the “arts of peace,” the Vandals, after seventy years of friendly neighboring with the Romans, joined the savage pack of Alans, Sueves and Burgundians which, on the last day of the year 406, broke into Gaul and shattered the empire and the civilization of Rome beyond the

Alps.]—J. G. Sheppard, *Fall of Rome, lect. 7.*—See also EUROPE: Introduction to the historic period: Migration; Map showing Barbaric invasions.

ALSO IN: T. Hodgkin, *Italy and her invaders, v. 2, bk. 3, ch. 2.*

406-409.—Final invasion of Gaul. See GAUL: 406-409.

409.—Invasion of Cartagena. See CARTAGENA: 409-713.

409-414.—Settlement in Spain. See SPAIN: 409-414.

428.—Conquests in Spain.—“After the retreat of the Goths [418] the authority of Honorius had obtained a precarious establishment in Spain, except only in the province of Galicia, where the Suevi and the Vandals had fortified their camps in mutual discord and hostile independence. The Vandals prevailed, and their adversaries were besieged in the Nervasian hills, between Leon and Oviedo, till the approach of Count Asterius compelled, or rather provoked, the victorious barbarians to remove the scene of war to the plains of Bætica. The rapid progress of the Vandals soon required a more effectual opposition, and the master-general Castinus marched against them with a numerous army of Romans and Goths. Vanquished in battle by an inferior enemy, Castinus fled with dishonour to Tarragona. . . . Seville and Carthage became the reward, or rather the prey, of the ferocious conquerors.”—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire, ch. 33.*—Southern Spain, the ancient Bætica, acquired from the Vandals the name Vandalusia, which became Andalusia.—Based on R. G. Latham, *Ethnology of Europe, ch. 2.*

429-439.—Conquests in Africa.—In May, 429, the Vandals passed from Spain into Africa, invited by Count Boniface, the Roman governor of the African province. The latter had been deceived by an intriguing rival, Count Aetius, who persuaded him that the imperial court at Ravenna were planning his disgrace and death. Thus incited to rebellion, as an act of self defense, he called the Vandals to his help. The latter had just fallen under the leadership of a new and terrible king—the bold and ruthless Genseric, who was destined to make the name of his people a proverb through all time for ferocity and barbarism. To the Vandals were united the Alans, and Genseric invaded Africa with some 80,000 men. He was joined, moreover, by great numbers of disaffected native Mauritanians, or Moors, and was welcomed by swarms of the fanatical Donatists, whose “vandalism” could quite equal his own. Count Boniface shrank aghast from the terrible invasion he had summoned, and learning, too late, how foully he had been played upon, returned to his allegiance with penitent energy and zeal. He turned his arms against Genseric; but it was in vain. “The victorious barbarians insulted the open country; and Carthage, Cirta, and Hippo Regius were the only cities that appeared to rise above the general inundation. . . . The seven fruitful provinces, from Tangier to Tripoli, were overwhelmed. . . . The Vandals, where they found resistance, seldom gave quarter; and the deaths of their valiant countrymen were expiated by the ruin of the cities under whose walls they had fallen. Careless of the distinctions of age or sex or rank, they employed every species of indignity and torture to force from the captives a discovery of their hidden wealth.” Defeated in a battle which he ventured, Boniface retired into Hippo Regius and stood a siege of fourteen months. A second battle, won by the Vandals, decided the

fate of the city, but its inhabitants escaped, for the most part, by sea, before the barbarians broke in. The great bishop of Hippo, the venerable St. Augustine, was in the city when the siege began, but died before it ended, in his seventy-sixth year. "When the city, some months after his death, was burned by the Vandals, the library was fortunately saved which contained his voluminous writings. [Hippo fell in the summer of 431. It was not until eight years later that Carthage succumbed,—taken treacherously, by surprise, on the 9th of October, 439; being 585 years after the destruction of the ancient city by the younger Scipio. The provinces of Africa were now fully in the possession of the Vandals, and the loss of their corn supply carried famine to Rome and Italy.]"—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 33.

ALSO IN: J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 7.—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and her invaders*, v. 2, bk. 3, ch. 2.

429-477.—In Sicily. See SICILY: 429-525.

431-533.—Ruin of Africa under their dominion.—"The Vandals were bigoted Arians and their government was peculiarly tyrannical; they always treated the Roman inhabitants of Africa as political enemies, and persecuted them as religious opponents. The Visigoths in Spain had occupied two thirds of the subjugated lands, the Ostrogoths in Italy had been satisfied with one third; and both these people had acknowledged the civil rights of the Romans as citizens and Christians. The Vandals adopted a different policy. Genseric reserved immense domains to himself and to his sons. He divided the densely peopled and rich districts of Africa proper among the Vandal warriors, exempting them from taxation and binding them to military service. . . . They seized all the richest lands, and the most valuable estates, and exterminated the higher class of the Romans. Only the poorer proprietors were permitted to preserve the arid and distant parts of the country. Still, the number of the Romans excited the fears of the Vandals, who destroyed the walls of the provincial towns in order to prevent the people from receiving succours from the Eastern Empire. . . . When Genseric conquered Carthage [see CARTHAGE: 439], his whole army amounted only to 50,000 warriors; yet this small horde devoured all the wealth of Africa in the course of a single century, and, from an army of hardy soldiers, it was converted into a caste of luxurious nobles living in splendid villas round Carthage. In order fully to understand the influence of the Vandals on the state of the country which they occupied, it must be observed that their oppressive government had already so far lowered the condition and reduced the numbers of the Roman provincials, that the native Moors began to reoccupy the country from which Roman industry and Roman capital had excluded them. . . . As the property of the province was destroyed, its Roman inhabitants perished."—G. Finlay, *Greece under the Romans*, ch. 3, sect. 5.—See also AFRICA: Ancient and medieval civilization.

455.—Sack of Rome by Genseric. See ROME: Empire: 455; BARBARIAN INVASIONS: 423-455.

533-534.—End of the kingdom and nation.—The weakened and disordered state of the Vandal kingdom, concurring with the revival of a military spirit in the eastern Roman empire, which the great soldier Belisarius had brought about, encouraged the Emperor Justinian to attempt, 533, a reconquest of the lost Roman provinces in Africa. With a fleet of six hundred ships, bearing 37,000 men, Belisarius set sail from Constantinople in the

month of June and landed early in September on the African coast, about five days journey from Carthage,—having halted at a port in Sicily on the voyage. A few days later, he defeated the Vandal king, Gelimer, in a battle (Ad Decimus) fought at ten miles distance from his capital, and entered Carthage in triumph (Sept. 15, 533), received with joy by its Roman and Catholic inhabitants, long persecuted and humiliated by the Arian Vandals. A second and decisive battle was fought some weeks afterwards at Tricameron, twenty miles away from Carthage, and there and then the Vandal kingdom came to its end. Gelimer fled into the wilds of Numidia, was pursued, and, having surrendered himself in the March following, was sent to Constantinople, and passed the remainder of his days in peace and modest luxury on a comfortable estate in Galatia. "The fall of the Vandal monarchy was an event full of meaning for the future history of Africa. There can be little doubt that in destroying it Justinian was unconsciously removing the most powerful barrier which might in the next century have arrested the progress of Mohammedanism."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and her invaders*, bk. 4, v. 3, ch. 15.—"The bravest of the Vandal youth were distributed into five squadrons of Cavalry, which adopted the name of their benefactor. . . . But these rare exceptions, the reward of birth or valour, are insufficient to explain the fate of a nation whose numbers, before a short and bloodless war, amounted to more than 600,000 persons. After the exile of their king and nobles, the servile crowd might purchase their safety by abjuring their character, religion, and language; and their degenerate posterity would be insensibly mingled with the common herd of African subjects. Yet even in the present age, and in the heart of the Moorish tribes, a curious traveller has discovered the white complexion and long flaxen hair of a northern race; and it was formerly believed that the boldest of the Vandals fled beyond the power, or even the knowledge, of the Romans, to enjoy their solitary freedom on the shores of the Atlantic ocean."—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 41.

VANDAMME, Dominique René, Count (1770-1830), French general. Served at Austerlitz, 1805; in the Eckmühl campaign, 1809; was forced to surrender at Kulm, after the battle of Dresden, 1813. See GERMANY: 1813 (August-October).

VAN DEN HEUVEL, Belgian representative at the Paris peace conference, 1919. See VER-SAILLES, TREATY OF: Conditions of peace.

VAN DER BILT, Cornelius (1794-1877), American financier. Established steamboat lines between New York and New England ports, Hudson river ports, and Havre, France; became chief owner of the Hudson River railroad, 1864; obtained control of the New York Central railroad, 1867; extended control over the Lake Shore, Canada Southern, and Michigan Central roads. See CAPITALISM: 19th century: United States; RAILROADS: 1870-1910; GIFTS AND BEQUESTS.

VANDERLIP CONCESSION. See JAPAN: 1921; RUSSIA: 1920-1921: Difficulties of establishing peace with Allies.

VAN DER MERSCH, Jean André (1734-1792), Belgian patriot. See VONCKISTS.

VANDERNOOTISTS, party formed in Brabant in 1788 to combat the oppression of Austria. "While the nobility had formed among themselves a secret society, . . . a more popular body had been drawn together at Breda under the direction of an advocate named Henri Van der Noot, and an ex-penitentiary of Antwerp Cathedral, named

Van Eupen. Van der Noot was a noisy, vulgar, pushing demagogue without any real merit, but he had gained the ear of the people and was popular. On the other hand Van Eupen was a man of education and ability. They were both impregnated with the new French doctrines which, while these events were occurring in Belgium, had been translated into action by the destruction of the Bastille. They regarded the society of the Nobles with suspicion and dislike; when the Count de la Marck wrote offering his co-operation they took no notice of his letter. For the moment Van der Noot was supreme with a grandiloquent self-conferred title of Agent Plenipotentiary of the people of Brabant."—D. C. Boulger, *History of Belgium*, v. 1, pp. 406-407.— See also **VONCKISTS**.

VANDERVELDE, Emile (1866-), Belgian statesman. Member of Parliament, 1894-1914; became leader of the Socialist party; aided Americans in the Belgian Congo, 1909; minister of justice, 1918; representative at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919; chosen to defend the Russian Social Revolutionists at their trial, 1922. See **VERSAILLES**, **TREATY OF**: Conditions of peace; **BELGIAN CONGO**: 1909; **RUSSIA**: 1922 (June-August).

VAN DEVENTER, Sir Jacob Louis (1874-1922), South African general. Served in the German Southwest African campaigns, 1914-1915; appointed commander-in-chief of the British forces in German East Africa, 1917. See **WORLD WAR**: 1915: VIII. Africa: a, 1; 1916: VII. African theater: a, 1; a, 2; a, 4; a, 6; a, 7; a, 9; a, 13, to a, 16; a, 18; 1917: VII. East African campaign: a; 1918: VII. East African theater: a.

VAN DIEMEN, Antony (1593-1645), Dutch governor-general of the Dutch East Indies, 1636-1645. See **AUSTRALIA**: 1601-1800.

VAN DIEMEN'S LAND, or Tasmania. See **TASMANIA**.

VAN DORN, Earl (1820-1863), American general. Served on the Confederate side during the Civil War as major general of the Mississippi forces. See **U. S. A.**: 1862 (January-March: Missouri-Arkansas); (May-July: On the Mississippi); (September-October).

VAN DUYSSE, Prudens (1804-1859), Flemish poet and composer. See **MUSIC**: Folk music and nationalism: Netherlands: Belgium.

VAN DYCK, Sir Anthony (1599-1641), Flemish painter. See **PAINTING**: Flemish.

VANE, Sir Henry (1613-1662), English statesman and author. Emigrated to Massachusetts, 1635; governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1636-1637; entered Parliament, 1640; negotiated the Solemn League and Covenant with Scotland, 1643; furthered the Self-Denying Ordinance and the New Model; condemned Pride's Purge; member of the council of state, 1649; arrested at the Restoration, 1660, and executed on the charge of treason, 1662. See **ENGLAND**: 1643 (July-September); 1658-1660; **MASSACHUSETTS**: 1637.

VAN EYCK, Hubert (c. 1366-1426), Flemish painter. See **PAINTING**: Flemish.

VAN EYCK, Jan (c. 1385-1440), Flemish painter. See **PAINTING**: Flemish.

VANGA, ancient name of eastern Bengal. See **BENGAL**.

VANGIONES, **TRIBOCI**, **NEMETES**.—"These tribes dwelt on the west bank of the Rhine, in what is now Rhenish Bavaria."—Tacitus, *Germany* (tr. by Church and Brodribb), with geographical note.

VAN LOO, Charles André (1705-1765), French painter. See **PAINTING**: French.

VAN METRE, John, early explorer of West Virginia. See **WEST VIRGINIA**: 1670-1727.

VANNES, town of western France, capital of the department of Morbihan, eighty-four miles northwest of Nantes. It was the ancient capital of the Veneti. See **VENETI OF WESTERN GAUL**; **BRITANNY**: 818-912.

VAN RENSSELAER, Killian. See **RENSSELAER**, **KILLIAN VAN**.

VAN RENSSELAER, Stephen (1764-1839), American political leader and soldier. Member of the New York state senate, 1790-1795; directed the unsuccessful assault upon Queenstown Heights, 1812; established a scientific school at Troy, 1824; member of the House of Representatives, 1823-1829. See **U. S. A.**: 1812 (September-November).

VAN'T HOFF. See **HOFF**, **JACOBUS HENRICUS VAN'T**.

VAN TWILLER, Wouter, or Walter (c. 1580-c. 1650), Dutch governor of New Netherland, 1633-1637. See **NEW YORK**: 1638-1647; **CONNECTICUT**: 1634-1637.

VAN WYCK, Robert A., first mayor of Greater New York, 1897-1901. See **NEW YORK CITY**: 1897.

VAPHIO, ancient site in Laconia, Greece, five miles south of Sparta. Here was found the "bee-hive" tomb, which was excavated by Dr. Tsountas in 1889. See **ÆGEAN CIVILIZATION**: Excavations and antiquities: Mycenaean area.

VAPORIZATION OF GASES: Use in refrigeration. See **INVENTIONS**: 19th century: Refrigeration.

VAQUEROS, North American Indian tribe. See **APACHE INDIANS**.

VARANGIAN SEA, one of the ancient names of the Baltic.—Based on R. G. Latham, *Native races of Russian empire*, ch. 16.

VARANGIANS, or Warings, **WARING GUARD**.—Varangians "was the name of the Byzantine equivalent to the 'soldiers of a free-company' in the 11th and 12th centuries. The soldiers were almost wholly Scandinavians—to a great extent the Swedes of Russia. The reasons against believing Varangian to be the same word as Frank, are: 1. The mention of Franci along with them, as a separate people. 2. The extent to which the Varangians were Scandinavians, rather than Germans of the Rhine. In favour of it is: The form of the present Oriental name for Europeans—Feringi. This, in my mind, preponderates. Connected by name only with the Franks, the truer ethnological affinities of the Varangians were with the Scandinavians of Russia."—R. G. Latham, *Germany of Tacitus: Epilegomena*, sect. 17.—"Many of the Warings and probably of the English also had taken military service at an early period under the Byzantine emperors. They formed a body-guard for the Emperor, and soon gained for themselves a renown greater than that possessed by the earlier imperial guard of the Immortals. The Byzantine writers usually speak of them as the barbarian guard or as the axe-bearers. Their weapon was the Danish battle-axe, or rather bill, and seems not to have had two blades turning different ways like those of a halberd, but to have had one with a sharp steel spike projecting, so that the weapon could be used either to strike or to thrust. Anna, the daughter of Alexis the First, calls them Warings or Varangians. Nicetas speaks of them as Germans. The Western writers call them usually Danes, or 'English and Danes.' The conquest of England by William the Norman caused many of the English to emigrate to Russia and so to Constantinople, where they joined the Waring guard. . . . Warings and English, while occupants of the

Greek palace, still spoke their own language, had their own laws, and chose, with certain exceptions, their own officers. The one in command was called the acolyth, or follower, because his place was immediately behind the Emperor."—E. Pears, *Fall of Constantinople*, ch. 6, sect. 3.—See also RUSSIA: 9th-12th centuries; UKRAINE: Origin of the people.

ALSO IN: V. Thomsen, *Relations between ancient Russia and Scandinavia*, lecture 3.

VARAVILLE, Battle of (1058), decisive victory over the French, invading Normandy, by Duke William—afterwards the Conqueror of England.—Based on E. A. Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, v. 3, ch. 12, sect. 2.

VARCHI, Benedetto (1502-1565), Florentine historian. See HISTORY: 22.

VARDAR, river of Macedonia, flowing through what is now Serbian and Greek territory into the Gulf of Salonika, Ægean sea. It was a scene of fighting during the World War. See WORLD WAR: 1915: V. Balkans: b, 6; c, 3, ii; c, 3, iii; 1916: V. Balkan theater: b; 1918: V. Balkan theater: c, 1; c, 5; c, 8, ii; c, 8, iii.

VARENNES-EN-ARGONNE, town of France in the department of Meuse, on the Aire, eighteen miles west of Verdun. It was here that Louis XVI and the royal family were arrested in their attempt to escape from Paris in 1791. The town was a scene of fighting during the World War. See FRANCE: 1790-1791: Oath of clergy; WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: v, 1.

VARIAN LAW. See MAJESTAS, LAW OF.

VARIAN MASSACRE (9 A.D.). See GERMANY: B. C. 8-A. D. 11.

VARIATION AND SELECTION. See EVOLUTION.

VARINI, Suevic clan. See AVIONES.

VARKANA, ancient name of Hyrcania. See HYRCANIA.

VARNI, Battles of (1444, 1828). See TURKEY: 1402-1451; 1826-1829.

VARRO, Caius Terentius (fl. 216 B.C.), Roman general. Defeated by Hannibal in the battle at Cannæ during the Second Punic War, 216 B.C. See PUNIC WARS: Second.

VARRO, Marcus Terentius (116-28 B.C.), Roman historian. See HISTORY: 17; LATIN LITERATURE: B. C. 82-43.

VARUS, Publius Quintilius (d. 9 A.D.), Roman general. Commander of Roman army in Germany, 6-9 A.D.; defeated by Arminius in the battle of Teutoberg Forest, 9 A.D. See ROME: Empire: B. C. 8-A. D. 11; GERMANY: B. C. 8-A. D. 11.

VASA, Gustavus. See GUSTAVUS I.

VASA, House of. See SWEDEN: 1523-1604; 1720-1792: Genealogical table.

VASAG, Battle of (1442). See TURKEY: 1402-1451.

VASCONES, early tribe of Aquitaine. See AQUITAINE: 681-768; BASQUES.

VASCONIA, early name of Gascony. See AQUITAINE: 781.

VASSAL. See FEUDALISM: Feudal aids; Centralization; Organization.

VASSALI. See CATTANI.

VASSAR, Matthew (1792-1868), American philanthropist. Endowed Vassar College. See GIFTS AND BEQUESTS.

VASSAR COLLEGE. See EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Secondary education; WOMAN'S RIGHTS: 1861-1910.

VASSY, Massacre of (1562). See FRANCE: 1560-1563.

VATICAN: Ancient Leonine city.—"The name

Vatican was applied by the writers of the Augustan age to the whole range of hills extending along the western bank of the Tiber, including the Janiculum and the Monte Mario. . . . But the name Vaticanus has now been restricted to the small hill standing behind the Basilica of St. Peter's, upon which the Vatican Museum and the Papal Gardens are situated. This hill is a small projecting portion of the range which includes the Janiculum and Monte Mario, and it is separated from the Janiculum by a depression, along which the street of the Borgo S. Spirito runs. The derivation of the name Vatican is lost. Gellius has preserved a quotation from Varro, in which the word is said to be derived from a deity Vaticanus, the presiding god of the first rudiments of speech ('vagine,' 'vagitonus'). Paulus Diaconus gives a different explanation, founded on the supposed expulsion of the Etruscans in fulfilment of an oracle ('vatum responso expulsis Etruscis'); and from this Niebuhr and Bunsen, following him, have supposed that an Etruscan city existed here in ancient times. There appears to be no sufficient evidence of such a settlement."—R. Burn, *Rome and the Campagna*, ch. 11.—In the ninth century, at the time of the pontificate of Leo IV, "the nations of the West and North who visited the threshold of the apostles had gradually formed the large and populous suburb of the Vatican, and their various habitations were distinguished, in the language of the times, as the 'schools' of the Greeks and Goths, of the Lombards and Saxons. But this venerable spot was still open to sacrilegious insult: the design of enclosing it with walls and towers exhausted all that authority could command or charity would supply: and the pious labour of four years was animated in every season and at every hour by the presence of the indefatigable pontiff. The love of fame, a generous but worldly passion, may be detected in the name of the Leonine City, which he bestowed on the Vatican; yet the pride of the dedication was tempered with Christian penance and humility."—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 52.—"It is perfectly correct to say that, since the fifteenth century, the world has been accustomed to associate the term Vatican with the chief residence of the Popes. . . . Over the grave of St. Peter, Constantine the Great erected his glorious basilica. On this hallowed spot assembled crowds of pilgrims from all lands, and here the Popes repeatedly held the most glorious ecclesiastical functions. As most of the great feasts began on the Vigil—that is, on the afternoon preceding—the Pope had on such occasions to spend the night at St. Peter's with his whole retinue. Hence arose the urgent necessity of erecting in the vicinity a larger residence for the Pope. . . . Pope Nicholas III (1277-1280) conceived magnificent plans for covering the Vatican Hill with buildings. He began the erection of a very extensive palace there, and this was brought to approximate completion by his immediate successors. By extensive purchases of land through his Apostolic Chamber (that is, the Papal Ministry of Finance), Nicholas assured to the Popes the undisturbed possession of the Vatican Hill and the surrounding property. The present Vatican Gardens represent a large portion of Nicholas's purchase."—P. M. Baumgarten, *History and description of Vatican palaces* (E. Begni, ed., *Vatican: Its history—its treasures*, p. 6).

15th century.—Building and embellishment of palaces.—Origin of Swiss Guard.—"Nicholas V., the simple scholar of humble birth, who founded the Vatican Library . . . conceived the magnificent

idea of making the Vatican Hill rival the Palatine with its Imperial Palaces and gardens. . . . It is difficult to gather from the documents hitherto available how much Nicholas actually built. None of his buildings remain except the exquisite little chapel frescoed by Fra Angelico with the story of S. Lorenzo, and part of the wing which now bears the name of the Borgias. The buildings of Paul II. (1464-1471), the magnificent Venetian Pope who erected the Palazzo di Venezia, have entirely disappeared. But Sixtus IV. (1471-1484), the first of the two della Rovere Popes, whose conceptions were smaller, immortalized himself by his contributions to the Vatican, for he built the Sistine Chapel, whose walls he had frescoed by the greatest masters of his day, Perugino, Pinturicchio, Ghirlandajo, Botticelli, Cosimo Roselli, and Luca Signorelli. . . . The 'Last Judgment' was not painted till more than half a century after Pope

Swiss Guard extends back to the fifteenth century. Their position was [later] secured by treaty under Julius II (1503-1513), who, at the instigation of the Swiss Cardinal Schinner, entered into an agreement with the Cantons of Zurich and Lucerne, in accordance with which these cantons undertook to supply two hundred and fifty men as a body-guard for the Pope. Since then the Pope has always had around him a corps of Swiss Guards, although in the course of time their number has been reduced and the conditions of their service have changed."—P. M. Baumgarten, *Vatican administration* (E. Begni, ed., *Vatican: Its history—its treasures*, p. 537).

16th century.—Additions and decorations contributed by Bramante, Raphael and Michelangelo.—Commissions of Sixtus V.—"It was [Julius II.] . . . who joined Innocent VIII's Villa Belvedere to the Vatican by the Cortile of the



PAPAL SWISS GUARD

Sixtus's death, and Michel Angelo did not begin the ceiling to which the chapel owes its fame until twenty-four years after the Pope's death. . . . Innocent VIII. (1484-1492) had a beautiful villa constructed for his use in the Vatican Gardens. . . . This, which was called the Villa Belvedere, was constructed for him by Antonio Pollaiuolo about 1490, and decorated with frescoes by Mantegna, which have perished. It was about a quarter of a mile from the Vatican Palace until Julius II. connected them. Gregorovius calls it Innocent's finest work. . . . His successor, the execrated Borgia Pope, Alexander VI. (1492-1503), in the midst of all his ambitions and excesses, found the time and money to embellish the Vatican with one of its greatest glories, the *Appartamenti Borgia*, the suite of rooms embellished by Pinturicchio with frescoes, which, as chamber decorations, have no superiors, except the same artist's glorious frescoes illustrating the career of Pius II. in the library of the Cathedral of Siena."—D. Sladen, *Secrets of the Vatican*, pp. 136-138.—"The origin of the Papal

Belvedere, which, before it was intersected by the Library and the Braccio Nuovo, was twelve hundred feet long. Bramante was the architect. . . . Julius also commissioned, and Bramante built, the Cortile of S. Damaso, one of the most wonderful in the world, for it is of vast size and is surrounded on three sides by the triple arcades of the Loggie, which Gregorovius calls the 'most successful imitation of the antique, . . . an unequalled example of vigour, lightness, and grace.' Some of them were frescoed by Raffaele, and he was the architect who completed them after Bramante's death. Julius II. is hailed as the founder of the Vatican Museum. . . . It was for Julius that Michel Angelo executed his immortal paintings on the roof of the Sistine Chapel, which made it the most celebrated chapel in the world. . . . Leo X., Giovanni de' Medici, had the same magnificent and Mænenatic tastes; it was he who completed the Loggie of S. Damaso under the direction of Raffaele. It was he who had ten of the designs intended for these Loggie not executed in the Loggie, but in the

Vatican tapestries woven at Arras in 1514. They were to hang on the walls of the Sistine Chapel below the frescoes: they are now kept in the Galleria degli Arazzi. . . . Raffaello's Stanze were originally commissioned by Julius II., and completed under Leo X. . . . Paul III. (1534-1549) . . . commissioned Michel Angelo to paint the Last Judgment in the Sistine Chapel, for which three famous frescoes by Perugino were destroyed. This was unveiled in 1547. . . . Julius III. (1550-1555) had a stately flight of steps made for the Belvedere by Michel Angelo. . . . It was Sixtus [V] who built the wing of the Courtyard of S. Damaso, which has been the residence of the Popes ever since. It was Sixtus who built the great hall of the Vatican Library, two hundred and twenty feet long, which, with its brilliant decorations in Pompeian style, is one of the finest chambers in Rome. But it destroyed the finest cortile in the world, the Courtyard of the Belvedere built by Bramante to connect the Villa Belvedere with the Vatican, which it cut clean in half. It is the actual palace of the Popes, built by Sixtus, though finally completed by Clement VIII. . . . (1592-1605)."—D. Sladen, *Secrets of the Vatican*, pp. 139-140, 143, 145.

1585-1921.—Printing press.—Private press.—"Pope Sixtus V (1585-1590), at the beginning of his reign, established at great expense a printing-office that was for that period entirely unique. This press was to print his revised edition of the Latin Bible. Sixtus entrusted its direction to the Venetian Domenico Pasa, and appointed a special commission of Cardinals to supervise the printing. In 1590 his 'Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editonis' appeared in three sumptuous volumes, which were for various reasons withdrawn immediately after his death. In 1592, 1593, and 1598 appeared three editions of the 'Vulgata Clementina,' which is used even to-day. Since that time an exceedingly large number of works of the most varied character have issued from the Vatican Press. In the course of time the most important Oriental alphabets were manufactured to meet the needs of the pagan missions and for the promotion of linguistic studies. . . . In connection with the Vatican Press, which at first served for purely scientific and literary purposes, there soon developed a Private Press, in which were printed the acts, decrees, instructions, formularies, and so on, used by the Curia in the discharge of its official business. Though there was no well-marked division at first, a special department gradually developed, with strict secrecy and special precautions and a staff selected only from employees who had been found entirely trustworthy."—P. M. Baumgarten, *Vatican administration* (E. Begni, ed., *Vatican: Its history—its treasures*, pp. 557-558).

1586.—Foundation of mosaic factory.—"In 1586 Pope Sixtus V founded the mosaic factory of the Vatican, and set its artists to prepare mosaics for the walls and ceiling of St. Peter's. The original site of the factory was near St. Martha's, beside St. Peter's, where the street is still known as the Via del Mosaico. Exigencies of space necessitated successive changes of location, and the factory was removed first to rooms in the Palace of the Holy Office, and then to the Palazzo Giraud (now the Torlonia) in the Piazza Scossacavalli. Finally, in 1825, worthy quarters were found for it in the Vatican itself by Pope Leo XII. . . . The mosaic factory really forms a part of the building department of St. Peter's, and is thus under the charge of . . . [the] Administrator of the Vatican Basilica."—S. Nobile, *Mosaic factory* (E. Begni,

ed., *Vatican: Its history—its treasures*, pp. 500-501, 503).

17th-20th centuries.—Continued building and beautifying of palaces.—"Bernini under Urban VIII constructed the Royal Staircase. Pius VI commanded the construction of the Greek cross Hall, the Round Hall and the Hall of the Muses. Pius VII in 1821 had the New Wing built by Raphael Sterne, Pius IX had the Scala Pia enclosed, thus closing in the fourth side of the Court of S. Damaso."—G. Govone, *Saint Peter and the Vatican (L'Italia monumentale, Monograph no. 6, p. 10)*.—Leo XIII. . . . (1878-1903), made one supreme contribution to the glories of the Vatican by restoring the Borgia Apartments, whose frescoes are, after those of the Cathedral Library at Siena, the masterpieces of Pinturicchio. . . . Leo XIII. . . . cleared out and entirely reconstituted the apartments under the great hall of the Vatican Library and various adjoining rooms to form the new Leonine Library, which now contains all the printed books. . . . Pope Leo also converted the Hall of Canonizations into a chapel, and spent a great deal of money on beautifying the floors."—D. Sladen, *Secrets of the Vatican*, p. 150.

1744.—Origin of Noble Guard.—Its place in system of papal guards.—"The Noble Guard of to-day trace their origin from the Cavalleggeri, a kind of body-guard which was reorganized by Benedict XIV in 1744, and received new regulations as to service and rank from Leo XIII. With the exception of the quartermaster, the equerry, the four trumpeters, and the master-at-arms, all the members of the Guard must be of noble birth. Their captain, who is always a Roman prince, holds the rank of lieutenant-general, and the other officers rank correspondingly. The privates in this Guard hold the rank of captain. . . . The Noble Guard renders service in the immediate vicinity of the Holy Father, . . . the Swiss Guard is entrusted with the guardianship of the person and dwelling of the Pope, and . . . the Palatine Guard is a guard of honor in the papal service."—P. M. Baumgarten, *Vatican administration* (E. Begni, ed., *Vatican: Its history—its treasures*, pp. 538-540).

1800-1850.—Papal Gendarmes.—"Pope Pius VII (1800-1823) organized a select body of police under the name of Carabinieri Pontifici (Papal Carbiniers). By decree of February 16, 1850, their name was changed to Veliti. After retaining this title for only two years, they were given their present title of Papal Gendarmes. They discharge the duties of both court attendants and police."—*Ibid.*, p. 541.

1871.—Position since Law of Papal Guarantees. See PAPACY: 1870.

1881.—Archives opened to public.—The Vatican secret archives are the accumulation of papers and documents for over seven hundred years. In 1881 "Pope Leo XIII was the first to make these manuscripts and archives fairly accessible to the public and there has always been a steady stream of students making use of the riches they contain. . . . During the middle ages the collection suffered from successive pillagings, and the present mass of archives dates largely from the pontificate of Innocent III. . . . [Even] these have suffered serious spoliation."—*Archives of the Vatican (Living Age, Sept. 17, 1922, p. 741)*.

1893.—Sanitary corps.—"The general sanitary corps of the Apostolic Palaces was reorganized in 1893 and placed on an entirely modern footing. This corps consists of a director, five physicians, and a number of assistant physicians. . . . Both classes of physicians have to appear at all great


functions, when they occupy, with the Sisters of Mercy, a specially erected ambulance station, and are thus on the spot to render medical aid if an accident of any kind should occur among the vast throng of persons assembled. This College of Physicians is assisted by two apothecaries, who must have always in readiness, especially on great festivals, the necessary materials to render relief."—P. M. Baumgarten, *Vatican administration* (E. Begni, ed., *Vatican: Its history—its treasures*, p. 544).

Present day papal administration.—Secretariate of state.—Consistories.—Papal secret chancery.—Distribution of alms.—Sacred Congregations.—Commissions, tribunals and offices.—Diplomatic relations.—Pope's apartments and gardens.—College of cardinals.—Conclave and election of a pope.—The Vatican may be regarded as the administrative center of the Catholic church, since it houses the supreme head of the church, and from it the whole church is governed. From its walls the pope issues a decree or *motu proprio*, advises the prelates or managing cardinals of the congregations, whose duty it is to lay before him the business of the Universal Church or of the diocese of Rome, and in all important matters his personal business activity is a factor. "The most important of all numerous bodies which have their general offices in the palace is the Secretariate of State. All the offices of this department (in so far as it deals with political and ecclesiastico-political matters) are situated on the third floor of those portions of the old Apostolic Palace which . . . surround the Cortile del Papagallo and the Cortile del Maresciallo. . . . Before 1870 the Secretariate of State had its seat in the Quirinal. . . . When recently the Secretariate of Briefs was placed under the direction of the secretary of state the offices of this great department were transferred to the Vatican Palace and established in the unoccupied halls of the old picture gallery. All the bureaus of the Secretariate of State are now on the same floor. The extent of business transacted here is evidenced by the archives. . . . The inventories (called *rubricelle*), which are added to the collections from day to day, render it possible to discover immediately any particular document. . . . A whole series of Roman Congregations hold either regularly or on special occasions their sessions in the Vatican. . . . The secretary of state receives the ambassadors and envoys accredited to the Holy See, so that all diplomatic affairs not transacted by correspondence are conducted in the Vatican. The secret, semi-public, and public consistories are held either in the Sala Concistoriale or in the Sala Regia. . . . A place of great activity is the Secret Chancery of the Holy Father; here are discharged all affairs pertaining to the pope in so far as they do not belong to any of the special departments. . . . The Alms, to be distributed according to certain principles, are entrusted to the Secret Almoner of the pope, who is always a titular archbishop. His offices lie near the quarters of the Swiss guards. All donations accruing in the form of Peterspence are administered separately by the 'Commissione Cardinalizia amministratrice dei Beni della Santa Sede.' . . . [Besides several other commissions] must still be mentioned the numerous offices of the palatine administration which is naturally very extensive."—P. M. Baumgarten, *Vatican* (*Catholic encyclopedia*, v. 15, p. 301).—The Sacred Congregations which carry on the central administration of the church are made up of cardinals assisted by consultants and official representatives. The eleven Sacred Congregations of

today are: Holy Office, Consistorial, Discipline of the Sacraments, Council, Religious, Propaganda Fide, Index, Rites, Ceremonial, Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, Studies. Permanent commissions of the Congregations provide for such interests as biblical and historical studies, preservation of the faith in Rome and codification of canon law. The tribunals of the Roman Curia are the Apostolic Penitentiary, the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signature and the Sacred Roman Rota. Offices embraced by the body include the Apostolic Chancery, the Apostolic Datary, the Apostolic Chamber and the Secretariate of State. Nuncios or agents are the means of maintaining diplomatic relations with the following countries: Austria, Bavaria, Belgium, Czecho-Slovakia, France, Germany, Hungary, Jugo-Slavia, Monaco, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Prussia, Russia, Spain and the United Kingdom together with most of the American republics, except the United States and Mexico. "The Pope dwells on the second and third stories of the Palace of Sixtus V. and his Secretary of State occupies the first floor. . . . Three large windows light the lofty and broad room, which serves as the private library of the Pope. A number of book-cases line the walls; a mahogany table of gigantic dimensions runs through the middle of the room, and is littered with books, documents, presents of all kinds, a few cases, and other objects. A row of valuable oil paintings, representing wild animals, hangs over the book-cases. Three busts resting on magnificent marble pillars complete the furnishings. On the writing-table ticks a valuable clock, and a number of small presents from all lands fill every space on the table left unoccupied by books and documents. . . . After work is done in the evening, or when meal-time comes, the Pope ascends by . . . [a] stairway to the living-rooms which he occupies with his two private secretaries. On this upper floor are the bedrooms, the dining-room, the sitting-room, rooms for the servants, the kitchen, and the other rooms pertaining to housekeeping. All these rooms are furnished with great simplicity."—P. M. Baumgarten, *History and description of Vatican palace* (E. Begni, ed., *Vatican: Its history—its treasures*, pp. 13, 17-18).—The Vatican Gardens [where the pope takes his exercise] lie to the west of the palace, between it and the walls of the ancient Leonine City. They are irregular in shape and of an extensive area. Important traces of the old Leonine Wall still remain; there is, for instance, at the highest point of the Gardens a battlemented circular tower of the usual medieval character (Torre Leonina).—A. M. De Villard, *Vatican gardens* (E. Begni, ed., *Vatican: Its history—its treasures*, p. 37).—A print published by Falda in his work on Roman gardens depicts them as they existed in 1683 and shows that the changes that have taken place are very slight. "It is a matter of universal knowledge that the chief advisers of the Popes form a special college, and are known by the name of Cardinals. Their office is, first, to assist the Pope in the government of the Universal Church, and, secondly, when the Pope dies, to elect a successor from their number. . . . Canon law prescribes that, on the death of a Pope, the Cardinals shall assemble as soon as possible at the place of his death [obviously the Vatican since the events of the pontificate of Pius IX] for the election of his successor; for it is reasonable to suppose that a large number of Cardinals will be already assembled at this place. At the end of the nine days which are prescribed for the burial ceremonies, and which

are also used for the preparation of the assembly hall, the Cardinals meet to elect the new Pope. This elective assembly is called the Conclave. Strict precepts require that the Conclave be held in rooms which are completely secluded by the stopping up of all entrances and windows that might make possible any communication with the outer world. Each accompanied by one priest (called a Conclavist) and one servant, the Cardinals are here immured until they have elected some one of their body by a two-thirds majority. The votes are cast each forenoon and afternoon by ballot in the Sistine Chapel. If the necessary majority has not been secured, the Master of Ceremonies burns the ballot papers, together with damp hay, in a small stove specially set up for this purpose in the Sistine Chapel. The stove-pipe extends over the gable of the chapel facing towards the Piazza di S.

Each Cardinal first signs his name at the top of the ballot paper (e. g., *Ego Thomas Card. Riarius*); he then inserts in the middle (after the words *Eligo . . . D. Card.*) the name of the candidate for whom he wishes to vote, and finally writes at the bottom of the paper the numeral indicating his order of precedence in the Sacred College and also some motto which has been chosen especially for this occasion and does not in any way suggest his identity. The upper and lower parts of the ballot are then folded and secured with three seals to the left and right of the printed words *Nomen* (name) and *Signa* (motto). Should no candidate secure the prescribed two-thirds majority, the ballots are burned unopened. When a candidate has received the necessary majority, he must reveal his motto, whereupon the bottom folds only of all the ballots are opened until that containing



GARDENS OF THE VATICAN, WITH ST. PETER'S IN THE BACKGROUND

Pietro, where thousands assemble at the appointed hour in the morning and afternoon to obtain the latest news from this little chimney-flue. The thick, bluish-gray smoke, caused by the moist hay, indicates to the populace that the voting has been held without result. When, however, a Cardinal has been chosen by a two-thirds majority of the electors present, the ballot papers alone (without the hay) are burned, the consequence being that only a light and almost invisible smoke issues from the chimney. . . . The elected candidate is clothed with the white papal soutane in the sacristy of the Sistine Chapel where three such soutanes of various sizes are always held in readiness. The Cardinals then pay him solemn homage for the first time, and the oldest of the Cardinal Deacons later announces the result of the election from the Loggia of St. Peter's. With lightning rapidity the news spreads throughout Rome, and every one hurries to St. Peter's to receive the first blessing which the new Pope gives from the above-mentioned Loggia. The method of voting is as follows:

his motto is discovered. The upper fold of this ballot is then opened to ensure that the candidate has not voted for himself. After this formality all the voting ballots are burned as before. To bring to an end a deadlock, or for various other reasons, the Cardinals are always at liberty to transfer their votes. They are then said to 'vote by *accedo*,' since the word *Accedo* (I go over to) occurs in the special ballot paper (No. 2) used in such an instance."—P. M. Baumgarten, *Vatican administration* (E. Begni, ed., *Vatican: Its history—its treasures*, pp. 507-508).—See also PAPACY: 6th-11th centuries; 1050.

ALSO IN: F. Gregorovius, *History of the city of Rome*.—A. A. Hopkins, *Art of the Vatican*.

VATICAN COUNCIL. See PAPACY: 1869-1870; ULTRAMONTANE.


VATICAN GARDENS. See VATICAN: Present day papal administration.

VATICAN LIBRARY. See LIBRARIES: Modern; Europe; Administration: Early methods; Italy.

VATICAN MANUSCRIPT OF THE BIBLE. See BIBLE, ENGLISH: Sources.

VATICAN MUSEUMS.—“The Vatican contains the oldest of existing museums . . . [and] the finest existing collection of marbles, bronzes, frescoes, mosaics, gems, and statues in the world. The most striking rooms open to the general visitor are the Sistine Chapel, built in 1473, and adorned by the genius of Michael Angelo; the Pauline Chapel, dating from 1540; the Loggie and Stanze of Raphael; the Court of the Belvedere; the Library, containing 24,000 MSS. and 50,000 printed volumes; several rich Museums of ancient and modern articles of *virtu* and the mosaic manu-

Gallery of the Statues, and contains a number of colossal busts, the historical portion of which are arranged in chronological order. Two unique representations in marble of the Organs of Respiration are extremely interesting, as showing the knowledge of the ancients in human anatomy. The Belvedere Court, designed by Bramante, is an octagonal room, of unequal sides, surrounded by four open porticos, with four cabinets in the angles, which contain some celebrated examples of ancient sculpture. . . . The [so-called] Museo Pio-Clementino is . . . the most magnificent Museum of ancient sculpture extant. Pius VI. . . . is said to have enriched it with more than 2,000 specimens. . . .



PAPAL COACH

Kept in the Vatican museum since the last appearance of Pius IX outside the papal residence.

factory. . . . [In] the Hall of the Greek Cross . . . are . . . two immense sarcophagi of red Egyptian porphyry . . . [and] a grand basin in porphyry, forty-one feet in circumference, found in the Baths of Diocletian. On each side of the entrance are two colossal Hermes, found in Hadrian's Villa, representing Tragedy and Comedy. Round the hall are statues and colossal busts of Jupiter, a bronze statue of Hercules, one of the largest of the ancient bronze statues existing, being fifteen feet high, and many others. [In] the Hall of the Animals . . . paved with mosaics chiefly found at Palestrina . . . the sculptures of animals constitute the finest collection of the kind ever formed. . . . The Gallery of Statues was collected in the halls belonging to the Casino of Innocent VIII. . . . The Hall of the Busts is a continuation of the

The Museo Chiaramonti was arranged by Canova. It contains upwards of 700 specimens of ancient sculpture, arranged in thirty compartments. . . . Opening to the west from the Museo Chiaramonti, the Gallery of Inscriptions is a long corridor, occupied almost exclusively with ancient sepulchral inscriptions and monuments, arranged in classes by Marini. . . . The Etruscan Museum is a very interesting department, owing its origin to Pope Gregory XVI., whose . . . zeal and liberality . . . added these valuable objects of art to the treasures accumulated in the Vatican by his predecessors. These ancient treasures would doubtless have been dispersed, perhaps irrevocably lost, if Gregory XVI. had not secured them for the Museum. They have been arranged in thirteen rooms. The Egyptian Museum [founded by Pius VII], although

inferior to many similar collections, presents much interest. . . . It occupies ten rooms underneath the Etruscan collection."—T. Greenwood, *Museums and art galleries*, pp. 343-347.—See also **ROME**: Modern city: 1550-1650.

ALSO IN: E. Begni, ed., *Vatican: Its history—its treasures*.—A. A. Hopkins, *Art of the Vatican*.

VATICAN PALACE. See **ROME**: Modern city: 1550-1650.

VATTEL, Emeric de (1714-1767), Swiss jurist. Served as councillor of embassy to the elector of Saxony, 1746-1758; best known for his "Droit des gens." See **INTERNATIONAL LAW**: Grotius and the early jurists.

VAUBAN, Sébastien le Prestre de (1633-1707), marshal of France, and military engineer. Served with the Spaniards under Condé in the Fronde, and later entered the French service; distinguished himself as an engineer at the capture of Sainte-Ménéhould, 1653; conducted the sieges of Gravelines, Ypres, and Oudenarde, 1655-1659; besieged Lille, Valenciennes, Mons, Namur and other towns in succeeding wars; constructed and improved many fortresses in France. See **NETHERLANDS**: 1672-1674; 1674-1678.

VAUCHAMP, Battle of. See **FRANCE**: 1814 (January-March).

VAUDEVILLE TRUST. See **TRUSTS**: United States: 1910-1923.

VAUDOIS. See **WALDENSES**.

VAUDREUIL, Philippe de Rigaud, Marquis de (c. 1641-1725), French colonial administrator. Became governor of Montreal, 1701, and governor-general of Canada, 1703. See **QUEBEC**, PROVINCE OF: 1698-1739; **LOUISIANA**: 1724-1764.

VAULT: In Roman architecture. See **ARCHITECTURE**: Classic: Roman.

In Gothic architecture. See **ARCHITECTURE**: Medieval: Gothic.

In Sessanian architecture. See **ARCHITECTURE**: Sessanian.

VAUX, fort of Verdun, France, east of the Meuse and about three miles northeast of the city. It was taken by the Germans in 1916, and later in the year was retaken by the French. The Germans took it again in the spring of 1917, but in 1918 it was captured by the Allies. See **WORLD WAR**: 1916: II. Western front: b, 9; b, 15; 1918: II. Western front: c, 9; g, 4; g, 4, i.

VAVASOURS, class of feudal lords. See **CATALAN**.

VEBLEN, Thorstein B., American economist. See **HISTORY**: 33.

VECTIGAL, **VECTIGALIA**.—"Pascua—Vectigalia—Publicum—are the terms employed to denote generally the Revenues of Rome, from whatever source derived. Pascua, i. e. Pasture lands, signified Revenue; because, in the earliest ages, the public income was derived solely from the rent of pastures belonging to the state. . . . Vectigal is the word used more frequently than any other to denote the Revenue of the state generally. . . . Publicum, in its widest acceptation, comprehended every thing which belonged to the community at large."—W. Ramsay, *Manual of Roman antiquities*, ch. 8.—"Cicero states that there was a difference between Sicily and all the other Roman provinces in the management of the Vectigal, which is the name for the contribution which the provinces made to the Roman State. All the provinces except Sicily paid either a fixed land-tax (vectigal stipendiarium) or tenths [decumæ] or other quotæ of their produce, and these tenths were let at Rome by the censors to the Publicani, who paid the State a certain sum for the

privilege of collecting the tenths and made out of them what profit they could. . . . The tenths of wheat and barley were let in Sicily to the Publicani, but sometimes a community would bid for its tenths and pay them itself."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman republic*, v. 3, ch. 4.

VECTIS, ancient name of the Isle of Wight.—E. H. Bunbury, *History of ancient geography*, v. 2, ch. 24, sect 2.

VEDANTISM.—"The so-called pantheistic theory of the Vedanta philosophy is . . . attractive to the majority of Hindu thinkers. It is true that both the Sankhyas and Vedanta together underlie Brahmanism; but the Vedanta is, so to speak, the latest revelation of the Veda, teaching the non-duality and non-plurality of Spirit—that is, the real existence of only one Spirit called Atman (nom. Atma) or Brahman (nom. Brahma) instead of many; the separation of human spirits and of all the phenomena of nature from that one Spirit being only effected when it is enveloped in Illusion. In other words, the separate existence of man's spirit and of all natural phenomena is only illusory. . . . Of course these hyper-subtleties are beyond the scope of ordinary philosophic thought; but they show how great is the difference between the Pantheism of India and that of Europe. A Vedantist believes in one impersonal Spirit, who, by association with Illusion, becomes the one Supreme personal God (Paramesvara) of the world (of illusion). And it is this personal God who, when he engages in the creation, preservation, and dissolution of an illusory Universe, is called Sa-guna because believed to be associated with the three Gunas which are held to be substances (dravya) and are the supposed constituents of his casual body, identified, as it is, with Ignorance. . . . Pure Vedantism, then, is not only a belief in one impersonal Spirit made up of three abstract essences. It is a belief that a kind of threefold triad of essences—to wit, three spiritual essences, three corporeal envelopes, and three dominating conditions or qualities—together constitute one personal God, while constituting at the same time every human personality. . . . And yet, after all, when the Vedantist theory, as held at present, is closely examined, it turns out to be virtually as dualistic, in regard to spirit and matter, as the Sankhya; the only difference being that the source of the material world (Prakriti) in the Sankhya is held to have a real existence (though one of its names is still Maya) instead of a merely illusory existence. Brahma and Maya (Illusion) in the Vedanta, Purusha and Prakriti (Maya) in the Sankhya, must be united in the act of creation. The external world is the product of two principles (which some compare to Knowledge and Ignorance, Light and Darkness). The chief difference between the two systems lies in the unity of Spirit taught by the Vedanta, as distinguished from the plurality of spirits taught by the Sankhya. Yet the Vedantist virtually believes in three conditions of being, viz. the real, the practical, and the illusory; for while he affirms that the one Spirit Brahma alone has a real (paramarthika) existence, he allows a practical (vyavaharika) separate existence to human spirits, to the world, and to the personal God or gods, as well as an illusory (pratibhasika) existence. Hence every object is to be dealt with practically as if it were really what it appears to be. A god is practically a god; a man, a man; a beast, a beast; so that when a man feeds a horse he does not feed him as a portion of God, but as an animal kept for riding. The Vedanta theory, like the Sankhya, has taken deep root in the Indian

mind. A mixture of both is the source of the popular religion and mythology of the Hindus. Both permeate their literature and give a colour to every thought and feeling of their daily lives."—M. Monier-Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, pp. 33, 36-38.—See also BRAHMANISM; RELIGION: B. C. 1000.

ALSO IN: E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*.

VEDAS.—"The Rig-Veda forms the great literary memorial of the early Aryan settlements in the Punjab. [See HINDU LITERATURE.] The age of this venerable hymnal is unknown. Orthodox Hindus believe, without evidence, that it existed 'from before all time,' or at least from 3001 years B. C. European scholars have inferred from astronomical data that its composition was going on about 1400 B. C. [See RELIGION: B. C. 1000.] But the evidence might have been calculated backwards, and inserted later in the Veda. We only know that the Vedic religion had been at work long before the rise of Buddhism in the sixth century B. C. The Rig-Veda is a very old collection of 1017 short poems, chiefly addressed to the gods, and containing 10,580 verses. Its hymns show us the Aryans on the banks of the Indus, divided into various tribes, sometimes at war with each other, sometimes united against the 'black-skinned' Aborigines. Caste, in its later sense, is unknown. Each father of a family is the priest of his own household. The chieftain acts as father and priest to the tribe; but at the greater festivals he chooses some one specially learned in holy offerings to conduct the sacrifice in the name of the people. The king himself seems to have been elected; and his title of Vis-pati, literally 'Lord of the Settlers,' survives in the old Persian Vis-paiti, and as the Lithuanian Wiesz-patis in east-central Europe at this day. Women enjoyed a high position; and some of the most beautiful hymns were composed by ladies and queens. Marriage was held sacred. Husband and wife were both 'rulers of the house' (*dampati*); and drew near to the gods together in prayer. The burning of widows on their husbands' funeral pile was unknown; and the verses in the Veda which the Brahmans afterwards distorted into a sanction for the practice, have the very opposite meaning. 'Rise, woman,' says the Vedic text to the mourner; 'come to the world of life. Come to us. Thou has fulfilled thy duties as a wife to thy husband.' The Aryan tribes in the Veda have blacksmiths, coppersmiths, and goldsmiths among them, besides carpenters, barbers, and other artisans. They fight from chariots, and freely use the horse, although not yet the elephant, in war. They have settled down as husbandmen, till their fields with the plough, and live in villages or towns. But they also cling to their old wandering life, with their herds and 'cattle-pens.' Cattle, indeed, still form their chief wealth—the coin in which payment of fines is made—reminding us of the Latin word for money, *pecunia*, from *pecus*, a herd. One of the Vedic words for war literally means 'a desire for cows.' Unlike the modern Hindus, the Aryans of the Veda ate beef; used a fermented liquor or beer, made from the soma plant; and offered the same strong meat and drink to their gods. Thus the stout Aryans spread eastwards through Northern India, pushed on from behind by later arrivals of their own stock, and driving before them, or reducing to bondage, the earlier 'black-skinned' races. They marched in whole communities from one river valley to another; each house-father a warrior, a husbandman, and priest; with his wife, and his little ones, and his cattle. These free-hearted

tribes had a great trust in themselves and their gods. Like other conquering races, they believed that both themselves and their deities were altogether superior to the people of the land, and to their poor, rude objects of worship. . . . Their divinities—*devas*, literally 'the shining ones,' from the Sanskrit root *div*, 'to shine'—were the great powers of nature. They adored the Father-heaven,—*Dyaush-pitar* in Sanskrit, the *Dies-piter* or *Jupiter* of Rome, the *Zeus* of Greece; and the Encompassing Sky—*Varuna* in Sanskrit, *Uranus* in Latin, *Ouranos* in Greek. Indra, or the Aqueous Vapour that brings the precious rain on which plenty or famine still depends . . . became the chief of the Vedic gods. [See MYTHOLOGY: Indian: Unparalleled length of life.] . . . Agni, the God of Fire (Latin *ignis*), ranks perhaps next to Indra in the number of hymns addressed to him. . . . Many other deities are invoked in the Veda—in all, about thirty-three gods, 'who are eleven in heaven, eleven on earth, and eleven dwelling in glory in mid-air. . . . Verses may be quoted declaring each of the greater deities to be the One Supreme: 'Neither gods nor men reach unto thee, O Indra.' Another hymn speaks of Soma as 'king of heaven and earth, the conqueror of all.' To Varuna also it is said, 'Thou art lord of all, of heaven and earth; thou art king of all those who are gods, and of all those who are men.' The more spiritual of the Vedic singers, therefore, may be said to have worshipped One God, though not One alone. . . . While the aboriginal races buried their dead in the earth or under rude stone monuments, the Aryan—alike in India, in Greece, and in Italy—made use of the funeral-pile. Several exquisite Sanskrit hymns bid farewell to the dead:—'Depart thou, depart thou by the ancient paths to the place whither our fathers have departed. Meet with the Ancient Ones; meet with the Lord of Death. Throwing off thine imperfections, go to thy home. Become united with a body; clothe thyself in a shining form.' The doctrine of transmigration was at first unknown. The circle round the funeral-pile sang with a firm assurance that their friend went direct to a state of blessedness and reunion with the loved ones who had gone before."—W. W. Hunter, *Brief history of the Indian peoples*, pp. 54-58.—See also INDIA: Language; B. C. 2000-600; BRAHMANISM: Essential features; PRIESTHOOD: Pagan priesthood; ARYA SAMAJ; UPANISHADS.

VEDDAHS, primitive race of Ceylon, generally supposed by scholars to represent a branch of the pre-Aryan Dravidians of southern India.

VEENHUIZEN, Dutch vagrancy colony in the northern part of Holland, thirty miles east of the Zuyder Zee. See PRISON REFORM: Holland.

VEERE, town in the province of Zealand, Holland, on the island of Walcheren, four miles north-east of Middelburg. It was the first town to proclaim William IV, Prince of Orange, Stadtholder of Holland, 1747. See NETHERLANDS: 1747.

VEGA, Garcilaso de la (1503-1536), Spanish soldier and poet. See SPANISH LITERATURE: 1500-1600.

VEGA, Romulo Diaz de la, president of Mexico, 1855. See MEXICO: 1848-1861.

VEGA CARPIO, Lope Felix de (1562-1635), Spanish dramatist and poet. See DRAMA: 1100-1681; SPANISH LITERATURE: 1500-1680.

"VEGETARIANS," Chinese sect. See CHINA: 1805 (August).

VEGLIA ISLAND, island in the Adriatic, off the west coast of Croatia. It was promised to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro by the Treaty of London, 1915. See LONDON, TREATY OR PACT OF.

VEHEMENTER NOS, encyclical of Pope Pius X. See **PAPACY**: 1906 (February).

VEHICLE BRAKES, Invention of. See **INVENTIONS**: 16th-17th centuries: Vehicle brakes.

VEHMGERICHTS, VEHMIC COURTS.—"In times when political, social and legal life are in process of fermentation, and struggling towards a new order of things, the ordinary tribunals lose their authority, and from the body of the people men spring up to protect the right in a primitive fashion, and to punish the criminal who has escaped the ordinary penalties of the law. Thus, at the close of the Middle Ages, or more precisely, the first half of the 15th century, the Vehmgerichts (or Vehm Courts, also called Free Courts, Franchise Courts, Secret Courts) rose to an authority which extended all over Germany, which knew no respect of persons, and before which many evil-doers in high places, who had bade defiance to the ordinary tribunals, were made to tremble. The name 'Vehme' is derived from the old German 'vervehmen,' which means to ban, or to curse. The Vehm courts were peculiar to Westphalia, and even there could only be held on the 'Red Land'—that is, the district between the Rhine and the Weser. They were dependent on the German Emperor alone, and their presidents, the Free-counts, received from the Emperor in person, or from his representative, the Elector of Cologne, the power of life and death. They traced their origin to Charlemagne, who, respecting the legal customs of the old heathen Saxons, introduced country courts among them after they had been converted to Christianity. For, even in the most ancient times, the Saxon freemen used to assemble at an appointed season, after they had held their great sacrifice, and hold a 'Thing' under the presidency of one of their oldest members, called the Grave, or Count, where they inflicted punishment and administered justice. The Vehm court consisted of a Free-count and a number of assessors, who were called 'The Initiated,' because they knew the secrets of the holy Vehme. There must be at least fourteen of these assessors, but there were generally twice that number. As it was no secret when a man was an assessor, and as it contributed greatly to the safety of his person, since people took good care not to molest a member of the holy Vehme, it gradually came about that men from every German province obtained admission into the number of assessors. When the Emperor Sigismund was elected into the number of 'The Initiated' at the Franchise Court of Dortmund, the number of assessors is said to have amounted to 100,000, among whom were many princes and nobles. And about a thousand assessors are said to have been present when the ban was issued against Duke Henry of Bavaria in 1420. . . . There was a 'secret court' to which only the initiated had access, and a 'public court' which was held in the morning in the light of day at a known court-house. The president's chairs were always set in the open air under a lime, oak, pear, or hawthorn tree, and often near a town, castle, or village. At Dortmund the president's chair was placed close to the town wall under a limetree, which, though sadly shattered, is still standing between the rails inside the railway station. Round the stone table were ranged three stone benches for the assessors; on the table there was carved in relief the German imperial eagle, and on it was placed the sword of justice. . . . The Vehm court which was originally, and was bound to be, a public one, gradually altered its character, enveloped itself in mysterious darkness,

and under the cloak of secrecy lent itself to all sorts of unrighteous objects. In 1461, accordingly, princes and cities leagued together to suppress the irregularities of these courts, and as soon as the orderly administration of justice came into existence with the rise of the new princely authority, they perished from their own impotence."—A. W. Grube, *Heroes of history and legend*, ch. 13.

ALSO IN: W. Scott, *Introduction to "Anne of Geierstein"*.—A. P. Marras, *Secret fraternities of the Middle Ages*, ch. 5.

VEIENTINE WARS. See **ROME**: Republic: B. C. 406-396.

VEIL, ancient town of Etruria, Italy, about ten miles northwest of Rome. Frequently at war with Rome, it was the scene of the massacre of the Fabii, about 476 B. C. It was besieged for ten years by the Romans under Camillus and taken in 396 B. C. See **ROME**: Republic: B. C. 406-396.

VELA, Blasco Nuñez (c. 1490-1546), Spanish governor of Peru, 1544-1546. See **PERU**: 1533-1548; 1544-1548; **LATIN AMERICA**: 1535-1700.

VELABRUM, district of ancient Rome, between the Palatine and Capitoline hills, extending from the Vicus Tuscus to the Forum Boarium. See **PALATINE HILL**.

VELASCO, Luis de (c. 1500-1564), Spanish administrator. Second viceroy of Mexico, 1550-1564. See **MEXICO**: 1535-1822.

VELASQUEZ, Diego (c. 1460-c. 1522), Spanish governor of Cuba, 1511-1522. Conquered Cuba, 1511; founded Santiago, Havana, and other towns, 1515; sent Cortés to conquer Mexico, 1519, but later sent an expedition against him which was defeated. See **CUBA**: 1511; 1514-1762; **MEXICO**: 1519 (February-April); 1519-1520.

VELAZQUEZ, Diego Rodriguez de Silva y (1599-1660), Spanish painter. See **PAINTING**: Spanish.

VELBUZD, Battle of (1330). See **MACEDONIA**: 11th-15th centuries.

VELDEKE, Heinrich von (fl. 1170-1190), German poet. See **GERMAN LITERATURE**: 1050-1350.

VELES, town of Serbia, on the Vardar, twenty-three miles northeast of Usküb. It was captured by the Allies in 1916. See **WORLD WAR**: 1916: V. Balkan theater: b, 1.

VELESTINO, Battle of. See **TURKEY**: 1807.

VELIBORI, Celtic tribe. See **IRELAND**: Tribes of early Celtic inhabitants.

VELITES, light infantry of the Roman army, as distinguished from the heavy-armed legionaires. "The velites did not wear any corslet or cuirass, but their tunic appears to have been formed of leather. . . . It is possible also that the velites sometimes wore, instead of leather, a tunic of quilted linen."—C. Boutell, *Arms and armour*, ch. 4.

VELITI, former name of the papal gendarmes. See **VATICAN**: 1800-1850.

VELLETRI, Battles at (1744, 1849). See **ITALY**: 1744; 1848-1849.

VELLICA, Battle of (c. 27 B. C.). See **CANTABRIANS**.

VELLINGHAUSEN, Battle of (1761). See **GERMANY**: 1761-1762.

VELLORE, town of British India, in the North Arcot district of Madras, eighty-seven miles west of Madras city. It was the scene of a Sepoy mutiny in 1806. See **INDIA**: 1805-1816.

VELLUM: Use in writing. See **BOOKS**: Writing materials; **BIBLE**, ENGLISH: 7th-8th centuries.

VELOCASSES, early tribe of northern France. See **BELGÆ**.

VENAISSIN, ancient county in the southwestern part of France now included in the depart-

ment of Vaucluse. It was ceded to the popes in 1273.

VENATIONES, contests of wild beasts with each other or with men in the Roman amphitheatres.

VENDÉE, Wars of the (1793-1794). See FRANCE: 1793 (March-April); 1793 (June); 1793 (July-December): Civil war; 1793-1794 (October-April); 1794-1796.

VENDÉMAIRE, first month of the French revolutionary calendar. See CHRONOLOGY: French revolutionary era, etc.

Thirteenth of Vendémiaire. See FRANCE: 1795 (October-December).

VENDES, Slavic tribe. See AVARS: 7th century.

VENDÔME, Louis Joseph, Duc de (1654-1712), marshal of France. Served in the wars in the Netherlands and at the victory of Marsaglia, 1693; commanded in Catalonia and took Tyrol, Piedmont, and Lombardy; was defeated at Oudenarde, 1708; defeated the Austrians in Spain at Villaviciosa, 1710. See NETHERLANDS: 1708-1709.

VENDORS, Athenian magistrates who took charge of financial affairs. See GREECE: B. C. 4th century: Economic conditions.

VENEDI.—"The Venedi extended beyond the Peucini and Bastarnæ [around the mouths of the Danube] as far as the Baltic Sea; where is the Sinus Venedicus, now the Gulf of Dantzig. Their name is also preserved in Wenden, a part of Livonia. When the German nations made their irruption into Italy, France, and Spain, the Venedi, also called Winedi, occupied their vacant settlements between the Vistula and Elbe. Afterward they crossed the Danube, and seized Dalmatia, Illyricum, Istria, Carniola, and the Noric Alps. A part of Carniola still retains the name of Windismarck derived from them. This people were also called Slavi."—Tacitus, *Germans, note to Oxford translation, ch. 46*.—"The Venedi [of Tacitus] . . . are obviously the Wends—the name by which the Germans always designate the neighbouring Slavonian populations; but which is no more a national name than that of Wälsch, which they apply in like manner to the Latin races on their southern frontiers."—E. H. Bunbury, *History of ancient geography, v. 2, ch. 26, sect. 2, footnote*.—See also SLAVS: Origin; VANDALS.

VENEDI OF BOHEMIA. See AVARS: 7th century.

VENEDOTIA, chief of the early states in Wales. See BRITAIN: 6th century.

VENETI OF CISALPINE GAUL.—One of the tribes or nations of Cisalpine Gaul bore the name of the Veneti. The Veneti occupied the country between the rivers Adige and Plavis and seem to have been considerably civilized when they first appear in history. They became allies of the Romans at an early day and were favorably dealt with when Gallia Cisalpina was added to the dominions of Rome. "No ancient writer distinctly states to what race the Veneti belonged. They are said to have resembled the Illyrians in dress and manners; but the very way in which this statement is made shows that its author did not regard them as Illyrians. . . . I have no doubt that the Veneti belonged to the race of the Liburnians, and that accordingly they were a branch of the widespread Tyrrheno-Pelasgians, in consequence of which they also became so easily Latinized." The capital city of the Veneti was Patavium (modern Padua). "Patavium was a very ancient and large town, and it is strange that it appears as such in Roman history all at once. It is mentioned as early as the fifth century [B. C.], during the expe-

dition of the Spartan Cleonymus; it is also spoken of at the time of Caesar and of the triumvirs. But Strabo is the first who describes Patavium as a large town, and in such a manner as to make it evident that it was an ancient place. He says that, next to Rome, it was the wealthiest city of Italy. . . . In the time of Augustus it was a large commercial and manufacturing place."—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lectures on ancient ethnography and geography, v. 2, p. 246*.

VENETI OF WESTERN GAUL: Location and character.—Caesar's campaign against them.—"The Veneti were one of the Armorican states of the Celtae. Their neighbours on the south were the Namnetes or Nannetes (Nantes), on the east the Redones, and on the north the Curiosolitae, and the Osismi in the north-west part of Bretagne, in the department of Finistère. The chief town of the Veneti was Dariorigum, now Vannes, on the bay of Morbihan in the French department of Morbihan, which may correspond nearly to the country of the Veneti. The Veneti were the most powerful of all the maritime peoples who occupied the peninsula of Bretagne. They had many vessels in which they sailed to the island Britannia, to Cornwall and the parts along the south coast of England, as we may assume. They surpassed all their neighbours in skill and experience in naval affairs."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman republic, v. 4, ch. 6*.—"The Veneti, "together with the Aulerici, Rhedones [or Redones], Carnutes, Andi and Turones, occupied the whole space between the lower Seine and the lower Loire, and were apparently closely united among themselves."

—C. Merivale, *History of the Romans, ch. 7*.—"The Andes [Andi] are the people whom Tacitus names the Andecavi, and the copyists of Ptolemy have named Ondicavae. They were west of the Turones, and their position is defined by the town Juliomagus or Civitas Andecavorum, now Angers on the Mayenne."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman republic, v. 4, ch. 6*.—"In my opinion these Veneti were the founders of the Veneti in the Adriatic, for almost all the other Celtic nations in Italy have passed over from the country beyond the Alps, as for instance the Boii and Senones. . . . However, I do not maintain my opinion positively; for in these matters probability is quite sufficient."—Strabo, *Geography* (tr. by Hamilton and Falconer), *bk. 4, ch. 4, sect. 1*.—"Caesar's third campaign in Gaul, 56 B. C., was directed against the Veneti and their Armorican neighbors. (See GAUL: B. C. 58-51.) These tribes had submitted themselves in the previous year to Caesar's lieutenant, the younger Crassus; but the heavy exactions of the Romans provoked a general rising, and Caesar was called to the scene in person. The Veneti were so amphibious a race, and their towns were generally placed so much out of the reach of a land army, that he found it necessary to build a fleet at the mouth of the Loire and bring it up against them. But the Veneti were better sailors than the Romans and their ships were more strongly built, so that the advantage would have still remained to them if Roman inventiveness had not turned the scale. Caesar armed his men with hooked knives at the end of long poles, with which they cut the rigging of the Venetian ships and brought down their clumsy sails, which were of leather. By this means he overcame and destroyed them, in a great naval fight. When the survivors submitted, he ruthlessly slew the senatorial elders and sold the remnant of the people into slavery.—Caesar, *Gaulic wars, bk. 3, ch. 7-16*.

ALSO IN: G. Long, *Decline of the Roman re-*

public, v. 4, ch. 6.—C. Merivale, *History of the Romans*, ch. 7.—Napoleon III, *History of Cæsar*, bk. 3, ch. 6.

VENETIA, ancient province of Italy, bounded by the Po, the Alps, and the Adriatic. It was ceded to Austria in 1815 and became finally united to Italy in 1866. See VIENNA, CONGRESS OF; also VENICE.

VENETIAN GLASS. See INVENTIONS: Ancient and medieval: Early industrial processes; 16th-17th centuries: Industry.

VENETIAN OPERA SCHOOL. See MUSIC: Modern: 1607-1734.

VENETIAN SCHOOL OF MUSIC. See MUSIC: Modern: 1527-1613; 1650-1739.

VENETIAN SCHOOL OF PAINTING. See PAINTING: Italian: High Renaissance.

VENEZUELA: Geographic description.—“The United States of Venezuela, as this republic is officially called, lie wholly within the tropical zone, between latitude 0° 55' N. and 12° 26' N. and longitude 59° 35' W. and 73° 21' W. (from Greenwich). [See LATIN AMERICA: Map of South America.] The area within these limits is some 1,020,400 square kilometres, or 394,000 square miles.”—L. V. Dalton, *Venezuela*, p. 25.—“The huge republic bulges out into the northernmost nub of the continent, where the terminal ranges of the Andes turn eastward to meet the Great Guiana Highlands and form those high-flung ramparts that protect the fertile, low-lying Amazon plains from the Atlantic. This black, mountainous front runs along the Caribbean coast line some fifteen hundred miles, broken at intervals, however, where the lovely blue of the tropical sea sweeps inland to meet the bright green of some great river basin.”—H. W. Van Dyke, *Through South America*, p. 400.—The population, in 1921, was 2,411,952, about 440,000 less than was estimated in 1918.

ALSO IN: H. R. Mill, *International geography*, pp. 881-888.—*Pan American Union, General descriptive data: Venezuela*, 1915, p. 3.

Aboriginal inhabitants. See COAJIRO.

1499-1550.—Discovery and naming of the province.—Its first occupation by German adventurers.—“The province contiguous to Santa Martha on the east was first visited by Alonso de Ojeda, in the year 1499 [see AMERICA: 1499-1500]; and the Spaniards, on their landing there, having observed some huts in an Indian village, built upon piles, in order to raise them above the stagnated water which covered the plain, were led to bestow upon it the name of Venezuela, or little Venice. . . . They made some attempts to settle there, but with little success. The final reduction of the province was accomplished by means very different from those to which Spain was indebted for its other acquisitions in the new world. The ambition of Charles V often engaged him in operations of such variety and extent that his revenues were not sufficient to defray the expense of carrying them into execution. Among other expedients for supplying the deficiency of his funds, he had borrowed large sums from the Velsers of Augsburg, the most opulent merchants at that time in Europe. By way of retribution for these, or in hopes, perhaps, of obtaining a new loan, he bestowed up them the province of Venezuela, to be held as an hereditary fief from the crown of Castile, on condition that within a limited time they should render themselves masters of the country, and establish a colony there. . . . Unfortunately they committed the execution of their plan to some of those soldiers of fortune with which Germany abounded in the 16th century. . . . In the course of a few years, their avarice and

exactions, in comparison with which those of the Spaniards were moderate, desolated the province so completely that it could hardly afford them subsistence, and the Velsers relinquished a property from which the inconsiderate conduct of their agents left them no hope of ever deriving any advantage. When the wretched remainder of the Germans deserted Venezuela, the Spaniards again took possession of it.”—W. Robertson, *History of America*, bk. 7.—See also EL DORADO.

ALSO IN: F. Depous, *Travels in South America*, ch. 1.


1718-1731.—Embraced in the viceroyalty of New Granada.—Raised to a distinct captain-generalship. See COLOMBIA: 1536-1731.

1810-1819.—War of Independence.—Miranda and Bolívar.—Great earthquake. See COLOMBIA: 1810-1819.

1821-1826.—Confederation with New Granada and Ecuador in the republic of Colombia.—Breaking of the confederacy. See COLOMBIA: 1819-1830; LATIN AMERICA: 1778-1824.

1829-1886.—Separation from Colombia.—Summary record of revolutions and civil wars.—Strife of the Yellows and the Blues.—“In all countries, under whatever name they may be known, there are two great political parties; the conservatives and the reformers. . . . Venezuela is no exception to the general rule; there is the ‘Oligarquia,’ which desires to let things alone, and the ‘Liberal’ party, which wishes to remould them in accordance with the spirit of the age. The Spanish misgovernment left a legacy of bitterness and anarchy that has been the cause of much misery. Political passion runs very high in the country, and its history for a generation between these two parties has been a continual struggle, always more or less warlike. The existence of Venezuela in an independent capacity is due, in a large measure, to the personal ambition of Paez, by whose influence the great Liberator [Simón Bolívar] was exiled from his fatherland, and the republic separated [in 1826] from Colombia. Whatever may have been the real wishes of the people, the death of Bolívar put an end to all thoughts of reunion; and Paez became its first constitutional president. The second president was the learned Dr. José María Vargas, whose election in March 1835 was said to have been irregular, and led to the ‘Revolucion de las Reformas.’ He was deposed and expelled in July, but in August recalled to power! General Paez now took the field against the ‘reformistas,’ and a civil war ensued, continuing until March 1836, when they were completely subjugated, and treated with great rigour by order of the Congress, but against the desire of Paez, who entreated to be allowed to deal with them clemently. In 1836, Dr. Vargas resigned the presidency, and after the remainder of his term had been occupied by three vice-presidents, General Paez, in 1839, became again the legitimate head of the nation. Now that the grave had closed over Simon Bolívar, the passions which had prevented the recognition of his greatness died also, and on the 17th of December 1842, the ashes of the immortal Liberator were transferred from Santa Maria with every mark of public respect and honour and received a magnificent national funeral, in the Temple of San Francisco, in Caracas. The fifth president was General Soublette, and the sixth General José Tadeo Monagas, who was elected in 1847. A great part of the Venezuelan people believe that all the evils that have fallen upon the republic since 1846 have had their origin in the falsification of votes, said to

have taken place during the election of Monagas for president. The liberal candidate was Antonio Leocadio Guzman; and it is asserted that he had a majority of votes. . . . Monagas did not have an easy tenure of office, for the opposition of Paez led to two years of civil war. Here it may be noted to the credit of the liberal party that, at the time when many of its opponents were prisoners, it abolished the penalty of death for political offences. To his brother, General José Gregorio Monagas, afterwards president of the republic, was due the emancipation of the slaves. The famous law of March 24th, 1854, conceded liberty and equal rights to all; but by a strange irony of fortune, he who had given the precious boon of freedom to thousands died himself incarcerated in a political prison. . . . At the beginning of 1859 the discontent of the liberals had reached a pitch which led to the outbreak of the War of the Federation. It was in this struggle that the present



GUZMAN BLANCO

leader of the liberal party first displayed his military skill." Antonio Guzman Blanco, born in 1830 and educated for the law, lived some years in the United States, part of the time as secretary of legation at Washington. Driven from Venezuela in 1858, "his expatriation soon after brought him in contact, first in St. Thomas and afterwards in Curazao, with General Falcon, then the head of 'los liberales.' Falcon landed in Venezuela in July 1859, and proclaimed the Federal Republic. Many rose to support him, and in Caracas, on the 1st of August, the president, Monagas, was arrested; the next day the same troops declared against the Federation, and fired upon the people! So commenced the five years' War of the Federation, which has left, even to the present day, its black and ruined tracks across the face of the country. On the 30th of September was fought the battle of Sabana de la Cruz, resulting in the fall of Barquisimeto. In this action, so fortunate for the liberals, Guzman Blanco made his acquaintance with war, and showed so much military talent and energy that he was induced to leave his civil duties and

take a 'commandante's' commission. The victory of Santa Ines, in December of the same year, followed. . . . The attack on San Carlos followed soon after, and was a disaster for the federals, who lost their general, Zamora, and were forced to retreat. Falcon sought aid in Nueva Granada." The next year Guzman Blanco won the victory of Quebrada-seca, Oct. 21, 1862. "Other victories followed, and were crowned by the grand and decisive combat of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of April, which gave the province of Caracas to the Federals, and led to a treaty between the two parties. The peace of Coche was arranged by Señor Pedro José Rojas, secretary to the Dictator, as Paez was sometimes called, and Guzman Blanco, as representative of Falcon, the chief of the revolution. Paez, by this treaty, undertook to abdicate 30 days later, when an assembly of 80 nominated in equal parts by the chiefs of each party, was to decide on a programme for the future. The assembly met in Victoria, and nominated Falcon President and Guzman Blanco provisional vice-president of the Federation. Falcon entered Caracas in triumph on July 24, 1863, and Guzman Blanco became Minister of Finance and of Foreign Relations." Guzman Blanco visited Europe in 1864 and 1867 to negotiate loans. "Meanwhile, in Caracas, the 'oligarquia,' which now assumed the name of the Blue party (El Partido Azul), was not idle, and its activity was increased by dissensions in the opposition. A section of the liberal party [or 'los amarillos'—'Yellows'] had become greatly disaffected to Marshal Falcon, who abdicated in favour of two revolutionary chiefs, Bruzual and Urrutia. This led to the treaty of Antimano, by which the 'partido azul' recognized the new government, but directly afterwards proclaimed the presidency of General José Tadeo Monagas. Three days' sanguinary combat, at the end of July 1868, gave it possession of Caracas." Guzman Blanco, returning at this juncture from Europe, was driven to take refuge in the island of Curazao; but in February, 1870, he reappeared in Venezuela; was supported by a general rising; took Caracas by assault, and defeated the Blues in several battles. "The congress of plenipotentiaries of the states met at Valencia, and nominated Guzman Blanco provisional president, and by the end of the year the enemy was nearly everywhere defeated."—J. M. Spence, *Land of Bolívar*, v. 1, ch. 8.—"At first, those who had risen and driven out the Spaniards divided the land among themselves, but as successive Generals strove for and gained the Presidency they again forfeited the property of the opposing party, and divided their possessions among their own followers. . . . Paez, Vargas, Paez, Zea, Soubllette, Paez, Gil, Monagas, Falcon, Monagas, Polidor, Pulgar, Blanco, Linares, Blanco, Crespo, and again Blanco . . . succeeded each other with marvellous rapidity, the principal occupation of the deposed President being to conspire against his successor. Some of them succeeded to power more than once. . . . In 1886 Don Gusman Blanco . . . [was apparently] supreme."—W. Barry, *Venezuela*, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: F. L. Petre, *Simón Bolívar "el libertador"*.—T. Williams, *Monagas and Paez*.

1869-1892.—Rule of General Blanco.—Revolution of 1889.—"In 1869 opened an era of peace and progress under the political domination of General Guzman Blanco. For 20 years, whether he was the head of a Provisional Government established by force of arms, or the constitutional Executive, or Minister to France, his will was the supreme force in the State. . . . He suppressed Cleri-

calism and established genuine religious liberty. He built railways, improved the public roads, and adorned the cities. . . . He developed the industries and commerce of the country, and promoted its prosperity by a policy at once strong and pacific. It was a system of political absolutism. . . . A reaction against it was inevitable. . . . The signal for a political revolution was raised by university students in October, 1889. They began operations by flinging stones at a statue of Guzman Blanco in Carácas. . . . It was a singularly effective revolution, wrought without bloodshed or excitement. This political movement was successful because Guzman Blanco was in Paris, and his personal representative in the executive office was not disposed to resent public affronts to his patron. The President, Dr. Rojas Paul, was a wise and discreet man. . . . He reorganized his Cabinet so as to exclude several of the devoted partisans of Guzman Blanco, and brought Dr. Anduesa Palacio into the field as a candidate for the Presidency. . . . Anduesa's administration, instead of being an era of reform, reproduced all the vices and corruption of the old order, and none of its progressive virtues. After two years it ended in civil war, usurpation, and the enforced resignation of Anduesa."—I. N. Ford, *Tropical America*, ch. 12.

1892-1893. — Constitutional government restored.—Anduesa Palacio resigned in favor of Vice President Villegas, and the legality of the succession was disputed by the opposition, under ex-President Joaquin Crespo. The civil war continued, and three short-lived dictatorships were set up in succession; but in June, 1893, a new constitution was adopted. Crespo was elected President for a term of four years.

1895 (July).—Question of the boundary of British Guiana taken up by the government of the United States.—Dispatch of Secretary Olney to Ambassador Bayard.—“From the early days of the independence of Venezuela continual protests had been made by the representatives of the republic against the alleged encroachments of residents and officials from British Guiana. Briefly, the contentions raised by the two parties were: on the part of Venezuela, that the Dutch, to whom we [English] were successors, had only claimed jurisdiction on the east side of the Essequibo River; on the part of Great Britain, that the Dutch had in 1759 and 1760 put forward the claim that their territory included, not merely the Essequibo River but the whole of the basin drained by that river and its tributaries. This claim was never rebutted by the authorities in Madrid. So the dispute dragged on, the British Government refusing to consent to arbitration of the boundary unless it was previously agreed by Venezuela that such parts of the Essequibo Valley as had been effectively occupied by British colonists were recognized as their territory. In April, 1895, the arrest by the Venezuelan authorities of two inspectors of the British Guiana Police on the Cuyuni River brought matters to a crisis. The inspectors were soon released, but Crespo appealed to Washington for protection against any claim for indemnity.”—L. V. Dalton, *Venezuela*, pp. 107-108.—The government of the United States had for a number of years been exerting itself to bring about the settlement of the long standing dispute. On July 20, 1895, the American secretary of state, Richard Olney, summarized “the important features of the existing situation” by the following despatch to the American ambassador in London: “1. The title to territory of indefinite but confessedly very large extent is in dispute between Great Britain on the

one hand, and the South American 1. Venezuela on the other. 2. The disparity of strength of the claimants is such that Venezuela can hope to establish her claim only through peaceful methods—through an agreement with her adversary either upon the subject itself or upon an arbitration. 3. The controversy with varying claims on the part of Great Britain has existed for more than half-a-century, during which period many earnest and persistent efforts of Venezuela to establish a boundary by agreement have proved unsuccessful. 4. The futility of the endeavour to obtain a conventional line being recognized, Venezuela, for a quarter of a century, has asked and striven for arbitration. 5. Great Britain, however, has always and continuously refused, and still refuses, to arbitrate except upon the condition of a renunciation of a large part of the Venezuelan claim, and of a concession to herself of a large share of the territory in controversy. 6. By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and promoting the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, by pressing for arbitration of the disputed boundary, by offering to act as Arbitrator, by expressing its grave concern whenever new alleged instances of British aggression upon Venezuelan territory have been brought to its notice, the Government of the United States has made it clear to Great Britain and to the world that the controversy is one in which both its honor and its interests are involved, and the continuance of which it cannot regard with indifference.” Secretary Olney proceeds next to consider the rights, the interests and the duty of the United States in the matter, and to what extent, if any, it “may and should intervene in a controversy between and primarily concerning only Great Britain and Venezuela,” and his conclusions on these points are founded on the doctrine set forth by President Monroe, of resistance to European intervention in American affairs. Quoting President Monroe's celebrated message on the subject, in 1823, Secretary Olney remarks: “The Message just quoted declared that the American continents were fully occupied, and were not the subjects for future colonization by European Powers. To this spirit and this purpose, also, are to be attributed the passages of the same Message which treat any infringement of the rule against interference in American affairs on the part of the Powers of Europe as an act of unfriendliness to the United States. It was realized that it was futile to lay down such a rule unless its observance could be enforced. It was manifest that the United States was the only Power in this hemisphere capable of enforcing it. It was therefore courageously declared, not merely that Europe ought not to interfere in American affairs, but that any European Power doing so would be regarded as antagonizing the interests and inviting the opposition of the United States. That America is in no part open to colonization, though the proposition was not universally admitted at the time of its first enunciation, has long been universally conceded. We are now concerned, therefore, only with that other practical application of the Monroe doctrine the disregard of which by an European Power is to be deemed an act of unfriendliness towards the United States. The precise scope and limitations of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not establish any general Protectorate by the United States over other American States. It does not relieve any American State from its obligations as fixed by international law, nor prevent any Eu-

ropean Power directly interested from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American State, or in the relations between it and other American States. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of Government of any American State, or to prevent the people of such State from altering that form according to their own will and pleasure. The rule in question has but a single purpose and object. It is that no European Power or combination of European Powers shall forcibly deprive an American State of the right and power of self-government, and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies. That the rule thus defined has been the accepted public law of this country ever since its promulgation cannot fairly be denied. . . . It is certainly no more than the exact truth to say that every Administration since President Monroe's has had occasion, and sometimes more occasions than one, to examine and consider the Monroe doctrine, and has in each instance given it emphatic indorsement. That distance and 3,000 miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between an European and an American State unnatural and inexpedient will hardly be denied. But physical and geographical considerations are the least of the objections to such a union. Europe, as Washington observed, has a set of primary interests which are peculiar to herself. America is not interested in them, and ought not to be vexed or complicated with them. . . . It is true, then, that the safety and welfare of the United States are so concerned with the maintenance of the independence of every American State as against any European Power as to justify and require the interposition of the United States whenever that independence is endangered? The question can be candidly answered in but one way. The States of America, South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of Governmental Constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States. To allow the subjugation of any of them by an European Power is, of course, to completely reverse that situation, and signifies the loss of all the advantages incident to their natural relations to us. But that is not all. The people of the United States have a vital interest in the cause of popular self-government. . . . To-day the United States is practically Sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition, . . . because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources, combined with its isolated position, render it master of the situation, and practically invulnerable as against any or all other Powers. All the advantages of this superiority are at once imperilled if the principle be admitted that European Powers may convert American States into Colonies or provinces of their own. The principle would be eagerly availed of, and every Power doing so would immediately acquire a base of military operations against us. What one Power was permitted to do could not be denied to another, and it is not inconceivable that the struggle now going on for the acquisition of Africa might be transferred to South America. If it were, the weaker countries would unquestionably be soon absorbed, while the ultimate result might be the partition of all South America between the various European Powers. . . . The people of the United States have learned in the school of experience to what extent the relations of States to each other depend not upon

sentiment nor principle, but upon selfish interest. They will not soon forget that, in their hour of distress, all their anxieties and burdens were aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against their national life on the part of Powers with whom they had long maintained the most harmonious relations. They have yet in mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our Civil War to set up a Monarchy in the adjoining State of Mexico. They realize that, had France and Great Britain held important South American possessions to work from and to benefit, the temptation to destroy the predominance of the Great Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might have been irresistible. From that grave peril they have been saved in the past, and may be saved again in the future, through the operation of the sure but silent force of the doctrine proclaimed by President Monroe. . . . There is, then, a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle and abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and requires the United States to treat as an injury to itself the forcible assumption by an European Power of political control over an American State. The application of the doctrine to the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela remains to be made, and presents no real difficulty. Though the dispute relates to a boundary-line, yet, as it is between States, it necessarily imports political control to be lost by one party and gained by the other. . . . It has been intimated, indeed, that in respect of these South American possessions, Great Britain is herself an American State like any other, so that a controversy between her and Venezuela is to be settled between themselves as if it were between Venezuela and Brazil, or between Venezuela and Colombia, and does not call for or justify United States' intervention. If this view be tenable at all, the logical sequence is plain. Great Britain as a South American State is to be entirely differentiated from Great Britain generally; and if the boundary question cannot be settled otherwise than by force, British Guiana with her own independent resources, and not those of the British Empire, should be left to settle the matter with Venezuela—an arrangement which very possibly Venezuela might not object to. But the proposition that an European Power with an American dependency is for the purposes of the Monroe doctrine to be classed not as an European but as an American State will not admit of serious discussion. If it were to be adopted, the Monroe doctrine would be too valueless to be worth asserting. . . . The declaration of the Monroe Message—that existing Colonies or dependencies of an European Power would not be interfered with by the United States—means Colonies or dependencies then existing with their limits as then existing. So it has been invariably construed, and so it must continue to be construed, unless it is to be deprived of all vital force. . . . It is not admitted, however, and therefore cannot be assumed, that Great Britain is in fact usurping dominion over Venezuelan territory. While Venezuela charges such usurpation Great Britain denies it, and the United States, until the merits are authoritatively ascertained, can take sides with neither. But while this is so—while the United States may not, under existing circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which of the two parties is right and which wrong—it is certainly within its right to demand that the truth shall be ascertained. . . . It being clear, therefore, that the United States may legitimately insist upon the merits of the boundary question being deter-

mined, it is equally clear that there is but one feasible mode of determining them, viz., peaceful arbitration . . . [Great Britain] admits that there is a controversy, and that arbitration should be resorted to for its adjustment. But, while up to that point her attitude leaves nothing to be desired, its practical effect is completely nullified by her insistence that the submission shall cover but a part of the controversy—that, as a condition of arbitrating her right to a part of the disputed territory, the remainder shall be turned over to her. . . . The territory which Great Britain insists shall be ceded to her as a condition of arbitrating her claim to other territory has never been admitted to belong to her. It has always and consistently been claimed by Venezuela. Upon what principle—except her feebleness as a nation—is she to be denied the right of having the claim heard and passed upon by an impartial Tribunal? No reason or shadow of reason appears in all the voluminous literature of the subject. . . . In these circumstances, the duty of the President appears to him unmistakable and imperative. Great Britain's assertion of title to the disputed territory, combined with her refusal to have that title investigated, being a substantial appropriation of the territory to her own use, not to protest and give warning that the transaction will be regarded as injurious to the interests of the people of the United States, as well as oppressive in itself, would be to ignore an established policy with which the honor and welfare of this country are closely identified. While the measures necessary or proper for the vindication of that policy are to be determined by another branch of the Government, it is clearly for the Executive to leave nothing undone which may tend to render such determination unnecessary. You are instructed, therefore, to present the foregoing views to Lord Salisbury by reading to him this communication (leaving with him a copy should he so desire), and to reinforce them by such pertinent considerations as will doubtless occur to you. They call for a definite decision upon the point whether Great Britain will consent or will decline to submit the Venezuelan boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration. It is the earnest hope of the President that the conclusion will be on the side of arbitration, and that Great Britain will add one more to the conspicuous precedents she has already furnished in favor of that wise and just mode of adjusting international disputes. If he is to be disappointed in that hope, however—a result not to be anticipated, and in his judgment calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations between this country and Great Britain—it is his wish to be made acquainted with the fact at such early date as will enable him to lay the whole subject before Congress in his next Annual Message.”

—Great Britain, *Parliamentary Publications (Papers by command: United States no. 1, 1896, pp. 13-21)*.—See also MONROE DOCTRINE: 1870-1895.

1895 (November).—British Guiana boundary question.—Replies of Lord Salisbury to Secretary Olney.—The reply of Lord Salisbury was not written until November 26. It was then given in two dispatches, bearing the same date,—one devoted entirely to a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine and of the argument founded on it by Secretary Olney; the other to a rehearsal of the Venezuela controversy from the standpoint of the British government. In the communication first mentioned he wrote: “During the period that has elapsed since the Message of President Monroe was delivered in 1823, the doctrine has undergone a very notable development, and the aspect which it now

presents in the hands of Mr. Olney differs widely from its character when it first issued from the pen of its author. The two propositions which in effect President Monroe laid down were, first, that America was no longer to be looked upon as a field for European colonization; and, secondly, that Europe must not attempt to extend its political system to America, or to control the political condition of any of the American communities who had recently declared their independence. . . . The system of which he speaks, and of which he so resolutely deprecates the application to the American Continent, was the system then adopted by certain powerful States upon the Continent of Europe of combining to prevent by force of arms the adoption in other countries of political institutions which they disliked, and to uphold by external pressure those which they approved. . . . But the circumstances with which President Monroe was dealing, and those to which the present American Government is addressing itself, have very few features in common. Great Britain is imposing no ‘system’ upon Venezuela, and is not concerning herself in any way with the nature of the political institutions under which the Venezuelans may prefer to live. But the British Empire and the Republic of Venezuela are neighbours, and they have differed for some time past, and continue to differ, as to the line by which their dominions are separated. It is a controversy with which the United States have no apparent practical concern. . . . It is not a question of the colonization by a European Power of any portion of America. It is not a question of the imposition upon the communities of South America of any system of government devised in Europe. It is simply the determination of the frontier of a British possession which belonged to the Throne of England long before the Republic of Venezuela came into existence. . . . The Government of the United States do not say that Great Britain, or that Venezuela, is in the right in the matters that are in issue. But they lay down that the doctrine of President Monroe, when he opposed the imposition of European systems, or the renewal of European colonization, confers upon them the right of demanding that when a European Power has a frontier difference with a South American community, the European Power shall consent to refer that controversy to arbitration; and Mr. Olney states that unless Her Majesty's Government accede to this demand, it will ‘greatly embarrass the future relations between Great Britain and the United States.’ Whatever may be the authority of the doctrine laid down by President Monroe, there is nothing in his language to show that he ever thought of claiming this novel prerogative for the United States. . . . I will not now enter into a discussion of the merits of this method of terminating international differences. It has proved itself valuable in many cases; but it is not free from defects, which often operate as a serious drawback on its value. It is not always easy to find an Arbitrator who is competent, and who, at the same time, is wholly free from bias; and the task of insuring compliance with the Award when it is made is not exempt from difficulty. . . . In the remarks which I have made, I have argued on the theory that the Monroe doctrine in itself is sound. I must not, however, be understood as expressing any acceptance of it on the part of Her Majesty's Government. . . . Though the language of President Monroe is directed to the attainment of objects which most Englishmen would agree to be salutary, it is impossible to admit that they have been inscribed by any adequate authority in the

code of international law; and the danger which such admission would involve is sufficiently exhibited both by the strange development which the doctrine has received at Mr. Olney's hands, and the arguments by which it is supported, in the despatch under reply. In defence of it he says: 'That distance and 3,000 miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and an America State unnatural and inexpedient will hardly be denied. But physical and geographical considerations are the least of the objections to such a union. Europe had a set of primary interests which are peculiar to herself; America is not interested in them, and ought not to be vexed or complicated with them.' . . . The necessary meaning of these words is that the union between Great Britain and Canada; between Great Britain and Jamaica and Trinidad; between Great Britain and British Honduras or British Guiana are 'inexpedient and unnatural.' President Monroe disclaims any such inference from his doctrine; but in this, as in other respects, Mr. Olney develops it. He lays down that the inexpedient and unnatural character of the union between a European and American State is so obvious that it 'will hardly be denied.' Her Majesty's Government are prepared emphatically to deny it on behalf of both the British and American people who are subject to her Crown."

In his second despatch, Lord Salisbury drew the conclusions of his government from the facts as seen on the English side, and announced its decision, in the following terms: "It will be seen . . . that the Government of Great Britain have from the first held the same view as to the extent of territory which they are entitled to claim as a matter of right. It comprised the coast-line up to the River Amacura, and the whole basin of the Essequibo River and its tributaries. A portion of that claim, however, they have always been willing to waive altogether; in regard to another portion, they have been and continue to be perfectly ready to submit the question of their title to arbitration. As regards the rest, that which lies within the so-called Schomburgk line, they do not consider that the rights of Great Britain are open to question. Even within that line they have, on various occasions, offered to Venezuela considerable concessions as a matter of friendship and conciliation, and for the purpose of securing an amicable settlement of the dispute. If as time has gone on the concessions thus offered diminished in extent, and have now been withdrawn, this has been the necessary consequence of the gradual spread over the country of British settlements, which Her Majesty's Government cannot in justice to the inhabitants offer to surrender to foreign rule, and the justice of such withdrawal is amply borne out by the researches in the national archives of Holland and Spain, which have furnished further and more convincing evidence in support of the British claims. Her Majesty's Government . . . have . . . repeatedly expressed their readiness to submit to arbitration the conflicting claims of Great Britain and Venezuela to large tracts of territory which from their auriferous nature are known to be of almost untold value. But they cannot consent to entertain, or to submit to the arbitration of another Power or of foreign jurists, however eminent, claims based on the extravagant pretensions of Spanish officials in the last century, and involving the transfer of large numbers of British subjects, who have for many years enjoyed the settled rule of a British Colony, to a nation of different race and language, whose political system is subject to

frequent disturbance, and whose institutions as yet too often afford very inadequate protection to life and property. No issue of this description has ever been involved in the questions which Great Britain and the United States have consented to submit to arbitration, and Her Majesty's Government are convinced that in similar circumstances the Government of the United States would be equally firm in declining to entertain proposals of such a nature."—Great Britain, *Parliamentary Publications (Papers by command: United States no. 1, 1896, pp. 23-31)*.

1895 (December).—Message of President Cleveland to the United States Congress on the Venezuela boundary dispute.—As the replies given by Lord Salisbury showed no disposition on the part of the British government to submit its dispute with Venezuela to arbitration, President Cleveland took the subject in hand, and addressed to Congress, on Dec. 17, 1895, a special message which startled the world by the peremptoriness of its tone. "It may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound, because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life and can not become obsolete while our Republic endures. If the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among the Governments of the Old World and a subject for our absolute non-interference, none the less is an observance of the Monroe doctrine of vital concern to our people and their Government. Assuming, therefore, that we may properly insist upon this doctrine without regard to 'the state of things in which we live' or any changed conditions here or elsewhere, it is not apparent why its application may not be invoked in the present controversy. If a European power by an extension of its boundaries takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring Republics against its will and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why to that extent such European power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be 'dangerous to our peace and safety;' and it can make no difference whether the European system is extended by an advance of frontier or otherwise. . . . The Monroe doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced. Of course this government is entirely confident that under the sanction of this doctrine we have clear rights and undoubted claims. Nor is this ignored in the British reply. The prime minister, while not admitting that the Monroe doctrine is applicable to present conditions, states: 'In declaring that the United States would resist any such enterprise if it was contemplated, President Monroe adopted a policy which received the entire sympathy of the English Government of that date.' . . . In the belief that the doctrine for which we contend was clear and definite, that it was founded upon substantial considerations, and involved our safety and welfare, that it was fully applicable to our present conditions and to the state of the world's progress, and that it was directly related to the pending controversy, and without any conviction as to the final merits of the dispute, but anxious to learn in a satisfactory and conclusive manner whether Great Britain sought under a claim

of boundary to extend her possessions on this continent without right; or whether she merely sought possession of territory fairly included within her lines of ownership, this Government proposed to the Government of Great Britain a resort to arbitration as the proper means of settling the question, to the end that a vexatious boundary dispute between the two contestants might be determined and our exact standing and relation in respect to the controversy might be made clear. It will be seen from the correspondence herewith submitted that this proposition has been declined by the British Government upon grounds which in the circumstances seem to me to be far from satisfactory. . . . Having labored faithfully for many years to induce Great Britain to submit this dispute to impartial arbitration, and having been now finally apprised of her refusal to do so, nothing remains but to accept the situation, to recognize its plain requirements, and deal with it accordingly. Great Britain's present proposition has never thus far been regarded as admissible by Venezuela, though any adjustment of the boundary which that country may deem for her advantage and may enter into of her own free will can not of course be objected to by the United States. Assuming, however, that the attitude of Venezuela will remain unchanged, the dispute has reached such a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United States to take measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its justification what is the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana. The inquiry to that end should of course be conducted carefully and judicially, and due weight should be given to all available evidence, records, and facts in support of the claims of both parties. In order that such an examination should be prosecuted in a thorough and satisfactory manner, I suggest that the Congress make an adequate appropriation for the expenses of a commission, to be appointed by the Executive, who shall make the necessary investigation and report upon the matter with the least possible delay. When such report is made and accepted it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela. In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people's safety and greatness."—United States, *Message and Documents* (Abridgment, 1895-1896).—The recommendations of the President were acted upon with remarkable unanimity and promptitude in Congress, a bill authorizing the appointment of the proposed commission, and appropriating \$100,000 for the necessary expenditure, being passed by the House on the day following the message (December 7), and by the Senate on the 20th.—See also U. S. A.: 1895 (December).

1895-1896 (December-January).—Feeling in

England and the United States over the boundary dispute. See U. S. A.: 1895-1896 (December-January).

1896-1899.—Appointment of the United States commission to investigate the boundary question.—Reopening of negotiations between the United States and Great Britain.—Solution of the main difficulty found.—Arbitration and its result.—The commission authorized by the Congress of the United States to investigate and report on the true divisional line between British Guiana and Venezuela was named by the president of the United States, on January 1, as follows: David J. Brewer, associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; Richard H. Alvey, chief justice of the court of appeals in the District of Columbia; Andrew D. White, ex-president of Cornell University, and ex-minister to Germany and Russia; Daniel C. Gilman, president of Johns Hopkins University; Frederick R. Coudert, of New York. One of the first proceedings of the commission was to address a letter to the secretary of state, suggesting a friendly intimation to the governments of Great Britain and Venezuela that their assistance to it, in procuring unpublished archives and the like evidence, would be highly acceptable, and that "if either should deem it appropriate to designate an agent or attorney, whose duty it would be to see that no such proofs were omitted or overlooked, the Commission would be grateful for such evidence of good will." This overture was well received in England, and had an excellent effect. It was responded to by Lord Salisbury, with an assurance that Her Majesty's government would readily place at the disposal of the President of the United States any information at their command, and would communicate advance copies of documents soon to be published on the subject of the boundary line. Before the close of January the commission had organized its work, with several experts engaged to assist on special lines. Professor Justin Winsor, librarian of Harvard University, had undertaken to report on the early maps of the Guiana-Venezuela country, Professor George L. Burr, of Cornell University, was making ready to examine the Dutch archives in Holland, and Professor J. Franklin Jameson, of Brown University, was enlisted for other investigations. Before these labors had gone far, however, the two governments, of Great Britain and the United States, were induced to reopen a discussion of the possibility of an arbitration. A convention embodying the agreement of the United States and Great Britain was signed at Washington by Secretary Olney and the British Ambassador, Lord Pauncefote. The agreement was carried to its next stage on Feb. 2, 1897, when a treaty between Great Britain and the United States of Venezuela was signed at Washington, which provided for an arbitral tribunal, which was to meet in Paris. (See U. S. A.: 1897, January-May). "The Paris tribunal, in 1899, awarded as follows: From the coast at Punta Playa in a straight line to the junction of the Barima and Mururuma, thence along mid-stream of the latter to its source. From this point to the junction of the Rio Haiowa and the Amacura, and along mid-stream of the latter to its source in the Sierra Imataca. Then south-west along the spur to the main range of the Sierra opposite the source of the Barima; then along the watershed south-east to the source of the Acarabisi, and down it to the Cuyuni, westward along this river to its junction with the Wenamu (Venamo) and up the latter to its most westerly course. Thence in a straight line to the summit of

Mount Roraima."—L. V. Dalton, *Venezuela*, pp. 107-108.—The line thus established by the decision, however, did not fully satisfy Venezuela as it gave to Great Britain more than half of the disputed territory.

1898-1900.—Change in the presidency.—Death of ex-President Crespo.—Revolution.—Rebellion.—General Joaquín Crespo retired from the presidency and was succeeded by General Ignacio Andrade on Mar. 1, 1898. A revolutionary movement was soon started, with General Hernandez at its head, and ex-President Crespo, who led the forces of the government against it, was killed in a charge April 16. Hernandez was surprised and captured a few weeks later, and the rebellion then subsided for a time. In the spring of 1899 Hernandez was set at liberty by Andrade, who, meantime, had crushed a minor revolt, undertaken by one General Guerra. August found the harassed President assailed by a fresh rising, started by General Cipriano Castro, and the restless revolutionist, Hernandez, was soon in league with it. This proved to be a revolution in earnest, and, after hard fighting, President Andrade fled from the capital and the country in October; Puerto Cabello, the last town to hold out for him, was bombarded and stormed the following month, and a new government was established, nominally under the Vice President, Rodriguez, but with Castro for its actual head. Before this had been fully accomplished, however, Hernandez was in arms against Castro, with his accustomed ill-success. Before the year closed he had fled the country; but early in 1900 he was once more in the field, maintaining a troublesome war until May, when he was defeated, and again a prisoner in his opponents' hands.

1898-1902.—Under leadership of Castro.—Quarrels with Colombia. See COLOMBIA: 1898-1902.

20th century.—Status of education. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: Latin America.

1901.—Claims of Germany.—Memorandum presented to the government of the United States.—Its reply.—Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.—On Dec. 11, 1901, the German embassy at Washington presented to the State Department of the government of the United States a memorandum of the claims and complaints of Germany against the government of Venezuela. The principal claim recited was that of the Berlin Company of Discount, "on account of the non-performance of engagements which the Venezuelan Government has undertaken in connection with the great Venezuelan Railway which has been built by the said Government." After some recital of circumstances in these cases, the memorandum proceeds to announce that "the Imperial Government believes that further negotiations with Venezuela on the present base are hopeless," and that measures of coercion are contemplated. "But we consider it of importance to let first of all the Government of the United States know about our purposes, so that we can prove that we have nothing else in view than to help those of our citizens who have suffered damages. . . . We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory." In reply, the Department of State returned a memorandum, in part as follows: "The President in his Message of the 3d of December, 1901, used the following language: 'The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American Power at the

expense of any American Power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World.' The President further said: 'This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American Power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. . . . We do not guarantee any State against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American Power. . . . The President of the United States, appreciating the courtesy of the German Government in making him acquainted with the state of affairs referred to, and not regarding himself as called upon to enter into the consideration of the claims in question, believes that no measures will be taken in this matter by the agents of the German Government which are not in accordance with the well-known purpose, above set forth, of His Majesty the German Emperor.'"—*Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (57th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Documents, v. 1, pp. 192-195)*.

1902-1904.—Castro president.—Concerted action by Great Britain, Germany, and Italy to enforce claims.—Blockade of ports and seizure of warships.—Agreements secured.—Reference to the tribunal at The Hague.—"Cipriano Castro, a Tachiran, had in May declared his intention of avenging a real or intended slight received from the Government, and, after marching through the Andes at the head of the so-called *Ejército Restaurador*, fighting several successful battles on the way, he entered Carácas late in October. The executive power, which he immediately assumed, was only confirmed by an *Asamblea Constituyente* in February, 1901. In March of that year a new Constitution was decreed, whereby the presidential period was extended to six years, and Castro was duly elected to the office. In 1902, the 'Matos' revolution broke out, under the General of that name; this appears to have been a genuine and popular revolt, and almost proved successful when in the autumn of the year a tactical mistake on the part of the revolutionists left Castro master of the country. No attempt was made to compensate foreigners for the damage to property suffered by them during these various revolutions, and in view of their accumulation, the various powers chiefly concerned—Great Britain, Germany, and Italy declared a blockade of the ports of Venezuela in January, 1903, which [reënforced by the intervention of the United States under President Roosevelt] had the desired effect of persuading Castro's Government to agree to the arbitration of the various claims by the third parties. Though the allied powers demanded that these claims should be settled first, the counter-demand of Venezuela, that all the powers, peaceful and otherwise, should be treated alike, was upheld by the Hague Tribunal, and protocols with all the countries were signed within a few months."—L. V. Dalton, *Venezuela*, pp. 102-104.—See also DEBTS, PUBLIC: America; U. S. A.: 1902-1903.—"During the summer of 1903 ten mixed commissions sat at Caracas to adjudicate upon the claims of as many nations against Venezuela. These commissions simply determined the amount of the claims in each case. The awards of these commissions are very instructive, as they show the injustice of resorting to measures of coercion for the collection of pecuniary claims which have not been submitted to arbitration. Belgian claimants demanded 14,921,805 bolivars and were awarded 10,898,643; British claimants demanded 14,743,572 and were awarded 9,401,267; German

claimants demanded 7,376,685 and were awarded 2,091,908; Italian claimants demanded 39,844,258 and were awarded 2,975,906; Spanish claimants demanded 5,307,626 and were awarded 1,974,818; United States claimants demanded 81,410,952 and were awarded 2,313,711. The decision of the Hague Court, which was rendered February 22, 1904, held that the three allied powers were entitled to preferential treatment; that Venezuela had recognized in principle the justice of their claims while she had not recognized in principle the justice of the claims of the pacific powers; that the neutral powers had profited to some extent by the operations of the allies, and that their rights remained for the future absolutely intact. This decision, emanating from a peace court, and indorsing the principle of armed coercion, was received with no small degree of criticism."—L. H. Latané, *United States and Latin America*, pp. 255-256.

ALSO IN: British Foreign Office, *Venezuela*, 1902, no. 1: *Correspondence respecting affairs of Venezuela*.—*Message of President Roosevelt*, Dec. 7, 1903.

1902-1905.—Short period of comparative tranquillity.—"After the blockade instituted in December, 1902, by Germany, Great Britain and Italy, had been raised, and protocols had been signed for the settlement of all duly recognized claims of foreign nations against Venezuela, Venezuela enjoyed a short period of tranquillity; but, by the beginning of 1905, every legation in Caracas had a list of grievances founded on alleged unfair awards of arbitrators, on denials of justice on the part of the Venezuelan courts and on the diminution by President Castro of the percentage he had agreed to pay to the creditor nations from the receipts of his custom-houses. Moreover, Germany and Great Britain began to show signs of restlessness, because President Castro had not provided, as had been agreed in the protocols, for the payment of interest to British and German bondholders. The situation looked even worse than before the blockade, for the principal nation aggrieved was the United States, and it had the moral support of all other nations represented in Caracas by legations. The main issue between the United States and Venezuela was the asphalt case. In July, 1904, President Castro had demanded ten million dollars from the American Company, known as the 'New York and Bermudez Asphalt Company,' and had threatened, if that amount was not paid immediately, that the whole asphalt lake and the property of the company would be seized. He based his demand on the alleged support given by the Asphalt Company to the Matos revolution of 1902; but, as he did not demand anything from the countless other supporters of the revolution, it was clear that his demand on the Asphalt Company was piratical."—H. W. Bowen, *Queer diplomacy with Castro* (*North American Review*, Mar. 15, 1907).

1903-1904.—Orinoco Steamship Company case involving the United States in Venezuelan affairs. See ORINOCO STEAMSHIP COMPANY CASE.

1904.—Adoption of a new constitution.—The constitution, adopted in Venezuela, on Apr. 27, 1904, reduced the number of states to thirteen—Aragua, Bermudez, Bolívar, Carabobo, Falcon, Guarico, Lara, Merida, Miranda, Tachira, Trujillo, Zamora, and Zulia—and provided for five territories—Amazonas Cristobal Colon, Colon, Delta-Amacuero, and Yururari—and the federal district, composed of the departments Libertador, Varagas, Guaicaipuro, and Sucre, and the island of Margarita. The states retained all rights not delegated

to the central government. The territories were administered by the president. The government was divided into three branches—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The legislative branch, called the Congress, was composed of two bodies—the Senate and the House of Deputies. One deputy was to be elected by every 40,000 inhabitants, and all deputies, as well as senators (two from every state) and the president were to serve for six years. Deputies must be twenty-one years of age, senators thirty and the president over thirty. No extraordinary powers were given to the Congress, except that fourteen of its members be chosen by itself to elect every sixth year a president, a first and a second vice president, and to elect a successor to the second vice president. The president, besides being charged with the usual executive duties, was authorized to declare war, arrest, imprison, or expel natives or aliens who are opposed to the reestablishment of peace, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, to permit aliens to enter the public service, to prohibit the immigration into the republic of objectionable religious teachers, and to establish rules for the postal, telegraph, and telephone services. The judicial power was vested in the Corte Federal y de Casacion (seven judges elected by the Congress) and the lower courts (appointed by the state governments). All Venezuelans over twenty-one years of age were entitled to vote, and aliens to obtain that right by getting naturalized. No length of time was prescribed for an alien to live in the republic before he can become naturalized. Art. 15 of the constitution denied the right of natives or aliens to present claims to the nation or states for damages caused by revolutionists. Art. 17 abolished the death penalty and art. 120 provided that all of Venezuela's international treaties shall hereafter contain the clause, "All differences between the contracting parties shall be decided by arbitration, without going to war." In conclusion, the constitution provided that the next constitutional term begin May 23, 1905. Up to that date General Castro was to be provisional president. Juan Vicente Gómez was made first vice president and José Antonio Velutini second vice president. As provisional president, General Castro was authorized to name the presidents of the states, to organize the federal territories, to fix the estimates for the public expenses, and, in short, to exercise the fullest powers.

1905-1906.—Troubles with the United States and France.—President Castro's vacation.—Both France and the United States had troubles which became acute in 1905 with the president of Venezuela, growing out of his treatment of French and American business interests and rights in that country. The accusation, that funds had been contributed to the Matos revolt in 1901-1902, made against an American company in the asphalt case (New York and Bermudez Company) was also brought against the French Cable Company, whose franchise was annulled and its property confiscated in like manner. In both cases, the matter was a proper one for arbitration, and this Castro refused, maintaining the finality of the decision of the Venezuela courts. Under instructions from Secretary Hay, the American minister to Venezuela informed the government of that country that if it refused to arbitrate the questions involved in this and other American claims, "the Government of the United States may be regretfully compelled to take such measures as it may find necessary to effect complete redress without resort to arbitration"; and France, about the same time, made a significant movement of armored cruisers to the

French Antilles. Moreover, the Venezuelan president in January, 1906, gave a fresh provocation to France. The French *chargé d'affaires* in Venezuela had gone on board a French steamer without official permit, and was refused permission to return to shore, on the pretence that he might bring yellow fever infection. France at once dismissed the Venezuelan *chargé* from Paris, and added a demand for apologies to her other claims. Having brought his country into this compromising situation, the eccentric Castro announced Apr. 9, 1906, in a proclamation: "Fatigue, produced by constant labor, and which I have been endeavoring to overcome for some time past, makes it imperative for me now, in order to restore my broken health, to retire from the exercise of the office of prime magistrate. In accordance with a provision of the constitution I have called to power Gen. Juan Vicente Gomez, a very meritorious citizen of well-known civic virtues, who in my absence will fulfill strictly the duties of his office. You all know him, and you know perfectly well that in view of his character you must support him without any hesitation whatever, in order that the administration may continue as it has up to now under the surest bases of stability, order and progress, thus making the action of the executive the most expeditious possible. . . . Our present international situation, completely defined and clear, gives us reason to hope that everything will continue harmoniously and on a basis of mutual respect and consideration." The next morning he left quietly for Los Teques, where he had a private estate; his late cabinet resigned, and a new ministry was formed by the acting president, Gomez. Six weeks later, on May 23, the president-on-vacation, from his retirement, issued a second proclamation, announcing his wish to withdraw permanently from public life, and his intention to resign the presidency at the next session of Congress. But differences appear to have arisen soon after this between the retired president and his substitute, General Gomez, over cabinet appointments, and presently there was a delegation sent to request the former to abandon his intended resignation. The delegation succeeded in its mission; Castro returned to Caracas and reburdened himself with the cares of state.

1905-1909.—Trouble with Colombia over the navigation of rivers flowing through both countries. See COLOMBIA: 1905-1909.

1907-1909.—President Castro's provocations to France and the United States.—His quarrel with Holland.—His venture abroad.—Triumph of his enemies in Venezuela.—Foreign governments he quarrelled with take part in preventing his return.—President Castro, practically dictator in Venezuela, continued in his provocative attitude towards both France and the United States, and added Holland to the list of exasperated nations which were studying how to deal with his insolence. His courts, after confiscating the franchises and seizing the property of the French Cable Company and the American asphalt concessionaires, imposed fines of \$5,000,000 on each. Of the five claims for redress or indemnity which the American government pressed upon him he refused to submit any to arbitration, in any form, at The Hague or elsewhere. This situation continued until the American legation was withdrawn from Caracas, in June, 1908. Castro had opened his quarrel with Holland in a characteristic way. The bubonic plague had got a footing at the Venezuelan port of La Guayra, and he refused to allow his own medical officers, who reported the fact, to take measures for preventing the spread of the disease. Then, when his

Dutch neighbors at Curaçao protected themselves by a quarantine against La Guayra he retaliated by an embargo on commerce with Curaçao, exchanged angry letters with the Dutch minister at Caracas, and ordered him finally to quit the country. The Netherland government acted slowly, with deliberation, on the matter, dispatching a battle-ship, at length, to the scene, and otherwise manifesting serious intentions. But now the domestic situation in Venezuela underwent a sudden change; or, rather, a recurrence to the situation in 1906, when Castro had found it easy to lay down the reins of authority and take them up again at his pleasure. He was afflicted with some ailment, for which he went abroad to seek treatment, appointing Vice President Gomez to conduct the government in his absence. Meantime, in Venezuela, his enemies, or the opponents of his rule, had acquired the upper hand, and were prepared to resist his return; a mob at Caracas, crying "down with Castro," wrecked considerable property of his friends. A few days later some of his partisans were arrested on the charge of having plotted the death of Acting President Gomez; and that trusted representative of the absent president became openly antagonistic to him. The Castro cabinet was dismissed, and an anti-Castro ministry was formed. Pacific overtures were made to the foreign governments with which Castro had quarrelled. William I. Buchanan, a diplomat of much experience in Spanish-America, was sent from the United States to reopen negotiations at Caracas, and the late Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs went abroad as an agent of President Gomez to treat with the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France. Buchanan found difficulty in arranging modes of settlement in the case of two American claims, that of the New York and Bermudez Company, and that of the Orinoco Corporation, which claimed very extensive concessions; but the obstacles were overcome and a satisfactory protocol signed, Feb. 13, 1909. Before this time, criminal proceedings had been instituted against Castro, on the charge that he had instigated the assassination of Vice President Gomez, and the High Federal Court had decided that adequate evidence had been adduced to warrant the action. To this accusation Castro made answer of denial from Dresden, February 27. At Bordeaux he was allowed to take passage a month later with the understanding that he must leave the ship before she reached a Venezuelan port, and he accepted tickets to Port-au-Spain, Trinidad. On leaving Paris his parting words had been: "I believe that God and destiny call me back to Venezuela. I intend to accomplish my mission there, even though it involves revolution." The British government, after consultation with the United States and other powers most interested in the avoidance of fresh disturbances in Venezuela, forbade his landing at Trinidad, and he found no port to receive him but that of Fort de France, Martinique. From that French soil, too, he was ordered away the next day, and took passage back to France, ultimately settling himself with his family in Spain. As soon as the out-cast president had been thus eliminated from Venezuelan politics he was cleared, May 21, of the charge of plotting to assassinate General Gomez, by decision of the criminal court. Both Holland and France had settled, by this time, their differences with Venezuela, and restored diplomatic relations.

1910-1911.—Election of General Juan Vicente Gomez.—Celebration of the centennial anniversary of the declaration of independence.—"April

19, 1910, the elections established General Juan Vicente Gomez as Constitutional President for the current term. Since that time the centenary of the independence of the republic has been celebrated in Carácas [June-July, 1911]. . . . The new President has shown himself eager to promote the welfare of the country and to encourage commerce; consuls have been appointed to stations where, since the time of Guzman Blanco, there has been none; the application of foreign capital to the development of the resources of the country has been encouraged, with due regard to the rights of the inhabitants, and more than all, the spirit of the country at large, wearied with the fifty revolutions of the last eighty years, is opposed to further strife, and inclined to maintain that internal peace, the benefits of which are already being enjoyed."—L. V. Dalton, *Venezuela*, p. 105.

1913.—Revolutions quelled.—An anti-Gomez uprising in the state of Trujillo was put down in 1913 but revealed the activity of a strong party of Nationalists under the leadership of General Hernandez working against the continuance of the Gomez administration. In August of the same year ex-President Castro headed a revolution which captured Coro. Gomez declared martial law and, heading the government troops himself, marched against the rebels and recaptured the town, dispersing the insurrectionary forces.

1914.—New constitution.—Bustillos made provisional president.—Campaign of Gomez against rebels.—"The constitution now in force is that of June 3, 1914. The legislative authority is vested in a congress of two houses—the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies—the former consisting of 40 members elected by the Legislative Assemblies of the States for three years, 2 for each State, Venezuelans by birth and over 30 years of age; the latter composed of deputies chosen from each State by a direct vote and for three years, one deputy for each 35,000 inhabitants, and an additional deputy for each additional 15,000. The Executive Power is vested in a President of the Republic, and a cabinet of seven ministers who sit in conjunction with the President. The National Congress elects the President for a term of seven years. He must be a Venezuelan by birth and over 30 years of age, and is eligible for reelection for the constitutional period immediately following that in which he holds office. The Federal Judiciary comprises the Supreme Federal and Cassation Court, the Supreme and Superior Tribunals, courts of first instance, district and municipal, belonging to the States, the Federal District and the Territories."—*Latin-American Year Book*, 1920, p. 629.—"The term of President Juan Vicente Gómez, who endeavored to give the country a good administration, expired April 19. Congress elected Gen. V. Márquez Bustillos Provisional President for one year, pending the regular presidential elections in December, 1914, and January, 1915. Márquez Bustillos organized his Cabinet with César Zumeta as its head and Minister of the Interior. In January, Gomez [as commander-in-chief of the army] returned to the capital after a five months' campaign which resulted in the suppression of the Castro revolt. A new uprising took place in March. Later José María Hernández (El Mocho) joined the rebels and they became active in the State of Falcón. By the end of July Hernández and the rebels had retreated to British Guiana. Opposition to the administration came to an end in October with the issuance of a proclamation appealing for peace by Angel C. Lange, the last of the revolutionary leaders. Measures for the de-

velopment of the country were undertaken including the extension of the system of national highways and the opening of manual training schools. The work of sanitation, undertaken in accordance with the new laws, has extended so far that yellow fever and bubonic plague are practically extirpated."

—*Venezuela (American Year Book, 1914, p. 119)*.

1915.—Presidential election.—Revolution checked.—In May, General Juan Vicente Gomez was unanimously elected president for the term ending April, 1922. He did not assume the office, however, but continued to serve as commander-in-chief of the army while Bustillos remained provisional president. The revolt begun in September, 1914, in the eastern part of Venezuela was completely checked by August, 1915. The Revolutionary leader, General Du Charme, was captured and executed without trial.

1917-1918.—Effect of World War.—Venezuela maintained a neutral attitude during the war. The general economic chaos during and following the war period compelled the government to pass special measures to remedy the disturbed financial machinery of the country.

1919.—New alien law.—"The President . . . published a new alien law on June 24, 1919. The principal provisions of the new act are as follows: Aliens shall enjoy the same civil rights as Venezuelan citizens with exceptions as provided by law. Aliens are divided into two classes, resident and transient. Aliens arriving in Venezuela shall present themselves within 15 days before the highest civil authority in their place of residence, to prove their identity, their intentions of settling in Venezuela, and the business or occupation in which they intend to engage. Aliens shall be subject to the same duties as citizens, but shall be exempt from military service and personal war taxes. Aliens shall observe strict neutrality in regard to Venezuelan national affairs; they shall not be permitted to become members of political associations, edit political publications, write on political subjects, or discourse publicly on this subject, and shall refrain from mixing even indirectly in the internal affairs of Venezuela. The alien who infringes this neutrality shall be considered a dangerous person and may be deported from the territory of the Republic. Aliens shall not hold public office, but the President may permit them to serve in the Charities, Public Health Service, or civil or military instruction. Aliens shall not have the right to take recourse to diplomatic means until all legal means have been exhausted and it is evident that justice has been defeated. Aliens shall have the right, like citizens, to indemnity from the Government for damage caused intentionally in times of war by legally constituted authorities acting in their official capacity. These claims shall be adjudged in accordance with proceedings established by national legislation for the proving and appraising of such claims and damages."—*Latin American Year Book*, 1920, p. 630.

1920-1923.—Joins League of Nations.—New law concerning development of oil.—Political, educational and economic events.—In March, 1920, Venezuela signified its adherence to the League of Nations. In June of that year a law concerning hydrocarbons was promulgated, outlining the status of foreign developers of Venezuela oil. "Much interest has recently surrounded the oil industry in Venezuela and the production of oil promises to be one of the most important sources of wealth, when the industry is developed more extensively. Development-work on a large scale continues, particularly in the region of Lake Maracaibo, and foreign capital is becoming more and

more interested in this industry."—*Venezuela trade* (*Pan American Magazine*, Oct., 1923, p. 158).—In 1922 General Gomez was again elected to the presidency for the period of 1922-1929 by a general vote of Congress. On July 5, 1922, the government's plan of educational reform was forwarded by the issuance of a presidential decree by which the Central University, closed for some years, was reopened. In October, the new custom house of the port of Guanta, opening that port to the importation of goods into the country, was ready for use. Its importance has been strengthened by the new government roads (see RAILROADS: 1912-1922) and the development of rich agricultural country near Maracay. Late in the year the boundary dispute with Colombia was being adjusted

1903, v. 79, pp. 247-257).—*Venezuela: An economic report* (*School of foreign service, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., April, 1921*).

VENI, VIDI, VICI ("I came, I saw, I conquered"), said to have been Julius Cæsar's report of his battle with Mithradates. See ROME: Republic: B. C. 47-46.

VENICE: Geographic description.—Architecture.—St. Mark's.—Doge's palace.—Venice is one of the chief cities of Italy, and the principal Italian seaport on the Adriatic, with a population in 1921 of 171,665. It was formerly a powerful city republic, with considerable territory on the mainland. The city is built on piles, on a group of low islands off the northeast coast of Italy, between the mouths of the Piave and the Po, and is separated from the



HARBOR OF VENICE

by Swiss arbitration with the coöperation of one Venezuelan and one Colombian commissioner. (See COLOMBIA: 1922: Boundary disputed.) On June 19, 1923, the wireless telegraph service between Venezuela and Colombia was inaugurated. On June 30 President Gomez's brother, General Juan C. Gomez, first vice president of Venezuela and governor of the federal district, was assassinated at Caracas.

See also CARACAS; LATIN AMERICA; MASONIC SOCIETIES: Central and South America; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1551-1912; 1914-1922; RACE PROBLEMS: Previous to 1900.

ALSO IN: R. Southey, *Expedition of Orsua and crimes of Aguirre*.—W. S. Robertson, *Beginnings of Spanish-American diplomacy*.—G. D. Flintner, *History of revolution of Caracas*.—W. L. Penfield, *Anglo-American intervention in Venezuela*.—S. Brooks, *Venezuelan imbroglio* (*Fortnightly Review*,

mainland by a long low sand bank, the Lido. (See ITALY: Map.) The city is famous for the beauty of its architecture. "The curve of the Grand Canal sweeps between two ranges of palaces, which built each apart and for itself involuntarily combine their diversities for its embellishment. Most of them are of the middle ages; . . . others of the renaissance. Porphyry and serpentine incrust the upper sections of the doors with their polished and precious material. Several facades are rosy, or mottled with delicate lines. . . . The canal turns, and you see rising from the water like a rich marine vegetation, or some strange and magnificent piece of white coral, Santa Maria della Salute, with its domes, its clusters of sculpture and its pediment loaded with statues, and beyond on another island, San Giorgio Maggiore, rotund and bristling like a pompous mother-of-pearl couch. You carry your eye to the left, and there is St. Mark's, the Cam-

panile, the Piazza, and the Ducal Palace. Probably no gem in the world equals it. . . . The admirable piazza [S. Marco], bordered with porticoes and palaces, extends rectangularly its forests of columns, its corinthian capitals, its statues, its noble and varied arrangement of classic forms. At its extremity, half gothic, half byzantine, rises the Basilico. . . . A few paces off, bare and erect like a ship's mast, the gigantic Campanile towers in the air. . . . Like a magnificent diamond in a brilliant setting the Ducal Palace effaces the rest."

—H. A. Taine, *Italy: Florence and Venice*, pp. 219-221.—Owing to the small size of the islands, the great palaces and warehouses are built down to the water's edge, and though the city is threaded by narrow streets and winding lanes, there are no carriage ways. Canals take the place of main streets, and traffic is carried on almost entirely by water. Steamers are now used on the larger canals, and motor boats are seen on the smaller ones that intersect the city; but the famous gondolas, which have been used for centuries are still much in evidence. The islands are united by bridges, which are sharply arched to allow of the passage of boats. There are a few gardens in the city and many small squares, of which the Piazza of St. Mark's is the largest. The campanili, detached from the churches, are among the great attractions of the city. An excellent idea of the beauty of the city may be obtained from the paintings of J. M. Turner, or the etchings of J. McNeil Whistler. The national arsenal of Italy is situated in Venice, and the industrial arts for which the city was formerly famous have been revived of late years. St. Mark's itself is a great treasure house of mosaics, rare marbles and porphyry in the interior and of church plate and jewels. Monuments to the famous men of the city were forbidden by the republic and in consequence, compared with some other Italian cities, outside of its use in the decoration of buildings, there is a dearth of sculpture in the streets and squares. The great exception is the Colleoni statue, near the Scuola di San Martin, which is ranked as one of the very few great equestrian statues of the world. The famous lion of St. Mark surmounts an ancient Egyptian column of grey granite, in the piazzetta of the doge's palace, while opposite to it stands a fellow monolith of red granite, with a figure of St. Theodore on top. The ducal palace, or palace of the doge, was built successively in three styles, Byzantine, Gothic and Renaissance. The Gothic ducal palace was begun by Doge Pietro Gradenigo at the opening of the fourteenth century. "One hundred and twenty-three years afterwards the first Grand Council sat in the finished Gothic building. From that time on Renaissance features began to appear and the portion where that style reigns was finished about the middle of the sixteenth century. . . . A fire partly destroyed the building, and the extensive changes which were then made left the building in its present form. . . . One singularity of the Doges' Palace is, that its front is built of marble of various colors arranged to produce a pattern. . . . Notice the giants' stairway, so-called from the figures at the top. These figures were colossal statues of Neptune and Mars typifying the strength of Venice by sea and in war. . . . On the top of the stairs the doges, or rulers of Venice, were crowned. . . . Connecting the palace with its prison is the well-known Bridge of Sighs, celebrated in Byron's verses. . . . And the dark dungeons to which it leads speak of the inhuman punishments of . . . earlier times."

—C. L. Barstow, *Famous buildings*, pp. 184-185.

ALSO IN: W. C. Hazlitt, *Venetian republic*.—

W. R. Thayer, *Short history of Venice*.—J. Ruskin, *Stones of Venice*.—S. A. Brooke, *Sea charm of Venice*.

452.—Origin of the republic.—When Attila the Hun, in the year 452, crossed the Alps and invaded Italy, "the savage destroyer undesignedly laid the foundations of a republic which revived, in the feudal state of Europe, the art and spirit of commercial industry. The celebrated name of Venice, or Venetia, was formerly diffused over a large and fertile province of Italy, from the confines of Pannonia to the river Addua, and from the Po to the Rætian and Julian Alps. Before the irruption of the barbarians, fifty Venetian cities flourished in peace and prosperity. . . . Many families of Aquileia, Padua, and the adjacent towns, who fled from the sword of the Huns, found a safe though obscure refuge in the neighbouring islands. At the extremity of the Gulf, where the Adriatic feebly imitates the tides of the ocean, near a hundred small islands are separated by shallow water from the continent, and protected from the waves by several long slips of land, which admit the entrance of vessels through some secret and narrow channels. Till the middle of the 5th century these remote and sequestered spots remained without cultivation, with few inhabitants, and almost without a name. But the manners of the Venetian fugitives, their arts and their government, were gradually formed by their new situation; and one of the epistles of Cassiodorus, which describes their condition about seventy years afterwards, may be considered as the primitive monument of the republic. . . . Fish was the common, and almost the universal, food of every rank: their only treasure consisted in the plenty of salt which they extracted from the sea."—E. Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ch. 35.—"The inhabitants of Aquileia, or at least the feeble remnant that escaped the sword of Attila, took refuge at Grado. Concordia migrated to Capularia (now Caorle). The inhabitants of Altinum, abandoning their ruined villas, founded their new habitations upon seven islands at the mouth of the Piave, which, according to tradition, they named from the seven gates of their old city. . . . From Padua came the largest stream of emigrants. They left the tomb of their mythical ancestor, Antenor, and built their humble dwellings upon the islands of Rivus Altus and Methamaucus, better known to us as Rialto and Malamocco. This Paduan settlement was one day to be known to the world by the name of Venice. But let us not suppose that the future Queen of the Adriatic sprang into existence at a single bound like Constantinople or Alexandria. For 250 years, that is to say for eight generations, the refugees on the islands of the Adriatic prolonged an obscure and squalid existence,—fishing, salt-manufacturing, damming out the waves with wattled vine-branches, driving piles into the sand-banks; and thus gradually extending the area of their villages. Still these were but fishing villages, loosely confederated together, loosely governed, poor and insignificant. . . . This seems to have been their condition, though perhaps gradually growing in commercial importance, until at the beginning of the 8th century the concentration of political authority in the hands of the first doge, and the recognition of the Rialto cluster of islands as the capital of the confederacy, started the republic on a career of success and victory."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and her invaders*, v. 2, bk. 2, ch. 4.—See also HUNS: 452.

554-800.—Dukedom under exarchs of Ravenna. See ROME: Medieval city: 554-800.

568.—Refuge from invading Lombards. See LOMBARDS: 568-573.

697-810.—Early constitution of government.—Origin of doges.—Resistance to Pepin, king of the Lombards.—Removal to the Rialto and founding of the new capital city.—Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.—“Each island had at first its own magistrate: the magistrates of the most considerable being called Tribunes Major, the others, Tribunes Minor [twelve tribunes in all], and the whole being equally subject to the council-general of the community; which thus constituted a kind of federal republic. This lasted nearly three hundred years, when it was found that the rising nation had fairly outgrown its institutions. Dangerous rivalries arose among the tribunes. . . . At a meeting of the Council-General in A. D. 697, the Patriarch of Grado proposed the concentration of power in the hands of a single chief, under the title of Doge or Duke. The proposition was eagerly accepted, and they proceeded at once to the election of this chief. ‘It will be seen (remarks Daru) that the Dogeship saved independence and compromised liberty. It was a veritable revolution, but we are ignorant by what circumstances it was brought about. Many historians assert that the change was not effected till the permission of the Pope and the Emperor was obtained.’ The first choice fell on Paolo Luca Anabesto. It was made by twelve electors, the founders of what were thenceforth termed the electoral families. The Doge was appointed for life: he named his own counsellors; took charge of all public business; had the rank of prince, and decided all questions of peace and war. The peculiar title was meant to imply a limited sovereignty, and the Venetians uniformly repudiated, as a disgrace, the bare notion of their having ever submitted to a monarch. But many centuries passed away before any regular or well-defined limits were practically imposed; and the prolonged struggle between the people and the Doges, depending mainly on the personal character of the Doge for the time being, constitutes the most startling and exciting portion of their history.” The third doge, one Urso, alarmed the people by his pretensions to such a degree that they slew him, and suppressed his office for five years, substituting a chief magistrate called “maestro della milizia.” “The Dogeship was then [742] restored in the person of Theodal Urso (son of the last Doge), who quitted Heraclea [then the Venetian capital] for Malamocco, which thus became the capital.” In his turn, Theodal Urso lost the favor of the people and was deposed and blinded. “It thenceforth became the received custom in Venice to put out the eyes of deposed Doges.” Later in the 8th century the dogeship was secured by a family which went far towards making it hereditary, and rendering it boldly tyrannical; but the yoke of the would-be despots—Giovanni and Maurice, father and son—was broken in 804, and they were driven to flight. The head of the conspiracy which expelled them, Obelerio, was then proclaimed doge. “The events of the next five years are involved in obscurity. One thing is clear. Pepin, King of the Lombards [son of Charlemagne], either under the pretence of a request for aid from the new Doge, or to enforce some real or assumed rights of his own, declared war against the Republic, and waged it with such impetuosity that his fleet and army, after carrying all before them, were only separated from Malamocco, the capital, by a canal. In this emergency, Angelo Participazio, one of those men who are produced by great occasions to mark an era, proposed that the entire population should

remove to Rialto, which was separated by a broader arm of the sea from the enemy, and there hold out to the last. No sooner proposed than done. They hastily embarked their all; and when Pepin entered Malamocco, he found it deserted. After losing a large part of his fleet in an ill-advised attack on Rialto, he gave up the enterprise, and Angelo Participazio was elected Doge in recognition of his services, with two tribunes for counsellors. One of his first acts was to make Rialto the capital, instead of Malamocco or Heraclea, which had each been the seat of Government at intervals. ‘There were round Rialto some sixty islets, which the Doge connected by bridges. They were soon covered with houses. They were girt with a fortification; and it was then that this population of fugitives gave to this rising city, which they had just founded in the middle of a morass, the name of Venetia, in memory of the fair countries from which their fathers had been forcibly expatriated. The province has lost its name, and become subject to the new Venice.’ [Daru. v. 1, p. 79.]—*Republic of Venice (Quarterly Review, October, 1874, v. 137, pp. 417-420)*. In 803 Charlemagne concluded a treaty, at Aix-la-Chapelle, with Nicephorus I, the Byzantine or Eastern emperor, establishing boundaries between the two empires which disputed the Roman name. “In this treaty, the supremacy of the Eastern Empire over Venice, Istria, the maritime parts of Dalmatia, and the south of Italy, was acknowledged; while the authority of the Western Empire in Rome, the exarchate of Ravenna, and the Pentapolis, was recognised by Nicephorus. The commerce of Venice with the East was already so important, and the Byzantine administration afforded so many guarantees for the security of property, that the Venetians, in spite of the menaces of Charlemagne, remained firm in their allegiance to Nicephorus. . . . Venice, it is true, found itself in the end compelled to purchase peace with the Frank empire, by the payment of an annual tribute of thirty-six pounds of gold, in order to secure its commercial relations from interruption; and it was not released from this tribute until the time of Otho the Great. It was during the reign of Nicephorus that the site of the present city of Venice became the seat of the Venetian government, Rivalto (Rialto) becoming the residence of the duke and the principal inhabitants, who retired from the continent to escape the attacks of Pepin [king of Italy, under his father, Charlemagne]. Heraclea had previously been the capital of the Venetian municipality. In 810 peace was again concluded between Nicephorus and Charlemagne, without making any change in the frontier of the two empires.”—G. Finlay, *Byzantine empire, 716-1057, bk. 1, ch. 2, sect. 1*.

Also in: H. F. Brown, *Venice, ch. 1-2*.

8th century.—Still subject to Eastern empire. See ROME: Medieval city: 717-800.

810-961.—Spread of commerce and naval prowess.—Destruction of Istrian pirates.—Conquests in Dalmatia.—“During the ninth, and the first sixty years of the tenth centuries,—from the government of Angelo Participazio, to the coming into Italy of Otho the Great,—the Venetian affairs, with brief intervals of repose, were wholly occupied with civil commotions and naval wars. The doges of the republic were often murdered; its fleets were sometimes defeated; but, under every adverse circumstance, the commercial activity, the wealth, and the power of the state were still rapidly increasing. In the ninth century the Venetians, in concert with the Greeks, encountered, though with indifferent

success, the navies of the Saracens; but the Narentines, and other pirates of Dalmatia, were their constant enemies, and were frequently chastised by the arms of the republic. The Venetian wealth invited attacks from all the freebooters of the seas, and an enterprise undertaken by some of them who had established themselves on the coast of Istria deserves, from its singularity and the vengeance of the republic, to be recorded in this place. According to an ancient custom, the nuptials of the nobles and principal citizens of Venice were always celebrated on the same day of the year and in the same church. . . . The Istrian pirates, acquainted with the existence of this annual festival, had the boldness [944] to prepare an ambush for the nuptial train in the city itself. They secretly arrived over night at an uninhabited islet near the church of Olivolo, and lay hidden behind it with their barks until the procession had entered the church, when darting from their concealment they rushed into the sacred edifice through all its doors, tore the shrieking brides from the arms of their defenceless lovers, possessed themselves of the jewels which had been displayed in the festal pomp, and immediately put to sea with their fair captives and their booty. But a deadly revenge overtook them. The doge, Pietro Candiano III., had been present at the ceremony: he shared in the fury and indignation of the affianced youths: they flew to arms, and throwing themselves under his conduct into their vessels, came up with the spoilers in the lagunes of Caorlo. A frightful massacre ensued: not a life among the pirates was spared, and the victors returned in triumph with their brides to the church of Olivolo. A procession of the maidens of Venice revived for many centuries the recollection of this deliverance on the eve of the purification. But the doge was not satisfied with the punishment which he had inflicted on the Istriots. He entered vigorously upon the resolution of clearing the Adriatic of all the pirates who infested it: he conquered part of Dalmatia, and he transmitted to his successors, with the ducal crown, the duty of consummating his design."—G. Procter, *History of Italy*, ch. 1, pt. 2.

829.—Translation of the body of St. Mark.—Winged Lion of St. Mark.—"In the second year of the reign of Doge Giustiniano Particiaco there was brought to Venice from Alexandria the body of the holy evangelist St. Mark. For, as Petrus Damianus says, Mark was brought from Alexandria into Venice, that he who had shone in the East like the morning star might shed his rays in the regions of the West. For Egypt is held to be the East and Venice the West. There he had held the rule of the Church of Alexandria, and here, being, as it were, born again, he obtained the sovereignty of Aquileia. Now this is how the thing was done. The king of the Saracens wishing to build himself a palace in Babylon, gave command that stones should be taken from the Christian churches and other public places, that they might build him a splendid house. And at that time there came by chance to the Church of St. Mark, Bon, tribune of Malamocco, and Rustico da Torcello, who had been forced by the wind, contrary to the edicts of Venice, to put in to the harbour of Alexandria with ten ships laden with merchandise, and they observing the sadness of the guardians of the church (two Greeks, by name Stauratio, a monk, and Theodoro, a priest), inquired the cause. And they answered that by reason of the impious edict of the king they feared the ruin of the church. Thereupon they prayed them to give them the holy

body that they might carry it to Venice, promising them that the Doge of Venice would receive it with great honour. But the keepers of the church were filled with fear at their petition, and answered reproaching them and saying: 'Know ye not how the blessed St. Mark, who wrote the Gospel, St. Peter dictating at his request, preached in these parts and baptised into the faith the men of these regions? If the faithful should become aware, we could not escape the peril of death.' But to that they answered: 'As for his preaching, we are his firstborn sons, for he first preached in the parts of Venetia and Aquileia. And in peril of death it is commanded, "If they persecute you in one city, flee ye to another," which the evangelist himself obeyed when in the persecution at Alexandria he fled to Pentapolis.' But the keepers said: 'There is no such persecution now that we should fear for our persons.' But while they spake, came one and broke down the precious stones of the church, and when they would not suffer it they were sorely beaten. Then the keepers seeing the devastation of the church, and their own great danger, listened to the prayer of the Venetians and appointed them a day when they should receive the holy body. Now the body was wrapped in a robe of silk sealed with many seals from the head to the feet. And they brought the body of St. Claudia, and having cut the robe at the back and taken away the body of St. Mark, they placed in its stead the blessed Claudia, leaving the seals unbroken. But a sweet odour quickly spread into the city, and all were filled with astonishment, and not doubting that the body of the evangelist had been moved, they ran together to the church. But when the shrine was opened and they saw the garment with the seals unbroken, they returned quickly to their homes. And when the body should be borne to the boats, they covered it with herbs and spread over it porkflesh for the passers-by to see, and went crying, 'Khanzir, khanzir!' which is the Saracen's abomination. And when they reached the ships they covered it with a sail while they passed through the Saracen ships. And as they sailed to Venice the ship which bore it with many others was saved from peril of shipwreck. For when the ships had been driven in the night by a tempestuous wind and were not far from Monte, the blessed St. Mark appeared to the Monk Dominic and bade him lower the sails of the ships. Which, when they had done, the dawn appearing, they found themselves close to the island which is called Artalia. And ten of them, having asked and obtained pardon for breaking the edicts of the Doge, they came to the port of Olivola. And the Doge, and the clergy, and the people came to meet them, and brought the body, with songs of thanksgiving, to the Doge's chapel."—*Old chronicle* (tr. in "*The City in the Sea*," by the Author of "*Belt and Spur*," ch. 3).—"Our fathers did not welcome the arrival of the captured eagles of France, after the field of Waterloo, with greater exultation than the people of Venice the relics of the blessed Evangelist. They abandoned themselves to processions and prayers, and banquets, and public holidays. . . . The winged 'Lion of St. Mark' was blazoned on the standards, and impressed on the coinage of the Republic. . . . The Lion became the theme of many political symbols. Thus it was represented with wings to show that Venetians could strike with promptitude; sitting, as a sign of their gravity in counsel—for such is the usual attitude of sages; with a book in its paws, to intimate their devotion to commerce; in war time the book was closed, and a naked sword sub-

stituted."—W. H. D. Adams, *Queen of the Adriatic*, pp. 42-43.

899.—Hungarian invasion. See HUNGARY: 934-955.

960.—Edict issued against slave trade. See SLAVERY: 8th-10th centuries.

1032-1319.—Development of the constitution of the aristocratic republic.—Grand Council.—Council of Ten.—Golden Book.—"It was by slow and artfully disguised encroachments that the nobility of Venice succeeded in substituting itself for the civic power, and investing itself with the sovereignty of the republic. During the earlier period, the doge was an elective prince, the limit of whose power was vested in assemblies of the people. It was not till 1032 that he was obliged to consult only a council, formed from amongst the most illustrious citizens, whom he designated. Thence came the name given them of 'pregadi' (invited). The grand council was not formed till 1172, 140 years later, and was, from that time, the real sovereign of the republic. It was composed of 480 members, named annually on the last day of September, by 12 tribunes, or grand electors, of whom two were chosen by each of the six sections of the republic. No more than four members from one family could be named. The same counsellors might be re-elected each year. As it is in the spirit of a corporation to tend always towards an aristocracy, the same persons were habitually re-elected; and when they died their children took their places. The grand council, neither assuming to itself nor granting to the doge the judicial power, gave the first example of the creation of a body of judges, numerous, independent, and irremovable; such, nearly, as was afterwards the parliament of Paris. In 1179, it created the criminal 'quarantia'; called, also, the 'vecchia quarantia,' to distinguish it from two other bodies of forty judges, created in 1229. The grand council gave a more complete organization to the government formed from among its members. It was composed of a doge; of six counsellors of the red robe, who remained only eight months in office, and who, with the doge, formed the 'signoria'; and of the council of pregadi, composed of 60 members, renewed each year. . . . In 1249, the sovereign council renounced the election of the doge, and intrusted it to a commission drawn by lot from among the whole council; this commission named another: which, reduced by lot to one fourth, named a third; and by these alternate operations of lot and election, at length formed the last commission of 41 members, who could elect the doge only by a majority of 25 suffrages. [See also, LOT, USE OF, IN ELECTION: Venice.] It was not till towards the end of the 13th century that the people began to discover that they were no more than a cipher in the republic, and the doge no more than a servant of the grand council,—surrounded, indeed, with pomp, but without any real power. In 1280, the people attempted themselves to elect the doge; but the grand council obliged him whom the popular suffrages had designated to leave Venice, and substituted in his place Pietro Gradenigo, the chief of the aristocratic party. Gradenigo undertook to exclude the people from any part in the election of the grand council, as they were already debarred from any participation in the election of a doge. . . . The decree which he proposed and carried on the 28th of February, 1297, is famous in the history of Venice, under the name of 'seratta del maggior consiglio' (shutting of the grand council). [See ITALY: 1250-1313.] He legally founded that hereditary aristocracy,—so prudent,

so jealous, so ambitious,—which Europe regarded with astonishment; immovable in principle, unshaken in power; uniting some of the most odious practices of despotism with the name of liberty; suspicious and perfidious in politics; sanguinary in revenge; indulgent to the subject; sumptuous in the public service, economical in the administration of the finances; equitable and impartial in the administration of justice; knowing well how to give prosperity to the arts, agriculture, and commerce; beloved by the people who obeyed it, whilst it made the nobles who partook its power tremble. The Venetian aristocracy completed its constitution, in 1311, by the creation of the Council of Ten, which, notwithstanding its name, was composed of 16 members and the doge. Ten counsellors of the black robe were annually elected by the great council, in the months of August and September; and of the six counsellors of the red robe, composing a part of the signoria, three entered office every four months. The Council of Ten, charged to guard the security of the state with a power higher than the law, had an especial commission to watch over the nobles, and to punish their crimes against the republic. In this they were restrained by no rule: they were, with respect to the nobility, the depositaries of the power of the great council, or rather of a power unlimited, which no people should intrust to any government. Some other decrees completed the system of the 'seratta del maggior consiglio.' It was forbidden to the quarantia to introduce any 'new man' into power. In 1315, a register was opened, called the Golden Book, in which were inscribed the names of all those who had sat in the great council. In 1319, all limitation of number was suppressed; and, from that period, it sufficed to prove that a person was the descendant of a counsellor, and 25 years of age, to be by right a member of the grand council of Venice."—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *History of the Italian republics*, ch. 5.—"When the Republic was hard pressed for money, inscriptions in the Golden Book were sold at the current price of 100,000 ducats. . . . Illustrious foreigners were admitted, as they are made free of a corporation amongst us. . . . The honour was not disdained even by crowned heads. . . . The original 'Libro d' oro' was publicly burned in 1797, but extracts, registers, and other documents are extant from which its contents might be ascertained."—*Republic of Venice (Quarterly Review, Oct., 1874, v. 137, p. 433)*.

ALSO IN: E. Flagg, *Venice, the city of the sea, introduction*.—Mrs. Oliphant, *Makers of Venice*, ch. 4.—H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 5-9.

1085.—Acquires sovereignty of Dalmatia and Croatia. See BYZANTINE EMPIRE: 1081-1085.

1099-1101.—First Crusade.—"The movement of the crusades brings Venice to the very forefront of European history. Her previous development had been slowly preparing the way for her emergence. The Council, held at Clermont in 1095, resolved that the armament should leave Europe early in the following year. The Pope and the leaders of the Crusades were obliged to turn their attention to the question of transport for the vast and amorphous mob, which, without discipline, with no distinction of ranks, with no discrimination between soldier and monk, between merchant and peasant, between master and man, was now bent on reaching the Holy Land, almost as eager to die there as to achieve the object of their mission, the recovery of the Sepulchre. The three maritime states of Italy—Genoa, Pisa, and Venice—were



Courtesy of Ehrich Galleries, N. Y.

MARRIAGE OF THE ADRIATIC
(After painting by Francesco Guardi)

each ready to offer their services. Each was jealous of the other, and each determined to prevent the other from reaping any signal commercial advantage from the religious enthusiasm of Europe. Venice was not only the most powerful, but also the most eastern, of the three competitors. It was natural that the choice should fall on her. When the Pope's invitation to assist in the Crusade reached the city, however, it seems that the Government did not at once embrace the cause officially in the name of the whole Republic. There was, at first, a tendency to leave the business of transport to private enterprise. But on receipt of the news that Jerusalem had fallen, the Venetian Government began to take active steps in the matter. . . . The Crusade was accepted with enthusiasm. The whole city engaged in preparing a fleet which should be worthy of the Republic. Then, after a solemn mass in S. Mark's, at which the standard of the Cross and the standard of the Republic were presented to the leaders, the soldiers of the Cross embarked on the fleet which numbered 200 ships, and set sail down the Adriatic, making for Rhodes, where they were to winter. At Rhodes two incidents of great significance in Venetian history took place. The Eastern Emperors have never viewed with favour the incursion of the Crusaders. The creation of the kingdom of Jerusalem was really a usurpation of Imperial territory. Alexius I. now endeavoured to persuade the Venetians to withdraw from the enterprise. In this he failed; Venice remained true to the Cross, and to her commercial interests. It is at this point that we find the beginnings of that divergence between Constantinople and the Republic, which eventually declared itself in open hostility, and led up to the sack of Constantinople in the fourth Crusade. Alexius, finding that the Venetians were not inclined to obey him, resolved to punish them. An instrument was ready to his hand. The Pisans saw with disfavour the advent of their commercial rivals in Eastern waters. They were willing to hoist the Imperial standard as opposed to the crusading cross, and to sail down upon the Venetians at Rhodes. They were defeated. The Venetians released all the prisoners except thirty of the more prominent among them who were detained as hostages. The first fruits of the Crusade, as far as Venice was concerned, were the creation of two powerful enemies, the Emperor and the Pisans."—H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 6.

1116-1141.—Wars for Dalmatia with Hungarians. See HUNGARY: 1116-1301.

1124.—Siege of Tyre. See TYRE: 1124.

1127-1128.—Beginning of quarrels with Byzantine empire.—“Previous to this time [about 1127], the Venetian republic had generally been a firm ally of the Byzantine empire, and, to a certain degree, it was considered as owing homage to the Emperor of Constantinople. That connection was now dissolved, and those disputes commenced which soon occupied a prominent place in the history of Eastern Europe. . . . For a short time, habit kept the Venetians attached to the empire; but they soon found that their interests were more closely connected with the Syrian trade than with that of Constantinople. They joined the kings of Jerusalem in extending their conquests, and obtained considerable establishments in all the maritime cities of the kingdom. From having been the customers and allies of the Greeks, they became their rivals and enemies. The commercial fleets of the age acted too often like pirates; and it is not improbable that the Emperor John had good rea-

son to complain of the aggressions of the Venetians. Hostilities commenced; the Doge Dominico Michiel, one of the heroes of the republic, conducted a numerous fleet into the Archipelago, and plundered the islands of Rhodes and Chios, where he wintered. Next year he continued his depredations in Samos, Mitylene, Paros, and Andros. . . . Peace was re-established by the emperor reinstating the Venetians in the enjoyment of all the commercial privileges they had enjoyed before the war broke out.”—G. Finlay, *History of the Byzantine and Greek empires*, bk. 3, ch. 2, sect. 2.

1171.—Establishment of Bank of Venice. See MONEY AND BANKING: Medieval: 12th-17th centuries.

1177.—Pretended Papal grant of the sovereignty of the Adriatic.—Doubtful story of humiliation of Frederick Barbarossa.—A “notable epoch in early Venetian history is the grant on which she based her claim to the sovereignty of the Adriatic. In the course of the fierce struggle between Alexander III. and Frederick Barbarossa [see ITALY: 1174-1183], the Pope, when his fortunes were at the lowest, took refuge with the Venetians, who, after a vain effort at reconciliation, made common cause with him, and in a naval encounter obtained so signal a victory that the Emperor was compelled to sue for peace and submit to the most humiliating terms. The crowning scene of his degradation has been rendered familiar by the pencil, the chisel, and the pen. . . . The Emperor, as soon as he came into the sacred presence, stripped off his mantle and knelt down before the Pope to kiss his feet. Alexander, intoxicated with his triumph and losing all sense of moderation or generosity, placed his foot on the head or neck of his prostrate enemy, exclaiming, in the words of the Psalmist, ‘Super aspidem et basiliscum ambulabis’ &c. (‘Thou shalt tread upon the asp and the basilisk.’) . . . ‘Non tibi, sed Petro’ (‘Not to thee, but Peter’), cried the outraged and indignant Emperor. ‘Et mihi et Petro’ (‘To both me and Peter’), rejoined the Pope, with a fresh pressure of his heel. . . . Sismondi (following a contemporary chronicler) narrates the interview without any circumstance of insult, and describes it as concluding with the kiss of peace. There are writers who contend that Alexander was never at Venice, and that the Venetians obtained no victory on his behalf. But the weight of evidence adduced by Daru strikes us to be quite conclusive in favour of his version. . . . In return for the good offices of Venice on this occasion . . . Alexander presented the reigning Doge, Ziani, with a ring, saying, ‘Receive this ring, and with it, as my donation, the dominion of the sea, which you, and your successors, shall annually assert on an appointed day, so that all posterity may understand that the possession of the sea was yours by right of victory, and that it is subject to the rule of the Venetian Republic, as wife to husband.’ . . . The well-known ceremony of wedding the Adriatic, religiously observed with all its original pomp and splendour during six centuries, was in itself a proclamation and a challenge to the world. It was regularly attended by the papal nuncio and the whole of the diplomatic corps, who, year after year, witnessed the dropping of a sanctified ring into the sea, and heard without a protest the prescriptive accompaniment: ‘Desponsamus te, mare, in signum veri perpetuique domini’ (we espouse thee, sea, in sign of true and perpetual dominion).” —*Republic of Venice* (*Quarterly Review*, October, 1874, v. 137, pp. 421-423).

ALSO IN: G. B. Testa, *History of the War of Frederick I against the communes of Lombardy*, bk. 11.—Mrs. W. Busk, *Mediæval popes, emperors, kings, and crusaders*, v. 2, bk. 2, ch. 8.

1201.—Cause of hostility to Constantinople.—“Of late years the Venetians had had difficulties with the New Rome. . . . These difficulties arose, in great measure, from the fact that the influence of Venice in Constantinople was no longer sufficient to exclude that of the other Italian republics. . . . But the hostility to Constantinople reached its height when the Venetians learned that Alexis had, in May 1201, received an embassy from Genoa, and was negotiating with Ottobono della Croce, its leader, for the concession of privileges for trade in Romania which Venice had hitherto regarded as exclusively her own. From this time the Doge appears to have determined to avenge the wrongs of his state on the ruler who had ventured to favour his rivals.”—E. Pears, *Fall of Constantinople*, ch. 8.

1201-1203.—Perfidious part in the conquest of Constantinople. See CRUSADES: 1201-1203.

1203-1205.—Overthrow of Byzantine empire by Venetians.—Share in partition.—Mediterranean lands held by Venice. See BYZANTINE EMPIRE: 1203-1204; 1204-1205; CRUSADES: Map of Mediterranean lands after 1204.

1216.—Acquisition of Ionian islands. See CORFU: 1216-1916; IONIAN ISLANDS: To 1814.

1256-1258.—Battles with the Genoese at Acre.—“At the period of the Crusades, it was usual in those cities or towns where the Christians held sway, to assign to each of the mercantile communities which had borne a part in the conquest or recovery of the particular district, a separate quarter where they might have their own mill, their own oven, their own bath, their own weights and measures, their own church, and where they might be governed by their own laws, and protected by their own magistrates. . . . At Saint Jean d’Acre, however, the Church of Saint Sabbas was frequented by the Venetians and the Genoese in common; and it happened that, in course of time, both nations sought to found a right to the exclusive property of the building. [Collisions ensued, in one of which (1256), the Genoese drove the Venetians from their factory at Acre and burned the church of Saint Sabbas. The Venetians retaliated by sending a squadron to Acre which destroyed all the Genoese shipping in the port, burned their factory, and reduced a castle near the town which was held by a Genoese garrison. Early in 1257 the fleets of the two republics met and fought a battle, between Acre and Tyre, in which the Venetians were the victors. On June 24, 1258, a second battle was fought very nearly on the same spot, and again Venice triumphed, taking 2,600 prisoners and 25 galleys. Through the efforts of the pope, a suspension of hostilities was then brought about; but other causes of war were working in the east, which soon led to fresh encounters in arms between the two jealous commercial rivals].”—W. C. Hazlitt, *History of the Venetian republic*, v. 1, ch. 11.

1261-1263.—Supplanting of the Venetians by the Genoese at Constantinople and in the Black sea.—War between the republics.—Victory at Malvasia. See GENOA: 1261-1299.

1294-1299.—War with Genoa.—Disastrous defeat at Curzola. See GENOA: 1261-1299.

14th century.—Fleets.—Commerce.—Industries.—“In the 14th century Venice had 3,000 merchantmen manned by 25,000 sailors. A tenth

part of these were ships exceeding 700 tons burden. There were besides 45 war-galleys manned by 11,000 hands; and 10,000 workmen, as well as 36,000 seamen, were employed in the arsenals. The largest of the war-galleys was called the Bucentaur; it was a state vessel of the most gorgeous description. Every year the Doge of Venice, seated upon a magnificent throne surmounted by a regal canopy, dropped from this vessel a ring into the Adriatic, to symbolise the fact that land and sea were united under the Venetian flag. This ceremony commemorated the victory gained over the fleet of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa in 1177, when the Venetians obliged him to sue for peace. [See above: 1177.] Ascension Day was selected for its celebration, and the Bucentaur, glorious with new scarlet and gold, its deck and seats inlaid with costly woods, and rowed with long banks of burnished oars, for many years bore the Doge to plight his troth with the words, ‘We espouse thee, O Sea! in token of true and eternal sovereignty.’ The merchant fleet of Venice was divided into companies sailing together according to their trade. Their routes, and the days for departure and return, their size, armament, crew, and amount of cargo, were all defined. In those times the seas were as much infested with pirates as the deserts with robbers; each squadron therefore hired a convoy of war-galleys for its protection on the voyage. There were six or seven such squadrons in regular employment. The argosies of Cyprus and Egypt, and the vessels engaged in the Barbary and Syrian commerce, concentrated their traffic chiefly at Alexandria and Cairo. The so-called Armenian fleet proceeded to Constantinople and the Euxine, visiting Kaffa and the Gulf of Alexandretta. A Catalonian fleet traded with Spain and Portugal, and another with France; while the most famous of all, the Flanders galleys, connected the seaports of France, England, and Holland with the great commercial city of Bruges. The internal traffic with Germany and Italy was encouraged with equal care, oriental produce arriving from Constantinople and Egypt, and many other commodities being distributed, at first by way of Carinthia, and afterwards of the Tyrol. Germans, Hungarians, and Bohemians conducted this distribution. In Venice a bonded ware-house (*fondaco dei tedeschi*), or custom-house, was accorded to the Germans, where they were allowed to offer their wares for sale, though only to Venetian dealers. Similar privileges were granted to the Armenians, Moors, and Turks, but not to the Greeks, against whom a strong animosity prevailed. . . . The ancient industries of preparing salt and curing fish were never disregarded. The Adriatic sands supplied material adapted for a glass of rare beauty and value, of which mirrors and other articles of Venetian manufacture were made. [See INVENTIONS: Ancient and mediæval: Early industrial processes.] Venetian goldsmiths’ work was universally famed. Brass and iron foundries prepared the raw material for the armourers, whose weapons, helmets, and bucklers were unsurpassed for strength and beauty. Ship-building, with a people whose principle it was always to have more ships than any other state, was necessarily a very important branch of industry. Not satisfied with penetrating to every part already opened to enterprise, the Venetians travelled into regions before unknown, and gave to the world the record of their daring adventures. Maffeo and Nicolo Polo spent fifteen years visiting Egypt, Persia, India, the Khan of Tartary, and

the Grand Khan or Emperor of China. Marco Polo, son of Nicolo, as well as Barthema and Joseph Barbaro, extended the knowledge obtained by their precursors in northern Europe and Asia."—J. Yeats, *Growth and vicissitudes of commerce*, pp. 98-101.—See also COMMERCE: Medieval: 11th-16th centuries.

ALSO IN: A. Anderson, *Origin of commerce*, v. 1. —*Venetian commerce* (*Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, v. 5, pp. 393-411).

1336-1338.—Alliance with Florence against Mastino della Scala.—Conquest of Treviso and other territory on the mainland. See VERONA: 1260-1338.

1351-1355.—Alliance with the Greeks and Aragonese in war with Genoa. See CONSTANTINOPLE: 1348-1355.

1358.—Loss of Dalmatia. See HUNGARY: 1301-1442.

1378-1379.—Renewed war with Genoa.—Defeat at Pola.—The treaty of June, 1355, between Venice and Genoa (see CONSTANTINOPLE: 1348-1355), established a peace which lasted only until April, 1378, when, "a dispute having arisen between the rival States in relation to the island of Tenedos, which the Venetians had taken possession of, the Signory formally declared war against Genoa, which it denounced as false to all its oaths and obligations. On the 26th of this month, Vettore Pisani was invested with the supreme command of the naval forces of the republic. . . . The new commander-in-chief was the son of Nicolo Pisani, and had held a commission in the Navy for 25 years. . . . Of the seamen he was the idol. . . . Pisani sailed from Venice early in May, with 14 galleys; and, on the 30th of the month, while cruising off Antium, came across a Genoese squadron of 10 galleys, commanded by Admiral Fieschi. It was blowing a gale at the time, and five of Pisani's vessels, which had parted company with him, and fallen to leeward, were unable to rejoin him, while one of Fieschi's drifted ashore, and was wrecked. Thus the battle which immediately ensued was between equal forces; but the Genoese admiral was no match for Vettore Pisani," and sustained a disastrous defeat, losing four vessels, with all their officers and crew. "During the summer, Pisani captured great numbers of the enemy's merchantmen; but was unable to find their fleet, which, under Luciano Doria, was actively engaged in cutting up Venetian commerce in the East. In November he asked permission to return to Venice to refit his vessels, which were in a very bad condition, but this was denied him; and, being kept constantly cruising through the winter, at its expiration only six of his vessels were found to be seaworthy. Twelve others, however, were fitted out at their own expense and sent to him by his friends, who perceived that his political enemies were making an effort to ruin him. At the end of February, 1379, Michele Steno and Donato Zeno were appointed by the Government, 'proveditori' of the fleet. These officers, like the field deputies of the Dutch republic in later times, were set as spies over the commander-in-chief, whose operations they entirely controlled. On the 1st of May, Pisani left Brindisi, bound to Venice, having a large number of merchantmen in charge, laden with wheat; and, on the 6th instant, as the weather looked squally, put into Pola, with his convoy, for the night. On the following morning, at day-break, it was reported to him that Doria was off the port with 25 vessels; whereupon he determined not to leave his anchorage until Carlo

Zeno, whom he was expecting with a reinforcement of 10 galleys, should be seen approaching. But the *Proveditori*, loudly denouncing such a determination as a reflection upon the valor of his officers and men, ordered him, peremptorily, in the name of the Senate, to engage the enemy without delay." The result was an overwhelming defeat, out of which Pisani brought six galleys, only—"which were all that were saved from this most terrible engagement, wherein 800 Venetians perished and 2,000 were taken prisoners. . . . Pisani was now violently assailed by his enemies; although they well knew that he had fought the battle of Pola against his own judgment, and agreeably to the wishes of the government, as made known to him by its accredited agents, Michele Steno and Donato Zeno. The Great Council decreed his immediate removal from the supreme command, and he was brought to Venice loaded with chains. [Condemned, upon trial before the Senate, he was sentenced to imprisonment for six months.]"—F. A. Parker, *Fleets of the world*, pp. 100-105.

1379-1381.—War of Chioggia.—Dire extremity of the republic and her deliverance.—After the great victory of Pola, which cost the Genoese the life of Luciano D'Oría, they lost no time in pressing their beaten enemy, to make the most of the advantage they had won. "Fresh galleys were forthwith placed under the command of Pietro, another of the noble D'Oría family; and before the eyes of all Genoa, and after the benediction of the archbishop, the fleet sailed from the harbour, and a great cry was raised from roof to roof, and from window to window, and each alley and each street re-echoed it with enthusiasm, 'to Venice! to Venice!' On arriving in the Adriatic, Pietro D'Oría joined the fleet already there, and prepared for his attack on Venice. . . . To possess himself of Chioggia, which was 25 miles distant from Venice, was D'Oría's first plan. It was the key of the capital, commanded the entrance to the harbour, and cut off any assistance which might come from Lombardy. . . . After a few days of gallant defence, and a few days of gallant attack by sea and land, the defenders of Chioggia were reduced to the last extremity. The entrance to the river was broken open, and the bridge, which for some time was a stumbling-block to the besiegers, was destroyed with all the soldiers upon it by the bravery of a Genoese sailor, who took a boat laden with tar and wool and other combustible materials, and set fire to it, escaping by means of swimming. The defenders having thus perished in the flames, and Chioggia being taken [August, 1379], the triumph of the Genoese was at its height." The Venetians, in consternation at the fall of Chioggia, sent a deputation to D'Oría humbly offering to submit to any terms of peace he might dictate; but the insolent victor ordered them home with the message that there could be no peace until he had entered their city to bridle the bronze horses which stand on the Piazza of St. Mark. This roused the indignation and courage of Venice anew, and every nerve was strained in the defense of the port. "Vettor Pisani, who since the defeat at Pola had languished in prison, was brought out by unanimous consent, and before an assembled multitude he quietly and modestly accepted the position of saviour of his country. . . . The one saving point for Venice lay in the arrival of a few ships from Constantinople, which . . . Carlo Zeno had under his command, endeavouring to make a

diversion in the favour of the Venetians at the Eastern capital. Pending the return of this fleet, the Venetians made an attack on Chioggia. And an additional gleam of hope raised the spirits of Pisani's men in the disaffection of the King of Hungary from the Genoese cause; and gradually, as if by the magic hand of a fickle fortune, Pietro D'Oria found himself and his troops besieged in Chioggia, instead of going on his way to Venice as he had himself prophesied. But the Genoese position was still too strong, and Pisani found it hopeless to attempt to dislodge them; his troops became restless: they wished to return to Venice, though they had sworn never to go back thither except as conquerors. It was in this moment of dire distress that the ultimate resort was vaguely whispered from the Venetian Council Hall to the Piazza. A solemn decree was passed, 'that if within four days the succour from Carlo Zeno did not arrive, the fleet should be recalled from Chioggia, and then a general council should be held as to whether their country could be saved, or if another more secure might not be found elsewhere.' Then did the law-givers of Venice determine that on the fifth day the lagunes should be abandoned, and that they should proceed en masse to Crete or Negropont to form for themselves a fresh nucleus of power on a foreign soil. It is indeed hard to realize that the fate of Venice, associated with all that is Italian, the offspring of the hardy few who raised the city from the very waves, once hung in such a balance. But so it was, when towards the evening of the fourth day [Jan. 1, 1380] sails were descried on the horizon, and Carlo Zeno arrived to save his country from so great a sacrifice. . . . Besides reinforcements by sea, assistance by land flocked in towards Venice. Barnabo Visconti; and his company of the Star, a roving company of Germans, and the celebrated Breton band under Sir John Hawkwood, the Englishman, all hurried to assist the fallen banner of St. Mark. Pietro D'Oria did all he could to maintain discipline amongst his troops; but when he fell one day in an engagement, through being struck by a Venetian arrow, a general demoralization set in, and their only thought was how to save themselves and abandon Chioggia. . . . On the 18th of February, 1380, the Venetians made another gallant attack . . . [and] the Genoese . . . were obliged to retire within the walls. . . . Driven to extremities, on the 22nd of June in that year, 4,000 Genoese were taken to the public prisons in Venice. . . . Since both parties were tired of war, and weakened with these extreme efforts, it was no difficult matter to establish a peace [Aug. 8, 1381].—J. T. Bent, *Genoa*, ch. 8.

ALSO IN: W. C. Hazlitt, *History of the Venetian Republic*, v. 3, ch. 20.—H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 12.

1386.—Acquisition of Corfu. See CORFU: 1216-1916.

1406-1447.—Acquisition of neighboring territory in northeastern Italy.—On the death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, the first duke of Milan (see MILAN: 1277-1447), the eastern parts of his duchy, "Padua, Verona, Brescia, Bergamo, were gradually added to the dominion of Venice. By the middle of the 15th century, that republic had become the greatest power in northern Italy."—E. A. Freeman, *Historical geography of Europe*, p. 241.—See also ITALY: 1402-1406.

1420-1699.—Control over Dalmatia. See DALMATIA: 1420-1699.

1426-1447.—League with Florence, Naples, Savoy, and other states against the duke of Milan. See ITALY: 1412-1447.

1450-1454.—War with Milan and Florence.—Alliance with Naples and Savoy. See MILAN: 1447-1454.

1454-1479.—Treaty with the Turks, followed by war.—Loss of ground in Greece and the islands. See GREECE: 1454-1479.

1460-1479.—Losing struggle with the Turks in Greece and the archipelago. See ITALY: 1447-1480.

1469-1515.—Early printers.—Aldine press. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1469-1515.

1486.—First authors' copyright laws. See COPYRIGHT: 1450-1793.

1489.—Acquisition of Cyprus. See CYPRUS: 1489-1570.

1492-1496.—Invasion of Italy by Charles VIII of France.—Alliance with Naples, Milan, Spain, the emperor and the pope.—Expulsion of the French. See ITALY: 1492-1494; 1494-1496.

1494-1503.—Rising power and spreading dominion of the republic.—Fears and jealousies excited.—"The disturbances which had taken place in Italy since Charles VIII's advent there [see ITALY: 1494-1496; 1499-1500; 1501-1504], came very opportunely for their [the Venetians'] plans and policy. On every available occasion the Venetians spread their power all round about them. In the struggle between Charles and Ferrantino [or Ferdinand, of Naples] they acquired five fine cities in Apulia, excellently situated for their requirements, which they peopled by the reception of fugitive Jews from Spain. Moreover, in the kingdom of Naples, one party had declared for them. . . . Tarento raised their standard. During the Florentine disorders they were within an ace of becoming masters of Pisa. In the Milanese feuds they acquired Cremona and Ghiara d'Adda. Their power was all the more terrible, as they had never been known to lose again anything which they had once gotten. No one doubted that their aim was the complete sovereignty over the whole of Italy. Their historians always talked as if Venice was the ancient Rome once more. . . . The Turkish war, which had kept them awhile employed, now at an end, they next tried their fortune in Romagna, and endeavoured, availing themselves of the quarrels between the returning nobles and Cesar [Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI], to become, if not the sole, at all events the most powerful, vassals of the papal chair. . . . The Venetians prepared to espouse the cause of those whom Cesar had suppressed. The cities reflected how genuine and substantial that peace was that the lion of Venice spread over all its dependencies. Having appeared in this country at the end of October, 1503, and having first promised the Malatesti other possessions in their own country, they took Rimini, with the concurrence of the prince and citizens. Without ado they attacked Faenza. . . . They continued their conquests, and, in the territories of Imola, Cesena, and Forli, took stronghold after stronghold. . . . Then it was that the first minister of France stated his belief that, 'had they only Romagna, they would forthwith attack Florence, on account of a debt of 180,000 guilders owing them.' If they were to make an inroad into Tuscany, Pisa would fall immediately on their arrival. Their object in calling the French into the Milanese territory was, that they considered them more fitted to make a conquest than to keep it; and, in the year 1504, they were negotiating how it were possible to wrest Milan again from them. Could they only succeed in this, nothing in Italy would be able longer to withstand them.

'They wanted,' as Macchiavelli said, 'to make the Pope their chaplain.' But they met with the staunchest resistance in Julius [the pope, Julius II.], as in him they could discover no weak point to attack. As pointedly as he could express himself, he declared to them, on the 9th November, 1503, that 'though hitherto their friend, he would now do his utmost against them, and would besides incite all the princes of Christendom against them.'—L. von Ranke, *History of the Latin and Teutonic nations*, bk. 2, ch. 3.

1498-1502.—War with the Turks. See TURKEY: 1498-1502.

1499-1500.—Alliance with France against the duke of Milan.—French conquest of the duchy.—Acquisition of Cremona. See ITALY: 1499-1500.

15th-17th centuries.—Decline of Venetian commerce and its causes.—'Commerce was for a long time free at Venice; and the republic only began to decline when its government had caused the source of its prosperity to be exhausted by monopoly. At first all the young patricians were subjected to the most severe ordeals of a commercial training. They were often sent as novices on board state-vessels to try fortune with a light venture, so much did it enter into the views of the administration to direct all citizens toward industrial occupations! The only reproach that can be brought against the Venetians, is the effort to exclude foreigners from all competition with them. Although commercial jealousy had not yet erected prohibitions into a system, and the ports of the republic were open to all the merchandise of the world, yet the Venetians only permitted its transportation in their own ships; and they reigned as absolute masters over all the Mediterranean. War had given them security from the Pisans, the Sicilians and the Genoese. Spain, long occupied by the Moors, gave them little occasion of offence. France disdained commerce; England had not yet begun to think of it; the republic of Holland was not in existence. Under cover of the right of sovereignty on the gulf, which she had arrogated to herself, Venice reserved the almost exclusive right to navigate. Armed flotillas guarded the mouths of all her rivers, and allowed no barque to enter or depart without being vigorously examined. . . . The Venetians had levelled all obstacles, but for themselves alone, and to the exclusion of other nations. Their legislation was very strict in respect to foreigners, in the matter of commerce. . . . As national manufactures acquired importance, the government departed from the liberal policy it had hitherto pursued, and the manufacturers obtained an absolute prohibition of such foreign merchandise as they produced. In vain, in the 17th century, did declining commerce urge the reëstablishment of former liberties and the freedom of the port: the attempt was made for a brief moment, but the spirit of restriction won the day, and the prohibitory régime early prepared the way for the death of the republic. The people of Italy, however, pardoned the Venetians for their commercial intolerance, because of the moderate price at which they delivered all commodities. The Jews, Armenians, Greeks and Germans flocked to Venice and engaged with safety in speculations, which were always advantageous, because of the security which the credit institutions gave and the recognized probity of the merchants. But soon Venice saw numerous manufactures spring up in Europe rivaling her own, and her commerce encountered most formidable competition in that of the Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish and English. The

discovery of the Cape of Good Hope [see PORTUGAL: 1463-1498] took away from her the monopoly of the spices of the Indies. The taking of Constantinople, by Mahomet II, had already deprived her of the magnificent privileges which her subjects enjoyed in that rich capital of the Orient. But the discovery of America and the vigorous reprisals of Charles V, who, at the commencement of his reign, in 1517, doubled the customs-duties which the Venetians paid in his states, completed the ruin of that fortunate monopoly which had made all Europe tributary. Charles V raised the import and export duties on all Venetian merchandise to twenty per cent; and this tariff, which would to-day appear moderate, sufficed them to prevent the Venetians from entering Spanish ports. Such was the origin of the exclusive system, the fatal invention which the republic of Venice was so cruelly to expiate. So long as she sought fortune only in the free competition of the talent and capital of her own citizens, she increased from age to age and became for a moment the arbiter of Europe; but as soon as she wished to rule the markets by the tyranny of monopoly, she saw a league formed against her commerce, formidable for a very different reason from that of Cambrai."—J. A. Blanqui, *History of political economy in Europe*, ch. 20.—See also COMMERCE: Medieval: 11th-16th centuries.

1501.—Hostile schemes of the emperor and the king of France. See ITALY: 1501-1504.

1508-1509.—League of Cambrai.—Republic despoiled of her continental provinces.—'The craving appetite of Louis XII. . . sharpened by the loss of Naples, sought to indemnify itself by more ample acquisitions in the north. As far back as 1504 [see ITALY: 1504-1506], he had arranged a plan with the emperor for the partition of the continental possessions of Venice. . . . The scheme is said to have been communicated to Ferdinand [of Aragon] in the royal interview at Savona [1507]. No immediate action followed, and it seems probable that the latter monarch, with his usual circumspection, reserved his decision until he should be more clearly satisfied of the advantages to himself. At length the projected partition was definitely settled by the celebrated treaty of Cambrai, December 10th, 1508, between Louis XII. and the emperor Maximilian, in which the Pope, King Ferdinand, and all princes who had any claims for spoiliations by the Venetians, were invited to take part. The share of the spoil assigned to the Catholic monarch [Ferdinand] was the five Neapolitan cities, Trani, Brindisi, Gallipoli, Pulignano, and Otranto, pledged to Venice for considerable sums advanced by her during the late war. The Spanish court, and, not long after, Julius II. ratified the treaty, although it was in direct contravention of the avowed purpose of the pontiff, to chase the 'barbarians' from Italy. It was his bold policy, however, to make use of them first for the aggrandisement of the church, and then to trust to his augmented strength and more favorable opportunities for eradicating them altogether. Never was there a project more destitute of principle or sound policy. There was not one of the contracting parties who was not at that very time in close alliance with the state, the dismemberment of which he was plotting. As a matter of policy, it went to break down the principal barrier on which each of these powers could rely for keeping in check the overweening ambition of its neighbors, and maintaining the balance of Italy. The alarm of Venice was quieted for a time by assur-

ances from the courts of France and Spain that the league was directed solely against the Turks, accompanied by the most hypocritical professions of good will, and amicable offers to the republic. The preamble of the treaty declares that, it being the intention of the allies to support the pope in a crusade against the infidel, they first proposed to recover from Venice the territories of which she had despoiled the church and other powers, to the manifest hindrance of these pious designs. . . . The true reasons for the confederacy are to be found in a speech delivered at the German diet, some time after, by the French minister Hélian. 'We,' he remarks, after enumerating various enormities of the republic, 'wear no fine purple; feast from no sumptuous services of plate; have no coffers overflowing with gold. We are barbarians. Surely,' he continues in another place, 'if it is derogatory to princes to act the part of merchants, it is unbecoming in merchants to assume the state of princes.' This, then, was the true key of conspiracy against Venice; envy of her superior wealth and magnificence, hatred engendered by her too arrogant bearing, and lastly the evil eye with which kings naturally regard the movements of an active, aspiring republic. To secure the co-operation of Florence, the kings of France and Spain agreed to withdraw their protection from Pisa, for a stipulated sum of money. [See PISA: 1494-1509.] There is nothing in the whole history of the merchant princes of Venice so mercenary and base as this bartering away for gold the independence for which this little republic had been so nobly contending for more than 14 years. Early in April, 1509, Louis XII. crossed the Alps at the head of a force which bore down all opposition. City and castle fell before him, and his demeanor to the vanquished, over whom he had no rights beyond the ordinary ones of war, was that of an incensed master taking vengeance on his rebellious vassals. In revenge for his detention before Peschiera, he hung the Venetian governor and his son from the battlements. This was an outrage on the laws of chivalry, which, however hard they bore on the peasant, respected those of high degree. . . . On the 14th of May, 1509, was fought the bloody battle of Agnadel, which broke the power of Venice and at once decided the fate of the war. Ferdinand had contributed nothing to these operations, except by his diversion on the side of Naples, where he possessed himself without difficulty of the cities allotted to his share. They were the cheapest, and, if not the most valuable, were the most permanent acquisitions of the war, being reincorporated in the monarchy of Naples. Then followed the memorable decree by which Venice released her continental provinces from their allegiance, authorizing them to provide in any way they could for their safety; a measure which, whether originating in panic or policy, was perfectly consonant with the latter. The confederates, who had remained united during the chase, soon quarrelled over the division of the spoil. Ancient jealousies revived. The republic, with cool and consummate policy, availed herself of this state of feeling. Pope Julius, who had gained all that he had proposed, and was satisfied with the humiliation of Venice, now felt all his former antipathies and distrust of the French return in full force. The rising flame was diligently fanned by the artful emissaries of the republic, who at length effected a reconciliation on her behalf with the haughty pontiff. The latter . . . planned a new coalition for the expulsion

of the French, calling on the other allies to take part in it."—W. H. Prescott, *History of the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella*, v. 3, pt. 2, ch. 22.

ALSO IN: T. A. Trollope, *History of the commonwealth of Florence*, v. 4, bk. 9, ch. 10.—*City in the sea*, ch. 21.—M. Creighton, *History of the papacy during the period of the Reformation*, bk. 5, ch. 14.—L. von Ranke, *History of the Latin and Teutonic nations from 1494 to 1514*, bk. 2, ch. 3.—H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 17-18.

1510-1513.—Breaking of the League of Cambrai.—Holy League of Pope Julius with Venice, Ferdinand, Maximilian, and Henry VIII against France.—French expelled from Italy.—Republic recovers its domain. See ITALY: 1510-1513.

1517.—Peace with the Emperor Maximilian.—Recovery of Verona. See FRANCE: 1516-1517.

1526.—Holy League against Emperor Charles V. See ITALY: 1523-1527.

1527.—Fresh alliance with France and England against the emperor. See ITALY: 1527-1529.

1540.—Founding of the Jesuit order. See JESUITS: 1540-1556.

1556.—Extent of territory. See EUROPE: Map of Central Europe: 1556.

1570-1571.—Holy League with Spain and the pope against the Turks.—Great battle and victory of Lepanto. See TURKEY: 1566-1571.


1572.—Withdrawal from the Holy League.—Separate peace with the Turks. See TURKEY: 1572-1573.

16th century.—Art of the Renaissance.—"It was a fact of the greatest importance for the development of the fine arts in Italy that painting in Venice reached maturity later than in Florence. Owing to this circumstance one chief aspect of the Renaissance, its material magnificence and freedom, received consummate treatment at the hands of Titian, Tintoretto, and Veronese. To idealise the sensualities of the external universe, to achieve for colour what the Florentines had done for form, to invest the worldly grandeur of human life at one of its most gorgeous epochs with the dignity of the highest art, was what these great artists were called on to accomplish. Their task could not have been so worthily performed in the fifteenth century as in the sixteenth, if the development of the æsthetic sense had been more premature among the Venetians. Venice was precisely fitted for the part her painters had to play. Free, isolated, wealthy, powerful; famous throughout Europe for the pomp of her state equipage, and for the immorality of her private manners; ruled by a prudent aristocracy, who spent vast wealth on public shows and on the maintenance of a more than imperial civic majesty: Venice with her pavement of liquid chrysopease, with her palaces of porphyry and marble, her frescoed façades, her quays and squares aglow with the costumes of the Levant, her lagoons afloat with the galleys of all nations, her churches floored with mosaics, her silvery domes and ceilings glittering with sculpture bathed in molten gold: Venice luxurious in the light and colour of a vaporous atmosphere, where sea-mists rose into the mounded summer clouds; arched over by the broad expanse of sky, bounded only by the horizon of waves and plain and distant mountain ranges, and reflected in all its many hues of sunrise and sunset upon the glassy surface of smooth waters: Venice asleep like a miracle of opal or of pearl upon the bosom of an undulating lake:—here and here only on the face of the whole globe was the unique city wherein the pride of life might combine with the lustre of the physical uni-

verse to create and stimulate in the artist a sense of all that was most sumptuous in the pageant of the world of sense. . . . The Venetians had no green fields and trees, no garden borders, no blossoming orchards, to teach them the tender suggestiveness, the quaint poetry of isolated or contrasted tints. Their meadows were the fruitless furrows of the Adriatic, hued like a peacock's neck; they called the pearl-shells of their Lido flowers, *for di mare*. Nothing distracted their attention from the glories of morning and of evening presented to them by their sea and sky. It was in consequence of this that the Venetians conceived colour heroically, not as a matter of missal-margins or of subordinate decoration, but as a motive worthy in itself of sublime treatment. In like manner, hedged in by no liminary hills, contracted by no city walls, stifled by no narrow streets, but open to the liberal airs of heaven and ocean, the Venetians understood space and imagined pictures almost boundless in their immensity. Light, colour, air, space: those are the elemental conditions of Venetian art; of those the painters weaved their ideal world for beautiful and proud humanity. . . . In order to understand the destiny of Venice in art, it is not enough to concentrate attention on the peculiarities of her physical environment. Potent as these were in the creation of her style, the political and social conditions of the Republic require also to be taken into account. Among Italian cities Venice was unique. She alone was tranquil in her empire, unimpeded in her constitutional development, independent of Church interference, undisturbed by the cross purposes and intrigues of the despots, inhabited by merchants who were princes, and by a free-born people who had never seen war at their gates. The serenity of undisturbed security, the luxury of wealth amassed abroad and liberally spent at home, gave a physiognomy of ease and proud self-confidence to all her edifices. The grim and anxious struggles of the Middle Ages left no mark on Venice. How different was this town from Florence, every inch of whose domain could tell of civic warfare. . . . It is not an insignificant, though a slight, detail, that the predominant colour of Florence is brown, while the predominant colour of Venice is that of mother-of-pearl, concealing within its general whiteness every tint that can be placed upon the palette of a painter. The conditions of Florence stimulated mental energy and turned the forces of the soul inwards. Those of Venice inclined the individual to accept life as he found it. Instead of exciting him to think, they disposed him to enjoy, or to acquire by industry the means of manifold enjoyment. To represent an art the intellectual strivings of the Renaissance was the task of Florence and her sons; to create a monument of Renaissance magnificence was the task of Venice."—J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy: Fine arts, ch. 7*.—See also PAINTING: Italian: High Renaissance; ARCHITECTURE: Renaissance: Italy.

1606-1607.—Republic under the guidance of Fra Paolo Sarpi.—Conflict with the pope.—Interdict which had no terrors.—"In the Constitution of the Republic at this time [1606] there were three permanent officials called Counsellors of Law, or State Counsellors, whose duties were to instruct the Doge and Senate on the legal bearings of any question in dispute in which the Republic was involved. But at the beginning of this year, because of the ecclesiastical element that frequently appeared in these quarrels (for they were mostly between the State and the Pope [Paul V]) the Senate resolved to create a new office,

namely, that of 'Teologo-Consulatore' or Theological Counsellor. In looking about for one to fill this office the choice of the Doge and Senate unanimously fell upon Fra Paolo Sarpi. . . . I have called Fra Paolo Sarpi the greatest of the Venetians. . . . Foreigners who came to Venice sought above all things to see him as 'the greatest genius of his age.' . . . On the 28th of January, 1606, he entered upon his public duties." From that time until his death, seventeen years later, he not only held the office of Theological Counsellor, but the duties of the three Counsellors of Law were gradually transferred to him, as those offices were vacated, in succession, by death. "The history of the Republic during these seventeen years was one unbroken record of great intellectual and moral victories. . . . Never was there in any land, by any Government, a servant more honoured and more beloved. The solicitude of the Doge, of the dreaded Council of Ten, of the Senate, of the whole people, for the safety and well-being of their Consulatore, was like that of a mother for



FRA PAOLO SARPI

her only child. 'Fate largo a Fra Paolo'—'Make room for Fra Paolo,' was often heard as he passed along the crowded Merceria. Fra Paolo loved Venice with an undying devotion, and Venice loved him with a romantic and tender affection. . . . Strained relations . . . [had] existed between Venice and the Vatican during the last years of Clement VIII's Pontificate. His seizure of the Duchy of Ferrara, his conduct in the matter of the Patriarch Zane's appointment, his attempt to cripple the book-trade of Venice by means of the Index Expurgatorius, all led to serious disputes, in every one of which he got the worst of it. Pope Paul V., who was then Cardinal Borghese, chafed at what he considered Clement's pusillanimity. Talking of these matters to the Venetian ambassador at Rome, Leonardo Donato, he once said, 'If I were Pope, I would place Venice under an interdict and excommunication'; 'And if I were Doge,' was the reply, 'I would trample your interdict and excommunication under foot.' Curiously enough, both were called upon to fill these offices, and both proved as good as their words. . . . Paul V. . . . found several excuses for quarrel. The Patriarch, Matteo Zane—he whose appointment had been a

matter of dispute with Clement VIII.—died, and the Senate appointed Francesco Vendramin as his successor. Pope Paul claimed the right of presentation, and demanded that he should be sent to Rome for examination and approval. The Senate replied by ordering his investiture, and forbidding him to leave Venice. Again, money had to be raised in Brescia for the restoration of the ramparts, and the Senate imposed a tax on all the citizens—laymen and ecclesiastics alike. Pope Paul V. claimed exemption for the latter, as being his subjects. The Senate refused to listen to him. . . . Two ecclesiastical property laws were in force throughout the Republic; by one the Church was prohibited from building any new monasteries, convents, or churches without the consent of the Government under penalty of forfeiture; and by the other it was disqualified from retaining property which it might become possessed of by donation or by inheritance, but was bound to turn it into money. . . . Pope Paul V. . . . demanded the repeal of these property laws [as well as the release of certain imprisoned ecclesiastics] in October, 1605. . . . Early in December, the Pope, impatient to bring the quarrel to a head, threatened to place Venice under interdict and excommunication if it did not yield to his demands. . . . On the very day that Fra Paolo accepted . . . [his] office he informed the Senate that two courses of action were open to them. They could argue the case either *de jure* or *de facto*. First, *de jure*, that is, they could appeal against the judgment of the Pope to a Church Council. . . . Secondly, the Republic could adopt the *de facto* course; that is, it could rely on its own authority and strength. . . . The *de facto* course was . . . the one Fra Paolo recommended; adding very significantly, 'He who appeals to a Council admits that the righteousness of his cause may be questioned, whereas that of Venice is indisputable.' The Senate hailed the advice thus given, and instructed him to draw out a reply to the Pope's brief in accordance with it. . . . From the moment this reply was received a bitter controversy was set on foot. Renewed demands came from Rome, and renewed refusals were sent from Venice. . . . Meanwhile the eyes of all the Courts of Europe were directed to the great struggle. . . . On the 17th of April, 1606, the bull of interdict and excommunication was launched; twenty-four days being allowed Venice for repentance, with three more added of the Pope's gracious clemency. . . . The bull was a sweeping one. . . . No more masses were to be said. Baptism, marriage, and burial services were to cease. The churches were to be locked up, and the priests could withdraw from the devoted land. All social relationships were dissolved. Marriages were declared invalid, and all children born were illegitimate. Husbands could desert their wives, and children disobey their parents. Contracts of all kinds were declared null and void. Allegiance to the Government was at an end."—A. Robertson, *Fra Paolo Sarpi, ch. 5, and preface*.—"It was proposed in the college of Venice to enter a solemn protest, as had been done in earlier times; but this proposal was rejected, on the ground that the sentence of the pope was in itself null and void, and had not even a show of justice. In a short proclamation, occupying only a quarto page, Leonardo Donato made known to the clergy, the resolution of the republic to maintain the sovereign authority, 'which acknowledges no other superior in worldly things save God alone.' Her faithful clergy would of themselves perceive the nullity of the 'censures' issued against them, and would continue the dis-

charge of their functions, the cure of souls and the worship of God, without interruption. . . . Commanded by their two superiors—the pope and the republic—to give contradictory proofs of obedience, the Venetian clergy were now called on to decide to which of the two they would render that obedience. They did not hesitate; they obeyed the republic: not a copy of the brief was fixed up. The delay appointed by the pope expired; public worship was everywhere conducted as usual. As the secular clergy had decided, so did also the monastic orders. The only exception to this was presented by the orders newly instituted, and in which the principle of ecclesiastical restoration was more particularly represented; these were the Jesuits, Theatines, and Capuchins. The Jesuits . . . departed from the city, and took shelter in the papal dominions. Their example influenced the other two orders. A middle course was proposed by the Theatines, but the Venetians did not think it advisable; they would suffer no division in their land, and demanded either obedience or departure. The deserted churches were easily provided with other priests, and care was taken that none should perceive a deficiency. . . . It is manifest that the result was a complete schism. . . . Paul V. thought at times of having recourse to arms. . . . Legates were despatched, and troops fitted out; but in effect they dared not venture to attempt force. There would have been cause to apprehend that Venice would call the Protestants to her aid, and thus throw all Italy, nay the Catholic world at large, into the most perilous commotions. They must again betake themselves, as on former occasions, to political measures, for the adjustment of these questions touching the rights of the Church. . . . I have neither inclination nor means for a detailed account of these negotiations through the whole course of the proceedings. . . . The first difficulty was presented by the pope, who insisted, before all things, that the Venetian laws, which had given him so much offence, should be repealed; and he made the suspension of his ecclesiastical censures to depend on their repeal. But the Venetians, also, on their part, with a certain republican self-complacency, were accustomed to declare their laws sacred and inviolable. When the papal demand was brought under discussion in January, 1607, although the college wavered, yet at last it was decidedly rejected in the senate. The French, who had given their word to the pope, succeeded in bringing the question forward once more in March, when of the four opponents in the college, one at least withdrew his objections. After the arguments on both sides had again been fully stated in the senate, there was still, it is true, no formal or express repeal of the laws, but a decision was adopted to the effect that 'the republic would conduct itself with its accustomed piety.' However obscure these words appear, the ambassador and the pope thought they discovered in them the fulfillment of their wishes. The pope then suspended his censures."—L. von Ranke, *History of the popes, v. 2, bk 6, sect. 12*.—"The moral victory remained with Venice. She did not recall her laws as to taxation of the clergy and the foundation of new churches and monasteries [nor permit the Jesuits to return, until many years later]. . . . The hero of the whole episode, Fra Paolo Sarpi, continued to live quietly in his convent of the Servites at S. Fosca. The Government received warning from Rome that danger was threatening. In its turn it cautioned Fra Paolo. But he paid little or no heed." On Oct. 25, 1607, he was attacked by three assassins, who inflicted serious

wounds upon him and left him for dead. By great care, however, Fra Paolo's life was saved, and prolonged until 1623. The would-be assassins escaped into the Papal States, where "they found not only shelter but a welcome."—H. F. Brown, *Venice*, ch. 20.—See also, PAPACY: 1605-1700.

ALSO IN: J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy: Catholic reaction*, v. 2, ch. 10.—T. A. Trollope, *Paul the pope and Paul the friar*.

1620-1626.—Valteline War.—Alliance with France and Savoy against the Austro-Spanish power. See FRANCE: 1624-1626.

1629-1631.—League with France against Spain and the emperor.—Mantuan War. See ITALY: 1627-1631.

1645-1669.—War of Candia with the Turks.—Loss of Crete. See TURKEY: 1645-1669.

1684-1696.—War of the Holy League against the Turks.—Siege and capture of Athens.—Conquest of the Morea and parts of Dalmatia and Albania. See TURKEY: 1684-1696; ATHENS: 1687-1688.

1699.—Peace of Carlowitz with the Sultan.—Turkish cession of part of the Morea and most of Dalmatia. See HUNGARY: 1683-1699.

1714-1718.—War with the Turks.—Morea lost.—Defense of Corfu.—Peace of Passarowitz. See TURKEY: 1714-1718.

1715.—Extent of territory. See EUROPE: Map of Central Europe: 1715.

1718-1797.—Rule in Dalmatia. See DALMATIA: 1787-1797.

1767.—Expulsion of Jesuits. See JESUITS: 1761-1769.

1796.—Bonaparte's schemes for the destruction of the republic.—Picking of the quarrel. See FRANCE: 1796 (April-October).

1797.—Ignominious overthrow of the republic by Napoleon. See FRANCE: 1796-1797 (October-April); 1797 (April-May).

1797 (October).—City and territories given over to Austria by Treaty of Campo-Formio. See FRANCE: 1797 (May-October).

1805.—Territories ceded by Austria to the kingdom of Italy. See GERMANY: 1805-1806.

1814.—Transfer of Venetian states to Austria.—Formation of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. See FRANCE: 1814 (April-June); VIENNA, CONGRESS OF; AUSTRIA: 1815-1846; ITALY: 1814-1815.

1848-1849.—Insurrection.—Expulsion of Austrians.—Provisional government under Daniel Manin.—Renewed subjugation. See ITALY: 1848-1849.

1859.—Grievous disappointment in Austro-Italian War. See ITALY: 1856-1859; 1859-1861.

1866.—Relinquishment by Austria.—Annexation to the kingdom of Italy. See ITALY: 1862-1866; GERMANY: 1866.

1902.—Fall of Campanile of St. Mark's.—On the morning of July 14, 1902, the Campanile or bell-tower of St. Mark's cathedral collapsed. An attentive architect had been calling attention for several years to signs of danger in its walls, but nothing had been done to avert the destruction of the most interesting monument of antiquity in the city. The building of the tower was begun in the year 888, and underwent a reconstruction in 1320. Its height was 322 feet.

1903-1912.—Rebuilding of campanile of St. Mark's.—Plans for the rebuilding of the old campanile were immediately laid, the new tower to be a replica of the original so far as possible. "On S. Mark's Day (April 25), 1903, the first stone

was laid. On S. Mark's Day, 1912, the new campanile was declared complete in every part and blessed in the presence of representatives of all Italy, while 2479 pigeons, brought hither for the purpose, carried the tidings to every corner of the country."—E. C. Lucas, *Wanderer in Venice*, p. 41.

1914-1922.—Modern city.—Effect of World War.—Economic, artistic and political events.—"Venice today is only 'one of the cities of Italy.' Her political entity is passed, but the outward expression of days of brilliant successes, her sumptuous living, her artistic pomp are still in existence. . . . [During the War] probably the most deplorable ruin was wrought by the bombardment of the Church of Santa Maria Formosa which was reduced to ruins by an Austrian air raid, August, 1916."—C. V. Sargent, *Venice in war time (Overland Monthly, February, 1918)*.—See also WORLD WAR: 1918: VIII. Aviation.—Many works of art were transported to places of safety and after the armistice restored to their original locations. The industrial arts for which the city was formerly famous have been revived of late years. The thirteenth biennial international exhibition of art was held April-October, 1922, and was reported a success commercially as well artistically. On October 8, 1922, a conference took place in Venice between Dr. Benès of Czecho Slovakia and Dr. Carlo Schanzer, the Italian foreign minister on the subject of economic coöperation with Austria.

See also COLONIZATION: Medieval Venetian; TAXATION: Growth from earliest times.

ALSO IN: J. Ruskin, *St. Mark's rest*.—Idem, *Stones of Venice*.—W. D. Howells, *Venetian life*.—C. E. Yriarte, *Venice*.—S. A. Brooks, *Sea-charm of Venice*.—F. H. Smith, *Gondola days*.—T. Okey, *Story of Venice*.—Mrs. M. O. Oliphant, *Makers of Venice*.—J. D. Richardson, *Doges of Venice*.—W. R. Thayer, *Short history of Venice*.—J. Pennell, *Venice, the city of the sea*.

VENICE OF THE EAST. See OSAKA.

VENICONII, Celtic tribe. See IRELAND: Tribes of early Celtic inhabitants.

VENIZELOS, Eleutherios (1864-), Greek statesman. Leader in the Cretan uprising of 1897 which secured the union of Crete with Greece (see CRETE: 1800-1913); called to Athens in the constitutional crisis, 1910; prime minister of Greece, 1910-1915; 1917-1920; left Greece, 1920; returned to power, January, 1924.

Appointed premier.—Constitutional and internal reforms. See GREECE: 1910; 1911.

Chief influence in the formation of the Balkan League. See GREECE: 1912; BALKAN STATES: 1912: Balkan League.

Policy in Second Balkan War. See GREECE: 1913: Second Balkan War.

Attitude toward World War.—Desire to join the Allies.—Personality. See BALKAN STATES: 1914-1916; GREECE: 1914; WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 71, ix.

Disagreement with King Constantine over Greek attitude.—Resignation and reelection.—Second resignation due to question of entering war. See GREECE: 1915 (January-February); (February-June); (June-November); WORLD WAR: 1915: V. Balkans: c, 1; c, 2.

Establishment of "independent cabinet" at Salonika. See GREECE: 1916: Independent cabinet of Venizelos; WORLD WAR: 1916: V. Balkan theater: d, 1; d, 2.

Return to power after the dethronement of Constantine.—Declaration of war.—"Tyranny" of the Venizelist régime. See GREECE: 1917; 1917-

1918; WORLD WAR: 1917: V. Balkan theater: a, 1; a, 2.

At Paris conference.—Negotiation of the Treaties of Neuilly and Sèvres. See GREECE: 1918-1920; VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Conditions of peace.

Defeat and resignation on the return of King Constantine. See GREECE: 1920-1921.

At Near East conference. See NEAR EAST, OR LAUSANNE, CONFERENCE (1922-1923).

VENLOO, or Venlo, town in the province of Limberg, Netherlands, on the Meuse. It was taken by the duke of Parma, 1586, and by Prince Henry of Orange in 1631. The allies under Marlborough took it from the French in 1702. Restored to the Netherlands in 1745, it was incorporated in France, 1801, and was again restored to the Netherlands in 1839. See NETHERLANDS: 1585-1586; 1625-1647; 1701-1704.

VENNER'S INSURRECTION (1661). See FIFTH MONARCHY MEN.

VENNONES, early tribe of the Alps. See RHETIA.

VENTA, three important cities in Roman Britain bore the name of Venta; one occupying the site of modern Winchester (see WINCHESTER), a second standing near Norwich, the third at Caerwent in Wales. They were distinguished, respectively, as Venta Belgarum, Venta Icenorum and Venta Silurum.—Based on T. Wright, *Celt, Roman and Saxon*.

VENTÔSE, sixth month of the French revolutionary calendar. See CHRONOLOGY: French revolutionary era, etc.

VENUE, Law of. See COMMON LAW: 1383-1403.

VENUS, or Aphrodite, Roman and Greek names respectively for the goddess of love and beauty in ancient mythology. See MYTHOLOGY: Grecian.

VERA CRUZ, chief seaport of Mexico and principal city of the state of Vera Cruz. (See MEXICO: Map.) The population in 1921 numbered 48,633. Vera Cruz and its harbor were pillaged by buccaners in 1653 and again in 1712, which led to the strengthening and completion on an island reef, about half a mile from shore, of the famous fort or Castle of San Juan de Ulúa, or Ulloa, begun in 1582. It was from Vera Cruz that Benito Juárez in 1859 promulgated his laws instituting a free church in a free state. Once its unhealthy location, enervating climate, and the prevalence of yellow fever, caused Vera Cruz to be called the city of the dead; but the institution of harbor improvements, water and sewage systems, paving, etc., has long since made Vera Cruz fairly inhabitable.

1519.—Founded by Cortés. See MEXICO: 1519 (June-October).

1839.—Attacked by the French. See MEXICO: 1828-1844.

1847.—Bombardment and capture by Americans under General Scott. See MEXICO: 1847 (March-September).

1914 (April).—Occupation by American forces under General Funston. See MEXICO: 1913-1914; 1914-1915; U.S.A.: 1914 (April): Occupation of Vera Cruz; A B C CONFERENCE.

VERAGUA, region in the western part of Panama, near the Gulf of Chiriqui. It was discovered and named by Columbus who attempted to found a settlement here in 1502. Another attempt at colonization was made by Diego de Nicuesa in 1509, but failed. See AMERICA: 1498-1505; 1509-1511; also TIERRA FIRME.

VERCELLI, city and archiepiscopal see of Pied-

mont, Italy, in the province of Novara, forty-four miles southwest of Milan. It was besieged and captured by the Spaniards in 1638, and restored to Savoy in 1659. See ITALY: 1635-1659; 1701-1713.

VERCINGETORIX (d. about 45 B. C.), leader of Gallic tribes who fought against Cæsar, 52 B. C. Was captured at the fall of Alesia, 52 B. C.; taken to Rome and exhibited at Cæsar's triumph, 46 B. C.; beheaded about 45 B. C. See GAUL: B. C. 58-51.

VERDE ISLANDS. See CAPE VERDE, OR VERDE, ISLANDS.

VERDEN, town in the province of Hanover, Prussia, twenty-one miles southeast of Bremen on the Aller. It became a Swedish duchy at the peace of Westphalia, 1648, and in 1719 was joined with Hanover. See GERMANY: 1648: Peace of Westphalia.

VERDI, Giuseppe (1813-1901), Italian composer. Studied with Provesi, later with Lavigna; produced "Rigoletto" at Venice, 1851, "Il Trovatore" at Rome, 1853; "Traviata" at Venice, 1853, and "Aida" at Cairo, 1871; the "Manzoni Requiem" was produced at St. Mark's, Milan, 1874, "Otello" in 1887, and "Falstaff" in 1893; the last named is considered his finest work and the greatest light opera except Wagner's "Meistersinger."—See also MUSIC: Modern: 1842-1921: Modern Italian school.

VERDUN, garrison town and fortress in eastern France, capital of an arrondissement in the department of Meuse. It is on the main line of the eastern railway between Paris and Metz. Following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, in which it was bombarded three different times before it finally capitulated, the fortification was redesigned and rebuilt with forts established on all the surrounding heights on which the German besiegers had set their batteries so that it comprised sixteen large forts and twenty smaller ones with additional field works, the circumference of all measuring about thirty miles and the greatest diameter of the ring about nine miles. Verdun (Roman Verodunum) was a town of some importance at the time of the Roman conquest and was included in Belgica Prima. The bishopric dates back to the third century. It was destroyed by the barbarian invaders, recovering only toward the end of the fifth century. In 502 the town was seized by Clovis, and after the time of Charlemagne it belonged to the kingdom of Austrasia. The Treaty of Verdun, signed in 843, by the grandsons of Charlemagne, partitioned the empire. (See VERDUN, TREATY OF.) Verdun at first was situated in the Lotharingian kingdom, extending from the North sea to and including Italy, but was soon incorporated in the kingdom of Louis the German. In the confusion of the feudal anarchy, however, it shared the fate of Upper Lorraine, being sometimes attached to France and again to Germany. It was finally conquered by Germany and came under the rule of bishops. Verdun with Toul and Metz then formed the territory of the Trois Evêchés. In the eleventh century Verdun became a free imperial city and its burghers began a struggle with their bishops for rights that were not finally secured until the following century.

1552-1559.—Possession taken by France. See FRANCE: 1547-1559.

1648.—Ceded to France in the Peace of Westphalia. See GERMANY: 1648: Peace of Westphalia; WESTPHALIA, PEACE OF (1648).

c. 1914-1918.—Region of fighting.—Great German drive and French counter offensive. See WORLD WAR: 1916: I. Military situation: c; d, 3; 1916: II. Western front: b; b, 5; b, 6; b, 11; b, 19;

1917: II. Western front: f; 1918: II. Western front: i.

VERDUN, Treaty of (843). The contest and civil war which arose between the three grandsons of Charlemagne resulted in a treaty of partition, lrought about in 843, which forever dissolved the great Frank empire of Clovis, and of the Pepins and Carls who finished what he began. "A commission of 300 members was appointed to distribute itself over the surface of the empire, and by an examination of the wealth of each region, and the wishes of its people, acquire a knowledge of the best means of making an equitable division. The next year the commissioners reported the result of their researches to the three kings, assembled at Verdun, and a treaty of separation was drawn up and executed, which gave Gaul, from the Meuse and Saône as far as the Pyrenees, to Karl; which gave Germany, beyond the Rhine, to Ludwig the Germanic; and which secured to Lothar Italy, with a broad strip on the Rhine, between the dominions of Karl and Ludwig, under the names of Lotharingia or Lorraine. This was the first great treaty of modern Europe; it began a political division which lasted for many centuries; the great empire of Karl was formally dismembered by it, and the pieces of it scattered among his degenerate descendants."—P. Godwin, *History of France: Ancient Gaul*, ch. 18.—"The treaty of Verdun, in 843, abrogated the sovereignty that had been attached to the eldest brother and to the imperial name in former partitions; each held his respective kingdom as an independent right. This is the epoch of a final separation between the French and German members of the empire. Its millenary was celebrated by some of the latter nation in 1843."—H. Hallam, *The Middle Ages*, v. 1, ch. 1, pt. 1.—See also FRANKS: 814-962; FRANCE: 9th century; GERMAN: 814-843; 843-962; ALSACE-LORRAINE: 842-1477; BELGIUM: Ancient and medieval period.

VEREENIGING, Treaty of. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1901-1902.

VERENDRYE, Pierre Gautier de Varennes de la (1685-1749), French-Canadian explorer. Attempted to reach the Rocky mountains, 1738. See MONTANA: 1743; WYOMING: 1650-1807.

VERGA, Giovanni (1840-), Italian novelist. See ITALIAN LITERATURE: 1860-1914; 1860-1920.

VERGARA, Treaty of (1839). See SPAIN: 1833-1846.

VERGENNES, Charles Gravier, Comte de (1717-1787), French statesman. Ambassador to Constantinople, 1755; became foreign minister, 1774; supported Americans in the War of Independence. See FRANCE: 1775-1776; U.S.A.: 1776-1778; 1778 (February); 1778-1779: French alliance; 1782 (September-November).

VERGNIAUD, Pierre Victurnien (1753-1793), French orator and revolutionist. See FRANCE: 1792 (August).

VERGOBRET, chief magistrate of the tribe of Gauls known as the Ædui. "Cæsar terms this magistrate vergobretus, which Celtic scholars derive from the words 'ver-go-breith,' ('homme de jugement,' O'Brien, Thierry). He was elected by a council of priests and nobles, and had the power of life and death. But his office was only annual." Divitiacus, the Æduian friend of Cæsar and the Romans, had been the vergobret of his tribe.—C. Merivale, *History of the Romans*, ch. 6, footnote.

VERIA, Battle of (1912). See TURKEY: 1912-1913.

VERKHNE-UDINSK, Conference of (1920). See SIBERIA: 1920-1922.

VERLAINE, Paul (1844-1896), French poet. See FRENCH LITERATURE: 1840-1896.

VERMANDOIS, House of.—The noble House of Vermandois which played an important part in French history during the Middle Ages, boasted a descent from Charlemagne, through his best loved son, Pepin, king of Italy. "Peronne and the Abbey of Saint-Quentin composed the nucleus of their Principality; but, quietly and without contradiction, they had extended their sway over the heart of the kingdom of Soissons; and that ancient Soissons, and the rock of Lâon, and Rheims, the prerogative city of the Gauls, were all within the geographical ambit of their territory. In such enclaves as we have named, Vermandois did not possess direct authority. Lâon, for example, had a count and a bishop, and was a royal domain."—F. Palgrave, *History of Normandy and England*, bk. 1, v. 1, ch. 5, sect. 6.—See also CHAMPAGNE: Origin of the country.

VERMANDOVILLERS, village about eight miles southwest of Peronne, northeastern France. In 1916, during the Battle of the Somme, it was taken from the Germans by the French. See WORLD WAR: 1916: II. Western front: c, 3.

VERMIGLI, Pietro Martire (Peter Martyr) (1500-1562), Augustinian abbot at Spoleto and Naples. Invited to England by Cranmer; appointed regius professor of divinity at Oxford, 1548.

VERMONT, known as the "Green Mountain State," is a North Atlantic state of the United States belonging to the New England group. It is bounded on the north by the province of Quebec; on the east by the Connecticut river which separates it from New Hampshire; on the south by Massachusetts; and on the west by New York and Lake Champlain. The state has an area of 9,564 square miles, of which 440 square miles are water; and a population, 1920, of 352,428. When a government was established in 1777, the state took the name of "New Connecticut" which was changed a year later, to Vermont, thus, making the state the only one in the Union with a Latin name. The first governor and forty-five of her governors in all have been natives of Connecticut; twenty-one of her Supreme Court judges and eleven of her United States senators were born on Connecticut soil.—Based on P. E. Sargent, *Handbook of New England*, 1921: *Vermont*.

Resources.—Vermont is largely agricultural. In 1920, the state contained 29,075 farms with a total area of 4,235,811 acres, of which 1,691,595 acres were improved land. The chief crops are hay, cereals, apples and potatoes. The state produces 20,227,495 pounds of creamery butter per year, and makes almost all of the cheese produced in New England. The value of the live-stock, 1920, was about \$28,502,803. "The first record of maple-sugar making by white men in the State was in Bennington in 1763. Since then the making of maple-sugar has become a general industry in Vermont, and the amount produced is greater than that of any other state and is nearly one-third of the whole amount produced in the United States."—E. Conant and M. S. Stone, *Text book of the geography, history, constitution and civil government of Vermont*, p. 56.—The woodland area is estimated to be about 3,900 square miles, and the chief timber product is spruce although other kinds are cut for market. The principal mineral product is its building and monumental stone, including marble, granite, slate, and limestone. The marble quarries produce half of the marble of the United States.—See also U.S.A.: Economic map.

Mountain rule.—"Vermont is divided into two nearly equal parts by a range of hills known as the Green Mountains. These form a ridge running north and south; the length of the state and substantially along its central line. This physical condition has given rise to the political arrangement known as the 'Mountain Rule,' a practice rooted in tradition, unrecognized by law, but as binding in effect as the Constitution itself. By this custom, nominations and appointments to political office are so arranged that an equal opportunity of political patronage is extended to the people on both sides of the grand division. Vermont's most exhaustive historical writer, Hon. E. P. Walton, says, 'This rule has always been accepted from the admission of Vermont to the Union.' . . . This event occurred in 1791, and separates the subsequent history of the state from the preceding, or colonial period, which dates from the settlement of Vermont in 1724. . . . The first General Assembly of the young Republic, was held at Windsor, March 12, 1778, and from that time until March 4, 1791, thirteen years, when Vermont was admitted into the Union, its General Assembly, had met twenty-eight times, fourteen on the east side and fourteen upon the west side of the 'Green Mountains,' usually alternating between the sides of the state. During this time, the Governors were taken from the west side, and the Lieutenant Governors, from the east side. . . . The territory comprising the new Republic was practically a wilderness, a range of high mountains reaching its entire length, covered with heavy forests; its entire territory made up of mountain and valley. . . . A foreign country to the north was at war with the Republic of America; to the west a hostile province endeavoured to deprive them of the homes, they had bought so dearly. Every settler strove to defend not only his own home, but also the home of every other settler, and at all times, whether night or day his neighbor's necessity was his own. . . . Under these circumstances, the 'Mountain Rule' was established, stronger than law, and as long as the descendants of the 'Green Mountain Boys' inhabit Vermont, will prevail. . . . Since Vermont was admitted into the Union, or for the past one hundred and twenty-five years, fifty different men have been elected Governor of Vermont, twenty-eight from the west side, and twenty-two from the east side of the Mountain, and since 1861, or for the past fifty-four years, twenty-seven Governors have resided upon the west side and twenty-seven upon the east side of the Mountain, for the past ninety years, twenty-three of Vermont's Governors, have resided on the west side, and twenty on the east side of the mountains. From 1791 to 1826, thirty-four years, Vermont's Governors were elected from the west side and the Lieutenant Governors from the east side. Since 1826, of the forty-three lieutenant Governors elected, twenty-three have resided on the west, and twenty on the east side. Since biennial elections have been established, the positions of Governor and Lieutenant Governor, have alternated between the sides of the mountains. Since 1791, to the present time [1916], there have been twenty-eight different persons elected to the office of United States Senator, and one has been elected from the west side and the other from the east side, with but two exceptions. The first exception was upon the death of Senator William Upham of Montpelier, when former Senator Samuel S. Phelps of Middlebury was appointed to fill the vacancy. . . . The second exception was in 1853, when Lawrence Brainard of St. Albans, was elected by the people,


to fill Senator Upham's place, and was caused by the mix up of political parties."—F. W. Baldwin, *Vermont's "mountain rule"* (*New England Magazine*, May, 1916).

1609-1724.—Early exploration.—Attempted settlements.—"July 4th, 1609, three Frenchmen, Samuel de Champlain, governor of Quebec, and two associates, entered Lake Champlain from the north. They accompanied a war party of Canadian Indians in an expedition against the Iroquois of New York, and ascended the lake in canoes as far as Ticonderoga, where they met and defeated their foes. . . . He and his two associates were probably the first civilized men who visited any portion of the territory now included within the limits of Vermont. By virtue of this discovery of Vermont, most of the state was claimed for the king of France, and appears on the old maps as a portion of New France. During the early wars between the English and French and Indians, the state was repeatedly traversed by hostile parties, but it was more than a hundred years after its discovery before any permanent settlement was made within its territory. The first temporary settlement on its soil was made by the French, who built in 1665 a fort called St. Anne, at Sandy Point, Isle La Motte, which was a post of great importance in the early Indian wars. The outlines of this fort are still plainly visible. In 1690 an expedition was sent by the governor of New York to the mouth of Otter Creek, and a small stone fort was built at Chimney Point, in the present town of Addison, to aid in the operations against the Indians. This position was afterward abandoned, but a French settlement was made there by a few families from Canada in 1730, who built a blockhouse and windmill. The next year Fort Frederic, afterwards known as Crown Point, was erected on the opposite side of the lake. Though extensive grants were made along the shores of Lake Champlain by the successive governors of Canada, it does not appear that settlements were made by the French for the purpose of cultivating the soil, except in the vicinity of their forts, one at Windmill Point in the present town of Alburg. These were not extensive, and were abandoned on the approach of the English in 1759. . . . The first permanent occupation of any of the territory of Vermont by civilized men was in the present town of Brattleboro in 1724, when a blockhouse, called Fort Dummer, was built, and a settlement begun on the 'Dummer Meadows' near by. This fort was erected by the colony of Massachusetts, and was supposed to be within its territory. . . . Within the next few years settlements were begun at Westminster and other places in this part of the state, but owing to the hostilities of the Indians, they at first grew but slowly, and some were abandoned altogether."—S. W. Landon, *Brief outline of the history and civil government of Vermont*, pp. 5-7.

1749-1774.—New Hampshire grants and conflict with New York.—Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys.—"Among the causes of the controversies which existed between the colonies in early times, and continued down to the revolution, was the uncertainty of boundary lines as described in the old charters. . . . A difficulty of this kind arose between the colony of New York and those of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. By the grant of King Charles II. to his brother, the Duke of York, the tract of country called New York was bounded on the east by Connecticut River, thus conflicting with the express letter of the Massachusetts and Connecticut charters, which extended those colonies westward

to the South Sea, or Pacific Ocean. After a long controversy, kept up at times with a good deal of heat on both sides, the line of division between these colonies was fixed by mutual agreement at 20 miles east of Hudson's River, running nearly in a north and south direction. . . . The Massachusetts boundary was decided much later to be a continuation of the Connecticut line to the north, making the western limit of Massachusetts also 20 miles from the same river. . . . Meantime New Hampshire had never been brought into the controversy, because the lands to the westward of that province beyond Connecticut River had been neither settled nor surveyed. There was indeed a small settlement at Fort Dummer on the western margin of the River, which was under the protection of Massachusetts. . . . Such was the state of things when Benning Wentworth became governor of New Hampshire, with authority from the King to issue patents for unimproved lands within the limits of

retained till the opening of the revolution, when its present name of Vermont began to be adopted." —J. Sparks, *Life of Ethan Allen* (*Library of American Biography*, v. 1).—"Lieutenant Governor Colden, acting chief magistrate of New York in the absence of General Monckton, perceiving the necessity of asserting the claims of that province to the country westward of the Connecticut river, wrote an energetic letter to Governor Wentworth, protesting against his grants. He also sent a proclamation among the people, declaring the Connecticut river to be the boundary between New York and New Hampshire. But protests and proclamations were alike unheeded by the governor and the people until the year 1764, when the matter was laid before the King and council for adjudication. The decision was in favor of New York. Wentworth immediately bowed to supreme authority, and ceased issuing patents for lands westward of the Connecticut. The settlers, considering all



WEATHERSFIELD, VERMONT

Site of the first settlement made in 1765

his province. Application was made for grants to the west of Connecticut River, and even beyond the Green Mountains, and in 1740 he gave a patent for a township 6 miles square, near the north west angle of Massachusetts, to be so laid out, that its western limit should be 20 miles from the Hudson, and coincide with the boundary line of Connecticut and Massachusetts continued northward. This township was called Bennington. Although the governor and council of New York remonstrated against this grant, and claimed for that colony the whole territory north of Massachusetts as far eastward as Connecticut River, yet Governor Wentworth was not deterred by this remonstrance from issuing other patents, urging in his justification, that New Hampshire had a right to the same extension westward as Massachusetts and Connecticut." After the British conquest of Canada, 1760, "applications for new patents thronged daily upon Governor Wentworth, and within four years' time the whole number of townships granted by him, to the westward of Connecticut River, was 138. The territory including these townships was known by the name of the New Hampshire Grants, which it

questions in dispute to be thus finally disposed of, were contented, and went on hopefully in the improvement of their lands. Among these settlers in the Bennington township were members of the Allen family, in Connecticut, two of whom, Ethan [sometimes called 'the Robin Hood of Vermont'] and Ira, were conspicuous in public affairs for many years. . . . The authorities of New York, not content with the award of territorial jurisdiction over the domain, proceeded, on the decision of able legal authority, to assert the right of property in the soil of that territory, and declared Wentworth's patents all void. They went further. Orders were issued for the survey and sale of farms in the possession of actual settlers, who had bought and paid for them, and, in many instances, had made great progress in improvements. In this, New York acted not only unjustly, but very unwisely. This oppression, for oppression it was, was a fatal mistake. It was like sowing dragons' teeth to see them produce a crop of full-armed men. The settlers were disposed to be quiet, loyal subjects of New York. They cared not who was their political master, so long as their private rights were re-

spected. But this act of injustice converted them into rebellious foes, determined and defiant. . . . Meanwhile speculators had been purchasing from New York large tracts of these estates in the disputed territory, and were making preparations to take possession. The people of the Grants sent one of their number to England, and laid their cause before the King and council. He came back in August, 1767, armed with an order for the Governor of New York to abstain from issuing any more patents for lands eastward of Lake Champlain. But as the order was not 'ex post facto' in its operations, the New York patentees proceeded to take possession of their purchased lands. This speedily brought on a crisis, and for seven years the New Hampshire Grants formed a theater where all the elements of civil war, except actual carnage, were in active exercise. . . . The hardy yeomanry who first appeared in arms for the defense of their territorial rights, and afterwards as patriots in the common cause when the Revolution broke out, were called Green Mountain Boys.—B. J. Lossing, *Life and times of Philip Schuyler*, v. 1, ch. 12.—The "Green Mountain Boys" were Connecticut Yankees transplanted. Vermont might well be considered the offspring of a single Connecticut county, for Ethan Allen and a good part of "his boys" were natives of Litchfield county.

ALSO IN: J. G. Ullery, *Men of Vermont*, v. 1, pp. 20-34.—S. Williams, *History of Vermont*, ch. 9.—W. Slade, ed., *Vermont State Papers*, pp. 1-49.—*Vermont Historical Society Collections*, v. 1 and 3.

1775.—Ticonderoga surprised by the Green Mountain Boys. See U.S.A.: 1775 (May).

1777.—Stark's victory at Bennington. See U.S.A.: 1777 (July-October).

1777-1778.—State independence declared and constitution framed.—Admission to Union denied.—Sources of first constitution.—"The settlers in the land which this year [1777] took the name of Vermont refused by a great majority to come under the jurisdiction of New York; on the 15th of January 1777, their convention declared the independence of their state. At Windsor, on the 2d of June, they appointed a committee to prepare a constitution; and they hoped to be received into the American union. But, as New York opposed, congress, by an uncertain majority against a determined minority, disclaimed the intention of recognising Vermont as a separate state. . . . On the 2d of July the convention of Vermont reassembled at Windsor. The organic law which they adopted, blending the culture of their age with the traditions of Protestantism, assumed that all men are born free and with inalienable rights; that they may emigrate from one state to another, or form a new state in vacant countries; that 'every sect should observe the Lord's day, and keep up some sort of religious worship'; that every man may choose that form of religious worship 'which shall seem to him most agreeable to the revealed will of God.' They provided for a school in each town, a grammar-school in each county, and a university in the state. All officers, alike executive and legislative, were to be chosen annually and by ballot; the freemen of every town and all one year's residents were electors. Every member of the house of representatives must declare his 'belief in one God; . . . in the divine inspiration of the scriptures; and in the Protestant religion.' The legislative power was vested in one general assembly, subject to no veto. . . . Slavery was forbidden and forever [the first prohibition of slavery made in the United States. (See U.S.A.: 1860: Slavery

concentrated in the South.)]; and there could be no imprisonment for debt. . . . After the loss of Ticonderoga, the introduction of the constitution was postponed [until March, 1778], lest the process of change should interfere with the public defence."—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 5, pp. 157, 161-162.—"The model for the constitution of 1777 was found in the Pennsylvania constitution, adopted in 1776, by a convention of which Benjamin Franklin was the President. This was recommended to the Vermont convention as a groundwork by Dr. Thomas Young of Philadelphia, who was an ardent friend of the new state [and who also suggested the name Vermont in a public letter, April 11, 1777]. Through the Pennsylvania constitution, parts of the constitution of Vermont find their origin in the earlier frames of government of the colony of Pennsylvania granted by William Penn, and even in the charter for Pennsylvania granted by King Charles the Second to William Penn."—S. W. Landon, *Brief outline of the history and civil government of Vermont*, p. 15.—"Among its provisions was that of providing a council of thirteen censors to be elected once in seven years, to determine whether the laws were duly executed, whether they were constitutional, and whether there were need of a revision of the Constitution. This section, Section XLV read as follows: 'In order that the freedom of this commonwealth may be preserved inviolate, forever, there shall be chosen, by ballot, by the Freemen of this State, on the last Wednesday in March, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-five, and on the last Wednesday in March, in every seven years thereafter, thirteen persons, who shall be chosen in the same manner the Council is chosen—except they shall not be out of the Council or General Assembly—to be called the Council of Censors; who shall meet together on the first Wednesday of June next ensuing their election; the majority of whom shall be a quorum in every case, except as to calling a Convention, in which two-thirds of the whole number elected shall agree; and whose duty it shall be to enquire whether the Constitution has been preserved inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and executive branches of government have performed their duty as guardians of the people; or assumed to themselves, or exercised, other or greater powers, than they are entitled by the Constitution. They are also to enquire whether the public taxes have been justly laid and collected, in all parts of this commonwealth—in what manner the public monies have been duly executed. For these purposes they shall have power to send for persons, papers, and records; they shall have authority to pass public censures—to order impeachments, and to recommend to the legislature the repealing such laws as appear to them to have been enacted contrary to the principles of the Constitution. These powers they shall continue, for and during the space of one year from the day of their election, and no longer. The said Council of Censors shall also have power to call a Convention, to meet within two years after their setting, if there appears to them an absolute necessity of amending any article of this Constitution not clearly expressed, and adding such as are necessary for the preservation of the rights and happiness of the people; but the articles to be amended, and the amendments proposed, and such articles as are proposed to be added or abolished, shall be promulgated at least six months before the day appointed for the election of such convention, for the previous consid-

eration of the people, that they may have an opportunity of instructing their delegates on the subject.'—L. H. Meader, *Council of Censors (Proceedings of Vermont Historical Society, Oct. 18-Nov. 2, 1808, pp. 111-113)*.

ALSO IN: Ira Allen, *History of Vermont (Vermont Historical Society Collections, v. 1, pp. 375-393)*.—*Vermont Historical Society Collections, v. 3*.—R. E. Robinson, *Vermont: A study of independence, ch. 10-14*.

1777-1793.—Amendments to the constitution.—“The constitution adopted in 1777 was amended in 1786. In 1793 a convention met at Windsor to make further changes. After striking out the preamble and making various amendments, by the signature of the President and Secretary they certified the whole constitution as ‘adopted’ by them. This certified constitution, now in the Secretary of State’s office, has prefixed a title-page, with the following words: ‘The Constitution of Vermont, as adopted by the Convention, holden at Windsor, July fourth, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-three.’ Thirty-six amendments have since been made. The first twenty-six were adopted by conventions held for that purpose.”—S. W. Landon, *Brief outline of the history and civil government of Vermont, p. 15*.—The revision of 1786 struck out the requirement of Protestantism; the revision in 1793 released the members of Assembly from the necessity of any religious subscription.—Based on R. Hildreth, *History of the United States, v. 4, ch. 3*.

1781.—Negotiations with the British authorities as an independent state.—Vermont had repeatedly applied for admission into the Union; but the opposition of her neighbors, who claimed her territory, and the jealousy of the southern states, who objected to the admission of another northern state, prevented favorable action in Congress. In 1780 a fresh appeal was made with a declaration that if it failed the people of the Green mountains would propose to the other New England states and to New York “an alliance and confederation for mutual defense, independent of Congress and of the other states.” If neither Congress nor the northern states would listen to them, then, said the memorial, “they are, if necessitated to it, at liberty to offer or accept terms of cessation of hostilities with Great Britain without the approbation of any other man or body of men.” “The British generals in America had for some time entertained hopes of turning the disputes in relation to Vermont to their own account, by detaching that district from the American cause and making it a British province. But the first intimation of their views and wishes was communicated in a letter from Colonel Beverly Robinson to Ethan Allen; dated New York, March 30th, 1780. In July, this letter was delivered to Allen in the street in Arlington, by a British soldier in the habit of an American farmer. Allen perused the letter, and then told the bearer that he should consider, it and that he might return. . . . Allen immediately communicated the contents of this letter to Governor Chittenden and some other confidential friends, who agreed in opinion, that no answer should be returned. Robinson, not receiving a reply to his letter and supposing it to have been miscarried, wrote again to Allen on the 2d of February, 1781, enclosing his former letter. In his second letter, after saying he had received new assurances of the inclination of Vermont to join the king’s cause, he said that he could then write with more authority; and assured Allen that he

and the people of Vermont could obtain the most favorable terms, provided they would take a decisive and active part in favor of Great Britain. He requested an answer; and that the way might be pointed out for continuing the correspondence; and desired to be informed in what manner the people of Vermont could be most serviceable to the British cause. Allen returned no answer to either of these letters; but, on the 9th of March, 1781, inclosed them in a letter to Congress, informing them of all the circumstances which had thus far attended the business. He then proceeded to justify the conduct of Vermont in asserting her right to independence, and expressed his determinate resolution to do every thing in his power to establish it. . . . ‘I am confident,’ said he, ‘that Congress will not dispute my sincere attachment to the cause of my country, though I do not hesitate to say, I am fully grounded in opinion, that Vermont has an indubitable right to agree on terms of a cessation of hostilities with Great Britain, provided the United States persist in rejecting her application for an union with them.’ . . . During the spring of 1780, some of the scouting parties belonging to Vermont had been taken by the British and carried prisoners to Canada. On the application of their friends to Governor Chittenden, he, in the month of July, sent a flag with a letter to the commanding officer in Canada, requesting their release or exchange. In the fall, the British came up lake Champlain in great force, and a very favorable answer was returned by General Haldimand to Governor Chittenden’s letter. A flag was at the same time sent to Ethan Allen, then a brigadier general and commanding-officer in Vermont, proposing a cessation of hostilities with Vermont, during negotiations for the exchange of prisoners.”—Z. Thompson, *History of the state of Vermont, ch. 4, sect. 6*.—“The immediate results were a truce, which covered not only Vermont but the frontiers of New York to Hudson river; the disbanding of the militia of Vermont; and the retiring of the British troops to winter quarters in Canada. Until the truce became generally known, the results of it occasioned much surprise in New York. It was further agreed, that the commissioners of both parties should meet on the subject of the cartel, and go together to Canada. This was attempted, but failed on account of the difficulty of getting through the ice on Lake Champlain. After contending several days with the elements, the commissioners separated; but ‘while their men [wrote Ira Allen] were breaking through the ice, much political conversation and exhibits of papers took place.’ William [‘Hist. of Vermont’] is more definite: ‘the British agents availed themselves of this opportunity to explain their views, to make their proposals, and offer as complete an establishment for Vermont, from the royal authority, as should be desired. The commissioners from Vermont treated the proposals with affability and good humor, and though they avoided bringing anything to a decision, the British concluded they were in a fair way to effect their purposes.’ The subsequent negotiations at Isle aux Noix, between Ira Allen and the British commissioners, as to matters beyond settling a cartel, were secret, and even the commander of the post had no knowledge of them, although he was associated with the British commissioners on the question of an exchange of prisoners. These facts show that the public had no knowledge except of a truce for a humane and proper attempt to relieve citizens of Vermont, and its officers and soldiers, who were

then prisoners in Canada; and the conclusion is that all the suspicion that then existed of the patriotism and fidelity of the great body of the people of the state, and all the obloquy since drawn from the negotiation with Haldimand and cast upon the state, were entirely unjust. If any body was really at fault, the number implicated was very small. Williams asserted that 'eight persons only in Vermont, were in the secret of this correspondence;' and Ira Allen that, in May, 1781, 'only eight persons were in the secret, but more were added as the circumstances required.'—*Vermont Historical Society Collections, v. 2, introduction*.—"By the definitive treaty between Great Britain and the United States, Sept. 3, 1783, Vermont was included within the boundaries separating the independent American from British territory, and thus the independence of Vermont was acknowledged first by the mother country. The State had been de facto independent from its organization; and therefore the following record, with the other papers contained in this and the first volume of the Historical Society Collections covers the existence of Vermont as an independent and sovereign state."—*Ibid., p. 397*.

ALSO IN: J. G. Ullery, *Men of Vermont, v. 1, pp. 20-34*.—*Haldimand papers (Vermont Historical Society Collections, v. 2)*.—D. Brymner, *Report on Canadian archives, 1889, pp. 53-58*.—R. E. Robinson, *Vermont: A Study of independence, ch. 15*.

1787-1864.—Suffrage qualifications. See SURFRAGE, MANHOOD: United States: 1787-1800; 1800-1864.

1790-1791.—Renunciation of the claims of New York.—Admission to the Union.—"The rapid increase of the population of Vermont having destroyed all hope on the part of New York of re-establishing her jurisdiction over that rebellious district, the holders of the New York grants, seeing no better prospect before them, were ready to accept such an indemnity as might be obtained by negotiation. Political considerations had also operated. The vote of Vermont might aid to establish the seat of the federal government at New York. At all events, that state would serve as a counterbalance to Kentucky, the speedy admission of which was foreseen. The Assembly of New York [July, 1789] had appointed commissioners with full powers to acknowledge the independence of Vermont, and to arrange a settlement of all matters in controversy. To this appointment Vermont had responded, and terms had been soon arranged. In consideration of the sum of \$30,000, as an indemnity to the New York grantees, New York renounced all claim of jurisdiction [October 7, 1790], consented to the admission of Vermont into the Union, and agreed to the boundary heretofore claimed—the western line of the westernmost townships granted by New Hampshire and the middle channel of Lake Champlain. This arrangement was immediately ratified by the Legislature of Vermont. A Convention, which met at the beginning of the year [1791], had voted unanimously to ratify the Federal Constitution, and to ask admission into the Union. Commissioners were soon after appointed by the Assembly to wait upon Congress and to negotiate the admission. No opposition was made to it, and [Feb. 18, 1791] within fourteen days after passage of the bill for the prospective admission of Kentucky, Vermont was received into the Union, from and after the termination of the present session of Congress."—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States, v. 4, ch. 3*.

1791-1812.—Legislative sessions.—Montpelier

made state capital.—"During the thirteen years [1777-1791] of the separate independence of Vermont, her legislature met twenty-eight times, and in one year, 1781, there were four sessions. From 1788, one session a year was the rule until 1870; since that time one session in two years has been the rule. Previous to 1791 the legislature had met in eight Vermont towns and in Charleston, N. H., and previous to 1808 it had met in fourteen Vermont towns. Fourteen sessions were held in Windsor, eight in Bennington, seven in Rutland. Montpelier, which became the permanent capital of the State in 1808, by act of Legislature of 1805, was the sixteenth town and the fifteenth Vermont town in which the legislature met. . . . In 1792, 1796 and 1800, the legislature chose four presidential electors, in 1804 and 1808 six, and in 1812 eight. In January 1804, an adjourned session of the legislature was held at Windsor to act on the twelfth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which was adopted on the part of Vermont. In 1805 an act of the legislature provided that on certain conditions Montpelier should become 'the permanent seat of the legislature.' The conditions were complied with and Montpelier became the capital of the State in 1808. In 1806, after refusing to authorize private banks, the legislature enacted a law establishing a State bank with branches at Woodstock and at Middlebury. Later, branches were established at Burlington and at Westminster. The State did not succeed in banking, and in 1811 the process of closing the business had already begun. . . . In 1807 the legislature provided for the erection of a state prison, which was located at Windsor and was in use within two years. In consequence of building the state prison, imprisonment largely took the place of such punishment as cutting off the ears, branding, whipping, putting in the stocks or pillory."—E. Conant, M. S. Stone, *Text book of the geography, history, constitution and civil government of Vermont, pp. 209-210, 232-233*.

1791-1914.—Lack of systematic plan in development of state administration of schools.—Evolution of the common school system.—Establishment of colleges.—From the first there was an active interest in common school education in Vermont, and as early as 1777 provision was made for the support of common schools by the towns throughout the state. "The statutes of this state have had provisions more or less looking toward secondary school instruction, since 1841, a law being passed that year for the associating together of two or more contiguous school districts to form a union district for the purpose of maintaining a union school to be kept for the benefit of the older children of such districts." This was followed by acts in 1844, 1867, 1898, and 1904 expanding this provision to accord with the development of the idea of high school education. "A study of the chief historical stages in the educational evolution of the state for the past one hundred years furnishes justification for the statement that Vermont has never completely assumed a definite constructive responsibility for the progressive development of the public school system; has never clearly regarded this system as an institution and instrumentality of the commonwealth. This may be accounted for as a natural result of a combination of influences. Among these are the sturdiness and independence of local communities under the characteristic New England scheme of government, the comparative isolation of the several principal geographic sections of the state from one another, and the absence of any dominating city centres of population. This

absence of positive state policy explains in large measure the lack of a proper state machinery for the administration, supervision, and inspection of the common schools and other public educational institutions. The establishment of the first State Board of Commissioners for Common Schools in 1827 and its abolition in 1833; the creation of the office of State Superintendent of Common Schools in 1845; the refusal of the General Assembly to appoint a State Superintendent in 1851, and the resulting absence of any state supervision for the following five years; the creation of a State Board of Education in 1856, which continued till 1874, when the office of Superintendent was re-established; the creation of another State Board of Education in 1908 as the successor to the Board of Normal School Commissioners created in 1898; and the passage by the legislature of 1912-13 of the act creating the present State Board of Education with its partial and ambiguous authority over the several parts of the educational system,—made clear the lack of a well-planned, continuous educational policy.”—*Vermont Educational Commission Report*, 1914, p. 148.—“Until 1864 a portion of the expense of the schools might be, and in many districts was, laid on the pupils attending the schools. Since that time the public schools have been supported wholly on the grand list or from the income of public funds. The graded school for the villages, with a high school for one of its departments, became an essential part of our school system during the period of Mr. Adams’ service, and normal schools were established for the training of teachers. . . . In 1894 free text books were voted by the General Assembly. In 1906 free high school privileges were extended to all pupils qualified to receive such, and a union supervision system by the combination of towns was established. In 1908 manual training was encouraged by State aid, and in 1912 the same encouragement was extended to the teaching of agriculture and to domestic science. In 1910, teacher training courses were established for the purpose of providing teachers for the rural schools. In 1912 a commission was created to investigate the education conditions of the State with Justice J. H. Watson as chairman. This commission committed the investigation to the Carnegie Foundation, whose findings were communicated to the people of the State by newspaper supplements, the first appearing December 27, 1913.”—E. Conant, M. S. Stone, *Text book of the geography, history, constitution and civil government of Vermont*, p. 293.—“The University of Vermont was chartered in 1791, Middlebury College in 1800, and Norwich University in 1834. . . . By an act of November 6, 1865, the University of Vermont, as created by an act of November 3, 1791, was, with its consent, merged in a new corporation entitled ‘The University of Vermont and State Agricultural College,’ to which new corporation was transferred all the property of the former University of Vermont, and to which was granted the income accruing from the proceeds of the sale of the land granted to the state of Vermont by the government of the United States under the Act of July 2, 1862. . . . The legal relations of the three colleges to the state of Vermont makes clear the fact that none of them is a state institution in the strict and complete or even the ordinary use of the term. Each is practically governed by its own board, and such measure of state control as has been given by amendments of the original charter or by new acts has looked in the direction of establishing just enough control to justify appropriations.”—*Vermont Educational Commission Report*, 1914, pp. 154-157.

1812-1814.—Part played in the War of 1812.—Legislation.—“The War of 1812 was unpopular in Vermont. . . . In spite of the feeling, however, . . . volunteers sprang to arms and rushed to the front. The government records show that only the more populous states of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia furnished more men for the regular army than this sparsely settled commonwealth.”—S. W. Landon, *Brief outline of the history and civil government of Vermont*, p. 10.—“When the legislature met in October [1812] laws were passed forbidding intercourse with Canada, exempting the persons and property of the militia in actual service from attachment, and laying a tax of one cent an acre on the lands of the State for military purposes. These measures were thought by many to be oppressive; and the Federal party, which opposed the war, gained in strength so that in 1813 and 1814 a Federalist governor, Martin Chittenden, a son of Thomas Chittenden, was chosen by the Legislature, as there had been no election by the people. The obnoxious laws of 1812 were repealed.”—E. Conant, M. S. Stone, *Text book of the geography, history, constitution and civil government of Vermont*, p. 246.

1812-1850.—Amendments to the constitution.—Anti-slavery party.—Attitude of state towards fugitive slaves.—First railroad charter.—“Originally the legislative power of the State of Vermont was ‘vested in a house of representatives,’ and the executive power was ‘vested in a governor, or, in his absence, a lieutenant-governor, and council,’ consisting of twelve councilors chosen annually by the freemen of the State. In 1836, the constitution was so amended as to abolish the executive council and to establish a senate consisting of thirty senators, apportioned to the counties according to their population and to be elected annually by the freemen of the counties. This change was effected by the adoption of articles two to thirteen of the Amendments to the Constitution. . . . By the apportionments made in consequence of the censuses of 1820 and 1830, Vermont had five representatives in Congress; and by the apportionment next following the census of 1840, she had four representatives. From 1812 to 1818, inclusive, and in 1822, representatives to Congress were elected on a general ticket as presidential electors now are. Presidential electors were chosen by the legislature until 1828, when the method of election by the freemen on a general ticket was introduced. . . . In 1820, the representatives in Congress from this State opposed the admission of Missouri as a slave State. . . . In 1825, the legislature resolved ‘that slavery is an evil to be deprecated by a free and enlightened people, and that this general assembly will accord in any measures which may be adopted by the general government for its abolition in the United States, that are consistent with the rights of the people and the general harmony of the States.’ In 1835, petitions were presented to the legislature praying for action in favor of the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. . . . The next legislature declared by resolution, ‘that neither Congress nor the State governments have any constitutional rights to abridge the free expression of opinions, or the transmission of them through the public mail; and that Congress does possess the power to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia.’ So far the opponents of slavery had not formed a political party in Vermont, but in 1841 the anti-slavery men nominated a governor and secured votes enough to prevent a majority. From this time the anti-slavery party continued, under different

names, until slavery disappeared. . . . In 1843 . . . 'no sheriff, deputy sheriff, high bailiff, constable, jailer or other officer or citizen of this State, shall hereafter seize, arrest or detain, or aid in the seizure, arrest or detention or imprisonment in any jail or other building, belonging to this State, or to any county, town, city or person therein, of any person for the reason that he is, or may be, claimed as a fugitive slave.' . . . In the summer of 1850, after a long and heated discussion in Congress, a new fugitive slave law was passed, providing for the arrest of runaways by United States officers, and denying to the runaways the right to testify when claimed as slaves. The Vermont legislature, in the autumn of the same year, responded with the following enactment: 'It shall be the duty of State's attorneys, within their respective counties, whenever any inhabitant of this State is arrested or claimed as a fugitive slave, on being informed thereof, diligently and faithfully to use all lawful means to protect, defend and procure to be discharged, every such person so arrested or claimed as a fugitive slave.' . . . Before 1840 Boston had become a railroad center, and the Vermont legislature had granted a charter for a railroad from Lake Champlain to the Connecticut River. Under this first charter nothing was accomplished, but another charter was granted in 1843. Ground was first broken for the road at Windsor in 1845; the first rail was laid at White River Junction in 1847; the first passenger train in Vermont ran over this road from White River Junction to Bethel, June 26, 1848. The Vermont Central and the Rutland and Burlington railroads were opened to Burlington in 1849; and within three years from this time railroads were opened from White River Junction to St. Johnsbury, from Essex Junction to Rouses Point, and from Rutland to Bennington, to Whitehall, and Troy, N. Y."—E. Conant, M. S. Stone, *Text book of the geography, history, constitution and civil government of Vermont*, pp. 243-244, 259-260, 260.

1814.—Represented at Hartford Convention. See U. S. A.: 1814 (December): Hartford Convention.

1852.—Adoption of prohibition amendment.—Vermont was one of the first states to adopt state prohibition. The amendment forbidding the sale of liquor was added to the constitution in 1852, following the example set by Maine in 1846. Massachusetts and Rhode Island, which passed similar legislation in the same year, later repealed it. But Vermont stood firm, and remained a pioneer example of prohibition when the movement, which had started in New England, shifted to the south and west.

1861-1864.—Part played in the Civil War.—"Vermont's part in the Civil War is one of the proudest chapters in her history. The whole number of men in the state subject to military duty was 60,719. She sent to the war 34,238, over five hundred more than her quota. Of this number, over five thousand lost their lives. A larger proportion of the soldiers from Vermont were killed or mortally wounded in battle than of those from any other northern state. Vermont furnished for the defence of the Union seventeen regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, three light batteries, and three companies of sharpshooters."—S. W. Landon, *Brief outline of the history and civil government of Vermont*, pp. 10-11.

1864.—St. Albans raid. See U. S. A.: 1864 (October): St. ALBANS RAID; MONTREAL: 1860-1901.

1870-1913.—Amendments to the constitution.—"In 1870 the constitution of the State was so

amended as to provide for biennial sessions of the legislature in place of annual sessions, and for biennial instead of annual elections of State and county officers. In 1880-83, a further amendment of the constitution was made, adding the secretary of State and the auditor of accounts to the list of officers to be chosen by the freemen of the State. By legislative enactments of 1880, women are empowered to vote in town meetings for school officers, and to hold school offices and the office of town clerk. The legislative provision (1824) for the choice of presidential electors by the freemen, and the constitutional amendments requiring the election of county officers (1850) by the freemen and increasing the number of State officers (1883) to be chosen by the freemen, are worthy of notice as extensions of the direct power of the people. In accordance with a resolution passed by the general assembly of 1908, a commission consisting of five members was appointed to prepare and present to the general assembly of 1910 proposals of amendments to the constitution. Fifteen proposals were presented, three of which, relating respectively to proposal of amendments at any session of the general assembly, decennial elections and woman suffrage, were rejected. The general assembly of 1912 refused to concur in and to ratify the amendments relating to eligibility of senators and representatives to any office created during, emoluments increased by or election vested in the general assembly; to changing the words 'uses' and 'use' in article I of chapter I, to 'benefits' and 'benefit'; to adding the words or 'benefits' after the words 'public uses' in article 9 of chapter I, and to enabling the senate to propose amendments at every sixth session. The amendments passed by the general assembly of 1910, concurred in by the general assembly of 1912 and ratified by the people March 4, 1913, related to approving, signing and vetoing bills by the governor; to time of biennial elections and sessions; to printing of the legislative journals and the calling of the yeas and nays; to the powers of the general assembly and the governor in regard to commutation, remission or mitigation of sentences; to the granting, extending or amending of charters; to change the words 'judge' and 'judges' when referring to the supreme court, to 'justice' and 'justices'; to power of the general assembly to pass laws compelling compensations for injuries; and to the revision and rewriting of chapter II by the supreme court in order to make it consistent with other sections of the Constitution."—E. Conant, M. S. Stone, *Text book of the geography, history, constitution and civil government of Vermont*, pp. 290-291.

1898.—Part played by the state in the Spanish-American War.—"Senator [Redfield] Proctor [of Vermont] . . . went to Cuba and investigated . . . the conditions in that island in the last days of Spanish rule. Upon his return to Washington, . . . in the course of the current business of the senate, he told what he saw. . . . 'Impartial history has recorded the fact,' says Senator Clay, 'that Senator Proctor did more than any other public man to arouse public sentiment against Spanish rule in Cuba and in favor of Cuban independence and self government.' . . . He secured the assignment of Admiral Dewey to the Asiatic Fleet shortly before the Spanish War and thus gave a Vermonter an opportunity to make the splendid record he did at Manila Bay."—F. C. Partridge, *Redfield Proctor*, pp. 90-93.—"Not many Vermonters were engaged in conflict with the Spanish on land. The first regiment of Vermont volunteers, consisting of fifty officers and nine hundred eighty men, was

mustered into the United States service, but was retained in camp at Chickamauga Park, Ga., where, with a large part of the Volunteer Army gathered there, it experienced severe suffering and loss from disease and death."—E. Conant, M. S. Stone, *Text book of the geography, history, constitution and civil government of Vermont*, pp. 286-287.—"To Commodore Dewey was due the credit of the victory of Manila Bay; to Captain Clark [of Vermont] of the Oregon was due the credit of taking that wonderful mechanism, a modern war-ship, on a voyage of more than half the circumference of the globe, from the coast of California around Cape Horn, to join the Atlantic squadron, a feat which was accomplished in a little more than two months without a rivet or a bolt of a gearing broken or out of place."—E. D. Collins, *History of Vermont*, p. 270.

1906-1915.—Revised school code.—Huntington fund.—School supervision.—Educational commission created.—"The general assembly of 1915 thoroughly revised the school code and incorporated nearly all the constructive features recommended by the commission. In its revision it provided for the appointment of the commissioner of education, state supervisors and inspectors, and the superintendents of groups of towns by the state board of education, to which were committee extensive powers and duties relating to courses of study, teacher-training courses, transportation, certification of teachers, and high school and vocational education. . . . The Huntington fund, which became available in 1886, was a gift to the State of Vermont by Arunah Huntington, a native of Vermont, who had acquired wealth in Brantford, Canada. The amount of this fund was \$211,131.46, the interest of which was divided equally among the towns in proportion to their population. In 1906 this fund was merged into the permanent school fund of the State. . . . A few facts indicate the tendency of recent educational movements in this State. The most significant are the support of the public schools entirely at the public expense, the multiplication of free high schools, the effort to improve all common schools by the better preparation of teachers, the opening of the colleges to women, the establishment of scientific courses of study in the colleges, the endowment of academies, and the institution of public libraries. . . . In 1906 provision was made for the professional supervision of schools by the combination of towns into unions, and generous financial aid was provided therefor; free advanced instruction was accorded all qualified students; a permanent school fund, consisting of the War Claims Fund, the Huntington Fund and the United States Deposit Money, was established; State aid was granted for the transportation of pupils and in encouragement of the centralization of schools; elementary and high schools were legally defined; and the school code was thoroughly revised. In 1912 means for developing rural communities was granted. But by far the most important educational act in recent years was the creation of an educational commission to investigate school conditions. In accordance with recommendations of this commission the general assembly of 1915 provided a minimum wage for teaching, for increased wages of trained teachers in rural schools, and for vocational education in junior and senior high schools, and made appropriations for the entire maintenance by the State of teacher-training courses, for the payment of transportation for all children living a mile and one-half or more from school, and for the payment of all supervision of schools in groups of two or more towns. By

these acts the rural school and country conditions were greatly benefited."—E. Conant, M. S. Stone, *Text book of the geography, history, constitution and civil government of Vermont*, pp. 293-295, 303-305.

1910-1923.—Legislation.—Part played in World War.—Graham embezzlement.—Governors.—In 1915, a workman's compensation law was enacted; and a bill for the adoption of the direct primary system to take effect in 1916; also a bill providing for the substitution of statewide prohibition for the local option, high-license law passed in 1902. The new law was to take effect, 1917, if the voters in referendum gave a majority vote in its favor, if disapproved it was nevertheless to take effect May 1, 1927, even if subsequent legislatures failed to keep the implied faith. At the town meetings held throughout the state in March, 1916, the majority



MONUMENT COMMEMORATING STARK'S
VICTORY AT BENNINGTON,
AUGUST, 16, 1777

Dedicated, Aug. 19, 1891

vote failed to register its approval. In 1917, an accounting system in the administration of the state business was created. A state Board of Control was established, composed of the governor, State treasurer, auditor of accounts, director of state institutions and a fifth person to be appointed biennially by the governor and senate. During the World War the state furnished 9,338 men or .25 per cent of the Expeditionary Forces. On Aug. 11, 1918 a shortage of \$20,000 in the accounts of Horace F. Graham with the state of Vermont when state auditor was discovered in the books which Graham turned over to his successor Benjamin Gates when the former took the governor's chair (1917). The shortage was discovered by bank examiner Frank C. Williams. The Graham contention was that this money was used for legitimate state work, but as a result of the disclosure about \$9,000 was paid the state treasurer to cover a part of the deficiency. Graham was found guilty in the county court on Feb. 5, 1920, but sentence was not

pronounced at that time, the case going to a higher court on petition for a new trial based on exceptions. He was sentenced in the supreme court, Nov. 4, 1920, for five to eight years imprisonment for embezzlement. In the afternoon of the same day Percival W. Clement (governor) granted a full and unconditional pardon.—Based on *New York Times*, Aug. 12, 1918, p. 4; Jan. 27, 1920, p. 12; Nov. 5, 1920, p. 13.—In 1919 laws were passed to legalize absent voting, and the State Board of Health authorized to divide the state into ten sanitary districts. The recent governors of the state have been John A. Mead, 1910-1912; Allen M. Fletcher, 1912-1915; Charles W. Gates, 1915-1917; Horace F. Graham, 1917-1919; Percival W. Clement, 1919-1921; James A. Hartness, 1921-1923.

1912.—Industrial arbitration board created. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: United States: 1886-1920.

See also NEW ENGLAND.

Also in: F. W. Holden, *Vermont of the Revolution* (*Magazine of History*, v. 22, January-June, 1916).—S. F. Bemis, *Vermont separatists and Great Britain* (*Magazine of History*, v. 22, January-June, 1917).—W. S. Rossiter, *Vermont, an historical and statistical study of the progress of the state* (*American Statistical Association, new series*, No. 93, March, 1911).—A. R. Hasse, *Index of economic material in documents of states of the United States: Vermont, 1789-1904*.—W. H. Crockett, *Vermont, the Green Mountain State*.

VERNEUIL, Battle of (1924). See FRANCE: 1429-1431.

VERNICOMES, tribe in ancient Caledonia, whose territory was the eastern half of Fife. See BRITAIN: Celtic tribes.

VEROMANDUI, ancient tribe of the Belgæ. See BELGÆ.

VERONA, city in Italy and capital of the province of the same name. It is a fortified city, and one of the famous Austrian "quadrilateral," which was formerly important because of its commanding military position. In 1921, it had a population of 92,413.

312.—Siege, battle, and victory of Constantine. See ROME: Empire: 305-323.

403.—Defeat of Alaric by Stilicho. See GOTHS: 400-403.

452.—Sacked by Huns. See HUNS: 452.

489.—Defeat of Odoacer by Theodoric. See ROME: Medieval city: 488-526.

493-525.—Residence of Theodoric the Ostrogoth.—"Pavia and Verona [as well as his ordinary capital city, Ravenna (see RAVENNA: 493-525)] were also places honoured with the occasional residence of Theodoric. At both he built a palace and public baths. . . . At Verona, the palace, of which there were still some noble remains incorporated into the castle of the Viscontis, was blown up by the French in 1801, and an absolutely modern building stands upon its site. . . . It seems probable that Theodoric's residence at both these places depended on the state of Transalpine politics. When the tribes of the middle Danube were moving suspiciously to and fro, and the vulnerable point by the Brenner Pass needed to be especially guarded, he fixed his quarters at Verona. When Gaul menaced greater danger, then he removed to Ticinum [Pavia]. It was apparently the fact that Verona was his coign of vantage, from whence he watched the German barbarians, which obtained for him from their minstrels the title of Dietrich of Bern. Thus strangely travestied, he was swept within the wide current of the legends relating to Attila, and hence it is that the really grandest figure in the

history of the migration of the peoples appears in the Nibelungen Lied, not as a great king and conqueror on his own account, but only as a faithful squire of the terrible Hunnish king whose empire had in fact crumbled into dust before the birth of Theodoric."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and her invaders*, v. 3, bk. 4, ch. 8.

11th-12th centuries.—Acquisition of republican independence. See ITALY: 1056-1152.

1236-1259.—Tyranny of Eccelino di Romano and the crusade against him.—"In the north-eastern corner of Italy the influence of the old Lombard lords, which had been extinguished there as in most other parts of the peninsula, was succeeded by that of a family that had accompanied one of the emperors from Germany. . . . The eye of a traveller passing from Verona to Padua may still be struck by one or two isolated hills, which seem as if they were designed by nature to be meet residences for the tyrants of the surrounding plains. One of these gave birth to a person destined to become the scourge of the neighbouring country. . . . Eccelino di Romano . . . was descended from a German noble brought into Italy by Otho III. The office of Podesta of Verona had become hereditary in his family. In the wars of the second Frederic [1236-1250], he put himself at the head of the Ghibellines in the surrounding principalities, and became a strenuous supporter of the emperor. Under the protection of so powerful an ally, he soon made himself master of Padua, where he established his headquarters, and built the dungeons, where the most revolting cruelties were inflicted on his victims."—W. P. Urquhart, *Life and times of Francesco Sforza*, v. 1, bk. 1, ch. 3.—In 1237, the emperor, Frederick II, "obliged to return to Germany, left under the command of Eccelino a body of German soldiers, and another of Saracens, with which this able captain made himself, the same year, master of Vicenza, which he barbarously pillaged, and the following year of Padua. . . . Eccelino judged it necessary to secure obedience, by taking hostages from the richest and most powerful families; he employed his spies to discover the malcontents, whom he punished with torture, and redoubled his cruelty in proportion to the hatred which he excited." Subsequently, the emperor confided "the exclusive government of the Veronese marches [also called the Trevisan marches] to Eccelino. The hatred which this ferocious man excited by his crimes fell on the emperor. Eccelino imprisoned in the most loathsome dungeons those whom he considered his enemies, and frequently put them to death by torture, or suffered them to perish by hunger. . . . In the single town of Padua there were eight prisons always full, notwithstanding the incessant toil of the executioner to empty them; two of these contained each 300 prisoners. A brother of Eccelino, named Alberic, governed Treviso with less ferocity, but with a power not less absolute." Eccelino maintained the power which he had gathered into his hands for several years after Frederick's death. At length, the pope, "Alexander IV., to destroy the monster that held in terror the Trevisan march, caused a crusade to be preached in that country. He promised those who combated the ferocious Eccelino all the indulgences usually reserved for the deliverers of the Holy Land. The marquis d'Este, the count di San Bonifazio, with the cities of Ferrara, Mantua, and Bologna, assembled their troops under the standard of the church; they were joined by a horde of ignorant fanatics from the lowest class." Headed by the legate Philip, archbishop of Ravenna, the crusaders took Padua, June

18, 1256, and "for seven days the city was inhumanly pillaged by those whom it had received as deliverers. As soon as Eccelino was informed of the loss he had sustained, he hastened to separate and disarm the 11,000 Paduans belonging to his army; he confined them in prisons, where all, with the exception of 200, met a violent or lingering death. During the two following years, the Guelphs experienced nothing but disasters: the legate, whom the pope had placed at their head, proved incompetent to command them; and the crowd of crusaders whom he called to his ranks served only to compromise them, by want of courage and discipline. . . . The following year, this tyrant, unequalled in Italy for bravery and military talent, . . . advanced into the centre of Lombardy, in the hope that the nobles of Milan, with whom he had already opened a correspondence, would surrender this great city." But, by this time, even his old Ghibelline associates had formed alliances with the Guelphs against him, and he was beset on all sides. "On the 16th of September, 1259, whilst he was preparing to retire, he found himself stopped at the bridge of Cassano. . . . Repulsed, pursued as far as Vimercato, and at last wounded in the foot, he was made prisoner and taken to Soncino: there, he refused to speak; rejected all the aid of medicine; tore off all the bandages from his wounds, and finally expired, on the eleventh day of his captivity. His brother with all his family were massacred in the following year."—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *History of the Italian republics*, ch. 3-4.

ALSO IN: J. Miley, *History of the Papal States*, v. 3, bk. 7, ch. 1.

1260-1338.—Rise of the House of the Scaligeri.—Successes of Can' Grande della Scala.—Wars and reverses of Mastino.—After the death of Eccelino, Verona, by its own choice came under the government of the first Mastino della Scala, who established the power of a house which became famous in Italian history. Mastino's grandson, Cane, or Can' Grande della Scala, "reigned in that city from 1312 to 1329, with a splendor which no other prince in Italy equalled. . . . Among the Lombard princes he was the first protector of literature and the arts. The best poets, painters, and sculptors of Italy, Dante, to whom he offered an asylum, as well as Ugucione da Faggiuola, and many other exiles illustrious in war or politics, were assembled at his court. He aspired to subdue the Veronese and Trevisan marches, or what has since been called the Terra Firma of Venice. He took possession of Vicenza; and afterwards maintained a long war against the republic of Padua, the most powerful in the district, and that which had shown the most attachment to the Guelph party and to liberty." In 1328, Padua submitted to him; and "the year following he attacked and took Treviso, which surrendered on the 6th of July, 1329. He possessed himself of Feltre and Cividale soon after. The whole province seemed subjugated to his power; but the conqueror also was subdued. [He died on the 22nd of the same month in which Treviso was taken.]"—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *History of the Italian republics*, ch. 6.—Can' Grande was succeeded by his nephew, the second Mastino della Scala, who, in the next six years, "extended his states from the northeastern frontiers of Italy to the confines of Tuscany; and the possession of the strong city of Lucca now gave him a secure footing in this province. He shortly made it appear to what purpose he meant to apply this new advantage. Under the plea of re-establishing the Ghibelin interests, but in reality

to forward his own schemes of dominion, he began to fill all Tuscany with his machinations. Florence was neither slow to discover her danger, nor to resent the treachery of her faithless ally,"—which Mastino had recently been. Florence, accordingly, formed an alliance with Venice, which Mastino had rashly offended by restricting the manufacture of salt on the Trevisan coast, and by laying heavy duties on the navigation of the Po. Florence agreed "to resign to Venice the sole possession of such conquests as might be made in that quarter; only reserving for herself the acquisition of Lucca, which she was to obtain by attacking Mastino in Tuscany, entirely with her own resources. Upon these terms an alliance was signed between the two republics, and the lord of Verona had soon abundant reason to repent of the pride and treachery by which he had provoked their formidable union (A. D. 1336). . . . During three campaigns he was unable to oppose the league in the field, and was compelled to witness the successive loss of many of his principal cities (A. D. 1337). His brother Albert was surprised and made prisoner in Padua, by the treachery of the family of Carrara, who acquired the sovereignty of that city; Feltro was captured by the Duke of Carinthia, Brescia revolted, and fell with other places to Azzo Visconti. . . . In this hopeless condition Mastino artfully addressed himself to the Venetians, and, by satisfying all their demands, detached them from the general interests of the coalition (A. D. 1338). By a separate treaty which their republic concluded with him, and which was then only communicated to the Florentines for their acceptance, Mastino ceded to Venice Treviso, with other fortresses and possessions, and the right of free navigation on the Po; he agreed at the same time to yield Bassano and an extension of territory to the new lord of Padua, and to confirm the sovereignty of Brescia to Azzo Visconti; but for the Florentine republic no farther advantage was stipulated than the enjoyment of a few castles which they had already conquered in Tuscany."—G. Procter, *History of Italy*, ch. 4, pt. 3.

ALSO IN: H. E. Napier, *Florentine history*, v. 2, ch. 19.

1351-1387.—Degeneracy and fall of the Scaligeri.—Subjugation by the Visconti of Milan. See MILAN: 1277-1447.

1405.—Added to the dominion of Venice. See ITALY: 1402-1406; VENICE: 1406-1447.

1517.—Surrendered to Maximilian. See FRANCE: 1516-1517.

1797.—Massacre of French soldiers. See FRANCE: 1797 (April-May).

1814.—Surrender to Austrians. See ITALY: 1814.

VERONA, Congress of (after Troppau and Laibach).—"The rapid spread of revolution in Europe inspired serious misgivings among the great powers, and impelled the Holy Alliance [see HOLY ALLIANCE] to show its true colours. Austria was especially alarmed by the movement in Naples [see ITALY: 1820-1821], which threatened to overthrow its power in Italy, and Metternich convoked a congress at Troppau, in Upper Silesia (Oct., 1820), at which Austria, Russia, Prussia, France and England were represented. Neapolitan affairs were the chief subject of discussion, and it was soon evident that Austria, Russia and Prussia were agreed as to the necessity of armed intervention. England made a formal protest against such high-handed treatment of a peaceful country; but as the protest was not supported by France, and England was not prepared to go to war for Naples, it was dis-

regarded. The three allied powers decided to transfer the congress to Laybach [Laibach] and to invite Ferdinand I. to attend in person. [The result of the conference at Laibach was a movement of 60,000 Austrian troops into Naples and Sicily, in March, 1821, and a restoration of Ferdinand, who made a merciless use of his opportunity for revenge.]—R. Lodge, *History of modern Europe*, ch. 25, sect. 8.—From Laibach, the allied sovereigns issued a circular to their representatives at the various foreign courts, in which portentous document they declared that “useful and necessary changes in legislation and in the administration of states could only emanate from the free will, and from the intelligent and well-weighed convictions, of those whom God has made responsible for power. Penetrated with this eternal truth, the sovereigns have not hesitated to proclaim it with frankness and vigour. They have declared that, in respecting the rights and independence of legitimate power, they regarded as legally null, and disavowed by the principles which constituted the public right of Europe, all pretended reforms operated by revolt and open hostilities.” “These principles, stated nakedly and without shame, were too much even for Lord Castlereagh. In a despatch, written early in the year 1821, while admitting the right of a state to interfere in the internal affairs of another state when its own interests were endangered, he protested against the pretension to put down revolutionary movements apart from their immediate bearing on the security of the state so intervening, and denied that merely possible revolutionary movements can properly be made the basis of a hostile alliance. The principles of the Holy Alliance were not intended to remain a dead letter; they were promptly acted upon. Popular movements were suppressed in Naples and Piedmont; and intervention in Spain, where the Cortes had been summoned and the despotic rule of Ferdinand VII had been overthrown, was in contemplation. Greece imitated the example set in the western peninsulas of Europe. The Congress of Verona was summoned, and Lord Castlereagh (now the Marquis of Londonderry) was preparing to join it, when in an access of despondency, the origin of which is variously explained, he took his own life. [He was succeeded in the British Ministry by George Canning.]—F. H. Hill, *George Canning*, ch. 20.—“The first business which presented itself to Mr. Canning was to devise a system by which the Holy Alliance could be gradually dissolved, and England rescued from the consequences of her undefined relations with its members. The adjourned Congress was on the point of assembling at Verona, and as it was necessary to send a representative in place of Lord Castlereagh, who seems to have been terrified at the prospect that lay before him, the Duke of Wellington was selected.”—R. Bell, *Life of Canning*, ch. 13.—“Canning instructed Wellington to press Metternich for the speedy evacuation of Piedmont by the Austrian troops. He defined the attitude of England towards Italy as one of ‘neutrality but not indifference.’ . . . Besides Italy, the subjects discussed at Verona were four, the question of Spain, and the question of her revolted colonies, the slave trade, and the relations between Greece, Turkey and Russia. But the first of all—the question of Old Spain—became . . . infinitely the most important at Verona. . . . The main object of the Conference had been avowed as the Turkish question. But Wellington . . . heard enough to convince him that France seriously thought of invading Spain, or pressing armed interference on the Congress. He at once wrote off for

additional instructions, to which Canning replied on Sept. 27 as follows: . . . ‘If there should be a determined project of interference by force or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are His Majesty’s Government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference, so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, and so utterly impracticable in execution that, should the necessity arise, or (I would rather say) if the opportunity should offer, I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare that to any such interference, come what may, His Majesty will never be a party.’ There was certainly no lack of boldness and vigor in these instructions, which threatened in diplomatic terms that England would rather dissolve the Alliance, formed in 1815 against Jacobinism in France, altogether than consent to interference in Spain. The objects of the different Powers were these, Canning wished to dissolve the system of Government by Congress, to confine within due bounds ‘that predominating areopagitical spirit,’ in which the Holy Alliance took upon themselves the Government of the world. Alexander viewed Spain as the headquarters of Revolution and Jacobinism, and sought to win fame for himself by destroying the Spanish constitution with the aid of his Russian troops, whose attention he wishes to distract. . . . The one desire of France, who had counted for nothing at Troppau and Laybach, was to win renown by her actions at Verona. For that purpose she was prepared for intervention in Spain, but . . . her ideas on the form of that intervention varied at different times during the Conference. Prussia was as always at this time, the humble slave of Metternich. . . . Wellington used all his powers of persuasion to convince Alexander of the difficulty of the task he contemplated. He declared it to be incompatible with the principles England believed should be adopted by all countries, irrespective of their political systems. . . . Metternich feared Alexander would take the opportunity of first conquering Spain and then uniting it in a strict alliance with Russia, and so would upset the balance of power. Louis XVIII and Villele [premier of France] were unwilling that Alexander should lead his army through French territory, but were anxious to secure his assistance in case of their own failure. The French envoy Montmorency therefore asked if the Powers would give France their moral and material support in case of war, and if they would join her in withdrawing their ambassadors. Wellington declared England would consider no conditional hypotheses of this type. Alexander, seeing the difficulties of his own project, declared he accepted the French plan to the full. Metternich now intervened with a proposal to specify the exact cases in which the Powers would interfere. The proposal was embodied in a procès verbale, specifying the cases which would produce joint interference;— first, an open attack by the Spanish Government on France; second, dethronement of the king, his trial or similar attempts on him, and his family; last, a formal act attacking the legitimate succession of the royal family. Also the ambassadors were to present a formal demand for a change in the Constitution of 1812, to be made in notes presented to the Spanish Government. They were to demand their passports in case of refusal. Recollections of Castlereagh, as well as the well-known solicitude of England for the safety of the royal family of Spain, seem to have induced the Holy Alliance to hope for the concurrence of Wellington. Metternich had used every effort to win him over, and

is even said, in the last resort, to have attempted to overcome his resistance, by using diplomatists of the type Augustus of Poland once despatched to Charles the Twelfth of Sweden. But Wellington remained firm and, to the utter consternation of the Continental diplomatists, refused to sign not only the *procès verbale* of the 20th Oct. but that of November 17th. . . . He submitted his reasons in manly and energetic language—"Experience has shown that during revolutions the minds of men are influenced by motives of party and faction, and that which is most repugnant to their feelings is *the formal organized interference of foreign powers*, and that the effect is to weaken and endanger the party in whose favour it is exerted." He remonstrated with the Powers on account of the 'highly objectionable' despatches, which they had agreed with France to address to Spain, and because of their proposed withdrawal of ambassadors. The British ambassador would have no part with them but would remain at Madrid, to endeavour to allay the irritation these hostile measures would cause, and to avoid the evil by friendly counsel and assistance. So ended the Congress of Verona. What was the effect of Wellington's protest, and what was the outcome and importance of the Congress? Montmorency stated in his official note of the 26th December that the measures conceived and proposed at Verona 'would have been completely successful, if England had thought herself at liberty to concur in them.' It was indeed the first serious shock to the Holy Alliance, which had disregarded Castlereagh's protests, since they had found the English attitude of isolation no impediment to their suppressing the Neapolitan revolt. But the opposition of Wellington at Verona had been far more pronounced, vigorous and effectual than that of the English envoys at Troppau or Laybach. Alexander's projects were partly checked by him, though partly also by the unwillingness of Villedieu to give a passage to Russian troops through France. . . . The differences between England and the Holy Alliance were not only revealed but proclaimed to the world. The principles of the Patriarchs had received the most emphatic and open denial, and England was launched boldly upon her separate course. As Canning wrote to Frere Aug. 8, 1823: 'The Allies lament themselves heavily at our separation from them; and cannot for their lives imagine that in disclaiming their principles we should have said what we really mean, and should thereafter continue pertinaciously to act as we have said. A little prudery, a little dust for the eyes of the House of Commons they could understand, and some prepared for it—but this real bonafide disapprobation astounds them; and this sturdy adherence to it when nobody is by—when we might just lift the mask, and show our real countenance to them without the world's seeing it—this is really carrying the jest too far—and they can tell us plainly that they wish we would have done, and 'cease our fuming.' The history of all I could tell them in two words—or rather in the substitution of one word for another—for "Alliance" read "England," and you have the clue of my policy.' The importance of Verona is therefore that it marked not, as was intended by Metternich, the beginning, but as was intended by Canning, the close of an epoch."—H. W. V. Temperley, *Life of Canning*, pp. 154-160.—"The development of this principle [of Canning's] as it applied to nations, was illustrated in the strict but watchful neutrality observed between France and Spain; and, as it applied to principles, in the recognition of the independence of the Spanish-American

colonies. The latter act may be regarded as the most important for which Mr. Canning was officially responsible, as that which exerted the widest and most distinct influence over the policy of other countries, and which most clearly and emphatically revealed the tendency of his own. It showed that England would recognize institutions raised up by the people, as well as those which were created by kings. It gave the death-blow to the Holy Alliance." The logic and meaning of Canning's recognition of the Spanish American republics found expression in one famous passage of a brilliant speech which he made in the House of Commons, Dec. 12, 1826, vindicating his foreign policy. "If France," he said, "occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation, that we should blockade Cadiz? No, I looked another way—I sought materials of compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."—R. Bell, *Life of the Right Honorable George Canning*, ch. 13.

ALSO IN: F. H. Hill, *George Canning*, ch. 20.—F. A. Châteaubriand, *Congress of Verona*.—A. Alison, *History of Europe, 1815-1852*, ch. 8 and 12 (v. 1, *Am. ed.*).—S. Walpole, *History of England*, v. 2, ch. 9.—J. A. R. Marriott, *George Canning and his times*.—W. A. Phillips, *George Canning*.

VERONESE, Paolo Cagliari (1528-1588), Venetian painter. See PAINTING: Italian; High Renaissance.


VERRAZANO, Giovanni da (c. 1480-c. 1527), Italian explorer of America. See AMERICA: 1523-1524; 1524; also Map showing voyages of discovery.

VERROCCHIO, Andrea del (1435-1488), Italian painter. See PAINTING: Italian: Early Renaissance.

VERSAILLES, town of northern France, capital of the department of Seine-et-Oise, about twelve miles southwest of Paris. Louis XIII built the chateau on the border of the forest of Versailles. It was converted into a magnificent palace by Louis XIV, in whose reign houses were built for the accommodation of the court which was located there from 1682 to the French Revolution. The town which was thus brought into existence increased in size in the reign of Louis XVI. It had, in 1921, a population of about 64,758. The palace and the famous gardens in which the Great and Little Trianons are situated are national property. Louis XIV "preferred Versailles to his other chateaux, because Fontainebleau, Chambord, Saint-Germain, were existences ready created, which François I. and Henri IV. had stamped with the ineffaceable imprint of their glory: at Versailles, everything was to be made, save the modest beginning left by Louis XIII. . . . At Versailles, everything was to be created, we say,—not only the monuments of art, but nature itself. This solitary elevation of ground, although pleasing enough through the woods and hills that surrounded it, was without great views, without sites, without waters, without inhabitants. . . . The sites would be created by creating an immense landscape by the hand of man; the waters would be brought from the whole country by works which appalled the imagination; the inhabitants would be caused, if we may say so, to spring from the earth, by erecting a whole city for the service of the chateau. Louis would thus make a city of his own, a form of his own, of which he alone would be the life. Versailles and the court would be the

body and soul of one and the same being, both created for the same end, the glorification of the terrestrial God to whom they owed existence. . . . The same idea filled the interior of the palace. Painting deified Louis there under every form, in war and in peace, in the arts and in the administration of the empire; it celebrated his amours as his victories, his passions as his labors. All the heroes of antiquity, all the divinities of classic Olympus, rendered him homage or lent him their attributes in turn. He was Augustus, he was Titus, he was Alexander; he was thundering Jupiter, he was Hercules, the conqueror of monsters; oftener, Apollo, the inspirer of the Muses and the king of enlightenment. Mythology was no longer but a great enigma, to which the name of Louis was the only key; he was all the gods in himself alone. . . . Louis, always served in his desires by

waters of heaven gathered from all the slopes of the heights into the windings of immense conduits from Trappes and Palaiseau to Versailles, these waters of the Seine brought from Marly by gigantic machinery through that aqueduct which commands from afar the valley of the river like a superb Roman ruin, and later, an enterprise far more colossal! that river which was turned aside from its bed and which it was undertaken to bring thirty leagues to Versailles over hills and valleys, cost France grievous efforts and inexhaustible sweats, and swallowed up rivers of gold increasing from year to year. . . . Versailles has cost France dearly, very dearly, nevertheless it is important to historic truth to set aside in this respect too long accredited exaggerations. . . . The accounts, or at least the abstracts of the accounts, of the expenditures of Louis XIV. for building, during the



AERIAL VIEW OF THE PALACE OF VERSAILLES, LOOKING WEST.

In the center are seen the Place d'Armes and the Cour Royale which constitute the approaches to the palace. In the background is the royal park.

the fertility of his age, had found a third artist, Lenotre, to complete Lebrun and Mansart. Thanks to Lenotre, Louis, from the windows of his incomparable gallery of mirrors, saw nought that was not of his own creation. The whole horizon was his work, for his garden was the whole horizon. . . . Whole thickets were brought full-grown from the depths of the finest forests of France, and the arts of animating marble and of moving waters filled them with every prodigy of which the imagination could dream. An innumerable nation of statues peopled the thickets and lawns, was mirrored in the waters, or rose from the bosom of the wave. . . . Louis had done what he wished; he had created about him a little universe, in which he was the only necessary and almost the only real being. But terrestrial gods do not create with a word like the true God. These buildings which stretch across a frontage of twelve hundred yards, the unheard-of luxury of these endless apartments, this incredible multitude of objects of art, these forests transplanted, these

greater part of his reign, have been discovered. The costs of the construction, decoration, and furnishing of Versailles, from 1664 to 1690, including the hydraulic works and the gardens, in addition to the appendages,—that is, Clagny, Trianon, Saint-Cyr, and the two churches of the new city of Versailles,—amount to about one hundred and seven millions, to which must be added a million, or a million and a half perhaps, for the expenses of the years 1661-1663, the accounts of which are not known, and three million two hundred and sixty thousand francs for the sumptuous chapel, which was not built until 1699-1710. The proportion of the mark to the franc having varied under Louis XIV., it is difficult to arrive at an exact reduction to the present currency. . . . The expenses of Versailles would represent to-day more than four hundred millions. This amount is enormous; but it is not monstrous like the twelve hundred millions of which Mirabeau speaks, nor, above all, madly fantastic like the four thousand six hundred millions imagined by Volney.”—



CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1919

Allied peace delegates assembled in the Hall of the Clock, Quai d'Orsay, where the Treaty of Versailles was framed
(After drawing by J. Simon)

The delegates present, indicated by number in the key sketch, are as follows: 1. M. Dutasta, Secretary. 2. M. Bethelot, France. 3. M. Fiehon, France. 4. E. M. House, United States. 5. Lieut. Col. Hanley, Great Britain. 6. President Wilson, United States. 7. Lloyd George, Great Britain. 8. M. Clemenceau, France. 9. A. J. Balfour, Great Britain. 10. H. White, United States. 11. General Tasker Hildreth, United States. 12. Robert Lansing, United States. 13. Viscount Milner, Great Britain. 14. Bonar Law, Great Britain. 15. G. N. Barnes, Great Britain. 16. Lord Robert Cecil, Great Britain. 17. M. Tarbueu, France. 18. Sir B. L. Horden, Canada. 19. France Charon, Samoan States. 20. J. Ward, New Zealand. 21. Phya Bihakh Hoshu, Siam. 22. W. M. Hughes, Australia. 23. L. L. Klotz, France. 24. M. Beres, Czechoslovakia. 25. M. Brodiano, Rumania. 26. General Botha, South Africa. 27. M. Cambon, France. 28. Leon Bourgeois, France. 29. M. Vesnich, Serbia. 30. Roman Dmowski, Poland. 31. M. Paderewski, Poland. 32. General Jan Smuts, South Africa. 33. W. F. Massey, New Zealand. 34. M. Burgon, Panama. 35. Maharajah of Bikaner, India. 36. Lord Sinha, India. 37. Emir Feisal, Arabia. 38. M. Trumbitch, Serbia. 39. N. Pashitch, Serbia. 40. Prince Haidar, Arabia. 41. M. Orlando, Italy. 42. Dr. Moniz, Portugal. 43. Dr. Vilho, Portugal. 44. Baron Mutsu, Japan. 45. Baron Makino, Japan. 46. M. Sonnino, Italy. 47. Marquis Saito, Japan. 48. M. de Alsua, Ecuador. 49. C. D. B. King, Liberia. 50. M. Calderon, Peru. 51. M. Mansour, interpreter. 52. Marquis Ruggi, Italy. 53. M. Guilbaud, Haiti. 54. M. Barzillai, Italy. 55. Marshal Foch, France. 56. M. Politis, Greece. 57. M. Blanco, Uruguay. 58. M. Venizelos, Greece. 59. Lou Tseng Tsing, China. 60. Sao Ke Alfred Sze, China. 61. M. Bustamante, Cuba. 62. M. Montes, Bolivia. 63. M. Mendes, Guatemala. 64. M. Magalhães, Brazil. 65. M. Vanderveide, Belgium. 66. General Weygand, aid to Marshal Foch, France. 67. M. Hymans, Belgium. 68. E. Pessoa, Brazil.

H. Martin, *History of France: Age of Louis XIV*, v. 1, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: L. Ritchie, *Versailles*.

1783.—Treaty by which Great Britain granted independence to the American colonies.—Provisions regarding Honduras. See BRITISH EMPIRE: Treaties promoting expansion: 1783; HONDURAS: 1782-1783.

1789.—Meeting of the French States-General.—Opening scenes of the French Revolution. See FRANCE: 1789 (May), and after.

1870.—Headquarters of the German court and the army besieging Paris. See FRANCE: 1870 (September-October).

1871.—Preliminaries of peace between Germany and France signed. See FRANCE: 1871 (January-May).

1871.—King William of Prussia proclaimed German emperor. See GERMANY: 1871 (January).

1919.—Treaty of peace between the Allied powers and Germany signed. See VERSAILLES, TREATY OF.

VERSAILLES, Treaty of (1783). See BRITISH EMPIRE: Treaties promoting expansion: 1783; HONDURAS: 1782-1783.

VERSAILLES, Treaty of (1919): Conditions of peace dictated to Germany, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919.—Historic document which ended the World War.—The original terms of the peace treaty were handed to the head of the German delegation, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, on May 7, 1919. There followed weeks of discussion and negotiation, during which several changes were made, including the entire revision of the Polish section. (See PARIS, CONFERENCE OF.) The text of the treaty which follows is reproduced from the revised and reprinted version, copies of which, in French and English, were issued by the peace conference to the delegates at the time of the signing of the treaty. The copy that was actually signed by the delegates was placed, with the maps belonging to it, in the archives of France at Paris. With a few exceptions, the delegates given in the preamble are those who signed the treaty. Those who signed for Italy, owing to the fall of the Orlando ministry, were a new group headed by Tittoni, the new minister of foreign affairs. The Chinese delegates refused to sign, because of the Shantung concessions to Japan. The German delegation of Brockdorff-Rantzau withdrew and were replaced by Dr. Hermann Müller and Dr. Johannes Bell, who actually signed for Germany.

The text of the treaty is as follows:

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, AND JAPAN,

These Powers being described in the present Treaty as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers;

BELGIUM, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHINA, CUBA, ECUADOR, GREECE, GUATEMALA, HAITI, THE HEDJAZ, HONDURAS, LIBERIA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, PERU, POLAND, PORTUGAL, RUMANIA, THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE; SIAM, CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, AND URUGUAY,

These Powers constituting with the Principal Powers mentioned above the Allied and Associated Powers,

of the one part;

And GERMANY,

of the other part;

Bearing in mind that on the request of the Imperial German Government an Armistice was

granted on November 11, 1918, to Germany by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in order that a Treaty of Peace might be concluded with her, and

The Allied and Associated Powers being equally desirous that the war in which they were successively involved directly or indirectly, and which originated in the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on July 28, 1914, against Serbia; the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on August 1, 1914, and against France on August 3, 1914, and in the invasion of Belgium, should be replaced by a firm, just, and durable Peace;

For this purpose the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES represented as follows:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, by:

The Honorable Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, acting in his own name and by his own proper authority;

The Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State;

The Honorable Henry White, formerly Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States at Rome and Paris;

The Honorable Edward M. House;

General Tasker H. Bliss, Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme War Council;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA, by:

The Right Honorable David Lloyd George, M. P., First Lord of His Treasury and Prime Minister;

The Right Honorable Andrew Bonar Law, M. P., His Lord Privy Seal;

The Right Honorable Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., His Secretary of State for Colonies;

The Right Honorable Arthur James Balfour, O. M., M. P., His Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The Right Honorable George Nicoll Barnes, M. P., Minister without portfolio;

And

for the DOMINION OF CANADA, by:

The Right Honorable Sir George Eulas Foster, G. C. M. G., Minister of Trade and Commerce;

The Honorable Charles Joseph Doherty, Minister of Justice;

for the COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, by:

The Right Honorable William Morris Hughes, Attorney General and Prime Minister;

The Right Honorable Sir Joseph Cook, G. C. M. G., Minister for the Navy;

for the UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, by:

General the Right Honorable Louis Botha, Minister of Native Affairs, and Prime Minister;

Lieutenant-General the Right Honorable Jan Christiaan Smuts; K. C., Minister of Defence;

for the DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND, by:

The Right Honorable William Ferguson Massey, Minister of Labor and Prime Minister;

for INDIA, by:

The Right Honorable Edwin Samuel Montagu, M. P., His Secretary of State for India;

Major-General His Highness Maharaja Sir Ganga Singh Bahadur, Maharaja of Bikaner, G. C. S. I., G. C. I. E., G. C. V. O., K. C. B., A. D. C.;

- THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, by:
 Mr. Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War;
 Mr. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
 Mr. Louis-Lucien Klotz, Minister of Finance;
 Mr. André Tardieu, Commissary General for Franco-American Military Affairs;
 Mr. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of France;
- HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY, by:
 Mr. V. E. Orlando, President of the Council of Ministers;
 Baron S. Sonnino, Deputy.
 Marquis G. Imperiali, Senator, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy at London;
 Mr. S. Crespi, Deputy.
 Mr. S. Barzilai, Deputy, formerly Minister;
- HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN, by:
 Marquis Sajonji, formerly President of the Council of Ministers;
 Baron Makino, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Diplomatic Council;
 Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of H. M. the Emperor of Japan at London;
 Mr. K. Matsui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of H. M. the Emperor of Japan at Paris;
 Mr. H. Ijuin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of H. M. the Emperor of Japan at Rome;
- HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE BELGIANS, by:
 Mr. Paul Hymans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of State;
 Mr. Jules van den Heuvel, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Minister of State;
 Mr. Emile Vandervelde, Minister of Justice, Minister of State;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA, by:
 Mr. Ismael Montes, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia at Paris;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, by:
 Mr. João Pandiá Calogeras, Deputy, formerly Minister of Finance;
 Mr. Raul Fernandes, Deputy;
 Mr. Rodrigo Octavio de L. Menezes, Professor of International Law of Rio de Janeiro;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC, by:
 Mr. Lou Tseng-Tsiang, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
 Mr. Chenting Thomas Wang, formerly Minister of Agriculture and Commerce;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC, by:
 Mr. Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante, Dean of the Faculty of Law in the University of Havana, President of the Cuban Society of International Law;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, by:
 Mr. Enrique Dorn y de Alsúa, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Ecuador at Paris;
- HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE HELLENES [GREECE], by:
 Mr. Eleutherios K. Venizelos, President of the Council of Ministers;
 Mr. Nicolas Politis, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA, by:
 Mr. Joaquin Méndez, formerly Minister of State for Public Works and Public Instruction, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Guatemala at Washington, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on special mission at Paris;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, by:
 Mr. Tertullien Guilbaud, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Haiti at Paris;
- HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE HEDJAZ, by:
 Mr. Rustem Haidar;
 Mr. Abdul Hadi Aouni;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS, by:
 Dr. Policarpo Bonilla, on special mission to Washington, formerly President of the Republic of Honduras, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, by:
 The Honourable Charles Dunbar Burgess King, Secretary of State;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA, by:
 Mr. Salvador Chamorro, President of the Chamber of Deputies;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA, by:
 Mr. Antonio Burgos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Panama at Madrid;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PERU, by:
 Mr. Carlos G. Candamo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru at Paris;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC, by:
 Mr. Ignace J. Paderewski, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
 Mr. Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC, by:
 Dr. Affonso Augusto Da Costa, formerly President of the Council of Ministers;
 Dr. Augusto Luiz Viera Soares, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs;
- HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ROUMANIA, by:
 Mr. Ion I. C. Bratiano, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
 General Constantin Coanda, Corps Commander, A. D. C. to the King, formerly President of the Council of Ministers;
- HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE SERBS, THE CROATS, AND THE SLOVENES, by:
 Mr. Nicolas P. Pachitch, formerly President of the Council of Ministers;
 Mr. Ante Trumbitch, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
 Mr. Milenko Vesnitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of H. M. the King of the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes at Paris;
- HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SIAM, by:
 His Highness Prince Charoon, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of H. M. the King of Siam at Paris;
 His Serene Highness Prince Traidos Prabandhu, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC, by:
 Mr. Karel Krámař, President of the Council of Ministers;
 Mr. Eduard Beneš, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY, by:
 Mr. Juan Antonio Buero, Minister for Foreign Affairs, formerly Minister of Industry;

GERMANY, by:

Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Empire;
 Dr. Landsberg, Minister of Justice of the Empire;
 Mr. Giesberts, Minister of Posts of the Empire;
 Oberbürgermeister Leinert, President of the Prussian National Assembly;
 Dr. Schücking;
 Dr. Karl Melchior;

Acting in the name of the German Empire and of each and every component State,

WHO having communicated their full powers found in good and due form HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war will terminate. From that moment and subject to the provisions of this treaty official relations with Germany and with any of the German States will be resumed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Part I.—The Covenant of the League of Nations

[See LEAGUE OF NATIONS.]

Part II.—Boundaries of Germany

Article 27. The boundaries of Germany will be determined as follows:

1. *With Belgium:* From the point common to the three frontiers of Belgium, Holland, and Germany, and in a southerly direction; the northeastern boundary of the former territory of neutral Moresnet, then the eastern boundary of the Kreis of Eupen, then the frontier between Belgium and the Kreis of Montjoie, then the northeastern and eastern boundary of the Kreis of Malmédy to its junction with the frontier of Luxemburg.

2. *With Luxemburg:* The frontier of the 3d August, 1914, to its junction with the frontier of France of the 18th July, 1870.

3. *With France:* The frontier of the 18th July, 1870, from Luxemburg to Switzerland, with the reservations made in Article 48 of Section 4 (Sarre Basin) of Part III.

4. *With Switzerland:* The present frontier.

5. *With Austria:* The frontier of the 3d August, 1914, from Switzerland to Czechoslovakia is hereinafter defined.

6. *With Czecho-Slovakia:* The frontier of the 3d August, 1914, between Germany and Austria from its junction with the old administrative boundary separating Bohemia and the Province of Upper Austria to the point north of the salient of the old Province of Austrian Silesia situated at about eight kilometers east of Neustadt.

7. *With Poland:* [Here follow a large number of place names; several of these have since become the cause of dispute.] . . .

8. *With Denmark:* The frontier as it will be fixed in accordance with Articles 109 and 110 of Part III, Section XII, (Schleswig.)

Art. 28. The boundaries of East Prussia with the reservations made in Section IX (East Prussia) of Part III will be determined . . . [names of places marking the new boundaries].

Art. 29. The boundaries as described above are drawn in red on a one-in-a-million map which is annexed to the present treaty. In the case of any discrepancies between the text of the treaty and this map or any other map which may be annexed, the text will be final.

Art. 30. In the case of boundaries which are defined by a waterway, the terms "course" and "channel" used in the present treaty signify: in the case of non-navigable rivers, the median line of the waterways or of its principal arm, and in the case of navigable rivers the median line of the principal channel of navigation. It will rest with the boundary commissions provided by the present treaty to specify in each case whether the frontier line shall follow any changes of the course or channel which may take place or whether it shall be definitely fixed by the position of the course or channel at the time when the present treaty comes into force.

Part III.—Political Clauses for Europe

SECTION I.—BELGIUM

Art. 31. Germany, recognizing that the treaties of April 19, 1839, which established the status of Belgium before the war, no longer conform to the requirements of the situation, consents to the abrogation of the said treaties and undertakes immediately to recognize and to observe whatever conventions may be entered into by the principal allied and associated powers, or by any of them in concert with the Governments of Belgium and of the Netherlands, to replace the said treaties of 1839. If her formal adhesion should be required to such conventions or to any of their stipulations, Germany undertakes immediately to give it.

Art. 32. Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Belgium over the whole of the contested territory of Moresnet, (called Moresnet Neutre.)

Art. 33. Germany renounces in favor of Belgium all rights and title over the territory of Prussian Moresnet situated on the west of the road from Liège to Aix-la-Chapelle: the road will belong to Belgium where it bounds this territory.

Art. 34. Germany renounces in favor of Belgium all rights and title over the territory comprising the whole of the Kreise of Eupen and of Malmédy. During the six months after the coming into force of this treaty, registers will be opened by the Belgian authorities at Eupen and Malmédy in which the inhabitants of the above territory will be entitled to record in writing a desire to see the whole or part of it remain under Germany sovereignty. The results of this public expression of opinion will be communicated by the Belgian Government to the League of Nations, and Belgium undertakes to accept the decision of the League.

Art. 35. A commission of seven persons, five of whom will be appointed by the principal allied and associated powers, one by Germany and one by Belgium, will be set up fifteen days after the coming into force of the present treaty to settle on the spot the new frontier line between Belgium and Germany, taking into account the economic factors and the means of communication. Decisions will be taken by a majority and will be binding on the parties concerned.

Art. 36. When the transfer of the sovereignty over the territories referred to above has become definitive, German nationals habitually resident in the territories will definitely acquire Belgian nationality ipso facto, and will lose their German nationality. Nevertheless German nationals who become resident in the territories after the 1st August, 1914, shall not obtain Belgian nationality without a permit from the Belgian Government.

Art. 37. Within the two years following the definitive transfer of the sovereignty over the territories assigned to Belgium under the present treaty, German nationals over 18 years of age habitually

resident in those territories will be entitled to opt for German nationality. Option by a husband will cover his wife, and option by parents will cover their children under 18 years of age. Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must within the ensuing twelve months transfer their place of residence to Germany. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in the territories acquired by Belgium. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export or import duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

Art. 38. The German Government will hand over without delay to the Belgian Government the archives, registers, plans, title deeds and documents of every kind concerning the civil, military, financial, judicial or other administrations in the territory transferred to Belgian sovereignty. The German Government will likewise restore to the Belgian Government the archives and documents of every kind carried off during the war by the German authorities from the Belgian public administrations, in particular from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Brussels.

Art. 39. The proportion and nature of the financial liabilities of Germany and of Prussia which Belgium will have to bear on account of the territories ceded to her shall be fixed in conformity with Articles 254 and 256 of Part IX (financial clauses) of the present treaty.

SECTION II.—LUXEMBURG

Art. 40. With regard to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, Germany renounces the benefit of all the provisions inserted in her favor in the treaties of Feb. 8, 1842, April 2, 1847, Oct. 20-25, 1865, Aug. 18, 1866, Feb. 21 and May 11, 1867, May 10, 1871, June 11, 1872, and Nov. 11, 1902, and in all conventions consequent upon such treaties. Germany recognizes that the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg ceased to form part of the German Zollverein as from Jan. 1, 1919; renounces all right to the exploitation of the railways, adheres to the termination of the régime of neutrality of the Grand Duchy, and accepts in advance all international arrangements which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers relating to the Grand Duchy.

Art. 41. Germany undertakes to grant to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, when a demand to that effect is made to her by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the rights and advantages stipulated in favor of such powers or their nationals in the present treaty, with regard to economic questions, to questions relative to transport and to aerial navigation.

SECTION III.—LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

Art. 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine.

Art. 43. In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

Art. 44. In case Germany violates in any manner the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

SECTION IV.—SARRE BASIN

Art. 45. As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the North of France and as part payment toward the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any kind, the coal mines situated in the Sarre Basin as defined in Article 48.

Art. 46. In order to assure the rights and welfare of the population and to guarantee to France complete freedom in working the mines, Germany agrees to the provisions of Chapters 1 and 2 of the annex hereto.

Art. 47. In order to make in due time permanent provision for the government of the Sarre Basin in accordance with the wishes of the population, France and Germany agree to the provisions of Chapter 3 of the annex hereto.

Art. 48. The boundaries of the territory of the Sarre Basin, as dealt with in the present stipulations, will be fixed. . . . [Here follows delimitation of frontiers.] A commission composed of five members, one appointed by France, one by Germany, and three by the Council of the League of Nations, which will select nationals of other powers, will be constituted within fifteen days from the coming into force of the present treaty, to trace on the spot the frontier line described below. . . . The decisions of this commission will be taken by a majority and will be binding on the parties concerned.

Art. 49. Germany renounces in favor of the League of Nations, in the capacity of trustee, the government of the territory defined above. At the end of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present treaty the inhabitants of the said territory shall be called upon to indicate the sovereignty under which they desire to be placed.

Art. 50. The stipulations under which the cession of the mines in the Sarre Basin shall be carried out, together with the measures intended to guarantee the rights and the well-being of the inhabitants and the government of the territory, as well as the conditions in accordance with which the plebiscite hereinbefore provided for is to be made, are laid down in the annex hereto. This annex shall be considered as an integral part of the present treaty, and Germany declares her adherence to it.

ANNEX

In accordance with the provisions of Articles 45 to 50 of the present treaty, the stipulations under which the cession by Germany to France of the mines of the Sarre Basin will be effected, as well as the measures intended to insure respect for the rights and well-being of the population and the government of the territory, and the conditions in which the inhabitants will be called upon to indicate the sovereignty under which they may wish to be placed, have been laid down as follows:

Chapter I.—Cession and Exploitation of Mining Property

1. From the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, all the deposits of coal situated within the Sarre Basin, as defined in Article 48 of the said treaty, become the complete and absolute property of the French State. The French State will have the right of working or not working the said mines or of transferring to a third party the

right of working them, without having to obtain any previous authorization or to fulfill any formalities. The French State may always require that the German mining laws and regulations referred to below shall be applied in order to insure the determination of its rights.

2. The right of ownership of the French State will apply not only to the deposits which are free, and for which concessions have not yet been granted, but also to the deposits for which concessions have already been granted, whoever may be the present proprietors, irrespective of whether they belong to the Prussian State, to the Bavarian State, to other States or bodies, to companies or to individuals, whether they have been worked or not, or whether a right of exploitation distinct from the right of the owners of the surface of the soil has or has not been recognized.

3. As far as concerns the mines which are being worked, the transfer of the ownership to the French State will apply to all the accessories and subsidiaries of the said mines, in particular to their plant and equipment both on and below the surface . . . and in general everything which those who own or exploit the mines possess or enjoy for the purpose of exploiting the mines and their accessories and subsidiaries. The transfer will apply also to the debts owing for products delivered before the entry into possession by the French State, and after the signature of the present treaty, and to deposits of money made by customers, whose rights will be guaranteed by the French State.

4. The French State will acquire the property free and clear of all debts and charges. Nevertheless the rights acquired, or in course of being acquired, by the employes of the mines and their accessories and subsidiaries at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, in connection with pensions for old age or disability, will not be affected. In return, Germany must pay over to the French State a sum representing the actuarial amounts to which the said employes are entitled.

5. The value of the property thus ceded to the French State will be determined by the Reparation Commission referred to in Article 233 of Part VIII (Reparations) of the present treaty. This value shall be credited to Germany in part payment of the amount due for reparation. It will be for Germany to indemnify the proprietors or parties concerned, whoever they may be.

6. No tariff shall be established on the German railways and canals which may directly or indirectly discriminate to the prejudice of the transport of the personnel or products of the mines and their accessories or subsidiaries, or of the material necessary to their exploitation. . . .

7. The equipment and personnel necessary to insure the dispatch and transport of the products of the mines and their accessories and subsidiaries, as well as the carriage of workmen and employes, will be provided by the local railway administration of the basin.

8. No obstacle shall be placed in the way of such improvements of railways or waterways as the French State may judge necessary to assure the dispatch and transport of the products of the mines and their accessories and subsidiaries. . . . The distribution of expenses will, in the event of disagreement, be submitted to arbitration. The French State may also establish any new means of communication . . . which it may consider necessary for the exploitation of the mines. It may exploit freely and without any restrictions the means of communication of which it may become the owner, particularly those connecting the mines

and their accessories and subsidiaries with the means of communication situated in French territory.

9. The French State shall always be entitled to demand the application of the German mining laws and regulations in force on the 11th November, 1918, excepting provisions adopted exclusively in view of the state of war, with a view to the acquisition of such land as it may judge necessary for the exploitation of the mines and their accessories and subsidiaries. The payment for damage caused to immovable property by the working of the said mines and their accessories and subsidiaries shall be made in accordance with the German mining laws and regulations above referred to.

10. Every person whom the French State may substitute for itself as regards the whole or part of its rights to the exploitation of the mines and their accessories and subsidiaries shall enjoy the benefit of the privileges provided in this annex.

11. The mines and other immovable property which become the property of the French State may never be made the subject of measures of forfeiture, forced sale, expropriation or requisition, nor of any other measure affecting the right of property. The personnel and the plant connected with the exploitation of these mines or their accessories and subsidiaries, as well as the product extracted from the mines or manufactured in their accessories and subsidiaries, may not at any time be made the subject of any measures of requisition.

12. The exploitation of the mines and their accessories and subsidiaries, which become the property of the French State, will continue, subject to the provisions of Paragraph 23 below, to be subject to the régime established by the German laws and regulations in force on the 11th November, 1918, excepting provisions adopted exclusively in view of the state of war. The rights of the workmen shall be similarly maintained, subject to the provisions of the said Paragraph 23, as established on the 11th November, 1918, by the German laws and regulations above referred to. No impediment shall be placed in the way of the introduction or employment in the mines and their accessories and subsidiaries of workmen from without the basin. The employes and workmen of French nationality shall have the right to belong to French labor unions.

13. The amount contributed by the mines and their accessories and subsidiaries, either to the local budget of the territory of the Sarre Basin or to the communal funds, shall be fixed with due regard to the ratio of the value of the mines to the total taxable wealth of the basin.

14. The French State shall always have the right of establishing and maintaining, as incidental to the mines, primary or technical schools for its employes and their children, and of causing instruction therein to be given in the French language, in accordance with such curriculum and by such teachers as it may select. It shall also have the right to establish and maintain hospitals, dispensaries, workmen's houses and gardens, and other charitable and social institutions.

15. The French State shall enjoy complete liberty with respect to the distribution, dispatch, and sale prices of the products of the mines and their accessories and subsidiaries. Nevertheless, whatever may be the total product of the mines, the French Government undertakes that the requirements of local consumption for industrial and domestic purposes shall always be satisfied in the proportion existing in 1913 between the amount consumed locally and the total output of the Sarre Basin.

Chapter II.—Government of the Territory of the Sarre Basin

16. The government of the territory of the Sarre Basin shall be intrusted to a commission representing the League of Nations. This commission shall sit in the territory of the Sarre Basin.

17. The Governing Commission provided for by Paragraph 16 shall consist of five members chosen by the Council of the League of Nations, and will include one citizen of France, one native inhabitant of the Sarre Basin not a citizen of France, and three members belonging to three countries other than France or Germany. The members of the Governing Commission shall be appointed for one year and may be reappointed. They can be removed by the Council of the League of Nations, which will provide for their replacement. The members of the Governing Commission will be entitled to a salary which will be fixed by the Council of the League of Nations, and charged on the local revenues.

18. The Chairman of the Governing Commission shall be appointed for one year from among the members of the commission by the Council of the League of Nations and may be reappointed. The Chairman will act as the executive of the commission.

19. Within the territory of the Sarre Basin the Governing Commission shall have all the powers of government hitherto belonging to the German Empire, Prussia or Bavaria, including the appointment and dismissal of officials, and the creation of such administrative and representative bodies as it may deem necessary. It shall have full powers to administer and operate the railways, canals, and the different public services. Its decisions shall be taken by a majority.

20. Germany will place at the disposal of the Governing Commission all official documents and archives under the control of Germany, of any German State, or of any local authority, which relate to the territory of the Sarre Basin or to the rights of the inhabitants thereof.

21. It will be the duty of the Governing Commission to insure the protection abroad of the interests of the inhabitants of the territory of the Sarre Basin.

22. The Governing Commission shall have the full right of user of property, other than mines, belonging, both in public and in private domain, to the Imperial German Government, or to the Government of any German State, in the territory of the Sarre Basin. As regards the railways, an equitable apportionment of rolling stock shall be made by a mixed commission on which the government of the territory of the Sarre Basin and the German railways will be represented. Persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and mails, coming from or going to the Sarre Basin, shall enjoy all the rights and privileges relating to transit and transport which are specified in the provisions of Part XII (ports, waterways, railways) of the present treaty.

23. The laws and regulations in force on Nov. 11, 1918, in the territory of the Sarre Basin, (except those enacted in consequence of the state of war,) shall continue to apply. If . . . it is necessary to introduce modifications, these shall be decided on, and put into effect by the Governing Commission, after consultation with the elected representatives of the inhabitants in such a manner as the commission may determine. No modification may be made in the legal régime for the exploitation of the mines, provided for in Paragraph 12, without the French State being previ-

ously consulted, unless such modification results from a general regulation respecting labor adopted by the League of Nations. In fixing the conditions and hours of labor for men, women, and children, the Governing Commission is to take into consideration the wishes expressed by the local labor organizations, as well as the principles adopted by the League of Nations.

24. Subject to the provisions of Paragraph 4, no rights of the inhabitants of the Sarre Basin acquired or in process of acquisition at the date of the coming into force of this treaty, in respect of any insurance system of Germany, or in respect of any pension of any kind, are affected by any of the provisions of the present treaty. Germany and the Government of the territory of the Sarre Basin will preserve and continue all of the aforesaid rights.

25. The civil and criminal courts existing in the territory of the Sarre Basin shall continue. A civil and criminal court will be established by the Governing Commission to hear appeals from the decisions of the said courts, and to decide matters for which these courts are not competent. The Governing Commission will be responsible for settling the organization and jurisdiction of the said court. Justice will be rendered in the name of the Governing Commission.

26. The Governing Commission will alone have the power of levying taxes and dues in the territory of the Sarre Basin [same to] be exclusively applied to the needs of the territory. The fiscal system existing on Nov. 11, 1918, will be maintained as far as possible, and no new tax except customs duties may be imposed without previously consulting the elected representatives of the inhabitants.

27. The present stipulations will not affect the existing nationality of the inhabitants of the territory of the Sarre Basin. No hindrance shall be placed in the way of those who wish to acquire a different nationality, but in such case the acquisition of the new nationality will involve the loss of any other.

28. Under the control of the Governing Commission the inhabitants will retain their local assemblies, their religious liberties, their schools, and their language. The right of voting will not be exercised for any assemblies other than the local assemblies, and will belong to every inhabitant over the age of 20 years without distinction of sex.

29. Any of the inhabitants of the Sarre Basin who may desire to leave the territory will have full liberty to retain in it their immovable property or to sell it at fair prices and to remove their movable property free of any charges.

30. There will be no military service, whether compulsory or voluntary, in the territory of the Sarre Basin, and the construction of fortifications therein is forbidden. Only a local gendarmerie for the maintenance of order may be established. It will be the duty of the Governing Commission to provide in all cases for the protection of persons and property in the Sarre Basin.

31. The territory of the Sarre Basin as defined by Article 48 of the present treaty shall be subjected to the French customs régime. . . . No export tax shall be imposed upon metallurgical products or coal exported from the said territory to Germany, nor upon German exports for the use of the industries of the territory of the Sarre Basin. Natural or manufactured products originating in the basin in transit over German territory and similarly German products in transit over the territory of the basin shall be free of all customs

duties. Products which both originate in and pass from the basin into Germany shall be free of import duties for a period of five years from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, and during the same period articles imported from Germany into the territory of the basin for local consumption shall likewise be free of import duties. During these five years the French Government reserves to itself the right of limiting to the annual average of the quantities imported into Alsace-Lorraine and France in the years 1911 to 1913 the quantities which may be sent into France of all articles coming from the basin, which include raw materials and semi-manufactured goods imported duty free from Germany.

32. No prohibition or restriction shall be imposed upon the circulation of French money in the territory of the Sarre Basin. The French State shall have the right to use French money in all purchases, payments, and contracts connected with the exploitation of the mines or their accessories and subsidiaries.

33. The Governing Commission shall have power to decide all questions arising from the interpretation of the preceding provisions, and the decision of a majority of the commission shall be binding on both countries.

Chapter III.—Plebiscite

34. At the termination of a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present treaty, the population of the territory of the Sarre Basin will be called upon to indicate their desires in the following manner: A vote will take place, by communes or districts, on the three following alternatives: (a) Maintenance of the régime established by the present treaty and by this annex; (b) union with France; (c) union with Germany. All persons without distinction of sex, more than 20 years old at the date of the voting, resident in the territory at the date of the signature of the present treaty, will have the right to vote. The other conditions, methods, and the date of the voting shall be fixed by the Council of the League of Nations in such a way as to secure the liberty, secrecy, and trustworthiness of the voting.

35. The League of Nations shall decide on the sovereignty under which the territory is to be placed, taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants as expressed by the voting. (a) . . . It will be the duty of the League of Nations to take appropriate steps to adapt the régime definitely adopted to the permanent welfare of the territory and the general interests. (b) If for the whole or part of the territory the League of Nations decides in favor of union with France, Germany hereby agrees to cede to France in accordance with the decision of the League of Nations all rights and title over the territory specified by the League. (c) If for the whole or part of the territory the League of Nations decides in favor of union with Germany, it will be the duty of the League of Nations to cause the German Government to be re-established in the government of the territory specified by the League.

36. If the League of Nations decides in favor of the union of the whole or part of the territory of the Sarre Basin with Germany, France's rights of ownership in the mines situated in such part of the territory will be repurchased by Germany in their entirety at a price payable in gold. The price to be paid will be fixed by three experts, one nominated by Germany, one by France, and one, who shall be neither a Frenchman nor a German,

by the Council of the League of Nations. The decision of the experts will be given by a majority. The obligation of Germany to make such payment shall be taken into account by the Reparation Commission, and for the purpose of this payment Germany may create a prior charge upon her assets or revenues upon such detailed terms as shall be agreed to by the Reparation Commission.

If, nevertheless, Germany after a period of one year from the date on which the payment becomes due shall not have effected the said payment, the Reparation Commission shall do so in accordance with such instructions as may be given by the League of Nations, and, if necessary, by liquidating that part of the mines which is in question.

37. If, in consequence of the repurchase provided for in Paragraph 36, the ownership of the mines or any part of them is transferred to Germany, the French State and French nationals shall have the right to purchase such amount of coal of the Sarre Basin as their industrial and domestic needs are found at that time to require. . . .

38. It is understood that France and Germany may, by special agreements concluded before the time fixed for the payment of the price for the repurchase of the mines, modify the provisions of Paragraphs 36 and 37.

39. The Council of the League of Nations shall make such provisions as may be necessary for the establishment of the régime which is to take effect after the decisions of the League of Nations mentioned in Paragraph 35 have become operative, including an equitable apportionment of any obligations of the Government of the territory of the Sarre Basin arising from loans raised by the commission or from other causes. From the coming into force of the new régime, the powers of the Governing Commission will terminate, except in the case provided for in Paragraph 35 (a).

40. In all matters dealt with in the present annex, the decisions of the Council of the League of Nations will be taken by a majority.

SECTION V.—ALSACE-LORRAINE

The HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, recognizing the moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871, both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of Alsace and Lorraine, which were separated from their country in spite of solemn protests of their representatives at the Assembly of Bordeaux, agree upon the following articles:

Art. 51. The territories which were ceded to Germany in accordance with the preliminaries of peace signed at Versailles on the 26th of February, 1871, and the treaty of Frankfurt on the 10th May, 1871, are restored to French sovereignty as from the date of the armistice of the 11th November, 1918. The provisions of the treaties establishing the delimitation of the frontiers before 1871 shall be restored.

Art. 52. The German Government shall hand over without delay to the French Government all archives, registers, plans, titles, and documents of every kind concerning the civil, military, financial, judicial, or other administrations of the territories restored to French sovereignty. If any of these documents, archives, registers, titles, or plans have been misplaced, they will be restored by the German Government on the demand of the French Government.

Art. 53. Separate agreements shall be made between France and Germany dealing with the in-

terests of the inhabitants of the territories referred to in Article 51, particularly as regards their civil rights, their business and the exercise of their professions, it being understood that Germany undertakes as from the present date to recognize and accept the regulations laid down in the annex hereto regarding the nationality of the inhabitants or natives of the said territories, not to claim at any time or in any place whatsoever as German nationals those who shall have been declared on any ground to be French, to receive all others in her territory, and to conform, as regards the property of German nationals in the territories indicated in Article 51, with the provisions of Article 297, and the Annex to Section 4 of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty. Those German nationals who without acquiring French nationality shall receive permission from the French Government to reside in the said territories shall not be subjected to the provisions of the said article.

Art. 54. Those persons who have regained French nationality in virtue of Paragraph 1 of the annex hereto, will be held to be Alsace-Lorrainers for the purposes of the present section. The persons referred to in Paragraph 2 of the said annex will, from the day on which they have claimed French nationality, be held to be Alsace-Lorrainers with retroactive effect as from the 11th November, 1918. From those whose application is rejected, the privilege will terminate at the date of the refusal. Such juridical persons will also have the status of Alsace-Lorrainers as have been recognized as possessing this quality, whether by the French administrative authorities or by a judicial decision.

Art. 55. The territories referred to in Article 51 shall return to France, free and quit of all public debts under the conditions laid down in Article 255 of Part IX (financial clauses) of the present treaty.

Art. 56. In conformity with the provisions of Article 256 of Part IX (financial clauses) of the present treaty, France shall enter into possession of all property and estate within the territories referred to in Article 51, which belong to the German Empire or German States, without any payment or credit on this account to any of the States ceding the territories. This provision applies to all movable or immovable property of public or private domain, together with all rights whatsoever belonging to the German Empire or the German States or to their administrative areas. Crown property and the property of the former Emperor or other German sovereigns shall be assimilated to property of the public domain.

Art. 57. Germany shall not take any action, either by means of stamping or by any other legal or administrative measures not applying equally to the rest of her territory, which may be to the detriment of the legal value or redeemability of German monetary instruments or moneys which at the date of the signature of the present treaty are legally current, and at that date are in possession of the French Government.

Art. 58. A special convention will determine the conditions for repayment in marks of the exceptional war expenditure advanced during the course of the war by Alsace-Lorraine or by public bodies in Alsace-Lorraine on account of the empire in accordance with German law, such as payment to the families of persons mobilized, requisitions, billeting of troops, and assistance to persons who have been expelled. In fixing the amount of these sums Germany shall be credited with that portion which Alsace-Lorraine would have contributed to

the empire to meet the expenses resulting from these payments, this contribution being calculated according to the proportion of the imperial revenues derived from Alsace-Lorraine in 1913.

Art. 59. The French Government will collect for its own account the imperial taxes, duties, and dues of every kind leviable in the territories referred to in Article 51 and not collected at the time of the armistice of the 11th November, 1918.

Art. 60. The German Government shall without delay restore to Alsace-Lorrainers, (individuals, juridical persons, and public institutions,) all property, rights, and interests belonging to them on the 11th November, 1918, in so far as these are situated in German territory.

Art. 61. The German Government undertakes to continue and complete without delay the execution of the financial clauses regarding Alsace-Lorraine contained in the armistice conventions.

Art. 62. The German Government undertakes to bear the expense of all civil and military pensions which had been earned in Alsace-Lorraine on the date of the 11th November, 1918, and the maintenance of which was a charge on the budget of the German Empire. The German Government shall furnish each year the funds necessary for the payment in francs, at the average rate of exchange for that year, of the sums in marks to which persons resident in Alsace-Lorraine would have been entitled if Alsace-Lorraine had remained under German jurisdiction.

Art. 63. For the purposes of the obligation assumed by Germany in Part VIII (reparations) of the present treaty to give compensation for damages caused to the civil populations of the Allied and Associated countries in the form of fines, the inhabitants of the territories referred to in Article 51 shall be assimilated to the above mentioned populations.

Art. 64. The regulations concerning the control of the Rhine and of the Moselle are laid down in Part XII (ports, waterways, and railways) of the present treaty.

Art. 65. Within a period of three weeks after the coming into force of the present treaty the port of Strasbourg and the port of Kehl shall be constituted, for a period of seven years, a single unit from the point of view of exploitation. The administration of this single unit will be carried on by a manager named by the Central Rhine Commission, which shall also have power to remove him. He shall be of French nationality. He will reside in Strasbourg and will be subject to the supervision of the Central Rhine Commission. There will be established in the two ports free zones in conformity with Part XII (ports, waterways, and railways) of the present treaty. A special convention between France and Germany, which shall be submitted to the approval of the Central Rhine Commission, will fix the details of this organization, particularly as regards finance. . . . All property rights shall be safeguarded. In particular, the administration of the ports shall not prejudice any property rights of the French or Baden railroads. Equality of treatment as respects traffic shall be assured in both ports to the nationals, vessels, and goods of every country.

In case at the end of the sixth year France shall consider that the progress made in the improvement of the Port of Strasbourg still requires a prolongation of this temporary régime, she may ask for such prolongation from the Central Rhine Commission, which may grant an extension for a period not exceeding three years. Throughout the

whole period of any such extension the free zones above provided for shall be maintained.

Pending appointment of the first manager by the Central Rhine Commission, a provisional manager, who shall be of French nationality, may be appointed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, subject to the foregoing provisions. For all purposes of the present article the Central Rhine Commission will decide by a majority of votes.

Art. 66. The railway and other bridges across the Rhine now existing within the limits of Alsace-Lorraine shall, as to all their parts and their whole length, be the property of the French State, which shall insure their upkeep.

Art. 67. The French Government is substituted in all the rights of the German Empire over all the railways which were administered by the Imperial Railway Administration, and which are actually working or under construction. The same shall apply to the rights of the empire with regard to railway and tramway concessions within the territories referred to in Article 51. This substitution shall not entail any payment on the part of the French State. The frontier railway stations shall be established by a subsequent agreement, it being stipulated in advance that on the Rhine frontier they shall be situated on the right bank.

Art. 68. In accordance with the provisions of Article 268 of Chapter I of Section I of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty, for a period of five years from the coming into force of the present treaty, natural or manufactured products originating in and coming from the territories referred to in Article 51 shall, on importation into German customs territory, be exempt from all customs duty. The French Government shall fix each year, by decree communicated to the German Government, the nature and amount of the products which shall enjoy this exemption. The amount of each product which may be thus sent annually into Germany shall not exceed the average of the amounts sent annually in the years 1911-1913. Further, during the period of five years above mentioned, the German Government shall allow the free export from Germany and the free reimportation into Germany, exempt from all customs duties and other charges, (including internal charges,) of yarns, tissues, and other textile materials or textile products of any kind, and in any condition, sent from Germany into the territories referred to in Article 51, to be subjected there to any finishing process. . . .

Art. 69. During a period of ten years from the coming into force of the present treaty, central electric supply works situated in German territory, and formerly furnishing electric power to the territories referred to in Article 51, or to any establishment the working of which passes permanently or temporarily from Germany to France, shall be required to continue such supply up to the amount of consumption corresponding to the undertakings and contracts current on the 11th November, 1918. Such supply shall be furnished according to the contracts in force and at a rate which shall not be higher than that paid to the said works by German nationals.

Art. 70. It is understood that the French Government preserves its right to prohibit in the future in the territories referred to in Article 51 all new German participation. 1. In the management or exploitation of the public domain and of public services, such as railways, navigable waterways, water works, gas works, electric power, &c. 2. In the ownership of mines and quarries of every

kind and in enterprises connected therewith. 3. In metallurgical establishments, even though their working may not be connected with that of any mine.

Art. 71. As regards the territories referred to in Article 51, Germany renounces on behalf of herself and her nationals as from the 11th November, 1918, all rights under the law of the 25th May, 1910, regarding the trade in potash salts and generally under any stipulations for the intervention of German organizations in the working of the potash mines. Similarly she renounces on behalf of herself and her nationals all rights under any agreements, stipulations or laws, which may exist to her benefit with regard to other products of the aforesaid territories.

Art. 72. The settlement of the questions relating to debts contracted before the 11th November, 1918, between the German Empire and the German States or their nationals residing in Germany on the one part, and Alsace-Lorrainers residing in Alsace-Lorraine on the other part, shall be effected in accordance with the provisions of Section III of part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty, the expression "before the war" therein being replaced by the expression "before the 11th November, 1918." The rate of exchange applicable in the case of such settlement shall be the average rate quoted on the Geneva Exchange during the month preceding the 11th November, 1918. There may be established in the territories referred to in Article 51, for the settlement of the aforesaid debts under the conditions laid down in Section III of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty, a special clearing office, it being understood that his office shall be regarded as a "central office" under the provisions of Paragraph 1 of the annex to the said section.

Art. 73. The private property rights and interests of Alsace-Lorrainers in Germany will be regulated by the stipulations of Section IV of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty.

Art. 74. The French Government reserves the right to retain and liquidate all the property, rights and interests which German nationals or societies controlled by Germany possessed in the territories referred to in Article 51 on Nov. 11, 1918, subject to the conditions laid down in the last paragraph of Article 53 above. Germany will directly compensate its nationals who may have been dispossessed by the aforesaid liquidations. The product of these liquidations shall be applied in accordance with the stipulations of Sections III and IV of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty.

Art. 75. Notwithstanding the stipulations of Section V of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty, all contracts made before the date of the promulgation in Alsace-Lorraine of the French decree of 30th November, 1918, between Alsace-Lorrainers (whether individuals or juridical persons) or others resident in Alsace-Lorraine on the one part, and the German Empire or German States and their nationals resident in Germany on the other part, the execution of which has been suspended by the armistice or by subsequent French legislation, shall be maintained. Nevertheless, any contract of which the French Government shall notify the cancellation to Germany in the general interest within a period of six months from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty shall be annulled except in respect of any debt or other pecuniary obligation arising out of any act done or money paid thereunder before the 11th November, 1918. If this dissolution would cause one of the parties substantial prejudice, equitable

compensation, calculated solely on the capital employed without taking account of loss of profits, shall be accorded to the prejudiced party.

With regard to prescriptions, limitations, and forfeitures in Alsace-Lorraine, the provisions of Articles 300 and 301 of Section V Part X (economic clauses) shall be applied, with the substitution for the expression "outbreak of war" of the expression "11th November, 1918," and for the expression "duration of the war" of the expression "period from the 11th November, 1918, to date of the coming into force of the present treaty."

Art. 76. Questions concerning rights in industrial, literary, or artistic property of Alsace-Lorrainers shall be regulated in accordance with the general stipulations of Section VII of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty, it being understood that Alsace-Lorrainers holding rights of this nature under German legislation will preserve full and entire enjoyment of those rights on German territory.

Art. 77. The German Government undertakes to pay over to the French Government such proportion of all reserves accumulated by the empire or by public or private bodies dependent upon it, for the purposes of disability and old age insurance, as would fall to the disability and old age insurance fund at Strasbourg. The same shall apply in respect of the capital and reserves accumulated in Germany falling legitimately to other serial insurance funds, to miners' superannuation funds, to the fund of the railways of Alsace-Lorraine, to other superannuation organizations established for the benefit of the personnel of public administrations and institutions operating in Alsace-Lorraine, and also in respect of the capital and reserves due by the insurance fund of private employes at Berlin by reason of engagements entered into for the benefit of insured persons of that category resident in Alsace-Lorraine. A special convention shall determine the conditions and procedure of these transfers.

Art. 78. With regard to the execution of judgments, orders, and prosecutions, the following rules shall be applied: 1. All civil and commercial judgments which shall have been given since Aug. 3, 1914, by the courts of Alsace-Lorraine between Alsace-Lorrainers, or between Alsace-Lorrainers and foreigners, or between foreigners, and which shall not have been appealed from before the 11th November, 1918, shall be regarded as final and capable of being fully executed. When the judgment has been given between Alsace-Lorrainers and Germans, or between Alsace-Lorrainers and subjects of the allies of Germany, it shall only be capable of execution after the issue of an *exequatur* by the corresponding new tribunal in the restored territory referred to in Article 51. 2. All judgments given by German courts since the 3d August, 1914, against Alsace-Lorrainers for political crimes or misdemeanors shall be regarded as null and void. 3. All sentences passed since the 11th November, 1918, by the Imperial Court of Leipzig on Appeals against the decisions of the courts of Alsace-Lorraine shall be regarded as null and void and shall be so pronounced. The papers in regard to the cases in which such sentences have been given shall be returned to the courts of Alsace-Lorraine concerned. All appeals to the Imperial Court against decisions of the courts of Alsace-Lorraine shall be suspended. In the cases referred to above, the papers shall be returned under the aforesaid conditions for transfer without delay to the French Cour de Cassation which shall be competent to decide them. 4. All prosecu-

tions of Alsace-Lorraine for offenses committed during the period between the 11th November, 1918, and the coming into force of the present treaty will be conducted under German law except in so far as this has been modified by decrees duly published on the spot by the French authorities. All other questions as to competence, procedure or administration of justice, shall be determined by a special convention between France and Germany.

Art. 79. The stipulations as to nationality contained in the annex hereto shall be considered as of equal force with the provisions of the present section. All other questions concerning Alsace-Lorraine which are not regulated by the present section and the annex thereto, or by the general provisions of the present treaty, will form the subject of further conventions between France and Germany.

ANNEX

1. As from the 11th November, 1918, the following persons are ipso facto reinstated in French nationality. First—Persons who lost French nationality by the application of the Franco-German treaty of the 10th May, 1871, and who have not since that date acquired any nationality other than German; Second—The legitimate or natural descendants of the persons referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph, with the exception of those whose ascendants in the paternal line include a German who migrated into Alsace-Lorraine after the 15th July, 1870; Third—All persons born in Alsace-Lorraine of unknown parents or whose nationality is unknown.

2. Within the period of one year from the coming into force of the present treaty, persons included in any of the following categories may claim French nationality; First—All persons not restored to French nationality under Paragraph 1, above, whose ascendants include a Frenchman or French woman who lost French nationality under the conditions referred to in the said paragraph; Second—All foreigners not nationals of a German State who acquired the status of a citizen of Alsace-Lorraine before the 3d August, 1914; Third—All Germans domiciled in Alsace Lorraine, if they have been so domiciled since a date previous to 15th July, 1870, or if one of their ascendants was at that date domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine; Fourth—All Germans born or domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine who have served in the allied or associated armies during the present war and their descendants; Fifth—All persons born in Alsace-Lorraine before 10th May, 1871, of foreign parents, and the descendants of such persons; Sixth—The husband or wife of any person whose French nationality may have been restored under Paragraph 1 or who may have claimed and obtained French nationality in accordance with the preceding provisions. The legal representatives of a minor may exercise on behalf of that minor the right to claim French nationality; and if that right has not been exercised, the minor may claim French nationality within the year following his majority.

Except in the case provided in No. 6 of the present paragraph, the French authorities reserve to themselves the right in individual cases to reject the claim to French nationality.

3. Subject to the provisions of Paragraph 2, Germans born or domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine shall not acquire French nationality by reason of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, even though they may have the status of citizens of Alsace-Lorraine. They may acquire French na-

tionality only by naturalization, on condition of having been domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine from a date previous to the 3d August, 1914, and of submitting proof of unbroken residence within the restored territory for a period of three years from the 11th November, 1918. France will be solely responsible for their diplomatic and consular protection from the date of their application for French naturalization.

4. The French Government shall determine the procedure by which reinstatement in French nationality as of right shall be effected, and the conditions under which decisions shall be given upon claims to such nationality and applications for naturalization, as provided by the present annex.

• SECTION VI.—AUSTRIA

Art. 80. Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria. Within the frontiers which may be fixed by a treaty between that State and the principal Allied and Associated Powers she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

SECTION VII.—CZECHO-SLOVAK STATE

Art. 81. Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete independence of the Czecho-Slovak State, which will include the autonomous territory of the Ruthenians to the south of the Carpathians. Germany hereby recognizes the frontier of this State as determined by the principal Allied and Associated Powers and the other interested States.

Art. 82. The old frontier as it existed on Aug. 3, 1914, between Austria-Hungary and the German Empire will constitute the frontier between Germany and the Czecho-Slovak State.

Art. 83. Germany renounces in favor of the Czecho-Slovak State all rights and title over the portion of Silesian territory defined as follows: Starting from a point about 2 kilometers southeast of Katscher, on the boundary between the Circles (Kreise) of Loebischütz and Ratibor; the boundary between the two Kreise; then, the former boundary between Germany and Austria-Hungary up to a point on the Oder immediately to the south of the Ratibor-Oderberg railway; thence, toward the northwest and up to a point about 2 kilometers to the southeast of Katscher: a line to be fixed on the spot passing to the west of Kranowitz. A commission composed of seven members, five nominated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, one by Poland, and one by the Czecho-Slovak State, will be appointed fifteen days after the coming into force of the present treaty to trace on the spot the frontier line between Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State. The decisions of this commission will be taken by a majority and shall be binding on the parties concerned. . . .

Art. 84. German nationals habitually resident in any of the territories recognized as forming part of the Czecho-Slovak State will obtain Czecho-Slovak nationality *ipso facto* and lose their German nationality.

Art. 85. Within a period of two years from the coming into force of the present treaty German nationals over 18 years of age habitually resident in any of the territories recognized as forming part of the Czecho-Slovak State will be entitled to opt for German nationality. Czecho-Slovaks who are habitually resident in Germany will have a similar

right to opt for Czecho-Slovak nationality. Option by a husband will cover his wife, and option by parents will cover their children under 18 years of age. Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must within the succeeding twelve months transfer their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their landed property in the territory of the other State where they had their place of residence before exercising the right to opt. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export or import duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property. Within the same period Czecho-Slovaks who are German nationals and are in a foreign country will be entitled, in the absence of any provisions to the contrary in the foreign law, and if they have not acquired the foreign nationality, to obtain Czecho-Slovak nationality and lose their German nationality by complying with the requirements laid down by the Czecho-Slovak State.

Art. 86. The Czecho-Slovak State accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion. The Czecho-Slovak State further accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the said powers such provisions as they may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations. The proportion and nature of the financial obligations of Germany and Prussia which the Czecho-Slovak State will have to assume on account of the Silesian territory placed under its sovereignty will be determined in accordance with Article 254 of Part IX (financial clauses) of the present treaty. Subsequent agreements will decide all questions not decided by the present treaty which may arise in consequence of the cession of the said territory.

SECTION VIII.—POLAND

Art. 87. Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete independence of Poland and renounces in her favor all rights and title over the territory bounded by the Baltic Sea; the eastern frontier of Germany as laid down in Article 27 of Part II (boundaries of Germany) of the present treaty, up to a point situated about two kilometers to the east of Lorzendorf, then a line to the acute angle which the northern boundary of Upper Silesia makes about three kilometers northwest of Simmenau, then to where the boundary of Upper Silesia has its meeting point with the old frontier between Germany and Russia, then this frontier to the point where it crosses the course of the Niemen, and then the northern frontier of East Prussia, as laid down in Article 28, Part II, aforesaid. The terms of this article do not, however, apply to the territories of East Prussia and the free city of Danzig, as defined in Article 28, of Part II (boundaries of Germany) and in Article 100 of Section XI (Danzig) of this part. The boundaries of Poland not laid down in the present treaty will be subsequently determined by the principal Allied and Associated Powers. A commission consisting of seven members, five of whom shall be nominated by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, one by Germany, and one by Poland, shall be constituted fifteen days after the coming into force of the present treaty to

delimit on the spot the frontier line between Poland and Germany. The decision of the commission will be taken by a majority of votes and shall be binding upon the parties concerned.

Art. 88. In the portion of Upper Silesia included within the boundaries described below the inhabitants will be called upon to indicate by a vote whether they wish to be attached to Germany or to Poland. . . . The régime under which this plebiscite will be taken and given effect to is laid down in the annex hereto. The Polish and German Governments hereby respectively bind themselves to conduct no prosecutions on any part of their territory and to take no exceptional proceedings for any political action performed in Upper Silesia during the period of the régime laid down in the annex hereto, and up to the settlement of the final status of the country. Germany hereby renounces in favor of Poland all rights and title over the portion of Upper Silesia lying beyond the frontier line fixed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers as this result of the plebiscite.

ANNEX

1. Within fifteen days from the coming into force of the present treaty the German troops and such officials as may be designated by the commission set up under the provisions of Paragraph 2 shall evacuate the plebiscite area. Up to the moment of the completion of the evacuation they shall refrain from any form of requisitioning in money or in kind and from all acts likely to prejudice the material interest of the country. Within the same period the workmen's and soldiers' councils which have been constituted in this area shall be dissolved. Members of such councils who are natives of another region and are exercising their functions at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, or who have gone out of office since the 1st of March, 1919, shall be evacuated. All military and semi-military unions formed in the said area by the inhabitants of the district shall be immediately disbanded. All members of such military organizations who are not domiciled in the said area shall be required to leave it.

2. The plebiscite area shall be immediately placed under the authority of an international commission of four members to be designated by the following powers: The United States of America, France, the British Empire, and Italy. It shall be occupied by troops belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers, and the German Government undertakes to give facilities for the transference of troops to Upper Silesia.

3. The commission shall enjoy all the powers exercised by the German or by the Prussian Government; except those of legislation or taxation. . . . The commission will maintain order with the help of the troops which will be at its disposal and to the extent which it may deem necessary by means of gendarmerie recruited among the inhabitants of the country. The commission shall provide immediately for the replacement of the evacuated German officials, and, if occasion arises, shall itself order the evacuation of such authorities and proceed to the replacement of such local authorities as may be required. It shall take all steps which it thinks proper to insure the freedom, fairness, and secrecy of the vote. In particular, it shall have the right to order the expulsion of any person who may in any way have attempted to distort the result of the plebiscite by methods of corruption or intimidation. . . .

4. The vote shall take place at such date as may

be determined by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, but not sooner than six months or later than eighteen months after the establishment of the commission in the area. The right to vote shall be given to all persons, without distinction of sex. . . .

5. On the conclusion of the voting the number of votes cast in each commune will be communicated by the commission to the principal Allied and Associated Powers with a full report as to the taking of the vote and a recommendation as to the line which ought to be adopted as the frontier of Germany in Upper Silesia. In this recommendation regard will be paid to the wishes of the inhabitants, as shown by the vote, and to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality.

6. As soon as the frontier has been fixed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers the German authorities will be notified by the International Commission that they are free to take over the administration of the territory which it is recognized should be German; the said authorities must proceed to do so within one month of such notification and in the manner prescribed by the commission. Within the same period and in the manner prescribed by the commission, the Polish Government must proceed to take over the administration of the territory which it is recognized should be Polish. When the administration of the territory has been provided for by the German and Polish authorities respectively the powers of the commission will terminate. The cost of the Army of Occupation and expenditure by the commission, whether in discharge of its own functions or in the administration of the territory, will be a charge on the area.

Art. 89. Poland undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and mails in transit between East Prussia and the rest of Germany over Polish territory, including territorial waters, and to treat them at least as favorably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and mails, respectively, of Polish or of any other most-favored nationality, origin, importation starting point, or ownership, as regards facilities, restrictions, and all other matters. Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs or other similar duties. Freedom of transit will extend to telegraphic and telephonic services under the conditions laid down by the conventions referred to in Article 98.

Art. 90. Poland undertakes to permit, for a period of fifteen years, the exportation to Germany of the products of the mines in any part of Poland in accordance with the present treaty. Such export shall be subject to duties or other charges or restrictions on exportation. Poland agrees to take such steps as may be necessary to secure that such products shall be available for sale to purchasers in Germany on terms as favorable as are applicable to like products sold under similar conditions to purchasers in Poland or in any other country.

Art. 91. German nationals habitually resident in territories recognized as forming part of Poland will acquire Polish nationality *ipso facto* and will lose their German nationality. German nationals, however, or their descendants who became resident in these territories after Jan. 1, 1908, will not acquire Polish nationality without a special authorization from the Polish State. Within a period of two years after the coming into force of the present treaty, German nationals over 18 years of age, habitually resident in any of the territories recognized as forming part of Poland, will be entitled to opt for German nationality. Poles who are Ger-

man nationals over 18 years of age, and habitually resident in Germany will have a similar right to opt for Polish nationality. . . . Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must within the succeeding twelve months transfer their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in the territory of the other State, where they had their place of residence before exercising the right to opt. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. Within the same period Poles who are German nationals and are in a foreign country will be entitled, in the absence of any provisions to the contrary in the foreign law, and if they have not acquired foreign nationality, to obtain Polish nationality and to lose their German nationality by complying with the requirements laid down by the Polish State. In this portion of Upper Silesia submitted to a plebiscite the provisions of this article should only come into force as from the definite attribution of the territory.

Art. 92. The proportion and the nature of the financial liabilities of Germany and Prussia to be borne by Poland will be determined in accordance with Article 254 of Part IX (financial clauses) of the present treaty. There shall be excluded from the share of such financial liabilities assumed by Poland that portion of the debt which, according to the finding of the Reparation Commission referred to in the above mentioned article, arises from measures adopted by the German and Prussian Governments with a view to German colonization in Poland. In fixing under Article 256 of the present treaty the value of the property and possessions belonging to the German Empire and to the German States which pass to Poland, with the territory transferred above, the Reparation Commission shall exclude from the valuation buildings, forests, and other State property which belonged to the former kingdom of Poland; Poland shall acquire these properties free of all costs and charges. In all the German territory transferred in accordance with the present treaty and recognized as forming definitely a part of Poland, the property rights and interests of German nationals shall not be liquidated under Article 297 by the Polish Government except in accordance with the following provisions: 1. The proceeds of the liquidation shall be paid direct to the owner; 2. If, on his application, the mixed arbitral tribunal provided for by the Section 6 of Part X (Economic Clauses) of the present treaty, or an arbitrator appointed by that tribunal, is satisfied that the conditions of the sale or measures taken by the Polish Government outside of its general legislation were unfairly prejudicial to the price obtained, they shall have discretion to ward to the owner equitable compensation to be paid by the Polish Government. . . .

Art. 93. Poland accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion. Poland further accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the said powers such provisions as they may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations.

SECTION IX.—EAST PRUSSIA

Art. 94. In the area between the southern frontier of East Prussia, as described in Article 28 of

Part II (frontiers of Germany) of the present treaty, and the line described below, the inhabitants will be called upon to indicate by a vote the State to which they wish to belong. The western and northern boundary of Regierungsbezirk Allenstein to its junction with the boundary between the Kreise of Oletsko and Angerburg, thence, the northern boundary of the Kreis of Oletsko to its junction with the old frontier of East Prussia.

Art. 95. The German troops and authorities will be withdrawn from the area defined above within a period not exceeding fifteen days after the coming into force of the present treaty. Until the evacuation is completed they will abstain from all requisitions in money or in kind and from all measures injurious to the economic interests of the country. On the expiration of the above-mentioned period the said area will be placed under the authority of an International Commission of five members appointed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers. This commission will have general powers of administration and, in particular, will be charged with the duty of arranging for the vote, and of taking such measures as it may deem necessary to insure its freedom, fairness, and secrecy. . . . Every person, irrespective of sex, will be entitled to vote who: (a) Is 20 years of age at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, and (b) Was born within the area where the vote will take place, or has been habitually resident there from a date to be fixed by the commission. . . . The result of the vote will be determined by commune, (Gemeinde,) according to the majority of the votes in each commune. On the conclusion of the voting the number of votes cast in each commune will be communicated by the commission to the principal Allied and Associated Powers with a full report as to the taking of the vote and a recommendation as to the line which ought to be adopted as the boundary of East Prussia in this region. In this recommendation, regard will be paid to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote, and to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality. The principal Allied and Associated Powers will then fix the frontier between East Prussia and Poland in this region. . . . When the administration of the territory by the East Prussian and Polish authorities, respectively, has been provided for, the powers of the commission will terminate. Expenditure by the commission, whether in the discharge of its own functions or in the administration of the territory, will be borne by the local revenues. . . .

Art. 96. In the area comprising the Kreise of Stuhm and Rosenberg, and the portion of the Kreis of Marienburg which is situated east of the Nogat, and that of Marienwerder east of the Vistula, the inhabitants will be called upon to indicate by a vote, to be taken in each commune (Gemeinde,) whether they desire the various communes situated in this territory to belong to Poland or to East Prussia.

Art. 97. The German troops and authorities will be withdrawn from the area defined in Article 96 within a period not exceeding fifteen days after the coming into force of the present treaty. Until the evacuation is completed they will abstain from all requisitions in money or in kind and from all measures injurious to the economic interests of the country. On the expiration of the above mentioned period the said area will be placed under the authority of an International Commission of five members appointed by the principal Allied and

Associated Powers. This commission, supported, if occasion arises, by the necessary forces, will have general powers of administration, and, in particular, will be charged with the duty of arranging for the vote and of taking such measures as it may deem necessary to insure its freedom, fairness, and secrecy. The commission will conform as far as possible to the provisions of the present treaty relating to the plebiscite in the Allenstein area. Its decision will be taken by a majority. . . . On the conclusion of the voting, the number of votes cast in each commune will be communicated by the commission to the principal Allied and Associated Powers, with a full report as to the taking of the vote and a recommendation as to the line which ought to be adopted as the boundary of East Prussia in this region. In this recommendation regard will be paid to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote and to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality. The principal Allied and Associated Powers will then fix the frontier between East Prussia and Poland in this region, leaving in any case to Poland for the whole of the section bordering on the Vistula full and complete control of the river, including the east bank as far east of the river as may be necessary for its regulation and improvement. Germany agrees that in any portion of the said territory which remains German no fortifications shall at any time be erected. The principal Allied and Associated Powers will at the same time draw up regulations for assuring to the population of East Prussia to the fullest extent, and under equitable conditions, access to the Vistula, and the use of it for themselves, their commerce, and their boats. The determination of the frontier and the foregoing regulations shall be binding upon all the parties concerned. When the administration of the territory has been taken over by the East Prussian and Polish authorities, respectively, the powers of the commission will terminate.

Art. 98. Germany and Poland undertake, within one year of the coming into force of this treaty, to enter into conventions of which the terms, in case of difference, shall be settled by the Council of the League of Nations, with the object of securing on the one hand to Germany full and adequate railroad, telegraphic, and telephonic facilities for communication between the rest of Germany and East Prussia over the intervening Polish territory, and on the other hand to Poland full and adequate railroad, telegraphic, and telephonic facilities for communication between Poland and the free city of Danzig over any German territory that may, on the right bank of the Vistula, intervene between Poland and the free city of Danzig.

SECTION X.—MEMEL

Art. 99. Germany renounces in favor of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title over the territories included between the Baltic, the northeastern frontier of East Prussia as defined in Article 28 of Part II (frontiers of Germany) of the present treaty and the former frontier between Germany and Russia. Germany undertakes to accept the settlement made by the principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these territories, particularly in so far as concerns the nationality of the inhabitants.

SECTION XI.—FREE CITY OF DANZIG

Art. 100. Germany renounces in favor of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights

and title over the territory comprised within the following limits: [Geographical details of the new state.] . . .

Art. 101. A commission composed of three members appointed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, including a High Commissioner as President, one member appointed by Germany, and one member appointed by Poland, shall be constituted within fifteen days of the coming into force of the present treaty for the purpose of delimiting on the spot the frontier of the territory . . . taking into account as far as possible the existing communal boundaries.

Art. 102. The principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to establish the town of Danzig, together with the rest of the territory described in Article 100, as a free city. It will be placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

Art. 103. A constitution for the free city of Danzig shall be drawn up by the duly appointed representatives of the free city in agreement with a High Commissioner to be appointed by the League of Nations. The constitution shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The High Commissioner will also be entrusted with the duty of dealing in the first instance with all differences arising between Poland and the free city of Danzig in regard to this treaty or any arrangements or agreements made thereunder. The High Commissioner shall reside at Danzig.

Art. 104. The principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to negotiate a treaty between the Polish Government and the free city of Danzig which shall come into force at the same time as the establishment of said free city, with the following objects: 1. To effect the inclusion of the free city of Danzig within the Polish customs frontiers and to establish a free area in the port. 2. To insure to Poland without any restriction the free use and service of all waterways, docks, basins, wharves, and other works within the territory of the free city necessary for Polish imports and exports. 3. To insure to Poland the control and administration of the Vistula and of the whole railway system within the free city; except such street and other railways as serve primarily the needs of the free city and of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communication between Poland and the Port of Danzig. 4. To insure to Poland the right to develop and improve the waterways, docks, basins, wharves, railways, and other works and means of communication mentioned in this article, as well as to lease or purchase through appropriate processes such land and other property as may be necessary for these purposes. 5. To provide against any discrimination within the free city of Danzig to the detriment of citizens of Poland and other persons of Polish origin or speech. 6. To provide that the Polish Government shall undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the free city of Danzig as well as the diplomatic protection of citizens of that city when abroad.

Art. 105. On the coming into force of the present treaty German nationals ordinarily resident in the territory described in Article 100 will *ipso facto* lose their German nationality, in order to become nationals of the free city of Danzig.

Art. 106. Within a period of two years from the coming into force of the present treaty German nationals over 18 years of age ordinarily resident in the territory described in Article 100 will have the right to opt for German nationality. All persons who exercise the right of option referred to above must during the ensuing twelve months

transfer their place of residence to Germany. These persons will be entitled to preserve the immovable property possessed by them in the territory of the free city of Danzig.

Art. 107. All property situated within the territory of the free city of Danzig belonging to the German Empire or any German State shall pass to the principal Allied and Associated Powers for transfer to the free city of Danzig or to the Polish State as they may consider equitable.

Art. 108. The proportion and nature of the financial liabilities of Germany and of Prussia to be borne by the free city of Danzig shall be fixed in accordance with Article 254 of Part IX (financial clauses) of the present treaty. . . .

SECTION XII.—SCHLESWIG

Art. 109. The frontier between Germany and Denmark shall be fixed in conformity with the wishes of the population. For this purpose the population inhabiting the territories of the former German empire situated to the north of a line from east to west . . . [and running thence through a number of places which are named] to the North Sea; thence passing south of the islands of Fohr and Amrum and north of the islands of Oland and Langeness shall be called upon to pronounce by a vote which will be taken under the following conditions:

1. Within a period not exceeding ten days from the coming into force of the present treaty, the German troops and authorities . . . shall evacuate the zone lying to the north of the line above fixed. Within the same period the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils which have been constituted in this zone shall be dissolved. . . . The said zone shall immediately be placed under the authority of an international commission, composed of five members, of whom three will be designated by the principal Allied and Associated Powers; the Norwegian and Swedish Governments will each be requested to designate a member. In the event of their failing to do so, these two members will be chosen by the principal Allied and Associated Powers. The commission, assisted in case of need by the necessary forces, shall have general powers of administration. In particular, it shall at once provide for filling the places of the evacuated German authorities, and, if necessary, shall itself give orders for their evacuation and proceed to fill the places of such local authorities as may be required. It shall take all steps which it thinks proper to insure the freedom, fairness, and secrecy of the vote. It shall be assisted by German and Danish technical advisers chosen by it from among the local population. Its decisions will be taken by a majority.

2. The right to vote shall be given all persons, without distinction of sex, who: (a) Have completed their twentieth year at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty; and (b) Were born in the zone in which the plebiscite is taken, or had been domiciled there since a date before the 1st January, 1900, or had been expelled by the German authorities without having retained their domicile there. Military persons, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the German Army, who are natives of the zone of Schleswig, in which the plebiscite is taken, shall be given the opportunity to return to their native place in order to take part in the voting there.

3. In . . . [certain specified sections] of the evacuated zone . . . the vote above provided for shall be taken within a period not exceeding three

weeks after the evacuation of the country by the German troops and authorities. The result will be determined by the majority of votes cast in the whole of this section. . . . If the vote results in favor of the reincorporation of this territory in the Kingdom of Denmark, the Danish Government, in agreement with the commission, will be entitled to effect its occupation with their military and administrative authorities immediately after the proclamation.

4. In the section of the evacuation zone situated to the south of the preceding section and to the north of the line which starts from the Baltic Sea thirteen kilometers from Flensburg and ends north of the islands of Oland and Langeness, the vote will be taken within a period not exceeding five weeks after the plebiscite shall have been held in the first section. The result will be determined by communes (Gemeinden) in accordance with the majority of the votes cast in each commune. . . .

Art. 110. Pending a delimitation on the spot, a frontier line will be fixed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers according to a line based on the result of the voting, and proposed by the International Commission, and taking into account the particular geographical and economic conditions of the localities in question. From that time the Danish Government may effect the occupation of these territories which the Danish civil and military authorities, and the German Government may reinstate up to the said frontier line the German civil and military authorities whom it has evacuated. Germany hereby renounced definitely in favor of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights of sovereignty over the territories situated to the north of the frontier line fixed in accordance with the above provisions. The principal Allied and Associated Powers will hand over the said territories to Denmark.

Art. 111. A commission, composed of seven members, five of whom shall be nominated by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, one by Denmark, and one by Germany, shall be constituted within fifteen days from the date when the final result of the vote is known, to trace the frontier line on the spot. . . .

Art. 112. All the inhabitants of the territory which is returned to Denmark will acquire Danish nationality *ipso facto*, and will lose their German nationality. Persons, however, who had become habitually resident in this territory after the 1st October, 1918, will not be able to acquire Danish nationality without permission from the Danish Government.

Art. 113. Within two years from the date on which the sovereignty over the whole or part of the territory of Schleswig subjected to the plebiscite is restored to Denmark: Any person over 18 years of age, born in the territory restored to Denmark, not habitually resident in this region and possessing German nationality, will be entitled to opt for Denmark. Any person over 18 years of age habitually resident in the territory restored to Denmark will be entitled to opt for Germany. Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must within the ensuing twelve months transfer their place of residence to the State in favor of which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain the immovable property which they own in the territory of the other State in which they were habitually resident before opting. They may carry with them their movable property of every description.

Art. 114. The proportion and nature of the financial or other obligations of Germany and Prussia

which are to be assumed by Denmark will be fixed in accordance with Article 254 of Part IX (financial clauses) of the present treaty. Further stipulations will determine any other questions arising out of the transfer to Denmark of the whole or part of the territory of which she was deprived by the treaty of Oct. 30, 1864.

SECTION XIII.—HELGOLAND

Art. 115. The fortifications, military establishments, and harbors of the islands of Heligoland and Dune shall be destroyed under the supervision of the Principal Allied Governments by German labor and at the expense of Germany within a period to be determined by the said Governments. . . . These fortifications, military establishments, and harbors shall not be reconstructed, nor shall any similar works be constructed in future.

SECTION XIV.—RUSSIA AND RUSSIAN STATES

Art. 116. Germany acknowledges and agrees to respect as permanent and inalienable the independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire on Aug. 1, 1914. In accordance with the provisions of Article 259 of Part IX (financial clauses) and Article 292 of Part X (economic clauses) Germany accepts definitely the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaties and of all treaties, conventions, and agreements entered into by her with the Maximalist [Bolshevik] Government in Russia. The Allied and Associated Powers formally reserve the rights of Russia to obtain from Germany restitution and reparation based on the principles of the present treaty.

Art. 117. Germany undertakes to recognize the full force of all treaties or agreements which may be entered into by the Allied and Associated Powers with States now existing or coming into existence in future in the whole or part of the former Empire of Russia as it existed on Aug. 1, 1914, and to recognize the frontiers of any such States as determined therein.

Part IV.—German Rights and Interests outside Germany

Art. 118. In territory outside her European frontiers as fixed by the present treaty, Germany renounces all rights, titles, and privileges whatever in or over territory which belonged to her or to her allies, and all rights, titles, and privileges, whatever their origin, which she held as against the Allied and Associated Powers. Germany undertakes immediately to recognize and to conform to the measures which may be taken now or in the future by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, in agreement where necessary with third powers, in order to carry the above stipulation into effect. In particular, Germany declares her acceptance of the following articles relating to certain special subjects:

SECTION I.—GERMAN COLONIES

Art. 119. Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions.

Art. 120. All movable and immovable property in such territories belonging to the German Empire or to any German State shall pass to the Government exercising authority over such territories on the terms laid down in Article 257 of Part IX

(financial clauses) of the present treaty. The decision of the local courts in any dispute as to the nature of such property shall be final.

Art. 121. The provisions of Section I (commercial relations) and Section IV (property, rights, and interests) of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty shall apply in the case of these territories whatever be the form of government adopted for them.

Art. 122. The Government exercising authority over such territories may make such provisions as it thinks fit with reference to the repatriation from them of German nationals, and to the conditions upon which German subjects of European origin shall, or shall not, be allowed to reside, hold property, trade, or exercise a profession in them.

Art. 123. The provisions of Article 260 of Part IX (financial clauses) of the present treaty shall apply in the case of all agreements concluded with German nationals for the construction or exploitation of public works in the German overseas possessions, as well as any sub-concessions or contracts resulting therefrom which may have been made to or with such nationals.

Art. 124. Germany hereby undertakes to pay in accordance with the estimate to be presented by the French Government, and approved by the Reparation Commission, reparation for damage suffered by French nationals in the Cameroons or the frontier zone by reason of the acts of the German civil and military authorities and of German private individuals during the period from Jan. 1, 1900, to Aug. 1, 1914.

Art. 125. Germany renounces all rights under the conventions and agreements with France of Nov. 4, 1911, and Sept. 28, 1912, relating to equatorial Africa. She undertakes to pay to the French Government, in accordance with the estimate to be presented by the Government and approved by the Reparation Commission, all the deposits, credits, advances, &c., effected by virtue of these instruments in favor of Germany.

Art. 126. Germany undertakes to accept and observe the agreements made or to be made by the Allied and Associated Powers or some of them with any other power with regard to the trade in arms and spirits, and to the matters dealt within the general act of Berlin of Feb. 26, 1885, the general act of Brussels of July 2, 1890, and the conventions completing or modifying the same.

Art. 127. The native inhabitants of the former German overseas possessions shall be entitled to the diplomatic protection of the Governments exercising authority over those territories.

SECTION II.—CHINA

Art. 128. Germany renounces in favor of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final protocol signed at Peking on Sept. 7, 1901, and from all annexes, notes, and documents supplementary thereto. She likewise renounces in favor of China any claim to indemnities accruing thereunder subsequent to March 14, 1917.

Art. 129. From the coming into force of the present treaty the high contracting parties shall apply in so far as concerns them respectively: 1. The arrangement of Aug. 20, 1902, regarding the new Chinese customs tariff. 2. The arrangement of Sept. 27, 1905, regarding Whang-Poo, and the provisional supplementary arrangements of April 4, 1912. China, however, will no longer be bound to grant to Germany the advantages or privileges

which she allowed Germany under these arrangements.

Art. 130. Subject to the provisions of Section VIII of this part, Germany cedes to China all the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property belonging to the German Government, which are situated or may be in the German concessions at Tientsin and Hankow or elsewhere in Chinese territory. It is understood, however, that premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices are not included in the above cession, and, furthermore, that no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government to dispose of the German public and private property situated within the so-called legation quarter at Peking without the consent of the diplomatic representatives of the powers which, on the coming into force of the present treaty, remain parties to the final protocol of Sept. 7, 1901.

Art. 131. Germany undertakes to restore to China within twelve months from the coming into force of the present treaty all the astronomical instruments which her troops in 1900-1901 carried away from China, and to defray all expenses which may be incurred in effecting such restoration, including the expenses of dismounting, packing, transporting, insurance, and installation in Peking.

Art. 132. Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German concessions at Hankow and Tientsin are now held. China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above areas, declares her intention of opening them to international residence and trade. She further declares that the abrogation of the leases under which these concessions are now held shall not affect the property rights of nationals or Allied and Associated Powers who are holders of lots in these concessions.

Art. 133. Germany waives all claims against the Chinese Government or against any Allied or Associated Government arising out of the internment of German nationals in China and their repatriation. She equally renounces all claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of German ships in China or the liquidation, sequestration or control of German properties, rights, and interests in that country since Aug. 14, 1917. This provision, however, shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall be governed by the provisions of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty.

Art. 134. Germany renounces, in favor of the Government of his Britannic Majesty, the German State property in the British concession at Shameen at Canton. She renounces, in favor of the French and Chinese Governments conjointly, the property of the German school situated in the French concession at Shanghai.

SECTION III.—SIAM

Art. 135. Germany recognizes that all treaties, conventions, and agreements between her and Siam, and all rights, titles and privileges derived therefrom, including all rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction, terminated as from July 22, 1917.

Art. 136. All goods and property in Siam belonging to the German Empire or to any German State, with the exception of premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices, pass *ipso facto* and without compensation to the Siamese Government. The goods, property, and private

rights of German nationals in Siam shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty.

Art. 137. Germany waives all claims against the Siamese Government on behalf of herself or her nationals arising out of the seizure or condemnation of German ships, the liquidation of German property, or the internment of German nationals in Siam. This provision shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall be governed by the provisions of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty.

SECTION IV.—LIBERIA

Art. 138. Germany renounces all rights and privileges arising from the arrangements of 1911 and 1912 regarding Liberia, and particularly the right to nominate a German receiver of customs in Liberia. She further renounces all claim to participate in any measures whatsoever which may be adopted for the rehabilitation of Liberia.

Art. 139. Germany recognizes that all treaties and arrangements between her and Liberia terminated as from Aug. 4, 1917.

Art. 140. The property, rights, and interests of Germans in Liberia shall be dealt with in accordance with Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty.

SECTION V.—MOROCCO

Art. 141. Germany renounces all rights, titles, and privileges conferred on her by the general act of Algeciras of April 7, 1906, and by the Franco-German agreements of Feb. 9, 1909, and Nov. 4, 1911. All treaties, agreements, arrangements, and contracts concluded by her with the Sherifian Empire are regarded as abrogated as from Aug. 3, 1914. In no case can Germany take advantage of these instruments, and she undertakes not to intervene in any way in negotiations relating to Morocco which may take place between France and the other powers.

Art. 142. Germany having recognized the French Protectorate in Morocco, hereby accepts all the consequences of its establishment, and she renounces the régime of the capitulations therein. This renunciation shall take effect as from Aug. 3, 1914.

Art. 143. The Sherifian Government shall have complete liberty of action in regulating the status of German nationals in Morocco and the conditions in which they may establish themselves there. German-protected persons, *semsars*, and '*associés agricoles*' shall be considered as having ceased, as from Aug. 3, 1914, to enjoy the privileges attached to their status and shall be subject to the ordinary law.

Art. 144. All property and possessions in the Sherifian Empire of the German Empire and the German States pass to the Maghzen without payment. For the purposes of this clause, the property and possessions of the German Empire and States shall be deemed to include all the property of the crown, the empire, or States, and the private property of the former German Emperor and other royal personages. All movable and immovable property in the Sherifian Empire belonging to German nationals shall be dealt with in accordance with Sections III and IV of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty. Mining rights which may be recognized as belonging to German nationals by the Court of Arbitration set up under the Moroccan mining regulations shall form the subject of a valuation, which the arbitrators shall be requested

to make, and these rights shall then be treated in the same way as property in Morocco belonging to German nationals.

Art. 145. The German Government shall insure the transfer to a person nominated by the French Government of the shares representing Germany's portion of the capital of the State Bank of Morocco. The value of these shares, as assessed by the Reparation Commission, shall be paid to the Reparation Commission for the credit of Germany on account of the sums due for reparation. The German Government shall be responsible for indemnifying its nationals so dispossessed. This transfer will take place without prejudice to the repayment of debts which German nationals may have contracted toward the State Bank of Morocco.

Art. 146. Moroccan goods entering Germany shall enjoy the treatment accorded to French goods.

SECTION VI.—EGYPT

Art. 147. Germany declares that she recognizes the protectorate proclaimed over Egypt by Great Britain on Dec. 18, 1914, and that she renounces the régime of the capitulations in Egypt. This renunciation shall take effect as from Aug. 4, 1914.

Art. 148. All treaties, agreements, arrangements, and contracts concluded by Germany with Egypt are regarded as abrogated as from Aug. 4, 1914. In no case can Germany avail herself of these instruments, and she undertakes not to intervene in any way in negotiations relating to Egypt which may take place between Great Britain and the other powers.

Art. 149. Until an Egyptian law of judicial organization establishing courts with universal jurisdiction comes into force, provision shall be made, by means of decrees issued by his Highness the Sultan for the exercise of jurisdiction over German nationals and property by the British consular tribunals.

Art. 150. The Egyptian Government shall have complete liberty of action in regulating the status of German nationals and the conditions under which they may establish themselves in Egypt.

Art. 151. Germany consents to the abrogation of the decree issued by his Highness the Khédive on Nov. 28, 1904, relating to the commission of the Egyptian public debt, or to such changes as the Egyptian Government may think it desirable to make therein.

Art. 152. Germany consents, in so far as she is concerned, to the transfer to his Britannic Majesty's Government of the powers conferred on his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, by the convention signed at Constantinople on Oct. 29, 1888, relating to the free navigation of the Suez Canal. She renounces all participation in the Sanitary, Maritime, and Quarantine Board of Egypt, and consents, in so far as she is concerned, to the transfer to the Egyptian authorities of the powers of that board.

Art. 153. All property and possessions in Egypt of the German Empire and the German States pass to the Egyptian Government without payment. For this purpose the property and possessions of the German Empire and States shall be deemed to include all the property of the crown, the empire or the States, and the private property of the former German Emperor and other royal personages. All movable and immovable property in Egypt belonging to German nationals shall be dealt with in accordance with Sections III and IV of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty.

Art. 154. Egyptian goods entering Germany shall enjoy the treatment accorded to British goods.

SECTION VII.—TURKEY AND BULGARIA

Art. 155. Germany undertakes to recognize and accept all arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers may make with Turkey and Bulgaria, with reference to any rights, interests, and privileges whatever which might be claimed by Germany or her nationals in Turkey and Bulgaria and which are not dealt with in the provisions of the present treaty.

SECTION VIII.—SHANTUNG

Art. 156. Germany renounces, in favor of Japan, all her rights, titles, and privileges—particularly those concerning the territory of Kiao-Chau, railways, mines, and submarine cables, which she acquired in virtue of the treaty concluded by her with China on 6th March, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung. All German rights in the Tsing-tao-Tsinan-Fu railway, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds . . . are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto. The German State submarine cables from Tsing-tao to Shanghai and from Tsing-tao to Che Foo, with all the rights, privileges, and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and incumbrances.

Art. 157. The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiao-Chau, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and incumbrances.

Art. 158. Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present treaty the archives, registers, plans, title deeds, and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiao-Chau. Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding articles.

Part V.—Military, Naval, and Aerial Clauses

In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which follow:

SECTION I.—MILITARY CLAUSES

Chapter I.—Effectives and Cadres of the German Army

Art. 159. The German military forces shall be demobilized and reduced as prescribed hereinafter.

Art. 160. 1. By a date which must not be later than March 31, 1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry. After that date the total number of effectives in the army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed 100,000 men, including officers and establishments of depots. The army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers. The total effective strength of officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed 4,000.

2. Divisions and army corps headquarters staffs shall be organized in accordance with Table No. 1 annexed to this section. The number and strength of the units of infantry, artillery, engineers, technical services, and troops laid down in the aforesaid table constitute *maxima* which must not be exceeded. The following units may each have their own depot: An infantry regiment; a cavalry regiment; a regiment of field artillery; a battalion of pioneers.

3. The divisions must not be grouped under more than two army corps headquarters staffs. The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or of other organizations for the command of troops or for preparation for war is forbidden. The Great German General Staff and all similar organizations shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form. The officers, or persons in the position of officers, in the Ministries of War in the different States in Germany and in the administrations attached to them, must not exceed three hundred in number and are included in the maximum strength of four thousand laid down in the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph of this article.

Art. 161. Army administrative services consisting of civilian personnel not included in the number of effectives prescribed by the present treaty will have such personnel reduced in each class to one-tenth of that laid down in the budget of 1913.

Art. 162. The number of employes or officials of the German States, such as customs officers, forest guards, and coast guards shall not exceed that of the employes or officials functioning in these capacities in 1913. The number of gendarmes and employes or officials of the local or municipal police may only be increased to an extent corresponding to the increase of population since 1913 in the districts or municipalities in which they are employed. These employes and officials may not be assembled for military training.

Art. 163. The reduction of the strength of the German military forces as provided for in Article 160 may be effected gradually in the following manner: Within three months from the coming into force of the present treaty the total number of effectives must be reduced to 200,000 and the number of units must not exceed twice the number of those laid down in Article 160. At the expiration of this period, and at the end of each subsequent period of three months, a conference of military experts of the principal Allied and Associated Powers will fix the reductions to be made in the ensuing three months, so that by the 31st of March, 1920, at the latest, the total number of German effectives does not exceed the maximum number of 100,000 men laid down in Article 160. In these successive reductions the same ratio between the number of officers and of men, and between the various kinds of units shall be maintained as is laid down in that article.

Chapter II.—Armament, Munitions, and Material

Art. 164. Up till the time at which Germany is admitted as a member of the League of Nations the German Army must not possess an armament greater than the amounts fixed in Table No. 2, annexed to this section, with the exception of an optional increase not exceeding one-twenty-fifth part for small arms and one-fiftieth part for guns, which shall be exclusively used to provide for such eventual replacements as may be necessary. Germany agrees that after she has become a member of the League of Nations the armaments fixed in

the said table shall remain in force until they are modified by the Council of the League. Furthermore she hereby agrees strictly to observe the decisions of the Council of the League on this subject.

Art. 165. The maximum number of guns, machine guns, trench mortars, rifles, and the amount of ammunition and equipment which Germany is allowed to maintain during the period between the coming into force of the present treaty and the date of March 31, 1920, referred to in Article 160, shall bear the same proportion to the amount authorized in Table No. 3 annexed to this section as the strength of the German Army as reduced from time to time in accordance with Article 163 bears to the strength permitted under Article 160.

Art. 166. At the date of March 31, 1920, the stock of munitions which the German Army may have at its disposal shall not exceed the amounts fixed in Table No. 3 annexed to this section. Within the same period the German Government will store these stocks at points to be notified to the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. The German Government is forbidden to establish any other stocks, depots, or reserves of munitions.

Art. 167. The number and calibre of the guns constituting at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty the armament of the fortified works, fortresses, and any land or coast forts which Germany is allowed to retain, must be notified immediately by the German Government to the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, and will constitute maximum amounts which may not be exceeded. Within two months from the coming into force of the present treaty the maximum stock of ammunition for these guns will be reduced to, and maintained at, the following uniform rates: Fifteen hundred rounds per piece for those the calibre of which is 10.5 cm. and under; 500 rounds per piece for those of higher calibre.

Art. 168. The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material shall only be carried out in factories or works the locations of which shall be communicated to and approved by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, and the number of which they retain the right to restrict. Within three months from the coming into force of the present treaty all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage, or design of arms, munitions, or any war material whatever shall be closed down. The same applies to all arsenals except those used as depots for the authorized stocks of munitions. Within the same period the personnel of these arsenals will be dismissed.

Art. 169. Within two months from the coming into force of the present treaty, German arms, munitions, and war materials, including anti-aircraft material, existing in Germany in excess of the quantities allowed must be surrendered to the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, to be destroyed or rendered useless. This will also apply to any special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognized as necessary for equipping the authorized strength of the German Army. The surrender in question will be effected at such points in German territory as may be selected by the said Governments. Within the same period, arms, munitions, and war material, including anti-aircraft material, of origin other than German, in whatever state they may be, will be delivered to the said Governments, who will decide as to their disposal. Arms and munitions which on account of the suc-

cessive reductions in the strength of the German Army become in excess of the amounts authorized by Tables 2 and 3 of the annex must be handed over in the manner laid down above within such periods as may be decided by the conferences referred to in Article 163.

Art. 170. Importation into Germany of arms, munitions, and war material of every kind shall be strictly prohibited. The same applies to the manufacture for and export to foreign countries of arms, munitions, and war material of every kind.

Art. 171. The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany. The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage, and use of the said products or devices. The manufacture and the importation into Germany of armored cars, tanks, and all similar constructions suitable for use in war are also prohibited.

Art. 172. Within a period of three months from the coming into force of the present treaty the German Government will disclose to the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers the nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other like chemical preparations used by them in the war or prepared by them for the purpose of being so used.

Chapter III.—Recruiting and Military Training

Art. 173. Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in Germany. The German Army may only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

Art. 174. The period of enlistment for noncommissioned officers and privates must be twelve consecutive years. The number of men discharged for any reason before the expiration of their term of enlistment must not exceed in any year 5 per cent. of the total effectives as fixed by the second sub-paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 160 of the present treaty.

Art. 175. The officers who are retained in the army must undertake the obligation to serve in it up to the age of forty-five years, at least. Officers newly appointed must undertake to serve on the active list for twenty-five consecutive years, at least. Officers who have previously belonged to any formation whatever of the army and who are not retained in the units allowed to be maintained must not take part in any military exercise, whether theoretical or practical, and will not be under any military obligations whatever. The number of officers discharged for any reason before the expiration of their term of service must not exceed in any year 5 per cent. of the total effectives of officers provided for in the third sub-paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 100 of the present treaty.

Art. 176. On the expiration of two months from the coming into force of the present treaty there must only exist in Germany the number of military schools which is absolutely indispensable for the recruitment of the officers of the units allowed. These schools will be exclusively intended for the recruitment of officers of each arm, in the proportion of one school per arm. The number of students admitted to attend the courses of the said schools will be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The students and the cadres will be reckoned in the effectives fixed by the second and third sub para-

graphs of Paragraph 1 of Article 160 of the present treaty. Consequently, and during the period fixed above, all military academies or similar institutions in Germany, as well as the different military schools for officers, student officers, (aspiranten,) cadets, noncommissioned officers, or student non-commissioned officers, (aspiranten,) other than the schools above provided for, will be abolished.

Art. 177. Educational establishments, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, and, generally speaking, associations of every description, whatever be the age of their members, must not occupy themselves with any military matters. In particular they will be forbidden to instruct or exercise their members, or to allow them to be instructed or exercised, in the profession or use of arms. These societies, associations, educational establishments, and universities must have no connection with the Ministries of War or any other military authority.

Art. 178. All measures of mobilization or appertaining to mobilization are forbidden. In no case must formations, administrative services, or general staffs include supplementary cadres.

Art. 179. Germany agrees, from the coming into force of the present treaty, not to accredit nor to send to any foreign country any military, naval, or air mission, nor to allow any such missions to leave her territory, and Germany further agrees to take appropriate measures to prevent German nationals from leaving her territory to become enrolled in the army, navy, or air service of any foreign power, or to be attached to such army, navy, or air service for the purpose of assisting in the military, naval, or air training thereof, or otherwise for the purpose of giving military, naval, or air instruction in any foreign country. The Allied and Associated Powers agree, so far as they are concerned, from the coming into force of the present treaty, not to enroll in nor to attach to their armies or naval or air forces any German national for the purpose of assisting in the military training of such armies or naval or air forces, or otherwise to employ any such German national as military, naval, or aeronautic instructor. The present provision, however, does not affect the right of France to recruit for the Foreign Legion in accordance with French military laws and regulations.

Chapter IV.—Fortifications

Art. 180. All fortified works, fortresses, and field works situated in German territory to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled. Within a period of two months from the coming into force of the present treaty such of the above fortified works, fortresses, and field works as are situated in territory not occupied by Allied and Associated troops shall be disarmed, and within a further period of four months they shall be dismantled. Those which are situated in territory occupied by Allied and Associated troops shall be disarmed and dismantled within such periods as may be fixed by the Allied High Command. The construction of any new fortification, whatever its nature and importance, is forbidden in the zone referred to in the first paragraph above. The system of fortified works of the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany shall be maintained in its existing state.

TABLE No. 1. [State and Establishment of Army Corps Headquarters Staffs and of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions.]

TABLE No. 2. [Tabular statement of armament

establishment for a maximum of seven infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and two army corps headquarters staffs.]

TABLE No. 3. [Maximum Stocks Authorized:]

SECTION II.—NAVAL CLAUSES

Art. 181. After the expiration of a period of two months from the coming into force of the present treaty the German naval forces in commission must not exceed: Six battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, or an equal number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in Article 190. No submarines are to be included. All other warships except where there is provision to the contrary in the present treaty, must be placed in reserve or devoted to commercial purposes.

Art. 182. Until the completion of the minesweeping prescribed by Article 193, Germany will keep in commission such number of minesweeping vessels as may be fixed by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Art. 183. After the expiration of a period of two months from the coming into force of the present treaty the total personnel of the German Navy, including the manning of the fleet, coast defenses, signal stations, administration, and other land services, must not exceed 15,000, including officers and men of all grades and corps. The total strength of officers and warrant officers must not exceed 1,500. Within two months from the coming into force of the present treaty the personnel in excess of the above strength shall be demobilized. No naval or military corps or reserve force in connection with the navy may be organized in Germany without being included in the above strength.

Art. 184. From the date of the coming into force of the present treaty all the German surface warships which are not in German ports cease to belong to Germany, who renounces all rights over them. Vessels which, in compliance with the armistice of Nov. 11, 1918, are now interned in the ports of the Allied and Associated Powers, are declared to be finally surrendered. Vessels which are now interned in neutral ports will be there surrendered to the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. The German Government must address a notification to that effect to the neutral powers on the coming into force of the present treaty.

Art. 185. Within a period of two months from the coming into force of the present treaty the German surface warships enumerated below will be surrendered to the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers in such allied ports as the said powers may direct. These warships will have been disarmed as provided in Article 23 of the armistice, dated Nov. 11, 1918. Nevertheless, they must have all their guns on board. Battleships—Oldenburg, Thuringen, Ostfriesland, Heligoland, Posen, Westfalen, Rheinland, and Nassau. Light Cruisers—Stettin, Danzig, München, Lübeck, Stralsund, Augsburg, Kolberg, and Stuttgart. And in addition forty-two modern destroyers and fifty modern torpedo boats, as chosen by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Art. 186. On the coming into force of the present treaty the German Government must undertake, under the supervision of the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the breaking up of all the German surface warships now under construction.

Art. 187. The German auxiliary cruisers and

fleet auxiliaries enumerated below will be disarmed and treated as merchant ships. Ships interned in neutral countries: Berlin, Santa Fé, Seydlitz, Yorck. Ships interned in Germany. . . .

Art. 188. On the expiration of one month from the coming into force of the present treaty all German submarines, salvage vessels, and docks for submarines, including the tubular dock, must have been handed over to the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. Such of these submarines, vessels, and docks as are considered by said Governments to be fit to proceed under their own power or to be towed shall be taken by the German Government into such allied ports as have been indicated. The remainder, and also those in course of construction, shall be broken up entirely by the German Government under the supervision of the said Governments. The breaking up must be completed within three months at the most after the coming into force of the present treaty.

Art. 189. Articles, machinery, and material arising from the breaking up of German warships of all kinds, whether surface vessels or submarines, may not be used except for purely industrial or commercial purposes. They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

Art. 190. Germany is forbidden to construct or acquire any warships other than those intended to replace the units in commission provided for in Article 181 of the present treaty. The warships intended for replacement purposes as above shall not exceed the following displacement: Armored ships, 10,000 tons; light cruisers, 6,000 tons; destroyers, 800 tons; torpedo boats, 200 tons. Except where a ship has been lost, units of the different classes shall only be replaced at the end of a period of twenty years in the case of battleships and cruisers, and fifteen years in the case of destroyers and torpedo boats, counting from the launching of the ship.

Art. 191. The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Germany.

Art. 192. The warships in commission of the German fleet must only have on board or in reserve the allowance of arms, munitions, and war material fixed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers. Within a month from the fixing of the quantities as above, arms, munitions and war material of all kinds, including mines and torpedoes, now in the hands of the German Government and in excess of the said quantities, shall be surrendered to the Governments of the said powers at places to be indicated by them. Such arms, munitions and war material will be destroyed or rendered useless. All other stocks, depots or reserves of arms, munitions or naval war material of all kinds are forbidden. The manufacture of these articles in German territory for, and their export to, foreign countries shall be forbidden.

Art. 193. On the coming into force of the present treaty Germany will forthwith sweep up the mines in the following areas in the North Sea to the eastward of longitude 4 degrees 00 minutes east of Greenwich: (1) Between parallels of latitude 53 degrees 00 minutes N. and 59 degrees 00 minutes N.; (2) to the northward of latitude 60 degrees 30 minutes N. Germany must keep these areas free from mines. Germany must also sweep and keep free from mines such areas in the Baltic as may ultimately be notified by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Art. 194. The personnel of the German Navy shall be recruited entirely by voluntary engagements entered into for a minimum period of

twenty-five consecutive years for officers and warrant officers, and twelve consecutive years for petty officers and men. The number engaged to replace those discharged for any reason before the expiration of their term of service must not exceed 5 per cent. per annum of the totals laid down in this section. (Article 183.) The personnel discharged from the navy must not receive any kind of naval or military training or undertake any further service in the navy or army. Officers belonging to the German Navy and not demobilized must engage to serve till the age of 45 unless discharged for sufficient reasons. No officer or man of the German mercantile marine shall receive any training in the navy.

Art. 195. In order to insure free passage into the Baltic to all nations, Germany shall not erect any fortifications in the area comprised between latitudes 55.27 north and 54.00 north and longitudes 9.00 east and 16.00 east of the meridian of Greenwich, nor install any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic. The fortifications now existing in this area shall be demolished and the guns removed under the supervision of the allied Governments and in periods to be fixed by them. The German Government shall place at the disposal of the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all hydrographical information now in its possession concerning the channels and adjoining waters between the Baltic and the North Sea.

Art. 196. All fortified works and fortifications other than those mentioned in Article 195 and in Part III (political clauses for Europe) Section XIII (Heligoland) now established within fifty kilometers of the German coast or on German islands off that coast, shall be considered of a defensive nature and may remain in their existing condition. No new fortifications shall be constructed within these limits. The armament of these defenses shall not exceed, as regards the number and calibre of guns, those in position at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty. The German Government shall communicate forthwith particulars thereof to all the European Governments. On the expiration of a period of two months from the coming into force of the present treaty the stocks of ammunition for these guns shall be reduced to and maintained at a maximum figure of fifteen hundred rounds per piece for calibres of 4.1-inch and under, and five hundred rounds per piece for higher calibres.

Art. 197. During the three months following the coming into force of the present treaty the German high-power wireless telegraphy stations at Nauen, Hanover, and Berlin shall not be used for the transmission of messages concerning naval, military, or political questions of interest to Germany or any State which has been allied to Germany in the war, without the assent of the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. These stations may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the said Governments, who will decide the wave length to be used. During the same period Germany shall not build any more high-power wireless telegraphy stations in her own territory or that of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey.

SECTION III.—AIR CLAUSES

Art. 198. The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces. Germany may, during a period not extending beyond Oct. 1, 1919, maintain a maximum number of 100

seaplanes or flying boats, which shall be exclusively employed in searching for submarine mines, shall be furnished with the necessary equipment for this purpose, and shall in no case carry arms, munitions, or bombs of any nature whatever. In addition to the engines installed in the seaplanes or flying boats above mentioned, one spare engine may be provided for each engine of each of these craft. No dirigible shall be kept.

Within two months from the coming into force of the present treaty the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the German land and sea forces shall be demobilized. Up to the 1st October, 1919, however, Germany may keep and maintain a total number of 1,000 men, including officers, for the whole of the cadres and personnel, flying and non-flying, of all formations and establishments.

Art. 200. Until the complete evacuation of German territory by the Allied and Associated troops, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Germany freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and landing.

Art. 201. During the six months following the coming into force of the present treaty the manufacture and importation of aircraft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft shall be forbidden in all German territory.

Art. 202. On the coming into force of the present treaty all military and naval aeronautical material, except the machines mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 198, must be delivered to the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. Delivery must be effected at such places as the said Governments may select, and must be completed within three months. In particular, this material will include all items under the following heads, which are or have been in use or were designed for warlike purposes: Complete airplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired, or assembled. Dirigibles able to take the air being manufactured, repaired, or assembled. Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen. Dirigible sheds and shelters of every kind for aircraft. Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of Germany, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant for the manufacture of hydrogen, as well as the sheds for dirigibles, may, at the discretion of said powers, be left to Germany until the time when the dirigibles are handed over. Engines for aircraft. Nacelles and fuselages. Armament, (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb-dropping apparatus, torpedo-dropping apparatus, synchronization apparatus, aiming apparatus.) Munitions, (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded or unloaded, stocks of explosives or of material for their manufacture. Instruments for use on aircraft. Wireless apparatus and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft. Component parts of any of the items under the preceding heads. The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the said Governments.

SECTION IV.—INTERALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

Art. 203. All the military, naval, and air clauses contained in the present treaty, for the execution of which a time limit is prescribed, shall be executed by Germany under the control of interallied commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Art. 204. The Interallied Commissions of Control will be specially charged with the duty of seeing to the complete execution of the delivery, destruc-

tion, demolition, and rendering things useless to be carried out at the expense of the German Government in accordance with the present treaty. They will communicate to the German authorities the decisions which the principal Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take, or which the execution of the military, naval, and air clauses may necessitate.

Art. 205. The Interallied Commissions of Control may establish their organizations at the seat of the Central German Government. They shall be entitled as often as they think desirable to proceed to any point whatever in German territory, or to send sub-commissions, or to authorize one or more of their members to go, to any such point.

Art. 206. The German Government must give all necessary facilities for the accomplishment of their missions to the Interallied Commissions of Control and to their members. It shall attach a qualified representative to each Interallied Commission of Control for the purpose of receiving the communications which the commission may have to address to the German Government, and of supplying or procuring for the commission all information or documents which may be required. The German Government must in all cases furnish at its own cost all labor and material required to effect the deliveries and the work of destruction, dismantling, demolition, and of rendering things useless, provided for in the present treaty.

Art. 207. The upkeep and cost of the Commissions of Control and the expenses involved by their work shall be borne by Germany.

Art. 208. The Military Interallied Commission of Control will represent the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the military clauses. . . . The German Government must furnish to the Military Interallied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to insure the complete execution of the military clauses, and in particular all legislative and administrative documents and regulations.

Art. 209. The Naval Interallied Commission of Control will represent the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the naval clauses. . . . The German Government must furnish to the Naval Interallied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the commission may deem necessary to insure the complete execution of the naval clauses. . . .

Art. 210. The Aeronautical Interallied Commission of Control will represent the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the air clauses. . . . The German Government must furnish to the Aeronautical Interallied Commission of Control all such information and legislative, administrative or other documents which the commission may consider necessary to insure the complete execution of the air clauses. . . .

SECTION V.—GENERAL ARTICLES

Art. 211. After the expiration of a period of three months from the coming into force of the present treaty, the German laws must have been modified and shall be maintained in conformity with this part of the present treaty. Within the same period all the administrative or other measures relat-

ing to the execution of this part of the treaty must have been taken.

Art. 212. The following portions of the armistice of Nov. 11, 1918: Article VI, the first two and the sixth and seventh paragraphs of Article VII, Article IX, Clauses I, II, and V of Annex No. 2 and the protocol, dated April 4, 1919, supplementing the armistice of Nov. 11, 1918, remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.

Art. 213. So long as the present treaty remains in force, Germany undertakes to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary.

Part VI.—Prisoners of War and Graves

SECTION I.—PRISONERS OF WAR

Art. 214. The repatriation of prisoners of war and interned civilians shall take place as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present treaty and shall be carried out with the greatest rapidity.

Art. 215. The repatriation of German prisoners of war and interned civilians shall, in accordance with Article 214, be carried out by a commission composed of representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part, and of the German Government on the other part. For each of the Allied and Associated Powers a subcommission composed exclusively of representatives of the interested powers and of delegates of the German Government shall regulate the details of carrying into effect the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

Art. 216. From the time of their delivery into the hands of the German authorities the prisoners of war and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their homes by the said authorities. Those among them who before the war were habitually resident in territory occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the consent and control of the military authorities of the Allied and Associated Armies of Occupation.

Art. 217. The whole cost of repatriation from the moment of starting shall be borne by the German Government, who shall also provide the land and sea transport and staff considered necessary by the commission referred to in Article 215.

Art. 218. Prisoners of war and interned civilians awaiting disposal or undergoing sentences for offenses against discipline shall be repatriated irrespective of the completion of their sentence or of the proceedings pending against them. This stipulation shall not apply to prisoners of war and interned civilians punished for offenses committed subsequent to May 1, 1919. During the period pending their repatriation all prisoners of war and interned civilians shall remain subject to the existing regulations, more especially as regards work and discipline.

Art. 219. Prisoners of war and interned civilians who are awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offenses other than those against discipline may be detained.

Art. 220. The German Government undertakes to admit to its territory without distinction all persons liable to repatriation. Prisoners of war or other German nationals who do not desire to be repatriated may be excluded from repatriation; but the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them

or to take them to a neutral country or to allow them to reside in their own territories. The German Government undertakes not to institute any exceptional proceedings against these persons or their families nor to take any repressive or vexatious measures of any kind whatsoever against them on this account.

Art. 221. The Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of German prisoners of war or German nationals in their hands conditional upon the immediate notification and release by the German Government of any prisoners of war who are nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers and may still be in Germany.

Art. 222. Germany undertakes 1. To give every facility to the commissions to inquire into the cases of those who cannot be traced; to furnish such commissions with all necessary means of transport; to allow them access to camps, prisons, hospitals, and all other places; and to place at their disposal all documents, whether public or private, which would facilitate their inquiries. 2. To impose penalties upon any German officials or private persons who have concealed the presence of any nationals of any of the Allied and Associated Powers, or have neglected to reveal the presence of any such after it had come to their knowledge.

Art. 223. Germany undertakes to restore without delay from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty all articles, money, securities, and documents which have belonged to nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers and which have been retained by the German authorities.

Art. 224. The high contracting parties waive reciprocally all repayment of sums due for the maintenance of prisoners of war in their respective territories.

SECTION II.—GRAVES

Art. 225. The Allied and Associated Governments and the German Government will cause to be respected and maintained the graves of the soldiers and sailors buried in their respective territories. They agree to recognize any commission appointed by an Allied or Associated Government for the purpose of identifying, registering, caring for, or erecting suitable memorials over the said graves and to facilitate the discharge of its duties. Furthermore, they agree to afford, so far as the provisions of their laws and the requirements of public health allow, every facility for giving effect to requests that the bodies of their soldiers and sailors may be transferred to their own countries.

Art. 226. The graves of prisoners of war and interned civilians who are nationals of the different belligerent States and have died in captivity shall be properly maintained in accordance with Article 225 of the present treaty. The Allied and Associated Governments on the one part, and the German Government on the other part, reciprocally undertake also to furnish to each other: 1. A complete list of those who have died, together with all information useful for identification. 2. All information as to the number and position of the graves of all those who have been buried without identification.

Part VII.—Penalties

Art. 227. The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II. of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offense

against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defense. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following powers: The United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. In its decision, the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed. The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.

Art. 228. The German Government recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply, notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her allies. The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war who are specified either by name or by the rank, office, or employment which they held under the German authorities.

Art. 229. Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that power. Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the powers concerned. In every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel.

Art. 230. The German Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to insure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of offenders, and the just appreciation of responsibility.

Part VIII.—Reparation

SECTION I.—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art. 231. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Art. 232. The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied or

Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea, and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto. In accordance with Germany's pledges, already given as to complete restoration for Belgium, Germany undertakes, in addition to the compensation for damage elsewhere in this chapter provided for, as a consequence of the violation of the treaty of 1839, to make reimbursement of all sums which Belgium has borrowed from the Allied and Associated Governments up to Nov. 11, 1918, together with interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum on such sums. This amount shall be determined by the Reparation Commission, and the German Government undertakes thereupon forthwith to make a special issue of bearer bonds to an equivalent amount payable in marks gold, on May 1, 1926, or, at the option of the German Government, on the 1st of May in any year up to 1926. Subject to the foregoing, the form of such bonds shall be determined by the Reparation Commission. Such bonds shall be handed over to the Reparation Commission, which has authority to take and acknowledge receipt thereof on behalf of Belgium.

Art. 233. The amount of the above damage for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an interallied commission, to be called the Reparation Commission, and constituted in the form and with the power set forth hereunder and in Annexes II to VII inclusive hereto. This commission shall consider the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard. The findings of the commission as to the amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to the German Government on or before the 1st May, 1921, as representing the extent of that Government's obligations. The commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from the 1st May, 1921. If, however, within the period mentioned, Germany fails to discharge her obligations, any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years, or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments, acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in this part of the present treaty, shall determine.

Art. 234. The Reparation Commission shall after the 1st May, 1921, from time to time, consider the resources and capacity of Germany and, after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to extend the date and to modify the form of payments, such as are to be provided for in accordance with Article 233; but not to cancel any part, except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented upon the commission.

Art. 235. In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claims, Germany shall pay in such installments and in such manner (whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities, or otherwise) as the Reparation Commission may fix, during 1919, 1920, and the first four months of 1921, the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gold marks. Out of this sum the expenses of the armies of occupation subsequent to the armistice of the 11th November, 1918, shall first be met, and such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation

may also, with the approval of the said Governments, be paid for out of the above sum. The balance shall be reckoned toward liquidation of the amounts due for reparation. Germany shall further deposit bonds as prescribed in Paragraph 12 (c) of Annex II hereto.

Art. 236. Germany further agrees to the direct application of her economic resources to reparation as specified in Annexes III, IV, V, and VI, relating respectively to merchant shipping, to physical restoration, and to coal and derivatives of coal, and to dyestuffs and other chemical products; provided always that the value of the property transferred and any services rendered by her under these annexes, assessed in the manner therein prescribed, shall be credited to her toward liquidation of her obligations under the above articles.

Art. 237. The successive installments, including the above sum, paid over by Germany in satisfaction of the above claims, will be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance on a basis of general equity and of the rights of each. For the purposes of this division the value of property transferred and services rendered under Article 243 and under Annexes III, IV, V, VI, and VII shall be reckoned in the same manner as cash payments effected in that year.

Art. 238. In Addition to the payments mentioned above, Germany shall effect, in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Reparation Commission, restitution in cash of cash taken away, seized, or sequestered, and also restitution of animals, objects of every nature, and securities taken away, seized, or sequestered, in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them in territory belonging to Germany or her allies. Until this procedure is laid down restitution will continue in accordance with the provisions of the armistice of 11th of November, 1918, and its renewals and the protocols thereto.

Art. 239. Germany undertakes to make forthwith the restitution contemplated by Article 238 and to make the payments and deliveries contemplated by Articles 233, 234, 235, and 236.

Art. 240. Germany recognizes the commission provided for by Article 233 as the same may be constituted by the Allied and Associated Governments in accordance with Annex II and agrees irrevocably to the possession and exercise by such commission of the power and authority given to it under the present treaty. The German Government will supply to the commission all the information which the commission may require relative to the financial situation and operations and to the property, productive capacity, and stocks and current production of raw materials and manufactured articles of Germany and her nationals, and, further, any information relative to military operations which in the judgment of the commission may be necessary for the assessment of Germany's liability for reparation as defined in Annex I. The German Government will accord to the members of the commission and its authorized agents the same rights and immunities as are enjoyed in Germany by duly accredited diplomatic agents of friendly powers. Germany further agrees to provide for the salaries and expenses of the commission, and of such staff as it may employ.

Art. 241. Germany undertakes to pass, issue, and maintain in force any legislation, orders, and decrees that may be necessary to give complete effect to these present.

Art. 242. The provisions of this part of the present treaty do not apply to the property, rights,

and interests referred to in Sections III and IV of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty, nor to the product of their liquidation, except so far as concerns any final balance in favor of Germany under Article 243, (a).

Art. 243. The following shall be reckoned as credits to Germany in respect of her reparation obligations: (a) Any final balance in favor of Germany under Sections III and IV of Part X (economic clauses) and Section V (Alsace-Lorraine) of Part III (political clauses for Europe). (b) Amounts due to Germany in respect of transfers under Part IX (financial clauses) Part XII (ports, waterways, and railways) and section IV (Sarre Basin) of Part III (political clauses for Europe). (c) Amounts which in the judgment of the Reparation Commission should be credited to Germany on account of any other transfers under the present treaty of property, rights, concessions, or other interests. In no case, however, shall credit be given for property restored in accordance with Article 238.

Art. 244. The transfer of the German submarine cables which do not form the subject of particular provisions of the present treaty is regulated by Annex VII hereto.

ANNEX I

[Categories of Damages]

Compensation may be claimed from Germany under Article 232 above in respect of the total damage under the following categories: 1. Damage to injured persons and to surviving dependents by personal injury to or death of civilians caused by acts of war. . . . 2. Damage caused by Germany or her allies to civilian victims of acts of cruelty, violence, or maltreatment (including injuries to life or health as a consequence of imprisonment, deportation, internment, or evacuation, of exposure at sea, or of being forced to labor by Germany or her allies.) . . . 3. Damage caused by Germany or her allies in their own territory or in occupied or invaded territory to civilian victims of all acts injurious to health or capacity to work, or to honor, as well as to the surviving dependents of such victims. 4. Damage caused by any kind of maltreatment of prisoners of war. 5. As damage caused to the peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers, all pensions and compensations in the nature of pensions to naval and military victims of war, (including members of the air forces,) whether mutilated, wounded, sick, or invalided, and to the dependents of such victims. . . . 6. The cost of assistance by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to prisoners of war and to their families and dependents. 7. Allowances by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to the families and dependents of mobilized persons or persons serving with the forces, the amount due to them for each calendar year in which hostilities occurred being calculated for each Government on the basis of the average scale for such payments in force in France during that year. 8. Damage caused to civilians by being forced by Germany or her allies to labor without just remuneration. 9. Damage in respect of all property, wherever situated, belonging to any of the Allied or Associated States or their nationals, with the exception of naval and military works or materials, which have been carried off, seized, injured, or destroyed by the acts of Germany or her allies on land, on sea, or from the air. . . . 10. Damage in the form of levies, fines and other similar exac-

tions imposed by Germany or her allies upon the civilian population.

ANNEX II

[Reparation Commission]

1. The commission referred to in Article 233 shall be called "The Reparation Commission," and is hereinafter referred to as 'the commission.'

2. Delegates to the commission shall be nominated by the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. Each of these powers will appoint one delegate and also one assistant delegate, who will take his place in case of illness or necessary absence, but at other times will only have the right to be present at proceedings without taking any part therein. On no occasion shall the delegates of more than five of the above powers have the right to take part in the proceedings of the commission and to record their votes. The delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy shall have this right on all occasions. The delegate of Belgium shall have this right on all occasions other than those referred to below. The delegate of Japan shall have this right on occasions when questions relating to damage at sea and questions arising under Article 260 of Part IX (financial clauses) in which Japanese interests are concerned are under consideration. The delegate of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State shall have this right when questions relating to Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria are under consideration. Each Government represented on the commission shall have the right to withdraw therefrom upon twelve months' notice, filed with the commission and confirmed in the course of the sixth month after the date of the original notice.

3. Such of the other Allied and Associated Powers as may be interested shall have the right to appoint a delegate to be present and act as assessor only while their respective claims and interests are under examination or discussion, but without the right to vote.

4. In case of the death, resignation or recall of any delegate, assistant delegate, or assessor, a successor to him shall be nominated as soon as possible.

5. The commission will have its principal permanent bureau in Paris and will hold its first meeting in Paris as soon as practicable after the coming into force of the present treaty, and thereafter will meet in such place or places and at such time as it may deem convenient and as may be necessary for the most expeditious discharge of its duties.

6. At its first meeting the commission shall elect from among the delegates referred to above a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, who shall hold office for one year and shall be eligible for reelection. . . .

7. The commission is authorized to appoint all necessary officers, agents, and employees who may be required for the execution of its functions, and to fix their remuneration; to constitute committees, whose members need not necessarily be members of the commission. . . .

8. All proceedings of the commission shall be private unless, on particular occasions, the commission shall otherwise determine for special reasons.

9. The commission shall be required, if the German Government so desire, to hear, within a period which it will fix from time to time, evidence and arguments on the part of Germany on any question connected with her capacity to pay.

10. The commission shall consider the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard, but not to take any part whatever in the decisions of the commission. The commission shall afford a similar opportunity to the allies of Germany when it shall consider that their interests are in question.

11. The commission shall not be bound by any particular code or rules of law or by any particular rule of evidence or of procedure, but shall be guided by justice, equity, and good faith. Its decisions must follow the same principles and rules in all cases where they are applicable. . . .

12. The commission shall have all the powers conferred upon it, and shall exercise all the functions assigned to it by the present treaty. The commission shall in general have wide latitude as to its control and handling of the whole reparation problem as dealt within this part of the present treaty, and shall have authority to interpret its provisions. Subject to the provisions of the present treaty, the commission is constituted by the several Allied and Associated Governments referred to in Paragraphs 2 and 3 above as the exclusive agency of the said Governments respectively for receiving, selling, holding, and distributing the reparation payments to be made by Germany under this part of the present treaty. The commission must comply with the following conditions and provisions: (a) Whatever part of the full amount of the proved claims is not paid in gold, or in ships, securities, and commodities or otherwise, Germany shall be required, under such conditions as the commission may determine, to cover by way of guarantee by an equivalent issue of bonds, obligations, or otherwise, in order to constitute an acknowledgment of the said part of the debt: (b) In periodically estimating Germany's capacity to pay, the commission shall examine the German system of taxation, first to the end that the sums for reparation which Germany is required to pay shall become a charge upon all her revenues prior to that for the service or discharge of any domestic loan, and, secondly, so as to satisfy itself that, in general, the German scheme of taxation is fully as heavy proportionately as that of any of the powers represented on the commission. (c) In order to facilitate and continue the immediate restoration of the economic life of the Allied and Associated countries, the commission will, as provided in Article 235, take from Germany by way of security for and acknowledgment of her debt a first installment of gold bearer bonds free of all taxes or charges of every description established or to be established by the Government of the German Empire or of the German States, or by any authority subject to them; these bonds will be delivered on account and in three portions, the marks gold being payable in conformity with Article 262 of Part IX (financial clauses) of the present treaty, as follows: *First*. To be issued forthwith, 20,000,000,000 marks gold bearer bonds, payable not later than May 1, 1921, without interest. There shall be specially applied toward the amortization of these bonds the payments which Germany is pledged to make in conformity with Article 235, after deduction of the sums used for the reimbursement of expenses of the armies of occupation and for payment of foodstuffs and raw materials. Such bonds as have not been redeemed by May 1, 1921, shall then be exchanged for new bonds of the same type as those provided for below, (Paragraph 12, c. second.) *Second*. To be issued forthwith, further 40,000,000,000 marks gold bearer bonds, bearing interest at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum between 1921 and 1926, and thereafter at 5 per cent. per annum,

with an additional 1 per cent. for amortization beginning in 1926 on the whole amount of the issue. *Third*. To be delivered forthwith a covering undertaking in writing, to issue when, but not until, the commission is satisfied that Germany can meet such interest and sinking fund obligations, a further installment of 40,000,000,000 marks gold 5 per cent. bearer bonds, the time and mode of payment of principal and interest to be determined by the commission.

The dates for payment of interest, the manner of applying the amortization fund, and all other questions relating to the issue, management, and regulation of the bond issue shall be determined by the commission from time to time. Further issues by way of acknowledgment and security may be required as the commission subsequently determines from time to time. (d) In the event of bonds, obligations, or other evidence of indebtedness issued by Germany by way of security for or acknowledgment of her reparation debt being disposed of outright, not by way of pledge, to persons other than the several Governments in whose favor Germany's original reparation indebtedness was created, an amount of such reparation indebtedness shall be deemed to be extinguished corresponding to the nominal value of the bonds, &c., so disposed of outright, and the obligation of Germany in respect of such bonds shall be confined to her liabilities to the holders of the bonds, as expressed upon their face. (e) The damage for repairing, reconstructing, and rebuilding property in the invaded and devastated districts, including reinstallation of furniture, machinery and other equipment, will be calculated according to the cost at the dates when the work is done. (f) Decisions of the commission relating to the total or partial cancellation of the capital or interest of any verified debt of Germany must be accompanied by a statement of its reasons.

13. As to voting, the commission will observe the following rules: When a decision of the commission is taken, the votes of all the delegates entitled to vote, or in the absence of any of them, of their assistant delegates, shall be recorded. Abstention from voting is to be treated as a vote against the proposal under discussion. Assessors have no vote.

On the following questions unanimity is necessary: (a) Questions involving the sovereignty of any of the Allied and Associated Powers, or the cancellation of the whole or any part of the debt or obligations of Germany. (b) Questions of determining the amount and conditions of bonds or other obligations to be issued by the German Government and of fixing the time and manner for selling, negotiating, or distributing such bonds. (c) Any postponement, total or partial, beyond the end of 1930, of the payment of installments falling due between the 1st May, 1921, and the end of 1926 inclusive. (d) Any postponement, total or partial, of any installment falling due after 1926 for a period exceeding three years. (e) Questions of applying in any particular case a method of measuring damages different from that which has been previously applied in a similar case. (f) Questions of the interpretation of the provisions of this part of the present treaty.

All other questions shall be decided by the vote of a majority. In case of any difference of opinion among the delegates, which cannot be solved by reference to their Governments, upon the question whether a given case is one which requires a unanimous vote for its decision or not, such difference shall be referred to the immediate arbitration

of some impartial person to be agreed upon by the Governments, whose award the Allied and Associated Governments agree to accept.

14. Decisions of the commission, in accordance with the powers conferred upon it, shall forthwith become binding and may be put into immediate execution without further proceedings.

15. The commission will issue to each of the interested powers, in such form as the commission shall fix: *First*. A certificate stating that it holds for the account of the said power bonds of the issues mentioned above, the said certificate, on the demand of the power concerned, being divisible in a number of parts not exceeding five; *Second*. From time to time certificates stating the goods delivered by Germany on account of her reparation debt which it holds for the account of the said power. The said certificates shall be registered, and, upon notice to the commission, may be transferred by indorsement. When bonds are issued for sale or negotiation, and when goods are delivered by the commission, certificates to an equivalent value must be withdrawn.

16. Interest shall be debited to Germany as from 1st May, 1921, in respect of her debt as determined by the commission, after allowing for sums already covered by cash payments or their equivalent, or by bonds issued to the commission, or under Article 243. The rate of interest shall be 5 per cent., unless the commission shall determine at some future time that circumstances justify a variation of this rate. The commission, in fixing on 1st May, 1921, the total amount of the debt of Germany, may take account of interest due on sums arising out of the reparation of material damage as from 11th November, 1918, up to 1st May, 1921.

17. In case of default by Germany in the performance of any obligation under this part of the present treaty, the commission will forthwith give notice of such default to each of the interested powers and may make such recommendations as to the action to be taken in consequence of such default as it may think necessary.

18. The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances.

19. Payments required to be made in gold or its equivalent on account of the proved claims of the Allied and Associated Powers may at any time be accepted by the commission in the form of chattels, properties, commodities, businesses, rights, concessions, within or without German territory, ships, bonds, shares, or securities of any kind, or currencies of Germany or other States, the value of such substitutes for gold being fixed at a fair and just amount by the commission itself.

20. The commission, in fixing or accepting payment in specified properties or rights, shall have due regard for any legal or equitable interests of the Allied and Associated Powers or of neutral powers or of their nationals therein.

21. No member of the commission shall be responsible, except to the Government appointing him, for any action or omission as such member. No one of the Allied or Associated Governments assumes any responsibility in respect of any other Government.

22. Subject to the provisions of the present treaty this annex may be amended by the unanimous decision of the Governments represented from time to time upon the commission.

23. When all the amounts due from Germany and her allies under the present treaty or the decisions of the commission have been discharged and all sums received, or their equivalents, shall have been distributed to the powers interested, the commission shall be dissolved.

ANNEX III

[Shipping]

1. Germany recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the replacement, ton for ton (gross tonnage) and class for class, of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that the tonnage of German shipping at present in existence is much less than that lost by the Allied and Associated Powers in consequence of the German aggression, the right thus recognized will be enforced on German ships and boats under the following conditions: The German Government on behalf of themselves and so as to bind all other persons interested, cede to the Allied and Associated Governments the property in all the German merchant ships which are of 1,600 tons gross and upward; in one-half, reckoned in tonnage, of the ships which are between 1,000 tons and 1,600 tons gross; in one-quarter, reckoned in tonnage, of the steam trawlers, and in one-quarter, reckoned in tonnage, of the other fishing boats.

2. The German Government will, within two months of the coming into force of the present treaty, deliver to the Reparation Commission all the ships and boats mentioned in Paragraph 1.

3. The ships and boats mentioned in Paragraph 1 include all ships and boats which (a) fly, or may be entitled to fly, the German merchant flag; or (b) are owned by any German national, company, or corporation or by any company or corporation belonging to a country other than an Allied or Associated country and under the control or direction of German nationals; or (c) which are now under construction (1) in Germany, (2) in other than Allied or Associated countries for the account of any German national, company, or corporation.

4. For the purpose of providing documents of title for the ships and boats to be handed over as above mentioned the German Government will: (a) Deliver to the Reparation Commission in respect of each vessel a bill of sale or other document of title evidencing the transfer to the commission of the entire property in the vessel free from all incumbrances, charges, and liens of all kinds, as the commission may require; (b) Take all measures that may be indicated by the Reparation Commission for insuring that the ships themselves shall be placed at its disposal.

5. As an additional part of reparation, Germany agrees to cause merchant ships to be built in German yards for the account of the Allied and Associated Governments as follows: (a) Within three months of the coming into force of the present treaty, the Reparation Commission will notify to the German Government the amount of tonnage to be laid down in German shipyards in each of the two years next succeeding the three months mentioned above; (b) Within twenty-four months of the coming into force of the present treaty, the Reparation Commission will notify to the German Government the amount of tonnage to be laid down in each of the three years following the two years mentioned above; (c) The amount of tonnage to be laid down in each year shall not exceed 200,000 tons, gross tonnage; (d) The specifications of the ships to be built, the conditions

under which they are to be built and delivered, the price per ton at which, they are to be accounted for by the Reparation Commission, and all other questions relating to the accounting, ordering, building and delivery of the ships, shall be determined by the commission.

6. Germany undertakes to restore in kind and in normal condition of upkeep to the Allied and Associated Powers, within two months of the coming into force of the present treaty, in accordance with procedure to be laid down by the Reparation Commission, any boats and other movable appliances belonging to inland navigation which since the 1st August, 1914, have by any means whatever come into her possession or into the possession of her nationals, and which can be identified. With a view to make good the loss in inland navigation tonnage, from whatever cause arising, which has been incurred during the war by the Allied and Associated Powers, and which cannot be made good by means of the restitution prescribed above, Germany agrees to cede to the Reparation Commission a portion of the German river fleet up to the amount of the loss mentioned above, provided that such cession shall not exceed 20 per cent. of the river fleet as it existed on the 11th November, 1918. The condition of this session shall be settled by the arbitrators referred to in Article 339 of Part XII (ports, waterways and railways) of the present treaty, who are charged with the settlement of difficulties relating to the apportionment of river tonnage resulting from the new international régime applicable to certain river systems or from the territorial changes affecting those systems.

7. Germany agrees to take any measures that may be indicated to her by the Reparation Commission for obtaining the full title to the property in all ships which have been during the war transferred, or are in process of transfer, to neutral flags, without the consent of the Allied and Associated Governments.

8. Germany waives all claims of any description against the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals in respect of the detention, employment, loss or damage of any German ships or boats, except when being made of payments due in respect of the employment of ships in conformity with the armistice agreement of the 13th January, 1919, and subsequent agreements. The handing over of the ships of the German mercantile marine must be continued without interruption in accordance with the said agreement.

9. Germany waives all claims to vessels or cargoes sunk by or in consequence of naval action and subsequently salvaged, in which any of the Allied or Associated Governments or their nationals may have any interest, either as owners, charterers, insurers or otherwise, notwithstanding any decree of condemnation which may have been made by a prize court of Germany or of her allies.

ANNEX IV

[Devastated Areas]

1. The Allied and Associated Powers require, and Germany undertakes, that, in part satisfaction of her obligations expressed in this part of the present treaty, she will, as hereinafter provided, devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas of the Allied and Associated Powers, to the extent that these powers may determine.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments may

file with the Reparation Commission lists showing: (a) Animals, machinery, equipment, tools, and like articles of commercial character, which have been seized, consumed, or destroyed by Germany or destroyed in direct consequence of military operations, and which such Governments, for the purpose of meeting immediate and urgent needs, desire to have replaced by animals and articles of the same nature which are in being in German territory at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty: (b) Reconstruction materials, (stones, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, wood, window glass, steel, lime, cement, &c.,) machinery, heating apparatus, furniture, and like articles of a commercial character which the said Governments desire to have produced and manufactured in Germany and delivered to them to permit of the restoration of the invaded areas.

3. The lists relating to the articles mentioned in 2 (a), above, shall be filed within sixty days after the date of the coming into force of the present treaty. The lists relating to the articles in 2 (b), above, shall be filed on or before Dec. 31, 1919. The lists shall contain all such details as are customary in commercial contracts dealing with the subject matter, including specifications, dates of delivery, (but not extending over more than four years,) and places of delivery, but not price or value, which shall be fixed as hereinafter provided by the commission.

4. Immediately upon the filing of such lists with the commission, the commission shall consider the amount and number of the materials and animals mentioned in the lists provided for above which are to be required of Germany. . . . Machinery, equipment, tools, and like articles of a commercial character in actual industrial use are not, however, to be demanded of Germany unless there is no free stock of such articles respectively which is not in use and is available, and then not in excess of 30 per cent. of the quantity of such articles in use in any one establishment or undertaking. The commission shall give representatives of the German Government an opportunity and a time to be heard as to their capacity to furnish the said materials, articles, and animals. . . . The German Government undertakes to deliver the materials, articles, and animals as specified in the said communication, and the interested Allied and Associated Governments severally agree to accept the same, provided they conform to the specification given. . . .

5. The commission shall determine the value to be attributed to the materials, articles, and animals to be delivered in accordance with the foregoing, and the Allied or Associated Power receiving the same agrees to be charged with such value, and the amount thereof shall be treated as a payment by Germany to be divided in accordance with Article 237 of this part of the present treaty. In cases where the right to require physical restoration as above provided is exercised the commission shall insure that the amount to be credited against the reparation obligation of Germany shall be the fair value of work done or materials supplied by Germany and that the claim made by the interested power in respect of the damage so repaired by physical restoration shall be discharged to the extent of the proportion which the damage thus repaired bears to the whole of the damage thus claimed for.

6. As an immediate advance on account of the animals referred to in Paragraph 2 (a) above, Germany undertakes to deliver in equal monthly installments in the three months following the com-

ing into force of the present treaty the following quantities of live stock: *First.* To the French Government, 500 stallions, (3 to 7 years,) 30,000 fillies and mares, (18 months to 7 years,) type: Ardennais, Boulonnais, or Belgian; 2,000 bulls, (18 months to 3 years,) 90,000 milch cows, (2 to 6 years,) 1,000 rams, 100,000 sheep, 10,000 goats. *Second.* To the Belgian Government, 200 stallions (3 to 7 years,) large Belgian type; 5,000 mares, (3 to 7 years,) large Belgian type; 5,000 fillies, (18 months to 3 years,) large Belgium type; 2,000 bulls, (18 months to 3 years,) 50,000 milch cows, (2 to 6 years,) 40,000 heifers, 200 rams, 20,000 sheep, 15,000 sows. The animals delivered shall be of average health and condition. To the extent that animals so delivered cannot be identified as animals taken away or seized, the value of such animals shall be credited against the reparation obligations of Germany in accordance with Paragraph 5 of this annex.

7. Without waiting for the decisions of the commission, referred to in Paragraph 4 of this annex, to be taken, Germany must continue the delivery to France of the agricultural material referred to in Article 3 of the renewal of the armistice of 16th January, 1919.

ANNEX V

[Coal and Coal Tar Products]

1. Germany accords the following options for the delivery of coal and derivatives of coal to the under-mentioned signatories of the present treaty.

2. Germany undertakes to deliver to France 7,000,000 tons of coal per year for ten years. In addition, Germany undertakes to deliver to France annually for a period not exceeding ten years an amount of coal equal to the difference between the annual production before the war of the coal mines of the Nord and Pas de Calais, destroyed as a result of the war, and the production of the mines of the same area during the years in question; such delivery not to exceed 20,000,000 tons in any one year of the first five years, and 8,000,000 tons in any one year of the succeeding five years. It is understood due diligence will be exercised in the restoration of the destroyed mines in the Nord and Pas de Calais.

3. Germany undertakes to deliver to Belgium 8,000,000 tons of coal annually for ten years.

4. Germany undertakes to deliver to Italy up to the following quantities of coal: July, 1919, to June, 1920, 4,500,000 tons. July, 1920, to June, 1921, 6,000,000 tons. July, 1921, to June, 1922, 7,500,000 tons. July, 1922, to June, 1923, 8,000,000 tons. July, 1923, to June, 1924, 8,500,000 tons. And each of the following five years, 8,500,000 tons. At least two-thirds of the actual deliveries to be land borne.

5. Germany further undertakes to deliver annually to Luxemburg, if directed by the Reparation Commission, a quantity of coal equal to the pre-war annual consumption of German coal in Luxemburg.

6. [Stipulation for prices to be paid for coal delivered under these options.] . . .

7. The Allied and Associated Governments interested may demand the delivery in place of coal of metallurgical coke in the proportion of three tons of coke to four tons of coal.

8. Germany undertakes to deliver to France and to transport to the French frontier by rail or by water the following products during each of the three years following the coming into force of this treaty: Benzol—35,000 tons. Coal tar—50,000

tons. Sulphate of ammonia—30,000 tons. All or part of the coal tar may, at the option of the French Government, be replaced by corresponding quantities of products of distillation, such as light oils, heavy oils, anthracene, naphthaline, or pitch.

9. The price paid for coke and for the articles referred to in the preceding paragraphs shall be the same as the price paid by German nationals under the same conditions of shipment to the French frontier or to the German ports, and shall be subject to any advantages which may be accorded similar products furnished to German nationals.

10. The foregoing options shall be exercised through the intervention of the Reparation Commission, which, subject to the specific provisions hereof, shall have power to determine all questions relative to procedure and the qualities and quantities of products, the quantity of coke which may be substituted for coal, and the times and modes of delivery and payment. In giving notice to the German Government of the foregoing options the commission shall give at least 120 days' notice of deliveries to be made after the 1st January, 1920, and at least thirty days' notice of deliveries to be made between the coming into force of this treaty and the 1st January, 1920. . . . If the commission shall determine that the full exercise of the foregoing options would interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Germany, the commission is authorized to postpone or to cancel deliveries, and in so doing to settle all questions of priority, but the coal to replace coal from destroyed mines shall receive priority over other deliveries.

ANNEX VI

[Dyestuffs and Chemical Drugs]

1. Germany accords to the Reparation Commission an option to require as part of reparation the delivery by Germany of such quantities and kinds of dyestuffs and chemical drugs as the commission may designate, not exceeding 50 per cent. of the total stock of each and every kind of dyestuff and chemical drug in Germany or under German control at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty. This option shall be exercised within sixty days of the receipt by the commission of such particulars as to stocks as may be considered necessary by the commission.

2. Germany further accords to the Reparation Commission an option to require delivery during the period from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty until Jan. 1, 1920, and during each period of six months thereafter until Jan. 1, 1925, of any specified kind of dyestuff and chemical drug up to an amount not exceeding 25 per cent. of the German production of such dyestuffs and chemical drugs during the previous six months' period. . . .

3. For dyestuffs and chemical drugs delivered . . . the price shall be fixed by the commission, having regard to pre-war net export prices and subsequent variations of cost or the lowest net selling price of similar dyestuffs and chemical drugs to any other purchaser.

4. All details, including mode and times of exercising the options and making delivery, and all other questions arising under this arrangement shall be determined by the Reparation Commission.

5. The above expression "dyestuffs and chemical drugs" includes all synthetic dyes and drugs and intermediate or other products used in connection with dyeing, so far as they are manufactured for sale.

ANNEX VII

[Submarine Cables]

Germany renounces on her own behalf and on behalf of her nationals in favor of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights, titles or privileges of whatever nature in the submarine cables set out below, or in any portions thereof:

Emden-Vigo: from the Straits of Dover to off Vigo;

Emden-Brest: from off Cherbourg to Brest;

Emden-Teneriffe: from off Dunkirk to off Teneriffe;

Emden-Azores (1): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal;

Emden-Azores (2): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal;

Azores-New York (1): from Fayal to New York;

Azores-New York (2): from Fayal to the longitude of Halifax;

Teneriffe-Monrovia: from off Teneriffe to off Monrovia;

Monrovia-Lome: from about latitude 2 degrees 30 minutes north, and longitude 7 degrees 40 minutes west of Greenwich,

to about latitude 2 degrees 20 minutes north, and longitude 5 degrees 30 minutes west of Greenwich,

and from about latitude 3 degrees 48 minutes north, and longitude 0 degrees 0 minutes to Lome;

Lome-Duala: from Lome to Duala;

Monrovia-Pernambuco: from off Monrovia to off Pernambuco;

Constantinople-Constanza: from Constantinople to Constanza;

Yap-Shanghai, Yap-Guam, and Yap-Menado (Celebes): from Yap Island to Shanghai, from Yap Island to Guam Island, and from Yap Island to Menado.

The value of the above-mentioned cables or portions thereof in so far as they are privately owned, calculated on the basis of the original cost less a suitable allowance for depreciation, shall be credited to Germany in the reparation account.

SECTION II.—SPECIAL PROVISIONS

[*Restoration of Trophies, Objets d'Art, &c.*]

Art. 245. Within six months after coming into force of the present treaty the German Government must restore to the French Government the trophies, archives, historical souvenirs, or works of art carried away from France by the German authorities in the course of the war of 1870-1871 and during this last war, in accordance with a list which will be communicated to it by the French Government; particularly the French flags taken in the course of the war of 1870-1871, and all the political papers taken by the German authorities on Oct. 10, 1870, at the Château of Cercay, near Brunoy, (Seine-et-Oise,) belonging at the time to M. Rouher, formerly Minister of State.

Art. 246. Within six months of the coming into force of the present treaty Germany will restore to his Majesty the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph Othman, which was removed from Medina by the Turkish authorities and is stated to have been presented to the ex-Emperor William II. Within the same period Germany will

hand over to his Britannic Majesty's Government the skull of the Sultan Mkwawa, which was removed from the protectorate of German East Africa and taken to Germany. . . .

Art. 247. Germany undertakes to furnish to the University of Louvain, within three months after a request made by it and transmitted through the intervention of the Reparation Commission, manuscripts, incunabula, printed books, maps, and objects of collection corresponding in number and value to those destroyed in the burning by Germany of the library of Louvain. . . . Germany undertakes to deliver to Belgium, through the Reparation Commission, within six months of the coming into force of the present treaty, in order to enable Belgium to reconstitute her two great artistic works: (a) The leaves of the triptych of the Mystic Lamb painted by the Van Eyck Brothers, formerly in the Church of St. Bavon at Ghent, now in the Berlin Museum. (b) The leaves of the triptych of the Last Supper, painted by Dierick Bouts, formerly in the Church of St. Peter at Louvain, two of which are now in the Berlin Museum and two in the old Pinakothek at Munich.

Part IX.—Financial Clauses

Art. 248. Subject to such exceptions as the Reparation Commission may approve, a first charge upon all the assets and revenues of the German Empire and its constituent States shall be the cost of reparation and all other costs arising under the present treaty or any treaties or agreements supplementary thereto or under arrangements concluded between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers during the armistice or its extensions. Up to May 1, 1921, the German Government shall not export or dispose of, and shall forbid the export or disposal of, gold without the previous approval of the Allied and Associated Powers acting through the Reparation Commission.

Art. 249. There shall be paid by the German Government the total cost of all armies of the Allied and Associated Governments in occupied German territory from the date of the signature of the armistice of the 11th November, 1918. . . . The cost of such liabilities under the above heads, so far as they relate to purchases or requisitions by the Allied and Associated Governments in the occupied territories, shall be paid by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Governments in marks at the current or agreed rate of exchange. All other of the above costs shall be paid in gold marks.

Art. 250. Germany confirms the surrender of all material handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the armistice agreement . . . and recognizes the title of the Allied and Associated Powers to such material. There shall be credited to the German Government against the sums due from it to the Allied and Associated Powers for reparation, the value, as assessed by the Reparation Commission . . . of the material handed over in accordance with . . . the armistice agreements, as well as of any other material handed over for which, as having non-military value, credit should, in the judgment of the Reparation Commission, be allowed to the German Government. Property belonging to the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals restored or surrendered under the armistice agreements in specie shall not be credited to the German Government.

Art. 251. The priority of the charges established

by Article 248 shall, subject to the qualifications made below, be as follows: (a) The cost of the armies of occupation as defined under Article 249 during the armistice and its extensions; (b) The cost of any armies of occupation as defined under Article 249 after the coming into force of the present treaty; (c) The cost of reparation arising out of the present treaty or any treaties or conventions supplementary thereto; (d) The cost of all other obligations incumbent on Germany under the armistice conventions or under this treaty or any treaties or conventions supplementary thereto. The payment for such supplies of food and raw material for Germany and such other payments as may be judged by the Allied and Associated Powers to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations in respect of reparation will have priority to the extent and upon the conditions which have been or may be determined by the Governments of the said powers.

Art. 252. The right of each of the Allied and Associated Powers to dispose of enemy assets and property within its jurisdiction at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty is not affected by the foregoing provisions.

Art. 253. Nothing in the foregoing provisions shall prejudice in any manner charges or mortgages lawfully effected in favor of the Allied and Associated Powers or their nationals respectively, before the date at which a state of war existed between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers concerned, by the German Empire or its constituent States, or by German nationals on assets in their ownership at that date.

Art. 254. The powers to which German territory is ceded shall, subject to the qualifications made in Article 255, undertake to pay: 1. A portion of the debt of the German Empire as it stood on the 1st August, 1914, calculated on the basis of the ratio between the average for the three financial years 1911, 1912, 1913, of such revenues of the ceded territory and the average for the same years of such revenues of the whole German Empire as in the judgment of the Reparation Commission are best calculated to represent the relative ability of the respective territories to make payments. 2. A portion of the debt as it stood on the 1st August, 1914, of the German State to which the ceded territory belonged, to be determined in accordance with the principle stated above. Such portions shall be determined by the Reparation Commission. The method of discharging the obligation both in respect of capital and of interest, so assumed, shall be fixed by the Reparation Commission. Such method may take the form, *inter alia*, of the assumption by the power to which the territory is ceded of Germany's liability for the German debt held by her nationals. But in the event of the method adopted involving any payments to the German Government, such payments shall be transferred to the Reparation Commission on account of the sums due for reparation so long as any balance in respect of such sums remains unpaid.

Art. 255. 1. As an exception to the above provision and inasmuch as in 1871 Germany refused to undertake any portion of the burden of the French debt, France shall be, in respect of Alsace-Lorraine, exempt from any payment under Article 254.

2. In the case of Poland that portion of the debt which, in the opinion of the Reparation Commission is attributable to the measures taken by the German and Prussian Governments for the German colonization of Poland shall be excluded from the apportionment to be made under Article 254.

3. In the case of all ceded territories other than

Alsace-Lorraine that portion of the debt of the German Empire or German States which in the opinion of the Reparation Commission represents expenditure by the Governments of the German Empire or States upon the Government properties referred to in Article 256 shall be excluded from the apportionment to be made under Article 254.

Art. 256. Powers to which German territory is ceded shall acquire all property and possessions situated therein belonging to the German Empire or to the German States, and the value of such acquisitions shall be fixed by the Reparation Commission, and paid by the State acquiring the territory to the Reparation Commission for the credit of the German Government on account of the sums due for reparation. For the purposes of this article the property and possessions of the German Empire and States shall be deemed to include all the property of the Crown, the Empire or the States, and the private property of the former German Emperor and other royal personages. In view of the terms on which Alsace-Lorraine was ceded to Germany in 1871 France shall be exempt in respect thereof from making any payment or credit under this article for any property or possessions of the German Empire or States situated therein. Belgium also shall be exempt from making any payment or any credit under this article for any property or possessions of the German Empire or States situated in German territory ceded to Belgium under the present treaty.

Art. 257. In the case of the former German territories, including colonies, protectorates, or dependencies, administered by a mandatory under Article 22 of Part I (League of Nations) of the present treaty, neither the territory nor the mandatory power shall be charged with any portion of the debt of the German Empire or States. All property and possessions belonging to the German Empire or to the German States situated in such territory shall be transferred with the territories to the Mandatory Power in its capacity as such, and no payment shall be made nor any credit given to those Governments in consideration of this transfer. For the purpose of this article the property and possessions of the German Empire and of the German States shall be deemed to include all the property of the crown, the empire or the States and the private property of the former German Emperor and other royal personages.

Art. 258. Germany renounces all rights accorded to her or her nationals by treaties, conventions or agreements, of whatsoever kind, to representation upon or participation in the control or administration of commissions, state banks, agencies or other financial or economic organizations of an international character, exercising powers of control or administration, and operating in any of the Allied or Associated States, or in Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey, or in the dependencies of these States, or in the former Russian Empire.

Art. 259. 1. Germany agrees to deliver within one month from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, to such authority as the principal Allied and Associated Powers may designate, the sum in gold which was to be deposited in the Reichsbank in the name of the Council of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt as security for the first issue of Turkish Government currency notes.

2. Germany recognizes her obligation to make annually for the period of twelve years the payments in gold for which provision is made in the German Treasury bonds deposited by her from time to time in the name of the Council of the

Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt as security for the second and subsequent issues of Turkish Government currency notes.

3. Germany undertakes to deliver, within one month from the coming into force of the present treaty, to such authority as the principal Allied and Associated Powers may designate, the deposit gold constituted in the Reichsbank or elsewhere, representing the residue of the advance in gold agreed to on the 5th of May, 1915, by the Council of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt to the Imperial Ottoman Government.

4. Germany agrees to transfer to the principal Allied and Associated Powers any title that she may have to the sum in gold and silver transmitted by her to the Turkish Ministry of Finance in November, 1918, in anticipation of the payment to be made in May, 1919, for the service of the Turkish internal loan.

5. Germany undertakes to transfer to the principal Allied and Associated Powers within a period of one month from the coming into force of the present treaty, any sums in gold transferred as pledge or as collateral security to the German Government or its nationals in connection with loans made by them to the Austro-Hungarian Government.

6. Without prejudice to Article 292 of Part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty, Germany confirms the renunciation provided for in Article XV of the armistice convention of the 11th November, 1918, of any benefit disclosed by the treaties of Bucharest and of Brest-Litovsk, and by the treaties supplementary thereto.

Germany undertakes to transfer, either to Rumania or to the principal Allied and Associated Powers, as the case may be, all monetary instruments, specie, securities and negotiable instruments or goods which she has received under the aforesaid treaties.

7. The sums of money and all securities, instruments and goods of whatever nature, to be delivered, paid and transferred under the provisions of this article, shall be disposed of by the principal Allied and Associated Powers in a manner hereafter to be determined by these powers.

Art. 260. Without prejudice to the renunciation of any rights by Germany on behalf of herself or of her nationals in the other provisions of the present treaty, the Reparation Commission may, within one year from the coming into force of the present treaty, demand that the German Government become possessed of any rights and interests of the German nationals in any public utility undertaking or in any concession operating in Russia, China, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or in the possessions or dependencies of these States or in any territory formerly belonging to Germany or her allies, to be ceded by Germany or her allies to any power, or to be administered by a mandatory under the present treaty, and may require that the German Government transfer, within six months of the date of demand, all such rights and interests and any similar rights and interests the German Government may itself possess, to the Reparation Commission. Germany shall be responsible for indemnifying her nationals so dispossessed and the Reparation Commission shall credit Germany on account of sums due for reparation with such sums in respect of the value of the transferred rights and interests as may be assessed by the Reparation Commission, and the German Government shall, within six months from the coming into force of the present treaty, communicate to the Reparation Commission all such rights

and interests, whether already granted, contingent, or not yet exercised, and shall renounce on behalf of itself and its nationals in favor of the Allied and Associated Powers all such rights and interests which have not been so communicated.

Art. 261. Germany undertakes to transfer to the Allied and Associated Powers any claims she may have to payment or repayment by the Governments of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and, in particular any claims which may arise, now or hereafter, from the fulfillment of undertakings made by Germany during the war to those Governments.

Art. 262. Any monetary obligation due by Germany arising out of the present treaty and expressed in terms of gold marks shall be payable at the option of the creditors in pounds sterling payable in London; gold dollars of the United States of America payable in New York; gold francs payable in Paris, or gold lire payable in Rome. For the purpose of this article, the gold coins mentioned above shall be defined as being of the weight and fineness of gold as enacted by law on the 1st January, 1914.

Art. 263. Germany gives a guarantee to the Brazilian Government that all sums representing the sale of coffee belonging to the State of Sao Paulo in the Ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp, and Trieste, which were deposited with the bank of Bleichröder at Berlin, shall be reimbursed, together with interest at the rate or rates agreed upon. Germany, having prevented the transfer of the sums in question to the State of Sao Paulo at the proper time, guarantees also that the reimbursements shall be effected at the rate of exchange of the day of the deposit.

Part X.—Economic Clauses

SECTION I.—COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

Chapter I.—Customs Regulations, Duties, and Restrictions

Art. 264. Germany undertakes that goods the produce or manufacture of any one of the Allied or Associated States imported into German territory, from whatsoever place arriving, shall not be subjected to other or higher duties or charges (including internal charges) than those to which the like goods the produce or manufacture of any other such State or of any other foreign country are subject. Germany will not maintain or impose any prohibition or restriction on the importation into German territory of any goods the produce or manufacture of the territories of any one of the Allied or Associated States, from whatsoever place arriving, which shall not equally extend to the importation of the like goods the produce or manufacture of any other such State or of any other foreign country.

Art. 265. Germany further undertakes that, in the matter of the régime applicable on importation, no discrimination against the commerce of any of the Allied and Associated States as compared with any other of the said States or any other foreign country shall be made. . . .

Art. 266. In all that concerns exportation Germany undertakes that goods, natural products or manufactured articles, exported from German territory to the territories of any one of the Allied or Associated States shall not be subjected to other or higher duties or charges (including internal charges) than those paid on the like goods exported to any

other such State or to any other foreign country. Germany will not maintain or impose any prohibition or restriction on the exportation of any goods sent from her territory to any one of the Allied or Associated States which shall not equally extend to the exportation of the like goods, natural products or manufactured articles, sent to any other such State or to any other foreign country.

Art. 267. Every favor, immunity, or privilege in regard to the importation, exportation, or transit of goods granted by Germany to any Allied or Associated State or to any other foreign country whatever shall simultaneously and unconditionally, without request and without compensation, be extended to all the Allied and Associated States.

Art. 268. The provisions of Articles 264 to 267 inclusive of this chapter and of Article 323 of Part XII (ports, waterways, and railways) of the present treaty are subject to the following exceptions. (a) For a period of five years from the coming into force of the present treaty, natural or manufactured products which both originate in and come from the territories of Alsace and Lorraine reunited to France shall, on importation into German customs territory, be exempt from all customs duty. The French Government shall fix each year, by decree communicated to the German Government, the nature and amount of the products which shall enjoy this exemption [which] shall not exceed the average of the amounts sent annually in the years 1911-1913. Further, during the period above mentioned the German Government shall allow the free export from Germany, and the free reimportation into Germany, exempt from all customs duties and other charges, (including internal charges,) of yarns, tissues, and other textile materials or textile products of any kind and in any condition, sent from Germany into the territories of Alsace or Lorraine, to be subjected there to any finishing process. . . . (b) During a period of three years from the coming into force of the present treaty natural or manufactured products which both originate in and come from Polish territories which before the war were part of Germany shall, on importation into German customs territory, be exempt from all customs duty. The Polish Government shall fix each year, by decree communicated to the German Government, the nature and amount of the products which shall enjoy this exemption, [which] shall not exceed the average of the amounts sent annually in the years 1911-1913. (c) The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to require Germany to accord freedom from customs duty, on importation into German customs territory, to natural products and manufactured articles which both originate in and come from the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, for a period of five years from the coming into force of the present treaty. The nature and amount of the products which shall enjoy the benefits of this régime shall be communicated each year to the German Government, [which] shall not exceed the average of the amounts sent annually in the years 1911-1913.

Art. 269. During the first six months after the coming into force of the present treaty, the duties imposed by Germany on imports from Allied and Associated States shall not be higher than the most favorable duties which were applied to imports into Germany on the 31st July, 1914. During a further period of thirty months after the expiration of the first six months, this provision shall continue to be applied exclusively with regard to products which, being comprised in Section A of the First Category of the German Customs Tariff of the 25th December, 1902, enjoyed at the above-

mentioned date (31st July, 1914) rates conventionalized by treaties with the Allied and Associated Powers, with the addition of all kinds of wine and vegetable oils, of artificial silk and of washed or scoured wool, whether or not they were the subject of special conventions before the 31st July, 1914.

Art. 270. The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to apply to German territory occupied by their troops a special customs régime as regards imports and exports, in the event of such a measure being necessary in their opinion in order to safeguard the economic interests of the population of these territories.

Chapter II.—Shipping

Art. 271. As regards sea fishing, maritime coasting trade, and maritime towage, vessels of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy, in German territorial waters, the treatment accorded to vessels of the most-favored nation.

Art. 272. Germany agrees that, notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary contained in the conventions relating to the North Sea fisheries and liquor traffic, all rights of inspection and police shall, in the case of fishing boats of the Allied Powers, be exercised solely by ships belonging to those powers.

Art. 273. In the case of vessels of the Allied or Associated Powers, all classes of certificates or documents relating to the vessel, which were recognized as valid by Germany before the war, or which may hereafter be recognized as valid by the principal maritime States, shall be recognized by Germany as valid and as equivalent to the corresponding certificates issued to German vessels. A similar recognition shall be accorded to the certificates and documents issued to their vessels by the Governments of new States, whether they have a seacoast or not, provided that such certificates and documents shall be issued in conformity with the general practice observed in the principal maritime States. The high contracting parties agree to recognize the flag flown by the vessels of an Allied or Associated Power having no seacoast which are registered at some one specified place situated in its territory; such place shall serve as the port of registry of such vessels.

Chapter III.—Unfair Competition

Art. 274. Germany undertakes to adopt all the necessary legislative and administrative measures to protect goods the produce or manufacture of any one of the Allied and Associated Powers from all forms of unfair competition in commercial transactions. Germany undertakes to prohibit and repress by seizure and by other appropriate remedies the importation, exportation, manufacture, distribution, sale or offering for sale in its territory of all goods bearing upon themselves or their usual get-up or wrappings any marks, names, devices, or descriptions whatsoever which are calculated to convey directly or indirectly a false indication of the origin, type, nature, or special characteristics of such goods.

Art. 275. Germany undertakes on condition that reciprocity is accorded in these matters to respect any law, or any administrative or judicial decision given in conformity with such law, in force in any Allied or Associated State and duly communicated to her by the proper authorities, defining or regulating the right to any regional appellation in respect of wine or spirits produced in the State to

which the region belongs or the conditions under which the use of any such appellation may be permitted; and the importation, exportation, manufacture, distribution, sale or offering for sale of products or articles bearing regional appellations inconsistent with such law or order shall be prohibited by the German Government and repressed by the measures prescribed in the preceding article.

Chapter IV.—Treatment of Nationals of Allied and Associated Powers

Art. 276. Germany undertakes: (a) not to subject the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers to any prohibition in regard to the exercise of occupations, professions, trade, and industry, which shall not be equally applicable to all aliens without exception; (b) not to subject the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to the rights referred to in Paragraph (a) to any regulation or restriction which might contravene directly or indirectly the stipulations of the said paragraph, or which shall be other or more disadvantageous than those which are applicable to nationals of the most-favored nation; (c) not to subject the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, their property, rights, or interests, including companies and associations in which they are interested, to any charge, tax, or impost, direct or indirect, other or higher than those which are or may be imposed on her own nationals or their property, rights, or interests; (d) not to subject the nationals of any one of the Allied and Associated Powers to any restriction which was not applicable on July 1, 1914, to the nationals of such powers unless such restriction is likewise imposed on her own nationals.

Art. 277. The nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in German territory a constant protection for their persons and for their property, rights, and interests, and shall have free access to the courts of law.

Art. 278. Germany undertakes to recognize any new nationality which has been or may be acquired by her nationals under the laws of the Allied and Associated Powers, and in accordance with the decisions of the competent authorities of these powers pursuant to naturalization laws or under treaty stipulations, and to regard such persons as having, in consequence of the acquisition of such new nationality, in all respects severed their allegiance to their country of origin.

Art. 279. The Allied and Associated Powers may appoint Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls, and Consular Agents in German towns and ports . . . and to admit them to the exercise of their functions in conformity with the usual rules and customs.

Chapter V.—General Articles

Art. 280. The obligations imposed on Germany by Chapter I and by Articles 271 and 272 of Chapter II above shall cease to have effect five years from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, unless otherwise provided in the text, or unless the Council of the League of Nations shall, at least twelve months before the expiration of that period, decide that these obligations shall be maintained for a further period with or without amendment. Article 276 of Chapter IV shall remain in operation, with or without amendment, after the period of five years for such further period, if any, not exceeding five years, as may be determined by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Art. 281. If the German Government engages in international trade, it shall not in respect thereof have or be deemed to have any rights, privileges, or immunities of sovereignty.

SECTION II.—TREATIES

Art. 282. From the coming into force of the present treaty and subject to the provisions thereof the multilateral treaties, conventions and agreements of an economic or technical character enumerated below and in the subsequent articles shall alone be applied as between Germany and those of the Allied and Associated Powers party thereto:

1. Conventions of March 14, 1884; Dec. 1, 1886, and March 23, 1887, and final protocol of July 7, 1887, regarding the protection of submarine cables.

2. Convention of Oct. 11, 1909, regarding the international circulation of motor cars.

3. Agreement of May 15, 1886, regarding the sealing of railway trucks subject to customs inspection, and protocol of May 18, 1907.

4. Agreement of May 15, 1886, regarding the technical standardization of railways.

5. Convention of July 5, 1890, regarding the publication of customs tariffs and the organization of an international union for the publication of customs tariffs.

6. Convention of Dec. 31, 1913, regarding the unification of commercial statistics.

7. Convention of April 25, 1907, regarding the raising of the Turkish customs tariff.

8. Convention of March 14, 1857, for the redemption of toll dues on the sound and belts.

9. Convention of June 22, 1861, for the redemption of the stade toll on the Elbe.

10. Convention of July 16, 1863, for the redemption of toll dues on the Scheldt.

11. Convention of Oct. 29, 1888, regarding the establishment of a definite arrangement guaranteeing the free use of the Suez Canal.

12. Convention of Sept. 23, 1910, respecting the unification of certain regulations regarding collisions and salvage at sea.

13. Convention of Dec. 21, 1904, regarding the exemption of hospital ships from dues and charges in ports.

14. Convention of Feb. 4, 1898, regarding the tonnage measurement of vessels for inland navigation.

15. Convention of Sept. 26, 1906, for the suppression of nightwork for women.

16. Convention of Sept. 26, 1906, for the suppression of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.

17. Conventions of May 18, 1904, and May 4, 1910, regarding the suppression of the white slave traffic.

18. Convention of May 4, 1910, regarding the suppression of obscene publications.

19. Sanitary conventions of January, 1892; April 15, 1893; April 3, 1894; April 19, 1897, and Dec. 3, 1903.

20. Convention of May 20, 1875, regarding the unification and improvement of the metric system.

21. Convention of Nov. 29, 1906, regarding the unification of pharmacopoeial formulæ for potent drugs.

22. Convention of Nov. 16 and 19, 1885, regarding the establishment of a concert pitch.

23. Convention of June 7, 1905, regarding the creation of an International Agricultural Institute at Rome.

24. Conventions of Nov. 3, 1881, and April 15,

1880, regarding precautionary measures against phylloxera.

25. Convention of March 19, 1902, regarding the protection of birds useful to agriculture.

26. Convention of June 12, 1902, as to the protection of minors.

Art. 283. From the coming into force of the present treaty the high contracting parties shall apply the conventions and agreements hereinafter mentioned, in so far as concerns them, on condition that the special stipulations contained in this article are fulfilled by Germany.

Postal Conventions

Conventions and agreements of the Universal Postal Union concluded at Vienna, July 4, 1891.

Conventions and agreements of the Postal Union signed at Washington, June 15, 1897.

Conventions and agreements of the Postal Union signed at Rome, May 26, 1906.

Telegraphic Conventions

International Telegraphic Conventions signed at St. Petersburg, July 10, (22,) 1875.

Regulations and tariffs drawn up by the International Telegraphic Conference, Lisbon, June 11, 1908.

Germany undertakes not to refuse her assent to the conclusion by the new States of the special arrangements referred to in the conventions and agreements relating to the Universal Postal Union and to the International Telegraphic Union, to which the said new States have adhered or may adhere.

Art. 284. From the coming into force of the present treaty the high contracting parties shall apply, in so far as concerns them, the International Radio-Telegraphic Convention of July 5, 1912, on condition that Germany fulfills the provisional regulations which will be indicated to her by the Allied and Associated Powers. If within five years after the coming into force of the present treaty a new convention regulating international radio-telegraphic communications should have been concluded to take the place of the convention of July 5, 1912, this new convention shall bind Germany even if Germany should refuse either to take part in drawing up the convention or to subscribe thereto. This new convention will likewise replace the provisional regulations in force.

Art. 285. From the coming into force of the present treaty the high contracting parties shall apply in so far as concerns them and under the conditions stipulated in Article 272 the conventions hereinafter mentioned: 1. The conventions of May 6, 1882, and Feb. 1, 1889, regulating the fisheries in the North Sea outside territorial waters. 2. The conventions and protocols of Nov. 16, 1887, Feb. 14, 1893, and April 11, 1894, regarding the North Sea liquor traffic.

Art. 286. The International Convention of Paris of March 20, 1883, for the protection of industrial property, revised at Washington on June 2, 1911; the International Convention of Berne of Sept. 9, 1886, for the protection of literary and artistic works, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, and completed by the additional protocol signed at Berne on March 20, 1914, will again come into effect as from the coming into force of the present treaty, in so far as they are not affected or modified by the exceptions and restrictions resulting therefrom.

Art. 287. From the coming into force of the present treaty the high contracting parties shall apply,

in so far as concerns them, the Convention of the Hague of July 17, 1905, relating to civil procedure. This renewal, however, will not apply to France, Portugal, and Rumania.

Art. 288. The special rights and privileges granted to Germany by Article 3 of the convention of Dec. 2, 1899, relating to Samoa shall be considered to have terminated on Aug. 4, 1914.

Art. 289. Each of the Allied or Associated Powers, being guided by the general principles or special provisions of the present treaty, shall notify to Germany the bilateral treaties or conventions which such Allied or Associated Power wishes to revive with Germany. The notification referred to in the present article shall be made either directly or through the intermediary of another power. Receipt thereof shall be acknowledged in writing by Germany. The date of the revival shall be that of the notification. The Allied and Associated Powers undertake among themselves not to revive with Germany any conventions or treaties which are not in accordance with the terms of the present treaty. The notification shall mention any provisions of the said conventions and treaties which, not being in accordance with the terms of the present treaty, shall not be considered as revived. In case of any difference of opinion, the League of Nations will be called on to decide. A period of six months from the coming into force of the present treaty is allowed to the Allied and Associated Powers within which to make the notification. Only those bilateral treaties and conventions which have been the subject of such a notification shall be revived between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany; all the others are and shall remain abrogated. The above regulations apply to all bilateral treaties or conventions existing between all the Allied and Associated Powers signatories to the present treaty and Germany, even if the said Allied and Associated Powers have not been in a state of war with Germany.

Art. 290. Germany recognizes that all the treaties, conventions, or agreements which she has concluded with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey since Aug. 1, 1914, until the coming into force of the present treaty are and remain abrogated by the present treaty.

Art. 291. Germany undertakes to secure to the Allied and Associated Powers, and to the officials and nationals of the said powers, the enjoyment of all the rights and advantages of any kind which she may have granted to Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, or to the officials and nationals of these States by treaties, conventions, or arrangements concluded before Aug. 1, 1914, so long as those treaties, conventions, or arrangements remain in force. The Allied and Associated Power reserve the right to accept or not the enjoyment of these rights and advantages.

Art. 292. Germany recognizes that all treaties, conventions, or arrangements which she concluded with Russia or with any State or Government of which the territory previously formed a part of Russia, or with Rumania before Aug. 1, 1914, or after that date until the coming into force of the present treaty, are and remain abrogated.

Art. 293. Should an Allied or Associated Power, Russia, or a State or Government of which the territory formerly constituted a part of Russia have been forced since Aug. 1, 1914, by reason of military occupation or by any other means or for any other cause, to grant or to allow to be granted by the act of any public authority, concessions, privileges, and favors of any kind to Germany or to a German national, such concessions, privileges, and

favors are *ipso facto* annulled by the present treaty. No claims or indemnities which may result from this annulment shall be charged against the Allied or Associated Powers or the powers, States, Governments, or public authorities which are released from their engagements by the present article.

Art. 294. From the coming into force of the present treaty Germany undertakes to give the Allied and Associated Powers and their nationals the benefit *ipso facto* of the rights and advantages of any kind which she has granted by treaties, conventions, or arrangements to non-belligerent States or their nationals since Aug. 1, 1914, until the coming into force of the present treaty so long as those treaties, conventions, or arrangements remain in force.

Art. 295. Those of the high contracting parties who have not yet signed, or who have signed but not yet ratified, the Opium Convention signed at The Hague on Jan. 23, 1912, agree to bring the said convention into force, and for this purpose to enact the necessary legislation without delay and in any case within a period of twelve months from the coming into force of the present treaty. Furthermore, they agree that ratification of the present treaty should in the case of powers which have not yet ratified the Opium Convention be deemed in all respects equivalent to the ratification of that convention and to the signature of the special protocol which was opened at The Hague in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Third Opium Conference in 1914 for bringing the said convention into force. For this purpose the Government of the French Republic will communicate to the Government of the Netherlands a certified copy of the protocol of the deposit of ratifications of the present treaty, and will invite the Government of the Netherlands to accept and deposit the said certified copy as if it were a deposit of ratifications of the Opium Convention and a signature of the additional protocol of 1914.

SECTION III.—DEBTS

Art. 296. There shall be settled through the intervention of clearing offices to be established by each of the high contracting parties within three months of the notification referred to in paragraph (e) hereafter the following classes of pecuniary obligations:

1. Debts payable before the war and due by a national of one of the contracting powers, residing within its territory, to a national of an opposing power, residing within its territory.

2. Debts which became payable during the war to nationals of one contracting power residing within its territory and arose out of transactions or contracts with the nationals of an opposing power, resident within its territory, of which the total or partial execution was suspended on account of the declaration of war.

3. Interest which has accrued due before and during the war to a national of one of the contracting powers in respect of securities issued by an opposing power, provided that the payment of interest on such securities to the nationals of that power or to neutrals has not been suspended during the war.

4. Capital sums which have become payable before and during the war to nationals of one of the contracting powers in respect of securities issued by one of the opposing powers, provided that the payment of such capital sums to nationals of

that power or to neutrals has not been suspended during the war. The proceeds of liquidation of enemy property, rights, and interests mentioned in Section IV and in the annex thereto will be accounted for through the clearing offices, in the currency and at the rate of exchange hereinafter provided in Paragraph (d), and disposed of by them under the conditions provided by the said section and annex. The settlements provided for in this article shall be effected according to the following principles and in accordance with the annex to this section: (a) Each of the high contracting parties shall prohibit, as from the coming into force of the present treaty, both the payment and the acceptance of payment of such debts, and also all communications between the interested parties with regard to the settlement of the said debts otherwise than through the clearing offices.

(b) Each of the high contracting parties shall be respectively responsible for the payment of such debts due by its nationals, except in the cases where before the war the debtor was in a state of bankruptcy or failure, or had given formal indication of insolvency or where the debt was due by a company whose business has been liquidated under emergency legislation during the war. Nevertheless, debts due by the inhabitants of territory invaded or occupied by the enemy before the armistice will not be guaranteed by the States of which those territories form part. (c) The sums due to the nationals of one of the high contracting parties by the nationals of an opposing State will be debited to the clearing office of the country of the debtor, and paid to the creditor by the clearing office of the country of the creditor.

(d) Debts shall be paid or credited in the currency of such one of the Allied and Associated Powers, their colonies or protectorates, or the British Dominions or India, as may be concerned. If the debts are payable in some other currency they shall be paid or credited in the currency of the country concerned, whether an Allied or Associated Power, colony, protectorate, British Dominion, or India, at the pre-war rate of exchange. For the purpose of this provision the pre-war rate of exchange shall be defined as the average cable transfer rate prevailing in the Allied or Associated country concerned during the month immediately preceding the outbreak of war between the said country concerned and Germany. If a contract provides for a fixed rate of exchange governing the conversion of the currency in which the debt is stated into the currency of the Allied or Associated country concerned, then the above provisions concerning the rate of exchange shall not apply. In the case of new States the currency in which and the rate of exchange at which debts shall be paid or credited shall be determined by the Reparation Commission provided for in Part VIII (Reparation).

(e) The provisions of this article and of the annex hereto shall not apply as between Germany on the one hand and any one of the Allied and Associated Powers, their colonies or protectorates, or any one of the British Dominions or India on the other hand, unless within a period of one month from the deposit of the ratifications of the present treaty by the power in question, or of the ratification on behalf of such Dominion or of India, notice to that effect is given to Germany by the Government of such Allied or Associated Power or of such Dominion or of India as the case may be.

(f) The Allied and Associated Powers who have adopted this article and the annex hereto may agree between themselves to apply them to their

respective nationals established in their territory so far as regards matters between their nationals and German nationals. In this case the payments made by application of this provision will be subject to arrangements between the allied and associated clearing offices concerned.

ANNEX

1. Each of the high contracting parties will, within three months from the notification provided for in Article 296, paragraph (e), establish a clearing office for the collection and payment of enemy debts. Local clearing offices may be established for any particular portion of the territories of the high contracting parties. Such local clearing offices may perform all the functions of a central clearing office in their respective districts, except that all transactions with the clearing office in the opposing State must be effected through the central clearing office. . . . [Here follows procedure of clearing offices.]

SECTION IV.—PROPERTY, RIGHTS, AND INTERESTS

Art. 297. The question of private property, rights, and interests in an enemy country, shall be settled according to the principles laid down in this section and to the provisions of the annex hereto:

(a) The exceptional war measures and measures of transfer (defined in paragraph 3 of the annex hereto) taken by Germany with respect to the property, rights, and interests of nationals of Allied or Associated Powers, including companies and associations in which they are interested, when liquidation has not been completed, shall be immediately discontinued or stayed and the property, rights, and interests concerned restored to their owners, who shall enjoy full rights therein in accordance with the provisions of Article 298.

(b) Subject to any contrary stipulations which may be provided for in the present treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights, and interests belonging at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty to German nationals, or companies controlled by them, within their territories, colonies, possessions, and protectorates including territories ceded to them by the present treaty. The liquidation shall be carried out in accordance with the laws of the Allied or Associated State concerned, and the German owner shall not be able to dispose of such property, rights, or interests nor to subject them to any charge without the consent of that State. German nationals who acquire *ipso facto* the nationality of an Allied or Associated Power in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty will not be considered as German nationals within the meaning of this paragraph.

(c) The price or the amount of compensation in respect of the exercise of the right referred to in the preceding paragraph (b) will be fixed in accordance with the methods of sale or valuation adopted by the laws of the country in which the property has been retained or liquidated.

(d) As between the Allied and Associated Powers or their nationals on the one hand and Germany or her nationals on the other hand, all the exceptional war measures, or measures of transfer, or acts done or to be done in execution of such measures as defined in Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the annex hereto shall be considered as final and binding upon all persons except as regards the reservations laid down in the present treaty.

(e) The nationals of Allied and Associated Powers shall be entitled to compensation in respect of damage or injury inflicted upon their property, rights, or interests, including any company or association in which they are interested, in German territory as it existed on Aug. 1, 1914, by the application either of the exceptional war measures or measures of transfer mentioned in Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the annex hereto. The claims made in this respect by such nationals shall be investigated, and the total of the compensation shall be determined by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for in Section VI or by an arbitrator appointed by that tribunal. This compensation shall be borne by Germany, and may be charged upon the property of German nationals, within the territory or under the control of the claimant's State. This property may be constituted as a pledge for enemy liabilities under the conditions fixed by Paragraph 4 of the annex hereto. The payment of this compensation may be made by the Allied or Associated State, and the amount will be debited to Germany.

(f) Whenever a national of an Allied or Associated Power is entitled to property which has been subjected to a measure of transfer in German territory and expresses a desire for its restitution, his claim for compensation in accordance with Paragraph (e) shall be satisfied by the restitution of the said property if it still exists in specie. In such case Germany shall take all necessary steps to restore the evicted owner to the possession of his property, free from all incumbrances or burdens with which it may have been charged after the liquidation, and to indemnify all third parties injured by the restitution. . . . [Here follows procedure of restitution.]

Art. 298. Germany undertakes, with regard to the property, rights and interests, including companies and associations in which they were interested, restored to nationals of Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the provisions of Article 297, Paragraph (a) or (f):

(a) To restore and maintain, except as expressly provided in the present treaty, the property, rights, and interests of the nationals of Allied or Associated Powers in the legal position obtaining in respect of the property, rights, and interests of German nationals under the laws in force before the war.

(b) Not to subject the property, rights, or interests of the nationals of the Allied or Associated Powers to any measures in derogation of property rights which are not applied equally to the property, rights, and interests of German nationals, and to pay adequate compensation in the event of the application of these measures.

ANNEX

1. In accordance with the provisions of Article 297, Paragraph (d), the validity of vesting orders and of orders for the winding up of businesses or companies, and of any other orders, directions, decisions, or instructions of any court or any department of the Government of any of the high contracting parties made or given, or purporting to be made or given, in pursuance of war legislation with regard to enemy property, rights, and interests is confirmed. The interests of all persons shall be regarded as having been effectively dealt with by any order, direction, decision, or instruction dealing with property in which they may be interested, whether or not such interests are specifically mentioned in the order, direction, decision, or instruction. No question shall be raised as to

the regularity of a transfer of any property, rights, or interests dealt with in pursuance of any such order, direction, decision, or instruction. Every action taken with regard to any property, business, or company, whether as regards its investigation, sequestration, compulsory administration, use, requisition, supervision, or winding up, the sale or management of property, rights, or interests, the collection or discharge of debts, the payment of costs, charges or expenses, or any other matter whatsoever, in pursuance of orders, directions, decisions, or instructions of any court or of any department of the Government of any of the high contracting parties, made or given, or purporting to be made or given, in pursuance of war legislation with regard to enemy property, rights, or interests, is confirmed. Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be held to prejudice the titles to property heretofore acquired in good faith and for value and in accordance with the laws of the country in which the property is situated by nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers. The provisions of this paragraph do not apply to such of the above-mentioned measures as have been taken by the German authorities in invaded or occupied territory, nor to such of the above-mentioned measures as have been taken by Germany or the German authorities since Nov. 11, 1918, all of which shall be void.

2. No claim or action shall be made or brought against any Allied or Associated Power or against any person acting on behalf of or under the direction of any legal authority or department of the Government of such a power by Germany or by any German national wherever resident in respect of any act or omission with regard to his property, rights, or interests during the war or in preparation for the war. Similarly no claim or action shall be made or brought against any person in respect of any act or omission under or in accordance with the exceptional war measures, laws, or regulations of any Allied or Associated Power.

3. [Definitions of terms employed in Article 297 and this Annex.] . . .

SECTION V.—CONTRACTS, PRESCRIPTIONS, JUDGMENTS

Art. 299. (a) Any contract concluded between enemies shall be regarded as having been dissolved as from the time when any two of the parties become enemies, except in respect of any debt or other pecuniary obligation arising out of any act done or money paid thereunder, and subject to the exceptions and special rules with regard to particular contracts or classes of contracts contained herein or in the annex hereto.

(b) Any contract of which the execution shall be required in the general interest, within six months from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, by the Allied or Associated Governments of which one of the parties is a national, shall be excepted from dissolution under this article.

When the execution of the contract thus kept alive would, owing to the alteration of trade conditions, cause one of the parties substantial prejudice the mixed arbitral tribunal provided for by Section VI shall be empowered to grant to the prejudiced party equitable compensation.

(c) Having regard to the provisions of the Constitution and law of the United States of America, of Brazil, and of Japan, neither the present Article, nor Article 300, nor the Annex hereto shall apply to contracts made between nationals of these

States and German nationals; nor shall Article 305 apply to the United States of America or its nationals.

(d) The present Article and the Annex hereto shall not apply to contracts the parties to which became enemies by reason of one of them being an inhabitant of territory of which the sovereignty has been transferred, if such party shall acquire under the present Treaty the nationality of an allied or associated power, nor shall they apply to contracts between nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers between whom trading has been prohibited by reason of one of the parties being in allied or associated territory in the occupation of the enemy.

(e) Nothing in the present Article or the Annex hereto shall be deemed to invalidate a transaction lawfully carried out in accordance with a contract between enemies if it has been carried out with the authority of one of the belligerent Powers.

Art. 300. (a) All periods of prescription, or limitation of right of action, whether they began to run before or after the outbreak of war, shall be treated in the territory of the High Contracting Parties, so far as regards relations between enemies, as having been suspended for the duration of the war. They shall begin to run again at earliest three months after the coming into force of the present Treaty. This provision shall apply to the period prescribed for the presentation of interest or dividend coupons or for the presentation for repayment of securities drawn for repayment or repayable on any other ground. . . .

(f) Germany shall compensate any third party who may be prejudiced by any restitution or restoration ordered by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal under the provisions of the preceding paragraphs of this Article. . . .

Art. 301. As between enemies no negotiable instrument made before the war shall be deemed to have become invalid by reason only of failure within the required time to present the instrument for acceptance or payment or to give notice of non-acceptance or non-payment to drawers or indorsers or to protest the instrument nor by reason of failure to complete any formality during the war. . . .

Art. 302. Judgments given by the courts of an Allied or Associated Power in all cases which, under the present treaty, they are competent to decide, shall be recognized in Germany as final, and shall be enforced without it being necessary to have them declared executory. If a judgment in respect of any dispute which may have arisen has been given during the war by a German court against a national of an Allied or Associated State in a case in which he was not able to make his defense, the allied and associated national who has suffered prejudice thereby shall be entitled to recover compensation, to be fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for in Section VI. . . .

Art. 303. For the purpose of Sections III, IV, V, and VII, the expression "during the war" means each Allied or Associated Power the period between the commencement of the state of war between that power and Germany and the coming into force of the present treaty.

ANNEX

I. General Provisions

1. Within the meaning of Articles 299, 300 and 301, the parties to a contract shall be regarded as enemies when trading between them shall have been prohibited by or otherwise became unlawful

under laws, orders or regulations to which one of those parties was subject. They shall be deemed to have become enemies from the date when such trading was prohibited or otherwise became unlawful.

2. The following classes of contracts are excepted from dissolution by Article 299 and, without prejudice to the rights contained in article 297 (b) of Section IV remain in force subject to the application of domestic laws, orders or regulations made during the war by the Allied and Associated Powers and subject to the terms of the contracts: (a) Contracts having for their object the transfer of estates or of real or personal property where the property therein had passed or the object had been delivered before the parties became enemies; (b) Leases and agreements for leases of land and houses; (c) Contracts of mortgage, pledge, or lien; (d) Concessions concerning mines, quarries or deposits;

(e) Contracts between individuals or companies and States, provinces, municipalities, or other similar juridical persons charged with administrative functions, and concessions granted by States, provinces, municipalities, or other similar juridical persons charged with administrative functions.

3. If the provisions of a contract are in part dissolved under Article 299, the remaining provisions of that contract shall, subject to the same application of domestic laws as is provided for in Paragraph 2, continue in force if they are severable, but where they are not severable the contract shall be deemed to have been dissolved in its entirety.

II. Provisions Relating to Certain Classes of Contracts

[Stock exchange and commercial contracts; securities, negotiable instruments; contracts of fire, life, marine and other insurances; reinsurance.]

SECTION VI.—MIXED ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

Art. 304 (a) Within three months from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal shall be established between each of the Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand and Germany on the other hand. Each such tribunal shall consist of three members. Each of the Governments concerned shall appoint one of these members. The President shall be chosen by agreement between the two Governments concerned. In case of failure to reach agreement, the President of the tribunal and two other persons either of whom may in case of need take his place, shall be chosen by the Council of the League of Nations, or, until this is set up, by M. Gustave Ador [Swiss president], if he is willing. These persons shall be nationals of Powers that have remained neutral during the war. If any Government does not proceed within a period of one month in case there is a vacancy to appoint a member of the tribunal, such member shall be chosen by the other Government from the two persons mentioned above other than the President. The decision of the majority of the members of the tribunal shall be the decision of the tribunal.

(b) The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established pursuant to paragraph (a) shall decide all questions within their competence under Sections III, IV, VI, and VII. . . .

(c) If the number of cases justifies it, additional members shall be appointed and each Mixed Arbitral Tribunal shall sit in divisions.

(d) Each Mixed Arbitral Tribunal will settle its own procedure except in so far as it is provided in the following Annex, and is empowered to award the sums to be paid by the loser in respect of the costs and expenses of the proceedings.

(e) Each Government will pay the remuneration of the member of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal appointed by it and of any agent whom it may appoint to represent it before the Tribunal. The remuneration of the President will be determined by special agreement between the Governments concerned, and this remuneration and the joint expenses of each tribunal will be paid by the two Governments in equal moieties.

(f) The high contracting parties agree that their courts and authorities shall render to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal direct all the assistance in their power, particularly as regards transmitting notices and collecting evidence.

(g) The high contracting parties agree to regard the decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal as final and conclusive, and to render them binding upon their nationals.

ANNEX

1. Should one of the members of the Tribunal either die, retire, or be unable for any reason whatever to discharge his functions, the same procedure will be followed for filling the vacancy as was followed for appointing him.

2. The tribunal may adopt such rules, of procedure as shall be in accordance with justice and equity and decide the order and time at which each party must conclude its arguments, and may arrange all formalities required for dealing with the evidence.

3. The agent and counsel of the parties on each side are authorized to present orally and in writing to the tribunal arguments in support or in defense of each case.

4. The tribunal shall keep record of the questions and cases submitted and the proceedings thereon, with the dates of such proceedings.

5. Each of the Powers concerned may appoint a secretary. These secretaries shall act together as joint secretaries of the tribunal and shall be subject to its direction.

6. The tribunal shall decide all questions and matters submitted upon such evidence and information as may be furnished by the parties concerned.

7. Germany agrees to give the tribunal all facilities and information required by it for carrying out its investigations.

8. The language in which the proceedings shall be conducted shall, unless otherwise agreed, be English, French, Italian, or Japanese, as may be determined by the Allied or Associated Power concerned.

9. The place and time for the meetings of each tribunal shall be determined by the President of the tribunal.

Art. 305. Whenever a competent court has given or gives a decision in a case covered by Sections III, IV, V, or VII, and such decision is inconsistent with the provisions of such sections, the party who is prejudiced by the decision shall be entitled to obtain redress which shall be fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. At the request of the national of an Allied or Associated Power, the redress may, whenever possible, be effected by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal directing the replacement of the parties in the position occupied by them before the judgment was given by the German Court.

SECTION VII.—INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

Art. 306. Subject to the stipulations of the present treaty, rights of industrial, literary, and artistic property, as such property is defined by the International Conventions of Paris and of Berne, mentioned in Article 286, shall be re-established or restored, as from the coming into force of the present treaty in the territories of the high contracting parties, in favor of the persons entitled to the benefit of them at the moment when the state of war commenced, or their legal representatives. Equally, rights which, except for the war, would have been acquired during the war in consequence of an application made for the protection of industrial property, or the publication of a literary or artistic work, shall be recognized and established in favor of those persons who would have been entitled thereto, from the coming into force of the present treaty. Nevertheless, all acts done by virtue of the special measures taken during the war under legislative, executive or administrative authority of any Allied or Associated Power in regard to the rights of German nationals in industrial, literary or artistic property shall remain in force and shall continue to maintain their full effect. No claim shall be made or action brought by Germany or German nationals in respect of the use during the war by the Government or any Allied or Associated Power, or by any persons acting on behalf or with the assent of such Government of any rights in industrial, literary or artistic property, nor in respect of the sale, offering for sale, or use of any products, articles, or apparatus whatsoever to which such rights applied. . . . Each of the Allied or Associated Powers reserves the right to treat as void and of no effect any transfer in whole or in part of or other dealing with rights of or in respect of industrial, literary or artistic property properly effected after Aug. 1, 1914, or in the future, which would have the result of defeating the objects of the provisions of this article. The provisions of this article shall not apply to rights in industrial, literary or artistic property which have been dealt with in the liquidation of businesses or companies under war legislation by the Allied or Associated Powers, or which may be so dealt with by virtue of Article 297, paragraph (b).

Art. 307. A minimum of one year after the coming into force of the present treaty shall be accorded to the nationals of the high contracting parties, without extension fees or other penalty, in order to enable such persons to accomplish any act, fulfill any formality, pay any fees, and generally satisfy any obligation prescribed by the laws or regulations of the respective States relating to the obtaining, preserving, or opposing rights to, or in respect of, industrial property either acquired before the 1st of August, 1914, or which, except for the war, might have been acquired since that date as a result of an application made before the war or during its continuance, but nothing in this article shall give any right to reopen interference proceedings in the United States of America where a final hearing has taken place. . . . The period from the 1st of August, 1914, until the coming into force of the present treaty shall be excluded in considering the time within which a patent should be worked or a trade mark or design used, and it is further agreed that no patent, registered trade mark or design in force on the 1st of August, 1914, shall be subject to revocation or cancellation by reason only of the failure to work such patent or use such trade mark or design for two

years after the coming into force of the present treaty.

Art. 308. The rights of priority provided by Article IV of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of Paris, of the 20th March, 1883, revised at Washington in 1911, or by any other convention or statute, for the filing or registration of applications for patents or models of utility, and for the registration of trade marks, designs, and models which had not expired on the 1st August, 1914, and those which have arisen during the war, or would have arisen but for the war, shall be extended by each of the high contracting parties for a period of six months after the coming into force of the present treaty. Nevertheless, such extension shall in no way affect the right of any of the high contracting parties or of any person who before the coming into force of the present treaty was *bona fide* in possession of any rights of industrial property conflicting with rights applied for by another who claims rights of priority in respect of them, to exercise such rights by itself or himself personally, or by such agents or licensees as derived their rights from it or him before the coming into force of the present treaty; and such persons shall not be amenable to any action or other process of law in respect of infringement.

Art. 309. No action shall be brought and no claim made by persons residing or carrying on business within the territories of Germany on the one part and of the Allied or Associated Powers on the other, or persons who are nationals of such powers, respectively, or by any one deriving title during the war from such persons, by reason of any action which has taken place within the territory of the other party between the date of the declaration of war and that of the coming into force of the present treaty, which might constitute an infringement of the rights of industrial property or rights of literary and artistic property, either existing at any time during the war or revived under the provisions of Articles 307 and 308. . . . This article shall not apply as between the United States of America on the one hand and Germany on the other.

Art. 310. Licenses in respect of industrial, literary, or artistic property concluded before the war between nationals of the Allied or Associated Powers or persons residing in their territory or carrying on business therein, on the one part, and German nationals, on the other part, shall be considered as canceled as from the date of the declaration of war between Germany and the Allied or Associated Powers. But, in any case, the former beneficiary of a contract of this kind shall have the right, within a period of six months after the coming into force of the present treaty, to demand from the proprietor of the rights the grant of a new license, the conditions of which, in default of agreement between the parties, shall be fixed by the duly qualified tribunal in the country under whose legislation the rights had been acquired, except in the case of licenses held in respect of rights acquired under German law. In such cases the conditions shall be fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal referred to in Section VI of this Part. The tribunal may, if necessary, fix also the amount which it may deem just should be paid by reason of the use of the rights during the war. . . . This Article shall not apply as between the United States of America on the one hand and Germany on the other.

Art. 311. The inhabitants of territories separated from Germany by virtue of the present treaty shall,

notwithstanding this separation and the change of nationality consequent thereon, continue to enjoy in Germany all the rights in industrial, literary, and artistic property to which they were entitled under German legislation at the time of the separation. . . .

SECTION VIII.—SOCIAL AND STATE INSURANCE IN CEDED TERRITORY

Art. 312. Without prejudice to the provisions contained in other articles of the present treaty, the German Government undertakes to transfer to any power to which German territory in Europe is ceded, and to any power administering former German territory as a mandatary under Article 22 of Part I (League of Nations,) such portion of the reserves accumulated by the Government of the German Empire or of German States, or by public or private organizations under their control, as is attributable to the carrying on of social or State insurance in such territory. The powers to which these funds are transferred must apply them to the performance of the obligations arising from such insurances. . . . In case these special conventions are not concluded in accordance with the above paragraph within three months after the coming into force of the present treaty, the conditions of transfer shall in each case be referred to a commission of five members, one of whom shall be appointed by the German Government, one by the other interested Government, and three by the governing body of the International Labor Office from the nationals of other States. This commission shall by majority vote within three months after appointment adopt recommendations for submission to the Council of the League of Nations, and the decisions of the council shall forthwith be accepted as final by Germany and the other Government concerned.

Part XI.—Aerial Navigation

Art. 313. The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall have full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of Germany, and shall enjoy the same privileges as German aircraft, particularly in case of distress by land or sea.

Art. 314. The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, while in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy the right of flying over the territory and territorial waters of Germany without landing, subject always to any regulations which may be made by Germany, and which shall be applicable equally to the aircraft of Germany and those of the Allied and Associated Countries.

Art. 315. All aerodromes in Germany open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with German aircraft as regards charges of every description, including charges for landing and accommodation.

Art. 316. Subject to the present provisions, the rights of passage, transit and landing, provided for in Articles 313, 314 and 315, are subject to the observance of such regulations as Germany may consider it necessary to enact, but such regulations shall be applied without distinction to German aircraft and to those of Allied and Associated Countries.

Art. 317. Certificates of nationality, airworthi-

ness, or competency, and licenses, issued or recognized as valid by any of the Allied or Associated Powers, shall be recognized in Germany as valid and as equivalent to the certificates and licenses issued by Germany.

Art. 318. As regards internal commercial air traffic, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Germany most favored nation treatment.

Art. 319. Germany undertakes to enforce the necessary measures to insure that all German aircraft flying over her territory shall comply with the rules as to lights and signals, rules of the air and rules for air traffic on and in the neighborhood of aerodromes, which have been laid down in the convention relative to aerial navigation concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers.

Art. 320. The obligations imposed by the preceding provisions shall remain in force until the 1st January, 1923, unless before that date Germany shall have been admitted into the League of Nations or shall have been authorized, by consent of the Allied and Associated Powers, to adhere to the convention relative to aerial navigation concluded between those powers.

Part XII.—Ports, Waterways and Railways

SECTION I.—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art. 321. Germany undertakes to grant freedom of transit through her territories on the routes most convenient for international transit, either by rail, navigable waterway, or canal, to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and mails coming from or going to the territories of any of the Allied and Associated Powers, (whether contiguous or not;) for this purpose the crossing of territorial waters shall be allowed. Such persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and mails shall not be subjected to any transit duty or to any undue delays or restrictions, and shall be entitled in Germany to national treatment as regards charges, facilities, and all other matters. Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs or other similar duties. All charges imposed on transport in transit shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions of the traffic. No charge, facility, or restriction shall depend directly or indirectly on the ownership or on the nationality of the ship or other means of transport on which any part of the through journey has been, or is to be, accomplished.

Art. 322. Germany undertakes neither to impose nor to maintain any control over transmigration traffic through her territories beyond measures necessary to insure that passengers are bona fide in transit; nor to allow any shipping company or any other private body, corporation, or person interested in the traffic to take any part whatever in, or to exercise any direct or indirect influence over, any administrative service that may be necessary for this purpose.

Art. 323. Germany undertakes to make no discrimination or preference, direct or indirect, in the duties, charges, and prohibitions relating to importations into or exportations from her territories, or, subject to the special engagements contained in the present treaty, in the charges and conditions of transport of goods or persons entering or leaving her territories, based on the frontier crossed; or on the kind, ownership, or flag of the means of transport (including aircraft) em-

ployed; or on the original or immediate place of departure of the vessel, wagon, or aircraft or other means of transport employed. Germany particularly undertakes not to establish against the ports and vessels of any of the Allied and Associated Powers any surtax or any direct or indirect bounty for export or import by German ports of vessels, or by those of another power, for example by means of combined tariffs. . . .

Art. 324. All necessary administrative and technical measures shall be taken to shorten, as much as possible, the transmission of goods across the German frontiers and to insure their forwarding and transport from such frontiers, irrespective of whether such goods are coming from or going to the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers or are in transit from or to those territories, under the same material conditions in such matters as rapidity of carriage and care en route as are enjoyed by other goods of the same kind carried on German territory under similar conditions of transport. . . .

Art. 325. The seaports of the Allied and Associated Powers are entitled to all favors and to all reduced tariffs granted on German railways or navigable waterways for the benefit of German ports or of any port of another power.

Art. 326. Germany may not refuse to participate in the tariffs or combinations of tariffs intended to secure for ports of any of the Allied and Associated Powers advantages similar to those granted by Germany to her own ports or the ports of any other power.

SECTION II.—NAVIGATION

Chapter I.—Freedom of Navigation

Art. 327. The nationals of any of the Allied and Associated Powers as well as their vessels and property shall enjoy in all German ports and in the inland navigation routes of Germany, the same treatment in all respects as German nationals, vessels and property. In particular the vessels of any one of the Allied or Associated Powers shall be entitled to transport goods of any description, and passengers, to or from any ports or places in German territory to which German vessels may have access, under conditions which shall not be more onerous than those applied in the case of national vessels; they shall be treated on a footing of equality with national vessels as regards port and harbor facilities and charges of every description.

Chapter II.—Free Zones in Ports

Art. 328. The free zones existing in German ports on the 1st August, 1914, shall be maintained. These free zones and any other free zones which may be established in German territory by the present treaty, shall be subject to the régime provided for in the following articles. Goods entering or leaving a free zone shall not be subjected to any import or export duty, other than those provided for in Article 330. Vessels and goods entering a free zone may be subjected to the charges established to cover expenses of administration, upkeep and improvement of the port, as well as to the charges for the use of various installations, provided that these charges shall be reasonable having regard to the expenditure incurred, and shall be levied in the conditions of equality provided for in Article 327. . . .

Art. 329. The facilities granted for the erection of warehouses, for packing and for unpacking

goods, shall be in accordance with trade requirements for the time being. All goods allowed to be consumed in the free zone shall be exempt from duty, whether of excise or of any other description, apart from the statistical duty provided for in Article 328 above. There shall be no discrimination in regard to any of the provisions of the present article between persons belonging to different nationalities or between goods of different origin or destination.

Art. 330. Import duties may be levied on goods leaving the free zone for consumption in the country on the territory of which the port is situated. Conversely, export duties may be levied on goods coming from such country and brought into the free zone. These import and export duties shall be levied on the same basis and at the same rates as similar duties levied at the other customs frontiers of the country concerned. On the other hand, Germany shall not levy, under any denomination, any import, export, or transit duty on goods carried by land or water across her territory to or from the free zone from or to any other State. . . .

Chapter III.—Clauses Relating to the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen (Russtrom-Memel-Niemen) and the Danube

(1) General Clauses

Art. 331. The following rivers are declared international; The Elbe (Labe) from its confluence with the Vltava (Moldau), and the Vltava (Moldau) from Prague; the Oder (Odra) from its confluence with the Oppa; the Niemen (Russtrom-Memel-Niemen) from Grodno; the Danube from Ulm; and all navigable parts of these river systems which naturally provide more than one State with access to the sea, with or without transshipment from one vessel to another; together with lateral canals and channels constructed either to duplicate or to improve naturally navigable sections of the specified river system, or to connect two naturally navigable sections of the same river. The same shall apply to the Rhine-Danube navigable waterway, should such a waterway be constructed under the conditions laid down in Article 353.

Art. 332. On the waterways declared to be international in the preceding article, the nationals, property and flags of all powers shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality, no distinction being made to the detriment of the nationals, property or flag of any power between them and the nationals, property or flag of the riparian State itself or of the most favored nation. Nevertheless, German vessels shall not be entitled to carry passengers or goods by regular services between the ports of any Allied or Associated Power, without special authority from such power.

Art. 333. Where such charges are not precluded by any existing conventions, charges varying on different sections of a river may be levied on vessels using the navigable channels or their approaches, provided that they are intended solely to cover equitably the cost of maintaining in a navigable condition, or of improving, the river and its approaches, or to meet expenditure incurred in the interests of navigation. . . .

Art. 334. The transit of vessels, passengers, and goods on these waterways shall be effected in accordance with the general conditions prescribed for transit in Section I, above. When the two banks of an international river are within the same

State goods in transit may be placed under seal or in the custody of customs agents. When the river forms a frontier goods and passengers in transit shall be exempt from all customs formalities; the loading and unloading of goods, and the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, shall only take place in the ports specified by the riparian State.

Art. 335. No dues of any kind other than those provided for in the present part shall be levied along the course or at the mouth of these rivers. This provision shall not prevent the fixing by the riparian States of customs, local octroi, or consumption duties, or the creation of reasonable and uniform charges levied in the ports, in accordance with public tariffs, for the use of cranes, elevators, quays, warehouses, &c.

Art. 336. In default of any special organization for carrying out the works connected with the upkeep and improvement of the international portion of a navigable system, each riparian State shall be bound to take suitable measures to remove any obstacle or danger to navigation and to insure the maintenance of good conditions of navigation. If a State neglects to comply with this obligation any riparian State, or any State represented on the International Commission, if there is one, may appeal to the tribunal instituted for this purpose by the League of Nations.

Art. 337. The same procedure shall be followed in the case of a riparian State undertaking any works of a nature to impede navigation in the international section. The tribunal mentioned in the preceding article shall be entitled to enforce the suspension or suppression of such works, making due allowance in its decisions for all rights in connection with irrigation, water-power, fisheries, and other national interests, which, with the consent of all the riparian States or of all the States represented on the International Commission, if there be one, shall be given priority over the requirements of navigation. Appeal to the tribunal of the League of Nations does not require the suspension of the works.

Art. 338. The régime set out in Article 332 to 337 above shall be superseded by one to be laid down in a General Convention drawn up by the Allied and Associated Powers, and approved by the League of Nations, relating to the waterways recognized in such Convention as having an international character. This Convention shall apply in particular to the whole or part of the above-mentioned river systems of the Elbe, (Labe,) the Oder, (Odra,) the Niemen, (Russtrom-Memel-Niemen,) and the Danube, and such other parts of these river systems as may be covered by a general definition. Germany undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 379, to adhere to the said General Convention as well as to all projects prepared in accordance with Article 343 below for the revision of existing international agreements and regulations.

Art. 339. Germany shall cede to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned, within a maximum period of three months from the date on which notification shall be given her, a proportion of the tugs and vessels remaining registered in the ports of the river systems referred to in Article 331 after the deduction of those surrendered by way of restitution or reparation. Germany shall in the same way cede material of all kinds necessary to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned for the utilization of those river systems.

The number of the tugs and boats and the amount of the material so ceded, and their dis-

tribution, shall be determined by an arbitrator or arbitrators nominated by the United States of America, due regard being had to the legitimate needs of the parties concerned, and particularly to the shipping traffic during the five years preceding the war. . . . The cessions provided for in the present article shall entail a credit of which the total amount, settled in a lump sum by the arbitrator or arbitrators, shall not in any case exceed the value of the capital expended in the initial establishment of the material ceded, and shall be set off against the total sums due from Germany; in consequence, the indemnification of the proprietors shall be a matter for Germany to deal with.

(2) Special Clauses Relating to the Elbe, the Oder, and the Niemen (Russtrom-Memel-Niemen)

Art. 340. The Elbe (Labe) shall be placed under the administration of an International Commission which shall comprise: 4 representatives of the German States bordering on the river; 2 representatives of the Czecho-Slovak State; 1 representative of Great Britain; 1 representative of France; 1 representative of Italy; 1 representative of Belgium. Whatever be the number of members present, each delegation shall have the right to record a number of votes equal to the number of representatives allotted to it. If certain of these representatives cannot be appointed at the time of the coming into force of the present treaty, the decisions of the commission shall nevertheless be valid.

Art. 341. The Oder (Odra) shall be placed under the administration of an International Commission, which shall comprise: 1 representative of Poland; 3 representatives of Prussia; 1 representative of the Czecho-Slovak State; 1 representative of Great Britain; 1 representative of France; 1 representative of Denmark; 1 representative of Sweden. If certain of these representatives cannot be appointed at the time of the coming into force of the present treaty, the decisions of the commission shall nevertheless be valid.

Art. 342. On a request being made to the League of Nations by any riparian State, the Niemen (Russtrom-Memel-Niemen) shall be placed under the administration of an International Commission, which shall comprise one representative of each riparian State, and three representatives of other States specified by the League of Nations.

Art. 343. The International Commissions referred to in Articles 340 and 341 shall meet within three months of the date of the coming into force of the present treaty. The International Commission referred to in Article 342 shall meet within three months from the date of the request made by a riparian State. Each of these commissions shall proceed immediately to prepare a project for the revision of the existing international agreements and regulations, drawn up in conformity with the General Convention referred to in Article 338, should such convention have been already concluded. In the absence of such convention, the project for revision shall be in conformity with the principles of Articles 332 to 337, above.

Art. 344. The projects referred to in the preceding article shall, inter alia:

(a) Designate the headquarters of the International Commission, and prescribe the manner in which its President is to be nominated;

(b) Specify the extent of the commission's powers, particularly in regard to the execution of works of maintenance, control, and improvement on the river system, the financial régime, the fix-

ing and collection of charges, and regulations for navigation;

(c) Define the sections of the river or its tributaries to which the international régime shall be applied.

Art. 345. The international agreements and regulations at present governing the navigation of the Elbe, (Labe,) the Oder (Odra,) and the Niemen (Russtrom-Memel-Niemen) shall be provisionally maintained in force until the ratification of the above-mentioned projects. Nevertheless, in all cases where such agreements and regulations in force are in conflict with the provisions of Articles 332 to 337 above, or of the General Convention to be concluded, the latter provisions shall prevail.

(3) Special Clauses Relating to the Danube

Art. 346. The European Commission of the Danube reassumes the powers it possessed before the war. Nevertheless, as a provisional measure, only representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Rumania shall constitute this commission.

Art. 347. From the point where the competence of the European Commission ceases, the Danube system referred to in Article 331 shall be placed under the administration of an international commission composed as follows: 2 representatives of German riparian States; 1 representative of each other riparian State; 1 representative of each non-riparian State represented in the future on the European Commission of the Danube. If certain of these representatives cannot be appointed at the time of the coming into force of the present treaty, the decisions of the commission shall nevertheless be valid.

Art. 348. The International Commission provided for in the preceding article shall meet as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present treaty, and shall undertake provisionally the administration of the river in conformity with the provisions of Articles 332 to 337, until such time as a definitive statute regarding the Danube is concluded by the powers nominated by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Art. 349. Germany agrees to accept the régime which shall be laid down for the Danube by a conference of the power nominated by the Allied and Associated Powers, which shall meet within one year after the coming into force of the present treaty, and at which German representatives may be present.

Art. 350. The mandate given by Article 57 of the Treaty of Berlin of the 13th July, 1878, to Austria-Hungary, and transferred by her to Hungary, to carry out works at the Iron Gates, is abrogated. The commission intrusted with the administration of this part of the river shall lay down provisions for the settlement of accounts subject to the financial provisions of the present treaty. Charges which may be necessary shall in no case be levied by Hungary.

Art. 351. Should the Czecho-Slovak State, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, or Rumania, with the authorization of or under mandate from the International Commission, undertake maintenance, improvement, weir, or other works on a part of the river system which forms a frontier, these States shall enjoy on the opposite bank, and also on the part of the bed which is outside their territory, all necessary facilities for the survey, execution, and maintenance of such works.

Art. 352. Germany shall be obliged to make to the European Commission of the Danube all res-

titutions, reparations, and indemnities for damages inflicted on the commission during the war.

Art. 353. Should a deep-draught Rhine-Danube navigable waterway be constructed, Germany undertakes to apply thereto the régime prescribed in Articles 332 to 338.

Chapter IV.—Clauses Relating to the Rhine and the Moselle

Art. 354. As from the coming into force of the present treaty, the Convention of Mannheim of 17th October, 1868, together with the Final Protocol thereof, shall continue to govern navigation on the Rhine, subject to the conditions hereinafter laid down. In the event of any provisions of the said Convention being in conflict with those laid down by the General Convention referred to in Article 338, (which shall apply to the Rhine,) the provisions of the General Convention shall prevail. Within a maximum period of six months from the coming into force of the present treaty, the Central Commission referred to in Article 355 shall meet to draw up a project of revision of the Convention of Mannheim. This project shall be drawn up in harmony with the provisions of the General Convention referred to above, should this have been concluded by that time, and shall be submitted to the powers represented on the Central Commission. Germany hereby agrees to adhere to the project so drawn up. Further, the modifications set out in the following articles shall immediately be made in the Convention of Mannheim. The Allied and Associated Powers reserve to themselves the right to arrive at an understanding in this connection with Holland, and Germany hereby agrees to accede if required to any such understanding.

Art. 355. The Central Commission provided for in the Convention of Mannheim shall consist of nineteen members, viz.: 2 representatives of the Netherlands; 2 representatives of Switzerland; 4 representatives of German riparian States; 4 representatives of France, which in addition shall appoint the President of the Commission; 2 representatives of Great Britain; 2 representatives of Italy; 2 representatives of Belgium. The headquarters of the Central Commission shall be at Strasbourg. Whatever be the number of members present, each delegation shall have the right to record a number of votes equal to the number of representatives allotted to it. If certain of these representatives cannot be appointed at the time of the coming into force of the present treaty, the decisions of the Commission shall nevertheless be valid.

Art. 356. Vessels of all nations, and their cargoes, shall have the same rights and privileges as those which are granted to vessels belonging to the Rhine navigation, and to their cargoes. . . .

Art. 357. Within a maximum period of the three months from the date on which notification shall be given Germany shall cede to France tugs and vessels, from among those remaining registered in German Rhine ports after the deduction of those surrendered by way of restitution or reparation, or shares in German Rhine navigation companies. . . . The cessions provided for in the present article shall entail a credit of which the total amount, settled in a lump sum by the arbitrator or arbitrators mentioned above, shall not in any case exceed the value of the capital expended in the initial establishment of the ceded material and installations, and shall be set off against the total

sums due from Germany; in consequence, the indemnification of the proprietors shall be a matter for Germany to deal with.

Art. 358. Subject to the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Convention of Mannheim or of the convention which may be substituted therefor, and to the stipulations of the present treaty, France shall have on the whole course of the Rhine included between the two extreme points of the French frontiers:

(a) the right to take water from the Rhine to feed navigation and irrigation canals (constructed or to be constructed) or for any other purpose, and to execute on the German bank all works necessary for the exercise of this right;

(b) the exclusive right to the power derived from works of regulation on the river, subject to the payment to Germany of the value of half the power actually produced, this payment, which will take into account the cost of the works necessary for producing the power, being made either in money or in power and in default of agreement being determined by arbitration. For this purpose France alone shall have the right to carry out in this part of the river all works of regulation (weirs or other works) which she may consider necessary for the production of power. Similarly, the right of taking water from the Rhine is accorded to Belgium to feed the Rhine-Meuse navigable waterway provided for below. . . . To insure the proper and faithful execution of the provisions contained in (a) and (b) above, Germany (i) binds herself not to undertake or to allow the construction of any lateral canal or any derivation on the right bank of the river opposite the French frontiers; (ii) recognizes the possession by France of the right of support on and the right of way over all lands situated on the right bank which may be required in order to survey, to build, and to operate weirs which France, with the consent of the Central Commission, may subsequently decide to establish. In accordance with such consent, France shall be entitled to decide upon and fix the limits of the necessary sites, and she shall be permitted to occupy such lands after a period of two months after simple notification, subject to the payment by her to Germany of indemnities of which the total amount shall be fixed by the Central Commission. . . . Should Switzerland so demand, and if the Central Commission approves, the same rights shall be accorded to Switzerland for the part of the river forming her frontier with other riparian States; (iii) shall hand over to the French Government, during the month following the coming into force of the present treaty, all projects, designs, drafts of concessions and of specifications concerning the regulation of the Rhine for any purpose whatever which have been drawn up or received by the Governments of Alsace-Lorraine or of the Grand Duchy of Baden.

Art. 359. Subject to the preceding provisions, no works shall be carried out in the bed or on either bank of the Rhine where it forms the boundary of France and Germany without the previous approval of the Central Commission or of its agents.

Art. 360. France reserves the option of substituting herself as regards the rights and obligations resulting from agreements arrived at between the Government of Alsace-Lorraine and the Grand Duchy of Baden concerning the works to be carried out on the Rhine; she may also denounce such agreements within a term of five years dating from the coming into force of the present treaty.

France shall also have the option of causing works to be carried out which may be recognized as necessary by the Central Commission for the upkeep or improvement of the navigability of the Rhine above Mannheim.

Art. 361. Should Belgium, within a period of 25 years from the coming into force of the present treaty decide to create a deep-draught Rhine-Meuse navigable waterway, in the region of Ruhrort, Germany shall be bound to construct, in accordance with plans to be communicated to her by the Belgian Government, after agreement with the Central Commission, the portion of this navigable waterway situated within her territory. The Belgian Government shall, for this purpose, have the right to carry out on the ground all necessary surveys. Should Germany fail to carry out all or part of these works, the Central Commission shall be entitled to carry them out instead; and, for this purpose, the commission may decide upon and fix the limits of the necessary sites and occupy the ground after a period of two months after simple notification, subject to the payment of indemnities to be fixed by it and paid by Germany. This navigable waterway shall be placed under the same administrative régime as the Rhine itself, and the division of the cost of initial construction, including the above indemnities, among the States crossed thereby shall be made by the Central Commission.

Art. 362. Germany hereby agrees to offer no objection to any proposals of the Central Rhine Commission for extending its jurisdiction:

(1) to the Moselle below the Franco-Luxemburg frontier down to the Rhine, subject to the consent of Luxemburg;

(2) to the Rhine above Basle up to the Lake of Constance, subject to the consent of Switzerland;

(3) to the lateral canals and channels which may be established either to duplicate or to improve naturally navigable sections of the Rhine or the Moselle, or to connect two naturally navigable sections of these rivers, and also any other parts of the Rhine River system which may be covered by the General Convention provided for in Article 338 above.

Chapter V.—Clauses Giving to the Czecho-Slovak State the Use of Northern Ports

Art. 363. In the ports of Hamburg and Stettin Germany shall lease to the Czecho-Slovak State, for a period of ninety-nine years, areas which shall be placed under the general régime of free zones and shall be used for the direct transit of goods coming from or going to that State.

Art. 364. The delimitation of these areas, and their equipment, their exploitation, and in general all conditions for their utilization, including the amount of the rental, shall be decided by a commission consisting of one delegate of Germany, one delegate of the Czecho-Slovak State and one delegate of Great Britain. These conditions shall be susceptible of revision every ten years in the same manner. Germany declares in advance that she will adhere to the decisions so taken.

SECTION III.—RAILWAYS

Chapter I.—Clauses Relating to International Transport

Art. 365. Goods coming from the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers, and going to

Germany, or in transit through Germany from or to the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers, shall enjoy on the German railways as regards charges to be collected (rebates and drawbacks being taken into account) facilities, and all other matters, the most favorable treatment applied to goods of the same kind carried on any German lines, either in internal traffic, or for export, import or in transit, under similar conditions of transport, for example as regards length of route. The same rule shall be applied, on the request of one or more of the Allied and Associated Powers, to goods specially designated by such power or powers coming from Germany and going to their territories. International tariffs established in accordance with the rates referred to in the preceding paragraph and involving through way-bills shall be established when one of the Allied and Associated Powers shall require it from Germany.

Art. 366. From the coming into force of the present treaty the high contracting parties shall renew, in so far as concerns them and under the reserves indicated in the second paragraph of the present Article, the conventions and arrangements signed at Berne on the 14th of October, 1890, the 20th September, 1893, the 16th July, 1895, the 16th June, 1898, and the 19th September, 1906, regarding the transportation of goods by rail. If within five years from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty a new convention for the transportation of passengers, luggage and goods by rail shall have been concluded to replace the Berne convention of the 14th October, 1890 and the subsequent additions referred to above, this new convention and the supplementary provisions for international transport by rail which may be based on it shall bind Germany even if she shall have refused to take part in the preparation of the convention or to subscribe to it. Until a new convention have been concluded, Germany shall conform to the provisions of the Berne Convention and the subsequent additions referred to above, and to the current supplementary provisions.

Art. 367. Germany shall be bound to co-operate in the establishment of through ticket services (for passengers and their luggage) which shall be required by any of the Allied and Associated Powers to insure their communication by rail with each other and with all other countries by transit across the territories of Germany; in particular Germany shall, for this purpose, accept trains and carriages coming from the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers and shall forward them with a speed at least equal to that of her best long-distance trains on the same lines. The rates applicable to such through services shall not in any case be higher than the rates collected on German internal services for the same distance, under the same conditions of speed and comfort. The tariffs applicable under the same conditions of speed and comfort to the transportation of emigrants going to or coming from ports of the Allied and Associated Powers and using the German railways, shall not be at a higher kilometeric rate than the most favorable tariffs (drawbacks and rebates being taken into account) enjoyed on the said railways by emigrants going to or coming from any other ports.

Art. 368. Germany shall not apply specially to such through services or to the transportation of emigrants going to or coming from the ports of the Allied and Associated Powers, any technical, fiscal or administrative measures, such as measures

of customs examination, general police, sanitary police, and control, the result of which would be to impede or delay such services.

Art. 369. In case of transport partly by rail and partly by internal navigation, with or without through way-bill, the preceding Articles shall apply to the part of the journey performed by rail.

Chapter II.—Rolling Stock

Art. 370. Germany undertakes that German wagons shall be fitted with apparatus allowing (1) of their inclusion in goods trains on the lines such of the Allied and Associated Powers as are parties to the Berne Convention of May 15, 1886, as modified on May 18, 1907, without hampering the action of the continuous brake which may be adopted in such countries within ten years of the coming into force of the present treaty, and (2) of the acceptance of wagons of such countries in all goods trains on the German lines. The rolling stock of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy on the German lines the same treatment as German rolling stock as regards movement, upkeep and repairs.

Chapter III.—Cessions of Railway Lines

Art. 371. Subject to any special provisions concerning the cession of ports, waterways and railways situated in the territories over which Germany abandons her sovereignty, and to the financial conditions relating to the concessionaires and the pensioning of the personnel, the cession of railways will take place under the following conditions: 1. The works and installations of all the railroads shall be handed over complete and in good condition. 2. When a railway system possessing its own rolling-stock is handed over in its entirety by Germany to one of the Allied and Associated Powers, such stock shall be handed over complete, in accordance with the last inventory before November 11th, 1918, and in a normal state of upkeep. 3. As regards lines without any special rolling-stock, commissions of experts designated by the Allied and Associated Powers, on which Germany shall be represented, shall fix the proportion of the stock existing on the system to which those lines belong to be handed over. . . . The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall be applied to the lines of former Russian Poland converted by Germany to the German gauge, such lines being regarded as detached from the Prussian State System.

Chapter IV.—Provisions Relating to Certain Railway Lines

Art. 372. When as a result of the fixing of new frontiers a railway connection between two parts of the same country crosses another country, or a branch line from one country has its terminus in another, the conditions of working, if not specifically provided for in the present treaty, shall be laid down in a convention between the railway administrations concerned. If the administrations cannot come to an agreement as to the terms of such convention, the points of difference shall be decided by commissions of experts composed as provided in the preceding Article.

Art. 373. Within a period of five years from the coming into force of the present treaty the Czecho-Slovak State may require the construction of a railway line in German territory between the stations of Schlauney and Nachod. The cost of construction shall be borne by the Czecho-Slovak State.

Art. 374. Germany undertakes to accept, within ten years of the coming into force of the present treaty, on request being made by the Swiss Government after agreement with the Italian Government, the denunciation of the International Convention of the 13th October, 1909, relative to the St. Gothard railway. In the absence of agreement as to the conditions of such denunciation, Germany hereby agrees to accept the decision of an arbitrator designated by the United States of America.

Chapter V.—*Transitory Provisions*

Art. 375. Germany shall carry out the instructions given her, in regard to transport, by an authorized body acting on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers:

1. For the carriage of troops under the provisions of the present treaty, and of material, ammunition and supplies for army use. 2. As a temporary measure, for the transportation of supplies for certain regions, as well as for the restoration, as rapidly as possible, of the normal conditions of transport, and for the organization of postal and telegraphic services.

SECTION IV.—DISPUTES AND REVISION OF PERMANENT CLAUSES

Art. 376. Disputes which may arise between interested powers with regard to the interpretation and application of the preceding articles shall be settled as provided by the League of Nations.

Art. 377. At any time the League of Nations may recommend the revision of such of these Articles as relate to a permanent administrative régime.

Art. 378. The stipulations in Articles 321 to 330, 332, 365, and 367 shall be subject to revision by the Council of the League of Nations at any time after five years from the coming into force of the present treaty. Failing such revision, no Allied or Associated Power can claim after the expiration of the above period of five years the benefit of any of the stipulations in the Articles enumerated above on behalf of any portion of its territories in which reciprocity is not accorded in respect of such stipulations. The period of five years during which reciprocity cannot be demanded may be prolonged by the Council of the League of Nations.

SECTION V.—SPECIAL PROVISION

Art. 379. Without prejudice to the special obligations imposed on her by the present treaty for the benefit of the Allied and Associated Powers, Germany undertakes to adhere to any general conventions regarding the international régime of transit, waterways, ports or railways which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers, with the approval of the League of Nations, within five years of the coming into force of the present treaty.

SECTION VI.—CLAUSES RELATING TO THE KIEL CANAL

Art. 380. The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality.

Art. 381. The nationals, property, and vessels of all powers shall, in respect to charges, facilities, and

in all other respects, be treated on a footing of perfect equality in the use of the canal, no distinction being made to the detriment of nationals, property, and vessels of any power between them and the nationals, property, and vessels of Germany or of the most favored nations. No impediment shall be placed on the movement of persons or vessels other than those arising out of police, customs, sanitary, emigration or immigration regulations, and those relating to the import or export of prohibited goods. Such regulations must be reasonable and uniform and must not unnecessarily impede traffic.

Art. 382. Only such charges may be levied on vessels using the canal or its approaches as are intended to cover in an equitable manner the cost of maintaining in a navigable condition, or if improving, the canal or its approaches, or to meet expenses incurred in the interests of navigation. The schedule of such charges shall be calculated on the basis of such expenses, and shall be posted up in the ports. These charges shall be levied in such a manner as to render any detailed examination of cargoes unnecessary, except in the case of suspected fraud or contravention.

Art. 383. Goods in transit may be placed under seal or in the custody of customs agents; the loading and unloading of goods, and the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, shall only take place in the ports specified by Germany.

Art. 384. No charge of any kind other than those provided for in the present treaty shall be levied along the course or at the approaches of the Kiel Canal.

Art. 385. Germany shall be bound to take suitable measures to remove any obstacle or danger to navigation, and to insure the maintenance of good conditions of navigation. She shall not undertake any works of a nature to impede navigation on the canal or its approaches.

Art. 386. In the event of violation of any of the conditions of Articles 380 to 386, or of disputes as to the interpretation of these articles, any interested power can appeal to the jurisdiction instituted for the purpose by the League of Nations. In order to avoid reference of small questions to the League of Nations, Germany will establish a local authority at Kiel qualified to deal with disputes in the first instance and to give satisfaction so far as possible to complaints which may be presented through the consular representatives of the interested powers.

Part XIII.—Labor

SECTION I.—ORGANIZATION OF LABOR

Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice; And whereas conditions of labor exist involving such injustice, hardship, and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the regulations of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labor supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease, and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of the children, young persons, and women, provision for old age

and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organization of vocational and technical education, and other measures: Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries; The high contracting parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity as well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world, agree to the following:

Chapter I.—Organization

Art. 387. A permanent organization is hereby established for the promotion of the objects set forth in the preamble. The original members of the League of Nations shall be the original members of this organization, and hereafter membership of the League of Nations shall carry with it membership of the said organization.

Art. 388. The permanent organization shall consist of: (i) a General Conference of Representatives of the Members, and, (ii) an International Labor Office controlled by the governing body described in Article 393.

Art. 389. The meetings of the General Conference of Representatives of the Members shall be held from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once in every year. It shall be composed of four representatives of each of the members, of whom two shall be Government delegates and the two others shall be delegates representing respectively the employers and the workpeople of each of the members. Each delegate may be accompanied by advisers, who shall not exceed two in number for each item on the agenda of the meeting. When the questions specially affecting women are to be considered by the conference, one at least of the advisers should be a woman. . . .

Art. 390. Every delegate shall be entitled to vote individually on all matters which are taken into consideration by the conference. If one of the members fails to nominate one of the non-Government delegates whom it is entitled to nominate, the other non-Government delegates shall be allowed to sit and speak at the conference, but not to vote. . . .

Art. 391. The meetings of the conference shall be held at the seat of the League of Nations, or at such other place as may be decided by the conference at a previous meeting by two-thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present.

Art. 392. The International Labor Office shall be established at the seat of the League of Nations as part of the organization of the League.

Art. 393. The International Labor Office shall be under the control of a governing body consisting of twenty-four persons, appointed in accordance with the following provisions; The governing body of the International Labor Office shall be constituted as follows:

Twelve persons representing the Governments; Six persons elected by the delegates to the conference representing the employers; Six persons elected by the delegates to the conference representing the workers. Of the twelve persons representing the Governments, eight shall be nominated by the members which are of the chief industrial importance, and four shall be nominated by the members selected for the purpose by the Government delegates to the conference excluding the delegates of the eight members mentioned above. Any question as to which are the members of the chief

industrial importance shall be decided by the council of the League of Nations. The period of office of the members of the governing body will be three years. The method of filling vacancies and other similar questions may be determined by the governing body, subject to the approval of the conference. The governing body shall, from time to time, elect one of its members to act as its Chairman, shall regulate its own procedure, and shall fix its own times of meeting. A special meeting shall be held if a written request to that effect is made by at least ten members of the governing body.

Art. 394. There shall be a Director of the International Labor Office, who shall be appointed by the governing body, and, subject to the instructions of the Governing Body, shall be responsible for the efficient conduct of the International Labor Office and for such other duties as may be assigned to him. The Director or his deputy shall attend all meetings of the governing body.

Art. 395. The staff of the International Labor Office shall be appointed by the Director, who shall, as far as is possible with due regard to the efficiency of the work of the Office, select persons of different nationalities. A certain number of these persons shall be women.

Art. 396. The functions of the International Labor Office shall include the collection and distribution of information on all subjects relating to the international adjustment of conditions of industrial life and labor, and particularly the examination of subjects which it is proposed to bring before the conference with a view to the conclusion of international conventions, and the conduct of such special investigations as may be ordered by the conference. It will prepare the agenda for the meetings of the conference. It will carry out the duties required of it by the provisions of this part of the present treaty in connection with international disputes. It will edit and publish in French and English, and in such other languages as the governing body may think desirable, a periodical paper dealing with problems of industry and employment of international interest. . . .

Art. 397. The Government departments of any of the members which deal with questions of industry and employment may communicate directly with the Director through the representative of their Government on the governing body of the International Labor Office, or, failing any such representative, through such other qualified official as the Government may nominate for the purpose.

Art. 398. The International Labor Office shall be entitled to the assistance of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in any manner in which it can be given.

Art. 399. Each of the members will pay the traveling and subsistence expenses of its delegates and their advisers and of its representatives attending the meetings of the conference or governing body, as the case may be. All the other expenses of the International Labor Office and of the meetings of the conference or governing body shall be paid to the Director by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations out of the general funds of the League. The Director shall be responsible to the Secretary-General of the League for the proper expenditure of all moneys paid to him in pursuance of this Article.

Chapter II.—Procedure

Art. 400. The agenda of all meetings of the conference will be settled by the governing body, who shall consider any suggestion as to the agenda that

may be made by the Government of any of the members or by any representative organization recognized for the purpose of Article 389.

Art. 401. The Director shall act as the Secretary of the Conference, and shall transmit the agenda so as to reach the members four months before the meeting of the conference, and, through them, the non-Government delegates when appointed.

Art. 402. Any of the Governments of the members may formally object to the inclusion of any item or items in the agenda. The grounds for such objection shall be set forth in a reasoned statement addressed to the Director, who shall circulate it to all the members of the permanent organization. Items to which such objection has been made shall not, however, be excluded from the agenda if at the conference a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by delegates present is in favor of considering them. If the conference decides (otherwise than under the preceding paragraph) by two-thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present that any subject shall be considered by the conference, that subject shall be included in the agenda for the following meeting.

Art. 403. The conference shall regulate its own procedure, shall elect its own President, and may appoint committees to consider and report on any matter. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this part of the present treaty, all matters shall be decided by a simple majority of the votes cast by the delegates present. The voting is void unless the total number of votes cast is equal to half the number of the delegates attending the conference.

Art. 404. The conference may add to any committees which it appoints technical experts, who shall be assessors without power to vote.

Art. 405. When the conference has decided on the adoption of proposals with regard to an item in the agenda, it will rest with the conference to determine whether these proposals should take the form: (a) of a recommendation to be submitted to the members for consideration with a view to effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise, or (b) of a draft international convention for ratification by the members. In either case a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present shall be necessary on the final vote for the adoption of the recommendation or draft convention, as the case may be, by the conference. . . . A copy of the recommendation or draft convention shall be authenticated by the signature of the President of the conference and of the Director and shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. The Secretary-General will communicate a certified copy of the recommendation or draft convention to each of the members. Each of the members undertakes that it will, within the period of one year at most from the closing of the session of the conference, or if it is impossible owing to exceptional circumstances to do so within the period of one year, then at the earliest practicable moment and in no case later than eighteen months from the closing of the session of the conference, bring the recommendation or draft convention before the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies for the enactment of legislation or other action. . . . If on a recommendation no legislation or other action is taken to make a recommendation effective, or if the draft convention fails to obtain the consent of the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, no further obligation shall rest upon the member. In the case of a federal state, the power of which to enter into conventions on labor matters is subject to limita-

tions, it shall be in the discretion of that Government to treat a draft convention to which such limitations apply as a recommendation only, and the provisions of this article with respect to recommendations shall apply in such case. The above Article shall be interpreted in accordance with the following principle: In no case shall any member be asked or required, as a result of the adoption of any recommendation or draft convention by the conference to lessen the protection afforded by its existing legislation to the workers concerned.

Art. 406. Any convention so ratified shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, but shall only be binding upon the members which ratify it.

Art. 407. If any convention coming before the conference for final consideration fails to secure the support of two-thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present, it shall nevertheless be within the right of any of the members of the permanent organization to agree to such convention among themselves. Any convention so agreed to shall be communicated by the Governments concerned to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, who shall register it.

Art. 408. Each of the members agrees to make an annual report to the International Labor office on the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provisions of conventions to which it is a party. These reports shall be made in such form and shall contain such particulars as the governing body may request. The Director shall lay a summary of these reports before the next meeting of the conference.

Art. 409. In the event of any representation being made to the International Labor Office by an industrial association of employers or of workers that any of the members has failed to secure in any respect the effective observance within its jurisdiction of any convention to which it is a party, the Governing Body may communicate this representation to the Government against which it is made and may invite that Government to make such statement on the subject as it may think fit.

Art. 410. If no statement is received within a reasonable time from the Government in question, or if the statement when received is not deemed to be satisfactory by the Governing Body, the latter shall have the right to publish the representation and the statement, if any, made in reply to it.

Art. 411. Any of the members shall have the right to file a complaint with the International Labor Office if it is not satisfied that any other member is securing the effective observance of any convention which both have ratified in accordance with the foregoing articles. The Governing Body may, if it thinks fit, before referring such a complaint to a Commission of Inquiry, as hereinafter provided for, communicate with the Government in question in the manner described in Article 409. If the Governing Body does not think it necessary to communicate the complaint to the Government in question, or if, when they have made such communication, no statement in reply has been received within a reasonable time which the Governing Body considers to be satisfactory, the Governing Body may apply for the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry to consider the complaint and to report thereon. The Governing Body may adopt the same procedure either of its own motion or on receipt of a complaint from a Delegate to the Conference. When any matter arising out of Articles 410 or 411 is being considered by the Governing Body, the Government in question shall, if

not already represented thereon, be entitled to send a representative to take part in the proceedings of the Governing Body while the matter is under consideration. Adequate notice of the date on which the matter will be considered shall be given to the Government in question.

Art. 412. The Commission of Inquiry shall be constituted in accordance with the following provisions: Each of the members agrees to nominate within six months of the date on which the present Treaty comes into force three persons of industrial experience, of whom one shall be a representative of employers, one a representative of workers, and one a person of independent standing, who shall together form a panel from which the members of the Commission of Inquiry shall be drawn. The qualifications of the persons so nominated shall be subject to scrutiny by the Governing Body, which may by two-thirds of the votes cast by the representatives present refuse to accept the nomination of any person whose qualifications do not in its opinion comply with the requirements of the present article. Upon the application of the Governing Body, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall nominate three persons, one from each section of this panel, to constitute the Commission of Inquiry, and shall designate one of them as the President of the commission. None of these three persons shall be a person nominated to the panel by any member directly concerned in the complaint.

Art. 413. The members agree that, in the event of the reference of a complaint to a commission of inquiry under Article 411, they will each, whether directly concerned in the complaint or not, place at the disposal of the commission all the information in their possession which bears upon the subject-matter of the complaint.

Art. 414. When the Commission of Inquiry has fully considered the complaint, it shall prepare a report embodying its findings on all questions of fact relevant to determining the issue between the parties and containing such recommendations as it may think proper as to the steps which should be taken to meet the complaint and the time within which they should be taken. It shall also indicate in this report the measures, if any, of an economic character against a defaulting Government which it considers to be appropriate, and which it considers other Governments would be justified in adopting.

Art. 415. The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall communicate the report of the Commission of Inquiry to each of the Governments concerned in the complaint, and shall cause it to be published. Each of these Governments shall within one month inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations whether or not it accepts the recommendations contained in the report of the Commission; and if not, whether it proposes to refer the complaint to the Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations.

Art. 416. In the event of any member failing to take the action required by Article 405, with regard to a recommendation or draft convention, any other member shall be entitled to refer the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Art. 417. The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in regard to a complaint or matter which has been referred to it in pursuance of Article 415 or Article 416 shall be final.

Art. 418. The Permanent Court of International Justice may affirm, vary or reverse any of the

findings or recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, if any, and shall in its decision indicate the measures, if any, of an economic character which it considers to be appropriate, and which other Governments would be justified in adopting against a defaulting Government.

Art. 419. In the event of any member failing to carry out within the time specified the recommendations, if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry, or in the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, as the case may be, any other member may take against that member the measures of an economic character indicated in the report of the Commission or in the decision of the Court as appropriate to the case.

Art. 420. The defaulting Government may at any time inform the Governing Body that it has taken the steps necessary to comply with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry or with those in the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, as the case may be, and may request it to apply to the Secretary-General of the League to constitute a commission of Inquiry to verify its contention. In this case the provisions of Articles 412, 413, 414, 415, 417 and 418 shall apply, and if the report of the Commission of Inquiry or the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice is in favor of the defaulting Government, the other Governments shall forthwith discontinue the measures of an economic character that they have taken against the defaulting Government.

Chapter III.—General

Art. 421. The members engage to apply conventions which they have ratified in accordance with the provisions of this part of the present treaty to their colonies, protectorates, and possessions which are not fully self-governing: 1. Except where owing to the local conditions the convention is inapplicable, or 2. Subject to such modifications as may be necessary to adapt the convention to local conditions. And each of the members shall notify to the International Labor Office the action taken in respect of each of its colonies, protectorates, and possessions which are not fully self-governing.

Art. 422. Amendments to this part of the present treaty which are adopted by the Conference by a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present shall take effect when ratified by the States whose representatives compose the Council of the League of Nations and by three-fourths of the members.

Art. 423. Any question or dispute relating to the interpretation of this part of the present treaty or of any subsequent convention concluded by the members in pursuance of the provisions of this part of the present treaty shall be referred for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Chapter IV.—Transitory Provisions

Art. 424. The first meeting of the Conference shall take place in October, 1919. The place and agenda for this meeting shall be as specified in the Annex hereto. Arrangements for the convening and the organization of the first meeting of the Conference will be made by the Government designated for the purpose in the said Annex. That Government shall be assisted in the preparation of the documents for submission to the Conference

by an International Committee constituted as provided in the said Annex. The expenses of the first meeting and of all subsequent meetings held before the League of Nations has been able to establish a general fund, other than the expenses of delegates and their advisers, will be borne by the members in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

Art. 425. Until the League of Nations has been constituted all communications which under the provisions of the foregoing articles should be addressed to the Secretary-General of the League will be preserved by the Director of the International Labor Office, who will transmit them to the Secretary-General of the League.

Art. 426. Pending the creation of a Permanent Court of International Justice, disputes which in accordance with this part of the present treaty would be submitted to it for decision will be referred to a tribunal of three persons appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

ANNEX

First Meeting of Annual Labor Conference, 1919

The place of meeting will be Washington. The Government of the United States of America is requested to convene the conference. The International Organizing Committee will consist of seven members, appointed by the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, and Switzerland. The committee may, if it thinks necessary, invite other members to appoint representatives.

Agenda:

1. Application of principle of the 8-hours day or of the 48-hours week.
2. Question of preventing or providing against unemployment.
3. Women's employment:
 - (a) Before and after childbirth, including the question of maternity benefit.
 - (b) During the night.
 - (c) In unhealthy processes.
4. Employment of children:
 - (a) Minimum age of employment.
 - (b) During the night.
 - (c) In unhealthy processes.
5. Extension and application of the International Conventions adopted at Berne in 1906 on the prohibition of night work for women employed in industry and the prohibition of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.

SECTION II.—GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Art. 427. The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the well-being, physical, moral, and intellectual, of industrial wage earners is of supreme international importance, have framed, in order to further this great end, the permanent machinery provided for in Section I and associated with that of the League of Nations. They recognize that differences of climate, habits, and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of immediate attainment. But, holding as they do, that labor should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles for regulating labor conditions which all industrial communities should en-

deavor to apply, so far as their special circumstances will permit. Among these methods and principles, the following seem to the High Contracting Parties to be of special and urgent importance:

First—The guiding principle above enunciated that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce.

Second—The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers.

Third—The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country.

Fourth—The adoption of an eight hours day or a forty-eight hours week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been attained.

Fifth—The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable.

Sixth—The abolition of child labor and the imposition of such limitations on the labor of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.

Seventh—The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value.

Eighth—The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labor should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.

Ninth—Each State should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part in order to insure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed. Without claiming that these methods and principles are either complete or final, the High Contracting Parties are of opinion that they are well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations; and that, if adopted by the industrial communities who are members of the League, and safeguarded in practice by an adequate system of such inspection, they will confer lasting benefits upon the wage earners of the world.

Part XIV.—Guarantees

SECTION I.—WESTERN EUROPE

Art. 428. As a guarantee for the execution of the present treaty by Germany, the German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present treaty.

Art. 429. If the conditions of the present treaty are faithfully carried out by Germany, the occupation referred to in Article 428 will be successively restricted as follows:

(i) At the expiration of five years there will be evacuated:—the bridgehead of Cologne and the territories north of a line running along the Ruhr, then along the railway Jülich, Duren, Euskirchen, Rheinbach, thence along the road Rheinbach to Sinzig, and reaching the Rhine at the confluence with the Ahr; the roads, railways and places mentioned above being excluded from the area evacuated.

(ii) At the expiration of ten years, there will be evacuated:—the bridgehead of Coblenz and the territories north of a line to be drawn from the intersection between the frontiers of Belgium, Ger-

many and Holland, running about 4 kilometers south of Aix-la-Chapelle, then to and following the crest of Forst Gemünd, then east of the railway of the Urft Valley, then along Blankenheim, Valdorf, Dreis, Ulmen to and following the Moselle from Bremm to Nehren, then passing by Kappel and Simmern, then following the ridge of the heights between Simmern and the Rhine and reaching this river at Bacharach; all the places, valleys, roads and railways mentioned above being excluded from the area evacuated.

(iii) At the expiration of fifteen years there will be evacuated:—the bridgehead of Mainz, the bridgehead of Kehl and the remainder of the German territory under occupation. If at that date the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments the evacuation of the occupying troops may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees.

Art. 430. In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present treaty with regard to reparation, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated forces.

Art. 431. If before the expiration of the period of fifteen years Germany complies with all the undertakings resulting from the present treaty, the occupying forces will be withdrawn immediately.

Art. 432. All matters relating to the occupation and not provided for by the present treaty shall be regulated by subsequent agreements, which Germany hereby undertakes to observe.

SECTION II.—EASTERN EUROPE

Art. 433. As a guarantee for the execution of the provisions of the present treaty, by which Germany accepts definitely the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and of all treaties, conventions and agreements entered into by her with the Maximalist Government in Russia, and in order to insure the restoration of peace and good government in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, all German troops at present in the said territories shall return to within the frontiers of Germany as soon as the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories. These troops shall abstain from all requisitions and seizures and from any other coercive measures, with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany, and shall in no way interfere with such measures for national defense as may be adopted by the provisional Governments of Esthonia, Let-
via, and Lithuania. No other German troops shall, pending the evacuation or after the evacuation is complete, be admitted to the said territories.

Part XV.—Miscellaneous Provisions

Art. 434. Germany undertakes to recognize the full force of the treaties of peace and additional conventions which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with the powers who fought on the side of Germany, and to recognize whatever disposition may be made concerning the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, and of the Ottoman Empire,

and to recognize the new States within their frontiers as there laid down.

Art. 435. The high contracting parties, while they recognize the guarantees stipulated by the treaties of 1815, and especially by the Act of 20th November, 1815, in favor of Switzerland, the said guarantees constituting international obligations for the maintenance of peace, declare nevertheless that the provisions of these treaties, conventions, declarations and other supplementary acts concerning the neutralized zone of Savoy, as laid down in paragraph 1 of Article 92 of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, and in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Treaty of Paris of 20th November, 1815, are no longer consistent with present conditions. For this reason the high contracting parties take note of the agreement reached between the French Government and the Swiss Government for the abrogation of the stipulations relating to this zone which are and remain abrogated. The high contracting parties also agree that the stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and of the other supplementary acts concerning the free zones of Upper Savoy and the Gex district are no longer consistent with present conditions, and that it is for France and Switzerland to come to an agreement together with a view to settling between themselves the status of these territories under such conditions as shall be considered suitable by both countries.

ANNEX

1. The Swiss Federal Council has informed the French Government on the 5th May, 1919, that after examining the provisions of Article 435 in a like spirit of sincere friendship it has happily reached the conclusion that it was possible to acquiesce in it under the following conditions and reservations:

First—The neutralized zone of Haute-Savoie:

(a) It will be understood that as long as the Federal Chambers have not ratified the agreement come to between the two Governments concerning the abrogation of the stipulations in respect of the neutralized zone of Savoy nothing will be definitely settled, on one side or the other, in regard to this subject.

(b) The assent given by the Swiss Government to the abrogation of the above-mentioned stipulations presupposes, in conformity with the text adopted, the recognition of the guarantees formulated in favor of Switzerland by the treaties of 1815 and particularly by the declaration of 20th November, 1815.

(c) The agreement between the Governments of France and Switzerland for the abrogation of the above-mentioned stipulations will only be considered as valid if the treaty of peace contains this article in its present wording. In addition, the parties to the treaty of peace should endeavor to obtain the assent of the signatory powers of the treaties of 1815 and of the declaration of 20th November, 1815, which are not signatories of the present treaty of peace.

Second—Free zone of Haute-Savoie and the district of Gex.

(a) The Federal Council makes the most express reservations to the interpretation to be given to the statement mentioned in the last paragraph of the above article for insertion in the treaty of peace, which provides that "the stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and other supplementary acts concerning the free zones of Haute-Savoie and the Gex district are no longer consistent with the present

conditions." The Federal Council would not wish that its acceptance of the above wording should lead to the conclusion that it would agree to the suppression of a system intended to give neighboring territory the benefit of a special régime which is appropriate to the geographical and economical situation and which has been well tested. In the opinion of the Federal Council the question is not the modification of the customs systems of the zones as set up by the treaties mentioned above, but only the regulation in a manner more appropriate to the economic conditions of the present day of the terms of the exchange of goods between the regions in question. The Federal Council has been led to make the preceding observations by the perusal of the draft convention concerning the future constitution of the zones, which was annexed to the note of April 26 from the French Government. While making the above reservations the Federal Council declares its readiness to examine in the most friendly spirit any proposals which the French Government may deem it convenient to make on the subject.

(b) It is conceded that the stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and other supplementary acts relative to the free zones will remain in force until a new arrangement is come to between France and Switzerland to regulate matters in this territory.

2. The French Government have addressed to the Swiss Government, on May 18, 1919, the following note in reply to the communication set out in the preceding paragraph: In a note dated May 5 the Swiss Legation in Paris was good enough to inform the Government of the French Republic that the Federal Government adhered to the proposed article to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Governments and Germany. The French Government have taken note with much pleasure of the agreement thus reached, and, at their request, the proposed article, which had been accepted by the Allied and Associated Governments, has been inserted under No. 435 in the peace conditions presented to the German plenipotentiaries. The Swiss Government, in their note of May 5, on this subject, have expressed various views and reservations. Concerning the observations relating to the free zones of Haute-Savoie and the Gex district, the French Government have the honor to observe that the provisions of the last paragraph of Article 435 are so clear that their purport cannot be misapprehended, especially where it implies that no other power but France and Switzerland will in future be interested in that question. The French Government, on their part, are anxious to protect the interests of the French territories concerned, and, with that object, having their special situation in view, they bear in mind the desirability of assuring them a suitable customs régime and determining, in a manner better suited to present conditions, the methods of exchanges between these territories and the adjacent Swiss territories, while taking into account the reciprocal interests of both regions. It is understood that this must in no way prejudice the right of France to adjust her customs line in this region in conformity with her political frontier, as is done on the other portions of her territorial boundaries, and as was done by Switzerland long ago on her own boundaries in this region. The French Government are pleased to note on this subject in what a friendly disposition the Swiss Government take this opportunity of declaring their willingness to consider any French proposal dealing with the system to be substituted for the present

régime of the said free zones, which the French Government intend to formulate in the same friendly spirit. Moreover, the French Government have no doubt that the provisional maintenance of the régime of 1815 as to the free zones referred to in the above-mentioned paragraph of the note from the Swiss Legation of May 5, whose object is to provide for the passage from the present régime to the conventional régime, will cause no delay whatsoever in the establishment of the new situation which has been found necessary by the two Governments. This remark applies also to the ratification by the Federal Chambers, dealt with in Paragraph 1 (a), of the Swiss note of May 5, under the heading "Neutralized Zone of Haute-Savoie."

Art. 436. The high contracting parties declare and place on record that they have taken note of the treaty signed by the Government of the French Republic on July 17th, 1918, with His Serene Highness the Prince of Monaco defining the relations between France and the Principality.

Art. 437. The high contracting parties agree that, in the absence of a subsequent agreement to the contrary, the Chairman of any commission established by the present treaty shall, in the event of an equality of votes, be entitled to a second vote.

Art. 438. The Allied and Associated Powers agree that where Christian religious missions were being maintained by German societies or persons in territory belonging to them, or of which the government is intrusted to them in accordance with the present treaty, the property which these missions or missionary societies possessed, including that of trading societies whose profits were devoted to the support of missions, shall continue to be devoted to missionary purposes. In order to insure the due execution of this undertaking the Allied and Associated Governments will hand over such property to boards of trustees appointed by or approved by the Governments and composed of persons holding the faith of the mission whose property is involved. The Allied and Associated Governments, while continuing to maintain full control as to the individuals by whom the missions are conducted, will safeguard the interests of such missions. Germany, taking note of the above undertaking, agrees to accept all arrangements made or to be made by the Allied or Associated Government concerned for carrying on the work of the said missions or trading societies and waives all claims on their behalf.

Art. 439. Without prejudice to the provisions of the present treaty, Germany undertakes not to put forward directly or indirectly against any Allied or Associated Power, signatory of the present treaty, including those which without having declared war, have broken off diplomatic relations with the German Empire, any pecuniary claim based on events which occurred at any time before the coming into force of the present treaty. The present stipulation will bar completely and finally all claims of this nature, which will be thenceforward extinguished, whoever may be the parties in interest.

Art. 440. Germany accepts and recognizes as valid and binding all decrees and orders concerning German ships and goods and all orders relating to the payment of costs made by any prize court of any of the Allied or Associated Powers, and undertakes not to put forward any claim arising out of such decrees or orders on behalf of any German national. The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to examine in such manner as they may determine all decisions and orders of German Prize

Courts, whether affecting the property rights of nationals of those powers or of neutral powers. Germany agrees to furnish copies of all the documents constituting the record of the cases, including the decisions and orders made, and to accept and give effect to the recommendations made after such examination of the cases.

RATIFICATION

The present treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris as soon as possible. Powers of which the seat of Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible. A first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the treaty has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand. From the date of the first procès-verbal the treaty will come into force between the high contracting parties who have ratified it. For the determination of all periods of time provided for in the present treaty this date will be the date of the coming into force of the treaty. In all other respects the treaty will enter into force for each power at the date of the deposit of its ratification. The French Government will transmit to all the signatory powers a certified copy of the procès-verbaux of the deposit of ratifications.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty.

DONE AT VERSAILLES, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the signatory powers.

See also AFRICA: Modern European occupation: 1018-1920; ALBANIA: 1910; ALSACE-LORRAINE: 1914-1920; 1919; ARABIA: 1919; Results of the treaty; ARMENIA: 1919-1920; BELGIUM: 1919 (June 28); BULGARIA: 1919; CANADA: 1919: Treaty of Versailles; CHINA: 1919: Shantung controversy; DANUBE: 1856-1919; ENGLAND: 1919: British representation at the peace conference; BRITISH EMPIRE: Treaties promoting expansion: 1920; Colonial and imperial conferences: 1921: Treaty of Versailles; FRANCE: 1919 (January-October); FIUME: 1919; Orlando's withdrawal, etc.; LEAGUE OF NATIONS: LUXEMBURG: 1919-1921; MEMEL; POLAND: 1919 (June); SAAR; SERBIA: 1919; SILESIA: 1919-1921; SPITSBERGEN: 1921; U. S. A.: 1918-1919 (December-February); 1920 (April); 1920: Final rejection of the Treaty of Versailles; 1921 (July-August); WORLD WAR: 1918: XI. End of the war: a, 2; a, 3; AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE; COUNCIL OF FOUR; INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT COURT OF; PARIS, CONFERENCE OF: Sources of information; SPA, CONFERENCE OF.

ALSO IN: J. M. Keynes, *Revision of the treaty*.—M. I. Newbigin, *Aftermath: A geographical study of the peace terms*, p. 128.

VERSAILLES WAR COMMITTEE. See WORLD WAR: 1918: I. Political survey: a.

VERSAILLES WAR COUNCIL, Allied military council with purely advisory powers created in 1918, before real unity of command under Foch was adopted. See WORLD WAR: 1918: I. Political survey: a.

VERTERÆ, Roman city in Britain, which probably occupied the site of the modern town of Brough, in Westmoreland, where many remains of the Romans have been found.—Based on T. Wright, *Celt, Roman, and Saxon*, ch. 5.

VERTICAL COMBINATIONS. See TRUSTS: Great Britain.

VERTURIONES, name by which one of the Caledonian tribes was known to the Romans.

VERULAM, Baron. See BACON, FRANCIS.

VERULAM, Lord Baltimore's first settlement in Newfoundland. See NEWFOUNDLAND: 1610-1655.

VERULAMIUM, VERULAM.—“The ‘oppidum’ of Cassivelaunus [the stronghold which Cæsar reduced on his second invasion of Britain] is generally believed to have been situated where the modern town of St. Alban's now stands [but the point is still in dispute]. An ancient ditch can still be traced surrounding a considerable area on the banks of the River Ver, from which the Roman town of Verulam [Verulamium] took its name. This town, which probably originated in the camp of Cæsar, grew into an important city in Roman times. It stands on the opposite side of the River Ver, and is still known for its Roman remains.”—H. M. Scarth, *Roman Britain*, ch. 2.—See also BRITAIN: B. C. 61.

VERUS, Lucius Aurelius (Lucius Ceionius Commodus) (130-169), Roman general and colleague of Marcus Aurelius, 161-169. See ROME: Empire: 138-180.

VERVINS, Treaty of (1598). See FRANCE: 1593-1598.

VESALIUS (Andreas Vesale) (1514-1564), Belgian physician. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern: 16th-17th centuries; EUROPE: Modern period: Revolutionary period; SCIENCE: Middle Ages and the Renaissance: 16th century.

VESLE, river in the northern part of France flowing through the departments of Marne and Aisne. During the World War it was a region of severe fighting. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: g, 2; g, 2, i; g, 3; g, 6; g, 9, iii; g, 9, iv; h.

VESONTIO, modern Besançon, in France; originally the largest of the towns of the Sequani.—Based on G. Long, *Decline of the Roman republic*, v. 4, ch. 2.

B. C. 58.—Battle between Suevi and Romans. See SUEVI: B. C. 58.

VESPASIAN (Titus Flavius Sabinus Vespasianus) (9-79 A. D.), Roman emperor, 70-79. Became consul, 51; commander-in-chief in the war against the Jews, 66; proclaimed emperor, 69; during his reign occurred the destruction of Jerusalem by his son Titus, 70, the conquests of Agricola in Britain, 78-79, and the construction of the Colosseum. See ROME: Empire: 70-96; BRITAIN: 43-53; MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 11; also COLLOSSEUM.

VESPASIAN FAMILY. See FLAVIAN FAMILY.

VESPUCCIUS, Americus (Amerigo Vespucci) (1451-1512), Italian navigator after whom the western continents were named. Explored South America. See AMERICA: 1497-1498; 1499-1500; 1500-1514; 1503-1504; also Map showing voyages of discovery.

VEST, George Graham (1830-1904), United States senator, 1879-1903. See U. S. A.: 1899 (January-February).

VESTA, Temple of. See TEMPLES: Ancient examples.

VESTAL VIRGINS.—“The Vestals (‘virgines Vestales,’ ‘virgines Vestæ’) were closely connected with the college of pontifices. They are said to

have come from Alba soon after the foundation of Rome: at first there were two Vestals for each of the two tribes, Ramnes and Tities; afterwards two others were added for the Luceres, and the number of six was exceeded at no period. The vestal, on being chosen, was not allowed to be younger than six or older than ten years. . . . She was clad in white garments and devoted to the service of Vesta for thirty years. . . . After this period she was at liberty either to remain in the service of the goddess (which was generally done) or to return to her family and get married. Her dress was always white; round her forehead she wore a broad band like a diadem ('infula'), with ribbons ('vittæ') attached to it. During the sacrifice, or at processions, she was covered with a white veil. . . . She was carefully guarded against insult or temptation; an offence offered to her was punished with death; . . . in public every one, even the consul, made way to the lictor preceding the maiden. At public games and pontifical banquets she had the seat of honour; and a convicted criminal accidentally meeting her was released. Amongst her priestly functions was the keeping of the eternal fire in the temple of Vesta, each Vestal taking her turn at watching. . . . Breach of chastity on the part of the Vestal was punished with death."—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect. 103.

"VEST-POCKET TICKET." See AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: 1882-1916.

VESUVIUS, Mount, volcano near the eastern shore of the Bay of Naples, nine miles southeast of the city of Naples. It is the only active volcano on the continent of Europe.

79.—Destruction of Pompeii and Herculaneum. See POMPEII.

1906.—Eruption of 1906. See ITALY: 1906: Eruption of Vesuvius.

VESUVIUS, Mount, Battles of (338 B. C., 552). See ROME: Republic: B. C. 340-338; Medieval city: 535-553.

VETERA: A. D. 69.—Siege and massacre. —The most important success achieved by the Batavian patriot, Civilis, in the revolt against the Romans which he led, 69 A. D., was the siege and capture of Vetera, a victory sullied by the faithless massacre of the garrison after they had capitulated.—Based on C. Merivale, *History of the Romans*, ch. 58.

VETO: Use in various countries. See INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: Early development and growth in Switzerland; PARLIAMENT: English: 1011; POLAND: 1578-1652; PRESIDENT: United States: Pardoning power; POCKET VETO; U. S. A.: 1816-1817; STATE GOVERNMENT: 1850-1921; 1890-1921.

Papal veto. See PAPACY: 1904.

VETTONES, a people who occupied the part of ancient Spain between the Tagus and the Upper Douro at the time of the Roman conquest of that country.—Based on T. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, bk. 4, ch. 1.

VIA SACRA AT ROME.—"The Via Sacra began at the Sacellum Streniæ, which was on the part of the Esquiline nearest to the Colosseum; on reaching the Summa Via Sacra . . . it turned a little to the right, descending the Clivus Sacer; at the foot of the slope it passed under the arch of Fabius, by the side of the Regia; thence it ran in a straight line, passing by the Basilica Æmilia, the arch of Janus, the Curia Hostilia, till it reached the foot of the Capitoline Hill, where, turning to the left, it ascended the Clivus Capitolinus, and

reached its termination at the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. The Via Sacra, as Ovid tells us, took its name from the sacred rites which were performed on it. Along this road passed the processions of priests with the sacred animals to be sacrificed at the altar of Jupiter Capitolinus. . . . Along this road also passed the triumphal processions of the victorious Roman generals. The procession entered Rome by the Porta Triumphalis, passed through the Circus Maximus, then, turning to the left, proceeded along the road at the foot of the southeast slope of the Palatine, when it joined the Via Sacra, and again turned to the left and ascended the Velia; on reaching the Summa Via Sacra it descended the Clivus Sacer, and then passed along the rest of the Via Sacra till it reached its destination at the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, where the victorious general lay before the god the spoils of his conquests."—H. M. Westropp, *Early and Imperial Rome*, p. 121.

ALSO IN: J. H. Parker, *Archæology of Rome*, pt. 6.

VIAUD, Julien. See LOTTI, PIERRE.

VIBORG MANIFESTO (1906). See RUSSIA: 1905-1906.

VICARS, or Vice Præfects, Roman. See DIOCESES OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

VICE PRESIDENT, United States: Election.—Powers and duties. See ELECTIONS, PRESIDENTIAL: United States: Steps in election of president, etc.; CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: Senate: Freedom of debate.

VICENZA, capital of the province of the same name, Italy, about forty-one miles northwest of Venice. The principal industry is the production of silk goods. Population, 1921, was 60,296.

452.—Sacked by Huns. See HUNS: 452.

11th-12th centuries.—Acquisition of republican independence. See ITALY: 1056-1152.

1237.—Pillage and tyranny by Eccelino di Romano. See VERONA: 1236-1259.

1405.—Conquest by Venice. See ITALY: 1402-1406.

VICKSBURG, Defense, Siege, and Capture of (1862-1863). See U. S. A.: 1862 (May-July: On the Mississippi); (June-October: Tennessee-Kentucky); (December: On the Mississippi); 1863 (January-April: On the Mississippi); (April-July: On the Mississippi).

VICO, Giovanni Battista (1668-1744), Italian philosophical writer. See ITALIAN LITERATURE: 1670-1745; HISTORY: 19; 25; 30; 33.

VICTOR I, Saint, pope, 190-198.

Victor II (Gebhard) (c. 1018-1057), pope, 1055-1057.

Victor III (Daferius Epifani) (1027-1087), pope, 1086-1087.

Victor IV (Cardinal Gregorio Conti), anti-pope elected in opposition to Innocent II, 1138.

Victor IV (Cardinal Octavian) (d. 1164), anti-pope, in opposition to Alexander III, 1159-1164. Was supported by Frederick Barbarossa. See ITALY: 1163-1164.

VICTOR, Claude Perrin, Duke of Belluno (1764-1841), French marshal. Served under Napoleon in the Russian campaign of 1812; turned to the support of the Bourbons; minister of war, 1821-1823; second in command in the Spanish peninsula, 1823; recalled upon accusations of complicity in fraudulent contracts. See RUSSIA: 1812 (June-September).

VICTOR AMEDEUS I, duke of Savoy, 1630-1637.

Victor Amedeus II (1666-1732), duke of Savoy, king of Sicily, 1713-1720; king of Sardinia, 1720-

1730. Under pressure from Louis XIV, he persecuted the Waldenses who were sheltering Huguenot refugees, 1686; sided with the allies against France; received Sicily, 1713; ceded Sicily to Austria, 1720, and received Sardinia in exchange; abdicated, 1730. See ITALY: 1715-1735; SAVOY AND PIEDMONT: 1580-1713; SPAIN: 1713-1725; WALDENSES: 1685-1691.

Victor Amedeus III (1726-1796), duke of Savoy and king of Sardinia, 1773-1796.

VICTOR EMMANUEL I (1759-1824), duke of Savoy and king of Sardinia, 1802-1821. See ITALY: 1820-1821.

Victor Emmanuel II (1820-1878), king of Sardinia, 1840-1861, first king of Italy, 1861-1878. See ITALY: 1848-1849; 1856-1859, to 1867-1870.

Victor Emmanuel III (1869-), king of Italy, since 1900. See ITALY: 1870-1901; 1901-1918.

VICTORIA (Alexandrina Victoria) (1819-1901), queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 1837-1901, and empress of India, 1877-1901. See ENGLAND: 1834-1837, to 1901 (January).

VICTORIA, Guadalupe (Juan Felix Fernández) (1789-1843), first president of Mexico, 1824-1829. See MEXICO: 1820-1826.

VICTORIA, one of the federated states of the Australian Commonwealth, in the southeastern part of Australia. (See AUSTRALIA: Map; Location and physical features.) It was formerly a part of New South Wales, but in 1851 it was proclaimed a separate colony with a partially elective legislative council, acquiring more complete autonomy in 1855. The state has an area of 87,884 square miles, of which 3,942,000 acres were under cultivation in 1919. The state had in 1921 a population of 1,531,529. Its capital is Melbourne, and its other leading cities are Balarat, Geelong, and Bendigo.

1836-1855.—Discovery and early settlements.—Separation from New South Wales.—Erected into colony of Victoria.—Discovery of gold.—Constitutional organization. See AUSTRALIA: 1787-1840; 1839-1855; ANTARCTIC EXPLORATION: 1839-1845.

1866.—Tariff legislation. See TARIFF: 1862-1892.

1885-1892.—Movement toward Australian federation. See AUSTRALIAN: 1885-1892; 1890.

1891-1896.—Labor legislation. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL: Australia: 1891-1912.

1893.—Liberal land policy.—Labor colonies.—

Village settlements.—“Victoria has legislated on the ‘back to the land’ lines in recent years. In 1893 ‘The Settlement on Lands Act’ was passed for the promotion of village settlements, Labour colonies, and of homestead associations. These practical measures have not yet borne much fruit in this colony in the way of solving the unemployed problem, but they lead the way thereto. . . . Victoria has much less of an area, and consequently less soil for settlements, than any of the other colonies except Tasmania. She has, therefore, paid more attention in the recent past to furthering manufacturing industries than to the opening up of the land for pushing employment in that way. . . . Under the Act of 1893 land not otherwise appropriated, and not of an auriferous nature or permanently reserved, can be appropriated for purposes of homestead associations, Labour colonies, and village settlements. The amount of land set apart for a homestead association cannot exceed 2000 acres. This area is subdivided into holdings of not more than 50 acres, and the number of persons in a particular association must not be less than one member to 50 acres of the total area set apart for the purposes of such

association. The right of permissive occupancy will be given for a period of three years to any member of a society or association seeking such a holding of land. The fulfilment of certain conditions, . . . gives a member over 18 years of age a state lease. The member agrees in this document to carry out certain improvements, in a given time, to pay the rent to the state and such moneys as the Land Board may advance to him for the development of his holding. He must not sublet, assign, or borrow money on the security of the holding. He must reside on his allotment, or near it, and carry on the industry of agriculture, dairying, gardening, grazing, or similar occupation. Land is set apart for the purposes of a township near every association area, and each member of the association can obtain a ‘lot’ of an acre in extent in such township, on lease, if he applies within one year of the setting apart by the Land Board of the land for such township site. This wise provision prevents the possibility of ground-rent landlordism in connection with such associations. The provisions for the establishment of Labour colonies follow, to some extent, those . . . of the Murray River Labour Settlements. . . . Land, however, is much more scarce in Victoria, and there are one or two conditions imposed of an interesting nature. An area for a Labour colony is to consist of 1500 acres. This land is vested in three trustees named by the government. Provision is made for the election of four more trustees, representing persons or bodies subscribing to the funds of such colonies. The joint committee hears applications for membership of a Labour colony, and undertakes the management of same. . . . The state undertakes to donate £2 towards equipping such Labour colonies for every £1 subscribed by members or supporters. . . . Village settlements are also provided for in the Act of 1893.”—M. Davitt, *Life and progress in Australasia*, ch. 28.

1900.—Enters Australian Commonwealth.—When the Australian states federated in 1900, Victoria entered the Australian Commonwealth as the foremost industrial state. Her progress was attributed to her high tariff policy. Melbourne, her leading city, was chosen as the federal capital until the new federal city at Canberra in New South Wales should be completed.—See also AUSTRALIA, CONSTITUTION OF.

1906-1908.—Important legislation.—An act of 1906 abolished separate representation of state public servants. The government now consists of the executive, comprising the governor and a responsible ministry, and a Parliament of two houses: the Legislative Council of 34 members elected for six years and the Legislative Assembly elected for three years but dissoluble at any time by the ministry. No one is eligible to membership in the Council unless possessed for at least a year before election of an estate worth at least £50 net annually, and the electors must have an educational or caste qualification or must own or occupy freehold rateably worth \$50 (£10) a year or leasehold worth \$75 (£15). The class of voters freed of property qualification comprises graduates of British and Colonial universities, students of Melbourne University, certificated teachers, ministers of religion, (but no clergyman may sit in either house of Parliament), lawyers, medical practitioners, and officers of the army and navy, whether active or retired. Seventeen (half) of the 34 members of the council retire every three years. No property qualification is necessary to membership in the Assembly, which is elected by universal suffrage.

The Adult Suffrage Act of 1908 extended the franchise to women. (See SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: Australia.) Members of the lower house are paid £300 a year; and those of both houses have free passes on all the railways. There are 61 urban and 146 rural municipalities, each with an elective council for local administration.

1908-1912.—Railroad development. See RAILROADS: 1908-1918.

1909-1920.—Legislation.—Education.—The Federal Old Age Pension Act came into operation, July 1, 1909; and in October, 1912, an act was passed by the federal Parliament providing for the payment, on application of five pounds to the mother of every child born in the commonwealth. In 1920, there were 2,333 state schools with 6,637 teachers, and a total enrolment of 247,337 scholars. Melbourne continued to be the political center of Australia, although Victoria has been the most conservative of the Australian states in her political development. Lord Stradbroke was governor in 1921.—See also SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: Australia.

1915.—Irrigation and forest development.—Agreement with New South Wales and South Australia regarding the Murray river. See CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: Australia.

1919.—Law controlling prices passed. See PRICE CONTROL: 1919-1920.

See also CHARITIES: Australasia; EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: Australia.

VICTORIA AND ALBERT MUSEUM, South Kensington, London, one of the four national museums controlled by the Board of Education. The museum owed its inception to the exhibition of 1851 and was first known as the Department of Practical Art. The Sheepshanks gallery of pictures was presented in 1857; a collection of oriental art belonging to the East India Company was added in 1879; French furniture and decorative art, the patent museum, books, prints and manuscripts, and drawings are among the principal collections added in later years. The museum was originally opened in a temporary structure, but in 1899 Queen Victoria laid the foundation of the new buildings bearing the official name. Numerous gifts and purchases have helped to make the collection one of the most important in Europe.

VICTORIA CROSS. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: VIII. War medals: a.

VICTORIAN ORDER.—A new order of knighthood, to be known as the Victorian Order, and to be conferred as a mark of high distinction, was instituted by Queen Victoria on April 21, 1896.

VICTORY LIBERTY LOAN. See U. S. A.: 1917-1919: Taxation and expenditures.

VICTORY MEDALS. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: VIII. War Medals: d.

VICUS.—According to Niebuhr, the term "Viculus" in Roman topography—"about which there has been much controversy"—"means nothing else but a quarter or district [of the city] under the superintendence of its own police officer."—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lectures on ancient ethnography and geography*, v. 2, p. 86.—See also GENS.

VIDOME (vice-dominus), hereditary officer in Geneva. See GENEVA: 1504-1535.

VIENNA, capital of the republic of Austria. (See AUSTRIA: Map.) The population was 1,841,326 in 1920. It has an area of 107 square miles, about half of which comprises woods and arable lands; the reduction of the national territory to 30,000 square miles and 6,000,000 people by

virtue of the Treaty of St. Germain, has largely diminished the importance and resources of the city.—See also CIVIC BEAUTY: Vienna.

Origin. See VINDOBONA.

10th century.—In kingdom of Arles. See BURGUNDY: 843-933.

12th century.—Fortification and commercial advancement. See AUSTRIA: 805-1246.

1246.—Siege of Rudolph. See AUSTRIA: 1246-1282.

1365.—Founding of university by Rudolph IV. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1348-1826.

1462.—Revolt against Emperor Frederick. See AUSTRIA: 1438-1493.

1485.—Siege, capture and occupation by Matthias of Hungary. See HUNGARY: 1471-1491.

1529.—Siege by the Turks. See HUNGARY: 1526-1567.

1619.—Threatened by Bohemian army. See GERMANY: 1618-1620.

1645.—Threatened by Swedes. See GERMANY: 1640-1645.

1683.—Siege by Turks.—Deliverance by John Sobieski. See HUNGARY: 1668-1683.

1805.—Surrendered to Napoleon. See FRANCE: 1805 (March-December).

1809.—Capitulation to Napoleon. See GERMANY: 1809 (January-June); AUSTRIA: 1809-1814.

1848.—Revolutionary riots.—Bombardment of the city. See AUSTRIA: 1848-1849.


1866.—Menaced by Prussia in Seven Weeks' War. See AUSTRIA: 1862-1866.

1867.—Effect of Ausgleich. See HUNGARY: 1856-1868.

1898.—Charitable organizations. See CHARITIES: Austria: 1783-1909.

VIENNA, Bank of the City of. See MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1703-1915.

VIENNA, Congress of.—"The Congress that met in Vienna in the fall of 1814 was composed of the most illustrious personages in Europe, with one significant exception, that of the Man of Elba, who was not invited or expected and yet whose animating personality was the direct cause of this mobilization of the world's celebrities. . . . [The] business was the distribution of the spoils of victory, the rending of Napoleon's mantle, his coat of many colors. The task was the redrawing of the political map of Europe. To be able to understand the mode of operations of the Congress of Vienna we must keep in mind three or four facts of the situation. One was the great prominence of the four allies, the allies of Chaumont, who had constituted the essential body of the Great Coalition before which Napoleon had been forced to strike arms. These were the Four. . . . Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England. . . . Another fact to be remembered is this, that the Congress of Vienna was not a peace congress. Peace had been concluded before ever that Congress met. Peace was the work of the Treaty of Paris of May 30, 1814. That treaty was, however, signed, not by four Powers, but by eight. For in addition to the four already mentioned the peace of Paris was signed by Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and France. That treaty settled some things and merely outlined the settlement of others. Its thirty-second article provided for a future congress to pass upon the many items of unfinished business which the treaty, necessarily concluded in haste, could not determine. Article XXXII reads as follows: 'All the powers engaged on either side in the present war shall, within the space of two months, send plenipotentiaries to Vienna to settle at a general Congress the arrangements which are to complete the pro-



CONGRESS OF VIENNA, 1814-1815

(After a crayon drawing by Jean Baptiste Isabey, engraved by Godefroy)

From left to right: Wellington, England; Count Lobo, Portugal; Saldanha, Portugal; Hardenberg, Prussia (seated); Count Löwenhielm, Sweden; Noailles, France; Metternich, Austria; Dubin, France; Nesserole, Russia; Palmella, Portugal (seated); Castlereagh, England (seated); Dalberg, France; Wessenberg, Austria (seated); Rasumowsky, Russia; Lord Stewart, England; Labrador, Spain (seated); Clancarty, England; Waacken; Gentz, Austria, secretary; Talleyrand, France (seated); Wilhelm von Humboldt, Prussia; Count Stackelberg, Russia (seated); Cathcart, England.

visions of the present treaty.' This was the only official call the Congress of Vienna ever had. . . . No further summons was issued, no more detailed statement was ever sent forth as to the composition of the Congress, as to its organization, or its mode of procedure. A general rendezvous had been given for two months hence at Vienna. That was the sole and the highly insufficient preparation of this momentous meeting. What, therefore, was not settled before the convening of the Congress would have to be determined after it convened. What happened was enlightening, if not generally pleasing."—C. D. Hazen, *Congress of Vienna* (C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer and R. H. Lord, *Three peace congresses of the nineteenth century*, pp. 5-6).—"The Congress was little more than a convenient assembly of diplomatists which would make it easier for them to consign to paper the agreements they would ultimately conclude. They had put forward the word 'Congress' imprudently, without reflecting upon all the results that the word implied. It had been an expedient to postpone, and perhaps to solve, their difficulties. But the invitation had been given and accepted by all the States of Europe; and the Great Powers were committed to admit them in some way to their councils. The result was that there came to Vienna an enormous number of plenipotentiaries imbued with vague aspirations and ill-considered designs, only to find no principle which should govern their procedure and no machinery by which they could be made into a coherent body. No appreciable difference would have been made in the final settlement at Vienna if the large majority of the plenipotentiaries had never appeared there at all."—C. K. Webster, *Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815*, p. 55.—"The Czar of Russia, the Kings of Prussia, Denmark, Bavaria, and Württemberg, and nearly all the statesmen of eminence in Europe, gathered round the Emperor Francis and his Minister, Metternich. . . . Lord Castlereagh represented England, and Talleyrand, France. Rasumoffsky and other Russian diplomatists acted under the immediate directions of their master. . . . Hardenberg stood in a somewhat freer relation to King Frederick William: Stein was present, but without official place."—C. A. Fyffe, *History of modern Europe*, v. 2, ch. 1.—"Hanover was represented by Count Münster, who was the trusted confidant, not only of the Prince Regent of England, but also of Castlereagh. . . . Of the three other signatories of the Paris Treaties, Spain was represented by Labrador, who most ineptly tried to imitate Talleyrand; Portugal principally by Palmella, whose Court in Brazil was so distant that he was not able to play much part; and Sweden by Lövenheim, who passively looked on at the struggles in which his master, Bernadotte, now professed to take no interest. Of the minor Powers, only a few of the plenipotentiaries, exercised much influence. . . . Holland was represented by Van Spaen and von Gagen. . . . Field-Marshal Wrede arrogantly defended Bavaria's interests. Both Murat and Ferdinand of Sicily had representatives at the Congress. All the minor States of Italy and Germany, as well as a large number of German princes and counts of the Empire who had been deprived of their sovereign rights during the upheaval in Germany, sent representatives. . . . The Pope was represented by Cardinal Consalvi, who played a singularly narrow rôle, in spite of his undoubted ability; the Sultan by Mavrogeni, his *chargé d'affaires* at Vienna, a Greek by nationality. Added to these were representatives of many spe-

cial interests, some as imposing as the German Catholics or as influential as the German Jews, others of little importance, amongst them the Order of St. John, which still had hopes of compensation for Malta. Even the deposed King of Sweden had Sir Sidney Smith, the defender of Acre, to uphold his cause. When it is remembered that a large number of the sovereigns and diplomatists brought with them their wives and other female relations, the extraordinary spectacle which Vienna presented can be imagined."—C. K. Webster, *Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815*, pp. 7, 59-60.—"Although the Congress had been postponed during the summer until the first of October in order to enable the Tsar to visit Russia, the plenipotentiaries of the four allied nations arrived in Vienna toward the middle of September [1814], and from the sixteenth onward they held meetings with each other. On the twenty-second they decided upon the general method of procedure at the Congress. A commission consisting of the representatives of the Four, and of France and Spain in addition, was to prepare the work on all matters of general European concern; and a commission of five leading German states, Austria, Prussia, Württemberg, Baden, and Hanover, and excluding Saxony, was to prepare the proposed federal constitution for Germany. The Four also signed a protocol to the effect that they intended to settle among themselves the distribution of the Polish, German, and Italian territories, renounced by Napoleon and comprising thirty-two millions of people, the main business in fact of the Congress; that only after having agreed among themselves would they communicate their decisions to France and Spain, and only then would they listen to any suggestions or objections from those two. It is to be noted that thus not only were two of the eight signers of the Treaty of Paris, Portugal and Sweden, eliminated forthwith from participation in the chief work of the Congress which they had joined in calling, that not only were two others of its signatories, France and Spain, assigned to a very humble rôle, but that all the other powers of Europe were to be entirely ignored. Such was the beginning of the organization, such the initial step in procedure of the Congress of Vienna. . . . On October 30, the representatives of the Eight met at Metternich's house. They elected Metternich president and Gentz secretary, and they chose by a lot a committee on credentials, consisting of the representatives of England, Russia, and Prussia. On November 1, a public declaration was made that the Committee on Credentials would meet on November 3, and that after the completion of its work the Committee of the Eight would formulate proposals for the further progress of the Congress. But November came and went, as did six other successive months, and the Congress was not opened. In fact it was never opened. In fact there was no Congress—there was simply a collection of negotiators of every grade, resident for the time being in the city of Vienna. There was never any verification of credentials, never any official and authoritative list of members. The members of this imaginary Congress never met together in the same room. When historians speak of Metternich as president of the Congress of Vienna and Gentz as its secretary, they use language inaccurately. They were president and secretary of the Committee of the Eight Powers which had signed the Treaty of Paris, nothing more. No plenary session was ever held. Yet the work for which these men had come together was

gradually accomplished. They did not assemble day after day and deliberate upon the many problems pressing for solution. Indeed, as has been said, they never once assembled. But during these months from September to June a very large number of treaties were made between the various states, and these were brought together in their essential features in the Final Act of June 9 [1815], which was hurriedly patched together a few days before the battle of Waterloo. Everything was arranged outside, in the intimate interviews of sovereigns and diplomats, and in the special committees that were in one way and another gradually appointed. Of organization, then, according to the modern idea of an international assembly, there was, in the case of the Congress of Vienna, strictly speaking, no trace. There was nothing in its method of discussing and settling questions that differentiated its procedure from ordinary diplomatic negotiations between nations, except the proximity of the negotiators. At one of the sessions of the Eight Powers, Metternich declared that the Congress 'was not a congress; that its opening was not, properly speaking, an opening at all; that the commissions were not commissions; that in the assembly of the powers at Vienna the only advantage they had to note was that of a Europe without distances.' The negotiations carried on at Vienna by this Europe from which distance had been eliminated were long and exceedingly complicated. In the course of them we encounter meetings of the Four, of the Six, of the Eight. But the really dominating group was neither of these but was the Committee of the Five. In other words, the Four who had wished and intended to do everything without France found that they were unable to do anything without her. They were obliged in the end, although most reluctantly, to admit her formally even to their sessions on the Saxon-Polish questions. Even after these were settled the Committee of the Five absorbed all important matters, and was, in the words of Friedrich Gentz, till the last moment 'the real and only Congress.' And the reason was that there were five Great Powers in Europe and no more. The map of Europe was redrawn by them because they had the men and the resources, in other words, force. As for the rest, the minor and secondary powers, they were nowhere, they flitted ineffectually in the dismal, dreary, outer limbo of the neglected."—C. D. Hazen, *Congress of Vienna* (C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer and R. H. Lord, *Three peace conferences of the nineteenth century*, pp. 6-7, 15-17).—"In effecting . . . [the] redistribution [of conquered territories] it was necessary to take into account not only the stipulations of the Treaties of Paris but also the treaties made in 1813 by the Three Eastern Powers, both among themselves and with the minor States. . . . Thus by the Treaty of Kalisch of February 28, 1813, . . . Russia had guaranteed by a secret article to restore Prussia to the political and financial position she occupied prior to 1806. The restoration of Polish territory necessary to join Silesia to Old Prussia was specifically mentioned, but apart from this, it was clear that Russia intended to retain all Prussian Poland. The Treaty of Reichenbach, however, concluded between Austria, Russia, and Prussia during the armistice of Pleswitz, and signed on June 27, 1813, immediately after Napoleon had rejected Austria's mediation, had laid down that the fate of the Duchy of Warsaw should be decided by the three Powers in concert, without the concurrence of France. These

two treaties were reinforced by the Treaties of Toeplitz, concluded on September 9, 1813, by which Russia agreed with Austria and Prussia that their States should be reconstructed on the scale of their possessions in 1805, while the Confederation of the Rhine and all Napoleon's other creations beyond the Rhine or the Alps were to be dissolved, Hanover was to be restored, an amicable arrangement was to be made as to the Duchy of Warsaw, and Austria was to recover her provinces on the Adriatic. Thus but little had been definitely settled as to the disposal of Napoleon's Empire, except that Prussia and Austria were to be at least as big as in 1805. Other treaties which were concluded with the minor Powers, such as the Treaty of Ried, between Bavaria and Austria (October 8, 1813), by which the latter Power obtained the promise of Tirol, had not been accepted by all the members of the Alliance, since it was impossible to decide the fate of the conquered territories while the claims of the Great Powers themselves were still unsatisfied. Sweden, who had received the promise of Norway from Russia in 1812 (subsequently confirmed by Great Britain in a subsidy treaty of 1813), was in a sense the only Power which had been granted a specific extension of territory that satisfied its expectations. Nearly all the rest of the reconstruction of Europe was still a matter of dispute. . . . Certain matters had been indicated for settlement in the public and secret articles of the treaties, such as the extension of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the creation of a German Federation, and a Constitution for Switzerland and the more general topics of the navigation of international rivers and the boundaries of the new Kingdom of Holland had also to be defined. . . . Constitutions had also to be given to Germany and Switzerland. . . . The principal stumbling-block had been the question of Poland. On this depended the fate of Saxony; and on the disposal of Saxony depended all the other arrangements in Germany, so that the frontier of almost every German State was likely to be affected. In Italy the frontier of the Austrian dominions and the incorporation of Genoa in Sardinia were already determined. But the fate of the territory that lay between the Papal dominions and Austria, including the three Legations, was still uncertain, while the Bourbon Powers had determined never to recognize Murat, and the Great Powers were already repenting of the treaty which, with their consent, Austria had signed with him. The fate of the Ionian Isles, then in British occupation, depended ultimately on the problem of Sicily. In the north, while the Norwegians had submitted at last to come under Swedish rule, there were still complicated questions to be settled in which Sweden, Hanover, and Prussia were interested."—C. K. Webster, *Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815*, pp. 8-9, 55-56.—"Two men had come to the Congress with a definite aim: Alexander had resolved to gain the Duchy of Warsaw, and to form it, with or without some part of Russian Poland, into a Polish kingdom, attached to his own crown; Talleyrand had determined, either on the question of Poland, or on the question of Saxony, which arose out of it, to break allied Europe into halves, and to range France by the side of two of the great Powers against the two others."—C. A. Fyffe, *History of modern Europe*, v. 2, ch. 1.—"It was his [Alexander I's] fixed resolve to create from this conquest (to which might possibly be added some parts of the Russian share of the partitions) a united, autonomous, but not

independent, kingdom of Poland, over which the Tsar of Russia was to rule. In this design he was supported by the Polish nobility, whom the defeat of Napoleon had left to the mercy of their former conquerors. . . . His Russian subjects were as much opposed to this plan, at any rate to the political aspect of it, as they had been to the prosecution of the European war. But his Ministers now and throughout the period were nearly all of non-Russian blood."—C. K. Webster, *Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815*, p. 5.—"Among the other Governments, the Ministry of Great Britain would gladly have seen a Polish State established in a really independent form; failing this, it desired that the Duchy of Warsaw should be divided, as formerly, between Austria and Prussia. Metternich was anxious that the fortress of Cracow at any rate should not fall into the hands of the Czar. . . . It was known before the opening of the Congress that the Czar proposed . . . handing over to King Frederick William the whole of Saxony. . . . The Saxon question had . . . already gained the attention of all the European Governments. . . . Talleyrand alone made the defence of the King of Saxony the very centre of his policy, and subordinated all other aims to this. His instructions, like those of Castlereagh, gave priority to the Polish question; but Talleyrand saw that Saxony, not Poland, was the lever by which he could throw half of Europe on to the side of France; and before the four Allied Courts had come to any single conclusion, the French statesman had succeeded, on what at first passed for a subordinate point, in breaking up their concert. . . . Talleyrand wrote to Louis XVIII, asking for his permission to make a definite offer of armed assistance to Austria in case of need. . . . He had isolated Russia and Prussia, and had drawn to his own side not only England and Austria but the whole body of the minor German States . . . On the 3rd of January, 1815, after a rash threat of war uttered by Hardenberg, a secret treaty was signed by the representatives of France, England, and Austria, pledging these Powers to take the field, if necessary, against Russia and Prussia in defence of the principles of the Peace of Paris. . . . The conclusion of the secret treaty of January 3rd marked the definite success of his plans. France was forthwith admitted into the council hitherto known as that of the Four Courts, and from this time its influence visibly affected the action of Russia and Prussia. . . . Alexander had already won a virtual decision in his favour on the Polish question, but he abated something of his claims, and while gaining the lion's share of the Duchy of Warsaw."—C. A. Fyffe, *History of modern Europe*, v. 2, ch. 1.—"The so-called 'Congress Kingdom' of Poland (the small realm which was set up by the Congress of Vienna in 1815), was suppressed by Russia a few years later. By the First Treaty of Paris (30 May, 1814) France was reduced to the limits of 1792, with the addition of Avignon, and other districts within these limits, and of part of Savoy; she received back all her colonies, except the Mauritius, Saint Lucia and Tobago, which were ceded to England. [See also FRANCE: 1814 (April-June).] . . . Eventually it was settled that Prussia should receive Lusatia, being about two-fifths of the Kingdom of Saxony, and Russia the greater part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, including the city of Warsaw; Prussia recovered from the Grand Duchy the province of Posen, with Thorn and Dantzic, while Austria recovered the Circle of Tarnopol in Southern Galicia, and

Cracow was made a free state. In order to establish strong powers upon the Rhine to curb France, Holland and Belgium, were united as the Kingdom of the Netherlands and granted to the Prince of Orange, who was also made Grand Duke of Luxembourg; the districts comprising the former electorates of Trèves and Cologne, etc., were granted to Prussia; the districts farther south to Bavaria, in compensation for the loss of Salzburg and the Tyrol, and the fortress of Mayence to Hesse-Darmstadt, to be garrisoned by the Germanic Confederation. . . . Lombardy and Venetia were given to Austria; Genoa was added to the Kingdom of Sardinia, in which the succession was fixed in the Carignano line; Tuscany and Modena were restored to their former rulers, both Austrian princes; Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla were given to the Empress Marie Louise for her life, with succession to the rightful heir, who was for the time made Grand Duke of Lucca; the States of the Church were restored to the Pope, and the question of retaining Murat on the throne of Naples remained unsettled until he defied Austria and endeavored to summon Italy to arms; after the defeat of Murat at Tolentino (3 May, 1815) Naples was restored to Ferdinand IV., who took the title of Ferdinand I., King of Two Sicilies. The districts on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, which Napoleon had governed as the Illyrian Provinces, were annexed by Austria. In the North, Sweden was confirmed in the possession of Norway, ceded to her by Denmark by the Treaty of Kiel, but Denmark lost Swedish Pomerania and received instead the Duchy of Lauenburg. In Germany, Prussia regained her acquisitions of 1803, with Swedish Pomerania, the greater part of the Kingdom of Westphalia, and Rhenish Prussia; Hanover received East Friesland and other districts; and the mediatisation of the petty states of Germany was maintained. England, in addition to the colonial gains made by the Treaty of Amiens, retained the Cape of Good Hope, the Mauritius, Malta, Heligoland, and the Ionian Islands, but restored Martinique to the French and Java to the Dutch; Castlereagh's chief preoccupation at Vienna was, however, to secure the abolition of the negro slave trade. [See SLAVERY: 1815.] Before its work was completed, the Congress of Vienna was startled by the news that Napoleon had left Elba and was again master of France [see FRANCE: 1814-1815]; it, therefore, hurried through the rest of its work by reorganizing Germany and Switzerland. The Germanic Confederation took the place of the Confederation of the Rhine; it consisted of thirty-five states, in addition to Austria, Prussia, Denmark and the Netherlands, namely: the four kingdoms of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony and Württemberg, the seven grand-duchies of Baden, Hesse-Cassel or Electoral Hesse, Hesse-Darmstadt, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, and Saxe-Weimar, nine duchies, eleven principalities, and the four free cities of Bremen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Lübeck; the affairs of the Confederation were entrusted to a Diet (Bundestag) presided over by Austria and consisting of an Ordinary Assembly of seventeen and a General Assembly of sixty-nine members. [See also SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: Germany: 1800-1840.] The Swiss Confederation was guaranteed neutrality by the powers of Europe; three new cantons, Geneva, Neuchâtel and the Valais were added; entire independence was given to the individual cantons and presidency of the Federal Diet was reserved to Zurich, Berne and Lucerne in turn. By the Second

Treaty of Paris (20 Nov., 1815) France lost the part of Savoy granted to her in 1814 and other rectifications of her frontier; she had to restore to their former owners the works of art accumulated in Paris; she was forced to pay a war contribution of 700,000,000 francs and to maintain an army of 150,000 troops of the Allies in possession of her eastern fortresses for five years.—H. M. Stephens, *Modern European history*, pp. 206-207. "The re-establishment of the previous state of things, so far as church property was concerned, was advocated by cardinal Consalvi and the representatives of the former ecclesiastical princes. Their efforts were, however, in vain owing to the lands being already in the possession of others. Another motion which failed to find approval was that of Dalberg, or rather of his representative, the vicar-general of Constance, baron von Wessenberg that a Concordat should be entered into for the whole of Germany. The only decision of the Congress touching religious matters was contained in Article XVI of the Act of Alliance, by which the civil equality, which had already been secured by several of the German States either through the free-will of their princes, or the pressure of Napoleon, was given to all religious denominations throughout the German confederation. This being so, it only remained for each State to regulate its own church matters."—F. X. Funk, *Manual of church history*, p. 218.—"When on June 9, 1815, the plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers, signatories of the Treaty of Paris, were convened for the purpose of formally approving the Final Act of the Congress, Labrador, the Spanish representative, refused to sign, giving as his reasons that only a small proportion of the subjects dealt with in the Final Act had ever been reported in the sittings of the Committee of the Eight, and that a fraction of these Powers ought not to be permitted to settle the affairs of all Europe, merely summoning the rest to accord or refused their signatures. This was practically the same idea as that of Hans von Gagern, representing the Netherlands, who, expressing his dissatisfaction with the decision concerning the country, and being informed by Wellington that it had been made by 'the Great Powers,' retorted that 'of this newly invented term, 'the Great Powers,' he knew neither the precise import nor the intention.' . . . The Congress of Vienna, by its conduct and procedure, proved beyond the possibility of doubt or cavil, that the settlement of the affairs of Europe belonged to the Great Powers, and that the other states had only to decide whether they would accept such settlement or not. And if they would not, what of it? was manifestly the thought in the mind of the predominating pentarchy."—C. D. Hazen, *Congress of Vienna* (C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer and R. H. Lord, *Three peace congresses of the nineteenth century*, pp. 15-18).—See also BALANCE OF POWER; British foreign policy; INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1792-1885; TURKEY: 1826-1856.

ALSO IN: A. Ward, *Congress of Vienna (Cambridge modern history)*.—A. Phillip, *Confederation of Europe*.

VIENNA, Imperial Library of. See LIBRARIES: Modern: Austria.

VIENNA, Pacification of (1606). See HUNGARY: 1606-1660.

VIENNA, Peace of (1809). See AUSTRIA: 1809-1914.

VIENNA, Treaty of (1725). See SPAIN: 1713-1725.

1731. See SPAIN: 1726-1731.

1735. See FRANCE: 1733-1735.

1864. See GERMANY: 1861-1866.

1921. See U.S.A.: 1921 (July-August): Peace with Germany and Austria.

VIENNA NOTE (1853). See RUSSIA: 1853-1854.

VIENNE, or Vienna, town in the department of Isère, France, on the Rhône. It was the chief town of the Allobroges in ancient times, and was subsequently made a Roman colony. It was from Vienna that Lugdunum (Lyons) was originally colonized.

500.—Under Burgundians. See BURGUNDY: 500; DAUPHIN.

11th century.—Founding of Dauphiny. See BURGUNDY: 1032.

1349.—Appanage of the dauphins of France. See DAUPHINE: 1349; BURGUNDY: 1127-1378.

VIEQUEZ, one of the Virgin islands, seven miles from the eastern extremity of Porto Rico. See PORTO RICO: Area and population.

VIERA, Feliciano (1872-), Uruguayan statesman. President of Uruguay: 1915-1919. See URUGUAY: 1915.

VIÈTE, or Vieta, François (1540-1603), French mathematician. See ALGEBRA.

VIEUZAC, Bertrand Barère de. See BARÈRE DE VIEUZAC, BERTRAND.

VIGER, Denis Benjamin (1774-1861), Canadian statesman. Premier, 1843-1846; appointed member of the Legislative Council, 1848. See CANADA: 1843-1849.

VIGILANCE COMMITTEES, or Vigilantes, committees of citizens formed to cope with or suppress outbreaks of lawlessness. Historical instances are the San Francisco Vigilance Committee of 1851 (see CALIFORNIA: 1856), the Montana Vigilance Committees of 1864, who, after a long series of murders and other crimes had been committed, took the law into their own hands and established order in the territory, and the committees formed in 1865 by the Cherokee Indians in Indian Territory.—See also IDAHO: 1870-1901.

VIGILANCIA, American steamship. It was sunk by a German submarine, Mar. 16, 1917. See U.S.A.: 1917 (February-April).

VIGNE, Pietro delle (c. 1190-1249), Italian chancellor and poet. See ITALIAN LITERATURE: 12th-14th centuries.

VIGNY, Alfred de (1797-1863), French poet. See FRENCH LITERATURE: 1800-1885.

VIGO, seaport of northwestern Spain in the province of Pontevedra on Viga bay. It was attacked by Sir Francis Drake in 1585 and 1589. It was again attacked by a combined British and Dutch fleet in 1702 and by Viscount Cobham in command of the British fleet in 1719. See SPAIN: 1702; 1713-1725.

VIKINGS. See NORMANS: Name and origin, to 8th-9th centuries; SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 8th-9th centuries; 8th-11th centuries.

VIKRAMADITYA SAKARI (fl. 1st century B. C.), legendary king of India. The Samvat Era, beginning 57 B. C., dates from his reign. See INDIA: B. C. 100-A. D. 828.

VILAGOS, Battle of (1849). See AUSTRIA: 1848-1849; HUNGARY: 1847-1849.

VILARAS, John (1771-1823), Greek poet. See GREEK LITERATURE: Modern.

VILICUS, steward of a Roman estate. See AGRICULTURE: Ancient: Development of the servile system among the Romans.

VILLA, Francisco (Pancho) (1877-1923), Mexican revolutionist. Led revolts against Huerta and Carranza, 1914; raided the town of Columbus,

New Mexico, 1916, which led to the United States punitive expedition into Mexico; made raids into Texas, 1919. See MEXICO: 1913-1914; 1914-1915; 1916-1917; 1919 (July-December); U.S.A.: 1914 (April); Mexican situation: 1916 (March).

VILLA VICOSA, Battle of (1665). See PORTUGAL: 1637-1668.

VILLACH, town in Carinthia, Austria, fifty-two miles northwest of Laibach, on the Drave. Its population was 16,466 in 1920. It joined the Illyrian provinces of Napoleon in 1809. See GERMANY: 1809 (July-September).

VILAFRANCA, Peace of (1859). See ITALY: 1856-1859; AUSTRIA: 1856-1859.

VILLALAR, Battle of (1521). See SPAIN: 1518-1522.

VILLALOBAR, Marquis de (1866-), Spanish statesman. Minister to Belgium; assisted in the formation of the Central relief committee of Brussels. See BELGIUM: 1914-1918; National distress.

VILLALOBOS, Ruy Lopez de (c. 1500-1544), Spanish navigator. Sailed for the Philippine islands, 1542. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1542.

VILLANI. See VILLEINS.

VILLARI, Pasquale (1827-1914), Italian historian and statesman. See ITALIAN LITERATURE: 1860-1914.

VILLARS, Claude Louis Hector de, Prince de Martignes, Marquis and Duc de Villars and Vicomte de Melun (1653-1734), marshal of France. Commanded in the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714. See NETHERLANDS: 1702-1704; 1708-1709; 1710-1712; GERMANY: 1706-1711.

VILLAVICIOSA, Battle of (1710). See SPAIN: 1707-1710.

VILLAZON, Eliodoro (1848-), Bolivian statesman. President of Bolivia, 1909-1913. Brought the Acre disputes with Peru to a peaceful conclusion. See ACRE DISPUTES.

VILLE. See BOROUGH.

VILLEGAGNON, Nicholas Durand de. See DURAND DE VILLEGAGNON, NICHOLAS.

VILLEHARDOUIN, Geoffroy de (c. 1160- c. 1213), first vernacular historian of France. Assisted in the conquest and government of Achaë and Athens. See HISTORY: 19; ACHÆA: 1205-1387; ATHENS: 1205-1308.

VILLEIN TAX, or Taille. See TAILLE AND GABELLE.

VILLEINAGE. See FEUDALISM: Organization; SERFDOM: 5th-18th centuries.

VILLEINS. See AGRICULTURE: Medieval: 14th-17th centuries; LABOR REMUNERATION: Development of wages system; MANORS; SERFDOM: 3rd-5th centuries; 11th-17th centuries; SLAVERY: 1000-1862.

VILLE-MARIE, early name for Montreal. See QUEBEC, PROVINCE OF: 1635-1672.

VILLENEUVE, Pierre Charles Jean Baptiste Silvestre (1763-1806), French admiral. Attempted to draw the British fleets away from the French coasts, 1805; defeated at Trafalgar, October, 1805. See FRANCE: 1805.

VILLERET, town in France, about ten miles from St. Quentin. It was captured by the Germans in 1918. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: c, 2.

VILLEROI, François de Neufville, Duc de (1644-1730), French soldier. Made marshal, 1693; served in campaign in the Netherlands and was defeated by Marlborough, 1706. See NETHERLANDS: 1705; 1706-1707.

VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, town in Somme, France, ten miles east of Amiens. It was recaptured from the Germans by the British in 1918.

See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: c, 33; c, 34; g, 7, i.

VILLERS-COTTERET, town in Aisne, France, fourteen miles southwest of Soissons. It was a region of fighting during the World War. See WORLD WAR: 1914: I. Western front: c, i; 1918: II. Western front: g, 3; g, 11.

VILLERSEXEL, Battle of (1871). See FRANCE: 1870-1871.

VILLIERS DE L'ISLE ADAM, Philippe de (1464-1534), grand master of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. Surrendered the island of Rhodes, the seat of the order, to the Turks, 1522; secured from Charles V, as the new seat of the order, the islands of Malta and Gozo, 1530. See HOSPITALERS OF ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM: 1522; 1530-1565.

VILLMERGEN, Battles of (1656, 1712, 1841). See SWITZERLAND: 1652-1789; 1803-1848.

VILLON, François (1431-c. 1463), French poet. See FRENCH LITERATURE: 1337-1465.

VILNA, Wilno, or Vilnius, city in Poland, ninety miles northeast of Grodno, on the Viliya. It was the chief city of the Lithuanian state from 1327 to 1447, when it united with Poland. It was ceded to Russia in 1656 and was finally annexed to Russia in 1795, after the partition of Poland. The population was 214,600 in 1914. See POLAND: 1793-1796; RUSSIA: Map of Russia and the new border states.

1915.—Capture by Germans. See WORLD WAR: 1915: III. Eastern front: i, 6.

1920.—Captured by Russians. See POLAND: 1919-1920: War with Russia.

1920.—Contest for possession between Poles and Lithuanians. See LITHUANIA: 1920-1922; POLAND: 1920: Zeligowski takes Vilna.

1922.—Incorporated in Poland. See LITHUANIA: 1920-1922; POLAND: 1922-1923.

VILNA UNIVERSITY. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1348-1922.

VILVORDE, town in Brabant, Belgium, six miles northeast of Brussels. It surrendered to the Spaniards in 1584, and was the scene of alleged German atrocities in 1914. See NETHERLANDS: 1584-1585; WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: X. Alleged atrocities, etc.: a, 7.

VIMIÉRO, Battle of (1808). See SPAIN: 1808-1809 (August-January).

VIMINAL, one of the hills of Rome. See SEVEN HILLS OF ROME.

VIMORY, Battle of (1587). See FRANCE: 1584-1589.

VIMY, town in France, about ten miles north of Arras. The ridge dominating the town was a scene of fighting during the World War. See WORLD WAR: 1915: II. Western front: j, 1; 1916: II. Western front: d, 2; 1917: II. Western front: c, 3; c, 4; c, 5; c, 9; c, 18.

VINCENNES, city in Indiana, on the Wabash, 117 miles southwest of Indianapolis. It was founded by the French in 1735, and was captured by the Americans from the British in 1778. The population was 17,160 in 1920. See CANADA: 1700-1735; U.S.A.: 1778-1779: Clark's conquest.

VINCENT, Henry (1813-1878), English lecturer and agitator. One of the leaders of the Chartist movement. See ENGLAND: 1838-1842.

VINCENT, Jesse Gurney (1880-), American mechanical engineer. See AVIATION: Development, etc.: 1910-1920.

VINCENT, John Heyl (1832-1920), American divine. Founded the Chautauqua Sunday School Association, 1874. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Chautauqua.

VINCENTIAN CONGREGATION. See **LAZARISTS**.

VINCI, Leonardo da (1452-1519), Florentine painter, sculptor, architect, musician, engineer, scientist, natural philosopher, and inventor. See **PAINTING**: Italian: High Renaissance; **EUROPE**: Renaissance and Reformation: Spirit of adventure, etc.; **ITALIAN LITERATURE**: 1450-1595; **MEDICAL SCIENCE**: Modern: 16th-17th centuries.

VINCY, Battle of (717). See **FRANKS**: 511-752.

VINDALIUM, Battle at (121 B. C.). See **ALLOBROGES, CONQUEST OF THE**.

VINDELICIA, in ancient geography, a country bounded on the south by Rhætia, on the north by the Danube and the Vallum Hadriani, on the east by the Oenus and on the west by the territory of the Helvetii. See **RHÆTIA**.

VINDOBONA, modern Vienna, on the Danube, originally a town of the Celts, in Pannonia, became a Roman military and naval station and a frontier city of importance. Marcus Aurelius died at Vindobona, 180 A. D.

VINEÆ.—The vineæ of Roman siege operations were "covered galleries, constructed of wicker work (vimina) generally, and sometimes of wood, for the purpose of covering the approach of the besiegers."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman republic*, v. 4, ch. 3, footnote.

VINEGAR BIBLE. See **BIBLE, ENGLISH**: Curious misprints in the old Bible.

VINGEANNE, Battle of (52 B. C.). See **GAUL**: B. C. 58-51.

VINLAND, name given to the region on the eastern coast of North America, visited by the Vikings of Norway. See **AMERICA**: 10th-11th centuries.

VINOGRADOFF, Sir Paul (1854-), English jurist and historian, born in Russia. See **HISTORY**: 33.

VIOLIN. See **MUSIC**: Modern: 1607-1737.

VIONVILLE, Battle of. See **FRANCE**: 1870 (July-August).

VIRGATE, medieval unit of land measurement. See **HIDE**; **MANORS**.

VIRGIL, Publius Vergilius Maro (B. C. 70-19), Roman poet. See **LATIN LITERATURE**: B. C. 43-A. D. 14.

VIRGIN GORDA ISLAND, one of the Virgin islands, British West Indies, in the eastern part of the group. See **VIRGIN ISLANDS**.

VIRGIN ISLANDS, group of some 50 to 100 or even more of small islands of eruptive origin forming part of the northeastern bounds of the Caribbean sea. Most of them are uninhabited, mere barren sand dunes or disintegrating rocks. The inhabited islands were dependencies of various sovereignties, chiefly Spain, Denmark, Great Britain, France, and Holland. Spain ceded Porto Rico and its dependent Virgin islands to the United States in 1898; and Denmark sold the three most important islands in the Virgin group (St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix) to the United States in 1917. The total area of these three islands is about 140 square miles, and they are officially designated the Virgin Islands of the United States. The British Virgins number 32 with a total area of only 58 square miles, the principal isles being Tortola, Anegada, Virgin Gorda, Jost van Dyke, Peter's Island, Salt, and Sombrero, which last is the site of a lighthouse maintained by the British government. The population in 1921 was 5,082. From the point of view of the naval officials of the United States, St. Thomas, though only second in size of the three (area about 33 square miles) is the most important of the islands, from the fact

that the harbor on its south side, where the town of Charlotte Amalie is located, is one of the finest in the Caribbean, affording refuge for the thousands of vessels in the West Indian and South and Central American trade and bound through the Panama canal. Under the régime of an open port, where duty-free ships' stores and coal might be had, the shipping world found the harbor of Charlotte Amalie an attractive way station on its Caribbean routes. Resting on the submerged backbone of the great Antilles, elevated 1,000 to 1,500 feet, the navalists say it is well adapted for fortifications to command both its shores. St. John, smallest of the three islands, is only 8 miles long and 4 miles wide at its broadest, its area being only some 21 square miles. Its harbor, Coral bay, is said to be the very best refuge in all the Antilles. St. Croix, the largest and most populous of the three islands, lies about 40 miles south-southeast of St. Thomas, has an area of 84.25 square miles, and a population of approximately 20,000, but no very good harbor.—See also **WEST INDIES**: Location.

Discovery and settlement.—Danish, Dutch and English colonial rivalry.—Destructive hurricanes.—"Historically, the little islands are interesting. They were discovered by Columbus in his second voyage to America and were probably named by him [in honor of St. Ursula and her virgins]. The islands were inhabited by fierce cannibalistic Carib Indians, who lived here until about 1550. It is not quite certain whether the Dutch settled first, but the Dutch and English conjointly settled St. Croix in 1625. In 1694 the Dutch were driven out by the English and abandoned the island, but some French settlers came in. In 1650 the Spaniards from Porto Rico seized St. Croix and expelled the English to the Bermudas. In 1653 the French got control and that same year the island and several others were sold to the Knights of Malta by Louis XIV. This order held St. Croix until 1665, when the French West India Company got it. This company failed in 1674 and the crown took back the territory. It proved a poor investment and by 1695 the French government abandoned the country, moving its one-hundred-and-forty-seven white people and six-hundred-and-twenty-three blacks to San Domingo. The island then remained uninhabited until 1733. It was visited by all nations, but the French still claimed it, and finally in June, 1733, they sold their claim to the King of Denmark for \$375,000. It is not positively known when St. Thomas was first settled, but a Copenhagen trading company got possession of the territory for Denmark about 1666. There had been other settlers on the island, probably English and Dutch, prior to this. The English captured all the Virgin group of islands, but not liking St. Thomas, abandoned it for more fertile places. In 1671 Danish trading companies seized the island as uninhabited territory and after some trouble with the English, proved their rights to it. The Danes also took possession of St. John about 1684, but did little in settling prior to 1716. In 1679 slavery was introduced and the slave trade continued until 1792, when the Danish government declared it illegal, and by 1803 absolutely abolished it. In 1724 St. Thomas was declared an open port to the commerce of the world and it proved a great trading place. The Danish trading companies, in order to monopolize commerce, excluded the Dutch from their harbor in 1736 and this proved ruinous. The condition of the islands became so bad that the Danish crown in 1758 bought them. . . . For a short time in 1801, and from 1807 to 1815, . . .

as a war measure the English seized and held them. [The islands were again returned to Denmark in 1815.] Except for some very severe storms, earthquakes and slave insurrections, the history of the islands is not eventful. In 1819 and 1837 very severe storms, and in 1867 a terrible earthquake did immense damage to life and property. In 1733 occurred the first troublesome slave insurrection in St. John, causing loss of life to whites and had to be put down by help of St. Domingo. In 1847 gradual emancipation was provided for by making all children born after that date free and abolishing all slavery after the end of twelve years. This was not satisfactory, and in 1848, after a dangerous insurrection, all the slaves, numbering twenty-hundred in St. Croix, thirty-five-hundred in St. Thomas, and twenty-five-hundred in St. John, were given full freedom by proclamation of the government."—A. M. Stickles, *Danish West Indies and American ownership* (*Journal of American History*, v. 7, 1913).—"On the 29th of October, 1867, a terrific hurricane passed over the island [St. Thomas], which, in magnitude and destructiveness, surpassed anything ever known or recorded in its history. Over 300 lives were lost and about 77 vessels were stranded or wrecked. Following this, on the 18th of November, came a severe shock of earthquake, and a tidal wave. The earthquake shock lasted about thirty seconds, and a few moments afterward the sea receded, leaving the harbour almost dry, exposing many sunken wrecks, and, upon its return, laying waste the wharves and warehouses built upon its shores. Many of the finest buildings were cracked, a great deal of property was destroyed, and such was the terror and dismay created that the people deserted their homes and camped out upon the hills."—L. K. Zabriskie, *Virgin islands of the United States of America*, pp. 16-17.—"On the evening of Monday, October 9, 1916, the islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John were visited by one of the fiercest and most destructive hurricanes that had been witnessed in that section since the memorable one of 1867. The first estimated damage to property was placed at about two million dollars but this figure was pared down considerably after a more careful survey of the situation had been taken. St. Thomas probably suffered greater injury than her two sister islands, owing principally to her costly harbour works. The fatalities in the three places were comparatively few, there being but four deaths, from drowning, reported in St. Thomas and five deaths due to injuries from falling walls or trees, recorded, respectively, in St. Croix and St. John. Many more, however, were wounded, and almost all of the inhabitants suffered seriously as a result of the havoc that was wrought."—*Ibid.*, p. 221.

United States purchase of islands.—Prolonged negotiations.—The first proposal for the transfer of the Danish West Indies to the United States was made by Secretary of State Seward at Washington, in January, 1865. In 1866 he offered Denmark \$5,000,000 for the islands. In 1867 Denmark, bound by treaty not to alienate St. Croix without consulting France, declined to sell for that sum, but expressed willingness to sell St. Thomas and St. John for the \$5,000,000 offered or the three islands for \$10,000,000, provided that arrangement could be made with France. Secretary Seward then advanced his offer to \$7,500,000 for the three islands, and Denmark tendered a new offer of St. Thomas and St. John. When Secretary Seward accepted this proposal, Denmark advanced the plea that the formal consent of the population of the islands must be had before the sale could be consummated.

At first Seward objected, but later he cabled the American minister to accept this condition, and the treaty was signed on Oct. 24, 1867. The election was held Jan. 9, 1868, the result showing 1100 or 1200 votes for and only 22 against the change of sovereignty. Denmark ratified the treaty without delay but Senator Sumner, then chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, held it unreported in committee for more than two years; and when it did come the report was adverse. Again, in 1902 under President Roosevelt, the United States approached Denmark in a move to buy the islands; and although that country had seen the previous treaty fail of ratification by the United States, notwithstanding its having been initiated by the same United States and ratified by Denmark, it was ready to treat again; and a new treaty was entered into for the transfer of the islands. This treaty named the sum of \$5,000,000 as the price agreed upon for the transfer of sovereignty. It was accepted by the Lower Danish House, but failed in the Upper by a tie vote. This treaty the United States Senate promptly accepted and ratified; and there was no opposition by France to the transfer of St. Croix. "The reasons for the bungling that took place in 1911-1912 when the scheme was again considered, have not yet fully come to light. . . . And now, more than half a century after negotiations were initiated, and in the progress of a mighty world war, the United States has finally purchased the Danish West Indian islands. The purchase price, \$25,000,000, represents a greater sum than has been paid for any of its acquisitions, not excepting Louisiana and the Philippines. The islands passed under the sovereignty of the United States on January 17, 1917. . . . The United States flag was hoisted on the three 'Virgin Islands of America' on March thirty-first [when Rear Admiral James H. Oliver, naval governor, took formal possession]."—W. Westergaard, *Danish West Indies*, p. 260.—See also DENMARK: 1917; U. S. A.: Historical geography; 1917 (March): Purchase of Danish West Indian islands.—On March 28, 1921, Captain S. E. W. Kittelle was appointed governor but retired in the autumn and was succeeded by Captain H. H. Hough. When trouble arose on account of the colonial council's criticism of certain points in judicial procedure, the government dissolved the council in September. The inhabitants demanded a civil instead of a naval government and prepared an appeal for introduction into the United States Congress granting citizenship to the Virgin islanders.—See also TERRITORIES AND DEPENDENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES: U. S. A.: 1917 (October): Trading with the Enemy Act.

ALSO IN: A. Warner, *Political peonage in the Virgin islands*.

VIRGIN MARY, Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the. See PAPACY: 1854.

VIRGINIA, one of the most northern of the South Atlantic states, lying about half way between Maine and Florida. It is bounded on the northwest by Kentucky and West Virginia; on the northeast by Maryland, from which it is separated by the Potomac river; on the south by North Carolina and Tennessee. Virginia has an area of 42,627 square miles including 2,365 square miles of water surface. The population numbered 2,300,187 in 1920. "The surface of Virginia is divided into two unequally inclined planes and a centrally located valley. The eastern plane is subdivided into the Piedmont and the Tidewater; the western into the Alleghany Highlands, the Cumberland Plateau, and the Ohio Valley section. The


area between them is commonly spoken of as the 'Valley.' It is subdivided into numerous smaller sections of which the Chinch, Holston, New, and Shenandoah valleys are the most important. The Tidewater extends from the Atlantic Coast to the 'fall line' on the rivers, i.e., to the line connecting the present cities of Fredericksburg, Richmond, Petersburg, and Weldon. The soil contains gravel, sand, shale, and clay. The Chesapeake and its broad arms are doorways to the sea, the Atlantic rivers being navigable for large vessels to Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Alexandria. The Virginia Piedmont lies in a right triangle. Its base is

Aboriginal inhabitants. See ALGONQUIAN FAMILY; IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY: Tribes of the South; POWHATAN CONFEDERACY.

1584-1607.—Name of Virginia given first to Raleigh's Roanoke settlement on the Carolina coast.—Early settlements.—End of Raleigh's undertakings. See AMERICA: 1584-1586; 1587-1590; U.S.A.: 1607-1752.

17th century.—Slow educational development. See EDUCATION: Modern: 17th century: United States.

1606-1607.—Virginia Company of London and its charter.—Colon: planted at Jamestown.—



POMEIOC, INDIAN VILLAGE IN VIRGINIA

(Drawn by John White, head of the "Lost Colony" at Roanoke, in 1587)

the northern boundary of North Carolina; its perpendicular the fall line of the Atlantic rivers; and its hypotenuse the Blue Ridge mountain range. The surface varies from rolling to hilly. The soil is of decomposed rocks of the Archean age and contains gneiss, mica, granite, porphyry, and iron. It is well adapted to wheat, corn, fruits, and tobacco."—C. H. Ambler, *Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861*, p. 1.—Virginia contains mineral resources but its output is not proportionally large; neither has it developed manufacturing to a high state, although it contains unusual advantages in transportation facilities, raw materials, and water power. (See also U.S.A.: Economic map.) Its fisheries are second in importance to Massachusetts only. As in other southern states, the problem of education is very difficult and illiteracy is high.

"The colonization of the North American coast had now become part of the avowed policy of the British government. In 1606 a great joint-stock company was formed for the establishment of two colonies in America. The branch which was to take charge of the proposed southern colony had its headquarters in London; the management of the northern branch was at Plymouth in Devonshire. Hence the two branches are commonly spoken of as the London and Plymouth Companies. The former was also called the Virginia Company, and the latter the North Virginia Company, as the name of Virginia was then loosely applied to the entire Atlantic coast north of Florida. [See AMERICA: Map of King James's grant.] The London Company had jurisdiction from 34° to 38° north latitude; the Ply-

mouth Company had jurisdiction from 45° down to 41°; the intervening territory, between 38° and 41° was to go to whichever company should first plant a self-supporting colony."—J. Fiske, *Beginnings of New England*, ch. 2.—"The charter for colonizing the great central territory of the North American continent, which was to be the chosen abode of liberty, gave to the mercantile corporation nothing but a wilderness, with the right of peopling and defending it. By an extension of the prerogative, which was in itself illegal, the monarch assumed absolute legislative as well as executive powers. . . . The general superintendence was confided to a council in England; the local administration of each colony to a resident council. The members of the superior council in England were appointed exclusively by the king, and were to hold office at his good pleasure. The authority extended to both colonies, which jointly took the name of Virginia. Each of the two was to have its own resident council, of which the members were from time to time to be ordained and removed according to the instructions of the king. To the king, moreover, was reserved supreme legislative authority over the several colonies, extending to their general condition and the most minute regulation of their affairs. . . . The summer was spent in preparations for planting the first colony, for which the king found a grateful occupation in framing a code of laws. The superior council in England was permitted to name the colonial council, which was independent of the emigrants, and had power to elect or remove its president, to remove any of its members and to supply its own vacancies. Not an element of popular liberty or control was introduced. Religion was established according to the doctrine and rites of the church within the realm. . . . Then, on the 19th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1606, one hundred and nine years after the discovery of the American continent by Cabot, forty-one years from the settlement of Florida, the squadron of three vessels, the largest not exceeding 100 tons' burden, with the favor of all England, stretched their sails for 'the dear strand of Virginia, earth's only paradise.' . . . The enterprise was ill concerted. Of the 105 on the list of emigrants, there were but 12 laborers and few mechanics. They were going to a wilderness, in which, as yet, not a house was standing; and there were 48 gentlemen to 4 carpenters. Neither were there any men with families. Newport, who commanded the ships, was acquainted with the old passage, and sailed by way of the Canaries and the West India Islands. As he turned to the north, a severe storm, in April, 1607, carried his fleet beyond the settlement of Raleigh, into the magnificent bay of the Chesapeake. The headlands received and retain the names of Cape Henry and Cape Charles, from the sons of King James; the deep water for anchorage, 'putting the emigrants in good Comfort,' gave a name to the northern point; and within the capes a country opened which appeared to 'claim the prerogative over the most pleasant places in the world.' . . . A noble river was soon entered, which was named from the monarch; and, after a search of seventeen days, . . . on the 13th of May they reached a peninsula about 50 miles above the mouth of the stream, where the water near the shore was so very deep that the ships were moored to trees. Here the council, except Smith, who for no reason unless it were jealousy of his superior energy was for nearly a month kept out of his seat, took the oath of office, and the majority elected Edward Maria Wingfield president for the

coming year. Contrary to the earnest and persistent advice of Bartholomew Gosnold, the peninsula was selected for the site of the colony, and took the name of James-town."—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States*, v. 1, pt. 1, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: T. J. Wertebaker, *Virginia under the Stuarts, 1607-1688*.—E. D. Neill, *History of the Virginia Company of London*, ch. 1.—Idem, *Virginia Vetusta*, ch. 1-2.—J. Burk, *History of Virginia*, v. 1, ch. 3.—E. M. Wingfield, *Discourse of Virginia (Archæologia Americana*, v. 4).—H. W. Preston, *Documents illustrative of American history*, p. 1.

1607-1610.—Settlement at Jamestown and services of Captain John Smith.—"Among the leaders of the expedition were Gosnold, the voyager and discoverer, and a prime mover in the affair; Wingfield, one of the first-named patentees, John Smith, Ratcliffe, Martin Kendall, and Percy. Of these men, John Smith has become famous. He has taken place among the founders of states, and a romantic interest has attached itself to his name. For centuries his character and deeds have been applauded, while in late years they have become a theme for censure and detraction. Modern investigation has relentlessly swept away the romance, and torn in pieces many of the long accepted narratives in which Smith recorded his own achievements. Yet it was not wholly by a false and fluent pen that Smith obtained and held his reputation. He was something more than a plausible writer of fiction. He was the strongest and most representative man among the Virginian colonists. . . . With this hopeful company Newport left the Downs on the 1st of January, 1607. The worthy Richard Hakluyt sent them a paper containing much good advice and some ingenious geographical speculations, and Drayton celebrated their departure in clumsy verses filled with high-flown compliments. The advice of the priest and the praise of the poet were alike wasted. By an arrangement ingeniously contrived to promote discord, devised probably by royal sagacity, the box containing the names of the council was not to be opened until the voyagers reached their destination. Dissension broke out almost immediately. Whatever the merits of the differences, this much is certain, that Smith was the object of the concentrated jealousy and hatred of his companions. . . . On the 13th of May, 1607, the settlers landed at James-town, sent out exploring parties, and began fortifications. A fortnight later, under the command of Wingfield, they repulsed an attack by the Indians; and on the 22d of June Newport sailed for England, and left them to their own resources. The prospect must have been a dreary one; nothing answered to their expectations. Instead of valuable mines, the adventurers found only a most fertile soil; instead of timid, trusting South American Indians, they encountered wild tribes of hardy, crafty, and hostile savages; instead of rich, defenceless, and barbarian cities, an easy and splendid spoil, they found a wilderness, and the necessity of hard work. From the miserable character of the settlers, dangerous factions prevailed from the first, until Smith obtained control, and maintained some sort of order—despotically, perhaps, but still effectually. No one would work, and famine and the Indians preyed upon them mercilessly. A small fort and a few wretched huts, built after much quarrelling, represented for many months all that was accomplished. The only relief from this dark picture of incompetent men perishing, without achievement, and by their

own folly, on the threshold of a great undertaking, is to be found in the conduct of Smith. Despite almost insurmountable obstacles, Smith kept the colony together for two years. He drilled the soldiers, compelled labor, repaired the fort, traded with the Indians, outwitted them and kept their friendship, and made long and daring voyages of discovery. He failed to send home a lump of gold, but he did send an excellent map of the Company's territory. He did not discover the passage to the South Sea, but he explored the great bays and rivers of Virginia. He did not find Raleigh's lost colonists, but he managed to keep his own from total destruction. The great result of all Smith's efforts was the character of permanency he gave to the settlement. Because he succeeded in maintaining an English colony for two consecutive years in America, the London Company had courage to proceed; and this is what constitutes Smith's strongest claim to admiration and gratitude of posterity. To suppose

ALSO IN: John Smith, *General historie of Virginia*, bk. 2-3.—J. Ashton, *Adventures and discoveries of Captain John Smith, newly ordered*, ch. 6-21.—W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, *Popular history of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 11.—E. Eggleston and L. E. Seelye, *Pocahontas*.

1609-1616.—New charter.—Colony taking root.—Introduction of tobacco culture.—“The prospects of the colony were so discouraging at the beginning of the year 1609, that, in the hope of improving them, the Company applied for a new charter with enlarged privileges. This was granted to them, on the 23d of May, under the corporate name of ‘The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London for the first Colony in Virginia.’ The new Association, which embraced representatives of every rank, trade, and profession, included twenty-one peers, and its list of names presents an imposing array of wealth and influence. By this charter Virginia was greatly enlarged, and made to comprise the coast-line and all islands within 100 miles of it,—200 miles north and 200 south of Point Comfort,—with all the territory within parallel lines thus distant and extending to the Pacific boundary; the Company was empowered to choose the Supreme Council in England, and, under the instructions and regulations of the last, the Governor was invested with absolute civil and military authority.”—R. A. Brock, *Virginia, 1606-1689 (Narrative and critical history of America, v. 3, ch. 5)*.—See also WEST VIRGINIA: 1609-1863.—“Under this charter the Company might have set up liberal institutions at once in Virginia, but conditions were not ripe, either in England or in America, for so radical a change. In 1612 the third charter had been granted. This had still further strengthened the Company and made them more independent of the King. It gave them the important privilege of holding great quarterly meetings or assemblies, where all matters relating to the government of the colony could be openly discussed.”—T. J. Wertenbaker, *Virginia under the Stuarts, 1607-1688*, p. 35.—Thomas West (Lord Delaware), the descendant of a long line of noble ancestry, received the appointment of Governor and Captain-General of Virginia. The first expedition under the second charter, which was on a grander scale than any preceding it, and which consisted of nine vessels, sailed from Plymouth on the 1st of June, 1609. Newport, the commander of the fleet, Sir Thomas Gates, Lieutenant-General, and Sir George Somers, Admiral of Virginia, were severally authorized, whichever of them might first arrive at Jamestown, to supersede the existing administration there until the arrival of Lord Delaware, who was to embark some months later; but not being able to settle the point of precedence among themselves, they embarked together in the same vessel, which carried also the wife and daughters of Gates. . . . On the 23d of July the fleet was caught in a hurricane; a small vessel was lost, others damaged, and the ‘Sea Venture,’ which carried Gates, Somers, and Newport, with about 150 settlers, was cast ashore on the Bermudas. . . . Early in August the ‘Blessing,’ Captain Archer, and three other vessels of the delayed fleet sailed up James River, and soon after the ‘Diamond,’ Captain Ratcliffe, appeared, without her mainmast, and she was followed in a few days by the ‘Swallow,’ in like condition. The Council being all dead save Smith, he, obtaining the sympathy of the sailors, refused to surrender the government of the colony; and



CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH

that he had the qualities of a founder of a state is a mistake, although in some measure he did the work of one. . . . His veracity as a historian in the later years of his life has been well-nigh destroyed. But little faith can be placed in the ‘Generall Historie,’ and modern investigation has conclusively relegated to the region of legend and of fiction the dramatic story of Smith’s rescue by Pocahontas. The shadow of doubt rests upon all his unsupported statements; but nothing can obscure his great services, to which the world owes the foundation of the first English colony in America. Yet, after all his struggles, Smith was severely blamed by the Company, apparently because Virginia was not Peru. In a manly letter he sets forth the defects of the colony, the need of good men with families, industrious tradesmen and farmers, not ‘poor gentlemen and libertines.’ Before, however, the actual orders came to supersede him, Smith resigned, or was forced out of the government, and returned to England. The feeble life of the colony wasted fast after his departure and during the sickness of Percy, who succeeded to the command.”—H. C. Lodge, *Short history of the English colonies in America*, ch. 1.

the newly arrived settlers elected Francis West, the brother of Lord Delaware, as temporary president. The term of Smith expiring soon after, George Percy—one of the original settlers, a brother of the Earl of Northumberland, and a brave and honorable man—was elected president. . . . Smith, about Michaelmas (September 29), departed for England, or, as all contemporary accounts other than his own state, was sent thither 'to answer some misdemeanors.' These were doubtless of a venial character; but the important services of Smith in the sustenance of the colony appear not to have been as highly esteemed by the Company as by Smith himself. He complains that his several petitions for reward were disregarded, and he never returned to Virginia. [See also AMERICA: 1614-1615.] . . . At the time of his departure for England he left at Jamestown three ships, seven boats, a good stock of provisions, nearly 500 settlers, 20 pieces of cannon, 300 guns, with fishing-nets, working-tools, horses, cattle, swine, etc. Jamestown was strongly fortified with palisades, and contained between fifty and sixty houses. . . . No effort by tillage being made to replenish their provisions, the stock was soon consumed, and the horrors of famine were added to other calamities. The intense sufferings of the colonists were long remembered, and this period is referred to as 'the starving time.' In six months their number was reduced to 60, and such was the extremity of these that they must soon have perished but for speedy succor. The passengers of the wrecked 'Sea Venture,' though mourned for as lost, had effected a safe landing at the Bermudas, where, favored by the tropical productions of the islands, they, under the direction of Gates and Somers, constructed for their deliverance two vessels from the materials of the wreck and cedar-wood, the largest of the vessels being of 80 tons burden. . . . Six of the company, including the wife of Sir Thomas Gates, died on the island. The company of 140 men and women embarked on the completed vessels—which were appropriately named the 'Patience' and the 'Deliverance'—on the 10th of May, 1610, and on the 23d they landed at Jamestown. . . . So forlorn was the condition of the settlement that Gates reluctantly resolved to abandon it." The whole colony was accordingly embarked and was under sail down the river, when it met a fleet of three vessels, bringing supplies and new settlers from England, with Lord Delaware, who had resolved to come out in person, as Governor and Captain-General of Virginia. Gates and his disheartened companions turned back with these new comers, and all were set vigorously at work to restore the settlement. "The administration of Delaware, though ludicrously ostentatious for so insignificant a dominion, was yet highly wholesome, and under his judicious discipline the settlement was restored to order and contentment." His health failing, Lord Delaware returned to England the following spring, whither Sir Thomas Gates had gone. Sir Thomas Dale had already been sent out with the appointment of high marshal, bearing a code of extraordinary laws which practically placed the colony under martial rule. Gates returned in June, 1611, with 300 additional settlers and a considerable stock of cows and other cattle. During that year and the next several new settlements were founded, at Dutch Gap, Henrico, and Bermuda Hundred, individual grants of property began to be made, and many signs of prosperity appeared. The year 1612 "was a marked

one, in the inauguration by John Rolfe [who marries Pocahontas two years later, having lost his first wife] of the systematic culture of tobacco,—a staple designed to exert a controlling influence in the future welfare and progress of the colony, and soon, by the paramount profit yielded by its culture, to subordinate all other interests, agricultural as well as manufacturing. [In the spring of 1613, Sir Thomas Gates left the colony, finally, returning to England, and the government fell to the hands of Dale, who remained at the head until 1616]."—R. A. Brock, *Virginia, 1606-1689* (*Narrative and critical history of America*, v. 3, ch. 5).

ALSO IN: W. Stith, *History of Virginia*, bk. 3.—J. H. Lefroy, *Memorials of the discovery and early settlement of the Bermudas*, v. 1, ch. 1.—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, ch. 13-16.—H. W. Preston, *Document illustrative of American history*, p. 14. 1613.—French settlements in Acadia destroyed by Argall.—Dutch at New York forced to promise tribute. See CANADA: 1610-1613; NEW YORK: 1610-1614.

1617-1619.—Evil days of Argall, and the better administration that followed.—Meeting of first provincial assembly.—"A party of greedy and unprincipled adventurers headed by Lord Rich, soon after the Earl of Warwick, acquired sufficient influence in the Company to nominate a creature of their own as Deputy-Governor. Their choice of Argall [Samuel Argall] would in itself have tainted their policy with suspicion. Whether dealing with the Indians, the French, or the Dutch, he had shown himself [see CANADA: 1610-1613; NEW YORK: 1610-1614] able, resolute, and unscrupulous. To do him justice, he seems at least to have understood the principle of Tiberius, that a shepherd should shear his sheep, not flay them. His first measure was to provide a sufficient supply of corn for the maintenance of the colony. With that he appeared to think that his duty to the settlers was at end. . . . An event soon occurred which released Argall from the fear of a superior, and probably emboldened him in his evil courses. Lord Delaware, who had sailed in a large vessel with 200 emigrants," died on the voyage. "Argall now began to show that his care for the well-being of the colony was no better than the charity of the cannibal who feeds up his prisoner before making a meal on him. Trade with the Indians was withheld from individuals, but, instead of being turned to the benefit of the Company, it was appropriated by Argall. The planters were treated as a slave-gang working for the Deputy's own private profit. The Company's cattle were sold, and the proceeds never accounted for. During this time a great change had come over the Company at home. An energetic and public-spirited party had been formed, opposed alike to Sir Thomas Smith and to Lord Rich. Their leader was Sir Edwin Sandys, a member of that country party which was just beginning to take its stand against the corruptions of the court policy. Side by side with him stood one whose name has gained a wider though not a more honourable repute, the follower of Essex, the idol of Shakespeare, the brilliant, versatile Southampton. . . . The . . . year 1619 was remarkable in the annals of the colony. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that it witnessed the creation of Virginia as an independent community. From the beginning of that year we may date the definite ascendancy of Sandys and his party, an ascendancy which was maintained till the dissolution of the Company, and

during which the affairs of Virginia were administered with a degree of energy, unselfishness, and statesmanlike wisdom, perhaps unparalleled in the history of corporations. One of the first measures was to send out Yeardley to supersede Argall."—J. A. Doyle, *English in America: Virginia, ch. 6*.—"George Yeardley was chosen Governor General of Virginia [in November, 1618], and was intrusted with several documents by whose authority he was to establish representative government in the colony. These papers, which became known as the Virginia Magna Charta, were the very corner-stone of liberty in the colony and in all America. Their importance can hardly be exaggerated, for they instituted the first representative assembly of the New World, and established a government which proved a bulwark against royal prerogative for a century and a half. . . . The Magna Charta made provision for the establishment of boroughs, which were to serve both as units for local government and as electoral districts. . . . With regard for the practical which has always been characteristic of Englishmen, the Company seized upon the existing units, such as towns, plantations and hundreds, as the basis of their boroughs. . . . As there were eleven of these districts and as each district chose two Burgesses, the first General Assembly was to contain twenty-two representatives. The Assembly convened at Jamestown, August 9th, 1619. . . . The legislative powers granted the Virginia Assembly in the Magna Charta, and continued with slight alterations after the revocation of the charter of the London Company, were very extensive. The Assembly could pass laws dealing with a vast variety of matters appertaining to the safety and welfare of the colony. Statutes were enacted in the session of 1619 touching upon Indian affairs, the Church, land patents, the relations of servants and landlords, the planting of crops, general morality in Virginia, the price of tobacco, foreign trade, etc. The collected laws of the entire colonial period fill many volumes, and cover a vast variety of subjects. But there were three things which limited strictly the Assembly's field of action. They must pass no statutes contravening first, the laws of England; secondly, the charters; thirdly, the instructions sent them by the London Company. When the colony passed into the hands of the King, all statutes were forbidden that conflicted with the charters, or with the instructions of the Crown. These restrictions lasted during the entire colonial period, but they were not always carefully regarded. The Company, and later the King, retained two ways of nullifying legislation which was unauthorized, or was distasteful to them. First, there was the veto of the Governor. . . . Secondly, the Company, and later the King, could veto laws even though the Governor had consented to them. But the most important power exercised by the Assembly was its control over taxation in Virginia. In the very first session it made use of this privilege by ordering, 'That every man and manservant of above 16 years of age shall pay into the hands and Custody of the Burgesses of every Incorporation and plantation one pound of the best Tobacco.' The funds thus raised were utilized for the payment of the officers of the Assembly. The levy by the poll, here used, was continued for many years, and became the chief support of the government. As the colony grew, however, and the need for greater revenues was felt, customs duties and other forms of taxation were resorted to.

Large sums were raised by an export duty upon tobacco. At times tariffs were placed upon the importation of liquors, slaves and other articles. But these duties had to be used with great care, for the carrying of the colony was done chiefly by English merchants, and Parliament would permit nothing detrimental to their interests. The Assembly claimed the exclusive right to levy general taxes. The Governor and Council time and again tried to wrest this privilege from them, but never with success. The Burgesses, realizing that their hold upon the exchequer was the chief source of their power, were most careful never to relinquish it. . . . The General Assembly was not only a legislative body, it was also a court of justice, and for many years served as the highest tribunal of the colony. . . . During the reign of Charles II, however, the Assembly was deprived of this function by royal proclamation, and the judiciary fell almost entirely into the hands of the Governor and Council. The General Assembly consisted of two chambers—the House of Burgesses and the Council. In the early sessions, the house sat together and probably voted as one body. Later, however, they were divided and voted separately. The Burgesses, as time went on, gradually increased in numbers until they became a large body, but the Council was always small. The Councillors were royal appointees. But since the King could not always know personally the prominent men of the colony, he habitually confirmed without question the nominations of the Governor. The members of the Council were usually persons of wealth, influence and ability. As they were subject to removal by the King and invariably held one or more lucrative governmental offices, it was customary for them to display great servility to the wishes of his Majesty or of the Governor. It was very unusual for them to oppose in the Assembly any measure recommended by the King, or in accord with his expressed wishes. Although the Councillors were, with rare exceptions, natives of Virginia, they were in no sense representative of the people of the colony. As the upper house of the Assembly, the Council exercised a powerful influence upon legislation. After the separation of the chambers their consent became necessary for the passage of all bills, even money bills. Their legislative influence declined during the eighteenth century, however, because of the growing spirit of liberalism in Virginia, and the increasing size of the House of Burgesses. The executive powers entrusted to the Council were also of very great importance. The Governor was compelled by his instructions to secure its assistance and consent in the most important matters. And since the chief executive was always a native of England, and often entirely ignorant of conditions in the colony, he was constantly forced to rely upon the advice of his Council. This tendency was made more pronounced by the frequent changes of Governors that marked the last quarter of the seventeenth century. . . . Great powers were lodged in the hands of this officer by his various instructions and commissions. He was commander of the militia, was the head of the colonial church, he appointed most of the officers, attended to foreign affairs, and put the laws into execution. His influence, however, resulted chiefly from the fact that he was the representative of the King. . . . Such, in outline, was the government originated by Virginia by the liberal leaders of the London Company, and put into operation by Sir George Yeardley. It lasted, with the short in-

termission of the Commonwealth Period, for more than one hundred and fifty years, and under it Virginia became the most populous and wealthy of the English colonies in America."—T. J. Wertenbaker, *Virginia under the Stuarts, 1607-1688*, pp. 35-42.—"In England the [London] Company under its new government set to work with an energy before unknown to it, to improve the condition of the colony. . . . To check the over-production of tobacco a clause was inserted in all fresh patents of land binding the holder to cultivate a certain quantity of other commodities. Everything was done to encourage permanent settlers rather than mere traders. Apprentices, unmarried women, and neat cattle were sent out. New forms of industry, too, were set on foot, such as timber yards, silk manufactures, iron foundries, and vineyards. . . . In the year 1619 alone over 1,200 persons were sent out, half as private settlers or servants, half at the expense of the Company."—J. A. Doyle, *English in America: Virginia*, ch. 6.

1619.—Introduction of negro slavery.—"In the month of August, 1619, five years after the commons of France had petitioned for the emancipation of every serf in every fief, a Dutch man-of-war entered James River and landed 20 negroes for sale. This is the sad epoch of the introduction of negro slavery; but the traffic would have been checked in its infancy had it remained with the Dutch. Thirty years after this first importation of Africans, Virginia to one black contained fifty whites; and, after seventy years of its colonial existence, the number of its negro slaves was proportionably much less than in several of the northern states at the time of the war of independence."—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Author's last revision), v. 1, pt. 1, ch. 8.

ALSO IN: T. J. Wertenbaker, *Planters of Colonial Virginia*.—P. A. Bruce, *Economic history of Virginia*, v. 2, ch. 11.—G. W. Williams, *History of the negro race in America*, v. 1, pt. 2, ch. 12.—G. P. Fisher, *Colonial era*, ch. 4.

1622-1624.—Plot and massacre by Indians.—Arbitrary dissolution of the Virginia Company by King James.—"On the 22nd of March, 1622, a memorable massacre occurred in the Colony. . . . On the evening before, and on that morning, the savages as usual came unarmed into the houses of the planters, with fruits, fish, turkeys and venison to sell. In some places they actually sat down to breakfast with the English. At about the hour of noon, the savages rising suddenly and everywhere at the same time, butchered the colonists with their own implements, sparing neither age, sex, nor condition. Three hundred and forty-seven men, women and children fell in a few hours. . . . The destruction might have been universal but for the disclosure of a converted Indian, named Chanco, who, during the night before the massacre, revealed the plot to one Richard Pace, with whom he lived. Pace . . . repaired before day to Jamestown and gave the alarm to Sir Francis Wyatt, the Governor. His vigilance saved a large part of the Colony. . . . The court of James I, jealous of the growing power of the Virginia Company and of its too republican spirit, seized upon the occasion of the massacre to attribute all the calamities of the Colony to its mismanagement and neglect, and thus to frame a pretext for dissolving the charter." The Company, supported by the colonists, resisted the high-handed proceedings of the King and his officers, but vainly. In November, 1624, "James I. dissolved the Virginia Company by a

writ of Quo Warranto, which was determined only upon a technicality in the pleadings. The company had been obnoxious to the ill will of the King on several grounds. The corporation had become a theatre for rearing leaders of the opposition, many of its members being also members of parliament. . . . Charles I. succeeding [1625] to the crown and principles of his father, took the government of Virginia into his own hands. The company thus extinguished had expended £150,000 in establishing the Colony and transported 9,000 settlers without the aid of government. The number of stockholders, or adventurers, as they were styled, was about 1,000 and the annual value of the exports from Virginia was, at the period of the dissolution of the charter, only £20,000. The company embraced much of the rank, wealth, and talent of the kingdom. . . . As the act provided no compensation for the enormous expenditure incurred, it can be looked upon as little better than confiscation effected by chicanery and tyranny. Nevertheless the result was undoubtedly favorable to the Colony."—C. Campbell, *Introduction to the history of the colony and ancient dominion of Virginia*, ch. 15-16.

ALSO IN: W. Stith, *History of Virginia*, bk. 4-5.—E. D. Neill, *History of the Virginia Company of London*, ch. 14-17.

1628.—Attempted settlement by Lord Baltimore. See MARYLAND: 1632.

1630-1652.—Activities of William Claiborne.—In 1621 William Claiborne came to Virginia an unknown figure and by 1630 he was secretary for the colony. He had gradually established a flourishing trade with the natives, which extended far northward, and his ambitious plans included building up connections with the Massachusetts Bay Colony. His settlement on Kent Island in Chesapeake bay (which was originally included in the Virginia grant) brought him into conflict with Lord Baltimore and the Calverts to whom the territory had later been given by Charles I. In 1635 he was removed from his post as secretary for the colony by Governor Harvey and in 1638 Kent island was definitely assigned to the Calverts. During the confusion of the Civil War in England, Claiborne again seized the island; but "in 1645 Sir William Berkeley returned to Virginia and from him the fugitive Calvert received effective aid and sympathy, so that late in 1646 he was able to invade his own territory with a force of Virginian and fugitive Marylanders. Claiborne and Ingle were soon expelled. . . . Early in 1652 four commissioners were sent to receive the submission of Berkeley and his colony. One of these . . . was the irrepressible Claiborne . . . [who] was restored to his office of secretary of state."—J. Fiske, *Old Virginia and her neighbors*, v. 1, pp. 308, 314.—See also MARYLAND: 1635-1638.

ALSO IN: J. H. Claiborne, *William Claiborne of Virginia*.

1639-1652.—Loyalty to King Charles.—Refuge of Cavaliers.—"Under Charles I. little worthy of notice occurred in the political history of Virginia. . . . Attempts were made to raise a revenue on tobacco, and subsequently to establish a royal monopoly of the tobacco trade. The attempts were averted, and the king contented himself with the pre-emption of the Virginian tobacco, and with enacting that no foreign vessel should be allowed to trade with Virginia, or to carry Virginia goods. In 1630 an attempt was made to re-establish the authority of the [London] com-

pany, but was strenuously and successfully opposed by the assembly. That the royal government sat lightly on Virginia may be inferred from the loyal tone which had thus early become a characteristic of the colony. After the establishment of the commonwealth, 'Virginia was whole for monarchy and the last country belonging to England that submitted to obedience to the commonwealth of England,' and under Berkeley's government the plantation was a safe refuge for the defeated cavaliers. . . . But as soon as two or three parliamentary ships appeared [1652] all thoughts of resistance were laid aside. Yet, whether from lenity or caution, the parliament was satisfied with moderate terms. The submission of the colonists was accepted as free and voluntary."—J. A. Doyle, *American colonies*, ch. 2.

1639-1663.—Attempts to colonize North Carolina. See NORTH CAROLINA: 1639-1663.

1644.—Fresh Indian outbreak and massacre of whites.—"After a peace of five or six years, the Indians, provoked by continued encroachments on their land, and instigated, it is said, by the aged chief Opechancanough, formed a new scheme for the extermination of the colonists. They were encouraged by signs of discord among the English, having seen a fight in James River between a London ship for the Parliament and a Bristol ship for the king. [In 1644.] Five hundred persons perished in the first surprise. . . . For defense the planters were concentrated in a few settlements; . . . forts were built at the points most exposed; and a ship was sent to Boston for powder, which, however, the General Court declined to furnish. The occasion was taken by 'divers godly-disposed persons' of Virginia to remove to New England. . . . The Indians were presently driven from their fastnesses. Opechancanough, decrepit and incapable of moving without assistance, . . . was taken prisoner and carried to Jamestown, where he was shot in the back by a vindictive soldier appointed to guard him. The Indian towns were broken up, and their 'clear lands possessed by the English to sow wheat in.' Opechancanough's successor submitted; and a peace was made by act of the Assembly, the Indians ceding all the lands between James and York Rivers. No Indian was to come south of York River under pain of death. The Powhatan confederacy was dissolved. The Indians of lower Virginia sunk into servile dependence, and dwindled away, or, migrating to the south and west, were mingled and confounded with other tribes."—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States*, v. 1, ch. 11.

ALSO IN: J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pt. 2, ch. 5.

1650-1660.—Under the Commonwealth and Cromwell, and the Stuart Restoration.—Two sides of the story.—Origin of the name of "The Old Dominion."—"After this, Sir William Berkeley [governor] made a new peace with the Indians, which continued for a long time unviolated. . . . But he himself did not long enjoy the benefit of this profound peace; for the unhappy troubles of King Charles the first increasing in England, proved a great disturbance to him and to all the people. They, to prevent the infection from reaching that country, made severe laws against the Puritans, though there were as yet none among them. But all correspondence with England was interrupted, supplies lessened, and trade obstructed. . . . At last the king was traitorously beheaded in England, and Oliver installed Protector. However, his authority was not acknowledged in Virginia for several years after, till they were forced to it by the last necessity. For in the year 1651, by Crom-

well's command, Captain Dennis, with a squadron of men of war, arrived there from the Carribee islands, where they had been subduing Bardoes. The country at first held out vigorously against him, and Sir William Berkeley, by the assistance of such Dutch vessels as were then there, made a brave resistance. But at last Dennis contrived a stratagem which betrayed the country. He had got a considerable parcel of goods aboard, which belonged to two of the Council, and found a method of informing them of it. By this means they were reduced to the dilemma, either of submitting or losing their goods. This occasioned factions among them; so that at last, after the surrender of all the other English plantations, Sir William was forced to submit to the usurper on the terms of a general pardon. However, it ought to be remembered, to his praise, and to the immortal honor of that colony, that it was the last of all the king's dominions that submitted to the usurpation; and afterwards the first that cast it off, and he never took any post or office under the usurper. Oliver had no sooner subdued the plantations, but he began to contrive how to keep them under, that so they might never be able for the time to come to give him farther trouble. To this end, he thought it necessary to break off their correspondence with all other nations, thereby to prevent their being furnished with arms, ammunition, and other warlike provisions. According to this design, he contrived a severe act of Parliament [1651], whereby he prohibited the plantations from receiving or exporting any European commodities but what should be carried to them by Englishmen, and in English built ships. [See NAVIGATION LAWS: 1651]. . . . Notwithstanding this act of navigation, the Protector never thought the plantations enough secured, but frequently changed their governors to prevent their intriguing with the people. So that, during the time of the usurpation, they had no less than three governors there, namely, Diggs, Bennet and Mathews. The strange arbitrary curbs he put upon the plantations exceedingly afflicted the people . . . and inspired them with a desire to use the last remedy, to relieve themselves from this lawless usurpation. In a short time afterwards a fair opportunity happened; for Governor Mathews died, and no person was substituted to succeed him in the government. Whereupon the people applied themselves to Sir William Berkeley (who had continued all this time upon his own plantation in a private capacity) and unanimously chose him their governor again [March, 1660]. Sir William . . . told the people . . . that if he accepted the government it should be upon their solemn promise, after his example, to venture their lives and fortunes for the king, who was then in France. This was no great obstacle to them, and therefore with an unanimous voice they told him they were ready to hazard all for the king. . . . Sir William Berkeley embraced their choice, and forthwith proclaimed Charles II. king of England, Scotland, France, Ireland and Virginia, and caused all process to be issued in his name. Thus his majesty was actually king in Virginia before he was so in England. But it pleased God to restore him soon after to the throne of his ancestors."—R. Beverley, *History of Virginia*, bk. 1, ch. 4.—"The government of Virginia, under the Commonwealth of England, was mild and just. While Cromwell's sceptre commanded the respect of the world, he exhibited generous and politic leniency towards the infant and loyal colony. She enjoyed during this interval free trade, legislative independence and internal

peace. The governors were men who by their virtues and moderation won the confidence and affections of the people. No extravagance, rapacity, or extortion, could be alleged against the administration. Intolerance and persecution were unknown, with the single exception of a rigorous act banishing the quakers. But rapine, extravagance, extortion, intolerance and persecution were all soon to be revived under the auspices of the Stuarts. . . . Richard Cromwell resigned the protectorate in March, 1660. Matthews, governor-elect, had died in the January previous. England was without a monarch; Virginia without a governor. Here was a two-fold interregnum. The assembly, convening on the 13th of March, 1660, declared by their first act that, as there was then in England 'noe resident absolute and generall confessed power,' therefore the supreme government of the colony should rest in the assembly. By the second act, Sir William Berkeley was appointed governor, and it was ordered that all writs should issue in the name of the assembly. . . . No fact in our history has been more misunderstood and misrepresented than this reappointment of Sir William Berkeley, before the restoration of Charles II. . . . Sir William was elected, not by a tumultuary assemblage of the people, but by the assembly; the royal standard was not raised upon the occasion, nor was the king proclaimed. Sir William, however, made no secret of his loyalty. . . . Sir William was elected on the 21st of the same month, about two months before the restoration of Charles II. Yet the word king, or majesty, occurs nowhere in the legislative records, from the commencement of the Commonwealth in England until the 11th of October, 1660—more than four months after the restoration. Virginia was indeed loyal, but she was too feeble to express her loyalty.—C. Campbell, *Introduction to the history of the colony and ancient dominion of Virginia*, ch. 21-22.—"There is no doubt whatever that if the Virginians could have restored the King earlier they would have done so; and Berkeley, who is known to have been in close communication and consultation with the leading Cavaliers, had sent word to Charles II. in Holland, toward the end of the Commonwealth, that he would raise his flag in Virginia if there was a prospect of success. This incident has been called in question. It is testified to by William Lee, Sheriff of London, and a cousin of Richard Lee, Berkeley's emissary, as a fact within his knowledge. Charles declined the offer, but was always grateful to the Virginians. The country is said to have derived from the incident the name of the 'Old Dominion,' where the King was King, or might have been, before he was King in England."—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pt. 2, ch. 10.

1651-1672.—English Navigation Acts and trade restrictions. See NAVIGATION LAWS: 1651; U. S. A.: 1651-1672.

1660-1677.—Restoration and its rewards to Virginia loyalty.—Oppression, discontent, and Bacon's Rebellion.—At the time of the restoration of the English monarchy, in the person of Charles II, the colony of Virginia "numbered not far from 50,000 souls, a large proportion of whom, especially, we may suppose, those of middle life and most active habits, were natives of the soil, bound to it by the strongest ties of interest and affection, and by their hopes of what it was destined to become in the opening future. Here was a state of things, comprising, in the apprehensions of the people, many of the elements of the highest happiness and prosperity. . . . But all this was

totally and suddenly changed, and universal distress brought upon the land, by the new restrictive clauses added to the original Navigation Act, by the first Parliament of Charles. By the act of the Long Parliament it had been simply provided that foreign vessels should import into England no other products than such as were grown or manufactured in their own country; a shaft aimed principally at the Dutch. . . . By Charles's Commons this first hint was . . . expanded into a voluminous code of monopolizing enactments, by which the trade of the world was regulated on the principle of grasping for England every possible commercial advantage, and inflicting upon all other nations the greatest possible commercial injury. . . . Upon the colonies, one and all, this cruel policy bore with a weight which almost crushed them. . . . From 1660, when this monopolizing policy took its beginning, the discontent of the people increased day by day, as each new prohibition was proclaimed. Commerce lay dead. Tobacco would no longer pay for its cultivation, much less enrich the laborious planter; manufactures, as that of silk, after being attempted, failed to bring the hoped-for relief, and there seemed no prospect but starvation and ruin. What wonder that mischief lay brewing in the hearts of a people who, for their almost slavish loyalty, met only these thankless returns of injury and injustice; for the Virginians of that day were monarchists in the full meaning of the term. . . . Other causes conspired with these purely political ones to bring the public mind of Virginia into such a state of deep exasperation as to find its relief only in insurrection. Of these, one was particularly a source of irritation; namely, the grants of vast tracts of territory, made by the wasteful and profligate King to his needy and profligate favorites, made wholly irrespective of present owners and occupiers, who were transferred, like serfs of the soil, to any great patentee to whom the caprice of Charles chose to consign them." The discontent culminated in 1676, under the influence of an excitement growing out of trouble with the Indians. After more than thirty years of quiet, the natives became hostile and threatening. "Various outrages were first committed by the Indians, on whom the whites, as usual, retaliated; murder answered murder, burning to burning, till, throughout the whole border country, were kindled the flames of an exterminating Indian war, accompanied by all its peculiar horrors. In the excited state of the public mind, these new calamities were laid at the door of the government." Governor Berkeley was accused of having an interest in the profits of trade with the Indians which restrained him from making war on them. Whether the charge was true or false, he gave color to it by his conduct. He took no steps to protect the colony. Nor would he authorize any self-defensive measures on the part of the people themselves. They "went so far as to engage that, if the Governor would only commission a general, whomsoever he would, they would 'follow him at their own charge.' Still they were not heard. Under such circumstances of neglect and excessive irritation, they took the case into their own hands." They chose for their leader Nathaniel Bacon, a young Englishman of education, energy and talent, who had been in the colony about three years, and who had already attained a seat in the Governor's Council. Bacon accepted the responsibility, "commission or no commission," and, in the spring of 1676, put himself at the head of 500 men, with whom he

marched against the Indians. The governor, after formally proclaiming him a rebel, raised another army and marched, not against the Indians, but against Bacon. He was hardly out of Jamestown, however, before the people of that neighborhood rose and took possession of the capital. On learning of this fresh revolt, he turned back, and found himself helpless to do anything but submit. The result was the summoning of a new Assembly,

all that had been granted was revoked; a proclamation was issued, again denouncing Bacon as a rebel, setting a price upon his head, and commanding his followers to disperse." Again, Bacon and his army retraced their steps and took possession of Jamestown, the governor flying to Accomac. A convention of the inhabitants of the colony was then called together, which adopted a declaration, or oath, in which they fully identified themselves



BACON AND BERKELEY
(After painting by J. E. Kelly)

to which Bacon was elected from his county, and the making of some progress, apparently, towards a curing of abuses and the removing of causes of discontent. But something occurred—exactly what has never been made clear—which led to a sudden flight on Bacon's part from Jamestown, and the gathering of his forces once more around him. Re-entering the capital at their head, he extorted from Governor Berkeley a commission which legalized his military office, and armed with this authority he proceeded once more against the Indians. "But as soon as he was sufficiently distant to relieve the Governor and his friends from their fears,

with Bacon in his course, and swore to uphold him. The latter then moved once more against the Indians; Berkeley once more got possession of the seat of government, and, once more, Bacon, (who had fought the Indians meantime at Bloody Run and beaten them) came back and drove him out. "The whole country . . . was with Bacon, and merely a crowd of cowardly adventurers about the Governor. Nothing would seem, at this moment, to have stood between Bacon and the undisputed, absolute control of the colony, had no unforeseen event interposed, as it did, to change the whole aspect of affairs." This unforeseen event

was the sudden death of Bacon, which occurred in January, 1677, at the house of a friend. "Some mystery attaches to the manner of it," and there were, of course, sinister whispers of foul play. "But, however and wherever Bacon died, it could never be discovered where he was buried, nor what disposition had been made of his body. . . . The death of Bacon was, in effect, the restoration of Sir William Berkeley to his lost authority, and the termination of the war; there being not an individual, among either his counsellors or officers, of capacity sufficient to make good his place. . . . Berkeley, gradually subduing all opposition, and making prisoners of many of the prime movers of the revolt, in a short time saw the authority of his government completely reestablished. . . . The historians of the period inform us that no less than 25 persons were executed during the closing period of the rebellion and the few next succeeding months."—W. Ware, *Memoir of Nathaniel Bacon (Library of American Biography, series 2, v. 3)*.—See also BACON'S REBELLION.

ALSO IN: J. A. Doyle, *English in America: Virginia, ch. 9*.—J. Burk, *History of Virginia, v. 2, ch. 4*.—G. Bancroft, *History of the United States (Author's last revision), pt. 2, ch. 10-11*.—E. Eggleston, *Nathaniel Bacon (Century Magazine, July, 1890)*.—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia, pp. 220-207*.—H. L. Osgood, *American colonies in the seventeenth century, v. 2, pp. 238, 380, 417, 422-423*.—M. N. Stanard, *Story of Bacon's Rebellion*.—C. M. Andrews, ed., *Narratives of the insurrections, 1675-1690*.

1660-1769.—Power of the House of Burgesses.—Resistance to royal governors.—Relations with home government.—"The House of Burgesses . . . for some time after the royalist reaction (1660) especially under Berkeley . . . was not popular but rather a dictatorial oligarchy under the influence of the governor. Under Culpeper and Howard, who followed Berkeley, there was a decided opposition on the part of the burgesses. This resistance to oppressive royal authority increased throughout the remainder of the colonial period, and was very pronounced at certain times in the eighteenth century. . . . The refusal of that body to make appropriations interfered very seriously with the plans of certain governors. . . . The House not only prescribed in detail the purposes for which military supplies were to be used, but also by putting the funds in the hands of committees dictated the course of military operations and exercised much authority over the troops. The power of the House was greatly increased by combining with its control over finance the appointment of the treasurer. . . . The colonists realized that it was only through the House of Burgesses that they could ever hope to restrain a dictatorial governor and to prevent the execution of oppressive British policy. The submission of the governor to the demands of the House from time to time convinced that body of the gradual decline of royal authority in the colony. But there was no organized movement in favor of independence, for up to the very beginning of the Revolution the colonists sincerely maintained their loyalty to the crown. Since the royal governor in the colony and British officials in England who were in a position to know the facts, and who would not be likely to exaggerate the financial condition of the colony, stated about the close of the seventeenth century, and also near the Revolution, that Virginia paid more into the British treasury than any other colony, and since the colonists bore the expenses of the government,

the maintenance of the military system aided neighboring colonies in time of emergency and also rendered assistance to the British government in offensive wars outside the colony, it was but natural that they should demand the common rights of Englishmen. They were denied these rights, and after every available means of securing them was exhausted they were compelled to meet with force the armed opposition of the British government."—P. S. Flippin, *Royal government of Virginia, p. 369*.—See also U. S. A.: 1624-1776.

1634-1699.—Piracy and its effect on the colony.—"So numerous were the pirate vessels hovering in the Chesapeake about 1684 that it was found necessary to adopt regulations for the guidance of the military authorities when aiming to destroy them or drive them out. . . . In this age, there was but a narrow line of division between the pirate and the privateer. Many privateers, after preying upon the enemy's commerce, did not hesitate to rifle any ship, whether belonging to their own or a friendly nationality, which happened to cross their track. Though keeping these latter acts in the dark, the crew of such a vessel were no doubt much inclined to boast of their achievements against an acknowledged enemy. So great was the quantity of plate, coin, precious stones, the rarest silks and costliest cloths, captured by many of these so-called privateers that the accounts of their success reaching the Colony from time to time were thought by some of the Governors to tend to demoralize the population in the pursuit of their usual avocations. It was reported in Virginia, in 1692, that a ship of this kind, which pretended to be from the Red Sea, had not long ago arrived in South Carolina and that its officers and seamen had stated that they had recently divided among themselves two thousand pounds sterling (equal to at least forty thousand dollars in purchasing power) taken from the coffers of a Moorish vessel overhauled in the course of their last cruise. 'I fear,' wrote Nicholson in deprecation of the sensation which this news had caused in the Colony, 'that, if such people be encouraged, it may prejudice his Majesty's service by debauching the inhabitants to make them leave planting and following ye same trade.' And in conclusion, he added: 'I very much fear that these sort of privateers or rather pirates when they have spent lavishly what they have got, then they are ready if not before, to make disturbance in the Government.' There seems to have been some ground for Nicholson's thinking that many of the colonists would be led away by the privateers' rich captures. . . . There is no proof, however, that such marauders found any section of the population of Virginia disposed to enter into practical collusion with them, either by purchasing outright their ill-gotten merchandise, or by furnishing them with victual in exchange for it. In June, 1699, a ship having among its passengers sixty pirates belonging to the band of the notorious Captain Kidd, and loaded down with Eastern merchandise of extraordinary value, arrived in Delaware Bay; after an unbroken voyage from the island of Madagascar. It was under Captain Shelley's command, who admitted that he had obtained his cargo by trading with pirates in those remote waters. Eighteen of the buccaneers brought over remained at Cape May, while nine, having secured a sloop, made their way towards Virginia, possibly with a considerable quantity of goods for sale in that Colony. In the meanwhile, other small vessels were expected from New York,

which were to convey thither the rest of the merchandise. Information of this ship's presence in the Jerseys, and the departure of a part of its crew for Virginia, was promptly sent to Governor Nicholson, so that he might take steps to arrest them so soon as they arrived. Nor were these the only marauders whom that officer was called upon to look out for during the same year; in 1699 also, a large band of pirates landed on Block Island within the limits of Rhode Island. Having removed to shore all their booty, which happened to be in the form of money and plate, they allowed their ship to sink, and then breaking up into separate bands, they dispersed in several directions. One of these bands was reported to have turned its face towards Virginia; and news of this fact having reached Nicholson, he issued a proclamation ordering their capture so soon as they were discovered to be within the bounds of the Colony. . . . Captain Aldred, of the *Essex Prize*, had sighted the private ship [belonging to Captain Kidd] in Lynnhaven Bay, to which waters she had leisurely gone from the coast of Accomac. He described her as being an English built vessel, equipped with about thirty guns, and with the King's colors and a red flag flying at her maintop masthead. He learned that she was known sometimes as the *Alexander*, and sometimes as the *Providence Galley*; that she was under the command of one John James; and that she was manned by a crew of thirty. Aldred promptly bore down on her when she came in sight, but having been received with a sharp volley, and deeming his own force, owing to the absence of seven of his seamen on shore, insufficient, he stood off; and soon returning to the north side of the river, sent a dispatch to the Governor to inform him of the pirate's presence. Finding themselves unmolested, the bucaniers now began to plunder every boat, sloop, and ship that passed within their reach. . . . The commanders-in-chief of the militia of Elizabeth City, Norfolk, Princess Anne, Accomac and Northampton counties were ordered to appoint in their respective districts persons who, without interruption, should patrol the shores until the twenty-ninth day of the following October, an interval of about three and a half months. One man was to be chosen whose duty it should be to pass constantly backwards and forwards along the beach between Cape Henry and Currituck Inlet; another to walk the length of the seaboard in Accomac; another the length of the seaboard in Northampton; and a fourth to be stationed on Smith's Island situated not far from Cape Charles. Should any one of these watches discover a boat making its way to the shore which there was good reason to suspect was occupied by pirates, then he was to hasten to inform the nearest militia officer in order that the whole country might be at once aroused; this was done by this officer in his turn reporting the same fact to all the neighboring commanders-in-chief; and they, in their turn, were required to report it to the Governor and Council at Jamestown; and if possible the same news was to be communicated to the captain of the guard-ship."—P. A. Bruce, *Institutional history of Virginia*, v. 2, pp. 207-211, 214.

ALSO IN: J. F. Jameson, *Privateering and piracy in colonial period*.

1689-1690.—King William's War.—First Colonial Congress. See U. S. A.: 1690; CANADA: 1689-1690.

1691.—Founding of William and Mary College. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1619-1819.

1696-1749.—Suppression of colonial manufactures. See U. S. A.: 1696-1749.

1699-1776.—Franchise qualifications. See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: United States: 1621-1776.

18th century.—Importance of tobacco trade. See COMMERCE: Era of geographic expansion: 17th-18th centuries: North American colonies.

1700.—Divergencies in the life and history of Virginia from that of England.—"In summarizing the particulars in which the general system of Virginia diverged from that of England in the Seventeenth century, they are found to be few in number, and not, in every instance, of great importance in their influence. They consisted, first, of the extensive, as opposed to the intensive, methods of cultivation, methods encouraged by the abundance of virgin lands, but productive of an air of neglect in sad contrast with that appearance of neatness, trimness, and thorough tillage which gave the face of the Mother Country the aspect of a beautiful garden on a great scale; secondly, of the presence of the African slave, who, while he fostered in the dominant class a love of liberty and an aristocratic spirit, was nevertheless, in himself and in his permanent bondage, incongruous with the genius of English institutions; thirdly, of the practical absence of the law of primogeniture, owing to the fact that, in these early times, the younger children's only prospect of support lay in inheriting some portion of their father's landed estate, virtually the only form of property then existing in the Colony, and the only means by which a livelihood could be easily secured [system overthrown by Thomas Jefferson in 1766]; fourthly, of the custom of hiring clergymen by the year, and during good behavior, instead of giving them a permanent freehold interest in their livings by the ceremony of induction; fifthly, of the smallness in the number of free grammar schools, in consequence of the comparatively limited accumulation of wealth; sixthly, of the recordation of deeds instead of the preservation of all muniments of title in private receptacles closed to public examination; seventhly, of a less complicated system of courts and a simpler legal procedure in the course of trials; eighthly, of a system of military tactics, adapted to a running fight in thick forests, and with a furtive and treacherous enemy; ninthly, of a suffrage which at first rested upon manhood alone; tenthly, of an Assembly that represented, not only all classes, like the English Parliament, but also every individual person belonging to the several constituencies; and finally, of a legislative body, whose members, unlike those sitting at St. Stephens, received pecuniary remuneration for the special services they performed. These divergencies did not seriously diminish the intensity of the English spirit animating the whole community in every branch of its interests, and every citizen on every side of his character."—P. A. Bruce, *Political history of Virginia in the seventeenth century*, pp. 633-634.

1700.—Contrast between the local institutions of Virginia and those of New England.—"In Virginia the economic circumstances were very different from those of New England, and the effects were seen in a different kind of local institutions. . . . In view of this group of circumstances [see above: 1700: Divergencies] we need not wonder that in Old Virginia there were no town meetings. The distances between plantations coöperated with the distinction between classes to prevent the growth of such an institution. The English parish, with its churchwardens and vestry and clerk, was reproduced in Virginia under the

same name, but with some noteworthy peculiarities. If the whole body of rate-payers had assembled in vestry meeting, to enact by-laws and assess taxes, the course of development would have been like that of the New England town meeting. But instead of this the vestry, which exercised the chief authority in the parish, was composed of twelve chosen men. This was not government by a primary assembly, it was representative government. At first the twelve vestrymen were elected by the people of the parish, and thus resembled the select-men of New England; but in 1662 'they obtained the power of filling vacancies in their own number,' so that they became what is called a 'close corporation,' and the people had nothing to do with choosing them. Strictly speaking, that was not representative government; it was a step on the road that leads towards oligarchical or despotic government. It was . . . one of the steps ineffectually opposed in Bacon's rebellion. It was the vestry, thus constituted, that apportioned the parish taxes, appointed the churchwardens, presented the minister for induction into office, and acted as overseers of the poor. The minister presided in all vestry meetings. His salary was paid in tobacco, and in 1696 it was fixed by law at 16,000 pounds of tobacco yearly. In many parishes the churchwardens were the collectors of the parish taxes. The other officers, such as the sexton and the parish clerk, were appointed either by the minister or by the vestry. With the local government thus administered, we see that the larger part of the people had little directly to do. Nevertheless, in those small neighbourhoods government could be kept in full sight of the people, and so long as its proceedings went on in broad daylight and were sustained by public sentiment, all was well. As Jefferson said, 'The vestrymen are usually the most discreet farmers, so distributed through the parish that every part of it may be under the immediate eye of some one of them. They are well acquainted with the details and economy of private life, and they find sufficient inducements to execute their charge well, in their philanthropy, in the approbation of their neighbours, and the distinction which that gives them.' The difference, however, between the New England township and the Virginia parish, in respect of self-government, was striking enough. We have now to note a further difference. In New England, the township was the unit of representation in the colonial legislature; but in Virginia the parish was not the unit of representation. The county was that unit. In the colonial legislature of Virginia the representatives sat, not for parishes but for counties. The difference is very significant. As the political life of New England was in a manner built up out of the political life of the towns, so the political life of Virginia was built up out of the political life of the counties. This was partly because the vast plantations were not grouped about a compact village nucleus like the small farms of the North, and partly because there was not in Virginia that Puritan theory of the church according to which each congregation is a self-governing democracy. The conditions which made the New England town meeting were absent. The only alternative was some kind of representative government, and for this the county was a small enough area. The county in Virginia was much smaller than in Massachusetts or Connecticut. In a few instances the county consisted of only a single parish; in some cases it was divided into two parishes, but

oftener into three or more. In Virginia, as in England and in New England, the county was an area for the administration of justice. There were usually in each county eight justices of the peace, and their court was the counterpart of the quarter sessions in England. They were appointed by the governor, but it was customary for them to nominate candidates for the governor to appoint, so that practically the court filled its own vacancies and was a close corporation, like the parish vestry. Such an arrangement tended to keep the general supervision and control of things in the hands of a few families. This county court usually met as often as once a month in some convenient spot answering to the shire town of England or New England. More often than not, the place originally consisted of the court-house and very little else, and was named accordingly from the name of the county, as Hanover Court House or Fairfax Court House; and the small shire towns that have grown up in such spots often retain these names to the present day. . . . Their number was diminished from the tendency to omit the phrase 'Court House,' leaving the name of the county for that of the shire town, as for example in Culpeper, Va. In New England the process of naming has been just the reverse; as in Hartford County, Conn., or Worcester County, Mass., which have taken their names from the shire towns. . . . The county court in Virginia had jurisdiction in criminal actions not involving peril of life or limb, and in civil suits where the sum at stake exceeded twenty-five shillings. Smaller suits could be tried by a single justice. The court also had charge of the probate and administration of wills. The court appointed its own clerk, who kept the county records. It superintended the construction and repair of bridges and highways, and for this purpose divided the county into 'precincts,' and appointed annually for each precinct a highway surveyor. The court also seems to have appointed constables, one for each precinct. The justices could themselves act as coroners, but annually two or more coroners for each parish were appointed by the governor. As we have seen that the parish taxes—so much for salaries of minister and clerk, so much for care of church buildings, so much for the relief of the poor, etc.—were computed and assessed by the vestry; so the county taxes, for care of court-house and jail, roads and bridges, coroner's fees, and allowances to the representatives sent to the colonial legislature, were computed and assessed by the county court. The general taxes for the colony were estimated by a committee of the legislature, as well as the county's share of the colony tax. The taxes for the county, and sometimes the taxes for the parish also, were collected by the sheriff. They were usually paid, not in money, but in tobacco; and the sheriff was the custodian of this tobacco, responsible for its proper disposal. The sheriff was thus not only the officer for executing the judgments of the court, but he was also county treasurer and collector, and thus exercised powers almost as great as those of the sheriff in England in the twelfth century. He also presided over elections for representatives to the legislature. It is interesting to observe how this very important officer was chosen. 'Each year the court presented the names of three of its members to the governor, who appointed one, generally the senior justice, to be the sheriff of the county for the ensuing year.' Here again we see this close corporation, the county court, keeping the control of things within its own hands. One other important

county officer needs to be mentioned. In early New England each town had its train-band or company of militia, and the companies in each county united to form the county regiment. In Virginia it was just the other way. Each county raised a certain number of troops, and because it was not convenient for the men to go many miles from home in assembling for purposes of drill, the county was subdivided into military districts, each with its company, according to rules laid down by the governor. The military command in each county was vested in the county lieutenant, an officer answering in many respects to the lord lieutenant of the English shire at that period. Usually he was a member of the governor's council, and as such exercised sundry judicial functions. He bore the honorary title of 'colonel,' and was to some extent regarded as the governor's deputy; but in later times his duties were confined entirely to military matters."—J. Fiske, *Old Virginia and her neighbors*, v. 2, pp. 34-41.

1710.—Colonization of Palatines. See PALATINES.

1710-1716.—Crossing the Blue Ridge.—Possession taken of the Shenandoah valley.—Knights of the Golden Horseshoe.—"Lord Orkney is made Governor, but as usual sends his deputy, and in the year 1710 appears the stalwart soldier and ruler, Sir Alexander Spotswood. Alexander Spotswood, or Spottiswoode, as his family were called in Scotland, rises like a landmark above the first years of the century. When he came to Virginia he was only 34 and in the bloom of his manhood. But he had already fought hard, and his faculties as a soldier and ruler were fully developed. . . . The Virginians received Spotswood with open arms. He was a man after their own heart, and brought with him when he came (June 1710) the great writ of habeas corpus. The Virginia people had long claimed that this right was guaranteed to them by Magna Charta, since they were equally free Englishmen with the people of England. Now it was conceded, and the great writ came,—Spotswood's letter of introduction. It was plain that he was not a new Berkeley looking to the King's good pleasure as his law, or a new Nicholson ready to imprison people or put halters around their necks; but a respecter of human freedom and defender of the right. . . . In . . . 1716, Governor Alexander Spotswood set out on an expedition which much delighted the Virginians. There was a very great longing to visit the country beyond the Blue Ridge. That beautiful unknown land held out arms of welcome, and the Governor, who had in his character much of the spirit of the hunter and adventurer, resolved to go and explore it. Having assembled a party of good companions, he set out in the month of August, and the gay company began their march toward the Blue Ridge Mountains. . . . In due time they reached the Blue Ridge, probably near the present Swift Run Gap, and saw, beyond, the wild valley of the Shenandoah. On the summit of the mountain they drank the health of the King, and named two neighboring peaks 'Mt. George' and 'Mt. Alexander,' after his Majesty and the Governor; after which they descended into the valley and gave the Shenandoah the name of the 'Euphrates.' Here a bottle was buried . . . containing a paper to testify that the valley of the Euphrates was taken possession of in the name of his Majesty, George I. Then the adventurers reascended the mountain, crossed to the lowland, and returned to Williamsburg. This picturesque incident of the time gave rise to

the order of the 'Knights of the Golden Horseshoe.' The horses had been shod with iron, which was unusual, as a protection against the mountain roads; and Spotswood sent to London and had made for his companions small golden horseshoes set with garnets and other jewels, and inscribed 'Sic juvat transcendere montes.'"—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pt. 2, ch. 21-22.—See also U. S. A.: 1681-1750.

1720.—Dispute over southern boundary. See NORTH CAROLINA: 1688-1720.

1744.—Treaty with the Six Nations and purchase of the Shenandoah valley.—"The Six Nations still retained the right to traverse the great valley west of the Blue Ridge. Just at this inopportune moment [1743], some of their parties came into bloody collision with the backwoodsmen of Virginia, who had penetrated into that valley. Hostilities with the Six Nations, now that war was threatened with France, might prove very dangerous, and Clinton [governor of New York] hastened to secure the friendship of these ancient allies by liberal presents; for which purpose, in conjunction with commissioners from New England, he held a treaty at Albany. . . . The difficulties between Virginia and the Six Nations were soon after [1744] settled in a treaty held at Lancaster, to which Pennsylvania and Maryland were also parties, and in which, in consideration of £400, the Six Nations relinquished all their title to the valley between the Blue Ridge and the central chain of the Allegany Mountains."—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 25.

ALSO IN: B. A. Hinsdale, *Old Northwest*, p. 59.

1748-1754.—First movements beyond the mountains to dispute possession with the French. See OHIO: 1748-1754.

1754.—Represented at colonial congress at Albany. See U. S. A.: 1754.

1754.—Opposing the French occupation of the Ohio valley.—Washington's first service. See OHIO: 1754.

1755-1760.—French and Indian War.—Brad-dock's defeat and after. See OHIO: 1748-1754; 1754; 1755; CANADA: 1750-1753, to 1759; NEW FRANCE, etc.; NOVA SCOTIA: 1749-1755; 1755; CAPE BRETON ISLAND: 1758-1760.

1756.—Number of slaves. See SLAVERY: 1756.

1759-1761.—Cherokee War. See SOUTH CAROLINA: 1759-1761.

1763.—Parsons' Cause and Patrick Henry.—"In Virginia as well as in Pennsylvania, a vigorous opposition to vested rights foreshadowed what was to come. A short crop of tobacco having suddenly enhanced the price of that staple, or, what is quite as likely, the issue of paper money in Virginia, first made that same year [1755], having depreciated the currency, the Assembly had passed a temporary act, authorizing the payment of all tobacco debts in money at twopence per pound—the old rate, long established by usage. Three years after, under pretence of an expected failure of the crop, this tender act was renewed. Francis Fauquier, who had just succeeded Dinwiddie as lieutenant governor, a man of more complying temper than his predecessor, readily consented to it. The salaries of the parish ministers, some sixty-five in number, were payable in tobacco. They were likely to be considerable losers by this tender law; and, not content with attacking it in pamphlets, they sent an agent to England, and by the aid of Sherlock, bishop of London, procured an order in council pronouncing the law void. Suits were presently brought to recover the difference

between twopence per pound in the depreciated currency and the tobacco to which by law the ministers were entitled. In defending one of these suits [1763], the remarkable popular eloquence of Patrick Henry displayed itself for the first time. Henry was a young lawyer, unconnected with the ruling aristocracy of the province, and as yet without reputation or practice. The law was plainly against him, and his case seemed to be hopeless. He had, however, a strong support in the prevailing prejudice in favor of the tender law, and in the dissatisfaction generally felt at the king's veto upon it. Addressing the jury in a torrent of eloquence as brilliant as it was unexpected, he prevailed upon them to give him a verdict. The Assembly voted money to defend all suits which the parsons might bring; and, notwithstanding their clear legal right in the matter, they thought it best to submit without further struggle."—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States*, v. 2, ch. 27.

ALSO IN: W. Wirt, *Life of Patrick Henry*, ch. 1. —M. C. Tyler, *Patrick Henry*, ch. 4.

1763-1766.—Question of taxation by Parliament.—Stamp Act and Patrick Henry's resolutions.—First Continental Congress.—Repeal of the Stamp Act and the Declaratory Act. See U.S.A.: 1760-1775; 1763-1764; 1765; 1766.

1766-1773.—Opening events of the Revolution. See U.S.A.: 1766-1767, to 1772-1773; BOSTON: 1770; 1773.

1768.—Boundary treaty with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix.—Pretended cession of lands south of the Ohio. See U.S.A.: 1765-1768; OHIO: 1768-1778.

1769.—Attempted prohibition of slave trade nullified by George III. See SLAVERY: 1713-1776.

1769-1772.—First settlement of Tennessee.—Watauga Association. See TENNESSEE: 1769-1772.

1773.—Petition for division. See WEST VIRGINIA: 1773-1820.

1774.—Western territorial claims of the Old Dominion.—Lord Dunmore's War with the Indians. See OHIO: 1774; U.S.A.: 1781-1786.

1774.—Boston Port Bill, the Massachusetts Bill, and the Quebec Act.—The First Continental Congress. See U.S.A.: 1774.

1775.—Beginning of the War of the American Revolution.—Second Continental Congress. See U.S.A.: 1775; 1775-1776; Washington in command, etc.

1775.—End of royal government.—Lord Dunmore's fight.—"History was rapidly made in the spring of 1775. The House of Burgesses, acting again as a convention, without governor or council, met in March, 1775, in the village of Richmond, where it could deliberate with more freedom than in Williamsburg under . . . [Governor Dunmore's] shadow. . . . The strong men of the colony mustered in force. They were flushed with excitement and conscious of great impending events, and they broke out into a violent party disagreement as to the course to pursue. The conservatives, despite the fruitlessness of their commercial policy, still hoped for an understanding with England; the progressives were prepared for immediate war and revolution. The struggle in the convention was precipitated over a pacificatory declaration 'that it is the most ardent wish of this colony (and they are persuaded of the whole continent of North America) to see a speedy return of those halcyon days, when we lived a free and happy people.' Immediately after the adoption of this useless, im-

pious, prayer, Patrick Henry rose to move that the colony be at once put in a state of defense. This bold challenge was accepted by the conservative leaders, Bland, Pendleton, Nicholas, Benjamin Harrison, and Willis Riddick, who feared lest the sympathy of the Whig Party in England and Parliament, upon which the conservatives now hung their hopes, might be alienated by the threat of force. They still dreamed that the manufacturing interests of England would succeed in moving the government and averting war, much as the Confederates fondled the delusion that the stoppage of the cottage supply would force Europe to intervene in the war between North and South. Furthermore, they pointed out that the colony was in no condition to go to war with the first military and naval power in the world. Henry answered them in the most famous of his speeches. Scouting the idea of a peaceful accommodation, the great agitator pleaded for military preparation. . . . [It is in vain, sir, to extenuate the matter. Gentlemen may cry, peace, peace, but there is no peace. The war is actually begun. The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms. Our brethren are already in the field. Why stand we here idle? What is it that gentlemen wish? What would they have? Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take, but as for me, give me liberty, or give me death!'] Dunmore however, mistaking the forbearance of the Virginians for timidity, determined to overawe them by a sudden and audacious stroke. On the night of April 20, 1775, a squad of marines from the king's ship *Magdalen*, lying in the James River near by, carried a quantity of powder from the colony powder-house in Williamsburg on board the ship. The next morning, when the townsfolk learned that their magazine had been rifled, they appeared in the streets in arms, only to quiet down finally under the representation of the town officials that the powder would be restored. The council respectfully requested the governor to return the colony's property and were met with the transparent excuse that it had been removed for fear of a slave rising and would be sent back when needed. Peyton Randolph and Robert Carter Nicholas played a great part in making this evasion palatable to the Williamsburgers, who, respecters of persons and dignitaries as they were, could become riotous on occasions. A wild rumor sent them to arms a second time a day or two later, but their excitement at last subsided and the incident seemed closed. . . . At this juncture, however, the agitator who appeared at every crisis, who had stirred the colony in the 'Parsons' Cause' in 1763 and again in the Stamp Act debate in 1765, seized the Heaven-born opportunity for vigorous action. Rousing the Hanover Committee by his fiery words, Patrick Henry marched on Williamsburg at the head of the county volunteer company. The act was less rash than it seemed: not only could Henry count on a large and devoted following throughout Virginia, but the movement was so well timed that it completely unnerved Dunmore, who had no troops behind him. When the orator, with the ever-growing mob of armed men that hastened to him from all sides, drew near Williamsburg, the governor sent him a message apparently offering payment for the powder. In any event, Henry received from a royal officer a sum of money for the powder and thereupon turned his men homeward. He professed satisfaction with the result, but, in reality, he had been checkmated in the

greatest effort of his career."—H. J. Eckenrode, *Revolution in Virginia*, pp. 45-47, 49-51.

Not long after the excited demonstrations which followed upon Governor Dunmore's secret removal of powder from the public magazine at Williamsburg, the governor received Lord North's "conciliatory proposition," and "he convened the House of Burgesses, on the 1st of June, to take it into consideration. This withdrew Peyton Randolph from Congress, as had been anticipated, and Mr. Jefferson succeeded to the vacancy. But the latter was not permitted to leave the Burgesses before an answer to the ministerial proposition was framed. . . . How much the answer was 'enfeebled' by the doubts and scruples of the moderate members, we cannot say, but it rings true revolutionary metal, and it was a noble lead off for the Assemblies of the other Colonies. . . . In the meantime events had transpired which soon afterwards terminated the official career of the Earl of Dunmore, and with it the royal government in Virginia. On the 5th of June, three men who entered the public magazine were wounded by a spring gun placed there by the orders of the Governor, and on the 7th, a committee of the House appointed to inspect the magazine, found the locks removed from the serviceable muskets, and they also discovered the powder which had been placed in mine. These things highly exasperated the multitude, and on a rumor getting abroad that the same officer who had before carried off the powder was again advancing towards the city with an armed force, they rose in arms. The Governor's assurance that the rumor was unfounded restored tranquillity. He, however, left the city in the night with his family and went on board the Fowey, lying at York, twelve miles distant. He left a message declaring that he had taken this step for his safety, and that thenceforth he should reside and transact business on board the man of war! An interchange of messages, acrid and crimiatory on his part, firm and spirited on the part of the House, was kept up until the 24th of June; when, on his final refusal to receive bills for signature except under the guns of an armed vessel, the House declared it a high breach of privilege, and adjourned to the 12th of October."—H. S. Randall, *Life of Jefferson*, v. 1, ch. 3.—"The convention that met on July 17, 1775, disregarded the fugitive governor, now become an active enemy, and at once proceeded to put the colony on a war-footing. It directed the enlistment of two regiments of troops and attempted to provide an efficient militia system. Furthermore, it filled an imperative need by creating a revolutionary executive, that junta known as the Committee of Safety. In the absence of several of the most noted leaders, sent as delegates to Congress, Peyton Randolph, Harrison, Henry, Jefferson, Wythe, and Richard Henry Lee, the highest vote for committeeman was given Edmund Pendleton, who thereby became chairman. He, with Richard Bland, who declined to go to Congress, Paul Carrington, Dudley Digges, Carter Braxton, John Page, and John Tabb, conservatives, and George Mason, Thomas Ludwell Lee, William Cabell, and James Mercer, progressives, composed the Committee of Safety. The election was a conservative triumph, owing partly to the absence of Richard Henry Lee and Jefferson, both of whom were in Philadelphia, and, even more, to the loss of Patrick Henry, who aspired to military glory as colonel of one of the Virginia regiments. Since Mason, the one strong progressive member of the committee, was absent from most of its meetings, direction of

affairs fell into the hands of the conservatives under the leadership of Edmund Pendleton, the chairman. This transfer of power from progressives to conservatives, with some of the aspects of a *coup d'état*, led to the postponement of hostilities with Dunmore for some months. Indeed, the year might have expired peacefully but for the headiness of the ex-governor, who left the Committee no choice but war. With the progressive leaders out of the way, at the election of the Committee of Safety the conservative faction succeeded in getting the executive power in its own hands and so deferred the final step in the breach with England; they doubtless hoped for some eleventh-hour victory of peace to satisfy colonial demands and yet leave the British Empire intact. The conservatives never realized, as Henry and Jefferson did, that such a dream was the one impossible thing."—H. J. Eckenrode, *Revolution in Virginia*, pp. 51, 56-57.

1775-1776.—Lord Dunmore's warfare.—Norfolk destroyed.—"Having drawn together a considerable force, Dunmore ascended Elizabeth River to the Great Bridge, the only pass by which Norfolk can be approached from the land side; dispersed some North Carolina militia collected there; made several prisoners; and then, descending the river [November, 1775], took possession of Norfolk. The rise of that town had been very rapid. Within a short time past it had become the principal shipping port of Virginia. Its population amounted to several thousands, among whom were many Scotch traders not well disposed to the American cause. Fugitive slaves and others began now to flock to Dunmore's standard. A movement was made in his favor on the east shore of Maryland, which it required a thousand militia to suppress. The Convention of Virginia, not a little alarmed, voted four additional regiments, afterward increased to seven, all of which were presently taken into continental pay. . . . Woodford, with the second Virginia regiment, took possession of the causeway leading to the Great Bridge, which was still held by Dunmore's troops. An attempt to dislodge the Virginians having failed, with loss, Dunmore abandoned the bridge and the town, and again embarked. Norfolk was immediately occupied by Woodford, who was promptly joined by Howe's regiment from North Carolina. After a descent on the eastern shore of Virginia [January, 1776], to whose aid marched two companies of Maryland minute men, being re-enforced by the arrival of a British frigate, Dunmore bombarded Norfolk. A party landed and set it on fire. . . . The part which escaped was presently burned by the provincials, to prevent it from becoming a shelter to the enemy. Thus perished, a prey to civil war, the largest and richest of the rising towns of Virginia. Dunmore continued, during the whole summer, a predatory warfare along the rivers, of which his naval superiority gave him the command, burning houses and plundering plantations, from which he carried off upward of 1,000 slaves. He was constantly changing his place to elude attack; but watched, pursued, and harassed, he finally found it necessary to retire to St. Augustine with his adherents and his plunder."—R. Hildreth, *History of the United States*, v. 3, ch. 32.

ALSO IN: C. Campbell, *Introduction to history of Virginia*, ch. 33.—W. F. Boogher, *Gleanings of Virginia history*, pp. 21-22.

1775-1784.—Exercise of sovereignty over Kentucky. See KENTUCKY: 1775-1784.

1776.—Independence declared and a constitution adopted.—Declaration of Rights.—"There

was a sudden change in public sentiment; and the idea of independence, said to be alarming to Virginians in March [1776] was welcome to them in April. One writes on the 2d: 'Independence is now the talk here. . . . It will be very soon, if not already, a favorite child.' Another, on the 12th, writes: 'I think almost every man, except the treasurer, is willing to declare for independence.'" On the 23rd, the Charlotte County Committee charged its delegates in convention to use their best endeavors "that the delegates which are sent to the General Congress be instructed immediately to cast off the British yoke." On the next day, a majority of the freeholders of James City took similar action. "In May, the avowals for independence were numerous. In this spirit and with such aims, a new convention was chosen, and on the 6th of May met in Williamsburg. It contained illustrious men,—among them, James Madison, in the twenty-fifth year of his age; George Mason, in the maturity of his great powers; Richard Bland, Edmund Pendleton, and Patrick Henry, rich in Revolutionary fame. . . . On the 14th of May the convention went into a committee of the whole on the state of the colony, with Archibald Carey in the chair; when Colonel Nelson submitted a preamble and resolutions on independence, prepared by Pendleton. These were discussed in two sittings of the committee, and then reported to the House. They were opposed chiefly by delegates from the Eastern District, but were advocated by Patrick Henry, and passed unanimously when 112 members were present,—about 20 absenting themselves. This paper enumerated the wrongs done to the colonies . . . and instructed the delegates appointed to represent the colony in the General Congress 'to propose to that respectable body to declare the United Colonies free and independent States,' and to 'give the assent of the colony to measures to form foreign alliances and a confederation,—provided the power of forming government for the internal regulations of each colony be left to the colonial legislatures.' The same paper also provided for a committee to form a plan of government for Virginia. This action was transmitted by the President to the other assemblies, accompanied by a brief circular. . . . It was hailed by the patriots in other colonies with enthusiasm. . . . The convention agreed (June 12) upon the famous Declaration of Rights declaring all men equally free and independent, all power vested in and derived from the people, and that government ought to be for the common benefit; also that all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience. It also complied with the recommendation of Congress, by forming a constitution and electing a governor and other officers."—R. Frothingham, *Rise of the republic*, ch. 11.—The following is the text of the Declaration of Rights:

A Declaration of Rights, made by the Representatives of the good People of Virginia, assembled in full and free Convention, which rights do pertain to them and their posterity as the basis and foundation of government. I. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. II. That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from,

the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them. III. That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of maladministration; and that, when a government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal. IV. That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services, which not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator or judge to be hereditary. V. That the legislative, executive and judicial powers should be separate and distinct; and that the members thereof may be restrained from oppression, by feeling and participating the burthens of the people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into that body from which they were originally taken, and the vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain and regular elections, in which all, or any part of the former members to be again eligible or ineligible, as the laws shall direct. VI. That all elections ought to be free, and that all men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed, or deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not in like manner assented, for the public good. VII. That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised. VIII. That in all capital or criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty; nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself; that no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers. IX. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. X. That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted. XI. That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury of twelve men is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred. XII. That the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments. XIII. That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State; that standing armies in time of peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by,

the civil power. XIV. That the people have a right to uniform government; and therefore, that no government separate from or independent of the government of Virginia, ought to be erected or established within the limits thereof. XV. That no free government, or the blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles. XVI. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity towards each other.

See also BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES; U. S. A.: 1776-1779.

ALSO IN: H. B. Grigsby, *Virginia Convention of 1776*.—W. C. Rives, *Life and times of Madison*, v. 1, ch. 5.—K. M. Rowland, *Life of George Mason*, v. 1, ch. 7.

1776.—Land laws for Kentucky. See KENTUCKY: 1775-1779.

1776-1779.—War in the North.—Declaration of Independence.—Articles of Confederation. See U. S. A.: 1776, to 1779.

1776-1808.—Anti-slavery opinion and causes of its disappearance. See below: 1776-1815; SLAVERY: 1776-1808.

1776-1815.—Growth and decline of liberalism.—Attitude towards slavery.—Discontent of the Virginia democrats.—Loss to the state through westward immigration.—“In 1785, the first movement for the abolition of slavery arose in Virginia. It proved abortive, . . . but it is a proof of the progress of radicalism. In the following years democratic social and political ideas continued to grow, although there was still a strong conservative element in the tidewater. The struggle over the adoption by Virginia in 1788 of the United States Constitution is not without its puzzling features. The westerners, the great upholders of individualism, generally opposed it, while the tidewater planters, who imagined they saw a hope for themselves in the centralizing tendencies of the Constitution, favored it. By such an apparent inversion of position as often occurs in politics, Patrick Henry led the anti-Federalists in the interests of States' Rights and democracy, and Madison became the successful leader of the Federalists. Henry made the most brilliant fight of his career on this occasion, but ratification was carried by a small majority and was distinctly a victory of the planter reactionaries. The success of the Federalists was not followed by a conservative ascendancy in Virginia as in Massachusetts. The principles of democracy were too passionately held by the great majority of men in all sections of the State to allow a return to the rule of the planter oligarchy. As soon as it became evident that the new Union was no rights-of-man government, but a highly conservative political and social structure, discontent broke out among the Virginia democrats. Thus, when Jefferson retired from Washington's Cabinet, he found the material existing for a party opposed to Federalist ideas, and he spent the next few years in organization. In this manner the Democratic-Republican Party came into being. The Democratic impulse was immensely quickened by the French Revolution. Virginia, which had experienced a real contest between the

forces of conservatism and liberalism, welcomed with enthusiasm the stimulating Galican propaganda. Indeed, the Old Dominion was transformed thereby. It became the fashion in the North in a later age to sneer at the inconsistency of the Revolutionary generation in preserving the institution of slavery, though subscribing to the Declaration of Independence dogma that all men are created free and equal. This inconsistency is more apparent than real. . . . [The] statement was meant to apply in a political rather than a social sense, . . . but it also had a very practical social application. The Revolution changed the attitude of the mass of Virginia people towards the negro race and the transformation lasted until the end of slavery. In the colonial era slaves were looked on as little better than brutes and were frequently treated with great cruelty. The law was absolutely callous, and a great number of poor blacks suffered execution for trifling thefts such as afterwards came to be good-naturedly looked on as a mere African weakness, or froze to death in jail awaiting trial; others were outlawed and killed on sight like wild animals. The records are full of these cases. But in this treatment of the blacks the Virginia people were in no sense more cruel than the rest of the world; it was the world, we must remember, in which men were hanged, drawn and quartered, broken on wheel and decapitated for comparatively trivial offences, with an iron disregard for human suffering the present age cannot understand—the antediluvian world before the egalitarian deluge. The Revolution changed all this. After 1795 a strong and persistent abolitionist sentiment existed in Virginia, and would probably have predominated but for the almost insuperable practical obstacles to emancipation. Popular feeling forced the government to permit private emancipation, which proceeded on such a scale that the institution of slavery was seriously threatened. The assembly intervened in 1816 to save it by requiring freedmen to leave the State within a year of manumission, and the practice of freeing slaves at the death of masters lessened. Gradually the democratic wave, which began in 1776 and reached high-water mark about 1795, spent its force. It had wrought great changes, but it was not destined to achieve a permanent triumph. Democracy in Europe had received a deathblow by the overthrow of Napoleon in 1815 and America felt the effect of the reaction. In Virginia other reasons contributed to the checking of liberalism. The development of the South and West drew from the Old Dominion its best young manhood and brought on a disastrous economic competition; Virginia lost rank as the greatest of American States and rapidly sank to a secondary position. It was no longer a land of energetic and forward-looking men, but of memories, a place of social amenities and soft dreaming. . . . The old English and aristocratic spirit revived and existed alongside the democratic theories of government which Jefferson had introduced. Jefferson's name was revered while his influence dwindled. Much, indeed, of the humanitarian teaching of the Revolution continued to permeate society and slavery was softened by this influence to the end, but the fact remains that in Virginia the swingback from democracy was steadily increasing in momentum from the fall of Napoleon to the Civil War.”—H. J. Eckenrode, *Revolution in Virginia*, pp. 298-300.

1778.—Suppression of the Transylvania Company in Kentucky. See KENTUCKY: 1765-1778.
1778-1779.—Clark's conquest of the Northwest


and its organization under the jurisdiction of Virginia. See U.S.A.: 1778-1779: Clark's conquest.

1779.—British coast raids at Norfolk and elsewhere. See U.S.A.: 1778-1779: Washington guarding the Hudson.

1779-1783.—War in the South.—Arnold's ravages.—Lafayette's campaign.—Surrender of Cornwallis.—Peace with Great Britain.—See U.S.A.: 1779 (September-October), to 1783 (September).

1779-1786.—Settlement of boundaries with Pennsylvania.—The Pan-handle.—“In 1779 commissioners appointed by the two States met at Baltimore to agree upon the common boundaries of Pennsylvania and Virginia. . . . On both sides there was an evident desire to end the dispute. Various lines were proposed and rejected. On August 31

of Lord Shelbourne toward westward expansion.—“There exists some doubt as to whether or not the very slight occupation of the old north-west by the Virginians influenced the final disposition of territory in the treaty which closed the [American Revolutionary War]. . . . It is possible that the American Commissioners may have felt that their position in claiming the west for the new republic was somewhat strengthened by the knowledge of the success of [George Rogers Clark in his conquests in the west in 1778-1779], . . . but it is unbelievable that they would have demanded less, even had he failed, since the first boundaries proposed by Benjamin Franklin included all Canada as well as the West; and his argument in support of his proposal was that such generosity would win the affections of the Americans and separate them from France. . . . Although



MONTICELLO

Thomas Jefferson's residence in Albemarle County, Virginia

the commissioners signed this agreement: 'To extend Mason and Dixon's line due west five degrees of longitude, to be computed from the River Delaware, for the southern boundary of Pennsylvania, and that a meridian line drawn from the western extremity thereof to the northern limit of the said State be the western boundary of Pennsylvania forever.' This contract was duly ratified by the legislatures of the two States. In 1785 Mason and Dixon's line was extended, and the southwestern corner of Pennsylvania established. The 'Pan-handle' is what was left of Virginia east of the Ohio River and north of Mason and Dixon's line, after the boundary was run from this point to Lake Erie in 1786. . . . It received its name in legislative debate from Hon. John McMillan, delegate from Brooke County, to match the Accomac projection, which he dubbed the Spoon-handle."—B. A. Hinsdale, *Old Northwest*, p. 109 and footnote.

1779-1797.—Influence of Clark's conquest on the cession of the Northwest Territory to the United States by Great Britain.—Liberal policy

the demand for the cession of Canada was not persisted in, still the demand of the American commissioners was for the cession of a large extent of western territory, most of which was occupied by British troops, and which could not be claimed from the fact that in one corner of the region there were a few French villages, who, though without American garrisons, acknowledged the sovereignty of the thirteen colonies. . . . When . . . [Lord Shelbourne] was president of the board of trade . . . he had drafted the proclamation of 1763, which was the fundamental law of the west in the years preceding the revolutionary war. . . . During the negotiations of 1782 he gave expression to the same thought [of westward expansion] in a letter to his agent in Paris in the following words: 'For the good of America, whatever the Government may be, new provinces must be erected on those bank lands and down the Mississippi.' To a man holding such a view of the future of the west, whose principles had been completely liberalized by the free trade teachings of Adam Smith, Franklin's

argument that a stable peace could only be made by ceding sufficient territory in the west for the expansion of the restless frontier population was convincing; and there seems never to have entered Lord Shelburne's mind a doubt as to the expediency of granting such extensive boundaries, even though the territory was garrisoned by British troops. He granted what seemed to him necessary for the completion of a permanent peace. The basis then for the success of American diplomacy had been laid not by the victory of the arms of Virginia, not through the boldness of George Rogers Clark in winning the old northwest for the United States, but in the liberal principles held by a British statesman. There is certainly a note of justifiable pride for his act, the noblest of his life, in the following words penned by Lord Shelburne to an American friend in 1797: 'I cannot express to you the satisfaction I have felt in seeing the forts (of the northwest) given up. I may tell you in confidence what may astonish you as it did me, that up to the very last debate in the House of Lords, the Ministry did not appear to comprehend the policy upon which the boundary line was drawn, and persist in still considering it as a measure of necessity, not of choice. However, it is indifferent who understands it. The deed is done: and a strong foundation laid for eternal amity between England and America.'—C. W. Alvord, *Virginia and the West (Mississippi Valley Historical Review, June, 1916, pp. 34, 38)*.

1784.—Cession of Western territorial claims to the United States. See U.S.A.: 1781-1786.

1787-1788.—Formation and adoption of the Federal constitution. See U.S.A.: 1787; 1787-1789.

1788.—Debates in the Virginia convention for and against ratification of the Federal constitution.—The newly framed constitution of the United States was submitted to Virginia for ratification in 1788. In the state convention, "John Marshall spoke but little, yet always with signal success, for the new [Federal] government. His was a rare mind. He has been thought to have been without imagination, and deficient in the higher sensibilities, which give power to words. But he reasoned with resistless force; he seized upon the attention, and carrying it captive with him, pressed into the centre of opposing arguments, until they were undermined and destroyed. . . . In the balances of the Constitution, he found appropriate matter for an exercise of his analysis, and he unfolded them with a clearness and skill which made doubt irrational, and faith secure. James Innes was eloquent in behalf of the government proposed. He was Attorney-General of the State, and had been so closely employed in the Court of 'Oyer and Terminer,' that he could not attend the early stages of the debate. He did not utter a word until the very last day of the argument, but he then made a speech of great strength and beauty. Deprecating local prejudices, he asked, 'Had we this political jealousy in 1775? If we had, it would have damped our ardour and intrepidity, and prevented that unanimous resistance which enabled us to triumph over our enemies. It is not a *Virginian, Carolinian, or Pennsylvanian*, but the glorious name of an *American*, that extended from one end of the continent to the other, that was then beloved and confided in.' . . . But beyond all others, James Madison was the successful champion of the Constitution. He knew it in all its parts, from the most expanded to the most minute; he had been the author of many of

its provisions, and had studied its character with the eye of a philosophic patriot. He was ready to meet every objection brought against it, and did in fact, during the debate, defend it first as a whole, and then clause by clause, to the end. He showed the mixed nature of the scheme. Some objected because it was a government of the people: it *consolidated* instead of confederating, and melted the states into one popular mass; yet were there others who thought the states would have too much contact with Congress, and the people too little. Mr. Madison proved that the Government was in some respects popular, in some respects, federal. It was to be ratified by the people in conventions: in this it was popular; but by the people divided into thirteen sovereignties: in this it was federal. The House of Representatives were to be elected by the people: in this it was popular; but the Senate was to be equally filled from the states: in this it was federal. Congress was to have power to lay taxes on individuals: in this the Government was consolidated; but the states might effect amendments: in this it was confederate. The President was to be commander-in-chief of army and navy: this was a feature of consolidation; but the states might arm and train the militia: this preserved the confederacy. So ingenious a system was worthy of so able an advocate. The ranks of the opposers were marshalled and led on by Patrick Henry. We have seen enough of his past displays to know, that now when a subject was before him which enlisted his strongest feelings, he would not sink beneath it. Some of the most powerful speeches he ever delivered, were made during this debate. He felt alarm, apprehension for his country; the new government seemed to him to threaten her liberties; he feared its consolidating tendencies. He asked why Constitution had dared to say, 'We, the people,' instead of 'We, the states.' The powers of the President seemed to him enormous, ruinous. 'This Constitution is said to have beautiful features, but when I come to examine these features, sir, they appear to me horribly frightful. Among other deformities, it has an awful squinting: *it squints towards monarchy!*' The federal judiciary encountered his warm opposition. He could not separate from it the ideas of injustice, of expense, of hazard, to the people. As the time for a final vote approached, Mr. Henry's anxiety increased, and his eloquence grew more impressive. While he was once speaking, and when he had wrought his hearers to a paroxysm of feeling, a furious storm arose; lightnings flashed, thunder pealed, and rain poured down in torrents. At the same time the spirit of the orator had soared to 'etherial mansions,' and invoked celestial witnesses to view the crisis of his country. The effect could not be borne; the members rose in confusion, and the meeting was dissolved. Yet the attentive reader of the 'Debates,' will find in Mr. Henry's speeches, more of declamation than of argument; more appeals to passion, than addresses to reason. It was indeed found by the reporter, impossible to follow him in his loftiest flights, yet it is believed that all of sound logic that he presented, has been preserved, and it bears but a small proportion to his glowing remonstrances and passionate harangues. He entered the body determined to oppose the new government to the last, and this spirit made him indiscriminating. He found nothing to approve in the Constitution. Assuredly it could not have been expected that the wisest men in America should have debated four months, and yet pro-

duced nothing good; but it would be hard to find a single clause in the Constitution, which was received with favour by Patrick Henry. George Mason waged war upon the system. He had opposed it in Philadelphia, and now carried his struggle to the final vote in Virginia. He urged that it was not a federal but a national government; that the power to collect taxes directly from the people proved its character, and that no republic could long endure in a country as extensive as America. He thought the power of the President overwhelming, and strongly inveighed against the extensive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which was to cover 'law and fact.' Once he crossed swords violently with Mr. Madison, but before their colloquy was closed, all bitter feeling was removed. James Munroe opposed the government, at the head of which his country was afterwards to place him. He loved the Union, and believed that the states loved the Union; but he thought their government ought to be strictly a union of the states, and not a melting together of the people. He believed democratic independencies might safely confederate. The great leagues of the world passed in review before him: the Amphycyonic, the Achaen, the Germanic, the Swiss Cantons. Polybius furnished him with passages to prove the happy structure of the Achaen League, but the German principedoms were only kept together by danger and the Emperor. He compared the Confederation and the Constitution: add to the first absolute power over commerce, and he would approve it; take away from the last the power of direct taxes, and he would approve it. This right to tax the people was the point he dreaded: how could a few representatives from a country covering nearly a million of square miles, tell what would be most suitable subjects of taxation; what would least oppress, what would best be endured. . . . On the 25th day of June [1788] the final vote was taken on the question of ratification. Eighty-nine members voted in the affirmative, and seventy-nine in the negative. Thus *ten voices* made Virginia a party to the Federal Union under the New Constitution. Immediately after this vote, two committees were appointed, one to prepare and report a proper form for ratifying the system adopted; the other to prepare and report such amendments as, in their opinion, ought to be recommended for the new Government. The first committee soon reported a form, which was adopted without delay. It is cautiously worded, and though, in a spirit of high patriotism, it ratifies the Constitution in full, yet, in behalf of the people of Virginia, it declares the limits of Federal power, and the inviolability of the rights of conscience and of the press. The other committee reported on the 27th of June. They had prepared a Bill of Rights and a list of amendments, which they wished added to the Constitution. These were nearly identical with those previously offered by Patrick Henry, in his effort to obtain a conditional ratification. It will not be necessary to detail them in full; but it will be highly proper to show how far they finally prevailed, in order that we may see to what extent Virginia has been instrumental in securing liberty for America. Immediately after the new Government went into effect, amendments were proposed, and having been duly ratified by the Legislatures of nine states, were made parts of the Constitution. Nearly every material change suggested by Virginia was adopted. For, one article of amendment provided for freedom in religion, and of speech, and

of the press, and for the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition for redress of grievances. Others declared that the people should have a right to have and bear arms, that soldiers should not be improperly quartered in private houses; that no unreasonable searches and seizures should take place; that excessive bail, and excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments should not be. Others secured a fair trial by jury in criminal *and civil* cases, and took away the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in all cases where individuals sought to sue a state. And another said that, 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.'—R. H. Howison, *History of Virginia*, v. 2, pp. 324-329, 331-333.

1791-1792.—Separation of Kentucky and its admission to the Union as a state. See KENTUCKY: 1780-1792.

1798.—Nullifying resolutions of Madison. See U. S. A.: 1798.

19th century.—Educational development.—Field schools. See EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Evolution of public school system.

1800-1864.—Suffrage qualifications. See SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: United States: 1800-1864.

1808.—Embargo and its effects. See U. S. A.: 1804-1809; 1808.

1813.—Coasts raided by British naval parties. See U. S. A.: 1812-1813: Indifference to the navy.

1815-1833.—Currency demands.—Illegal banks.—Unsuccessful movements for state banks.—State convention.—Abolition of slavery issue.—“During and immediately following the second war with Great Britain, specie and bank-notes had become as scarce in the western counties as martins in the month of December. The iron makers, the salt and wool manufacturers, cattle raisers and small farmers now demanded some kind of money to carry on their legitimate operations and to aid in the completion of their contemplated works of internal improvement. The danger of dependence upon their northern neighbors was not considered sufficiently menacing to warrant granting their demands for relief. Consequently, they resorted to a sort of ‘moonshine’ enterprise to obtain it. They now supplied the demands for a currency by the use of illegal banks which sprang into existence in every small town and flooded the whole western country with worthless currency. Later these banks sought to sustain themselves by an appeal to the Assembly which was asked to accept the *status quo* and to legalize their issues. The refusal of these requests called forth other acts of defiance. The banking monopoly of Richmond was severely attacked; the immediate resumption of specie payment was demanded; grand juries presented the Assembly as an unjust and tyrannical body; and associations, not unlike those which went into the West at an earlier date and set up pioneer governments, were formed to protect the illegal banks. Persistence in their efforts brought about the enactment of a law to compel the banks of Virginia (there were only two each located at Richmond) to resume specie payment on or before November 15, 1816. . . . It was at this juncture that [Thomas Ritchie] . . . called upon Thomas Jefferson to publish his writings upon the subject of banking and classed the illegal bankers of western Virginia with the Tory traitors of New England. . . . The Assembly was called immediately to repeal the law requiring the resumption

of specie payment. But it completed its work by incorporating two new banks in western Virginia, one at Winchester, the other at Wheeling, and the illegal state banks were required to go out of business. . . . The unsuccessful movement for state banks was immediately responsible for a demand on the part of the westerners for a reform in the state constitution. . . . Accordingly a convention, composed mainly of representatives of the illegal banks, assembled at Winchester and issued a call for a larger and more representative convention to be held at Stanton, August 19, 1816. The slogan of the reformers was equal representation for equal numbers of free whites. . . . Had not the election of Adams diverted attention from local to national issues and had not the indiscretion of Giles created discord within the Democratic-Republican party of the state, the reform movement, set in motion by the banking interests of western Virginia in 1816, would doubtless have prevailed before 1828. It came near succeeding in 1825. . . . The westerners in their plans for controlling the organization of the convention [were] actuated by a desire to clinch the main point at issue, they demanded the white basis of representation, which would have given equal numbers of delegates for equal numbers of voters or equal numbers of the white population. On the other hand the easterners desired a mixed basis which would have considered property as well as population as a basis of representation in the proposed convention."—C. H. Ambler, *Thomas Ritchie: A study in Virginia politics*, pp. 66-68, 119.—"Discussions in the constitutional convention of 1829-30 and the abolition agitation caused the question of negro slavery to assume an alarming sectional aspect in this period. . . . The divergence of view between the east and the west on the subject of negro slavery resulted largely from economic causes. . . . The burden of the argument of the abolitionists was that negro slavery was an economic evil. . . . But the Virginia abolitionists, like those elsewhere, failed or refused to consider that negroes freed would still be negroes, and as repellent to white immigration as when slaves. They busied themselves chiefly with a slave problem, while their opponents were concerned with a negro problem. . . . Most of the speakers were of a younger generation and they addressed themselves to reach a more materially minded Virginia than did even the speakers of 1829-30. Another feature of the debates of 1831-32, not so marked a feature of prior discussions but of much subsequent importance, was the disposition of the pro-slavery men to place the western leaders in a place of discredit, to whip them into line, and to dub the most refractory with opprobrious epithets. Goode was especially resourceful in the use of these tactics. He characterized the abolition leaders as the Rufus Kings of the west; they were told that the east could expect nothing of them in the time of her calamity, should it ever come. . . . C. J. Faulkner and W. B. Preston were ridiculed for comparing the abolition movement to 'a great political revolution,' to the 'generous efforts of the Parisian patriots.' W. G. Summers was an object to suspicion because he found delight in the political theories of Thomas Jefferson. He was denominated the 'Byron of the west, walking on the mountain tops and gazing on the desolation which burns in the plains below.' In case abolition had diffused itself through the mountains, Goode was for immediate dismemberment, as the only alternative to the recurrence of the horrors of Saint Bartholomew. Few of the prominent western

leaders ever lived down the part they took in this debate. . . . Preston's amendment to the report of the select committee that, 'It is expedient to adopt some legislative amendment for the abolition of slavery,' was defeated: ayes 58, noes 73. . . . The House next took up a bill for the removal from the state of the free people of color. It provided for their compulsory removal and for an appropriation of \$100,000 to meet the first expenses thereof. The discussion of this bill turned upon whether or not coercion should be used and upon the amount of the appropriation. Delegates from the west opposed forced removals and so large an appropriation. As finally passed by the House the bill made the deportation of those already free voluntary and provided for an appropriation of \$35,000 to be used in 1832 and \$90,000 to be used in 1833."—C. H. Ambler, *Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861*, pp. 185-186, 193-194, 196-201.

1817.—Founding of University of Virginia. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1803-1825.

1821.—Decision of Supreme Court against Cohens in Lottery Ticket case. See COHENS VS. VIRGINIA.

1829-1850.—Internal improvement schemes.—First appearance of the German "invincibles."—Political readjustments.—Bank legislation.—Sectional division over abolition of slavery.—"Reform convention."—"The internal improvement schemes urged by advocates of the American System and the railways in process of construction westward from Baltimore were the important factors in shaping the internal improvement policies in Virginia during this period [1829]. Her legislators yet believed it possible to make Richmond a commercial rival of Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. Accordingly they . . . sought to revive interest in the proposed water communication between the James and the Kanawha rivers. . . . During the first years of this period the chief discussion, especially in the west, was to determine the policy of the Jackson administration on the subject of internal improvements. The constitutional convention of 1829-30 taught the west to expect little of the east in the way of roads and canals. . . . The Assembly of 1829-30 was flooded by the west with petitions asking the incorporation of internal improvement companies and appropriations thereto. . . . During these years the merits of railways and canals were subjects of much discussion. . . . In 1831 Winchester, a very small place, subscribed \$40,000 to be used in constructing a lateral road to the Baltimore and Ohio. About the same time Lynchburg subscribed \$300,000 to be used to construct a railroad between the James and New rivers. . . . The Assembly of 1830-31 incorporated a number of railway companies, but the acts of incorporation were determined largely by sectional interest. . . . By a combination of interests the same Assembly incorporated the Lynchburg and New River Railroad Company. . . . The Assembly of 1830-31 ended its work by rejecting a bill to appropriate two million dollars intended to aid the companies it had incorporated and internal improvements in general. Because of the scarcity of private capital in the west this defeat was a death blow to the Lynchburg and New River and the Staunton and Potomac railway companies."—C. H. Ambler, *Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861*, pp. 175, 178-181.—"In the elections of 1835 the Democrats elected a large majority to the Assembly and seventeen of the twenty-one representatives in Congress. This election marked the first appearance of the 'Tenth Legion of the Valley,' the German 'invincibles,' as a

factor in Virginia politics. . . . During the summer of 1835 most of the counties east of the Blue Ridge held one or more mass-meetings to denounce the abolitionists, to memorialize the Assembly regarding them, and to protest against the abolition of negro slavery in the District of Columbia. . . . The political readjustment of 1841 and 1842 enabled the Democrats to regain control of the Assembly and to reverse completely the course pursued by the Whig Assemblies. . . . By 1843 most of the prominent leaders residing east of the Blue Ridge had become Democrats, but the rank and file of that party continued to reside west of the mountains. . . . With the establishment of the Independent Treasury and the failure to re-charter a national bank, the subject of banking ceased to be of importance. The subject of internal improvements was an important one from a sectional standpoint during this period. . . . The most important sectional issue in Virginia during this period, however, was that which arose out of the movement for a united slaveholding South. Although the Virginia congressmen united to oppose the Wilmot Proviso, the abolition of the slave trade, and abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, leading citizens of western Virginia were at the same time trying to devise means to rid that portion of the state of negro slavery. . . . The movement for an extension of slave territory took quite a different form in eastern Virginia. . . . In 1850 the Assembly, under the control of the east, passed resolutions which recommended that the state send delegates to the proposed Nashville Convention and that the people assemble in district conventions to elect delegates, intrusted with sovereign power, to a general convention of the southern states. [See U. S. A.: 1850 (June).] . . . The patriotic devotion of the west to the Union did much to produce moderation in the east in 1850."—C. H. Ambler, *Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861*, pp. 223-225, 232-233, 239, 244-245, 249.—"In March, 1850, the General Assembly finally agreed to submit the question of calling another convention to the people, determining in advance, however, that the convention should be organized on the mixed basis (white population and taxation). This arrangement gave the East seventy-six delegates and the West fifty-nine, an eastern majority of seventeen; whereas, on the white basis, the East would have had sixty-one and the West seventy-four, a western majority of thirteen. In spite of the fact that the East controlled, the convention of 1850-51 is known as the reform convention. The apportionment of representatives for the House was finally fixed on the white basis, giving the West eighty-three delegates by the census of 1850, and the East sixty-nine, while the Senate was still based on an arbitrary apportionment of thirty to the East and twenty to the West. The West now had a majority of four on joint ballot. This convention also extended the suffrage to every male white over twenty-one years of age who had resided two years in the state and one year in the district. These two reforms, together with the popular election of governor and judges, changed Virginia from an aristocratic government into one of the most democratic in the Union."—J. A. C. Chandler, ed., *South in the building of the nation (History of the states, v. 1, History of the southern states, pp. 109)*.

1831.—Nat Turner insurrection of slaves. See SLAVERY: 1828-1832.

1851-1859.—Political record.—Gubernatorial election, 1855.—Anti-abolitionism.—Gubernatorial contest, 1859.—"The years immediately fol-

lowing 1851 marked a brief period of political record. In local politics the constitution of that year produced much the same effect as the compromise of the previous year had produced in national politics. Sectional controversies in the Assembly sank into insignificance; Joseph Johnson, the first governor of Virginia to be elected by a vote of the people was elected from the trans-Alleghany. . . . But forces were at work to terminate this brief period of activity in internal improvement and of political harmony. They first manifested themselves in national politics, when the Democratic state convention of 1852 refused to incorporate into its platform a plank declaring the Compromise of 1850 to be a permanent settlement of the questions therein embraced and adopted instead a plank declaring the doctrines of 1798 to be the fundamental principles of the Democratic party. This action alienated many former Whigs as well as some Democrats. . . . In the gubernatorial election of 1855 Henry A. Wise, of Accomac County, was the Democratic nominee and Thomas S. Flournoy, of Halifax, the Know-Nothing. Flournoy secured his nomination at a conference of party leaders, but Wise was nominated by a state convention. . . . Wise's administration was characterized by a continuous struggle between the conservative and radical wings of the Democratic party. . . . Under the leadership of Wise, of the surviving nullifiers and seceders of 1832, and of a corps of young politicians the radicals set about to make the Democratic party pro-southern and pro-slavery and at the same time to retain Wise's leadership in the west. . . . In the gubernatorial contest of 1859 each wing of the Democratic party had its candidate. Wise and the radicals favored the nomination of John W. Brockenbrough, an eastern man of strong pro-southern sympathy but well and favorably known in the west. . . . On the other hand, the conservatives, led by Hunter, favored the nomination of 'honest John' Letcher, the political idol of the Tenth Legion, the Democratic stronghold of the Valley. . . . Letcher received the Democratic nomination for governor, and William L. Goggin that of the opposition party. . . . Notwithstanding the fact that each candidate stood upon a pro-slavery platform, there can be no doubt that Letcher owed his election to his former utterances in favor of abolition and to the anti-slavery sentiment of the west."—C. H. Ambler, *Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861*, pp. 300, 302, 305-307, 319-320, 323-325.

1859.—John Brown's invasion at Harper's Ferry. See U. S. A.: 1859.

1861 (January-June).—Attempted peace-making.—Ordinance of secession passed.—Separation of West Virginia, which adhered to the Union.—"Early in January, 1861, the Virginia Assembly met at Richmond to determine the action of the Commonwealth in the approaching struggle. It was plain that war was coming unless the authorities of the United States and of the seceding States would listen to reason; and the first proceedings of the Assembly looked to peace and the restoration of fraternal union. Virginia recommended to all the States to appoint deputies to a Peace Convention. [See U. S. A.: 1861 (February): Peace Convention.] . . . Thus ended in failure the first attempt of Virginia to preserve the national peace; and the crisis demanded that she should promptly decide upon her course. On February 13 (1861) a Convention assembled at Richmond, and a Committee was appointed on Federal Relations. On March 10 (1861), this Committee reported fourteen resolutions protesting against all

interference with slavery; declaring secession to be a right; and defining the grounds on which the Commonwealth would feel herself to be justified in exercising that right, namely: the failure to obtain guarantees; the adoption of a warlike policy by the government of the United States; or the attempt to exact the payment of duties from the seceded States, or to reinforce or recapture the Southern forts. These resolves clearly define the attitude of Virginia at this critical moment. After prolonged discussion, all but the last had passed the Convention when intelligence came that war had begun. The thunder of cannon from Charleston harbor broke up the political discussion. . . . Mr. Lincoln had expressed himself in his inaugural with perfect plainness. Secession was unlawful, and the Union remained unbroken; it was his duty to execute the laws, and he should perform it. To execute the laws it was necessary to have an army; and (April 15, 1861) President Lincoln issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 troops from the States remaining in the Union. The direct issue was thus presented, and Virginia was called upon to decide the momentous question whether she would fight against the South or against the North. . . . As late as the first week in April the Convention had refused to secede by a vote of 89 to 45. Virginia was conscientiously following her old traditions and would not move. Now the time had come at last. . . . On the 17th of April, two days after the Federal proclamation, the Convention passed an ordinance of secession and adherence to the Southern Confederacy, by a vote of 88 to 55, which was ratified by the people by a majority of 96,750 votes, out of a total of 161,018. West Virginia refused to be bound by the action of the Convention, and became a separate State, but the Virginia of the Tidewater and Valley went with the South."—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pt. 3, ch. 22.—Of the 46 delegates from the territory now comprising West Virginia, 29 voted against the ordinance of secession, 9 for it, 7 were absent and one excused. Those who voted against it hastened to leave the city, and on reaching their homes, became generally the leaders of a movement to separate their section of the state from the Old Dominion. On May 13 a convention of delegates from the counties of northwestern Virginia was held at Wheeling, by the action of which a more general convention was called and held at the same place on June 11. The latter convention assumed the power to reorganize the government of the state of Virginia.—Based on V. A. Lewis, *History of West Virginia*, ch. 21-23.

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 3, ch. 25, v. 4, ch. 19.—J. E. Cooke's *Virginia*, pt. 3, ch. 22.—J. C. McGregor, *Disruption of Virginia*.

1861 (April).—Governor Letcher's reply to President Lincoln's call for troops.—Richmond held by state authorities. See U.S.A.: 1861 (April).

1861 (April).—Seizure of Harper's Ferry and Norfolk navy yard. See U.S.A.: 1861 (April): Activity in Virginia and Maryland.

1861 (June-November).—Loyal state government organized in West Virginia.—Steps taken toward separation from the old state.—A convention held on June 11 in West Virginia declared the state offices of Virginia vacant by reason of the treason of those who had been elected to hold them, and proceeded to form a regular state organization, with Francis H. Pierpont for the executive head. Maintaining that the loyal people were entitled to speak for the whole state they declared that their government was the government of Vir-

ginia. They subsequently admitted delegates from Alexandria and Fairfax counties in Middle Virginia and from Accomac and Northampton counties on the eastern shore. Thus organized, the government was acknowledged by Congress as the government of Virginia and senators and representatives were admitted to seats. The Pierpont Government, as it was called, then adopted an ordinance on Aug. 20, 1861, providing "for the formation of a new State out of a portion of the territory of this State." The ordinance was approved by a vote of the people, and on November 26 the convention assembled in Wheeling to frame a constitution for the new government.—Based on J. G. Blaine, *Twenty years of Congress*, v. 1, ch. 21.—See also WEST VIRGINIA: 1861-1862; 1863; BORDER STATES.

1861 (July).—Richmond made the capital of the Southern Confederacy.—"The Conspiracy had no intention originally of establishing its seat of government at Richmond. That was a part of the price exacted by Virginia for her secession, and it was not paid without reluctance. It is to be remembered that at that time everything seemed to turn on what the Border States would do. . . . By establishing the seat of government at Richmond, it became certain that the most powerful of the Southern armies would always be present in Virginia. If Virginia had been abandoned, all the Border States would have gone with the North. . . . The Confederates having determined on the transfer of their seat of government to Richmond, the necessary preparations were completed and their Congress opened its first session in that city on the 20th of July, 1861."—J. W. Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, v. 2, ch. 39.—See also BORDER STATES.

1861-1865.—Battleground of the Civil War. See U.S.A.: 1861 (May: Virginia), and after.

1865 (April).—Last meeting of the secession legislature.—President Lincoln's permit. See U.S.A.: 1865 (April: Virginia): President Lincoln at Richmond.

1865 (May-July).—Recognition of Pierpont state government by President Johnson. See U.S.A.: 1865 (May-July).

1867-1876.—Constitutional convention.—Fourteenth Amendment ratified.—Re-admission to the Union.—State credit.—Re-adjusters.—"Reconstruction in Virginia followed the same general course which it took elsewhere in the South. . . . The old Commonwealth became the Military District of Virginia, and Pierpont and the other civil officials exercised their offices merely at the pleasure of the district commander. Fortunately, General John M. Schofield, who was first assigned to the district, and his immediate successor, General Canby, were intelligent, honest, and humane men; but their work was prescribed for them. The electorate of Virginia was completely changed by the acts of Congress. Negroes were permitted to vote on the question of holding a Constitutional Convention and at the election of the delegates, and the white men who had held the higher public offices before the war and then entered the Confederate service, the leaders of their various communities, were not permitted to vote. For the first time since the slave ship landed at Jamestown, African negroes were admitted into the body politic. This, next to emancipation, was doubtless the greatest change in the constitution of Virginian society that had ever come about. Even the separation from Great Britain did not so profoundly affect the internal life of the Commonwealth. Twenty-four negroes sat in the Constitutional Convention of 1867-68. With various Northern men

who had recently come into the State, and a lesser number of native white men who had gone over to the Republicans, they had a majority of the body. The Constitution which it framed granted the suffrage to their race and denied it to those white men who had held important public offices before the war and afterwards served the Confederacy. A test oath was also prescribed which would have excluded from office under the new Constitution the leading men of the State. However, through the zealous labors of a committee of conservative whites, Congress was persuaded to submit the disfranchising and disqualifying clauses separately. They were defeated. The rest of the Constitution was accepted by the people, and when, in January, 1870, Virginia, having chosen a legislature which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, was readmitted to that Union of which her own illustrious sons had been the master-builders, her white and black citizens were on a footing of equality in politics and before the law. The Freedmen's Bureau, which had been set up to aid and protect the negroes, was disestablished in 1869, and the two races were also left to find for themselves a new industrial and social relation. . . . Such a division among the whites arose before long over the question of the debt. In the old days, whatever else might be said of Virginia's government, it was certainly an honest government. The credit of the State had been guarded so well that at times her bonds sold higher than the bonds of the national government. Most of the debt had been incurred through schemes of internal improvement. In 1861, the aggregate was nearly \$39,000,000. During the war, the interest payments were for the first time suspended. The accumulation of the interest, and the refusal of West Virginia to assume any part of the obligation, left upon the people of Virginia, impoverished as they were, and harassed and distracted by misgovernment, a burden which was for the time too heavy for them. The Pierpont legislature found it necessary to reduce temporarily the rate of interest, but declared that there was no purpose to repudiate the debt. In 1871, when it had risen to \$47,000,000, the Radical legislature refunded it, principal and interest, issuing new obligations to the amount of two-thirds of the whole. It was held that West Virginia must assume the other third. The interest coupons of the new bonds were made receivable for all public dues, and the bond-holders readily accepted the terms. The result, however, was that the taxes were paid so generally in the coupons that not enough money was collected to pay the expenses of the government. Accordingly, the Legislature enacted the very next year that the coupons should no longer be receivable for taxes; but the bondholders brought the matter before the courts, and the repealing act was pronounced unconstitutional. The people began to divide on the question, and a party opposed to the bondholders, and in favor of readjusting the debt,—that is to say, of repudiating it in part or in whole,—promptly arose. William Mahone, a shrewd and ambitious man, commended to popular favor by valiant services in war, became its leader. After some years of agitation, he and his followers got control of the government; and among his followers were the great mass of the negroes. The State courts, as well as the legislature and the executive offices, were filled with Readjusters, and but for the protection of the Federal courts, and to a certain extent of the Federal executive also, extended under that clause of the Federal Constitution which forbids a State to break or impair its contracts, the creditors of Virginia would have lost the bulk, as

indeed they did lose a considerable part, of their claims. This was a great descent from earlier standards. But the lowering of the whole tone of the public service, the putting of unfit men into office, the trickery and jobbery had come to prevail, were even more humiliating to high-minded Virginians. By an extraordinary political uprising, the Readjusters were driven from power, and the white man's party has from that time continued to control, though once again, when the whole country was divided over financial questions, there was some division in its ranks. More and more impressed with the conviction that the right of the negroes to vote and to hold office, even though they did not actually get a share of the power,—even though they in great part failed altogether to exercise their privileges,—was baneful to the political life of the Commonwealth, the white people again and again considered plans to undo that part of Reconstruction."—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pp. 509-513.—See also U. S. A.: 1865 (May-July); 1868-1870: Reconstruction complete; 1868-1876.

1869-1902.—Organization of public school system.—In 1869, the Peabody Fund came to assist in the establishment of public schools in Virginia. "The public free school system went into effect in the fall of 1870. It was modeled upon tried systems; and instead of decentralized district system which had already proved unsatisfactory in New England, a centralized system was, from necessity, at once inaugurated. The administrators were a state board of education, a superintendent of public instruction, division superintendents, and district trustees. The state board of education was composed of the governor, attorney-general, and superintendent of public instruction. . . . From 1870 to 1882 it gradually became less centralized. From 1882 to 1902 no noteworthy changes were made in the system; but the new constitution of 1902 . . . again centralized the administration in the state board of education."—F. A. Magruder, *Recent administration in Virginia*, pp. 17, 20.

ALSO IN: E. W. Knight, *Reconstruction and education in Virginia* (*South Atlantic Quarterly*, January and April, 1916).

1901-1906.—Constitutional convention.—Organization of the State Corporation Commission.—Bureau of Insurance.—"In 1901, after much discussion, a Constitutional Convention was elected to change the suffrage laws. Following the example of other Southern States, it set itself to devise a plan which should deprive the great mass of the negroes of the suffrage and yet permit even illiterate white men to vote. To do this without violating the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or incurring that lessening of Virginia's representation at Washington which the Fourteenth Amendment threatened, was no easy task. . . . By requiring various qualifications for registration, particularly literacy and property, and by exempting from these requirements all who had served in warfare and their descendants, the convention accomplished its principal design. Any serious participation of negroes in the political life of the State was apparently made impossible."—J. E. Cooke, *Virginia*, pp. 513-514.—"In the new constitution of 1902 one-third of the long document is devoted to a detailed provision for a unique commission to be known as the 'State Corporation Commission.' . . . The commission is composed of three members, one being appointed by the governor every alternate February for a term of six years, at a salary of \$4000 per annum, with \$500 extra for the chairman. One of the three must have the qualifications prescribed for members of the supreme court of appeals; and

each must take oath that he has no financial interest in any transportation or transmission company. . . . Its functions are legislative, judicial, and executive. It creates, regulates, and supervises all domestic corporations, except municipal corporations and institutions owned by the State; and it regulates and supervises all foreign corporations permitted to do business in the State. The legislative functions of the commission are to prescribe rates and classifications for transportation companies; to prescribe rates for transmission companies; and to prescribe other regulations, such as demurrage charges. The constitution of 1902 provided that a bureau of insurance, a bureau of banking, and other bureaus might be established within the department of the state corporation commission by the General Assembly. In 1906 a bureau of insurance was established under the supervision and control of the corporation commission."—F. A. Magruder, *Recent administration in Virginia*, pp. 513-514, 151, 159.

1907.—Jamestown Tercentennial Exposition. See JAMESTOWN TERCENTENNIAL EXPOSITION.

1908.—Origin of city manager plan of municipal government in Staunton. See CITY MANAGER PLAN OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: Origin.

1908-1920. — Legislation. — Constitutional amendments.—"In 1908 the General Assembly created a department of public health with an annual appropriation of \$40,000, and a new state board of health superseded the old one. The present board consists of twelve men who must be members of the State Medical Society. The governor appoints three annually to serve for four years, and one must live in each congressional district, with two additional ones from the city of Richmond. . . . In 1910 the General Assembly, upon a recommendation of the State Dental Association, passed an act requiring all future candidates for the profession of dentistry also to pass an examination for the practice of medicine."—F. A. Magruder, *Recent administration in Virginia*, p. 122.—Between 1910 and 1920 ten amendments to the constitution were adopted, covering the reelection of city and town treasurers, and a commission of revenue; classification of cities according to population and providing forms of city and town governments. In 1912, a department of mines was created, and a primary election law passed which did not include presidential elections. In 1914 a state Forestry Commission was established, and a state prohibition amendment was adopted. Four years later, on Jan. 10, 1918, the Federal Prohibition (Eighteenth) Amendment was ratified. In 1915, a permanent Tax Board was created consisting of the governor, an auditor, and the chairman of the State Corporation Commission. In 1916, the State Board of Health was given control over all water supplies which might endanger the public, and a state art commission was constituted. In 1918, the hours of labor for women and children were so amended as to bring them up to the Federal standard. The minimum age for employment was raised to sixteen years, and a workmen's compensation act was passed. An elective law covering both public and private employees was put in operation. The law excluded domestic servants, farm laborers, and casual employees, also railroad employees covered by Federal and state liability laws. An industrial commission was provided to administer the workmen's compensation system. In this year, 1918, a Mothers' Pension law was enacted; and the principle of the uniform Family Desertion Acts was adopted. (See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: United States: 1893-1918.) William

Hodges was governor of the state from 1910 to 1914. He was succeeded in the executive office by Henry Carter Stuart.

1915.—Case against West Virginia settled. See SUPREME COURT: 1914-1916; WEST VIRGINIA: 1906-1915.

1918.—Adoption of budget system.—Its chief features.—"Budget Bill."—Effect on governor's veto.—"After a careful study of ways and means to place the government of Virginia on an efficient 'war' basis by the Virginia Commission on Economy and Efficiency, the conclusion was reached that the one thing that more than anything else would place the state government on a more business-like basis and enable it to function more efficiently in meeting the demands of the war would be the introduction of a modern budget system. The commission accordingly drafted a budget law and embodied it in its report to the general assembly in January. With the approval and support of Governor Westmoreland Davis, who was inaugurated on February 1, [1918], this law was introduced as a bill in both houses of the assembly and promptly adopted. . . . The act was approved by Governor Davis on February 19, 1918, and . . . [took] effect on June 21, 1918. . . . The [new] law places ample safeguards over the treasury, and places definite responsibility on the governor, who is constituted 'chief budget officer of the state,' to frame an intelligent financial policy for the conduct of the state's business. The Virginia budget law requires that every two years all state agencies shall report their financial needs to the governor in itemized form before the first of November preceding the January meeting of the general assembly. These estimates must be filed with the governor in the form prescribed by him. . . . All bills introduced in either house, carrying appropriations, shall be itemized in accordance with the classifications used in the budget.' As will be seen, this provision forces an early consideration of the administration's work program, directs attention to the financial needs of the state and to the condition of the treasury; and checks the flood of local and 'political' appropriation measures until after the general assembly has had an opportunity properly to consider and provide for the constructive and vital business of the state."—L. Hodges, *Virginia war economy and budget system* (*Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, July, 1918, pp. 50-53).

1918-1922.—Part in World War.—Legislation.—During the World War, the state furnished 98,566 men to the expeditionary forces of the United States, or 1.96 per cent of the national forces. A national army camp, Camp Lee, was located near Petersburg, a special artillery camp was located at Lee Hall, and an engineer camp at Accotink. Embarkation camps were organized at Newport News, Camp Hill, and Camp Stuart. In 1920 an agricultural experiment station was established; a commission to study the condition of the blind was created; an act was passed for the regulation of fire insurance; a Workmen's Compensation Act was passed (see SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: United States: 1920) and the powers of the building and loan association were extended. During this period of legislation (1918-1922) Westmoreland Davis was governor of the state. In 1922 the voters pronounced against the proposed call for a constitutional convention by a majority of more than 51,000 "The Virginia legislature which adjourned on March 11, 1922, passed three important educational bills. The first provides for a new plan of adopting and distributing text books. The second provided for the county

as the unit of school administration, by which the number of school boards of the state is reduced from 643 to 120. The third bill makes education compulsory between the ages of eight and fourteen for public school children during the entire school session, unless the elementary course of study has been completed before fourteen years of age."—*New educational legislation in Virginia (School and Society, Mar. 25, 1922, p. 332)*.

Also in: W. H. Foote, *Sketches of Virginia*.—V. W. Smith, *History of first discovery and settlement of Virginia*.—E. D. Neill, *History of the Virginia Company of London*.—B. B. Mumford, *Virginia's attitude towards slavery and secession*.—T. J. Wertenfaker, *Virginia under the Stuarts*.—D. I. Bushnell, *Virginia from early records*.—P. A. Bruce, *Institutional history of Virginia in the seventeenth century*.—A. C. Gordon, *Men and events and chapters of Virginia history*.—J. C. McGregor, *Disruption of Virginia*.—*Swiss colonies (Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Richmond, 1921, v. 20)*.—O. P. Chitwood, *Justice in colonial Virginia (Johns Hopkins University Studies, v. 23)*.—C. W. Sams, *Conquest of Virginia, the forest primeval*.—E. J. Miller, *Legislature of the province of Virginia*.—R. Hakluyt, *Third voyage to Virginia*.—H. S. Burrage, ed., *Early English and French voyages chiefly from Hakluyt, 1534-1608*.—R. M. Hughes, *Government of Virginia prior to the Federal constitution (Constitutional Review, October, 1922)*.

VIRGINIA, University of.—"In 1816 the Legislature of Virginia authorized the president and directors of the Literary Fund to report a plan for a university at the next session of the Assembly. The committee made a full report as requested, but nothing was accomplished beyond bringing the subject of education prominently before the people. At the legislative session of 1817-18 that part of the bill relating to a university and the education of the poor was passed. . . . In the bill authorizing the establishment of the university, it was provided that the sum of \$45,000 per annum should be given for the education of the poor, and \$15,000 to the university. The commissioners having reported in favor of Central College as the most convenient place in Albemarle County, the Legislature decided, after much discussion, to locate the university at Charlottesville, and to assume the property and site of Central College. The commissioners embodied in their report an exhaustive plan for a university chiefly from the pen of Thomas Jefferson."—F. W. Blackmar, *Bureau of Education, circular of information, 1890, no. 1, pp. 174-175*.—See also **UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES**: 1803-1825.

Also in: H. B. Adams, *Thomas Jefferson and the University of Virginia (Bureau of Education, Circular of Information, 1888, no. 1)*.

VIRGINIA, West. See **WEST VIRGINIA**.

VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS. See U.S.A.: 1708.

VIRGINIA COMPANY. See **VIRGINIA**: 1606-1607; 1622-1624; **MARYLAND**: 1632.

VIRGINIA DYNASTY.—"With but slight intermission from the days of Washington to those of Monroe, the tobacco planters under the Virginia dynasty had ruled the nation. . . . Sad indeed was the spectacle of Virginia's ancient aristocracy [in 1830]. It had never been a luxurious society. The very wealthy planters, with vast cultivated estates and pretentious homes, were in the minority. . . . The plantation was a little world in itself. . . . The leading planters served as justices of the peace, but they were not dependent for their selection

upon the popular vote. . . . The county government of Virginia was distinctly aristocratic. . . . Almost no large cities were found in Virginia. The court-house was hardly more than a meeting-place for the rural population. . . . Such were, in the main, the characteristics of that homespun plantation aristocracy which, through the Virginia dynasty, had ruled the nation in the days of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe."—F. J. Turner, *Rise of the new west, pp. 50, 59-61*.—One of the constitutional amendments proposed by the Hartford Convention (1814) was due to New England opposition to the "Virginia Dynasty." This proposed amendment provided that the president should never be chosen twice successively from the same state.—See also U.S.A.: 1814 (December).

VIRGINIA PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. See U.S.A.: 1787.

VIRGINIA VS. WEST VIRGINIA (1915). See **SUPREME COURT**: 1914-1916.

VIRGINIUS AFFAIR (1873). See **CUBA**: 1868-1895.

VIRIATHUS (died c. 139 B.C.), Lusitanian rebel and guerilla chief. Brought into collision with Rome because of his predatory excursions into neighboring Spanish territory. See **LUSITANIA**.

VISAYAS, or Bisayas, central group of the Philippine islands, constituting one of the four main insular groups. The islands of Leyte and Samar, in the Visayas group, were swept by an immense wave caused by a cyclone, in October, 1897, thousands of natives being killed, and much property destroyed. See **PHILIPPINE ISLANDS**: Geographical features; People.

VISCONTI, celebrated Italian family, rulers of Milan. See **MILAN**: 1277-1447; 1447-1454; **ITALY**: 1402-1406.

Visconti, Azzo (1302-1339), son of Galeazzo I, lord of Milan, 1328-1339. See **MILAN**: 1277-1447.

Visconti, Bernabò (1319-1385), nephew of Lucchino, whom he succeeded as lord of Milan in 1349. Ruled jointly with Galeazzo II. See **MILAN**: 1277-1447; **VENICE**: 1379-1381.

Visconti, Filippo Maria (1391-1447), son of Gian Galeazzo. Nominal ruler of Pavia, 1402; duke of Milan, 1412-1447. See **ITALY**: 1412-1447.

Visconti, Galeazzo I (1277-1328), duke of Milan, 1322-1328. See **MILAN**: 1277-1447.

Visconti, Galeazzo II (1320-1378), nephew of Lucchino, whom he succeeded in 1349. Ruled jointly with Bernabò; held court at Pavia. See **MILAN**: 1277-1447.

Visconti, Gian Galeazzo (1347-1402), son of Galeazzo II, duke of Milan, 1378-1402. The most powerful of the Visconti family. See **MILAN**: 1277-1447; **FLORENCE**: 1390-1402.

Visconti, Giovanni Maria (1380-1412), son of Gian Galeazzo, duke of Milan, 1402-1412; assassinated by the Ghibelline partisans. See **ITALY**: 1412-1447.

Visconti, Lucchino (1287-1340), uncle of Azzo, ruler of Milan, 1339-1349. See **MILAN**: 1277-1447.

Visconti, Matteo, the Great (1255-1322), nephew of Ottone, whom he succeeded as political leader of Milan, 1295. See **MILAN**: 1277-1447; **ITALY**: 1310-1313; Visitation of Emperor Henry VII; 1313-1330.

Visconti, Ottone (1208-1295), archbishop of Milan, 1262-1295.

Visconti, Valentina (1366-1408), daughter of Gian Galeazzo, the grandmother of Louis XII. Through her Louis XII derived his claims to Milan. See **MILAN**: 1447-1454; **ITALY**: 1499-1500.

VISCONTI-VENOSTA, Emilio, Marquis (1829-1914), Italian statesman. Appointed adviser

to Farini, 1860; minister of foreign affairs, 1863-1864; 1869-1876; 1896-1898; 1899-1901; ambassador to Constantinople, 1866; Italian representative at Algeçiras, 1906. See ITALY: 1906: Part of Italy at Algeçiras conference.

VISÉ, town of Belgium, about ten miles south of Maastricht. It was occupied by the Germans in 1914. See WORLD WAR: 1914: I. Western front: a; Miscellaneous auxiliary services; X. Alleged atrocities, etc.: a, 2.

VISHNU, second deity of the Hindu trinity. He is the preserver who has several times taken human form to save mankind from some great evil or peril. Certain sects worship him as the supreme god. See BRAHMANISM: Essential features; MYTHOLOGY: Indian: Unparalleled length of life; JUGGERNAUT.

VISIGOTHS. See GOTHS; EUROPE: Introduction to the historic period: Migrations; CADIZ: 5th-8th centuries; CARTAGENA: 409-713; FRANKS: 511-752.

VISINE, Denis Ivanovitch von (1744-1792), Russian dramatist. See RUSSIAN LITERATURE: 1752-1816.

VISIT AND SEARCH, Right of. See SEARCH, RIGHT OF.

VISITOR-GENERAL.—In Spanish institutional history, the visitor-general "was a direct personal representative of the king, a kind of *legatus a latere*, clothed with extraordinary powers, limited only by the particular instructions which were given him with his commission. He was, in civil and military, what the grand inquisitor was in ecclesiastical affairs, except that the visitor-general was not restricted in his investigations by any vain distinctions between the temporal and spiritual domains. The office of visitor-general had been used in Spanish America back in the days of the earliest viceroys, and the early records are filled with evidences of the conflict between these two high offices. [The most celebrated example of the exercise of this office is to be seen in the career of José de Gálvez who was visitor-general in Spanish America from 1761 to 1774.]—D. E. Smith, *Viceroy of New Spain*, p. 113.

ALSO IN: H. I. Priestly, *José de Gálvez, visitor-general of New Spain*.—C. E. Chapman, *Founding of Spanish California*.

VISTULA, river of Poland, flowing into the Baltic. Part of its lower course is bounded on the east by East Prussia, and on it are situated Cracow, Ivangorod, Warsaw, Plotsk, Thorn and the free city of Danzig at the mouth. In 1914 and 1915 the Germans and Russians disputed possession of its middle course.—See also WORLD WAR: 1915: III. Eastern front: a, 6; g, 8; i, 4.

VITAL STATISTICS. See STATISTICS; EUGENICS: Meaning and purpose; INSURANCE: Life insurance: Early forms.

VITEBSK, capital of the former Russian government of the same name, in Latvia. The town came under the dominion of the Lithuanians in 1320. It was under Polish sovereignty during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and was annexed to Russia in 1772. By the Russo-Latvian Treaty of Aug. 11, 1920, the three western districts of the province, Dvinsk, Reshitza and Lutsin, were ceded to Latvia and were called Latgalia. See POLAND: 1921: Peace treaty with Russia; RUSSIA: Map of Russia and the new border states.

Battle of. See RUSSIA: 1812 (June-September).

VITELLIUS, Aulus (15-69 A. D.), Roman emperor, Jan. 2 to Dec. 22, 69 A. D. See ROME: Empire: A. D. 69.

VITERBO, city of Italy, fifty-four miles north-west of Rome. The trial of the Camorristas for the Cuocolo murder was held here. See CAMORRA: 1906-1912.

Treaty of (1515). See FRANCE: 1515-1518.

VITGEFT, Admiral (d. 1904), commander of the Russian naval forces at the siege of Port Arthur. See JAPAN: 1902-1905.

VITIGES, or Witiges (d. 542), king of the Ostrogoths, 536-540. See ROME: Medieval city: 535-553.

VITRUVIUS (Marcus Vitruvius Pollio) (fl. 1st century B. C.), Roman architect and engineer. See AGORA.

VITTORIA, Battle of (1813). See SPAIN: 1812-1814.

VITTORINO DA FELTRE, or Vittore dei Rambaldoni. See FELTRE, VITTORINO DA.

VITTORIO VENETO, Battle of. See WORLD WAR: 1918: IV. Austro-Italian theater: c.

VIVIANI, René (1863-), French statesman and former Socialist leader. Deputy for the department of Creuse, 1906; appointed minister of labor, 1906; minister of public instruction, 1913; appointed premier by President Poincaré, July, 1914; resigned that office in 1915 and became minister of justice; supported the League of Nations and was one of the French delegates to the Washington conference, November, 1921.—See also FRANCE: 1914 (August-September); 1915 (October); WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 48; 76; U. S. A.: 1917 (April-May).

VIVONNE, Catherine de, Marquise de Rambouillet (1588-1665), French social leader, famous for her influence on the literature and society of her time. See RAMBOUILLET, HÔTEL DE.

VIZCAÍNO, Sebastián (c. 1550-1615), Spanish explorer. Conducted an expedition along the California coast, 1602-1603. See CALIFORNIA: 1543-1781.

VIZCAYA, province in Spain. See BASQUE PROVINCES.

VIZIR, or Vizier, originally the chief minister or public representative of the Abassid caliphs. The office of vizier spread from the Arabs to most other Mohammedan peoples. "Like the Sassanian emperors, the Caliph was not only the divinely appointed ruler, but the embodiment of the government itself. His word was literally law, and his caprice might at any moment overturn the most careful calculations of the ministers, or deprive them of life, power, or liberty, during the performance of their most active duties, or at a most critical juncture. It was very seldom, however, that this awful personage condescended to trouble himself about the actual details of the executive government. The Vizier, as the word implies [Vizier, in Arabic *Wazir*, means "one who bears a burden,"—(Footnote)], was the one who bore the real burden of the State, and it was both his interest and that of the people at large to keep the Caliph himself as inactive as possible, and to reduce him, in fact, to the position of a mere puppet."—E. H. Palmer, *Haroun Alraschid, Caliph of Bagdad*, ch. 1.—See also SUBLIME PORTE; NABOB; INDIA: Political divisions.

VLADIMIR, Saint (c. 956-1015), grand duke of Kiev and of all Russia. First Christian sovereign of Russia, 980-1015. See RUSSIA: 10th-11th centuries; CHRISTIANITY: 10th-18th centuries; UKRAINE: Origin of the people.

VLADIMIR, town of Russia, capital of the government of the same name. It was founded in the twelfth century, and was the chief town of the Russian settlements under the rule of the

Mongols, 1242-1328. See RUSSIA: 1054-1237; also Map: Growth of Russia in Europe, 1300-1796; UKRAINE: Origin of the people.

VLADISLAUS. See WLADISLAUS; LADISLAUS.

VLADIVOSTOK, city of Siberia, chief Russian seaport on the Pacific, and terminus of the Trans-Siberian railway. It is located in the southern tip of the Maritime province, with its harbor on the Japan sea. (See PACIFIC OCEAN: Map.) Vladivostok was founded in 1860. As the naval base for the Pacific fleet of the Russian empire, it was the center of military and naval operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905. (See JAPAN: 1902-1905.) In the World War it was the objective of the Siberian expedition. Following the revolution in Russia, it was the center of the All-Russian government or Republic of Siberia under Admiral Kolchak. As the reorganization of Russia proceeded under the Bolsheviks, Vladivostok was included in the Far Eastern Republic. Red troops occupied the city in 1923, and the American consulate was closed. The population at that time was 91,464.—See also RUSSIA: 1918-1920; JAPAN: 1921.

VLAKHS, Vlachs, Wallachs, or Arumani, names applied to the people of the Rumanian race, though not adopted by the people themselves. The total number of Vlachs is estimated at about eleven millions. When the Roman emperor Trajan conquered Dacia in 101 A. D., he planted Roman colonists beyond the Danube. These, mingling with the native Dacians, formed a community which still preserves, in language and in sympathy, and even in its name of Rumania, its connection with the Latin peoples of the West. This community was the first to be submerged by the barbarian inroads from the north and east; but the ancestors of the Rumanians withdrew to the mountains, to emerge again after the flood had subsided, and to produce one of the chief factors of the ages old Balkan problem.—See also RUMANIA: B. C. 5th century-A. D. 1241; 13th-18th centuries; ALBANIA: Medieval period; BULGARIA: 12th century.

VOCATES, ancient tribe of Aquitaine. See AQUITAINE: Ancient tribes.

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION. See EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Beginning of commercial education; Industrial education; also Modern developments: 20th century: Vocational education; Workers' education: United States.

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION ACT, Ontario (1921). See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: Canada.

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION ACTS: United States (1918, 1920). See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: World War and education: Re-education.

VOCLAD, or Vouglé, Battle of (507). See GOTHS: 507-509.

VOCONIAN LAW.—The object of the Viconian law, passed at Rome about 169 B. C. under the auspices of Cato the censor, "was to limit the social influence of women, by forbidding rich citizens to make them heiresses of more than one half of their whole estate."—W. Ihne, *History of Rome*, v. 4, bk. 6, ch. 12.—See also WOMAN'S RIGHTS: B. C. 300-A. D. 300.

VODIÆ, early Celtic tribe. See IRELAND: Tribes of early Celtic inhabitants.

VOGEL, Hermann Wilhelm (1834-1898), German chemist. Experimented in photography. See INVENTIONS: 19th century: Photography.

VOGEL, Sir Julius (1835-1899), British colonial statesman. Head of provincial government of New

Zealand, 1866-1869; colonial treasurer, commissioner of stamps, postmaster-general, 1869-1872, 1884-1887; premier, 1873-1875, 1876. See NEW ZEALAND: 1870-1876; 1870-1890.

VOGEL VON FALCKENSTEIN, Eduard (1797-1885), Prussian general. In charge of the army in western Germany during the Seven Weeks' War, 1866. See GERMANY: 1866.

VOGT. See ADVOCATUS; SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: 1000-1300.

VOGULS, eastern branch of the Finnish race, living in the Ural mountains, Russia. See HUNGARY: Origin of Hungarians.

VOITURE, Vincent (1598-1648), French poet. See FRENCH LITERATURE: 1608-1715.

VOIVODINE, territory including several small provinces north of the Danube, now part of Jugoslavia. See BALKAN STATES: 1921: Jugoslavia; JUGO-SLAVIA: 1848-1867; EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: Serbia.

VOLATERRÆ, Siege of (82-80 B. C.).—Some remnants of the armies defeated by Sulla, in the civil war, took refuge in the Etruscan town of Volaterræ, and only capitulated after a siege of two years.—Based on W. Ihne, *History of Rome*, v. 5, bk. 7, ch. 19.

VOLCÆ.—"When the Romans entered the south of France, two tribes occupied the country west of the Rhone as far at least as Tolosa (Toulouse) on the Garonne. The eastern people, named the Volcae Arecomici, possessed the part between the Cebenna or Cevenna range (Cévennes), the Rhone, and the Mediterranean, and according to Strabo extended to Narbonne. The chief town of these Volcae was Nemausus (Nismes). The Volcae Tectosages had the upper basin of the Garonne: their chief town was Tolosa."—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman republic*, v. 1, ch. 21.

VOLGA, river in Russia, longest river in Europe, having a total length of 2,325 miles. It rises in the Valdai hills about the center of Russia, flows east and south to the government of Kazan, then south and east to Sarepta; where it again turns eastward, and flows into the Caspian sea at Astrakhan. With its tributaries it drains the middle, east and southeast of Russia. The Volga and its tributaries have had an immense influence on the history of Russia. "The tenth century nucleus of the Russian Empire was found about the low nodal watershed formed by the Valdai Hills, whence radiated the rivers later embodied in the Muscovite domain. Here in Novgorod at the head of the Volchov-Ladoga-Neva system, Pskof on the Velikaya, Tver at the head of the navigable Volga, Moscow on the Oka, Smolensk on the Dnieper, and Vitebsk on the Duna, were gathered the Russians destined to displace the primitive Finnish population and appropriate the wide plains of eastern Europe. Everywhere their conquests, colonization, and commercial relations have followed the downstream course of their rivers. . . . The influence of the Volga has been irresistible. Down its current Novgorod traders in the twelfth century sought the commerce of the Caspian and the Orient; and later the Muscovite princes pushed their conquest of the Tartar hordes from Asia."—E. C. Semple, *Influences of geographic environment*, p. 348.—See also RUSSIA: Rivers.

VOLHYNIA, formerly government of a southwestern Russia, east of Poland and Galicia. (See RUSSIA: Map: Growth of Russia in Europe, 1300-1796.) The region, inhabited by Slavs, was divided into twelve districts embracing some important towns: Zhitomir, Dubno, Kovel, Lutsk, Ostrog,

Kremenets, Novograd, Volhynsky, Rovno, Staro-Konstantinov and Saslavl. (See UKRAINE: Origin of the people.) It remained independent until the fourteenth century. The territory then passed under Lithuanian rule and was united with Poland in 1569. With the partition of Poland (1793-1795), Russia annexed the territory. During the World War it was the center of severe fighting. The Russians captured the fortresses of Dubno and Lutsk and occupied an important stretch of territory west of the Styr river. (See WORLD WAR: 1915: III. Eastern front: f, 8; 1916: III. Eastern front: a, 2; DUBNO; LUTSK.) By the treaty signed Mar. 18, 1921, the greater part of the section was ceded to Poland, Russia retaining only a small part. See POLAND: 1921: Peace treaty with Russia.

VOLIVA, Wilbur Glenn (1870-), American divine. General overseer of the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion, since 1907. See CHRISTIAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH IN ZION.

VOLKSRAAD, South African public assembly. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1895 (November); 1897 (January-March); SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF, CONSTITUTION OF.

VOLSCI, ancient tribe of Italy. See ITALY: Ancient; LATIUM; OSCANS; ROME: Republic: B. C. 489-450; B. C. 390-347.

VOLSTEAD ACT (1919). See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1919-1920.

VOLSUNGSAGA, one of the groups of Scandinavian mythic-heroic sagas embodying the legends of the Volsungs. In "The Volsunga Saga, the transproser's embellishments are very easily separated from the ancient traditions, since several of the old poems, on which the saga is based, are preserved in the Elder Edda. The whole middle portion of the saga is a transprosing of the poems which relate to the Volsungs, and the opening chapters are also clearly based on very ancient songs, which are now lost, while the last chapters are unmistakably a later addition to the original cycle of poems. The Volsunga Saga is of great importance on account of the connected narration of all the parts of the Volsung story. When we compare the poems that have come down to our time with the Volsunga Saga we find that the relation between song and story, wherever the transproser's method can be detected, is of such a nature that in all probability the leading features of the traditions have as a rule been preserved in their pure and original form. Occasionally, it is true, a romantic chord is struck which cannot be traced back to the songs, and which cannot be made to harmonize with the ancient traditions, but reminds us of the age of chivalry with its tendency to tell supernatural adventures and paint the most grotesque pictures with the most glowing colors. Not unfrequently the original plot has been distorted by the transproser for the reason that he has not correctly understood the poem. But viewed as a whole the transprosing is faithfully done, and the impression we get from those parts of which we possess only the prosaic paraphrase is uniformly the same as that which we get from those passages of which the original poems are preserved. The saga is in fact throughout, by virtue of its natural simplicity, an exceedingly fascinating reproduction substantially of the songs with which we are familiar, and frequently it approaches the form of the verse so closely that we catch glimpses of the latter with its alliterations. The Volsunga Saga is particularly interesting from the fact that it illustrates how the original and ancient nucleus of the saga in the course of time has received various additions, other traditions having become united

with the Volsung legends. A remarkable example of this is the expansion which the Sigurd traditions have received by becoming united with the traditions relating to the viking king Bagnar Lodbrok, the latter's wife Aslaug being represented as a daughter of Sigurd and Brynhild. This is a striking illustration of the tendency quite common among the ancients to connect the most prominent families with kings and heroes of the heroic age. That the organic unity of the story could not but suffer by this blending of one episode with another for the purpose of bringing the Volsung race down to historical times, must be admitted, though there is throughout the later additions a manifest effort to preserve the fundamental thought that characterizes the oldest and original parts of the story."—F. W. Horn, *History of the literature of the Scandinavian North*, pp. 63-65.—"Of all the stories kept in being by the saga-tellers, and left for our delight, there is none that so epitomizes human experience; has within the same space so much of nature and of life; so fully expresses the temper and genius of Northern folk, as that of the Volsungs and Niblungs, which has in varied shapes entered into the literature of many lands. In the beginning, there is no doubt that the story belonged to the common ancestral folk of all the Teutonic and Scandinavian people in the earliest days of their wanderings. . . . In these poems the only historical name is that of Attila, the great Hun leader, who fills so large a part of the imagination of the people whose power he had broken."—H. H. Sparling, *Introduction to translation of the Volsung Saga by E. Magnusson and W. M. Morris*, pp. 21, 22.

VOLTA, Alessandro (1745-1827), Italian physicist. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: 1784-1800.

VOLTAIRE, François Marie Arouet de (1694-1778), French historian, dramatist and philosopher. See FRANCE: 1789: Survey of France on the eve of the revolution; Literary forerunners; EUROPE: Modern: Revolutionary period; FRENCH LITERATURE: 1700-1794; 1700-1800; 1700-1814; DRAMA: 1700-1799; HISTORY: 25; ATHEISM; DEISM: France.

VOLTMETER, instrument for measuring voltage. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Measuring instruments: 1833-1921.

VOLTURNO, Battle of (1860). See ITALY: 1859-1861.

VOLUME: Origin of word. See BOOKS: Evolution.

VOLUNTARY AID SOCIETIES: Germany. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: Germany: 1845-1876.

VOLUNTARY SCHOOLS: England. See EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: England: Voluntary and board schools.

VOLUNTARY SCHOOLS ACT (1897). See ENGLAND: 1896-1897.

VOLUNTEERS, congregation of secular priests. See OBLATES.

VOLUNTEERS, Irish. See IRELAND: 1778-1782.

VOLUNTEERS, Ulster and National: Ireland. See IRELAND: 1913-1916; 1914-1916.

VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA. See SALVATION ARMY: 1896-1900.

VOLUNTII, ancient Celtic tribe. See IRELAND: Tribes of early Celtic inhabitants; BRITAIN: Celtic tribes.

VOLUTES. See ORDERS OF ARCHITECTURE.

VONCKISTS.—The Vonckists were the radical party in Belgium at the time of the Brabacón revolt, when Belgium declared her independence of

Austria. "The victory of the Belgian rebels in 1789 had been followed by internal dissensions, which appeared directly the new Constitution was proclaimed. The first difference was between the Van der Nootists, or Statists, as they termed themselves, and the Vonckists. The latter, inspired by the success of the French Revolution, advocated a thoroughly democratic constitution, and the organisation of a new elective system of local administration, to the great disgust of the Statists, who desired simply the restoration of the older order of things, but with the central government controlled by elected assembly instead of being in the hands of the House of Hapsburg. Curiously enough popular feeling ran in a direction very different from that followed in France. Influenced by the priests, the Belgian people, and more especially the mob of Brussels, were convinced that the Vonckists were atheists; the democrats were attacked in the streets, maltreated and imprisoned; the bourgeois National Guards refused to protect them; they were proscribed by Van der Noot and the party in power; and after many riots and disturbances Vonck fled to France in April, 1790. These events greatly weakened the Belgian Republic, for the democratic party, which had been energetic in the revolution, numbered in its ranks many of the ablest and most enlightened men in the country. But even more serious was the result abroad, for the National Assembly of France and Lafayette were surprised and disgusted at the persecution of the democrats, and the sympathy of the French people was entirely alienated from the Belgian leaders. Still more striking in its effect was the conduct of the Van der Nootists towards the gallant officer, Van der Mersch, who had commanded the patriot troops in the invasion of October, 1789. Not satisfied with superseding him by the Prussian general Schönfeld, the Van der Nootists had him arrested on a charge of disorganizing the Belgian army and imprisoned at Antwerp, to the great wrath of the people of Flanders, of which province Van der Mersch was a native. The conquering party was further divided. The nobility and clergy, headed by the Duc d'Artemberg, were jealous of the ascendancy assumed by Van der Noot, and of the continued omnipotence of the Assembly at Brussels. Under these circumstances it was a significant fact that the Austrian troops in Luxembourg under the command of Marshal Bender were able with the help of the people themselves to occupy the province of Limburg. . . . The experiences of a year of revolution made the Belgian people not unwilling to return under the sway of Austria; the cities surrendered without a blow, and on 2d December, 1790, Brussels capitulated. Van der Noot fled with his chief friends, and Belgium was won back by Leopold as easily as it had been lost by Joseph."—H. M. Stephens, *Revolutionary Europe*, pp. 92-94.

VON WINKELRIED, Arnold. See **WINKELRIED**.

VOODOOISM, term referring to certain magical and secret rites believed to be prevalent among the negroes of the West Indies, more particularly in the republic of Haiti, and in southern United States. "It was from the West Coast (Dahomey) Negroes that Voodoo came to America. . . . Voodoo requires a priest, a priestess, and a snake, or it is no real Voodoo, a word meaning fearful. Red Voodoo requires human victims; while Voodoo is content with a cock or goat."—E. W. Hopkins, *History of religions*, p. 30.

VORARLBERG, most westerly province of Austria, consisting of the districts of Bregenz, Bludenz and Feldkirch, with an area of 1,005 square

miles, and a population, in 1920, of 133,212. It was ceded to Bavaria by the Treaty of Pressburg, 1806. (See **GERMANY**: 1805-1806.) It is included in the Austrian republic which was proclaimed on Nov. 12, 1918.

VORBECK, Von Lettow. See **LETTOW-VORBECK**, PAUL VON.

VORSTIUS, or Voorst, Konrad (1569-1622), Dutch theologian. See **NETHERLANDS**: 1603-1619.

VOSGES, department on the frontier of north-eastern France, bounded by Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Alsace-Lorraine, Haute-Saône, and Haute Marne. (See **ALSACE-LORRAINE**: Early history.) Its principal industries are manufacturing of textiles, and farming. It was a scene of fighting during the World War. See **WORLD WAR**: I. Western front: h; p, 3; 1915: II. Western front: f; f, 2; i, 7; j, 6.

VOSGES MOUNTAINS, mountain range on the west side of the Rhine, between Basel and Mainz, which since the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 has formed the frontier between France and Germany for 150 miles.

VOSS, Johann Heinrich (1751-1826), German poet and translator. See **GERMAN LITERATURE**: 1600-1750.

VOTAN, hero-god of the Indians of Maya stock, supposed to have founded the city of Palenque. See **CENTRAL AMERICA**: Aborigines.

VOTE AND VOTING. See **SUFFRAGE**, **MANHOOD**; **SUFFRAGE**, **WOMAN**; **COMPULSORY VOTING**; **CUMULATIVE VOTING**; **PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION**: General principles; United States; also **SAN FRANCISCO**: 1916-1917; **BELGIUM**: 1894-1895.

VOUZIERS, town of northeastern France, in the department of Ardennes. Almost throughout the entire duration of the World War it was held by the Germans. In 1918 it was taken by the French under Gouraud. See **WORLD WAR**: 1918: II. Western front: m.

VOYAGE, Continuous. See **CONTINUOUS VOYAGE**.

VOYER, René de, and other members of the family. See **ARGENSON**.

VRACHOPHAGOS, Battle of (1352). See **CONSTANTINOPLE**: 1348-1355.

VRANYA, town of Serbia on the Morava. In the fall of 1915 it was captured by the Bulgars. See **WORLD WAR**: 1915: V. Balkans: b, 4.

VROEDSCHAP (Assembly of Sages), Dutch governing body. See **NETHERLANDS**: 1584-1585.

VULCAN PASS, route through the Carpathians, between Transylvania and Wallachia. This was one of the passes used in 1916 by General Falkenhayn in his attack on Rumania. See **WORLD WAR**: 1916: V. Balkan theater: c, 6, iii.

VULCANAL AT ROME.—"The Vulcanal, or, as it is called by Livy, the Area Vulcani, must have been close to the Senaculum [early meeting place of the Senate], on the slope of the Capitol. It seems to have been originally an open space of some extent, used for public meetings, especially those of the Comitia Tributa, and dedicated to Vulcan. Sacrifices of small fish were offered to Vulcan here, and a temple dedicated to that god stood also here in the earliest times, but it was afterwards, on the enlargement of the pomerium beyond the Palatine, removed for religious reasons to the Circus Flaminius, and the Vulcanal became simply a consecrated area."—R. Burn, *Rome and the Campaigna*, ch. 6, pt. 1.

VULCANIZATION OF RUBBER. See **INVENTIONS**: 19th century: Industry.

VULGAR ERA. See **CHRONOLOGY**: Christian era.

VULGATE, Latin version of the Bible prepared by St. Jerome. See BIBLE, ENGLISH: 7th-8th centuries; PAPACY: 1907-1909.

VULTURNUM, ancient name for Capua. See CAPUA.

VUNI VALU, meaning "Root of War" or "Source of Power," title accorded to the chief Na Ulivou. See FIJI ISLANDS.

VUTCHITCH, regent for Michael Obrenovitch. See SERBIA: 1817-1875.

W

WAALS, Johannes Diderik (1837-1923), Dutch physicist. See CHEMISTRY: Physical: Laws of gases; NOBEL PRIZES: Physics: 1910.

WAARTGELDERS, Dutch mercenaries under Barneveld. See NETHERLANDS: 1603-1619.

WABASH, river in Indiana and the largest northern tributary of the Ohio. It was called the River St. Jerome by the French in 1712. See LOUISIANA: 1698-1712.

WABENAKIES. See ABNAKIS.

WACOS. See HUECOS.

WADAI, country of north central Africa, bounded on the north by Borku and Enndi, on the south by the Ubangi sultanates, on the west and southwest by Kanem and Bagirmi, and on the east by Darfur. It was recognized as within the French spheres of interest by the Anglo-French declaration of 1890. See NIGERIA: 1882-1899.

WADDINGTON, William Henry (1826-1894), French statesman. Prime minister, 1879. See FRANCE: 1875-1889.

WADE, Benjamin Franklin (1800-1878), American political leader. United States senator, 1851-1869; chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 1861-1862; urged a strong policy against the secessionists; opposed Lincoln's policy of reconstruction in the Wade-Davis Manifesto; aided in the abolition of slavery in the territories; became a member of President Grant's Santo Domingo Commission, 1871. See also WADE-DAVIS MANIFESTO.

WADE-DAVIS MANIFESTO, statement published Aug. 5, 1864, in the *New York Tribune* by Benjamin Franklin Wade and Henry W. Davis. It condemned in strong terms the policy of reconstruction advocated by President Lincoln.

WAGE, Minimum. See LABOR REMUNERATION: 1894-1922; 1910-1920; also MASSACHUSETTS: 1922; OREGON: 1921-1923; WISCONSIN: 1912-1917.

WAGE FUND THEORY. See LABOR REMUNERATION: Successive wage theories.

WAGE REGULATION. See ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, INDUSTRIAL; LABOR REMUNERATION.

WAGE SYSTEMS. See LABOR REMUNERATION.

WAGER OF BATTLE, TRIAL BY COMBAT, JUDICIAL COMBAT.—"Trial by combat does not seem to have established itself completely in France till ordeals went into disuse, which Charlemagne rather encouraged, and which, in his age, the clergy for the most part approved. The former species of decision may, however, be met with under the first Merovingian kings (Greg. Turon, l. vii, c. 10, l. x. c. 10), and seems to have prevailed in Burgundy. It is established by the laws of the Alemanni or Suabians. Baluz t. i. p. 80. It was always popular in Lombardy. . . . Otho II. established it in all disputes concerning real property. . . . God, as they deemed, was the judge. The nobleman fought on horseback, with all his arms of attack and defence; the plebeian on foot, with his club and target. . . . If the combat was intended to ascertain a civil right, the vanquished party, of course, forfeited his claim and paid a fine. If he fought by proxy, the champion was

liable to have his hand struck off; a regulation necessary, perhaps, to obviate the corruption of these hired defenders. In criminal cases the appellant suffered, in the event of defeat, the same punishment which the law awarded to the offence of which he accused his adversary. Even where the cause was more peaceably tried, and brought to a regular adjudication by the court, an appeal for false judgment might indeed be made to the suzerain, but it could only be tried by battle. And in this, the appellant, if he would impeach the concurrent judgment of the court below, was compelled to meet in combat every one of its members; unless he should vanquish them all within the day, his life, if he escaped from so many hazards, was forfeited to the law. If fortune or miracle should make him conqueror in every contest, the judges were equally subject to death, and their court forfeited their jurisdiction for ever. . . . Such was the judicial system of France when St. Louis [1226-1270] enacted that great code which bears the name of his Establishments. The rules of civil and criminal procedure, as well as the principles of legal decisions, are there laid down with much detail. . . . [Trial by combat] was never abolished by any positive law, either in France [at large] or England. But instances of its occurrence are not frequent even in the fourteenth century."—H. Hallam, *Middle Ages*, v. 1, ch. 2, pt. 2.—"Nor was the wager of battle confined to races of Celtic or Teutonic origin. The Slavonic tribes, as they successively emerge into the light of history, show the same tendency to refer doubtful points of civil and criminal law to the arbitration of the sword. The earliest records of Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, Servia, Silesia, Moravia, Pomerania, Lithuania, and Russia, present evidences of the prevalence of the system." The last recorded instance of the wager of battle in France was in 1549. "In England, the resolute conservatism, which resists innovation to the last, prolonged the existence of the wager of battle until a period unknown in other civilized nations. . . . It was not until the time of Elizabeth that it was even abolished in civil cases. . . . Even in the 17th century, instances of the battle ordeal between persons of high station are on record." As late as 1818 the right was claimed and conceded by the judges, in a criminal case which caused much excitement. "The next year the act 59 Geo. III, chap. 46, at length put an end for ever to this last remnant of the age of chivalry."—H. C. Lea, *Superstition and force*, ch. 2.—See also COMMON LAW: 1077; CRIMINAL LAW: 1818.

WAGER OF LAW.—"This was the remarkable custom which was subsequently known as canonical compurgation, and which long remained a part of English jurisprudence, under the name of the Wager of Law. The defendant, when denying the allegation under oath, appeared surrounded by a number of companions—'juratores,' 'conjuratores,' 'sacramentales,' 'collaudantes,' 'compurgatores,' as they were variously termed—who swore, not to their knowledge of the facts, but as sharers and par-

takers in the oath of denial. This curious form of procedure derives importance from the fact that it is an expression of the character, not of an isolated sept, but of nearly all the races that have moulded the destinies of Europe. The Ostrogoths in Italy, and the Wisigoths of the South of France and Spain were the only nations in whose codes it occupies no place, and they, . . . at an early period, yielded themselves completely to the influence of the Roman civilization. . . . The church, with the tact which distinguished her dealings with her new converts, was not long in adopting a system which was admirably suited for her defence in an age of brute force."—H. C. Lea, *Superstition and force*, ch. 1.—See also COMMON LAW: 1833.

WAGNER, Richard (1813-1883), German composer. Studied with Gottlieb Müller and Theodor Weinlig; produced the operas "Rienzi," "Der fliegende Holländer," and "Tannhäuser," at Dresden in 1842, 1843, and 1845, respectively; appointed court-conductor at Dresden, 1843; produced the opera "Lohengrin," at Weimar, 1850; first complete performance of the tetralogy, "Der Ring des Nibelungen," given at Bayreuth, Aug. 13-17, 1876.—See also MUSIC: Modern: 1843-1897.

WAGNER, Fort, Siege of. See U. S. A.: 1863 (July: South Carolina); (August-December: South Carolina).

WAGRAM, Battle of. See GERMANY: 1809 (July-September).

WAHHABIS or **Wahabees**.—"The Wahabees derive their name from Abdul Wahab, the father of Sheikh Muhammad, their founder, who arose about the beginning of the . . . [eighteenth] century, in the province of Najd, in Arabia. The object of the Wahabee movement was to sweep away all later innovations, and to return to the original purity of Islam, as based upon the exact teaching of the Koran and the example of Mahomet. The principles of the sect rapidly spread among the Arab tribes, and were adopted by the sovereign princes of Darayah, in Najd. Impelled by religious zeal and political ambition, and allured by the prospect of plunder, the Wahabees soon acquired nearly the whole of Arabia, and menaced the neighbouring Pashaliks of Turkey and Egypt. Mecca and Medina soon fell into their hands, the shrine was despoiled of its rich ornaments, and the pilgrim route to the Kaaba closed for some years. Early in . . . [the nineteenth] century (1811), Muhammad Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, at the bidding of the Sultan, set himself to check the progress of this aggressive sect; and his son Ibrahim Pasha completed the work (1818). . . . The following . . . [are] particulars of the Wahabee reform. . . . They reject the decisions of the 'four orthodox doctors,' and the intercessions of saints; they condemn the excessive reverence paid to Mahomet, and deny his mediation, until the last day. They also disapprove of the ornamenting of tombs, &c."—J. W. H. Stobart, *Islam and its founder*, ch. 10, with footnote.—"The influence of the Wahabi movement extended beyond Arabia and was greater in its religious than in its political aspect. It was introduced into India by Sayid Ahmad of Oudh, who claimed to be the Mahdi. His propaganda to purge out Hindu superstitions from Islam excited fierce fanaticism. He raised a jihad against the Sikhs, captured Peshavur in 1830, and maintained an insurrection for four years. He declared that India was a Dar-il-Harb, a land of warfare, and that jihad against the British government was obligatory. The influence of Wahabis is still felt in India and the sect continues near the northwest frontier. Another sect,

called the Faraisis, arose in India, animated with the same spirit. In Sumatra a like movement was started about 1837 by a pilgrim returned from Mecca. He began the correction of the errors and abuses of Moslems, especially striving to abolish the use of opium, tobacco, and betel nut. From this propaganda grew up the Padri sect. They proclaimed the jihad against the heathen Bataks, destroyed their villages, outraged their women, sold their children into slavery, and killed every male who would not accept Islam. Wahabism bore fruit in Africa. Osman Danfodio, chief of the Fulahs, learned the doctrine at Mecca, and on his return preached it. He succeeded in arousing the people, founded Sokoto and the Fulah kingdom, subdued several heathen states and forced them to embrace Islam. Wahabism was also the inspiration of the Sanusi.' . . . (Arnold: 'Preaching of Islam,' pp. 230, 265, 299.) Wahabism greatly influenced the whole Islamic body. Just as the Protestant Reformation was followed by a counter-reformation in Roman Catholicism, so Wahabism was the instrument for arousing the Sunni Moslems. [See SUNNITES.] Its influence, true to its own spirit, has been thoroughly reactionary. That return to primitive Islam is the hope of the world's regeneration has been the inspiration of modern conservative movements. Of it T. W. A. Arnold (*Ibid.*, pp. 345-346) says: 'It has given birth to numerous movements which take rank among the most powerful influences in the Islamic world. It is closely connected with many of the modern Moslem missions; the . . . zeal it has stirred up, the new life it has infused into existing religious institutions, the impetus it has given to theological study and to the organization of devotional exercises, have all served to awaken and keep alive the innate proselyting spirit of Islam.' Similarly Canon Sell says (*Missionary Review*, October, 1902, p. 732): 'Its religious teaching, and still more its narrow fanatical spirit, have spread into many lands and influenced many peoples.' Palgrave who lived and travelled in Turkey and Arabia in close contact with Moslems, writes: 'The whole school of Islamic teaching has been modified by it; not only the common people but also many of the highest and best educated classes, even the Sultan (Abdul Aziz) himself, are distinctly inclined to the stricter school, and so are most of the principal Ulema.' . . . This spirit was also a reaction against the introduction of European laws and customs by the reforming Sultans, Mahmud II and Abdul Aziz in his first years. A strong feeling of opposition to these measures existed not only among the Ulema on account of the Western code, but also among the beys and proprietors, because they had been deprived of their lands and feudal privileges by the new regulations. So political conservatism and zeal for Islam went hand in hand. Dissatisfaction with the new codes led to a partial return to the jurisdiction of the Mahkamah or Courts of the Sacred Law. Opposition to the patronage given to the infidels led to the casting out from employ of many Europeans who about 1850 had overrun the Turkish service, and the employment in their places of Moslem doctors, civil engineers, and administrators. Rushdi schools which had been started for the whole population, including Christians, were transformed into strictly Mohammedan schools, with teaching of Islam and Islamic languages. The Sultan Abdul Aziz became sympathetic with the reactionaries. The Grand Vizier, Ali Pasha, said to a British official: 'What we want is an increase of fanaticism rather than a diminution of it.' Notwithstanding these symptoms, the political reformers

retained superior influence in the government till the promulgation of the Constitution of 1876. After its abrogation by Sultan Hamid, he openly became the chief of the reactionaries, and made it his whole aim to strengthen the Moslem element of his empire. This aim soon assumed a wider scope and developed into a movement to which is given the name Pan-Islamism.'—S. G. Wilson, *Modern movements among Moslems*, pp. 55-57.—See also ARABIA: 1919: King of Hejaz.

ALSO IN: C. M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia deserta*.—D. B. MacDonald, *Muslim theology*.—T. Nöldeke, *Sketches from Eastern history*, p. 103.—W. C. Taylor, *History of Mohammedanism and its sects*, ch. 11.

WAHKPOTONAS, North American Indian tribe. See SIOUAN FAMILY.

WAHLSTADT, Battle of. See LIEGNITZ, BATTLE OF.

WAHLSTATT, Battle of. See GERMANY: 1813 (August-October).

WAHPETONS, North American Indian tribe. See SIOUAN FAMILY.

WAIHI MINERS' STRIKE: New Zealand (1912). See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1906-1913.

WAILATPUAN FAMILY.—"Hale established this family and placed under it the Cailloux or Cayuse or Willetpoos, and the Molele. Their headquarters as indicated by Hale are the upper part of the Walla Walla River and the country about Mounts Hood and Vancouver."—J. W. Powell, *Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology*, p. 127.

WAIKAS, South American Indian tribe. See CARIBS.

WAITANGI, Treaty of (1840). See NEW ZEALAND: 1837-1852.

WAITE, Morrison Remick (1816-1888), American jurist. Member of the Alabama Claims Arbitration Commission, 1871; chief justice of the United States Supreme Court, 1874-1888. See SUPREME COURT: 1869-1890.

WAITZ, Georg (1813-1886), German historian. See HISTORY: 26.

WAITZ, Theodor (1821-1864), German psychologist and anthropologist. See PHILOLOGY: 3.

WAITZEN, Battle of (1849). See AUSTRIA: 1848-1849; HUNGARY: 1847-1849.

WAI-WU-PU, board of foreign affairs in China. See CHINA: 1901-1908.

WAIZERU ZAUDITU (1876-), empress of Abyssinia since 1916. See ABYSSINIA: 1913-1920.

WAKASHAN FAMILY.—"The . . . family name was based upon a vocabulary of the Wabash Indians, who, according to Gallatin, 'inhabit the island on which Nootka Sound is situated.' . . . The term 'Wakash' for this group of languages has since been generally ignored, and in its place Nootka or Nootka-Columbian has been adopted. . . . Though by no means as appropriate a designation as could be found, it seems clear that for the so-called Wakash, Newittee, and other allied languages usually assembled under the Nootka family, the term Wakash of 1836 has priority and must be retained."—J. W. Powell, *Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology*, pp. 129-130.

WAKE ISLAND, small island in the Pacific between Hawaii and Guam. It was annexed to the United States by the American forces on their way to Manila in 1898. It is about one square mile in area, and is uninhabited. See PACIFIC OCEAN: Map of southeastern Asia; U.S.A.: Historical geography.

WAKEFIELD, Edward Gibbon (1796-1862), British colonial statesman. Devised a new method of land settlement in Australia. See AUSTRALIA: 1821-1845; SOUTH AUSTRALIA: 1834-1836.

WAKEFIELD, Battle of (1460).—Queen Margaret, rallying the loyal Lancastrians of the north of England, met her enemy, the duke of York, and the enemies of her party, on Wakefield Green, Dec. 30, 1460, and defeated them with great slaughter, the duke of York being found among the slain. But her fruitless victory was soon reversed by young Edward, earl of March, eldest son of the deceased duke of York, who deposed King Henry VI and planted himself on the throne, before the same winter had passed.—See also ENGLAND: 1455-1471.

WAKEFIELD SYSTEM. See AUSTRALIA: 1821-1845; SOUTH AUSTRALIA: 1834-1836.

WAKIDI (747-823), Arabian historian. See HISTORY: 21.

WALCHEREN EXPEDITION. See ENGLAND: 1809 (July-December).

WALDECK, small German republic, lying between Westphalia and Hesse-Nassau. It was proclaimed a republic in November, 1918, but it is governed by Prussia in accordance with a treaty concluded in 1867. Waldeck has an area of 433 square miles, and a population of 66,432 in 1919.

WALDECK-ROUSSEAU, Pierre Marie René Ernest (1846-1904), French statesman. Minister of the interior 1881, 1883-1885; premier, 1899-1902. See FRANCE: 1899 (February-June); 1900-1904; also BLOC.

WALDENSES, or Vaudois.—"Let me at the outset express my conviction that the whole attempt to ascribe to the Waldenses an earlier date than the latter half of the 12th century, to throw back their origin some two hundred years, or sometimes much more than this, even to the times of Claudius of Turin (d. 839), is one which will not stand the test of historical criticism; while the endeavour to vindicate for them this remote antiquity has introduced infinite confusion into their whole history. The date of Waldo, who, as I cannot doubt, is rightly recognized as their founder, we certainly know. When it is sought to get rid of their relation to him as embodied in the very name which they bear, and to change this name into Vallenses, the Men of the Valleys or the Dalesmen, it is a transformation which has no likelihood, philological or historic, to recommend it. . . . Peter Waldo,—for we will not withhold from him this Christian name, although there is no authority for it anterior to the beginning of the 15th century,—was a rich citizen and merchant of Lyons [in the later half of the 12th century]. Not satisfied with those scanty portions of Scripture doled out to the laity in divine services, and yearning above all for a larger knowledge of the Gospels, he obtained from two friends among the priesthood a copy of these last and of some other portions of Scripture translated into the Romance language; a collection also of sayings from the Fathers. The whole movement remained to the end true to this its first motive—the desire namely for a fuller acquaintance with the Word of God. That Word he now resolved to make the rule of his life. . . . He, . . . as a first step, sells all that he has, and bestows it upon the poor. In the name which he adopts for himself and for the companions whom he presently associates with him, the same fact of a voluntary poverty, as that which above all they should embody in their lives, speaks out. On this side of the Alps they are Poor Men of Lyons; on the Italian, Poor Men of Lombardy. . . . And

now he and his began to preach in the streets of Lyons, to find their way into houses, to itinerate the country round. . . . In 1178 the Archbishop of Lyons forbade their preaching or expounding any more. Such as did not submit had no choice but to quit Lyons, and betake themselves elsewhere. And thus it came to pass that not the city, already so illustrious in ecclesiastical story, where Irenæus taught and Blandina suffered, . . . but the Alpine mountains must shelter these outcasts, and in turn be made famous by their presence." In 1209, Pope Innocent III made an attempt to absorb Waldo's society in an "Order of Poor Catholics," which he instituted. "Failing this, he repeated, a few years later, at the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), the Church's sentence against the Waldenses, including them under a common ban with the Cathari and the whole rabble rout of Manichæans and others with whom they have so often since been confounded. . . . Enemies have sought to confound, that so there might be imputed to the Waldenses any evil which had been brought home to the Albigenses. . . . Friends have sought to identify them out of the wish to recruit the scanty number of witnesses for Scriptural and Apostolical truth in the dark ages of the Church; as certainly it would prove no small numerical addition if the Albigenses might be counted among these." It seems to be certain that the Waldenses were not spared by the crusaders who exterminated the Albigenses of southern France between 1209 and 1229. They fled before that storm into the recesses of the Alps. "But they were numerous in North Italy as well; and far more widely scattered over the whole of central Europe than their present dwelling place and numbers would at all suggest. They had congregations in Florence, in Genoa, in Venice, above all in Milan; there were Waldensian communications as far south as Calabria; they were not unknown in Arragon; still less in Switzerland; at a later day they found their way to Bohemia, and joined hands with the Hussites there."—R. C. Trench, *Lectures on mediæval church history, lecture 17*.—"The valleys which the Vaudois have raised into celebrity lie to the west of Piedmont, between the province of Pignerol and Briançon, and adjoining on the other side to the ancient Marquisate of Susa, and that of the Saluces. The capital, La Tour, being about 36 miles from Turin, and 14 from Pignerol. The extent of the valleys is about 12 Italian miles, making a square of about 24 French leagues. The valleys are three in number, Luzern, Perouse, and St. Martin. The former . . . is the most beautiful and extensive."—J. Bresse, *History of the Vaudois, pt. 1, ch. 1*.—See also ALBIGENSES; CATHARI; MANICHEANS.

ALSO IN: A. Muston, *Israel of the Alps*.—E. Comba, *History of the Waldenses of Italy*.

1526-1561.—Identification with the Calvinists.—Persecuting war of the duke of Savoy.—Tolerant treaty of Cavour. See SAVOY AND PIEDMONT: 1559-1580.

1546.—Massacre of the remnant in Provence and Venaisin. See FRANCE: 1532-1547.

1655.—Second persecution and massacre.—Cromwell's intervention.—"They [the Waldenses] had experienced persecutions through their whole history, and especially after the Reformation; but, on the whole, the two last Dukes of Savoy, and also Christine, daughter of Henry IV. of France, and Duchess-Regent through the minority of her son, the present Duke, had protected them in their privileges, even while extirpating Protestantism in the rest of the Piedmontese dominions. Latterly, however, there had

been a passion at Turin and at Rome for their conversion to the Catholic faith, and priests had been traversing their valleys for the purpose. The murder of one such priest, and some open insults to the Catholic worship, about Christmas 1654, are said to have occasioned what followed. On the 25th of January, 1654-5, an edict was issued, under the authority of the Duke of Savoy, 'commanding and enjoining every head of a family, with its members, of the pretended Reformed Religion, of what rank, degree, or condition soever, none excepted, inhabiting and possessing estates in the places of Luserna . . . &c, within three days, to withdraw and depart, and be, with their families, withdrawn out of the said places, and transported into the places and limits marked out for toleration by his Royal Highness during his good pleasure,' . . . unless they gave evidence within 20 days of having become Catholics. Furthermore it was commanded that in every one even of the tolerated places there should be regular celebration of the Holy Mass, and that there should be no interference therewith, nor any dissuasion of any one from turning a Catholic, also on pain of death. All the places named are in the Valley of Luserna, and the object was a wholesale shifting of the Protestants of that valley out of nine of its communes and their concentration into five higher up. In vain were there remonstrances at Turin from those immediately concerned. On the 17th of April, 1655, the Marquis di Pianezza, entered the doomed region with a body of troops mainly Piedmontese, but with French and Irish among them. There was resistance, fighting, burning, pillaging, flight to the mountains, and chasing and murdering for eight days, Saturday, April 24, being the climax. The names of about 300 of those murdered individually are on record, with the ways of the deaths of many of them. Women were ripped open, or carried about impaled on spikes; men, women, and children, were flung from precipices, hacked, tortured, roasted alive; the heads of some of the dead were boiled and the brains eaten; there are forty printed pages, and twenty-six ghastly engravings, by way of Protestant tradition of the ascertained variety of the devilry. The massacre was chiefly in the Valley of Luserna, but extended also into the other two valleys. The fugitives were huddled in crowds high among the mountains, moaning and starving; and not a few, women and infants especially, perished amid the snows. . . . There was a shudder of abhorrence through Protestant Europe, but no one was so much roused as Cromwell. . . . On Thursday the 17th of May, and for many days more, the business of the Savoy Protestants was the chief occupation of the Council. Letters, all in Milton's Latin, but signed by the Lord Protector in his own name, were despatched (May 25) to the Duke of Savoy himself, to the French King, to the States General of the United Provinces, to the Protestant Swiss Cantons, to the King of Sweden, to the King of Denmark, and to Ragotski, Prince of Transylvania. A day of humiliation was appointed for the Cities of London and Westminster, and another for all England." A collection of money for the sufferers was made, which amounted, in England and Wales, to £38,000—equal to about £137,000 now. Cromwell's personal contribution was £2,000—equivalent to £7,500 in money of the present day. The Protector dispatched a special envoy to the court of Turin, who addressed very plain and bold words to the duke. Meanwhile Blake with his fleet was in the

Mediterranean, and there were inquiries made as to the best place for landing troops to invade the duke's dominions. "All which being known to Mazarin, that wily statesman saw that no time was to be lost. While Mr. Downing [second commissioner sent by Cromwell] was still only on his way to Geneva through France, Mazarin had instructed M. Servien, the French minister at Turin, to insist, in the French King's name, on an immediate settlement of the Vaudois business. The result was a 'Patente di Gratia e Perdono,' or 'Patent of Grace and Pardon,' granted by Charles Emanuel to the Vaudois Protestants, Aug. 19, in terms of a Treaty at Pignerol, in which the French Minister appeared as the real mediating party and certain Envoys from the Swiss Cantons as more or less assenting. As the Patent substantially retracted the Persecuting Edict and restored the Vaudois to all their former privileges, nothing more was to be done." These events in Piedmont drew from Milton his immortal sonnet, beginning: "Avenge, O Lord, thy slaughtered saints."—D. Masson, *Life of John Milton*, v. 5, bk. 1, ch. 1, sect. 2.

ALSO IN: J. B. Perkins, *France under Mazarin*, v. 2, ch. 16.—A. Muston, *Israel of the Alps*, v. 1, pt. 2, ch. 6-9.

1685-1691.—Expatriated by Victor Amadeus.—Return under Henri Arnaud.—"After the great massacre of 1655, the Church of the Valleys . . . rested from persecution for thirty years [but tolerance of Protestants almost ceased in Europe with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685]. . . . At no previous period of their history, perhaps, had the Waldenses been so entirely devoid of human aid as now [for Louis XIV demanded that the duke of Savoy should exterminate or banish all heretics]. Gianavello, whose stout heart and brave arm had stood them in such stead formerly, was in exile. Cromwell, whose potent voice had stayed the fury of the great massacre, was in his grave. An avowed papist [James II] filled the throne of Great Britain. It was going ill at this hour with Protestantism everywhere. The Covenanters of Scotland were hiding on the moors, or dying in the Grass-market of Edinburgh. France, Piedmont, and Italy were closing in around the valleys; every path guarded, all their succors cut off, an overwhelming force waited the signal to massacre them. So desperate did their situation appear to the Swiss envoys, that they counseled them to 'transport elsewhere the torch of the gospel, and not keep it here to be extinguished in blood.' . . . [The first attack from Victor Amadeus, helped by the French, came in 1686, but the Waldenses were able to repel it.] The issue by arms being deemed uncertain, despite the vast disparity of strength, treachery, on a great scale, was now had recourse to. Wherever, throughout the valleys, the Vaudois were found strongly posted and ready for battle, they were told that their brethren in the neighboring communes had submitted, and that it was vain for them, isolated and alone as they now were, to continue their resistance. . . . This base artifice was successfully practiced at each of the Vaudois posts in succession, till at length the valleys had all capitulated. . . . The instant consequence of the submission was a massacre which extended to all their valleys, and which was similar in its horrors to the great butchery of 1655. In that massacre upwards of three thousand perished. The remainder of the nation, amounting, according to Arnaud, to between twelve thousand and fifteen

thousand souls, were consigned to the various jails and fortresses of Piedmont. [A few escaped to Geneva and to Germany where they remained until 1690 when they decided to return to their valleys.] . . . Meanwhile, the scenes were shifting rapidly around the expatriated Vaudois, and with eyes uplifted they awaited the issue. They saw their protector, William of Orange, mount the throne of England. They saw their powerful enemy Louis XIV attacked at once by the emperor and humiliated by the Dutch. They saw their own Prince Victor Amadeus withdraw his soldiers from Savoy, seeing that he needed them to defend Piedmont. It seemed to them that an invisible hand was opening their path back to their own land. Encouraged by these tokens, they began to arrange a second time for their departure. . . . At this crisis, as on so many previous ones, a distinguished man arose to lead them. Henri Arnaud, who was at the head of the eight hundred fighting men who now set out for their native possessions, had at first discharged the office of pastor, but the troubles of his nation compelling him to leave the valleys, he had served in the armies of the Prince of Orange. . . . Arriving on the southern shore of the lake, these eight hundred Vaudois bent their knees in prayer, and then began their march through a country covered with foes. Before them rose the great snow-clad mountains over which they were to fight their way. Arnaud arranged his little host into three companies—an advanced guard, a center, and a rear guard. Seizing some of the chief men as hostages, they traversed the valley of the Arve to Sallenches, and emerged from its dangerous passes just as the men of the latter place had completed their preparations for resisting them. Occasional skirmishes awaited them, but mostly their march was unopposed, for the terror of God had fallen upon the inhabitants of Savoy. . . . At last they succeeded in reaching the Pra del Tor. To their amazement and joy, on arriving at this celebrated and hallowed spot, they found deputies from their prince, the Duke of Savoy, waiting them with an overture of peace. The Vaudois were as men that dreamed. An overture of peace! How was this? A coalition, including Germany, Great Britain, Holland, and Spain, had been formed to check the ambition of France, and three days had been given to Victor Amadeus [Duke of Savoy] to say to which side he would join himself—the Leaguers or Louis XIV. He resolved to break with Louis and take part with the coalition. In this case, to whom could he so well commit the keys of the Alps as to his trusty Vaudois? Hence the overture that met them in the Pra del Tor."—J. A. Wylie, *History of the Waldenses*, pp. 162, 166-168, 176-177, 195.

1691.—Toleration.—The Protestant nations of Europe financed the returned Waldenses, and, under the leadership of William of Orange, protected them. The shadow of persecution was lifted from the lands of Savoy and Piedmont.

1808-1848.—Efforts towards revival of Waldensianism.—Final religious liberty.—During the eighteenth century the Waldenses were not persecuted, but suffered much from religious intolerance, and gradually their influence and numbers grew feeble. "The visit paid them by the apostolic Felix Neff, in 1808, was the first dawning of their new day. With him a breath from heaven, it was felt, had passed over the dry bones. The next stage in their resurrection was the visit of Dr. William Stephen Gilly, in 1828. He cherished, he tells us, the conviction that 'this is

the spot from which it is likely that the great Sower will again cast his seed, when it shall please him to permit the pure church of Christ to resume her seat in those Italian states from which pontifical intrigues have dislodged her.' The result of Dr. Gilly's visit was the erection of a college at La Torre, for the instruction of youth and the training of ministers, and a hospital for the sick; besides awakening great interest on their behalf in England. After Dr. Gilly, there stood up another to befriend the Waldenses, and prepare them for their coming day of deliverance. The career of General Meckwith is invested with a romance not unlike that which belongs to the life of Ignatius Loyola. . . . But despite the efforts of Gilly and Beckwith, and the growing spirit of toleration, the Waldenses continued to groan under a load of political and social disabilities. They were still a proscribed race. . . . The French Revolution of 1848, with trumpet peal, sounded the overthrow of all these restrictions. They fell in one day."—J. A. Wylie, *History of the Waldenses*, pp. 198-199, 201-202.—From that time on the Waldensian sect has been active in all Protestant countries, where their religious teaching has been carried on by the support of their aid societies.

ALSO IN: F. Gilly, *Excursions to Piedmont and researches among Waldensians*.—C. Melia, *Origin, persecution and doctrines of Waldenses*.

WALDERSEE, Alfred, Count (1032-1904), Prussian field marshal. See GERMANY: 1889-1890.

WALDMAN, Louis, one of the five Socialist members of the New York Assembly who were expelled in 1920. See NEW YORK: 1920: Expulsion of the socialists.

WALDO, Peter (fl. 1170), founder of the religious sect of Waldenses. See WALDENSES.

WALDSHUT, town of Baden, Germany, on the Rhine, thirty miles southeast of Freiburg. It was taken in 1637 by Duke Bernhard of Weimer. See GERMANY: 1634-1639.

WALES: Population.—A r e a.—M i n e r a l wealth.—Industries.—Forestry.—Coal trade and shipping.—Wales which lies to the west of England is the smallest of the three countries forming the United Kingdom. Its population in 1921 was 2,206,712, of whom about eight per cent speak Welsh only, thirty-two per cent are bi-lingual and the remainder speak English only. The land area is 4,751,000 square miles. The mineral wealth of South Wales and the slate quarries of North Wales have, during the last century, made the country of vital importance to the commercial world. "The great industrial area of Wales includes Monmouthshire, Glamorganshire, and Carmarthenshire; Monmouthshire being legitimately included in Wales industrially, as it is in matters of education and Sunday closing. The obvious reason for this location of industry is the fact that in these countries lies the best coal in the world. It gives rise to the great industry of its own extraction from the earth, and to the very important undertakings that have established themselves as closely as possible to it in order to reap the advantages of its superlative power producing value as economically as possible. Apart from the presence of coal, the physical features of South Wales have lent themselves well to industrial development. The distance from pit to port is very short, usually from five to twenty miles, and the gradient in favour of the load. The seaway of the Bristol Channel upon which the ports are founded is deep and assured, and although the immediate connexions of the docks

with the channel necessitate in most of the ports a certain amount of dredging through sandy and muddy foreshores, this, in practice, is not much of a detriment."—J. Rees, *Transformation: South-Wales as an industrial unit* (*The Times* [London], *Trade Supplement*, Oct. 29, 1921, p. 1).—The tinplate trade of Wales was the foremost in the world until this position was taken by the United States. "The most serious blow that the tinplate industry of Wales has had to withstand was the determination in 1889 of the United States to become independent of Welsh suppliers by creating a tinplate industry under its own flag by means of the protection of a very high tariff upon all importations of tinplate, and to-day is seen, as at Rosslyn Chapel, the apprentice pillar surpassing the masters' pillar, the present capacity of the American tinplate trade being more than double that of Great Britain."—H. S. Thomas, *Signs of tinplate revival: Recapturing lost trade* (*The Times* [London], *Trade Supplement*, Oct. 29, 1921, p. 10).—"The slate-producing area of Great Britain is confined to the western coast and extends with certain breaks from Cumberland to Cornwall. Of the total output, 90 per cent. comes from the North Wales slate quarries, situated in Carnarvonshire and Merionethshire. The state found in these two counties is also of a totally different character from that quarried in South Wales and England, where it is mainly of volcanic origin. In North Wales it is a sedimentary rock. This necessarily affects and determines all the conditions of the industry in the respective areas—the methods of working, the purposes for which the stone is used, the size, price, and market of the slates. . . . Impermeable, impenetrable by weather, unaffected by acid fumes, unsurpassed cleavage properties combining minimum weight with maximum strength; possessing great compressive, tensile, and transverse strength; uniformity of colour and texture, with permanence of original colour under varying weather conditions; great toughness, hardness and elasticity; that and more is the North Wales slate. . . . That the three qualities last named—toughness, hardness, and elasticity—should be found combined in a material popularly supposed to be brittle is proved by the fact that a piece of slate three feet long, supported at both ends, can be bent about 4 in. in the middle before rupture takes place. As regards durability, it is quite a common occurrence for Welsh slates stripped from roofs 60, 80, and 100 years old to be used again in constructing new roofs."—B. Evans, *Mountain mining: How the world's best slate is won: Methods and men* (*The Times* [London], *Trade Supplement*, Oct. 29, 1921, p. 19).—"The favorable position of Wales in relation to timber demands was amply proved during the war, no woodlands being so keenly searched and so ruthlessly exploited as those of the Principality. The threatened calamity of a stoppage of the mines and the serious hampering of military operations in France were indeed obviated only by those war-time fellings. The result of deforestation is deplorable; go where one may—through parts once famous for the beauty of their woodland scenery, such as the Vale of Llangollen, Bettws-y-coed, Aberystwyth, Dinas Mawddwy, Crickhowel, or Llanidloes—one finds the steep slopes stripped of their forest verdure, only unsightly tree stumps are left protruding from the hillside. Fortunately the position may be retrieved. There is every prospect of a new and better forestry arising out of the ashes of the old. It has taken the

'shake up' of a European war to do it, but at last we have a State forest service at work and a national scheme of forestry in operation. In time we may expect not only to have the depleted areas planted and amenity restored, but a large timber reserve built up to meet any possible future emergency."—F. Story, *Afforestation: 300,000 acres still await planting* (*The Times* [London], *Trade Supplement*, Oct. 29, 1921, p. 22).—The leading coal port of Wales is Cardiff. It "has not only led the world in the coal trade, but has also built up a very large ship-owning connexion. The place that Cardiff took for so many years in the bulk cargo carrying trade, and the fact that in former years it was always possible to get an outward cargo from Cardiff, no doubt led to the establishment there of ship-owning on a very large scale. Many shipowners whose headquarters are at other ports have offices in Cardiff from which they run their fleets, and although the number of steamers registered as Cardiff-owned is not so great it is estimated that at least 3,000,000 tons dead-weight of shipping are regularly controlled and run from Cardiff. One Cardiff firm alone controls 39 modern steamers, several of which burn coal or fuel oil, aggregating 340,000 tons d.w. The port of Cardiff embraces also the ports of Barry and Penarth for customs purposes."—*South-eastern ports: Cardiff, Barry, Penarth, and Newport* (*The Times* [London], *Trade Supplement*, Oct. 29, 1921, p. 24).—See also below: 1535-1921.

Ancient divisions.—Wales was anciently divided into four well-marked geographical units and it is impossible to understand the history of Wales without knowing these divisions. The four kingdoms, Gwynedd, Powys, Deheubarth, and Morgannwg correspond to the modern bishoprics of Anglesey, Flint, St. Davids and Llandaff. "Gwynedd was, as its conformation necessarily made it, the seat of the dominating power in Wales throughout its history, and the theatre in which stirring events again and again took place. It contained the most magnificent, and strategically the most important, of the four great mountain groups of Wales—Snowden, or *Eryri*, 'the home of eagles.' It included the ancient Môn, the island of Anglesey, 'the mother of Wales,' which, as the granary of Snowden, afforded an essential element of strength to that natural fortress. . . . A very little study of Welsh history will show that Snowden with its outworks was the central point of that history in almost every age, and that its natural advantages for defence necessarily made it so. Over and over again invading armies swept along the coast, only to be turned back when they attempted to pass beyond the Conway and enter the mountains of Carnarvonshire, or to meet a worse fate, having entered, and being unable to return. Thus the mountain barrier which rises on the western side of the Conway valley and stretches across from the north coast to Tremadoc Bay is the natural feature which dominates the military history of Wales, and the history of Wales is the history of war from first to last. Further, it is near the river's mouth where the town of Conway stands that nearly all attempts to enter Snowden appear to have been made."—H. Pilkington, *North Wales: Its wild story and scenery*, pp. 6-7.—Powys, occupying most of central Wales and the northeast marches, usually received the first brunt of all invasions. "Central Wales may be regarded as a broad table-land, through which rivers great and small furrow their way in winding courses

to the sea, but which has few clearly marked mountain ranges or stretches of fertile plain. The ancient kingdom of Powys took in most of this region, extending in its widest limits from the neighbourhood of Mold to the river Wye, near Glasbury and Hay. It included some productive districts, such as the lower valley of the Dee and the well-watered meadows of the upper Severn, so that its children were not altogether without warrant in hailing it as 'Powys, the Eden of Wales.' But most of it was pastoral upland, a country well fitted to be the nurse of a race of hardy, independent warriors, lovers of tribal freedom, haters of the sluggish and toilsome life of the lowland tiller of the soil, and tenacious holders of ancient privileges. Such were the men of Powys, inheritors of the old Brythonic traditions, in whom incessant warfare with the Merian English kept alive the ancient tribal characteristics. . . . The original 'dextralis pars Britanniae' or 'Deheubarth Kymry' embraced the whole of South Wales, in which sense the term is used by Asser and by those who drafted the charters in the *Liber Landavensis*. But in later parlance the name Deheubarth came to be restricted to the realm, which included most of the South Welsh area, formed by the accretion of Ceredigion, Ystrad Tywi and Brycheiniog around the ancient kingdom of Dyfed, and in this sense it was exclusive of Gwent and Morgannwg. . . . The well-sunned plains which, from the mouth of the Tawe to that of the Wye, skirt the northern shore of the Bristol Channel enjoy a mild and genial climate and have from the earliest times been the seat of important settlements. Roman civilisation gained a firm foothold in the district, as may be seen from its remains at Cardiff, Caerleon and Caerwent. Monastic centres of the first rank were established here, at Llanilltud, Llanancarfan and Llandaff, during the age of early Christian enthusiasm. Politically, too, the region stood apart from the rest of South Wales, in virtue, it may be, of the strength of the old Silurian traditions, and it maintained, through many vicissitudes, its independence under its own princes until the eve of the Norman Conquest. It had its own bishop, seated at Llandaff, and never acknowledged the supremacy of David, whose sway was so mighty in the rest of Deheubarth."—J. E. Lloyd, *History of Wales from the earliest times to the Edwardian conquest*, v. 1, pp. 242-243, 256, 273.

B. C. 55-A. D. 683.—Early history.—Origin of name.—Family of Cunedda.—Rule of Maelgwyn.—Advance of the Anglo-Saxons.—Cornwall and Strathclyde separated.—Rule of Cadwallawn.—Loss of North Wales.—"The history of Wales, which stretches back as far as that of any nation in Europe, and which presents to the student of peoples some most interesting problems, has been singularly neglected by historians until comparatively recent years. The direct ancestors of the Welsh were offering sacrifices to their gods in Britain thousands of years before our era. The Welsh are, indeed, descended from races which conquered a large part of Western Europe, Albion, and Ireland; their immediate ascendants, the Britons, opposed Caesar's landing and lived long under Rome's government, learning their lessons in Roman schools and pleading before Roman judges; they fought stubbornly and for centuries against the barbarian Saxons, struggling as few people have had to struggle to preserve a great widespread civilization. This people, driven back at last by force of overwhelm-

ing numbers to the mountains of Cymru, still held the flag of liberty aloft, met in succession and successfully Saxon and Angle and Dane, Norseman and Norman, until at last, worn out and embroiled by centuries of warfare, they succumbed to the Norman castle-builders, as more than twelve hundred years before their ancestors had succumbed to the block-houses and forts of Frontinus and Agricola. . . . The title 'Briton' is to-day borne by many peoples in many lands, few of whom, probably, realize that, strictly speaking, it is the Welshman alone who is entitled to that name. When in olden times the Anglo-Saxon chroniclers referred to their enemies the Britons they used to term 'wealas' or 'bret-Wealas.' When in 1870 the German historian von Treitschke spoke of the Frenchmen of Lorraine he used the term 'Wälsch,' inelegantly translated in *Elsass and Lothringen Past and Present* as 'Welsh.' [See WELSH and WALLOONS.] Both terms expressed the same notion of enmity. The Welshman was the Saxon's enemy, but he was a Briton-enemy. . . . Until the fifth century of our era the Welsh people were mainly found in Britain rather than in Cymru."—G. Stone, *Wales*, pp. ix, xi-xii.—"When Rome had become too weak to interfere with the distant mountains of Wales, the family of Cunedda rose [about 400] to greatness as a family of officials, chiefly concerned with the defence of the wall. The Pictish attacks on the valley of the Clyde, and the Angle advance along the Humber, drove them southwards, and Deganwy became the chief seat of their power. Deganwy is now a desolate and insignificant ruin, overlooking the thriving sea-side resort of Llandudno [in North Wales], but still commanding the views of seas and islands over which the heirs of the Romans once held sway. While the invaders were conquering the plains of England, Maelgwn was vigorously restoring the unity of the western province. . . . About 550, when Maelgwn ruled over the mountains and seas of the west, two new barbarian powers were forming in the east. Ida, the Flamebearer, the Angle who had established his power on the rock fortress of Bamborough, threatened the northern part of Maelgwn's realm; the Saxons, though London barred the Thames estuary, were advancing over Salisbury Plain towards the lower valley of the Severn. Popular imagination was deeply affected by the death of Maelgwn of the yellow plague. Soon the western province he had united was to bear the full force of Teutonic attack. The Saxons came first. Ceawlin appeared in the Severn valley in 577. The victory of Deorham extended West Saxon power to the sea, and Cornwall fell away finally from Wales. The great cities of the Severn, from Gloucester to Uriconium, were sacked and devastated; and it was not until he was advancing on the valley of the Dee that the conqueror was hurled back in the battle of Fethanlea in 584. As soon as the Saxon had recoiled from the attack on the western province, the Angle came. About 613 the Angle king Ethelfrith defeated the Britons at the battle of Chester. The Angle dominions now included parts of the vale of Maelor, and reached the western sea, and the great fortress of Chester no longer united the mountains of the west and of the north under one rule. The victory of Chester, an account of which Bede might have got in his childhood from one who had been there, cut Strathclyde and the whole of the north from Wales. The whole that now remained of the Roman province was the mass of mountains between the plains and the

sea—modern Wales. One great attempt was made by Cadwallon [or Cadwallawn, ruler of Gwynedd] to recover the north, and to wear the crown of Britain. For one year alone he succeeded in holding it; when he died fighting for it near the Great Wall in 635, he bequeathed to his son Cadwaladr a vanishing crown, powerful enemies, a distracted and a plague-stricken country. The Cymric attempt at continuing the political unity bequeathed by Rome to the west, found expression in the romances of Arthur, whose dim and majestic presence gradually dominates Welsh political thought. The period which bequeathed Wales the mythical champion of its traditional unity, also gave it a patron saint. St. David represents the final victory of Christ over a host of deities—Lud of the Silver Hand, patron of flocks and ships; Merlin, imprisoned in an enchanted palace; Lear, and old King Cole; Gwydion ap Don, who created the maiden Flower-Aspect from rose and broom and anemomy; Elden, goddess of marching armies, and Ceridwen, goddess of wisdom and knowledge; and a host of others, some mighty and some maimed, some possessed of wonderful power, others known from the good they did. The disappearance of the Motley throng was not final; many of them, especially well deities, reappeared disguised as the saints of the new religion—some have remained in popular superstition to this day. . . . With the death of Cadwaladr [683], the struggle for the recovery of the north was given up for ever. For the next six hundred years the struggle is a different one; it is between a king who regarded himself as the champion of the unity of the Britons, wearing 'the crown of Arthur' [for to the Welsh Arthur is essentially a Welsh hero], and the princes who were descended from the tribal kinglets. The chief sources of information concerning the attempt at uniting Wales is the 'Chronicle of the Princes.' The earliest copy of it we possess was written during the first half of the fourteenth century, probably at the Cistercian abbey of Strata Florida in Ceredigion. It begins, as it ends, with the loss of a crown; it begins with the loss of the 'crown of Britain,' it ends in the midst of the war which caused the loss of the crown of Wales. It is full, picturesque, and generally trustworthy."—O. M. Edwards, *Wales*, pp. 27-31.—See also ARTHURIAN LEGEND; BRITAIN: 6th century; CUMBRIA; MYTHOLOGY: Celtic: Christian era.

8th and 9th centuries.—Invaded by Saxons and Danes.—Rhodri Mawr's defense of his country.—Three divisions of Wales.—For two centuries, the eighth and ninth, Wales was harassed by invaders. Offa, king of the Mercians, conquered Amwythig and Henfordd; the Norse and Danish pirates ravaged the eastern coast, pillaging the flourishing monasteries. In this long era of struggle for her self-preservation there rose a king among the Welsh who was able to defend his country by bringing first to his standard the warring native chieftains. This was Rhodri Mawr, or Rhoderick the Great, whose name became part of the national heroic traditions of the Welsh. In 877, he lost his life in battle, and his power passed to his three sons, among whom Wales was divided—Gwynedd (North Wales), Deheubarth (South Wales), and Powys (Mid Wales). Three courts were maintained.

928.—Laws of Howel Dda.—"With the advent of Hywel Dda to the throne, these separate semi-independent kingdoms were merged into one under the rule of one sovereign. Even more important

than the unification of Wales, as inaugurated in Hywel's [Howel Dda the Good] reign, was the codification of Welsh law which he brought about [928]. He was not long on the throne before he perceived that the laws and customs of the country were being violated with impunity, and, as a result, were losing both their value and necessity for the people. In order to arrest the degeneracy of law by giving it a standard value, and to readjust the social habits of the people to the new conditions created by the great development of trade and the break-up of an antiquated social caste, Hywel summoned representative men from each commot to meet him in council. As many as 170 prelates and 836 deputies assembled and, after prayer and fasting, twelve of the most experienced persons, together with a doctor of laws, were chosen from that assembly, and to them was assigned the task of examining, abrogating and codifying all the various and varying laws in force throughout the land. Their labours resulted in the publication of 'The Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales.' This work has great historical importance. It affords the clearest insight into the social modes and customs that prevailed among the early Welsh and reflects the readjustments in the habits of the people which a new civilisation was making inevitable. As Mr. O. M. Edwards points out, 'there is one great radical difference between the Wales of the Laws and later Wales—the social system is tribal, not territorial. The political unit is always a group of families, not a district of land. The king is not the owner of the land, he is the patriarch of his people.'—J. H. Edwards, *Life of David Lloyd George, with a short history of the Welsh people*, v. 1, pp. 17-18.

950-1062.—Period of tribal dissensions.—Following the rule of Howel Dda, who died in 950, the country was torn by tribal wars brought on by the rivalries of the princes of Powys, Gwynedd, and Deheubarth, and their feudal followers. Llewelyn ap Seissyllt finally won the overlordship of all Wales and reigned till 1022, giving the country a fairly peaceful rule. His son Griffith carried on a long war against Harold, earl of Wessex, until 1062 when he was treacherously slain. Then Wales was placed under the king's half brothers, by Harold, who was himself, within less than five years, to fall before the invading Normans.

1066-1169.—William the Conqueror, and Welsh resistance.—Bleddyn.—Griffith ap Cynan.—Owain Gwynedd.—"William the Conqueror landed in England in 1066. The conquest of England was accomplished in the next five years, but that of 'gallant little Wales,' to which William immediately turned his attention, was to occupy two hundred. To Hugh the Wolf, the Norman custodian of Chester (whose name will be recognised in that of Hugh Lupus, the late Duke of Westminster), was entrusted the subjugation of North Wales. Robert, known as Robert of Rhuddlan, was his chief lieutenant in the task, and soon established himself at Rhuddlan on the Clwyd, where, on the site of an old Welsh fort, he built the sturdy castle which remains, as improved by Edward I, and but little dilapidated, to this day. Other Norman nobles were at the same time pushing into Wales further south from Shrewsbury and Hereford. Bleddyn [prince of Powys], who in the north bore the brunt of the first Norman attack, was killed in battle (not with the Normans but with a rival prince) in 1075. Then arose Griffith ap Conan [1075], the half Irish prince of Gwynedd, who was to stem the tide of Norman progress. But he had in the first instance to establish himself

in his own dominions. To achieve this he made an alliance with Robert of Rhuddlan, to which neither party intended to adhere. Griffith got the best of the bargain, gaining time to secure the loyalty of Gwynedd, which was all he wanted. His career, however, though ultimately successful, was one of many vicissitudes. Hugh the Wolf and Robert of Rhuddlan soon ravaged Snowdon. Griffith was often defeated, sometimes driven to sea as the only means of escape, often occupied in subduing one or other of his Welsh neighbours, and once for a long period the prisoner of Hugh the Wolf in the dungeons of Chester. While Griffith was a prisoner, Robert of Rhuddlan reared a Norman castle at Deganwy on the site of the Welsh one, realising no doubt the need for a stronghold here if Snowdon was to be held or reconquered. Then was made the first attempt since Roman times at the scientific outflanking of Snowdon. Starting from the Conway, Hugh the Wolf and Robert of Rhuddlan crossed by sea to Anglesey and built the castle of Aberlleiniog, a few miles north of the spot where Beaumaris Castle still stands. Another castle was established on the heights south-east of Bangor on the mainland, but it appears to have been found untenable and was soon abandoned. Meanwhile the other Norman forces had attacked South Wales successfully both by sea and land, and before 1094 had subdued it. Snowdon alone held out in the north, and hopeless though its position seemed, the indomitable Griffith was yet to set it free. He escaped from Chester, successfully stormed Aberlleiniog, drove Robert of Rhuddlan back to Deganwy, and carried the war into what the Normans had regarded as finally conquered territory. He had his revenge on Robert too. The event is thus described by Mr. Owen Edwards: 'One hot day in July, as Robert was enjoying his noontide sleep at Deganwy, Griffith came with a few ships, and they cast anchor under Great Orme's Head. When Robert awoke he saw the ships, full of his cattle, ready to put to sea. Shouting and cursing, he snatched his shield, and ran down the steep, rocky bank to the seashore accompanied by one retainer only. He died like a wild boar, fighting to the last, pierced through and through by the Welshmen's spears. Griffith cut his head off and nailed it to the mast of his ship and then, within sight of the pursuing Normans, threw it into the sea.' . . . Encouraged by the example of Griffith, South Wales now almost shook off the Norman yoke, but the tide soon turned again. William Rufus [1087-1089], now on the throne of England, came west in person and almost recovered the ground which had been lost. Aberlleiniog was quickly rebuilt, and Norman armies again pressed into Snowdon from Anglesey and Deganwy. But now, and again in the reign of Henry I [1087-1100], Griffith defied all attempts to subdue him, and died in 1137 master of the greater part of Wales, leaving an unsurpassed reputation for restless energy and indomitable courage. Owen Gwynedd [1137-1170], elder son of Griffith ap Conan, aided by his brother Cadwaladr, and taking advantage of the distracted state of England in the reign of Stephen, for a time succeeded in extending the dominion established by his father. But Cadwaladr alienated Owen by a crime in 1143, and several years of civil war ensued in Wales. By 1152 Owen had established his supremacy, and when Henry II, who came to the throne of England in 1154, invaded Wales, Owen was to some extent ready to oppose him. Nevertheless, Henry was not seriously checked till his troops had entered Anglesey by sea. A temporary peace was



ROYAL EISTEDDFOD AT CARNARVON, WALES

National bardic congress, meeting annually, for the encouragement of bardism, music and general literature of the Welsh

then agreed upon, and, as usually happened when no foreign war occupied them, the various Welsh princes again fought among themselves. By 1169 Owen had once more established his authority. His growing power induced Henry II to attack him again, this time by a new route up the valley of the Dee. Owen assembled an army at Corwen, and Henry was compelled to retire on Chester. He made one more attempt to organise an expedition into Gwynedd along the coast, but this too was unsuccessful. Owen Gwynedd died later in the same year (1169) and was buried in Bangor Cathedral, where, in the same grave, his brother Cadwaladr, who had returned to his allegiance before the death of Owen, was laid three years afterwards."—H. Pilkington, *North Wales: Its wild story and scenery*, pp. 17-19.

1200-1277.—Llewelyn ab Iorwerth the Great.—Alliances with King John and Henry III.—Great assembly at Aberdovey.—Llewelyn ab Gruffydd, prince of all Wales.—Alliance with Simon de Montfort and French.—Treaty of Montgomery.—War with Edward I.—Treaty of Rhuddlan.—“With the advent of the thirteenth century two great historical personages dominate the Welsh stage in turn, and around their respective personalities the changing scenes revolve. These were the two Llywelyns—Llywelyn ap Iorwerth [1200-1240], famed in Welsh history as Llywelyn the Great, and Llywelyn ap Griffith [1282]. His father—Iorwerth—was the rightful heir to the throne of Gwynedd; but it appears that his claims were disregarded on account of the physical disfigurement of a broken nose. If young Llywelyn ap Iorwerth found no throne to inherit at his father's death, he was in the position of being the rightful heir to a bequeathed claim, and with the powerful aid of his mother's kinsfolk he speedily set himself to make good that claim. . . . One portion after another of the Snowdonian district succumbed to Llywelyn's might, and under the spell of his prowess Gwynedd recovered its past glory and became once more the centre and symbol of the independence of Wales. By the time Llywelyn had attained his majority the whole country had come under his sway, and so great was his prestige that King John, who now occupied the English throne, bestowed upon him in marriage his illegitimate daughter, Joan. Such an event was in itself eloquent in its meaning. If not merely embodied a recognition of the independence of Wales, but it obviously sought, by means of the most sacred of hostages, to perpetuate the policy of conciliation. Unfortunately, the hopes which sprang from such an alliance became dissipated in a personal estrangement between Llywelyn and his father-in-law, and this developed into dimensions of war; but the source of all this tragic result lay in John's notorious shiftiness of character, and not in any breach of trust on the part of the Welsh prince. . . . In that Great Charter, so aptly described as ‘the basis of English liberty,’ there were three clauses which had special reference to the interests of Wales. These clauses pledged the king to the restitution to Welshmen of all lands that had been taken from them, and they further stipulated for all legal disputes in Wales being henceforth decided in strict accordance with the accepted code of Welsh laws and not by the laws and customs prevailing on the English borders. [See MAGNA CARTA.] . . . In the year following the historic date of the Great Charter he [Llewelyn] convened all the native princes to meet in assembly at Aberdovey [1216]. This assembly has been very aptly described ‘as virtually a Welsh parliament,

the first of its kind.’ The purpose of the gathering was equally unique. ‘It was to be a legislative, an executive, and a judicial body. It was to represent the unity of the country under one supreme prince of Wales.’ . . . [In 1233 he had overcome South Wales.] . . . He realised that, in the highest interests of the country, it was better to give away the semblance of independence in order to preserve the reality. He was much more concerned in protecting Welsh territory from the menace of further encroachments and of ensuring the independence of his people in their own internal affairs than in waging a hopeless struggle for the elusive shadow of an illusive sovereignty. Llywelyn had great difficulty in bringing the Welsh princes into line with his declared policy, but the masterfulness of his personality finally triumphed. The attitude of the Welsh chieftains, however, was that of sullen acquiescence rather than of agreement, when ‘in 1237 Llywelyn, Prince of Wales, by special messengers sent word to Henry III. that as his time of life required that he should henceforth abandon all strife and tumult of war and should for the future enjoy peace, he had determined to place himself and his possessions under the authority and protection of him, the English king, and would hold his lands from him in all fealty and friendship, and enter into an indissoluble treaty; and if the king should go on any expedition he would, to the best of his power, as his liege subject, promote it by assisting him with troops, arms, horses, and money.’ As might have been expected, such vassalage on the part of the great Cymric chief was readily accepted by the king, and in return Llywelyn's lordship over the whole territory of Wales received the royal imprimatur. . . . [Llewelyn ab Iorwerth the Great, died in 1240. Wales again became disunited and broke away from the suzerainty of England. Llewelyn ab Gruffydd came into power in 1246 and by 1258 had made all the Welsh chieftains take the oath of fealty to him.] In every direction Llewelyn ap Griffith was victorious, and his sovereignty supreme. Gwynedd had been restored to its ancient supremacy, and the Welsh princes had become not merely the allies of Llywelyn, but also his feudal vassals. The Welsh leader, however, had a genius for turning the latent resources of national sentiment to practical use. He recognised the necessity, no less than the desirability, of symbolising the unity of Wales in the stable form of a recognised sovereignty. He was not long in giving definite shape to his purpose. Early in 1258 he summoned, after the historic example of his illustrious grandfather, all the princes to meet in council, and at that gathering he assumed the title of ‘Prince of Wales.’ The significance of the new title becomes apparent by reason of the fact that Llywelyn the Great, even in the heyday of his triumphs, had been content with mere title of ‘Prince of Aberffraw and Lord of Snowdon.’ The new prince soon proved that his new designation was to be no mere empty title. He infused into the sonorousness of the phrase an authority absolutely unrivalled in its range and unprecedented in the history of Wales. Not only did he enter into a confederacy with the English barons in their great struggle, under the leadership of Simon de Montfort, against the unconstitutional action of the king, but he took a still more momentous step by embarking upon a policy of foreign alliances. He made a compact with Scotland by which it was agreed that neither country should make peace with England without the consent of the other, and should in time of war make common cause. . . . So real had Lly-

welyn's supremacy become, and so widespread was his authority, that the English king had no alternative but to recognise it as an outstanding fact. The royal acknowledgment became embodied in the Treaty of Montgomery in 1267 in terms that were most favourable to the Welsh prince. [In 1274, Llewelyn refused to attend Edward's coronation.] . . . In 1275 Edward, determined to come to grips with the Welsh ruler, appeared with an army at Chester, and under cover of force commanded Llywelyn to render homage. On the unanimous advice of the council of the Welsh princes, declares a Welsh chronicler, 'Llywelyn did not go to the king, and for that reason the king returned in anger to England.' . . . In 1277 four great armies marched into Wales, and the country was attacked at its most vulnerable points. The king himself led a force through Chester on to Rhuddlan in the northern district; another advanced through Shrewsbury; a third penetrated as far as Brecon; while a fourth marched to Carmarthen in the south. In this way the whole of the country became scheduled into military campaigns, and Edward was able to draw his cordon tight. It was not, however, the strength of the mighty hosts of the English king that appalled Llywelyn, but the hideous spectre of famine that hovered around his own camp. The cornfields in Anglesey had been ruthlessly devastated, and he had no means of replenishing his food supplies. Llywelyn, in the circumstances, deemed discretion to be better than a hopeless valour, and accordingly he entered into negotiations with the king. On November 10th, he signed, in Edward's presence, the Treaty of Rhuddlan [or Conway]. By the terms of this treaty, so truly described as 'humiliating,' Llywelyn was permitted to retain the title of 'Prince of Wales,' but the title was to become extinct at his death and the barons of Snowdon were to become the king's men. His territories were reduced to the dimensions of the Snowdonian district, and all the Welsh princes were to transfer their allegiance from Llywelyn to Edward. Further, Llywelyn himself was required to come to England annually to do homage to the English king."—J. H. Edwards, *Life of David Lloyd George, with a short history of the Welsh people*, v. 1, pp. 44, 46, 49, 57-60.—"The Treaty of Conway humbled Llywelyn as signally as that of Montgomery had exalted him. By it he lost all his conquests in South and Mid Wales and even that Middle Country between the Conway and the Dee which no strong ruler of Gwynedd had ever let slip, and which he had held from the beginning of his victorious career. His territory was confined within the comparatively narrow bounds of Gwynedd above Conway."—J. E. Lloyd, *History of Wales from the earliest times to the Edwardian conquest*, v. 2, p. 759.

1282-1284.—Conquest of Wales by Edward I.—Death of Llewelyn.—Statute of Rhuddlan.—"The final breach between Llywelyn and the king came suddenly and there is little in the history of the preceding three years to suggest that it was impending. No doubt, the prince had his grievances, but they were not of the first order, and Edward was taken completely by surprise when news was brought to him at Devizes of the outbreak of March, 1282. The cause of the war was the oppressive rule of the royal officials, now as of old doing their master grave disservice, in the districts which had been taken from Llywelyn, and the prince was drawn into the field, not so much by his own wrongs as by those endured by his former subjects."—J. E. Lloyd, *History of*

Wales from the earliest times to the Edwardian conquest, v. 2, p. 761.—Edward I led his armies into Gwynedd and took Conway castle in 1282. Llewelyn was killed in an obscure skirmish and Gwynedd soon submitted. Edward built several castles, Carnarvon, Criccieth and Harlech, as fortresses to hold his possessions. In 1284 at Carnarvon castle the title of Prince of Wales was given to his new born son, afterwards Edward II. By the statute of Rhuddlan 1284 (or *Statuta Walliæ*) he divided the ancient kingdoms of Gwynedd, Powys, Deheubarth and Morganwg into counties. "The result of this *Statuta Walliæ* was to separate North Wales from the marches. The eastern part of Wales was divided into counties and placed under the English system of local government; sheriffs and other officers were appointed; the English mode of legal procedure was established; the office of coroner was introduced; the king's writs were made to run in Wales; the assize, the jury, essoins, and vouching to warranty in the English manner were also introduced; the English law of dower took the place of the old Welsh law relating to goods in communion and division on separation and *da*. In one important particular, however, the old Welsh system still lived on. The Welsh mode of inheritance of land, not according to the law of primogeniture, but according to a custom similar to that existing in Kent to-day, was preserved. In the future as in the past Welsh land descended, not to the eldest son, but to all heirs equally."—G. Stone, *Wales*, p. 351.

1307-1327.—Policy of Edward II toward Wales.—His system of Welsh juries.—First representation in English Parliament.—"It was a wonder to an English chronicler a hundred years later why Wales clung to Edward II. when Scotland had rebelled against him and when England had cast him away, why its poets had written elegies on him in their own tongue, and why it still remembered him with affection. . . . During the whole of his reign [1307-1327] a struggle was going on in Wales between the new official class and the conquered people. When the king interfered it was in the interest of the Welsh freemen. . . . Welshmen were denied justice in civil matters, because the jury was English and ignorant of the customs of Wales. Edward II. ordained that suits between Welshmen must be decided by a Welsh jury and according to Welsh law; suits between Welshmen and Englishmen by a jury composed of an equal number of Welshmen and Englishmen; and suits between Englishmen as before. . . . Between the conquest and the reign of Henry VIII. Edward is the only king who summoned members from Wales to his Parliaments. In 1322, when he was at the height of his power, twenty-four representatives were summoned from South Wales and twenty-four from North Wales. In his last Parliament in 1326, the three counties of North Wales were represented by eighteen Welshmen, and their boroughs by six Englishmen."—O. M. Edwards, *Wales*, pp. 221-224.—"The evils which sprang from these many jurisdictions had an important bearing on the history of Wales for the next two centuries. With so many masters having rule over them, it is not to be wondered at that the Welsh were discontented and eventually rose in rebellion. It has been suggested comparatively recently that the main cause of the rising under Owen Glendower was the Black Death, with its resulting misery. [See also BLACK DEATH.] That there is much probability in this suggestion is certain, but it should also be remembered that

the Welsh had been groaning for over a century under seigneurial jurisdictions without any native protectors to guard them from real oppression, as had been the case in the earlier years of the struggle between Welsh and Norman and Welsh and English. . . . It is not to be expected, however, that a conquered country will immediately submit to the commands and demands of the conqueror. Throughout the early years of Edward II's reign there are numerous references in the *Calendar of Close Rolls* to Wales, many of them being directed to Roger de Mortuo Mari (Mortimer), Justice of Wales, who is frequently ordered to see that the king's castles in Wales are fortified and well guarded. We also find him (in 1300) ordered not to appoint Welshmen to fill the offices of sheriff and bailiff if he can find Englishmen."—G. Stone, *Wales*, pp. 352, 357.

1402-1413.—Owen Glendower's rebellion.—Alliance with the Percys.—His defeat at Shrewsbury.—England's policy toward conquered Wales.—The usurpation by Henry IV of the English crown played an important part in Welsh history. As lord of Hereford, he represented to the Welsh one of the hated marcher lords and as such could never be popular. A national hero arose in Owen Glendower, a descendant of the last Llewelyn. His lands had been confiscated by Lord Grey of Ruthin. In 1402 Owen had sufficient troops and followers to make a raid on Lord Grey and take him prisoner near Snowdon. He overran Herefordshire (the marcher lands of the king), and took prisoner Sir Edmund Mortimer, uncle to the rightful heir of the English throne. This captive was instrumental in turning Owen's mind towards deposing Henry IV. An alliance took place between Owen and the Percys of Northumberland, who were discontented with their lack of reward in helping Henry to secure the throne. Owen also allied himself with the French, and three times he was able to resist attacks on his country. "The French did not commence to send aid to Owain until 1404. There is reason to believe that about this time there was a well-developed plan in existence for the invasion of England by France. A league with France was signed by Owain's ambassadors, John Hanner and Griffith Yonge, in Paris on June 14, 1404. It was not ratified by Owain, however, until January 1405. About the same time Owain had obtained the support of the Pope, and Trevor, Bishop of St. Asaph, seems to have thought that Owain's bid for power would prove successful, for he is found revolting from Henry and joining the forces of the Welsh leader. . . . Glyndwr was now at the highest point in his career. We find him keeping a regular court in Wales, possessing his own chancery, seal, and courts of law. We even read of his calling a Parliament of the de Montfort type to meet at Machynlleth, and he was also formally crowned Prince of Wales."—G. Stone, *Wales*, pp. 383, 378.—At last he decided that the time was ripe for an invasion of England with the aid of the Percys and Mortimers. The three armies were to meet at Shrewsbury, but for some reason Glendower failed his two allies, who were hopelessly defeated. "The established Saxon view is that the *débâcle* of Shrewsbury was caused to a great extent by Glyndwr's liking for destructive warfare—a trait which kept him ravaging South Wales too long, so that he was unable to form a juncture with Percy's forces at Shrewsbury, and arrived too late to support his ally, being consequently forced to look passively on at the defeat of Hotspur's army and the destruction of his greater ambitions.

Within recent years, however, an extremely instructive addition has been made to the theories relating to this engagement by a learned author who chooses to be known under the pen-name of 'Owen Rhoscomyl.' If we accept the suggestions thrown out by this writer it would seem that the real rendezvous of the allies was fixed in the Mortimer country at Ludlow—which was, of course, the seat of the Mortimers' power. Our authority adds: 'From this place they were to march eastward into England to attack Henry with a view to placing the crown upon the head of the child Earl of March.' It is clear that, for this juncture to be safely effected, it was desirable for Glyndwr to make the country behind as safe as possible. It would have been madness to have withdrawn his troops from Wales in an easterly direction if he had left behind him all the retainers and men-at-arms of his enemies the marcher lords, ready and able to fall upon his now defenceless possessions. He would have had no safe base upon which to fall in the event of a temporary check or defeat. In consequence of such considerations it does seem at least probable that Owain had a definite politic purpose in his harrying of South Wales. While Hotspur was hurrying down to Cheshire, Owain was carrying fire and sword throughout the south. He had not, however, been forgetful of his ally. Many of his Welsh followers had been directed to join Hotspur's forces in Cheshire. As a result of these and other additions to his ranks, Hotspur, who was ever a better man in the battlefield than in the council-chamber, seems to have determined to accomplish the overthrow of Henry single-handed. He certainly struck out east, completely off the line of march he should have taken had it been his purpose to join his allies. It was not, indeed, until he found that the men of the Midlands were not hurrying to his standard like the men of Cheshire that he decided to attempt the juncture originally planned. Now, however, it was too late. . . . Everything seems to have pointed to the necessity for instant action. The scattered armies of the allies might have been combined and flung against the king. But Owain failed to act. It was the great blunder of his life and the turning-point of his career. Hence onward his star was on the decline, until at last it set in gloom as deep as ever enclouded the last days of a brave man's life. . . . The later years of Owain's life are wrapped in obscurity. In 1413 Henry IV had been succeeded by his son Henry of Monmouth. At this time Glyndwr had been reduced to the condition of a wanderer among the mountains of the north. His followers had largely deserted him, won over by the promises of pardon held out to them by Hugh Huls, or Holes, Baron of the Exchequer, and Chief Justice Hankford, who had been sent by Henry V to North Wales to inquire into the conduct and pardon of rebels who were prepared to submit and pay an appropriate fine in lieu of escheat. By the end of that year the country was quiet, and such confidence had Henry in the settled state of Wales that we find a Welshman, Rhys ap Thomas, appointed Steward of Cardigan. Castles were rebuilt and the country returned to a state of peace. As Mr. Wylie has said in his work on Henry V: 'The general pacification of the country is strongly evidenced by the employment of many Welshmen in positions of trust under the English Government, and it is significant to find many Welsh squires as well as 500 archers from South Wales with genuine Welsh names fighting side by side with Englishmen at Agincourt, though there is also evidence that some

Welsh gentlemen fought with the French on the opposite side.'—G. Stone, *Wales*, pp. 379-381, 383, 388.

1485-1603.—Tudor Royal House of Welsh origin.—Henry VII of England.—Act of Union.—Tudor administration of Wales.—“The Tudors traced their descent from Cadwaladr [664-683], the last British king. It is true that they had in them the royal blood of North and of South Wales. They had fought for Llywelyn the Great, they had representatives at Cressy and Agincourt, they had supported their kinsman Glendower, they had married into the French and into the English royal families. It was partly good fortune, and partly their own determination that their fortune should be good, that brought them to the brilliant position they occupied during the sixteenth century, and enabled them to become the creators of modern Britain in all the essential aspects of its history. . . . In Wales they rode rough-shod over all sentiment and tradition; and established, in their methodical pitiless way, a strong system of justice and a real political union with England. They were exceedingly popular, and Mary was not less popular than the others. Henry VII. could always call Rees ap Thomas with an army of archers to his aid [as he did at Bosworth field in 1485, when he defeated Richard III and secured the English throne]. Welshmen flocked to the Court, from the Herberts and the Cecils, who gave the sovereigns counsel in building their absolutism, to the lowly family of brewers from whom came Oliver Cromwell to subvert that absolutism, and then to imitate it. . . . [Under Henry VIII, Wales and England were strongly united by the Act of Union.] The union of 1535 brought two great benefits to Wales—its march lordships became shire ground, and it was given representation in Parliament. . . . Under the Tudors an energetic and a continuous policy succeeded in making the king's law supreme in Wales. Three institutions were used, the Star Chamber, the Court of the Council of Wales and the Marches, and the Great Sessions of Wales. . . . In Wales, as in England, there have been two great periods of the revival of local government—during the second half of the sixteenth century and during the second half of the nineteenth. But the revival meant more in Wales. It was more than the introduction of a better form of government; it realised a dream that had never been forgotten, and cannot be. Welsh independence, in a measure that would have satisfied Llywelyn, is being gradually restored in the form of local government. Under the Tudors the shire became a unit for local government; Wales had an independent system of law courts; and the towns, which had been in theory hostile garrisons, became the centres of national life. . . . But the Tudors had attempted more. To them the customs of Wales were sinister usages, its language a curse, and its national life a dead volcano of treason. They were not content with introducing the law of primogeniture, which completed the destruction of the old social system. They had enacted, in the statute which united Wales with England [1535], that all the sessions of justice were to be held in English, that all oaths were to be administered in English, and that ‘henceforth no person or persons that use the Welsh speech or language shall have or enjoy any manner of office or fees within this realm of England, Wales, or other the king's dominion, upon pain of forfeiting the same office or fees unless he or they used and exercise the English speech or language.’ . . . The upper class obeyed the Tudors, and became English in thought and language. The lower classes remained

sturdily Welsh.”—O. M. Edwards, *Wales*, pp. 311-312, 322, 330, 335-337, 339.

1535-1921.—Wales during Protestant Reformation.—Her part in England's Civil War.—Conservative character of Wales in revolutionary movements of modern history.—Education.—Development of industrial resources.—With “the Tudors came those changes which saw the fall of an aristocracy and the rise of a monarchy wisely tolerating and apparently bending before the people in their Parliament assembled. This era it was which saw the rule of law beginning to be firmly established. For Wales . . . [especially following the Act of Union of 1535] saw the seigneurial jurisdictions crushed; it saw the Council of the Marches developed and strengthened. Under Bishop Lee it saw lawlessness ruthlessly put down; under the firm hand of Thomas Cromwell it saw disorder checked and trade encouraged. Toward the end of the Tudor period, the world saw the eyes of north-western Europe turning toward Rome. The Renaissance, bringing to man the fruits of knowledge, caused him to cast away the husks of creed. Again Wales took her part. For many reasons the waves of this mighty movement had been late in reaching her shore, and Wales remained Catholic for years after England had turned Protestant.”—O. M. Edwards, *Wales*, pp. 391-392.—“Wales had its full share of the unity caused by the patriotism of Tudor times; it had its full share also in the disruption caused by the struggle between political ideals in Stuart times. It was almost entirely Royalist. It was in the English parts only, especially in southern Pembrokeshire [Pembroke is called Little England beyond Wales], that the Parliament had partisans. From the king's march on Edgehill in 1624, with an army largely Welsh, to the capture of the Harlech in 1647, the last castle to hold out for the king in the First Civil War, Wales was enthusiastically Royalist. The feeling of sheer, blind, unreasoning loyalty was strong among Welsh squires like Sir John Owen of Cleaneau. The more thoughtful and moderate men, like Archbishop Williams, though they had been strongly opposed to the absolutism which had found exponents in the favourites of the first two Stuart kings, yet threw themselves entirely to the king's side. The people followed the example of the gentry in everything. The Tudor laws had placed them more than ever in the power of the great landowners. They had no traditional reverence for the privileges of Parliament. To them the Puritan Revolution was but an extreme form of the Protestant Reformation that had been thrust upon them.”—*Ibid.*, pp. 354-355.—“But when the Bible was translated into Welsh by such men as Salesbury and Bishop Morgan [William Morgan's Bible was published 1620] and had been distributed widely by the munificence of Myddleton, the Puritan spirit began to gather in force, and although it developed too late to prevent Wales attaching herself in the main to the Royalist party in the great struggle of the Civil War, it grew in time into that austere Nonconformity which in the eighteenth century did much to cleanse Wales of serious abuses, and certainly was effective in preserving the Welsh language from the fate which has overtaken Old Cornish.”—*Ibid.*, p. 391.—“The history of modern Wales is the history of the rise of a subject class to prosperity and to political power. They were in serfdom during the period of the princes; they prospered, so quietly that the gradual amelioration of their lot was not noticed, while the social system of which they formed part was crumbling; the freemen of old

were hurled ignominiously into their ranks by mediæval lawyer and New Monarchy official; out of the tempest of war in which prince and poet were lost, they emerged free. They had little else from their freedom. Their rights to the land had gone, or were rapidly going. They had no literature; the mediæval ode had become a string of stereotyped alliterations; and when the richer class took to reading English or to reading nothing, Welsh literature died away. They had very little hope, they were thick on the land; their wealth lay in superstition and in the happiness of aimless indolence. Now, after three centuries, they are among the wealthiest and most industrious, and among the best educated and most thoughtful peasantry in the world. It is interesting to trace the history of their development; it is still more interesting to see it mirrored in their literature. They opposed every revolution that helped to make men free. They opposed the Reformation, they opposed the Puritan Revolution, they opposed the French Revolution, and every movement connected with them. But each revolution left among them a thought or a book, the legacy of one of their own number whose message during his lifetime had been like the voice of one crying in the wilderness, which sooner or later profoundly affected their life."—*Ibid.*, pp. 339-340.—"Fairly early in the eighteenth century Griffith Jones of Llanddowror, a clergyman, realised how ignorant the Welsh peasants were, and discovered that they were anxious to learn. The modern system of Welsh education, which found its completion in our own day, has its beginning in a little country school in Carmarthenshire, maintained by the pence offered by the poorest of the poor at the celebration of the Lord's Supper. . . . Almost suddenly the vast mineral wealth of Wales was discovered. It is stated that, at the present day, while England and Scotland produce minerals to the value of about £2 per acre, the produce of Wales is over £4 per acre. The Romans may have found gold in Merioneth, and copper in Anglesey; London obtained its water supply by means of wealth got out of Cardigan silver mines. But it was in the nineteenth century that agriculture became less important in Wales than the mining and manufacturing industries. The slate and greenstone quarries of Arvon and Merioneth, the copper mines of Anglesey, the zinc mines of Denbigh, the lead mines of Flint and Montgomery, the gold mines of Merioneth, and the silver mines of Cardigan, the iron furnaces of Glamorgan and Monmouth, and the great inexhaustible coal mines—their history is crowded into the nineteenth century. . . . From North Wales the human stream flows continuously to the slate quarries of Arvon and Merioneth, to the coal mines of the lower Dee, and to swell the great Welsh population of Liverpool. From every part of Wales the peasant trudges to the valleys among the Glamorgan and Monmouth hills or to the great seaports on the South Wales coast, all teeming with people. Coal and steel and tinplate, of world-wide reputation, have given energy to the labour once bestowed indolently on peat and sheep and homespun. While the population of the central shires is stationary or declining, that of Glamorgan and Monmouth has increased fivefold within sixty years. From Newport to Swansea the Severn sea is covered with ships carrying to all parts of the world the wealth of the inexhaustible mines in the mountains; Cardiff stands second among the ports of the kingdom, and third among the ports of the world. Trained by their self-education in religious and

literary matters, enfranchised when the new wealth gave them political independence, the Welsh people were peculiarly adapted for local government. In no part of the kingdom have the local councils—the County Council established in 1888 and the District Council and Parish Council established by the Local Government Act of 1894—been so welcome and so active. The year 1894, which gave a measure of local government to the Welsh ratepayer, also brought the University of Wales. [See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1893-1920.] However strong the Welsh claim to self-government has been, the desire for becoming capable of self-government has been stronger. The development of education has at least kept pace with the growth of wealth and of political power. . . . The development of Wales has been twofold—in national intensity and in the expansion of imperial sympathy. From Cressy and Agincourt to Albuera and Inkerman, its levies and regiments have done their duty; from David Gam and Roger Williams to Picton and Nott, its sons have been where the surge of the advancing British wave has beaten fiercest. To the cause of capital it has given a Lord Overstone, to the cause of labour a Robert Owen. If its best and strongest thought has been given to Welsh literature, it has given to England thoughts that have not been entirely forgotten, from George Herbert to Henry Vaughan, and from John Dyer to William Morris. In the development of British art it is represented by Richard Wilson, John Gibson, and Burne Jones. [During the period of the World War, Wales contributed two prime ministers to the British empire, David Lloyd George to England and W. M. Hughes to Australia.]"—*Ibid.*, pp. 386, 397, 399-400, 403.—Mar. 31, 1920, to Mar. 31, 1921, marks the first year of the establishment of the church in Wales and its formation into a separate archbishopric. See ENGLAND: 1912-1914.

1839-1844.—Outbreaks of the Rebeccaites. See REBECCAITES.

1904.—Welsh Coercion Act passed. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: England: Primary and secondary.

1915.—Coal strike in South Wales. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1915: South Wales coal strike.

See also AGRICULTURE: Modern period; British Isles: 20th century; CHARITIES: Great Britain; EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: England and Wales; LIBRARIES: Modern: England, etc.: London libraries, etc.; MUSIC: Folk music and nationalism: Celtic: Wales; PHILOLOGY: 9; 17; PUBLIC HEALTH: Great Britain; RURAL CREDIT: Great Britain and Ireland.

ALSO IN: F. Seebohm, *Tribal system in Wales*.—O. Rhoscomyl, *Flame bearers of Welsh history*.—H. T. Evans, *Analysis of Welsh history*.—J. Rhys, *Celtic Britain*.—J. C. Morrice, *Wales in the seventeenth century*.—O. M. Morgan, *Wales*.—T. Davis, *Normal outline of Wales*.—J. Finnemore and E. M. Wilmot, *England and Wales*.—E. Hutton, *Book of the Wye*.—G. Borrow, *Wild Wales*.—A. G. Bradley, *In the march and borderland of Wales*.—E. Rhys, *South Wales coast*.—A. T. Story, *North Wales*.—G. F. Wade, *South Wales*.—Great Britain Royal Commission, *Inventory of ancient monoliths*.—J. H. Parry, *Memories of most eminent Welshmen*.—T. Roberts, *Eminent Welshmen*.—W. L. Williams, *Making of modern Wales*.—F. Haverfield, *Military aspects of North Wales*.—A. G. Little, *Mediæval Wales*.—J. E. Morris, *Welsh Wars of Edward I*.—A. G. Bradley, *Owen Glyndwr*.—C. A. G. Skeel, *Council in marches of Wales*.—W. R. Williams, *History of great sessions of Wales*.—S. Baring-Gould,

Book of North Wales.—Idem, *Book of South Wales.*
—E. T. John, *Wales: Politics and economics.*

WALES, Church of. See CHURCH OF WALES.

WALES, Prince of.—"When Edward I. subdued Wales, he is said to have promised the people of that country a native prince who could not speak English, and taking advantage of the fact that his queen, Eleanor, was delivered of a child at Carnarvon Castle, in North Wales, he conferred the principality upon his infant son Edward, who was yet unable to speak. By the death of his eldest brother Alphonso, Edward became heir to the throne, to which he afterwards succeeded as Edward II.; but from this time forward, the principality has been appropriated solely to the eldest sons of the kings of England, who previous to this period had only borne the title of 'Lord Prince.' In 1841, for the first time, the dukedom of Saxony was introduced among the reputed titles of the Prince of Wales. This dignity his Royal Highness derives merely in right of his own paternal descent. . . . Without any new creation, and previous to his acquiring the title of Prince of Wales, the heir-apparent of the sovereign is Duke of Cornwall, the most ancient title of its degree in England. Edward the Black Prince . . . was created the first Duke of Cornwall in 1337. . . . The dukedom merges in the Crown when there is no heir apparent, and is immediately inherited by the prince on his birth, or by the accession of his father to the throne, as the case may be. [See CORNWALL, DUCHY OF.] . . . The earldom of Chester is one of the titles conferred by patent, but it was formerly a principality, into which it had been erected by the 21st of Richard II. In the reign of Henry IV., however, the act of parliament by which it had been constituted was repealed, and it has ever since been granted in the same patent which confers the title of Prince of Wales. As the eldest sons of the kings of Scotland have enjoyed the titles of Duke of Rothsay, Earl of Carrick, Baron Renfrew, and Hereditary Great Steward of Scotland, those dignities are also invariably attributed to the Prince of Wales."—C. R. Dodd, *Manual of dignities, pt. 2.*—See also WALES: 1200-1277. In 1917, by the "Proclamation of the House of Windsor," the German title of duke of Saxony was dropped from the dignities of the prince of Wales.

WALFISH BAY, harbor and small enclave of territory of Southwest Africa. It was annexed by Great Britain in 1878, and since 1884 has been administered by the government of Cape Colony. Since 1919 the surrounding territory has been under the mandate of the Union of South Africa. The name (German *Walfish*, whale) is derived from the fact that the bay was formerly frequented by whaling ships.—See also SOUTHWEST AFRICA, PROTECTORATE OF: 1885; AFRICA: Modern: 1914-1920: Lack of railway and industrial development.

WALI, Arabian title, given to certain governors of extensive provinces under the caliphate. It seems to have had a viceregal significance, marking the bearer of it as an immediate representative of the caliph.—Based on T. P. Hughes, *Dictionary of Islam.*

WALID I (d. 714), caliph of Damascus, c. 704-714. See CALIPHATE: 715-750.

Walid II, caliph of Damascus, 743-745.

WALKER, Benjamin (1753-1818), American soldier. See U.S.A.: 1777 (January-December).

WALKER, Sir Howenden (c. 1656-1728), British naval officer. Commanded the unsuccessful expedition against Quebec, 1711. See CANADA: 1711-1713.

WALKER, Robert James (1801-1869), Amer-

ican political leader and financier. United States senator, 1835-1841; secretary of the treasury under President Polk, 1845-1849; identified with the Walker Revenue Tariff of 1846; governor of Kansas Territory, 1857-1858; negotiated a loan in Europe for the United States, 1863. See TARIFF: 1846-1861.

WALKER, William (1824-1860), American adventurer. Conducted a filibustering expedition into Nicaragua and gained control over the country, 1855. See NICARAGUA: 1855-1860; CENTRAL AMERICA: 1821-1871; COSTA RICA: 1856-1860.

WALKER BILL (1920). See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1919-1920.

WALKER-DONAHUE RESOLUTION. See NEW YORK: 1923.

WALKER-GILLET BILL (1920). See NEW YORK: 1920: Radical reforms.

WALKER TARIFF BILL (1846). See TARIFF: 1846-1861.

WALL OF CHINA, Great. See CHINA: Origin of the people.

WALL OF PROBUS. See GERMANY: 277.

WALL STREET, street in New York City which follows the line of the early wall of the city, now the financial center of the United States. See NEW YORK CITY: 1865-1878; CAPITALISM: 19th century: United States; STOCK EXCHANGE: New York.

Investigation of. See STOCK EXCHANGE: 1909.

WALLACE, Alfred Russel (1823-1913), English scientist and philosopher. Formulated, with Darwin, the theory of natural selection. See EVOLUTION: Historical development of the idea.

WALLACE, Henry Cantwell (1866-), American cabinet member. Secretary of agriculture, 1921. See IOWA: 1920-1921; U.S.A.: 1921 (March): President Harding's cabinet.

WALLACE, John Findley (1852-), American civil engineer. First American chief engineer of the Panama canal, 1904. See PANAMA CANAL: 1904-1905.

WALLACE, Lewis (Lew) (1827-1905), American soldier and novelist. Fought at Shiloh, 1862; prevented the capture of Washington by the Confederate troops, 1864. See U.S.A.: 1864 (July: Virginia-Maryland).

WALLACE, Peter (fl. 18th century), Scottish adventurer. Led expedition to the British Honduras and made a settlement at Belize. See HONDURAS, BRITISH: 1502-1733.

WALLACE, Sir William (c. 1270-1305), Scottish patriot and national hero. Became leader of a party of insurgents in 1297; defeated the English in the battle of Stirling Bridge, 1297; made guardian of Scotland, 1297; defeated by Edward I of England at Falkirk, 1298; betrayed to the English, 1305; tried for treason and condemned to death. See SCOTLAND: 1290-1305.

WALLACH, Otto (1847-), German chemist. See NOBEL PRIZES: Chemistry: 1910.

WALLACHIA, former principality of the Balkan peninsula, now forming the southwestern part of Rumania. It is bounded by the Transylvanian Alps, Moldavia, and the Danube, and is divided by the Aluta, a tributary of the Danube, into Great Wallachia on the east and Little Wallachia on the west. Wallachia was united with Moldavia in 1861 to form the state of Rumania. See BALKAN STATES: Map showing distribution of nationalities.

Ancient inhabitants. See VLAKHS.

12th century.—Part of the second Bulgarian kingdom. See BULGARIA: 12th century.

14th century.—Conquest by Louis the Great. See HUNGARY: 1301-1442.

1393-1460.—Under the sovereignty of Turkey. See RUMANIA: 13th-18th centuries.

1595.—In domains of Transylvania. See HUNGARY: 1567-1604.

1682.—Union with Hungary against Austria. See HUNGARY: 1668-1683.

1829.—Restored to Turkey. See RUMANIA: 1828-1858.

1861.—United with Moldavia. See RUMANIA: 1856-1875.

WALLENBERG, Knut Agathon (1853-), Swedish statesman. Minister for foreign affairs, 1914-1917. See SWEDEN: 1914-1918.

WALLENSTEIN, Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von, Duke of Friedland, Sagan, and Mecklenburg (1583-1634), German soldier and statesman. Imperialist general in the Thirty Years' War; raised an army for the imperialist service, 1625; invaded Silesia, 1627; besieged Stralsund unsuccessfully, 1628, and was removed from his command, 1630; resumed command, 1632; recovered Bohemia from the Saxons and defeated Gustavus Adolphus before Nuremberg, but was defeated by him at Lützen, 1632; removed from command and outlawed, 1634; later assassinated by his officers. See GERMANY: 1624-1626, to 1630; 1631-1632; 1632-1634; AUSTRIA: 1618-1648; HUNGARY: 1606-1660.

WALLER, Sir William (c. 1597-1668), English soldier. Served in the Thirty Years' War; was second in command of the Parliamentary forces under Essex, 1642; defeated at Cropredy Bridge, 1644; deprived of his command, 1645; expelled from Parliament, 1647; active in negotiating the return of Charles II, 1660. See ENGLAND: 1644 (January-July); 1644-1645.

WALLHOF, Battle of (1626). See SWEDEN: 1611-1620.

WALLINGFORD, Treaty of, concluded, 1153, between King Stephen and Matilda, who claimed the English crown as the heir of her father, Henry I. By the treaty Stephen was recognized as king and Matilda's son Henry (who became Henry II) was made his heir.—See also ENGLAND: 1135-1154.

WALLOONS, a people akin to the French, but representing a separate branch of the Romance peoples, inhabiting the Belgian provinces of Hainaut, Namur, Liège, parts of Luxemburg and southern Brabant. They form the lesser half of the Belgian nation, the more numerous half being Flemish, and, being allied to the French by their tongue and traditions, while the Flemish are allied to the Germans, they always represent a special problem in Belgian statesmanship. Until the fifteenth century Walloon was a literary language, and there have been several attempts in the nineteenth century to revive its use in letters. But, for all practical purposes, the use of the Walloon tongue among cultivated people has been superseded by French, to which it is closely allied. "In Namur, Liege, and Luxembourg, the speech is what is called Walloon, the same word as Welsh, and derived from the German root 'wealth,' a foreigner. [See WELSH.] By this designation the Germans of the Flemish tongue denoted the Romano-Belgic population whose language was akin to the French, and whom a hilly and impracticable country (the forest districts of the Ardennes) had more or less protected from their own arms. Now the Walloon is a form of the Romano-Keltic so peculiar and independent that it must be of great antiquity, i. e., as old as the oldest dialect of the French, and no extension of the dialects of Lorraine, or Champagne, from which it differs materially. It is also a language which must have been formed on a Keltic basis. . . . The Walloons, then, are Romano-Kel-

tic; whereas the Flemings are Germans, in speech and in blood."—R. G. Latham, *Ethnology of Europe*, ch. 3.—See also NETHERLANDS: 1494-1510; BELGIUM: Ancient and medieval history.

Submission of. See NETHERLANDS: 1577-1581.

Settlement in Brooklyn. See BROOKLYN: 1624.

WALLOONS, Pappenheim's. See PAPPENHEIM'S WALLOONS.

WALLS, Roman, in Britain. See ROMAN WALLS IN BRITAIN.

WALLS OF BABYLON. See BABYLON: Nebuchadrezzar, etc.

WALLS OF JERUSALEM. See JERUSALEM: B. C. 976-168.

WALPOLE, Horatio or Horace, 4th Earl of Orford (1717-1797), English author and political leader. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1660-1780.

WALPOLE, Sir Robert. See ORFORD, ROBERT WALPOLE.

WALPOLE, town in Norfolk county, Massachusetts, eighteen miles southwest of Boston. See CITY PLANNING: United States: Progress in city planning.

WALPOLE COMPANY. See U. S. A.: 1765-1768.

WALRAM I (d. 1198), count of Nassau. See NASSAU.

WALSENBERG, Battle at (1914). See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1910-1914.

WALSH, Francis Patrick (1864-), American lawyer. Appointed chairman of the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, 1913. See INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION.

WALSH, William John (1841-1921), Irish Roman Catholic archbishop of Dublin and Irish nationalist. See IRELAND: 1917.

WALTER, Eugene (1874-), American dramatist. See DRAMA: 1865-1913.

WALTER, John (1739-1812), English journalist. Founded the *London Times*, 1785. See PRINTING AND THE PRESS: 1785-1812.

WALTER OF BRIENNE, Count (d. 1311), duke of Athens and count of Lecce. Overthrown by the Catalan Grand Company, 1311. See ATHENS: 1205-1308; CATALAN GRAND COMPANY.

Walter of Brienne, Count (d. 1356), duke of Athens and constable of France. Driven from Florence, 1343. See FLORENCE: 1341-1343.

WALTER THE PENNILESS (d. 1097), French knight, leader in the First Crusade. See CRUSADES: 1006-1099.

WALTHAM, or HOLY CROSS, ABBEY, town of Essex, England, noted for the ruins of a magnificent Norman abbey church which was built in the eleventh century to contain a portion of the true cross. The town developed about the church, and became noted in Tudor times and to the end of the eighteenth century for its markets and fairs. In 1923 it had a population of 6,540.

WALTHAM FOREST. See EPPING FOREST.

WALTON, George (1740-1804), American lawyer. Signed the Declaration of Independence, 1776. See U. S. A.: 1776 (July): Text of Declaration of Independence.

WAMPANOAGS, or Pokanokets, North American Indian tribe. See INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in North America: Eastern Woodlands Area; ALGONQUIAN FAMILY; NEW ENGLAND: 1674-1675; 1676-1678; RHODE ISLAND: 1636.

WAMPUM.—"Wampum, or wompam, according to Trumbull was the name of the white beads made from stems or inner whorls of the *Pyruca Carica* or *Canaliculata* periwinkle shells so common on all the south coast of New England. When strung they were called wampon or wampom—peage

or peake or peg, equivalent to 'strings of white beads,' for peage means 'strung beads.' Color was the basis of the nomenclature, as well as of the difference in value. 'Wompi' was white; 'Sacki' was black; 'Suckauhock' was the black beads made from the dark part of the poquauhock, the common quahog, Venus' mercenaria or round clam shell. The value of the black was generally twice that of the white. . . . The word generally used among the Dutch who led in introducing the bead currency of the Indians, Sewan or Zeewand, was more general in its application than wampum. But whatever the difficult Indian linguistic process may have been, the New England men soon settled on wampum and peage as the working names for this currency. The shell cylinders, black or white, were about one-eighth of an inch in diameter and one-quarter long. There were shorter beads used for ornaments, but there is hardly any trace of them in the currency. . . . The Indians strung the beads on fibres of hemp or tendons taken from the flesh of their forest meat. . . . The strings of peage were embroidered on strips of deer-skin, making the 'Máchequoce,' a girdle or belt 'of five inches thickness,' or more, and to the value of ten pounds sterling or more, which was worn about the waist or thrown over the shoulders like a scarf. More than 10,000 beads were wrought into a single belt four inches wide. These belts were in common use like the gold and jewelry of our day. They also played the same symbolic part which survives in the crown jewels and other regalia of civilized nations. . . . Whenever the Indians made an important statement in their frequent negotiations, they presented a belt to prove it, to give force to their words. . . . It gave to the words the weight of hard physical facts and made the expression an emblem of great force and significance. The philologists call this literary office, this symbolic function of wampum, an elementary mnemonic record. The same was fulfilled by the quippus, knotted strings or quipu of the ancient Peruvians. . . . 'This belt preserves my words' was a common remark of the Iroquois Chief in council. . . . The Iroquois

were a mighty nation, almost an incipient state. Their only records were in these mnemonic beads. . . . Tradition gives to the Narragansetts the honor of inventing these valued articles, valuable both for use and exchange. . . . The Long Island Indians manufactured the beads in large quantities and then were forced to pay them away in tribute to the Mohawks and the fiercer tribes of the interior. Furs were readily exchanged for these trinkets, which carried a permanent value, through the constancy of the Indian desire for them. . . . After the use of wampum was established in colonial life, contracts were made payable at will in wampum, beaver, or silver. . . . The use began in New England in 1627. It was a legal tender until 1661, and for more than three quarters of a century the wampum was current in small transactions."—W. B. Weeden, *Indian money as a factor in New England civilization*.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 17th century: Indian money, etc.; QUPU; also MASSACHUSETTS: 1623-1629.

WANBOROUGH, Battle of (591). See Hwiccas.

WANDIWASH, Battle of (1760). See INDIA: 1758-1761.

WANG, Chengting T., Chinese representative at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919. See VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Conditions of peace.

WANG HSI-CHICH (321-379), Chinese painter. See PAINTING: Chinese.

WANGENHEIM, Baron, German ambassador at Constantinople. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 74.

WAPANACHKIK, North American Indian tribe. See ABNAKIS; ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

WAPENTAKE. See HUNDRED, THE.

WAPISIANAS, South American Indian tribe. See CARIBS.

WAPPINGERS, North American Indian tribe. See ALGONQUIAN FAMILY; STOCKBRIDGE INDIANS.

WAR, Articles of (1686). See MILITARY LAW: Articles of war.

WAR, Cost of World. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XIV. Cost of war.

WAR, PREPARATION FOR

Mobilization.—Military information in peace time.—Secret service.—"The Army which will take the field at the outbreak of war is the Regular Army, which is organized, kept up, and trained, year by year, in peace. The War Army will be this Peace Army mobilized, or brought up to war strength and completed in every essential, by calling up reserve officers and men to fill its ranks."—H. Foster, *Organization: How armies are formed for war*, p. 152.—"Preparation for war includes not only the physical training of the combatant forces, but the obtaining in time of peace of military information concerning the enemy. This information covers the geography, resources and military strength of the opponent, the character and composition of his forces, their clothing, arms and equipment. It also includes the preparation of military maps of possible theaters of operations, and in recent years the playing of war games on such maps under assumed conditions approximating as closely as possible the conditions that would obtain in war. Information of the enemy's country is obtained in time of peace not only from available books and commercial sources of information, but through local representatives of

the government, such as consuls and military attachés. In addition to these, most governments possess an efficient secret service to obtain special information."—J. F. O'Ryan and W. D. A. Anderson, *Modern army in action*, p. 36.—"Military intelligence is the term applied to all such information as may be of value to the successful prosecution of a war. The Military Intelligence Division is that branch of the General Staff which is organized to secure this information. Its field of inquiry includes the investigation of active and potential enemies, allies, and neutrals; their military, political, and economic condition; their state of mind, their secret activities at home and abroad, and their strategic and tactical plans for present or future campaigns. A well-organized intelligence service provides, moreover, for estimating and safeguarding the resources of its own country; for protecting war industries and means of transportation; for stimulating the morale of its troops and of the civil population; for frustrating enemy agents and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda. Thus arises the distinction between the positive and the negative aspects of the service. The former, known as Positive Intelligence, con-

cerns itself with the collection and distribution of information. It publishes estimates of the military, economic, political, and psychological status of various countries; prints maps of enemy districts, with particular reference to fortifications, harbors, and routes of travel; deciphers intercepted messages, and translates foreign documents. The Negative Branch of the service concerns itself with the frustration of all agents, military or civil, who are consciously or unconsciously of value to the enemy. This is known as Counter-Espionage, or Negative Intelligence. It establishes a system of propaganda designed to neutralize the propaganda of the enemy; it detects and causes the arrest of spies among the troops as well as in the civil population; it censors news and information given to the public; it prevents enemy agents from entering or leaving the country, and it investigates the causes of economic disturbances and unrest."—E. A. Powell, *Army behind the army*, pp. 331-332.

Primitive warfare.—Military training in early Greece.—"In the earliest times every male from the age when he could use a weapon until his age rendered him helpless, was a warrior. As his intelligence increased and he developed arts and sciences their products were applied for warlike use as well as for peace time demands. Gradually the warriors accustomed to fight in masses without particular order, were exercised and trained in preparation for war. This was done under the leadership of the more expert and intelligent. Tribes learned to build their huts and villages in places difficult of access and learned to protect them with walls and stockades. From these rude beginnings developed the fortified towns of later days. As tribes expanded into nations, warfare became more complicated and a greater undertaking. . . . In Greece every citizen was a soldier and he was trained as such. Religion, education, and public athletic contests contributed to the preparation of the Greek citizen for war. He was a soldier between the ages of eighteen and sixty and political preferment was based upon military distinction."—J. F. O'Ryan and W. D. A. Anderson, *Modern army in action*, pp. 32-34.

Rome: Military service.—"Rome, like the Greek states, raised her armies on the compulsory principle. Livy tells us that Servius Tullius, about 550 B. C., compelled the citizens to arm themselves with different degrees of elaboration according to their income; and that he imposed no military service at all upon the 'proletariate'—that is, upon the poorest class, the men who had nothing. . . . [There is no doubt, however], that the proletariate were excused only so far as they were not actually needed; and that, in great crisis like the Punic Wars, the Romans armed not only the poorest classes but even slaves. The Roman army, therefore, which drove out the kings and founded the Republic, was essentially a citizen-army. In so far as any citizen legally escaped service, it was only because he did not enjoy full civic rights; and, even so, he might always be commandeered when the state had need of him. . . . But Rome's wars against Carthage, like the French Revolutionary wars, lasted so long that the citizen-soldier became a professional. Let us look a little closer into this. When Hannibal first invaded Italy, Rome put into the field about 3½ per cent. of her total population—that is, the same proportion as Prussia brought against France in 1870. After the disastrous defeat of Cannae (216 B. C.), Rome at once raised such vast levies that (if we are to

believe Delbrück) she had soon 8½ per cent. in arms—indeed, if we count the losses already suffered, she had by this time armed 9½ per cent. of her total population. . . . [At the close of the war the army had become professional.] The State, accepting still wider military responsibilities as time went on drifted more and more in the direction of the professional army, until Marius inaugurated a new epoch by emphasizing and stereotyping a movement which had begun long before his time. . . . [The Roman army changed rapidly from a citizen militia into a long-service professional army composed mainly of the poorest class and officered by the upper class.]"—G. G. Coulton, *Case for compulsory military service*, pp. 14-17.—"In the early days of the Republic the poor soldier stood to lose his farm by his patriotism. Soon the fighters had to be paid; and from the day of Marius onwards Roman commanders perforce provided for their veterans—so often their accomplices in the violation of their country's laws and liberties. The provision was made on the one hand by donations from the loot, on the other by grants of land taken from others, it might be in Italy itself. Sulla so rewarded his swordsmen; the triumvirs took the land of eighteen Italian towns to divide among their legionaries. To the end the emperors had constantly to provide for their time-expired men by confiscations. Thus did empire pay for its instrument."—J. M. Robertson, *Evolution of states*, p. 25.—"The time of service was very long; the minimum was sixteen years, the maximum twenty-five. Hence a man was a soldier all his life, a wretched condition for the poor men who were forcibly enrolled in times of urgent need. The soldiers were citizens, or became so on entering or leaving the service. They were enrolled in the legions of infantry or cavalry. The auxiliaries, who were often bands of barbarians in the pay of the Empire, became more and more numerous. . . . [The general officers in the army, the *magistri militum*, also directed] the movements of the fleets, which had stations throughout the Empire. These were at Misenum, Ravenna, Egypt, Africa, Syria, the Black Sea, Britain, Fréjus, the Rhine, with an arsenal at Mayence, the Danube, the Euphrates, the Rhone, with stations at Vienne and at Arles, the Saone at Chalons, and on Lakes Como and Neufchatel. There were many arsenals for the storage of weapons and ships' stores."—C. Bémont and G. Monod, *Medieval Europe from 395 to 1270*, pp. 12-13.

German tribes: Military service.—"No German," says Tacitus, 'may bear arms until the *civitas* has recognised him as capable of so doing. Then one of the princes, or the young man's father, or one of his relatives, equips him, in the midst of the assembly, with shield and javelin.' Henceforth he became a part of the army."—*Ibid.*, p. 28.

Merovingian period.—In Gaul, in the Merovingian period "all freemen bore their own expenses during their military service. Those who were not rich enough became dependents of more powerful men, who gave them equipments and food and secured them a share in the booty. The great proprietors brought with them, moreover, troops made up of clients and *liti*, who fought with them, and slaves, who, without joining in the combat, bore the master's arms, cared for the wounded, or buried the dead. An army could not be levied except by order of the king. He ordered, through the counts, the convocation, or *heriban*, the violation of which resulted in severe

penalties. The army was commanded by the king, the dukes, or other high officers."—*Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

France.—Prior to the reign of Charlemagne "there was no standing army. When war broke forth the order to take the field was issued by royal proclamation (*bannum, heribannum*). Military service was not compulsory on all freemen, but on proprietors alone. Towards the end of his reign Charlemagne specified those who were liable for service. Those who possessed a certain number of *manses*, farms,—two, three, four,—according to the year, must enlist. Those who owned fewer joined with others in such a way that one would join the army and the others would pay him an indemnity in money, which took the place of pay. Counts were obliged to keep a list of all who were answerable for service. Those who failed to answer the royal summons, except for cause, were fined. There were few legal exceptions. The palatines, certain agents of the counts, bishops or abbots alone were privileged. Service was required of members of the clergy; the bishop or abbot led his men to war, as a lay noble did. The soldiers equipped and fed themselves at their own expense. The length of service was not stated; but a capitulary of 811, ordering soldiers to provide themselves with food for three months, counting from the day when they should have reached the frontier of the country to be invaded, leads to the inference that it did not exceed three months. Charlemagne's army was made up of horsemen, no infantry, as in the preceding epoch; but the organization of these armies is little known. If a frontier were invaded, a general levying of troops was made in the neighbouring countries: this was the *landwehr*, already so-called in the ninth century."—*Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.—"As late as the sixteenth century the royal army of France was made up of three distinct elements: 1, the knights; 2, the sergeants; 3, the mercenaries. 1. The direct vassals of the crown were required to perform military service, at their own expense, during forty days of each year and furnish a certain quota of men at arms; for instance, the count of Champagne, who had more than two thousand noble vassals, sent only twelve bannerets, which would be about one hundred men. The king could not keep his knights beyond the legal term of service except by paying them; it was thus Saint Louis kept Joinville during the seventh crusade. The summons to arms was made by the bailiffs and seneschals, who assumed command of the troops in their provinces and led them to the field. The knights were always mounted. 2. The sergeants (*servientes*) were the lower class impressed into military service, but their position was not clearly defined, and they fought on foot as well as on horseback. They were drawn from the king's immediate domains, or from churches in the king's domain, or from the communes. Troops from the abbey of Saint Denis took part in the sieges of Puiset under Louis VI. The communal militia appeared later; they are first heard of at Bouvines (1214), where they fought but to run away. 3. The mercenaries were recruited from all sides, but especially from Gascony, Brabant, and Hainault. They were styled *routiers* (stragglers), *cotereaux* (a name probably meaning peasants), and *paillards* (loose fellows), etc. Some among their chiefs became celebrated, as Mercadier in the service of Richard the Lion-Hearted, and Cadoc, with Philip Augustus. They formed regular troops, permanent and capable of dis-

cipline, but despised by the knights. The pay was six sous a day for paid horsemen plus the price of their horse; one sou for the infantry crossbowmen."—*Ibid.*, p. 437.—"Before the end of the thirteenth century, there began 'a transformation of military service into a tax paid to the king. The communes and chartered towns gave money instead of sending their armed men; a fact which gradually brought about a radical change in the military and financial organization of the monarchy.' This system was regularized by an act of 1317, which definitely consecrated vicarious service."—G. G. Coulton, *Case for compulsory military service*, p. 42.

Italy.—Flanders.—England.—"In the city-republics of medieval Italy, there was a law of universal service in the citizen-militia. It was these levies who won liberty for the Lombard communes at Legano, in 1176; the distinction of a city like Milan was that 'artisans, whom the military landholders contemned, acquired and deserved the right of bearing arms for their own and the public defence.' Here, as in ancient Athens, every able-bodied man was called out at once at the time of national crisis. . . . In 1200, the constitutions of these North Italian communes approached more nearly to pure democracy than any other constitutions in Europe, and their military power depended almost entirely on the compulsory citizen-levy. A century later, these cities were ruled, almost without exception, by despots; and there is . . . [probably no exception] to the rule that these despots governed by means of paid standing armies—the usual policy of an absolute government,' as Hallam calls it. In Rome, the least free politically of all the great towns, the militia was never a success: it was reconstituted at the republican revival of 1356, but disappeared soon after the abolition of these free institutions in 1362. In Florence, on the other hand, by the popular reconstitution of 1250, 'the people . . . [were] now organized on a military footing. . . . These towns and country companies combined, formed a united popular militia, ready for action at any moment, either against foreign foes or to curb patrician tyranny at home.' These armed men numbered, according to Giovanni Villani, 100,000 in 1312. By 1351, however, Florence had begun to follow the example of the other Italian cities; Matteo Villani, describing her war with the Archbishop of Milan, boasts of the ordinary citizen's unconcern. He writes (*lib. ii. cap. 20*), 'Though the enemy had so great a host close by at Mugello, the Florentines seemed to care little for all this; within the city, every man went about his merchandize or his handicraft without bearing any sort of arms.' A century later, the Florentine Republic had practically become a despotism under Cosimo de Medici, who laid the foundation of his power by an alliance with the greatest mercenary leader of his time, Francesco Sforza. We find a similar process in the great cities of the Low Countries—Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, etc. It may be traced clearly enough in the first two volumes of Pirenne's admirable *Historie de Belgique*. . . . The civic militias which saved Flanders from French despotism at the beginning of the fourteenth century were, as Pirenne points out, the forerunners of that *levée en masse* which, centuries later, saved the French Revolution. But towards the end of that same century, the Counts of Flanders began to break down the civic liberties by astute diplomacy. The citizen-militias decayed; in 1411 the Count mobilized them, but found that they

gave him little help in his wars, while they refused to disband again until they had wrung from him certain political concessions. He took care not to call out the militia again; and, by 1471, Flanders had a standing professional army of 10,000."—*Ibid.*, pp. 33-36.—The Anglo-Saxon "army was a militia (*fyrd*), aristocratic, and not a standing army. The king's personal military force only, armed like the Danes, the *huscarls*, represented a standing army. [See HOUSECARLS.] There was no real fleet. On land as well as on the seas, England was unprepared to offer a long resistance to an invader."—C. Bémont and G. Monod, *Medieval Europe from 395 to 1270*, p. 449.—Nevertheless, "the English citizen-militia was better organized, and more frequently used, than any similar force in Europe, except the republican militias of the Swiss Cantons and of Lombardy, and the almost equally democratic militias of the Low Countries. The Saxon Fyrd (as the militia was then called) nearly beat William off at Hastings; and its subsequent development cannot be better sketched than in a series of brief extracts from Professor Tout's article in the *Dictionary of English History*, pp. 730-1. "The history of the national militia subsequently to the Conquest strongly illustrates the continuity of English constitutional development. William I. exacted from every freeman the old national oath to join in defending the king, his lands and his honour both at home and beyond sea. In 1073 the fyrd took a prominent share in the conquest of Maine. William II. cheated the fyrd out of the ten shillings apiece which the shires had given them for their maintenance. Yet it was always faithful to the crown in its struggle against the feudalists. The defeat of Robert of Belesme, the repulse of David of Scotland at Northallerton, the suppression of the feudal revolt of 1173, were largely due to its valour and patriotism. . . . Henry II., while relying for foreign service mainly on mercenaries paid for by the scutages of the barons, trusted to the fyrd for home defence. His Assize of Arms (1181) revived and reorganized that ancient body, and devised an excellent machinery for compelling every citizen to possess the arms appropriate to his station in life. . . . Nor did Edward hesitate to make full use of the men thus trained. The London city documents, as the fullest existing, give us the best idea of the extent to which men were levied for the French wars. Between 1337 and 1355, London was called upon for more than 2,500 men; this in terms of modern population, would mean a levy of something like 300,000 from London alone. The town archives of Norwich and Lynn show similar evidence; and the Berkeley papers show how much was required for the county of Gloucester."—G. G. Coulton, *Case for compulsory military service*, pp. 37, 40-41.—See also FYRD.

16th-18th centuries.—Formation of modern armies.—"Modern organization dates from the close of the Feudal Epoch in the fifteenth century, after which wars were waged less for national purposes than for the furtherance of dynastic or State interests, and were no longer carried on by the levy of the nation, but by mercenaries hired by the Monarch or the State. This process originated in Italy. . . . Permanent regular forces are first found in France near the end of the fifteenth century, when the King raised companies of men-at-arms (*gens d'armes*) or armoured horsemen, and foot archers and halberdiers, of whom his Scottish Guards were the finest type. Up to that time the 'Lance'—that is,

the fully armoured knight with his retinue of a squire, a page, and three or four mounted men—formed the principal element of every military force. A number of such independent Lances, jealous of each other, and untrained to act together, could not be organized in the modern sense. Besides these mounted men, there was usually a mass of men on foot, unarmoured and ill-armed, undisciplined and untrained. In feudal times it was only the English archers, the Genoese crossbowmen, and the Swiss halberdiers who had the discipline and training to make them of any account as Infantry. The word company in its military sense denoted originally the gathering of feudal retainers who followed their lords to the wars; it then came to mean the band who obeyed a captain (*caput*, head), some noted leader among the mercenaries from whom regular armies sprang. The word company is derived from the Old French *compainie*, the Latin *companion-em* (companion), from *cum pane* (with bread), implying an intimate association of men in one mess. . . . The first country to possess a formidable Standing Army was Spain, in the sixteenth century, and her example was soon followed by France, the Empire, and the Netherlands, and in the next century by Sweden, England, and Prussia. The most important developments in war organization were due to great military reformers, whose armies became the model of their day to all other countries. These were Maurice of Nassau, who led the Dutch in their terrible struggle with Spain towards the close of the sixteenth century, and Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, who a few years later formed the famous army which carried all before it during the Thirty Years' War."—H. Foster, *Organization: How armies are formed for war*, pp. 163-165, 171-172.—"Although organized according to the requirements of modern warfare, [in the seventeenth century the French] army rested upon the feudal principles. The nobles no longer lead their vassals, and in the last years of Louis XIV's reign the convocation of the *arrière-ban* appeared ridiculous. But instead of vassals, the nobles led soldiers recruited by themselves, and the regiments constituted a property, which was bequeathed to the castle, even to the children in the cradle. The nobility owed military service; in return, it received a monopoly of command. The reforms of Louvois and his successors had compelled the officers to work and to perform their duties, without affecting the privileges inherent to their caste, and of which the officers of the royal navy were equally jealous; they were called officers of the *pavillon blanc*, and were full of contempt for the officers of the *pavillon bleu*, or merchant navy."—J. Verschoyle, *History of modern civilization*, p. 358.—"In all the European states the government, at the close of the feudal régime, ceased to exact military service from the inhabitants; the armies were composed of volunteers, usually engaged for a long term of service. In the eighteenth century certain governments had need of larger armies, and as the enrolled volunteers did not suffice, they began to levy soldiers by force from among their subjects. This was done in France by Louis XIV., in Prussia by Frederick William, in Russia by Peter the Great. (Footnote: The kings of Sweden had set the example from the time of Gustavus Adolphus.) But the system was always applied to the peasants and laborers; the nobles and bourgeoisie were exempt. When France was at war with all Europe, she tried, at first, to recruit

her army with patriots (the volunteers of 1791-1792). But, from the beginning of the year 1793 the Convention was obliged to have recourse to a forced levy. At that time was declared the principle that every Frenchman owed military duty to his country. As all the young men fit for duty were not needed, a system of conscription was adopted. Lots were drawn to decide who should depart and who should remain."—C. Seignobos, *History of contemporary civilization*, p. 420.

1793-1914.—From the French Revolution to the World War.—General survey.—French law of conscription, 1798.—Substitutions.—Prussian army, 1800-1812.—Compulsory service in Europe.—European armies in 1891 and 1900.—Relative state of armament in 1907.—Japan.—United States.—“Navies maintained as a permanent force go back to the eighteenth century, when France, Spain, and England kept small fleets ready for emergencies, but the cost of building and equipping warships was in those days light indeed when compared with our own days. Immense armies came later, and are the creation of the French Revolutionary epoch, which introduced compulsory military service, or, rather, developed it on a far greater scale, for the obligation to serve in war had existed in most countries, as in England, for instance, from primitive times. A very large proportion of the population began to be called to active service, first in France during and after the Revolution, then in the other great countries of the European continent. Last of all came modern science, which provided armies and fleets with artillery of a range and variety theretofore undreamt of, adding new means of attack, first in explosives of immense power and thereafter in airships and aéroplanes and submarines and sea mines, so that war began to be carried on far above the surface of the land as well as below the surface of the sea. . . . The notion of what is called a Nation in Arms, a reversion to those primitive days when a whole tribe of Cherokees or Sioux in North America, or a whole clan of Macdonalds and Campbells in Scotland, went out to fight its neighbors, began with Napoleon, who bled France nearly white by repeatedly calling to the colors a large proportion of his subjects. The habit spread to Austria and Prussia and Italy, but was most fully worked out by Prussia. Only Britain and the United States, protected by their position, escaped the contagion, though the principle had been followed by Britain as regards its navy when in the beginning of the last century sailors had to be secured at all costs. Each nation forced the pace for the others. A new conscription law in Russia, intended to augment largely her army, was one of the causes which made Germany hurry into war in 1914, because she deemed the increase of her neighbor's forces a menace likely to become every year more formidable. Each enlargement of a standing army and navy meant, at least for some nations, an increase of the national bellicose spirit, and for all of them an increase of the military and naval caste called into existence for war purposes. The officers of the army and navy belonged to the wealthier and more educated class, and in some countries, such as Prussia and Austria, and, at least as respects the navy (which held a socially superior rank) in Russia also, to the class socially highest, so they exercised a great influence on public opinion as well as on the government. Here was a huge profession, trained for fighting,

its mind military rather than civic, its constant preoccupation with fighting creating an impatience to fight, while the vigilant eye it kept on the plans of rival countries made it eager to get ahead and be the first to strike. The civil population admired rather than blamed this eagerness, for it indicated an ardor to do what the soldier caste thought to be their duty, and as they were willing to risk their own lives they counted the lives of individual men a small matter in comparison with the national life of which they believed themselves to be the saviors. The idea that the safety of the State was to be found in the constant increase of armaments came to possess the whole people, so that even those who did not desire war repeated the old dictum, *Si vis pacem para bellum*, ‘If you wish for Peace, prepare for War.’ This was why European nations, though some grumbled, continued to bear the rapidly mounting cost of armaments and munitions. These were regarded as an insurance against war as well as against defeat, and probably even against an attack, for each nation lived in dread of its neighbors and wished to frighten them into peace.”—J. Bryce, *International relations: Eight lectures delivered in the United States in Aug, 1921 (Institute of Politics Publications, Williams College, pp. 210-212)*.—“The new dangers which France encountered in 1798 at least furnished the Directory with an opportunity of reorganizing the military forces. The wars of the Revolution had ended by giving France real armies; this had been seen in 1794, 1795, 1796; the amalgamation of battalions of volunteers and of the troops of the line had been made; one uniform only was used for the infantry, the blue coats and the white coats and the regimental names of the old monarchy had disappeared. . . . The staff was organized, but the essential point, that is to say, a regular law of recruitment, was lacking, for until then requisitions, or a levy in mass, had always been resorted to. On the 19th Fructidor an VI. (5th September, 1798) the Councils adopted a law which forced all young men between twenty and twenty-five years of age to enter the military service (with certain exceptions and dispensations); the defensurs conscrits (this was the term used), were divided into five classes or years. The legislative power settled the number of the contingent, and the executive power proceeded to the roll-call, commencing by the youngest. Called or not called, the defensurs conscrits were on the list five years after their inscription, and then received their final dismissal unless the country were at war. This was the starting point of the regular levies which constituted the military power of France. . . . [Napoleon permitted those who drew the lot for active service to pay substitutes. Consequently the rich became practically exempt. This system, which was adopted by all the countries including the United States in her Civil War drafts, remained in force until after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. During the Napoleonic Wars] Scharnhorst, a Hanoverian officer and Minister of War, secured by the most skilful measures a national army for Prussia. He determined to convert the whole nation into soldiers by making the army a simple training school, imposing the principles of enforced military service, but never raising the whole contingent at a time. He thus made all the citizens pass through the army in succession, replacing the trained soldiers by recruits, without ever exceeding the number allowed

by Napoleon, or by the precarious state of the finances. He thus, between 1808 and 1812, prepared a strong reserve of men drilled and ready at the first signal to enter the line."—J. Verschoyle, *History of modern civilization*, pp. 386-387, 406.—"The kingdom of Prussia, which, in order to fight Napoleon, was forced to enroll all the able-bodied young men, preserved the system of universal military service, even after the war had ended. . . . [Every Prussian was a soldier; he served in the regular army for three years, then passed into the reserve, then into the Landwehr. There was no exemption, no substitution.] When the citizens of Berlin, in 1816, demanded exemption, the king replied by a threat to publish the names of all who had made the demand. But the young men who have completed their studies have the right, by enrolling in advance, to do only one year's active duty and to do it in the town of their choice. They are called one year volunteers. The Prussian system is based rather on the absolute right of the government in regard to its subjects than on a principle of equality; for Prussian society was not then, and is not now, democratic. But the example of Russia accustomed other peoples to the idea that every citizen is obliged to bear arms for his country. After the victories of Prussia over Austria (1866), and over France (1870), nearly all the European states adopted the principle of obligatory military service. Usually they have followed the Prussian method, in the institution of three years and one year terms of service. France, which in 1875 had adopted the volunteer system with a term of five years, has just changed to the three years' term, and abolished the volunteer feature (1889)."—C. Seignobos, *History of contemporary civilization*, pp. 420-421.—"In 1858 Belgium adopted Antwerp as the base of her defensive system, and the pivot of her active army. From that date until 1888 defensive works were undertaken in the neighbourhood of this city. In 1888 attention was attracted to the line of the Meuse, as a protection, it is to be presumed, against the advance of Germany; hence Liège and Namur . . . [were] fortified after the modern system."—C. S. Jerram, *Armies of the world*, p. 28.—The mutual fears engendered by the Prussian wars of conquest during the year 1864 to 1872 led to the augmentation of the several continental armies of Europe. Compulsory service and annual training became the rule and the burden of taxation became very great. Verschoyle, writing in 1891 says: "The German Empire includes more than forty-six millions of men, and its rulers have devoted themselves to perfecting the army, that formidable instrument of aggression. Having provoked the other powers to increase their armaments, it has been forced to augment its own. The Empire now possesses a permanent army of over four hundred thousand men. The twelve years' service exacted from all Germans (seven in active service and the reserve, and five in the landwehr) enables it to place 1,456,677 men, 312,732 horses, and 2,080 cannons upon a war footing without including the Landsturm or the special services. This formidable organization is a source of danger to all the neighbouring powers, and it forces them to augment their military expenses and to impose crushing sacrifices on their peoples. . . . Russia can place the greatest number of men in the field. France has made an immense effort, since the law of 1872, which rendered military service compulsory, and prolonged it until the age of forty. In case of war it can

place 1,500,000 men in the field. Germany can do the same, and has also carried the art of methodical organization of the various arms employed to a rare state of perfection. Since the passing of recent laws the Austria-Hungarian army is equally effective. Italy has extended its military organization to its utmost limit. England itself, in spite of its girdle of fleets, has endeavoured to place the army on the same level and can dispose of about 600,000 men. (Footnote: Russia has 2,151,000 men on a war footing, which could be much more than doubled in time of need. France, 1,567,000 men. Germany, 1,456,677, independent of reserves. Austria-Hungary, 1,039,536 [number augmented by the new organization of reserve]. Italy, 1,080,000 men, besides a territorial militia of 1,021,000 men. Great Britain has a regular army of 199,273 men, besides the yeomanry and militia 151,798, the volunteers 246,180 and lastly, the Indian imperial native army of 127,000 men, and that of the feudatory or independent states, 350,000). Is this then the end of our civilization? Have men laboured so hard only to invent new methods of killing each other, displayed so much intelligence only to return to a scientific barbarism that is more formidable than primitive barbarism itself? We must hope not, but that all these armaments will equalise and neutralise one another. By advancing the science of war, by forcing whole nations to arm themselves, it will be realised at last that such extremities cannot be resorted to for the gratification of vain ambitions, and that these organizations should be used solely for the defence of national territory and national honour. Meanwhile the cost of the armaments themselves is producing calamities only less disastrous than those of actual war."—J. Verschoyle, *History of modern civilization*, pp. 406, 450, 452-453.—In Austria-Hungary, where the army and the common need of presenting a united front in regard to foreign affairs were the most important links between the states, from the nineteenth to the forty-second year, all, even the clergy, were liable to service. Usually the young men were enrolled in their twenty-first year. At the end of the nineteenth century it was estimated that about 144,000 were accepted each year for training. The rest were excused. In Belgium, personal service was not obligatory. Some time during the twentieth year the young Belgians drew lots for service, and out of a total of about 45,000 annually liable, about 13,000 were taken. Substitutes were allowed at the somewhat prohibitive price of about \$300. The total war strength was estimated at 145,000. The peace strength was less than half that number. Bulgaria was actually a nation in arms. All able-bodied men were supposed to serve two years in the active army and eight years in the reserve; but cavalry, artillery, engineers and the medical corps served three years in the active army and six years in its reserve. All arms served seven years in the reserve army, a force distinct from the reserve of the active army, and passed into the militia, which was divided into two bans; the infantry served four years in each. Other arms served an additional year in the second ban. The peace strength of the army in 1900 was 2600 officers and 42,000 men including all arms. The war strength was estimated at 270,000 men and 624 guns. In Denmark, where service was obligatory, able-bodied men from the age of twenty-two, served eight years with the colors, and about six years with the reserves.

About 7,000 recruits were trained annually. The peace strength of the British army, exclusive of India amounted to 165,015 men of all ranks. The Indian army numbered 71,157, making a total of 236,172. Exclusive of 25,000 gendarmerie and republican guard, the peace strength of the French army was estimated at 27,450 officers and 517,000 men, present and absent. In Germany the total peace strength was 545,000; in Italy 222,400. Russia had a peace strength of 860,000 men and 36,000 officers. Moreover in parts of Asiatic Russia mobilization was permanent, and according to Rediger and von Lübell, the probable peace strength of the Russian army was 1,000,000.—Based on C. S. Jerram, *Armies of the world*, pp. 2-3, 26-27, 30-31, 35, 109, 147.—The relative state of armament in Europe in 1907 is indicated by the instructions given by the British Foreign secretary in June to the delegates to the second Hague conference. "After the apparently final declaration of the German Government, that under no circumstances would they take part . . . a discussion was initiated by Sir Edward Fry on August 17th, at the fourth Plenary Meeting of the Conference. He began by quoting Muravieff's Circular of 1898, and pronounced its true and eloquent words to be more opportune than ever. The charges of Europe, the United States and Japan had risen from 251 to 320 millions. Such is the expenditure which might serve better objects; such is the burden under which our peoples groan; such is the Christian peace of the civilised world in the twentieth century. I know you will agree with me that the realisation of the wish expressed in 1899 would be a great blessing for the whole of humanity. . . . The British Government, recognising that several Governments desire to restrict their military expenses, and that this can be realised by the independent action of each Power, would be ready to communicate yearly to the Powers who would do the same the programme of new ships of war and the expenditure this would entail. . . . In conclusion, I propose the following resolution: 'The Conference confirms the resolution adopted in 1899, and, seeing that the charges have considerably increased in almost all countries since that year, the Conference declares that it is highly desirable to see all Governments resume the serious study of this question.'"—A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, ed., *Cambridge history of British foreign policy*, v. 3, pp. 352-353.

Prior to the abolition of the feudal system in Japan "all the armed strength of the nation, partitioned into nearly three hundred independent units, was under their direct control, and it was the fief and not the nation that claimed the loyalty and services of the samurai who were the only citizens trained to arms. . . . The Imperial Government had no army at all and no means of raising one: conscription did not come till after the mediatisation of the fiefs. . . . [At the commencement of the Meiji period a beginning was made, under French instructors, in the formation of a national army, recruited by conscription, and, under British instruction, of a navy. In 1804, at the opening of the Chino-Japanese War], European residents in Tokyo were astounded at the evidence that was daily brought before their eyes of the completeness in every detail of the Japanese preparations. She had now a highly-trained army of a strength when fully mobilised of 150,000 men, with capable generals at its head, and the officers included experts in every branch of modern military science. Her mobilisation scheme,

when tested, worked with the ease of a well-oiled engine. She had enough merchant shipping for all oversea transport requirements, and an efficient navy to convoy it. . . . In 1877, when the Satsuma Rebellion took place, Japan had a trained army of, on its war footing, 46,000 men. In 1894, when the war with China occurred, she had an army which, when fully mobilised, in all its details, both for field and fortress services, numbered 220,000 men. Ten years later the war with Russia took place. Japan then had an army of 180,000 men with the colours, a first reserve of 200,000 and a second reserve of 470,000 men, all highly-trained soldiers. During the war 570,000 recruits were called up, and altogether, including camp followers of all grades, nearly one and a half million men were landed on the continent."—J. H. Longford, *Japan*, pp. 170-171, 203, 234.—"By act of February 2, 1901, the maximum authorized strength of the Regular Army of the United States was fixed at 100,619 men. Within this limit the figure was slightly varied by executive action from year to year, and after making deductions for the Philippine scouts and the quartermaster and the hospital corps it stood at 89,573 on June 30, 1913. . . . It thus appears that in 1915 there was approximately one regular soldier in the United States army for every 1150 inhabitants; at the same time it was pointed out that the figures for Great Britain were one for every 205; Germany, one for every 70; France, one for every 50; Russia, one for every 190; Japan, one for every 230. . . . The second source of military strength contemplated by our traditional policy was the organized militia of the States. The subject of the militia of the States was deemed of sufficient importance by the founders of our government to have two clauses of the Federal Constitution devoted to it. . . . The third supply of troops contemplated in our traditional policy was an army of volunteers to be raised by special measures on the actual outbreak of an emergency. The manner in which this policy operated in practice is shown by the example of the Spanish War. In April, 1898, Congress passed an Act empowering the president to call for volunteers. This act began with a declaratory provision that 'all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and persons of foreign birth who should have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, and with such exceptions and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law shall be liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States.' The act then went on to authorize the President to raise a Voluntary Army to be maintained for the period of the war only, the term of enlistment was fixed at two years unless the war should sooner end; and it was provided that so far as practical, volunteers should be recruited from the various states in proportion to their population. It was under the terms of this act that the 220,000 or more volunteers were raised, who, together with some 60,000 regulars, formed our army in the Spanish War. Two provisions of the act in particular gave rise to trouble and difficulty. The first of these was the provision fixing a definite term of enlistment, and a short term at that. The Spanish War was a short war; but, even so, it was found necessary to retain volunteers in the Philippines beyond the legal term of their service in order that the islands might not be wholly denuded of troops in the interval before the arrival of fresh forces. The error in

policy which stands out in this instance is important because it has characterized almost every similar measure adopted at other like crises in our history."—J. Dickinson, *Building of an army*, pp. 9-10, 15, 22-23.

1872.—Re-organization of French army.—After the defeat of the French in the Franco-Prussian War, "a new military law was passed in 1872 which reorganized the French army on the model of that of Prussia. The principle of universal military service was introduced. . . . This law was readily accepted by the people, and it was the prelude to a military revival which greatly alarmed Bismarck."—J. S. Schapiro, *Modern and contemporary European history*, p. 22.

1898-1913.—Holland.—Army reform and coast defense.—"In recent years [written in 1918] there has been a growing uneasiness among the Dutch lest their great colonial possessions, fine harbors, and rich trade might tempt their powerful neighbors to acts of aggression. It was also feared that, in case of war between England and Germany, Holland's neutrality might be violated by either or by both. As a result army reforms were made in 1898 and in 1912, which introduced compulsory military service on the Swiss model. A coast-defense law, passed in 1913, provided for elaborate fortifications at Flushing and at Amsterdam."—*Ibid.*, p. 488.

1900-1915.—Total naval expenditures by chief naval powers.—The total naval expenditures by the principal naval powers from 1900 to 1915 were:

1902-1909.—Brazil and Argentina in a "Dreadnought" competition.—The controversy between Brazil and Argentina about what is called "equilibrium of armament" was still carried on in 1909 with much animation in the press of both countries. The subject of discord was the Brazilian Government's order for three large battleships of the "Dreadnought" type, which was to be met by an Argentine triplet, for which tenders were urgently called. Taxpayers in both countries were inclined to support the somewhat daring proposal from Buenos Ayres that Brazil should keep the first "Dreadnought" cede the second to Argentina, and cancel the order for the third.

1905.—German emperor's statement of his peace policy based on preparation for war.—In the spring of 1905, speaking at Bremen, on the unveiling of a monument to his father, the German Emperor, William II, made a statement of his motives in striving for the creation in Germany of a great naval and military power. He said: his aim was to "do everything possible to let bayonets and cannon rest, but to keep the bayonets sharp and the cannon ready, so that envy and greed shall not disturb us in tending our garden or building our beautiful house." "I vowed," he said, "never to strike for world-mastery."

1906-1909.—"Dreadnought" era.—Outclassing of all battleships built prior to 1906.—New type and effects of its introduction.—The evolution of battleships received a startling and revolutionizing impulsion in 1906, when a new *Dreadnought* (re-

FISCAL YEAR	Great Britain (Apr. 1 to Mar. 31).	United States (July 1 to June 30).	Germany (April to March).	France (January to December).
1900-1901	\$145,792,850	\$61,721,695	\$37,173,074	\$72,683,180
1901-2	150,569,190	68,438,301	46,315,800	67,079,011
1902-3	150,679,328	82,977,641	48,818,700	59,217,558
1903-4	173,548,058	104,126,192	50,544,000	59,740,222
1904-5	179,138,049	116,655,826	49,110,300	60,178,623
1905-6	161,117,947	109,725,059	54,918,000	61,565,779
1906-7	152,954,342	98,392,144	58,344,300	59,514,296
1907-8	151,880,617	117,353,474	69,133,500	60,685,813
1908-9	156,401,161	120,421,579	80,737,626	62,194,916
1909-10	181,936,341	122,247,365	95,047,820	64,899,580
1910-11	202,056,258	111,791,980	103,302,773	74,102,439
1911-12	211,596,296	133,550,071	107,178,480	80,371,109
1912-13	224,443,296	129,787,233	109,089,096	81,602,832
1913-14	237,530,459	136,858,301	112,091,125	90,164,625
1914-15	260,714,275	141,872,786	113,993,329	123,828,872

FISCAL YEAR	Russia (January to December).	Italy (July 1 to June 30).	Japan (April to March).	Total.
1900-1901	\$42,101,212	\$23,829,206
1901-2	45,488,462	23,875,532	\$21,373,954	\$423,140,250
1902-3	50,769,465	23,522,400	17,654,528	433,639,620
1903-4	60,018,895	23,522,400	17,553,279	489,053,046
1904-5	58,076,543	24,300,000	10,018,024	497,477,365
1905-6	60,228,444	24,494,400	11,378,202	483,427,831
1906-7	60,703,557	25,865,668	30,072,061	485,846,368
1907-8	43,012,166	27,516,454	35,124,346	504,706,370
1908-9	40,682,482	30,453,697	39,347,332	539,238,793
1909-10	58,059,040	31,812,885	35,005,719	589,008,759
1910-11	46,520,465	40,505,204	36,880,158	615,258,277
1911-12	56,680,915	40,780,987	42,944,329	673,111,187
1912-13	82,010,633	41,893,420	46,510,216	716,335,726
1913-14	117,508,657	40,550,147	48,105,152	791,808,466
1914-15	128,954,733	56,020,440	69,111,653	895,396,088

Appendix to the Congressional Record, 64th Congress, v. 53, pt. 15, p. 1884.

placing an obsolete battleship of that name) was added to the British navy. In size, plan and armament it embodied naval teachings just taken from the Russo-Japanese War, and was supposed to put every other existing battleship into an inferior second class. It brought suddenly a new standard into all comparative measurements of naval power, impairing seriously the worth of the costly monsters then afloat. It signalled, in fact, a start for entirely new racing among the competitors for "sea-power." Admiral Lord Charles Beresford lashed the naval authorities of his country for bringing on the *Dreadnought* craze. In a speech at London he said that "he did not object to Dreadnoughts or improvements in battleships; what he did object to was the advertisement connected with the first Dreadnought." Similar criticism appeared in a pamphlet published by Andrew Carnegie, when his attention was called to the fact that both Japan and Russia had bigger ships than the *Dreadnought* on the stocks before the latter was begun.

1907.—Brazilian military service.—Service in the Brazilian army was made obligatory by legislation in 1907.

1907-1909.—British territorial force.—Reorganization of 1907-1908.—Lord Roberts's criticism.—His bill for compulsory training.—The volunteer or militia forces of the United Kingdom, for home service, underwent an important reorganization in 1907, according to the provisions of an act entitled the "Territorial and Reserve Forces Act."

1907-1909.—British army organization.—Creation of a general staff.—Result of Esher Report.—Defense Committee.—After the Boer War, Great Britain awoke to the fact that, in face of the enormous continental armies then in being, her own army was organized on entirely too small a scale, and in consequence, steps were taken to place it on something like an adequate footing. In April, 1907, speaking at the imperial conference, Richard Haldane, the secretary of war in the British ministry, said: "We realized that we had gone into the war without adequate preparation for war on a great scale, and that we had never fully apprehended the importance of the maxim that all preparation in time of peace must be preparation for war; it is of no use unless it is designed for that; it is the only justification for the maintenance of armies—the preparation for war. In consequence, when the war was over, the then Government set to work—and the present Government has continued to work—to endeavour to put the modern military organization into shape. In 1904 a very important committee sat. It was presided over by a civilian who had given great attention to the study of military organization, Lord Esher, and it contained on it two very distinguished exponents of naval and military views, Sir John Fisher and Sir George Clarke, as its other members. The committee reported, and its report contained a complete scheme for the reorganization of the War office and of the Army. . . . The broad feature which emerged with regard to military preparations was this—Count Moltke was able to organize victory for the Prussian and German armies in 1866, and again in 1870, because he and the General Staff working under him were free to apply their minds wholly to war preparation. That he was able to do this was due to the fact that the organization and business administration of the Army in peace were kept entirely distinct from the service which con-

sisted in the study of war problems and in the higher training of the Staff and of the troops. That was the principle recommended by the Esher Committee, and it culminated in the provision of a brain for the Army in the shape of a General Staff. That General Staff we have been at work on for a long time past in endeavouring to get together. . . . They were got together under the Esher reorganization, and virtually there has been a General Staff in existence for some time. But it was not until last September that it received formal and complete shape in the Army Order of that month." In place of the commander-in-chief, a new post, that of inspector-general, with a term of five years, was proposed, the principal duty of the office being to inspect and report on the efficiency of the military forces. Earl Roberts had just retired from the position of commander-in-chief, and the duke of Connaught became inspector-general under the new regime. The existing Defense Committee, instituted in 1902, was to be enlarged by the addition of a permanent secretary, holding office for five years; two naval officers, selected by the admiralty; two military officers, chosen by the viceroy of India; and, if possible, other colonial representatives, holding office for two years. Of the importance of this Defense Committee, and of its work, Prime Minister Asquith took occasion to speak in Parliament (July 29, 1909): "The functions of the Defense Committee arise out of . . . the necessity of co-ordinating the work of the Navy and Army. It is the primary business of the Defense Committee to study and determine what is the best provision that can from time to time be made for the military and naval requirements of the Empire as a whole, to keep both naval and military requirements, and their due relation to each other, constantly in view. . . . In 1907 a special committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense was appointed to go into the whole matter [of the possibility of invasion]. In arriving at their conclusion the committee conceded to those who were apprehensive of invasion that it would take place when our Regular Forces were absent upon some foreign expedition and that the attack might be a surprise attack. The view unanimously arrived at was, in the first place, that as long as the naval supremacy of the country was adequately assured, invasion on a large scale, involving the transport of 150,000 men, was an absolutely impracticable operation. . . . The belief of the Admiralty was that a force of 70,000 men could not get through; but an ample margin must be allowed for safety, and it therefore became the business of the War Office to see that we had a force capable of dealing effectively with 70,000 men. For this country, then, to be secure against invasion we ought to have an unassailable supremacy at sea and a home Army ready to cope with a force of the dimensions he had named. It was upon these conclusions that both the military and naval policy of the country during his administration would be carried on."

1909.—British Navy War Council.—The following is from an official statement issued by the British Admiralty, Oct. 11, 1909: "In further development of the policy which has actuated the Board of Admiralty for some time past of organizing a Navy War Council, it has been decided to place on an established footing the arrangements made in previous years for the study of strategy and the consideration and working out of war plans. A new department, called the Naval

Mobilization Department, has been formed under the directorship of a flag officer, and there is concentrated in it that part of the business of the Naval Intelligence Department and the Naval War College which related to war plans and mobilization. Under the presidency of the First Sea Lord, the officers directing the Naval Intelligence Department, and the Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty will form the standing Navy War Council."

1909.—British Imperial Defense Conference.—Its agreements for an imperial system.—Compulsory military training contemplated in Australia.—In connection with the doubts that were awakened in Great Britain, and throughout the British empire, in 1909, as to the adequacy of their general preparations for defense, Premier Asquith announced in the House of Commons, on May 3, that steps had "been taken to ascertain whether the Governments of the self-governing Dominions are prepared to favour a conference at an early date for the discussion of imperial co-operation for defence. The Government had suggested, he said, that the conference should be held this summer—if possible, in July." The proposal was approved throughout the empire, and delegates to the conference from each of the self-governing dominions came to London and held sessions with representatives of the home government, beginning on July 28. The delegates in attendance were the following:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.—Colonel J. F. Foxton, minister without portfolio, assisted by Captain Creswell and Colonel Bridges, naval and military experts.

NEW ZEALAND.—Sir Joseph Ward, prime minister and minister of defense.

CANADA.—Sir Frederick Borden, minister of militia and defense, L. Brodeur, minister of marine and fisheries, these ministers being assisted by Admiral Kingsmill and General Sir Percy Lake, as naval and military advisers.

NEWFOUNDLAND.—Sir E. P. Morris, prime minister.

CAPE COLONY.—J. F. X. Merriman, prime minister.

NATAL.—J. R. Moor, prime minister, assisted by Colonel Greene, minister of railways.

THE TRANSVAAL.—General J. C. Smuts, colonial secretary.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.—General Hertzog, Colonial secretary.

On August 26, after the adjournment of the conference, the premier, in a statement to the House of Commons, summarized its main conclusions as follows: "First as regards military defence: after the main Conference at the Foreign office, a military Conference took place at the War Office, and resulted in an agreement on the fundamental principles set out in papers which had been prepared by the General Staff for consideration by the delegates. The substances of these papers, which will be included among the papers to be published, was the recommendation that, without impairing the complete control of the Government of each Dominion over the military forces raised within it, those forces should be standardized, the formation of units, the arrangements for transport, the patterns of weapons, and so forth, being as far as possible assimilated to those which have been recently worked out for the British Army. Thus while the Dominion troops would in each case be raised for the defense of the Dominion concerned, it would be made readily practicable in case of need for that Dominion to mobilize

and use them for the defense of the Empire as a whole. . . . The result was a plan for so organizing the forces of the Crown wherever they are that while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, should these Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire, in a real emergency, their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous Imperial Army. Naval defence was discussed at meetings of the Conference held at the Foreign Office on August 3, 5, and 6. In Australia and New Zealand there had been eagerness for some time to take a more effective part in the defense of the empire, their remote position and their contiguity to swarming alien populations giving their people some special anxieties which are reasonable enough. They are lonely communities of Europeans, planted on the edge of the prodigious populations of the Asiatic world. They have learned suddenly that some, at least, of those populations can do things, in war and otherwise, that were supposed to be reserved especially for effective performance by the white variety of the human race. What disposition of mind will move the Eastern folk in the exercise of the powers of action—which are discoveries as new to them as to us—has yet to be learned. It is doubtful if they themselves know what the inclination of their career will be, when they have really digested the new contents of their minds and have fully surveyed their new position in the world. Meantime, Australia has good reason to think anxiously of what Japan certainly and China most probably can do, if they are moved by imperialistic ambitions to an aggressive career."

1909.—Chilian navy building.—It was reported from Santiago de Chile to the English press, Oct. 21, 1909, that "the Government has decided upon a naval expenditure of £4,000,000, which includes a 20,000 ton battleship, two ocean-going destroyers, and several submarines. Instructions for tenders have been sent to the Commission in London." A later message to the American press, November 12, stated that "the naval building programme decided upon by the Chilian government, provides for the construction of one battleship, four torpedo boat destroyers, and two submarines at an expenditure of \$14,000,000."

1909.—Danish fortification and naval defense. See DENMARK: 1902-1909.

1909.—French naval administration.—Alarming discovery of bad conditions.—France was startled and shocked in March, 1909, by rumored scandals in naval administration, uncovered by the investigations of a Parliamentary Commission.

1909.—German side of the navy building question.—When, in March, 1909, debate on the navy estimates in England started excitement over the rapidity with which Germany seemed to have developed the building of Dreadnoughts, Chancellor Bülow, on the 29th of that month, said in the Reichstag: "The Federated Governments entertain no thoughts of entering into competition with British sea-power by means of the construction of the German navy. According to the provisions of the Navy Law, the immovable purpose of German naval policy is founded upon the fact that we desire to create our naval armaments solely for the protection of our coasts and our trade. It is, moreover, an indisputable fact that the programme of our naval construction lies open in absolute publicity." This statement was supplemented by one from Admiral Tirpitz, who said: "We shall have ready for use in 1912 ten Dreadnoughts and three Invincibles—in all 13, and not

17, large modern ships—and that not in the spring, but in the autumn. How far it is right to base comparisons of naval strength upon the number of Dreadnoughts is a question which I shall not here discuss." As to the suggested readiness and desire of Great Britain to join in an international agreement for the limiting of naval armaments, the Germans had an answer, which was phrased forcibly by one of the agrarian organs when it said: "When the weaker promises the stronger to abstain from all means of increasing his strength, the strong man needs to make no further effort to retain his relative preponderance for ever.* If the other naval Powers entered into such an agreement, England, without taking upon herself any further burdens, would retain mastery at sea before which all must bow. Little need as we have to interfere with regard to England's programme, even so little need has England to look askance upon our construction of ships, not to attack England, but only in order to have a naval power with which even the strongest opponent will not light-heartedly engage in battle. This good right of ours we shall not surrender by any agreement."—See also GERMANY: 1890-1914: Growth of the army, etc.

1909.—Italian and Austrian programs of naval construction.—A dispatch from Rome in May, 1909, announced that the minister of marine, Admiral Mirabello, had obtained the approval of the cabinet to a naval program that provides for the construction within three years at a total expense of \$52,800,000 of four dreadnoughts and a number of fast scout cruisers. A local paper stated that the decision to build these vessels was reached after Italy had learned that Austria-Hungary was going to spend \$40,000,000 on increased naval power."

1909.—Italian fighting strength at the end of the year.—The fighting strength of the Italian navy was reckoned by the Rome correspondent of the *London Times*, in November, 1909, as follows: "Counting in all four of the San Giorgio cruisers [only two of which were then finished] as forming part of the available navy at the end of this year, and setting aside some 20 ships of various kinds and 40 or 50 torpedo-boats, which may, however, be of some secondary use, the full fighting force of the Italian navy at the beginning of 1910 should be six first-class battleships, five second class battleships, seven first-class armoured cruisers, three second-class armoured cruisers, 19 destroyers, and 36 first-class torpedo-boats. But it must be borne in mind that eight of the first 21 fighting units—the five battleships and three armoured cruisers described here as of the second class—are not very modern ships. The shipbuilding programme of Admiral Mirabello promises, besides other less important vessels, four battleships of the Dreadnought type."

1909.—Adoption of compulsory military training in New Zealand. See NEW ZEALAND: 1906-1909.

1909-1910.—Canadian share of the undertakings of British imperial defense.—For performance of the share assumed by Canada, of undertakings of British imperial defense agreed to at the imperial conference in London, July, 1909, Sir Wilfrid Laurier brought forward a bill in the Dominion House of Commons, January 12, 1910, a bill entitled, "An act respecting the naval service of Canada." In his speech introducing the bill Sir Wilfrid said: "It provides for the creation of a naval force to be composed of a permanent corps, of a reserve force, and of a volunteer force of

the same pattern absolutely as the present organization of the militia force. . . . Every man who will be enrolled for naval service in Canada will be enrolled by voluntary engagement. There is no compulsion of any kind, no conscription, no balloting. . . . 'Active service' as defined by the act means service or duty during an emergency, and emergency means war, invasion or insurrection, real or apprehended." The bill embodying the naval program of the government, as set forth by the prime minister, was enacted on March 11, 1910, by 119 votes to 78.

1909-1910.—French naval program revised in 1909.—Radical changes in the department of the marine.—A dispatch from Paris, June 8, 1909, announced: "According to the *Temps* this evening, the Navy Council has finally decided to recommend that, in addition to 45 ships of the line, the fleet shall consist of 12 'scout cruisers,' 60 large destroyers, and 64 submarines. The importance attached to an increase in the number of capital ships, which is the chief feature of the new proposals, is illustrated by a comparison with the so-called 'programmes' of 1900 and 1907. In 1900 it was decided on paper that the fleet should consist of 28 battleships, 24 armoured cruisers, 52 destroyers, 263 torpedo-boats, and 38 submarines or submersibles. In 1907 the composition of the fleet was changed to 38 battleships, 20 armoured cruisers, six scouts, 109 destroyers, 170 torpedo-boats, 82 submarines for offensive purposes and 49 defence submarines." The new program showed an increase in the number of capital ships and destroyers, the abolition of armoured cruisers as a separate class and of torpedo boats in favor of destroyers, and a decrease in the number of submarines. On April 1, 1910, it was announced from Paris that the Chamber of Deputies had voted to lay down two battleships in the current year, designed to equal the latest type added to the navies of Great Britain and Germany.

1909-1913.—Anticipation of World War.—European situation as seen by Rosebery and Grey.—Lord Rosebery, in speaking at a banquet given to the delegates attending the British imperial press conference, at London, in June, 1909, said: "I do not know that in some ways I have ever seen a condition of things in Europe so remarkable, so peaceful, and in some respects so ominous as the condition which exists at this moment. There is a hush in Europe, a hush in which you may almost hear a leaf fall to the ground. All forebodes peace; and yet at the same time, combined with this total absence of all questions of friction, there never was in the history of the world so threatening and so overpowering a preparation for war. That is a sign which I confess I regard as most ominous. For 40 years it has been a platitude to say that Europe is an armed camp, and for 40 years it has been true that all the nations have been facing each other armed to the teeth, and that has been in some respects a guarantee of peace. Now, what do we see? Without any tangible reason we see the nations preparing new armaments. They cannot arm any more men on land, so they have to seek new armaments upon the sea, piling up these enormous preparations as if for some great Armageddon—and that in a time of profoundest peace." On Mar. 29, 1909, Sir Edward Grey, the British secretary for foreign affairs, said: "One-half of the national revenue of the great countries in Europe is being spent on what are, after all, preparations to kill each other. Surely the extent to which this expenditure has grown really becomes a satire and a reflection

upon civilization." On the other hand, in a speech made at Karlsruhe, on September 11, 1909, after a military review in Baden, the German emperor commented on the situation as follows: "So long as there are peoples there will be enemies and envious folk; and so long as there are enemies and envious folk it will be necessary to be on one's guard against them. Consequently there will continue to be prospects of war, and even war itself, and we must be ready for everything."

1909-1913.—Belgian conscription law.—"At the beginning of the reign of King Albert [in 1909], the possibility of a general European war arose, and fears were entertained by the Belgians that their neutrality might be violated in spite of the guarantees of the powers. A new army law was therefore passed in 1913 which made military service compulsory for all citizens. Fortifications were built, particularly along the German frontier because of greater fear from that quarter."—J. S. Shapiro, *Modern and contemporary European history*, p. 494.

1909-1913.—Great Britain and Germany.—Dreadnoughts.—Parliamentary debate on navy estimates.—An exciting period of debate in Parliament and of discussion throughout Great Britain was opened on March 17, 1909, when the navy estimates for the coming year were submitted to the House of Commons. In his speech on bringing forward the estimates which contemplated an expenditure of £35,142,700, being nearly £3,000,000 in excess of the expenditures of the current year, the first lord of the admiralty, Reginald McKenna, explained the reasons for the increase at length, saying in part: "We cannot take stock of our Navy, and measure our requirements except in relation to the strength of foreign navies. I am, therefore, obliged to refer to foreign countries in making estimates of our naval requirements. Several of the Powers are rapidly developing their naval strength at this moment; but none at a pace comparable with that of Germany. . . . Two years ago, I believe, there was in Germany, with the possible exception of one or two slips in private yards, no slip capable of carrying a Dreadnought. To-day they have actually no less than 14 such slips and three more under construction. And what is true of the hull of the ships is true also of the guns, armour, and mountings. Two years ago any one familiar with the capacity of Krupp's and other great German firms would have ridiculed the possibility of their undertaking the supply of all the component parts of eight battleships in a single year. To-day this productive power is a realized fact, and it will tax the resources of our own great firms if we are to retain the supremacy in rapidity and volume of construction. Having said so much on foreign naval development, I turn to our own programme of construction. As I have said, we shall have in March, 1911, eight completed Dreadnoughts and four Invincibles. We propose to lay down two more Dreadnoughts in July of this year, and the terms of the contracts will provide that they shall be complete in July 1911. . . . Two more ships will be laid down in November this year, to be completed in 1911, and in that year our total strength in Dreadnoughts and Invincibles will be 12 of the former and four of the latter. The date, however, which we have to bear in mind is that up to which the present programme must provide—April, 1912. I have shown that we shall in the course of 1911 have 16 of these modern ships, as against 13 ships for which Germany is already making provision. The German law provides for four more ships to be

laid down in 1910-11. But if the construction of these ships is accelerated—as I understand was the case of the four ships of the 1909-10 programme—they would be completed by April, 1912. Therefore on that date Germany would have 17 Dreadnoughts and Invincibles. But even if no acceleration takes place before April, 1910, this number would be completed in the autumn of 1912. This is a contingency which his Majesty's Government have to take into account." The estimate of the first lord was challenged by Arthur Balfour, the leader of the opposition, who contended that the four ships which, according to the German programme were to be laid down on April 1, 1909, had been actually laid down in advance of that time. He had information to that effect; whereas McKenna was informed that materials had been collected in advance of that time. Over this difference of information as to the facts of German dreadnought-building, and consequent differences of conclusion, controversy raged throughout the kingdom for weeks. Prime Minister Asquith tried to moderate the impeachment of German good faith in the matter. "It is fair and right to the German Government that I should say," he said, "that we have had a most distinct declaration from them that it is not their intention to accelerate their programme (cheers) and we cannot possibly, as a Government, believing as we do most explicitly in the good faith of those declarations (cheers), we cannot possibly put before the House of Commons and Parliament a programme based on the assumption that a declaration of that kind will not be carried out."

1909-1914.—Japan's armament.—The naval status of Japan, as ascertained and described by the Tokio correspondent of *The London Times*, was as follows: "Ever since the Russo-Japanese War it has been well-nigh impossible for the public to form a clear idea of what steps were in progress with regard to the expansion and maintenance of the Japanese Navy. In the year before the outbreak of the conflict—namely, 1903, a programme of expansion was approved by the Diet. It involved the building of three battleships, three armoured cruisers, and two second-class cruisers; that is to say, eight fighting vessels, displacing 100,000 tons approximately. The cost was set down as ten millions sterling, and the programme was to have been spread over a period of 11 years, ending in 1913. Subsequently, however, owing to financial expediency, the time of completion was extended, first to 1915, and thereafter to 1916, so that seven years still remain. Knowing this and observing carefully what ships were laid down from time to time, there should have been, it will appear, no difficulty in forming a clear perception of the actual conditions at any moment."

1911-1913.—Austrian army increase.—"A proposal in 1911 to increase the [Austrian] army encountered vigorous opposition in the Reichsrat which led to a dissolution of that body. In the elections which followed, the Christian Socialists, who had favored the bill, suffered a crushing defeat; and the German Liberals, who had opposed it, gained many seats. But the international crisis arising out of the Morocco Affair [see FRANCE: 1910-1912; MOROCCO: 1911-1912] and the Balkan Wars [1912-1913], compelled the newly elected Parliament to pass a law increasing the army."—J. S. Shapiro, *Modern and contemporary European history*, p. 436.

1912-1913.—Churchill's proposal to build fewer warships.—"It was not long before the menace of German naval expansion rendered the movement [for increased naval outlay] chronic, and sooner

still the destruction of the Russian navy [in 1904-1905] was to leave Great Britain to face but one hostile fleet in the North Sea. On March 18, 1912, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Churchill, made to Germany a perfectly frank though irritatingly ingenious proposal for arresting the keen and costly naval rivalry between the two countries. 'If you will slow down in 1913,' he said to Germany, 'we will slow down too; if you decide not to build the three ships now contemplated you will automatically wipe out no fewer than five British potential super-Dreadnoughts!' Germany retorted by passing a Navy Bill increasing the naval force cruising in the North Sea from seventeen fully-manned battleships to twenty-five, with sixteen in reserve. Consequently Mr. Churchill said: 'It will be my duty to come again to Parliament this year for men, money and material.' And the First Lord thereupon expounded the consequences of the policy of the 'concentration of the British fleet in decisive theatres' . . . capable of guarding and patrolling the British Empire. . . . Admiral Tirpitz's alleged declaration on February 7, 1913, that Germany could safely accept the relative proportion (16 to 10) between the British and German Dreadnoughts proposed by Mr. Churchill in March, 1912, was made simultaneously with the proposal for the increase of the German aerial fleet and the announcement of the plan for the augmentation of the German army until it numbered 865,000 men! The reply of the French was immediate,—restoration of the three years' military service system so recklessly abandoned in 1905."—W. M. Fullerton, *Problems of power*, pp. 74-77.

1913.—France.—Extension of military service.—General European preparation.—"Poincaré's election as president [in 1913] was largely due to his vigorous championship of a three-year's military service law. In 1905 service in the army had been reduced from three to two years. . . . Under the new law [of 1913], the French army was increased by about 170,000 men."—*Ibid.*, pp. 271-272.—See also FRANCE: 1913-1914.—"All the nations began to prepare for the coming conflict more assiduously than ever; the Reichstag increased the peace footing of the German army by 136,000 men; shortly afterwards, France followed by increasing military service from two to three years; Russia reorganized her army and increased military service from three to three and one-quarter years; Austria-Hungary increased her peace footing by 97,000 men; Italy introduced important army reforms; Belgium introduced universal military service; England increased her naval appropriations."—J. S. Schapiro, *Modern and contemporary European history*, p. 708.

1914.—Swedish defense laws.—"Fear of possible Russian aggression frequently aroused [Sweden], . . . and a strong sentiment demanded a larger army and navy. In 1914 there took place a remarkable demonstration of peasants, thousands of whom came from all parts of Sweden to petition the King for greater military preparedness. King Gustavus assured them of his warm sympathy, which gave rise to a bitter controversy in the Riksdag. The Liberal Ministry was opposed to an increase in the military and naval establishments, and resigned as a protest against the King's action. A dissolution of Parliament in 1914 resulted in the triumph of the King, as the new Riksdag passed the defense bills which he advocated."—*Ibid.*, p. 477.—See also SWEDEN: 1914-1917.

1914.—European armies on a peace footing.—In 1914, the year when the greatest war broke over the world, European armies on a peace foot-

ing and fortifications were stated to be as follows: "The 'National Army' of France is composed of the Metropolitan Army and the Colonial Army, the former number 753,403 and the latter about 116,000—40,000 being in Morocco and 39,000 in Algeria—a total of 869,403, exclusive of 25,000 in the Gendarmerie or military police. Military service is compulsory and universal from the ages of 20 to 48, the only exemptions being for physical disability. . . . The peace strength of the Russian army is 1,284,000 men, its war strength 5,962,306. Military service is compulsory and universal, beginning at the age of 20 and terminating with the end of the 43d year. Service in the active army is for 3 years in the case of the infantry and artillery, for 4 years in the other arms. . . . Owing to the enormous extent of the Russian empire, its army is divided into three forces, the army of European Russia, the army of the Caucasus, and the Asiatic army. . . . Austria-Hungary's peace establishment is 472,716, the war strength of her regular army 1,360,000. Military service is universal and compulsory, beginning at the age of 19—but more usually at 21—and ending at 43. . . . The Italian army on a peace footing numbers 250,860 officers and men, exclusive of the troops in Africa. Service is compulsory and universal, beginning at the age of twenty. Two years in the permanent army are followed by 6 years in the reserve, 4 years in the mobile militia, and 7 years in the territorial militia. . . . Apart from the Indian Army and the local Forces in the various colonies the military establishment of Great Britain consists of the Regular Army and the Territorial Army, both being recruited by voluntary enlistment between the ages of 18 and 25. The enlistment is for 12 years, with permission under certain circumstances to prolong it to 21 years. Three to nine years is the period with the colors, and the remainder with the Army Reserve, most men electing to serve 7 years with the colors and 5 in the reserve. . . . The Belgian army has a peace footing of 3,542 officers and 44,061 men, with a war strength variously estimated at from 300,000 to 350,000. . . . In 1913 the Netherlands had in its Home Army 1,543 officers and 21,412 men and 152 guns. On a war footing it could probably be raised to about 270,000 men. . . . Serbia has 10 divisions divided into 4 army corps, with a peace footing of 160,000, and a war strength of over 380,000. . . . Bulgaria has a peace establishment of about 3,900 officers and 56,000 men. . . . Roumania's army on a peace footing is about 5,460 officers and 98,000 men, on a war footing 5 army corps and approximately 580,000 men. . . . In 1912 Greece had a peace establishment of 1,952 officers and 23,268 men, but the . . . [Balkan Wars have] caused her to augment them to 3 army corps and her war footing is not far from 250,000 men. . . . Few people realize how strongly the frontiers of the Powers of central Europe are fortified—in fact the whole continent bristles with fortifications."—F. L. Huidekoper, *Armies of Europe (World's Work, Sept., 1914)*.—See also WORLD WAR: Causes: Indirect 1; Preparation for war.

1914.—Naval status at outbreak of the World War. See WORLD WAR: 1914: IX. Naval operations: a.

1914-1916.—United States.—Naval strength.—Regular army.—"On July 1, 1914, the United States Navy was third in rank in regard to total tonnage built and building. France was closely pressing . . . [her] for third place. But the other leading nations had a reserve force in personnel as follows: England, 43 per cent.; Germany, 104 per cent.; France, 149 per cent.; while the U. S.

Naval Reserves were only 12 per cent. of the active personnel. All things considered, it is clearly evident that the United States ranked fourth in naval power. The great war had waged about a year before . . . [the country] awoke to the unpleasant truth of its real condition and its relative standing. The political party in power then began to realize that the nation demanded 'preparedness.' President Wilson then directed the Secretary of the Navy to draw up a shipbuilding program. . . . The Secretary decided that \$500,000,000 expended for new construction in the next five years would meet the demands and needs of the nation, and he directed the General Board to draw up a plan under these conditions. . . . As the months of debate in Congress on the Naval Appropriation bill wore on . . . the President decided that the country needed more preparedness than the Secretary had estimated. This necessity was met by the simple expedient of modifying the time limit of the above programme . . . [so as] to carry out the scheme in three instead of five years. . . . Furthermore, the Secretary . . . [was] authorized to increase the total cost of any vessel not to exceed 20 per cent. as a bonus for speedy construction."—*American Year Book*, 1916, p. 320.—The National Defense Act which became law on June 3, 1916, provided for four classes of troops: first, the Regular Army; secondly, the reorganized National Guard; thirdly, an 'enlisted reserve corps'; and fourthly, a volunteer army to be raised only in time of war. The maximum strength of the Regular Army was raised to approximately 298,000 men; but it was provided that in time of peace it should not exceed 175,000."—J. Dickinson, *Building of an army*, p. 441.

1915-1916.—England: War emergency acts.—Munitions of War Act.—National Registration Act.—Lord Derby's recruiting scheme. See ENGLAND: 1915: Naval legislative and administrative measures; Ministry of munitions; Colliery recruiting courts; 1915 (October); 1916 (December).

1916-1918.—United States: Preparedness campaign.—Selective service system.—War measures.—Mobilizing of material resources. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: g; h; i; i, 2; U.S.A.: 1916-1917: Campaign for preparedness; 1917 (May): Military unpreparedness; 1917-1919: Effect of the war.

1919-1923.—Post-war preparations and expenditures.—"In pre-war times the statesmen of each country could make a parliamentary case for their military budgets by calling attention to the menace of prodigious armies across their frontiers. Germany and Austria built up great armaments because their frontiers were open to the attack of two great military powers who had engaged to pool their resources in the event of war. France and Russia raised huge armies because Germany possessed the most redoubtable army in the world, and could rely in the case of war upon the assistance of the not inconsiderable forces of the Austrian empire. And both Austria and France had always the uncertain factor of Italy, with her army of 3,000,000, to reckon with. But since the war . . . the two great military empires of Central Europe had disappeared. Germany, which before the war had a peace establishment of 800,000 men and reserves running into millions, has to-day a total army of 100,000 men—about one-third the size of the Polish army. The formidable German equipment which for four years pounded the cities and villages of northern France to dust is either destroyed or scattered for display amongst the towns and villages of the victors. The Austrian army, which had in 1913-14 a peace establishment

of 420,000 men and a reserve of two or three millions of trained men . . . [had been reduced in 1923 to] 30,000 men. In spite of these facts France has still an army of 736,000 men . . . under arms, with a trained reserve of two or three millions more. She is strengthening and developing her air force as if she feared—or contemplated—an immediate invasion. In 1914 France had an air force of 400 aëroplanes; to-day she has 1,152. But numbers signify little. The size, the power, and the purpose of the machines signify much. Amongst the 1,152 air machines of to-day will be found bombers of a destructiveness such as was not dreamt of in 1914. Should human folly drift once more into war, these preparations are full of evil omen as to the character of that conflict. A single bomb dropped from one of the new bombers contains more explosive material than one hundred of those carried by the old type. And the size of the machine and of its bombs is growing year by year. Where is it to stop? And what is it all for? Where is the enemy? Where is the menace which demands such gigantic military developments? Not one of the neighbours of France has to-day a force which reaches one-fourth the figures of her formidable army. Germany no longer affords a decent pretext. The population of Germany is equal to the aggregate population of Poland, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Czecho-Slovakia, but her army barely numbers one-seventh of the aggregate peace establishment of these four countries. Rumania alone, with a population of 15,000,000, has an army twice the size of that allowed by the Treaty of Versailles to Germany with her population of 60,000,000. These countries have in addition to their standing armies reserve forces of millions of trained men, whilst the young men of Germany are no longer permitted to train in the use of arms. Her military equipment is destroyed, and her arsenals and workshops are closely inspected by Allied officers lest a fresh equipment should be clandestinely produced. An army of 700,000 is, therefore, not necessary in order to keep Germany within bounds. The only other powerful army in Europe is the Russian army. It is difficult to gather any reliable facts about Russia. The mists that arise from the unhealthy political and economic swamp obscure and distort all vision. The statistics concerning her army vary according to the point of view of the person who cites them. The latest figure given by the Russians themselves is 800,000. On paper that indicates as formidable a force as that possessed by the French. But the events of the past few years show clearly that the Russian army is powerful only for defence, and that it is valueless for purposes of invasion. . . . Every little state bristles with guns to scare off invaders. Meanwhile no country in Europe pays its way, except Britain, with her reduced army and navy. But by means of loans and inflated currencies they all, even the smallest of them, contrive to maintain larger armies than Frederick the Great or the Grand Monarque ever commanded in their most triumphant years."—D. Lloyd George, *Where are we going?* pp. 53-58.—"The strength of the standing armies of Europe in 1913 was 3,747,179 men. In 1922 the strength was 4,354,965, an increase of 607,786, despite the compulsory reduction of 696,135 men in the standing armies of Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria. This means that in the remaining states of Europe there has been in 1922 an increase of 1,303,921, as compared with 1913. Great Britain's standing army in 1922 was stronger by about 10,000 men than it was in 1913, but she was then maintaining considerable forces in Constantinople, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and on the

Rhine, as the result of obligations which she had incurred after the war, obligations which account for far more than 10,000 men. The standing army of France in 1922 numbered 736,261 men, against 760,439 in 1913, a reduction of 24,178, though France's obligations in North and West Africa were enormously greater than they were before the war, and absorbed more than three times as many troops as they did in 1913. Italy, with a greatly increased land frontier, had reduced her forces in 1922 by 80,390, as compared with 1913. In the days when the territory which is now Czecho-Slovakia was governed from Vienna, it contributed to the standing army of Austria a quota of 73,000. In 1922 Czecho-Slovakia maintained an army of 160,000 men. The incidence of military service upon her people was, therefore, more than twice as heavy. The territory of the new Poland was, before the war, partly under German, partly under Austrian, and partly under Russian rule. It then found 100,000 men for the standing armies of those three great military powers. In 1922 Poland had a standing army of 275,000 men. Finland before the war provided 30,000 men for the army of the tsar. In 1922 she had an army of 120,000. The standing armies of the three great European powers, Great Britain, France, and Italy, in 1922, numbered 1,099,047 men, those of the remaining states of Europe 3,255,918. It was in the states bordering upon the western frontier of Russia that the most striking increases had taken place. These states together were maintaining standing armies numbering 650,000 men.—Based on F. Maurice, *Armies of Europe (Atlantic Monthly, May, 1923)*.—"To-day [1922] Japan's army, according to the very modest totals given in the published statistics, consists of 250,000 men with the colours and a fully-trained reserve of 618,000. But there is no secrecy at all in the fact that recent reforms in organisation are intended to give Japan in the year 1930 a fully-trained army of four and a half millions, recruited entirely from her own sons, without drawing in any way on the splendid raw material which she already has in Korea and may have, in far less than a decade, in Manchuria and Mongolia. The development of her navy proceeded apace with that of her army, and as a world naval power, after making all the reductions provided in the Washington pact, Japan is inferior only to Great Britain and the United States, while in her own seas she is as invincible as she is on land."—J. H. Longford, *Japan*, pp. 234-235.—"The Army Act of 1920, like the National Defense Act, provides that the [United States] army shall consist of a Regular Army, a reserve corps, and the National Guard while in Federal service. Unlike the National Defense Act, the Army Act contains no reference to a volunteer army as part of the army of the United States. The Army Act made provision for a Regular Army of approximately 298,000 men, the figure to which the National Defense Act had provided that the army was to be raised in increments extended over five years; but the Defense Act had contained a proviso that in time of peace the size of the army should not exceed 175,000, and this limit was increased in the Army Act to 280,000."—J. Dickinson, *Building of an army*, pp. 373-374.

See also CONSCRIPTION; MILITARY ORGANIZATION; WARSHIPS.

WAR, Secretary of. See WAR DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES.

WAR AGAINST POVERTY BUDGET. See ENGLAND: 1900 (April-December).

WAR BONUS BILL. See U.S.A.: 1921 (March-July).

WAR CABINETS, English. See CABINET: English: War cabinets.

WAR CAMP COMMUNITY SERVICE: World War. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: IX. War relief: g; XIV. Cost of war: b, 8.

WAR CHEST FINANCING: Origin of idea. See CLEVELAND, OHIO: 1917-1921.

WAR CORRESPONDENTS: World War. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: III. Press reports and censorship: c.

WAR DEPARTMENT, United States.—Among the executive departments of the United States, whose secretaries form the president's cabinet, the "third department is that of War, established second in point of time, August 7, 1789. Originally, it had jurisdiction under the direction of the President over both military and naval affairs, over land grants for military services, and over Indian affairs. In 1798 its jurisdiction over naval affairs was transferred to the Navy Department, created in that year. Its jurisdiction over land grants was transferred to the Treasury Department soon after its establishment, and its jurisdiction over Indian affairs was transferred to the Interior Department in 1849. During the Period 1833-1849 it also had jurisdiction in the matter of military pensions, and it still retains the Record and Pension Office. The Secretary of War 'performs such duties as are required of him by law or may be enjoined upon him by the President concerning the military service.' The duties devolved by law upon him are: the supervision of all estimates of appropriations for the expenses of the Department, including the military establishment, of all purchase of army supplies, of all expenditures for the support, transportation and maintenance of the army, and of such expenditures of a civil nature as may be placed by Congress under his direction. He has also supervision of the United States Military Academy at West Point and of military education in the army, of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, of the various battlefield commissions, and of the publication of the official records of the War of the Rebellion. Furthermore, he has charge of all matters relating to national defence and seacoast fortifications; army ordnance, river and harbor improvements, the prevention of obstruction to navigation, the establishment of harbor lines and all plans and locations of bridges authorized by Congress to be constructed over the navigable waters of the United States require his approval. There is an Assistant Secretary of War, to whom is assigned specifically some of the duties embraced under the general charge of the Secretary of War. He is vested with Authority to decide all cases which do not involve questions of policy, the establishment or reversal of precedents, or matters of special or extraordinary importance. There is in this department what is known as the General Staff Corps, organized under an Act of February 14, 1903, whose principal duties are: to prepare plans for the national defence and for the mobilization of military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of preparation for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and co-ordinating the action of all the different officers who are subject to the supervision of the Chief of Staff, and to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time presented by the President. The

Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President, or of the Secretary of War under the direction of the President, has supervision of all troops of the line, of the Adjutant-General's department in matters pertaining to the command, discipline, or administration of the existing military establishment and of the Inspector General's, Judge Advocate General's, Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Medical, Pay and Ordnance Departments, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps and performs such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned by the President. For purposes of administration, his office constitutes a supervising military bureau of the War Department. Duties formerly prescribed by statute for the Commanding General of the Army, as a member of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification and of the Board of Commissioners of the Soldiers' Home, are performed by the Chief of Staff or some other officer designated by the President. There are embraced within the Department several military bureaus, whose chiefs are officers of the Regular Army of the United States, the Military Secretary, the Inspector General, the Quartermaster General, the Commissary General of Subsistence, the Surgeon General, the Paymaster General, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, the Judge Advocate General, the Chief Signal Officer, and, lastly, the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, to whom is assigned, under the immediate direction of the Secretary of War, all matters pertaining to civil government in the island possessions of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the War Department. To this chief is also assigned the transaction of all business in this country in relation to the temporary administration of the Republic of Cuba. In 1902 there was created within this Department a Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors to which are referred for consideration and recommendation all reports upon examinations and surveys provided by Congress and all projects and changes in projects for river or harbor improvement upon which report is desired by the Chief of Engineers, U. S. A. It is also made its duty to report through the Chief of Engineers upon the advisability of undertaking certain improvements at the expense of the United States."—J. H. Finley and J. F. Sanderson, *American executive and executive methods*, pp. 298-301.—"The President is officially commander-in-chief of the regular army and of the militia when it is in the service of the United States. A President has never personally directed the movements of armies in the field. The real management of a war falls upon the Secretary of War, the head of the War Department. This officer has supervision of the army in times of war as well as in times of peace. He acts through the chief of staff of trained officers who have direct control of the troops. A most important duty of the Secretary of War is to care for the material welfare of the army. In this he is assisted by the quartermaster-general, who attends to the clothing and the transportation of troops; by the commissary-general, who supplies the food; by the chief of ordnance, who supplies the arms; by the surgeon-general, who provides medicine and assistance for the sick and wounded; by the adjutant-general, who conducts the correspondence of the War Department. It is estimated that ten per cent of the population and wealth of the United States is situated on the sea-coast, exposed to destruction by hostile naval forces. The defense of this life and property is the duty of the War Department."—S. E. Forman, *American democracy*, pp. 250-251.

Investigation of its conduct in the war with Spain. See U. S. A.: 1898-1899.

Report on preparation for war. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: i, 2.

Issuing of medals and service chevrons. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: VIII. War medals: b, d.

ALSO IN: L. O. Ingersoll, *History of the War Department of the United States*.

WAR EXCISE TAX. See U. S. A.: 1917-1919: Taxation and expenditures.

WAR FINANCE CORPORATION. See U. S. A.: 1922 (May-December); Economic situation; RURAL CREDIT: United States: Agricultural Credits Act; Federal Farm Loan Act.

WAR GARDENS. See AGRICULTURE: Modern: United States: Effects of the World War.

WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD: United States. See U. S. A.: 1917 (May): Mobilization of civilian forces; 1917-1919: Effect of the war; WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: i, 11; PRICE CONTROL: 1917-1919.

WAR LABOR BOARD: United States. See AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR: 1917-1919; U. S. A.: 1918-1920; LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1917-1918: Munition strikes; 1918-1919: New York harbor strikes.

WAR LIBRARY SERVICE: Great Britain. See LIBRARIES: Modern: England, etc.: British war libraries.

United States. See LIBRARIES: Modern: United States: Effects of the World War.

WAR MEDALS. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: VIII. War medals.

WAR OF 1812. See U. S. A.: 1804-1809; 1808; 1810-1812, to 1815 (January).

WAR OF JENKINS' EAR (1739). See ENGLAND: 1739-1741.

WAR OF LIBERATION (1813-1814). See GERMANY: 1812-1813, to 1813 (October-December).

WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1775-1783). See U. S. A.: 1775, and after.

WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION (1740-1748). See AUSTRIA: 1740, to 1744-1745; NETHERLANDS: 1745; 1746-1747; ITALY: 1741-1743, to 1746-1747; AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: Congresses: 2.

WAR OF THE FEDERATION (1859-1864). See VENEZUELA: 1829-1886.

WAR OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE (1672-1714). See AUSTRIA: 1672-1714.

WAR OF THE LOVERS (1580). See FRANCE: 1578-1580.

WAR OF THE QUEEN'S RIGHTS. See BELGIUM: 1667.

WAR OF THE REBELLION (Civil War) (1861-1865). See U. S. A.: 1860 (November-December), to 1865 (May).

WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1701-1714). See SPAIN: 1702, and after; NETHERLANDS: 1702-1704, and after; GERMANY: 1702, and after; ITALY: 1701-1713; NEW ENGLAND: 1702-1710; UTRECHT: 1712-1714.

WAR OF THE THREE HENRYS (1587-1589). See FRANCE: 1584-1589.

WAR POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES.—Distribution of power.—The war powers of the United States are stated in the constitution (Article I, Sect. VIII, 1-8). "The war powers under the Constitution are carefully distributed. To Congress is given the power 'to declare war.' The proposal to add 'to make peace' found no favor, as this was deemed to belong to the treaty-making power vested in the President and the Senate. To the President was given the

direction of war as the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. It was not in the contemplation of the Constitution that the command of forces and the conduct of campaigns should be in charge of a council or that as to this there should be a division of authority or responsibility. The prosecution of war demands in the highest degree the promptness, directness, and unity of action in military operations which alone can proceed from the Executive. This exclusive power to command the Army and Navy, and thus to direct and control campaigns, exhibits not autocracy but democracy fighting effectively through its chosen instruments and in accordance with the established organic law. While the President is Commander in Chief, in the Congress resides the authority 'to raise and support armies' and 'to provide and maintain a navy' and 'to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,' and as a safeguard against military domination the power to raise and support armies is qualified by the provision that 'no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.'—C. E. Hughes, *Fighting powers of the United States under the constitution (Address before American Bar Association, Sept. 5, 1917, at Saratoga Springs)*.

Power to declare war.—"The framers of the Constitution turned over an ample measure of the powers of war to Congress because Representatives and Senators are delegates of the People and States of the United States whose commercial interests must be staked upon the issues of every conflict. The People pay the bill. Therefore, their representatives in Congress are of right the proper persons to control military affairs. 'The war making power,' according to the decision in the case of *Perkins vs. Rogers* (35 Indiana Rep., 167) 'is, by the Constitution, vested in Congress and . . . the President has no power to declare war or conclude peace except as he may be empowered by Congress. . . . The existence of war, and the restoration of peace are to be determined by the political department of the government, and such determination is binding and conclusive upon the courts, and deprives the courts of the power of hearing proof and determining as a question of fact either that war exists or has ceased to exist.' In the course of the decision of the case of *Brown vs. United States* (8 Cranch's Rep., 120) which grew out of one of the incidents of the War of 1812 with Great Britain, Chief Justice Marshall took pains to explain just what happens to commerce when war is declared. A ship owned in Massachusetts, chartered to a British company and loaded with British goods, had put in at New Bedford, where, at the instance of the Federal authorities, the cargo had been claimed as enemy property. An action for forfeiture had been instituted upon the claim that the goods seized were the property of an alien enemy. The case finally reached the Supreme Court of the United States, where Chief Justice Marshall ruled that a declaration of war does not of itself authorize the seizure and condemnation of property of the enemy, but that a special act of Congress must be passed for that purpose. He said: 'The declaration of war has only the effect of placing the two nations in a state of hostility, of producing a state of war, of giving those rights which war confers; but not of operating, by its own force, any of those results, such as a transfer of property, which are usually produced by ulterior measures of government.'—C. W. Bacon and F. S. Morse, *American plan of government*, pp. 152-153.

Power to grant letters of marque and reprisal.—"In Revolutionary days, owners of small ships

found profitable employment as privateers. A smart sailing master with a good reputation as a fighting man, could get any number of stout fellows to take the chances of the sea against the merchant ships of the enemy. The Continental Congress issued many letters of marque in order to harass the enemy and retaliate for injuries already suffered. Many an honest Yankee sailor was able to put by prize money during the Revolutionary War, and was sorry when it was over. Incidentally, the privateersmen did their share for the American cause. Their captures of muskets, gunpowder, and military supplies often came in the nick of time, when Washington had more soldiers than he could supply with arms. Privateering now being out of date, this clause of the Constitution is obsolete."—*Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.

Power to make rules concerning captures on land and water.—This power "gives Congress a right to prescribe what disposition shall be made of property captured in time of war; and the President, as commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, carries out its directions. The case of *The Thomas Gibbons* (8 Cranch's Rep., 421) turned upon President Madison's instructions of August 28, 1812, that privateers should not interrupt any vessels belonging to citizens of the United States, coming from British ports to the United States laden with British merchandise, in consequence of the repeal of the British Orders in Council. *The Thomas Gibbons*, one of those very ships, had been brought into the harbor of Savannah by a privateer which claimed her as a prize. The Federal District Court sustained the protest of the owners that the ship and cargo were protected from seizure by the terms of the President's proclamation. The appeal of this case to the Supreme Court resulted in a declaration that it is for Congress to lay down, and for the President to enforce, rules concerning 'captures on land and water.' Justice Story said: It is very clear that the President has, under the Prize Act, power to grant, annul, and revoke at his pleasure, the commissions of privateers; and by the act declaring war, he is authorized to issue the commission in such form as he shall deem fit. . . . In this view, the commission is qualified and restrained by the power of the President to issue instructions. The privateer takes it subject to such power, and contracts to act in obedience to all the instructions which the President may lawfully promulgate."—*Ibid.*, pp. 154-155.

Power to pass conscription laws.—"Upon every citizen lies the duty of aiding in the common defense. In exercising its constitutional power to raise armies the Congress may enforce this duty. The Congress may call any one to service who is able to serve. The question who may be called, or in what order, is simply one for the judgment of the National Legislature. The power vested in Congress is not to raise armies simply by calling for volunteers, but to raise armies by whatever method Congress deems best, and hence must be deemed to embrace conscription. To the framers of the Constitution the draft was a familiar mode of raising armies, as it had been resorted to by the colonies to fill up their quotas in the Revolutionary War."—C. E. Hughes, *Fighting powers of the United States under the constitution (Address before the American Bar Association, Sept. 5, 1917, at Saratoga Springs)*.—The constitution states that "Congress shall have Power to . . . raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.' The Supreme Court has said that in this particular the power of Congress is 'plenary and

exclusive.' This statement was made in *Tarble's Case* (13 Wallace's Rep., 397) in which the main question was whether a State court has any right to discharge a soldier from military service by writ of habeas corpus. One Edward Tarble had enlisted in the United States army in July, 1869. Soon afterward, his father had petitioned a Wisconsin court to issue a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that, as the boy was under eighteen, he could not legally be enlisted. The writ was issued and served on his commanding officer, who protested that the State court had no power to release a Federal soldier by this means. When, in spite of this objection, the release was ordered the case was taken to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which ruled that a State court might lawfully decide whether a Federal court had jurisdiction in a case involving the rights and liberties of a citizen of a State. The military authorities now took the case to the Supreme Court at Washington, and asked that tribunal to decide whether Congress and the Federal Courts were to be dealt with in such cavalier fashion. Justice Field said: 'Among the powers assigned to the National government is the power "to raise and support armies," and the power "to provide for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." The execution of these powers falls within the line of its duties; and its control over the subject is plenary and exclusive. It can determine, without question from any State authority, how the armies shall be raised, whether by voluntary enlistment or forced draft, the age at which the soldier shall be received, and the period for which he shall be taken, the compensation he shall be allowed, and the service to which he shall be assigned. . . . No interference with the execution of this power of the National government in the formation, organization, and government of its armies by any State officials could be permitted without greatly impairing the efficiency, if it did not utterly destroy, this branch of the public service. The two-year period for which Congress may make appropriations for the support of an army, was established probably because the members of the House of Representatives are elected every two years. The People's House of each Congress must assume responsibility for the size of the army, since it has to take the first step toward making the biennial appropriation for its support.' Alexander Hamilton is said to have written the number of *The Federalist* (No. 26.) which says: 'The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.'—C. W. Bacon and F. S. Morse, *American plan of government*, pp. 155-156.

Power to provide and maintain a navy.—'Congress can appropriate money to be used in building and equipping battleships and in providing all appliances for the navy, which when thus established is under the control of the President.'—*Ibid.*, p. 157.

Power to make rules for government of army and navy.—Congress is given "power to formulate military codes and insitute courts-martial by which the President maintains discipline in the army and navy. Courts of law may not interfere with courts-martial. In the case of *Dynes vs. Hoover* (20 Howard's Rep., 65) an attempt was

made to induce the Supreme Court to prevent the execution of the sentence of a naval court-martial on the ground that the Supreme Court has power over all cases arising under the Constitution. Frank Dynes had been convicted at New York under the Act of April 23, 1800, of having attempted to desert from the U. S. Ship *Independence* on September 12, 1854, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment in the penitentiary of the District of Columbia. The President ordered the United States marshal to receive Dynes from a vessel which had brought him from New York to Washington, and commit him to the penitentiary of the District of Columbia. The prisoner tried to regain his liberty by suing the marshal for false imprisonment upon the ground that the President had no constitutional authority to issue such an order. The defendant answered that, as marshal of the District of Columbia, he had imprisoned the plaintiff under the authority of the President and in execution of the sentence of a naval court-martial. Justice Wayne, in the course of the decision of the Supreme Court, took occasion to say that the judiciary has no power to control the action of military and naval courts established by Congress under this constitutional clause. He said in part: 'Among the powers conferred upon Congress by the 8th section of the first article of the Constitution, are the following: "to provide and maintain a navy," "to make rules for the government of the land and naval forces." . . . Congress passed the Act of 23d April, 1800, providing rules for the government of the navy. . . . The 35th article provides for the appointment of courts martial to try all offences which may arise in the naval service. . . . In this case, all of us think that the court which tried Dynes had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the charge against him.'—*Ibid.*, pp. 157-158.

Congressional power over state militia.—The constitution states that "Congress shall have Power . . . To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.' The Supreme Court explained the meaning of this clause in the case of *Houston vs. Moore*. (5 Wheaton's Rep., 1.) A Pennsylvania militiaman named Houston had refused to march with his detachment when called into actual service by the governor in pursuance of an order or requisition made by the President of the United States on July 4, 1814. Houston was tried by court-martial under a Pennsylvania law, which provided that any person who refused to obey when so ordered out should be liable to the penalties prescribed by the Act of Congress of February 28, 1795. A fine was imposed and collected out of his property. He thereupon brought a lawsuit against the deputy marshal who had collected the fine upon the claim that the Pennsylvania law was null and void because the United States alone had power to punish him for disobedience of its orders. Justice Washington said: 'Upon the whole, I am of opinion, after the most laborious examination of this delicate question, that the State court-martial had a concurrent jurisdiction with the tribunal pointed out by the acts of Congress to try a militia-man who had disobeyed the call of the President, and to enforce the laws of Congress against such delinquent; and that this authority will remain to be so exercised until it shall please Congress to rest it exclusively elsewhere, or until the State of Pennsylvania shall withdraw from their court-martial the authority

to take such jurisdiction.'—*Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.—“As the service of the Organized Militia can only be required by the National Government for the limited purposes specified in the Constitution, it follows (as Attorney General Wickersham advised President Taft) that the Organized Militia, as such, can not be employed for offensive warfare outside the limits of the United States. This, however, is apart from the power of Congress to raise and support a Federal Army. Congress may be content with a small standing army in ordinary times, but Congress may create and equip such army as it pleases, subject to the qualification with respect to appropriations. It can equip an army in preparation for war, and of course, it may furnish whatever army is required for the prosecution of war. The organization and service of an army raised by Congress are not subject to the limitations governing its control of the militia. The power to use an army is coextensive with the power to make war; and the army may be used wherever the war is carried on, here or elsewhere. There is no limitation upon the authority of Congress to create an army, and it is for the President as Commander in Chief to direct the campaigns of that army wherever he may think they should be carried on.”—C. E. Hughes, *Fighting powers of the United States under the constitution (Address before the American Bar Association, Sept. 5, 1917, at Saratoga Springs)*.—The constitution states that “‘Congress shall have Power . . . To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.’ The framers of the Constitution gave Congress, instead of the President, power to summon the militia for active service, because the law-making bodies were under the control of the People and the States. They limited the power of Congress over the militia by providing that the citizen soldiery should not be called into active service except for three specified objects. No serious question arose under this clause until, in 1861, it became necessary to use the militia of the loyal States against the States which had attempted to secede from the Union. At the beginning of the Civil War, President Lincoln, under the authority of certain acts of Congress which dated back to 1795 and 1807, called out the militia, so that the laws should be faithfully executed (U. S. Const., Art. II., Sec. 3) in those States where the Federal Courts had become ineffective. His proclamation putting the ports of the Confederacy under blockade was challenged in the Supreme Court in *The Prize Cases* (2 Black’s Rep., 635) in which the question was whether the citizen soldiers of some States could be used under the authority of acts of Congress to obstruct access to the harbors of other States. Proceedings were brought in the Federal Courts against a number of vessels which had been captured as blockade runners. Some of these were condemned and others released, according to the merits of each case. Justice Grier sustained the war powers of Congress.”—C. W. Bacon and F. S. Morse, *American plan of government*, pp. 158-159.

Power of the president.—“By the Constitution, Congress alone has power to declare a national or foreign war. It cannot declare war against a State, or any number of States, by virtue of any clause in the Constitution. The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power. He is bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of several States when called into the actual service of the United States. He has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a

domestic State. But by the Acts of Congress of February 28, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is authorized to call out the militia and use the military and naval forces of the United States in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of the United States. . . . He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the declaration of it be ‘unilateral.’”—*Ibid.*, p. 159.—See also PRESIDENT: United States: War powers of the president.

Taxing power.—“One of the expressed objects of the power granted to Congress ‘to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises’ is to ‘provide for the common defense’; and it can not be doubted that taxes laid for this purpose—that is, to support the Army and Navy and to provide the means for military operations—must be laid subject to the constitutional restrictions. That is, all duties, imposts, and excises must be uniform throughout the United States, and direct taxes must be apportioned among the States according to population. And by the sixteenth amendment, providing that income taxes, from whatever source derived, may be laid without apportionment among the States, these taxes fall into the great class of excise duties and imposts and are alike subject to the rule requiring geographical uniformity, a requirement operative in war as well as in peace.”—C. E. Hughes, *Fighting powers of the United States under the constitution (Address before the American Bar Association, Sept. 5, 1917, at Saratoga Springs)*.

Treason.—“The provisions as to treason are also clearly applicable in war: ‘Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort—And—the Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainer of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.’

“But what shall be said of the efficacy in time of war of the great guaranties of personal and property rights? It would be impossible . . . to discuss comprehensively this important subject, or even to refer to all these guaranties, but we may briefly touch upon the question in its relation to the fifth and sixth amendments, viz.: ‘No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.’ Clearly these amendments, normally and perfectly adapted to conditions of peace, do not have the same complete and universal application in time

of war. Thus the fifth amendment normally gives its protection to 'any person.' But in war this must yield to the undoubted national power to capture and confiscate the property of enemies."—*Ibid.*—The exception to right of trial by jury, insured to the citizens of the United States by Amendments V and VI of the constitution, lies in the provision for cases "arising in the land and naval forces or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger."

Martial law.—"A different question, however, is presented with respect to the rights of citizens and others not enemies in places which are outside the actual theater of war. It was upon the question of the power of Congress to provide for the trial of citizens by military commission in such places that the justices sharply divided in the noted case of Milligan. He was a citizen of Indiana who had been tried by a military commission at Indianapolis on a charge of aiding the enemy and conspiring against the Government and had been sentenced to be hung. He was not a resident of one of the rebellious States nor a prisoner of war, and he had not been in the military or naval service. The court was unanimous in the opinion that under the terms of the act of Congress creating the commission it had no jurisdiction. But the majority of the court went further and declared that Congress was without power to provide for the trial of citizens by military commissions save in the locality of actual war and when there was no access to the courts."—*Ibid.*

Power to wage war and regulations to insure success.—Implied powers of war administration.—"The extraordinary circumstances of war may bring particular business and enterprises clearly into the category of those which are affected with a public interest and which demand immediate and thoroughgoing public regulation. The production and distribution of foodstuffs, articles of prime necessity, those which have direct relation to military efficiency, those which are absolutely required for the support of the people during the stress of conflict, are plainly of this sort. Reasonable regulations to safeguard the resources upon which we depend for military success must be regarded as being within the powers confided to Congress to enable it to prosecute a successful war. In the words of the Supreme Court: 'It is well settled that the Constitution is not self-destructive. In other words, that the power which it confers on the one hand it does not immediately take away on the other.' (Billings v. United States, 232 U. S., 282.) This was said in relation to the taxing powers. Having been granted in express terms, the court held it had not been taken away by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. As the Supreme Court put it in another case: 'The Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring upon the one hand a taxing power and taking the same power away on the other by the limitations of the due process clause.' (240 U. S., 24.) Similarly, it may be said that the power has been expressly given to Congress to prosecute war and to pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution."—*Ibid.*—"At the outbreak of the [World War] the National Government was wholly without any . . . organ of general administration except in so far as the President and his Cabinet constituted such an organ. Though constitutionally the President's powers are exclusively executive as distinguished from administrative, the President has nevertheless become in effect the administrator-in-chief of the Government. This has resulted partly as a logical consequence of his duty as Chief Executive

to see that the laws are duly enforced, partly in consequence of the powers possessed by him to nominate and, with the consent of the Senate, to appoint the chief administrative officers of the Government and his unrestricted power to dismiss all such officers, but chiefly from the fact that Congress has by statute conferred upon him administrative powers of the most comprehensive character. Especially has this policy been pursued by Congress since the entrance of the United States into the war. In almost no case did Congress attempt itself to prescribe the character of organization or the administrative methods that should be employed in enforcing the large volume of war legislation it enacted. Almost invariably it contented itself with providing that the President should take such action as in his opinion was wise to see that the provisions of those acts were properly carried out. By an Act approved May 20, 1918, it went much further even than this, and conferred a general power upon the President during the war and for six months after its termination to effect such a coordination or consolidation of existing bureaus, agencies, and offices of the Government as in his opinion would lead to a more efficient prosecution of the war. This very important Act . . . is known as the Overman Act from the name of its author. . . . Prior to the outbreak of the Great War recognition was had of the need for some organ that should have as its function the formation of a general war programme and the correlation of the activities of the several branches of the Government for its execution should the United States ever be called upon to engage in a conflict that would measurably tax its resources. To this end there was drafted as early as 1912 a bill providing for the creation of a body to be known as the Council of National Defense. This bill, which had the strong endorsement of President Taft, the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, had as its principle the creation of a body through which the programme and activities of Congress and the Executive might be correlated for purposes of war preparation and prosecution. It thus provided for a body composed of *ex officio* members representing the two Houses of Congress, the President, and the War and Navy Departments. The chief function of this body was to insure that a general programme in respect to preparedness and the prosecution of war, should that eventuality occur, should be adopted that would secure the common support of all branches of the Government. Particularly was it designed to insure that the War and Navy Departments should not work at cross-purposes such as had been more or less in evidence during our war with Spain. Mention is made of this proposal, although it failed of enactment, since it illustrates a feeling on the part of Congress that it should participate directly in the formulation of preparedness and war programmes which was strongly in evidence during the first few months after our entrance into the war. This was manifested by the introduction of bills calling for the creation of a joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, a War Cabinet, special Departments of Munitions, Air Service, and the like. All of these proposals were successfully opposed by President Wilson on the ground that they tended to lessen his authority as head of the administration, to divide responsibility, and were unnecessary. As the possibility of the United States' being drawn into the war became progressively more apparent, this idea of a Council of National Defense was revived in a modified form and provision was made for its establishment by a clause inserted in the Army

Appropriation Act of March 29, 1916. This Act provided for the creation of a body to be known as the Council of National Defense to consist of the six Secretaries of War, the Navy, the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The function of this body was stated in exceedingly broad terms to be 'the coördination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare,' and its specific duties, in performing this function."—W. F. Willoughby, *Government organization in war time and after (Problems of war and of reconstruction, pp. 5-6, 9-11)*.

WAR PRISONERS. See PRISONERS OF WAR.

WAR RELIEF. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: IX. War relief; INTERNATIONAL RELIEF; FOOD REGULATION: 1918-1921.

WAR REVENUE ACTS: United States. See U. S. A.: 1917-1919: Taxation and expenditures.

WAR RISK INSURANCE. See U. S. A.: 1917 (May): Mobilization of civilian forces; 1917-1919: Effect of the war; INSURANCE: Government.

WAR SAVING STAMPS. See U. S. A.: 1917-1919: Taxation and expenditures.

WAR TIME PROHIBITION BILL (1918). See LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1913-1919.

WAR TRADE BOARD: United States. See TARIFF: 1917-1919; BLACKLIST: American.

WAR WORK COUNCIL, Y. M. C. A. See YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: World War activities: 1917-1919: Organization of war work council.

WAR WORK COUNCIL, Y. W. C. A. See YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION: 1917.

WARAD-SIN (fl. 2350 B. C.), king of Elam. See BABYLONIA: First Babylonian empire.

WARAUS, South American Indian tribe. See CARIBS.

WARBECK, Perkin (c. 1474-1499), pretender to the throne of England. Claimed to be the duke of York, son of Edward IV. See ENGLAND: 1485-1509.

WARBURG, Battle of. See GERMANY: 1760.

WARD, Artemas (1727-1800), American soldier and jurist. Conducted the siege of Boston, 1775; became chief justice of the court of common pleas at Worcester in 1776; president of the Massachusetts Executive Council, 1777. See U. S. A.: 1774-1775; 1775 (April-May); (May-August).

WARD, Artemus. See BROWNE, CHARLES FARRAR.

WARD, Sir Joseph George (1857-), New Zealand statesman. Premier, 1906-1909; represented New Zealand at the colonial conferences in London, 1907, and 1909. See NEW ZEALAND: 1906-1909; BRITISH EMPIRE: Colonial and imperial conferences: 1907; WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1909: British Imperial Defense Conference.

WARD, Mary Augusta (Mrs. Humphry Ward) (1851-1920), English novelist. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1880-1920.

WARE VS. HYLTON (1796). See SUPREME COURT: 1789-1835.

WARENNE, John de, Earl of Surrey and Sussex (c. 1231-1304), English soldier. Fought under Prince Edward at the battle of Lewes, 1264; served as the king's lieutenant in Scotland, 1296-1297. See SCOTLAND: 1290-1304.

WARFARE, Laws of. See BLOCKADE; CAPITULATIONS; CONTRABAND; EMBARGO; FREEDOM OF THE SEAS: 1650-1815; 1914-1918; GENEVA CONVENTIONS; HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1899: Convention with respect to the laws and customs of war on land; INTERNATIONAL LAW; MILITARY LAW; NEUTRALITY.

WARFARE, Organization of. See MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

WARFARE, Trench. See TRENCH WARFARE.

WARFUSÉE-ABANCOURT, town of France, east of Amiens. It was taken by the Germans in 1918. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: c, 27.

WARINGS. See VARANGIANS.

WARMBAD, mission station of Namaqualand, Southwest Africa, 130 miles northeast of the mouth of the Orange river. It was taken by the British in 1915. See WORLD WAR: 1915: VIII. Africa: a, 1.

WARNER, Anna Bartlett (1820-1915), American novelist. Presented Constitution island to the United States. See CONSTITUTION ISLAND.

WARREN, Francis Emroy (1844-), American legislator. Territorial governor of Wyoming, 1885-1886, 1889-1890; governor of Wyoming, 1890; United States senator, 1890-1913. See WYOMING: 1868-1889; U. S. A.: 1898 (April-May).

WARREN, Gouverneur Kemble (1830-1882), American general. Took part in the Peninsular campaign of the Civil War; participated in the siege of Petersburg, 1864. See U. S. A.: 1864 (August: Virginia); 1865 (March-April: Virginia).

WARREN, Joseph (1741-1775), American patriot. See U. S. A.: 1772-1773; 1775 (May); (June).

WARRIOR, British armored cruiser. It was disabled in the battle of Jutland, May 31, 1916. See WORLD WAR: 1916: IX. Naval operations: a, 1; a, 9.

WARS: The following is a list of some of the principal wars in history:

Achæan: 148-146 B. C. See ROME: Republic: B. C. 197-146.

Afghan: 1838-1842. See AFGHANISTAN: 1838-1842.

1878-1880. See AFGHANISTAN: 1869-1881.

Alexandrine: 48-47 B. C. See ALEXANDRIA: B. C. 48-47.

Algerian-French: 1830. See BARBARY STATES: 1830; FRANCE: 1815-1830.

1835-1846. See BARBARY STATES: 1830-1846.

American Civil: 1861-1865. See U. S. A.: 1860 (November-December), to 1865 (May).

American Revolutionary: 1775-1783. See U. S. A.: 1765, to 1783 (September).

American War of 1812: 1812-1815. See U. S. A.: 1804-1809; 1808; 1810-1812, to 1815 (January).

Amorian: 838. See AMORIAN WAR.

Anglo-French. See ANGLO-FRENCH WARS.

Ashanti: 1873-1874. See ENGLAND: 1873-1880.

Austrian Succession: 1740-1748. See AUSTRIA: 1740, to 1744-1745; ITALY: 1741-1743, to 1746-1747; NETHERLANDS: 1745; 1746-1747; also AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: Congresses: 2.

Austro-Prussian. See below: Seven Weeks' War.

Austro-Swiss: 1385-1389. See SWITZERLAND: 1386-1388.

Austro-Turkish: 1593-1596. See HUNGARY: 1567-1604.

1596-1606. See HUNGARY: 1595-1606.

1663. See HUNGARY: 1660-1664.

1683. See HUNGARY: 1668-1683.

1684-1699. See HUNGARY: 1683-1699.

1714-1718. See HUNGARY: 1699-1718; TURKEY: 1714-1718.

1737. See RUSSIA: 1734-1740.

1787-1792. See TURKEY: 1776-1792.

Balkan: 1912-1913. See BALKAN STATES: 1912, to 1913-1914.

Barbarian: 409-553. See BARBARIAN INVASIONS; HUNS: 441-446; 452; ROME: Empire: 406-500; 408-410; 455.

Barbary: 1801-1805. See BARBARY STATES: 1785-1801; 1803-1805.

1815. See BARBARY STATES: 1815.
 1816. See BARBARY STATES: 1816.
 1830. See BARBARY STATES: 1830; 1830-1846.
 Barons': 1216. See ENGLAND: 1216-1272.
 Bear Flag: 1846. See BEAR FLAG WAR.
 Bishops': 1638-1640. See SCOTLAND: 1638-1640;
 ENGLAND: 1640; Short Parliament.
 Black Hawk: 1831-1832. See ILLINOIS: 1832.
 Boer: 1899-1902. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF:
 1899 (October-November), to 1901 (April).
 Bolivian: 1809-1825. See BOLIVIA: 1809-1825.
 Bulgaro-Serbian: 1885. See BULGARIA: 1885-
 1886.
 Burgundian: 1467-1468. See BURGUNDY: 1467-
 1468.
 Burmese: 1824-1826; 1852; 1885. See BURMA:
 1824-1886.
 Caledonian and Roman: 208-211. See BRITAIN:
 208-211.
 Chile and Peru: 1879-1884. See CHILE: 1833-
 1884.
 Chinese. See below: Opium War.
 Chinese-French: 1884. See FRANCE: 1875-1889.
 Chinese-Japanese: 1894-1895. See CHINA:
 1894-1895.
 Chioggia: 1379-1381. See VENICE: 1379-1381.
 Civil Wars: American. See above: American
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 English. See below: English Civil.
 French. See below: French Civil.
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 Cleomonic: 227-221 B. C. See GREECE: B. C.
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 Cods and Hooks: 14th century. See NETHER-
 LANDS: 1345-1354.
 Corinthian: 395-387 B. C. See GREECE: B. C.
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 Crimean: 1854-1856. See RUSSIA: 1853-1854, to
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 Crusades: 1096-1291. See CRUSADES.
 Denmark and England: 1801-1802. See
 FRANCE: 1801-1802.
 Denmark and Sweden: 1523-1604. See SWE-
 DEN: 1523-1604.
 1611-1629. See SWEDEN: 1611-1629.
 1643-1645. See GERMANY: 1640-1645.
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 SWEDEN: 1644-1697.
 1807-1810. See SWEDEN: 1807-1810; FRANCE:
 1807-1808 (August-November).
 England and France. See ANGLO-FRENCH WARS.
 England and Scotland: 1296-1307. See SCOT-
 LAND: 1200-1305; 1305-1307.
 1312-1314. See SCOTLAND: 1306-1314.
 1513. See SCOTLAND: 1513.
 1541-1546. See SCOTLAND: 1542; 1544-1548.
 England and the Netherlands. See below:
 Netherlands and England.
 English Civil: 1642-1648. See ENGLAND: 1642
 (January-August), to 1648 (September-November).
 European. See WORLD WAR.
 Federation, War of the: 1859-1864. See VENE-
 ZUELA: 1820-1886.
 France and England. See ANGLO-FRENCH WARS.
 France and the Coalitions: 1792-1815. See
 COALITION.
 France and the Grand Alliance: 1672-1714.
 See FRANCE: 1680-1690, to 1695-1696; AUSTRIA:
 1672-1714; also below: Spanish Succession
 France and the Netherlands: 1672-1678. See
 AUSTRIA: 1672-1714; NETHERLANDS: 1672-1674;
 1674-1678.

1793-1795. See FRANCE: 1792 (September-
 December); 1792-1793 (December-Febru-
 ary); 1793 (February-April); (March-
 September); (July-December); 1794
 (March-July); 1794-1795 (October-May).
 Franco-Austrian: 1859. See ITALY: 1856-1859;
 1859-1861; AUSTRIA: 1856-1859.
 Franco-Prussian: 1870-1871. See FRANCE: 1870
 (July-August), to 1871 (January-May).
 French-Algerian. See above: Algerian-French.
 French and Indian: 1754-1763. See FRENCH
 AND INDIAN WAR.
 French-Chinese. See above: Chinese-French.
 French Civil: 1562-1598. See FRANCE: 1560-
 1563, to 1593-1598.
 French Revolution: 1789-1799. See FRANCE:
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 1789 (July): Mob in arms; 1791-1792, to 1799
 (November-December); EUROPE: Modern: French
 Revolution.
 Fronde: 1648-1653. See FRANCE: 1647-1648, to
 1651-1653.
 Gallic: 58-51 B. C. See GAUL: B. C. 58-51.
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 Granada: 1483-1492. See SPAIN: 1476-1492.
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 Greco-Persian: 334-331 B. C. See MACEDONIA:
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 public: B. C. 215-196; B. C. 197-146; GREECE: B. C.
 214-146.
 Greco-Turkish: 1897. See TURKEY: 1897.
 Greek Independence: 1821-1828. See GREECE:
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 Gurkha: 1814-1815. See INDIA: 1805-1816.
 Holy War: 1684-1699. See TURKEY: 1684-1696.
 Huguenot: 1562-1598. See FRANCE: 1560-1563,
 to 1593-1598.
 Hundred Years': 1337-1453. See FRANCE: 1337-
 1360; 1360-1380; 1415; 1429-1431; 1431-1453;
 EUROPE: Modern: Rise of the nation-state, etc.
 Hungarian: 1848-1849. See HUNGARY: 1847-
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 Italian: 1859. See ITALY: 1856-1859.
 Jacobite: 1715. See SCOTLAND: 1715.
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 Jenkins' Ear: 1739. See ENGLAND: 1739-1741.
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 118-104; ROME: Republic: B. C. 118-99.
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 1744; 1745; 1745-1748.
 King Philip's: 1675-1676. See NEW ENGLAND:
 1674-1675; 1675 (July-September); (October-De-
 cember); 1676-1678.
 King William's: 1689-1697. See KING WIL-
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 Lamian: 323-322 B. C. See GREECE: B. C. 323-
 322.
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 Liberation, War of: 1813-1814. See GERMANY:
 1812-1813, to 1813 (October-December).
 Lovers, War of the: 1580. See FRANCE: 1578-
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 Maccabæan: 168-135 B. C. See JEWS: B. C.
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 Macedonian: 214-146 B. C. See GREECE: B. C.
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 1798-1805; 1805-1816; 1816-1819.

- Marius and Sulla: 88-82 B. C. See **ROME: Republic: B. C. 88-78.**
- Messenian: 745-668 B. C. See **MESSENIAN WARS.**
- Mexican: 1810-1821. See **MEXICO: 1810-1819; 1820-1826.**
- 1846-1848. See **MEXICO: 1845; 1846-1847; 1847 (March-September).**
- Mithradatic: 88-66 B. C. See **MITHRADATIC WARS.**
- Moorish. See above: **Granada.**
- Mysore: 1767-1805. See **INDIA: 1767-1769; 1780-1783; 1785-1793; 1798-1805.**
- Napoleonic: 1800-1815. See **FRANCE: 1800-1815 (June-August); GERMANY: 1806 (October), to 1807 (February-June); 1809 (January-June); (July-September); 1809-1810 (April-February); 1812-1813; 1813 (April-May), to 1813 (October-December); RUSSIA: 1812 (June-September), to 1812 (October-December); AUSTRIA: 1809-1814.**
- Netherlands and England: 1652-1654. See **ENGLAND: 1652-1654.**
- 1665-1666. See **NETHERLANDS: 1665-1666.**
- Netherlands and France. See above: **France and the Netherlands.**
- Netherlands and Spain: 1566-1609. See **NETHERLANDS: 1566, to 1594-1609.**
- 1621-1648. See **NETHERLANDS: 1603-1619; 1625-1647.**
- Numantian: 143-134 B. C. See **NUMANTIAN WAR.**
- Octavian and Antony: 32-31 B. C. See **AUGUSTUS; ROME: Empire: B. C. 31-A. D. 14.**
- Olynthian: 351-348 B. C. See **GREECE: B. C. 351-348.**
- Opium: 1840-1842. See **CHINA: 1839-1842; OPIUM PROBLEM: 1840.**
- Parthia and Rome: 53 B. C. See **ROME: Republic: B. C. 57-52.**
- 106-117. See **ROME: Empire: 96-138.**
- Peasants': 287. See **BAGAUDS.**
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- 1492-1514. See **GERMANY: 1492-1514.**
- 1524-1525. See **GERMANY: 1524-1525.**
- 1652-1653. See **SWITZERLAND: 1652-1789.**
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- Peloponnesian: 431-404 B. C. See **GREECE: B. C. 435-432, to B. C. 405; ATHENS: B. C. 431, and after.**
- Peninsular: 1808-1814. See **SPAIN: 1807-1808, to 1812-1814.**
- Pequot: 1637. See **NEW ENGLAND: 1637; RHODE ISLAND: 1637.**
- Persia and Macedonia: 334-330 B. C. See **MACEDONIA: B. C. 334-330.**
- Persia and Rome: 226-627. See **PERSIA: 226-627.**
- Persia and Turkey. See below: **Turko-Persian.**
- Persian: 492-490 B. C. See **GREECE: B. C. 492-491; B. C. 490.**
- 481-479 B. C. See **GREECE: B. C. 481-479, to B. C. 479; PERSIAN WARS: Mycale; PERSIA: B. C. 480-405.**
- 399-387 B. C. See **GREECE: B. C. 399-387.**
- Phocian. See below: **Sacred Wars.**
- Poland and Russia. See below: **Russo-Polish.**
- Poland and Sweden: 1656-1658. See **SWEDEN: 1644-1697.**
- 1700-1721. See **SWEDEN: 1697-1700, to 1719-1721.**
- Poland and Turkey: 1671-1676. See **POLAND: 1668-1696.**
- 1684-1696. See **TURKEY: 1684-1696.**
- Polish Succession: 1733-1735. See **POLAND: 1732-1733.**
- Pontiac's: 1763-1764. See **PONTIAC'S WAR.**
- Punic: 264-146 B. C. See **PUNIC WARS.**
- Quadruple Alliance: 1718. See **FRANCE: 1717-1719; ITALY: 1715-1735; SPAIN: 1713-1725.**
- Queen Anne's: 1702-1714. See **QUEEN ANNE'S WAR.**
- Queen's Rights, War of the: 1667. See **BELGIUM: 1667.**
- Religious. See above: **Crusades; Huguenot.**
- Rohilla: 1772-1774. See **INDIA: 1773-1785.**
- Rome and Macedonia: 215-205 B. C. See **ROME: Republic: B. C. 215-196.**
- 200-196 B. C. See **ROME: Republic: B. C. 215-196.**
- 171-168 B. C. See **ROME: Republic: B. C. 171-133.**
- Roman Civil: 50-31 B. C. See **ROME: Republic: B. C. 52-50, to B. C. 31.**
- Roman Social: B. C. 90-88. See **ROME: Republic: B. C. 90-88.**
- Roses, Wars of the: 1455-1485. See **ENGLAND: 1455-1471.**
- Russo-Polish: 1792. See **POLAND: 1791-1792.**
- 1919-1920. See **POLAND: 1919; 1919-1920: War with Russia.**
- Russo-Swedish: 1523-1604. See **SWEDEN: 1523-1604.**
- 1613-1617. See **SWEDEN: 1611-1629.**
- 1700-1709. See **SWEDEN: 1697-1700; 1701-1707; 1707-1718; UKRAINE: 1700-1721.**
- 1740-1741. See **RUSSIA: 1740-1762.**
- Russo-Japanese: 1904-1905. See **JAPAN: 1902-1905.**
- Russo-Turkish: 1734-1740. See **RUSSIA: 1734-1740.**
- 1768-1774. See **TURKEY: 1768-1774.**
- 1787-1792. See **RUSSIA: 1768-1796; TURKEY: 1776-1792.**
- 1806-1812. See **TURKEY: 1789-1812.**
- 1828-1829. See **TURKEY: 1826-1829.**
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- Sabine. See **SABINE WARS.**
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- 448-447 B. C. See **SACRED WAR, THE SECOND.**
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- Sarmatian and Marcomannian: 167-180. See **SARMATIAN AND MARCOMANNIAN WARS.**
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- Scotch-English. See above: **England and Scotland.**
- Seminole: 1816-1818; 1835-1843. See **FLORIDA: 1812-1819; 1835-1843.**
- Serbo-Bulgarian: 1885. See **BULGARIA: 1885-1886.**
- Seven Weeks': 1866. See **AUSTRIA: 1862-1866; GERMANY: 1866.**
- Seven Years': 1756-1763. See **SEVEN YEARS' WAR.**
- Sikh: 1845-1846; 1848-1849. See **INDIA: 1836-1845; 1845-1849.**
- Silesian: 1740-1742; 1744-1745; 1756-1763. See **SILESIA WARS.**
- Sioux: 1862. See **INDIANS, AMERICAN: 1860-1865; U. S. A.: 1862-1864; WYOMING: 1851-1865.**
- 1866-1876. See **MONTANA: 1876; U. S. A.:**

1866-1876; WYOMING: 1866 (June-December); 1868-1876.

Slave: 133 B. C. See SLAVE WARS IN SICILY AND ITALY.

Social: Achæan (210-217 B. C.). See GREECE: B. C. 280-146.

Athenian (357-354 B. C.). See ATHENS: B. C. 378-357.

Roman (90-88 B. C.). See ROME: Republic: B. C. 90-88.

Spain and Morocco: 1894. See SPAIN: 1885-1806.

Spanish-American: 1898. See U. S. A.: 1898 (February-March), to 1898 (July-December).

Spanish Civil: 1833-1839. See SPAIN: 1833-1846, 1872-1876. See SPAIN: 1873-1874; 1874-1875.

Spain and the Netherlands. See NETHERLANDS AND SPAIN.

Spanish Succession: 1701-1714. See ITALY: 1701-1713; GERMANY: 1702, and after; NETHERLANDS: 1702-1704, and after; SPAIN: 1702, and after; also NEW ENGLAND: 1702-1710.

Sweden and Denmark. See above: Denmark and Sweden.

Sweden and Poland. See above: Poland and Sweden.

Swedish-Russian. See above: Russo-Swedish.

Swiss Peasants': 1653. See SWITZERLAND: 1652-1780.

Switzerland and Austria. See above: Austro-Swiss.

Taiping Rebellion: 1850-1864. See CHINA: 1850-1864; 1856-1860.

Thirty Years': 1618-1648. See GERMANY: 1608-1618, to 1648; AUSTRIA: 1618-1648; BOHEMIA: 1611-1618; 1621-1648.

Three Henrys, War of the: 1587-1589. See FRANCE: 1584-1589.

Trojan. See GREECE: Indo-European migrations.

Turkey and Poland. See above: Poland and Turkey.

Turkish-Austrian. See above: Austro-Turkish.

Turko-Italian: 1911-1912. See ITALY: 1911-1913; TRIPOLI: 1911-1913.

Turko-Persian: 1623-1640. See TURKEY: 1623-1640.

Valtelline: 1624-1626. See FRANCE: 1624-1626.

Vendée, War of the: 1793-1794. See FRANCE: 1793 (March-April); (June); (July-December); 1793-1794 (October-April).

World War: 1914-1918. See WORLD WAR.

Zulu: 1878-1879. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1877-1879.

See also REVOLUTIONS.

WARS OF THE ROSES. See ENGLAND: 1455-1471.

WARSAW, capital of Poland and chief town of the government of Warsaw, on the left bank of the Vistula. (See RUSSIA: Map: Growth of Russia in Europe, 1300-1796.) In 1921 the population of the city numbered 931,176. Until 1526, Warsaw was the residence of the dukes of Mazovia. It was then annexed to Poland, and, when Poland and Lithuania were united, it was chosen as the residence of the kings of Poland. See POLAND: 1333-1572.

1656.—Three days' battle with the Swedes and Brandenburgers.—Defeat of the Poles. See BRANDENBURG: 1640-1688; SWEDEN: 1644-1697; MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 27.

1764.—Captured by Russians. See POLAND: 1763-1790.

1788.—Convention of Diets. See POLAND: 1791-1792.

1792-1794.—Occupied by the Russians.—Their

forces expelled.—Capture of the city by Suvarov.—Its acquisition by Prussia. See POLAND: 1791-1792; 1793-1796.

1806.—Occupied by Napoleon's troops. See GERMANY: 1806-1807.

1807.—Created a grand duchy, and ceded to the king of Saxony. See GERMANY: 1807 (June-July).

1812.—Extent of the dominions of the duchy of Warsaw in Europe. See EUROPE: Modern: Map of central Europe in 1812.

1815.—Grand duchy given to Russia. See VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.

1830-1831.—Revolt.—Attack and capture by Russians. See POLAND: 1830-1832.

1862-1863.—Demonstrations in favor of Polish independence.—Insurrection. See POLAND: 1863-1869.

1905.—Disturbances.—General strike.—Massacre. See RUSSIA: 1905 (January); (April-November); BLOODY SUNDAY.

1914.—Scene of battle. See WORLD WAR: 1914: II. Eastern front: d, 2; d, 3; POLAND: 1914-1917.

1915 (June-July).—Abandoned by Russians.—Captured by Germans. See WORLD WAR: 1915: III. Eastern front: g, 7; g, 9; i, 3; i, 4.

1920-1922.—Scene of anti-Semitic demonstrations. See JEWS: Poland: 1920-1922.

WARSAW SCHOOL OF HORTICULTURE. See EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL: Poland.

WARSAW UNIVERSITY. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1348-1922.

WARSHIPS: Classification and functions.—“The three primary elements of naval force are battleships, cruisers large and small, and torpedo craft of all kinds including submarines, together with their attendant depot ships and other needful auxiliaries. These three elements are for war purposes organized in definite relations one with another, battleships being the central core and nucleus of the whole organization, but seldom, except in actual conflict, in such immediate contact with the enemy as the other two. A battleship is the chief component unit of a main fleet. It has been variously designated from time to time as a ‘capital ship,’ a ‘ship fit to lie in a line,’ a ‘ship of the line,’ a ‘line-of-battle ship,’ and, all to briefly a ‘battleship’—for the word ‘line’ is much more essential to its proper definition than the word ‘battle.’ . . . The so-called battle cruiser is, as its designation implies, something of a hybrid, being on the one hand ‘fit to lie in a line,’ and on the other exceedingly well qualified to discharge many of the functions of a cruiser proper. It has the speed of a very fast cruiser combined with the armament and armour, both slightly, but not perhaps unduly, reduced of a battleship. We shall perhaps best conceive its functions in the line of battle by recalling the tactical disposition projected—but for lack of numbers not carried out—by Nelson at Trafalgar, when he declared his intention of ‘placing the fleet in two lines of 16 ships each, with an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships, which will always make a line of 24 sail on whichever line the Commander-in-Chief may direct.’ . . . On the other hand, its function as a cruiser does not seem to differ essentially from that of other cruisers properly so-called, except in the measure of its greater force. This function must now be briefly considered. The cruiser proper is either an armoured cruiser, a protected cruiser—protected, that is, by an internal armoured deck covering its vitals, but not by vertical armour on its side—or a light cruiser of such moderate displacement that it can carry very little armour, if

any, either vertical or internal. It is employed either singly or in organized squadrons to patrol the seas far and wide, either for the purpose of gathering and transmitting to headquarters information of the enemy's movements and whereabouts, or for the still more important purpose of keeping open the ocean highways and clearing them of such of the enemy's cruisers as may be endeavouring to molest, attack, and interrupt their adversary's commerce afloat, and thereby of affording safe conduct to the latter. . . . A third function of the larger cruiser, armoured and protected, is to afford adequate protection and support to the light cruisers and torpedo craft employed in maintaining as close a watch as is practicable on the ports which shelter the armed forces of the enemy, with intent to make sure that none of his small craft can come in or go out without being challenged and, if it may be, impeached, and none of its larger craft can come out without being observed, shadowed, attacked with torpedoes if opportunity offers, and in any case instantly reported to the supporting cruisers astern of the advanced guard off the ports and from them to the headquarters of the battle-fleet itself. This is at once the most vital and the most hazardous function which light cruisers and flotillas of torpedo craft have to perform. . . . A fourth function, on occasion, is to take part in the conflict of battle-fleets themselves, for it is one of the characteristics of modern naval warfare that the battleship enjoys no immunity from the attack of torpedo craft. But that is a function which can only come into operation when the enemy's battleships are at sea."—*The Times* (London) *book of the navy*, pp. 5-9.

Earliest shipbuilders.—Phœnician and Greek.—"Many attempts at explaining the construction of antique ships have been made, but the mutual ignorance of seafaring men and philologists with regard to the technical terms of their respective branches of knowledge has, in many cases, led to bewildering confusion and wild conjectures. Moreover, antique representation of ships—partly from the total want of perspective, partly from the omission of the most important details—are of comparatively little assistance to us."—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, p. 253.—The Phœnicians were the earliest ship builders of whom we have any knowledge, but the only records existing of their activities in that line have come down to us through Assyrian channels, and these records go back no further than about 700 B. C. The Greeks were once supposed to have learned more from the Phœnicians in navigation and in commercial enterprise than now seems to be the fact. Undoubtedly there was a time, after the fall of the Cretan sea power and of the Mycænæan domination, during which the Phœnicians were active in Greek waters and influenced the new development of Greek life in some degree. The Phœnicians seemingly cared for nothing but commercial opportunities, and showed no kind of political ambition throughout their career. Yet they also had their war galleys, and it is not improbable that they or the Egyptians invented the style of craft later developed by the Greeks and Romans. "Following the researches of Boeckh (in his celebrated work on the Attic navy) with regard to the construction and rigging of Greek ships, Graser has expounded an entirely new theory of the dimensions and rowing apparatus of Greek ships. His intimate knowledge of modern ships has been of considerable assistance to him. . . . We pass over the earliest attempts at navigation in

hollow trees or on rafts. The invention of the art of shipbuilding, like that of most other arts, must be placed in prehistoric times; gods and heroes are mentioned as its originators. . . . Homer's description of the interior arrangements of ships prove that at the time of the Trojan war the art of shipbuilding was considerably advanced. Rowers (20 to 52 in number), sitting on benches along the sides of the ship, beat the waves simultaneously with their long oars made of pinewood. As in our sloops (*Schaluppen*), the oars of the Homeric vessel were made fast between pegs by means of leather straps so as to prevent their slipping. . . . The war vessels sent against Iliion [Troy] carried fifty to a hundred and twenty soldiers, who undoubtedly, had also to act as rowers. Of the fifty men forming the crew of the smallest vessels, forty plied the twenty oars by turns, the others taking care of the rigging or acting as officers. The small draught of the vessels is proved by the fact of their being, without much difficulty, pulled ashore, where wooden or stone props served to keep them dry and protect them from the waves. The development of shipbuilding was undoubtedly due to the Greeks. The numerous natural harbours of the Greek continent, combined with the growing demands of intercommunication with the islands, and the colonies of Asia Minor and southern Italy, favoured the rapid growth of navigation. The continual wars waged among the Greek tribes, and by them collectively against barbarians, necessitated the keeping up of large navies. The Homeric vessel, most likely only a transport, and unfit for battle, was soon supplanted by war-vessels of larger dimensions. Besides flat-bottomed vessels . . . we also hear of ships of greater draught in which the oarsmen sat in two rows, one over the other. During the Persian and Peloponnesian wars the fleets consisted of *τρίηρεις* exclusively. Vessels with more than three ranks of rowers . . . were first introduced by Dionysios I., tyrant of Syrakuse, after a Carthaginian pattern. . . . Even six rows were not always deemed sufficient. Ten and (with a modification of the system) more rows were placed one over the other, the result being a surprising velocity and hardness of the vessels thus constructed. In the battle of Actium we hear of ships with ten rows; Demetrios Poliorketes had even vessels of fifteen and sixteen rows, the seaworthiness of which is warranted by antique authors. The construction of the war vessel, as introduced shortly before the Persian wars, must now command our attention. The keel consisted of one horizontal beam, parallel to the longitudinal axis of the vessel; in older ships it rose from the centre to the ends in a wide curve. The large ships of a later period had keels composed of several straight beams joined together, into the ends of which stem and stern posts were inserted almost in a right angle, being only slightly bent outwards. Under the keel another beam was placed parallel to it, so as to add to its power of resistance; corresponding to this, a third beam lay on the top of the keel; into this, the ribs of the ship were let. The upper ends of each pair of corresponding ribs forming together one curvature were joined together by means of a straight cross-beam, destined to carry the upper deck. The bulwark, enclosing the two long sides of the latter, generally consisted of trellis-work. In larger vessels a second layer of boards, underneath the upper deck, was laid across the ribs of the vessel, destined to carry the second or lower deck. The two decks communicated with each other and the hull by means of steps, hatchways being cut in the

boards for the purpose. The hull contained the ballast and the pump. Both in the prow and poop of the vessel small half-decks, corresponding to our forecastle and quarter-deck, were placed considerably above the upper deck. They rested on the prolongation of the ribs nearest to stem and stern. The poop and prow were essentially identical in construction, differing in this from all modern vessels excepting our latest ironclads [1875]. The planks of the vessel were strengthened externally by a wooden ledge just above the waterline, corresponding to which a number of boards were placed along the ribs inside, so as to give firmness to the whole fabric. As a further means of increasing their compactness, war-vessels were provided with a band consisting of four stout ropes laid horizontally round the hull below the water line; in case of a dangerous voyage, the number of these ropes might be increased. . . . A little lower than the upper deck, just above the upper holes for the oars, a narrow gangway runs along both sides of the vessel; in woodclad vessels this *parodos* [gangway] is protected by strong massive boards. Both stem-post ended in a volute. The tent-like house of the helmsman stood on the poop just underneath the volute. From this point he directed the two rudders to right and left of the stern, which are peculiar to all antique ships, by means of a rope running across the vessel. The rudders were always kept parallel. To the volute of the poop a leaf or feather ornament has been added. The prow frequently shows an ornament resembling the neck of a swan which, perhaps, at the same time, served for fastening ropes. Between these two, the flagstaff, with the flags attached to it, was erected. . . . The prow, as we said before, exactly resembled the poop. Here, also, a strong wooden band encircled the vessel on a level with the *parodos*. The point where the outer ribs crossed each other was marked by a ram's head made of bronze, and serving either as an ornament or as a protection to the upper part of the vessel. Underneath this, on a level with the waterline, was the beak, consisting of several rafters let into the body of the vessel and ending in a point, which was made more formidable by the addition of a massive piece of iron divided into three blunt teeth of unequal length. Two beams, supported by prows, protruded on both sides of the rostrum [beak]; on these the anchors were hung up. They also served to protect the vessel from the attacks of the enemy's beak. We finally mention an opening on each side of the prow, through which the cables were drawn; these holes were bound with iron, and somewhat resembled eyes, whence their name *ophthalmoi*. The resemblance of a vessel thus constructed to a fish was not unnoticed by the ancients. Something similar we meet with in the imitation of dragons in the vessels of the Norsemen, and in the construction of Chinese junks. . . . The mainmast stood in the centre of the vessel. It was square-rigged, and carried two sails, one above the other, answering to our course and topsail. Above these was another square sail corresponding to our top-gallant sail, and above that two triangular sails. Besides the main-mast there were two smaller masts, with two fore-and aft lateen sails each, one over the other, which were important in tacking. Strong ropes supported the main-mast . . . and the two smaller masts; thinner ropes served for lifting and bracing the yards, setting the sails, etc. Besides the ropes of the rigging . . . a war vessel required various contrivances of a similar nature to protect her both against high seas and the mis-

siles of the enemy. To this class belonged strips of tarpaulin hung round the hull to cover the apertures for the oars, when these had to be pulled in owing to the roughness of the sea; as also an awning suspended over the upper deck as a protection both from the sun and missiles; a woven stuff was also pulled over the trellis of the bulwark to ward off darts and arrows. . . . The interior arrangement of the antique ship, particularly with regard to the position and manipulation of the oars, is subject to many doubts. . . . The building and equipping of vessels was done in military harbours, of which that of Athens is in the best state of preservation."—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, pp. 253-259, 262.


Roman.—"The Roman vessel resembles the Greek in most points. . . . As long as Roman conquests were limited to Italy, their navy consisted only of long boats (*caudices, naves caudicariæ*) for river navigation, and of small sea-vessels as a means of intercommunication between the maritime provinces, not to mention the defence of the harbours. The Carthaginian wars necessitated the building of a powerful fleet. In a space of two months 130 penteres and trieres were constructed, after the pattern of a stranded Carthaginian pentere. The timbers were roughly cut, and the improvised sailors had to be trained on rowing-frames erected on shore; but the foundation was thus laid of a fleet of triremes, quadriremes, and quinqueremes, commonly called *naves longæ*. The Romans, differing in this from the Greeks, transferred the mode of close fighting to their sea-battles. Two or four towers (*navis turrita*) and catapults transformed the deck into a castle, from which the marines began the fight with missiles till the vessels approached within boarding distance. The marines, therefore, were much more numerous on board Roman than Greek vessels. The quinquereme contained 120. After the battle of Actium Roman ship building underwent a thorough change. That battle had been won against the Greek-Egyptian fleet of Antony, built according to Greek rules, chiefly by means of the ships of the Liburnian pirates, which had only two banks of oars and a very light rigging. In consequence, the Roman fleet was reorganised according to the same principle (*navis Liburna*). Besides men-of-war, larger vessels of burden were required; these *naves onerariæ* . . . were about three or four times as long as they were broad. Many statements in ancient authors prove the quickness of voyage in those days. Balbilus went from Messina to Alexandria in six days (the French mail-steamers require 6½ days for the same distance)."—*Ibid.*, pp. 263-264.

8th-9th centuries.—Character of Viking ships. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 8th-9th centuries.

9th century.—Open rowboat of Alfred the Great's time.—Saxon and Danish war vessels.—"A hundred years ago the old line-of-battleship was of wood, had many decks and was pierced for more than one hundred guns. Such was the big fighting machine. Today [1915] the superdreadnought of steel has ten or twelve guns. But these are of from thirteen to fifteen inch calibre. A single shot from one of them weighs almost as much as the total of metal discharged from all the guns on the ship of one hundred years ago. Such difference and more, is there between the first ships of the line that are separated by a century. One shell from a superdreadnought would set one of the old line-of-battleships ablaze from stem to stern. The superdreadnought has developed in the course of a thousand years from the open row-

boat that carried armed men. This may be said to have been the type of war boat Alfred the Great found in use and from which he began to develop a fleet of war vessels. Alfred himself took command of his fleet in sea battle and was quick to found, organise and systematically plan the extension of his country's 'sea power,' though he had never read Mahan and even was ignorant of the term of which that author practically was the inventor. Evidently Alfred had grasped the fundamental fact that the rampart of defence to an island race lay on the sea that lapped their shores, and that their only adequate protection lay in an efficient navy. Alfred succeeded his brother Ethelred in 871, but it was not until he had by his victories over the Danes secured at any rate temporary peace for the territory over which he held sway, that he devoted his attention to providing permanent security from foreign attack in the shape of a fleet. One of the chief marks of Alfred's genius lies in the fact that he was his

beam of ten and a half feet, and was apparently intended to be propelled by twenty-eight oarsmen. Alfred's vessels were akin in type, but vastly superior in design and sea-worthiness to the latter, as is evident from the description of contemporaries: 'Full nigh twice as long as the others; some had sixty oars, some had more; they were both swifter and steadier and also higher than the others; shapen neither like the Frisian nor the Danish, but so as it seemed to him that they would be most efficient.' Campbell seems to think that they were of a type to the 'galleys' of the Mediterranean; and as Alfred had twice visited Rome, though only as quite a child, it may be that dim recollections of the craft that he had seen in the port of the Tiber aided him when he came to work out the designs of what were known as the 'king's ships'—built primarily for war, though hired out for trading purposes in time of peace—and which may fairly claim to be the earliest vessels in a 'Royal Navy.' In the very year that



FLEET OF WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR

own naval architect. As Campbell says of him, 'he had made himself master of the principles of shipbuilding, and knew how to vary the form in constructing vessels, so as to fit them for different uses and services; which, if the ignorance of those times were half so gross as modern writers are willing to represent, was certainly a very great and wonderful discovery. . . . His naval architects might be, and in all probability were, men of as great skill and extensive capacities as any of their time; but then their knowledge was of a very different nature from that of the king: they might be great artists in their way, but were still mechanics.' The type of craft that conveyed the Saxon raiders oversea were simply undecked row-boats, somewhat high at prow and stern, and fitted with a pole mast carrying a single square sail. They could accommodate some fifty or sixty men, and were specially built for beaching. The ships of the Danes were of the same type, but developed into somewhat more sea-going and habitable vessels, and the larger ones were fitted with light removable half-decks. A typical craft of this kind, found in Jutland, is seventy-five feet long, with a


the earliest 'king's ships' were launched, they swept the South Saxon coast clear of pirates, destroying no less than twenty of these hornet craft, and putting their crews to the sword; and in 885 his fleet inflicted a signal defeat on the Danish invaders off the Essex coast. Alfred, however, was not invariably successful in the long-protracted naval warfare; but experience was being gained, the importance of sea power becoming more and more recognized, and a love of maritime enterprise was being engendered in the characteristics of the race. So much, indeed, was the latter the case, that Alfred sent out several expeditions for the purpose of discovery and commerce."—*Evolution of the warship* (Lotus Magazine, Jan., 1915, pp. 209-210). —See also NORMANS: Influence of Vikings, etc.

11th-15th centuries.—Naval and commercial supremacy of the Byzantine empire and Venice. See COMMERCE: Medieval: 11th-16th centuries.

15th-16th centuries.—First royal navy.—"Great ship" of the sixteenth century.—First armored ship.—"In its gradual evolution from the rowboat to the ship with sails and through increase in size and sail power the warship attained the dimensions

of the *Great Harry*, built by Henry VII in 1488, at the cost of £14,000. This may be regarded as the first ship of a royal navy, for, unlike previous 'king's ships,' which in no way differed from ordinary merchantmen of their period, she was undoubtedly built primarily for war, though she probably engaged in commerce during peace time. This ship is stated by Derrick to have been burnt by accident at Woolwich in 1553; but according to Yonge she was, on the accession of Henry VIII, rechristened *Regent*, and perished in a memorable battle. . . . To replace the *Regent*, Henry VIII built his great ship the *Henry Grâce de Dieu*. A great novelty in this ship was that she had port-holes, thus giving extra battery decks. This was a design introduced into the French ships fifteen

versally carried. The heavy pieces comprised cannon, demi-cannon, and cannon-petro, mounted on the lower deck, and culverins and demi-culverins mounted on the main deck. On the superstructure were carried the medium pieces, sakers, minions, falcons, falconets, and rabinets. Smaller pieces, known as 'port-piece halls,' 'port-piece chambers,' 'fowler halls,' 'fowler-chambers,' and 'curtails,' were also carried. Many of these latter discharged a number of projectiles—the prototype, in fact, of the modern 'grape' and 'canister'—and were mounted pointing inboard from the poop and fore-castle, so as to be utilisable against any boarders who had made good their entrance. In fact, during the period so far did the science of artillery advance that we are told 'sea fights in these



HARRY GRACE DE DIEU, 1520

(From painting by Dominick Serres, engraved by W. A. Le Petit)

years before by Descharges, a Brest shipwright. Henry's great ship was a two-decker, of large tonnage—one list says fifteen hundred—carrying twenty-six heavy guns, fourteen on the lower and twelve on the main deck. Of the light pieces there were forty-six—eighteen on the poop and quarter-deck, and the same number on the fore-castle, and ten giving fire direct astern. She had four masts and a bowsprit, and was square-rigged on the 'foer' and 'mayne,' and lateen-rigged on the 'mayne mizzen' and 'bonaventure.' She may be taken as a typical 'great ship' of the sixteenth century; for the improvements that took place during the Elizabethan era consisted not so much in enlarging tonnage, but in building on longer keels and with finer lines, in the lowering of the great top-heavy superstructures, and, finally, in the sheathing of the keels with lead (an idea taken from the Spaniards), so as to decrease fouling. Ordnance, and that of fairly large calibre, was now uni-

versally carried. The heavy pieces comprised cannon, demi-cannon, and cannon-petro, mounted on the lower deck, and culverins and demi-culverins mounted on the main deck. On the superstructure were carried the medium pieces, sakers, minions, falcons, falconets, and rabinets. Smaller pieces, known as 'port-piece halls,' 'port-piece chambers,' 'fowler halls,' 'fowler-chambers,' and 'curtails,' were also carried. Many of these latter discharged a number of projectiles—the prototype, in fact, of the modern 'grape' and 'canister'—and were mounted pointing inboard from the poop and fore-castle, so as to be utilisable against any boarders who had made good their entrance. In fact, during the period so far did the science of artillery advance that we are told 'sea fights in these

days come seldom to boarding or to the great execution of bows and arrows, small shot, and the sword, but are chiefly performed by the great artillery breaking down masts and yards, tearing, raking, and bilging the ships.' Some of the guns were brass pieces; indeed, according to Derrick, all the ordnance in some ships was of that material, but in the main the guns were constructed of iron. The fact that the smaller pieces of artillery were 'breach-loading' is but another proof of the old adage, that there is nothing new under the sun."—*Evolution of the warship* (*Lotus Magazine*, Jan., 1915, pp. 211-212).—"While the idea of protecting ships of war by means of armor plate is not of so recent conception as may be generally supposed, its practical application, like that of many inventive designs, was delayed until long after the first trial; and armored ships, as we know them, date from about the middle of the nineteenth century. Prior to the sixteenth century,

the wooden sides of the ships were depended upon for protection against hostile missiles, and, with the advent of guns and their increase in power, the thickness of the sides of the vessels increased. The *Great Michael* which was built by James the Fourth of Scotland, who was killed at Flodden in 1513, was 240 feet in length and 56 feet in breadth, but as the sides of the ship were 10 feet in thickness, the interior breadth was only 36 feet. While this great thickness was given to the sides of the vessel for the purpose of protection, it scarcely entitles the *Great Michael* to be classified as an armored vessel, and the first of these does not appear until 1530. One of the largest ships of that time, belonging to the fleet of the Knights of St. John, was covered entirely with lead and was said to be successful in keeping out all the shot of the period. The practice of using lead armor does not, however, seem to have become general."—R. Arthur, *Armor and its application to ships* (*Coast Artillery Journal*, 1914, v. 42, p. 28). —"In 1578 the *Dreadnought* was a ship of 400 tons, manned by 250 men—the modern seaman wonder where they all stowed themselves away—whereof, says the roll of the navy for that day, there were mariners 140, gunners 20, soldiers 80, the remainder officers. The 'furniture of the ship' was, Harquebusses 80, Bows 25, Arrows, sheaves of 50, Pikes 50, Bills 60, Corselets 40, and Mariners (*sic*) 80. From the time of Drake to the building of the first ironclad the ships of the Royal Navy, although they became bigger, differed little in type, the two-decked and three-decked line of battleships being the generally accepted units for bearing the shock of battle."—*The Times* (London) *book of the navy*, p. 18.

1516-1535.—Prowess of the Barbary fleets in the Mediterranean. See BARBARY STATES: 1516-1535.

16th century.—Character of the Spanish war vessels in the sixteenth century. See ENGLAND: 1588: Spanish Armada; Destruction of the Armada.

1782-1860.—French floating batteries.—Early English, French and American experiments in armor plate.—Use of armored vessels in the Crimean War.—Building of *La Gloire* and the *Warrior*.—"The French had designed floating batteries in 1782 with a novel means of protection. These vessels, which the French employed in their attack upon Gibraltar, were covered with junk, rawhide, and timber to the thickness of 7 feet, and had bombproofing over the decks. Unfortunately for the French, this armor-plating was combustible and the ships were easily set on fire with red-hot shot. Still the French seemed to like the idea of floating batteries, for similar vessels were again used some seventy years later by them in the Crimea. The earliest recorded proposal to employ war vessels seems to have been made in England by Sir William Congreve in 1805. In 1812 John Stevens, of New Jersey, designed a ship with a battery protected by inclined armor. In 1814, a bomb-proof vessel was patented by Thomas Gregg of Pennsylvania. The Stevens family continued to work on the subject of iron armor and had, by 1841, determined by actual experiment, the penetrative powers of the projectiles of the day against wrought iron. In 1842 R. L. Stevens began the construction of an iron-armored ship which was never completed. In 1845 M. Dupuy de Lôme designed an armored frigate. In 1814 the first war steamer ever built, the *Fulton*, was launched and demonstrated the possibilities of steam in the construction of navies. This ship was

designed by Robert Fulton and called by him the *Demologos*. She was essentially a floating battery, the precursor of the *Monitor*, with two 100-pounder guns on pivot mountings and with a ram-shaped bow. She was driven by a steam paddle in the center of the ship, and was armored with wood so thick that it was proof against the shot of the time. The *Demologos*, upon being launched, became known as the *Fulton the First* and was considered the *Dreadnought* of the day. She attained a speed of 3½ knots, but was not completed in time to demonstrate her possibilities in the war. By 1822 shell guns had been adopted and the question of protection to ships became more important than it had been before. General Paixham, the inventor of the shell gun (*canon obusier*), himself suggested that the only reply to shell was armor. The necessity for armor becoming more and more apparent, experiments were begun about 1827 in England, France, and the United States, with a view to the determination of the resisting powers of iron and its possibility of use for protection of ships. Iron, for structural purposes, was developed rapidly, but in ship construction wood continued to be used almost to the exclusion of iron, until the middle of the century; and even in 1850 there were constructors who declared that iron was unsuitable, because of the greater stresses to which the larger ships were subjected. The local strength and stiffness of a wooden ship was great, but the structural strength was considerably less than that of the iron vessel. Iron was, therefore, practically forced upon ship designers. It is of record that an iron boat, intended apparently for passenger service, was built and launched on the River Foss in Yorkshire in 1777, and during all the latter part of the century iron was, according to report, used in the construction of canal boats and barges. The first iron steamboat in the United States, of which there is definite record, was the *Aaron Manby*, built in 1820. The U. S. S. *Wolverine* (ex-Michigan) built in 1842, was the first iron warship in our service, and is still in use (out of commission) on the Great Lakes. The use of metal in the construction of merchant and passenger vessels developed much more rapidly than in naval construction, because of the slower increase in size of naval vessels. However, by about the middle of the nineteenth century iron had been definitely adopted and the navies of the world were continuing with ships of metal that struggle for supremacy which had begun with ships of wood. In 1840 the British Admiralty conducted experiments to test the action of shot against iron plates backed by various substances, and it was concluded that iron was a poor material for ships of war. In 1842 armor experiments were conducted with iron plates made by riveting together plates three-eighths of an inch in thickness to a total thickness of six inches. These plates did not successfully resist 8-inch guns or heavy 32-pounders at 400 yards; so some modifications were introduced and further experiments made in 1850. This laminated armor was never reported on favorably, and general opinion, at about this time, was somewhat against armor. The French, however, formed a more favorable opinion of iron armor than did the other nations, and, in 1853, they constructed five floating batteries which carried four inches of iron armor. These ships were almost totally unmanageable because of their bad lines, and their speed never exceeded four knots. They were of light draft and carried eighteen 50-pounder guns with a crew of 320. It was intended that they should be able to use either sail or

steam; but, when it was discovered that they refused absolutely to proceed under sail, the masts were removed and pole masts substituted. Notwithstanding their many defects, three of them were sent to the Crimea, and it is reported that it was necessary to provide transports to carry their guns for them. Having arrived safely, they joined a large fleet in the attack on Kinburn on October 17, 1855, and, by steaming in close to the fortifications, the floating batteries were enabled to silence the batteries in the course of a four-hour engagement without material injury to themselves. It was no doubt the success of the floating batteries in this attack which led the French to adopt armor plating for their ships of war; and so it is the French who are to be credited with having produced the first sea-going iron-clad, *La Gloire*, and, with her, that contest between gun and armor which has not yet ended; for improved kinds of guns and armor are still being sought and experimented with. *La Gloire*, together with the *Normandie*, the *Invincible*, and the *Couronne*, were laid down in 1858; but scarcely were their frames up before England replied by laying down the *Warrior*, the *Black Prince*, the *Defence*, and the *Resistance*.—R. Arthur, *Armor and its application to ships* (*Coast Artillery Journal*, 1914, v. 42, pp. 28-31).—"The first idea of the 'armoured' vessel was to cover the side of the ship with iron plates. To do this in a two-decked or three-decked ship was impossible, as the extra weight would have submerged her lower ports, or even if it did not do this, would have placed them in such close proximity to the water as to render the opening of them a most dangerous operation. It was therefore decided to build H. M. S. *Warrior*, the first of our [British] ironclads, as a frigate, that is to say, a vessel with one fighting deck. But even in her case the pioneer builders of the ironclad were hampered by the enormous weight which the ship had to bear, subject to the condition that she must so float that the best use could be made of her as a fighting machine. It was evident that it was a case for a compromise, and the designers met it by leaving the ends unprotected and plating the middle portion for a little over half her length. This arrangement involved placing an armoured bulkhead across the ship at each end of the armoured portion of the side to protect her against a raking fire. She therefore became a floating square iron box as far as her midship section was concerned, with unarmoured ends that could easily be pierced. Experiments having shown that 4½ in. of iron, backed by 18 in. of teak, could not be penetrated by the 68 pounder gun, then the most powerful ordnance in use afloat, this specification was accordingly used in the construction of what was avowedly an experimental ship. She was built at the Thames Ironworks, Blackwall, from the designs of the Controller of the Navy, Rear-Admiral Robert Spencer Robinson, and launched December 29, 1860."—*The Times* (London) *book of the navy*, pp. 19-20.

1856-1905.—American ships.—From wood to iron.—Propulsion and armament.—*Monitor* and *Merrimac*.—Effect on English and French experimenters.—Type of battery changed by Russo-Japanese War.—"The ship of the line, built of wood, reached its greatest development just prior to the Civil War of the United States of America. The change from wood to iron covered a period of twenty (20) years, or from 1856 to 1876. A little later than the end of this period sail power was abandoned and steam relied upon entirely, the last full rigged ship of the United States Navy

being the 'Newark' as originally built. In wooden vessels the United States led the way among the nations, and its models and methods of construction were eagerly sought after and copied by foreign navies. The 'Hartford' and 'Franklin' classes were of the best American type, and were immediately followed in the English Navy by similar vessels. The United States was rich in building materials, especially in live oak, from which the frames of the vessels were made, and which was practically indestructible. For this reason, perhaps, as well as that its corps of naval constructors were men of great practical skill in wooden ship building, the United States continued the use of wood when the lack of such material was driving the European navies into the use of iron in place of wood. A study of the construction of one of these fine specimens of naval construction is of great interest, especially when the construction was more or less composite. In the best vessels iron was used in strapping the frames both inside and out, and reinforcing the upper strength members, with iron clamps. The vessels were full rigged, having auxiliary machinery capable of steaming at 10-knots speed. They were fitted with two-bladed propeller wheels, which were hoisted or triced up above the water line when the vessels were under sails. The vessels were armed with smooth bore muzzle loading guns, generally of 8-inch diameter of bore, throwing solid shot of 68 pounds and having a penetration of about four inches in wrought iron at close range. Later in the United States Navy eleven-inch pivot guns were used, one being mounted on the centerline, usually forward, and served on either broadside. . . . The scarcity of building material led to the building of iron vessels in the English and French Navies. . . . While this development was going on abroad some of the brightest minds, quickened by the possibility of war in the United States, were giving earnest thought and study to a fighting machine, notably John Stevens and Theodore Timby, American born citizens and John Ericsson, a Swede, who afterwards became an American citizen. Stevens made the plans of a remarkable vessel called the Stevens Battery and at his death left a sufficient sum of money available for the completion of the vessel. The vessel, however, was never completed. . . . Theodore Timby had given years to the perfection of a revolving fort or turret of steel, in which was housed a number of guns. This fort he mounted on a raft which was intended for harbor defense. . . . It remained, however, for the genius of Mr. Ericsson to combine the ideas of both Timby and Stevens in the epoch making vessel known as the 'Monitor.' I fully believe Mr. Ericsson was working along entirely independent lines from either of these gentlemen, but all three had many ideas in common, and the fact remains that Mr. Timby was so protected by patents of his design that Mr. Ericsson had to pay \$5000 royalty on each of the turrets fitted on the Monitor class. Just here we will refer to the Stevens battery, which has a lasting influence upon subsequent warship design. Its building period extended over such a term of years, from 1860 to 1870, that many of its original features were modified entirely and the experience of the naval combats of the Civil War incorporated. However, Mr. Stevens started out to build an armored vessel with guns of one calibre carried in revolving turrets. In this general conception he and Ericsson were on common ground, but Stevens went much further. He introduced the armored deck with sloping sides extending down to the lower edge of the armor belt, precisely what was known as the

protective deck of later years. His main belt extended from stem to stern. The vessel was fitted with twin screws, and the same type of balanced rudder now fitted to nearly all United States battleships found its prototype in the wonderful vessel. Unfortunately the vessel passed into the ownership of the State of New Jersey and was never fully completed. Attention, however, is called to the features incorporated and actually built which afterward became fundamental in battleship design: 1. Battery of one-calibre guns mounted in turrets. 2. Twin screws. 3. Protective deck. 4. Balanced rudders fitted in the deadwood or run of the vessel. While these features were being dreamed upon and slowly put into execution, Mr. Ericsson, for the Northern States, and the designer of the reconstructed 'Merrimac' was pushing ahead and forcing upon their governments types of vessels that were to revolutionize the design of war vessels the world over, and which were known as the 'Monitor' and 'Merrimac.' In the former was the complete waterline belt and armored deck with guns mounted in turrets, while in the 'Merrimac' was found the armored casemate with sloping sides and the ram. The combination of these features has been perpetuated in battleship design to the present day [1914]. The United States Government was so exhausted financially by the long war that it had neither means nor inclination to carry into effect the many lessons of the war, but England, ever watchful, profited to the utmost by the experience gained in our naval engagements and embodied them in the navy of iron vessels she was rapidly building. About this time there arose in England a group of notable men who by practical and technical training were well able to establish and apply the valuable lessons of the American Civil War. These were Scott Russell, Brunel, Sir Edwin Reed, and Rankine, followed by William John, William White, Nathaniel Barnaby, Francis Elgar, and Martel, while in France such men as DeBusy and Bertin were investigating and working along the same line. To Russell must be accorded the credit of starting scientific inquiry into the lines of the least resistance, to Brunel the best disposition of material to meet longitudinal stresses, and to Reed and his young assistants the cellular construction and framing which did so much to obtain the necessary strength with less weight. The designs evolved ran the gamut of the armored broadside with multiple guns of the 'Warrior' type to the battery of a few guns of larger calibre mounted in turrets, such as the 'Devastation' type of high freeboard Monitors. These designs finally worked into the mixed gun battery with the large guns mounted in turrets or barbets and the smaller guns in armored casemates. This type of battery prevailed in one form or the other, up to the time of the Russo-Japanese War. The fight through that long period was between armor and guns, with varying results. At one time the armor would defeat the guns, then the guns would penetrate the best armor made. The same fight is still on, with honors resting with the guns. Then began the long fought question between speed and protection and armament, or the feature of offense and defense. The lesson hastily drawn from the fight in the Japan Sea [1905] was the all-gun battery of heavy guns, with a numerous secondary battery of very small guns. Calm and cooler consideration, however, has given the larger calibre rapid firing gun its old place as a defense against torpedo craft, with the exception perhaps that protection for this class of gun has been dropped. The cycle has been

made that we are again with batteries of mixed calibres just as at the close of the Civil War, only with all the tremendous increase in power and rapidity of fire."—W. A. Dobson, *Evolution of the battleship of the dreadnought type (Proceedings of the Engineers' Club, Oct., 1914, v. 31, no. 4, pp. 299-304)*.—See also U. S. A.: 1862 (March): Battle of the *Monitor and Merrimac*.

1861-1892.—Contest between gun and armor.—British experiments.—Italian improvements in use of steel.—Compound plates.—Harveyized nickel steel armor.—"By 1862 all the naval powers of the world had taken notice of the new naval developments. While the manufacture of armor plates progressed rapidly from the first the improvements in gun powder forced a continually increasing thickness of the plates. While soft iron had been adopted for the armor for ships, experiments continued with this and with laminated armor, hard iron, and, later, chilled iron, steel, and the plate-upon-plate system. In 1861 various backings such as timber, cork, india-rubber, layers of wire, etc., were tried and it was concluded that, 'while the hard materials improved the resisting power of the armor, they led to its being more injured by cracking, and to the giving way of fastenings.' At about this same time, a Special Committee on Iron (British) came to the following conclusions: '1. That steel and steely iron are bad materials for armor, while soft iron is best. 2. That corrugations and bosses, designed to break shot on impact, are undesirable. 3. That plates should be as large as practicable. 4. That hard backing supported the plates at the expense of the bolts, whose functions are not only to hold the plates on but also to resist vibration and prevent buckling. 5. That tonguing and grooving of plates tend to spread injury from plate to plate, and are bad. 6. That the effect of shot on plates is not proportional to the momentum of the former, but to the energy.' . . . The advantages of a hard pointed projectile with which to attack the soft armor soon became apparent, and Sir William Palliser introduced an ogival-pointed chilled-iron shot. His projectiles were first tried at Shoeburyness in the autumn of 1863. In 1864 steel plates made their first appearance, plates supplied by the Thames Company, Brown & Co., the Parkgate Company, and Petin & Gaudet, being unsuccessfully tested in Russia in this year. With the adoption of armor protection for ships of war, all the principal nations of the world, with the exception of the United States, began the construction of armor-clad navies with a feverish activity, which continued until the eighties. Up to 1875 the contest between gun and armor had wrought iron armor on one side and cast iron projectiles on the other. There had been no material improvement in the manufacture of projectiles since the introduction of rifled cannon other than that (noted above) caused by chilling the ogive in casting. Neither had there been any essential improvement in the manufacture of armor-plate; so the steadily increasing power and caliber of the gun had forced a continually increasing thickness of armor-plates. The climax was reached in 1876 when the *Inflexible*, a ship of 11,880 tons, was given 24 inches of armor amidships. In this ship an outer thickness of 12-inch armor-plate was backed with 11 inches of teak, behind which was another 12-inch armor-plate backed with 6 inches of teak. Inside all this were two thicknesses of 1-inch iron plating. As the weight of armor to be carried by ships could not be increased indefinitely, an improved kind of armor with which the gun might be successfully

opposed became necessary. The Italians seem to have been the first to recognize this, for they began a series of experiments at Spezia in 1876 upon several forms of target, with their attention especially directed to steel. The steel employed tended to shatter upon impact of the projectile; but it was noted that projectiles which passed completely through wrought iron plates were stopped by the steel plates. As a result, the Italians fitted the *Dandolo* and the *Duilio* with armor belts consisting of 21.65 inches of solid steel. These were the first ships to carry steel armor. These experiments gave added stimulus to the investigation of steel for armor; and, from this date, experiments were conducted under the conviction that wrought iron would be replaced sooner or later by steel in some form. Mr. George Wilson, of the Cammel Company, patented a compound armor in 1876 which was to compete with the all steel armor. This armor consisted of a steel face welded to a wrought-iron back and offered the advantages of a hard surface and a tough body. Experiments in 1877 with plates consisting of 5 inches of steel united to 4 inches of wrought iron showed this compound armor to be superior to wrought iron plates, and further experiments showed that best results with compound armor were obtained when the steel constituted about one-third of the plate. Naturally, a contest between the all-steel and the compound armor resulted, and the compound armor seemed at first to have the advantage; but, with the introduction of the steel shell a little later, the advantage turned to the steel plate. The compound plate was produced mainly in England and the steel plate mainly in France, and rivalry between these plates continued until the Annapolis and Ocha experiments of 1890. At these trials the superiority of the steel plate was demonstrated beyond a doubt; but both plates were found to be inferior to a new nickel-steel plate which had just appeared. The introduction of the compound and the steel armor gave the plate the advantage over the gun, and investigations were conducted with a view to the determination of the best material for projectiles. One series of experiments was conducted by the British Admiralty in 1877 with chilled iron projectiles of various kinds, steel projectiles, and projectiles with steel bodies and chilled iron heads. Among other things, they recommended: 'That all battering projectiles should have heads struck with a radius of 2 diameter. That the question of a delay-action fuse to be used with guncotton be further investigated. That a certain proportion of forged steel shells be issued. That cast steel shells be not adopted unless greatly improved.' In this same test was tried a wrought iron cap on the point of the projectile. This was brought about by the fact that it had been discovered that a steel-faced armor plate lost its power of breaking up chilled shot when a 2½-inch wrought-iron plate was placed over the face of steel plate. Captain English and General Inglis thought a cap would serve the same purpose as the iron plate. The effect of the first shot encouraged further investigation, but further trial showed that 'no advantage was gained by a cap.' Other experiments were carried on by all the manufactures of projectiles. Krupp, Hadfield, Holtzer, Armstrong, Firth, and others tested cast steel, forged steel, specially treated steel, and steel alloys, until the Holtzer works advanced a chrome-steel projectile which was successful against the new armor. With a chrome-steel projectile, Holtzer in France and Hadfield in England became most prominent as projectile manufacturers. The

projectile having again gained the ascendancy, it became necessary to effect the destruction of the chrome-steel projectile; so the plate manufacturers began to increase the hardness of the face of the plates. Captain Tressider, R. E., patented a method of face hardening in 1887, which was first applied to the compound armor. In 1880 Schneider introduced nickel into steel; and in 1891 or 1892 the St. Chamond works used nickel steel with a small percentage of chromium. The armor which was adopted for replacing the steel and the compound armor was a face-hardened nickel-steel armor introduced by Mr. H. A. Harvey, of the Harvey Steel Works of Newark, N. J. This is the armor mentioned above as having been tested at the Annapolis trials. These trials led to further tests at Indian Head, and the results were so successful that Harveyized nickel steel armor-plate was adopted for warships."—R. Arthur, *Armor and its application to ships* (*Coast Artillery Journal*, 1914, v. 42, pp. 32-36).

1870-1905.—Development of navies: Austria-Hungary.—France.—Germany.—Italy.—Japan.—Russia.—"Austria-Hungary during the seventies built a number of casemate vessels and in the eighties two barbette ships, of which the last one, *Kronprinz Erzherzog Rudolph*, 1887, 6950 ts., resembled the English *Admiral* class in point of protection, but the belt was higher and the barbettes were developed into redoubts. This vessel had high freeboard, a speed of 16 kts., an armament of 12-in. guns and 12-in. armor on the water-line. The coal capacity was small, but the ship was well adapted for defensive service in the Adriatic, and was remarkable as a technical achievement, considering the small displacement. The vessels of the *Monarch* class, 1895-96, 5500 ts., were too small and had too low freeboard for anything but local coast defence in the Adriatic. As in German ships of that time the primary guns were of only 9.4-in. caliber. . . . At the end of the century the naval power of Austria fell far short of the needs of the country and compared unfavorably with that of Italy, who was the most probable enemy. . . . The first ships built in the new century, however, were hardly equal to the task assigned to them, being of too small displacement. The *Habsburg* class, 1900-02, 8175 ts., 20 kts., and the *Erzherzog Karl* class, 1903-05, 10,450 ts., 20.5 kts., resembled respectively the English *Formidables* and *King Edwards* in the disposition of armor and battery, but the primary guns, of 9.4-in. caliber, were too light for ships that might have to meet first-class battleships. The high speed was probably adopted in competition with fast Italian ships. Technically, the qualities of these vessels were all that could be expected of the limited displacements."—W. Hovgaard, *Modern history of warships*, pp. 128-129.—"In France several second-class cruisers of the protected type were built during the nineties. The last and most important was the *Jurien de la Gravière*, 1899, 5600 ts., 23 kts., which was well adapted to its work as a commerce-destroyer, being faster than the English cruisers of that time. . . . Towards the end of the eighties France possessed a number of protected cruisers, large and small, designed with the main object of eventually preying upon British commerce, but the value of these vessels was much depreciated by the advent of the high-explosive shell and the quick-firing gun. . . . In 1888, the French Government authorized the construction of an armored cruiser, the *Dupuy-de-Lôme*, 1890, 6500 ts., 20 kts., designed by De Bussy. . . . The sides were completely covered by armor of 4-in thickness, extending from 3¼ ft.

below the water-line to the main deck, 13 ft. above the water-line. A 1½-in. vaulted deck, which joined the lower edge of the side armor, was worked the entire length of the ship, and a splinter deck was fitted underneath in way of the machinery. The space between these decks was filled with coal, and above the armor deck, behind the belt, was a cofferdam of 3 ft. depth filled with cellulose. The combination of side armor with an under-water deck was applied to battleships a few years later, in the *Majestic*. The principal armament of the *Dupuy-de-Lôme* consisted of two 7.6-in. and six 6.4-in. B.L. guns, all mounted in single turrets on the main deck, except one that was placed on the forecastle. The disposition of the battery was peculiar, the two heavy pieces being placed amidships, one on each side, while the 6.4-in. guns were grouped together at the ends, three forward and three aft. All the guns had longitudinal fire, and thus the somewhat unique result was attained that five guns could be brought to bear in all directions. The *Dupuy-de-Lôme* was the first large vessel to receive three propellers, a practice followed in all later French armored cruisers, and soon after adopted by the Germans. The sides had a pronounced tumble-home, as in most other French ships, and also the bow and stern exhibited the same feature in a rather exaggerated degree. In this way a great deal of weight was saved in the upper works, and longitudinal fire was obtained with the broadside guns; but the form was not without concurrent disadvantages. Especially the plough-shaped bow proved objectionable, since it had a tendency to bury itself in the waves, resulting in a serious reduction in speed. This feature was repeated in many French cruisers and in some of the battleships. It was later severely criticized, and ultimately much modified or entirely abandoned. The *Dupuy-de-Lôme* marks a new epoch in the history of protection, and a great step in advance compared with the older belted cruisers and with the protected cruisers of her time. . . . *Jeanne d'Arc*, 1899, 11,100 ts., of 23 kts., designed speed, was the first of a series of large armored cruisers embodying Admiral Fournier's ideas. The protection was extensive, but not so complete as in the *Dupuy-de-Lôme*. . . . The *Jeanne d'Arc* formed the model for the succeeding large cruisers of the *Jules Michelet*, the *Ernest Renan*, and the *Edgar Quinet* classes, 1905-08."—W. Hovgaard, *Modern history of warships*, pp. 190, 206-208.

"Towards the end of the sixties Prussia acquired three armored battery vessels (*Panzer Fregatten*), which were built in England and France. After the war with France in 1870-71, the newly created German Empire commenced at once an active naval policy, and the Chief of the Admiralty, General von Stosch, laid out a plan to build up the navy (*Flottengründungsplan*). Three rigged turret ships, the *Preussen* class, 1873-75, 6650 ts., similar to the British *Monarch*. . . were the first armored iron ships constructed in Germany. . . . Two casement vessels, the *Kaiser* and *Deutschland*, 1874, 7550 ts., designed by Reed, were built in England. . . . In 1877 was launched the *Sachsen*, 7300 ts., 14 kts., the first of a class of four coast-defence vessels (*Ausfall-Corvetten*). She carried two 10¼-in. guns in a pear-shaped barbettes forward, and four 10¼-in. guns in a rectangular barbettes amidships. In the distribution of the artillery great weight was given to longitudinal fire, as in the *Inflexible*. The hull protection was on the central citadel plan. The *Sachsen* was the first large armored ship of the German Navy without sail power. . . . The *Baden*, was not completed till 1884. . . . Not till

1883 . . . was the keel laid to another armorclad, the *Oldenburg*, 5100 ts., which was intended to be the fifth vessel of the *Sachsen* type, but owing to lack of funds she had to be of smaller size, and became a somewhat belated casemate vessel. The need of a small type of coast-defence ship for the protection of the estuaries in the North Sea and the Baltic, and in particular for the defence of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, called for the *Siegfried* class, six vessels of 3500 ts., 15 kts., and 18 ft. draught, launched during the years 1889-93. These vessels strongly resembled the *Tréhouart* [a French ship] in point of general form of hull and hull protection, but the heavy guns, being placed in shallow barbettes with lightly armored floors, were not so well protected as in the closed turrets of the French ships. The forward barbettes redoubt might be described as two single barbettes merged into one structure, reaching from one side of the ship to the other. . . . The only advantage of the *Siegfried* mounting was that the bow-guns could fire more nearly in after directions. The belt was complete, but the high freeboard and large superstructures made the ships very vulnerable to shell fire. Two additional vessels of this class, the *Odin* and *Aegir*, were launched in 1894-95, differing from the previous ships chiefly in their system of water-line protection, which was a reversion to that of the British *Admiral* class. . . . Later these ships were reconstructed. . . . A new era in the history of the German Navy commenced in 1888 with the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II. . . . The construction of larger seagoing battleships was commenced, the first type being the *Brandenburg* class, 1891-92, 10,000 ts., 17 kts. In general form of hull and in disposition of armament these ships resembled strongly the French *Admiral Baudin* type, having great tumble-home, a complete belt, and three barbettes placed in the center-line. The main battery was very powerful, consisting of six 11-in. guns, all capable of firing on either broadside, but the secondary battery consisted of only 4-in. and 3½-in. Q.F. guns. The *Brandenburg* having no intermediate battery, resembled still more than its prototype, the *Admiral Baudin*, the latter 'all-big-gun' battleships. . . . The midship barbettes was not well placed, the guns being relatively short and close to the deck. . . . In the next type of battleships, the *Kaiser* class, 1896-99, 11,000 ts., 18 kts., the armament was entirely different in character and disposition. . . . The main battery consisted of four guns of only 9.4-in. caliber, but an exceedingly powerful intermediate battery of eighteen 6-in. Q.F. guns was carried, in addition to a torpedo-defence battery of 3½-in. Q.F. guns. The reduction in the caliber of the principal guns appears to be due chiefly to a desire to save weight for the secondary battery. . . . The secondary battery was not only very powerful, but also well protected, being mounted in single turrets and casemates protected by 6-in. armor. As in the *Charles Martel*, the secondary guns were clustered in rather close proximity to the principal guns, which were here mounted in twin turrets forward and aft. Nearly all the 6-in. guns were capable of firing along the keel-line. The torpedo-defence battery was of heavier caliber than used at that time in the British and American Navies. . . . A belt of harvey-nickel steel of 12-in. thickness extended indeed for about four-fifths of the length, and was covered by an armour deck on the top, while a splinter deck was fitted at the height of the lower edge, as in the French ships; but the belt was very narrow, and no protection was given to the side above the belt, as in contemporaneous ships



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
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
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
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TYPES OF WARSHIPS

1 *Iron Duke*, British battleship, 1912. 2. *Charles Martel*, French type of battleship of the 'nineties. 3. *Moltke*, German battle cruiser, 1910-1911. 4. *Dreadnought*, 1905, original battleship of its type. 5. *Iowa*, American battleship, 1917. 6. *Conte di Cavour*, Italian battleship, 1911. 7. *Woolsey*, American destroyer. 8. *Hood*, British battle cruiser, 1918.

of other navies. A high superstructure and extensive bridges added to the large unprotected target which these ships presented, and made them very vulnerable to shell fire. In this respect, as also in the great tumble-home of the sides and the arrangement of the guns, these vessels resembled strongly the French battleships of the nineties (*Bouvet*). The boiler plant consisted of twelve cylindrical and six Thornycroft boilers, which latter were here for the first time used in larger battleships. There were three propellers. The normal fuel supply was 650 ts. of coal, with an additional of 100 ts. of oil for mixed combustion. Triple screws and a supply of oil-fuel were features of all succeeding battleships and large cruisers of the German Navy. The ships of the *Kaiser* class were later constructed. The superstructures were cut down, and the four lower casemate guns were removed, with the result that the top of the belt came higher above the water. . . . [According to] the Navy Law of 1900, . . . the fleet was to consist of two 'double squadrons,' each of seventeen battleships with an appropriate number of smaller units. . . . By the new law, therefore, a harmonious development of the navy was secured, and its strength practically doubled. The type represented by the *Kaiser* class was modified and improved upon in the following three types of battleships: the *Wittelsbach* class, 1901-02, 11,600 ts., the *Braunschweig* class, 1902-04, 13,000 ts., 18 kts.; and the *Deutschland* class, 1904-06, 13,000 ts., 18 kts. These classes possessed the tactical advantage of homogeneity, but their primary battery was weak, although in the two latest classes the 11-in. gun took the place of the 9.4-in. gun. At the same time the high mounting of the forward guns, which had been hitherto a feature of German battleships, was abandoned, the heavy turrets being both mounted on the main deck. The secondary battery was powerful, especially in the two latest classes, where fourteen 6.7-in. guns were substituted for the eighteen 6-in. guns of the *Wittelsbach*. The torpedo-defence battery was in all vessels of 3½-in. caliber, as in the *Kaiser* class. The same tendency to an extension of the armored surface, which existed in other navies, was evidenced in the German ships during this period. The water-line received protection of light armor at both ends, and the heavy portion of the belt was more and more extended. A redoubt of armor of medium thickness was built above the belt between the barbettes of the big guns up to the main deck, housing a battery of secondary guns. The armor deck was of the sloping type. The conning-tower was very large, of the shape of an oval, with transverse major axis, and protected by armor of 12-in. thickness. There were six torpedo tubes, four submerged on the broadside, one submerged in the bow, and one aft, which in the *Deutschland* was likewise submerged. In the latest vessels of the *Deutschland* class, small-tube boilers of the Thornycroft-Schulz type were used exclusively, and this boiler, which had already been adopted previously in torpedo-vessels and cruisers became henceforth the standard for all vessels of the German Navy. The main reason for this important step was probably a desire for a reduction in weight, but it also had the advantages which follow from uniformity in the *matériel*. The supply of liquid fuel was raised to 200 ts. in normal load condition. The relatively small displacement of German battleships of that period was necessitated by the insufficient dimensions of canal-locks and harbors, and was perhaps due also to the naval policy, which aimed primarily at control of the

Baltic and the North Sea. . . . A demand for well-armed and protected cruisers arose about the middle of the nineties, in consequence of which the ships of the *Freya* class, 1807-98 of about 5600 ts., 19 kts., were laid down. They were armed with two 8.3-in. and eight 6-in. guns. . . . Germany commenced the construction of small cruisers with the *Hela*, 1895, 2000 ts., 21 kts., fitted with locomotive boilers. At the end of the decade was commenced the *Gazelle* class, 1898-1900, about 2600 ts., 20-22 kts., mostly fitted with small-tube boilers of the Schulz-Thornycroft type. The *Frauenlob* class of vessels, 1902, was a slight modification of the *Gazelle* type."—W. Hovgaard, *Modern history of warships*, pp. 110-116, 189-190, 192.

"During the first part of the nineties there was a pause in battleship construction in Italy, but in 1897 the two vessels of the *Emanuele Filiberto* class, 9650 ts., 18 kts., were launched. . . . The defence of the extended coast of Italy required fast and powerful ships, and Brin, in accordance with this policy, designed the *Regina Margherita* type, 1901, 13,200 ts., 20 kts., armed with four 12-in. four 8-in., twelve 6-in., and twenty 3-in. guns. Such high speed and powerful armament could not be combined with heavy armor in ships of that size, whence the belt was of only 6-in. thickness. . . . The next type, the *Vittorio Emanuele III.* class, 1904-07, 12,600 ts., 22 kts., was designed by Colonel (later General) Cuniberti, who, like Brin, was a strong advocate of high speed for the Italian battleships. The *Vittorio Emanuele* type was highly successful, remarkable results being obtained on a relatively small displacement. Combining, as it did, high speed with a good protection and an armament which comprised heavy armor-piercing guns, it may be considered a forerunner of the battle-cruiser. By abandoning the heavy quick-firers and substituting 8-in. turret guns instead, a secondary battery of exceptional power was obtained. . . . The hull of the two last ships of this class, the *Rome* and *Napoli*, was constructed entirely of high-tensile steel, a material which was used only partly in the *Vittorio Emanuele* and *Regina Elena*. The armament consisted of two 12-in. guns mounted singly in barbette-turrets protected by 10-in. armor, and twelve 8-in. guns in twin turrets protected by 6-in. armor. . . . The forward 12-in. guns was mounted high on the upper deck, which extended for two-thirds of the length of the ship from the bow. Two of the 8-in. gun turrets were likewise mounted on the upper deck, but all the other guns were placed on the main deck. The torpedo-defence battery consisted of twenty-four 12-pdrs., of which eight were placed in a 3-in. casemate amidships. The water-line belt was complete from end to end, with a thickness of 10 in. amidships, reduced to 4 in. at the ends. The protective deck had 4-in. armor on the slopes, and a 1-in. splinter deck was fitted underneath. The sides between the belt and the main deck were protected by 8-in. armor amidships, and by 3¼-in. armor in the bow. The normal coal supply was 1000 ts., total capacity 2800 ts."—W. Hovgaard, *Modern history of warships*, pp. 116-118.—"The armorclad navy of Japan is of even more recent date than that of the United States and Germany. The first armored ships were the casemate vessel *Fusoo*, 1877, 3700 ts., and two small coast-defence ships of 2250 ts., launched in 1877-78, all built in England. In the war with China in 1894-95, the Japanese did not possess a single battleship until they captured the Chinese vessel *Chen-Yuen* at Wei-hei-Wei. After that war Japan pursued a vigorous policy of naval expansion in preparation for the

struggle with Russia. . . . The vast majority of the new ships and all the battleships acquired during this period were built in England and modelled on contemporaneous English ships. The *Fuji* and *Yashima*, 1896, 12,300 ts., were reduced *Royal Sovereigns*, but somewhat faster. . . . The *Shikishima* class, 1898-99, 15,000 ts., was quite similar to the English *Formidable*. . . . The *Mikasa*, 1900, 15,200 ts., was similar to the *Shikishima*. Most of the 6-in. guns were, however, mounted in a battery as in American ships, but instead of a central longitudinal armor bulkhead two 2-in. bulkheads were fitted behind the guns, one on each side, forming with transverse splinter bulkheads between the guns a continuous series of single casemates. In this way the guns were efficiently protected, but supervision and fire control of the battery were rendered difficult. . . . In the *Kashima* and *Katori*, 1905, about 16,000 ts., the Japanese followed the *King Edward* type, but 10-in. guns took the place of the 9.2-in. guns of the English ships. These ships were not completed till after the war."—*Ibid.*, pp. 127-128.—"Up to about the middle of the nineties the Russians appear to have followed the English practice in the general design of their battleships, but after that time French models were preferred. . . . The *Navarin*, 1891, 9475 ts., was a reduced *Trafalgar*. She was well protected; even the superstructure, in which a 6-in. battery was placed, had 5-in. armor. . . . *Sissoi Veliki*, 1894, 8875 ts., bore much resemblance to the *Royal Sovereign*, but the heavy guns were mounted in closed turrets and the secondary battery in a large casemate on the gun deck. . . . The *Poltava* class, 1894-95, 10,950 ts., to which also the *Petropavlovsk* and the *Sebastopol* belong, were reduced *Royal Sovereigns*. . . . The *Peresviet*, *Pobieda*, and *Oslibia*, 1898-1900, 12,675 ts., were of French type, not unlike the *Suffren*, characterized by relatively small beam, considerable tumble-home, and high freeboard with towering superstructures. The armament was four 10-in. and eleven 6-in. guns, of which latter one was placed right in the bow on the main deck, the others in single casemates, as in the English battleships of that period. The water-line belt was 9 in. thick amidships and extended over six-sevenths of the ship's length; above the belt was a 5-in. redoubt up to the second deck, extending about one-third the length of the ship. The protection of the stability was imperfect even at moderate angles of heel, for the heavy armor belt was in normal condition only about 9 in. above the water, and the ends above the belt were entirely unprotected. . . . Amidships, the gun-ports on the gun deck were in normal condition only from 10 to 11 ft. above the water-line. The curve of stability must have been very weak, due to the great tumble-home of the sides, and although the high freeboard secured a great range, this advantage was in time of battle illusory when the unprotected upper works were damaged. Finally, these ships possessed the undesirable feature of a center-line bulkhead in the boiler-rooms. . . . The *Retvizan*, 1900, 12,700 ts., which was built by Cramps in Philadelphia, resembled very closely the English *Formidable* both in point of armament and protection. . . . The *Czarevitch*, 1901, 12,900 ts., was built in Toulon after the design of Mons. Lagane. Like the *Oslibia*, she was of distinctly French type and resembled the *République* in the disposition of armor and artillery. The beam was relatively greater than in the *Oslibia*, being increased from 71.5 ft. to 75.5 ft. The draught was reduced from 27½ ft. to 26 ft. The tumble-home was, however, much greater than in the *République*. The arma-

ment consisted of four 12-in. guns, mounted in closed turrets forward and aft, the forward turret about 31 ft. above the water-line. Twelve 6-in. guns were mounted in twin turrets, four on the upper deck at the corners of the superstructure, and two on the main deck amidships. Part of a battery of 12-pdrs. was mounted on the second deck amidships on the broadside. The water-line belt, 10 in. thick amidships, extended the whole length of the ship. It was surmounted by another complete strake of armor of 8-in. maximum thickness, covered by a 2¾-in. armor deck, which was about 7 ft. above the water-line. A splinter deck, 1½ in. thick, was fitted about 6 ft. below the principal armor deck, slightly above the level of the water-line, and curved down at the sides to form a lateral armor bulkhead some 6 ft. from the sides, as in the *Henri IV.*, intended as protection against under-water attack. The speed was 18 kts. . . . The ships of the *Borodino* class, 1901-03, 13,600 ts., . . . had the same armament as the *Czarevitch* and were in point of general form and protection very similar to that vessel. The principal armor deck was 4 in. thick. The conning-tower had a very bad location, being imbedded between inflammable bridges, which carried several light guns and numerous fittings. It was adjacent to the foremast and the charthouse. The roof was of the mushroom type. According to Chief Constructor Koutejnikoff, the designed metacentric height was 4.3 ft. in normal condition and 4.1 ft. in fully loaded condition, but when equipped and ready . . . the ships were, in spite of Koutejnikoff's urgent representations, so much overloaded that the metacentric height, as found by inclining experiment in Libau, was only 2½ ft. The upper edge of the water-line belt was immersed, the top of the upper strake was not more than 6 ft. above the water, and the port-sills of the 12-pdr. battery, mounted on the gun deck, were less than 8 ft. above the water. . . . Russia was the first country to acquire a vessel which deserved the name of 'ocean-scout,' viz., the *Novik*, 1900, 3000 ts., 26 kts., built by Schichau in Elbing. The acquisition of this vessel was due to the initiative of Admiral Makaroff, who realized the necessity of extreme speed in ships to be used for reconnoitering service. The *Novik* was built as an enlarged destroyer. The hull was exceedingly light and the free-board was low, although somewhat augmented in the bow by a low forecastle. The boilers were of the Thornycroft type; the coal supply was small. The armament was rather heavy, six 4.7-in. Q.F. guns and five above-water torpedo tubes. The protective deck was 2 in. thick over the vitals. There were three propellers, of which the central one projected considerably below the hull, as in a torpedo-boat. There was no double bottom. . . . At the end of the nineties Russia built a number of protected cruisers to be used primarily as commerce-destroyers, viz., the *Bogatyr* class, the *Askold*, and the *Variag*, all of about 6500 ts. displacement and of 23 kts. speed, and the *Pallada* class, of the same size and 20 kts. speed. These ships carried an armament of 6-in. and 3-in. guns. The 6-in. guns were either unprotected or provided with shields. Only the *Bogatyr* class had twin turrets for the 6-in. guns forward and aft, protected by 4-in. armor, while four guns were placed in single casemates at the corner positions on the main deck. The uptakes were protected by 2-in. armor up to the main deck."—W. Hovgaard, *Modern history of warships*, pp. 118-121, 123-124, 192-193.

1893-1914.—Harvey armor replaced by "Krupp Cemented".—Changes in armor plate slight.—

Modifications in construction of ships.—New types.—Dreadnought originated in Great Britain.—Development of the American dreadnought.—“In 1893 Krupp introduced a face-hardened armor, nickel chrome steel with special heat treatment, which soon superseded the Harvey armor. This armor, known as Krupp Cemented (K. C.), was adopted by Germany on the *Kaiser Wilhelm II* in 1897. By 1901 this new armor had been adopted by all the naval powers, and now [1914] practically all the principal armor of all the navies of the world is Krupp Cemented. In regard to recent improvements in armor very little has been made public. Several new kinds of armor or methods of manufacture have recently been reported, and it may be that K. C. armor will soon be discarded, as have all preceding kinds. The Schaumann plate, recently invented, consists of a light steel plate backed by a plate of duralumin. The two are welded together at various points, but not solidly. The new plate is lighter than steel and it is stated that the inventor expects to equal the best Krupp plate with 25 to 30 percent less weight. Another new plate is the Simpson, which consists of a hard tool steel plate and a tough steel plate welded together, with a sheet of copper between, giving a weld which is practically invisible, the welded plates being molecularly continuous. Hadfield had produced a cast steel plate which has been very successfully tested, and the use of these plates seems to be becoming more and more general. However, the quality of armor in general use has not greatly improved since 1897, while, on the other hand, guns have enormously improved at the same time that there has been improvement in the projectile itself, as well as that due to the adoption of the cap shortly after the Russian trials in 1894. With the introduction of the 13.5 and the 14-inch guns in the last year or so it may be said that the gun has again attained superiority over the armor; so, according to all precedent, we should see a new or improved armor adopted in the course of the next few years. . . . The change to steel permitted a lighter construction, giving a decrease in the dead weight and an increase in the allowable weight for armor and armament. Improvements in the methods of manufacture since that date have permitted of many improvements in the details of construction. In types of ships there has been a great change. The old wooden sailing ship carried a battery arranged for broadside fire, while the battleship of today is prepared for heavy end-on as well as broadside fire. The intermediate armament came into being on armored ships and passed away, battleships of to-day carrying only big guns and some torpedo defense guns. The old line-of-battle ships were high sided and from this type we jumped to the monitor with practically no freeboard. The battleships and battle-cruisers of today [1914] have worked back to the high freeboard and its elevated gun platform, which permits the use of the guns in a seaway and gives greater stability to the ship. In size also there has been a marked increase since the beginning of the modern era. Warships increased very gradually but continuously in size from the 1400 tons of the French floating batteries to the 12,000 tons of the pre-Dreadnoughts. Since then they have increased very rapidly to the 30,000 tons of to-day, with 40,000 tons proposed, with the result that battleships launched ten years ago have to-day but little value. [The British super-dreadnought *Hood*, launched in 1919, is 41,200 tons.] As the Panama Canal can accommodate battleships up to 43,000 tons only, that would seem to be the present limit in size, at least for the United States. The *Dreadnought*, which

marked the beginning [1906] of the rapid increase in size of warships, is about the only epoch-making development in naval science originating in Great Britain, but it opened a new era in ship design for the navies of the world. [See also WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1906-1909.] This ship was based on the design of ‘the ideal ship for the British Navy,’ published in 1903 by Colonel Cuniberti, Constructor to the Italian Navy. The ship, whose design had been declined by the Italian Navy because it was too ambitious for that power, was to be of 17,000 tons displacement and was to combine in itself the offensive and defensive powers of two or three battleships. The idea was not taken seriously, until, in the Russo-Japanese War, it was announced that the battleships *Aki* and *Satsuma*, which had been laid down, were to be more or less on the lines of Colonel Cuniberti’s design. At the same time it was announced that the United States had started the *South Carolina* and the *Michigan*, each carrying four two-gun center-line turrets. Both of these ideas were public property before the *Dreadnought* was laid down, but she was built with such rapidity that she was completed before any other vessel of the type, and her building was shrouded in so much mystery that she received considerably more advertising than did the other vessels. Japan and the United States are obviously entitled to a great share of the credit for originating the Dreadnought movement. The *South Carolina* type, all big guns on the center line, all bearing on either side, was a distinct novelty. No secrecy whatever was observed about them and the United States is probably the first nation that definitely adopted the all-big-gun idea. The Dreadnought idea spread rapidly, each nation striving to out-do the others by increasing the size and armament of each vessel laid down. This has resulted in a type known as the super-Dreadnought which surpassed the *Dreadnought* as much as that vessel surpassed its immediate predecessors. . . . It remains to be seen, however, whether the battleship will retain dominion over the sea or whether it is doomed to disappear, future wars being decided in the air or beneath the surface of the waters.”—R. Arthur, *Armor and its application to ships* (Coast Artillery Journal, 1914, v. 42, pp. 37-39).—The British ship *Dreadnought* was launched on February 10, 1906. The *South Carolina* and *Michigan* were laid down in the course of the same year. “At the time of the Spanish-American War our battleships had as their primary batteries 13-inch or 12-inch guns, combined with 8-inch, all in turrets, the heavier guns being mounted on the centre-line forward and aft, and the 8-inch on either beam. The secondary battery ranged from 6-inch down to 3-pounder rapid fire guns. The chief lessons taught by this war, insofar as battleships are concerned, were the value of keeping a navy in the pink of condition, both men and material; the necessity of radical changes in our gun target practice; and the necessity of adopting smokeless powder. The gallant effort of Cervera’s fleet, without proper stores or good ammunition, and its pathetic destruction, as compared with the famous trip of the ‘Oregon,’ speaks volumes for the necessity of a high standard of naval efficiency and drill. The remarkably low number of hits for the number of shots fired was a surprise to our naval authorities and brought about such a radical reform in target practice, mounting of guns, and service of ammunition, that today our vessels are excelled by none in the number of target hits. . . . In the early American Dreadnaughts the heavy guns were mounted in pairs in turrets, using the standard American emplacement. This arrange-

ment gave at the best four guns ahead and astern, with the broadside varying in accordance with the number of turrets mounted. This has given place to mounting three, and in the French Navy even four, heavy guns in a single turret. With a battery of ten or twelve heavy guns the emplacement may be made in four turrets, the forward guns and their ammunition being entirely clear forward of the machinery, while the after guns and ammunition abaft the machinery. This is a most desirable arrangement, as it lends itself to the better ventilation of magazines and prevents interruption between engine and the rooms. In one case we may have three guns each in the lower turrets and two each in the upper firing over the turrets below. This would give five heavy guns ahead and astern and ten on either side. By using three guns in each turret the head and stern fire may be increased to six guns and the broadside to twelve. The French in their latest design have placed four guns in one turret. With twelve guns, if mounted in four turrets, this would mean no increase in head fire over the 3-gun turret, but renders it possible to mount all twelve guns in three turrets, with the second turret firing over the first, giving eight guns ahead, twelve on broadside, and four astern. All sorts of variants may be made by using the several types of turrets here spoken of. . . . In firing in salvo this objection is not a serious one. However, the number of guns per turret may vary. The mounting of all heavy guns in turrets protected by armor and placing these upon the centre line has been universally adopted and the United States must be given the credit for originating this plan, embodying the greatest efficiency with the least weight. . . . It may be of interest to dwell for a few moments on the development and application of the turtle back or protective deck to war vessels. . . . The Stevens Battery incorporated this feature, but before this a lieutenant in the U. S. Navy, by the name of Hunter, invented an armored deck with the sides sloping down at the sides of the vessel below the waterline. In the development of foreign war vessels this system was adopted for the protection of the magazines and machinery of protected cruisers and in some cases sole reliance for protection to the vital portion of the vessel was placed in decks of this sort for ships of large displacement and heavy artillery. Later on, this principle was applied to battleships, the idea being that if the projectile penetrated the belt armor the armored deck would stop the fragments of shell or deflect the solid shot. The accepted method of the present day is to work a flat deck of armor at the top of the main deck and a sloping deck not more than one and one-half inches thick on the slopes as a splinter deck."—W. A. Dobson, *Evolution of the battleship of the dreadnaught type (Proceedings of the Engineers' Club, Oct. 1914, v. 31, no. 4, pp. 306-307, 309)*.

1900-1918.—Formation of submarine fleets.—Use of guns.—Mine-laying submarines. See SUBMARINES: 1900-1918; 1912-1918.

1905.—Smaller navies: Argentina.—Brazil.—Norway. — Holland. — Sweden. — Denmark.—"Most navies of the second and third rank are intended for a defensive policy or for offensive duties within a short distance from their base. . . . This determines the requirements to seagoing qualities. For countries that border on the ocean, it is desirable to have ships of full seagoing, *i.e.* ocean-going, capability. . . . The coast-lines of these countries [Argentina and Brazil] are very extensive, . . . requiring for their defence ships of full seagoing capability, high speed, and good steaming radius. . . . During the period here under con-

sideration the Argentine Government was not able or willing to incur the enormous expenditure incident to the construction of such vessels, and as late as the middle of the nineties the country possessed no armored ships suitable for service on the ocean. The small armorclads *Almirante Brown*, 1880, 4200 ts., and the *Libertad* and *Independencia*, 1890-91, 2340 ts., could only be used for coast defence in a narrow sense. In the last half of the nineties several armored cruisers were acquired as a compromise to represent the sea-going element. The requirements to the Brazilian Navy are even more exacting than in case of the Argentine Navy, the coast-line to be defended being much more extended; but in Brazil, as in Argentina, only small coast-defence ships were acquired prior to 1905. The *Riachuelo*, 5700 ts., and *Aquidaban*, 4950 ts., were built by the Thames Iron Works in the eighties, and resembled the British Admiral class in point of protection, but the two turrets, which carried 9.4-in. guns, were placed *en échelon*. At the end of the nineties two still smaller coast-defence ships were built by La Seyne in Toulon. . . . The strategical conditions of Norway demand, first, a local defence of important fiords; second, a general defence of the extended coast-line, so as to prevent blockades and protect the communication between different parts of the country. Before the advent of the submarine boat, monitors assisted by torpedo-craft were the types best suited for the former duty, and during the years 1866-72 four monitors were launched. . . . The problem before the Norwegian Navy is, in fact, similar to, although less exacting than, that before the Argentine Navy, and requires at least moderate-sized seagoing battleships; but the financial resources of the country have not so far allowed this solution without an undue concentration of power in a few ships. Hence, a compromise has been adopted by the construction of smaller ships which can only imperfectly satisfy all requirements. In 1895 the naval defences of Norway were in a very low condition, the only armored vessels being the four monitors, which were then quite obsolete; but the controversy with Sweden concerning the union between the two countries suddenly aroused an interest in the naval defence, and liberal means were appropriated for this purpose. The result was the acquisition of four armorclads of the *Harald Haarfager* type, 1897-1900, of nearly 4000 ts. displacement. These vessels, which were built by Armstrong, were very similar to the Swedish ships of that time, being, like these, in reality slow-speed armored cruisers. . . . The Dutch Navy has to perform two entirely distinct strategic duties: defence of home coasts and defence of the colonies, especially in the East Indies. The ships destined for the former service must be suitable for coast and river navigation, whence small draught is of advantage. The freeboard may be moderate, . . . the coal supply may be small and the speed moderate. The caliber of the guns and the thickness of the armor should match those of first-class battleships. . . . Ships for service in the colonies must be capable of navigating the ocean and must possess a fair speed and great steaming radius. The armament and protection may be relatively light in view of the service which such vessels will generally have to perform. . . . Second-class armored cruisers seem the most appropriate for this service. The *Reinier-Claeszen*, 1891, 2500 ts., was a monitor with a mid-ship superstructure. She was built for home defence, but the small displacement did not allow an adequate armament to be carried, and the armor was very light. The main battery consisted of one 8.3-in. and one 6.7-in. gun. In the following type,

the *Piet-Hein* class, 1894, 3500 ts., 16 kts., an attempt was made to combine the qualities required for home defence and colonial service in one design (*schep à double usage*), but the small displacement made it impossible for the designers to solve this problem, and a compromise had to be accepted. The armament was light, consisting of three 8.3-in. and two 6-in. guns, and the armor belt was of only 6-in. thickness. The freeboard was moderately high, 9 or 10 ft., and the seagoing capability was fairly good, but the coal capacity was small, the ships were therefore militarily too weak for home defence, and the steaming radius was too small for colonial service. At the end of the nineties it was decided to build a new and larger type of armor-clad, especially designed for service in the East Indies, where it should be assisted by protected cruisers. The vessels of the *Piet-Hein* class became thus available for home service and were to be assisted by the older monitors and gunboats. The new ships, the *Koningin-Regentes* class, 1900-01, 5100 ts., 16½ kts., were armed with two 9.4-in. and four 6-in. guns. The belt was complete and had a maximum thickness of 6 in. The coal capacity was 680-830 ts., giving a steaming radius of 4500 miles. There was one full deck above the protective deck and a fore-castle. The two last ships of this class were slightly larger and carried the 6-in. guns in single turrets. . . . Swedish battleships, having to operate in the Baltic and the Kattegat, must possess fair seagoing qualities. The speed should be relatively high on account of the extended coast-line of the country, but, as in the Norwegian battleships, the coal supply may be small. The ships built prior to 1880 were monitors and gunboats, well suited to local defence of the fiords and channels inside the numerous islands that skirt large sections of the Swedish coast, but not adapted to work in the open sea. The first monitor was designed by John Ericsson, who presented to his native country the two American 15-in. guns with which the ship was armed. It was completed in 1865 and was named *John Ericsson*. It was regarded at that time as the most powerful armor-clad in Europe. In the period from the middle of the eighties to 1905 were built a number armor-clads of from 3300 to 3700 ts. displacement, all with about 9 or 10 ft. freeboard, armed with two guns of 10-in. or 8.3-in. caliber, and protected on the same principle as the English *Admiral* class. The earliest vessels, the *Svea* class, carried two 10-in. guns in one turret, but all the later ships had a turret at each end. The secondary battery consisted of 5-in. or 6-in. guns, and was well protected. The thickness of the armor belt was reduced steadily from 11¼ in. in the *Svea*, 1885, to 7 in. in the *Aeran* class, 1901-03. The speed was high for ships of that size, being about 15 kts. in the *Svea* type, increasing to 17 kts. in the *Aeran*. These features were still more marked in the last ship laid down in this period, *Oskar II.*, 1905, 4600 ts., which had a speed of 18½ kts., and only 6-in. armor on the belt. On the other hand, the hull protection was more extended. In spite of the larger displacement, the primary battery still consisted of two 8.3-in. guns, as in the preceding ships, but the secondary armament was increased to eight 6-in. guns, mounted in turrets. The relatively high requirements as to seaworthiness and speed in Swedish battleships were such as could only be satisfied on a much larger displacement, . . . if at the same time an adequate armament and protection were to be carried. . . . The solution was necessarily a compromise. . . . The resulting type, especially as represented by *Oskar II.*, was virtually . . . an armored cruiser of relatively

slow speed. . . . The operation of Danish battleships is confined almost entirely to landlocked waters, where only small seagoing capability is required. . . . Under these advantageous conditions a monitor-like vessel, with a freeboard of 3 to 4 ft., fulfils the requirements. After the construction of several small monitors following the *Rolf Kreke*, there was built a rather large casemate vessel, the *Helgoland*, 1878, 5400 ts., with the armor and armament of a first-class battleship. The freeboard was unnecessarily large, being about 11 ft., but on the whole the *Helgoland* was a satisfactory type for that time. The *Iver Hvitfeldt*, 1886, 3300 ts., was very similar to contemporaneous Swedish battleships, and had the same freeboard, which, again, was rather high for Danish waters. She carried two 10-in. guns in barbettes. The *Skjold*, 1896, 2200 ts., was a monitor for harbor defence, armed with one 9-in. and three 4.7-in. guns. In this ship Thornycroft boilers were used for the first time in an armor-clad, after having been first successfully tried in a small cruiser, the *Gejser*, 1892. They were henceforth applied in practically all classes of warships in the Danish Navy. In 1899 was launched the *Herluf Trolle*, 3410 ts., 15 kts., the first of a new class of ships which in point of seagoing capability were well suited to the conditions, being virtually monitors with a low fore-castle to prevent the bow-wave from flooding the fore-deck. A rather large superstructure was built amidships, housing four 6-in. guns in single casemates, and at each end was mounted one 9.4-in. gun in a closed turret. The belt was complete, and had a maximum thickness of 8 in. It was covered with a flat 2-in. armor deck. Again, the caliber of the principal guns, although superior to that of Norwegian and Swedish ships, was too small."—W. Hovgaard, *Modern history of warships*, pp. 129-135.

1905-1915.—Various navies since 1905.—"In the Argentine Navy the complete step to the dreadnought type was taken in the *Rivadavia* and *Moreno*, 1911, 27,570 ts. . . . [In Austria-Hungary], 1907, the claim was advanced that the fleet should be sufficiently strong to perform all duties in the Adriatic. . . . This brought about the construction of an intermediate type, the *Radetzky* class of 14,300 ts. displacement; but the political events in 1909 and the general development in warship design soon led to greater efforts, and in 1911 was launched the *Viribus Unitis*, the first of a class of dreadnoughts of 20,000 ts. displacement, which was well suited to the conditions that obtained in the Mediterranean. These ships carry four triple turrets in the center-line on the *Michigan* plan. The conning-tower is in two stories, and an armored Bar and Stroud range-finder is mounted in a hood on the top; it rises behind the gun turrets as an independent structure, being practically unencumbered by bridges and other light works. . . . The Brazilian Navy acquired the dreadnoughts, *Minas Geraes* and *Sao-Paulo*, 1908-09, 19,500 ts., and the *Rio de Janeiro*, 1913, 27,500 ts.; but the latter ship was incorporated in the British Navy at the outbreak of the war and named the *Agincourt*. . . . The [German] Navy Law of 1900 was modified by various amendments (*Novellen*), and was finally replaced by a new Law . . . 1912, according to which the German fleet by 1920 should consist of 41 battleships organized in 5 squadrons, with one fleet-flagship, 20 large cruisers, 40 small cruisers, 144 torpedo-boats, and 72 submarines. Battleships and cruisers should be replaced after twenty years, reckoned from the year when the first appropriation was given for the old ship till the year when the first appropriation was given for the new ship.

The German dreadnought battleships evolved through the following types: the *Nassau*, 1908, 18,600 ts.; *Helgoland*, 1909-10, 22,450 ts.; *Kaiser*, 1911-12, 24,300 ts.; *König*, 1913-14, 26,600 ts.; and *Ersatz Wörth* or *Baden* class, 28,000 ts. The development followed the same general lines as in the British Navy. The caliber of the heavy guns, which was 11 in. in the *Nassau*, was increased to 12.2 in. in the *Helgoland*, but this weapon was considered equivalent in power to the 13½-in. gun that was just then adopted in the British Navy, and the number of guns in the *Helgoland* was twelve as against ten in the British ships. After the English, in 1913, had adopted the 15-in. gun, the German followed and adopted the same caliber (38 cm.) in the *Ersatz Wörth*. The German dreadnoughts, like the Japanese, carry a battery of 6-in. guns, but besides that they have a light battery consisting of a great number of 3½-in. (8.8 cm.) guns. The disposition of the primary guns in the *Nassau* and *Helgoland* is the same as in the *Kawachi*, where two turrets placed on each side mask one another and are liable to interfere with the center-line turrets at the ends. This feature is the result of overgunning and is particularly objectionable in . . . short vessels. . . . In the *Kaiser* class, where the number of guns is reduced to ten, it has been avoided, the superfiring arrangement being adopted for the aft turrets, and the two midships turrets being mounted on the broadsides *en échelon*. This is the same arrangement as in the *Neptune*, then already abandoned in England. In the *König* class there are five turrets in the center-line, as in the *Orion*, and the *Ersatz Wörth* is, in the arrangement of the guns, a copy of the *Queen Elizabeth*. The torpedo tube in the bow, which had been a feature in German ships for many years, was abandoned in the *Kaiser* class, and henceforth only five tubes were carried. The belt armor, which was 12 in. thick in the *Nassau*, was increased to 14 in. in the *König* and 15 in. in the *Baden*. The uptakes are in later ships protected by 6-in. armor. In the *Helgoland*, and probably also in later ships, Frahm's anti-rolling tanks are fitted. . . . The evolution of the light cruiser in the German Navy was very systematic, progressing from the *Bremen* class, 1903-05, 3200 ts., 23 kts., through the *Königsberg*, *Kolberg*, and *Magdeburg* classes to the *Rostock* class, 1912, 4800 ts., 27 kts. The vessels of the two latter classes resemble the English *Bristol* type, but their armament, twelve 4-in. guns, is lighter, the speed somewhat higher, and the coal capacity greater. Two guns are mounted abreast of each other, forward and aft respectively, on a fore-castle and on a deckhouse. The waterline is protected by a narrow 4-in. belt; the protective deck has 2 in. of armor. The vessels of the *Graudenz* class, 1913-14, 5000 ts., 27.5 kts., are armed with two 6-in. and ten 4-in. guns. In the *Ersatz Gefion* of this class, Föttinger transformers were tried in the propulsive machinery. The 4-in. gun with which the German light cruisers are armed is semi-automatic and can fire up to about twenty rounds per minute. . . . A number of German light cruisers built during the war, named after war losses, *Köln*, etc., were of 5400 ts. displacement and carried eight 6-in. guns. Two cruisers, the *Bremse* and *Brummer*, 4000 ts., 29.5 kts., armed with four 6-in. guns in the center-line, were specially designed and equipped for mine-laying. The German cruisers excel in coal capacity. The vessels of the *Magdeburg* class, for instance, can stow nearly 1200 ts., those of the *Rostock* class stow 1550 ts. of coal. . . . The German armored cruiser evolved from the *First Bismarck*, 1897, 10,550 ts., 19 kts.,

through the *Prinz Heinrich*, 1900, 8750 ts., 20½ kts.; the *Prinz Adalbert* and *Friedrich Karl*, 1901-02, 8850 ts., 21 kts.; the *Roon* and *Yorck*, 1903-04, 9350 ts., 21½ kts.; the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, 1906, 11,400 ts., 23 kts.; and the *Blücher*, 1908, 15,550 ts., 25¾ kts., showing a steady progression in size and speed. . . . While the caliber of the primary guns was reduced, beginning with the *Prinz Adalbert*, and while the number of guns was gradually increased, the distribution of the side armor was altered in the same general direction, being concentrated and heavy (8 in.) in the *Fürst Bismarck*, but more extended and lighter (4 in. or 6 in.) in the later types. . . . The first German battle-cruiser was *Von der Tann*, 1909, 19,100 ts., 28 kts. She is of the same size and quite similar in general design to the *Indefatigable*, but the heavy guns are only of 11-in. caliber. The torpedo-defence guns are of 3½-in. caliber, but in addition an intermediate battery of ten 6-in. guns is carried. The armor on the belt is of 10-in. thickness as against 8-in. in the English ship, and the 6-in. guns are placed in a large armored casemate or battery amidships. *Von der Tann* was followed by the *Moltke*, *Goeben*, and *Seydlitz*, all armed with ten 11-in. guns, arranged as in the *Neptune*. The *Seydlitz*, 1912, 24,600 ts., 28 kts., is said to be protected against submarine attack by 2-in. longitudinal bulkheads fitted 10 ft. from the sides. The armor was carried to the main deck amidships. The last type of which any data are officially known is the *Derfflinger*, 1913, 26,000 ts., 26.5 kts. (designed), armed with eight 12-in. guns mounted in four turrets on the super-firing plan and twelve 6-in. guns. . . . The *Derfflinger* was followed by the *Lützow*, 1913, *Hindenburg*, 1915, *Mackensen* and *Graf von Spee*, 1917. The two last-named ships are said to be larger and more powerfully armed than previous German ships of this class. [See also GERMANY: 1898-1914; WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1909: German side, etc.; 1909-1913; WORLD WAR: CAUSES: Indirect: 1.] . . . In Holland, the latest battleship, *De-Zeven-Provincien*, 1909, 6400 ts., although carrying 11-in. guns instead of the 10-in. guns in earlier vessels, is yet too weakly gunned and also the armor protection is too light to enable the ship to face modern first-class battleships. The same remark applies to the new Swedish battleship *Sverige*, 6700 ts., which is likewise armored with 11-in. guns. . . . [The] *De-Zeven-Provincien* has fore-castle, poop, and deckhouse amidships, and carries 700 ts. of coal, the *Sverige* has only a superstructure amidships, and carries but 310 ts. of coal. . . . The primary as well as the secondary battery in the Swedish ship is exactly twice as powerful as in the Dutch ship; the belt armor is about 8 in. against 6 in., and a 4-in. redoubt is fitted between the belt and the main deck, not found in the Dutch ship. The speed is 22.5 kts. against 16.3 kts. It appears, however, that a ship of still greater military value could have been obtained by giving the *Sverige* two guns of heavier caliber instead of the four 11-in. guns, by reducing the speed somewhat, and by increasing the thickness of the armor. A step in this direction was taken in the Danish battleship *Niels Juel*, 4000 ts., now building, of the *Herluf Trolle* class, which is to carry two 12-in. guns instead of the 9.4-in. guns of former ships of that class. . . . The *Quarto* class [in Italy] 1911-12, 3250-3550 ts., 28 kts., have relatively high speed, but are said to be bad sea-boats. The armament consists of six 4.7-in., six 3-in. guns, and two above-water 18-in. torpedo tubes. Provision is made for carrying 200 mines. . . . The Italians adopted the triple-gun

turret in the *Dante Alighieri*, 1910, 19,200 ts., and used this installation in the following ships except in the superfiring turrets, which are on the twin system. The armor protection of Italian battleships is characterized by great extension and very moderate thickness. In the *Andrea Doria* the side is almost completely covered with armor, the thickness ranging from 10 in. to 4 in. The vessels of the *Christoforo Colombo* class, 30,000 ts., 25 kts., now building, are to carry eight 15-in. and sixteen 6-in. guns. They seem to resemble strongly the *Queen Elizabeth*. . . . The *Satsuma* and *Aki*, the first battleships built in Japan, are a development of the intermediate *Kashima* type, but the *Kawachi* and *Settsu*, 1910-11, 20,800 ts., are pure dreadnoughts, carrying twelve 12-in. guns mounted in twin turrets, of which four are placed on the broadsides. In the *Fuso* class, 1914-17, 31,000 ts., 22.5 kts., the broadside installations are abandoned, and twelve 14-in. guns are mounted in triple turrets on the center-line. The secondary battery consists of sixteen 6-in. and four 3-in. guns, the latter for use against aircraft. . . . The Battleships *Tsukuba* and *Ikoma*, laid down in 1905, were designed for 20.5 kts., but in the *Kurama* and *Ibuki*, 1907, 14,600 ts., the speed was raised to 22 kts., 3 kts. more than in battleships of that date. These vessels were a modification of the *Vittorio Emanuele*. The next Japanese battle-cruisers, the four vessels of the *Kongo* class, 1912-13, 27,500 ts., 28 kts., were of a far more perfect design and represent the best practice in the construction of battle-cruisers. The main armament consists of eight 14-in. guns mounted on the *Michigan* plan, and the Japanese here, as in their battleships, retained the secondary battery, which consists of sixteen 6-in. guns. The light battery is of 3-in. caliber. A powerful armament of four double 21-in. torpedo tubes is carried. The maximum thickness of the belt is 10 in., which approaches that of contemporaneous battleships. . . . The *Pervozvannyi* class [Russia], 1906-07, and the *Gangut* class, 1911, are remarkable for the completeness of their protective system, the armor extending over practically the entire outer surface, but, as in the Italian ships, this is necessarily attained at the expense of thickness. The *Gangut* is quite similar to the *Dante Alighieri*, but, although 4000 ts. larger, its armament and external protection are, according to the published data, somewhat weaker and the speed somewhat smaller than in the Italian ship. Probably greater weight is devoted in the Russian type to armor decks and the under-water protection, or the published data are inaccurate."—W. Hovgaard, *Modern history of warships*, pp. 159, 157-158, 155-156, 196, 219, 231-232, 160-161, 196-197, 156-157, 155, 232-233, 157.

1914.—Strength of the Great Powers at the outbreak of the World War. See WORLD WAR: 1914: IX. Naval operations: a.

1914-1918.—World War lessons.—Usefulness of destroyers.—Mine layers and sweepers.—Smoke screens.—Sea-going battleships.—Light cruisers.—Torpedo vessels.—"In the recent war the usefulness of destroyers was fully demonstrated. In spite of the numerous fleet of such craft possessed by Great Britain, there seems to have been a constant scarcity of them throughout the war. In the North Sea, destroyers, assisted by submarines, appear to have performed the principal part of the reconnoitring, patrol, and blockading service. They were used extensively for escorting battleships and troopships, and successfully attacked battleships (*Goliath*) and cruisers (*Hamadieh* and *Takachio*). . . . In the spring of 1915, when active operations against the Dardanelles commenced, the

work of the destroyers became even harder. . . . In the battle of Jutland destroyers vindicated their position as an indispensable link in the organism of a modern fleet. Tactically destroyers were used as a screen for the capital ships, partly to protect them against submarines, partly against attacks from other destroyers. In the latter function they were often assisted by light cruisers. . . . They were used for direct attack on capital ships whenever opportunities offered, and when it was desired to head off the enemy, to open the range, or perform a critical maneuver. . . . On many occasions during the war destroyers carried out surprise night attacks by bombarding roadsteads and fortresses, a work for which they are well suited on account of their smallness and high speed. The most important duty of destroyers in this war, however, was the safeguarding of the lines of communication across the sea against attack by submarines. This duty comprised in the first line protection of transports of troops and army supplies of all kinds, but it included also protection of all merchant shipping, and as the war developed this problem became one of vital importance. Gradually, as the German submarines progressed in seagoing capacity and arteristic power, destroyers became more and more indispensable to combat them and a powerful artillery the first requisite. . . . In large seagoing destroyers the gun has now become the primary weapon, while the torpedo, although yet of importance, is a weapon of opportunity. . . . Since 1905 a great number of vessels in all navies were fitted out as 'mine-layers' and 'mine-sweepers.' . . . In this war mines were used on an unprecedented scale. The losses in warships due to mine attack aggregated for the Central Powers about 135,000 tons and for the Entente Powers about 200,000 tons, not including auxiliary cruisers and other special vessels. There was, moreover, an enormous destruction of merchant tonnage. The mine danger exerted a marked influence on the strategic conditions; it affected the relative importance of the various types of warships, and in some cases influenced their design. . . . The enormous proportions which the mine war had taken by this time is evidenced by the fact that during 1917 one thousand mine-sweepers were constantly employed around the British coasts, and a total of 4600 mines were swept up. Mine-sweeping, which at first was carried out with improvised means and methods, became a profession or art, which was practised methodically by crews trained and experienced in this particular service and in ships specially equipped for this purpose. It was preceded and assisted by a systematic exploration and reconnoitring of the suspected areas, and in this work not only patrol vessels but also all kind of aircraft were employed on an increasingly large scale. The production of mines attained unprecedented figures; in the United States alone it arose at the end of 1917 to one thousand a day. . . . The submarine mine is, more than any other weapon, American in origin and development. It was invented by an American about one hundred and fifty years ago, was for the first time applied on a large scale in the American Civil War, and reached its highest development in the North Sea barrage, which was due essentially to American initiative and efforts. In boldness of conception, in magnitude, as well as in energy and skill of execution the North Sea barrage surpassed everything heretofore attempted in that field. . . . Concealment as a means of protection, allowing temporary relief from attack by a superior enemy, was practised during the war on many occasions, and

often with important results. [See *WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: VII.*] . . . Seagoing battleships must be able to navigate the ocean for extended periods, and should afford a dry and steady platform for the guns. They must therefore possess good seagoing capability as one of their fundamental qualities. The battles of the Dogger Bank and Falkland Islands, as well as several minor actions in the World War, have demonstrated the enormous value of combined superiority in speed and gun power. In fact, a ship possessing the speed-gauge and being armed with guns of superior power can annihilate a weaker enemy at extreme ranges with relatively small risk to itself. This two-fold superiority, for which we venture to propose the name of the 'speed-armament gauge,' must be a fundamental principle in battleship design. The principle of the speed-armament gauge is of paramount importance for battleships, but is of at least equal importance to battle-cruisers, and must indeed govern the design of all classes of vessels armed with artillery as their principal weapon. . . . For the torpedo-defence battery a caliber of 6 in. will probably remain adequate for the present. A battery of anti-aircraft guns, effective up to altitudes of at least 10,000 ft., must be carried in all battleships. As regards protection against attack by artillery, there appears no immediate necessity for augmenting the thickness of vertical armor, but it is likely that the horizontal armor protection will be further developed in view of the great angles of fall of projectiles at extreme fighting ranges, and the dangers of aerial attack. A more efficient under-water protection is imperatively demanded in order to meet the greatly enhanced submarine dangers. . . . Conning-towers should be further developed in direction of roominess and protection, permitting a concentration of all the controlling elements of the ship within one armored structure, so designed as to avoid mutual interference and the danger of simultaneous disarrangement of destruction of the various parts. . . . To the requirements here advanced must be added that of a great radius of action, necessitating a large supply of fuel. It is evident, therefore, that seagoing battleships must be in the future at least as large and probably larger than any vessels of this class now completed. . . . The limitation to an increase in size, imposed by the requirements to tactical and strategical divisibility of the forces, is essentially a financial one, and need not, so far, be considered by the great and wealthy nations. The only active limitations are those due to restrictions in the use of ports, docks, canals and channels. . . . Under modern conditions of warfare battleships are not self-contained tactical units. More than ever they require for their assistance and protection a variety of attendant ships of different types, the most important of which are battle-cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. Each of these classes, besides being indispensable as tactical adjuncts to the battleships, also supplement them strategically and are required for a variety of independent duties. Depending upon the nature of the operations, a fleet of modern battleships needs also the more extraneous assistance of minesweepers, mine-layers, and a host of auxiliary vessels. Other types of ships, such as monitors, gun-boats, small submarines, and torpedo-boats, are required for local defence of and attack on coasts and harbors. . . . Light Cruisers should be at least as fast as battle-cruisers and should carry guns at least as powerful as those of enemy ships of their class. These claims may lead to an increase in displacement considerably beyond the now common

5000 ts., and possibly to a differentiation in large and small light cruisers in order to meet all the various requirements of the service. Since multiplicity of units is a fundamental claim in this class of vessels, it is well to be conservative in augmenting their displacement. Torpedo-Vessels should be at least as fast as light cruisers. The 4-in. gun and the 21-in. long-range torpedo will probably for some time to come remain the principal armament of large destroyers. The violent motions of this craft in a seaway render it unprofitable to go to larger caliber of the guns, since long-range fighting cannot be used with advantage on such an unsteady gun platform. Flotilla-leaders of more than 1500 ts. displacement may perhaps with advantage carry guns of 4.7-in. or 5-in. caliber."—W. Hovgaard, *Modern history of warships*, pp. 271-273, 275, 444-445, 449-451, 471, 477-481.

See also *SUBMARINES; WAR, PREPARATION FOR; WORLD WAR: 1914: IX. Naval operations; 1915: IX. Naval operations; 1916: IX. Naval operations; etc.*

ALSO IN: F. L. Robertson, *Evolution of naval armament*.

WARTBURG, castle near Eisenach in Saxe-Weimar, Germany. Luther was concealed here in 1521 at the instance of Frederick the Wise, elector of Saxony, and it was during his ten months' stay that he completed his translation of the New Testament. See *PAPACY: 1521-1522; also GERMANY: 1817-1820.*

WARWICK, Richard Neville, Earl of (1428-1471), called "the king-maker," English political leader and commander. Fought in the Wars of the Roses first against the Yorkists and then against the Lancastrians. See *ENGLAND: 1455-1471.*

WARWICK, House of. See *BEAUCHAMP.*

WARWICK PLANTATION. See *RHODE ISLAND: 1641-1647.*

WASEDA UNIVERSITY. See *UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1871-1913.*

WASHAKIS, North American Indian tribe. See *SHOSHONEAN FAMILY.*

WASHINGTON, George (1732-1799), American soldier, statesman and first president of the United States. Commander-in-chief of the Continental forces during the American Revolution. Served in the French and Indian War, 1754, 1755-1758; member of the First and Second Continental Congresses, 1774 and 1775; commander-in-chief of the Continental army, 1775-1783; member of the Constitutional Convention of 1787; president of the United States, 1789-1796.

First campaigns in the French and Indian War. See *OHIO: 1754; 1755.*

Delegate to First Continental Congress. See *U. S. A.: 1774 (September).*

In the War of the American Revolution. See *U. S. A.: 1775 (May-August), to 1783 (November-December); also AMERICAN FABIAN.*

Part in the framing of the Federal constitution. See *U. S. A.: 1787.*

Presidential election and administration. See *U. S. A.: 1789, to 1796.*

Choice of site for Federal capital. See *WASHINGTON, D. C.: 1791-1800.*

Plan for Cumberland Road. See *CUMBERLAND ROAD.*

Views on the creation of a United States navy. See *NAVY DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES: Origin.*

Farewell address. See *U. S. A.: 1796: Washington's farewell address.*

Death. See *U. S. A.: 1799.*

As a deist. See *DEISM: American deists.*

WASHINGTON, George Corbin (1789-1854), American political leader. Nominated for the vice presidency of the United States by the Know Nothing party, 1852. See U.S.A.: 1852: Appearance of the Know Nothing, or American, Party.

WASHINGTON, William (1752-1810), American soldier. See U.S.A.: 1780-1781.

WASHINGTON, name for proposed state west of Pennsylvania. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1784.

WASHINGTON: Location.—Area.—Climate.—Resources.—Washington, the "evergreen state," is one of the Pacific coast states, and nineteenth in size of the states of the Union, to which it was admitted in 1889. It is bounded on the north by British Columbia, on the east by Idaho, on the south, by Oregon, and on the west by the Pacific ocean. In 1920 its population was 1,356,621. "Washington is located at the northwest corner of the United States directly west of the most accessible passes across the northern Rocky Mountains. It is therefore on the natural trade routes between the central states and the Orient. It is also the nearest shipping point to Alaska. . . . The state is roughly rectangular in form. The greatest length east and west is 360 miles and the greatest width 240 miles. Its total area is 69,127 square miles, including 2201 square miles of water surface. . . . [It] exceeds in area the New England states."—E. J. Saunders, *Physical geography of Washington* (*Journal of Geography*, May, 1916, p. 309).—"Washington is said to have all climates except the tropical. It is divided into two distinct divisions by the Cascade Mountains. On the west, the Puget Sound Country, there is really no winter and almost no ice or snow. Roses bloom in December and grass is green all the year round. . . . In Eastern Washington the climate is very different. It is much drier and somewhat colder in winter and dry and considerably warmer in summer. . . . In some sections of Eastern Washington irrigation is carried on, and enormous fruit, grain, and pasture crops are raised. The climate of both Eastern and Western Washington is entirely free from the sudden changes and variations of other sections. There are almost no thunderstorms; no cyclones or blizzards; no drought or floods; no sunstrokes; no insect pests, grasshoppers, army worms, chinch bugs, etc. . . . Different parts of the state vary so much in altitude, rainfall, quality of soil, etc., that almost any fruits except the citrus family will thrive and bear bountiful harvests somewhere."—W. C. Wolfe, *Washington, the evergreen state* (*Sketches of Washingtonians*, pp. 18, 22).—"Beginning at Mt. St. Helens on the south, and following to the International boundary on the north, crossing at times to the east, and veering at others to the west, the great mineral belt of Washington traverses the state, identifying itself with the Cascade range and its numerous and elevated spurs and foothills. . . . [The mineral wealth consists of] precious metals as well as of copper, lead, quicksilver, zinc, arsenic, antimony, molybdenum, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, titanium, quarries of granite, limestone, sandstone, marble, jasper, and serpentine beds of fire clay, kaolin, diatomaceous earth and pottery clays, veins of talc and asbestos and indications of petroleum."—J. C. Hubbart, *Metal mining* (*Sketches of Washingtonians*, p. 35).—See also U.S.A.: Economic map.

1803.—Basis of claim for American possession. —Louisiana Purchase. See LOUISIANA: 1798-1803.

1811-1846.—Early history of Washington and Oregon coincident.—Astoria.—"The history of Washington is a part of, and essentially the same as, the history of Oregon during its earlier years. The Washington of today was originally a part of that vaster Oregon which extended from California, then a part of Mexico, on the south, to an undefined boundary,—by many claimed to be in the line of 54° 40' north, or the southern boundary of Alaska, but finally fixed by the treaty of 1846 at the forty-ninth parallel,—and from the Pacific Ocean to the summit of the Rocky Mountains. Until California was acquired, at the close of the Mexican war in 1848, Oregon was the only territory owned or claimed by the United States, bordering on the Pacific. . . . The value of this vast region was for many years but lightly regarded either by our government or its people."—C. A. Snowden, *History of Washington*, v. 1, p. 3.—See also OREGON: 1808-1826.—"After the Louisiana purchase by the United States and the return of the Lewis & Clark expedition with their report upon the conditions which they found in the Pacific Northwest, . . . it became an open secret that the Americans and especially the great fur merchant of New York, namely John Jacob Astor, had designs upon the Columbia river basin. . . . The Nor'westers [the Northwest Company, an English firm] were quick to see the opportunity offered them by . . . the defenseless condition of the Astor establishment on the Columbia [1817]. . . . Without going into details, Duncan McDougal, the factor in charge at Astoria, sold out the whole Astorian enterprise on the Pacific to the Northwest Company on November 12th, 1813. The American flag was hauled down and the Union Jack was run up in its stead."—W. C. Brown, *Early Okanogan history*, pp. 2, 20.—"The real peopling of Washington was started by the Oregon Migration in the spring of 1843. This party, of more than one thousand people from Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and other honest farmers of the middle west, had Marcus Whitman as one of the leaders and followed the Oregon Trail through the South Pass into the new country. Horace Greeley considered these people wholly insane but he lived to visit this region of marvelous possibilities and advised young men to go west. The long caravans crawling slowly over the plains and the mountains did not bring the people very rapidly. . . . The early comers spread over the new lands, selecting those sites that were best adapted for fishing, sawmills and trading posts."—W. M. Gregory, *Growth of cities of Washington* (*Journal of Geography*, May, 1916).—See also TRAILS: Transcontinental.—The extent of the claim upon the Oregon Territory made in 1846 by the United States government, based upon the settlements of these western pioneers, is a controverted question among American historians.—See also OREGON: 1818-1846; 1846-1855.

1848-1853.—Creation of Territory of Washington.—Political relations with Oregon Territory.—"In 1848 Oregon had been organized as a territory in which the settlers of the territory later to be known as Washington were included. [See OREGON: 1846-1855.] Just before it adjoined in 1851 the legislature of Oregon passed an act removing the capital of the territory from Oregon City to the new town of Salem. . . . When the time appointed for the next meeting of the legislature arrived, a majority of its members repaired to Salem, organized both houses [legislature and council] and proceeded to business. . . . At Ore-

gon City also appeared [Judge] Columbia Lancaster, sole member of the council, . . . Daniel F. Brownfield, sole representative of the north side of the river, and three other members of the lower house, and proceeded to organize a minority legislature, so far as such a body could be organized. . . . For seventeen days, Sundays excepted, these two minority houses gravely met and as gravely adjourned for want of a quorum. Then the presiding officers as gravely adopted a memorial to Congress, to which they affixed their official signature and adjourned without day. . . . Before the time arrived for the next meeting of the legislature, Judge Lancaster resigned his place [in the regular council] and Governor Gaines in November, 1853, called a special election to choose his successor. . . . The proclamation came so late there was not time to hold the election and get returns from the scattered communities interested in time for the member chosen to be present at the session of 1852-1853. . . . Thus for two successive sessions the settlers in northern Oregon were deprived of the services of nearly all of the few representatives allotted to them, and it is not surprising that they should feel that their interests were neglected, or that they should early begin to agitate for a legislature, all of which should be their own. . . . At the second celebration in Olympia on July 4, 1852 . . . the separation question was discussed with much enthusiasm. Before the meeting adjourned resolutions were adopted recommending that a general convention be held at Cowlitz landing on August 29, 1852. . . . On the appointed day twenty-six delegates assembled at Cowlitz. . . . [They] proceeded to prepare a memorial to Congress asking for the division of the territory; also for a military road from some point on the Sound to Walla Walla, and another from the Sound to the Columbian River. They also indicated the boundaries of twelve counties of which the new territory would consist, and asked that the benefits of the donation law might be extended to it when created. They then adjourned to meet again in the following May, when, if the prayer of their memorial was not granted, they proposed to proceed to the preparation of a constitution, after the manner of California, and ask for admission as a State. As the territory did not then contain more than twenty-five hundred or three thousand inhabitants, the action might by some be considered a little presumptuous. . . . [A subsequent convention was shortly called at Monticello.] The memorial which the convention had adopted was promptly sent to Washington with a letter to Governor Lane, who was now territorial delegate from Oregon at the national capital, asking that he would give it his cordial approval and support. It was soon followed by a similar memorial from the Oregon legislature, approving and recommending the separation. . . . These were laid before Congress by Delegate Lane, who gave them his hearty and vigorous support. There was now no slavery question to provoke discussion or opposition. Nobody called attention to, or seems to have thought of, the fact that the census, taken scarcely more than two years earlier, had shown only 1,040 people residing in the territory, or that the number now was scarcely more than three thousand. The bill met scarcely any opposition. During its consideration in the House, Representative Stanton of Kentucky had proposed to change the name of the new territory from Columbia to Washington, and this was immediately approved. No one cared

to withhold this honor from the Father of His Country, and on the second of March [1853], just as the thirty-second Congress, and Mr. Fillmore's administration, were drawing to a close, the bill passed and was immediately approved by the president."—C. A. Snowden, *History of Washington*, v. 3, pp. 195, 202-204, 210.

1863.—Idaho separated as territory. See IDAHO: 1863-1864.


1872.—Settlement of San Juan water boundary question. See SAN JUAN, OR NORTHWESTERN, WATER-BOUNDARY QUESTION.

1872-1890.—Development of the state's resources by new railroads.—Lumber industry.—In the seventies "came a rapid and a tremendous development when the great timber resources were suddenly made accessible by the railroads that were extended into this region with marvelous rapidity. One of the earliest railroads was at Walla Walla in 1876, its rails were wooden stringers covered with rawhide. Its traffic was frequently delayed by the starving coyotes eating the hide track which is a minor incident in the rapid railroad development that enabled the state to jump from the difficult trail and the slow caravan to the more expeditious steam road. In 1880 Washington had less than three hundred miles of railroad and in the decade that followed its mileage increased ten times and the same period had an increase of 375 per cent in population. These decades of wonderful growth in population were due to the sudden opening of the vast forests to lumbering. The railroad found a ready market in the east or at a shipping port on the coast for the lumber, the salmon, and the wheat. The western terminus of each road became a port for the outlet of the regions of production. Thus the gathering points for manufacture or for shipping were the places that had the greatest growth in the early development of the state's natural resources. . . . Washington has leaped from an undeveloped region of scattered sawmills and fishing ports to an urban state in which its percentage of urban people ranks eleventh among the states. The wagon road stage of development that stands in the growth of a community between the trail and the steam road was rapidly hurdled. Hence the rural life . . . developed slowly, . . . for the exploitation of the forests has offered a more rapid source of wealth than the slower process of soil cultivation. In the vigorous growth of the cities of the western part of the state the forests and the railroads have been controlling influences to which must be added the geographical advantage of their location on the salt water estuary of Puget Sound. This Inland Sea of the Northwest reaches nearly one hundred miles eastward with its narrow arms of deep navigable water that extend into the lands for more than a hundred miles to the north and south. This 'Harbour Country' offers to commerce more than 1,900 miles of shore line, many deep and easily accessible harbors surrounded by a land of equable climate. Further, this body of water is nearer Chicago, Alaska and Japan than is the rival harbor of San Francisco, and this is a great geographic advantage for Puget Sound in the competition for Pacific commerce. It is about Puget Sound that the most vigorous growth of cities has taken place. The counties contiguous to Puget Sound are about one fifth of the area of the state and yet they have more than one half of its total population. The railroads reaching westward to this Inland Sea have made cities where they

touch the open and navigable water of the Sound. The growth and development of these railroad and port towns has been due at first to the lumber, then to the fish, and later to the rich resources of Alaska and the extensive markets of the Far East. The materials and outfits for the Alaskan development have been shipped largely from the Puget Sound ports and in return they have controlled the Alaskan products. In the Far East markets the Puget Sound ports show their advantage in distance by their greater imports of raw silk and far greater shipments of iron products than San Francisco. Seattle [became] the first city of the Northwest because it has the most advantageous site on Puget Sound for the Union of sea commerce and land trade. . . . Spokane, the second city of the state, began with a saw-mill and three men in 1872."—W. M. Gregory, *Growth of cities of Washington* (*Journal of Geography*, May, 1916, pp. 348-350, 352).

1889.—Admission to statehood.—Political conditions at time of admission.—"A time came at

But Washington was, at length, no longer alone in demanding statehood. Idaho formed wholly, and Montana formed partly out of the Oregon country, and partly out of the Louisiana purchase, and Dakota, large enough for two states, were likewise demanding admission, and Congress could defer their claims no longer. An enabling act authorizing five new states to be formed along the Northern border, between Minnesota and the Pacific, was passed by the house and Senate, and became law in February 1889. . . . In 1850 the donation law had been looked upon as an experiment of such extreme liberality, that its operations had been limited to three years, and then almost grudgingly extended to five. But now a settler who was American born, or who had become a naturalized citizen, might take a homestead wherever he could find an unoccupied or unreserved part of the public domain. In 1853 Congress felt that it had done a generous thing in giving two whole townships of wild land to found a territorial University in Washington, but this



SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, IN 1864

last when Congress could no longer postpone the demand of the far away territory for full membership in the family of states. . . . [At that period] the Civil War reconstruction, the resumption of specie payments, and transcontinental railroad building absorbed public attention. The west advanced steadily and even rapidly. Washington, its richest and remotest part, earliest began to claim, and then to urgently demand recognition of its right to statehood. Its legislators planned and worked according to the light that was in them. Its governors—Ferry among the first—urged the matter in their annual reports to the Interior Department, in their correspondence, and in their messages. But the East was conservative and even incredulous. . . . It seemed scarcely possible, no doubt, that the new region, so long known yet so little known to many, could deserve what it so persistently asked. Could it be that a sufficient number of people to form a state, had gone two thousand miles to find new homes, when Kansas, Iowa and Minnesota were scarcely more than safely in the Union? How could it be that this new territory had grown so rapidly, when Ohio and Indiana and Illinois had been so much more deliberate and dignified in their progress?

enabling act gave the new state two sections, in place of one in every township for public school purposes; 50 sections for public buildings; 90,000 acres for an Agricultural College and 100,000 acres for a Scientific School; besides liberal endowments in lands for Manual Schools and other institutions. . . . The [Constitutional] Convention had not proceeded far when it became apparent that some of its members also had some very troublesome views as to what a Constitution should be. Could they have had their way it would have comprised a full code of statutes, many of them impracticable, inoperative, and unrepeatable or amendable except by vote of the people. It took time, patience and hard work, principally in the Committees, to eliminate all these crude and impracticable theories. The work was also hindered and embarrassed to some extent by a numerous lobby representing various interests, but it was in time finally and satisfactorily accomplished. The Convention sat fifty-two days, Sundays included,—though no sessions were held on Sundays,—and concluded its work. The Constitution was published in full in most of the newspapers of the territory, and on October 1st, 1889, the people, by a satisfactory majority, rati-

fied and approved it. Two articles were submitted separately, one providing for female suffrage, and the other for prohibition, but both were defeated. The location of the Capital was also voted upon as a separate issue, the cities competing being Olympia, Ellensburg, North Yakima and Vancouver, and Olympia won by a practically decisive vote. In due course the Constitution, as adopted by the people, was approved by Congress, and President Harrison issued his proclamation announcing that fact. November 11th, 1889 was fixed upon as the day when the territorial should give place to the new state government, and on that day the state officers and members of the legislature who had been chosen on the day that the Constitution was voted upon, and a large number of citizens, including many of the oldest living settlers, assembled at the Capital. . . . Governor Miles C. Moore, last of the territorial executives, . . . turned the government over to Governor Ferry, who had been one of his predecessors as governor of the territory, and was now to be the first governor of the state. The other state officers took their oaths of office, the first legislature organized and began its session. It was just a hundred and one years, and about a hundred days, since Gray and Kendrick had first displayed the flag of the Union, which was not yet a Union, off the Coast of Oregon, and forty-four years since Simmons, Kindred, McAllister and their party had fixed their homes at Tumwater, almost within sight of the scene of these ceremonies. The wilderness of those days had disappeared, and now a new state was launched, to take its place as number 42 in the fleet of the Union, and hold it proudly forever."—C. A. Snowden, *History of Washington*, v. 4, pp. 384-385, 389-390.—See also U. S. A.: 1889-1890.

ALSO IN: E. S. Meaney and J. T. Condon, ed., *Washington's first constitution and proceedings of convention* (*Washington Historical Quarterly*, Jan., 1918-1919).—E. S. Meaney, *Cowlitz convention* (*Washington Historical Quarterly*, Jan., 1922).

1890-1917.—Irrigation program.—State governors.—"It is interesting to note that irrigation was not absent from the minds of the citizens when they met, in 1889, to make their State Constitution. Ar. XXI, Sec. 1, provides as follows: 'The use of waters of the State for irrigation, mining and manufacturing shall be deemed a public use.' The year 1890 marks a systematic organization of irrigation, and in order to protect all parties in their legal right in the use of water for irrigation an act was passed which provided that every person, association or corporation owning or claiming any interest in any ditch or canal, shall, on or before June 1, 1890, file with the Clerk of the County the name and full description, giving location of the headgate, name of stream from which it comes, amount of water claimed under such ditch, present capacity and the number of acres irrigated. It also provided that the Court might, when thought necessary, appoint a commissioner with qualifications, as theoretical and practical knowledge of the science of hydraulics, as will enable him to construct and operate measuring devices as may be necessary to place in any ditch. . . . The year 1890 also marks the beginning of the district organization for the irrigation. Utah has the honor of having enacted the first district law on January 20, 1865. The Wright law, an amendment on Utah's law, was enacted in California, March 7, 1887. On March 20, 1890, . . . an act was ratified by Washington's governor pro-

viding for the organization and government of irrigation districts and the sales of bonds arising therefrom. This law was amended in 1895 . . . and has been further improved, until today the 'District Law' is thought superior to the Water User's Association, the authorized organization of federal projects. The district system is being substituted by the Reclamation Service for its organization. The district system is a business organization of the stockholders of a project and the governing board levies assessments for the whole. In 1895, the Legislature provided for a Commission of Public Lands to take, select, manage and dispose of all public lands of the State of Washington. All proposals for construction of irrigation works shall be filed with him. . . . In February, 1904, Governor Henry McBride appointed an irrigation Committee for the purpose of investigating the subject of irrigation, and recommending such changes in the laws 'as may be deemed for the best interest of the State.' This Board stated that since the waters of the State belonged to it, its right should be asserted; and that the State should for the present permit private individuals and corporations to use its waters to aid in the development of its resources; and that the right to use water should be appurtenant to, and, under ordinary circumstances, inseparable from the lands. These were incorporated into legislation and the water code began to have laws of real benefit to the people. In the session of 1917, the office of State Hydraulic Engineer was created, and on June 15, 1917, the present incumbent began his work. His duty is to supervise all public waters within the State, their appropriation, diversion and use, and officers connected therewith. He shall inspect all dams, canals, ditches, irrigation systems and hydraulic power plants insofar as may be necessary to assume safety to life and property. All persons claiming a right to divert any waters shall petition the State Hydraulic Engineer, and he shall investigate and file findings with the Superior Court which shall proceed as in civil action."—R. M. Boening, *History of irrigation in the state of Washington* (*Washington Historical Quarterly*, Jan., 1919, pp. 40-41).—The governors of the state of Washington are as follows: Elisha P. Ferry, 1889-1893; John H. McGraw, 1893-1897; J. R. Rogers, 1897-1901; Henry G. McBride, 1901-1905; Albert E. Mead, 1905-1909; Samuel C. Cosgrove, 1909; M. E. Hay, 1909; Ernest Lister, 1913-1919; Louis F. Hart, since 1919.

1911-1920.—Ratification of Federal amendments.—State legislation.—Industrial welfare measures.—Washington ratified the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Income Tax) on Jan. 26, 1911; the Seventeenth Amendment (Direct Election of Senators) on Feb. 7, 1913; and the Eighteenth Amendment (Prohibition) on Jan. 13, 1919. The Nineteenth Amendment (Woman Suffrage) was adopted by the Washington state legislature on Mar. 22, 1920. In the matter of constructive state legislation, Washington has a significant record. The 1911 legislature passed a compulsory state insurance act, which was upheld by the state supreme court on September 27, 1911. The Washington law has proved one of the most successful in the history of workmen's compensation legislation. Under its operation were included 5,000 employers and more than 100,000 employees. During the first ten months of its administration there was paid into the state "accident fund" the sum of \$791,473.57. Of the 9,212 accidents reported in the

same period claims were adjusted in the case of 7,660 applicants at a cost to the state of fifteen cents for every dollar paid out in awards. The law not only provides for compensation in case of injury, but also sets aside a reserve to guarantee pensions during the life of widows or for workmen's children until they reach the age of sixteen. In November, 1911 a women's suffrage amendment to the state constitution was adopted, which provided for jury duty for women in the state courts. The experience under the operation of this provision was such to lead to a rapidly increasing number of women jurors and a corresponding decrease in the prejudice against the innovation. (See also SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: United States: 1851-1920.) Further legislation for the women of the state was enacted in 1913. Under the mother's pension and family deserter's acts it is the duty of each county to provide an amount of money sufficient to support women whose husbands are dead, or are inmates of penal institution or an insane asylum; also to care for women who have been deserted by their husbands, or whose husbands have been totally disabled, when such women are destitute mothers of children under fifteen years of age. Women who are not mothers are not benefited by the legislation. Allowances to mothers are made by the juvenile court in each county. In 1912 the voters approved an amendment to the constitution proposed by the legislature in 1911, providing for the initiative and referendum in legislation. During the same year impeachment investigation proceedings were begun against Judge Hanford of Seattle. The case originated in the Judge's revocation of Leonard Oleson's citizenship papers on the ground of his socialistic views. During the investigation Judge Hanford was attacked for drunkenness and conduct unbecoming a member of the Federal bench. His resignation, accepted by President Taft, ended the investigation. During the 1913 session of the legislature the law creating the Industrial Welfare Commission was passed and the organization of the Commission was effected in July. Its first action was an investigation into conditions affecting the employment of women workers throughout the state. Upon the basis of the information collected the commission fixed upon a minimum wage for each of three classes of employees, mercantile, factory, and laundry. The new wage was made obligatory in 1914 in each group. The fact that the law had given the commission control over the apprenticeship problem enabled that body to determine occupations requiring apprenticeship, period of time to be served, rate of wages to be paid and issuance of license to employer. [See also LABOR REMUNERATION: 1910-1920.] Through the interest of the farmers' granges the legislature was prevailed upon to create a department of agriculture in 1913. At the fall election in 1914 a test was made of the initiative and referendum adopted two years before. One of the most important measures initiated by petition provided for the abolition of private employment agencies by making it illegal to collect fees from persons seeking employment. The measure was approved by a majority of the voters. Governor Lewis F. Hart became governor in 1919.

1917-1918.—Part in the World War.—Washington contributed 45,154 men to the American Expeditionary Forces, or 1.2 per cent. of the total national forces. The great demand for spruce wood in the war industries was met largely from the magnificent forests of that western state.

1918.—Flood problem.—“The rapid fall on the western slope of the Cascade Mountains from the glacial line to the valleys below, coupled with the floating of immense quantities of large trees and other debris down the streams at every flood season [has given Washington] a unique flood problem from the beginning, and without precedent as to solution. The original estimate of the cost of work [of reclaiming devastated areas] was \$1,500,000, and it was agreed under the terms of the contract that a fund should be created in each county, to be known as the ‘Inter-County River Improvement Fund,’ and that there should be raised by general taxation in the two counties the sum of \$250,000 each year for six successive years. It was also agreed that a fund, to be known as the ‘Upkeep Fund,’ should be provided, producing the sum of \$50,000 per year for a period of ninety-nine years.”—W. J. Roberts, *Inter-county river improvement in the state of Washington* (American City, Dec., 1918, pp. 443-444).—See also CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: United States: 1918.

1918-1919.—General strike in Seattle. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1918-1919: Seattle general strike.

1921.—Re-organization of government administration by civil administrative code.—Washington in 1921 undertook the complete revision of her state administration by passing a new civil code through which certain state offices were abolished, and the work of administering the state was concentrated and logically assigned. The new system of government was put into effect Apr. 1, 1921. “To Governor Louis F. Hart belongs the chief credit for the enactment of a code on the main lines of that of Illinois and of Nebraska. Upon Governor Hart's suggestion the special session of the legislature of 1920 authorized him to have such a code drawn to be presented to the regular session of 1921. In the preparation of this code Governor Hart had the assistance of Attorney-General L. L. Thompson, of L. D. McArdle, known for his intimate knowledge of our state government, and of Hon. Charles Gleason, an expert draftsman and attorney of Seattle. This code after consideration by the legislature was enacted into law, with slight change. The Civil Administrative Code . . . creates ten departments of the state government and over each department there is a chief executive officer known as a director. The ten departments are as follows: public works, business control, efficiency, taxation and examination, health, conservation and development, labor and industries, agriculture, licenses, fisheries and game. Each director is nominated by the governor and confirmed by the senate. The act also creates nine administrative committees of three members each and composed of the elective state officers. These nine committees are: state equalization, state finance, state highway, state capitol, state archives, state parks, state voting machine, state law library, state library. The governor and the ten appointed directors are to constitute the administrative board. The governor is the chairman. In popular language this board is called the governor's cabinet. The act gives it the power to adopt general rules for the transaction of business of the board. A majority of those present at any meeting of the board is given the power to determine and advise as to questions of policy in the administration of any of the departments of the state government created by this act. It is made the duty of the board to systematize

and unify the duties of the various departments of the state government created by this act; to classify subordinate offices, departments and institutions; to determine the salaries and compensation of subordinate officers and employees; to authorize in cases of emergency, any institution, state officer or department of the state government to incur liabilities to carry on their work until the meeting of the legislature. Each office created by this act became established on the first day of April. The salaries of the director are to be fixed by the governor. Each director is given power to make rules for his own department not inconsistent with state law. Each department is to maintain its principal office at the state capital, but branch offices may be established at other points in the state. While the governor is to nominate each director, the director names his own chief assistants, and these assistants select their own subordinates."—W. F. Dodd, ed., *Legislative notes and reviews (American Political Science Review, Nov., 1921, pp. 568, 569-570)*.

ALSO IN: F. Pierce, *Annotated Encyclopedia of Laws of Washington, 1921, v. 1, pp. 10-40*.

1922.—Reconstruction Congress.—"On January 9, a convention was held at Tacoma of more than 400 delegates from hundreds of organizations throughout the state of Washington. A permanent state-wide congress was organized under the title of the Washington Reconstruction Congress. . . . The program adopted at the Tacoma conference involves the reclamation and settlement of waste lands in cooperation with the Federal Government, construction of good roads and public improvements, vocational education and training, and the care and welfare of social dependents and delinquents."—H. A. Weston, "*Consolidated people's lobby*" for reconstruction in the state of Washington (*American City, Mar., 1919, pp. 214-215*).

ALSO IN: J. M. Taylor, *History and government of Washington*.—H. K. Hines, *Illustrated history of the state of Washington*.—J. Hawthorne, *History of Washington, the evergreen state*.—H. H. Bancroft, *Washington, Montana and Idaho (History of Pacific states, v. 26)*.—F. G. Grant, *History of Seattle*.—E. Meeker, *Seventy years of progress in Washington*.—P. L. Haworth, *Trail makers of the North-west—Manufacturing opportunities in the state of Washington—History of the Pacific North-west*.—C. B. Bagley, *In the beginning: A sketch of some early events in western Washington*.—J. S. Gallagher, *Government of Washington*.

WASHINGTON, D. C.: Area.—Population.—The city of Washington, the Federal capital of the United States, is part of the District of Columbia. (See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.) It is not a separate municipality, but subject to the same laws as the territory set aside by Congress for the seat of the Federal government. The District of Columbia has an area of 38,408 acres, of which the city occupies 6,654. The population of Washington in 1920 was 437,571. Its commercial importance is evidenced from the fact that it ranked third in the United States in 1921 as a port of entry for foreign tonnage.

1791-1800.—Foundation of the city.—L'Enfant's plan for its development.—Other architects.—National government removed from Philadelphia to Washington.—"One important duty which engaged the President's [Washington's] attention during part of the recess [of Congress] related to the purchase and survey of the new Federal city. The site chosen on the Potomac by himself and the commissioners in conformity with

law [see U. S. A.: 1780-1792], lay a few miles to the north of Mount Vernon on the Maryland side of the river, at the confluence of the Eastern Branch, and just below Georgetown. The tradition goes that, while a young surveyor scouring the neighboring country, Washington had marked the advantages of this spot for a great city. . . . The entire soil belonged in large parcels to a few plain, easy, Maryland farmers, who rode over to Georgetown for their flour and bacon. One of these only, David Burns, was obstinate about making terms. . . . The government was permitted to reserve all tracts specially desired at £25 an acre, while the land for avenues, streets, and alleys should cost nothing. Thus the Federal Capital came to the United States as substantially a free conveyance of half the fee of the soil in consideration of the enhanced value expected for the other half. Major Pierre Charles l'Enfant, a French engineer who had served in the Revolutionary war, was selected . . . to map out the new city [and to plan for its development as the new capital of the new republic]. . . . The highways were mapped and bounded . . . substantially as they exist at this day, being so spacious and so numerous in comparison with building lots as to have admitted of no later change, in the course of a century, except in the prudent direction of parking, enlarging sidewalks, and leaving little plats in front of houses to be privately cared for. Streets running due north and south from the northern boundary to the Potomac were intersected at right angles by others which extended east and west. To mar the simplicity of this plan, however, which so far resembled that of Philadelphia, great avenues, 160 feet wide, were run diagonally, radiating like spokes, from such main centres as Capitol Hill and the President's house. [See also CITY PLANNING: United States: Survey of New York]. . . . This new Capital, by the President modestly styled 'the Federal City,' but to which the commissioners, by general acclamation, proceeded in September to affix his illustrious name, was America's first grand essay at a metropolis in advance of inhabitants. . . . The founder himself entered with unwonted ardor into the plans projected for developing this the new Capital. Not only did he picture the city which bore his name as an instructor of the coming youth in lessons of lofty patriotism, but he prophesied for it national greatness apart from its growth as the repository of the nation. He believed it would become a prosperous commercial city, its wharves studded with sails, enjoying all the advantages of Western traffic by means of a canal linking the Potomac and Ohio rivers, so as to bring Western produce to the seaboard. The ten-mile square which comprised the territorial District of Columbia, inclusive of the Capital, stretched across the Potomac, taking Georgetown from the Maryland jurisdiction, and Alexandria from Virginia. . . . The first corner-stone of this new Federal district was publicly laid with Masonic ceremonies, and though the auction sale of the city lots in autumn proved disappointing, the idea prevailed that the government would gain from individual purchasers in Washington city a fund ample enough for erecting there all public buildings . . . needed."—J. Schouler, *History of the United States, v. 1, ch. 2, sect. 2*.—"L'Enfant was removed before having progressed far with the work, and Andrew Ellicott of Pennsylvania was appointed in his place. But the present widely admired plan of Washington had its origin in the artistic, creative mind of L'Enfant. In 1792,

Congress voted him a sum of five-hundred guineas, and deeded him a lot in Washington, as compensation for his services; but the designing of the capital city had been to him a work of art and love, and he rejected all considerations of payment. His dismissal had been brought about by his refusal to submit his plans to the Commissioners, his defense being that if his design were published speculators would seize upon the 'vistas and architectural squares and raise huddles of shanties which would permanently disfigure the city.' . . . The lots sold more readily abroad than at home, and

more practical drawings. . . . Sometime before this, and in answer to an advertisement by the Commissioners, James Hoban, an Irish architect, then acting as supervising architect of the Capitol, had submitted plans for a 'President's House,' and they had been accepted. Inasmuch as the Act of Congress creating the District decreed that the houses for Congress and the President should be ready for occupancy by the year 1800, the work on both was now carried forward vigorously. Washington, retiring to his home at Mount Vernon at the close of his second term in 1797, gave over



L'ENFANT'S PLAN OF WASHINGTON, 1792

A. Equestrian figure of George Washington. B. Historic column, intended for a mile or itinerary column from whose station all distances through the continent are to be calculated. C. Naval itinerary column proposed to be erected to celebrate the rise of a navy. D. Church intended for national purposes. E. Five grand fountains. F. Grand cascade formed of the water from the sources of the Tiber. G. Public walk, being a square 1200 feet through which carriages may ascend to the upper square of the federal house. H. Grand avenue, bordered with gardens on each side. I. President's park. K. Well improved field, being part of the walk from the president's house. L. Square. M. Avenue running under an archway, lined with shops.

for a time brought extravagant prices in London. However, comparatively few seem to have been disposed of, and the meagre return from sales was most unfortunate because the money was badly needed to pay for the first public buildings. Finally, the President made a personal appeal to Maryland, which lent \$100,000, not, however, without first securing the personal bond of the Commissioners. The Capitol was planned by Dr. William Thornton, an Englishman, who seems to have been a man of some natural talent, but unskilled in architecture. Stephen L. Hallett, a professional house-builder, also submitted specifications for the building, and there is good reason to suppose that Thornton's plans, as finally accepted, were considerably affected by Hallett's

the care of the Federal city to his successor, John Adams. President Adams first appointed a new architect for the Capitol, Stephen Hallett, who resigned after holding the position for one year. George Hadfield, an Englishman, next appointed, resigned in 1708, and left James Hoban the supervising architect, to finish the work alone. Congress having adjourned about May 20, 1800, to meet in Washington in November, the seat of government was removed from Philadelphia to Washington early in June of that year. When the government officials arrived, only the north wing of the Capitol had been completed, while the Treasury Building, a plain two-story structure of thirty rooms located on the site of the south front of the present edifice, was the only public building ready

for the occupancy of the executive departments. Work had been begun on the War Office at the southwest corner of the White House grounds. When Congress convened in November, little progress had been made. The few hotels and buildings of the city were so overcrowded that few of the members could secure quarters nearer than Georgetown, three miles away through mud and forest. Streets existed for the most part only on paper, and Pennsylvania Avenue, the principal thoroughfare, was really a bog lined with bushes. The only sidewalk, that from the Capitol to the Treasury, being made of stone chippings, so wounded the feet and tempers of pedestrians as to make the mud of the street preferable."—F. A. Vanderlip, *Washington, the nation's capital* (L. P. Powell, ed., *Historic towns of the southern states*, pp. 120-121, 125-126, 129).—President and Mrs. Adams moved into the new White House in November, 1800.

1802-1871.—First charter.—Amendments.—Mayorality government replaced by territorial government.—"On May 3, 1802, the first charter of the City of Washington was granted under an act of Congress incorporating the inhabitants, and dividing the city into three wards for the purpose of assessment. This charter provided for the government of the city by a Mayor, to be appointed annually by the President, and an elective Council of twelve members divided into a 'first chamber' of seven members, and a 'second chamber' of five members, the latter to be chosen from the whole of councillors. The continuance of this charter was limited to a period of two years. It was renewed at its expiration by an act approved February 28, 1804, for an added term of fifteen years. The act of renewal changed the council to consist of two chambers of nine members each, both of which were to be chosen by popular election. An act of Congress approved May 4, 1812, further amended the charter so as to provide for the election of the Mayor by the 'Councils,' which were to consist of a Board of Aldermen of eight members elected biennially, two from each ward, and a Board of Common Council, of twelve members, elected annually, three from each ward. This act provided for the redistricting of the city from time to time so as to equalize as nearly as possible the numbers of voters in the several wards. An entirely new charter was created by an act of Congress approved May 15, 1820. This act contained many provisions relating to the powers and duties of the Corporation but made little change in the form of government except to provide for the election of the Mayor biennially by popular ballot and for the annual election alternately of one of the two aldermen from each ward. By this act the city was provisionally divided into six wards. The charter of 1820 was by its terms to continue in force for twenty years. It was amended in minor respects in 1824 and 1826, and as so amended continued in force until 1848. Up to this time the city officers, aside from the Mayor and members of the two boards of the Council, had been appointed under authority of ordinances creating their offices. In 1848 the charter was amended to make the offices of assessor, register, collector and surveyor, elective. The charter, as amended in 1848, continued in force under its own provisions for a period of twenty years with some amendments made in 1864 and 1865. Upon the expiration of the term of this charter in 1868, it was continued for one year with an amendment making all officers who had previously been appointed by the Mayor, elec-

tive by the Mayor, Board of Aldermen and Board of Common Council in joint session. In 1869 these offices were again made appointive by the Mayor and in this form the charter continued in force until the Territorial form of government went into full effect June 1, 1871. . . . It was an inevitable result of the Civil War that the interest of the nation in its Capital should be keenly awakened. Almost immediately upon the close of that conflict, public sentiment was directed to the problem of placing the city in a condition fitting its character as the seat of the government of the reunited country. The consideration of this question was crystallized into law by the act approved February 21, 1871, creating the so-called 'Territorial' Government, which provided that on and after June 1 of that year the corporations of Washington and Georgetown, and the Levy Court of the County of Washington, which had jurisdiction over the portion of the District which was outside of those corporations, should no longer exist as such; and that beginning with that date the entire District of Columbia should constitute a single municipality under the name of 'The District of Columbia.' It was the passage of this act which gave the National Capital its full municipal impulse. From this time forward the municipal history of the City of Washington is identical with that of the government of the District of Columbia. . . . The new municipality consisted of a Governor; a Board of Public Works composed of the Governor and four other persons; a Secretary, a Board of Health; a Legislative Assembly, consisting of a Council of eleven members and a House of Delegates consisting of 22 members, and a Delegate in the House of Representatives of the United States."—W. Tindall, *Standard history of the city of Washington*, pp. 225-226, 247-248.

1814.—In the hands of the British.—Destruction of public buildings. See U.S.A.: 1814 (August-September).

1861 (February).—Peace convention. See U.S.A.: 1861 (February): Peace convention.

1861 (April).—Threatening activity of Secessionists.—Peril of national capital. See U.S.A.: 1861 (April): Activity in Virginia and Maryland.

1861 (April-May).—Coming of the first defenders of the national capital. See U.S.A.: 1861 (April): Activity in Virginia and Maryland; (April-May: Maryland).

1862 (April).—Abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. See U.S.A.: 1862 (April-June).

1864.—Approached and threatened by Early. See U.S.A.: 1864 (July: Virginia-Maryland).

1867.—Extension of suffrage to negroes. See U.S.A.: 1867 (January).

1873-1915.—Washington under territorial government.—Governor Shepherd's improvement of the city.—Corcoran Art Gallery.—Re-organization of form of government by the Organic Act of 1878.—"The District's second, and last, Governor, Alexander R. Shepherd, a native of Washington, who served from September 13, 1873, to June 20, 1874, backed by President Grant, put into practical effect the reawakened national concern. Imbued with the ideals of the first President, he set about with vigor and rough-shod methods to build up the long-neglected city. Streets and avenues that until then were in existence only on the map laid out under Washington's directions, were opened, graded and paved. Improvements all over the city were made and

all was done at the expense of the resident taxpayers. The unprecedented improvements and their accompanying expenditures, placing a new and heavier burden upon taxpayers, aroused a storm of protest such as to end the Shepherd régime and the territorial form of government."—G. H. Gall, *New Washington and the South*, p. 27.

—In 1874 there was opened to the public the collection of paintings and statuary presented to the city by William Wilson Corcoran, one of its philanthropic residents. The donor presented to the city at the same time an endowment gift of \$900,000 by which the Corcoran Art Gallery has been developed. A free art school is maintained in connection with this gallery. "Early in 1874, in compliance with a petition of W. W. Corcoran and many other leading property owners in the District, who charged the officers of the District government with unlawful conduct, extravagance and mismanagement, a Joint Select Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives was appointed by a resolution which originated in the House of Representatives on February 2, 1874. . . . The investigation conducted by this Committee showed a complicated and apparently insolvent condition of affairs which seemed to call for a readjustment of the municipal situation by disinterested hands. The Committee made a report on June 16, 1874. . . . The recommendations of the Allison Committee were put into effect by the speedy passage of the Act of Congress, approved June 20, 1874, which abolished the Territorial form of government and provided for a Commission of three members to be appointed by the President of the United States and by and with the consent of the Senate. This Commission was to exercise much the same power and authority as had been vested in the Governor and Board of Public Works under the Territorial government. To co-operate with and assist the Commission, the President was by this act authorized to detail an officer of the Engineer Corps of the Army who, under the general supervision of the Commissioners, was to have control of the engineering work of the municipality. . . . The act [Organic Act] creating the permanent Board of Commissioners was approved June 11, 1878. This act declared that all the territory ceded by the State of Maryland for the permanent seat of Government of the United States, should continue to be designated as the District of Columbia, and that the District of Columbia should 'remain and continue a municipal corporation.' By the terms of this act the two civil members of the Board of Commissioners were required to have been residents of the District for three years next preceding their appointment. Their salary was fixed at \$5,000 per annum. The first appointment was to be one Commissioner for one year and one for two years, after which their successors were to be appointed for three years."—W. Tindall, *Standard history of the city of Washington*, pp. 268, 271, 277.—"The question as to just what political rights the citizens of the District of Columbia should have is not by any means a new one. A hundred years ago it was a very live issue and was mentioned in several presidential messages to congress, and it has continued to break out at intervals during the whole century. [See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Constitutional status.] . . . Closely bound up with the question of local self-government has been another, which was settled by the congress . . . at the same time that the commission form was adopted. This was

the question as to what was the proper proportion of the expense of local administration that congress should provide as compared with that to be furnished by the local taxpayers. For a long while the general theory prevailed that the city should bear its own expenses just as any other city should. But the theory was never strictly applied as from the very beginning congress, much in the manner of an indulgent parent giving money to a free-spending offspring, granted appropriations, guaranteed bond issues, and assumed part of the expenses for improvements. There has always been a more or less definite feeling that the status of the city was out of the ordinary, and that the dignity of a national capital demanded a standard of upkeep whose cost should properly not be shouldered entirely on the local citizens. The organic act of 1878 fixed the proportion to be paid by congress at one-half and this half-and-half arrangement has continued ever since. In a way it may be regarded as a compromise, the property holders and other taxpayers of the District consenting to forego a voice in the levying of taxes and other municipal matters and the national government consenting to pay half the expenses. . . . [Since this article was written congress has changed the proportion to 60 and 40 per cent, the larger amount to be paid from taxes raised in the District.]"—O. Wilson, *Disfranchised Washington* (*National Municipal Review*, Aug., 1920, pp. 489-491).

1884.—Washington monument completed. See WASHINGTON MONUMENT.

1890.—Meeting of first International American Congress. See AMERICAN REPUBLICS, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF: 1890.

1897.—Library of Congress completed. See LIBRARIES: Modern: United States: Library of Congress.

1900.—Centennial celebration.—In December, 1900, the one hundredth anniversary of the existence of Washington as the capital of the United States was celebrated. "The whole nation . . . gathered through its representatives in Congress and the governors of its States to celebrate the accomplishments of a century and to pledge new efforts to a realization of 'The Federal City' of which Washington dreamed; and the world looked on through the eyes of the diplomatic corps. The Park Commission plan, that embellishment, modernization, and extension of the Washington L'Enfant plan to meet the requirements of the greater city, was conceived, and its execution commenced within a year afterward [by a commission appointed by the United States Senate and composed of Daniel Hudson Burnham, C. F. McKim, Augustus St. Gaudens, and F. L. Olmsted, Jr.]"—G. H. Gall, *New Washington and the South*, p. 29.


1902.—Restoration of the White House. See WHITE HOUSE.

1902.—Unveiling of Rochambeau monument. See U. S. A.: 1902 (May).

1913.—Park Commissioners' plans.—Monuments and government buildings.—"With the overwhelming vote in Congress in February, 1913, authorizing the expenditure of \$2,000,000 for a great memorial structure to Abraham Lincoln and directing that the structure be raised on the site chosen for it eleven years before by the Park Commission, the keystone of the plan's main arch was dropped into place. Although never formally enacted into law, as was its prototype the Washington L'Enfant plan, the Park Commission

plan for the greater Washington has been followed consistently and every important new step in the upbuilding of the city for the past eleven years has been taken in conformity with it. To keep the plan intact and locate public structures in conformity with it has been no easy task during this period. . . . Practically every important proposed public building has involved a contest over its location, and in every instance selfish motives have entered that would make serious departure from the whole scheme. A bitter fight was waged over the location of the Great Memorial, but the advocates of adherence to the plan set for it by the Park Commission finally prevailed. The last important and greatest contest of all was that over the Lincoln Memorial in the closing days of the Sixty-second Congress. Another important section of the plan was also provided for by Congress on the fourth of March, 1913, the first large project in the section relating to the outer-park system. This was a provision for a connecting parkway along the valley of

ing occupies the square at the southeast corner of 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue. Although incomplete, a new building has been erected for the Department of Agriculture at a present cost of \$1,500,000, on the B Street, S. W. side of the Mall. A new building for the Government Printing Office has been constructed at a cost of \$2,500,000. Extensive additions have been made to the White House. . . . Two notable semi-public buildings, the Pan-American Union and the D. A. R. Continental Memorial Hall, have been erected in conformity with the plan of the Park Commission at a cost of nearly \$2,000,000, and are notable features in the ornamentation of the scheme. Just west of the Union Station, and on the plaza, there has been completed a new building for the Washington City Post Office at a cost of nearly \$3,000,000. Looking out upon Potomac Park just south of the Washington Monument a great new building for the Bureau of Engraving and Printing has been erected at a cost of \$2,500,000. Without exception, these buildings, to be erected, under con-



LINCOLN MEMORIAL BUILDING AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Dedicated May 30, 1922

Rock Creek between Rock Creek and Potomac Park. Congress also made an appropriation for a survey and estimate for the memorial bridge proposed by the Commission to span the Potomac and form a public highway to the national cemetery at Arlington. . . . A conception of the physical development of the capital since 1900 can best be had from a brief review of the more notable accomplishments of the period. In that time the unsightly railway stations and yards, one at Sixth and B Streets, and the other at New Jersey Avenue and C Street, have been entirely cleared away. The Union Station, into which come all of the passenger trains entering the city, has been erected at a cost, including the vast plaza, of nearly \$20,000,000. Splendid new office buildings have been erected for the accommodation of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, on two sides of the park on the east side of the Capitol, at a total cost of nearly \$7,000,000. A great new building for the National Museum has been erected at a cost of \$3,500,000 on the B Street, N. W., line of the Mall. At a cost of \$2,500,000, a new building has been erected to house the Government of the District of Columbia. This build-

struction, or about to be built, harmonize in design and location with the original plan of the founders, which was enlarged by the Park Commission in 1900. The Connecticut Avenue bridge over Rock Creek has been built at a cost of \$1,000,000. An ornamental bridge on Sixteenth Street has been constructed and work is now proceeding on another to carry Q Street across Rock Creek, the two costing \$435,000. Potomac Park has been largely developed and the Speedway completed. The Army War College, built at a cost of \$1,000,000, now adorns the point of land formed by the Anacostia River and the Washington channel of the Potomac. Additions to the park system of the District, costing for the ground alone about \$800,000, not including the Rock Creek Park connection, have also been made. Thus there has been expended about \$65,000,000 in this short period in carrying into execution the plan for beautifying the city. Remarkable progress in municipal improvements has also been made. A new sewerage disposal system has been instituted at a cost of \$5,264,520. A filtration plant, which has resulted in giving Washington an abundant supply of pure water has been built at a cost of \$3,500,000. The rail-

road grade crossings of the city have been abolished at a cost to the railroad companies of about \$15,000,000, and to the United States and the District of Columbia of \$3,000,000."—G. H. Gall, *New Washington and the South*, pp. 29-32.—See also CIVIC BEAUTY: Washington, D. C.

1917-1920.—Housing problem.—With the increased activity of all government departments in Washington following the declaration of war on Apr. 6, 1917, the influx of extra clerical workers estimated at about 60,000, strained the housing capacity of the city to an unprecedented degree. Buildings were commandeered by the government, and many temporary structures were erected. The prices of hotels and boarding houses rose exorbitantly, and the city faced serious economic conditions.—See also HOUSING: United States: National Housing Association.

1919.—Race riots.—Pershing's reception by Congress.—"Serious race riots lasting for several days in Washington, . . . left a toll of dead among the white and black participants and spread a reign of terror throughout [the city], . . . never before experienced in . . . [its] history. . . . The riots in Washington began on Saturday, July 19, 1919. They were occasioned by long continued and repeated reports of assaults by negroes on white women. Soldiers, sailors, marines, and civilians made violent attacks on negroes in the Centre Market district in the heart of the city. [The riots lasted about a week.] Seven men, four colored, were killed, and more than seventy were wounded. . . . The rioting was the most serious since the days following the Civil War."—N. Y. *Times Current History*, Aug., 1919, p. 453.—See also RACE PROBLEMS: 1905-1921.—General Pershing's return to the United States after the World War was the occasion for a formal recognition of his services to the country tendered him by a joint session of Congress on Sept. 18, 1919.

1920.—Zoning ordinance.—"On March 1, 1920, an act of congress provided for the creation of a zoning commission for Washington, consisting of the commissioners of the District of Columbia, the superintendent of public buildings and grounds, and the superintendent of the capitol buildings and grounds. The act provided that the engineer commissioner of the district should act as chairman of the zoning commission, that employes of the several departments of the district government might be used for the preparation of a zoning plan, an appropriation of \$5,000 was made for the expenses of the commission. The act also provided that the work should be completed not later than September 1, 1920. Owing to pressure of work in the district, consideration of the zoning plan was not undertaken until May 1, when a definite program of procedure was outlined which provided for the preparation of the various study maps not later than July 1, preparation of the tentative use-height-and-area zone maps and ordinance by August 1. The week of August 9 was devoted entirely to public hearings, after which the plan was revised in accordance with suggestions made at the hearings and by numerous individuals and organizations. The plan was officially adopted and became effective August 30, 1920. Provision is made for four districts (residential, first commercial, second commercial, and industrial); four height districts (35 feet, 55 feet, 85 feet, and 110 feet); and for four area districts." *National Municipal Review*, Dec., 1920, pp. 799-800).

1921.—Supreme Court case of Block vs. Hirsh

as a result of housing law of 1919. See SUPREME COURT: 1921.

1921-1922.—Disarmament conference. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

See also DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; WHITE HOUSE; EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: Workers' education; United States.

ALSO IN: M. C. Ames, *Hundred years in Washington*.—W. M. Barton, *Road to Washington*.—W. G. Bryan, *History of National Capital*.—T. N. Page, *Romantic founding of Washington*.—C. B. Todd, *Story of Washington*.—J. M. Stahl, *Invasion of the city of Washington*.—W. O. Stoddard, *Inside the White House*.—P. L. Phillips, *Beginnings of Washington*.—G. C. Hazelton, *National Capital*.—W. H. Taft and J. Bryce, *Washington: Beginning, growth and future*.—H. B. Macfarland, *Nation's relations with its capital*.—J. B. Varnum, *Washington sketch book*.

WASHINGTON, Fort, military post on Manhattan island, important during the American Revolution. It occupied the ground overlooking the Hudson, between the present 181st and 186th streets. It surrendered to the British in 1776. See U. S. A.: 1776 (August); (September-November).

WASHINGTON, Treaties of: 1842. See U. S. A.: 1842.

1871. See ALABAMA CLAIMS: 1871; ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1871-1872.

1877. See FISHERIES: 1877-1898.

1896. See BERING SEA QUESTION.

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS (1921-1922).—

"The objects of the international conference which sat in Washington from November 12, 1921, to February 6, 1922, were set forth in President Harding's formal invitation of August 11, 1921, to Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. [See U. S. A.: 1921 (July-August): Conference for the limitation of armament.] (Note.—On July 10, 1921, the department of state announced that these powers had been 'approached with formal but definite inquiries' on the subject.) These objects included two distinct topics, limitation of armament, and Pacific and Far Eastern questions. The problem of an association of nations, emphasized by the Republican platform of 1920 and various addresses by President Harding, lay in the background though not on the formal agenda, published September 21, 1921. The conference consisted of plenary sessions and committees. The plenary sessions were formal occasions attended by all the delegates, in which announcement was made of programs for discussion or agreements reached. They were not intended for negotiation but for declaration. . . . [They] were open to members of the Senate and House of Representatives, representatives of the press and such of the public as had cards of admission from the state department. The delegates sat at a 'U'-shaped, green-covered table with Mr. Hughes as chairman at the head of the 'U.' The remaining American delegates sat at his right, the British at his left and then in regular alternation the French, Italian and Japanese delegations. Thus, as is customary in such gatherings, an alphabetic order was followed. The powers attending merely the Far Eastern but not the Limitation of Armament Conference sat at the ends of the 'U' in a similar order, Belgium, China, Netherlands, Portugal. In the center of the 'U' sat the secretary of the conference and the official interpreter, M. Cameflynck, ready to repeat instantly every English speech in French and vice versa, for both these languages were official in the conference. Back of the delegates sat their techni-

cal experts. . . . The delegations were assisted by technical experts. Of these Japan had the most. . . . 'One hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war.' Thus President Harding struck the keynote of the conference at its opening meetings . . . November 12, 1921. . . . After President Harding's address of welcome, Secretary of State Hughes was elected chairman and surprised the conference and the world by laying down a concrete program for the limitation of naval armaments. On November 14 a session was held in which Mr. Balfour for Great Britain, Premier Briand for France, Admiral Baron Kato for Japan and Senator Schanzer for Italy accepted the American proposal 'in principle.' Committee negotiations upon the details of this proposal began at once as also upon the Far Eastern problems, but before any conclusions had been reached another plenary session was held, on November 21, to afford Premier Briand the opportunity to say that France was unwilling to discuss an agreement for the limitation of land armament until Germany was 'morally' as well as 'physically' disarmed. He cited passages from General Ludendorff's recent book to prove that this happy state had not been reached. Delegates of the other powers diplomatically voiced their disappointment, Senator Schanzer of Italy expressing the hope, doomed to disappointment, that the land armament item on the agenda would not be abandoned."—Q. Wright, *Washington conference (American Political Science Review, May, 1922, pp. 285-287)*.

The American proposal embodied four general principles:

(1) That all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned; (2) that further reduction should be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships; (3) that in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the powers concerned; (4) that the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies, and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed. In accordance with these principles the United States offered to scrap thirty capital ships, with an aggregate tonnage (including that of ships in construction, if completed) of 845,740 tons; Great Britain was called upon to scrap a tonnage of 583,375; Japan, 289,100 tons. With respect to replacement, the United States proposed that it be agreed that the first replacement tonnage shall not be laid down until ten years from the date of the agreement, and that replacements be limited by an agreed maximum of capital ship tonnage as follows: For the United States, 500,000 tons; for Great Britain, 500,000 tons, and for Japan, 300,000 tons. Two further conditions were proposed, that, subject to the ten year limitation above fixed and the maximum standard, capital ships may be replaced when they are twenty years old by new capital ship construction; and that no capital ship should be built in replacement with a tonnage displacement of more than 35,000 tons. With regard to the naval power of France and Italy, in view of certain extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting the existing strength of those two countries, the United States did not consider necessary a discussion at that stage of the proceedings of the tonnage allowance of these nations, but proposed that it be reserved for the later consideration of the conference. With regard to auxiliary combatant craft, it was proposed that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla leaders and destroyers allowed each power should be—for the United States, 450,000 tons; for Great Britain,

450,000 tons, and for Japan, 270,000 tons. It was provided, however, that no power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in auxiliary surface combatant craft on Nov. 11, 1921, exceeded the prescribed tonnage should be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements began, at which time the total tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft for each nation should be reduced to the prescribed allowance. In submarines, the United States and Great Britain were to be allowed 90,000 tons each, and Japan 54,000 tons; the tonnage of airplane carriers allowed was 80,000 tons each for the United States and Great Britain and 48,000 tons for Japan. The limitation of naval aircraft was not proposed owing to the fact that naval aircraft may be readily adapted from special types of commercial aircraft.


The results of the conference may be summarized as follows:

1. A treaty signed Feb. 6, 1922, between the United States, the British empire, France, Italy and Japan, limiting naval armament. The contracting powers agree that in existing warships (specified by names) the United States shall retain a total tonnage of 500,650, which, on the completion of the two ships of the *West Virginia* class and the scrapping of the *North Dakota* and *Dela-ware*, would be raised to 525,850 tons. The total tonnage of capital ships to be retained by the British empire was fixed at 580,450, but on completion of two projected vessels and the stipulated scrapping of four others, the total quota would stand at 558,950 tons. The metric tonnage to be retained by France was to be 221,170, while provision was made for new construction in 1927, 1929 and 1931. The Italian quota was designated at 182,800 metric tons, with new construction permissible during the same years as laid down for France. Japan undertook to retain a tonnage of 301,320. A capital ship is defined as a vessel of war whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding eight inches (203 millimetres). No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, for, or within the jurisdiction of any of the contracting powers, and no capital ship shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of sixteen inches (406 millimetres), while no war vessel hereafter laid down by any of the contracting powers, other than a capital ship, shall carry a gun exceeding eight inches in calibre. Except for conversion into two aircraft carriers, no warship designated to be scrapped may be converted into a war vessel. In time of peace, no preparations for the installation of warlike armaments on merchant vessels may be carried out beyond the necessary stiffening of decks for the eventual mounting of six-inch guns. The sale or transfer of warships from one power to another is prohibited; nor shall any power, while at war, convert to its own use any warship that may be under construction within its jurisdiction for another power. Furthermore, the United States, the British empire and Japan agree that the *status quo* at the signing of the present treaty shall be maintained, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, in their respective territories and possessions, as specified: (1) The insular possessions—present or future—of the United States in the Pacific ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska, and the Panama canal zone, not including the Aleutian islands, and (b) the Hawaiian islands; (2) Hong Kong and insular possessions—present or future—of Great Britain in the Pacific.

east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand; (3) the following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific: the Kurile islands, Bonin islands, Amami-Oshima, Loochoo islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, or any other such insular possessions in the Pacific which Japan may hereafter acquire. This treaty to remain in force until Dec. 31, 1936, notice of intention to terminate the treaty to be given two years before the expiration of that date, whereupon the treaty will terminate for all of the contracting parties.—Based on official report on the Washington conference (67th Congress, 2nd Session, 1921-1922, v. 10, Senate Document no. 126).—See also U.S.A.: 1922 (January-September).

2. A treaty signed Feb. 6, 1922, between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy

merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. Article II. The Signatory Powers invite all other civilized Powers to express their assent to the foregoing statement of established law so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents. Article III. The Signatory Powers, desiring to ensure the enforcement of the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a government superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws



FOUR-POWER PACIFIC TREATY, DEC. 13, 1921
Facsimile of the signatures of the principal delegates

and Japan, in relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare. The contracting parties, "desiring to make more effective the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants at sea in time of war, and to prevent the use in war of noxious gases and chemicals, have determined to conclude a Treaty to this effect . . . (declaring) Article I . . . that among the rules adopted . . . the following are to be deemed an established part of international law: (1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine its character before it can be seized. A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure. A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been placed in safety. (2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine cannot capture a

of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought before the civil or military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found. . . . Article V. The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties, the Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto."—67th Congress, 2nd Session, 1921-1922, v. 10, Senate Document no. 126.—See also POISON GAS: Recent developments.

3. A treaty signed Dec. 13, 1921, between the

United States, the British empire, France and Japan "with a view to the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. . . . I. The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment. II. If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation. III. This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting Parties to terminate it upon twelve months' notice."—*Ibid.*—See also U. S. A.: 1923 (March-September).—Accompanying this "Four-Power Treaty" a separate instrument, signed the same day, declared (1) "That the Treaty shall apply to the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean; provided, however, that the making of the Treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States of America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements between the United States of America and the Mandatory Powers, respectively, in relation to the mandated islands. (2) That the controversies to which the second paragraph of Article I refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers."—*Ibid.*—By a supplementary treaty signed Feb. 6, 1922, it was agreed that "the term 'insular possessions and insular dominions' used in the aforesaid Treaty shall, in its application to Japan, include only Karafuto (or the southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa and the Pescadores, and the islands under the mandate of Japan."—*Ibid.*

4. A treaty signed on Feb. 6, 1922, between the United States, Belgium, the British empire, China, France, Italy and Japan, "to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon a basis of equality of opportunity," sets forth that the contracting parties, other than China, agree "Article I (1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial integrity of China; (2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the

security of such States. Article II. The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I. Article III. With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agree they will not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking (a) Any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China; (b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity. . . . China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this Article in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties to the present Treaty or not. [In Article IV the signatories agree not to lend their support to the creation of spheres of influence in Chinese territory. In Article V China agrees not to exercise or permit any unfair discrimination on her railways, whether in respect of freight or passenger transport, while Article VI defines China's neutrality rights in any war to which she may not be a party. In Article VII the signatories agree to full and frank communication among themselves should a situation arise involving application of this treaty, and Article VIII invites the adherence of non-signatory states, which shall become effective on notification received by the United States government.]—*Ibid.*

5. A treaty signed on Feb. 6, 1922, between the United States, Belgium, the British empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal, "with a view to increasing the revenues of the Chinese Government," embodies a resolution adopted on February 4, "with respect to the revision of Chinese customs duties, for the purpose of making such duties equivalent to an effective 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, in accordance with existing treaties concluded by China with other nations," though the provisions of this treaty "shall override all stipulations of treaties between China and the respective Contracting Powers which are inconsistent therewith, other than stipulations according most favored nation treatment." The treaty provides for a Tariff Revision Commission at Shanghai and stipulates the procedure to be adopted.

6. A treaty signed on Feb. 4, 1922, between the representatives of China and Japan "to settle amicably and in accordance with their common interest outstanding questions relative to Shantung," provides, in Article I, that "Japan shall restore to China the former German leased Territory of Kiaochow." Articles II to VIII deal with the appointment of a Joint Commission to arrange the details of transfer, the handing over of administrative powers, official documents, public property, etc. Articles IX to XI provide for the withdrawal of Japanese troops and the disposition of Chinese police or military force. Arti-

cles XII-XXII relate to the transfer of the Custom House of Tsingtao, of the railway properties and mines, and the terms of compensation from China to Japan. In Articles XXIII-XXVIII Japan renounces any attempt to establish an exclusive settlement within the territory and China agrees to open the entire area to foreign trade and to respect foreign vested rights; China agrees to purchase the salt industry from Japanese subjects, and to take over the submarine cables and two Japanese wireless stations for fair compensation.

7. A convention signed Feb. 11, 1922, between the United States and Japan relative to the Island of Yap. (See YAP.) "Article I. Subject to the provisions of the present convention, the United States consents to the administration by Japan, pursuant to the . . . mandate [awarded by the League of Nations to Japan], of all the former islands in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator. Article II. The United States and its nationals shall receive all the benefits of the engagements of Japan defined in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the aforesaid mandate, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations. It is further agreed between the High Contracting Parties as follows: (1) Japan shall insure in the islands complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality; American missionaries of all such religions shall be free to enter the islands and to travel and reside thereon, to acquire and possess property, to erect religious buildings and to open schools throughout the islands; it being understood, however, that Japan shall have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order and good government and to take all measures required for such control. (2) Vested American property rights in the mandated islands shall be respected and in no way impaired; (3) Existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be applicable to the mandated lands; (4) Japan will address to the United States a duplicate of the annual report on the administration of the mandate to be made by Japan to the Council of the League of Nations; (5) Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate as recited in the convention unless such modification shall have been expressly assented to by the United States. Article III. The United States and its nationals shall have free access to the island of Yap on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nation and their respective nationals in all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable or of any cable which may hereafter be laid or operated by the United States or by its nationals connecting with the island of Yap. The rights and privileges embraced by the preceding paragraph shall also be accorded to the Government of the United States and its nationals with respect to radio-telegraphic communication; provided, however, that so long as the Government of Japan shall maintain on the island of Yap an adequate radio-telegraphic station, cooperating effectively with the cables and with other radio stations on ships or on shore, without discriminatory exactions or preferences, the exercise of the right to establish radio-telegraphic stations on the island by the United States or its nationals shall be suspended. Article IV. In connection with the rights embraced by Article III, specific rights, privileges, and exemptions, in so far as they relate to electrical communications,

shall be enjoyed in the island of Yap by the United States and its nationals in terms as follows: (1) Nationals of the United States shall have the unrestricted right to reside in the island, and the United States and its nationals shall have the right to acquire and hold on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nation or their respective nationals all kinds of property and interests, both personal and real, including lands, buildings, residences, offices, works, and appurtenances. (2) Nationals of the United States shall not be obliged to obtain any permit or license in order to be entitled to land and operate cables on the island or to establish radio-telegraphic service, subject to the provisions of Article III, or to enjoy any of the rights and privileges embraced by this article and by Article III. (3) No censorship or supervision shall be exercised over cable or radio messages or operations. (4) Nationals of the United States shall have complete freedom of entry and exit in the island for their persons and property. (5) No taxes, port, harbor, or landing charges or exactions of any nature whatsoever, shall be levied, either with respect to the operation of cables or radio stations, or with respect to property, persons, or vessels. (6) No discriminatory police regulations shall be enforced. (7) The Government of Japan will exercise its powers of expropriation in the island to secure to the United States or its nationals needed property and facilities for the purpose of electrical communications if such property or facilities can not otherwise be obtained. It is understood that the location and the area of land so to be expropriated shall be arranged between the two Governments according to the requirements of each case. Property of the United States or of its nationals and facilities for the purpose of electrical communication in the island shall not be subject to expropriation."—*Congressional Record, Feb. 21, 1922, pp. 3170-3172.*—"Far East and Pacific Questions were concerned primarily with China, but Pacific islands and Siberia were also on the agenda. The absence of Russia from the conference precluded action on the latter beyond a resolution taking cognizance of the Japanese declaration of intention eventually to withdraw its troops from Siberia and northern Sakhalien. No time was stated. . . . More important is the four power pact. . . . The agreement is to continue for ten years and more unless denounced with a year's notice. Its dual object from the American standpoint of superseding the Anglo-Japanese alliance and protecting the Philippines seems to have been achieved, the first expressly. The treaty is only between four powers and is confined to insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific, but in other respects it seems to bear a close resemblance to Article X of the League of Nations Covenant. . . . Mr. Lodge, however, in presenting the four power pact to the conference on December 10, distinguished it from this article, and in offering the treaties to the Senate on February 10, President Harding said: 'There is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no written or moral obligation to join in defense, no expressed or implied commitment to arrive at any agreement except in accordance with our constitutional methods. It is easy to believe, however, that such a conference of the four powers is a moral warning that an aggressive nation, giving affront to the four great powers ready to focus world opinion on a given controversy, would be embarking on a hazardous enterprise.' . . . The United States will have less cause to worry about the Philippines . . . and the

Anglo-Japanese alliance has been superseded. Made in 1902 against Russia, renewed in 1905 and 1911 against Germany, it seemed in 1921 to have no objective unless the United States. Yet to denounce it after the loyal observance by Japan during the World War would hardly comport with British honor. The addition of France and the United States seemed the easiest way out and this was achieved by the four power pact."—Q. Wright, *Washington conference (American Political Science Review, May, 1922)*.

ALSO IN: F. W. Eggleston, *Washington and after: An Australian view (Nineteenth Century, Sept., 1922)*.—J. N. Jordan, *Washington conference and Far Eastern questions (Quarterly Review, July, 1922)*.—K. K. Kawakami, *Japan's foreign policy*.

WASHINGTON HIGHWAY, canal between the Chesapeake bay and the Ohio river. See **CANALS**: American: Rehabilitated.

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE (1919). See **LABOR LEGISLATION**: 1919-1922.

WASHINGTON MONUMENT.—A monument to Washington, of white marble, in plain obelisk form, 55 feet square at the base and 555 feet in height, was begun at the city of Washington in 1848, but stood unfinished for many years. In 1876 Congress made appropriations for the work, and it was completed in 1884.

WASHINGTON PEACE CONFERENCE. See **CENTRAL AMERICA**: 1907; **COSTA RICA**: 1907.

WASHINGTON'S BIRTHDAY. See **HOLIDAYS**.

WASHITA RIVER, Battle of (1868). See **INDIANS, AMERICAN**: 1865-1876.

WASHOAN FAMILY.—"This family is represented by a single well known tribe, whose range extended from Reno, on the line of the Central Pacific Railroad, to the lower end of Carson Valley."—J. W. Powell, *Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, p. 131*.

WASSERMANN, August von (1866-), German therapist. See **MEDICAL SCIENCE**: Modern: 19th-20th centuries: Serotherapy.

WAT TYLER'S REBELLION. See **ENGLAND**: 1381.

WATAUGA ASSOCIATION, first government of settlers, west of the Allegheny mountains, in East Tennessee. See **TENNESSEE**: 1760-1772.

WATER CLOCK, ancient invention for measuring time. See **INVENTIONS**: Ancient and medieval: Measurements.

WATER CONSERVATION. See **CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES**.

WATER LAW. See **RIPARIAN RIGHTS**: Theories of water law.

WATER POWER. See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY**: Electric power: 1806-1921; 1921.

WATER POWER ACT (1920). See **U.S.A.**: 1922: Relations between the states, etc.

WATER POWER TRUST. See **TRUSTS**: United States: 1909.

WATER RIGHTS. See **RIPARIAN RIGHTS**: Definition.

WATER SUPPLY. See **AQUEDUCTS**; **MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT**: Early development of public works; **NEW YORK CITY**: 1905-1919; 1923; **WORLD WAR**: 1916: VI. Turkish theater, b, 2, i.

WATERFORD, county in the province of Munster, Ireland. In 1367 it came under English control. See **IRELAND**: 1327-1367.

WATERFORD, city, seaport and chief town of Waterford county, Ireland, ninety-seven miles southwest of Dublin. It was under control of the

Danes until taken by Strongbow in 1171; granted to John Talbot, earl of Shrewsbury, 1447; attacked unsuccessfully by Cromwell in 1649, and surrendered to William III in 1691. See **IRELAND**: 1169-1200.

WATER-LILY SECT. See **TRIAD SOCIETY**.

WATERLOO CAMPAIGN, Napoleon's. See **FRANCE**: 1815 (June); **ORDNANCE**: 19th century. Marlborough's campaigns. See **NETHERLANDS**: 1705.

WATERTOWN, township of Massachusetts, about six miles west of Boston. See **TOWNSHIP AND TOWN-MEETING**.

WATERWAYS. See **CANALS**.

WATERWAYS TREATY. See **CANADA**: 1909 (January).

WATLING STREET.—The Milky Way was known to our early English ancestors as Watling Street, signifying the road "by which the hero-sons of Waelta marched across" the heavens. When they settled in England they transferred the name to the great Roman road which they found traversing the island, from London to Chester. See **ROMAN ROADS IN BRITAIN**; **BRITAIN**: 411.

WATLING'S ISLAND, small island of the Bahamas, in the central part of the group. See **BAHAMAS ISLANDS**: 1492-1783.

WATSON, John Christian (1867-), Australian statesman and labor leader. Premier of Australia, 1904. See **AUSTRALIA**: 1903-1904.

WATSON, William Arthur (1860-), British general. See **WORLD WAR**: 1917: VI. Turkish theater: b, 2.

WATT, James (1736-1819), British mechanical engineer. Famous for his improvement of the steam engine. See **STEAM AND GAS ENGINES**: Watt's improvements in the steam engine; **STEAM NAVIGATION**: Beginnings.

WATT, William Alexander (1871-), Australian statesman. Minister of the crown, 1899; Postmaster-general for Victoria, 1899-1900; premier, 1912-1914; member of Parliament, 1917-1918; acting prime minister, 1918-1920. See **AUSTRALIA**: 1919-1920.

WATTEAU, Antoine (1684-1721), French painter. See **PAINTING**: French.

WATTIGNIES, Battle of. See **FRANCE**: 1793 (October): Battle of Wattignies.

WAUHATCHIE, Battle of. See **U.S.A.**: 1863 (October-November: Tennessee).

WAULKING SONG. See **MUSIC**: Folk music and nationalism: Celtic: Hebrides.

WAYNE, Anthony (Mad Anthony Wayne) (1745-1796), American soldier. Member of the Pennsylvania legislature, 1774-1775; member of the Committee of Public Safety, 1775; served in Canada, at Ticonderoga, 1776-1777; commanded a division at Brandywine and at Germantown, 1777; in the battle of Monmouth, 1778; stormed Stony Point, 1779; served at Yorktown, 1781; member of the House of Representatives from Georgia, 1791-1792; commander-in-chief of the army, 1792; defeated the Indians, 1794; signed the Treaty of Greenville with the Northwestern Indian tribes, 1795. See **U.S.A.**: 1777 (January-December); 1778 (June); 1778-1779: Washington guarding the Hudson; 1781 (January); 1793-1795: **NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES**: 1790-1795.

WAYNESBOROUGH, Battle of. See **U.S.A.**: 1865 (February-March: Virginia).

WAZIR, or Wazeer. See **VIZIR**.

WAZIRIS, tribe inhabiting the mountain region of Waziristan in northwestern India. In 1894 they waged war against the British. See **INDIA**: 1894.

W BEACH, beach on the Gallipoli peninsula, a landing place for British troops during the World War. See **WORLD WAR**: 1915: VI. Turkey: a, 3, i; a, 4, iv.

W. C. T. U. See **WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION**.

WEALTH. See **CAPITALISM**; **ECONOMICS**; **MONEY AND BANKING**; **TARIFF**; **TRUSTS**.

WEAPONS OF WARFARE. See **ORDNANCE**; **RIFLES AND REVOLVERS**; **DUM-DUM BULLET**; **GRENADES**; **LIQUID FIRE**; **MILITARY ORGANIZATION**; **TORPEDO**; **TRENCH WARFARE**: Defensive weapons.

WEARE, Meshech (1713-1786), American political leader. Commissioner to Albany Congress, 1754; member of the Committee of Public Safety, 1775; president of the state of New Hampshire, 1776-1784. See **NEW HAMPSHIRE**: 1783-1816.

WEAVER, James Baird (1833-1912), American political leader. Member of the House of Representatives, 1878-1880; 1884-1888; candidate for presidency, 1880, 1892. See **U. S. A.**: 1880: Twenty-fourth presidential election.

WEAVING. See **INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION**: England: Inventions in textile industry; **INVENTIONS**: Ancient and medieval; Early industrial processes; 18th century: Industry; 19th century: Industry; **INDIANS, AMERICAN**: Cultural areas in North America: Southwest area.

WEAVING BROTHERS. See **BEGUINES**.

WEBB-KENYON LAW. See **LIQUOR PROBLEM**: United States: 1913.

WEBB-POMERENE ACT (1918). See **TRUSTS**: United States: 1918-1921.

WEBER, Karl Maria von (1786-1826), German composer. Studied with many teachers among them Michael Haydn and Abbé Vogler. He held many appointments as capellmeister and conductor in Germany, finally in 1816, becoming conductor of the Royal Opera at Dresden. "Der Freischütz" was produced in Berlin, 1821, "Euryanthe" in Vienna, 1823, and "Oberon" in London, 1826. A vivid and melodic character marks his works and he strongly influenced the later "romanticists" in Germany. See **MUSIC**: Modern: 1818-1880.

WEBSTER, Daniel (1782-1852), American statesman, orator and constitutional lawyer. Member of the House of Representatives from New Hampshire, 1813-1817; one of the advocates in the Dartmouth College case, 1818; member of the House of Representatives from Massachusetts, 1823-1827; United States senator from Massachusetts, 1827-1841, 1845-1850; debate with Hayne, 1830, and with Calhoun, 1833; secretary of state, 1841-1843, 1850-1852; negotiated Ashburton Treaty with England, 1842. See **U. S. A.**: 1828-1833; 1842: Treaty with England; 1850 (March); 1850-1851; 1852: Appearance of the Know Nothing, or American, party; 1852: Seventeenth presidential election; **BIBLE, ENGLISH**: Modern estimates; **FOOTE RESOLUTIONS**; **TARIFF**: 1828; also **UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES**: 1754-1769.

WEBSTER, John (c. 1580-c. 1624), English dramatist. See **DRAMA**: 1592-1648.

WEBSTER, Noah (1758-1843), American lexicographer and author. See **PRINTING AND THE PRESS**: 1784-1813.

WEBSTER, Sir Richard Everard. See **ALVERSTONE, SIR RICHARD EVERARD WEBSTER**.

WEBSTER-ASHBURTON TREATY (1842). See **MAINE**: 1841-1842; **U. S. A.**: 1842: Treaty with England; **AFRICAN SQUADRON**.

WEDDELL, James (1787-1834), English navigator and writer. See **ANTARCTIC EXPLORATION**: 1819-1838.

WEDEL, Botho, Baron von (1862-), German diplomat. See **WORLD WAR**: Diplomatic background: 12, c.

WEDELSPANG, Battle of (1850). See **DENMARK**: 1848-1862.

WEDGEWOOD, Thomas (1771-1805), English physicist and philanthropist, said to have been the inventor of photography. See **INVENTIONS**: 19th century: Photography.

WEDMORE, Peace of, treaty of peace concluded between King Alfred and the Danes, by which the latter were bound to remain peacefully on that side of England which lay north and east of "Watling Street." See **ENGLAND**: 855-880.

WEED, Thurlow (1797-1882), American journalist and politician. Established the *Anti-Masonic Enquirer*, 1826; prominent member of the Anti-Masonic party, 1826-1832. See **NEW YORK**: 1826-1832.

WEEK DAYS: Origin of names. See **MYTHOLOGY**: Germanic: Identification of Germanic gods, etc.

WEEK OF MERCY. See **INTERNATIONAL RELIEF**: Jewish relief.

WEEKLY REST DAY. See **SUNDAY OBSERVANCE**.

WEEKS, John Wingate (1860-), American legislator and cabinet officer. Mayor of Newton, Massachusetts, 1903-1904; member of the House of Representatives, 1905-1913; United States senator, 1913-1919; secretary of war since 1921. See **U. S. A.**: 1921 (March): President Harding's cabinet.

WEHLAU, Treaty of (1657). See **BRANDENBURG**: 1640-1688.

WEIGHT-CLOCK, ancient invention for measuring time. See **INVENTIONS**: Ancient and medieval: Measurements.

WEI-HAI-WEI, territory with a capital of the same name, China, under British administration. The territory "covers an area of 285 square miles bordering the Yellow Sea, on the coast of the foreland of Shantung, facing northward. It comprises a coast-line about 70 miles in length, and is bounded by an (approximate) arc of a circle whose centre is that of the bay in which the harbour is situated. [The territory had a population of 154,416 at the 1921 census inhabiting 'upwards of 300 villages.] The resident white population is small (some 200 in all), consisting of a few officials, missionaries, and traders."—A. J. Herbertson and O. J. R. Howarth, *Oxford survey of the British empire* (Asia, pp. 448, 451).—See also **BRITISH EMPIRE**: Extent.—Under the terms of the Washington conference (1921-1922), Britain offered to restore it to China. Negotiations to carry this out began on October 2, 1922.

1895.—China sanctions temporary Japanese occupation. See **SHIMONOSEKI, TREATY OF**.

1898.—Lease to England. See **CHINA**: 1898 (March-July).

1914.—Occupied by British. See **WORLD WAR**: 1914: V. Japan: d, 2.

WEIMAR, town in the state of the same name in Germany, incorporated in the new republic of Thuringia, Dec. 24, 1919. The state had, in 1919, a population of 433,314. Formerly the town of Weimar was the capital of the grand duchy of Saxe-Weimar and is famous as the home of Goethe and Schiller. See **SAXONY**: 1180-1553.

WEINBERG, Battle of (1140). See **AUSTRIA**: 805-1246.

WEINSTOCK, Harris (1854-), American merchant, born in England. Appointed member

of the Industrial Relations Commission, 1913. See INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION.

WEISMANN, August (1834-1914), German zoölogist. See EVOLUTION: Weismann's theory of continuity of the germ plasm.

WEISSENBERG, Battles of. See GERMANY: 1620; FRANCE: 1870 (July-August).

WEITZEL, Godfrey (1835-1884), American general. During the Civil War sent to aid in the defense of Fort Pickens, Florida, 1861; in Lafourche campaign, 1862-1863; entered Richmond, 1865. See U. S. A.: 1865 (April: Virginia): Abandonment of Richmond.

WEKERLE, Alexander (1848-1921), Hungarian statesman. Member of the House of Deputies, 1886; minister of finance, 1889; premier, 1892-1894, 1906-1909, 1917-1918. See HUNGARY: 1878-1890; 1897-1910; 1917-1918; AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1905-1906; WORLD WAR: 1917: XII. Political conditions in the belligerent countries: b.

WELATABIANS. See WILZEN.

WELCH, William Henry (1850-), American pathologist. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern: 20th century: Experimental method.

WELD, Sir Frederick Aloysius (1823-1891), English colonial administrator. Governor of Western Australia, 1870. See WESTERN AUSTRALIA: 1616-1870.

WELDON RAILROAD, Battle on the. See U. S. A.: 1864 (August: Virginia).

WELFARE, Industrial. See LABOR ORGANIZATION; LABOR REMUNERATION; SOCIAL INSURANCE; CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION; also KANSAS: 1915.

WELFARE WORK, World War. See WORLD WAR: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: IX. War relief; INTERNATIONAL RELIEF.

WELFS. See GUELFES.

WELHAVEN, Johann Sebastian Cammermeyer (1807-1873), Norwegian poet and critic. See SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE: 1814-1900.

WELLAND SHIP CANAL, Canadian canal twenty-seven miles long, between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. See CANALS: American: Great Lakes and St. Lawrence system.

WELLES, Gideon (1802-1878), American statesman. Member of the Connecticut legislature, 1827-1835; comptroller of the state, 1835, 1842, 1843; secretary of the navy under presidents Lincoln and Johnson, 1861-1869. See U. S. A.: 1863 (July: New York).

WELLESLEY, Richard Colley Wesley, Marquis (1760-1842), English statesman, and administrator of India. Member of House of Commons, 1784-1797; member of Board of Control of Indian affairs, 1793; governor-general of India, 1797-1805; envoy to Spain, 1809; secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1809-1812; lord-lieutenant of Ireland, 1821-1828, 1833-1834. See INDIA: 1798-1805; 1805-1816; ENGLAND: 1806-1812.

WELLESLEY, Province of, division of the Straits Settlements, on the west coast of the Malay peninsula. See STRAITS SETTLEMENTS: Conquest and settlement.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE. American college for women, founded in 1875. See EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Secondary education; WOMAN'S RIGHTS: 1861-1910.

WELLINGHAUSEN, or Kirchdenkern, Battle of (1761). See GERMANY: 1761-1762.

WELLINGTON, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of (1769-1852), British general and statesman. Served in the Netherlands, 1794-1795; in command of forces in India, 1796-1805; expedition to Hanover, 1805; member of House of Commons, 1806-

1807; secretary for Ireland, 1807, 1809; led expedition against Copenhagen, 1807; commander of English and allied forces in Spain against Napoleon, 1808, 1809-1814; ambassador to Paris, 1814-1815; envoy to Congress of Vienna, 1815; commander at battle of Waterloo, 1815; commander-in-chief of the army of occupation in France, 1815-1818; representative at Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818; at Verona, 1822; ambassador to Russia, 1826; commander-in-chief of the army, 1827; prime minister, 1828-1830; foreign secretary, 1834-1835; cabinet member without portfolio, 1841-1846. See SPAIN: 1808-1809 (August-January); 1809 (February-July); (August-December); 1809-1810 (October-September); 1812 (June-August); ENGLAND: 1827-1828: Administration of Lord Goderich; 1830: Death of George IV; FRANCE: 1815 (June); VERONA, CONGRESS OF.

WELLINGTON, capital of New Zealand, on a bay of Port Nicholson, on the south coast of North island. (See AUSTRALIA: Map.) It had a population of 110,680 in 1920.

1840.—Founding of the city. See NEW ZEALAND: 1837-1851.

1865.—Capital transferred from Auckland. See NEW ZEALAND: 1855-1873.

1913.—Congress of labor parties. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1906-1913.

WELLMAN, Walter (1858-), American journalist, explorer and aeronaut. See ARCTIC EXPLORATION: 1901-1909; Chronological summary: 1894; 1898-1899; AVIATION: Important flights since 1900: 1910.

WELLS, Herbert George (1866-), English novelist and historian. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1880-1920.

WELLS, Horace (1815-1848), American dentist. One of the first to use anesthetics in dentistry. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: Modern: 19th century: Discovery of anesthetics.

WELSBACH, Karl Auer, Baron von (b. 1858), Austrian inventor. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Electric lighting: 1841-1921; INVENTIONS: 19th century: Artificial light.

WELSH, Name of the.—“The Germans, like our own ancestors, called foreign, i. e. non-Teutonic nations, Welsh. Yet apparently not all such nations, but only those which they in some way associated with the Roman Empire: the Cymry of Roman Britain, the Romanized Kelts of Gaul, the Italians, the Roumans or Wallachs of Transylvania and the Principalities. It does not appear that either the Magyars or any Slavonic people were called by any form of the name Welsh.”—J. Bryce, *Holy Roman empire*, ch. 17, footnote.—“Wealhas, or Welshmen, . . . it was by this name, which means ‘strangers,’ or ‘unintelligible people,’ that the English knew the Britons, and it is the name by which the Britons, oddly enough, now know themselves.”—J. R. Green, *Making of England*, p. 122.—See also WALES; WALLOONS.

WELSH CALVINISTIC METHODISTS. See METHODIST CHURCH: 1729-1791; PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES: 1870-1920.

WELSH LANGUAGE. See PHILOLOGY: 9; 11; 17.

WELSH MUSIC. See MUSIC: Folk music and nationalism: Celtic: Wales.

WEMYSS, Sir Rosslyn Erskine. See WESTER WEMYSS.

WENCESLAUS, or Wenzel I (1205-1253), king of Bohemia, 1230-1253.

Wenceslaus II (1271-1305), king of Bohemia, 1278-1305.

Wenceslaus III (1289-1306), king of Bohemia, 1305-1306, king of Hungary, 1301-1305.

Wenceslaus IV (1361-1419), Holy Roman emperor, 1378-1400, king of Bohemia, 1378-1419. Deposed from the German throne, 1400. See **BRANDENBURG**: 1168-1417; **GERMANY**: 1347-1493; **JEW**s: Germany: 11th-16th centuries.

WENDS.—"The Germans call all Slavonians Wends. No Slavonian calls himself so."—R. G. Latham, *Germany of Tacitus: Prolegomena*, sect. 15.—See also **AVARS**: 7th century; **VANDALS**: Origin, etc.; **VENEDI**.

WENTWORTH, Benning (1606-1770). American colonial administrator. Royal governor of New Hampshire, 1741-1767. See **VERMONT**: 1749-1774.

WENTWORTH, Sir John (1737-1820), colonial administrator in America. Royal governor of New Hampshire, 1767-1776; lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia, 1792-1808. See **NEW HAMPSHIRE**: 1775-1776.

WENTWORTH, Thomas. See **STRAFFORD**, **THOMAS WENTWORTH**.

WENZEL. See **WENCESLAUS**.

WERBACH, Battle of. See **GERMANY**: 1866.

WERBEN, Battle of. See **GERMANY**: 1631.

WERGELAND, Henrik Arnold (1808-1845), Norwegian poet. See **SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE**: 1814-1900.

WERGILD, Weregild, or Leodis.—"The principle that every injury to either person or property might be compensated by a money payment was common to all the northern nations. It was introduced into Gaul by the conquering Franks, and into Britain by the English invaders. Every man's life had a fixed money value, called the 'wergild.' In the case of a freeman, this compensation for murder was payable to his kindred; in that of a slave, to his master. The amount of the wergild varied, according to a graduated scale, with the rank of the person slain."—T. P. Taswell-Langmead, *English constitutional history*, p. 41.

ALSO IN: F. Seeböhm, *Tribal custom in Anglo-Saxon law*.

WERKBUND. See **ARTS AND CRAFTS MOVEMENT**.

WEROWOCOMOCO, one of Powhatan's residents. See **POWHATAN CONFEDERACY**.

WERRINGEN, or Wöerringen, Battle of (1288), fought between Henry III, count of Luxembourg, and John, duke of Brabant. The duke of Brabant, who was besieging the castle of Woeringen, near Bonn, was attacked by Henry of Luxembourg, who was supported by his allies, the bishop of Cologne and Reinald of Gelderland. By his victory John attached Limburg to the duchy of Brabant.

WESEL, city in Prussia, on the Rhine, thirty-two miles northwest of Düsseldorf. It was an important Hanseatic town. See **CITIES, IMPERIAL AND FREE, OF GERMANY**.

WESLEY, Charles (1707-1788), English Methodist clergyman and hymn writer. Accompanied his brother John to Georgia, 1735-1736. See **GEORGIA**: 1732-1739; **METHODIST CHURCH**: 1729-1791.

WESLEY, John (1703-1791), English clergyman and founder of Methodism. Went to Georgia as a missionary, 1735-1738. See **BRISTOL**: 1739; **CHURCH OF ENGLAND**: 18th century; **GEORGIA**: 1732-1739; **METHODIST CHURCH**: 1729-1791; **MISSIONS, CHRISTIAN**: 17th-19th centuries.

WESLEYAN METHODISTS. See **METHODIST CHURCH**.

WESSAGUSSET, settlement founded by Thomas Weston in Massachusetts, 1622. See **MASSACHUSETTS**: 1622-1628.

WESSEL, Johan Herman (1742-1785), Danish dramatist and poet. See **SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE**: 1750-1850.

WESSEX, one of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of England. It was situated in the southern part of England, extending from Watling Street to the Channel, and was in the center of the ancient kingdom of England. See **ENGLAND**: 477-527; 802-839.

WESSOBRUNNER GEBET, old German prayer. See **GERMAN LITERATURE**: A. D. 1st-9th centuries.

WEST, Benjamin (1738-1820), American painter. See **PAINTING**: American.

WEST, Francis (1586-1633), English colonial administrator in America. Temporary president of Virginia, 1609; governor, 1627-1628. See **NEW ENGLAND**: 1620-1623; **VIRGINIA**: 1609-1616.

WEST, Thomas. See **DELAWARE, OR DE LA WARR, LORD**.

WEST AFRICA, that part of the continent of Africa which contains the French colonies of Morocco, Algeria, French West Africa, and French Equatorial Africa; the Spanish colony of Rio di Oro, Portuguese Guinea, and the Portuguese colony of Angola; the British colonies of Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Gambia, and Nigeria, the British protectorate of Cameroon, formerly a German colony, South West Africa; and the republic of Liberia.

19th century.—Growth of British and French control. See **BRITISH EMPIRE**: Expansion: 19th century: Africa: West Africa; **AFRICA**: Modern European occupation: Later 19th century.

1916.—Conquest by the British and French from the Germans. See **WORLD WAR**: 1916: VII. African theater: b.

1919.—German colonies renounced by Germany allocated to Great Britain, France and the Union of South Africa by the Versailles treaty. See **VERSAILLES, TREATY OF**: Part IV.

ALSO IN: M. Ali and W. F. Hutchinson, *West African Year Book*, 1920-1921.—G. L. Beer, *African questions at peace conference*.

WEST AUSTRALIA. See **WESTERN AUSTRALIA**.

WEST GÖTA CANAL. See **CANALS**: Principal European canals: Sweden.

WEST INDIA COMPANY, Dutch. See **DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY**.

WEST INDIA COMPANY, French, French trading company organized by Colbert, and important in the development of Canada. See **CANADA**: 1664-1674; **FRANCE**: 1661-1683.

WEST INDIES: Location.—Area.—Name.—Number of islands.—As colonial possessions of foreign powers.—"The West Indies extend from the tip of Florida's toe west and east a thousand miles out to sea. This is the most important section of the Caribbean world and comprises the four large islands of Cuba, Jamaica, Hispaniola (Hayti, or San Domingo) and Porto Rico. [See also **CUBA**; **JAMAICA**; **HAITI**; **HAITI, REPUBLIC OF**; **PORTO RICO**; **SANTO DOMINGO**.] The continental shore line of South America and Central America, and the old Spanish Main from the mouth of the Orinoco to the Yucatan channel complete the land boundaries of the American Mediterranean."—S. Bonsal, *American Mediterranean*, p. 1.—The West Indies are made up of two great groups of islands, the Greater Antilles and the Lesser Antilles, whose total area is over 100,000 square miles. Four foreign governments hold possessions in these islands, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Holland. The West Indies "owe their names to the fact that when they were discovered by Columbus, the Genoese navigator believed that he had achieved

his ambition and had succeeded in reaching India by a western route. The name 'West Indies' was once of wider application than it is now. [See also AMERICA: 1493; 1493-1496; 1494.] . . . A large part of America thus became the 'West Indies,' but the term was eventually applied only to the islands in the Caribbean sea, and to adjacent parts of the mainland. The islands were also called the Antilles after Antilla or Antiglia, a mythical land which figures on old charts and maps 200 leagues to the West of the Azores or Western Islands. The most northerly of the West Indies are the Bahamas, which have a total area of 4,466 square miles. [See also BAHAMA ISLANDS.] Below them is the chain of large islands lying east and west, known as the Greater Antilles which consist of Cuba, an independent republic, by far the largest island in the West Indies, having an area of 44,000 square miles, with Jamaica (British, 4,207 square miles) just below its eastern end, Haiti or San Domingo (an island owned by independent republics, 29,830 square miles [formerly a French colony]), and Porto Rico (American, 3,600 square miles). To the east of Porto Rico are the Lesser Antilles lying mainly north and south, which comprise St. Thomas (American, 33 square miles), St. Croix (American, 74 square miles), St. John (American, 20 square miles) [all three islands, and a number of unnamed islands known as the Virgin islands and formerly owned by Denmark (see VIRGIN ISLANDS)]; another small group of islands, called also the Virgin Islands (British, 58 square miles); and in sequence below them, Anguilla (British, 35 square miles); St. Martin (Dutch and French, 38 square miles); St. Bartholomew (French, 8 square miles); Saba (Dutch, 5 square miles); Barbuda (British, 62 square miles); St. Eustatius (Dutch, 8 square miles); St. Kitts (British, 68 square miles); Nevis (British, 50 square miles [see NEVIS]); Antigua (British, 108 square miles); Montserrat (British, 32½ square miles); Guadeloupe (French, 619 square miles [see GUADELOUPE]); Marie Galante (French, 55 square miles); Dominica (British, 291 square miles); Martinique (French, 380 square miles); St. Lucia (British, 233 square miles); St. Vincent (British, 140 square miles); Barbados (British, 166 square miles [see BARBADOS]); Grenada and the Grenadines (British, 123 square miles); Tobago (British, 114½ square miles); and . . . Trinidad (British, 1,752 square miles). The Greater Antilles used to be called by the Spanish the *Islas de Sotavento*, or the Leeward Islands, owing to their being to leeward of the prevailing north-easterly trade winds, and, for the converse reason, the Lesser Antilles were known as the *Islas de Barlovento*, or Windward Islands, but these titles have been diverted to two British groups of islands."—A. E. Aspinall, *British West Indies*, pp. 7-8.—Curaçao (Dutch, 212 square miles) is the largest of a group of islands lying off the coast of Venezuela, and with them is known as Holland's Curaçao colony. See CURAÇAO.

British possessions.—"It will be seen from the above figures that the total area of the British West Indian Islands is less than a quarter of that of Cuba. For administrative purposes, however, British Guiana . . . [the] great colony on the north-east coast of South America, and British Honduras, on the coast of Central America, of which the areas are 90,277 square miles and 8,598 square miles respectively, are included in the [British] West Indies, with the interests of which they have much in common. . . . The British West Indies are divided into eight colonies or groups, namely, the Bahamas, Barbados, British Guiana, British Hon-

duras, Jamaica with its dependencies Turks and Caicos Islands and the Caymans, Trinidad and its ward Tobago, the Windward Islands, and the Leeward Islands. With the exception of some of the Bahama islands, all the West Indies are within the tropics."—A. E. Aspinall, *British West Indies*, p. 8.—"There are 130,000 East Indians in British Guiana, 110,000 in Trinidad, 18,600 in Jamaica and smaller numbers in some of the other colonies. Originally introduced into the British West Indies as indentured labourers on the sugar estates, most of them are now free from their indentures, many have become peasant farmers and some have acquired considerable wealth and occupy important positions. While the spending capacity of the East Indian population remains very low they have retained their national customs and tastes and therefore a regular demand for Indian produce exists and the trade is large enough to enlist the interest of exporters. The annual imports of rice alone into Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica exceed 18,000 tons and the four largest colonies import at least 4,000,000 produce bags every year."—A. W. H. Hall, *Report on Economic and Financial Conditions in the British West Indies*, June 30, 1922 (*Great Britain Department of Overseas Trade*, p. 16).—See also BAHAMA ISLANDS; BARBADOS; GUIANA; HONDURAS, BRITISH; JAMAICA; TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS.

Dutch possessions.—Curaçao holds first place because geographically and commercially it is of all Netherlands possessions in the West Indies closest to the United States. Since the opening of the Panama Canal especially, it has gained a strategic position in the trade between the various hemispheres that makes it an object of Pan-American interest it could not claim before. The Colony of Curaçao is divided into two groups, the Leeward and the Windward Islands. To the former belong Curaçao proper, Aruba and Bonaire, to the latter St. Martin (which is partially French), Saba and St. Eustace. The distance between the two groups is from 200 to 600 miles. The largest of the six islands, Curaçao, after which the whole group has been named, measures about 300 square miles and has a population of about 35,000 of whom 15,000 reside in the capital of the island, Willemstad. . . . Curaçao is only on the first rung of the ladder to national prosperity. With the enterprise of its Government leaders, the progressive spirit and foresight of its many prominent merchants, with its strategic position as the key to the West Indies, with its uniformly excellent climate, and varied natural resources, it is fast becoming one of Holland's most cherished dependencies."—*Curaçao: Key to the West Indies* (N. Van Aken, ed., *Holland and her colonies*, Sept., 1921, pp. 11, 15).—Surinam (Dutch Guiana) has an area of 46,060 square miles and a population of 113,181. Formerly it belonged to Great Britain, but was exchanged at the Treaty of Breda in 1667 for the colony of New Netherlands. Later it was given back to England. The Dutch regained it in 1802. The population consists of Europeans, a few aboriginal Indians, negroes (who are in the majority) and coolies from India and China.—See also CURAÇAO; GUIANA: 1580-1814.

French possessions.—The French possessions in the West Indies consist of Guadeloupe, acquired in 1634; Martinique, acquired in 1634; and St. Pierre and Miquelon, acquired in 1635. "While the northern coast of Santo Domingo had been frequented by French adventurers as early as the year 1630, no claim to sovereignty over that territory had been made at first by the French crown. Although repelled at various times, the persistency

of the buccaneers had outlasted the spasmodic vigilance of Spain, and they had continued to grow in numbers and in daring. Upon the organization of the [French] Company of the West Indies, Louis XIV had placed the stamp of his royal approval on their encroachments by including in the patent of the French governor of Tortuga full jurisdiction over the settlements on the northern coast of Santo Domingo. Families were sent over from France, courts were established in the principal towns, and the region became an integral portion of the French colonial domain. By 1675 it was estimated that the French population in northern Santo Domingo numbered several thousand inhabitants, while Spanish settlements in the south contained only a scant fifteen hundred souls. This action on the part of Louis XIV seemed to indicate clearly the policy that he intended to follow in regard to Spanish rights in America. Spain confidently believed that the French settlements in Santo Domingo would be but a stepping-stone to more formidable aggressions on her mainland colonies, and that in such aggressions the pirate host in the Caribbean region would be utilized in hiding the true designs of the French until the desired usurpation should be successfully accomplished."—W. E. Dunn, *Spanish and French rivalry in the Gulf region of the United States, 1678-1702* (*University of Texas Bulletin No. 1705, Jan. 20, 1914, Studies in History, no. 1, pp. 8-9*).—See also GUADELOUPE; MARTINIQUE; SANTO DOMINGO.

United States' interests.—Purchase of Virgin islands in 1917.—"The slave holding party [of the United States] sought to acquire Cuba and Porto Rico, hoping to turn them into slave states; and President Polk even tried to buy Cuba from Spain. . . . Attempts were made by President Johnson in 1867 to acquire St. Thomas and St. John from Denmark, and by President Grant (1860-73) to acquire San Domingo, . . . but the Senate frustrated both."—J. Bryce, *American commonwealth, v. 2, p. 568*.—"By her policy toward Cuba [after the War with Spain, 1898] the United States gave the world a striking example of observing the plighted word even when contrary to the national interest. . . . For a century the United States had expected to acquire the 'Pearl of the Antilles.' Spain in the treaty of peace (1899) refused to recognize the Cuban government and relinquished it into the hands of the United States. The withdrawal of Spanish troops left the Cuban government utterly unable to govern, and the United States was forced to occupy the island. Nevertheless, the Government had begun the war with a recognition of Cuba's independence and to that declaration it adhered. The country gave the best of its talent to make the island self-governing as soon as possible. Harvard University invited Cuban teachers to be guests at a summer session. American medical men labored . . . to stamp out disease. General Leonard Wood as military governor established order and justice and presided over the evolution of a convention assembled to draft a constitution for the people of Cuba and to determine the relations of the United States and Cuba. These relations . . . were subsequently embodied in the Platt Amendment (March 2, 1901)."—C. R. Fish, *Path of empire (Chronicles of America Series, v. 46, pp. 201-202)*.—See also CUBA: 1901 (February-March).—"For three years Cuba remained an American possession . . . until, on May 20, 1902, Thomas Estrada Palma took his office as first president of Cuba Libre, and the island was launched forth as a new republic."—A. H. Verrell, *Cuba, past*

and present, p. 10.—See also CUBA: 1901-1902; 1902.—"For the United States to step into a foreign country as an administrator [as it did in the case of Haiti] was indeed a startling innovation. . . . On the other hand the development of such a policy was a logical sequence of the Monroe doctrine. . . . In 1915 the United States took the Island of Hayti under its protection by a treaty which not only gave the government complete control of the fiscal administration but bound it to land efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian independence."—C. R. Fish, *Path of empire (Chronicles of America Series, v. 46, pp. 268-269)*.—See also HAITI, REPUBLIC OF: 1911-1916; DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; U. S. A.: 1915 (August-September).—Porto Rico, which came into the possession of the United States by the treaty following the Spanish-American War, 1899, was organized as a dependency in April, 1900. (See PORTO RICO: 1900 [April].) The Virgin islands, or Danish West Indies, were purchased by the United States from Denmark in 1917, primarily for naval coaling stations, and placed under the administration of the United States Navy. See VIRGIN ISLANDS; U. S. A.: 1917 (March): Purchase of Danish West Indian islands; also Historical geography.

See also U. S. A.: 1919-1923.

15th century.—Piracy.—Privateering.—Domination of buccaneers. See BUCCANEERS: Privateering caused by rigid destructions; English buccaneers; French buccaneers.

1492-1496.—Explored by Columbus. See AMERICA: 1492; 1493-1496; 1494.

17th century.—British Settlements. See BRITISH EMPIRE: Expansion: 17th century: West Indies.

1658.—Destruction of Spanish bullion fleet in Santa Cruz harbor by British admiral. See ENGLAND: 1655-1658.

1670-1674.—Trade with South Carolina. See SOUTH CAROLINA: 1670-1783.

18th century.—British imperial policy and control. See AMERICA: 1720-1744.

1700-1717.—Trade with Montreal established. See MONTREAL: 1700-1722.

1762-1763.—British victories over the French.—Gains of islands from French by Treaty of Paris. See SPAIN: 1761-1763; BRITISH EMPIRE: Treaties promoting expansion: 1763; SEVEN YEARS' WAR: Treaties which ended the war.

1782.—British loss of islands. See ENGLAND: 1780-1782.

1815.—English gains after Napoleonic Wars. See BRITISH EMPIRE: Treaties promoting expansion: 1815.

1897.—Report of a Royal Commission on the condition and prospects of the sugar growing colonies.—A state of increasing distress in most of the British West India colonies, caused by the depression of the sugar growing industry, led to the appointment, in December, 1896, of a Royal Commission "to make an inquiry into the condition and prospects of the colonies of Jamaica, British Guiana, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and the Leeward Islands, and to suggest such measures as appeared calculated to restore and maintain the prosperity of these colonies and their inhabitants." In the August following the commission made its report, stating that the sugar industry in the West Indies was in danger of great reduction, which in some colonies may be equivalent or almost equivalent to extinction. The commission reported as follows:

"The special remedies or measures of relief which we unanimously recommend are—(1.) The settle-

ment of the labouring population on small plots of land as peasant proprietors. (2.) The establishment of minor agricultural industries, and the improvement of the system of cultivation, especially in the case of small proprietors. (3.) The improvement of the means of communication between the different islands. (4.) The encouragement of a trade in fruit with New York, and, possibly, at a future time, with London. (5.) The grant of a loan from the Imperial Exchequer for the establishment of Central Factories in Barbados. The subject of emigration from the distressed tracts also requires the careful attention of the various Governments, though we do not find ourselves at the present time in a position to make recommendations in detail." The commission suggested that grants of money be made to Dominica and St. Vincent. A quarter of a century later (1922-1923), the British West Indies were producing 184,800 short tons of sugar.

1898.—Barbados devastated by tornado.—Ten thousand homes were destroyed on the island of Barbados on Sept. 10, 1898, when a tornado swept the island. St. Vincent and St. Lucia suffered from the same storm in great losses of life and property.

1899.—Porto Rico visited by hurricane.—Three-fourths of the Porto Ricans were made homeless by a terrific hurricane which visited the island on Aug. 7 and 8, 1899. The total loss of life in the West Indies was estimated at 5,000.

1899-1901.—British reciprocity arrangement with the United States. See U.S.A.: 1899-1901.

1901.—Industrial arts exposition at Charleston. See CHARLESTON: 1901.

1902.—Martinique's volcanic disaster.—Mont Pelée, the volcano overlooking the city of St. Pierre on the island of Martinique, after a long period of inactivity, overwhelmed the city on May 8, 1902, destroying it, and the lives of many of its citizens by a rain of lava and fire. La Soufrière, the volcano on the neighboring island of St. Vincent, also broke into action.

1914-1918.—Part in World War. See BRITISH EMPIRE: World War: 1914-1918; CUBA: 1917 (April); HAITI, REPUBLIC OF: 1918 (July); JAMAICA: 1914-1918; WORLD WAR: 1914: VIII. Canada, etc.

1915-1920.—United States loans and interest.—Extent of control. See DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; HAITI, REPUBLIC OF: 1911-1916; SANTO DOMINGO: 1908-1918; U.S.A.: 1916; 1919-1923.

1920-1922.—Proposed West Indian Council.—Associated West Indian Chamber of Commerce.—Canadian West Indian Agreement.—"During 1920 Sir Edward Davson, the President of the Associated West Indian Chambers of Commerce, formulated a scheme for a West Indian Council. The federation of the British West Indies, though undoubtedly a very desirable ideal, is for many reasons impracticable at the present time, and Sir Edward Davson therefore suggested that a Conference should be held to discuss the formation of a Central Council which should be advised by a number of sub-committees dealing with law, health, education, customs, police, commerce and agriculture. The formation of such a Council 'was in no way connected with the question of Federation' but 'would supply a complete system of West Indian co-operation.' The Colonial Office therefore invited the Colonial Governments to arrange for a Conference to be held in Trinidad in January, 1922. Unfortunately the purpose of this Conference was misunderstood, and as some of the colonies failed to send representatives, it fell through. When this became known Sir Edward

Davson immediately convened a meeting of the Associated West Indian Chambers of Commerce in Trinidad, and delegates from British Guiana, Barbados, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Montserrat, Antigua, St. Christopher and Nevis attended. Resolutions were adopted relating to the following subjects, namely, the sugar crisis, increased preference by the United Kingdom and Canada, steamship and telegraphic communications, the West Indian Central Conference, currency, the Hague Rules, freight rates, etc. This meeting had been arranged to coincide with Mr. [Leonard] Wood's visit to Trinidad, and before the delegates separated the principal resolutions were discussed with him. . . . All the West Indian colonies except Bermuda have now [1922] introduced new tariffs to give the different degrees of preference arranged for it in the agreement, and since the beginning of 1921 the Canadian Government Merchant Marine have been running a three-weekly passenger and freight service to the Leeward and Windward Islands, Barbados, Trinidad and British Guiana."—A. W. H. Hall, *Report on Economic and Financial Conditions in British West Indies, June 30, 1922 (Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade)*.—See also CANADA: 1920: Canadian tariff.

See also MASONIC SOCIETIES: West Indies.

ALSO IN: O. T. Bulkeley, *Lesser Antilles*.—F. Dodsworth, *Book of West Indies*.—A. K. Fiske, *History of West Indies*.—J. Rodway, *West Indies and the Spanish Main*.—A. H. Verrill, *Isles of spice and palm*.—E. G. Sinkler, *Barbadoes handbook*.—J. H. Collins, *Handbook of Tobago*.—J. W. Root, *British West Indies and the sugar industry*.—E. J. Cameron, *Hints to settlers in St. Lucia*.—S. Grieve, *Notes on Dominica*.—F. R. Hart, *Admirals of the Caribbean*.—H. de R. Walker, *West Indies and the empire*.—J. M. Bullock, *Making of the West Indies*.—C. G. Murray, *United West Indies*.—H. K. Fiske, *History of the West Indies*.

WEST POINT.—Early in the War of Independence, the need of fortifying the Hudson river at its narrow passes was seen. In the spring of 1778, "a committee of the New York Legislature, after surveying several sites, unanimously recommended West Point as the most eligible. Works were accordingly commenced there under the direction of Kosciuszko. . . . The principal redoubt, constructed chiefly of logs and earth, was completed before May. . . . At the close of 1779, West Point was the strongest military post in America. In addition to the batteries that stood menacingly upon the hilltops, the river was obstructed by an enormous iron chain. . . . West Point was considered the keystone of the country during the Revolution, and there a large quantity of powder, and other munitions of war and military stores, were collected. These considerations combined made its possession a matter of great importance to the enemy, and hence it was selected by Arnold as the prize which his treason would give as a bribe. [See U.S.A.: 1780 (August-September).] When peace returned, it was regarded as one of the most important military posts in the country, and the plateau upon the point was purchased by the United States Government. . . . The Military Academy at West Point was established by an act of Congress which became a law on the 16th of March, 1802. Such an institution, at that place, was proposed by Washington to Congress in 1793; and earlier than this, even before the war of the Revolution had closed, he suggested the establishment of a military school there. But little progress was made in the mat-

ter until 1812."—B. J. Lossing, *Field book of the Revolution*, v. 1, pp. 702-706.—From the opening of the academy in 1802, when the Corps of Engineers was stationed there, until the close of the World War, November, 1918, it had graduated 6539 cadets. Then because of the war two classes were graduated in advance of their normal time, and since then, November, 1918, 816 new students have been admitted, while there were 483 in the fourth class. The roll of instructors in 1920 counted 159, and the library more than 106,284 volumes.—See also CONSTITUTION ISLAND.

ALSO IN: E. C. Boynton, *History of West Point*.

WEST SAXON KINGS OF ENGLAND: Genealogical table. See ENGLAND: 855-880.

WEST SPITSBERGEN, or New Friesland. See SPITSBERGEN.

WEST VIRGINIA: Location.—Description.—Area.—Population.—Resources.—West Virginia, known as the "Pan-handle State," is the fortieth in size of the states of the Union to which it was admitted in 1863. "It is bounded on the north by Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Maryland; on the east, by Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia; on the south by Virginia and Kentucky; and on the west by Kentucky and Ohio. West Virginia is the most irregular in shape of all the states of the American Union. The total area of the state is 24,715 square miles; of this, 24,580 square miles . . . are land, and 135 square miles water surface. West Virginia has a wealth of natural resources. In 1920 she was the second state in coal production in the United States, having mined 75,500,000 tons. In the production of natural gas she led all the states in the Union. In petroleum production she stood eighth. West Virginia possessed more hard wood than any other state except Arkansas. In her steel industry she ranked sixth. In 1920 her population was 1,463,701.—See also U. S. A.: Economic map.

1609-1863.—Included in Virginia.—"What is now West Virginia was not included in the [grant given by James I to the Virginia Company of London on Apr. 10, 1606]; . . . but this was afterwards done by the sixth section of the second Charter granted to the Virginia Company, bearing date May 23, 1609, when the boundary of the Virginia colony was so enlarged as to include 'all those lands, countries, and territories situate, lying, and being in that part of America called Virginia, from the point of land called Cape or Point Comfort, all along the sea coast to the northward two hundred miles; and from the said point of Cape Comfort, all along the sea coast to the southward two hundred miles, and all that space and circuit of land, lying from the sea coast of the precinct aforesaid, up into the land throughout from sea to sea west and northwest,'—that was, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans. The zone within this grant being four hundred miles wide, of course included the present State of West Virginia. (Henning's 'Statutes at Large' of Virginia, Vol. 1, p. 88.) . . . She was, therefore, a part of Virginia from 1609 to 1863—a period of 254 years; and throughout this length of time they had one common interest in the literature of those States"—S. Myers, *History of West Virginia*, v. 1, pp. 31, 51.

1632.—Partly embraced in the Maryland grant to Lord Baltimore. See MARYLAND: 1632.

1670-1727.—Early exploration.—First settlers.—"It is probable that the first white men who saw any part of the eastern portion of the State of West Virginia were those composing the party under John Lederer, a German explorer in the service of Sir William Berkeley, Colonial Governor

of Virginia. In company with Captain Collett, nine Englishmen and five Indians, he, on August 30, 1670, set out from York River and proceeded by way of the Rappahannock, near the present city of Fredericksburg; thence to the mouth of the Rapidan River; thence along the north side of the Rappahannock to the base of the Blue Ridge; and thence to the summit of the mountain barrier, from which, at a point south of the present Harper's Ferry, the explorers looked down upon and across the Lower Shenandoah Valley—now included in the counties of Jefferson and Berkeley—a first view of the old part of West Virginia."—S. Myers, *History of West Virginia*, v. 1, p. 53.—"As early as 1670 and 1671 Henry Batts reached the valley of New River. A period of forty-five years followed before another attempt at exploration was recorded. In 1716 Governor Spotswood, of Virginia, led a party of explorers over the Blue Ridge, across the Shenandoah River, and to the eastern base of the Alleghanies; but he did not reach the present territory of West Virginia. Within nine years after that time the Potomac River, above its passage through the Blue Ridge, had been explored; and twenty years after Governor Spotswood's expedition, William Mayo ascended to the very source of the Potomac, passed the summit of the Alleghanies, and discovered tributaries of Cheat River, in the present county of Tucker. There is reason to believe that the Kanawha Valley, as far west as Charleston, had been visited before that time."—R. E. Fast and H. Maxwell, *History and government of West Virginia*, p. 11.—"About the year 1725 John Van Meter, a representative of an old Knickerbocker family early seated on the Hudson, traversed the valley of the South Branch of the Potomac—the Wap-pa-tom-i-ca of the Indians. He was an Indian trader, making his headquarters with the Delawares, on the Susquehanna. Thence he made journeys far to the southward, to trade with the Cherokees and Catawbas. It was he who first told the story of the wonderful fertility of the land in the Lower Shenandoah and South Branch Valleys. In 1727 a number of Germans from the valley of the Susquehanna in Pennsylvania crossed the Potomac . . . and founded a village which they named New Mecklenburg [the first settlement in West Virginia]."—S. Myers, *History of West Virginia*, v. 1, p. 55.

1732-1770.—Early settlers.—Scotch-Irish.—Quakers.—One of the first settlers was "John Lewis [who], with the aid of his sons, constructed from native stone the walls of 'Fort Lewis' [1732], within which the hardy pioneers who came after him found refuge until the barbarian no more visited the banks of the Shenandoah. . . . Other adventurers reached the Upper Valley and, attracted by the great fertility of the soil, hastened to make surveys and applications for patents for their lands. The earliest of these issued was that for what has ever since been known as Beverly Manor. The patent, signed by Governor William Gooch and bearing date September 6, 1736, granted to William Beverly, of the county of Essex; Sir John Randolph, of the city of Williamsburg; Richard Randolph, of the county of Henrico; and John Robinson, of the county of King and Queen, a tract of land containing 118,491 acres. These lands were located within the present limits of Augusta county and included the site of the city of Staunton. The magisterial district in which that city is situated is still known as 'Beverly Manor.' . . . The second grant made of lands in the Upper Valley was that to Benjamin Burden,

or Borden—name spelled both ways. . . . Burden went to Europe for the purpose of securing emigrants to settle upon his lands, and in 1737 returned, bringing with him more than a hundred families. Among these primitive emigrants we meet with the names of some who have left a numerous posterity, now widely dispersed, not only over the Virginias, but throughout the South and West—such as Ephraim McDowell, Archibald Alexander, John Patton, Andrew Moore, Hugh Telford and John Matthews. The first party was soon joined by others, mostly of their relatives and acquaintances, from the mother country. . . . They were Irish Presbyterians, who, being of Scotch extraction, were called Scotch-Irish. [See SCOTCH-IRISH.] . . . While these determined people were finding homes in the Upper Valley the lower portion was being occupied by the sturdy yeomanry of Germany. Quite a number of those who settled on Opequon, now in Berkeley and Jefferson, were Quakers, and to them is due the credit of having established the first religious organization, not only in West Virginia, but west of the Blue Ridge."—V. A. Lewis, *History of West Virginia*, pp. 68-72.—"From the coming of the first white settlers to West Virginia to the year 1754—a period of nearly thirty years—the white men and Indians dwelt together in peace and harmony. . . . In 1755 the English General, Edward Braddock, with the 44th and 48th Royal Infantry Regiments, came to Virginia, and, having been joined by a large force of provisional troops, marched against Fort Duquesne; but when within ten miles thereof, his army was shot down by the French and Indians on the fatal field of Monongahela. Then began a war of extermination—a border war carried on against the West Virginia settlements. This continued for seven long years, in all of which the French and Indians, or the latter alone, carried death and desolation all along the frontier of civilization. [See also SOUTH CAROLINA: 1759-1761.] The West Virginia pioneers nevertheless stood their ground, and, aided by companies of rangers from the older Virginia settlements, warred successfully against their barbarian enemies until the close of the war in 1763."—S. Myers, *History of West Virginia*, v. 1, pp. 100-101.

1768.—Cession of Iroquois claims to western Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Kentucky. See U. S. A.: 1765-1768.

1773-1820.—Movement towards independence.—Objection to aristocratic constitution of Virginia.—Political grievances of western territory.—From the first the settlers in western Virginia developed a difference in economic and social interests which left little in common between them and the older sections of the East. The agitation for a separate government began almost as soon as there were enough settlers to justify any form of political administration. In 1773 a petition was sent to England asking for a separate government. "On the 2d day of December, 1773, George Mercer, who was still in London, addressed a letter to George W. Fairfax, which is still preserved, and from which it is learned that the new province was to be called 'Vandalia,' the seat of government of which was to be at the mouth of the Great Kanawha, and George Mercer to be the first governor. That Washington was apprised of this scheme is apparent from the advertisement for the sale of his lands on the Ohio and Great Kanawha rivers, which appeared in the *Virginia Gazette* in 1773. . . . The Revolution put an end to all these negotiations, and had it not been so, it is probable that there would have been an independent gov-

ernment in what is now West Virginia more than a century before it came. . . . In the year 1776, Virginia framed and adopted a Constitution by which she was governed for more than fifty years. It was the first document of the kind prepared by an American State, and, formed without a precedent, it was but natural that in it should be found many imperfections. First among these were its two great distinctive features—Sectionalism and Aristocracy—both of which had their origin a century before the preparation of that Constitution. The unequal representation of the counties, which was the remote cause of its sectional character, was established in the year 1661, by the House of Burgesses, representing a population residing exclusively in the Tidewater region, and consequently at that time homogeneous in character and identical in interest. The limitation of suffrage to freeholders, which gave to it its aristocratic character, was imposed on the Colony in 1677, by Royal instruction from Charles II., to the Governor of the Colony of Virginia 'To take care that the members of the Assembly be elected only by freeholders, as being more agreeable to the customs of England,' to which he might have added, 'And more congenial also with monarchical institutions.' With the increase of population and the organization of counties west of the Blue Ridge, the principle was reversed, and what had been equal representation had become unequal representation, and while many of the western counties paid into the public treasury many times the amount paid by some of the eastern counties, yet the representation of both was the same. Loudoun county had a population twenty-six times as great as Warwick, and paid twenty times as much of the State taxes, while both had the same representation upon the floor of the General Assembly. What was true of these two counties was, by comparison, true of many others in the two sections. It was 'taxation without representation'—one of the leading causes of the Revolution—and it is not surprising that it became a source of great dissatisfaction to the dwellers in the Valley, and to men who were felling the forests on the western slope of the Alleghenies and in the valleys toward the Ohio. This basis of representation gave to the East the balance of power, and rendered the western section almost powerless in all matters of State legislation. In the Assembly in 1820, the former had one hundred and twenty-four members, while the latter had but eighty. The result was that the East secured to itself nearly everything in the character of internal improvements."

—V. A. Lewis, *History of West Virginia*, pp. 79, 310-320.

1815-1860.—Struggle for equal representation in Virginia government.—As early as 1815 a movement began to demand equal representation. A convention was called at Richmond Oct. 5, 1829, but it was unable to secure reforms. Another convention took place Oct. 14, 1850. This extended the right of suffrage and gave the western parts greater equality.

1860-1861.—Opposition of West Virginia to secession.—Wheeling convention.—Two rival state governments in Virginia.—On Oct. 12, 1860, a meeting was held in Preston county against secession from the Union; another was held in Harrison county on the 24th. Taylor county had a meeting on December 3, Wheeling City on December 14 and Mason county in January, 1861, but eastern Virginia was in an overwhelming majority for secession. West Virginia then decided to become a separate state. "From the people of

Monongalia [came] the first resolution relative to the formation of a new State. But they were soon followed by expressions of a similar sentiment, for on the 22d of April the people of Wetzel, assembled in mass meeting, declared by resolution, "That Secession is no remedy for the evils which afflict the country, and we pledge ourselves to oppose any act of Secession attempting to force us into a connection with the Gulf States; then, as citizens of Western Virginia, we will deem it a duty to ourselves and posterity to adopt such means and use such measures as will result in a division of the State."—V. A. Lewis, *History of West Virginia*, p. 9.—The first Wheeling convention which met on May 13, 1861, was divided on the question of secession until such time as the matter was put before the people. The second Wheeling convention on June 11, 1861, elected Francis H. Pierpont as governor of Virginia. Thus there were two governments in Virginia, one owing allegiance to the United States and one forming part of the Confederacy of Southern States.—See also VIRGINIA: 1861 (January-June).

1861 (June-July).—General McClellan's successful campaign.—Confederates driven out. See U. S. A.: 1861 (June-July: West Virginia).

1861 (August-December).—Campaign of Rosecrans against Lee. See U. S. A.: 1861 (August-December: West Virginia).

1861-1862.—Vote on separation from Virginia.—Adoption of constitution for new state.—Under the guidance of Governor Pierpont, the government of the loyal parts of Virginia was established and a tentative marking out of the boundaries for a new state of West Virginia was made through the vote of the counties, for the western parts of Virginia were determined to form an entirely separate state. The second Wheeling convention decided to put the matter to the popular vote. In October there were 18,489 votes in favor of the new state and only 781 against. Kanawha was proposed as a name for the new state.—"The [constitutional] Convention met November 26, 1861, in Wheeling; all the counties in the present State of West Virginia being represented, except Jefferson, Berkeley, Webster and Monroe. The Convention adopted a constitution for the new State, to be submitted to a vote of the people at an election to be held April 3rd, 1862. This constitution differed from the old constitution of Virginia in several important particulars. It abolished the old County Court system and provided for Judicial Circuits and created township government for local affairs. It provided that taxation should be equal and uniform; that the State should contract no debt, but should assume an equitable proportion of the debt of Virginia, and also provided for the establishment of a system of public schools. This constitution was adopted by a vote of the people, the vote being reported as being 18,061 for it and 514 against it. The population of these counties in 1860 was 334,921 whites and 12,771 negroes. The assent of the State of Virginia to the creation of the State of West Virginia was given by the re-organized government under Governor Pierpont on May 6th, 1862, and it was finally approved by Congress after the constitution had been amended so as to provide for the gradual emancipation of the slaves [December, 1862]."—J. M. Callahan, *Semi-centennial history of West Virginia*, pp. 451-452.—See also VIRGINIA: 1861 (June-November).

1862 (May-June).—Frémont's Mountain Department. See U. S. A.: 1862: (May-June: Virginia).

1863.—Admission to the Union.—It had been President Lincoln's condition that the newly organized state make provision for the gradual abolition of slavery. "This provision was the subject of extended debate and discussion. The constitution as amended was again voted upon by the people and adopted by a majority of 17,000 of the votes cast [Mar. 26, 1863]; and, in accordance with the Acts of Congress, the President of the United States, on April 19th [1863], issued his proclamation providing that the government of the new State of West Virginia should go into effect on the 20 day of June, 1863. . . . Governor Pierpont, who had been exercising the powers of Governor of the re-organized government of Virginia at Wheeling, now removed the seat of his government to Alexandria, and after the war it was removed to Richmond, and he remained Governor during the early part of the Reconstruction Period. . . . West Virginia entered upon her career as a separate state of the American union at the most critical period in the war of secession—two weeks before the battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. After the President's proclamation, . . . the new government was rapidly organized. Arthur I. Boreman for governor, and other state officers, nominated at a convention at Parkersburg early in May, were elected the latter part of the same month."—J. M. Callahan, *Semi-centennial history of West Virginia*, pp. 453, 151.

Also in: V. A. Lewis, *History of West Virginia*, ch. 25-26.—E. McPherson, *Political history of the United States during the Great Rebellion*, pp. 377-378.—J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, v. 6, ch. 14.

1868.—Attitude toward Confederates. See U. S. A.: 1865-1868.

1868.—West Virginia University founded.—In 1868 the University of West Virginia was founded at Morgantown.

1869-1885.—Determination of the site of the state capital.—Removal from Wheeling to Charleston, and back to Wheeling.—Final choice of Charleston.—"At the time of the formation of the State, Wheeling became the Capital, and here the seat of Government continued until April 1, 1870, when in compliance with an act of February 20, 1869, it was removed to Charleston, which place was, by the act providing for the removal, declared to be the permanent capital. But it proved not to be such, for by another act of the Legislature, passed February 20, 1875, to take effect ninety days after its passage, it was again established at Wheeling 'until otherwise provided by law.' Citizens of Charleston enjoined the removal of the records from that city, and on the 20th of May, the Governor and other executive officers departed for Wheeling, but took no State property with them. Thus the State officers were at Wheeling and the archives at Charleston. The suit was carried before the Supreme Court of Appeals, where the injunction was dissolved and the archives removed and deposited in the Lindsey Institute building, which had been occupied previously as a Capitol. In it the government remained until the completion of the State building in 1876, which the city of Wheeling had erected. Still great dissatisfaction existed, and February 21, 1877, the Legislature passed a bill submitting the question of permanent location of the capital to the people, to decide by ballot whether it should be at Clarksburg, Martinsburg or Charleston, the act declaring that the place receiving the largest number of votes should from and after the 1st day of May, 1885, be the permanent capital of the State.

Charleston was successful; work was at once begun on the capitol building at that place, and on the last date mentioned above the government made its final removal."—V. A. Lewis, *History of West Virginia*, p. 469.

1873-1921.—Governors.—Political history of the state.—In 1873 the Democratic governor, J. J. Jacob (1871-1877) came "into serious conflict with the legislature in regard to the appointing power of the executive department and the power of the legislative department to pass the act of January 14, 1873, creating the board of public works with appointive powers. . . . H. M. Mathews [1877-1881], who defeated General Nathan Goff (the popular Republican candidate) for governor, was a patriotic, broad and liberal minded ex-Confederate who had fully accepted the results of the Civil War and was well-fitted to lead in meeting living issues. His administration has been characterized as an era of good feeling in which the state began to show new signs of awakening life—especially in industrial development. He adopted a liberal and sensible policy of appointing on administrative boards members from both political parties—a wise policy which unfortunately was abandoned by some of his immediate successors. During his administration a committee of inquiry investigated the question of discriminating freight rates of the Baltimore and Ohio railway and reported (January 15, 1879) that the Camden Consolidated Oil company had received especial advantages by a system of rebates. Governor J. B. Jackson [Democrat, 1881-1885], who succeeded Governor Mathews in 1881, was an honest but partisan Democrat of the old school. . . . Jackson favored the enactment of laws that would encourage immigration, manufactures, and the development of the material resources of the state. He also attempted to secure reforms in taxation and state finance, by directing that all property not exempted by the constitution should be listed for taxation, and by the appointment of a tax commission (1883). During his administration, a period of general prosperity and happiness (excepting the calamitous results of the great floods of February, 1884), steps were also taken to revise the laws, some of which were indefinite and inconsistent. Soon after the inauguration of E. Willis Wilson [Democrat], who was elected in 1884 . . . there was a continuation of the agitation for the revision of the tax laws in order to secure equality of taxation, and the governor also proposed legislation to reform the election laws, to prohibit oppressive trusts and combinations, and to prevent the distribution of railway passes to officers of the state and delegates to political conventions. The administration waged a fierce and relentless war against the trunk line railroads which, the governor said, had discriminated against the people of West Virginia in freight and passenger rates. . . . [At the conclusion of his term of office, there was a ballot scandal in the gubernatorial election, and Governor Wilson refused to give up his office to either of the candidates, General Goff, or Carr, president of the Senate.] Mandamus proceedings in the state supreme court were at once begun against Governor Wilson by the other two claimants. The case of General Goff was decided on March 12, the court holding that the joint legislative convention of the legislature alone had power to determine the result of an election and that General Goff was not the legal governor. The case of President Carr was decided on March 14, the court declaring that there existed in the office no such vacancy as under the

constitution would authorize the president of the senate to succeed to the duties of the governor. The joint committee completed its work in December. The majority report declared, by counting out 300 votes, a plurality of 237 for [A. Brooks] Fleming. This was signed by the three Democratic members. The minority report found no such frauds as charged by the majority, and gave a plurality of 140 to Goff. On December 18, Governor Wilson issued his proclamation calling an extra session for January 15. At this session the majority report, by a strictly party vote, was accepted and Fleming was declared elected [1890-1893]. The governor in his biennial message of 1889 emphasized the need of a registration law to remedy the fraudulent and corrupt voting which had been common in almost every county in the state. In 1890, following the charges of bribery and fraud made by each party in the contested gubernatorial election, a special session of the legislature (called to consider thirty-seven specified subjects) enacted a law designed to prevent the purchase of votes, or other forms of bribery at elections, and to prevent ballot box frauds. The senate voted for an Australian ballot bill, which failed in the house (Democratic). Governor Fleming continued the policy of his predecessor, who as a result of the contest had continued to act as executive for nearly a year beyond the term for which he was elected. He urged the taxation of the property of the Pullman company and other foreign car companies, and of the business of foreign telegraph companies operating in the state. He also recommended a general policy of legislation to preserve the resources of the state from monopoly, to foster agricultural interests, and to diversify the various industries of the State. . . . [William A. MacCorckle, a Democrat, was governor from 1893 to 1897. A succession of Republican governors followed: George W. Atkinson, 1897-1901; Albert B. White, 1901-1905; and William M. O. Dawson, 1905-1909.] The beginning of [William E.] Glasscock's republican administration was marked by a more centralized management of the finances of state institutions through the agency of a newly created board of control, which by liberal principles of economy reduced much waste of expenditure. In the latter part of his term, the most prominent public question was the prohibition amendment, which was submitted by the legislature and ratified by popular vote in the elections of 1912. Near its close, his administration was called to face difficult problems connected with the strike precipitated by general mining conditions on Paint creek and Cabin creek in Kanawha county—resulting in the first declaration of martial law in the state [see below: 1902-1913] and the appointment of a commission of investigation which recommended various legislative remedial reforms for the conservation of life, health and happiness, and for the general welfare. . . . In his inaugural address Governor [Henry D. Hatfield, 1913-1917, a Democrat] indicated that his administration would promote a program of progressive principles. For over four months he devoted a large part of his energy to the solution of the serious industrial and political problems connected with the strike of miners on Paint and Cabin creeks, and to the establishment of conditions conducive to a permanent peace between miners and coal operators. By August, 1913, he was able to obtain an agreement by which the mines secured important concessions without imposing any unnecessary burden upon the operators."—J. M. Callahan, *Semi-centennial history of*

West Virginia, pp. 241-243, 245, 247-248.—Governor Hatfield was succeeded by John J. Cornwall in 1917, which was a victory for the Democrats. In 1921, Ephraim F. Morgan (a Republican) became governor of the state. In national politics West Virginia has always followed the Republican column.

1902-1913.—Kanawha coal strikes.—Demands of the miners.—Armed conflict and martial law.—Report of Governor's Mining Investigation Committee.—Settlement.—“Of the fifty-five counties which composed the state of West Virginia thirty-nine have coal areas aggregating 9500 square miles or 6,080,000 acres. . . . Prior to the year 1902 the miners of West Virginia were fairly well organized, though their organization was not ‘recognized’ by the operators, in that they refused to meet them in joint conferences. At a state convention held that year in Huntington the miners determined to make a vigorous attempt to compel recognition. They prepared a scale of wages and called upon the operators to accept it or meet the union in a joint conference to discuss a new wage-scale. In accordance with past policy the operators ignored the demand and a strike ensued. Although the events of the first few weeks were auspicious and seemed to portend a victory for the miners, in the end they not only failed to receive recognition but also lost their organization everywhere throughout the state except in the Kanawha district. There, however, the strike was in a large measure successful. . . . Subsequent to the strike of 1902, there was no serious disturbance in the Kanawha district for a period of two years. In the fall of 1904, however, a disagreement arose on Cabin Creek with regard to the interpretation of that clause of the joint agreement relating to the check-off. The miners claimed that an unlimited check-off was provided for, whereby union dues were to be collected through the company offices not only from regularly enrolled members of the union but from all men employed in and about the mines, whether members or not. The operators denied that such was the correct interpretation and urged that the dispute be submitted to arbitration as provided by the joint agreement for the settlement of disputes. The union, however, refused to arbitrate and called a local strike. It lasted only about ten days and resulted in the union losing all of its organization on Cabin Creek, though control was retained in other parts of the Kanawha district. . . . These conditions remained practically unchanged until the spring of 1912. Since the recognition of the union by the Kanawha operators in 1902, wages in the district had been raised about seven per cent, except on Cabin Creek where under non-union operation smaller wage advances had been granted. The check-off, which during earlier years had been in effect in the union mines, had gradually disappeared and for several years prior to 1912 had not been in effect at all. The joint agreement of 1910 was to expire on April 1, 1912. It had been the custom in years past for representatives of the union and of the Kanawha Coal Operators’ Association to meet in joint conference during February or March preceding the expiration of the old agreement, for the purpose of effecting a new one. At the request of the union the meeting for 1912 was postponed until the operators and miners in the other four states of the central competitive field had concluded their new interstate agreement, which that year had been delayed. A conference had been held earlier in the year at Indianapolis,

but so urgent was the demand of the miners for higher wages and so strenuous was the resistance of the operators that an adjournment was necessary before any agreement had been reached. A second meeting was held in Cleveland from March 20 to 30 (1912), and there after a final struggle the operators were forced to grant an increase of five cents a ton for coal miners and an advance of 5.26 per cent for inside day labor. The miners in the Kanawha district immediately formulated their demands and presented them to the operators on April 8, the opening day of the Kanawha Joint Conference. The following were the most important: (1) the Cleveland wage advance; (2) a uniform work day of eight hours; (3) pay every two weeks; (4) an unlimited check-off. The operators refused to grant the demands, but offered to renew the old scale and the old conditions. Finding the operators firm in their refusal, the union dropped all its demands except that for the Cleveland wage advance. This too was refused and a third offer was made by the miners, to accept the old scale if a check-off was given. The mere collection, at the source, of union dues from all employees in and about the mines appears on the surface to be a relatively unimportant request; but to the union it is frequently a matter of the utmost importance. While the excitement of the strike keeps the miner's interest centered in the organization, he needs no incentive to loyalty; but when the difficulty has been adjusted and he sees others, not members of the union, enjoying the benefits of the same wage scale and the same conditions of employment which he enjoys, yet paying no dues, his enthusiasm wanes. The check-off is as a rule one of the last demands to be granted by operators, and this occasion proved to be no exception. The demand was refused; no further concessions were made by either party; and on April 18 [1912], negotiations were concluded. On the following day a strike was called throughout the Kanawha district and all mines except those on non-union Cabin Creek were closed down. . . . The newspaper accounts of the strike were so unreliable that the Governor on August 28 appointed a commission to make a thorough investigation of the whole disturbance, that the public might be informed as to the true conditions. This commission was composed of the Rt. Rev. P. J. Donahue, a Catholic Bishop, Captain S. L. Walker of the state militia, and Hon. F. O. Blue, state tax commissioner. The temper of the strikers was slowly approaching white heat. In order to protect their property, the operators had installed four machine guns, one on Paint Creek and three on Cabin Creek, and in addition had employed secret service men from the Baldwin-Felts and Burns detective agencies. They mingled with the strikers and kept the operators forewarned of all impending outbreaks. Despite all the efforts of the agitators to close down the Cabin Creek mines, many still remained at work. A great demonstration was therefore planned by the union forces to compel these men to join in the strike. On the evening of September 2, forces were gathered from the camps of the striking miners, from union mines across the river and elsewhere, and these men in large numbers went into the woods along Cabin Creek, intending on the day following to drive out all working miners at the head of the creek where the most of the mines are located. It is estimated that 1500 armed men were assembled in the hills that night. The operators, fully aware of their intentions, sent the women to the cellars, and prepared to defend themselves and their property as

best they could. Such were the conditions on the night when Governor Glasscock issued his martial law proclamation and created a military commission to serve as a substitute for the criminal courts of the district. The operators strenuously opposed the declaration of martial law, claiming that they were able to cope with the situation themselves. The union officials, however, were strongly in its favor, for through it they hoped to eliminate the guard system. Upon the declaration of martial law, the militia assumed entire control of the strike district. They disarmed both mine guards and miners, and brought before the military commission for trial all violators of law and order. Under their régime peace and quiet were soon restored. . . . On September 11, Governor Glasscock attempted to effect a settlement of the difficulty by submitting to both parties proposals for the arbitration of all points in dispute. The miners agreed to the Governor's terms, but the operators, especially those on Cabin Creek, were firm in their refusal to meet the union's representatives, on the ground that the only question at issue was the recognition of the union, which in their opinion was not a subject for arbitration. Despite the failure to effect a settlement, conditions became much more quiet during the martial-law régime. On October 14 the Governor deemed it safe to recall the proclamation. . . . The Mining Investigation Commission, appointed by the Governor, made its report November 27. It attributed the main cause of the strike to the efforts of the United Mine Workers to organize West Virginia. In discussing the 'contributing causes' the commission reported as follows: (1) Wages—at least equal to those in union states and in many respects better. (2) Houses—'as comfortable as those of the average farm hand, or of those who live by other manual labor.' (3) Rents—'slightly excessive, but not exorbitant.' (4) Sanitation—'as good as could be expected in view of the location and other surroundings.' (5) Company stores—in the districts under examination had charged more than a fair average figure in open market for any given article.' (6) Blacklisting—evidence 'tending somewhat to establish the fact' that it had in some cases been employed. (7) Guard System—'vicious, strife promoting, and un-American.' The report concluded with some suggestions for establishing a more perfect harmony between employers and employees and a recommendation for some form of legislation analogous to the Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907. By the first of the year [1913], conditions in the strike districts were greatly improved and hope was entertained that a settlement would soon be effected. Early in February, however, violence again broke out. . . . On March 4, Governor Glasscock's term of office expired, and Governor Hatfield, his successor, assumed the burden of bringing about a settlement of the difficulty. For days he labored to effect a compromise satisfactory to both parties. At last, worn out by their petty complaints and disagreements, the Governor, on April 25, issued what was practically an ultimatum, that the "strife and dissension must cease within thirty-six hours." This had the desired effect, and within the specified time-limit both parties had agreed to the terms of settlement submitted by the Governor. The agreement was signed by representatives of the union and of the companies on Paint Creek and Cabin Creek. It became effective on May 1. The following were its chief provisions: (1) A nine-hour day, which should be understood as nine hours of actual serv-

ice, at the wage scale previously paid; (2) Semi-monthly pay; (3) A checkweighman to be provided where a majority of the miners requested one; (4) Right of the miners to deal where they pleased without discrimination. It was thought that a final settlement had at last been effected. Considerable opposition, however, soon developed on the part of the union because no check-off was granted, nor provision made for arbitration. At first the dissatisfaction did not assume alarming proportions, and on May 29, just one year after the first outbreak of the strike, Governor Hatfield authorized the civil authorities in the strike zone to resume their full jurisdiction. Martial law remained in this modified form until its complete revocation a few weeks later. Dissatisfaction, however, with regard to the provision and operation of the greement of May 1 [1913], increased to so great an extent that on June 29 the miners on Paint Creek and Cabin Creek declared another strike. . . . This second strike on Paint Creek and Cabin Creek was not of long duration. On July 15, the leading Paint Creek companies signed a new agreement to be effective until April 1, 1914. They again accepted the articles of agreement of May 1. . . . Though the union was successful in its efforts to secure the check-off, the miners returned to work under a wage-scale essentially lower than that which had prevailed before the strike. No provision was made for an arbitration board. . . . On July 29 a settlement was made on Cabin Creek to be effective until April 1, 1915. Terms very similar to those of the Paint Creek agreement were accepted, except that no check-off was provided. The wage for day-work was not advanced, but there was an advance for coal miners of from twelve to seventeen per cent. On this creek, however, as on New River, provision was made for the arbitration of all matters in dispute. Thus ended an insurrection which had continued for a period of fourteen months. Thirteen lives were lost during the course of the strike. The cost in money was enormous: operators' loss in business \$2,000,000; loss to the miners in wages \$1,500,000; cost to the taxpayers of Kanawha county \$100,000; cost to the United Mine Workers \$602,000; property destroyed \$10,000; total \$4,612,000. The union's membership in the state had increased from 2000, the figures for paid-up members prior to the beginning of the strike, to 4769 on November 30, 1913. These figures appear insignificant in comparison with a total of 20,000 miners in the Kanawha district and 70,000 in the entire state."—*West Virginia coal strike (Political Science Quarterly, Dec., 1914)*.

1906-1915.—*Lawsuit with Virginia.*—*Decision of Supreme Court.*—In 1906 Virginia commenced a suit against West Virginia for the payment of her share of the state debt contracted before 1862. "Judgment [was] rendered [against West Virginia] in 1915. The results are thus summarized by Mr. Justice White: The judgment . . . was for \$12,393,929.50, with interest, and it was based upon three propositions specifically found to be established: First, that when territory was carved out of the dominion of the State of Virginia for the purpose of constituting the area of the State of West Virginia, . . . the new State, coincident with its existence, became bound for and assumed to pay its just proportion of the previous public debt of Virginia. Second, that this obligation of West Virginia was the subject of contract between the two States made with the consent of Congress, and was incorporated into the Constitution by which West Virginia was admitted by Congress into the

Union, and, therefore, became a condition of such admission and a part of the very governmental fiber of that State. Third, that the sum of the judgment rendered constituted the equitable proportion of this debt due by West Virginia in accordance with the obligations of the contract. This case is especially noteworthy because the bonds were largely held by private individuals who had already exempted Virginia from paying their claims, because a large part of the judgment was for interest on the bonds, and because it was conceded that the judgment could not be paid without the exercise of the power of taxation. West Virginia has passed a debt settlement bill (1919) in which she provides for direct taxes to meet the debt. But for a time it looked as if some form of compulsion would be necessary. The court did not hesitate to meet this possibility squarely. It recognized a threefold obligation to carry out the judgment of the court: (1) the duty of West Virginia to provide for the debt by appropriate taxation; (2) the power and the duty of Congress to make provision for enforcing the terms of the contract between the two States, either by legislation which should apply to West Virginia directly, or by legislation which would give the court direct authority to enforce its judgment; (3) the duty of the court to secure the enforcement of its own judgment under existing legislation. In the hope that one of the first two methods would be used, the court did not consider fully the methods, by which it might carry out its own decree, but it suggested that this might be done either by mandamus to the legislature of West Virginia, or perhaps even by the direct exercise of the judicial power within the limits of the State. Happily, the action of West Virginia has cut the Gordian knot and relieved the court from what would certainly have been a trying and embarrassing situation. But the fact that the Supreme Court has never been compelled to resort to force in its inter-state decrees, does not lessen the significance of a decision in which it claimed both for Congress and for itself such sweeping powers."—R. G. Caldwell, *Settlement of inter-state disputes*, p. 58.

1920-1921.—Logan county miners in collision with operating companies over unionizing.—**Bloodshed in Mingo county.**—"On May 19 [1920] eleven men were shot to death in the town of Matewan, Mingo County. Seven of them were detectives, three were miners and one was an official. . . . With the beginning of May, the miners formed local unions, and brought in 2,000 members. As fast as the miners . . . [joined] the union, the coal companies . . . [were] evicting them from the company-owned houses. . . . The stronghold of the operators' power . . . [was] not Mingo, but Logan County. . . . There [were in 1920] 91,000 persons in West Virginia employed in and around mines. Of these, 54,000 [were] organized in the United Mine Workers of America. For the possession of the unorganized 37,000 the coal operators and the union . . . engaged in the . . . bloody struggle. Of these 37,000, 4,000 . . . [were] in Mingo and 9,000 in Logan. . . . The coal operators . . . [maintained] on their pay-rolls public officials who preserve order, guard the company funds, and keep union men out of the county. It is this exercise of public power under private pay which . . . [was] one of the fundamental causes and is the most lively occasion of the bad blood between owners and workers."—A. Gleason, *Private ownership of public officials* (*Nation*, May 29, 1920).—See also LABOR STRIKES

AND BOYCOTTS: 1920-1922: Warfare in West Virginia; 1922: Nation-wide coal strike.

1922.—Violation of Corrupt Practices Act.—In October, 1922, F. C. Roberts, Republican candidate for the United States Senate, was indicted for excessive expenditure. He was fined and disenfranchised for violation of the Corrupt Practices Act.

ALSO IN: W. P. Willey, *Inside view of formation of West Virginia*.—G. W. Atkinson, *Prominent men of West Virginia*.—T. J. Wertenbaker, *Virginia under the Stuarts*.—J. A. Ryan, *Legalized despotism in West Virginia*.

WESTENDE, port of Belgium, about twenty miles south of Ostend. It was held by the Germans during the World War and shelled in 1915 by the Dover patrol. See WORLD WAR: 1915: IX. Naval operations: a, 2.

WESTENDORP & COMPANY, bankers of Amsterdam. They aided Santo Domingo in her financial distress. See SANTO DOMINGO: 1901-1905.

WESTER WEMYSS, Rosslyn Erskine Wemyss, 1st Baron (1864-), British admiral. Commanded a squadron during the landing of the British troops at Gallipoli, 1915; commander-in-chief in the East Indies and Egypt, 1916-1917; first sea lord of the Admiralty, 1917-1919; member of the war cabinet, 1918. See WORLD WAR: 1915: VI. Turkey: a, 3, i; 1917: I. Summary: b, 12; 1918: XI. End of the war: a, 1.

WESTERÅS, Diets of (1527-1544). See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 1397-1527; SWEDEN: 1523-1604.

WESTERN AUSTRALIA.—Western Australia comprises about one-third of the continent of Australia, and is the most sparsely settled section of that country. It is bounded on the west by the Indian ocean, and on the east by South Australia and Northern territory. It extends 1,500 miles in length and is 1,000 miles across. See AUSTRALIA: Location and physical features; also Map.

1616-1870.—Exploration and settlement.—Peel's colony.—Penal colonies.—The names of many famous men are connected with the exploration and survey of the country. It was discovered in 1616 by Dirk Hartog. In 1627 Jan Pieter Nuyts examined and charted the southern coast line. In 1629 Urech of Batavia landed on the Abrolhos islands. In 1688 William Dampier anchored in Cygnet bay. In 1896 William de Vlaming expored the Swan river. In 1722 Captain de St. Alouarn, anchored off Cape Leewin and started explorations for the French government. In 1791 Captain George Vancouver surveyed and took possession of the country northwest of King George Sound. In 1801 Matthew Flinders reached Cape Leewin. In 1818 De Freycinet revisited western Australia. From 1818 to 1822 Lieutenant Parker King surveyed the coast line, and in 1826 Major Lockyer landed at Albany and took possession in the name of Great Britain.—Based on *Pocket Year Book of Western Australia*, 1923.—In 1827 "Captain Stirling explored the Swan River, discovered in 1697 by Vlaming [and called by him New Holland], and reported that the country there was 'not inferior in any natural essential condition to the Plain of Lombardy,' an optimistic view that experience has failed to justify. Stirling urged that the Swan River should be occupied, and Darling supported this view. The British authorities decided against the idea on the score of expense. The distance from Sydney was so great that it meant setting up a new Government, and this was not necessary. But private enterprise stepped in. . . . The reports of Stirling on the Swan River led Thomas Peel, a wealthy cousin of Sir Robert Peel,

and others to propose to the British Government that they should take 10,000 emigrants to Western Australia, receiving in return 4,000,000 acres of land. Eventually the scheme was modified. Settlers were to receive an acre for each 1s. 6d. of capital invested, on condition that they spent 1s. 6d. an acre in improvements. Peel was granted 250,000 acres of land, receiving 200 acres for each person over ten years of age whom he brought to the colony. Stirling, who was appointed [Lieutenant] Governor [1829], was to receive 100,000 acres. This was the first free settlement in Australia. [Between 1837 and 1839 Captain George Grey made his explorations into the interior.] No convicts were landed in Western Australia until 1850. . . . In 1841 Edward John Eyre, setting out from Fowler's Bay on February 25, worked his way round the coast of the Great Australian Bight to Albany on King George's Sound, which he reached on July 7, 1841. Accompanied only by his overseer, Baxter, and three aborigines, he set out on a journey of over 1,000 miles through a barren, dry, and desolate region. At one point he crossed a stage of 150 miles without water. About halfway through two of the aborigines shot Baxter and deserted, carrying off some of the stores. With one King George's Sound native as his sole companion, Eyre struggled on. He killed his horses and dried their flesh for food, and found a little water by collecting, in the early morning, the dew from the bushes in a sponge. Even so he would probably have failed, but on the coast near Lucky Bay he found a French whaler, the *Mississippi*, one of the great fleet of foreign whaling ships, mainly French and American, which then worked on the southern and western coasts of Australia. The Frenchmen even had vegetable gardens and a few sheep and goats grazing on islands off this desolate coast. With assistance from Rossiter, the whaling captain, Eyre pushed on to Albany. This exploit had but intensified the isolation of Western Australia by showing how difficult, almost impossible, it was to traverse the intervening wilderness, and until the Transcontinental Railway was opened in 1917 the sea was, for all practical purposes, the only means of reaching Western Australia from the east. . . . The population was still, after twenty years of settlement, only 5,000. About this time the British authorities had raised the price of land throughout Australia, whatever its quality, to £1 an acre. Settlers could no longer be attracted to Western Australia by the prospect of acquiring large areas at exceptionally low rates. And, by restricting land sales, this policy reduced the fund which had been used to pay the passages of immigrant labourers. Under these conditions the earlier policy was abandoned, and in 1849 a public meeting, held at Perth, decided in favour of asking the British Government to 'erect this colony into a regular penal settlement.' This was done, and the first convicts arrived in June, 1850. During the next seventeen years about 10,000 prisoners and the same number of free immigrants were landed in Western Australia. After 1853, when transportation to Van Diemen's Land ended, Western Australia was the one part of Australasia to which convicts were sent. To this day Perth and Fremantle retain more buildings bearing evidences of the convict days than any other towns in Australia. In 1867 the system was finally abandoned."—T. Dunbabin, *Making of Australasia (Making of the British empire, pp. 136-149)*.—In spite of the forced growth of the population, little progress was made until the advent of Sir Frederick Weld, who was appointed governor in 1870 and at once

initiated a vigorous policy of development. Explorations of the interior were begun and, surveys were made for telegraph and railway lines. The explorations of the Forrest brothers into the interior took place at this time, 1869-1870.—See also AUSTRALIA: 1787-1840.

1885-1900.—In councils for federation of Australia. See AUSTRALIA: 1885-1892; 1900: Federation, etc.; 1900 (August).

1892-1893.—Coolgardie and Kalgourlie gold fields discovered.—Effect on status of Western Australia at federation.—"Long before the Kimberley find was reported—in fact, as far back as the year 1847—a traveller and prospector named Calvert had discovered, much further to the south and west, reliable evidence of the existence of the precious metal on the upper courses of the Ashburton and Murchison rivers. Nothing, however, was done to utilize his information for a long period, and it was not till the year 1891 that his report was verified by the finding in each of the localities mentioned by him of both quartz and alluvial gold. Mining was then undertaken on each of these fields and with particularly good results in the Murchison district. Prior to this . . . a still more important auriferous region was found in the Yilgam district, situated about 250 miles eastward of Perth. This discovery was the immediate forerunner of the finding of and successful mining for the precious metal at a number of places in the Pilbarra district. But all of these discoveries were about to be overshadowed by one of infinitely more importance; for during the year 1892, Messrs. Bayley and Ford reported, and their report was verified, that they had found rich gold-bearing country in the Coolgardie district, situated considerably to the eastward of the Yilgam field. Immediately this news became known, a rush set in—at first from the settled parts of the colony; but soon large numbers of gold-seekers from all parts of Australia came pouring in, and for a time the long journeys and labours of many of these men were abundantly rewarded by rich returns. As these began to fall off, some of the prospectors moved still further eastward and there came across the Kalgourlie field, which was soon to be famous as one of the chief gold-producing localities of the world and as the richest of the existing auriferous fields of Australia. . . . The extent and importance of the influx into Western Australia that the gold-fields had caused may be readily judged from the fact that in the year 1891, or shortly before the Coolgardie discovery, the population of the Western State was estimated to be 58,674, and that in the opening year of the twentieth century it exceeded 180,000 persons; whilst, during the same period, the revenue of the colony increased nearly sixfold and the expenditure in a slightly larger degree. In fact, though blessed with a number of other sources of wealth, Western Australia is wholly indebted to the Coolgardie and Kalgourlie gold-fields for bringing her, in a few years, from a position immensely behind the next most backward of the eastern colonies to one in which she could take an honourable place among the sisterhood of States that form to-day the Australian Commonwealth. Nay more, it is highly probable, if there had been no Coolgardie or Kalgourlie gold-fields, that Western Australia would not have been permitted to enter the Commonwealth as an Original State."—R. P. Thomson, *National history of Australia, New Zealand, and the adjacent islands, pp. 186-188*.

1889-1900.—Representative government accorded Western Australia.—"The agitation in the

colony for a Constitution similar to those in existence in Eastern Australia was supported in the year 1889 by a unanimous vote of the Legislative Council and this, greatly aided by the influence of the other colonies, was decisive with the authorities in Great Britain, and thus, in the following year [1900], the Imperial Parliament passed a measure granting to the western province Responsible, combined with Representative, Government, and this in the following year came into full operation."—*Ibid.*, pp. 189-190.

1900.—Women granted suffrage. See SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: Australia.

1901.—Member of Australian Commonwealth.—In 1901 when "the statesmen of the West resolved to submit to the electors of their colony that Federal Bill which the other colonies had, in the previous year [1900], determined to adopt, the western voters, on the 31st of July, by a decisive majority accepted it also, and with the adherence to the Compact of Union, the Australian family was fully complete. Owing to her comparatively small population, Western Australia, like Tasmania, has had to take advantage of the provision in the Constitution which guarantees a minimum of five members in the House of Representatives, to each State, which, by the smallness of its population, might be otherwise entitled to a lesser number; but, equally with each of the more populous States, she returns six representatives to the Senate. In the former Chamber one of her members, Sir John Forrest, has, from the outset, occupied a prominent position."—R. P. Thomson, *National history of Australia, New Zealand, and the adjacent islands*, p. 190.

1901-1910.—Effect of gold production on status of Western Australia in the Australian Commonwealth.—"In the Commonwealth Constitution which the western men endorsed [in 1901] there was a provision made for the exceptional position that Western Australia was placed in by the gold-fields and by the fact that a great mass of her imports came from the eastern States. Had the revenue derived from the latter been suddenly cut off, the Treasury would have been largely depleted. In consequence, it was provided that, for five years after Federation, Western Australia might levy duties on goods from the east; but these imposts were to decrease by one-fifth annually. Hence, the collections finally came to an end in the year 1906. A further concession of a similar character was subsequently made, for just as Tasmania succeeded in inducing the Commonwealth to accord a special consideration to her owing to the fact that so much of the goods consumed within her limits were either re-exports from, or the produce of, the eastern States, so did Western Australia [under the capable premiership of Sir John Forrest], after the failure of the Referendum on the financial questions in the year 1910, find that the National Government recognized that her revenues were in a difficult position from a like cause. Accordingly it was provided that for a period of ten years from 1910, an annual amount should be granted to Western Australia, which should commence with £250,000 for the first year and be reduced by £10,000 yearly, that is to say, for the second year the amount would be £240,000, and so on, so that, at the end of the ten years, the last payment would be £150,000."—*Ibid.*, p. 189.

1902.—Workmen's compensation law passed. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries: Australia.

1907-1917.—Railroad construction.—Trans-

continental railway completed. See AUSTRALIA: 1907-1920; RAILROADS: 1908-1918.

1911.—University of Western Australia founded. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1850-1922.

1913.—Railroad construction.—During the year 1913, 600 miles of railroad were constructed.

1920.—Soldiers' land settlement scheme.—Civil service strike.—A further immigration project was inaugurated in 1920 with the soldiers land settlement scheme. By grants of land to soldiers, Western Australia hoped to bring some of her thousands of undeveloped acres into profitable use. In the same year, a strike of civil servants resulted in the creation of an Appeal Board. The Prince of Wales visited Australia in 1920.

1921.—Group settlements to encourage immigration.—Trade delegation to the Near East.—Race riots.—In 1921 the government decided to encourage immigration by founding group settlements instead of giving isolated plots of lands to settlers. (See IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: Australia: 1909-1921.) In order to stimulate export trade through new markets, a trade delegation was sent to the countries of the Near East.—"Anti-Japanese feeling in Australia culminated in a race riot at Broome, an important seaport of West Australia, on Dec. 21, in which two Japanese were killed and others injured. Nearly all the male white inhabitants were sworn in as special constables and disarmed the Japanese. Broome is the centre of the pearling industry, in which large numbers of Japanese are employed. The trouble originated in disputes between Japanese and Malays. The Japanese became aggressive and it was necessary to send a white man in each pearling boat. As a consequence of the riot the pearling fleet was temporarily laid up."—*New York Times Current History*, Feb., 1921, pp. 313.

1922-1923.—Immigration.—Loans to farmers.—"The most important political event of the year [1922-1923] in Western Australia was the definite launching of the Government's scheme of comprehensive settlement by the introduction of a steady stream of migrants from Great Britain. In March the Premier (Sir James Mitchell) visited England and successfully negotiated an agreement with the British Government which postulates the introduction of 75,000 immigrants within three years. The scheme had previously received the endorsement of the Commonwealth Government, which, after investigation of the lands proposed to be opened up, gave a guarantee of financial assistance. The terms of the tripartite agreement finally concluded provide that, for the first five years, the interest charges on the loan of £6,000,000 necessary to carry out the settlement scheme will be paid in equal moieties by the Imperial, Commonwealth, and State Governments. The Commonwealth Government maintains the necessary organisation in the United Kingdom for the purpose of securing settlers, but the final selection is in the hands of the State. Up to the end of 1922, 4,369 State-aided migrants had arrived in Western Australia, and the immigration propaganda also had the effect of attracting to Western Australia 2,109 full-paying third-class passengers on account of whom the Government accepts no responsibility. Except for a few weeks in the depth of winter, when seasonal conditions produced a temporary depression, no difficulty was found in placing the new arrivals in situations in the country immediately on arrival, the scheme providing that the oversea settlers, in order to familiarise themselves with local conditions, shall serve for a few months with established

agriculturists before taking up holdings of their own. Early in the year some difficulty was found in placing married couples, but so brisk has been the demand for labour latterly that during December the Government cabled to the Agent General requesting that the shipments of married persons, be increased by 1,000 monthly. The favourable terms under which loan money has been made available have enabled the Government to place at the disposal of the State Agricultural Bank all the funds necessary to meet the demands from farmers for advances for clearing purposes, in consequence of which large additional areas have been, and are being prepared for cultivation. For the 1922 season 2,237,465 acres of land were cropped, but owing to the shortage of rain in some districts during the growing season the estimated average yield of wheat (9.05 bushels per acre) was below anticipations, in addition to which an unexpectedly large area sown for grain was cut for hay. Yielding to the representations of growers' organisations, the Government terminated the State wheat pool, which had operated during the 1921-22 season, and the 1922-23 season's crop is being handled by a growers' voluntary pool and by private buyers."—*Pocket Year Book of Western Australia*, 1923, pp. 94-95.

ALSO IN: H. Taunton, *Australind*.—M. Vivienne, *Travels in Western Australia*.—T. Chambers, *Western Australia*.—J. M. Price, *Land of gold*.—A. F. Calvert, *Western Australia: Its history and progress*.—*Western Australia Official Year Book*.

WESTERN EMPIRE, western portion of the Roman empire after its division in 395. See **ROME**: Empire: 394-395; 423-450; 455-476; 476; **GERMANY**: 800; **HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE**: 962; 963.

WESTERN FEDERATION OF MINERS. See **INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD**; also Recent tendencies.

WESTERN ISLANDS. See **HEBRIDES**, OR **WESTERN ISLANDS**.

WESTERN RESERVE OF CONNECTICUT, part of northern Ohio reserved by Connecticut in 1786, when she ceded her claim to the western lands to the government. See **OHIO**: 1786-1796; **PENNSYLVANIA**: 1753-1799; **U. S. A.**: 1781-1786.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY. See **UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES**: 1826-1922.

WESTERN TERRITORY. See **NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES**: 1788-1802.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY. See **ELECTRIC DISCOVERY**: Telegraphy and telephony: Telegraphy: 1855-1917; **TRUSTS**: United States: 1907: Chief existing combinations.

WESTERNISTS, group of Russian critics. See **RUSSIAN LITERATURE**: 1836-1859.

WESTHOEK, town in Belgium. It was a scene of fighting in 1917. See **WORLD WAR**: 1917: II. Western front: d, 10; d, 11.

WESTINGHOUSE, George (1846-1914), American inventor and engineer. See **INVENTIONS**: 19th century: Railroad air brake.

WESTMINSTER, Provisions of. See **OXFORD**, PROVISIONS OF.

WESTMINSTER, Statutes of. See **COMMON LAW**: 1275; 1285; **DE DONIS CONDITIONALIBUS**; **ENGLAND**: 1275-1205.

WESTMINSTER, Treaties of (1655, 1674). See **FRANCE**: 1655-1658; **NETHERLANDS**: 1674.


WESTMINSTER ABBEY, or the Collegiate Church of St. Peter, ancient abbey church, famous as the crowning place of the kings of England, and in modern times the place of sepulchre of the country's most honored dead. The Anglo-Saxon

King Sebert is said to have erected the first church in honor of Saint Peter about 616. The Benedictine religious house (monasterium, or minster), connected with this church, and directly west of the Cistercian abbey of St. Mary of the Graces (Eastminster), was named Westminster Abbey. "A charter was certainly granted to Westminster by Offa (756-796), and a residence of the Saxon kings was established hard by. Another charter, purporting to be granted by King Edgar, and date 951, is in existence. By some not over-credulous persons it is accepted as genuine, but it is more probably an early and a very skilful forgery. This charter is witnessed, among others, by Dunstan, who was Archbishop of Canterbury from 960-980, and practically re-established Westminster Abbey by bringing twelve Benedictine monks from Glastonbury and settling them at Thorney. . . . The 'Western Monastery,' or 'Minster of the West,' did not flourish during the stormy time of the Danish invasion, and it would possibly have had no further history if the notice of Edward the Confessor had not been attracted to it. . . . His piety took the form of special devotion to S. Peter. Before he ascended the throne, he had vowed that he would make a pilgrimage to the apostle's tomb in Rome, and soon after his coronation he announced his intention of keeping his oath. The Great Council heard his decision with dismay. . . . A deputation was therefore sent to Leo IX. to persuade him to release Edward from his vow. The pope consented on condition that the king should found or restore a monastery to S. Peter. . . . The king ultimately decided that the old monastery at Thorney, of which his intimate friend Edwin was the abbot, should be replaced by a new and magnificent Abbey of S. Peter. . . . The Abbey was begun in 1050 on a site to the east of the old church, which was occupied by the monks during the rebuilding. In the Confessor's lifetime little more than the choir was completed, and this was joined by a porch, or *atrium*, to the old church, which thus became the nave of the new structure. Of Edward's work nothing is now to be seen above ground, but in 1866 small fragments in position, consisting of wall-footings and bases of two piers, beneath the floor of the presbytery, were discovered by Sir G. Gilbert Scott. . . . The work of construction was carried on after the Confessor's death, for he had left large funds for its continuation. . . . The choir and transepts, the first bay of the nave northwest of the crossing, and the south and west walls of the cloister, as well as the chapterhouse and the adjoining buildings, were completed by the year 1100. Fifty years later the nave and western towers were finished. . . . Up to the time of the Confessor and for some years afterward, the church of the Abbey was the parish church of the district. This arrangement, however, was found inconvenient alike to the monks and the people. At first the north aisle of the Abbey church was set apart for parochial worship, but very soon the Church of S. Margaret was built in the shadow of the great minster. . . .

"The first important event which took place in the new Abbey church, after its dedication on December 28, 1065, was the burial of the founder himself on January 6 of the following year. William the Conqueror was crowned there on Christmas Day, 1066. . . . Since then the coronation of every English sovereign has taken place in the Church of S. Peter, with the exception of Edward V., who, in Speed's phrase, died 'uncrowned without sceptre or ball.' Henry III., although

crowned at Gloucester on his accession, was crowned again at Westminster four years later. . . . The next great event in the story of the construction of Westminster Abbey took place in the reign of Henry III., who may in some sense be called its second founder. . . . His association with the Abbey commenced early in his life, for, although the . . . [original] lady-chapel was not due to his inspiration, he laid its foundation-stone in 1220, when only fifteen years of age. This structure, which remained unaltered for more than two centuries, was really the starting-point of Henry's reconstruction of the Norman church. It ended in a semi-octagonal apse, the foundations of which were discovered in 1876. Henry's rebuilding of the eastern parts of the church occupied nearly a quarter of a century (1245-1269). . . . The plan is unquestionably French, but the

Abbey. In 1296 Edward brought the famous stone of Scone to the Abbey, and on it caused himself to be crowned King of the Scots. . . . Up to the year 1330 no considerable structural additions or alterations were made, but the magnificence of the Abbey was from time to time increased by the erection of [various] tombs. . . . Almost as soon as the nave was completed, the thirteenth-century lady-chapel was pulled down to make room for a new one, generally known as Henry VII.'s chapel, which was the last of the royal alterations and additions to the Abbey church. . . . The building was . . . probably finished about the year 1510. . . . We must now turn for a moment to the consideration of the fate of S. Peter's Church at the Reformation. Looking to the destruction which that vast change brought to many abbeys of great prestige, Westminster may be said to have



WESTMINSTER ABBEY

details are clearly English, and the workmanship is better than that of contemporary French builders. The parts first undertaken included the eastern arm and the chapels round it, both the transepts, the crossing, and the chapter-house. The last of these was practically finished in 1253, the windows being temporarily filled with canvas in order that the room might be used without delay. From the evidence of the fabric itself, it would appear that the construction of the main buildings of the church was pushed forward as rapidly as, if not more rapidly than, the chapter-house. By the year 1269 the eastern portions of the building and the four bays west of the crossing were finished. The cloisters were also rebuilt with the adjacent parts of the church so far as they lay by them. . . . From the time of Henry III., Westminster Abbey became, and for centuries remained, the mausoleum of English royalty. . . . On August 19, 1274, the coronation of Edward and his Queen, Eleanor of Castile, took place, being the first joint coronation in the history of the

Abbey. The dissolution of the monastery was quietly effected on January 16, 1539, and the first book containing the orders of the new dean and chapter is dated 1542. The abbot was converted into a dean; for the monks, twelve prebendaries, who were to meet every Saturday in the year, were substituted. Over the head of the newly constituted body was placed a prelate, entitled Bishop of Westminster, whose diocese extended over the whole of Middlesex, with the exception of Fulham. The Episcopate of Westminster was, however, short-lived. It was only with great difficulty that the Abbey was preserved from destruction in the tempestuous days of Edward VI. . . . The services of the Roman Church were continued until the reign of Edward VI., when the 'Communion' took the place of 'Mass,' and brass lecterns, candlesticks, angels, and other ornaments, as well as many sumptuous vestments, were sold, the proceeds being spent in adding to the library. In the reign of Mary, who was crowned on October 1, 1553, the monastery was partially reinstated under Abbot

Heckenham, and the old worship was revived, and in 1557 the queen and Philip of Spain attended mass in the Abbey. The abbacy was swept away by Elizabeth, who re-established the dean and twelve prebendaries under the title of the 'College, or Collegiate Church of S. Peter, Westminster.' During the Commonwealth, although the services were changed and 'monuments of superstition and idolatry' demolished, the fabric itself happily escaped serious injury. The year 1643 is memorable by reason of the Assembly of Divines in Henry VII.'s Chapel. With the Restoration, the older order of things naturally returned. A school was always attached to the Monastery of Westminster. The famous public school which flourishes beside the Abbey to-day was practically founded by Henry VIII. and richly endowed by Elizabeth in 1560. Up to the eighteenth century the Abbey church remained without towers or spires. . . . For generations the erection of a great spire over the crossing has been eagerly discussed, and more than once the discussion has resulted in a definite project. The last great structural additions to the fabric, the western towers, were completed in 1730. Sir Christopher Wren 'restored' the lower parts of the towers, sweeping away exquisite details in ruthless fashion, and designed the upper parts in a style of his own. After his death in 1723, the work was continued by Nicholas Hawksmoor up to 1736, and probably completed by James during the term of office of Dean Wilcocks. . . . There have, of course, from time to time been repairs to various parts of the structure, including the almost complete recasing of the exterior; indeed, the Abbey has suffered and is still suffering much from restoration, but the general aspect of the great church remains unchanged. . . . The most ambitious alteration has been that of the north front under Sir Gilbert Scott and Mr. J. L. Pearson."—G. Hiatt, *Westminster Abbey*, pp. 4-15.

ALSO IN: H. M. Pratt, *Westminster Abbey*—W. J. Loftie, *Westminster Abbey*.

WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY.—"In the Grand Remonstrance of the winter of 1641, the Commons desired a general synod of the most grave, pious, learned, and judicious divines of this island, to consider all things necessary for the peace and good government of the church. It was not until the summer of 1643 that this synod was at last after half a dozen efforts actually appointed by Parliament. . . . The Westminster Assembly of Divines . . . was nominally composed of one hundred and fifty members, including not only Anglicans, but Anglican bishops, and comprehending, besides divines, ten lay peers and twice as many members of the other House. Eight Scottish commissioners were included. The Anglicans never came, or else they immediately fell off; the laymen, with the notable exception of Selden, took but a secondary part; and it became essentially a body of divines, usually some sixty of them in attendance. The field appointed for their toil was indeed enormous. It was nothing less than the reorganization of the spiritual power, subject to the shifting exigencies of the temporal, with diverse patterns to choose from in the reformed churches out of England. Faith, worship, discipline, government, were all comprehended in their vast operation. They were instructed to organize a scheme for a church; to compose a directory in place of the Prayer Book; to . . . [draw up] a confession of faith . . . [and] a catechism . . . The divines first met in Henry VII.'s chapel (July 1, 1643), but when the weather grew colder they moved into the Jerusalem Chamber. . . . For most of five

years and a half they sat—over one thousand sittings. . . . It was not until May (1747) that this famous exposition of theological truth was submitted to the House of Commons. By that time Parliament, in deep water, had other things to think of, and the Westminster Confession never received the sanction of the State. Nor did the two catechisms, which, along with the Confession, are still the standards not only of the Church of Scotland, but of the great body of Presbyterian churches grouped all over the English-speaking world, and numbering many millions of strenuous adherents. The effect of familiarity with the Shorter Catechism upon the intellectual character of the Scottish peasantry, and the connection between Presbyterian government and a strongly democratic turn of thought and feeling in the community, are accepted commonplaces. . . . Few more determined struggles have ever been fought on our sacred national battle-ground at Westminster, than the contest between the Assembly of Divines and the Parliament. The divines inspired from Scotland insisted that Presbytery was of divine right. The majority of the Parliament, true to English traditions and instinct, insisted that all church government was of human institution and depended on the will of the magistrate. The divine contended that presbytery and synod were to have the unfettered right of inflicting spiritual censures, and denying access to the communion-table to all whom they should choose to condemn as ignorant or scandalous persons. The Parliament was as stubborn that these censures were to be confined to offenses specified by law, and with a right of appeal to a lay tribunal. . . . The breach widened as time went on, and by 1645 its repair was hopeless. The conflict in its progress made more definite the schism between Presbyterian and Independent. It was the alliance of Independent and Erastian in Parliament that finally baffled the Presbyterian after the Scottish model, and hardened the great division, until what had been legitimate difference on a disputable question became mutual hatred between two infuriated factions. . . . We need not follow the vicissitudes of party, or the changing shadows of military and political events as they fell across the zealous scene. . . . It was in 1646 that Parliament consummated what would have seemed so extraordinary a revolution to the patriots of 1640 by the erection of the Presbyterian system of Scotland, though with marked reservations of Parliamentary control, into the Established Church of England. The uniformity that had rooted itself in Scotland, and had been the center of the Solemn League and Covenant [1643] was now nominally established throughout the island. But in name only. It was soon found in the case of church and state alike, that to make England break with her history is a thing more easily said than done, as it has ever been in all her ages. The Presbyterian system struck no abiding root. The Assembly, as a Scottish historian has pointedly observed, though called by an English Parliament, held on English ground, and composed of English divines, with only a few Scotsmen among them, still, as things turned out, existed and labored mainly for Scotland."—J. Morley, *Oliver Cromwell*, pp. 145-153, 155-156.—See also PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES: 1649-1919; ENGLAND: 1643 (July); (July-September); 1646 (March).

WESTMINSTER CONFESSION. See CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH: 1646-1883.

WESTMINSTER PALACE.—"Westminster was from the days of Edward the Confessor the



PEACE OF WESTPHALIA: ADOPTION OF TREATY AT MUNSTER, 1648
(After the painting executed on copper by Gerard Terborch in 1648, now in the National Gallery at London)

recognised home of the great council of the nation as well as of the king. How this came about, history does not record; it is possible that the mere accident of the existence of the royal palace on the bank of the Thames led to the foundation of the abbey, or that the propinquity of the abbey led to the choice of the place for a palace; equal obscurity covers the origin of both. . . . From the very first introduction of representative members the national council had its regular home at Westminster. There, with a few casual exceptions, . . . all the properly constituted parliaments of England have been held. The ancient Palace of Westminster, of which the most important parts, having survived until the fire of 1834 and the construction of the New Houses of Parliament, were destroyed in 1852, must have presented a very apt illustration of the history of the Constitution which had grown up from its early simplicity to its full strength within those venerable walls. It was a curious congeries of towers, halls, churches, and chambers. . . . As time went on, every apartment changed its destination: the chamber became a council room, the banquet hall a court of justice, the chapel a hall of deliberation. . . . The house of commons met occasionally in the Painted Chamber, but generally sat in the Chapter House or in the Refectory of the abbey, until the reign of Edward VI, when it was fixed in S. Stephen's chapel."—W. Stubbs, *Constitutional History of England*, v. 3, ch. 20, sect. 735-736.

WESTMINSTER SCHOOL. See WESTMINSTER ABBEY.

WESTON, Thomas (c. 1575-c. 1624), English adventurer. Sent a group of colonists to Plymouth, 1622. See MASSACHUSETTS: 1622-1628.

WESTPHALIA, province of Prussia with an area of 7,809 square miles, and a population, in 1919, of 4,488,115. See GERMANY: Map; SAXONY. 1500-1789.—As one of the circle. See GERMANY: 1493-1519; 1789.

1801-1803.—Ceded to Darmstadt by Treaty of Lunéville. See GERMANY: 1801-1803.

1806.—Occupied by Louis Napoleon, king of Holland. See GERMANY: 1806 (October).

1807-1813.—Kingdom created by Napoleon for his brother Jerome. See GERMANY: 1807 (June-July); 1813 (October-December); AUSTRIA: 1809-1814.

1809.—Revolt against the French. See GERMANY: 1809 (April-July).

1815.—Ceded to Prussia. See VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.

WESTPHALIA, Peace of (1648), treaty bringing the Thirty Years' War to an end. "It was just before the death of Richelieu, which occurred in 1642, that the first whisperings of peace were heard. Everybody was inexpressibly weary of the war and longed for the cessation of its horrors, yet each ruler and statesman wanted peace on terms advantageous to himself. The arrangement of the articles of peace was a matter of infinite difficulty, for the affairs and boundaries of the states of Central Europe were in almost hopeless confusion. To facilitate matters the commissioners were divided into two bodies, one holding its sessions at Osnabrück, and the other at Münster, both Westphalian cities. After four years of discussion and negotiation, the articles of the celebrated Peace of Westphalia, as it is called, were signed by different European powers. The chief articles of this important peace may be made to fall under two heads,—those relating to territorial boundaries, and those respecting religion. As to the first, these cut short in three directions the actual or nominal

limits of the Holy Roman Empire. Switzerland and the United Netherlands were severed from it; for though both of these countries had been for a long time practically independent of the Empire, this independence had never been acknowledged in any formal way. The claim of France to the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun in Lorraine, which places she had held for about a century, was confirmed, and all Alsace, save the free city of Strasburg, was given to her. These Alsatian lands gave France a foothold on the Rhine and an open door into Germany,—a door which remained open until 1871, when Germany, determined to possess these valuable lands across her border, went to war against France, pushed her back from the river, and seized the coveted territory. Sweden, already a great maritime power, was given territories in North Germany—Western Pomerania and other lands—which greatly enhanced her influence by giving her command of the mouths of three important German rivers,—the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser. But these lands were not given to the Swedish king in full sovereignty; they still remained a part of the Germanic body, and the king of Sweden through his relation to them became a prince of the Empire and entitled to a seat in the German Diet. The changes within the Empire were many, and some of them important. Brandenburg, the nucleus of a future great state, especially received considerable additions of territory. She got Eastern Pomerania, and also valuable ecclesiastical lands. The articles respecting religion were even more important than those which established the metes and bounds of the different states. Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists were all put upon the same footing. Every prince, with some reservations, was to have the right to make his religion the religion of his people, and to banish all who refused to adopt the established creed; but such nonconformists were to have five years in which to emigrate. This arrangement was known as the princes' 'Right of Reformation' and the subjects' 'Right of Emigration.' The different states of the Empire—they numbered over four hundred, counting the free imperial cities—were left almost wholly independent of the imperial authority. They were given the right to enter into alliances with one another and with foreign princes, but not, of course, against the Emperor or the Empire. This provision made the Empire merely a loose confederation, and postponed to a distant future the nationalization of the German fatherland. Germany became what Italy had been, and still was, an open field in which any enemy might sow the dragon's teeth of discord and war. These were some of the most important provisions of the noted Peace of Westphalia. For more than two centuries they formed the fundamental law of Germany, and established a balance of power between the European states which, though it was disregarded and disturbed by Louis XIV of France, was in general maintained until the great upheaval of the French Revolution."—P. Van Ness Myers, *Medieval and modern history*, pp. 391-393.—"When by the Peace of Westphalia a crowd of petty principalities were recognized as practically independent states, the need of a body of rules to regulate their relations and intercourse became pressing. Such a code (if such it can be called) Grotius and his successors compiled out of the principles which they found in the Roman law; then the private law of the Germanic countries, thus laying the foundation whereon the system of international jurisprudence has been built up dur-

ing the last three centuries."—J. Bryce, *Holy Roman empire*, p. 436.—See also GERMANY: 1648; Peace of Westphalia; 1648: Effects of the Peace of Westphalia; 1648-1705; AUSTRIA: 1618-1648; INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1648-1714; NETHERLANDS: 1648.

ALSO IN: J. H. C. Hayes, *History of modern Europe*, v. 1, pp. 228-232.

WESTPORT, Battle of. See U. S. A.: 1864 (March-October: Arkansas-Missouri).

WETHERELL, Sir Charles (1770-1846), English barrister. Attacked by a mob at Bristol in 1831 because of his opposition to the Reform Bill. See BRISTOL: 1831.

WETHERSFIELD, town in Connecticut, about four miles south of Hartford. It was settled in 1635, and is the oldest settlement in the state. See CONNECTICUT: 1634-1637.

WETTIN, House of, Saxon family from which several of the royal houses of Europe are descended. See SAXONY: 1180-1553.

WETZLAR, Prussian town, thirty-three miles northwest of Frankfurt-on-Main. It became an imperial free city in the 12th century. See CITIES, IMPERIAL AND FREE, OF GERMANY.

WEXFORD, town in the county of the same name in the province of Leinster, Ireland. The town, originally a Danish colony, became one of the chief towns of the English Pale. See IRELAND: Historical map.

1169.—Taken by the English under Robert Fitz-Stephen. See IRELAND: 1169-1200.

1367.—Under English control. See IRELAND: 1327-1367.

1649.—Taken by Cromwell. See IRELAND: 1649-1650.

1793-1798.—Troubles of Protestants and Catholics. See IRELAND: 1793-1798.

WEYLER Y NICOLAU, Valeriano, Marquis of Tenerife (1839-), Spanish general. Sent to Cuba to suppress the rebellion, 1896; ruled there, 1896-1897; captain-general of Madrid, 1900; minister of war, 1901-1902, 1905-1906; minister of marine, 1905; governor of Catalonia, 1909. See CUBA: 1895-1898; BARCELONA: 1902; SPAIN: 1885-1896; 1900-1909.

WEYMOUTH, George (fl. 1602-1605), English navigator and explorer. See AMERICA: 1602-1605; MAINE: 1602-1605.

WHANG-TI, or Hwang-ti, Chinese imperial title signifying yellow emperor or ruler. See MANCHURIA: Early history.

WHARF LABORERS' STRIKE (1917). See NEW ZEALAND: 1914-1918.

WHARTON, Thomas, 1st Marquis of (1648-1715), English statesman. Author of a satirical ballad, "Lillibullero," which "sang James III out of three kingdoms." See LILLIBULLERO.

WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND ECONOMY. See EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Beginning of commercial education.

WHEATON, Loyd (1838-), American general. Served in Cuba, 1898; in the Philippines, 1899; commander of Luzon, 1900. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1899; Armed opposition to establishment of American government.

WHEATSTONE, Sir Charles (1802-1875), English physicist and inventor. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: 1823-1921; also, Measuring instruments: 1833-1921.

WHEATSTONE BRIDGE, instrument used to measure electrical resistance. See ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY: Measuring instruments: 1833-1921.

WHEELER, Joseph (1836-1906), American

soldier. Fought on the Confederate side during the Civil War; served in the campaign at Shiloh, 1862; at Chattanooga and Chickamauga, 1863; opposed Sherman's advance on Savannah, 1864; member of the House of Representatives, 1880-1899; commanded a division in Cuba, 1898, and in the Philippines, 1899-1900. See ALABAMA: 1898; U. S. A.: 1898 (June-July).

WHEELER, William Almon (1819-1887), vice president of the United States, 1877-1881. See U. S. A.: 1876-1877.

WHEELING, city of West Virginia, about sixty-six miles southwest of Pittsburgh. In 1920 it had a population of 56,208. See WEST VIRGINIA: 1860-1861; 1869-1885.

WHELOCK, Eleazar (1711-1779), American educator. President of Dartmouth College, 1770-1779. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1754-1769.

WHIGGAMORS. See WHIGS.

WHIGS: American party. See U. S. A.: 1834; 1841; 1854-1855.

WHIGS, WHIGGAMORS: English party.—"The southwest counties of Scotland have seldom corn enough to serve them round the year: and the northern parts producing more than they need, those in the west come in summer to buy at Leith the stores that come from the north: and from a word 'whiggam,' used in driving their horses, all that drove were called the 'whiggamors,' and shorter the 'whiggs.' Now in that year [1648], after the news came down of Duke Hamilton's defeat [at the battle of Preston [see ENGLAND: 1648 (April-August)]], the ministers animated their people to rise and march to Edinburgh; and they came up marching on [at] the head of their parishes, with an unheard-of fury, praying and preaching all the way as they came. The marquis of Argyle and his party came and headed them, they being about 6,000. This was called the 'whiggamors' inroad; and ever after that all that opposed the court came in contempt to be called 'whiggs'; and from Scotland the word was brought into England, where it is now one of our unhappy terms of distinction."

—G. Burnet, *History of my own time, summary*, v. 1, bk. 1, sect. 43.—"We find John Nicoll, the diarist, in 1666, speaking of the west-country Presbyterians as 'commonly called the Whiggs,' implying that the term was new. The sliding of the appellation from these obscure people to the party of the opposition in London a few years later, is indicated by Daniel Defoe as occurring immediately after the affair of Bothwell Bridge in 1679. The Duke of Monmouth then returning from his command in Scotland, instead of thanks for his good service, found himself under blame for using the insurgents too mercifully. 'And Lauderdale told Charles, with an oath, that the Duke had been so civil to the Whiggs because he was himself a Whig in his heart. This made it a court-word; and in a little while all the friends and followers of the Duke began to be called Whiggs.'—R. Chambers, *Domestic annals of Scotland*, v. 2, p. 172.—See also ENGLAND: 1680.

1683.—Downfall of the party. See ENGLAND: 1681-1683.

1709.—Rise of influence under Marlborough. See ENGLAND: 1709.

1712.—Fall with Marlborough. See ENGLAND: 1710-1712.

1714-1741.—Growth of power under George I and ministry of Walpole. See ENGLAND: 1714-1721; 1727-1741.

1793-1796.—Discredited by French Revolution. See ENGLAND: 1793-1796.

See also LIBERAL PARTY.

WHIPPLE, Abraham (1733-1819), American naval officer. First commodore of the American navy. See U. S. A.: 1775-1776: Beginning of American navy.

WHIPPLE, William (1730-1785), American patriot and signer of the Declaration of Independence. See U. S. A.: 1776 (July): Text of the Declaration of Independence.

WHIPS, Party.—The "party whips," in English politics, are "an extremely useful and hard-working body of officials. Being charged with the duty of keeping the respective sides in readiness for all emergencies, they are generally to be found in the lobby, where they make themselves acquainted with the incomings and outgoings of members, and learn a good deal as to their prospective movements. The whips are the gentlemen who issue those strongly underlined circulars by which legislators are summoned on important nights; and who, by their watchfulness and attention, can generally convey reliable intelligence to the party chiefs. If the Ministers, for example, are engaged in any controversy, and their whips are not absolutely certain of a majority, they would make arrangements for a succession of men to keep on talking till the laggards could be brought to their places." The whips also arrange "pairs," by which members of opposite parties, or on opposite sides of a given question, agree in couples, not to vote for a certain fixed period of time, thereby securing freedom to be absent without causing any loss of relative strength to their respective parties. This arrangement is common in most legislative bodies. "In addition to these duties, the whips of the opposing forces have to move for the issue of new writs in the place of deceased members—a task never undertaken till they have a candidate ready for the fray."—*Popular account of Parliamentary procedure*, p. 18.

ALSO IN: E. Porritt, *Englishman at home*, p. 198 and appendix K.

WHISKY INSURRECTION. See PENNSYLVANIA: 1794.

WHISKY RING.—The Whisky Ring, so called, brought to light in the United States in 1875, "was an association, or series of associations, of distillers and Federal officials for the purpose of defrauding the Government of a large amount of the tax imposed on distilled spirits, and, further, of employing a part of the proceeds in political corruption. On the trial of the indictments a number of Federal officers were convicted."—A. Johnston, *History of American politics*, ch. 23.

ALSO IN: *Whisky frauds: Testimony taken* (44th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives Miscellaneous Documents, v. 9, no. 186).

WHISTLER, James Abbott McNeill (1834-1903), American painter and etcher. See PAINTING: American; ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1880-1920.

WHITBOURNE, Sir Richard (fl. 1579-1627), English colonist and writer. See NEWFOUNDLAND: 1610-1655.

WHITBY, seaport and watering-place in the North Riding of Yorkshire, England, on both sides of the mouth of the Esk, where it enters the North Sea. Streonshalh, the old town on the present site of Whitby was the home of Cædmon. Here in 657, St. Hilda founded a Benedictine abbey. The town was burned by the Danes in 867 and rebuilt in 1078 by William de Percy.

644.—Council of. See CHURCH OF ENGLAND: 597-1066.

1914.—Bombarded by Germans. See WORLD WAR: 1914: IX. Naval operations: d.

WHITE, Andrew Dickson (1832-1918), Ameri-

can educator and diplomat. Member of New York Senate, 1863-1867; president of Cornell University, 1867-1885; member of commission sent to Santo Domingo, 1871; minister to Germany, 1879-1881; minister to Russia, 1892-1894; member of Venezuela Boundary Commission, 1896; ambassador to Germany, 1897-1902; chairman of the American delegation to the Hague Peace Conference, 1899. See HAGUE CONFERENCES: 1899: Conference; AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION.

WHITE, Edward Douglass (1845-1921), American jurist. Served in the Confederate army during the Civil War; member of the Louisiana legislature, 1874-1878; associate justice of the Louisiana supreme court, 1878-1891; United States Senator, 1891-1894; associate justice of the United States Supreme Court, 1894-1910; chief justice, 1910-1921. See SUPREME COURT: 1888-1913; 1917; 1917-1921; BOYCOTT: 1921; U. S. A.: 1900-1901.

WHITE, Sir George Stuart (1835-1912), British soldier. Commander-in-chief of Indian forces, 1893-1898; conducted defense of Ladysmith in Boer War, 1899. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1899 (October-December).

WHITE, Henry (1850-), American diplomat. Secretary of legation at Vienna, 1883-1884, and at London, 1884-1893, 1897-1905; ambassador to Italy, 1905-1907, and to France, 1907-1909; special ambassador to Chile, 1910; member of American Commission to Negotiate Peace at Paris, 1919. See AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE; VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Conditions of peace.

WHITE, John Philip (b. 1870), American labor leader. President of Iowa Miners' Association, 1904-1907, 1909-1910; international president of the United Mine Workers of America since 1911; adviser to the United States fuel administration, 1917-1919. See U. S. A.: 1918-1920.

WHITE AND BALTIC SEA CONFERENCE. See BALTIC AND WHITE SEA CONFERENCE.

"WHITE AUSTRALIA" POLICY. See AUSTRALIA: 1919; IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION: Australia: 1901-1910; 1909-1921; RACE PROBLEMS: 1904-1913.

WHITE BOOK, German diplomatic correspondence dealing with the World War. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 3.

WHITE BROTHERHOOD, secret association of southern whites. See U. S. A.: 1866-1871; KU KLUX KLAN.

WHITE CAMELIA, Knights of the, organization of southern whites similar to the Ku Klux Klan of the Reconstruction period and often confounded with the Ku Klux, with which it was afterwards merged. It originated in Louisiana in 1867 and spread quickly over the whole of the Confederacy. Its organization was like that of the Ku Klux, but without the uncouth nomenclature. Its officers were called commanders, and the membership, much larger than that of the Ku Klux, knights and brothers. See KU KLUX KLAN; U. S. A.: 1866-1871.

WHITE CITY. See BELGRADE.

WHITE COCKADE.—"This is the badge at the same time of the House of Stuart and of the House of Bourbon."—E. E. Morris, *Early Hanoverians*, p. 138.

WHITE COMPANIES. See WHITE PENITENTS, OR WHITE COMPANIES.

WHITE COMPANY, name assumed by bands of freebooters in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. One of the bands, under the leadership of Sir John Hawkwood, fought in the pay of various

Italian states until it was disbanded in 1391. See ITALY: 1343-1393.

WHITE CROSS, Order of the, order founded by the grand duke of Tuscany, 1814.

WHITE EAGLE, Order of the, Polish order of knighthood, instituted in 1325 by Wladislaus I, and revived by Augustus in 1705.

WHITE FRIARS. See CARMELITE FRIARS.

WHITE GUARDS, Finland, anti-Bolshevist troops. See FINLAND: 1918.

WHITE GUELPHS (Bianchi), political party in Florence. See FLORENCE: 1295-1300; 1301-1313.

WHITE HOODS OF FRANCE.—"The Caputiati, Capuchons, or White Hoods [was] a sect originating with a wood-cutter of Auvergne, by

out some hints about restoring the primæval liberty of mortals and universal equality; thereby incurring the displeasure of Hugo Bishop of Auxerre, who took arms against them, and put an end to the sect by the might of the sword in 1186."—L. Mariotti, *Frà Dolcino and his times*, ch. 1.

WHITE HOODS OF GHENT, followers of John Lyon in Ghent, who in 1379 proceeded against ditchers sent out by the city of Bruges to divert by a canal the waters of the River Lys. This was the beginning of a series of violent conflicts lasting three years. See FLANDERS: 1379-1381.

WHITE HOUSE, executive mansion in Washington, official residence of the president of the United States. The house, which is not ex-



THE WHITE HOUSE, NORTH PORTICO
Before its restoration

name Durand, about the year 1182. Their primary object was the maintenance of peace, and the extermination of the disbanded soldiery, whom the English kings had spread over the south of France, and [who] were now ravaging the country under the name of Routiers or Cotereaux. The members of this religious association were bound by no vow, and made no profession of any particular faith; they were only distinguished by the white head-gear that gave them their name, and wore a little leaden image of the Virgin on their breast. They found favor at first with the bishops, especially in Burgundy and the Berri, and were even, from the best political causes, countenanced by Philip Augustus. They thus rose to such a degree of power that on the 20th of July, 1183, they surrounded a body of 7,000 of the marauding party, and suffered not one man to escape. They were, however, soon intoxicated with success, and threw

tremely large, is built in excellent proportions, and on the south front has a fine portico supported by Ionic columns. It is flanked east and west by two low wings: the westerly one contains the president's office, and cabinet offices; while the east wing is used as an entrance for the general public. The public is admitted to the state rooms—the east room, blue room, red room, and green room, or state dining room. The south front faces on handsome grounds, at the head of the fine park system which sweeps down to the Potomac. The building, which was designed by James Hoban, after the plan of the seat of the dukes of Leinster, was begun in 1792 at the instance of President Washington. (See also WASHINGTON: D. C.: 1791-1800.) It was first occupied by President Adams in 1800 and was partly destroyed by the British in 1814 in reprisal for the destruction of York (now Toronto) in Canada in the winter of 1813. The wings were not

added until 1903. "During President Roosevelt's Administration the historic mansion has undergone complete repair and restoration—so complete, in fact, that the vexed question of an appropriate home for the President of the United States is, in all probability, settled forever. In his Message, transmitting the Report of the Architects on the restoration of the White House, President Roosevelt aptly and appreciatively remarks: 'Through a wise provision of the Congress at its last session, the White House, which had become disfigured by incongruous additions and changes, has now been restored to what it was planned to be by Washington. In making the restorations the utmost care has been exercised to come as near as possible to the early plans and to supplement these plans by a careful study of such buildings as that of the University of Virginia, which was built by Jefferson. The White House is the property of the nation, and so far as is compatible with living therein it should be kept as it originally was, for the same reasons that we keep *Mount Vernon* as it originally was. The stately simplicity of the architecture is an expression of the character of the period in which it was built, and is in accord with the purpose it was designed to serve. It is a good thing to preserve such buildings as historic monuments which keep alive our sense of continuity with the nation's past.' . . . An act [Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill], approved June 20th, 1902, appropriated \$65,196 to be expended at the discretion of the President 'for a building to accommodate the offices of the President, to be located in the grounds of the Executive Mansion. . . . In addition, \$475,445 was appropriated for repairs and refurbishing the Executive Mansion and for each and every purpose connected therewith.'"—E. Singleton, *Story of the White House*, v. 2, pp. 279-280.—In accordance with the advice of Charles F. McKim, the architect, the east and west terraces were restored so as to comply with the original plans. The rooms in the western terrace were arranged to provide space for the executive offices.—See also WASHINGTON, D. C.: 1791-1800.

ALSO IN: C. B. Todd, *Story of Washington*.—M. Clemmer, *Ten years in Washington*, ch. 19.—W. B. Bryan, *History of the national capital*.

WHITE HOUSE LANDING, Battle of. See U. S. A.: 1862 (May: Virginia): Evacuation of Norfolk by rebels.

WHITE HUNS. See HUNS, WHITE.

WHITE LEAGUE, political group formed in Louisiana during the Reconstruction period, to overcome the corrupt government. See LOUISIANA: 1868-1874.

WHITE MAGIC. See MAGIC.

WHITE MONKS. See CISTERCIAN ORDER.

WHITE MOUNTAIN, Battle of. See BOHEMIA: 1618-1620; GERMANY: 1620.

WHITE OAK ROAD, Battle of. See U. S. A.: 1865 (March-April: Virginia).

WHITE PAPER, British diplomatic correspondence preceding the outbreak of the World War. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 3.

WHITE PENITENTS, or White Companies.—"The end of the 14th century witnessed a profound outburst of popular devotion. The miserable condition of the Church, distracted by schism, and the disturbed state of every country in Europe, awoke a spirit of penitence and contrition at the prospect of another great Jubilee, and the opening of a new century. Bands of penitents wandered from place to place, clad in white garments; their faces, except the eyes, were covered with hoods, and on their backs they wore a red cross. They

walked two and two, in solemn procession, old and young, men and women together, singing hymns of penitence, amongst which the sad strains of the 'Stabat Mater' held the chief place. At times they paused and flung themselves on the ground, exclaiming 'Mercy,' or 'Peace,' and continued in silent prayer. All was done with order and decorum; the processions generally lasted for nine days, and the penitents during this time fasted rigorously. The movement seems to have originated in Provence, but rapidly spread through Italy. Enemies were reconciled, restitution was made for wrongs, the churches were crowded wherever the penitents, or 'Bianchi' ['White Penitents,' 'White Companies,' 'White-men' are various English forms of the name] as they were called from their dress, made their appearance. The inhabitants of one city made a pilgrimage to another and stirred up their devotion. The people of Modena went to Bologna; the Bolognese suspended all business for nine days, and walked to Imola, whence the contagion rapidly spread southwards. For the last three months of 1399 this enthusiasm lasted, and wrought marked results upon morals and religion for a time. Yet enthusiasm tended to create imposture."—M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy during the period of the Reformation*, v. 1, pp. 145-146.—See also FLAGELLANTS.

ALSO IN: T. A. Trollope, *History of the commonwealth of Florence*, v. 2, p. 297.

WHITE PILLARS, Battle of. See GREECE: B. C. 500-493.

WHITE PLAINS, Battle of. See U. S. A.: 1776 (September-November).

WHITE RUSSIA. See RUSSIA: Great, Little, White, and Black.

WHITE SEA, arm of the Arctic ocean, extending southwestward into north Russia. Archangel is the chief seaport.

WHITE SEA AND BALTIC CONFERENCE. See BALTIC AND WHITE SEA CONFERENCE.

WHITE SHIP, Sinking of the.—William, the only legitimate son of Henry I of England, accompanied his father on a visit to Normandy (1120). "When they were about to return by the port of Barileur, a Norman captain, Thomas Fitz-Stephen, appeared and claimed the right of taking them in his ship, on the ground that his father had been captain of the 'Mora,' in which the Conqueror crossed to invade England. The king did not care to alter his own arrangements, but agreed that his son should sail in the 'Blanche Nef' [the White Ship] with Fitz-Stephen. William Ætheling, as the English called him, was accompanied by a large train of unruly courtiers, who amused themselves by making the sailors drink hard before they started, and dismissed the priests who came to bless the voyage with a chorus of scoffing laughter. It was evening before they left the shore, and there was no moon; a few of the more prudent quitted the ship, but there remained nearly 300—a dangerous freight for a small vessel. However, fifty rowers flushed with wine made good way in the waters; but the helmsman was less fit for his work, and the vessel struck suddenly on a sunk rock, the Raz de Catteville. The water rushed in, but there was time to lower a boat, which put off with the prince. When in safety, he heard the cries of his sister, the countess of Perche, and returned to save her. A crowd of desperate men leaped into the boat; it was swamped, and all perished."—C. H. Pearson, *History of England during the Early and Middle Ages*, v. 1, p. 445.

WHITE SLAVE TRADE: Movement for suppression.—American legislation.—"While the

beginning of the present movement of warfare against commercialized vice in an active and direct form dates practically from the beginning of this [twentieth] century, the foundations were laid in Europe in 1878, during the period of twenty years before the beginning of the century. A clergyman of the Church of England made a public declaration to the effect that English girls were being transported to Belgium for immoral purposes. The declaration was taken up by . . . Josephine Butler, who gathered the evidence to prove the declaration. Belgium demanded of the English government that the charges be withdrawn or that they be investigated by competent authorities. The English Home Secretary . . . ordered an inquiry to be made by a magistrate of the city of London. Contrary to their expectations, Josephine Butler . . . appeared with her witnesses. Before the magistrate had concluded his hearing, two leading police officials of Brussels were retired. Twenty years of agitation followed. When, in 1902, the French government, roused by the revelations made throughout the rest of Europe, called together an international congress which drafted an international treaty, the term 'white slave' came into being. . . . Following the ratification of this international treaty by the great powers of Europe [1904] and the United States [1908], and subsequent agitation in the United States, . . . there was appointed by the President of the United States a commission to investigate the subject of immigration. One of the important topics taken up by this commission was the importation of women into this country from Europe for immoral purposes. [The report of this commission was published in 1909, and astonished the country with its revelations.]—J. B. Reynolds, *War against the white slave traffic and commercialized vice (Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction, 1914, pp. 211-212)*.—"By the act of March 26, 1910, sections 2 and 3 of the immigration law of February 20, 1907, were amended to more effectively prevent the importation of women and girls for immoral purposes and their control by importers and others after admission to the United States. These amendments followed recommendations of the Immigration Commission contained in a report of the Commission on the importation and harboring of women for immoral purposes. By the act of March 26 the following were added to the classes excluded by section 2 of the immigration act: 'Persons who are supported by or receive in full or in part the proceeds of prostitution.' Under the terms of the act of 1907 'women or girls coming into the United States for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose,' and also 'persons who procure or attempt to bring in prostitutes or women or girls for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose,' were specifically excluded from the United States. Under that law, however, there was no specific provision for the exclusion of that particularly reprehensible class of persons referred to in the act of March 26, 1910. By the amendment of section 3 of the law of 1907 additional means were provided for the punishment and deportation of aliens who in any way profited or derived benefit from the proceeds of prostitution. The agitation of the white-slave traffic in Congress also resulted in the enactment of a law prohibiting the transportation of persons from one state to another for purposes of prostitution [the White-Slave Traffic Act or so-called Mann Act, approved June 25, 1910]."—*Abstracts of the Reports of the Immigration Commission, v. 2, p. 577*.—See also U.S.A.: 1922: Relations between the states, etc.

Work of League of Nations for suppression of traffic in women and children.—The League of Nations "in accordance with the covenant, is entrusted with the general supervision over, and the execution of, agreements in regard to the Traffic in Women and Children. Accordingly, the League took as its starting point, the agreements reached in 1910 between 19 states. When the League took up the matter in 1920, it was found that the Convention of 1910 had not been applied in many even of the signatory states. The League convened an International Conference which met in Geneva in June 1920 and at which 34 states were represented. The conference passed unanimously a 'Final Act' which was a great advance upon previous efforts to combat the traffic. By changing the name 'White Slave Traffic' to 'Traffic in Women and Children,' the League enabled the agreement to be extended to protect the native population in the colonial possessions of the European countries. The 'Final Act' of the Geneva International Conference was approved by the League's Council and Assembly. As a result, the League has formed a Special Advisory Committee which centralises information with regard to the traffic in women and children from all parts of the world. Also, this committee has power to recommend, through the League's Council, reforms and fresh legislation that it thinks desirable and to enquire into any failure of any member-state, signatory to the Convention, to carry out its obligations, and to urge the assembly and the Council to bring all possible pressure to bear upon the defaulting state."—C. B. Fry, *Key book of League of Nations*.

ALSO IN: *American Social Hygiene Legislation Manual, 1922*.

WHITE TERROR: Finland. See FINLAND: 1918.

France. See FRANCE: 1794-1795 (July-April); 1815-1830.

Russia. See RUSSIA: 1918 (August-September).

WHITE TOWER. See TOWER OF LONDON.

WHITE TOWN, British name for Rochelle. See ROCHELLE: Early importance.

WHITE VS. HART (1872). See SUPREME COURT: 1866-1873; U.S.A.: 1869-1872.

WHITE VS. TEXAS (1869). See U.S.A.: 1869-1872; SUPREME COURT: 1866-1873.

WHITEBIRD CANYON, Battle of (1877). See IDAHO: 1860-1878.

WHITEBOYS, peasant organization in southern Ireland for the redress of grievances of the tenants. See IRELAND: 1760-1798.

WHITEFIELD, or Whitfield, George (1714-1770), English religious leader and founder of the Calvinistic Methodists. See METHODIST CHURCH: 1720-1791; BRISTOL: 1739.

WHITEHEAD, Robert (1823-1905), English inventor and engineer. See TORPEDO: Development.

WHITES (Bianchi), political party in Florence. See FLORENCE: 1295-1300; 1301-1313.

WHITES (Blancos), political party in Uruguay. See URUGUAY: 1821-1905; 1904.

WHITE'S CLUB. See CLUBS: 19th-20th centuries: London.

WHITLEY COUNCILS.—In England "the history of the nineteenth century and after, so far as it concerns the relations of capital and labour, is encouraging. . . . The striking fact becomes evident that an improvement in the relations of capital and labour has taken place side by side with a strengthening of the organisations, defensive and offensive, of the opposing interests. It is to the lasting credit of the Sub-Committee appointed by the [British] war-time Ministry of Reconstruction

to consider the relations between employers and employed, that they seized on this fact and rightly interpreted it. It is because these opposing interests are so strongly organised that their difficulties can be most easily settled, and it is in the industries where Employers' Associations and Trade Unions are strongest, that the Sub-Committee (the Whitley Committee as it is usually called, after its chairman) suggested the fullest extension of the method of conference and conciliation. For industries well organised on both sides the system of Joint Standing Industrial Councils was suggested in the first Whitley report, dated March, 1917. These 'Whitley Councils' resemble Trade Boards in that they are permanent bodies representative of both capital and labour. They differ from Trade Boards in that they are not statutory but purely voluntary, and that their decisions are not enforced by law, but owe their value to the good faith which each side should be able to have in the other because it is strongly organised and truly representative. They, therefore, differ also from those meetings of representatives of employers and employed which have met from time to time to settle specific questions of dispute, for although, like them, they are not statutory bodies and rely for the upholding of their decisions on the good faith and representative characters of the opposing organisations, they are not to meet merely to settle particular disputes, but are to be permanent bodies meeting regularly to discuss difficulties, to suggest improvement, and largely to forestall disputes. To descend to details. The Committee divide all industry into three groups. In *Group A* they place 'industries in which organisation on the part of employers and employed is sufficiently developed to render the Councils representative'; *Group B* is to include 'industries in which either as regards employers or employed, or both, the degree of organisation, though considerable, is less marked than in *Group A* and is insufficient to be regarded as representative'; the last group, *Group C*, includes 'industries in which organization is so imperfect, either as regards employers or employed, or both, that no associations can be said adequately to represent those engaged in the trade.' Of these three groups the first and last are, generally speaking, definite: trades falling in either can readily be assigned to their group. *Group B* is less exact, including some examples very nearly ripe for inclusion in the first group and others only just beyond the last. The proposals seek first, the establishment of a full organisation of councils in the advanced group, and, second, the application of the system to the lower groups in such modified forms as will help them to advance in organisation until they become fitted for the complete system applicable to *Group A*. The complete system is to consist for each trade of a joint standing industrial council for the whole country, and, subsidiary to this, district councils, and smaller bodies still for industrial establishment or works, those smallest bodies being known as 'works committees.' The establishment of a joint standing industrial council in an industry postulates one Employers' Association and one Trade Union (or, at least, a very small group) covering the whole country. The scheme is to be taken up voluntarily by those bodies, and the two sides are to agree as to representation on the council, the constitution of the council, and the somewhat delicate question of the chairmanship. In all this the industry is given a free hand. Strongly as the system is recommended by the government department, there is not compulsion, no stereotyped form. The state is willing to lend all the aid it can, particularly

by watching the progress of the system where adopted, and by giving assistance and information where desired; beyond that nothing at present. The variety of the needs of various industries, the delicate nature of some of their problems, the intricate and close knowledge of the associations on both sides concerning the conditions in the trade, are all recognised, and the state is prepared to leave all to them, trusting in their capacity. The Whitley commissioners recommend frequent and regular meetings of the councils wherever they are set up, for 'the object is to secure co-operation by granting to workpeople a greater share in the consideration of matters affecting their industry, and this can only be achieved by keeping employers and workpeople in constant touch.' . . . They would naturally discuss questions of hours of work and rates of wages, including the intricate problems of fixing rates for piece-work and time-work of varying kinds and under varying conditions. In this they would materially assist their trade unions and employers' associations. They would not, as some have feared, supersede the trade unions, because the representatives of labour, being appointed by the unions, would be responsible to them and could not bind them without their approval. The whole power of the labour representatives, in fact, would rest on the support of the unions behind them, answerable to the whole of the workpeople, and still holding the ultimate weapon of the strike. Joint councils are not intended to supersede, but to supplement, existing organisations. . . . The councils are . . . urged to establish themselves as the head of a system of lesser councils. . . . 'In every industry there are certain questions, such as rates of wages and hours of work, which should be settled by District or National Agreement, and with any matter so settled, no Works Committee should be allowed to interfere; but there are also many questions closely affecting daily life and comfort in, and the success of, the business, and affecting in no small degree efficiency of working, which are peculiar to the individual workshop or factory. The purpose of a Works Committee is to establish and maintain a system of co-operation in all these workshop matters.' 'We regard the successful development and utilisation of Works Committees in any business . . . as of equal importance with its commercial and scientific efficiency; and we think that in every case one of the partners or directors, or some other responsible representative of the management, would be well advised to devote a substantial part of his time and thought to the good working and development of such a committee.' While the complete system of councils and committees is recommended for the most highly organised industries, only partial application is suggested for those classified in *Group B*. Some may be found to be so nearly complete in their organisation as to be capable of establishing national councils if, at first at any rate, these councils are carefully guided. It is recommended that information collected by the state on the working of the system generally should be utilised on behalf of these weaker national councils by the appointment of members representing the government department, but not possessed of voting power. In other industries of *Group B* there may be found localities or branches of the trade well organised although the trade as a whole is not ready for a national council. Here the local organisation only could be used, and it is proposed that district committees should be established without a national council, but by their work, influence and experience warranted gradually

to prepare the trade, as a whole, for national organisation. For the totally unorganised trades, classified in *Group C*, strong state control is necessary, for they are quite incapable of organising on the Whitley system, at present. Those sitting for the unorganised party would have no real power, because they would not be truly representative of their side of the industry, and would be unable to commit it to any decision they might take in the council or committee. A method for dealing with such cases is already familiar in trade boards, and nothing more than an extension of this system is recommended. There is nothing revolutionary in the scheme of the Whitley commissioners. . . . The system continues progress in the direction already taken before the war by arbitration and conciliation and trade boards, availing itself of accumulated experience on both sides and on the part of the state; seeking to wear away difficulties gradually without any sudden and serious disorganisation of the economic system. The scheme was published in 1917 in the hope that it might be adopted by a great many industries, and an organisation thereby provided in good time to deal with the problems of peace. Within a year over forty trades had announced that they had set up joint standing industrial councils or were in various stages of the consideration of the proposal."—A. S. Turberville and F. A. Howe, *Great Britain in the latest age*, pp. 174-182.—The Whitley plan, in the five years following the World War, resulted in the following successful applications. It was adopted by the Trades Union Congress in 1917. The civil service departments put it into use in 1919, and in that year it was also accepted by the Federation of British Industries. A permanent court for industrial arbitration was established by the Industrial Court Act of November, 1919. The Mining Industry Act of 1920 and the Agricultural Act of 1920 provided special machinery for applying arbitration to these industries. The Trades Board Act of 1918 by providing for the extension of Trade Boards, carried out the suggestion of the Whitley Committee that their scheme of voluntary industrial arbitration should not interfere with the system already established.

ALSO IN: E. M. Friedman, *Labor and reconstruction in Europe*.—P. V. Kellog and A. Gleason, *British labor and the war*.—G. R. A. Askwith, *Industrial problems and disputes*.—G. Frank, *Politics of industry*.—*Joint industrial councils in Great Britain* (United States Department of Labor, Bulletin no. 255, July, 1919).

WHITLOCK, Brand (1869-), American diplomat, author and municipal reformer. Mayor of Toledo, 1905-1911; minister to Belgium, 1913-1919; ambassador to Belgium since 1919. See BELGIUM: 1914-1918: National distress; 1919: Visit of royal family to United States; CAVELL, EDITH; TOLEDO, OHIO: 1906-1911; WORLD WAR: 1916: X. German rule in northern France and Belgium: b.

WHITMAN, Marcus (1802-1847), American pioneer missionary, active in Oregon country. See OREGON: 1840-1842; 1847-1848.

WHITMAN, Walt (originally Walter) (1819-1892), American poet. See AMERICAN LITERATURE: 1830-1890.

WHITNEY, Eli (1765-1825), American inventor. Inventor of the cotton gin. See U.S.A.: 1793: Whitney's cotton gin; INVENTIONS: 18th century: Industry.

WHITNEY, Sir James Pliny (1843-1914), Canadian lawyer and public official. See ONTARIO: 1896-1905; 1906-1914.

WHITNEY, William Collins (1841-1904), American cabinet officer. Secretary of the navy, 1885-1889. See NAVY DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES: System since 1842.

WHITSUNDAY, English name for Pentecost. See QUARTER DAYS.

WHITTIER, John Greenleaf (1807-1892), American poet. See AMERICAN LITERATURE: 1830-1890.

WHITTINGHAM, Charles (1795-1876), English printer. See BIBLE, ENGLISH: 16th-18th centuries.

WIART, Henry Carton de, Belgian statesman. Envoy to the United States, 1914. See BELGIUM: 1914: Belgian mission to United States; WORLD WAR: 1914: I. Western front: x.

WIBELUNG, ancient town of Franconia from which is derived the name Ghibelline. See GUELFES, OR GUELFES AND Ghibellines.

WICHITAS, North American Indian tribe. See INDIANS, AMERICAN: Cultural areas in North America: Plains area; OKLAHOMA: 1824-1837; PAWNEE FAMILY.

WICKED BIBLE. See BIBLE, ENGLISH: Misprints in old Bibles.

WICKERSHAM, George Woodward (1858-), American lawyer and cabinet officer. Attorney-general of the United States, 1909-1913. See TRUSTS: United States: 1907-1909: Thievery in the sugar trust; 1911: Supreme Court decisions; U.S.A.: 1909 (March): Inauguration of President Taft.

WICLIF. See WYCLIF.

WIDE AWAKES.—In the American presidential canvass of 1860, the younger supporters of Abraham Lincoln formed companies that undertook the parades and torchlight processions of the campaign in a systematic and disciplined way that was then quite new. They took the name of "Wide Awakes."

WIDEMIR (fl. 470), Ostrogothic king. See GOTHs: 473-474.

WIDOWS, Law for. See COMMON LAW: 1217.

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS INSURANCE. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Insurance of widows and orphans.

WIDSITH, English minstrel. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 6th-11th centuries.

WIDUKIND, or Wittekind (d. 807), Saxon leader. See SAXONS: 772-804; SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 8th-9th centuries.

WIELAND, Christoph Martin (1733-1813), German poet. See GERMAN LITERATURE: 1600-1750; 1700-1832.

WIEN, Max (1866-), German physicist. See NOBEL PRIZES: Physics: 1911.

WIERINGEN, island in the Zuider Zee, Netherlands. Ex-Crown Prince Frederick William of Germany took refuge here from November, 1918, to December, 1923.

WIESBADEN, German cruiser. It was lost in the battle of Jutland in 1916. See WORLD WAR: 1916: IX. Naval operations: a, 8.

WIESNER, Friedrich von (1871-), German statesman. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 14.

WIGHT, Isle of, island off the south coast of England, in the English Channel. In 1921 the population numbered 94,697.

Conquest by Jutes. See ENGLAND: 449-473. Occupied by the French in 1545. See FRANCE: 1532-1547.

WIJK, Peace of (1412). See NETHERLANDS: 1356-1413.

WILBERFORCE UNIVERSITY. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: United States: Negroes.

WILDCAT BANKS.—"During Jackson's struggle with the Bank of the United States [see U. S. A.: 1833-1836; 1835-1837] many new banks had been formed in various States, generally with little or no capital to pay the notes which they issued. They bought large quantities of cheaply printed bills. As these bills had cost them very little, they could afford to offer a higher price in paper money for lands in distant States and Territories than others could afford to offer in gold and silver. Having bought the lands for this worthless money, the wildcat bankers sold them for good money, hoping that their own bills would not soon find their way back for payment. If they were disappointed in this hope, the bank 'failed,' and the managers started a new one."—A. Johnston, *History of the United States for schools*, sect. 496.—See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1837-1841.

WILDE, Oscar O'Flahertie Willis (1856-1900), British dramatist and poet. See ENGLISH LITERATURE: 1880-1920; DRAMA: 1843-1895.

WILDERNESS, territory south of the Rapidan river, Virginia.

Hooker's campaign. See U. S. A.: 1863 (April-May: Virginia).

Battle of the. See U. S. A.: 1864 (May: Virginia): Grant's movement on Richmond.

WILDERNESS ROAD, one of the routes taken by immigrants going to Kentucky. See U. S. A.: 1783-1786.

WILDERSPIN, Samuel (1792-1866), English educator. Originated infant schools. See EDUCATION: Modern: 18th century: France: Infant schools; 19th century: England: Spread of popular education.

WILDMAN, Rounseville, United States consul at Hong Kong. See U. S. A.: 1897 (November); 1898 (April-May: Philippines).

WILFRED, Saint (c. 634-709), English archbishop. Bishop of Ripon, 665-668, 686-687; of York, 668-677, 685; converted Friesland, 677. See CHRISTIANITY: 496-800.

WILHELM. See WILLIAM.

WILHELMINA (1880-), queen of the Netherlands since 1890. Under regency of her mother, 1890-1898. See NETHERLANDS: 1887-1896; 1898-1903.

"**WILHELMINA,**" American vessel. It left New York for Hamburg on Jan. 22, 1915, with a cargo of foodstuffs on board. "According to the prevailing principles of international law, foodstuffs were only conditional contraband. They might be imported into Germany if they were intended for the exclusive use of the civil population. As, however, England succeeded in restraining the exporters from any attempt to consign foodstuffs to Germany, especially as in view of the enormous supplies that were being forwarded to our enemies they had little interest in such shipment, the question never reached a clear issue. Herr Albert therefore induced an American firm to ship foodstuffs for the civil population of Germany on the American steamer *Wilhelmina*, bound for Hamburg, by himself undertaking the whole risk from behind the scenes. This was arranged in such a way as to preserve in appearance the good faith of the American firm, and to make the shipment seem purely American in the eyes of the American Government and the English."—J. H. A. Bernstorff, *My three years in America*, pp. 9192.—Calling at Falmouth on February 9, her cargo was detained as prize and was subsequently subjected to proceed-

ings for condemnation. On January 25 a decree of the Bundesrat had made "all grain and flour imported into Germany deliverable only to certain organizations under direct Government control; on February 6 this provision was repealed; and it . . . never applied to more than 15 per cent of the *Wilhelmina's* cargo, which was largely of meats, vegetables, and fruits. The important question raised by the case was therefore whether Great Britain should treat as contraband foodstuffs destined for the civil population of the enemy. This question was never determined, for on March 11 the British government instituted its embargo upon all neutral trade with Germany and proceeded forthwith, in accordance with the terms of the order in council, to purchase the *Wilhelmina's* cargo."—*War cyclopaedia*, p. 304.—See also U. S. A.: 1915 (February): Contraband of war.

WILHELMSTAL, town in East Africa, formerly German territory, taken by the British in 1915. It was later given the name of Lushoto. See WORLD WAR: 1915: VIII, Africa: a, 1.

WILHELMSTRASSE, street in Berlin, Germany, on which is located the office of the chancellor and other government offices, hence often used to signify the German administration.

WILKES, Charles (1798-1877), American naval officer and explorer. Stopped the British steamer *Trent* and removed two Confederate commissioners, Mason and Slidell, 1861, thus causing considerable friction with England. See TRENT AFFAIR; U. S. A.: 1861 (November); ANTARCTIC EXPLORATION: 1819-1838; also map.

WILKES, John (1727-1797), English politician and publicist. Imprisoned for his criticism of George III, 1763; expelled from Parliament, 1764; became lord mayor of London, 1774. See ENGLAND: 1762-1764; 1768-1774.

WILKIE, Sir David (1785-1841), Scottish painter. See PAINTING: Europe (19th century).

WILKINS, John (1733-1809), American pioneer. See ILLINOIS: 1765-1774.

WILKINSON, Charles William (1868-), British general. See WORLD WAR: 1916: VII. African theater: a, 11.

WILKINSON, James (1757-1825), American soldier and adventurer. Governor of Upper Louisiana, 1805-1807; accomplice in Burr's scheme for the conquest of Mexico, but later denounced him to the government; tried for treason, 1807; acquitted, 1811; took part in the War of 1812 in Canada, 1813-1814. See U. S. A.: 1806-1807; 1813 (October-November); (December); LOUISIANA: 1785-1800; 1798-1803; FLORIDA: 1811-1813.

WILLAERT, Adrian (c. 1480-1562), Flemish composer. Became maestro di cappella of St. Marks, Venice, 1527, where he established a school of music and became the founder of the older Venetian composition. Among his works are two masses, books of motets, 1530-1545, and psalms for vespers, 1571. See MUSIC: Modern: 1527-1613.

WILLARD, Daniel (1861-), American railway president. Appointed as railroad expert on the Council of National Defense, 1916. See RAILROADS: 1916-1920.

WILLARD, Emma C. (Hart) (1787-1870), American educator. See EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Secondary education; WOMAN'S RIGHTS: 1644-1852.

WILLEKENS, Jacob (1571-1633), Dutch admiral. See BRAZIL: 1510-1661.

WILLIAM I (1707-1888), German emperor, 1871-1888, king of Prussia, 1861-1888. Served against Napoleon, 1814-1815; put down insurrections in Baden and the Palatinate, 1849; military governor

of the Rhineland and Westphalia, 1849; united with Austria against Denmark, 1864; commanded at Königgratz against Austria, 1866; commanded in the Franco-German War, 1870-1871; proclaimed German emperor, 1871. See GERMANY: 1861-1866; 1871 (January); 1888: Death, etc.; EUROPE: Modern: Wars of the great powers; MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 28.

William II, Friedrich Wilhelm Victor Albert (1859-), German emperor, 1888-1918, and king of Prussia. Abdicated, 1918.

Rescript on the Prussian constitution. See PRUSSIA: 1850-1918; 1882.

Accession to the throne.—Character.—Early relations with Bismarck. See GERMANY: 1888: Death of Emperor William I.

Visit to Turkey in 1888. See TURKEY: 1914: In the control of Germany; BAGDAD RAILWAY: Plan.

Aid to Zeppelin in aircraft invention. See AVIATION: Development of balloons and dirigibles: 1806-1914.

Rupture with Bismarck.—Forced resignation of chancellor. See GERMANY: 1880-1890.

Attitude toward labor movement. See GERMANY: 1880-1890.

Desire for world power and expansion.—Friendly relations with Turkey. See GERMANY: 1800-1914: Alteration of foreign policy.

Claims to kingship by divine right. See GERMANY: 1894-1899.

His message to President Kruger relative to the Jameson raid. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1896 (January).

Speech to his brother Prince Henry at Kiel on leaving for China. See GERMANY: 1897 (November-December).

Speech and blessing to soldiers departing for China.—His views on warfare. See WORLD WAR: Causes: Indirect: i, 3.

Statement of peace policy. See WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1905.

Moroccan controversy.—Negotiations of Roosevelt. See U.S.A.: 1905-1906.

Interview stating attitude toward England.—Effect. See GERMANY: 1908 (November).

Speech in 1909 stating views on peace. See WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1909-1913: Anticipation of World War.

Pan-German ideas. See PAN-GERMANISM: German presentation of Pan-Germanism.

Declaration of belief in German cultural supremacy. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 2.

Review of reign until the war. See WORLD WAR: Causes: Indirect: j.

Union with Austria in crisis with Serbia.—Dislike of Berchtold's program. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 9.

Notes on the letter from Tschirschky. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 16.

Exchange of telegrams with King George before outbreak of war. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 40.

Exchange of telegrams with Tsar Nicholas before outbreak of war. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 43; 69.

Attitude toward the war.—Desire for war. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 44; 73, ii.

Knowledge of approaching Austro-Serbian crisis. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 73, iii.

Exultation at capture of Warsaw.—Telegram to his sister, queen of Greece. See WORLD WAR: 1915: III Eastern front: i, 3.

Telegram of congratulations to the crown

prince at the front. See WORLD WAR: 1917: Western front: c, 20.

Proclamation to the army concerning peace with the Allies. See WORLD WAR: 1918: II. Western front: y, 2; y, 3.

Arraignment at Paris peace conference. See PARIS, CONFERENCE OF: Arraignment of the Kaiser; VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Part VII.

Abdication. See GERMANY: 1918 (November). Asylum in the Netherlands. See NETHERLANDS: 1914-1918.

William I, the Conqueror (c. 1027-1087), king of England, 1066-1087, and duke of Normandy, 1035-1087. Succeeded to the duchy of Normandy, 1035; aided Henry of France against the count of Anjou, 1048; repelled an invasion by Anjou, 1054; acquired Maine, 1063; forced Harold, earl of Essex and heir to the English throne to promise his aid in obtaining the English throne, 1064; but Harold disregarded this promise and ascended the throne; William invaded England, conquered Harold, and was crowned, 1066; suppressed the barons, 1066-1070; exacted homage of Scotland, 1072; put down a rebellion of the barons, 1075-1076. See ENGLAND: 1042-1066, to 1085-1086; NORMANDY: 1035-1063; SALISBURY, GEMOT OF; SCOTLAND: 1066-1093.

William II, Rufus (c. 1056-1100), king of England, 1087-1100. Third surviving son of William I; put down a revolt of the barons, who wished his elder brother, Robert of Normandy, as king, 1088-1090; waged war in Normandy against his brother Robert, 1090-1091; invaded Scotland, 1091; invaded Normandy, 1094; took possession of Normandy from his brother Robert, 1096; conquered Maine, 1098-1099. See ENGLAND: 1087-1135.

William III (1650-1702), king of England, 1689-1702, and prince of Orange. Proclaimed stadtholder of the Netherlands, 1672; married Mary, daughter of King James of England, 1677; opposed to James's policy; invited by English barons to accept crown; landed in England, 1688; proclaimed joint sovereign with Mary, 1689; defeated James at the battle of the Boyne in Ireland, 1690; in the league against France, 1690-1697. See ENGLAND: 1688 (July); 1688 (July-November); 1689 (January-February); AUSTRIA: 1672-1714; FRANCE: 1689-1690; IRELAND: 1689; NETHERLANDS: 1690-1694; SCOTLAND: 1688-1690.

William IV (1765-1837), king of England, 1830-1837. See ENGLAND: 1830: Death; 1834-1837.

William I (1772-1844), king of the Netherlands, 1815-1840. Commanded against the French, 1793-1795; served against Napoleon, 1800; recovered his territories from Napoleon, 1813; proclaimed first king of the Netherlands, 1815; secession of Belgium, 1830; abdicated, 1840. See NETHERLANDS: 1813; 1813-1830; 1815-1845; 1840-1840.

William II (1792-1849), king of the Netherlands, 1840-1849. Commanded against Napoleon, 1815; led army against Belgium, 1832; proclaimed king at the abdication of his father William I, 1840. See NETHERLANDS: 1840-1840.

William III (1817-1890), king of the Netherlands, 1849-1890. Abolished slavery in the Dutch West Indies, 1862; incorporated Limburg into his territories, 1866; neutrality of Luxembourg recognized by the Treaty of London, 1867. See NETHERLANDS: 1840-1890; 1887-1890.

William, the Lion (1143-1214), king of Scotland, 1165-1214. Unsuccessful invasion of England, 1174. See SCOTLAND: 1174-1180.

William I, the Silent (1533-1584), prince of Orange, 1544-1584, and count of Nassau, 1550-1584. Founder of the Republic of the United Netherlands. Governor of Holland, Zealand and

Utrecht, 1555; served in the war of Philip II against Henry II of France and negotiated preliminaries of peace, 1559; addressed petition to Philip II for recall of Granvella, who was persecuting Protestants, 1564; active in the struggle of the Dutch Protestants against the Duke of Alva, 1568-1576; brought about pacification of Ghent, 1576; union of Utrecht, 1579; received the hereditary stadtholdership, 1581; assassinated, 1584. See NETHERLANDS: 1559-1562, to 1584-1585.

William II (1626-1650), prince of Orange, 1648-1650. Grandson of William the Silent. As stadtholder, established peace with Spain, 1648; negotiated peace with France, 1650. See NETHERLANDS: 1648-1650.

William III, prince of Orange. See **WILLIAM III**, KING OF ENGLAND.

William IV, Charles Henry Friso (1711-1751), prince of Orange, 1747-1751. Recognized as stadtholder of all provinces of Holland, 1747. See NETHERLANDS: 1747.

William V (1329-1389), count of Holland, 1354-1359. See NETHERLANDS: 889-1345; 1345-1354; 1356-1413.

William VI, of Oosterhaut (1365-1417), count of Holland, 1404-1417. See NETHERLANDS: 1356-1413; 1406-1417.

WILLIAM ÆTHELING (d. 1120), prince of England. See **WHITE SHIP**.

WILLIAM AND MARY COLLEGE. See **UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES**: 1619-1819.

WILLIAM HENRY, Fort, fort at the southern end of Lake George, in Canada. It was captured by Montcalm in 1756. See **CANADA**: 1756-1757.

WILLIAM OF CHAMPEUX (c. 1070-1121), French philosopher. See **EDUCATION**: Medieval: 11th-12th centuries.

WILLIAM OF MALMESBURY (c. 1080-c. 1143), English historian. See **HISTORY**: 19.

WILLIAM OF NASSAU. See **WILLIAM I**, THE SILENT.

WILLIAM OF NORMANDY. See **WILLIAM I**, THE CONQUEROR.

WILLIAM OF ORANGE. See **WILLIAM III**, KING OF ENGLAND; **WILLIAM I**, THE SILENT.

WILLIAM OF WIED, Prince (Wilhelm Friedrich Heinrich) (1876-), king of Albania, 1914. See **WORLD WAR**: 1914: III. Balkans: e; ALBANIA: 1908-1914.

"**WILLIAM P. FRYE**," "American vessel, sunk, in defiance of treaties and law, by the German raider *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* January 28, 1915, while carrying a cargo of wheat to the British Isles. The United States Government promptly protested against the sinking, urging that it was in violation of the treaties of 1799 and 1828 with Prussia, and presented a claim for the value of the ship. The German Government acknowledged its liability under the treaties, but contended that the sinking of the ship was legal if its value in money was paid. An agreement was finally reached, providing that the question whether there had been a violation of international law should be referred for decision to The Hague tribunal. In the course of the correspondence the German Government agreed that while the arbitration was pending (1) it would not sink American vessels unless loaded with 'absolute contraband'; also (2) that when vessels were sunk, 'all possible care must be taken for the security of the crew and passengers'; and (3) that 'the persons found on board of a vessel may not be ordered into her lifeboats except when the general conditions—that is to say, the condition of the sea—and the neighborhood of the coasts afford absolute certainty that the boats will reach the

nearest port.' This agreement was repudiated by Germany January 31, 1917."—*War cyclopaedia*, p. 105.

WILLIAM RUFUS. See **WILLIAM II**, RUFUS, KING OF ENGLAND.

WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR. See **WILLIAM I**, THE CONQUEROR, KING OF ENGLAND.

WILLIAMS, Ephraim (1715-1755), American soldier and pioneer, and founder of Williams College. See **UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES**: 1793.

WILLIAMS, Sir George (1821-1905), English welfare worker. Founder of the Y. M. C. A. See **YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION**: 1844-1851.

WILLIAMS, James Douglas (1808-1880), governor of Indiana, 1876-1880. See **INDIANA**: 1868-1916.

WILLIAMS, John (1796-1839), English missionary. See **SAMOA**: 1830-1878.

WILLIAMS, Roger (c. 1604-1683), English colonist, founder of the state of Rhode Island. Pastor in Salem, 1631; assistant pastor in Plymouth, 1631-1633; pastor at Salem, 1634; ordered to leave the colony, 1635; founded Providence, 1636; established the first Baptist church, 1639; procured a charter for the Rhode Island Colony, 1644. See **RHODE ISLAND**: 1631-1636, to 1639; 1651-1652; 1683; **MASSACHUSETTS**: 1636; **NEW ENGLAND**: 1637; **U. S. A.**: 1607-1752.

WILLIAMS, William (1731-1811), American patriot. Signer of the Declaration of Independence. See **U. S. A.**: 1776 (July): Text of Declaration of Independence.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE. See **UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES**: 1793.

WILLIAMSBURG, Canada, Battle of. See **U. S. A.**: 1813 (October-November).

WILLIAMSBURG, Virginia, Battle of. See **U. S. A.**: 1862 (May; Virginia): Peninsular campaign: Battle of Williamsburg.

WILLIAMSBURG BRIDGE, bridge across the East river, New York City. See **NEW YORK CITY**: 1867-1915.

WILLIBRORD, or Wilbrord, Saint (c. 657-c. 738), English missionary. Apostle to the Frisians. See **CHRISTIANITY**: 496-800.

WILLISTON PROJECT, North Dakota. See **NORTH DAKOTA**: 1900-1914.

WILLOWS, Battle of the. See **GOTHS**: 378; **ROME**: Empire: 363-379.

WILLS, Statute of. See **COMMON LAW**: 1540-1542.

Revocation and construction. See **COMMON LAW**: 1683-1771; **EQUITY LAW**: 1603-1625.

WILMINGTON, Delaware, city, twenty-seven miles southwest of Philadelphia.

1638.—Founding. See **DELAWARE**: 1638-1640.

1919.—Report of field investigations.—Recommendations. See **DELAWARE**: 1918-1919.

WILMINGTON, North Carolina, city and port, 148 miles east of Raleigh, on the Cape Fear river.

1781.—Held by the British. See **U. S. A.**: 1780-1781.

1865.—Occupation by Federal forces. See **U. S. A.**: 1865 (February-March: North Carolina).

1898.—Race war. See **NORTH CAROLINA**: 1808.

WILMOT, David (1814-1868), American political leader and jurist. Opposed the extension of slavery in the territory the United States was expecting to get from Mexico; author of the famous Wilmot Proviso, 1846. See **U. S. A.**: 1845-1846: Slavery question.

WILMOT PROVISIO. See **U. S. A.**: 1845-1846.

WILNO. See **VILNA**.

WILSON, Sir Charles Rivers (1831-1916), British financier. Served on the Council of the Suez Canal Company, 1876-1895; finance minister to the khedive of Egypt, 1877-1880; went to the relief of Gordon, 1884-1885. See EGYPT: 1875-1882; 1884-1885.

WILSON, Henry (1812-1875), vice president of the United States, 1873-1875. See U. S. A.: 1872.

WILSON, Sir Henry Hughes (1864-1922), British field marshal. Served in the British War Office, 1901-1910; took part in the World War, 1914-1916; sent on Russian mission, 1916; British military representative at Supreme War Council, 1918; elected to Parliament and supported the Ulsterites, 1921; assassinated, 1922. See IRELAND: 1922-1923; WORLD WAR: 1918: XI. End of the war: a, 1.

WILSON, James (1742-1798), American jurist and signer of the Declaration of Independence. See U. S. A.: 1776 (July): Text of Declaration of Independence; 1787.

WILSON, James (1835-1920), American cabinet officer. Member of the House of Representatives, 1873-1877, 1883-1885; secretary of agriculture, 1897-1913. See U. S. A.: 1897 (March); 1901-1905; 1905-1909; 1909 (March): Inauguration of President Taft; AGRICULTURE: Modern: United States: 1880-1916.

WILSON, James Harrison (1837-), American soldier. Served in the Civil War; in charge of the cavalry bureau, 1864; captured Jefferson Davis, 1865. See U. S. A.: 1865 (April-May).

WILSON, William Bauchop (1862-), American cabinet officer. President of the District Miner's Union, 1888; secretary and treasurer of the National Union of Miners, 1900; member of House of Representatives, 1907-1913; secretary of labor, 1913-1921; member of the Council of National Defense, 1916-1921. See U. S. A.: 1913 (March); 1918-1920.

WILSON, (Thomas) Woodrow (1856-1924), American statesman, educator, historian and twenty-eighth president of the United States. Professor of history at Bryn Mawr, 1886-1888, and at Wesleyan University, 1888; professor of jurisprudence at Princeton, 1890-1902; president of Princeton, 1902-1910; governor of New Jersey, 1911-1913; president of the United States, 1913-1921.

Comment on administration of Grover Cleveland. See U. S. A.: 1897: Review of Cleveland's administration.

Elected governor of New Jersey.—Administration. See U. S. A.: 1910 (August-November); NEW JERSEY: 1911-1913.

Address before Governors' conference (1910). See GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE.

Nomination for presidency.—Election.—Choice of cabinet. See U. S. A.: 1912: Woodrow Wilson and the election; 1912 (November); 1913 (March).

Relations with Latin America.—Proposed treaties.—Bryan-Wilson treaties. See ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL: Modern: 1913; COLOMBIA: 1909-1917; LATIN AMERICA: 1913.

Speech suggesting repeal of Panama Canal Act.—Attitude on Panama canal tolls. See PANAMA CANAL: 1912-1914; U. S. A.: 1914 (March-June).

Relations with Mexico.—Address to Congress on situation.—Opinion on Villa and Carranza.—Requests intervention.—Removes and replaces arms embargo. See U. S. A.: 1913 (August); 1914; 1914 (April): Mexican situation; 1914 (April): Occupation of Vera Cruz.

Offer of mediation to Germany and belligerent

nations at outbreak of World War.—Asks for neutrality.—Proclaims it.—Desires to extend isolation policy. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 65; U. S. A.: 1914 (August): State of American opinion on World War; ENTANGLING ALIANCES.

Extension of the civil service. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: United States: 1913-1920.

First and second *Lusitania* notes.—"Too proud to fight" speech.—Attitude toward war. See WORLD WAR: 1915: XI. Politics and diplomacy: c; c, 1; c, 2; U. S. A.: 1915 (May-September).

Note to belligerent nations requesting peace terms.—Address before League to Enforce Peace. See WORLD WAR: 1916: XI. Peace proposals: b; U. S. A.: 1916 (May).

Management of Mexican situation. See U. S. A.: 1916 (March); 1916-1917.

Speech on Arabian question. See ARABIA: 1916 (June).

Approves Federal Aid Road Act and Federal child labor law.—Prevents railroad strike. See U. S. A.: 1916 (July): Federal Aid Road Act; 1916 (August): Federal child labor law; ADAMSON LAW; U. S. A.: 1916 (August-September).

Reelection.—Criticism of presidential campaign. See U. S. A.: 1916 (February-November).

Attitude toward preparedness. See U. S. A.: 1916-1917: Campaign for preparedness.

Message to Russia. See WORLD WAR: 1917: III. Russia and the Eastern front: m, 1.

Speech urging peace without victory. See U. S. A.: 1917 (January): American aims, etc.

Declares relations with Germany severed. See U. S. A.: 1917 (February-April).

Takes oath of office second time. See U. S. A.: 1917 (February-May).

Speech to Congress asking for formal declaration of war against Germany.—Proclamation of war.—Address to Congress stating that war exists.—Declaration of war aims. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: e; U. S. A.: 1917 (April): President Wilson asks Congress to declare state of war.

Address to "fellow countrymen" regarding entrance of United States into the war. See WORLD WAR: 1917: VIII. United States and the war: f.

Address to Senate on note to belligerents and termination of war. See WORLD WAR: 1917: XI. Efforts toward peace: d.

Message to Congress on situation. See U. S. A.: 1917 (December).

Note to Pope Benedict in answer to plea for peace. See WORLD WAR: 1917: XI. Efforts toward peace: h.

Address to Congress on way to win war, and ends to be gained. See WORLD WAR: 1917: XI. Efforts toward peace: l.

Speech on hyphenated Americans. See AMERICANIZATION: Hyphenism.

Proclamation of conscription law for national army. See WORLD WAR: VIII. United States and the war: g.

Wins Nobel prize for peace. See NOBEL PRIZES: Peace: 1918.

Given extraordinary powers by Overman Bill. See U. S. A.: 1918 (January-April).

Declaration of the "fourteen points" and four additional bases for peace. See U. S. A.: 1918 (January); 1918 (February); WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: b.

Address to Congress in reply to addresses of Counts Czernin and von Hertling. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: e.

Speech stating peace terms. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: g.

Speech at Mt. Vernon regarding necessary peace terms. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: h.

Reply to Austrian peace proposal.—Speech on peace terms. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: l.

Reply to Germany and Austria regarding armistice. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: o.

Note to Germany on peace terms. See WORLD WAR: 1918: X. Statement of war aims: q.

Address announcing armistice. See WORLD WAR: 1918: XI. End of the war: b.

Telegram to King Albert on his return to Brussels. See WORLD WAR: 1918: XI. End of the war: d.

Address on the duties of the peace conference. See U.S.A.: 1918 (September-November).

Appeals for election of Democratic Congress. See U.S.A.: 1918 (November).

Annual address to Congress.—Announcement that he is to attend peace conference. See U.S.A.: 1918 (November-December).

Reception abroad.—Opposition at home.—Opening of peace conference.—Return. See U.S.A.: 1918-1919 (December-February); AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE; PARIS, CONFERENCE OF: Outline of work; Course of discussion; VERSAILLES, TREATY OF: Conditions of peace.

Plans for Turkish settlement. See PARIS, CONFERENCE OF: Question of Turkey.

Plan for League of Nations. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS: Making of the league at the Paris conference.

Refusal to recognize Treaty of London. See ADRIATIC QUESTION: Problem of Italy's new frontiers.

Opinion on tariff situation in message to Congress. See TARIFF: 1921: United States.

Attitude on Fiume Question, and self-determination for Slav races. See FIUME: 1919: Attitude of President Wilson, etc.; JUGO-SLAVIA: 1918 (April-October).

Recommendation for independence of Philippines. See PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: 1918-1921.

Conference with Committee on Foreign Relations.—Desire for League of Nations. See U.S.A.: 1919 (February-March).

Defends League of Nations in speech in New York.—Returns to Paris. See U.S.A.: 1919 (March).

Submits Treaty of Versailles to Senate.—Conference with Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. See U.S.A.: 1919 (July-September): Discussion over League of Nations.

Endeavors to obtain unconditional ratification of treaty.—Speech-making tour.—Illness. See U.S.A.: 1919 (July-September): President Wilson's endeavors, etc.

Vetoes Senate resolution declaring end of war. See U.S.A.: 1919 (September-November).

Attitude towards railroad strike. See U.S.A.: 1919 (August-November).

Changes in cabinet. See U.S.A.: 1919-1920.

Vetoes Knox Resolution. See U.S.A.: 1920-1921 (April-July 1).

Attitude on question of Armenian boundaries.—Rejects promised mandate. See ARMENIA: 1920: Treaty of Sèvres, U.S.A.: 1920 (May).

Review of foreign affairs at close of administration. See U.S.A.: 1920 (November): Foreign policy.

Proclamation opening Panama canal. See PANAMA CANAL: 1920-1922.

WILSON, Mt., mountain in California, on which is located a famous solar observatory. See ASTRONOMY: Photographic astronomy.

WILSON BILL (1890). See KANSAS: 1876-1890.

WILSON VS. NEW. See SUPREME COURT: 1917.

WILSON-GORMAN TARIFF ACT. See TARIFF: 1894.

WILSON'S CREEK, Battle of. See U.S.A.: 1861 (July-September: Missouri).

WILSON'S RAID. See U.S.A.: 1865 (April-May).

WILTON, Battle of (872). See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 8th-9th centuries.

WILZEN, or Welatabians.—“The Wilzen, as the Franks called them, or the Welatabians, as they called themselves, were perhaps the most powerful of the Slavonian tribes, and [at the time of Charlemagne] occupied the southern coast of the Baltic; their immediate neighbors were the Abodrites, old allies of the Franks, whom they harassed by continual raids.” Charlemagne led an expedition into the country of the Wilzen in 789 and subdued them.—J. I. Mombert, *History of Charles the Great*, bk. 2, ch. 4.

WIMBORNE, Ivor Churchill Guest, 2nd Baron (1873-), British administrator. Member of Parliament, 1900-1910; paymaster-general, 1910-1912; lord-lieutenant of Ireland, 1915-1918. See IRELAND: 1916 (May-July).

WIMPFEN, Battle of (1622). See GERMANY: 1621-1623.

WINCEBY FIGHT (1643).—The sharp encounter known as Winceby fight, in the English Civil War, was one of Cromwell's successes, which drove the royalist forces out of the Lincolnshire country, and compelled the marquis of Newcastle, who was besieging Hull, to abandon the siege. “Cromwell himself was nearer death in this action than ever in any other; the victory, too, made its due figure, and ‘appeared in the world.’ Winceby, a small upland hamlet, in the Wolds, not among the Fens, of Lincolnshire, is some five miles west of Horncastle. The confused memory of this Fight is still fresh there. [The fight occurred Oct. 10, 1643.]”—T. Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell's letters and speeches*, v. 1, letter 18.—See also HULL: 1643.

WINCHESTER, Elhanan (1751-1797), American divine. See UNIVERSALISM.

WINCHESTER, James (1752-1826), American general. Commander at Fort Wayne, 1812-1813. See U.S.A.: 1812-1813: Harrison's northwestern campaign.

WINCHESTER, England, capital of Hampshire, sixty-six miles southwest of London, and the ancient capital of England. In 1921 it had a population of 23,378. “There can be little doubt that a town, of greater or less importance, has existed since the earliest dawn of English history on the same place where stands the Winchester of today. . . . If the first founders of the ancient city were Celtic Britons, covering with their rude dwellings the summit and sides of S. Catherine's Hill they were certainly conquered by the Belgæ, also probably of Celtic origin, who, crossing over from Gaul, established themselves in a large district of southern England. But whether in their time Winchester was called Caer Gwent is doubtful; very probably it was simply Gwin or Gwent, the white place. . . . But as there is no question of the Roman occupation of Britain, first by Julius Cæsar, later on by Claudius and Vespasian, so we

know that the settlement on the Itchen was turned into Venta Belgarum, and S. Catherine's Hill converted into a Roman camp. . . . Venta, as well as many other towns, was completely Romanised. . . . But the time arrived when Rome could no longer defend herself at home, and was thus forced to leave Britain to contend with the wild Northmen who had already begun their inroads. The Britons implored their former masters to come back and help them, but in vain. . . . We know how Vortigern, chief among the southern British kings, invited the Saxon adventurers to help him against the Picts and Scots, who encroached more and more in Britain. . . . In 495 (as we learn from the Brito-Welsh Chronicle), there 'came two ealdormen to Britain, Cerdic and Cymric,' who landed at Hamble Creek, and eventually, after many battles much extolled in the Saxon Chronicle, became kings of the West Saxons. Cerdic is said to have been crowned in Venta, to have slaughtered most of the inhabitants and all the priests, and to have converted the cathedral into a heathen temple. . . . The name Venta now becomes Wintana, with the affix of 'ceaster,' Saxon for fortified place."—A. R. R. Bramston and A. C. Leroy, *Historic Winchester*, ch. 1.—See also VENTA.—Most of the Saxon kings of Wessex were buried in the ancient cathedral, no portion of which remains to-day. The present cathedral was begun in 1070 and is the chief glory of the town.

WINCHESTER, Battles of (1862, 1864). See U. S. A.: 1862 (May-June: Virginia); 1864 (August-October: Virginia).

WINCKELMANN, Johann Joachim (1717-1768), German archæologist. See ARCHÆOLOGY: Method and scope; Development.

WINDAU, seaport of Latvia, on the Baltic sea. The Germans captured it from the Russians in 1915. See WORLD WAR: 1915: III. Eastern front: g, 8.

"**WINDBER,**" American vessel. While it was at sea, the steward, one Piepenbrink, was removed by a French cruiser. In answer to the protest of the United States government (dated Dec. 7, 1914), the British government sought to extenuate the act on the ground that, while Piepenbrink had declared his intention of becoming an American citizen, he was actually still a German subject. The American government replied that he was an American citizen in contemplation of the law, but that whether he was or not, his removal was without justification, citing the case of the *Trent*. [See TRENT AFFAIR.] Eventually the British and French governments agreed to Piepenbrink's release as a special favor, while reserving the question of principle.

WINDER, William Henry (1775-1824), American soldier. In command of Fort Washington, 1814. See U. S. A.: 1814 (August-September).

WINDHOEK, capital of the former German colony of Southwest Africa. It surrendered to General Botha, of the Union of South Africa, in 1915. See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1915; WORLD WAR: 1915: Africa: a, 1.

WINDISCHGRÄTZ, Alfred Candidus Ferdinand, Prince (1787-1862), Austrian field marshal. Fought in the Napoleonic Wars, 1804-1814; took part in war in Bohemia, 1840-1848; suppressed the insurrection in Prague, and in Vienna, 1848; took Buda and Pesth, 1849; governor of Mainz, 1850. See AUSTRIA: 1848-1849; HUNGARY: 1847-1849.

WINDSOR, Connecticut, town six miles north of Hartford, settled in 1635. See CONNECTICUT: 1634-1637.

WINDSOR, House of, name of the reigning family in Great Britain, succeeding the House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha in 1917, by virtue of the following proclamation:

A PROCLAMATION

DECLARING THAT THE NAME OF WINDSOR IS TO BE BORNE BY HIS ROYAL HOUSE AND FAMILY AND RELINQUISHING THE USE OF ALL GERMAN TITLES AND DIGNITIES.

GEORGE R. I.

Whereas we, having taken into consideration the Name and Title of Our Royal House and Family, have determined that henceforth Our House and Family shall be styled and known as the House and Family of Windsor: And whereas We have further determined for Ourselves and for and on behalf of Our descendants and all other the descendants of Our Grandmother Queen Victoria of blessed and glorious memory to relinquish and discontinue the use of all German Titles and Dignities: And whereas We have declared these Our determinations in Our Privy Council:

Now, therefore, We, out of Our Royal Will and Authority, do hereby declare and announce that as from the date of this Our Royal Proclamation Our House and Family shall be styled and known as the House and Family of Windsor, and that all the descendants in the male line of Our said Grandmother Queen Victoria who are subjects of these Realms, other than female descendants who may marry or may have married, shall bear the said Name of Windsor: And do hereby further declare and announce that We for Ourselves and for and on behalf of Our descendants and all other the descendants of Our said Grandmother Queen Victoria who are subjects of these Realms, relinquish and enjoin the discontinuance of the use of the Degrees, Styles, Dignities, Titles and Honours of Dukes and Duchesses of Saxony and Princes and Princesses of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, and all other German Degrees, Styles, Dignities, Titles, Honours and Appellations to Us or to them heretofore belonging or appertaining

Given at Our Court at *Buckingham Palace*, this Seventeenth day of *July*, in the year of our Lord One thousand nine hundred and seventeen, and in the Eighth year of Our Reign.

GOD SAVE THE KING.

—The *Times* (London), July 17, 1917.

Genealogical table. See ENGLAND: 1483-1485. See also WINDSOR CASTLE.

WINDSOR, Treaties of (1175, 1890). See IRELAND: 1160-1200; WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 71, xi.

WINDSOR CASTLE, principal residence of the English sovereigns since William the Conqueror bought the land from Westminster Abbey. It is situated at Windsor, on the river Thames, twenty-one miles southwest of London. The castle is a veritable museum of works of art, collections made by princes since Henry VIII engaged Holbein as his court painter. The royal library is also very valuable, and contains an unusually fine collection of drawings. (See also GARTER, KNIGHTS OF THE.) "All the successive Royal Houses have been connected with Windsor, some more closely than others. King Edward VII., now the only Monarch who may be said to belong to the line of Saxe-Coburg, is buried there; so also is Queen Vic-

toria, the last representative of the House of Hanover. . . . Norman (1066-1154), Plantagenet (1154-1399), Lancaster (1399-1461), York (1461-1485), Tudor (1485-1603), Stuart (1603-1714), Hanoverian (1714-1901), have all occupied the same princely residence in succession, and if English surnames are derived, as in hundreds of cases they are, from a family's place of residence or origin, it is certain that no place can compete with the name of Windsor for the purpose for which the King has now selected it. For the first time in its long history Windsor becomes the home of an eponymous House."—*The Times* (London), July 17, 1917.

WINDWARD ISLANDS, southern part of the Lesser Antilles islands of the West Indies. See **WEST INDIES**: Location; **BRITISH EMPIRE**: Extent.

WINE GROWERS' REVOLTS: France. See **FRANCE**: 1007 (May-July); 1911.

WINEBRENNER, John (1797-1860), American divine. See **CHURCHES OF GOD IN NORTH AMERICA**.

WINEDI. See **VINEDI**.

WINES, Enoch Cobb (1806-1879), American divine and penologist. See **PRISON REFORM**: International conferences.

WINGATE, Sir Francis Reginald (1861-), British soldier. Took part in the Nile expedition, 1884-1885; served in the Egyptian army, 1886-1891; director of the intelligence service, 1892; in campaigns in the Sudan, 1896-1898; governor-general of the Sudan, 1899-1916; high commissioner of Egypt, 1917-1919. See **EGYPT**: 1899-1900; 1916-1917; **SUDAN**: 1914.

WINGFIELD, Edward Maria (c. 1560-c. 1613), English merchant and colonist. See **VIRGINIA**: 1606-1607.

WINGFIELD, Battle of (655). Fought between King Oswin of Northumberland and King Penda of Mercia, the latter being defeated and slain.

WINKELRIED, or von Winkelried, Arnold, legendary Swiss patriot. Said to have fallen in the battle of Sempach in which the Austrians were defeated, 1386. The story relates how he flung himself upon the closely serried ranks of the Austrians, and received in his breast so many spears that a way was opened in their ranks for the Swiss soldiers to break through.—See also **SWITZERLAND**: 1386-1388.

WINNEBAGOES, North American Indian tribe. See **STOUAN FAMILY**.

WINNIPEG, capital of Manitoba, the most easterly of the prairie provinces of Canada, is situated at the confluence of the Red river of the North with the Saskatchewan. "The town seemed to have four nuclei—Fort Garry, which had been the seat of government and the centre of business for the Hudson's Bay Company; Winnipeg village, which was the centre of the 'Canadians' and most of the other newcomers; Point Douglas, the old centre of the Selkirk settlers; and the village of St. John's. . . . In November . . . [1873] the bill incorporating the city became law. . . . Up to 1874 the city had telegraph communication to the south only, but . . . [by 1876] there was a telegraph line between Winnipeg and Battleford. In 1877 the *Prince Rupert* inaugurated a steamboat service on the Assiniboine river, and the venture proved so successful that a company was formed and several boats were soon plying on that stream. . . . A bill to incorporate Winnipeg's first street railway was passed in 1882."—F. H. Schofield, *Story of Manitoba*, v. 1, pp. 318-319.—In 1921, the population of the city was 179,087.

1917.—Strike of metal trade workers. See **CANADA**: 1917 (June).

1919-1921.—Housing problem. See **HOUSING**: Canada.

See also **UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES**: 1790-1920.

WINSLOW, Edward (1595-1655), Anglo-American colonial governor. Governor of Plymouth colony, 1633, 1636, 1644; appointed commander against the Spaniards in the West Indies by Cromwell, 1655. See **MASSACHUSETTS**: 1623-1629; **Plymouth colony**; **NEW ENGLAND**: 1675 (October-December).

WINSLOW, John (1702-1774), American soldier. In charge of the seizure of the Acadians, 1755; commander of New England troops, 1756; led an expedition to Kennebec, 1758-1759. See **NOVA SCOTIA**: 1755.

WINSLOW, John Ancrum (1811-1873), American naval officer. Served in the Civil War; sent to Europe in search of Confederate cruisers, 1862; commanded during the victorious combat with Semmes of the *Alabama*, 1864; commander of the Gulf squadron, 1866-1867, and of the Pacific squadron, 1870-1872. See **ALABAMA CLAIMS**: 1862-1864.

WINTER, Sir James Spearman (1845-1911), Newfoundland statesman. Solicitor-general, 1882-1885; attorney-general, 1885-1889; representative at the Washington Fisheries conference, 1887-1888, and at the fisheries conferences in London, 1890, 1898; member of Joint High Commission on Fisheries, 1898; judge of the Supreme Court, 1893-1896; premier, 1897-1900. See **NEWFOUNDLAND**: 1897-1900.

WINTHROP, Fitz-John (1638-1707), colonial governor of Connecticut, 1698-1707. See **U.S.A.**: 1690; **CONNECTICUT**: 1689-1701.

WINTHROP, John (1538-1649), English colonist in America. First governor of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1629-1630; deputy governor, 1634-1636; governor, 1637-1640, 1642-1644, 1646-1649. See **MASSACHUSETTS**: 1629-1630; 1631-1636.

WINTHROP, John, the Younger (1606-1676), colonial governor of Connecticut. Planned New London, 1646; governor, 1657, 1660-1676; deputy-governor, 1658; secured Connecticut charter, 1662. See **CONNECTICUT**: 1662-1664; **NEW YORK**: 1664; **RHODE ISLAND**: 1660-1663.

WINZINGERODE, Ferdinand, Count von (1770-1818), Russian general of German birth. Served in the Napoleonic Wars. See **FRANCE**: 1814 (January-March).

WIPPEDS FLEET, Battle of (465), decisive battle fought between the Jutes under Hengest and the Britons, which settled the conquest of Kent by the former.

WIRELESS COMPASS. See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY**: Telegraphy and telephony: Wireless or radio: 1914-1918.

WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY. See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY**: Telegraphy and telephony: Wireless or radio.

WIRELESS TELEPHONY. See **ELECTRICAL DISCOVERY**: Telegraphy and telephony: Wireless or radio: 1915-1921; 1919.

WIRT, William (1772-1834), American lawyer and statesman. District attorney, 1816; attorney-general, 1817-1829. See **FLORIDA**: 1819-1829; **ANTI-MASONIC PARTY**.

WIRTH, Karl Joseph (1879-), German statesman. Minister of finance, 1918, 1920-1921; chancellor, 1922. See **GERMANY**: 1910-1920: Economic difficulties; 1920 (June); 1921 (November-December).

WISBY, town on the west coast of the island of Gotland, Sweden. It was an ancient Hanseatic port. See HANSA TOWNS.

1361.—Taken and plundered by the Danes. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: 1018-1307.

WISBY, Laws of. See ADMIRALTY LAW: 1798.

WISCONSIN, northern, middle western state (popularly called the "Badger state"). The Mississippi separates most of the state from Minnesota and Iowa, while the Menominee and Montreal rivers separate it on the north and east from the upper peninsula of Michigan. The state contains 810 square miles of water, and has a shore boundary 550 miles long. The resources of the state consist of timber, hay, grain, zinc, stone, iron ore and clay products. In 1900 Wisconsin was the greatest lumber producing state in the Union, but by 1909 it had fallen to eighth place because of destructive fires and otherwise depleted forests. The growth of manufactures, however, has been steady and rapid. The raising of live-stock, particularly dairy cows, is an important industry. (See also U.S.A.: Economic map.) The area of the state is 56,066 square miles and the population in 1920 was 2,631,839. Physically the state is rich. The southern and central portions are overlaid with a perfect network of railways. "Wisconsin is working out its educational ideas on the intelligent system of one that may be expected to demonstrate the full value of the popular method—I mean a more intimate connection with the life of the people. . . . The graded school system of the State is vigorous, all working up to the University. This is a State institution, and the State is fairly liberal to it. . . . The distinguishing thing, however, about the state university is its vital connection with the farmers and the agricultural interests. I do not refer to the agricultural department . . . but . . . the connection of the University with the farmers' institutes. A special act of the Legislature drawn . . . by C. E. Estabrook authorized the farmers' institutes and placed them under the control of the regents of the University. . . . Co-education seems to be everywhere accepted without question as if it were already demonstrated that the mingling of the sexes in the higher education will produce the sort of men and women most desirable in the highest civilization. The success of women in the higher schools, the capacity shown by women in the management of public institutions and in reforms and charities, have perhaps something to do with the factor to woman suffrage [shown in the state]."—C. D. Warner, *Studies in the South and West*, pp. 157, 163-165.

Aboriginal inhabitants. See SIOUAN FAMILY.

1634-1673.—Visited by Nicolet and traversed by Marquette and Joliet. See CANADA: 1634-1673.

1658-1669.—Radisson and Groseilliers.—Fathers Ménard and Allouez.—Post at Rapides des Peres.—Explorers came in quick succession. Radisson and Groseilliers followed Nicolet's path and descended the Wisconsin river almost to its mouth in 1659. In 1661 Father Ménard was killed in upper Wisconsin. In 1665 Father Allouez founded La Pointe mission. In 1669 the first church was built at Rapides des Peres on the Fox river, around which grew the first permanent settlement. It became the great port for trappers and traders.

1671-1685.—Claimed by France.—Explored by La Salle.—Fortified by Perrot.—In 1671 Saint-Lusson took formal possession of the territory in the name of the king of France. Eight years later La Salle thoroughly explored the Wisconsin region before he went down the Mississippi, but no real

settlements were made in spite of the activities of trappers and traders. (Wisconsin had become the central ground of the *coureurs de bois*.) About this time the De Langlade family established itself at Green bay. In 1685 Perrot, who had been a prominent trader and explorer in Wisconsin, was made "commandant of the west." This marked the beginning of the period of real occupation. Perrot, therefore, found it necessary to build numerous forts along the Mississippi to protect the increasing population from the Indians, to regulate trade, and to build up the connection between Canada and Louisiana.

1712-1740.—War between the Fox Indians and the French.—After the slaughter of a tribe of Fox Indians near Detroit, the French were involved in constant warfare with the Foxes. The result was disastrous to French trade and made it extremely difficult to keep up the posts down the Mississippi.

1755-1765.—French and Indian Wars.—First English-speaking colony formed.—During the French and Indian Wars the Indians and Charles de Langlade led troops against Braddock. In 1761 Robert Rogers went to Detroit to occupy the French posts in the West. Lieutenant Gorrell was sent to occupy the more or less deserted Wisconsin post, and the company together with the traders who accompanied him formed the first English-speaking colony in Wisconsin. The fort was called Fort Edward Augustus, but during Pontiac's rebellion in 1763, Gorrell was forced to abandon it. By 1765, the English began to re-occupy the posts.

1763.—Cession to Great Britain. See SEVEN YEARS' WAR: Treaties.

1763.—King's proclamation excluding settlers. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1763.

1774.—Embraced in the province of Quebec. See CANADA: 1763-1774.

1776-1783.—Revolutionary War.—At this time the Wisconsin settlers and traders were loyal to the British, and although this territory went to the United States by the Treaty of 1783, the British continued to rule the region for some time. After 1796 the posts began slowly to be evacuated by the British.

1784.—Included in the proposed states of Syl-
vania, Michigan and Assenisipia. See NORTH-
WEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1784.

1785.—Partially covered by the western land claims of Massachusetts, ceded to the United States. See U.S.A.: 1781-1786.

1787.—Ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory.—Perpetual exclusion of slavery. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1787.

1805-1848.—Territorial vicissitudes.—Admission into the Union as a state.—From 1805 to 1809, Wisconsin formed a part of Indiana Territory. From 1809 to 1818 her territory was embraced in the Territory of Illinois, excepting a small projection at the northeast which was left out of the described boundaries and belonged nowhere. When Illinois became a state, in 1818, and her present boundaries were established, all the country north of them was joined to Michigan Territory. In 1834 that huge territory was still further enlarged by the temporary addition to it of a great area west of the Mississippi, embracing the present states of Iowa, Minnesota and part of Dakota. It was an unwieldy and impracticable territorial organization, and movements to divide it, which had been on foot long before this last enlargement, soon attained success. In 1836, the

year before Michigan became a state, with her present limits, the remaining territory was organized under the name of Wisconsin. Two years later, "by act of June 12, 1838, congress still further contracted the limits of Wisconsin by creating from its trans-Mississippi tract the Territory of Iowa. This, however, was in accordance with the original design when the country beyond the Mississippi was attached to Michigan Territory for purposes of temporary government, so no objection was entertained to this arrangement on the part of Wisconsin. The establishment of Iowa had reduced Wisconsin to her present limits, except that she still held, as her western boundary, the Mississippi river to its source, and a line drawn due north therefrom to the international boundary. In this condition Wisconsin remained until the act of congress approved August 6, 1846, enabling her people to form a state constitution. . . . Wisconsin was admitted into the Union, by act approved May 29, 1848, with her present limits."—R. G. Thwaites, *Boundaries of Wisconsin (Wisconsin State Historical Society Collections, v. 11, pp. 455-468)*.

ALSO IN: B. A. Hinsdale, *Old Northwest, ch. 17*.—M. M. Quaife, *Movement for statehood, 1845-1846 (Wisconsin State Historical Society Collections, v. 36)*.

1812-1825.—Fur traders.—"In the history of the fur-trade, the period of 1812-25 was, for what we now know as Wisconsin, a time not only of transition but of crisis. Before the outbreak of our second war with Great Britain the fur-trade in the so-called Upper Country had experienced little change, either in methods or in *personelle*. Under Jay's Treaty (1796), the Americans had been given control of the Northwest posts. About 1808 John Jacob Astor's American Fur Company superseded the old Michilimackinac Company of British traders, and took over its territory, of which Wisconsin was a part. Astor, however, naturally found it expedient to employ as agents and crews those men who had been trained to the business. Thus the same Mackinac, Green Bay, and Prairie du Chien Frenchmen, or their descendants, who had served during the French régime and had continued in the employ of the British were now the representatives of a New York instead of a Montreal house. The transfer had not much altered the method of conducting the trade itself. But the opening of the war of 1812-15 demoralized all previous arrangements. It now became a military necessity that the United States should insist on each trader declaring whether his political allegiance was to remain British or be henceforth American. Heretofore, the rival companies operating along the international frontier had been conscious of no political divisions; but the incident at Astoria, on the Northwest Coast, showed that under hostile conditions there must needs be a fierce clashing of interests, for business rivals had now become political enemies. This sharpening of relations was especially acute in Wisconsin. In 1805-06 the principal Wisconsin traders had courteously welcomed Lieut. Z. M. Pike and accepted American commissions as civil and Indian officials; they now turned front, repudiated these commissions, and at the head of their forest allies took the war-path in an attempt to drive Americans and American sympathizers from the country of the Upper Lakes. The signing of the Treaty of Ghent (December, 1814) did not quench this spirit of Anglo-French hostility toward American interests. The Canadian traders and their barbaric followers were keenly disappointed that this instrument had not

redrawn the international boundary in the region of the Upper Lakes. With the aid of the local militia they had with much display of valor wrested from the Americans the forts of Mackinac and Prairie du Chien and the broad belt of territory dominated by those posts, and had hoped that the peace would confirm to them its acquisition. The district which they had captured and held had in fact never ceased to be British in spirit, and should, they claimed, have remained British territory. Small wonder, therefore, that tribesmen, traders and *habitants* felt aggrieved at the peace settlement and long refused to be reconciled. The treaties made by American officials with the Indian tribes at Portage des Sioux in 1815 and 1816 were the fruit of virtual threats by the former. The Winnebago did not as a whole treat for peace, but for years sullenly brooded. As a matter of fact, most Wisconsin Indians hated the 'Big Knives,' and until long after 1825, the year with which these documents cease, made annually trips to Drummond Island and Amberstburg to consult with their wily British 'father.' This intercourse continually invited disorder among our wards, but American authorities long found its discontinuance impracticable. As soon as peace was declared between Great Britain and the United States the Americans began to assert control of the Northwestern fur-trade, and to threaten expulsion of those inhabitants who would not consent to become citizens of the republic. The first step was to build and garrison forts in the recovered territory. The Mackinac and Chicago posts that had throughout the war been in the hands of the British or of their Indian allies and were now retroceded to the United States, required strengthening and equipping; at Green Bay and Prairie du Chien new strongholds were erected; a few years later (1819), Fort Snelling was established on the upper reaches of the Mississippi River. Next, came the rehabilitation of the government fur-trade factories. The Mackinac factory was not restored, possibly because geographically it was not convenient to the needs of any considerable body of Indians, although the island remained the chief outfitting and gathering station for the Upper Country; but new locations for factories were chosen at Chicago, Green Bay, and Prairie du Chien. The outlook for the system was hopeful, and sanguine observers freely prophesied beneficent effects from fair dealing with the Indians. It was pointed out that the tribesman who, for instance, had at Green Bay paid fifteen dollars for a pound of tobacco and a dollar-and-a-half for a thimble, would readily recognize and appreciate the benevolence of a government that sold him articles at cost and paid him full market value for his furs. A British admirer of the plan wrote: 'He (the Indian) had only to present a portion of his furs, etc., for barter to the Canadian Traders and the like at the States Trading House, and the advantages of dealing with the latter were too palpable to be overlooked.' Unfortunately for the success of the system, the transactions were not thus simple. The improvident barbarian, having no reserve stock of necessities, could not possibly go out to his winter's hunt unless supplied in advance, and on unsecured credit, with firearms, ammunition, clothing, and sundries of various kinds. To the repayment of these credits, he pledged to the trader the peltries which he was about to seek. Obviously, goods advanced under such hazardous conditions were charged for at the highest possible prices; and furs brought in exchange therefor were received at the lowest prevailing rates. To secure

such credits among the Indians, who were shifty and uncertain in their financial relations, the trader was under the necessity of sending clerks and *voyageurs* to follow as many of them as possible to their hunting grounds and to secure on the spot as much of their peltry harvest as could thus be obtained; also to waylay others in the forest and along the streams on their return to the summer villages. Thus almost wholly depleted of the fruits of their winter's hunt, the Indians reached Green Bay or Prairie du Chien with but few skins to present at the government trading house, for barter on a strictly market basis. The government factors encountered other sources of trouble. It had been the custom of both French and British Indian officials periodically to make considerable presents to their forest wards; weapons, ammunition, utensils, clothing, ornaments, and liquor were distributed among them with a rather free hand, being regarded as a sort of annuity to secure the continuance of their good will. Under the rule adopted for the American government factory system, the factors were held to a strict accountability for the goods placed in their hands. They were not furnished with presents for the Indians, yet the withholding of such gratuities was interpreted by the latter as evidence of meanness, than which no vice is more contemptible in aboriginal eyes. Moreover, no liquor could be obtained at the factories in exchange for furs—the federal government even forbade private traders to deal in this powerful incentive to forest trade; a prohibition, however, constantly violated by even the best of the factor's rivals. Square dealing at the factory, when devoid of credit, presents, and liquor offered little attraction to the Indian, so long as all three of these lures remained features of the unofficial trading post. He could not or would not go on the hunt without advances; he experienced keen human enjoyment in receiving something for nothing; and through his long period of enforced abstinence, while in the woods he longed for the joys of intoxication, to obtain which indulgence he was willing to make almost any sacrifice. Moreover, the Indian had profound contempt for a government that turned trader. . . . The truth is, that this period—closing with the year 1825, when the great treaty at Prairie du Chien had adjusted the boundaries between the tribes, and brought about a temporary peace of the warring rivals—is an interesting interval between the disintegration of an old regime and the inauguration of a new. Broadly viewed, it is plain that the injury to our fur trade was inevitable, owing to changing economic conditions. Under American domination, it was impracticable for Wisconsin long to remain a game preserve for the redmen, as had been contemplated by both its French and its British owners. The new political masters felt impelled to exploit its resources in the interest of the civilization and not of the hunter class. Accustomed to a patriarchal society the old traders chafed at the innovations that quickly followed American occupation; they found themselves victims of a new social order. Such of the younger generation as became Americanized soon found it essential to abandon the French language and customs, that heretofore had prevailed in this region, and to familiarize themselves with the Anglo-American substitutes therefore. On their shoulders, in large part, fell the task of rebuilding the social and industrial fabric of Wisconsin."—R. G. Thwaites, *Preface (Wisconsin State Historical Society Collections, v. 20, pp. xi-xv, xx)*.

ALSO IN: F. J. Turner, *Indian trade in Wisconsin (Johns Hopkins University Studies, v. 9)*.

1816-1832.—Indian lead mines taken over by Americans.—In 1816 the Indian title to the lead regions was nullified. These mines had first been worked as early as the seventeenth century by Perrot. In 1786 Julien Dubuque systematically worked them after obtaining privileges from the Indians. In 1804 William Henry Harrison obtained full rights from the Indians but these rights were never carried out. In 1810, 400,000 pounds were mined by the Indians. Between 1816 and 1820, such progress was made by white men that the region was filled with miners. In 1822 the first civil government was established and immigrants flooded the lead diggings to such an extent that by 1830 lead mining began to take precedence over the fur trade which under John Jacob Astor had been the dominant industry. This resulted in friction between the Indians and settlers so that Red Bird and the Winnebagos took the war path in 1827, and Black Hawk in 1832.

1832.—Black Hawk War. See ILLINOIS: 1832.

1832-1920.—Immigration.—German element.—Other elements in population.—Comparison with other states.—Social modifications due to character of population.—"By 1850 Michigan contained nearly 400,000 inhabitants, who occupied the southern half of the State. But she now found an active competitor for settlement in Wisconsin. In this region two forces had attracted the earlier inhabitants. The fur-trading posts of Green Bay, Prairie du Chien, and Milwaukee constituted one element, in which the French influence was continued. The lead region of the southwest corner of the State formed the center of attraction for Illinois and Southern pioneers. The soldiers who followed Black Hawk's trail in 1832 reported the richness of the soil, and an era of immigration followed. To the port of Milwaukee came a combined migration from western New York and New England, and spread along the southern tier of prairie counties until it met the Southern settlers in the lead region. Many of the early political contests in the State were connected, as in Ohio and Illinois, with the antagonisms between the sections thus brought together in a limited area. The other element in the formation of Wisconsin was that of the Germans, then just entering upon their vast immigration to the United States. Wisconsin was free from debt; she made a constitution of exceptional liberality to foreigners, and instead of treasuring her school lands or using them for internal improvements, she sold them for almost nothing to attract immigration. The result was that the prudent Germans, who loved light taxes and cheap hard-wood lands, turned toward Wisconsin,—another *Völkerwanderung*. From Milwaukee as a center they spread north along the shore of Lake Michigan, and later into northern central Wisconsin, following the belt of the hard-wood forests. So considerable were their numbers that such an economist as Roscher wrote of the feasibility of making Wisconsin a German State. 'They can plant the vine on the hills,' cried Franz Löher in 1847, 'and drink with happy song and dance; they can have German schools and universities, German literature and art, German science and philosophy, German courts and assemblies; in short, they can form a German State, in which the German language shall be as much the popular and official language as the English is now, and in which the German spirit shall rule.' By

1860 the German-born were sixteen per cent of the population of the State. But the New York and New England stream proved even more broad and steady in its flow in these years before the war. Wisconsin's population rose from 30,000 in 1840 to 300,000 in 1850. The New England element that entered this State is probably typical of the same element in Wisconsin's neighboring States, and demands notice. It came for the most part, not from the seaboard of Massachusetts, which has so frequently represented New England to the popular apprehension. A large element in this stock was the product of the migration that ascended the valleys of Connecticut and central Massachusetts through the hills into Vermont and New York,—a pioneer folk almost from the time of their origin. The Vermont colonists decidedly outnumbered those of Massachusetts in both Michigan and Wisconsin, and were far more numerous in other Northwestern States than the population of Vermont warranted. Together with this current came the settlers from western New York. These were generally descendants of this same pioneer New England stock, continuing into a remoter West the movement that had brought their parents to New York. The combined current from New England and New York thus constituted a distinctly modified New England stock, and was clearly the dominant native element in Michigan and Wisconsin. . . . Wisconsin's future is dependent upon the influence of the large proportion of her population of foreign parentage, for nearly three-fourths of her inhabitants are of that class. She thus has a smaller percentage of native population than any other of the States formed from the Old Northwest. Of this foreign element the Germans constitute by far the largest part, with the Scandinavians second. Her American population born outside of Wisconsin comes chiefly from New York. In contrast with the Ohio River States, she lacks the Southern element. Her greater foreign population and her dairy interests contrast with Michigan's Canadian and English elements and fruit culture. Her relations are more Western than Michigan's by reason of her connection with the Mississippi and the prairie States. Her foreign element is slightly less than Minnesota's, and in the latter State the Scandinavians take the place held by the Germans in Wisconsin. The facility with which the Scandinavians catch the spirit of Western America and assimilate with their neighbors is much greater than is the case with the Germans, so that Wisconsin seems to offer opportunity for non-English influence in a greater degree than her sister on the west. While Minnesota's economic development has heretofore been closely dependent on the wheat-producing prairies, the opening of the iron fields of the Mesabi and Vermilion ranges, together with the development of St. Paul and Minneapolis, Duluth and West Superior, and the prospective achievement of a deep-water communication with the Atlantic, seem to offer to that State a new and imperial industrial destiny. Between this stupendous economic future to the northwest and the colossal growth of Chicago on the southeast Wisconsin seems likely to become a middle agricultural area, developing particularly into a dairy State. She is powerfully affected by the conservative tendencies of her German element in times of political agitation and of proposals of social change. Some of the social modifications in this State are more or less typical of important processes at work among the neighboring States of the Old Northwest. In the north, the men who

built up the lumber interests of the State, who founded a mill town surrounded by the stumps of the pine forests which they exploited for the prairie markets, have acquired wealth and political power. The spacious and well-appointed home of the town-builder may now be seen in many a northern community, in a group of less pretentious homes of operatives and tradesmen, the social distinctions between them emphasized by the difference in nationality. A few years before, this captain of industry was perhaps actively engaged in the task of seeking the best 'forties' or directing the operations of his log-drivers. His wife and daughters make extensive visits to Europe, his sons go to some university, and he himself is likely to acquire political position, or to devote his energies to saving the town from industrial decline, as the timber is cut away, by transforming it into a manufacturing center for more finished products. Still others continue their activity among the forests of the South. This social history of the timber areas of Wisconsin has left clear indications in the development of the peculiar political leadership in the northern portion of the State. In the southern and middle counties of the State, the original settlement of the native American pioneer farmer, a tendency is showing itself to divide the farms and to sell to thrifty Germans, or to cultivate the soil by tenants, while the farmer retires to live in the neighboring village, and perhaps to organize creameries and develop a dairy business. The result is that a replacement of nationalities is in progress. Townships and even counties once dominated by the native American farmers of New York extraction are now possessed by Germans or other European nationalities. Large portions of the retail trades of the towns are also passing into German hands, while the native element seeks the cities, the professions, or mercantile enterprises of larger character. The non-native element shows distinct tendencies to dwell in groups. One of the most striking illustrations of this fact is the community of New Glarus, in Wisconsin, formed by a carefully organized migration from Glarus in Switzerland, aided by the canton itself. For some years this community was a miniature Swiss canton in social organization and customs, but of late it has become increasingly assimilated to the American type, and has left an impress by transforming the county in which it is from a grain-raising to a dairy region. From Milwaukee as a center, the influence of the Germans upon the social customs and ideals of Wisconsin has been marked. Milwaukee has many of the aspects of a German city, and has furnished a stronghold of resistance to native American efforts to enact rigid temperance legislation, laws regulative of parochial schools, and similar attempts to bend the German type to the social ideas of the pioneer American stock. . . . With all the evidence of the persistence of the influence of this nationality, it is nevertheless clear that each decade marks an increased assimilation and homogeneity in the State; but the result is a compromise, and not a conquest by either element."—F. J. Turner, *Frontier in American history*, pp. 227-228, 233-236.

ALSO IN: K. E. Levi, *Geographical origins of Wisconsin Germans* (*Wisconsin State Historical Society Collections*, v. 14, pp. 342-351).

1836-1844.—Madison chosen as the capital.—Wisconsin phalanx.—The first temporary council met at Belmont where Madison was finally chosen

as the capital. There continued to be a rapid growth in population and towns, and in 1844 the Wisconsin phalanx, a very successful communistic settlement, was established at Ripon. At the same time the Mormons settled in Racine and Walworth counties.

1847-1848.—Constitutional conventions.—Public school system established.—The first constitution, submitted to the people after the bill had passed Congress admitting Wisconsin to the Union, was rejected. The second submitted by the convention was accepted and Wisconsin became a state May 29, 1848. The same year the free public school system was established, whose excellence was to attract nation-wide attention. (See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1848.) During this period extensive German and Scandinavian immigration occurred.

1849.—Boundary settlement with Minnesota. See MINNESOTA: 1849.

1851.—First railroad.—The first railroad was built in 1851 when a track was laid from Milwaukee to Waukesha. In 1854 it was extended to Madison, and in 1857 to the Mississippi.

1854.—Organization of Republican party.—Attitude towards slavery.—Wisconsin held strong anti-slavery sentiments in the fifties, and in 1854 the first steps were taken towards the organization of the Republican party at Ripon. A fugitive slave, being returned to his master, was rescued by a mob from Milwaukee, and the fugitive slave law was declared null and void by the supreme court of the state. Besides taking a stand against slavery, the new party attacked the Democratic administration of the state, because its early history was full of scandals in the sale of public lands and in the charters granted to railroads, scandals which continued under Republican administration, as well.—See also U. S. A.: 1854-1855.

1856-1893.—Governatorial contest.—Position of women.—Railroad extension.—Panic of 1893.—“Civil war threatened to convulse the people of the state in 1856 as the result of a bitter contest for the office of governor. No governor ever had warmer friends or bitterer enemies than William A. Barstow. The Democrats renominated him in the fall of 1855, while the Republicans placed Coles Bashford in nomination. Many scandals during Governor Barstow's term gave the Republicans an opportunity to vigorously attack his administration, and such terms as the ‘Forty Thieves’ and ‘Barstow and the Balance’ passed into current language in the course of the campaign. The entire machinery of election was in Democratic hands. When the state canvassers declared Barstow reelected by a majority of 157, his opponents loudly proclaimed that a fraud had been committed, and that the returns had been doctored in the interest of the governor. Party newspapers made such an outcry that political passions were inflamed to a point that threatened personal collision between the factions at the capital. Undaunted by the charges of fraud, Gov. Barstow prepared for his installation. Early in January, seven companies of militia arrived in Madison, marched to the governor's residence and escorted him to the capitol, where two thousand persons awaited his appearance and that of the other state officers. With much ceremony they proceeded to the senate chamber, where the usual oath of office was administered. In the meantime Coles Bashford had quietly gone to the court-room of the Supreme court, and Chief Justice Whiton administered the oath of governor. Some of the

most eminent attorneys of the state had ranged themselves on the side of Bashford, including Timothy O. Howe, E. G. Ryan, Alexander W. Randall and J. H. Knowlton. By their advice, Bashford proceeded to the executive office and formally demanded possession. Gov. Barstow refused to yield, and the contest was thereupon transferred to the Supreme court. Here much legal sparring ensued, Jonathan E. Arnold, Harlow S. Orton and Matt. H. Carpenter representing the governor, who had nine points of possession. Tremendous excitement ensued all over the state. Partisans of the contestants prepared for the seemingly inevitable encounter by arming themselves; it seemed that an appeal to physical force would follow the appeal to law. The result of the court's inquiry was awaited with intense concern by conservative men who feared the consequences. The counsel of the contestant won at every point in their contention before the court, and finally Barstow withdrew from the case, claiming that political prejudices prevented fairness of treatment, and further denying the right of the court to go behind the returns. Foreseeing the outcome he sent his resignation as governor to the legislature, hoping to prevent the seating of Bashford by installing as governor the duly-elected lieutenant-governor, Arthur McArthur. It was a shrewd move, but Bashford's lawyers were prepared for it. They held that McArthur could gain no rights to the office of governor through the resignation of a fraudulently-elected incumbent. The court went on with the inquiry, and found gross forgeries of election returns. Their amended count gave Bashford a majority of 1,009, and they declared him entitled to the office of governor. Instead of yielding gracefully, McArthur announced that he would hold on at all hazards. On the day that the court rendered its decision, March 24, great crowds flocked to the capitol, with a grim and determined air that boded ill. . . . The enemy . . . [was] dispossessed with scarcely a struggle and the unexpected ending made the crowd good-humored. . . . For a time the assembly refused to recognize the new governor, but finally did so. The lieutenant-governor resumed his place as presiding officer of the senate, and the troubled waters subsided. The case was a notable one. For the first time in the history of the country had a Supreme court been asked to oust a governor and seat a contestant. The lawyers engaged in the case were among the greatest who ever practiced at the bar in the Northwest. Jonathan E. Arnold and J. K. Knowlton were regarded as lawyers of exceptional power; E. G. Ryan became chief justice of the Supreme court of the state, and so did Harlow S. Orton; Matt. H. Carpenter died a senator of the United States; Timothy Howe and Alexander Randall served as cabinet officers, each occupying the position of postmaster-general. Although the crisis passed without bloodshed, there is no doubt that it needed but a breath to fan the flame into tremendous proportions.”—H. E. Legler, *Leading events in Wisconsin history*, pp. 230-333.

“Many stumbling blocks were encountered by women in their efforts to secure legal recognition in this state. It was not until 1877 that the legislature passed a law permitting members of their sex to practice law. The year before that the Supreme Court of the state rejected the application of Miss Lavinia Goodell for admission to the bar. E. G. Ryan was chief justice of the state at the time. ‘We cannot but think the com-

mon law wise in excluding women from the profession of the law,' said the eminent jurist in the decree of refusal. 'The profession enters largely into the well-being of society, and, to be honorably filled, and safely to society, exacts the devotion of life. The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and nurture of children of our race, and for the custody of the homes of the world and their maintenance in love and honor. And all life-long callings of women inconsistent with the order of nature, and when voluntary, are treason against it.' A lobby of women convinced the next legislature that the views entertained by the chief justice were not founded on the rights of womankind, and a law was passed permitting women to practice law. Many Wisconsin women have availed themselves of the right thus obtained. In 1871, by legislative enactment, a college for women was added to the State University. . . . Immediately after the war railroad extension was carried on in the state at a remarkable rate. The attitude of the railroad magnates toward the people grew so arrogant that [the unheeded warnings of Governor Washburn in 1873 were followed by a radical change of government at the next election], . . . and the passage of the famous 'Potter law' followed at the next legislative session. [See below: 1873-1907.] . . . During the days of wildcat banking in territorial times, the people of Wisconsin sustained heavy losses [see MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1837-1841]; they suffered reverses when the hard times of 1873 swept over the country; but the climax of commercial adversity overtook them in 1893. The business panic of that year, which swept from one end of the country to the other, engulfed about 200 commercial houses in this state and two scores of banks were forced to close their doors. The panic began with a run on the banks. . . . The five Milwaukee banks that failed had \$13,700,000 of assets and but \$11,700,000 of liabilities, and two of them—one of them Mitchell's [Wisconsin Marine] bank—resumed business when the panic subsided. In but one instance was brazen dishonesty the cause of the wreck, and the culprit was sent to the penitentiary. Dishonesty of management was also charged in a few instances in other cities of the state, but on the whole unforeseen and unavoidable conditions contributed mainly to the business disasters of the year. The storm cleared the business atmosphere and eventually led to more wholesome financial methods in commercial life."—*Ibid.*, pp. 282-283, 287-288.

1861-1865.—Social relief during Civil War.—"In an effort to ameliorate the effect upon the currency of the overthrow of the credit of the Southern States, upon whose bonds it rested, Wisconsin, on April 17, provided that all actions against banks or banking institutions to compel specie payment be deferred until December 1, 1861, that the state laws with regard to the same subject be not enforced, nor any bank-note be protested by a state officer until the same date. . . . More specifically affecting soldiers was the Wisconsin law of April 17, 1861, exempting 'from all civil process . . . such persons as may enroll themselves in the service of the country.' This was modified on May 25 to exclude actions for the foreclosure of mortgages and to enforce mechanics' liens, and on March 15, 1862, to exclude actions in trusteeship and joint indebtedness. On March 22, 1862, the legislature provided that in the case of volunteers all sales of state lands on credit be held *in statu*

quo until three months after their discharge, and on April 5, 1862, it was ordered that a stay be granted in all mortgage foreclosure proceedings. On March 31, 1863, volunteers were allowed until April 1, 1865, to redeem 'all lands' sold for taxes. . . . The volunteer had good ground for the belief that relief would not be limited to such negative action. The blazing posters which those seeking recruits plastered along the city streets and spread broadcast over the countryside, dwelt not only on the generous pay offered by the United States, and its land bounties and pensions, but very frequently on the care that would be taken of those at home. . . . Wisconsin was the only state . . . which undertook to handle the subject through the central administration. On May 25, 1861, it was voted that 'non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates mustered into the service of the United States or of this state . . . receive . . . in addition to the pay provided . . . the sum of five dollars a month to all volunteers having families dependent on them for their support.' The execution of the law was placed in the hands of the secretary of State, and he was to authorize payments only while the soldier was in actual service as evinced by monthly reports from the regimental officers, or, after April 4, 1864, from hospital authorities. The operation of the law was gradually extended to all Wisconsin volunteers, but never included those entering the regular United States service and consequently excluded the navy. Soldier and family must be residents of the state. The term family was ambiguous. It was defined March 22, 1862, as 'Wife living, and actually dependent,' or, there being no wife, children under fourteen, or no children, 'infirm or indigent parent or parents, actually dependent upon the labor of said volunteer.' By a law of April 4, 1864, in the case of children who had lost their mother by death or desertion, the money was to go to 'the person having such child or children in charge.' No family was to receive more than five dollars a month, but by the law of March 3, 1863, a family having more than one breadwinner in the ranks could transfer its claim in case the one in whose name they received the extra pay should die. A law of April 2, 1863, evinced some delicacy of feeling by allowing the state officials to omit the names of recipients from their annual reports. . . . In Wisconsin, laws of May 15, 1861, and September 25, 1862, granted the local government authorities the power of taxing 'for the support of the families . . . of volunteers.' One indication of the frequent exercise of this right is the great number of laws legalizing such taxes in cases where some irregularity of form occurred. Other laws permitted in individual cases the different wards of various cities to tax themselves for the same purpose. For the most part this local relief was voted by the towns, cities, and villages, their total contributions for war expenses amounting to \$7,134,341.12, as compared with \$618,164.55 paid by the counties. Twenty-six counties taxed themselves while thirty-two did not, but in only three was there a complete absence of town and county relief. Rock county was perhaps the most generous, giving at one period ten dollars in winter and a little less in summer. In most cases some smaller sum was given to a wife, with additional allowance for minor children. . . . During and after 1863 . . . [bounties] played a large part in the support of soldiers' families. This close connection is illustrated by a Wisconsin law of March 2, 1865, al-

lowing Oshkosh to levy a 'special volunteer tax' for bounties, the payment of which, in the case of married men, could be made in monthly installments. State and local relief was not the sole reliance of those left at home. The pay of the soldier was not sufficient to provide for maintenance but was an item in the support of his family. The problem, however, was to get the money from the soldier to the family, and sometimes it was not easy to persuade the soldier to send home as much as it was felt he should. This situation led to the development of the allotment service. This was organized on a somewhat peculiar basis, in that the officers employed in it held United States commissions but were appointed and paid by the states, which also managed the funds collected. Wisconsin on April 3, 1862, provided for allotment commissioners, with salaries fixed by the governor but not to exceed one thousand dollars each, or three thousand dollars in all. The state treasurer was to receive and distribute the money. . . . The United States government was so strongly committed to the payment of pensions, that the Northern States deemed it unnecessary to devise any permanent plans for the future, but there was an opportunity for real suffering during the period between the death of the volunteer and the obtaining of the pension, while the securing of the latter was often a matter not of time alone, but also of money and knowledge. Wisconsin, on April 2, 1863, provided that the state aid continue six months after the death of the principal, unless the pension begin before. This act created an injustice in that it applied only to those who died after the act was passed. Some of the local relief, however, was extended without regard to this provision. . . . In addition to these public resources, private charity, organized and unorganized, naturally assisted the necessities in their own communities. . . . In many cases employers offered to continue pay to those enlisting. . . . The women's own work was another resource."—C. R. Fish, *Social relief in the Northwest during the Civil War* (*American Historical Review*, Jan., 1917).

ALSO IN: C. R. Fish, *Raising of the Wisconsin volunteers* (*Military Historian and Economist*, July, 1916).—*Messages and proclamations of the Wisconsin war governors* (*Wisconsin History Commission, Reprints, no. 2*).—F. Merk, *Economic history of Wisconsin in the Civil War decade*.

1866-1877.—Growth of National Farmers Alliance. See U. S. A.: 1866-1877.

1871.—Forest fires.—After a continued period of drought, disastrous forest fires broke out in Oconto, Dove, Brown, Shawano, Manitowoc and Kewaunee counties. Vast tracts of timber were burned, about 1,000 lives lost and many were rendered destitute.

1873-1907.—Struggle between the railroad corporations and the state government.—Potter, or granger, law.—Defiance of railroads.—Modification of the law.—Public Utilities Commission of 1905.—"In January, 1873, Governor Cadwallader C. Washburn pointed out to the legislature that 'vast and overshadowing corporations in the United States are justly a source of alarm, and the legislature cannot scan too closely every measure that comes before them which proposes to give additional rights and privileges to the railways of the state.' This warning came just previous to a financial panic that profoundly affected the commercial and manufacturing interests of Wisconsin, in common with those of other states. One result of the

financial storm of 1873 was the customary defeat of the dominant party. The Democratic-Liberal Reformers came into power in January, 1874, with William R. Taylor as governor, supported by an assembly of his political faith; but the senate, owing to half of the body being hold-over members, remained Republican. The most conspicuous legislation was an act called the 'Potter Law,' or 'Granger Law,' which asserted the right of the state to regulate railroad freight and passenger rates within the commonwealth through a board of three commissioners clothed with almost autocratic powers. [See also RAILROADS: 1870-1876.] The legislature adjourned on March 13. A fortnight later the presidents of the St. Paul and the Northwestern systems—then, as now, the principal companies operating in the state—officially informed the governor that their respective corporations would 'disregard so much of the law as attempts to fix an arbitrary rate of compensation for freight and passengers.' Their contention was, that the rates fixed by law would 'amount to confiscation, as the working expenses could scarcely be paid under it.' Governor Taylor issued a proclamation to the effect that, unless the companies submitted he would use to the utmost all the great powers of his office to compel them to do so. Action was thereupon brought in the state supreme court, in the nature of a *quo warranto*, for the annulment of the charters of the transgressing roads. Application was also made to the supreme court by the attorney-general, for an injunction restraining the companies from further disobedience of the law. A long legal fight followed, that attracted national attention, with the result that the court granted the injunction, the decision in the case being written by Chief Justice Edward G. Ryan. Judge Ryan held that 'in our day the common law has encountered in England, as in this country, a new power, unknown to its founders, practically too strong for its ordinary private remedies. . . . It comports with the dignity and safety of the state that the franchises of corporations should be subject to the power that grants them, that corporations should exist as the subordinates of the state which is their creator.' The attorney-general was, on his part, instructed not to prosecute the companies for forfeiture of charter until the latter were given a reasonable time to arrange their tariffs under the new law. In the United States District Court at Madison, a suit of stockholders of the Northwestern Railway, praying for an injunction against the state, on the ground that the value of their securities was being depreciated by the Potter Law, was decided against the petitioners, so far as the validity of the law was concerned. The question as to the state's right to interfere with interstate commerce, however, was left undecided, as the court desired to hear further argument. Thus the companies were defeated at every point, so far as traffic within the state was concerned, and open opposition ceased. But more effective measures were now resorted to by them, to influence public opinion against the law. European capitalists, who at that time were chiefly relied upon for assistance in American railroad development, declined further investments in the stock of such roads as ran through the 'Granger states'—some of the neighboring commonwealths having followed Wisconsin's example. Work on roads in course of building was suspended, projected lines were abandoned, some of the smaller towns were, on the plea of enforced economy badly treated in the matter of

service, and everywhere railroad employees were spreading reports that Grangerism was spelling ruin to the companies on whom Wisconsin so largely depended for prosperity. In 1876 the Reform party was buried beneath a mountain of opposition ballots, the sting in the railroad law was promptly removed by the new legislature, and the Granger movement became a closed chapter. . . . In 1905, after some years of renewed agitation, recalling not a few aspects of the Grangerism of three decades previous, the state created a new railroad-rate-regulating commission, composed of three members with large powers. Two years later there were placed under the jurisdiction of this body the various other public utility corporations of the state,—those operating street and interurban railroads, sleeping cars, gas plants, electric power and lighting plants, waterworks, and the like. The constitutionality of laws creating this public utilities commission having been called in question, the state supreme court rendered a decision on June 5, 1908, confirming the validity of the commission and declining to hamper its operations so long as stockholders were allowed a 'reasonable compensation' for their investment. Corporations of this character are now taxed by the state upon an ad valorem basis, the valuation of their tangible property being established by the State Tax Commission (created in 1899), which employs for this purpose a competent staff of engineers, appraisers and accountants."—R. G. Thwaites, *Story of Wisconsin*, pp. 382-387.

1889.—Bennett law.—In 1889 the Bennett law was passed to enforce the teaching of English in the public and parochial schools of Wisconsin. The result was that the German portion of the population voted Democratic in 1890 and the Bennett law was repealed. The Republicans, however, were able to regain their power in 1895.

1901-1905.—Reform movement in state led by La Follette through four campaigns of national interest.—Direct primary issue.—"The lion's share of credit for the political regeneration of Wisconsin is yielded by all to La Follette. . . . Smarting under the humiliation of having his delegates taken away from him in the previous convention, and eager to remedy the sordid political conditions that prevailed, . . . La Follette resolved upon a campaign for the complete abolition of the caucus and convention system. . . . In its stead he decided to propose primary elections for the direct nominations of all candidates for public office from lowest to highest. . . . There was then no thorough-going primary in any state, although the legislatures in a number of states had begun breaking the new ground in sporadic ways. . . . La Follette was . . . alert enough to discern the new movement in its uprising. . . . After his two defeats for nomination [for governor] it was assumed by many that La Follette would not again be a candidate in 1900. . . . But with the entrance of La Follette into the field the other candidates for governor made no headway. . . . With four candidates against him LaFollette was elected by the unparalleled plurality of 102,745 votes. . . . The change of administration in January, 1901 . . . was to mark the passing of an old order. . . . The traditional Republicanism . . . controlled by conservatism and holding to party fetiches was to give way to a new ideal of service to the state and a new type of public servant. . . . The first of the great battles of the session of 1901 was waged over the primary election law. . . . All the interests opposed to La Follette united to discredit

and defeat the measure [which they succeeded in doing at that time]. . . . The second great fight of the session was over the so-called railroad taxation bill. . . . Like the primary bill, this was also to be defeated and created a burning issue for the next campaign. . . . The stalwart allies in the legislature . . . conspired to crush LaFollette in the next campaign [in 1902 and again in 1903. In 1904] the entire state was rent in twain and every political party disrupted by the burning issue of La Folletism. . . . With the election in 1904 La Follette's great fight was finally and decisively won. . . . The legislature chosen at that same election was to write all the demands of the party upon the statute books."—A. O. Barton, *La Follette's winning of Wisconsin*, pp. 77-78, 139, 151, 164, 165, 170-171, 174, 181, 286, 449.—In 1905 Governor La Follette entered the United States Senate. "Thanks to the movement for genuinely democratic popular government which Senator La Follette led to overwhelming victory in Wisconsin, that state has become literally a laboratory for wise experimental legislation aiming to secure social and political betterment for the people as a whole."—T. Roosevelt (C. McCarthy, *Wisconsin idea, introduction*, p. 7).

1902.—Care of deaf and blind children. See CHARITIES: United States: 1874-1902.


1905-1911.—Progressive legislation.—Stringent insurance law.—Examination of state banks.—Economic status.—Governor James O. Davidson was La Follette's successor in office and the advocate of his policy of government administration by experts. "Wisconsin has also taken hold of the insurance problem with vigor. The special session of the legislature which I called in 1905 provided for a committee to investigate insurance corporations. This was about the time of the Hughes investigation in New York, and the committee appointed pursuant to that legislation rendered a very signal service to our state. As a member of that committee H. L. Ekern, who was then Speaker of the Assembly—a legislator of real creative power—developed a very remarkable aptitude for the insurance problem. It was most extraordinary. Ekern is a Norwegian, a university graduate, a lawyer. In the legislature of 1907 he appeared before the committee having charge of the insurance legislation, and there demonstrated his ability to more than hold his own against the ablest actuaries and lawyers representing the largest insurance companies in the United States. In 1910 he was elected Insurance Commissioner of the state and in the legislature of 1911 he brought about a complete recodification of our insurance laws. He has indeed practically laid the basis for a system of state insurance—the first, I think, in the United States. The public service of the state has been democratized by a civil service law opening it to men and women on an equal footing independent of everything excepting qualification and fitness for office. I think the passing of this law was the only case of the kind where the employees then holding office were not blanketed into the service, but were required to take the regular competitive examinations in order to retain their jobs. The law has worked to the great advantage of the service and to the general improvement of political standards. There is no longer any political pull in Wisconsin. I give here, also, some further facts to show that Wisconsin, instead of being retarded by progressive legislation, is advancing more rapidly than the country taken as a whole. Since 1904, when we recodified our whole system for the examination

of state banks, there has not been a single failure among the 573 state banks in Wisconsin, with \$27,000,000 of capital, surplus and undivided profits. The only bank failures in the state have been those of three national banks through embezzlement. During the years 1903 to 1911 the capital, surplus and undivided profits of all state and national banks in Wisconsin increased 72 per cent., whereas for the United States they increased only 48 per cent. Individual deposits for the same years in Wisconsin banks increased 82 per cent., while in the United States as a whole they increased but 74 per cent. The clearing-house exchanges for Milwaukee increased 117.5 per cent. from 1900 to 1910, whereas for the United States the increase was 106 per cent. Milwaukee's increase was greater than Chicago's. Judged by commercial failures, Wisconsin has prospered better in proportion than the country. The total liabilities in commercial failures for the entire United

be fair and complete that did not record the splendid services of the men who led the fight for progressive principles. I regret that I cannot here give to each the individual recognition that is merited. That must wait for a more detailed history of the Wisconsin movement. It was a day-and-night service with them; they left their offices and business interests and devoted years to the great constructive work which has made Wisconsin the safest guide in dealing with the political, economic and social problems of our time."—R. M. La Follette, *La Follette's autobiography*, pp. 364-368.

ALSO IN: F. C. Howe, *Wisconsin: An experiment in democracy*.—R. L. Hale, *Valuation and rate making: Conflicting theories of Railway Commission, 1905-1917* (*Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law*, v. 80).

1907.—Railroad legislation. See RAILROADS: 1907.



STATE HOUSE, MADISON, WISCONSIN

Built at a cost of \$7,000,000 in 1909-1910, on the site of the old building, partly destroyed by fire in 1904.

States in the four years, 1906 to 1909 increased 33 per cent. over the total amount for the preceding four years 1902 to 1905. But the liabilities in Wisconsin for the same years fell off 5.3 per cent. In other words, comparing the four years that followed the progressive victory of 1905 with the four years that preceded it, the business failures in Wisconsin fell off one twentieth, but for the whole United States they increased one third. These are a few of the conclusive proofs that progressive legislation in Wisconsin has not been destructive, as its enemies predicted. Instead of driving capital out of the state it has attracted capital more than other states. It has made investments safe for all, instead of speculative for a few. It has been conservative and constructive as well as progressive. Only one or the progressive laws—a law passed in 1911, declaring flowing water public property—has been overturned by the supreme court of the state, and not one has been carried into the federal courts. No account of the long and successful struggle in Wisconsin would

1908.—Coöperative movement. See COÖPERATION: United States.

1910-1912.—Socialist power.—Election of Berger to Congress. See SOCIALISM: 1901-1913.

1911.—Workmen's Compensation Act passed. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries; United States: 1893-1918.

1911.—Significance of the state income tax.—“For many years expert opinion in the United States has strongly condemned the state income tax. Despite the voice of authority, however, the legislature of Wisconsin passed an income-tax law in 1911, which has since stood the test of two assessments. The Wisconsin income tax originated in an effort to find an equitable and efficient method of personal taxation. . . . The tax on property did not meet the requirements of the situation and, after the necessary constitutional amendment had been secured, a graduated income tax was adopted as the most available supplement to the system previously in force. The law was approved in July, 1911, and went into effect the following

year. The first assessment, therefore, was made in 1912, based upon incomes of 1911. The Wisconsin law is applicable to persons living in Wisconsin, to business transacted there and to income derived from property within the state. Where the business is taxed in Wisconsin any partner or shareholder residing in Wisconsin is exempt in his personal return from income taxed directly to the partnership or corporation. The rates are progressive, rising in the case of individuals and partnerships from one per cent on the first \$1,000 of taxable income to six per cent on taxable income over \$12,000. For corporations the rate rises from two per cent on the first \$1,000 of taxable income to six per cent on income over \$6000. The incomes of wife, husband and children under eighteen years of age are grouped together and the following deductions are allowed: \$800 for an individual, \$1,200 for man and wife and \$200 additional for each child entirely dependent upon the taxpayer for support. No deductions are provided for partnerships and corporations. Educational and benevolent institutions not conducted for pecuniary profit are exempt from the tax, as are insurance companies and all those public utilities which pay taxes directly to the state government. The yield of the tax is, of course, greatly affected by this withdrawal of insurance companies, steam railways, street railways and all gas and power companies associated with street railways. Since the first assessment, banks and trust companies have likewise been exempted from the income tax. This exemption is due to the fact that the income of most of these corporations is given proper weight in fixing assessments under the *ad valorem* tax imposed by the state government. Moreover, in the case of practically all of these corporations, the personal property tax would be sufficient to cancel the income tax. For it is provided by the statute that any personal property tax may be used as an offset or credit against the income tax. Thus a man with an income tax of \$100 and a personal property tax of \$70, pays his personal property tax and only \$30 as income tax. It was found impracticable to make the income tax a complete substitute for the tax on personal property. On the passage of the income-tax law, however, all moneys and credits, household goods and farm machinery were exempted from taxation, thus leaving subject to the property tax only a few kinds of personal property, the most important of which are farm animals, and the stock of merchants and manufacturers. The administration of the tax is highly centralized, the assessment of corporations being made by the tax commission, and the assessment of partnerships and individuals by assessors of incomes appointed by the tax commission in accordance with civil service requirements. But the income tax is still predominantly a local tax. The administration only is centralized. The state government gets only ten per cent of the revenues collected and pays all expenses. Twenty per cent goes to the county government and seventy per cent to the town, city or village in which the tax is collected. . . . The greatest discovery of the Wisconsin income tax is the non-political assessor of incomes. The law requires assessors of income to be selected in accordance with civil-service requirements and without regard to political affiliation. Among the forty-one assessors of incomes there are republicans, democrats, socialists and single-taxers. . . . It is very largely their work that has made the income tax a success. With the

property tax they have wrought something in the nature of a revolution. . . . The insignificant yield of the income tax in rural districts raises sharply the question whether or not the income tax has proved a successful substitute for the personal property tax. No categorical answer to this question can be given. The income tax produced in the first year several times as much as the revenue formerly collected from the important classes of personalty exempted when the income tax took effect. In the larger cities, moreover, the income tax produced enough to warrant the immediate exemption of all personal property from taxation. On the other hand, in the smaller cities, villages and rural townships, the yield of the income tax is, except where there are important mines or factories, almost negligible."—T. S. Adams, *Significance of the Wisconsin income tax (Political Science Quarterly, Dec., 1913, pp. 569-572, 583)*.—In 1912 the state supreme court upheld the constitutionality of the law.

1911-1919.—Governors.—Ratification of Federal amendments.—From 1911 to 1914 F. E. McGovern was governor of the state, conducting an administration in line with the reform program of his two predecessors. The conservative elements of the Republican party appeared to triumph in 1914 in the election of Emanuel Phillip, who, however, proved an able administrator during the critical years of the World War, when the nation looked with concern to the state whose loyalties might have been expected to be divided by sentiments springing from a population markedly of German extraction. The Sixteenth Federal Amendment (Income Tax) was ratified, May 26, 1911; the Seventeenth (Direct Election of Senators), May 8, 1913; and the Nineteenth (Woman Suffrage), June 10, 1919. The Eighteenth Amendment (Prohibition) was not ratified by Wisconsin.

1912-1917.—Important court decisions and legislation.—In 1912 a blue sky law and a minimum wage law were passed. In 1916 a decision of the United States Supreme Court denied to a state the right to revoke the charter of a foreign corporation because it removed a case to the United States courts. Marriage Licenses were regulated by a law passed in 1917, which was one of the earliest attempts to put into application some of the conclusions of eugenics. It required a clear bill of health before a license could be granted.

1917-1918.—Part played in the World War.—In 1917 the legislature provided for a moratorium. The state furnished 87,000 soldiers or 2.5% of the whole force.

1918-1919.—Municipal and coöperative housing law.—"In July [1919] the Wisconsin Legislature added a section to its general corporation law which made it possible for municipalities to engage in housing or for interested individuals to organize themselves to form coöperative housing companies. Under the law in question such a corporation is given power to acquire land and to prepare it for residential use upon approval of any public land commission or city planning commission of any locality where the property of such corporation is located. It is also provided that if the land is located within any city or within a radius of three miles from the boundary of the city approval must be had from the health department for the development of the land. No single dwelling may be erected by such company the cost of which exceeds \$5,000. Sufficient ground space must be provided to furnish sufficient air and light. . . . The Wisconsin act has been se-

cured by the urgency of the Milwaukee Housing Commission, whose report was filed in April, 1918. The original draft of the law was drawn by members of that commission. In its report to the mayor of Milwaukee that commission said among other things: The solution of the housing problem involves—(a) The elimination of speculative land values in some residential districts. (b) Zoning of the city to safeguard all residential districts. (c) Economical and adequate planning of streets, transportation, sewage disposal, water supply, lighting, planting of trees, etc. (d) Elimination of waste in construction of homes. (e) Acquiring for wage earners the benefits of ownership without interfering with labor mobility. (f) Legislation aiming to stimulate the erection of wage earners' homes. (g) Public instruction as to the possibilities of housing betterment."—United States Department of Labor (*Monthly Labor Review*, Sept., 1919).

1921-1922.—Governor Blaine.—State amendment of trial by jury.—John J. Blaine, Republican, was elected governor of Wisconsin in 1922, and Robert M. La Follette was returned to the United States Senate for a fourth term. In that year the voters of Wisconsin made the following amendment to their state constitutions: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in the manner prescribed by law. Provided, however, that the Legislature may, from time to time, by statute, provide that a valid verdict in civil cases may be based on the votes of a specified number of the jury, not less than five sixths thereof."

1923.—Changes in workmen's compensation law. See SOCIAL INSURANCE: Details for various countries; United States: 1023.

ALSO IN: M. M. Strong, *History of the Territory of Wisconsin from 1836-1848*.—S. S. Hebbard, *History of Wisconsin, under dominion of France*.—R. G. Thwaites, *Historic waterways*.—H. C. Campbell, *Wisconsin in three centuries*.—A. H. Sanford, *Government of Wisconsin*.—F. C. Howe, *Wisconsin: An experiment in democracy*.—E. B. Usher, *Wisconsin, its history and biography, 1848-1913*.—F. L. Holmes, *Wisconsin's war record*.—R. G. Thwaites, *Story of Wisconsin*.

WISCONSIN, University of. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1848.

WISE, Henry Alexander (1806-1876), American soldier and political leader. Member of the House of Representatives, 1832-1836, 1837-1841, 1843; minister to Brazil, 1844-1847; governor of Virginia, 1855-1860; joined Confederate army, 1861. See U.S.A.: 1842: Victory of John Quincey Adams, etc.; 1861 (August-December: West Virginia).

WISEMAN, Nicholas Patrick Stephen (1802-1865), English cardinal and first Roman Catholic archbishop of Westminster. Founded the *Dublin Review*, 1836; acted as coadjutor to the vicar apostolic, 1840, and later as vicar apostolic in England, 1849; diplomatic envoy of the pope, 1840-1850; created archbishop of Westminster and cardinal by Pius IX, 1850.

WISEMAN, Sir William George Eden (1885-), British diplomat. Chief adviser on American affairs to the British delegation at the Paris conference, 1918-1919.

WISHART, George (c. 1513-1546), Scottish reformer and martyr. Accused of heresy, 1538, 1539; member of Corpus Christi College in England, 1543-

1545; burned at the stake, at the instigation of Cardinal Beaton, 1546.

WISHOSKAN FAMILY.—"This is a small and obscure linguistic family and little is known concerning the dialects composing it or of the tribes which speak it. . . . The area occupied by the tribes speaking dialects of this language was the coast from a little below the mouth of Eel River to a little north of Mad River, including particularly the country about Humboldt Bay."—J. W. Powell, *Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology*, p. 133.

WISIGOTHS. See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS).

WISMAR, seaport of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Germany, on the Baltic, and an important town in the Hanseatic League. See HANSA TOWNS; GERMANY: 1648: Peace of Westphalia.

WISSELL, Rudolf (1869-), German statesman. Minister of reconstruction, 1919. See GERMANY: 1918-1919 (December-January).

WISSMAN, Hermann von (1853-1905), German-African explorer. Explored West Africa, 1880-1882; Congo basin, 1883-1885; Mozambique and surrounding country, 1886-1887; imperial commissioner, 1889-1890; governor of German East Africa, 1895-1896. See TANGANYIKA TERRITORY: German colonization.

WITAN. See WITENAGEMOT.

WITBOIS, tribe in South Africa. See SOUTHWEST AFRICA: 1905.

WITCHCRAFT, Salem. See MASSACHUSETTS: 1692; 1692-1693.

WITENAGEMOT, assembly of the wise. This in old English history "is the supreme council of the nation, whether the nation be Kent or Mercia as in the earlier, or the whole gens Anglorum et Saxonum, as in the later history. The character of the national council testifies to its history as a later development than the lower courts, and as a consequence of the institution of royalty. The folkmoot or popular assembly of the shire is a representative body to a certain extent: it is attended by the representatives of the hundreds and townships, and has a representative body of witnesses to give validity to the acts that are executed in it. . . . The council of the aggregated state is not a folkmoot but a witenagemot. . . . On great occasions . . . we must understand the witenagemot to have been attended by a concourse of people whose voices could be raised in applause or in resistance to the proposals of the chiefs. But that such gatherings shared in any way the constitutional powers of the witan, that they were organized in any way corresponding to the machinery of the folkmoot, that they had any representative character in the modern sense, as having full powers to act on behalf of constituents, that they shared the judicial work, or except by applause and hooting influenced in any way the decision of the chiefs, there is no evidence whatever. . . . The members of the assembly were the wise men, the sapientes, witan; the king, sometimes accompanied by his wife and sons; the bishops of the kingdom, the ealdormen of the shires or provinces, and a number of the king's friends and dependents. . . . The number of the witan was thus never very large."—W. Stubbs, *Constitutional history of England*, v. 1, ch. 6, sect. 51-52.—See also ENGLAND: 958; 959-975; PARLIAMENT, ENGLISH: Early stages of its evolution; SUFFRAGE, MANHOOD: British empire: 500-1295.

ALSO IN: J. M. Kemble, *Saxons in England*, v. 2, bk. 2, ch. 6.—H. Taylor, *Origin and growth of English constitution*, v. 1.—A. B. White, *Making of the English constitution*, pt. 1, sect. 3.—F. Pollock

and F. W. Maitland, *History of English law*.—T. Hodgkin, *Political history of England to 1066*.—W. Stubbs, *Constitutional history of England*, v. 1, pp. 119-140.

WITE-THEOW, one who was enslaved for non-payment of debts in medieval times. See **THEOW**; **SLAVERY**: 1000-1070.

WITHERSPOON, John (1723-1794), American divine and signer of the Declaration of Independence. See U. S. A.: 1776 (July): Text of Declaration of Independence.

WITIGES. See **VITIGES**.

WITIKIND. See **WIDUKIND**.

WITIZA, or **Benedict of Aniane** (750-821), French monk. See **MONASTICISM**: 9th-13th centuries.

WITNESSES, Legal. See **COMMON LAW**: 1208; 1450; 1470; **CRIMINAL LAW**: 1547.

WITOS, Vincent, Polish statesman. Premier, 1920-1921. See **POLAND**: 1922.

WITT, John de. See **DE WITT**, JOHN.

WITTE, Sergei Yuleivitch, Count (1849-1915), Russian statesman. In charge of the management of transportation of troops during the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878; held various administrative offices in connection with railways until appointed minister of communications, 1892; minister of finance, 1892-1903; president of Committee of Ministers, 1903; peace envoy at Portsmouth, 1905; first prime minister, 1905-1906; member of Council of the Empire, 1906. See **RUSSIA**: 1809-1903; 1902-1904; 1905 (August); (November-December); 1905-1906; **JAPAN**: 1905; **PORTSMOUTH**, **TREATY OF**; **RAILROADS**: 1837-1908.

WITTEKIND. See **WIDUKIND**.

WITTELSBACH, House of, family name of the former House of Bavaria, and of the former electors of the Palatinate. The dynasty was deposed in 1918. See **BAVARIA**: 1180-1356; 1918-1919; **GERMANY**: 1621-1623; **PALATINATE OF THE RHINE**: 1214.

WITTENBERG, town of Saxony, Prussia, on the Elbe, about fifty-five miles southwest of Berlin. 16th century.—School of Melancthon. See **EDUCATION**: Modern: 16th century: Melancthon.

1517.—Scene of Luther's attacks against the doctrine of indulgence. See **PAPACY**: 1517: Luther's attack upon the indulgences; **GERMANY**: 1517-1523; **EUROPE**: Renaissance and Reformation: Melancthon an aid to Luther.

1521.—Luther burns papal bull. See **PAPACY**: 1517-1521.

1813.—Siege and capture by the allies. See **GERMANY**: 1813 (October-December).

1914-1918.—State of prison camp. See **WORLD WAR**: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: XIII. Prisoners, etc.: a.

WITTENBERG, University of. See **UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES**: University customs.

WITTENWEIHER, Battle of (1638). See **GERMANY**: 1634-1639.

WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig Adolf Peter, Count, Prince of Sayn-Wittgenstein-Ludwigsburg (1769-1843), Russian field-marshal. Took part in campaigns against Napoleon, 1807, 1812; in command of allied troops, 1813; commanded a Russian division, 1813-1814; commanded the Army of the Pruth and occupied the Danubian provinces during the war with Turkey, 1828. See **GERMANY**: 1812-1813; 1813 (April-May); **RUSSIA**: 1812 (June-September); (October-December).

WITTSTOCK, Battle of (1636). See **GERMANY**: 1634-1639.

WITU, sultanate on the east coast of Africa, forming part of the Tanaland province of the

British East Africa protectorate. The sultan nominally rules but the government is conducted by the British resident. The country was a German protectorate, from 1885 until 1890, when it was yielded to the British.

1884.—Country comes under German control. See **AFRICA**: Modern European occupation: 1884-1890.

1890.—Ceded to England by Germany in exchange for Heligoland. See **GERMANY**: 1890-1891.

1895.—Included in the British East Africa protectorate. See **BRITISH EAST AFRICA**: 1895-1897.

WLADISLAUS, kings of Hungary. See **LADISLAUS**.

Wladislaus I (1260-1333), king of Poland, 1319-1333.

Wladislaus II, Jagiello (1350-1434), king of Poland, 1386-1434. Grand duke of Lithuania, 1381-1434; married Hedwig, queen of Poland, and crowned king, 1386; defeated Teutonic Knights at Tannenburg, 1410. See **POLAND**: 1333-1572.

Wladislaus III (1424-1444), king of Poland, 1434-1444, king of Hungary, 1440-1444. See **AUSTRIA**: 1437-1516; **HUNGARY**: 1301-1442.

Wladislaus IV (1595-1648), king of Poland, 1632-1648. See **POLAND**: 1590-1648.

WODEN, or **Woten**. See **ODIN**.

WÖERINGIN, Battle of. See **WERRINGEN**, **BATTLE OF**.

WÖEVRE, plain to the east of Verdun, eastern France. It was a scene of conflict between the Allies and the Central Powers in the World War. See **WORLD WAR**: 1918: II. Western front: g, 10.

WÖHLER, Friedrich (1800-1882), German chemist. See **CHEMISTRY**: Organic: Defined; General: Modern: Lavoisier; **INVENTIONS**: 19th century: Industry.

WOHLGEMUTH, or **Wohlgemut**, Michael (1434-1519), German painter. See **PAINTING**: German.

WOIPPY, Battle of. See **FRANCE**: 1870 (September-October).

WOLCOTT, Oliver (1726-1797), American soldier and signer of the Declaration of Independence. See U. S. A.: 1776 (July): Text of Declaration of Independence; **CONNECTICUT**: 1818.

WOLF, Friedrich August (1759-1824), German scholar and historian. See **HISTORY**: 26.

WOLF, Hugo (1860-1903), Austrian composer. Studied with his father and at the Vienna Conservatory; music critic for the *Salonblatt*, Vienna, 1884-1887; composed the bulk of his work from 1887 to 1896. His chief characteristic was the writing of entire cycles by one poet rather than single songs; chief among these cycles are the "Mörike" cycle of fifty-three songs, the "Eichendorff," cycle of twenty songs, and the "Goethe" cycle of fifty-one songs.—See also **MUSIC**: Modern: 1818-1921.

WOLFE, James (1727-1759), British general. Fought against the Scottish insurgents, 1745-1747; commanded a division at the capture of Louisburg, 1758; commanded at the capture of Quebec, 1759. See **CANADA**: 1759 (July-September).

WOLFENBÜTTEL. See **BRUNSWICK-WOLFENBÜTTEL**.

WOLFF, or **Wolf**, Christian (1679-1754), German philosopher. See **UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES**: 1694-1906.

WOLF-FERRARI, Ermanno (1876-), Italian composer. See **MUSIC**: Modern: 1842-1921: Modern Italian school.

WOLFRAM VON ESCHENBACH (c. 1165-c. 1220), German poet. See **GERMAN LITERATURE**: 1050-1350.

WOLFSBRÜCKE, Battle of (1645). See GERMANY: 1640-1645.

WOLGAST, Battle of (1628). See GERMANY: 1627-1629.

WOLLASTON, William Hyde (1766-1828), English chemist and physicist. See INVENTIONS: 19th century: Instruments.

WOLLENS ACT, United States (1867). See TARIFF: 1860-1883.

WOLSELEY, Garnet Joseph, Viscount (1833-1913), British field marshal. Served in second Burmese War, 1852-1853; in India, also taking part in the relief of Lucknow, 1857; fought in the war with China, 1860; commander of Red River Expedition to put down Riel's rebellion in Canada, 1870; commanded in Ashanti War, 1873-1874; administrator of Natal, 1875; member of the council for India, 1876; governor of Natal and the Transvaal, 1879-1880; defeated Egyptian insurgents under Arabi Pasha, 1882; commanded expedition for the relief of Gordon, 1884-1885; commander-in-chief of the forces in Ireland, 1890; commander-in-chief of the British army, 1895-1900. See EGYPT: 1882-1883; CHANNEL TUNNEL: 1914 (May).

WOLSEY, Thomas (c. 1475-1530), English cardinal and statesman. Dean of Lincoln, 1509; privy counselor, 1511; bishop of Lincoln, 1514; archbishop of York, 1514; became lord chancellor and cardinal, 1515; prime minister of Henry VIII, 1515; legate of the pope, 1519; deprived of offices because of disagreement with Henry VIII regarding his divorce, 1529; restored to archbishopric of York; arrested on a charge of treason, 1530. See ENGLAND: 1513-1529; EUROPE: Renaissance and Reformation: Catholic Reformation; BALANCE OF POWER: Modern application.

WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, organization of women, primarily for the promotion of temperance. As a result of the great temperance crusade of 1874, a group of women issued a call for a convention of temperance women, which was held in Cleveland, Ohio, Nov. 7, 1874. Sixteen states were represented. This was the first of a continuous succession of annual conventions. Mrs. Annie Wittermyer was the first president of the national organization and was succeeded in

1879 by Frances E. Willard, who held the position until her death in 1898. Later presidents have been Mrs. L. M. N. Stevens, who followed Miss Willard, and Anna A. Gordon, who took office in 1914. In 1883, due to the efforts of Miss Willard, the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union was organized.—See also LIQUOR PROBLEM: United States: 1869-1893.

WOMAN'S COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, group of ten representative women of the United States, appointed by the Council of National Defense, Apr. 21, 1917, to coöordinate and centralize the war work of women. The members were Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, of New York, chairman; Miss Ida Tarbell, of New York, vice chairman; Mrs. Philip N. Moore, of St. Louis, secretary; Mrs. Stanley McCormick, of Boston, treasurer; Mrs. Josiah E. Cowles, of California; Miss Maud Wetmore, of Rhode Island; Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, of New York; Mrs. Antoinette Funk, of Illinois; Mrs. Joseph R. Lamar, of Georgia; and Miss Agnes Nestor, of Illinois. The organization had state divisions in forty-eight states, and acted as a mouthpiece of the government, sending messages to women, stimulating patriotic service, and supplying a channel for effective prosecution of war work. There were ten departments or subcommittees finding their counterpart in state, county, and civic units, namely, registration, food production and home economics, food administration, women in industry, child welfare, maintenance of existing social service agencies, health and recreation, education, Liberty Loan, and home and foreign relief: The headquarters at 1814 N Street N. W., Washington, D. C., became a clearing house for war activities through organizations and through individuals. When the Council of National Defense at the termination of hostilities turned its attention to problems of reconstruction, the Woman's Committee, by an amalgamation with the state councils section, was merged into the field division of the council, guiding the work of 184,000 units of state, county, community and municipal councils of defense, and local units of women's committees throughout the country.

WOMAN'S RIGHTS

Introduction.—A comprehensive, and critical history of women's rights, which takes into consideration all the factors in the situation, does not exist, notwithstanding the constant appeal to history in support of this or that thesis with regard to women. Most existing histories have been written in the heat of the conflict for the emancipation of women, and have, in one way or another, the bias of propaganda. Moreover, the data for such history is scanty and not easy to interpret—belonging as it does to the intimate, partly unconscious, and generally unrecorded life of the world. The records of women's legal rights and the indirect testimony of literature—the two main sources of historical material—or even the biographies of exceptional women furnish only very partial testimony for the history of women's position and real social rights. Through the greater part of the world's history the attempt to extend woman's rights concerns woman, not as an individual, but as a social institution—as daughter, wife, or mother. The economic and social importance of women is so overwhelmingly important in any condition of economic life short

of the most highly civilized that it is only under conditions of exceptional material prosperity and a high development of the arts of living that women have been sufficiently free from their fundamental tasks of feeding, clothing, and mothering the world to look around for any other works or opportunity for self-expression. Whenever conditions of prosperity obtain, and the woman's arts of providing food and clothing begin to be organized by men on a large scale—as in Greece in its most brilliant period, in the convents of the Middle Ages, in Europe following the Industrial Revolution—a movement toward the so-called "freedom" of women forthwith develops. But such periods have been brief in the history of the world, and with the collapse of the general organization of the arts of life before war or disaster or the too rapid change and development of national life, women are forced back into their primitive place as feeders, clothers, and mothers, and are too busy keeping the machinery of life running in the unit of the family to think of other fields of activity. The most recent movement for the "emancipation" of women in the

nineteenth century bids fair to be the most permanent because it is based on a change in the industrial foundations of society, which has practically abolished the original primitive industries of the household. The history of women's rights is therefore a large and somewhat nebulous subject. Sometimes it concerns humane provisions to make the woman comfortable in her all important place in the home, as in ancient Babylonia and Egypt. Sometimes women's rights are considered to be their rights, not to be made happy and efficient in the home, but to escape from it altogether. Nearly everything that concerns the intimate life of the family, as the unit of society, becomes a part of the subject of woman's rights. In this survey the attempt has been made to cover the outstanding periods in the history of the world when there has been some effort to improve the quality and scope of woman's life, whether in the home or out of it.

Women in prehistoric times.—"On the threshold of the past we find the horde as the first human community. In the horde, as in the cattle herd, sexual impulses were gratified without order or separation according to pairs. We have no grounds for assuming that in this primitive state men were physically or mentally superior to women. Not only is such an assumption *a priori* improbable, the observations afforded us by savage races at the present day tend to prove the contrary. Among all such races the size and weight of the brain differs far less according to sex than is the case among civilised nations, while in regard to bodily strength, little or no inferiority exists on the side of the women. Indeed, certain tribes in the interior of Africa are governed by women instead of men, owing to the superior strength of the former. In one Afghan tribe the women carry on war and hunt, while the men attend to the household. The King of Ashantee in West Africa, and the King of Dahomey in Central Africa have female bodyguards, and regiments entirely recruited from and officered by women, which distinguish themselves from the male troops by greater courage and bloodthirstiness. . . . The so-called Amazon States which are supposed to have existed in ancient times on the shore of the Black Sea and in Asia, and which were composed entirely of women, can only be explained on the grounds of physical authority. . . . As long as the single hordes, and later on the tribes (clans) were in a state of constant warfare, and before agriculture or the breeding of cattle had been introduced, and death was consequently no rare occurrence, it was a matter of primary importance for the horde or tribe to free itself from every appendage that required care, that was an impediment in battle or flight, and that promised small future return for the trouble incurred. This applied especially to female children, who were consequently put out of the way as soon as possible after birth. A few only of the strongest were allowed to live for the necessary purposes of propagation. This is the simple explanation of the practice which still exists among many savage races of Further Asia and Africa, of killing female infants immediately after birth, a practice which has also been erroneously ascribed to the modern Chinese. The same fate was shared by all male children who came crippled or misshapen into the world, and therefore threatened to become a burden to the tribe. They too were put out of the way. As is well known, the same custom prevailed in several Greek States, *e. g.*, in Sparta. A further rea-

son for destroying female children was the loss of life which an endless state of warfare occasioned among the males, who thus sought to avoid a disproportionate increase of women. Moreover, it was a far simpler plan to capture women by force than to bring them up from infancy."—A. Bebel, *Woman*, pp. 7-9.

B. C. 2250-538.—Babylonia.—Provisions with regard to women in Code of Hammurabi.—Temple prostitution.—"Hammurabi, the great law-maker of the Babylonians, . . . published a number of regulations relating to marriage. Adultery was punishable by the death of both persons by drowning. Provision was made for the desertion of wives. 'If a man has abandoned his city, and absconded, and after that his wife has entered the house of another, if that man comes back and claims his wife, because he had fled and deserted his city, the wife of the deserter shall not return to her husband.' A wife or a concubine who had borne children could not be sent away from the harem without the return of her dowry, and she was at liberty to marry again. Incest incurred a penalty of death, either by drowning or burning, according to the severity of the crime. The law of Hammurabi was very rigid in regard to the descent of property through the mother. 'If a man has married a wife and she has borne children, and that woman has gone to her fate, then her father has no claim upon her dowry. The dowry is her children's.' Mr. Chilperic Edwards, author of 'The Oldest Laws in the World,' writes, in his notes on the Hammurabi Code, that many of the stories of Herodotus about the women of Babylon are fables. 'The Babylonian woman was given in marriage by her father or brothers. The suitor, or his family, paid a certain sum as "bride-price," the amount being often handed over in instalments. The bride's father gave her a "dowry," which usually, but not necessarily, included the "bride-price." The bridegroom might also make his bride a "settlement." The status of the concubine is not clear. She does not seem to be necessarily of lower rank, like the Roman, but was a secondary spouse. Like the chief wife she carried bride-price and dowry, and we may assume that she possessed the same rights as the chief wife in regard to maintenance and participation in the husband's estate.' A humane measure for the annulment of marriage on the ground of incompatibility is recorded in the following clause: 'If a woman hate her husband, and say "Thou shalt not possess me," the reason for her dislike shall be inquired into. If she be careful, and has no fault, but her husband takes himself away and neglects her, then that woman is not to blame. She shall take her dowry and go back to her father's house.' In Babylon women were queens and priestesses, and held other exalted positions. The goddess was more honoured than the god. Women owned property and had equal rights with men. The Queen Semiramis had immense sway; and greater still was the power of Nitocris, who, according to Herodotus, enlarged and fortified the city and showed a wonderful capacity for engineering and the planning of canals and reservoirs. By the . . . Code of Hammurabi, marriage by purchase and polygamy were permitted in Babylon. But wives could not be divorced at the caprice of the husband, and the marriage dowry given to the bride by her father could not be taken from her even though she were divorced. Concubinage was allowed by the Code, the secondary wife, or concubine, ranking as subordinate to the chief wife.

"If a man desired a maiden for his wife, he approached her parents first, and the prospective bride had no voice in the contract. Herodotus describes a custom of the Babylonian villagers that recalls the old-time hiring fairs of England. Once a year all the girls of a marriageable age were collected together in an open space, surrounded by a crowd of men. One by one the damsels were put up for sale, the more comely being first offered to the bidders. The wealthiest men naturally secured the most beautiful wives. After the disposal of the handsome women, their plain sisters were sold by auction; but in this case they were given to poor men, and the successful bidder was one who would accept the lowest dowry. This sum was paid out of the sale of the beautiful maidens. Until the buyer of a girl had given full assurance that he would marry her legally, he was not permitted to carry her away. In the event of disharmony in the married life, the wife would be freed from the tie by the return of the purchase money. 'Such,' writes the historian, 'was their best institution. It has not, however, continued to exist.' At a later period, after defeats in warfare and impoverishment, the poorer classes resorted to the selling of their daughters in prostitution. Herodotus refers to the sacred prostitution of women at the Temple of Mylitta, the Venus of the Babylonians. Generally speaking, prostitution is comparatively uncommon in polygamous countries, and its introduction often arises from the coming of strangers from the monogamous nations. The religious rite observed in the Babylonian temple was by no means a purely commercial transaction. Once in her life every woman in ancient Babylon was compelled to sit in the Temple of Mylitta until chosen by a man. . . . After 'absolving herself from her obligation to the goddess,' the woman returned home, and was regarded as chaste. . . . The rite of Mylitta was designed as a benefit to the woman-devotee. . . . Similar rites were practised by the Egyptians, the Romans, in the worship of Priapus, the Corinthians, and among the priestesses of Cyprus. In Lydia it was the custom of girls to prostitute themselves for the purpose of securing a marriage-portion. Frazer is of the opinion that this was a development of sacred prostitution. At first the money is offered to the god, but later it is used by the woman as a marriage-portion. . . . The secularisation of prostitution followed gradually upon the decay of religious and symbolic prostitution among the Eastern nations. Once a ceremony of holy and solemn import, it degenerated into a mere traffic for money, and is now a commercial institution of every monogamous country. In the harems of Babylon, the wives held considerable power and high status. Nor were the concubines the mere chattels of their masters. The Hammurabi Codes had important clauses respecting the treatment of inferior wives. If a man determined to dismiss a concubine, he was compelled to pay her 'the usufruct of field, garden, and goods,' to maintain and educate her children. A bride put away on the ground of sterility, or for another cause, was entitled to the price originally paid for her. If there was no bride-price, the husband paid her one mina of silver; and in the case of a poor man one-third of a mina of silver. In regard to faithless wives in the harem, the law was not liberal. The woman who had 'belittled her husband,' or 'played the fool,' was sent away without compensation or held as the slave of a new wife. An errant wife was condemned to death by

drowning, a favourite Oriental punishment for women."—W. M. Gallichan, *Women under polygamy*, pp. 23-24, 17-22.—See also BABYLONIA: Social structure; EDUCATION: Ancient: B. C. (c) 35th-6th centuries: Babylonia and Assyria.

B. C. 2000-500.—Egypt.—Comparatively high status of Egyptian women.—Legal position.—Condition of women under polygamy.—Domestic life of monarchs.—'Among the Egyptians,' wrote Diodorus, 'the woman rules over the man.' The existence of the harem in a nation so distinguished as ancient Egypt for a recognition of sex-equality, is somewhat bewildering at the first thought. Let us remember that polygamy from the earliest times has been the privilege and the luxury of the rich. It was never the practice of a vast mass of the population in polygamous countries. Therefore, in speaking of such countries, we must not lose sight of the fact that the bulk of women are outside of the harems. It is also necessary that we should recognize the constant recruiting of the inmates of the harem by the importation of alien women. . . . [But the harem is not really typical of the present domestic life of the Egyptians, though happy relations between men and women seemed often to flourish there.] In Egypt of ancient days the mass of the people laboured for the mere maintenance of existence, and bowed beneath the stern common lot of the multitude in most civilised nations. Family life among the humble was on a very different plane from the luxurious lives of the influential and the wealthy. But in happy domesticity the Egyptians excelled all peoples. The women were the beloved of their husbands, the mistresses of the house. Innumerable are the precepts to husbands, urging them to bestow tenderness and affection upon their wives, to cherish them in every manner and to honour all women. The marriage contracts, in the days of the highest culture in Egypt, prove conclusively that women were more favoured than men. Purchase-marriage became a form only, for the bride-price was given to her, and the wife's property was entirely her own to enjoy and dispense as she chose. In the event of separation, the wife retained her possessions. A woman who left her husband was entitled to all that was her own, and in some instances the wife was endowed with the whole of her husband's belongings. Children were carefully and lovingly tended by both parents. Even the child of a slave woman was legitimate and accorded equitable rights. The woman who had wandered from the strict path of chastity was not scorned nor made an outcast. Petah Hotep declared that such misfortune should be softened by the kindness of the man who had consorted with her. He was enjoined to shelter her and 'be kind to her for a season,' and to 'send her not away.' [Even within the bounds of polygamy there seems to have been considerateness and justice.] The wives living in polygamy had each their own house; their children were endowed and their property-rights were well-defined. Instead of being at the beck and call of her husband at any time, the woman received him in her own house as an invited guest. [The highest dignity and luxury of women in polygamous union was found in the royal household.] . . . When the Egyptians became pacific, women enjoyed the social, civic and domestic advantages which were denied to them during the militant period. The Greek travellers in Egypt were surprised at the independence of the women. It is doubtful whether, at the highest stage in their culture, the Greeks

approached the Egyptian ideal of family life."—W. M. Gallichan, *Women under polygamy*, pp. 25-27.

B. C. 1200.—Women in old Indian law.—Dependence upon and subservience to husbands.—"The position of women in all countries is largely determined by the teaching of the prevailing faith. In the monogamous Christian nations, the social and marital status of women is due chiefly to the precepts of St. Paul and the ascetic Fathers. Hindu women owe their position principally to the elaborate counsels and rules laid down by Vishnu and Manu. Indian sacred writings abound with the most explicit commands upon the relations of the sexes. Manu fears woman as all men fear an overwhelming fascination. He desires that she should be justly and kindly treated. The necessity for her protection is constantly urged upon men. . . . Thus speaks Manu:—"Day and night women must be kept in dependence by the males of their families. . . . Her father protects her in childhood, her husband protects her in youth, and her sons protect her in old age. A woman is never fit for independence. He who carefully guards his wife, preserves the purity of his offspring, virtuous conduct, his family, himself, and his means of acquiring merit. No man can completely guard women by force; but they can be guarded by the employment of the following expedients: Let the husband employ his wife in the collection and expenditure of his wealth, in keeping everything clean, in the fulfilment of religious duties, in the preparation of his food, and in looking after the household utensils." . . . In 'The Institutes of Vishnu' there are a number of clauses relating to marriage. A man is forbidden to marry a woman of a lower caste. No woman having six fingers can be married, nor one having lost one of her limbs. There is a curious prohibition against marriage with a woman of decidedly red hair. . . . Finally, Vishnu forbids marriage with a woman who 'talks idly.' The stigma of virginity must be removed as soon as possible after a girl attains to the function of womanhood. If no man chooses her within three months, she is at liberty to make her choice. We will now survey some of 'The Duties of a Woman,' according to Vishnu. To live in harmony with her husband. To show reverence (by embracing their feet and such-like attentions) to her mother-in-law, father-in-law, to Gurus (such as elders), to divinities, and to guests. To keep household articles (such as the winnowing basket and the rest) in good array. To maintain saving habits. To be careful with her pestle and mortar and other domestic utensils. Not to practise incantations with roots, or other kinds of witchcraft. To observe auspicious customs. Not to decorate herself with ornaments, or to partake of amusements, while her husband is absent from home. Not to resort to the houses of strangers during the absence of her husband. Not to stand near the doorway or by the windows of her house. Not to act by herself in any matter. To remain subject, in her infancy, to her father; in her youth to her husband; and in her old age to her sons. After the death of her husband to preserve her chastity, or to ascend the pile after him. No sacrifice, no penance, and no feasting allowed to women apart from their husbands; to pay obedience to her lord is the only means for a woman to obtain bliss in heaven. A woman who keeps a fast or performs a penance in the lifetime of her lord, deprives her husband of his life, and will go to hell. The following advice to would-be husbands is from the 'Upanishads.'

'She is the best of women whose garments are pure. Therefore let him approach a woman whose garments are pure, and whose fame is pure, and address her.' . . . Are these ordinances obeyed to the letter? . . . It is fairly evident, from all that we hear of the present position of the women of India, that neither Manu or Vishnu are invariably accepted quite literally."—W. M. Gallichan, *Women under polygamy*, pp. 91-95.—See also INDIA: People; ASIA: European influences, etc.: 5.

B. C. 600-300.—Seclusion of Greek women.—Citizen-women of Athens.—Hetaira.—Woman's life in the home.—Legal position.—Feminism in Greek literature.—The life of the Greek woman, especially at Athens during the period of its greatest glory, is usually represented as extremely limited. 'The citizen-women had special apartments assigned to them, generally in the upper story, that they might have to come downstairs, and men might see them if they ventured out. Then they were forbidden to be present at any banquet. The men preferred to dine by themselves, rather than expose their wives to their neighbour's gaze. And in order to defy all possibility of temptation, the women must wrap up every part of their bodies. In addition to these external arrangements, laws were passed such as might deter the most venturesome. . . . Restrictions of the most stringent nature and punishments the most terrible were employed to keep the citizenship pure. To help further to realize the position of the Athenian wife, we have to add that she was generally married about the age of fifteen or sixteen. Up to this time she had seen and heard as little as possible, and had inquired about nothing. Her acquaintance with the outside world had been made almost exclusively in religious processions. . . . When she married, her life was not much more varied. Her duties lay entirely within the house. They were summed up in the words, 'to remain inside to be obedient to her husband.' She superintended the female slaves who carded the wool; she made, or assisted in making the garments of her husband and children; she had charge of the provisions; and she was expected to devote some time to the infants. If she went out at all, it was to some religious procession or to a funeral, and if old she might occasionally visit a female friend and take breakfast with her, or help her in some hour of need. For the discharge of the duties which fell to an Athenian woman no great intellectual power was needed, and accordingly the education of girls was confined to the merest elements. . . . Matches were managed to a large extent by old women, who were allowed to go from house to house, and who explained to the young woman the qualities of the young man and to the young man the qualities of the young woman. A marriage concluded in such a way might or might not be happy, but there could be little ideal love about it. Nor is there any reason to believe that the Athenians were very fond of their wives. They liked them if they managed their houses economically, and had healthy children, especially sons. . . . [The husbands were absent from their wives for] most part of the day; they did not discuss with them subjects of the highest moment; they did not share with them their thoughts and aspirations. The domestic sentiment was feeble."—J. Donaldson, *Woman*, pp. 50-53.—"Generally speaking, the law afforded a woman but little protection from her husband; infidelity on his part did not entitle her to a divorce. On the other hand, the strictest fidelity was required from the wife; but, in spite of the

seclusion in which she lived, infidelity was by no means uncommon. . . . In most Greek states the offenders were punished by the loss of certain rights, and the husband was not only justified in demanding a divorce, but even morally bound to do so if his wife's wrong-doing had been noised abroad. The law took no steps to punish the lover; but the husband had the right to inflict corporal punishment on him, or even, if he caught him in the act, to kill him, unless, indeed, he preferred to seek compensation for his shame in a money fine. In case of divorce, too, the woman was worse off than the man. In consequence of the loose relation of the marriage-tie, it was very easy to break it. A husband could dismiss his wife or send her back to her parents, or the woman could simply leave her husband's house, and this was usually enough to annul the marriage. Women of the better classes only went out attended by a servant or slave, and then but seldom. A respectable woman stayed at home as much as possible. . . . There were no common meetings for them as there were for men. They visited one another occasionally, and there were a few festivals in the year to which they went without the men, and then the proceedings seem to have been very lively, as for instance, at the Thesmophoria. The women drove in their finest clothes to the Eleusinian celebrations, and they also took part in the Panathenaea, on which occasion the daughters of the resident foreigners carried their chairs and sunshades behind them. In general, it appears as though more liberty had been gradually granted women in the matter of appearance in public."—A. Zimmern, *Home life of ancient Greeks*, pp. 149-153.—"The citizen-women were confined to their houses, and did not dine in company with the men. But the men refused to limit their associations with women to the house. They wished to have women with them in their walks, in their banquets, in their military expeditions. The wives could not be with them then, but there was no constraint on the stranger-women . . . and accordingly they selected these stranger women as their companions, and 'Hetaira,' or companion, was the name by which the whole class was designated. Thus arose a most unnatural division of functions among the women of those days. The citizen-women had to be mothers and housewives—nothing more; the stranger-women had to discharge the duties of companions, but remain outside the pale of the privileged and marriageable class. These stranger-women applied their minds to their function, with various ideas of it, and various methods. Many adopted the lowest possible means of gaining the good-will of men; but many set about making themselves fit companions for the most intellectual and most elevated among men. They were the only educated women in Athens. They studied all the arts, became acquainted with all new philosophical speculations, and interested themselves in politics. Women who thus cultivated their minds were sure to gain the esteem of the best men in Greece. Many of them also were women of high moral character, temperate, thoughtful, and earnest, and were either unattached or attached to one man, and to all intents and purposes married. Even if they had two or three attachments, but behaved in other respects with temperance and sobriety, such was the Greek feeling in regard to their peculiar position, that they did not bring down upon themselves any censure from even the sternest of Greek moralists."—J. Donaldson, *Woman*, pp. 57-59.—"Notwithstanding this, every-

where and always in antiquity a woman's sphere was supposed to be the household, and when the family and the number of slaves were large, this charge required a good deal of strength and attention. Not only had all the food to be prepared for the household, but also the clothing had to be provided for all its members; for it was very unusual for any woman, who had numerous slaves at her disposal, to purchase stuffs or clothes ready-made. They therefore spent a great part of the day with their daughters and maids in a specially appointed part of the house, where the looms were set up. Here, in the first place, the wool, which was bought in a rough condition, was prepared for working, by washing and beating, then fulled and carded, disagreeable occupations which, on account of the exertion required, were usually left to the maids. The wool thus prepared for working was then put in large work or spinning-baskets . . . and we often see these on monuments which represent scenes from a woman's life."—A. Zimmern, *Home life of the ancient Greeks*, p. 153.—The legal position of the wife is thus defined in Xenophon's "Economicus." "If at some future time God grant us to have children born to us, we will take counsel together how best to bring them up, for that . . . will be a common interest, and a common blessing, if haply they shall live to fight our battles and we find in them hereafter support and succor when ourselves are old. But at present there is our house here, which belongs alike to both. It is common property, for all that I possess goes by my will into the common fund, and in the same way all that you deposited was placed by you to the common fund. We need not stop to calculate in figures which of us contributed most, but rather let us lay to heart this fact that which ever of us proves the better partner, he or she at once contributes what is most worth having."—G. W. Botsford and E. G. Sihler, *Hellenic civilization*, p. 503.—There were not wanting complaints of the monotony, loneliness, and drudgery of the secluded life of women. A poet in the Greek anthology bewails the lot of women thus. "The task of youths is not so great as falls to us delicate women. They have their comrades, to whom with fearless utterance they tell the pains of their anxiety. They are busy with diverting games, and roaming about the streets, enjoy bright colored pictures. 'Tis not permitted us to see the daylight, but in dim rooms we are hidden, wasted with worries."—*Ibid.*, p. 704.—Despite the fact that in the brief period of the finest Greek civilization nothing effective was done to release women from conditions whose ill effects were beginning to be recognized, there must have been a considerable "woman's rights" movement—to judge from the tone of Literature. Euripides is full of passages which have the very quality of the modern feminist discontent. "Lysistrata," by Aristophanes, boldly puts the whole case of the modern woman suffragists, proclaiming that a woman's hand on the helm of state now and then would preserve a man-ridden polity from considerable foolishness. The existence of a good deal of feminist discussion is further attested by Plato, who comes out boldly with the whole feminist program, striking at the root of the matter, after the fashion of the most daring of European feminists, with a proposal for communal motherhood and householding, and equal political responsibilities even to the highest administrative offices of the state.

B. C. 300-A. D. 300.—Ancient Rome.—Political

divisions.—Domestic position of women.—Marriage and divorce.—Economic independence.—Public activities.—Degeneracy in the latter days of the empire.—Political and social power of women of the upper classes.—“In Roman society there were . . . three classes of women—the full citizen, the alien, and the slave. The Roman citizen could marry only a woman who was the daughter of a Roman citizen. Marriage with any other was impossible. The very object of marriage was to produce a race of citizens, and, therefore, both father and mother must belong to the class of citizens. It was for this reason that such care was taken of the purity of Roman women, and such a broad distinction was drawn between the conduct of the man and the woman. There must be no suspicion of spuriousness in regard to the Roman citizen. But the offspring of the man with a foreign woman or a slave did not become a citizen, and, therefore, the State was perfectly indifferent as to what relations might exist between a male citizen and alien women or slaves, and society was equally indifferent. The Roman idea of a family made the father a despot, with the power of life and death over his children, who could do nothing without his consent. This was the case in regard to male children, even after they had reached a considerable age. Women, according to the opinion of the early Romans, were always children. They required protection and guidance during their whole life, and could never be freed from despotic control. Accordingly, when a Roman girl married, she had to choose whether she would remain under the control of her father, or pass into the control, or—as it was called—into the hands of her husband. It is likely that in the early ages of the city she always passed from the power of her father into the hands of her husband, and the position she occupied was that of daughter to her husband. She thus became entirely subject to him, and was at his mercy. Roman history supplies many instances of the despotism which husbands exercised over their wives. The slightest indiscretion was sometimes punished by death, while men might do what they liked without let or hindrance. . . . I think that we may see that the Roman matrons did not like this arbitrary treatment, and that they protested against the assumption that they were beings quite different from their husbands, and entitled to no rights and privileges as against them. And the interesting feature in the history of the Roman matron is the gradual emancipation which she effected for herself from these fetters of Roman tradition and usage. . . . In the later days of the Republic and the commencement of the Empire, Roman matrons displayed . . . [a] rage for foreign worships. The temples of the Egyptian goddess Isis were crowded, and her priests were caressed and revered. Many women became adherents of the Jewish faith, and Eastern divinities had numerous devotees. In these cases the women claimed for themselves the right to worship whatever god pleased them. Often, in carrying out this worship, they had to break through the rules of conventionality, and they thus asserted for themselves a freedom which nothing but a religious impulse would have led many of the more sensitive to claim. . . . Marriage was . . . a contract which came into full force when the woman was led to the house of the man. It was a contract which must be made in the presence of witnesses, and it could be dissolved; but again, the dissolution of it must be carried out legally—in the presence of competent witnesses. Religious ceremonies

accompanied the marriage, but the religious ceremonies had nothing to do with the contract, and therefore were not essential to the marriage. It was necessary in this contract that husband and wife should give their consent, and when they were under control, that their parents or guardians also should consent. Generally each family had a family council, consisting of friends and relatives, and this council would be summoned to decide on the terms of the contract, and it was deemed disreputable in a man to dissolve his marriage without invoking this council. Husband or wife might dissolve the marriage for any reason, but precipitation was guarded against by the necessity of legal forms and by the practice of asking the advice of this council, at the head of which was the father of the husband or wife. . . . Whenever there arose a feeling of bondage, the woman as well as the man could arrange for a dissolution of the connexion. And the woman had no pecuniary difficulties in the way. Every father provided for the support of the daughters for life by the dowries which he bestowed on them; and, therefore, no woman was compelled to put up with a faithless and cruel husband because she was entirely dependent on him for her subsistence. The complaints which we hear of Roman marriages are not from the female, but the male side. The women were too independent. A Roman marries a Roman woman who has ample means of her own. He finds that the old times are gone, and he cannot now lay hold of her money or property without her consent. He must now humour her if he is to enjoy her wealth, and the effort to gain her over in this way is held up as degrading and humiliating to a man, and it is represented that it is better for a man to be without a wife than to be subject to all the imperious whims of a wealthy woman. Then, again, there was no shame attached to a dissolution of marriage. Marriage was a contract. . . . It was an agreement between two parties, and whenever this agreement began to gall the one or the other, there was no reason why the agreement should not come to an end. . . . No doubt it was their good sense, their kindness, and their willingness to co-operate with men, that led to their freedom and power in political matters. And this power was sometimes very great. . . . It is true that some of the women who engaged in political affairs were reckless and disagreeable. . . . But even these women had much enjoyment from their careers and the companionship of their own choice. At all events, the women enjoyed great freedom, and a wide field for the exercise of their power. And many of them certainly made a good use of their opportunities and wealth. Some of them were charitable. They bestowed public buildings and porticoes on the communities among which they lived; they received public honours, and one woman in Africa so impressed her fellow-citizens with her excellence that she was elected one of the two chief magistrates of the place. Especially in Asia Minor did women display public activity. Their generosity took the most various forms, even to bestowing considerable sums on each citizen in their own cities. They erected baths and gymnasia, adorned temples, put up statues, and contributed in every way to the enjoyment of their fellow countrymen. They often presided at the public games or over the great religious ceremonies, having been regularly appointed to this position, and they paid the expenses incurred in these displays. In consequence of this they received the most marked distinction, and were elected to the highest magistracies.

They also held priesthoods, and several of them obtained the highest priesthood of Asia—perhaps the greatest honour that could be paid to anyone. And they were admitted to aristocratic clubs, such as the 'gerousia' is generally supposed to have been. It cannot be said that all the professions were thrown open to them, because many of the professions were not open to the men. Medicine and teaching and similar arts were still to a large extent practised by slaves or freedmen, and were deemed unworthy occupations for free-born citizens. . . . Women had a wide range of action in legal matters. Many Roman women devoted themselves to philosophy and literature, and showed considerable ability in these subjects. But there is no proof that any one of them attained a great reputation. Only one literary work of a Roman woman has come down to us, the Satire of Sulpicia. It is creditable to her good sense and ability, but it does not take a high place among satires."—J. Donaldson, *Woman*, pp. 79, 87-89, 97-98, 109-110, 114-115, 122-127.—"The Roman lady's irritable pride of birth is at least as old as the rivalry of the two Fabiæ in the fourth century. The elder Cato dreaded a rich wife as much as Juvenal, and satirised as bitterly the pride and gossip and luxury of the women of his time. Their love of gems and gold ornaments and many-coloured robes and richly adorned carriages is attested by Plautus and the impotent legislation of C. Oppius. Divorce and ghastly crime in the noblest families were becoming common in the days of the Second Punic War. About the same time began that emancipation of women from the jealous restraints of Roman law, which was to be carried further in the Antonine age. The strict forms of marriage, which placed the wife in the power of her husband, fell more and more into desuetude. Women attained more absolute control over their property, and so much capital became concentrated in their hands that, about the middle of the second century B. C., the Voconian law was passed to prohibit bequests to them, with the usual futile result of such legislation. Yet the old ideal of the industrious housewife never died out, and Roman epitaphs for ages record that the model matron was a wool-worker and a keeper at home. . . . But from the second century B. C. the education of the Roman girl of the higher classes underwent a great change. Dancing, music, and the higher accomplishments were no longer under a ban, although they were still suspected by people of the old-fashioned school. Boys and girls received the same training from the grammarian, and read their Homer and Ennius together. There were women in the time of Lucretius, as in the time of Juvenal, who interlarded their conversation with Greek phrases. . . . Even in the gay circle of Ovid, there were learned ladies, or ladies who wished to be thought so. Even Martial reckons culture among the charms of a woman. Seneca maintained that women have an equal capacity for cultivation with men. Thus the blue-stocking of Juvenal, for whom he has so much contempt, had many an ancestress for three centuries, as she will have many a daughter till the end of the Western Empire. Even in philosophy, usually the last study to attract the female mind, Roman ladies were asserting an equal interest. Great ladies of the Augustan court, even the empress herself, had their philosophic directors, and the fashion perhaps became still more general under M. Aurelius. . . . Even in the field of authorship, women were claiming equal rights. . . . Juvenal feels as much scorn for the woman who is interested in public

affairs and the events on the frontier, as he feels for the woman who presumes to balance the merits of Virgil and Homer. And here he is once more at war with a great movement towards the equality of the sexes. From the days of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, to the days of Placidia, the mother of Honorius, Roman women exercised, from time to time, a powerful, and not always wholesome, influence on public affairs. . . . The influence of women in provincial administration was also becoming a serious force. . . . In the inscriptions of the first and second centuries, women appear in a more wholesome character as 'mothers of the camp,' or patronesses of municipal towns and corporations. They have statues dedicated to them for liberality in erecting porticoes or adorning theatres or providing civic games or feasts. . . . We are reminded of the 'chapter of matrons' who visited Agrippina with their censure, and another female senate, under Elagabalus, which dealt with minute questions of precedence and graded etiquette. On the walls of Pompeii female admirers posted up their election placards in support of their favorite candidates. Thus Juvenal was fighting a lost battle, lost long before he wrote. For good or evil, women in the first and second centuries were making themselves a power."—S. Dill, *Roman society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, pp. 79-81.—"There was at no time at Rome anything that could be called a feminist movement. No solidarity existed in a sex split by caste into classes that had no motive in common. The ladies from time to time organized to obtain legislation in their interests; but so far as we know, such legislation dealt only with pecuniary questions. We have no record of any attempt on their part to improve the lot of women in general. Women in general were in fact submerged. An inspection of the literature and the inscriptions of the late Republic and the early Empire gives the odd impression that the Roman women of the lower classes had pretty nearly ceased to exist. The professional woman, if we may so call her, the doctor, the *accoucheuse*, the *masseuse*, the actress, the dancer, the courtesan, the dressmaker, was almost always a Greek. In trade and industry, the same was true; according to the inscriptions, Greek women were the fish-mongers, the barmaids, and the laundresses of Rome. No one can doubt that hundreds of thousands of hard-working, god-fearing Roman women lived silent, unrecorded lives, and bore children to carry on the state. But the lady had nothing to do with them. Her struggles were directed to the strengthening of her own position. It was to this end that Hortensia and her ladies came down to the Forum to argue that taxation without representation is tyranny. . . . Public speaking had no terrors for the Roman lady. We read of women of litigious temperament who were constantly at law, and argued their own cases in the prætor's court and in the Forum. The practice was prevalent enough to need an edict to suppress it. Business on a large scale sometimes provided an outlet for the energies of the restless, able, and idle *domina*. The manufacture of bricks seems to have been largely in her hands, for almost every Roman brick is stamped with the name of its maker, and the names of many great ladies, including even empresses, are handed down to us on the remnants of their product. The great field, however, for the activity of the Roman lady was the exertion of her personal influence, and the development of her power in political and social intrigue. The amorous intrigue, for which

she is perhaps most famous, should be subordinated to the other two, for it was apparently in many cases their handmaid. . . . The women of the Triumvirates are hardly less striking figures than the men. The Empire saw a succession of masterful women, indistinguishable psychologically from the male. Augustus caused public honors to be accorded to his wife and to his sister. Tacitus was struck by the significant novelty of a woman enthroned, when Agrippina was seated near Claudius to review a Roman army. With the Antonines, titles for women began to develop: 'mother of the legions,' 'mother of the senate and the people.' It was debated in the senate whether magistrates sent to govern the provinces should be permitted to take their wives with them, and in the course of the discussion conservative opinion declared that the official ladies were altogether too active in political matters. . . . Social changes in Rome had brought . . . [the lady] from the privacy of her own house into the world of society. She found herself at the head of a great establishment, with town-house and country-house, with a round of magnificent entertainments to offer and to receive, and with more money to spend than Europe had ever seen collected before, or would see again for many centuries. Supposing her to be singly devoted to her husband, she found that she could be of immense assistance to his career. Aften, too, she found that she must compete with other women for his admiration. An attractive *demi-monde*, chiefly Greek, had become an institution in Rome. It behooved a wife to be as charming and intelligent as the ladies without the pale. The art of fascination once learned, it was difficult not to keep it in practice at the expense of the first comer. And when a woman had discovered that she counted for something in her husband's career, she not unnaturally aspired to a career of her own. Seneca expressed succinctly the dilemma in which the Roman found himself: it is hard, said he, to keep a wife whom every one admires; and if no one admires her it is hard to have to live with her yourself. We have a great deal of detailed information about the ladies of Rome. Many are known to us by name, and we are aware of the impression they made on their contemporaries. We should not be helped in differentiating them from other ladies by opening a ledger and setting down the good against the bad, Calpurnia against Faustina, and Alcmena against Trimalchio's wife. The trait that is interesting for our purpose is present in good and bad alike. The Roman lady was a person; indeed, she was often what we call a 'character.' She is distinguished from the Athenian lady as a statue in the round is distinguished from a relief. Once for all, she was detached from the background of family life and, not supported throughout her height by the fabric of society, must see to it that her personal centre of gravity should not lie without her base. She committed her own sins and bore her own punishment. Her virtues were her own, and did not often take the direction of self-effacement. The strong men among whom she lived, who broke everything else, could not break her."—E. J. Putnam, *Roman lady* (*Century Magazine*, June, 1910, pp. 791-794).

ALSO IN: O. Schreiner, *Women and labor*, pp. 86-94.

A. D. 300-1400.—Medieval Christianity.—Effect of canon law in improving woman's position.—Opening of independent career to women in monastic life.—Secular liberties.—Rise of chivalry.—In the Middle Ages, under which for our

purpose we include early Christian times, an important factor affecting the position of women is the relation in which they stood to the Church. Many influences were at work here. On the side of women was the old, ineradicable belief of the human heart that woman stands very near to the Divine. . . . The worship of motherhood . . . persisted down to Christian times, and its undying spirit was, like other elements of far less value in Paganism, recognized and transcended by the Church—a fact which was naturally most helpful to women in every department of life. Above all, the true inner spirit of Christianity accorded dignity to women, vouching for the truth that both men and women are primarily spiritual beings, and that sex relations are secondary and evanescent. . . . On the other side was the weight of custom in the patriarchal world, causing practical difficulties of all sorts, for how were national customs to be suddenly set aside—the veil, as a needful distinction worn by all women of good repute, the strict seclusion to which they were accustomed—such difficulties in fact as are discussed by St. Paul in his First Letter to the Church at Corinth? Moreover, the Jewish elements in Christian tradition regarded women as inferior beings, and, lastly, the asceticism of the age, which despised marriage, and, in defiance of common sense, laid to the score of woman alone all the degradation and vice of Pagan society, branded her, in Tertullian's shameful words, as the 'Devil's gateway'—J. A. Thomson, *Position of woman*, pp. 41-42.—"The most important effect of the canon law was on marriage, which was now a sacrament and had its sanction not in the laws of men, but in the express decrees of God. Hence even engagements acquired a sacred character unknown to the Roman law; and when a betrothal had once been entered into, it could be broken only in case one or both of the contracting parties desired to enter a monastery. Free consent of both man and woman was necessary for matrimony. There must also be a dowry and a public ceremony. . . . Clandestine marriages were forbidden, but the Church always presumed everything it could in favour of marriage and its indissolubility. . . . Not until the great Council of Trent in 1563 was this changed. At that time all marriages were declared invalid unless they had been contracted in the presence of a priest and two or three witnesses. The Church is seen in its fairest light in its provisions to protect the wife from sexual brutality on the part of her husband. . . . Various other laws show the same regard for the interests of women. A man who was entering priestly office could not cast off his wife and leave her destitute, but must provide living and raiment for her. Neither husband nor wife could embrace the celibate life nor devote themselves to continence without the consent of the other. A man who cohabited with a woman as his concubine, even though she was of servile condition or questionable character, could not dismiss her and marry another saving for adultery. Slaves were now allowed to contract marriages and masters were not permitted to dissolve them. . . . By doctrine of 'diriment impediments' the Pope or a duly constituted representative of his can declare that a marriage has been null and void from the very beginning because of some impediment defined in the canon law. Canon IV of the twenty-fourth session of the Council of Trent anathematizes any one who shall say that the Church cannot constitute impediments dissolving marriage, or that she has erred in constituting them. The

impediments which can annul marriage and leave the parties free to marry again are chiefly affinity and consanguinity. Affinity 'is a relationship arising from the carnal intercourse of a man and a woman, sufficient for the generation of children, whereby the man becomes related to the woman's blood relatives and the woman to the man's.' Consanguinity is 'blood relationship or the natural bond between persons descended from the same stock' and is a 'diriment impediment' to the fourth degree. The minute and far-fetched subtleties which the Church has employed in the interpretation of these relationships make escape from the marital tie feasible for the man who is eager to disencumber himself of his life's partner. The Church furthermore grants a decree of nullity for 'spiritual kinship' which exists, for example, when a man marries a woman whose father stood as his godfather at baptism. Moreover, the Church regards as dissoluble the marriage of all unbaptised persons; it is divided on the question of the validity of baptisms not administered by itself. A Catholic husband, whose wife has not been baptised or has been baptised by a non-Roman, can have his marriage declared null and void and may marry again. . . . Questions such as those of inheritance belong properly to civil law; but the canon law 'claimed to be heard in any case into which any spiritual interest could be foisted. Thus in the year 1199 Innocent III enacted that children of heretics be deprived of all their offending parents' goods 'since in many cases even according to divine decree children are punished in this world on account of their parents.'—E. A. Hecker, *Short history of woman's rights*, pp. 108-114, 116.—'The Church, while excluding women from priestly or pastoral office, gave them, short of this, 'a greater career than any other ever thrown open to women in the course of modern European history.' The convent from about the seventh to the fourteenth century was not what it later became, purely a place of devotion and seclusion; on the contrary, in it the woman of spirit and capacity might find a high and satisfying career, while the ordinary woman found assurance from want and safety from violence. True, the price paid was the renunciation of family ties, but in return the religious house provided congenial companionship and outlets in abundance for individual taste and energy. Nuns wrote books, like the *Garden of Delights* of the Abbess Herrad, or the Latin Comedies of the nun Hrosvith; wonderful tapestries, fine embroideries, exquisitely illuminated MSS bore witness to their artistic skill; the education of the gently-born girls of the time was carried on in convents; and, besides, the woman of practical ability would have the housekeeping of the great establishment to superintend, its often large estates to manage. Nor was even sport denied—the recognized medieval authority on hawking was a nun—Dame Juliana Berners. And over the whole community the Abbess ruled—a lady frequently of royal birth, who ranked with princes and nobles. Even mixed religious houses were ruled by Abbesses. Such were Whitby in Yorkshire, where in Saxon times under St. Hilda several bishops were trained, Fontevrault in France, the chosen burial place of Norman kings, and Wadstena in Sweden. The medieval convent was, in fact, a blend of three things—a feudal castle, a college, and an industrial establishment—and its head might be a powerful noble in close touch with the politics and national business of her time. Thus in England Abbesses who held the convent lands of the kings,

might be summoned, in common with Peeresses in their own right, to attend Parliament, but were allowed, what was then esteemed a privilege, to send proxies in their stead. In Spain the Abbess of Las Huelgas ruled both in secular and ecclesiastical affairs over sixty towns and villages, the military force which she could bring into the field was second only to that of the King, and when she travelled 'her journey was little less than a royal progress.' In Germany two Abbesses at least, those of Quedlinburg and Gandersheim, were sovereign Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, minted their own coinage, and were represented on the Imperial Diet. Twice during the reign of the Emperor Otto III, once in his minority and again during his long absence in Italy, his aunt, Matilda, Abbess of Quedlinburg, governed the empire, once at least, in 999, convening the Diet. However true it may be that about the fourteenth century convents ceased to be in line with the advanced thought of the time, their intellectual standard woefully declined, moral laxity crept in, and they often became mere convenient places for disposing of superfluous women; still, it must be admitted that with their abolition in Protestant countries all the benefits they had conferred upon unmarried women and widows, and all the opportunities they had afforded of a dignified and useful life, disappeared also. . . . On the secular side of life in the Middle Ages we find that the woman of high birth—privileged in every age—had almost unlimited opportunities. Thus, in the fifth century two great Empresses ruled the civilized world. Pulcheria, the daughter of the Emperor Theodosius, from her sixteenth year governed in fact, though not in name, the Eastern Empire. . . . Of the second, Galla Placidia, who ruled the Western Empire for twenty-five years, Hodgkin writes, 'She was the man of her family, she had the energy and the wisdom of her father' (Valentinian I). . . . But not only women of noble birth, women generally in the Middle Ages enjoyed more equality of opportunity with men than they have ever done since. The ideals of life were shared by men and women, not sharply sundered. Thus in [England] . . . women could be burgesses of towns, trading freely and fulfilling all the duties and enjoying the privileges, so valuable in those days, of that position. They could be members of those trading and semi-religious Guilds and Companies which played so important a part in the social and commercial life of the times, wearing the livery, taking apprentices, and sitting at the election feasts. Thus the greater Companies of the Drapers, Clothworkers, Brewers, Grocers, Armourers, Barber-Surgeons and others counted their Sisters as in all respects equal to their Brothers. On the whole, the women were better educated than the men, except churchmen. . . . In England, in Saxon times, rough as society was, and though it was held to be a salutary discipline to administer three blows with a broomstick to wives (this discipline would go a considerable way, surely, to account for the attraction of convent life), yet these very wives shared in public affairs with more freedom than women do now, or did until very lately. Public matters were not, as later, accounted exclusively men's business. Women could inherit and possess property freely, and could be present at the local Moot or meeting of the wise men, and even at the national Witenagemot. With Norman rule the rights of women in England were gradually curtailed, but even the Feudal System, hard as it was in some respects on women, especially on heiresses,

yet conferred upon them the compensating advantage of fully recognizing their right to hold property, and even to fill high office in the State, when such office fell to them in default of male heirs. That husbands and sons might fill such offices by proxy for wives and mothers no doubt generally reduced the latter to the position of mere transmitters of honour, but in some cases the offices were filled by the heiresses themselves. . . . One other point cannot be passed over—the rise of Chivalry about the eleventh century, in the comparatively peaceful and wealthy regions of Southern France, for the change wrought by Chivalry in manners and social relations was far reaching and partly, though not entirely, beneficial. . . . No ideal could be finer, but, while fully admitting its excellence, we cannot but ask what Chivalry practically did for women? It ignored the peasant, and it failed to deliver the rich woman from the tyranny of the feudal system, which identified her with her property. The reverent service of his lady dictated to the knight by Chivalry, was, no doubt, of infinite value for the refining and softening of manners. But the show of virtue was hollow. In the Provençal Courts of Love, presided over by the fine ladies of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, it was decided that love between husband and wife was impossible, and yet love was declared to be the inspiring source of every worthy action. The whole scheme of society was artificial and absurd, and the false morality which naturally followed, and which pervades medieval romances (we probably know it from Tennyson's *Idylls of the King*), poisoned social life."—J. A. Thomson, *Position of Woman*, pp. 43-52.—See also MONASTICISM: Women and monasticism; ABBOT: Hilda; Hildegarde.

1100-1400.—Lady of the castle.—Feudal property rights of the lady.—Superiority of her education to that of her husband.—Occupations.—Physical freedom and courage.—Development of courtly love.—"Doubtless it would be absurd to represent the social status of the lady as the direct outcome of the architecture of her home, since both were in fact the outcome and expression of the life of the man of her class and time. But it is certain that the castle was the primary condition of that life, and that, where its interests clashed with those of the lady, hers had to give way. In her everyday life she perhaps gained as much from its limitations as she lost. . . . Her place was in the hall, and in the hall the life of the house was transacted. Whatever interested her husband was discussed in her presence. . . . If she lost in refinement she gained in education. The life of her time was an open book before her; she was free to form her opinion of men and things and to make her personality count for what it was worth. But the really sinister effect upon the lady of the castle and its lands was one that resulted from their meaning rather than from their physical characteristics. They were held by the knight from his overlord on condition of the payment of rental in the form of military service. Every acre of ground was valued in terms of fighting-men, and only the knight in person could be sure of rallying the quota and producing them when required. If the knight died, in harness or in his bed, and left a widow with young children or a daughter as his sole heir, there was a good chance that the rent would not be paid. The overlord had the right, in view of his interests in the matter, to see that a fief should not be without a master; in other words, to marry as soon as might be the widow or the daughter of the

deceased to some stout knight who was willing to take the woman for the sake of the fief. . . . In fact, it could be said of the lady as truly as of the serf that she 'went with the land.' She knew this full well herself. . . . Farseeing men betrothed or even married their children in infancy. Hardy younger sons might win castle and lands by recommending themselves through feats of arms to fathers of daughters. . . . As a sort of indemnification for the iron hand laid upon her destiny by the system of land-tenure in the Middle Age, the lady achieved a new measure of personal liberty. She might within reason philander where she would, provided she married where she was bid. The lady's education was probably, on the academic side at least, considerably better than her husband's. Very likely she could more often read and write than he. . . . Not only in literary but in practical matters the daughter of the castle would receive much the same education as Helen of Troy. She would be a famous spinster and needlewoman, able to make a shirt or an altar-cloth. . . . All household work was familiar to her. Life was full of emergencies, and she was ready for them. Often she was a skilful leech, unafraid of blood, trained to succour the men on whose lives her life depended. . . . In religion she learned the Pater Noster, the Ave and the Credo. She could read her book of hours and follow the mass. The cult of the Virgin had virtually restored the feminine divinity of primitive religion. . . . It is the *métier* of the romance to deal with action, and from it we receive inevitably the impression of a stirring, animated life. Where the house of the great lord is concerned this impression may be measurably true. . . . But in the castle of the simple knight, life, as far as we are able to reconstitute it, must have passed with a monotony before which the modern mind quails. When Gautier, an enthusiast for the Middle Age, enumerates the winter occupations of the castellan, he is obliged to include sitting at the window and watching the snow fall. The lady of the castle was vigorous, and loved to be out of doors. . . . High physical courage was esteemed a virtue in her as in her lord, for it is only in secure and peaceful societies that the timid lady survives to transmit her qualities. . . . The hardihood which served her well in crises was an invaluable element of daily life for herself and for her offspring, as it led her to healthy and vigorous out-of-door pastimes. But after the fullest allowance has been made for these pursuits, many empty hours remain unaccounted for. Life for the lady in the small castle must have had some similarity to life for women on the remote ranch to-day, if we eliminate the postal service and the library, and if we imagine that the ranchman is away from home as often as he can manage it, rounding up wild cattle, fighting Indians, trailing horse-thieves, or otherwise pleasurably endangering his life. . . . The aspect of life that comes to the modern woman under the guise of literature had a different expression, though largely literary too, in the existence of the lonely *châtelaine*. In her case it came to be a reflection of the social development for which the age is noted, a specific and original contribution to the history of the lady—I mean, of course, the theory and practice of courteous love. In looking closely at this institution it must be borne in mind that in the age of chivalry the wedded relation was not a romantic one. The husband was allowed by law to beat his wife for certain offences, and it is likely that he did not always wait to consult the code. The law, it is

true, specified that he was to beat her 'reasonably,' and insisted that he must stop short of maiming her; he must not, for instance, destroy an eye or break a bone. Her marriage had been contracted without any necessary reference to inclination, and her relations with her husband were simply such as she was personally able to make them. With him her sole source of strength was her power to please, and that was naturally, as always, largely a matter of accident. He was under no manner of compulsion to try to please her. The fact, however, that she was his wife gave her importance with the rest of the world in proportion to his own, and from the standing-ground of this external importance she applied her lever to society. In her lord's absence she commanded the castle; in his presence she shared the respect paid him by his subordinates. And the whole ordinary population of the castle consisted of subordinates. Not only his servants and men-at-arms, but the knights who held of him in fee and the squires who waited on him for military education observed towards him the etiquette of inferior to superior. This etiquette was strictly personal to him, and his wife had logically no right to share in it; but it was inevitably reflected on her by the sentiment that to-day makes the enlisted man in a lonely army post feel that the colonel's wife very nearly holds a commission herself. Like the colonel's wife, the knight's lady was the social head of the garrison; but she had the advantage of being free from competition with the wives of subalterns. If the visiting knight or squire had a wife, she stayed at home. The lady of the castle was virtually the only woman in a society consisting of men generally younger than herself who were socially her husband's inferiors, and who therefore paid court to her. If she had any personal force or charm these circumstances were highly favourable to its exertion. With her husband's importance her sphere of influence would vary from a single squire to a whole train of knights-vassal, but her position would tend to stereotype itself; so that the success of a great baron's wife in modifying the manners and the ideas of her husband's court would work to the advantage of the lonely châtelaine in the simple donjon. From the great centres would spread a theory of the lady's position and of the duty to her of every gentleman not her husband. Such a theory was developed and perfected in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and came by degrees to colour the whole of literature. The brutality of the old romances faded out, and an extraordinary code of manners came into fashion, based on a new theory of feminism and largely due to the initiative of influential women themselves. How far this theory actually modified life we are not in a position to say. It is certain, however, that every lady who listened to troubadour or jongleur, or who read for herself the new love-songs and romances, was furnished with the material for constructing a fresh estimate of her own importance. . . . As in the case of the lady abbess, feudalism played into the hands of the very persons to whose interests it was apparently inimical. A form of society devised and carried on by men became suddenly a source of strength to women. And the most surprising thing of all is that the women in whose hands power was thus placed proved to be able to use it. Instead of showing the atrophied remnant of a suppressed class, ready to govern in name but in reality to be governed by the nearest man, and to carry on a society and a culture imitative of that erected

by men everywhere about them, they proved to be themselves personages capable of forming reasoned designs and making them prevail, and they effected changes in society and culture that have become a permanent part of the life of Europe. . . . By chivalry we mean to-day not the strong, hard framework of military society which prevailed for centuries in Europe, unregardful of women if not cruel to them, but we mean the brief and local phase, confined chiefly to the great courts, which, by passing into literature, has forever clothed the knight with virtues and sentiments not (if all had their rights) his own. The constraint that was put upon the man who looked for preferment in a lady's service to be clean and civil, pleasant to look at and pleasant to hear, and an ardent advocate of the intellectual and moral supremacy of women, was but a small and ephemeral result of her power. The real result was attained when the men of genius had constructed and won acceptance everywhere for a whole theory of life based on the superiority of the lady. . . . The lady's power to excite love was to her what the lord's prowess in battle was to him. The new theory of life was therefore based upon a new theory of love, and into this new theory were worked up a number of old elements that would have seemed singly rather unpromising material. One of the fundamental principles of the doctrine of courteous love was its incompatibility with marriage. It is true that no age of men had imagined that love and marriage were ever, except by accident, coincident. Since marriage is primarily founded on economic considerations, the continued effort of mankind to make its sentimental aspect prevail involves a paradox. The Athenians . . . looked not to their wives for love's delight. The Romans were not authorities on love, but what they knew by that name was not a domestic sentiment. Early Christianity also considered marriage as a duty rather than a pleasure. But these different societies had felt the irksomeness of the bond from the man's point of view; it was in conflict with one of the characteristics that had been most serviceable in helping him along in the world—his unquenchable desire of novelty. Courtesy, on the other hand, objected to marriage from the point of view of the wife. Courtesy maintained that a lady's love should be free. The mere fact that in marriage she was bound by law to yield her favours destroyed their value and her dignity. Even if she married her lover, she thereby extinguished love. *Amour de grace* and *amour de dette* were discriminated by the doctors, who held the first only to be worthy of the name of love. No true lover would accept love save as a gift of free will. The lady might withhold her favour with reason or without; treason to love consisted in bestowing it for any reason save love alone. But it was not as a pretext for frequent change that the lady exalted love at the expense of marriage. On the contrary, it behooved her to choose her lover with far greater care than her husband (says Sordello in his *Ensenhamen d'Onor*), because love is *plus fort establit*. Husband and wife may be parted by divers accidents, *mas no es res que puese' amors, ses mort, partir*. . . . The lady dreamed of no reconstruction of society; marriage was her portion, and she accepted it. Love did not interfere with it—did not, in fact, lie in the same plane. Her criticism of marriage was suggested and enforced by a number of circumstances besides her own personal revolt from it. The poets who embodied her ideas were generally of a class below

her own, and under chivalry there was no marriage possible between classes. The singer who offered homage to his lady must find some footing on which he could address her without too servile an acknowledgment of inferiority. Nothing could have served his purpose so well as the theory that love is the great leveller, but that every lover is his lady's servant. Besides the barriers to marriage erected by feudal society, the Cluniac reform was insisting on the celibacy of the clergy, but many a troubadour was either monk or priest. For him also it was valuable that love should keep clear of marriage."—E. J. Putnam, *The lady*, pp. 115, 117, 119-120, 122, 124-127, 130, 133-136.

1334-1574.—Status of women raised under Hojo rule in Japan. See JAPAN: 1334-1574.

1400-1600.—Pre-eminence of women in Italian Renaissance.—Freedom of education.—Anti-feminist movement in the north.—"It was during the Renaissance that the remarkable flowering of the intellect of the Italian woman was seen at its best. While the women in the other parts of Europe, especially in England and Germany, were suffering the ill effects consequent on the suppression of the convents, which, for centuries, had been almost the only schools available for girls, the women of Italy were taking an active part in the great educational movement inaugurated by the revival of learning, and winning the highest honors for their sex in every department of science, art and literature. Not since the days of Sappho and Aspasia had woman attained such prominence, and never were they, irrespective of class-condition, accorded greater liberty, privileges or honor. The universities, which had been opened to them at the close of the Middle Ages, gladly conferred upon them the doctorate, and eagerly welcomed them to the chairs of some of their most important faculties. The Renaissance was, indeed, the heyday of the intellectual woman throughout the whole of the Italian peninsula—a time when woman enjoyed the same scholastic freedom as men, and when Mme. de Staël's dictum, *Le Génie n'a pas de sexe*, expressed a doctrine admitted in practice and not an academic theory. It would require a large volume, or rather many volumes, to do justice to the learned women of Italy who conferred such honor upon their sex during the period we are considering. . . . But the educational advantages enjoyed by the women of the Renaissance were not for the bourgeoisie—not for the daughters of peasants, tradesmen and artisans. They were solely . . . for the benefit of the children of princes or of scholars—of those only who could claim either nobility of birth or nobility of genius. Even the most zealous of the humanists would have been surprised if they had been asked to diffuse a portion of their light among the women of the masses. For education, as they viewed it, was something solely for the elect—for ladies of the court and not for women of a lower condition. So far as the rest of womankind was concerned, their occupation was limited, according to a Breton saying, to looking after altar, hearth, and children—'*La femme se doit garder l'autel, le feu, les enfants.*' It was about this time, too, that men began, especially in France and Germany, to revive the anti-feminist crusade which had so retarded the literary movement among the women of ancient Greece and Rome. They refused to hear women and intellect spoken of together. The Germans recognized no intelligence in them apart from domestic duties. . . . 'What the Italians called intelligence a German would call tittle-tattle, trickery,

the spirit of opposition.' . . . In the estimation of Luther, the intellectual aspirations of women were not only an absurdity, but were also a positive peril. . . . Montaigne gave expression to the age-old prejudice against woman by refusing to regard her as anything but a pretty animal, while Rabelais, the coryphæus of the French Renaissance, declared that 'Nature in creating woman lost the good sense which she had displayed in the creation of all other things.' . . . The masses of women, especially after the suppression of the convent schools in England and Germany, were, in many parts of Europe, and notably in the two countries mentioned, in a worse condition than they were during the Dark Ages."—H. J. Mozans, *Women in science*, pp. 57-58, 73-75.

16th century.—Views of Erasmus and Luther in regarding education of women. See EDUCATION: Modern: 16th century: Erasmus, etc.; Luther, etc.; Schools in Germany.

1500-1600.—Women of the English Renaissance.—Spanish influence on English court ladies.—Enthusiasm for education of women.—Advanced feminism of the period.—Change of attitude after Elizabeth's time.—"The learned lady as a recognized factor in social life had no real place in England till the time of Henry VIII. Renaissance ideas concerning the education of women came into England from Spain through Catherine, the first wife of Henry VIII. She was in England from 1501 to 1531. Under the influence of her mother, Queen Isabella, she had been given remarkable educational advantages. Queen Isabella was interested in all that pertained to learning. . . . Learning for women was encouraged at her court. The queen had herself a lady teacher Beatrix Galindo, who was professor of rhetoric at the University of Salamanca, and who was called, for her knowledge of the Latin language, *La Latina*. Other learned ladies of Spain were doubtless known at the court, as Francisca de Lebrixa who often took the place of her father, professor of history in the University of Alcalá; or Doña Maria Pacheco de Mendoza and her sister, who are mentioned by Mr. Foster as the parallels of Sir Thomas More's daughters in England. In this eager, ambitious, intellectual atmosphere the daughters of Isabella were brought up. She gave them personal instruction, and secured for them foreign teachers of eminence. Erasmus said that Catherine had been happily reared on letters from her infancy, that she loved literature, and that she was *egregie docta*. In the English court Queen Catherine's influence was all on the side of learning. Mr. Watson says that all the treatises on the education of women that appeared in England between 1523 and 1538 were under the spell of Catherine. In the education of her own daughter, the Princess Mary, she kept to the traditions of the Spanish court and secured the most learned tutors for the young girl. . . . These treatises by Vives and Hyrde have much in common and they express the most advanced contemporary ideas on woman's education. That the place of woman is in the home is emphatically stated. Housewifery is imperative. . . . The lady should also be mistress of a closet of medicaments which she must be able to administer with skill. Occupations that involve any sort of publicity are counted inappropriate for women, hence Vives gives 'no license to a woman to be a teacher.' The essential feminine virtues are piety and modesty. Obedience to parents and to husbands is enjoined. This obedience, if born of inner concord, might be a voluntary and ideal thing. . . . In all these points Vives

and Hyrde were quite in accord with their age. The new element in their creed was that learning could make women more attractive, companionable, and efficient in these home relationships. . . . The example set at court was followed in many noble families. There is in the realm of education no single picture more entertaining and attractive than that of Sir Thomas More and his daughters. . . . Sir Thomas could not see why learning was not as suitable for girls as for boys. . . . In describing the ideal wife he said: 'May she be learned, if possible, or at least capable of being made so,' and he gave the same training to [his daughter] Margaret and her sisters as to his son John. The fame of these daughters went far. . . . In addition to the many instances of girls trained in the best learning of their times during the first half of the sixteenth century, we have striking contemporary testimony as to the prevalence of the custom, and the high esteem in which such learning was held. Richard Mulcaster (1530-1611), first head-master of a school founded by the Merchant Taylors' Company in 1561, in discussing principles of education, expressed advanced ideas concerning the ability and training of girls. . . . Mulcaster was himself in favor of sending girls to the public grammar schools, and even to the universities, but he said it was 'a thing not used' in his country, there was no 'president' thereof. But he is enthusiastic about the attainments of women. . . . It is but natural that the praise of learning for women should extend through the reign of Elizabeth. The Queen herself was an admirable linguist. She spoke and wrote Latin with ease; she was a student of Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon; and she made translations into English from French and Italian, even translating from Latin into Greek. According to Ascham she read more Greek every day than some Prebendaries read Latin in a week, and bestowed more regular hours on learning than six of the best given gentlemen in the court. . . . With the death of Elizabeth we come practically to the end of the favor accorded learned women. The changed tone of public opinion may be fairly indicated by a few scattered utterances from contemporary poems and essays. Sir Thomas Overbury, in his *Characters* (1614), describes 'A Good Woman' as one 'whose husband's welfare is the business of her actions.' Her chief virtue is that 'Shee is Hee.' In *A Wife* he says that 'Books are a part of Man's Prerogative.' He praises a 'passive understanding' in women and deprecates learning. . . . Sir Ralph Verney said of his own daughter: 'Pegg is very backward. . . . I doubt not but she will be scholar enough for a Woeman.' With regard to Little Nancy Denton he wrote: 'Let not your girl learn Latin nor short hand: The difficulty of the first may keep her from that vice, for soe I must esteem it in a woeman; but the easinesse of the other may be a prejudice to her; for the pride of taking sermon noates hath made multitudes of women unfortunate.' . . . Mr. Baldwyn, it is true, in 1619, in his *New Help to Discourse*, praises England as the place where women had the greatest prerogatives. . . . But this favorable opinion must be discounted as being a retrospective estimate based mainly on the attitude towards women in the sixteenth century; and further, as being an Englishman's attempt to exalt English as against continental customs."—M. Reynolds, *Learned lady in England*, pp. 5-9, 16-17, 19, 23-26.

17th-18th centuries.—Neglect of woman's education in England and France. See EDUCATION:

Modern: 17th century: England; France: Standard, etc.; 18th century: England.

1644-1852.—Women's status in America.—Work in the home.—Gainful occupations open to women.—Colonial legislation.—Early steps toward higher education.—"Our primary interests during this early [Colonial] period were agriculture and commerce, and there was very little field for the industrial employment either of men or women. Such manufactures as were carried on in these early centuries were chiefly household industries and the work was necessarily done in the main by women. Indeed, it would not be far wrong to say that, during the colonial period, agriculture was in the hands of men, and manufacturing, for the most part, in the hands of women. Men were, to be sure, sometimes weavers, shoemakers, or tailors; and here and there women of notable executive ability, such as the famous Eliza Lucas of South Carolina, managed farms and plantations. . . . Women . . . were, for the most part engaged in the domestic cares of the household, which included at that time the manufacture within the home of a large proportion of the articles needed for household use. And besides the occupations of a domestic kind, there were, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, various other employments open to them. . . . One of the oldest of these was the keeping of taverns and 'ordinaries.' . . . Shopkeeping was another of the early gainful employments for women in this country. . . . Other kinds of business attracted women in this same period. The raising of garden seeds and similar products seems to have been a common occupation. Women were sometimes shrewd traders and, often, particularly in the seaboard towns, venturesome enough to be speculators. . . . Among the other gainful employments for women in this period which were not industrial might be mentioned keeping a 'dame's school' which, though a very unremunerative occupation, was often resorted to. There were, too, many notable nurses and mid-wives; in Bristol a woman was ringer of the bell and kept a meeting-house, and in New Haven a woman was appointed to 'sweepe and dresse the meeting house every weeke and have 1s. a weeke for her pains.' . . . There remain, however, a number of instances, in which women were employed in and were even at the head of what might, strictly speaking, be called industrial establishments. A woman, for example, occasionally ran a mill, carried on a distillery, or even worked in a sawmill. The 'Plymouth Colony Records' note in 1644 that 'Mistress Jenny, upon the presentment against her, promiseth to amend the grinding at the mill, and to keep morters cleane, and baggs of corne from spoyleing and loosing.' At Mason's settlement of Piscataqua, 'eight Danes and twenty two women' were employed in sawing lumber and making potash. In 1693 a woman appears with two men on the pages of the 'Boston Town Records' 'desiring leave to build a slaughter house.' But all of these seem to have been unusual employments. . . . Perhaps the best expression of the prevailing attitude toward the employment of women at that time is to be found in one of the Province Laws of Massachusetts Bay for the session of 1692-93. The law ordered that every single person under twenty-one must live 'under some orderly family government,' but added the proviso that 'this act shall not be construed to extend to hinder any single woman of good repute from the exercise of any lawful trade or employment for a livelihood, whereunto she shall have the allowance and approbation of

the selectmen . . . any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.' It is not, therefore, surprising to find that, in 1695, an act was passed which required single women who were self-supporting to pay a poll-tax as well as men. That this attitude was preserved during the eighteenth century, the establishment of the spinning schools bears witness. There was, however, the further point that providing employment for poor women and children lessened the poor rates, and the first factories were welcomed because they offered a means of support to the women and children who might otherwise be 'useless, if not burdensome, to society.' The colonial attitude toward women's work was in brief one of rigid insistence on their employment. Court orders, laws, and public subscriptions were resorted to in order that poor women might be saved from the sin of idleness and taught to be self-supporting."—E. Abbott, *Women in industry*, pp. 11, 13-17, 33-34.—"In America, freedom for women to study has moved more rapidly than in Europe. Even in the colonial period, there were emancipated women, . . . and in the last half of the eighteenth century several schools were opened for girls, which were more than polite finishing schools. Notable among these institutions were the seminary at Bethlehem, Pa., opened in 1753 by the Moravians, and the school established by the Society of Friends, in Providence, R. I., in 1784. But nearly all girls' schools before 1800 were limited to terms of a few months, where girls attended to learn needle-work, music and dancing, and to cultivate their morals and manners. At the close of the Revolutionary War, the leaders of public opinion universally recognized that their new experiment in government would succeed only if the voters were intelligent. This statement of belief became the major premise on which all arguments for free and compulsory education were based. . . . But the women had not full citizenship and hence the argument for general education did not apply to them. . . . But even without this change . . . economic conditions steadily forced the women into educational activity. There were not enough men available to teach the scattered country schools, and citizens had to be trained for the needs of the new democracy. . . . American women were fortunate, too, in having for their leaders such women as Emma Willard, Mary Lyon and Catherine Beecher. Emma Willard was a woman of the world; she had traveled abroad and she brought to her work a cultivated nature, wide experience of life and a natural leadership. Her personality went far toward lifting the movement to a plane of respect. After trying a little academy in Vermont, she appealed to the State of New York in 1814 for help. . . . The State . . . granted her articles of incorporation for her academy at Waterford, N. Y., but refused her the modest sum of five thousand dollars for which she had asked. In 1821, she established the Troy Female Seminary, where for years she trained and led the intellectual life of American women. Miss Mary Lyon begged the money from the common people with which she opened Mount Holyoke Seminary in 1837. . . . Notwithstanding the conserving influence of housework and religion, there went steadily out from Mount Holyoke during the following years a strong line of teachers demanding ever larger opportunity for themselves and for those they taught. Miss Catherine Beecher added to her work in schools for girls a general propaganda for woman's education, and she devised large plans for its development. In

1852, she organized the American Woman's Educational Association 'to aid in securing to American women a liberal education, honorable position, and remunerative employment.' She helped to start girls' schools in half a dozen cities, and by writing and talking she sowed in the hearts of women, especially in the Middle West, a discontent with existing conditions and a deep desire to know. . . . Boston opened a high school for girls in 1825. New York opened a high school for girls three years later. It was in the West, however, that this movement took strongest root and made most steady advance."—E. Barnes, *Woman in modern society*, pp. 61-63, 65-68.—See also EDUCATION: Modern: 19th century: United States: Secondary education.

1650-1775.—Women in England.—Effects of Civil War and Restoration.—Writers and scholars.—Spread of ideal of intellectual freedom for women.—First realization of possible economic independence through education.—"The first half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth seem even more than a hundred years apart in tone and temper. We turn from the eager intellectual life of many women in the Tudor period, from their full and rich opportunities, and we find that in the time of the earlier Stuarts there were very few women who took any pride in learning, that there was little or no provision at home or in schools for any but the most desultory sort of education for girls, and that there were practically no formulated ideals or theories of intellectual advancement for women. But at the close of this barren half-century we come upon what may be considered the real beginnings of the modern work of women. . . . The reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth have been called the golden age for learned women, and even a cursory glance over these years serves to justify that reputation. . . . But this golden age remains as hardly more than a brilliant picture; it has practically no important place in the progress of the education of women. The advantages given to women were nullified, so far as initiating more widespread activities is concerned, by two inherent defects. The learning of women had no legitimate purpose or outcome beyond the home. . . . Learning was a kind of high-class individual accomplishment purely for home consumption. A second defect was that learning belonged only to the daughters of the nobility or of the very rich. Even within these bounds it was sporadic, depending entirely on the opinion of the head of the family. A gradual decline of interest in scholarship as an appropriate pursuit for damsels of high lineage was apparent even in Elizabethan days, and the change from Tudor ideals became marked in the period from the death of Elizabeth to the Restoration. James looked upon women with contempt. Queen Anne's mother, Sophia of Mecklenburg, was a highly gifted woman who, after her retirement from public life, devoted her leisure to astronomy, chemistry, and other sciences. But Anne had none of her mother's intellectual interests. . . . She brought no literary ideals or ambitions to counteract the king's cold indifference to education in general. Under Charles I and Henrietta Maria there might readily have arisen in a new and lighter form some educational ideals or schemes favorable to women. . . . But the troubled times of the Civil War turned the minds of both men and women to sterner tasks. And it is perhaps not strange that this period proves the most barren one in English history so far as the education of girls is con-

cerned. At the Restoration we enter upon a new era of feminine activity. The beginnings of this era do not, however, coincide sharply with 1660, but belong at least a decade earlier. The chief women writing and studying between 1650 and 1675, the Duchess of Newcastle, Mrs. Philips, Mary North, Dorothy Osborne, Margaret Blagge, Lady Pakington, the Countess of Warwick, Mrs. Hutchinson, and Lady Fanshawe, brilliantly ushered in this new period. With the coming of peace and national security women were apparently conscious not only of a new freedom, but of a new power and a new demand for some form of personal expression. But it must be observed that along with this consciousness of national and political self-realization there was, under the Puritans, stern repression in matters of social and religious life. At the coming of Charles, however, all this was changed. With disastrous suddenness people found themselves free to follow with all gayety of spirit wherever their pleasure-loving instincts led. That such breaking of bonds resulted in an almost incredible outburst of immorality should not be allowed to obscure the fact that there was also a remarkable freeing of the mind from conventional standards. For good or for evil the individual found himself free to give energetic expression to his individual tendencies. By this freedom, by this license, women as well as men were profoundly moved. The new impulses thus brought into being did not, however, give rise to anything like orderly and progressive activity on the part of women. The century following 1660 is seen to be an inchoate assemblage of beginnings. . . . There is, indeed, after the middle of the eighteenth century, even an appearance of retrogression in the attention devoted to learned pursuits for women. It is not till the end of that century that the movement acquires new momentum. Until we come to Catharine Macaulay, the novelists in the last quarter of the century, and Mary Wollstonecraft at its end, we have little that is new in theory or striking in achievement. From 1760 to 1775 no new woman writer of distinction appears. On ideals of education and conduct, Dr. James Fordyce, Mrs. Barbauld, and Mrs. Chapone, the recognized arbiters, are tame compilers of bromidic maxims with little of the dignity and spirit of the best writers on feminism six or seven decades earlier. The actual accomplishment of the period before 1760 was a destruction of old placidities, a restlessness of discussion, rather than a movement reaching definite achievement. But this discussion and the many individual examples of literary or learned accomplishment on the part of women were together slowly having their collective effect. Finally salons came and gave social prestige to the women who could think and talk brilliantly, and gave a tremendous impetus, if not to actual learning, yet to the idea that a woman should have sense, intelligence, a wide knowledge of books, and an understanding of history and current affairs. From Catharine Macaulay to about the time of Tennyson's *Princess* is a period possessing considerable unity and one that would reward minute study. Such an investigation would bring us close to the establishment of great schools for the higher education of women and their consequent entrance upon a new era, an era that should look back with astonishment and respect to such ancestors as Anna van Schurman, Bathsua Makin, Dr. Hickes, and Mary Astell. One of the most promising characteristics of the work of women is the emergence of learning from

the aristocratic seclusion of the 'golden age.' In Tudor times it was in courtly circles only that learning was counted appropriate for women. Elizabeth Lucas stands as a solitary record of a lady from the wealthy middle class whose accomplishments were similar to those in the palaces of the great. But a significant change is to be noted in the century initiated about 1660. Duchesses and countesses are listed with wives and daughters of the clergy, of rich merchants, of needy tradesmen. From the Duchess of Newcastle to Mary Leapor, the gardener's daughter, the roll shows that aristocratic restrictions are no longer in full force in the realm of letters. In intimate connection with this change is the fact that authorship is no longer a private, home affair. . . . To be sure, women hesitated to publish. The Orindas and Astræas and Philomelas and Ardelias, whom Richardson derides as 'the lovely dastards' of the sex, show how women sought protecting pseudonyms. But publish they did. . . . Furthermore, women were thinking of authorship as a tool and as a weapon, not merely as a private resource. Mrs. Behn, the first English woman to write definitely for money, was but the precursor of various women in succeeding years who came to regard the products of their minds as of pecuniary significance. Especially is this true towards the end of the period. When we find Mrs. Haywood and Mrs. Manley writing fiction of a sort that will sell, Mrs. Blackwell doing superb botanical work in order to pay the fine imposed on her husband, or Mrs. Collyer writing that she may supplement a meager income and educate her children, we may not have come upon great art or literature, but we have come upon a new idea for women, the possible economic value of their work. It was not an idea that reached any but the most meager fruition, but at least the seed of a new thought was sown. A third change was a respect for literature as a weapon, sometimes of offense, but mainly of defense and propaganda. . . . Pamphlets poured forth. In fact, the fundamental difference between the golden age of the Tudors and the much less agreeable period for learned women after the Restoration was this matter of a public. . . . Of greater significance still is the large number of women who gave themselves to intellectual pursuits. From Mrs. Philips to Mrs. Collyer the roll is impressively long. . . . And all the way down the line there is the suggestion that many other women of like tastes and attainments have been lost in obscurity."—M. Reynolds, *Learned lady in England*, pp. 46, 42-43¹.

1673-1800.—First suggestions for women's colleges.—Limitations on feminine education.—Unchanged conceptions of woman's position and duties.—"There were, of course, hundreds of intelligent men to whom any change in the status of women seemed hostile to the best interests of society. And there were hundreds of women who flouted all thoughts of learning as essentially, eternally unfeminine. . . . But we come to quite a different state of affairs when we consider the opinions of the progressive minority. The proposed schemes for higher education, although without immediate practical result, are notable indications of a new era of thought. Bathsua Makin's was the first formulated plan. But her effort to graft new fruit on the old stock resulted in a singular mixture. Her impassioned desire to induct girls into the excellencies of higher learning was hampered in various ways. She could not lessen the attention paid to the accomplish-

ments; she could not venture to push the school age beyond sixteen; and she could not make her beloved linguistics compulsory. What she did accomplish was not in the establishment of an ordered system. It was rather the impress of her tastes and advanced ideas on the minds of individual pupils. . . . Mrs. Makin's court prestige, her reputation for prodigious scholastic attainments, her courage, originality, and independence, made her a dignified and an authoritative figure. . . . The education proposed by Dr. Hickes in his remarkable sermon in 1683, ten years after Mrs. Makin established her school, was not analyzed into details. But when he suggested for women seminaries of learning similar to Oxford and Cambridge with only such changes in the instruction and the regimen as might be found advisable to fit them for their lives as women, and when he urged rich and childless women to make their wealth serve humanity by founding such colleges for girls, he was too far ahead of his time to meet any immediate practical response, or even any opposition. The next plan came from Mary Astell. This was a matured scheme. Her college was to be a sort of conventual retreat without vows and with an emphasis on the intellectual as well as the religious life. Publicity, college honors, degrees, were not thought of. . . . Mary Astell seems to have looked about her and found many women to whom the customary régime offered no satisfactory place. There were widows who did not choose remarriage, spinsters unwelcome in the homes allotted them by kinship, girls with dowries too slender to make an advantageous marriage probable, young heiresses subject to the too adventurous pursuit of impecunious lovers and so in need of a haven pending marriage. All these uncoördinated needs were to be met by the new institution. The plan was to provide agreeable surroundings wherein women could tranquilly and without hostile criticism work out their own salvation. . . . The plan included too much, and the adjustments rendered necessary by its captivating flexibility would have taxed any organizer to the utmost. . . . Mary Astell's contribution was in the idea she set forth and in her eloquent defense of that idea. It is surprising that Defoe's plan for a woman's college should have been coincident with Mary Astell's, yet independent of it. . . . He evidently considers Mary Astell's plan as too loose in general structure and too religious in tone to be practicable. He narrows his work down to such studies as are given in public schools. After Defoe we hear of no further plans for higher education. But the idea lingered in the minds of many. Richardson in *Clarissa Harlowe* suggests such an institution, and Lady Mary Wortley Montagu says that it was her youthful ambition to be foundress of a college. In Mrs. Centlivre's *Basset Table* the learned young Valeria is advised to found a woman's college in which the pupils shall be called 'Valerians.' The most curious and interesting embodiment of the scheme was that by Thomas Amory. . . . [His] fictitious narrative is . . . of especial significance as showing the persistence of Mary Astell's abortive plan. In complete harmony with these various schemes for giving women greater intellectual freedom was the attitude in many private homes. It is quite surprising to discover how many studious girls had a favorable home environment. . . . In all the discussions of plans for the intellectual training of women two suggestive limitations are to be noted.

One is that nearly all men and women who favored the higher education did so because of the advantage it would be to the Church. The Quakers recognized the right of women to speak in public because they believed such action authorized by the Scriptures, but the freedom so granted did not go beyond religious topics. Susanna Wesley's ministry to her husband's parishioners was excusable only because her teaching was in the service of the Church. And the clergymen of high rank who favored learned women did so because the piety of these women would probably prove more advantageous if it were trained. Even Ballard put extra emphasis on the ladies who read the Scriptures in Hebrew and Greek. . . . The basis of Bishop Burnet's objection to Mary Astell's college was that a body of women thus set apart for learning might conceivably prove inimical to the Church. . . . It was the attitude towards the Church that turned the scale against or in favor of higher education. In point of fact, no woman—not even the most profligate—wrote against religion. On the contrary, all women of letters—even the most profligate—wrote in favor of religion. Genuinely, or as a matter of convention, they all upheld virtue and the authority of the Church. A second limitation is that the ultimate outcome of any greatly increased intellectual freedom for women was but dimly desied. . . . Further steps in independence would seem an inevitable sequence. But such steps were not only not taken, they were not even foreseen. . . . Home duties and relationships remained unchanged. Bathsua Makin said that higher education was not designed to make wives self-assertive, but more reasonably and intelligently submissive. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu and Mary Astell, the two most advanced and independent women of their day, are at one with the theory of the divinely ordained headship of man. Their bitterness of tone contains no thought of change, no hint of rebellion. Women were still under the dominion of fathers and husbands. The difference was that these fathers and husbands were in numerous instances willing to accord a very much enlarged freedom. But the next step was not taken by virtue of which the final right of decision as to her own thought and action would have belonged to the woman herself. There was, furthermore, no claim made by women for any part in public life. Mary Wollstonecraft's suffrage programme of 1791, mild as it was, would have seemed to Mary Astell an incredible overturning of feminine ideals. . . . The idea of woman as a self-sufficing, self-directing individuality, responsible for her own destiny, and capable of playing an important part in civic and national affairs, did not come into clear outline until two centuries after Mary Astell's pronouncement. . . . What was actually accomplished in the century before 1760 was a lavish sowing of seed, a steady infiltration of new ideas, a breaking up of old certainties as to woman's place in domestic and civic life, and an accumulation of examples proving women capable of the most varied intellectual aptitudes and energies."—M. Reynolds, *Learned lady in England*, pp. 447-450, 453-456.

1700-1787.—Social importance and freedom of the lady in France.—Lack of thorough education.—The salon.—Political influence.—"The difference between the status of the lady at Athens in the fifth century before Christ and her status in France in the eighteenth century of our era is so profound that other social changes seem comparatively negligible. . . . The lady alone of

All classes of society had succeeded in breaking her tabu and, while leaving her economic basis untouched, in altering her social relations in several fundamental directions. She retained what she had originally and added provinces on every side. At Athens she was allowed the dignities belonging to the head of the household on condition of entire fidelity to her husband. In France she even strengthened her position in the house while no longer fulfilling the condition. She had of old been a lady as distinguished from a courtesan; in the eighteenth century the distinction had disappeared except as between amateurs and professionals. Her private security had of old been connected,—indissolubly as men supposed—with her abstinence from public activity; in the later period she strengthened her hand at home by the importance she gained abroad. But since her economic position was unchanged, since men were still officially in control and what she enjoyed was won by favour, it was necessary that all the changes in her position should be wrought by the connivance of men. . . . She was therefore seated in the fork of a perpetual dilemma; to gain her ends, whether in politics or in millinery or in letters, she must cultivate her powers, but how far could she cultivate them without giving offence to men? No one but a Puritan will imagine that to be the mistress of a king or a minister or a savant—to be Madame de Pompadour or Madame de Boufflers or Mlle. de Lespinasse—was a matter simply of *beaux yeux*. Such women and hundreds more of the same type were possessed of talents so great that if they had been men they would have been men of distinction. Being women, they had not only to be agreeable in a positive sense, but they had to draw a veil over what might displease if seen too clearly,—over the unremitting intellectual labour which alone enabled them to achieve their ends. They were permitted to undertake great responsibilities provided they preserved an air of being unfit for them, and to present every other evidence of genius provided they dissembled the capacity to take infinite pains. The education the lady received in her youth before she took the matter in hand herself was not of a sort to raise the presumption of pedantry against her. The convent was the only school and its graduates could not always read and write. The four younger daughters of Louis XV could not when they were 'finished' at Fontevault. Thirty years later the little girl who became Madame Roland received a favourable impression at the school of the Congregation, which was one of the best of its day. The sister in charge of instruction was an object of jealousy because of her superior attainments which consisted of a beautiful handwriting, skill with the needle, a knowledge of orthography and some acquaintance with history. Thirty-four pupils from six years old to eighteen occupied a single room and were divided into two classes. The ethical side of the children's training was open to criticism as well as the pedagogical. . . . To balance their severities, the good sisters allowed the most surprising privileges. Many convents received ladies from the world as transient guests and these inmates brought the world with them. Madame de Genlis, shortly after her marriage, sojourned in a convent while her husband was absent on military duty. She enjoyed herself thoroughly. The abbess used to invite men to dinner in her apartment; at the carnival, Madame de Genlis was allowed to give in the convent-parlour two balls a week attended by nuns and

school girls. . . . The little girls were often allowed free access to the lady-boarders and listened with round eyes to their tales of life in the world. The hygiene of the early eighteenth century was primitive everywhere, and the convent was not a leader in reform. Bathing was discouraged. The children sometimes slept in their clothes, either for fear of the cold or to be able to lie a few minutes longer in the morning. They were required to rise early, and yet they had no food until nine o'clock, although the last meal had been taken at not later than six the night before. There was apparently no ventilation in either school-room or dormitory, and no systematic open-air exercise. The corset was an article of faith, and very careful convents required the pupil to sleep in it lest the good work of the day among her organs be undone at night. If a little girl were not sent to the convent but educated at home she was not likely to fare very much better. If her parents were thoughtless, she grew up as best she might; if they were thoughtful, they were pretty sure to have a theory of education of which the child was to be the living vindication. No subject was more congenial to the theorists of the eighteenth century; every one had a plan for the regeneration of society, and every one began soundly enough with the training of the child. . . . The fundamental occasion of the great efflorescence of the lady under Louis the Fifteenth was the peculiar social temper of the French, finding free play in favourable external conditions, which had been developing ever since the days of Louis the Eleventh. The lady's acknowledged importance as a factor in civilised social life is plainly noted in the tales and by-play of the *Heptameron*. If her progress was interrupted, the interruption was due to the relapse into barbarism known as the wars of religion. These once over, the lady's future was assured; she had but to take her own. Even Louis the Fourteenth could not suppress her. The French sense of solidarity made her essential to the social scheme, and the century which in England developed the coffee-house and Dr. Johnson developed in France the salon. The art of the *salonnière* is in its nature unsusceptible of comparative criticism, like that of the actress. . . . It is a somewhat striking fact that the portraits of the most famous *salonnières* show them—even though the good-will of the artist—as plain. Madame Geoffrin's portentous ugliness, the irregularity of Mademoiselle de Lespinasse, the *chinoiserie* of Madame du Deffand, are an enduring proof of their power. But it would be a bold woman who should argue from their example that to be plain and to have no education are in themselves the basis of social success. One result of the lady's lack of education was her restriction to the field of action which is always most congenial and easiest to her, the field of personal influence. She had plenty of ideas but she could not express them impersonally. . . . A man whose function was merely to write great books could do so with his eyes closed; the lady whose success in life was to consist in exploiting him was compelled to keep hers open. Her first business was to understand herself, her second to understand her world. Nothing is more surprising to the Anglo-Saxon, who believes in unpremeditated art, than the fact that beauty is not necessary to make a Frenchwoman seductive. The power of mind when applied to the science of being agreeable is something of which he has very little conception. His women have an *amour propre* which forbids them

to try to please. The admiration they excite without trying is the only kind they value. . . . The French lady of the eighteenth century on the other hand aimed to please as whole-heartedly as a grocer aims to sell cabbages. Her enthusiasm often carried her to the length of pleasing her husband. Her intimate man friends she pleased without too much trouble, and she was very careful to please her woman-friends as well. In the political world the women (Montesquieu says) all had relations with each other and formed a sort of republic, a state within the state, the members of which were always active in mutual good offices. But the lady counted these steps as but preliminary; she was a failure unless she pleased all her world. . . . The lady could give sound advice on any practical subject. . . . The ladies of the court of Francis the First delighted in a sort of erotic mysticism that included both sacred and profane love. Love and religion were interwoven in an emotion not too clearly analysed. The ladies of the eighteenth century had no illusions about either. . . . To suppose that the life of the *salonnière* consisted in giving pleasant parties is to mistake the flower for the root and the branch. The force of these strong and gifted ladies showed itself everywhere where personal influence can count, that is throughout the field of social relations. The ablest of all had a controlling voice in the affairs of the state, instructed ambassadors, determined the fate of ministers. The very despatches of the time show a feminine style and abound in '*mots de ruelle*.' Cardinal de Tencin and the Duke de Choiseul expressed the wills of Madame de Tencin and the Duchess de Gramont. Madame de Langeac could command *lettres de cachet*, Mademoiselle Renard could create general officers, Mademoiselle Guimard could distribute benefices. The surest way into the Academy was through a lady's recommendation; the success of a play, a poem, a picture, a philosophy, depended upon her. The lady is the sturdy oak, the man of genius the clinging vine; Madame de Luxembourg protects Rousseau, Madame de Richelieu protects Voltaire; Madame de Choiseul protects the Abbé Barthelemy; Mademoiselle de Lespinasse protects de Guibert. It was not until the middle of the century that the diffused feminism of the age crystallised in the salon. . . . The knight was gone, and the lady was emancipated. In the social struggle she fought with the same weapons and the same chance of success as her lord. Instead, therefore, of two codes of conduct for the sexes with love as the only common ground, *politesse* was as nearly as possible the same for both sexes."—E. J. Putnam, *The lady*, pp. 224-229, 232, 235, 237-239, 242.—See also RAMBOUILLET, HÔTEL DE.

1800-1875.—American women in industry.—Inadequate wage.—Beginnings of women's trade unions.—"As early as 1832 they [American women] were employed in as many as one hundred different occupations. In many of these, to be sure, they were as rare as women blacksmiths are today. But in 1836 a committee of the National Trades' Union, appointed to inquire into the evils of 'female labor,' reported that in the New England States 'printing, saddling, brush making, tailoring, whip making and many other trades are in a certain measure governed by females,' and added that of the fifty-eight societies composing the Trades' Union of Philadelphia, twenty-four were 'seriously affected by female labor.' The census of 1850 enumerated nearly one hundred and seventy-five different manufacturing industries in

which women were employed, and the number has steadily increased until there is now scarcely an industry in which they are not to be found. . . . Women's wages have always been excessively low and their hours excessively long. About 1830 Mathew Carey estimated that in Philadelphia, New York, Boston and Baltimore there were between 18,000 and 20,000 working women, at least 12,000 of whom could not earn, by constant employment for 16 hours out of the 24, more than \$1.25 per week. At this rate he figured that, allowing for the loss of one day a week through sickness, unemployment or the care of children, and counting lodging at 50 cents and fuel at 12½ cents a week, a woman would have left for food and clothing just \$22.50 per year. A good seamstress without children and employed all the time he figured could earn \$1.12½ per week or \$58.50 per year, out of which she would have to pay 50 cents per week for rent, 15 cents per week for fuel, 8 cents per week for soap, candles, etc., and \$10 for shoes and clothing—which would leave her for food and drink 2¾ cents per day. If she was hampered by the care of children, was unemployed one day a week, or was slow or unskilled, he figured that, at the same rates of expenditure, she would have a yearly deficit of \$11.56. The situation of the working women in the cities of this country during the early decades of the nineteenth century was, indeed, as characterized by the New York *Daily Sentinel*, the first daily labor paper in this country, 'frightful, nay disgraceful to our country, . . . a gangrenous spot on the body politic, a national wound that ought to be visited and dressed, lest it rankle and irritate the whole system.' Fifteen years later conditions were little better. An investigation of 'female labor' in New York in 1845 led to the assertion by the *New York Tribune* that there were in that city about 50,000 working women, one half of whom earned wages averaging less than \$2 per week, and to the further statement that the girls who flocked to that city from every part of the country to work as shoe binders, type rubbers, artificial-flower makers, match-box makers, straw braiders, etc., found competition so keen that they were obliged 'to snatch at the privilege of working on any terms.' . . . In 1863 the average wages paid to women in New York, taking all the trades together, were said to have been about \$2 a week, and the hours ranged from eleven to sixteen a day. And in 1887 it was stated that in New York City nine thousand and in Chicago over five thousand women earned less than \$3 per week. Some of these statements may be exaggerations, but there can be no doubt that, throughout the entire history of women in industry in this country, their wages, in thousands of cases, have been inadequate for decent support. Their wages, too, have been far below those of men. In 1833 and again in 1868 it was stated that women's wages were, on an average, only about one-fourth what men received. Moreover, it has been authoritatively stated that during the civil war period the wages of women increased less than those of men, while their cost of living rose out of all proportion. It is probable that, in general, women's wages have been less flexible, more subject to the influence of custom and less to the influence of demand and supply, than men's. Unfortunately custom in this case has furnished a standard of exploitation and not of protection. It is probable, too, that working women have suffered more than working men from periods of panic and depression, for such periods, like war, have thrown upon their own re-

sources thousands of women who in normal times are supported by their male relatives. . . . The general conditions under which women have toiled in this country have been little if any better than their wages and their hours. . . . One woman who testified before the Massachusetts Committee on Hours of Labor in 1845 stated that, in the room where she worked, along with about 130 other women, 11 men and 12 children, there were 293 small lamps and 61 large lamps which were sometimes lighted in the morning as well as in the evening. The lack of ventilation in the mills and boarding houses of Lowell was in 1849 made the subject of a report to the American Medical Association by Dr. Josiah Curtis, and in the same year the physician of the Lowell Hospital, established by the manufacturing corporations exclusively for the use of operatives, attributed to lack of ventilation in the cotton mills the fact that, since the founding of the hospital nine years before, over half the patients had suffered from typhoid fever. Typhoid fever, however, was doubtless a far less general result of these conditions than consumption. . . . There is no reason to believe that conditions were any better, if as good, in other manufacturing districts. . . . Whole blocks of tenements, too, have been rented out to families in New York for the manufacture of cigars. As early as 1877 the United Cigar Manufacturers' Association, an organization of small employers, condemned as unsanitary these tenement cigar factories where the babies rolled on the floor in waste tobacco, and the housework, the cooking, the cleaning of children and the trade of cigar making were all carried on in one room. From these evil conditions, low wages, long hours and unwholesome sanitary arrangements, immigrant women have naturally been the greatest sufferers, for, like their husbands and brothers, they have been obliged to begin at the bottom. Irish women first entered the factories of New England, for example, as waste pickers and scrub women. But their daughters became spinners and weavers. There have been, however, certain exceptions to this rule. The skilled Bohemian women cigar makers who came to New York in the seventies, for instance, earned from the first comparatively high wages. Foreign girls who have gone into domestic service, moreover, have frequently earned higher wages than American girls who have chosen to be, for example, saleswomen. The chief forces which have tended to improve the condition of working women have been trade unions, industrial education and legislation. In certain industries, especially shoe making, cigar making, printing and collar and cuff making, trade unions have brought about higher wages, shorter hours or better conditions in certain localities. Women shoe-binders, about one thousand in number, won a strike for higher wages at Lynn as early as 1834, and during the sixties and seventies the Daughters of St. Crispin protected the working women of their craft. Women members were admitted into the Cigar Makers' International Union in 1867 and were prominent in the great strike of 1877. The International Typographical Union admitted women in 1869. Probably no organization of women workers, however, has been more effective than the Collar Laundry Union of Troy, N. Y., the predecessor of the Shirt, Waist and Laundry Workers' International Union. During the sixties the Collar Laundry Union is said to have raised the wages of its members from \$2 or \$3 to \$14 a week, and to have contributed \$1000 in aid of Troy iron molders on strike against a reduction

of wages, and \$500 in aid of striking bricklayers in New York. . . . In the textile industries, too, a long series of efforts by operatives to improve their own situation began with the picturesque strike of four hundred women and girls in Dover, N. H., in 1828, when the operatives paraded the town with flags and inscriptions and the factory agent advertised for two or three hundred 'better-behaved women.' The long and bitterly contested but successful strike of the Fall River weavers against a reduction of wages in 1875 was led by women who went out after the Weavers' Union, composed of men, had voted to accept the reduction. Many other examples of effective trade-union activity among women workers might be cited. These women's organizations, moreover, have proved powerful factors in the fight for ten-hour laws."—H. L. Sumner, *Economic position of women*, pp. 14-15, 17-24.

1815-1900.—Effects of industrial revolution on woman's movement in England.—Change in economic status of the home.—Parasitism of middle class women.—Exploitation of working women.—About the beginning of the nineteenth century the question of woman's rights took an entirely new form and began to emerge as a definite movement. The history of women hitherto had been far from static. Even the nineteenth century did not create a greater revolution in the general attitude to woman's rights than had been created in the Middle Ages by the code of chivalry and the recognition, for the first time, of a whole series of woman's rights which, though seldom embodied in political statutes, altered the social position of woman and set her on that "pedestal" against which the feminists of the nineteenth century appealed. But previous to 1800 woman's rights had been mainly personal and social and had not been achieved by an organized and definitely formulated effort among women themselves. With the beginning of the nineteenth century there occurred a revolutionary change which entirely altered the social relations of individuals—both men and women—and precipitated upon the world a whole set of new questions. One of these questions was the relation between capital and labor; another was the movement for woman's rights. "It was not until the nineteenth century that the demand of women for political, economic, and educational freedom was heard among any considerable mass of the people. This extension of the demand for emancipation was due to economic changes . . . associated with the substitution of mechanical power for human energy in the making of commodities, and with the development of powerful and smoothly working machines in place of human hands and simple tools. . . . Of all the changes introduced by the industrial revolution there is none greater than the alteration brought about in the position of women. Many people believe that it was only in the nineteenth century that women began, on a large scale, to work for their living. There could be no greater mistake. All the evidence goes to show that before the eighteenth century women, with few exceptions, worked as hard and as long as men did. In the sixteenth century women not only helped their husbands in farm work, but they toiled at spinning and carding of flax and wool as a by-industry of their own. . . . Before the industrial revolution women took a full share in industrial work. The basis of their work, however, was quite different from what it is to-day. Speaking generally, before the industrial revolution the economic unit was the family, and

and not the individual. So much was this the case, that in the censuses of 1811, 1821, and 1831 it was assumed that all the members of the family would practise the same occupation. Much of the work done by women in the family was of a domestic nature for the immediate service of their husbands and children, and not for profit. In technical language it was the production of use values, and not of exchange values. . . . It is common to find a woman carrying on the farm or shop of her husband after his death, and the farmer's wife . . . was her husband's working partner in his business enterprise as well as his housekeeper and servant. In fact, before the nineteenth century marriage was an industrial partnership as well as a relation of affection. The women worked, and worked hard, contributing much to the wealth of England, which was sold in her markets. This situation must have served to modify considerably the harshness of the common law, which decreed the husband's entire control of his wife's property. Fitzherbert's husbandmen, depending as he did on his wife's energy in poultry yard, garden, and spinning room, would not be likely to insist upon his legal rights to take absolute possession of her earnings. And in one way the law recognized the wife's partnership. A husband could not leave his property entirely away from his wife. The widow's ancient right to one third of her husband's property was only abolished in England by the Reform Parliament, that Parliament which was called together on the basis of the Franchise Act, which for the first time introduced the word 'male' into the qualifications of the parliamentary elector. Before the industrial revolution, then, the household was, as a general rule, the unit of industry, and women worked in it as members of the family for the production of exchange as well as of use values. Now what was the effect of the industrial revolution on the position of women in relation to these economic activities of the family? Briefly, the answer is that the introduction of machinery, by taking work out of the home and establishing the factory, the railway, and the mine as the organs of industry, 'broke up the family as an economic unit and diminished the amount of production for use carried on within the home. Brewing, baking, butter-making, spinning, weaving, even—to a large extent—the making of clothes, have ceased to be activities of the family; and increasingly housewives are finding that it is cheaper and more convenient to hand over jam making, laundry work, even window cleaning and floor polishing, to agencies that exist independently of the home. This is an inevitable development. Modern machinery and the use of artificial sources of power immensely cheapen production, but they can only be used by organizations bigger than the family group. So that the economic basis of the family has altered more within the last hundred years than in the whole course of Christian civilization preceding that time. Inevitably this has reacted on the position of women, whose relation to the family was always closer than that of men; and the changes in the nature and aspirations of women, which have developed in the nineteenth century, are very largely, though not entirely, due to these altered economic conditions. But different classes of women were affected very differently. Among the wealthier people attempts were made to preserve the subordination of women to the family unit, although the economic justification for that dependence had ceased. Among the poor the necessity for the women's contribution to the family income was so strong that they were drafted into the new

forms of industrial life without any consideration of their powers or capacities. To put it shortly, parasitism became the fate of the middle class women, ruthless exploitation that of the working class women. The latter were absorbed in large numbers by the new factories, as were also the children, who equally had worked as parts of the family unit; and the first stage of machine production saw the women and children workers cruelly and shamelessly sacrificed to the demands of profit. . . . The middle class woman, in fact, was regarded solely from the standpoint of sex. There was no way by which she might satisfy her natural wish to use the welling energies within her other than by becoming the mistress of a household. Naturally, therefore, she often regarded 'to be settled' as an end to be aimed at, quite apart from the personality of the man who offered to make her his wife. And the irony of the situation was that to the finer spirits who refused to acquiesce in this degradation of love to the economic plane, there was no other alternative than an existence which became 'that useless, blank, pale, slow-trailing thing' of which one of the Charlotte Brontë heroines so bitterly complains. As the nineteenth century wore on other tendencies came into play which further increased the hardships of middle class women. The presence of a surplus of women in the middle classes made itself more and more apparent. Probably the cause of this is the emigration of young men, rendered necessary by our enormous colonial development; but it may be that some other and more subtle cause is at work. . . . Another new element in the position of the middle class woman arises from the fact that her men relations tend to become salaried officials in place of independent merchants and employers. This means not only that the women can no longer take part in the economic activities of their men relations, but that, in the event of the death of the latter, their position is far more precarious. A business or a shop goes on even after the death of a husband or father who established or inherited it, but when a salaried official dies his family are altogether deprived of the support which he afforded them. And again, if a wife is no longer of any direct economic value, if on the contrary, she is an expense, then men, in many cases, probably with reluctance, must defer marriage until they can afford that luxury."—E. J. Morley, *Economic foundations of the women's movement* (Fabian Tract, no. 175, pp. 2-3, 5-6, 8-9, 11).

1839-1848.—Laws passed for the legal emancipation of women in America. See COMMON LAW: 1839-1848.

1861-1910.—Further development of education for girls.—American colleges.—English education.—"It was fortunate for the cause of feminism that . . . [the English] system of elementary education had a religious origin, and the Church of England and dissenting sects equally believed in the possession by girls of souls to be saved, so that even from the days of society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, schools for girls were established side by side with those for boys. In the second half of the nineteenth century the movement for creating High Schools revolutionised the education of the middle-class girl, and led to the establishment of numerous women's colleges."—G. Slater, *Making of modern England*, p. 290.—"The effort to establish distinctly women's schools [in the United States] was continued after the Civil War by Matthew Vassar, who founded in 1861, and opened in 1865, the first adequately endowed and organized college for women in Amer-

ica. Ten years later, Miss Sophia Smith founded and endowed Smith College to furnish women 'with means and facilities for education equal to those that are offered in colleges for young men.' The institution was opened in 1875; and in the same year Henry Durant established Wellesley College. . . . The West has always led the East in opening equal opportunity to women, even equal suffrage. . . . Thus it is no accident that Oberlin, in the western forest, was the first college to open its doors to women. Antioch, under Horace Mann's direction, was, however, the first institution of higher learning to give men and women equal opportunity. . . . A woman can work in almost any important university in America to-day if she cares to do so. In 1910 there were conferred in the United States 12,590 A. B. degrees, and women took 44.1 per cent of them."—E. Barnes, *Women in modern society*, pp. 69-71.—"The opening of . . . higher educational opportunities to women has given feminism a cutting edge, and has also stimulated its other demands. The girls who has proved her intellectual fitness demands free entrance to the intellectual professions. To a great extent this demand has been successful. The greatest fight of all was over the entry to the medical profession, and was won only after a struggle lasting for eighteen years. The prejudice against women doctors still persists. [In England] we have as yet [written in 1915] no women solicitors or barristers, scarcely any women ministers of religion. But journalism, painting, sculpture, music, the stage, and teaching give women opportunities approximately equal to those of men. Into the disputed question as to how far women are penalised for their sex in the amount of their remuneration, it is impossible to enter here. Side by side with the demand for equal opportunities in work, is that for equal opportunities in play. The time is not so long past when the unfortunate inmates of girls' schools were provided with no more exciting forms of physical recreation than an ordered march in the afternoon, two and two, with the governess in the rear. Croquet came to the rescue, followed by lawn tennis. Now hockey, golf, cycling, swimming, motoring, and even aviation have their female devotees in goodly numbers; and the best women in many forms of athletics can hold their own with all except the men in the first-class. . . . But perhaps it may be said that the wisest and soundest form of feminism is the demand that the work which is characteristically women's should receive full recognition of its true importance, both in remuneration and in status. When women began to desert their homes for paid occupations, a sudden discovery was made that the work of household management, of the care of husbands and the bringing up of babies, hitherto despised because feminine, was really, after all, of inestimable importance. But to this day the respectable poor widow with three or four children is usually driven by a Board of Guardians into the factory, and compelled to neglect her children, instead of being required to give them all her time and enabled to do so."—G. Slater, *Making of modern England*, pp. 290-291.—See also EDUCATION: Modern; 19th century: England: Voluntary and board schools; France; Germany; United States: Secondary education.

1867-1905.—Progress of feminism in Europe.—Predominance of Scandinavian influences.—German organization.—Demands.—Education.—Economic life.—Marriage and the family.—Public life in community and state.—"To the American observer there is much food for reflection in

the outspoken feminism of the continental movement. One sees very little evidence of truckling to narrow-minded criticism. All questions of importance are thrashed out in the open, at conventions and in the feminist press. The consequence is that the foreign movement has developed a very strong power of self-direction and a keen, steady consciousness of woman's varied interests as a sex. One cause, though not the only one, of their more aggressive self-expression is the consciousness of being in the majority. On the continent, as well as in England, the 'surplus women' were already a problem before the outbreak of the war. In Germany, there were 800,000 superfluous women, and in Austria-Hungary 600,000, making a total of 1,400,000. Likewise, in the four Scandinavian states, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, the women outnumber the men by nearly 300,000. That grave social changes must result from this disturbance of the natural balance of the sexes is a foregone conclusion. The impetus thus given to the woman movement will be no less powerful because it is not of their own seeking. The industrial revolution also gave a great impetus to the woman movement, which was not of its own seeking, but the impetus is none the less powerful and cumulative. The greater autonomy of the European woman movement is most definitely seen in the number and kind of periodicals which interpret the movement to the public. That the women who write the leaders and articles in a dozen or two of fortnightly and monthly journals should have no voice in the councils of the nation is an official betrayal by the German government of that on which it professes, as a state, to place the highest moral value—Kultur. These feminist periodicals correspond in purpose to the American suffrage journals. But in no sense are they to be compared with the so-called women's magazines, the commercialized monthly journals which really exploit, with cold-blooded cunning, all the immaturities in woman which feminism is trying so laboriously to remove. On the continent, however, the woman's press has attained substantial dimensions. Beginning with *Neue Bahnen* (New Paths) in 1867, it has steadily increased in volume and excellence, mirroring in its various journals the progress of the age of reason in the woman's world. All phases of feminism are discussed in their columns, and their intellectual hospitality and devotion to the free speech are evidenced by the range of subjects treated, embracing, as it does, everything from the servant problem to the new morality. Even the special organ of the 'moderates,' *Die Frau*, has opened its columns from time to time to the exponents of the new ethics propaganda, though its teachings have been definitely repudiated by the organized Frauen-Bewegung of Germany. But to stifle discussion and pronounce the taboo is not the way the feminist journals have chosen. . . . It is not to be inferred that the various branches of the German woman's movement operate with insipid unanimity and thoughtless agreement. On the contrary, there are the socialist-feminists and the bourgeois-feminists; the conservative feminists, the moderate feminists, and the radical feminists; the Christian-feminists and the neutral-feminists; the 'Old Feminists' and the 'Young Feminists'; the suffrage-feminists and the feminist-feminists. These divisions mean an appreciable amount of pull and strain within the movement, a lively flow of internal discussion, and a multitude of mutually corrective attacks. . . . Despite all evidences of heterogeneity, the will to organize is strong

in both Germany and Scandinavia—the will and the skill. During the past twenty years, the German women have built up a great Union of Women's Clubs (Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine). The Union now [written in 1915] embraces 2,290 Associations and has a membership of half a million women. The establishment of the union grew directly out of the International Congress of Representative Women held at the Chicago World's Fair in 1893. Taking for their model the organization of the American Women's Clubs, the German women formed their union in 1894. At first it was simply a loose federation of women's associations, mainly philanthropic in character. Today it is a self-conscious, self-directing organization for the furtherance of all the aims of the woman movement. It is true that the knitting processes of the intervening twenty years have proceeded very slowly and unequally. At times it looked as if disruption were imminent, but always the new sense of cohesion triumphed and the union grew. History shows that the sense of cohesion is a thing of slow growth even among the men of the human race. How much slower and more difficult must it be among women, the unsocialized sex, individuals who dwell in the super-isolation of married life. . . . The first organization whose avowed purpose was the emancipation of women to be formed in Germany was the Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein (General Woman's Union). This association, founded in 1865, is still the strongest subdivision of the Federation (Bund). From the beginning, it adopted a pro-woman attitude. Its history is practically the history of the German woman movement. It is, in many ways, the most representative of all the associations which have combined to form the great half-million woman party. In 1905, the same year in which moral and political militancy startled the world, the General Woman's Union issued a program which is of utmost importance to the student of the woman movement. This program fixes the threshold of European feminism. Its demands are the minimum demands of the twentieth century woman movement. Anything less than this program would be something less than feminism, just as anything more would be pioneerism, and pioneerism requires no platform. Conceiving, then, that the time for organization on a grand scale had come, the makers of the program for 1905 set out to produce a document which should serve as an instrument of amalgamation for as many sex-conscious women as possible. They took over the political demands of the nineteenth century feminists but rejected their insistent emphasis on woman solely as a human being. They adopted Ellen Key's idea of total sex differentiation but rejected the matriarchal program which she built upon it. The practical demands of the declaration, however, are the groundwork of the practical feminist movement of both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and are valid, on whatever basis of abstract theory, always and everywhere, until they shall have been canceled by the necessary social reforms. . . . Some of the demands of the program have been so canceled in Germany and Scandinavia during the ten years which have elapsed since its drawing up. The Woman's Movement has chosen its goals and tasks irrespective of all political and religious parties. It works for the women of all classes and parties. The demands of the Women's Movement are based on the existence of thorough-going mental and physical differences between the sexes. It deduces from this fact that only by the cooperation of men and women can all the pos-

sibilities of cultural progress be realized. The Woman's Movement, therefore, sets for itself this aim: To bring the cultural influence of women to its complete development and free social effectiveness. The opportunity for the full development and effectiveness of woman's influence is *not* contained in the social and economic conditions of the present. Much more is it true that modern life has, on the one hand, limited the sphere of influence of the woman within the home, and on the other hand, thrust her into active participation in economic and social life, without providing her with the inward equipment and the outward mobility for it. The Woman's Movement seeks, therefore, a transformation of ideas and conditions in the fields of: 1. Education. 2. Economic Life. 3. Marriage and the Family. 4. Public Life in Community and State. The Woman's Movement holds the opinion that the education of girls in its present form does not show sufficient consideration either for the development of personality in woman or for her future domestic, vocational, and civic duties. It demands from state and community the manifestation of the same interest in the education of girls as in that of boys. It makes especially the following demands. 1. Obligatory continuation schools for girls after their dismissal from the public schools. 2. Reorganization of the secondary schools for girls, so that the latter, without hurt to their special adaptation to women's sphere, shall be made equal to the secondary schools for boys. It must be made possible for girls to prepare themselves, either within the frame-work of their own secondary schools or by admission to the boys' secondary schools, to enjoy their rights in the higher institutions of learning. 3. The unconditional admission of properly qualified and prepared women to all universities and technical schools. The Woman's Movement regards as the primary and immediate occupation of the married woman the sphere of duties involved in marriage and motherhood. The satisfactory performance of this vocation must be secured in the interest of society by all the means of education, of economic reform, and of legal protection. The work of women in the performance of this vocation shall be valued, economically and legally, as a competent cultural service. In view of the great number of women who remain unmarried and the still greater number of those who cannot find an adequate provision in marriage, the vocational work of women is an economic and moral necessity. But the Woman's Movement also regards the vocational work of women, in a broader sense and independently of every outward necessity, as a cultural value, for women may be the possessors of a specific talent, and with the full and free development of their capacities may find, in many fields of intellectual and material activity, tasks which by reason of their nature they can perform better than men. In respect to the economic valuation of women's vocational work, the Woman's Movement stands for the principle: Equal pay for equal work. In consequence of this view of the economic side of the Woman question, the Woman's Movement makes the following demands. 1. It lays upon parents, and, in a deeper sense, upon society, the obligation to give every girl the opportunity to learn an occupation according to her inclination and capacity. 2. It strives to broaden the range of women's occupation, especially by the furtherance and improvement of the vocational training of girls. 3. It supports all forms of vocational organization as a primary means of elevating women's work, especially its

economic valuation. It works towards the continuous broadening and the efficient execution of the laws protecting working women as well as toward the extension of state insurance in the sense of greater economic protection of the mother. 5. It seeks for women participation in the rights which are conferred upon certain classes of business (Merchants' Courts, Trade Courts, and so forth). The Woman's Movement sees in the sacredness of marriage the essential guarantee of the physical and spiritual welfare of posterity and the fundamental condition of public health. With regard to sexual morality, it lays upon men and women alike the same duties and combats the double standard of morals which, on the one hand, grants to the man a sexual freedom fatal in every respect and, on the other hand, strikes the woman with unjust harshness. It demands for the woman, as the guardian of the home and the educator of the children, that she shall bear, in harmony with the dignity of her obligation and the value of her activities, the same legal responsibility as the man in all the affairs of marriage and of family life. From the foregoing we derive the following aims: 1. The Woman's Movement combats prostitution with all the means at its command and sees in the legal sanction of vice, expressed by the existing system of regimentation, a social and moral danger. 2. It demands a reform of the marriage laws, by which both parents shall be assured of the same rights of decision in all personal affairs and the same responsibilities and rights in their joint affairs, especially the same share in parental authority. It demands statutory reforms concerning the rights of illegitimate children, reforms which shall lay upon the illegitimate father greater responsibilities toward mother and child. . . .

"The Woman's Movement represents the conviction that our economic, social, and intellectual progress must have as consequence the increasing participation of women in the public life of community and state. It demands the enlistment of women in the duties and rights of communal and political citizenship. It demands this primarily for the sake of women. For, in the modern state, the economic and cultural interests of women can only be lastingly secured by the acquisition of these rights. Also the exclusion of women from national life and social responsibility, together with the inevitable narrowing of her domestic sphere of influence, must result in the retarding of her development as a personality as well as in the lowering of her social position. The Woman's Movement takes this demand in the second place for the sake of the public welfare, because the coöperation of women is indispensable to state and community in the solution of all their modern social-political problems. In particular, the Woman's Movement seeks the following goals, according to the possibilities given by the stage of social development: 1. Admission of women to responsible offices in community and state, primarily to such as stand in a particularly close relation to the interests of women (the education of girls, social-political administration of state and community, the problems concerning working women, courts of law, and so forth). 2. Enlistment of women in the representation of laity in legal proceedings (justice of the peace and jury members). 3. Removal of all limitations placed on women's right to combine. 4. The extension of the church franchise to women. 5. The extension of the community franchise to women. 6. The extension of the political franchise to women."—K. Anthony,

Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia, pp. 11-17, 19-26.

1867-1921.—First feminist movement in England.—Attitude toward marriage.—Growing realization of the importance of the child.—Mutterschutz on the continent.—From the time of the development of a conscious woman's movement in the middle of the nineteenth century, the struggle for women's rights underwent a considerable change in direction and emphasis. The earliest struggle was for higher education and political representation. The struggle for higher education was won in a generation. At the same time the early leaders of the movement for woman's rights had begun a slow and unpopular effort to gain economic independence. As the question of education settled itself and the struggle for enfranchisement became less novel and difficult, the question of economic independence grew to be the one of greatest importance. But this brought up the whole matter of marriage, motherhood, and the care of children. The first advocates of woman's rights had been individualists. They had fought for personal liberty. Faced with a choice between a "career" and motherhood, they made the choice heroically and seemed to think the matter settled. But as more and more women entered the professions and organized industry, as the woman with a man's education and a man's work ceased to be an unusual phenomenon, the sacrifice of marriage to work began to be resented. There arose a generation of women who not only claimed both work and motherhood for women, but began a spirited attack upon the limitations of the home as hitherto conducted, pointing out that it defeated its own end, and instead of fostering motherhood, restricted it. Of these newer leaders the most notable were Charlotte Perkins Gilman in America and Ellen Key in Scandinavia. They frankly centred their whole propaganda in the child. For his sake they proposed reforms that seemed to shake the very foundations of society—the abolition of private housekeeping, communal nurseries, free divorce, etc. Their effort was earnest and high-minded, and they had a powerful influence. "The first feminist movement [in England] emerged into the open at the time of the Reform Bill of 1867. If its origin is grasped, its peculiar characteristics will be easily understood. It was on the whole a demand of elderly unmarried women for the right to freer activities, as the alternative to an impracticable ideal of marriage and motherhood for every woman. Therefore it is not astonishing that these early feminists tended on the whole to ignore differences of sex, since those differences had been made the pretext for condemning them to a condition of parasitism, against which a healthy human being was bound to revolt. It was natural enough that these pioneers of the women's movement should insist upon their likeness to men, should demand the right to the same education as men received and the entrance to the same professions as men followed. In their revolt against the degradations which sex parasitism had brought in its train, it was not unnatural that in their dress and bearing they should neglect the grace and charm which a normal man will always desire in women. It was not unnatural either, when they found a section of the public advocating in industry special protection of women by law, that they should regard this as another form of the masculine exclusiveness from which they themselves suffered, so that to them the right of a woman to be a doctor and the right of a woman to work underground in a mine should pre-

sent themselves as similar demands. Being but middle class women, influenced by the progressive ideals of their class, they were mostly Liberals, and to their special dread of the exclusion of women from human activities, other than those conditioned by sex, was added the strong individualism of the Liberalism of the period. Therefore they naturally set themselves in opposition to the demand for factory legislation, and there arose in consequence misunderstandings between two sections of reformers, the echoes of which have persisted to our own time. The attitude towards marriage of these early feminists has also been much misunderstood. There were, no doubt, a certain number among them who were indifferent or opposed to marriage; but most of them found themselves driven into hostility to normal family relations, mainly because these were used as an argument to convince them that the alterations in the position of women which they desired were impossible. When a woman, struggling for education and the right to work for herself, was met by the objection: 'If you learn Greek or if you become a doctor no one will marry you,' is it astonishing that she answered, 'I don't care if no one does'? Moreover, as has been already said, the pioneers came mostly from the class of 'superfluous women.' They knew well that marriage was far from being the certainty or the likelihood which their opponents always assumed it to be. The alternative for them was not work or marriage, but work and money of their own or a spinstered existence in their fathers' houses. Therefore, naturally most of them put out of their minds, with what bitterness few people have realized, the possibility of marriage and motherhood, and turned instead to develop their own intellectual and spiritual forces, devoting themselves to public work and to the struggle for that independent living which is so sweet to the woman who has revolted against parasitism. . . . So, at the present time there are two main sections in the modern women's movement—the movement of the middle class women who are revolting against their exclusion from human activity and insisting, firstly, on their right to education, which is now practically conceded on all sides; secondly, on their right to earn a livelihood for themselves, which is rapidly being won; and, thirdly, on their right to share in the control of Government. . . . On the other hand, there are the women of the working classes, who have been faced with a totally different problem, and who naturally react in a different way. Parasitism has never been forced on them. Even when the working class woman does not earn her own living in the world of industry—though practically all the unmarried girls of the working classes do so—her activities at home are so unending, and she subconsciously feels so important and so valuable, that she has never conceived of herself as useless and shut out from human interests as the parasitic middle class woman. . . . The reforms that she demands are not independence and the right to work, but rather protection against the unending burden of toil which has been laid upon her. A speaker at a working women's congress said once, 'It is not work we want, but more love, more leisure to enjoy life, and more beauty.' These facts explain the relative lukewarmness of working class women in the distinctively feminist movement, and one of the possible dangers of the future is that the working class women in their right and natural desire to be protected against that exploitation which the first development of machinery brought with it, should allow themselves to drift without

observing it into the parasitism which was the lot of middle class women. . . . An even more momentous change is occurring in the attitude towards marriage. The first generation of feminists did not so much oppose marriage as ignore it; but there is now coming into existence a second generation of advanced women, few at present, but destined to increase. . . . The problem of the modern professional woman is that she is forced to reconcile two needs of her nature which the present constitution of society make irreconcilable. She wants work, she wants the control of her own financial position, she wants education and the right to take part in the human activities of the State, but at the same time she is no longer willing to be shut out from marriage and motherhood. And the present organization of society means that for most women the two are alternatives. . . . The normal woman, like the normal man, desires a mate and a child, but she does not therefore desire nothing else. Least of all does she desire to sink back into a state of economic dependence and sex parasitism. Women do not want either love or work, but both; and the full meaning of the feminist movement will not develop until this demand becomes conscious and articulate among the rank and file of the movement."—E. J. Morley, *Economic foundations of the women's movement (Fabian Tract, no. 175, pp. 13-17)*.—As the question of marriage and motherhood emerged as the real crux of the Woman's Movement, there were not wanting those who arose to protest that not only had woman's household works been taken from her in the new society, but even her function of motherhood was being so restricted that it no longer filled her life. "The commandment to the modern woman is now not simply 'Thou shalt bear,' but rather, 'Thou shalt not bear in excess of thy power to rear and train satisfactorily'; and the woman who should today appear at the door of a workhouse or the tribunal of the poor-law guardians followed by her twelve infants, demanding honorable sustenance for them and herself in return for the labor she had undergone in producing them, would meet with but short shrift. . . . It is certain that the time is now rapidly approaching when child-bearing will be regarded rather as a lofty privilege, permissible only to those who have shown their power rightly to train and provide for their offspring, than a labor which in itself, and under whatever conditions performed, is beneficial to society. Further, owing partly to the diminished demand for childbearing, rising from the extreme difficulty and expense of rearing and education, and to many other complex social causes, . . . millions of women in our modern societies are so placed as to be absolutely compelled to go through life not merely childless, but without sex relationship in any form whatever; while another mighty army of women is reduced by the dislocations of our civilization to accepting sexual relationships which almost negate child-bearing, and whose only product is physical and moral disease. . . . Even for those of us [who are child-bearers], child-bearing and suckling, instead of filling the entire circle of female life from the first appearance of puberty to the end of middle age, becomes an episodal occupation, employing from three or four to ten or twenty of the three-score-and-ten years which are allotted to human life. . . . Looking round . . . with the uttermost impartiality we can command, on the entire field of woman's ancient and traditional labors, we find that fully three-fourths of it have shrunk away for ever, and that the remaining fourth still tends

to shrink. It is this great fact, so often and so completely overlooked, which lies as the propelling force behind that vast and restless 'Woman's Movement' which marks our day. It is *this* fact, whether clearly and intellectually grasped, or, as is more often the case, vaguely and painfully felt, which awakes in the hearts of the ablest modern European women their passionate, and at times it would seem almost incoherent, cry for new forms of labor and new fields for the exercise of their powers.—O. Schreiner, *Women and labor*, pp. 59-64.—“Stimulated mainly by Ellen Key, the movement to reform the institution of marriage is decidedly the most important work of European feminism. The marriage problem is approached by the continental critics from an angle as yet little known in our American discussions. In America, the faults of the marriage institution are seen in the prevalence of divorce. The fact that one out of every twelve marriages ends in divorce is the outstanding feature of the marriage situation in this country. In Europe, on the other hand, the failure of the institution of marriage is seen in the prevalence of illegitimacy. By a curious statistical coincidence, it happens that in Germany one out of every twelve babies born is illegitimate [written in 1915]. This mass of illegitimacy is just as disconcerting to the European moralist as the corresponding mass of divorce is to the American moralist. The effect on public discussion is strikingly prominent. The question of divorce, which occupies so much attention in America, falls into the background in Europe and the question of illegitimacy, which has scarcely been broached in public in this country, is one of the most widely-discussed public questions of the day in foreign countries. The illegitimate children born in Germany yearly number 180,000. In Sweden, they number 18,000, and in Norway 5,000. Moreover, to get a true picture of the number of individuals concerned, we must double these numbers, because each case of illegitimacy means an outlawed pair, the unmarried mother and the illegitimate child. It is apparent that the fate of so large a group of persons cannot be a matter of indifference to society or state. It is also apparent that the sole form of marriage legally sanctioned in these countries is not that practiced by a considerable portion of the population. Either something is wrong with this large group of human beings or something is wrong with marriage. According to church and state, nothing can be wrong with the form of sex union defined as legal marriage. To its official sponsors, it represents the highest ideal of sex morality that has yet been attained, or ever will be attained, by civilization. But according to the woman movement and the Mutterchutz movement, something is wrong with the institution of marriage. The woman movement approves of its monogamic basis, but attacks its proprietary rights. Monogamy purified of proprietary rights is the ideal of the main guard of European feminism, the substance of the marriage reforms demanded by the 1905 Program. The Mutterschutz movement goes further. It not only demands the abolition of proprietary rights in marriage, but questions the eternal validity of monogamy itself, if not as ideal morality at least as practical morality. . . . The Mutterschutz idea was the natural historical corrective of a . . . proprietary marriage. The founding of this society in 1905 was the most important historical event in the history of the woman movement since the American Woman's Rights Convention at Seneca Falls in 1848. [See SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: United States: 1848-1851.] . . . With the establishment of

this society, the Mutterschutz Idea became a system. It had already been partly formulated by individuals and leaders, primarily by Ellen Key and Lily Braun. But the society now existed based on the Mutterschutz Idea, with international connections and systematized activities. Its purpose was stated to be the reform of sexual ethics and the protection of motherhood. It soon developed that among their other activities, they had to carry on a ceaseless crusade against hypocrisy. They had to reckon not so much with conventional conscience as with guilty consciences. . . . The movement was denounced as a menace to the family, the church, and the state. That women should come before the public and discuss such subjects was peculiarly resented. But for the fact that they were so ably championed by such continental celebrities as Professor August Forel of Switzerland, Dr. Rutgers of Holland, Dr. Sigmund Freud of Austria, and Minister of Justice Castberg of Norway, the feminine contingent would have had a much thornier path to tread than they actually did.”—K. Anthony, *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, pp. 83-84, 88, 90, 92.

ALSO IN: C. P. Gilman, *Women and economics. 1870-1911.*—Struggle of women for legal justice in England.—Attitude of the law toward women.—Injustices which drove English women to militant revolt.—Attempt of women to get the right to hold property or control their own earnings.—Struggle for liberty of person.—Attempt to get a share in control of their own children.—Injustice in maternity benefit provisions.—“For centuries the status of a woman while single was solemnly defined as *femme sole* and after marriage as *femme covert*. Veritably it may be said that the second estate of that woman was far worse than the first. A *femme sole* was in legal phraseology an ‘infant’ until her majority, but after attaining it she had full possession and control of her property. If she was rich, it was scarcely reputable that she should not marry unless she became a nun; consequently the interval between minority and wedlock was, so to speak, ‘twixt hay and grass. Nevertheless, if she defied social sentiment and remained single, the law protected her ownership. She might be choused out of her possessions, but she could not be deprived of them. The instant she married, however, she became *femme covert*, and every attribute of ownership ceased. Of every human status devised by civilization that of the *femme covert* was the most ignominious, though it wore the air of chivalrous concern for the inherent helplessness of women. So absolutely did the law insist on merging her entity in her lord and master's that if she committed a crime (unless it were very atrocious), she was assumed to have acted at his instance and he was held responsible for it. . . . The author of ‘The English Woman's Legal Guide’ (London, 1913) states her quondam predicament succinctly as follows: ‘By the common law, prior to the series of acts known as the Married Women's Property Acts, 1870-1908, a woman by marrying stood to lose, either permanently or during married life, all actual benefit in any property of which she was at the commencement of or might during the marriage be possessed. The theory was that “a man and his wife are but one person in the law,” which sounds as favourable to wife as to husband, and which if literally applied would have meant equal enjoyment by both of their common property. This, however, was not the meaning given to the phrase in practice. The real meaning would be expressed better by saying that “a man

and his wife are but one person in the law, and that one person is the man," since the immediate interest in the whole of her property passed to her husband, while his property continued to belong to him solely.' So genuine did this legal fiction—that a married woman could not own anything—seem to the legal mind that as time went on and a desire was felt to protect the dowries of wives from the rapacity or debts of husbands, recourse was had to circumvention. Barred from declaring that a wife's property should continue hers, the lawmakers of the period devised a method of tying it up so that her spouse or his creditors could not reach the principal, and so that the yearly income should be paid over to her own use. This method survives in the comparatively modern system of trusts by which estates in Great Britain or the United States can be kept intact during a generation or so for the support of widows, unmarried daughters or spendthrift sons, and protection against sons-in-law. Yet, although because of its historic origin, the tradition of woman's financial ineptitude lingers, it is some time now since the common-law fiction holding her incapable of ownership after marriage was done away with as an absurdity in English-speaking countries. In the United States, where it obtained for a while as a part of the legal code inherited from England, the repudiation has been well-nigh universal. To quote from 'The Legal and Political Status of Women in the United States' (1912). . . . 'In most of the States at the present time property of every kind owned by either husband or wife at time of marriage, or acquired during the marriage by gift, devise, bequest, inheritance, or purchase, constitutes the separate estate of such husband or wife, and is not liable for the debts of the other, but it is liable for the debts of the one who owns the property whether they were incurred before or after marriage.'—B. Grant, *Law and the family*, pp. 5-10.—'It took thirty years of agitation and effort in England to obtain for married women the right to hold property, or to control their own earnings. Again and again bills were introduced and debated in Parliament. . . . Even as late as 1882, when the measure at last actually became law, there were not wanting outspoken protests against any limitation of the power of the husband over his wife and her property. 'Who is the head of the house?' exclaimed one despairing member of Parliament—'the woman or the husband?' 'This bill,' he added, 'is a measure to carry out certain notions of women who rebelled against the law of God that women should be subservient to men.' Nor was the subservience of the wife shown only in the fact that she could hold no property. Until 1890, a husband had the right to confine his wife in his own house, and to prevent her by force from leaving him. In 1840 in the well-known Cochrane case, the court decreed that 'the husband hath by law, power and dominion over the wife, and may keep her by force within the bounds of duty and may beat her, but not in a violent or cruel manner.' What was a violent or cruel manner was apparently left by the court to the judgment of the husband. . . . The fight of English mothers for the right to some share in their own children was longer, bitterer and up to now less successful than the fight of the English wife to her own property or to her personal liberty. Even yet the English child has practically only one legal parent—the father when the child is legitimate, is a source of pride and honour to the parent, when it is earning wages or when it has property to pass on its death; the mother when it is the child of shame and dis-

honour, and when its care and upbringing are a burden almost too heavy for those crushed and feeble shoulders to bear. In 1884, after fifty years of agitation, which was begun in the first case by the Hon. Mrs. George Norton, the question of the mother's right to some share in her children was again under debate in the House of Commons. The first step in the direction of recognizing the rights of the mother was taken in 1839, in response to the public feeling created by Mrs. Norton's valiant battle against her husband for the right occasionally to see her three boys, or at least to know of their whereabouts and of their health. . . . Another very small and hesitating step had been taken in 1857 when it was made possible for the court, after a woman had obtained a divorce from her husband—which could only be granted if he were persistently cruel to her as well as unfaithful—to award to the wife the care of the children until they attained the age of seven. In 1873 the age to which the innocent mother might be allowed to keep her children was extended to ten years old, and in 1884 the effort was being made to give to a mother the right of guardianship over her children in the event of the death of her husband. It was not until 1886 that the Infant Guardianship Act was passed, which over-ruled the old law that a man might by will leave his children to any guardianship he pleased, excluding altogether the mother even from access to them. It took two years of debate and agitation after the introduction of the bill in 1884 to force the measure through both Houses of Parliament. During the debates on the bill, one of the strong advocates of the woman's cause was Mr. [James] Bryce. . . . 'The common law of England,' said Mr. Bryce in commenting caustically on the attitude of the opponents of the mothers of England, 'considered husband and wife to be one, but it did so on the basis of giving the husband all that was his own, and all that was his wife's and giving her nothing; and that principle which had been constantly applied as regarded the property was also applied in the family as regarded the respective rights of the parents to the custody, guardianship and control of their children. The wife had no rights during the lifetime of the husband, and even after his death, by his will, he could exclude her altogether.' . . . A modern instance of English discrimination against women is furnished by the Insurance bill on which the House of Commons engaged in the session of 1911. This measure, which was heralded as the great statesmanlike plan of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which should do away with destitution and make the working classes of England happy and comfortable, is most palpably unfair to women. For widows and orphans it makes no provision, in fact for these most helpless waifs of modern civilisation, it does less than nothing. It does less than nothing because, by compelling every wage earner to ensure against his own sickness and unemployment, it makes it almost impossible for him to make provision either by thrift or insurance against his untimely death. Neither is there any help under the measure for the married women in the home. The single woman wage-earner, although unfairly discriminated against in the amount of relief granted her during sickness or unemployment—a man making the same weekly payment receives ten shillings a week during sickness, a woman receives seven shillings and sixpence—is included within the four corners of the measure. But the woman in the home—the women who are doing the normal work of wives and mothers—is to have no help during the sick-

ness. She is not to be allowed to insure even though she may desire to do so. And the excuse of Mr. Lloyd George for her exclusion is that the nation cannot afford any money for the mother in the home. The demands of the voting wage-earners are too insistent. The voteless woman must drag through sickness with no insurance fund to help out with doctor and nurse, and helper to see to the unfulfilled duties of the mother—duties far more exigent than those which fall to the lot of the factory worker or the casual laborer. . . . It is true that the Insurance bill includes a maternity benefit of thirty shillings. But strange as this may sound, the maternity benefit is for the men rather than for the women, and in the first place the bill provided that the money should be paid to the husband. Owing to the great outcry in the country which greeted this provision, it was amended and it was provided that money shall be paid direct to doctor and nurse. It is, however, only wives of insured men, who are in full working, for whom the maternity benefit is designed. The wife of the man who is not insured, or who through unemployment has exhausted his insurance fund will not benefit. Nor, unless an amendment is carried, will the widow to whom a child may be born in the first sad months after the loss of her husband.”

—A. G. Parritt, *Causes of the revolt of women in England*, pp. 3-5, 7-8.

ALSO IN: G. Wells, *Critique of methods of alteration of women's legal status*.

1900-1921.—International aspects of woman's movement.—Movements for woman's rights in the Orient.—Turkey.—China.—Japan.—India.—Municipal suffrage in Burma.—“Something approaching an international freemasonry in women's matters has most surely been one outgrowth of the Woman's Movement. . . . British women owe many a debt of gratitude to leaders in Norway and Germany, Finland, and other European countries, for victories already won, or lines of advance indicated. Where would much of our work for the suppression of the White Slave Traffic be, if it were not for the leaders in Switzerland and other Continental countries, who form, for instance, the great body of the ‘Amies de la Jeune Fille’? To women in the United States of America many societies of women workers in other lands have owed ideas which have borne fruit in united work for municipal and other reforms. Indeed, it was from that republic that the first organized Woman's Movement emanated. . . . The Woman's Movement differs greatly in form as it makes its appearance in different types of civilization, and as influenced by differing faiths. The lines of its development are affected also by economic and other causes, but, however varied its development may be, the same ideals are found everywhere struggling to birth. The Woman's Movement is an international fact. In unexpected ways the Near and Far East share in the movement. An article in the *Contemporary Review* for June, 1914, gives the following as the aim of the Turkish Society for the Defence of the Rights of Women:—1. To transform the outdoor costume of Turkish women. 2. To ameliorate the rules of marriage according to the exigencies of common sense. 3. To fortify woman in the home. 4. To render mothers capable of bringing up their children according to the principles of modern pedagogy. 5. To initiate Turkish women into life in society. 6. To encourage women to earn their own living by their own work, and to find them work in order to remedy the present evils. 7. To open women's schools in order to give young Turkish

girls an education suited to the needs of their country; and to improve those schools already existing.’ The last two points are considered to be in some ways the most important, and ‘show that Turkish women have grasped the essential nature of their problem, because it remains true in Turkey, as elsewhere, that in women's economic independence and in her intellectual training lies the secret of her social position.’ Dr. Alice Salomon, the secretary of the German National Council of Women (*Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine*), in a report on the work of the Woman's Movement throughout the world, writes: ‘The endeavour to grasp the Woman's Movement in different lands as a whole, never fails to produce a feeling of astonishment that the aims and undertakings of the modern woman, though everywhere spontaneous in their origin, are so fundamentally alike, utterly different as their promoters may be in national temperament, in environment, in occupations, and in religion. The same convictions animate the women of all lands: they strive after the same objects: they are everywhere dominated by the same ideas: they are pushing the same demands.’ Miss Ruth Rouse writes: ‘My own experience amongst the women students of forty-two different countries confirms this verdict: conversation with leaders of women's organizations, study of their literature, attendance at their conferences, reveal a curious unanimity of idea and ideal. It is no forced and artificial unanimity, for the majority of modern national women's movements have sprung up spontaneously.’ From East to West, from North to South, the Movement spreads. Already we find at least eight international organizations at work. These are summed up in a recent writing as The International Council of Women, with its more than seven million members in twenty-two different lands (the National Councils of Women of which this is composed are almost invariably very representative of the Woman's Movement): The International Women's Suffrage Alliance; The Travellers' Aid Society; Les Amies de la Jeune Fille, working in thirty-nine countries; Le Secretariat Internationale de l'Action Sociale de la Femme; L'Association Catholique Internationale des Œuvres de Protection de la Jeune Fille; The World's Young Women's Christian Association, with 670,000 members in twenty-three countries; The World's Women's Christian Temperance Union, with auxiliaries in at least fifty countries. The nations whose women are joining these international societies are in most varied stages of development; not only do we find among them those lands where women are educated and have also long since entered the great industrial world, but also countries where, in spite of a so-called civilization, women's position is still mediæval. The great non-Christian lands are beginning to take their place in the line and enter the International Alliance. China was the twenty-seventh nation to form a National Woman Suffrage Association. Those who know China well speak of the last decade as having witnessed there the greatest educational renaissance the world has ever seen. The words, ‘the emancipation of women,’ have become one of the watchwords of modern China. Education and the ideals of moral freedom have gone forward hand in hand. After some fifty-five years in which under missionary (and therefore foreign) guidance, women's education had battled its way into favour, the prospectus of the first girls' school under purely Chinese management in 1897 contained a clause to the effect that ‘no girls may be sold as concubines or as slaves, who have

been pupils.' A society was launched by a Manchu princess a few years ago to abolish the practice of having secondary wives. So China moves with her Western sisters. [See also CHINA: 1920: Development of journalism.] In Japan, too, the new life is throbbing. 'Women are demanding larger spheres of service in both professional and commercial life, a larger freedom of choice in marriage, more spiritual freedom . . . the right to *think*.' . . . Of the three great Eastern countries, India, however, is that which we might feel would be excluded from countries in the freemasonry of the Woman's Movement. It is true that it is possible even now for an Indian woman lawyer who has intimate knowledge of the life of uppercaste Indian women to say sadly that they are still back in the life of the mediæval centuries, but the very existence of that woman lawyer and her position as legal adviser on women's matters to the Government of Bengal is typical of the advance that is being made. Another Indian woman, the wife of a barrister, stood for election to the Municipal Council in Allahabad, though finally her name was withdrawn. The Begum of Bhopal, a woman ruler of a Mohammedan State, in spite of all Mohammedan prejudice, even presides at public meetings at which men are present. Behind these outstanding women there is an ever-increasing number of those who are steadily opening new avenues for themselves, and taking up the burden of the yet unemancipated masses of their fellow-women. [See also INDIA: 1835-1922.] . . . The history of women's education has been on the whole fairly uniform in character in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in those of Northern Europe. The story of Mary Lyon in the United States and her fight for higher education, the foundation by her of a great women's college, Mount Holyoke, could be paralleled in many lands. The rapidity of the growth of the demand for higher education for women in the United States since then could perhaps scarcely be paralleled except in Russia—for these are some 60,000 women in the American universities and colleges, and (before the . . . [World War]) some 40,000 in those of Russia. In many countries, however, in varying proportion, the advance from merely elementary education, or something supposedly specially adapted to girls, to the highest education possible to any, has been made. In Latin countries girls educated under Roman Catholic auspices have not had so great an opportunity, but last year before the . . . war some six thousand women were studying in French universities. A curious development of education is reported from China, where an English college woman for a time taught in one of the many new 'Political Colleges' for both men and women. These schools were started by the great political parties, and run at fees which could not possibly pay, involving therefore in many cases daily personal superintendence or tuition without any remuneration. There is something rather pathetic about the mistaken idea that one can and should stimulate girls to spend their time studying International, Mercantile and Administrative Law to the exclusion of subjects of far greater importance, in a country where infant mortality is normally fifty per cent. Yet, however mistaken in form or method, the devotion to modern education shown by this is an augury of the place Chinese women will ultimately take in the educational world. . . . From education we pass to economic changes. Scarcely a country remains untouched by the gigantic revolution which has forced women out of home production into factory production. While Great

Britain has approximately four and a half million women and girls over fifteen in industry, Germany is reported to have nine million, in each case about a third of its female population. In France the proportion is said to be a good deal higher. In the United States of America eight million women and girls over ten years of age were reported in 'gainful occupations' in the last census [1910]. The evils of sweated trades among women are limited to no one nation, nor the danger of the breaking-up of homes because of women's enforced absence for daily work. Even India shares in the new industrial life, and thousands of women work twelve to fourteen hours a day in the mills of Bombay; the child labour in the jute mills of Calcutta was one of the evils to which attention was drawn by the Maharani of Baroda. The factory returns of Japan for 1910 show 477,874 women factory workers, and of these 34,605 girls were under fourteen years of age. The girls work for long hours and are housed in dormitories attached to the factories in many cases. After some seven or eight years of work many are sent home with tuberculosis or other diseases. Some rather meagre factory laws to remedy these things have been passed, but they are only to come into operation some eight years hence.—U. M. Saunders, *Some aspects of the woman's movement*, pp. 129-138.—See also EDUCATION: Modern developments; 20th century; General education; China; England: Primary and secondary; France; UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 19th-20th centuries; Higher education of women.

1914-1921.—Effect of the World War on woman's rights.—The World War made a great change in the whole status of woman, or rather, it first made the world conscious of the changes that had already taken place. The first notable aspect of the change was the replacing of men in business and industry by women. This altered the whole economic position of women and gave them a remuneration substantially equal to that of men. The conditions of the war also broke down many of the traditional restrictions that had stood in the way of woman's progress. Moreover, the great development of war activities which required women's services demonstrated that war is no longer a masculine occupation, and opened further fields of usefulness. One of the results of the realization of women's new position in the world was that, after the World War, the right of suffrage was conceded in practically all civilized countries.—See also ENGLAND: 1915: Ministry of munitions; FRANCE: 1914-1918: French women, etc.; ITALY: 1915-1918.

1916.—Granted complete equality with men in Norway. See NORWAY: 1916.

1917.—University for women established in Poona, India. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1857-1920.

1920.—Liberal marriage and divorce law passed in Sweden. See SWEDEN: 1910-1923.

1921.—Women refused full membership at Cambridge University. See UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: 1258-1921.

1922.—Rights of naturalization of women in the United States. See NATURALIZATION: United States: Laws relating to women.

See also SUFFRAGE, WOMAN; MEDICAL SCIENCE: Ancient: 2nd century; 3rd-6th centuries; SALIC LAW; YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION.

WOMEN, Insurrection of. See FRANCE: 1789 (October): Famine in Paris.

WOMEN'S CONGRESS (1909). See SUFFRAGE, WOMAN: Russia.

WOMEN'S LAND ARMY. See **FOOD REGULATION:** 1914-1918: Legislative enactments in Great Britain.

WOMEN'S LIBERAL FEDERATION (1886). See **SUFFRAGE, WOMAN:** England: 1860-1905.

WOMPAM. See **WAMPUM.**

WONAMEYS, North American Indian Tribe. See **DELAWARES.**

WONDERFUL PARLIAMENT. See **PARLIAMENT:** English: 1388.

WOO WANG, Chinese emperor, c. 1122-1078 B. C. See **CHINA:** Origin of the people.

WOOD, Sir Henry Evelyn (1838-1919), British field-marshal. Served in the Crimean War, 1854-1855; served through the Zulu War of 1879; commanded in the Transvaal War, 1880-1881; served in the Nile expedition, 1884-1885; created field-marshal, 1903.

WOOD, Leonard (1860-), American soldier and administrator. Served in the Santiago campaign, July, 1898; military governor of Santiago, July, 1898-December, 1899; governor of Cuba, 1899-1902; governor of Moro province in the Philippines, 1903-1906; commander of the Philippines division, 1906-1908; chief of Staff, United States Army, 1910-1914; commander of the Eastern department, 1914-1917; defeated as candidate for Republican nomination for the presidency, 1920; appointed governor-general of the Philippines, 1921.

In command of the Rough Riders. See **U. S. A.:** 1898 (April-May).

Military command and governorship of Cuba. See **CUBA:** 1899 (December).

Work against malaria in Cuba. See **MEDICAL SCIENCE:** Modern: 19th-20th centuries; Insect transmission of disease.

Member of Philippines Investigation Commission.—Governor-general of the Philippines. See **PHILIPPINE ISLANDS:** 1917-1918; 1918-1921; 1921-1923.

In Republican campaign. See **U. S. A.:** 1920 (May-November).

WOODFALL, Henry Sampson (1739-1805), English journalist and printer. Published the Junius Letters in his paper, the *Public Advertiser*. See **JUNIUS LETTERS.**

WOODFORD, William (1735-1780), American general. See **VIRGINIA:** 1775-1776.

WOODRUFF MANIFESTO (1887). See **UTAH:** 1882-1893.

WOOD'S HALFPENCE, name given to the halfpence issued for Ireland by William Wood in 1722. See **IRELAND:** 1722-1724.

WOODWARD, Arthur Smith (1864-), English paleontologist. Discovered and interpreted, with Charles Dawson, the Piltdown skull, 1912. See **EUROPE:** Prehistoric period: Earliest remains, etc.: Piltdown man.

WOODWARD VS. DARTMOUTH COLLEGE (1819). See **UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES:** 1754-1769.

WOOLLY-HEADS, American political faction. See **U. S. A.:** 1850 (March).

WOOLSACK, seat of the Lord Chancellor, who presides in the House of Lords. In the reign of Elizabeth an Act of Parliament was passed to prevent the exportation of wool, and to keep in mind this source of our national wealth, woolsacks were placed in the House of Lords, whereon the judges

sat.—Based on A. C. Ewald, *Crown and its advisers, lecture 3.*

WOOLSTON, Thomas (1669-1731), English deist. See **DEISM:** English deism.

WOOSTER, David (1711-1777), American soldier. See **U. S. A.:** 1775 (May-August).

WOOTZ STEEL BLADES. See **INVENTIONS:** Ancient and medieval: Early industrial processes.

WORCESTER, Dean Conant (1866-), American zoologist, public official, and authority on the Philippines. See **PHILIPPINE ISLANDS:** 1900: Progress toward civil government.

WORCESTER, capital of the county of the same name in Massachusetts, forty-four miles southwest of Boston, on the Blackstone river. It was settled in 1673 and was sacked by the Indians in 1676. See **NEW ENGLAND:** 1676-1678.

WORCESTER, Battle of. See **SCOTLAND:** 1651 (August).

WORDE, Wynkyn de (died c. 1534), English printer. See **PRINTING AND THE PRESS:** 1476-1491.

WORDEN, John Lorimer (1818-1897), American naval officer. Commanded the *Monitor* in the battle with the *Merrimac* at Hampton Roads, 1862. See **U. S. A.:** 1862 (March): Battle of the *Monitor* and *Merrimac*.

WORDSWORTH, William (1770-1850), English poet. See **ENGLISH LITERATURE:** 1780-1830.

WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' COUNCILS: Germany. See **GERMANY:** 1918 (November); 1918-1919 (December-January).

WORKER'S COMMITTEE ACT (1920). See **NORWAY:** 1920.

WORKERS' DWELLINGS. See **HOUSING.**

WORKERS' EDUCATION. See **EDUCATION:** Modern developments: 20th century: Workers' education.

WORKERS' EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION. See **EDUCATION:** Modern developments: 20th century: Workers' education: England.

WORKERS' PARTIES. See **LABOR PARTIES.**

WORKERS', PEASANTS', AND SOLDIERS' COUNCILS: Hungary. See **HUNGARY:** 1919 (March).

WORKING MAN'S PARTY: California. See **CALIFORNIA:** 1877-1880.

WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES, Council of: Russia. See **RUSSIA:** 1917: Disintegrating propaganda; 1917 (Mar. 8-15); (July).

WORKMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS. See **LABOR ORGANIZATION.**

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LEGISLATION. See **SOCIAL INSURANCE.**

WORKMEN'S INSURANCE. See **SOCIAL INSURANCE.**

"WORKS POLICY": New Zealand. See **NEW ZEALAND:** 1870-1890.

WORLD, Seven wonders of the. See **RHODES, COLOSSUS OF; BABYLON: Nebuchadrezzar, etc.; Hanging gardens; EPHESIAN TEMPLE; PYRAMIDS.**

WORLD COURT, or Permanent Court of International Justice. See **INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT COURT OF; also U. S. A.:** 1923 (March-September).

WORLD LEAGUE AGAINST ALCOHOLISM. See **LIQUOR PROBLEM: International movements.**

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION. See **PEACE MOVEMENT: Peace organizations.**

WORLD WAR

EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THE ARRANGEMENT OF MATERIAL COMPRISING HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR.

Owing to the great length and complexity of the article **WORLD WAR** it was necessary to devise a special scheme of arrangement. The plan adopted will, it is expected, enable the reader to grasp and understand the World War as a whole—from historical causes to peace and reconstruction—or to read any portion by itself, or insure quickest possible reference to any of the many thousands of topics comprising this vast subject. A careful reading of the following explanation will be helpful.

There are twelve main divisions, lettered from A to L, as follows:

- A. CAUSES OF THE WAR
- B. DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND
- C. PREPARATION FOR WAR
- D. FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR: 1914
- E. SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR: 1915
- F. THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR: 1916
- G. FOURTH YEAR OF THE WAR: 1917
- H. FIFTH YEAR OF THE WAR: 1918
- I. MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARY SERVICES, ARMISTICES, ALLEGED ATROCITIES
- J. BIBLIOGRAPHY
- K. DOCUMENTS
- L. CHRONOLOGY

Each of these main sections is further subdivided, and to show the form and extent of the subdivisions a part of Section E is given below:

- E. SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR: 1915
 - I. MILITARY SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1915.
 - II. WESTERN FRONT.
 - (a) Summary of military operations, 1915.
 - I. BATTLE OF SOISSONS.
 - (b) Battle of Neuve Chapelle.
 - I. DISPOSITION OF TROOPS.
 - (c) Second battle of Ypres.
 - (d) Battle of the Labyrinth.
 - (e) Further operations around Ypres.
 - (f) Summer operations.
 - I. ACTION AT FONTENELLE (FRENCH REPORT).
 - 2. FONTENELLE AND LES ÉPARGES (GERMAN REPORT).
 - (i) *French tactics.*
 - (ii) *French attacks repulsed.*

It will be observed that five different and distinctive styles of type are used to indicate the various divisions, subdivisions, topics and subtopics.

WORLD WAR: EXPLANATORY NOTES

Each of the items included in the article is indexed in the usual Larned way and specific reference is made to the section where the desired material is to be found. It will be noted that each division and subdivision is given a number or letter: A, B, C; I, II, III; a, b, c; 1, 2, 3; (i), (ii), (iii). It is to these letters and figures that the reader is referred from other volumes, rather than to the titles of the sections. Thus

BAILLOUD, Maurice Camille, French general.
See **WORLD WAR**; 1915: V. Balkans: c, 3, i; 1917:
VI. Turkish theater: c, 1, vi.

LES ÉPARGES, town in France. . . . See **WORLD
WAR**: 1915: II. Western front: f, 2; f, 2, i.

In the section "B. DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND" only Arabic numerals are used as guides to its different parts.

Page-headings throughout the article furnish cues to the subdivisions, such as the years, battle fronts and lettered or numbered sub-sections, and (in the second line of italics) to the principal subject-matter, to be found on the pages.

With the above explanation in mind a very little practice in referring to topics under this subject head will prove the simplicity and efficiency of the system.

WORLD WAR

A. CAUSES OF WORLD WAR

"On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist in the streets of the chief town [Serajevo] of Bosnia. [See also AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1914 (June).] Doubtless not more than the merest handful of the millions who read the news on the following day, realized that the murder would carry in its train consequences of extraordinary moment. The popular mind had become accustomed to assassination of royalty. . . . Who could guess that this new crime would prove to be of greater significance? And yet within five weeks of the murder and apparently as a direct result, the five greatest Powers of Europe were battling in the most terrific war of history. . . . The murder was merely the occasion of the conflict, the spark igniting the magazine; if it had not been for thirty years' accumulation of powder, there could have been no explosion. History shows that great events find their genesis in influences which work for a long time separately and silently, but which when brought together by some comparatively minor factor, are powerful in their union to produce results of the utmost magnitude. So it was in the case of the war that broke out in 1914."—C. Seymour, *Diplomatic background of the war, 1870-1914*, pp. 1-2.

I. INDIRECT CAUSES OF THE WAR

(a) Development of the German empire.—"To comprehend . . . the influences which by their combination resulted in the titanic conflict, a survey of the previous forty-five years of diplomacy is essential. Even the most superficial consideration of the generation that followed the Franco-Prussian War, leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the factor of vital significance during this period was the development of the new German Empire. . . . Not that German policy was more aggressive or more nationally selfish than that of the other states; but that simply by her entrance into the circle of great nations and by her extraordinary growth, new elements were introduced into the diplomatic situation, which were destined to result inevitably in conflict. The other states were simply passive, in the sense that they pursued their policy along much the same lines as those followed previous to 1871. Germany was the active agent. By defeating France and forcing upon her a humiliating peace in 1871, Germany attained her political unity and at once secured a position of unquestioned weight in the councils of the great Powers. A decade later, she organized the Triple Alliance, which guaranteed the support of Austria and Italy and soon assured to her a preponderant rôle in European diplomacy; by means of this coalition of the three states of central Europe and despite the Dual Alliance of France and Russia which was formed in 1891, Germany practically controlled the Continent from 1882 to the end of the century. [See also TRIPLE ALLIANCE.] This position of primacy she utilized skillfully to secure a period of uninterrupted peace on the Continent, which gave her the necessary opportunity for organizing her imperial political institutions and developing the industrial

and commercial activities essential to the economic life of the nation. With increasing intensity, the Germans created new industries, built up their mercantile marine, opened up new markets, laid down vessels of war, dreamed of colonies. And as a result partly of economic necessity and partly of a moral transformation that came over the Empire, German policy began to concern itself not merely with European matters, but with everything that went on over all the globe. It was the inauguration of Germany's 'World Policy.' [See also GERMANY: 1890-1914: Alteration of foreign policy.] It was inevitable that the policy of the other states should be affected by the successful growth of Germany, and when they recognized its true significance, a new period opened in the history of European diplomacy. The more far-sighted in France and Great Britain perceived with inexorable lucidity that Germany's new policy must necessarily threaten the position of their own countries. In the face of the common danger they agreed to put an end to their traditional enmity and, together with Russia, to form a tentative combination, which was designed merely to preserve the balance of power threatened by the growth and ambitions of Germany. The latter Power, disquieted by this apparent barricade to the realization of her hopes and in order to reinforce her prestige, adopted a policy of bluster, which was at times successful, but which culminated in welding the loose understanding between the three Powers into a comparatively solid force of opposition. Under such conditions there arose a diplomatic conflict scarcely less bitter than the war which was to succeed it. On the one side stood the Entente Powers, unalterably convinced that the development of the Germany world policy spelled their ultimate or their immediate ruin; on the other, Germany, equally determined in the belief that failure to win for herself a position in world affairs comparable to her influence in European matters, meant economic and national disaster. Between such opposite poles there could be no compromise. With each successive crisis the tension increased. Finally, in the summer of 1914, the strain suddenly exerted upon the thread of fate proved too severe and it snapped. If, as seems obvious, the development of Germany—military, naval, economic, national—was the essential leit-motif of the international drama which was to have such a tremendous dénouement, we ought to remind ourselves briefly of the circumstances under which united Germany came into being. The foundation of the German Empire in 1871 was, perhaps, the greatest political fact of the nineteenth century. Both because of the immediate effects of the process of unification and because of the ultimate consequences, which were not at once revealed, any survey of recent diplomatic history must go back to the great triumph of Prussia and Bismarck in 1871. Previous to that date, Germany as a political state was non-existent. The hundred and more kingdoms, principalities, duchies and cities which were loosely bound together in the German Federation, formed something more than a geographical expression, for they were sentimentally united by language . . . but they formed nothing like a nation in the po-

litical sense. From disunion comes weakness, and all through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Germany was the prey of Europe. Although the two chief German states, Austria and Prussia, were reckoned as great Powers, their mutual jealousy had on more than one occasion left Germany impotent before the attack of a powerful foe on the east and on the west."—*Ibid.*, pp. 2-5.

1. A UNITED NATION.—"For centuries the dream of a politically united nation had filled the minds of Germans. . . . But whenever a definite attempt was made to transform the vision into fact, the mutual hatred of the warring German states proved disastrous and the dream of union was never realized. The forces of disintegration always triumphed over those of consolidation. With the fall of Napoleon, it seemed for a moment as though the hope of unification might be fulfilled. The burst of patriotism which informed the war of liberation against the French Emperor was enforced by the conviction that the national aspiration was about to be satisfied; the youths who pressed on from Leipsic, driving the French across the Rhine, fought the more fiercely in the belief that they were fighting for a united Fatherland. . . . But the hopes of the peoples were deceived by the princes. The popular enthusiasm for national unity based upon liberalism was not in accord with the designs of the diplomats and sovereigns who planned the map of Europe in 1815, and Germany was left disunited. A generation later, in 1848, the German Liberals made another effort to attain national unity. For the moment the reactionary Austrian Government was paralyzed by a revolution which spread through all the Hapsburg possessions; the King of Prussia was intimidated by the Berlin mob; and the Liberals, meeting at Frankfort, had free hand. But their attempt was again frustrated by the opposition of the princes. Austria, which soon recovered her control and stamped out revolution, refused to sanction a centralized Germany founded upon liberal principles. And the King of Prussia would not take the imperial crown from the hands of the people, 'picked up out of the mud,' as he said; he would reign as emperor only by the grace of God and at the invitation of his fellow princes. The failure of the German Liberals in 1848 was succeeded by the far different method of Bismarck, which ultimately proved successful, although the cost was great. . . . In the mind of Bismarck, the sole means of union was to be found in the Prussian King and army. Austria, the great stumbling-block to unity, must be driven out of Germany by war; the other German states must be compelled by force to accept union under the Prussian domination. With the strongest army in Europe as his instrument, Bismarck carried this policy into effect by means of three wars: the war of 1864 with Denmark, of 1866 with Austria, and of 1870 with France. . . . A quarrel that sprang up in 1863 between the King of Denmark and the German states, over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, presented the opportunity he desired. Persuading Austria to act with Prussia, Bismarck brought on a war with Denmark in 1864, in which the smaller power was naturally overwhelmed. Denmark surrendered the two duchies to the rulers of Austria and Prussia. [See also GERMANY: 1861-1866.] Realizing that so long as Austria remained a member of the German Confederation, Prussia could not hope to unify Germany under her own control, Bismarck did not seek to prevent the quarrel that soon developed over the disposi-

tion of Schleswig and Holstein. In both his military and diplomatic arrangements he was thoroughly prepared for the struggle with Austria that was to decide the hegemony of Germany. The Prussian army had been brought to the highest degree of efficiency by the Minister of War, Roon, and was led by that master of strategy, Moltke. Bismarck had received from Napoleon III a guarantee of benevolent neutrality, in return for vague promises of compensation for France along the Rhine. He obtained the active assistance of Italy in his attack upon Austria by promising that Italy should win the province of Venetia. The war with Austria, which broke forth in 1866 [see GERMANY: 1866], was brief and decisive; it completely fulfilled the hopes of Bismarck. Austria, defeated in a seven weeks' campaign and with her main army crushed at Sadowa, agreed to withdraw from the German Confederation, and allow Prussia to organize a centralized union of the North German states under Prussian domination. Hanover and some five smaller states were annexed to Prussia outright, despite their protests. It was the first step towards national unity; the new North German Federation was solidly constituted and led by Prussia formed a powerful political entity. But it was incomplete. There still remained the states of South Germany, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, who were jealous of Prussia, resentful of the position of mastery that she was securing, and who appeared determined on remaining aloof. Bismarck perceived that to bring them into the union a third war would be necessary, preferably directed against France, the national enemy of Germany; a war in which the states of both North and South Germany should fight together side by side. By a series of diplomatic manœuvres, which force our admiration if not our approval, and favored by the rash and bellicose attitude of the French Government, Bismarck precipitated the Franco-German War in 1870. With equal skill he saw to it that the struggle was regarded as a national and not merely a Prussian quarrel, and that South Germany stood by the North German Federation. The entire country was a unit, and the sentiment of national consciousness aroused by battling against a common foe was enforced by the common victory. The brave, but ill-equipped and miserably officered French armies proved totally incapable of coping with the Germans, who were splendidly organized and directed by the genius of Moltke. Overwhelmed at Sedan in September, 1870, the French Emperor surrendered; four months later Paris capitulated, and the Provisional Government of France accepted the German terms. In order that France might be stripped of future powers of offence and defence, Alsace-Lorraine was taken from her, and she was forced to pay an indemnity of five billion francs (Treaty of Frankfort). [See also GERMANY: 1870 (September-December).] Through this national victory over France, Bismarck's hope of persuading the South German states to enter the union was realized. While the German guns were still thundering outside the walls of Paris, at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, painted with all the scenes of the triumphs of Louis XIV, the King of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor and accepted by the rulers of all the German states. A consolidated unified Germany, in which the principle of centralization triumphed over all factors of disunion, became a definite fact."—*Ibid.*, pp. 5-9.

2. NEW POLITICAL STATE.—"Thus was born in Europe a new political state, whose entrance upon

the international stage was destined to have the most far-reaching consequences. The whole set of international conditions which rested upon the division of Germany disappeared. France was humiliated and her material power broken, at least for the moment. The creation of united Germany brought with it the completion of Italian unity, for upon the withdrawal of the French troops, which had been stationed at Rome to protect the Pope, Victor Emmanuel was able to make of Rome the capital of his kingdom. German unification also reopened the Near Eastern Question, for Bismarck, in order to win the benevolent neutrality of Russia in 1870, had agreed to her violation of the neutrality of the Black Sea, which had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Paris in 1856; Russia could once more send her warships down to the Bosphorus and again threaten Constantinople. More important than the immediate political results were the moral effects of the methods employed by Bismarck in the unification of Germany. Instead of coming through the application of liberal and nationalistic principles, as the idealists of 1815 and 1848 had hoped, it was consummated in direct contravention to those principles. It was the product of force not unadulterated with trickery. . . . The effect upon Germany was inevitable. Having witnessed the failure of the liberal and the success of the Bismarckian method, the German people 'conceived thereby a faith in force, a veneration of power and might that has directed in large part the subsequent course of German life and history.' The material prosperity that followed upon the military and political success of Bismarck only enhanced their belief that 'iron is gold.' The world did not realize at once the full significance of the Prussian victory and the acceptance of Prussian methods by Germany; and the ultimate consequences of Prussian domination in Germany were not completely manifested until the twentieth century. For, after securing the unification of Germany, Bismarck was careful to allay the fears caused by his methods and extraordinary success. During the twenty years that followed the birth of the German Empire, he made use of quite different weapons than those by which he had carried out his earlier policy. War and brute force had served their turn; what he desired after the war with France was a period of uninterrupted peace in which he might consolidate the Empire and foster its economic development. Above all he was anxious to preserve the new diplomatic prestige that Germany had won on the Continent of Europe. The study of how he worked towards these ends is essential to an understanding of contemporary international relations."—*Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

(b) *Italy and Austria*.—1. *LONG-STANDING QUARRELS*.—Although at the outbreak of the World War Italy and Austria were partners in the Triple Alliance, there still existed an old-standing feud between the two countries which contained a variety of factors, political, ethnological, geographical, strategic and economic. "Austria came out of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, mistress of Lombardy, and of the Veneto, of the Trentino, of Julian Venetia and of Dalmatia, all provinces which by . . . right of nationality belong to United Italy. [See AUSTRIA: 1815-1846.] Besides this actual territorial domination in Italy, she had also dukelings and a duchess of her own imperial house upon the petty thrones of Modena, Tuscany and Parma; and by intrigue and the encouragement of the elements of disorder in the various states of the peninsula she had managed

to conclude secret treaties with their separate intimidated governments. [In 1849 Palmerston had declared that "Austria never possessed Italy as part of her Empire, but has always held it as conquered territory."] In fact she may be said to have been effectively in control of the destinies of all Italy, throughout whose extent she was served by a widely extended and intricate system of espionage. . . . The consolidation of northern Italy from the Ticino to the Julian Alps under the dominion of Austria, in 1814 and 1815 [see ITALY: 1814-1815], and the years which followed, was characterized by three cardinal enormities of misgovernment: the first was the supplanting of all Italian civil and military officials, from the clerk and corporal to the judge and general, by Austrians almost all of whom were unacquainted with the language, and ignorant of the habits of the country, —by 1817 two Italians only remained in the higher departments of the Lombard government; the second, the levying of crushing taxes—in 1817 landed proprietors paid about 37 per cent of their annual produce in direct taxes; the third, the expenditure of a large part of the revenue extorted from Italy, . . . as far as possible in, and for the benefit of, the German and other provinces of the Empire—during the Austrian domination in the Lombardo-Veneto from 1814 to 1859, government expenditure for these provinces amounted to only about fifty per cent of the revenue collected there; the remaining fifty per cent was carried out of the country and expended elsewhere in the Empire, while the Italian provinces received no benefit in return. . . . Industries in the German and other provinces were also favoured to the detriment of those in the Italian provinces—for example, the very armies by which Austrian domination was maintained in Italy, were furnished with supplies purchased whenever practicable, though necessarily at a much greater expense, in the German provinces. Venice was the city to suffer most from the ruinous effects of Austrian misrule. In 1797 it numbered 137,240 inhabitants, including those of Murano, Burano and Malamocco. In 1824 its population reckoned on the same basis had decreased to 114,000."—H. N. Gay, *Introduction* (M. Alberti et al., *Italy's great war and her national aspirations*, pp. 16, 18).

2. *GERMANIZATION OF ITALY*.—"The purpose and end of Austrian methods of administration and government in the Lombardo-Veneto may be summed up in one word, *Germanization*. The term occurs early in Austrian official despatches and the vital error of the policy which it defined was quickly recognized by the more able of the Austrian governors. The predatory fiscal system imposed . . . and the general misery of the population were in themselves sufficient to account for the grave discontent and the strong aversion with which the Austrian was regarded from the outset in Italy, but . . . the fundamental error which excluded all possibility of conciliation between the government and the governed and which bred an ever increasing hatred of the oppressor for half a century, was the Austrian policy of *Germanization*. . . . The population of the Italian provinces which were subjected to the Austrian yoke by the Treaty of Vienna for nearly a half-century numbered about five millions. The population of the other parts of the Austrian Empire numbered about thirty millions. The odds therefore, in view of the numerical inferiority of the Italians, were overwhelmingly against the success of any revolution undertaken for the libera-

tion of the Italian provinces from foreign domination. Furthermore, Austria kept an army of occupation in Italy of such strength as to make still more evident the inutility of any efforts at Italian revindication, unless accompanied by assistance from outside. . . . Everywhere in Italy, however, the result of the Austrian policy was the same—to augment the ranks of the liberals and to quicken their hatred of the foreign oppressor and of the autocrat. Austria had believed that she would be able to completely eradicate secret societies from the peninsula, but when she had done her utmost, she found that she had only consolidated national sentiment, and that the Italian nation had become little less than one vast secret society, sworn to resist all attempts at *Germanization*, and at the first opportunity to drive her back beyond the Alps. . . . The first great political conflict in Europe which seemed to offer a chance of success for a simultaneous national rising against Austria in Italy, was the revolutionary movement which swept over the continent in 1848. Violent outbreaks against the government in Hungary and even in Vienna itself, compromised the very existence of the Empire. Milan, the headquarters of Austrian domination in the Lombardo-Veneto, was the first Italian city to seize the opportunity and to rise against 'the Germans.' The prohibition against the private possession of fire-arms had long been in force, and in consequence the Milan insurgents could command but six hundred muskets and shot-guns with which to oppose the Austrian garrison of twelve thousand troops, fully equipped, well furnished with artillery and commanded by Austria's greatest soldier, Field-Marshal Radetzky. But such was the audacity and exasperation of the citizens after decades of suffering and humiliation that after five days of ferocious fighting at the barricades Radetzky withdrew his troops from the heroic city and fell back upon the fortresses of the Quadrilateral. The epic struggle is known in history as the Five Glorious Days of Milan. . . . But the hour of Italy's final liberation had not yet sounded. Sectional jealousies prevented the different parts of the country from working together as a whole; party hatred ran high and the patriots were divided. . . . there were unitarian monarchists, federalists and republicans. The failure of the revolutions in Vienna and in Hungary left Austria free to pour her armies into Italy, and her domination there was soon restored with blood and iron."—H. N. Gay, *Introduction* (M. Alberti et al., *Italy's great war and her national aspirations*, pp. 22-25, 29-32).—See also ITALY: 1848-1849.

3. PUNISHMENT FOR POLITICAL OFFENSES.—The crushing of the revolution of 1848, in Italy was followed by stern reprisals and cruel punishments. "From August 6, 1848 to August 9, 1849 the execution of 961 sentences of capital punishment in the Lombardo-Veneto were reported in the official journals of Austria. . . . For the most trivial offences . . . men, women and children were condemned to be flogged—for patriotic songs, for conversations hostile to the government, for applauding, for hissing. . . . *L'Italia del Popolo* of Lausanne estimated the total number of those condemned for political crimes in the Lombardo-Veneto in two years, April 1849 to April 1851, at over 4,000. But the crowning infamy of Austrian domination in Italy was the shameful trial of the martyrs of Belfiore. One hundred and twenty-seven arrests were effected between July 1851 and the end of 1852, the victims being charged with complicity in a conspiracy which centered in

Mantova; of these, ten found death on the gallows and forty received milder sentences. . . . The war of 1859 freed Lombardy [see ITALY: 1856-1859], and the war of 1866 liberated the greater part of the Veneto, but the premature peace of 1866 . . . left several Italian provinces still under the despotic rule of Austria. [See ITALY: 1862-1866.] . . . The martyrdom of the courageous patriots of Belfiore . . . [was] followed by the equally brutal martyrdom of equally noble and devoted sons of Italy, in Trieste, Trent and other unredeemed Italian territory [—Italia Irredenta. These provinces, Italy stood ready to bargain for or win when the occasion offered.]"—H. N. Gay, *Introduction* (M. Alberti et al., *Italy's great war and her national aspirations*, pp. 33-35).

(c) Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.—The two most powerful international factors underlying the political history of the World War were undoubtedly the Triple Alliance and the so-called Triple Entente. A more detailed account of these groupings of European states will be found elsewhere. (See BALANCE OF POWER; ENTENTE CORDIALE; TRIPLE ALLIANCE.) They will be discussed here only in their relation to the war, the influence of these combinations upon the complex diplomatic circumstances preceding the war, and the subsequent alignment of the principal belligerents for the conflict. When the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) was held, Europe was war-weary and anxious for any agreement whereby the nations would be forced to keep the peace. In November, 1815, therefore, the late Allies against Napoleon—England, Prussia, Russia and Austria—concluded a quadruple alliance pledging themselves to the preservation of "public peace, the tranquillity of states, the inviolability of possessions, and the faith of treaties." Since that time during the nineteenth century, various congresses of the powers had been held, all with a view to maintaining peace. These gatherings, held as occasions arose during international crises, came to be known as the "Concert of Europe." Owing to conflicting interests and policies, however, these "concerts" were rarely accompanied by harmony. The suppression of insurrections in different countries was regarded as one of the functions of the concert. Great Britain disagreed with this view and dropped out of the concert. Yet there were occasions when matters of general European interest drove the powers into some agreement in order to prevent war among themselves. Under the dominance of Metternich the nascent spirit of nationalism and liberalism had been disregarded; the rights of autocracy were to be maintained at all costs. In the end nationalism, allied with liberalism, triumphed over internationalism in partnership with autocracy. That the statesmen of Europe failed to establish a successful combination to ensure the preservation of peace led to the formation of diplomatic groups with the sole object of maintaining the balance of power between their countries. "Early in the twentieth century [we find] the great European powers . . . aligned into two rival groups. . . . [After the Franco-Prussian war Bismarck realized that the French feeling of humiliation over the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 by the Treaty of Frankfurt] would lead France into another war with Germany unless he could continue to keep the odds against her. . . . His policy, therefore, was to isolate France and thus deprive her of all hope of success in a war with Germany. To this end he approached Austria and Russia with a view to allying them with Prussia. Since . . . 1866 he had



Maps prepared specially for the **NEW LARNED**
 under direction of the editors and publishers.

maintained a very friendly attitude toward Austria. He had also in 1863 offered the Tsar of Russia aid in putting down the Polish revolt and had thereby won his lasting gratitude. . . . [In 1872] the Three Emperors' League [*Dreikaiserbund*] was the result. The success and permanence of this league was endangered by the rivalry of Austria and Russia in the Balkans. This rivalry became acute at the time of the Berlin Congress (1878). [See BERLIN, CONGRESS OF.] . . . The decision of the powers was a diplomatic victory for Austria-Hungary and a defeat for Russia. Bismarck supported Austria-Hungary's demands in the congress and thereby strengthened the cordial feeling existing between his country and Austria-Hungary but at the same time incurred the ill will of Russia. The Three Emperors' League now fell into abeyance, and though Russia did not formally withdraw at this time, relations between Germany and Russia were strained for a few years. Bismarck, feeling that he would have now to count on the possible enmity rather than on the friendship of Russia, decided to draw more closely to Austria-Hungary. In 1879 Germany and Austria formed a defensive alliance against Russia. . . . Italy became a party to the alliance in 1882. To take this step Italy had to suspend a deep-seated historic enmity toward Austria, for this power had frequently thwarted efforts on the part of the Italian people to liberate and unify the peninsula. . . . One reason for her taking this unnatural step was that she was ambitious to play the rôle of a great power and was angered at France for having taken Tunis (1881), because she had picked out this region as a suitable field for Italian occupation. The league of the three powers was known as the Triple Alliance. It was made for a definite period and . . . [was] renewed from time to time. Italy did not formally withdraw from it until May, 1915.—O. P. Chitwood, *Immediate causes of the Great War*, pp. 7-10.—“Let it be emphasized first of all that the Triple Alliance is by no means to be regarded as supplanting the Austro-Hungarian-German treaty of October 7, 1879. On the contrary, it did not impair the validity of that treaty in any way. Independently of the treaty which the Central Powers concluded with Italy in 1882 (a treaty four times renewed), the Austro-Hungarian-German treaty, from October 1879, to the outbreak of the World War, constituted the basis of action of the Central Powers in all questions of foreign policy, most especially as concerns their relation to Russia. For in none of the treaties of the Triple Alliance is Russia mentioned as that power, upon whose single and unprovoked attack upon one of the allies the *casus foederis* was to be considered established for the other two. The duty of giving aid in this case devolved exclusively upon Germany and Austria-Hungary, to the extent provided for in the treaty of October, 1879.”—A. F. Pribram, *Secret treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914* (tr. by D. P. Myers and J. D. D'Arcy Paul), v. 1, p. 6.—In July 1886 Italy requested the prolongation of the Triple Alliance, at a time when changes which had taken place in European affairs “gave the Italians reason to believe that they could now enter into negotiations under more favorable circumstances. The Bulgarian affair, with the annexation of Eastern Rumania to Bulgaria in September, 1885, had destroyed the passable relations which, thanks to the mediatory policy of Bismarck, had existed up to that time between the governments of Vienna and St. Petersburg. The events following this—

the Serbo-Bulgarian war, Austria's intervention in favor of the vanquished Serbian king, and the firm stand taken by the government of Vienna against that predominance of Russian influence in the Balkans which had manifested itself in the enforced abdication of Alexander of Battenberg—aggravated the struggle of the two powers for mastery in the Balkans. The understanding existing between them threatened to vanish; the peril of an Austro-Russian war loomed larger. Taking these circumstances into consideration, the value to Austria-Hungary of an alliance with Italy, stronger as she now was financially and in military resources, had decidedly increased—all the more so because it must have been realized in Vienna that Bismarck was by no means inclined to support Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy through thick and thin. On the contrary, it was known that he intended to demand considerable sacrifices of his ally for the purpose of blocking the union of the French military party, at that time making great headway under Boulanger's leadership, with that of Russia. . . . The renewal of the Triple Alliance in February, 1887, was accomplished only after prolonged negotiations, and was dearly paid for by the Central Powers; while the mutual distrust between Italy and Austria-Hungary remained undisputed. In fact, the points of friction had multiplied through Italy's freshly acquired right to a decisive voice in the Balkan questions. . . . The Triple Alliance [however] became a bulwark against French projects of revenge as well as against Russia's efforts to extend her sphere of influence in the Balkans, both of which perils assumed more threatening proportions during 1887, and, toward the end of that year and the beginning of 1888, brought Europe to the verge of war. The structure erected by Bismarck's masterly skill for the safeguarding of peace had as its core the alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, around which numerous other powers were grouped as more or less stalwart buttresses.”—*Ibid.*, v. 2, pp. 46-47, 82.—“In 1883 Roumania attached herself to the group of powers which had recently founded the Triple Alliance. The agreement effecting this was never submitted to the Roumanian parliament, probably because its ratification might have been difficult to procure. Nevertheless it was constantly renewed and was the underlying fact in the nation's foreign policy. For thirty years Roumania considered herself and was considered a part of the German system of alliances which dominated Europe. The practical results of this secret and yet well-known connection were that Austro-German finance and commerce were able to secure a control in Roumania which was sometimes very irksome to the latter.”—C. D. Hazen, *Europe since 1815*, v. 2, p. 860.—Bismarck had thus succeeded in his policy of isolating France. But this period of isolation ended in 1891, when France and Russia formed the Dual Alliance. Negotiations, which included the floating of large Russian loans in France, were carried on throughout the remainder of the year 1891, in 1891 and 1892, and finally on Dec. 31, 1893 a military convention was signed between two countries. “The document signed by Giers and the Marquis of Montebello on December 31 was revealed by the French Government in 1918, when the Tsardom was overthrown and the alliance at an end. France and Russia being animated by an equal desire to maintain peace, and having no other aim than to be ready for a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against one or other of them,

have agreed on the following: 1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia will employ all her forces to attack Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France will employ all her forces to combat Germany. 2. In the event of the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any member of it, mobilizing, France and Russia, at the first news and without the need of preliminary accord, will immediately and simultaneously mobilize the whole of their forces . . . to combat Germany. 3. The forces to be employed against Germany will be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the part of Russia 7 to 800,000. These forces will engage with all their might, so that Germany has to fight both on the East and West. 4. The staffs of the armies will co-operate at all times in preparing and facilitating the execution of the measures above contemplated. They will communicate in time of peace all the information relative to the armies of the Triple Alliance which comes to their knowledge. The ways and means of corresponding in time of war will be studied. 5. France and Russia will not conclude peace separately. 6. The present convention will have the same duration as the Triple Alliance. 7. All the clauses will be kept rigorously secret.' Though nobody doubted that an alliance had been concluded, the momentous secret was not officially revealed to the world till January, 1895."—G. P. Gooch, *History of modern Europe, 1870-1919*, pp. 183-184.

"In June, 1914, the French ambassador at Berlin told . . . [the] secretary of State, that France's obligations to Russia were as binding as those of Germany to Austria. The formation of the Triple Alliance had divided Europe into two hostile camps. Great Britain for a while stood aside in isolation, maintaining a policy of neutrality toward both groups. She thus had the power of tipping the scales in favor of the side to which she might throw her support. There were causes of friction between Great Britain and members of both groups, and she might at any time give up her position of neutrality and identify herself with one side or the other. The friendship that Bismarck had cultivated between Germany and Great Britain began to wane in the 'nineties. The Conservative party, which ruled England from 1895 to 1905, favored imperialism and a strong foreign policy. In the meantime, Germany too had entered upon a policy of industrial development and colonial expansion. As a result of these imperialistic ambitions a feeling arose in both countries that the interests of Germany conflicted with those of Britain. . . . It was thought by many Englishmen that Germany had 'an ambition to deprive their country of her maritime supremacy and to rule the world.' On the other hand, the charge was made in Germany that England was trying to isolate her and thus prevent her from playing an important part in world politics. These unsatisfactory relations were aggravated by Germany's attitude toward the Boer struggle with the British (1899-1902). 'The British were especially aroused by the more or less open favor and sympathy which the emperor and official classes of Germany showed to the Boers.' In addition to this general feeling of distrust, there were specific instances of friction between these two great powers. One important controversy was that over the Bagdad Railroad, the construction of which was in line with Germany's ambition to extend her influence over Turkey. [See BAGDAD RAILWAY.] . . . Germany's avowed purpose was economic, the desire to develop the rich natural

resources of Mesopotamia to the advantage of both this neglected district and Germany. It is more than likely, however, that her aims were political as well as economic. If her plan were realized, she would have convenient bases for propaganda against Egypt and India in time of peace and of attack in time of war. [See GERMANY: 1912: Balkan and Asia Minor interests.] It is no wonder, therefore, that British public opinion took affright and British statesmanship determined to thwart the scheme. . . . The result was that Great Britain determined to shut off the road from the Persian Gulf. The only suitable terminus for the road was in the little principality of Koweit, the ruler of which was virtually independent of Turkey. In 1899 England signed a secret treaty with the Sheik of Koweit, pledging him protection on condition that he would not dispose of any of his territory without the consent of the English Government. Great Britain also signed an agreement with Russia in 1907 whereby protectorates over southern and northern Persia were established by these two countries respectively. In this way the Bagdad Railroad was shut off not only from the Persian Gulf but also from Central Asia. The result was very unfortunate for the relations between Germany and England. The German people were aroused to renewed bitterness against Great Britain which country, they considered, had prevented the success of an important business venture purely out of jealousy and ill will. Germany, however, persisted in her plan and a few years later succeeded in getting the consent of both Russia and Great Britain to the completion of the railroad. Russia agreed to give up her opposition by an understanding arrived at in 1911, and Great Britain by one that had been negotiated, though not consummated, just prior to the outbreak of the war in 1914. Thus just on the eve of the Great War, England and Germany had virtually settled amicably one important cause of difference between them."—O. P. Chitwood, *Immediate causes of the Great War*, pp. 11-14.—See also EUROPE: Modern: Conflicting currents before World War.

"The main cause of Anglo-German tension in the years following the Boer War was neither Venezuela, nor the Bagdad Railway, nor Canadian Preference, nor commercial rivalry [though all contributed], but the resolve of Germany to build a formidable Fleet. British anger at the Kruger telegram of 1896, declares Reventlow, converted Germany to the idea of a Fleet. In 1898, a small programme of construction to be carried out by 1904, was accepted by the *Reichstag*, and the German Navy League was founded. Little interest, however, was aroused till the Boer War, when the Kaiser utilized the excitement created by the stoppage of German vessels on the east coast of Africa to secure acceptance of an enlarged programme to be completed by 1917. The decision of 1900 brought Germany into what German publicists describe as the danger-zone; and in his political apologia, *Imperial Germany*, Bülow claims credit for careful steering. When Bebel quoted in the *Reichstag* articles by naval officers arguing that the fleet must be strong enough to defeat England, the Chancellor dismissed them as rubbish to which no sensible German paid attention. Even when the programme of 1900 was completed, he pointed out, the German Navy would only stand fourth or fifth on the list; and it harboured no aggressive designs. . . . Official assurances failed to dispel the anxiety of the British Government, which was fostered, not only by the Navy

Law of 1902, but by provocative utterances of the Kaiser, who styled himself Admiral of the Atlantic, and of certain of his subjects. It was owing to the danger anticipated from a new quarter that it was decided in 1903, to construct a first-class naval base at Rosyth; that the Cawdor programme of four battleships annually was sanctioned, and that Sir John Fisher, on his appointment as First Sea Lord in 1904, proceeded drastically to overhaul the distribution and composition of the British Fleet. . . . In 1897, an article in *The Saturday Review* contended that, if Germany could be swept away to-morrow, every Englishman would be the richer. This mischievous nonsense attracted no attention in England; but it was diligently exploited [in Germany] to whip up enthusiasm for a Fleet. In 1904, an article in *The Army and Navy Gazette*, suggesting that Great Britain should veto any further increase of the German warships, was accepted in Germany as the authentic voice of the Admiralty. . . . [A speech by Sir Arthur Lee, Civil Lord of the Admiralty early in 1905 was construed by Germany as an official threat.] The Kaiser complained to the British Ambassador, and large sections of German opinion began to believe that their country was threatened by a sudden attack. The construction of the *Dreadnought* intensified the feeling of danger and impotence."—A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, ed., *Cambridge history of British foreign policy, 1783-1919*, v. 3, pp. 302-305.—See also GERMANY: 1898-1914; WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1909: German side of navy building; WARSHIPS: 1870-1905; 1905-1915.—"The Navy Estimates for 1908-9, providing for only two *Dreadnoughts*, although in March the German programme was enlarged, testified to the conciliatory spirit of the British Cabinet. The promotion of Mr. Asquith to the Premiership in 1908 brought Mr. Lloyd George to the Exchequer, and Mr. Churchill into the Cabinet; and for the next three years those two men led a crusade for social reform and a reduction of armaments. . . . On November 23rd, Lord Roberts delivered a weighty speech in the House of Lords, which succeeded in making compulsory service a living issue. 'Hitherto,' he began, 'I have failed to wake people up to my warnings against a danger that is all too obvious. If you, who ought to realise that our naval supremacy is being disputed, neglect to place this country in such a state of defence as would make even the most powerful nation hesitate to attack it, I cannot help feeling that a terrible awakening may be in store for us at no very distant period. . . . The Navy is not enough. The Territorial Army is too small and too untrained to cope with highly trained troops. . . . There lies in front of us one of the strangest spectacles ever witnessed. Within a few hours' steaming of our coasts, there is a people numbering over sixty millions, our most active rivals in commerce and the greatest military power in the world, adding to an overwhelming military strength a naval force which she is resolutely and rapidly increasing; while we are taking no military precautions in response. [In his speech Lord Roberts asked for a million men.]"—*Ibid.*, pp. 389, 392-393.—"A few days before German pressure at Petrograd ended the Bosnian crisis, British nerves received an unexpected shock. The Navy Law of 1908, reducing the life of capital ships from 25 to 20 years, conformed to the general practice and excited no alarm in Whitehall; but, in the autumn, the Admiralty learned that the German naval programme of 1909-10 was being anticipated. The Admiralty's proposal for meeting the new German Navy Bill was, accordingly, to lay down six *Dreadnoughts* in 1909-10, and a similar number in the two succeeding years. . . . The Estimates were indeed for four, but it was added that the Government 'might find it necessary to make preparations for the rapid construction of four more large armoured ships.' Thus, the Admiralty, in the guise of a compromise, obtained power to build two more than they originally proposed. . . . For the first time, the Estimates were defended by selecting Germany as the standard by which to measure . . . [British] requirements; and British and German *Dreadnoughts* were balanced against each other down the vista of the coming years. . . . [A wave of panic swept over Great Britain from which the navy profited], for six of the eight vessels of our 1909-10 programme were super-*Dreadnoughts*, with 13.5 inch instead of 12 inch guns. This smart stroke delayed the construction of the German vessels that had already been laid down, and, when the dangerpoint of the spring of 1912 was reached, Germany possessed, not the thirteen monsters which Mr. Asquith had foretold as a certainty, but nine. . . . [In a speech made at this time Sir Edward Grey, foreign minister, said:] 'A new situation in this country is created by the German programme, whether it is carried out quickly or slowly. When it is completed, Germany will have a fleet of 33 *Dreadnoughts*—the most powerful the world has ever seen. That imposes on us the necessity, of which we are now at the beginning—except so far as we have *Dreadnoughts* already—of rebuilding the whole of our fleet.' . . . [The accord between Great Britain and France became gradually closer, and in 1912 an exchange of letters took place in which it was agreed that under certain circumstances the British fleet would support the French fleet in defense of the coasts of France. (See below: Diplomatic background: 56.)] The Grey-Cambon formula left the British Government in theory with its hands free; but M. Poincaré's comments show that it understated the intimacy of the relationship which had grown up in eight years of diplomatic cooperation. . . . The freedom of the British Government continued to be solemnly reiterated at intervals by the Prime-Minister and the Foreign Secretary; but, from 1911 onwards, every Frenchman regarded Great Britain as bound in honour to come to the assistance of France if attacked by Germany. The problem was further complicated by the fact that France was allied to Russia, whom she was bound to aid if attacked. It was not deemed necessary to embody . . . [British] relations to the great Slavonic Power in a written formula; yet the action of Russia might concern the fortunes of Great Britain very closely, since an attack on Russia would involve an attack on France. . . . [Great Britain was] thus conditionally involved in the quarrels and ambitions of a distant Power over whose policy . . . [she] exercised no control. . . . In April 1912, . . . discussions between British and Belgian experts [which had been commenced] in 1906, were revived. As a European War appeared to become more probable, the part which Belgium and the Scheldt might be forced to play became an object of increasing interest to her neighbors. . . . No convention [however] was concluded or even discussed. Indeed, when General Jungbluth was invited to attend the British manœuvres in 1912, the invitation was declined in order to afford no foundation for the rumour of an *entente*. But though no common action was taken, both coun-

try's proposal for meeting the new German Navy Bill was, accordingly, to lay down six *Dreadnoughts* in 1909-10, and a similar number in the two succeeding years. . . . The Estimates were indeed for four, but it was added that the Government 'might find it necessary to make preparations for the rapid construction of four more large armoured ships.' Thus, the Admiralty, in the guise of a compromise, obtained power to build two more than they originally proposed. . . . For the first time, the Estimates were defended by selecting Germany as the standard by which to measure . . . [British] requirements; and British and German *Dreadnoughts* were balanced against each other down the vista of the coming years. . . . [A wave of panic swept over Great Britain from which the navy profited], for six of the eight vessels of our 1909-10 programme were super-*Dreadnoughts*, with 13.5 inch instead of 12 inch guns. This smart stroke delayed the construction of the German vessels that had already been laid down, and, when the dangerpoint of the spring of 1912 was reached, Germany possessed, not the thirteen monsters which Mr. Asquith had foretold as a certainty, but nine. . . . [In a speech made at this time Sir Edward Grey, foreign minister, said:] 'A new situation in this country is created by the German programme, whether it is carried out quickly or slowly. When it is completed, Germany will have a fleet of 33 *Dreadnoughts*—the most powerful the world has ever seen. That imposes on us the necessity, of which we are now at the beginning—except so far as we have *Dreadnoughts* already—of rebuilding the whole of our fleet.' . . . [The accord between Great Britain and France became gradually closer, and in 1912 an exchange of letters took place in which it was agreed that under certain circumstances the British fleet would support the French fleet in defense of the coasts of France. (See below: Diplomatic background: 56.)] The Grey-Cambon formula left the British Government in theory with its hands free; but M. Poincaré's comments show that it understated the intimacy of the relationship which had grown up in eight years of diplomatic cooperation. . . . The freedom of the British Government continued to be solemnly reiterated at intervals by the Prime-Minister and the Foreign Secretary; but, from 1911 onwards, every Frenchman regarded Great Britain as bound in honour to come to the assistance of France if attacked by Germany. The problem was further complicated by the fact that France was allied to Russia, whom she was bound to aid if attacked. It was not deemed necessary to embody . . . [British] relations to the great Slavonic Power in a written formula; yet the action of Russia might concern the fortunes of Great Britain very closely, since an attack on Russia would involve an attack on France. . . . [Great Britain was] thus conditionally involved in the quarrels and ambitions of a distant Power over whose policy . . . [she] exercised no control. . . . In April 1912, . . . discussions between British and Belgian experts [which had been commenced] in 1906, were revived. As a European War appeared to become more probable, the part which Belgium and the Scheldt might be forced to play became an object of increasing interest to her neighbors. . . . No convention [however] was concluded or even discussed. Indeed, when General Jungbluth was invited to attend the British manœuvres in 1912, the invitation was declined in order to afford no foundation for the rumour of an *entente*. But though no common action was taken, both coun-

tries proceeded to prepare for the expected storm. Belgium introduced compulsory service in 1913, and elaborate surveys of Belgian roads and railways were undertaken by the British War Office."—*Ibid.*, pp. 430-431, 468-470.

(d) **The Balkans.**—1. **THE BALKANS TO 1878.**—"Most wars finally turn upon a single incident which may be the culmination of a long and acrid controversy, but is accepted as the reason for hostilities. In 1861 everybody knew that the war actually began with the firing on Fort Sumter. In 1870 the last official reason was the insistence, or supposed insistence, of the Emperor of the French upon a pledge from the King of Prussia that he would not in future allow any Hohenzollern to occupy the throne of Spain. . . . For reasons hereafter given, August 1, 1914, marks the extinction of the last possibility of peace and may be considered the date of the beginning of the war. . . . Eight nations were placing their troops in the field before any one of them could give a solid and substantial reason for the war, other than that they were compelled to defend themselves against a wicked and unprovoked attack. That the war began in eastern Europe was natural because . . . the tension in that part of the world is greater, and on that battleground of the ages live a number of race groups of individuals whose fate is settled for them by members of a different race unacceptable to them. Whatever might have happened next year or in the next decade, it is clear that the prime reason for the war of 1914 is to be found in the abnormal relations of the Balkans to the rest of the European powers. The tale of the present [1914] condition of the Balkans may be taken up in the year 1876. . . . In that year Turkey still occupied almost all the territory north to the Danube and Save Rivers, except for Greece, then confined to the southern peninsula; and the plucky little country of Montenegro, which was the only part of the Balkans that never bowed the knee to the Turks. The trouble was made public by certain journalists who discovered that the Turks were sending certain irregular troops called *Bashi Bazouks* to harry, strip, and torture the Bulgarians. With great difficulty these journalists got access to the English newspapers; that aroused Mr. Gladstone. . . . [then in opposition, against Lord Beaconsfield, the premier, for defending Turkey]. When in 1877 Russian and Rumanian troops marched southward, freeing Bulgaria, England held off. . . . [But in 1878] the Conservatives . . . took the side of Turkey and for their good-nature received the Island of Cyprus. Austria, which was on the flank of Russia, refrained from using the military opportunity of cutting the Russian communications and held off while the Russians penetrated to San Stephano [Stefano], within sight of the imperial city of Constantinople. Then England took affront and in the Congress of Berlin compelled the Russians to draw back beyond the Danube. [See also BULGARIA: 1875-1878; 1878; TURKEY: 1877-1878; 1878; EUROPE: Modern: Wars of the great powers.] Austria was at last rewarded with the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which completed a compact block of territory lying between the Adriatic Sea and the Turkish province of Macedonia. [See BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1878.] On the other side the Bulgarians were allowed to set up a little principality like that of the Servians. The purpose of the Treaty of Berlin, signed July 13, 1878 [see BERLIN, CONGRESS OF], was to give Austria close contact with the Balkan states and at the same time to prepare the Christ-

ian inhabitants of the rest of the Balkans for some sort of governments of their own. Russia was left shut out from the Danube by the buffer state of Rumania, which looks on itself as non-Slav. Anyone can see that this settlement was crude and temporary, yet when Disraeli and Salisbury returned to London from the Congress they rode through the streets in triumph and Disraeli made his brilliant and theatrical remark, 'I bring you peace with honor.' The only wonder is that this settlement endured for thirty-six years."—A. B. Hart, *War in Europe*, pp. 104-107.

2. **BALKAN TROUBLES FROM 1878 TO 1912.**—"It was part of a general disposition not to look Oriental things squarely in the face that the Treaty of 1878 still kept up the fiction of Turkish supremacy over Bulgaria and also over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria was 'constituted an Autonomous and tributary Principality under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.' . . . Montenegro was held to be independent, as was also Servia. Rumania gave up some territory on the Russian border and received other territory on the delta of the Danube. This treaty left Turkey still the strongest power in the Balkans; and the five little Slav or semi-Slav states, Rumania, Servia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece, were left to work out their own salvation. Macedonia and Albania continued integral parts of the Turkish Empire. [See also BALKAN STATES: 1878.] The Austrians occupied in Bosnia and Herzegovina a region which had never been theirs, in which the population was Serb, and in which there had been no such things as good order and good government for centuries. . . . It took many years to tranquilize the two provinces in which about a third of the population was intensely Moslem; but the Austrians persevered, built narrow-gauge railroads, stopped the brigandage, encouraged farming and lumbering, and made a handsome little capital out of the old Moslem town of Sarajevo. [See also BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1878-1908.] . . . Meantime across the border Macedonia was year after year the scene of the merciless forays of the *Comitadjis*. These were professional brigands, armed and aided by committees or associations of Bulgarians or Greeks as the case might be, and their main object was to kill out as many Greek or Bulgarian villages as possible so as to hold as much territory as possible when the break-up came. [See also MACEDONIA: 1870-1912.] The traffic on the River Danube has long been open to all nations, but the Upper Danube runs wholly through [what was then] Austro-Hungarian territory, and the Austrians were the intermediaries between the Balkan Slav powers and the rest of Europe. They were constantly suspected of biding their time till they might safely move down from Bosnia through Macedonia and take possession of Salonica, thus giving them a port on the *Ægean* and a land route in the direction of the Orient. In 1908 the Young Turks revolted and deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid [in 1909]. Their government everywhere relaxed and the Austrians, on October 5 [7], 1908, issued a declaration to the effect that the Emperor had made up his mind . . . ['to extend my sovereign rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina'], promising the people civil rights, freedom of religious belief, and freedom of the press, and a formal constitution. . . . Part of the population considered this action a second and unrighteous conquest, which was intended to remove the last hope of combination with their Serb neighbors in Servia and beyond. [See also BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1908.]

Servia also took it in very ill part till Austria used such threats that on March 31, 1909, the Servian government formally declared that 'Servia recognizes that the *Fait Accompli* regarding Bosnia had not affected her rights.' . . . Notwithstanding this unwilling promise, the Servians were in trouble with Austria much of the time. The Austrians cruelly hampered their exports of grain, cattle, and timber, which were their only means of livelihood. Belgrade lies [1914], . . . a short cannon shot from the Hungarian border and the Austrian Minister and Consul-General were potent forces in Servian affairs."—A. B. Hart, *War in Europe*, pp. 107-111.

3. BALKAN WARS OF 1912 AND 1913.—"The year 1912 opened with dark clouds on the eastern horizon. The death of Count Aehrenthal, once the stormy petrel of European politics, was regretted; for he had championed the cause of peace since 1909 against the bellicose Chief of the Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, and his successor, Count Berchtold, was headstrong and incapable. A Military Convention between Servia and Bulgaria was signed in April, determining the conditions of mutual aid in the event of attack by Turkey, Roumania and Austria, or of an attack on Turkey. A Græco-Bulgarian Military Convention followed in September, and a verbal understanding was reached with Montenegro. In the same month, Austria enquired whether the Great Powers would join in 'recommending to Turkey the adoption of a policy of progressive decentralization, which would secure to the Christian nationalities their legitimate guarantees, and in urging the Balkan States to await peacefully the results of their policy.' The Powers approved; but Berchtold seemed in no hurry to follow up his suggestion, and on October 8th Montenegro gave the signal for the Balkan War by attacking her ancient foe."—A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, ed., *Cambridge history of British foreign policy, 1783-1919*, v. 3, p. 470.—"Turkey had gone through several stages of revolution, and, for the moment, seemed impotent. Venizelos, the Greek Premier . . . laid the foundation for an understanding between Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria. . . . In October, 1912, war began, and by the next June the Turkish power in Europe, after six hundred years of existence, was smashed. The city of Constantinople was too large a prize for any of the allies and remained Turkish, with a narrow belt of territory behind it. Otherwise the whole of the Balkans was apportioned by a treaty (practically dictated by the Great Powers) to the five Christian powers, Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece, and to the mixed Christian and Moslem people of Albania. At that moment the Balkan alliance was still intact. A quarrel [however] arose as to the portion of Macedonia which should go to Bulgaria. . . . All this time the Austrians were lying along the frontier of Bosnia waiting for the opportunity to step in; and some of the ablest statesmen in the Empire though the time had then come for a step which would in all probability have brought about the two combinations of opposing powers which [in 1914 were] fighting each other. It was clear that if Austria went into the Balkans, Russia would do the same. The event proved that either the Austrians were not ready to take the step, or had not the assurance of support of Germany which was necessary in such a crisis. . . . Nobody will ever know how far Russia caused either of the Balkan wars nor how far Russia recommended moderation to the allies. One thing is certain: there is not and

never has been any evidence that any Balkan power desired or would have accepted incorporation with Russia, or would have failed to fight with all its strength against any arrangement which meant that Russia should establish a protectorate over them."—A. B. Hart, *War in Europe*, pp. 111-113.—See also BALKAN STATES: 1912: First Balkan War, to 1914-1916.

4. HIGH TIDE FOR SERBIA.—"The result of the Balkan War was to give the world a new impression of the national and military strength of the Balkan powers. They easily defeated the Turks, who, to be sure, were disorganized and amazingly unprovided. . . . In the second war, when the Bulgarians expected to repeat their triumph of 1885, the Servian armies man for man, regiment for regiment, division for division, stood day after day and week after week against the Bulgarians. The Servian people were naturally elated; their sovereign . . . [was] a figurehead, the real head of the nation being the Prime Minister Pashitch, a man of large capacity. Servia is a peasant land, most of the farmers owning their own fields; it has almost no city population. Yet it had fought two victorious campaigns and its area and population were nearly doubled as a result of the war. . . . But what the Servians wished was less significant than what the Serbs in Trans-Leithia thought. Naturally the Austro-Hungarian government . . . [had] not been generous in producing proof that its people were losing their loyalty. In case of any break-up the pressure would immediately come upon the Magyars, who, . . . [were] only 10,000,000 in an aggregation of 21,000,000. All the circumstances point to the certainty that the Magyar statesmen informed the German statesmen who were carrying on the monarchy in Vienna that unless something were done, the Trans-Leithian part of the Empire would crack to pieces."—*Ibid.*, pp. 113-115.—See also BALKAN STATES: 1914-1916; BULGARIA: 1912, to 1914; RUMANIA: 1912-1913; SERBIA: 1909-1913; TURKEY: 1914.—"The rapid triumph of the Balkan States raised difficulties for their champions. Sir Edward Grey expressed the hope that the Tchataldja lines would be held, adding that, if the Turks were ejected from their capital, it should be internationalized. His apprehensions, however, were quickly relieved; for the Bulgarian wave had spent its force. A far graver problem was raised by the victories of Servia and by her resolve to secure an outlet on the Adriatic. These possibilities of explosion threw a special responsibility on Great Britain, of which she showed herself fully conscious throughout the Conference of Ambassadors which sat in London from December onwards. The task of its Chairman, Sir Edward Grey, was to prevent Russia and Austria flying at each other's throats. . . . Throughout these agitating controversies, the British and German Governments worked in perfect accord for the preservation of peace. 'Sir Edward,' writes Prince Lichnowsky, who had succeeded Marschall von Bieberstein and speedily learned to admire the character of the Foreign Secretary, 'from the very beginning took up the position that England had no interest in Albania. He merely wished to mediate between the two groups as an "honest broker." He therefore, by no means took sides with the Entente, and his authoritative influence contributed in no small measure to agreement. On all questions we took sides with Austria and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey hardly ever backed the French or Russian claims. . . . Thus with his assistance it was possible to coax King Nicholas out of Scutari. . . . He conducted

the negotiations calmly and tactfully. When a question threatened to become involved, he sketched a formula which was always accepted. His personality inspired equal confidence in all the participants.' A slightly different account is given by Jagow, the German Foreign Minister. 'The credit of an attitude of mediation should not be denied to him. Certainly, he often advised yielding at Petrograd, as we did at Vienna, and found formulas of agreement; but he represented the Entente, because, like us, he neither could nor would abandon his associates. We, like England, played a mediatory part.' . . . The ten months of war had left a profound *malaise*, not only in the Balkans, but also on the broad arena of European politics. The overthrow of Turkey by a League formed under the auspices of the Tsar, and the aggrandisement of his *protégé* Serbia, filled the Central Powers with alarm. The German Army was increased, and a capital levy of 50 millions was devoted to strengthening the frontier fortresses, improving the artillery, and augmenting the gold reserve at Spandau. The German military effort inevitably provoked a French response, and the Three Years' Service, which had been abolished in 1905, was restored. Austria, where Conrad von Hötzendorf had been restored to his position as Chief of the Staff after the death of Aehrenthal, was only restrained from action against Serbia, when Bulgaria attacked her late allies, by the refusal of her own allies to cooperate. That opinion in Russia was no less inflamed than in Germany, Austria and France was proved when, in response to a request from Turkey for a German officer of high rank to reorganise her army, Liman von Sanders was appointed in November, 1913, to command the First Army Corps. Sazonoff telegraphed to Benckendorff that a German Commander of an army corps in the Turkish capital was tantamount to a German garrison on the Bosphorus, and suggested that Great Britain and France should make a joint representation at the Porte and ask for compensations. Sir Edward Grey agreed that a German garrison at Constantinople could not be permitted, and proposed to try to persuade Germany to modify her plan. Meanwhile, he was willing to join France and Russia in asking the Porte if it was really intended to give Liman [von Sanders] command of Turkish troops in the capital.—A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, ed., *Cambridge history of British foreign policy, 1783-1919*, v. 3, pp. 471-474.—“While the Liman [von Sanders] crisis was at its height a New Year's article in a Russian military paper expressed the views prevailing among a section of officers. 'We all know we are preparing for a war in the West. Not only the troops but the whole nation must accustom itself to the idea that we arm ourselves for a war of annihilation against the Germans, and the German Empire must be annihilated.' . . . The Liman incident inspired Sazonoff to submit a memorandum to the Tsar 'on the necessity of a comprehensive programme of action, in order to assure for us a satisfactory solution of the question of the Straits in the event of being compelled at no distant period to defend our interests in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.' The Tsar ordered the question to be discussed by a Crown Council, which met on February 21, 1914. . . . The deliberations of the Council were unknown to the public; but the tension was revealed in a sensational article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* of March 2 from its Petrograd correspondent. 'The Russian danger is not imminent; but in 1917 the army reforms will be

completed and troops are already being massed on her Western frontier. Germany will perhaps be unable to prevent invasion. Russian armaments are enormous and she will turn her arms against Germany. Such a war would be acclaimed by the whole people. In three years, when we negotiate a new commercial treaty, she will perhaps try to provoke foreign complications.' The article, which was believed to have been inspired from Berlin, aroused alarm throughout Europe; and an article in the *Bourse Gazette* of March 13, universally attributed to Sukhomlinoff, the War Minister, increased the excitement. 'Russia wishes for peace but is ready for war. The army is not only large but excellently equipped. Russia has always fought on foreign soil and has always been victorious. Russia is no longer on the defensive, Russia is ready.' On May 14 Jagow uttered a warning in the Reichstag to the Russian Press, while expressing his conviction that the Government remained friendly; and on May 23 exhorted the Press of both countries to remain calm. The appeals were in vain. . . . Russia, like Germany and France, had made feverish efforts since the Balkan wars to increase and improve her armaments; for it was in vain that Witte and Rosen besought the Tsar and their colleagues in the Council of the Empire to drop the forward policy in the Balkans which was leading straight to war. In June, 1913, an increase of recruits was demanded of the Duma, approved by the Tsar in August, and begun in November, the scheme to be completed in 1917. In the spring of 1914 the Duma, in secret session, voted large sums for military preparations. [See also RUSSIA: 1914 (August): Status of army.] . . . The tension was increased by a provocative article on June 13 in the Petrograd *Bourse Gazette*, entitled, 'Russia is ready. France must be ready too,' attributed to the War Minister. 'Russia fulfils all her obligations under the alliance, and she expects her ally to do the same. The contingent of recruits this year has been raised from 450,000 to 580,000, and the period of service increased by six months. Thus every winter Russia has an army of 2,300,000. Germany possesses 880,000, Austria 500,000 and Italy 400,000. Russia therefore naturally expects 770,000 men from France, which is only possible with the Three Years' Service. . . . Russia and France desire no war; but Russia is ready, and France must be ready too.' The article aroused anger in Berlin. 'So the Russians have shown their cards,' wrote the Kaiser. 'Any German who still disbelieves that Russia and France are working full steam for an early war against us and that we must take corresponding measures is fit for a madhouse.' On June 16 the pacific Chancellor wrote to Lichnowsky that no inspired article had ever so nakedly revealed the bellicose tendencies of the Russian military party. 'Till now only the extremist circles among the Pan-Germans and militarists attributed to Russia the definite plan of an early offensive against us; but cooler minds are beginning to share this view. The first result is the cry for a new and immediate increase of the army; and when the army gets something, the navy will also raise its voice. As the Kaiser is already won over I apprehend for the summer and autumn the outbreak of a new attack of armament fever. I do not believe Russia is planning a speedy attack; but she wishes, in the event of another Balkan crisis, to take a stronger line. Whether it comes to a European conflagration will depend solely on the attitude of Germany and England. If we combine, which

our respective obligations do not forbid, war will be avoided. If not, a subsidiary difference between Russia and Austria would light the torch.' While the relations between the Dual Alliance and the Central Powers grew steadily worse, a welcome *détente* had occurred between Great Britain and Germany. After the settlement of the Morocco crisis [see GERMANY: 1911: Morocco crisis] Sir Edward Grey declared that . . . [Great Britain] had no desire to oppose German expansion in Central Africa; and the possibilities of colonial co-operation were briefly discussed between Lord Haldane and Bethmann-Hollweg at Berlin. Negotiations were begun in London after his return, and the first task was to overhaul the agreement of 1898 which divided the African colonies of Portugal into economic spheres of influence. 'Thanks to the accommodating spirit,' writes Lichnowsky, 'the new agreement fully accorded with our wishes and interests.' Angora, with San Thomé and Principe on the West coast, and Mozambique from German East Africa to the Zambesi were earmarked for Germany. The agreement was far more favourable to Germany than that of 1898. The negotiations were practically completed when King George visited Berlin in May, 1913, and the agreement was initiated in August. Sir Edward, however, would only sign if the agreement of 1898 and the Windsor Treaty were published with it; and the Wilhelmstrasse declined the condition. 'We intended publication,' explains Jagow, 'but only at a suitable moment, when the danger of hostile criticism should be less acute, and if possible with the simultaneous announcement of the Bagdad agreement, then near completion.' Sanction was finally obtained at the end of July, 1914; but by that time the war was in sight, and the Treaty was never signed."—G. P. Gooch, *History of modern Europe, 1878-1919*, pp. 519-522, 524-526.—In May 1914 conversations between Great Britain and Russia were begun with a view to arriving at an arrangement such as that contained in the Grey-Cambon letters. The matter was allowed to rest in abeyance for the time, and meantime the secret was transmitted to Berlin by an official in the Russian embassy and was revealed in the *Berliner Tageblatt*. By August, the time set to continue the conversations, all Europe was ablaze.

(e) *Bosnia and Herzegovina.—Revival of Italian irredentism.*—"The announcement of the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria (October, 1908) [see BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1908; TURKEY: 1908; also below: n; and Diplomatic background: 8], aroused in Italy a feeling of mingled anxiety and resentment, which expressed itself in a press polemic so violent as to demand all the address of the Government to neutralize it. The Italian Foreign Affairs Minister in diplomatic phrase referred to it as having 'so deeply perturbed the Italian political atmosphere.' It was generally demanded that Austria should meet the requirements in the Triple Alliance Treaty for compensation to Italy under such circumstances by ceding to her at least the Trentino, and it was declared later by some that certain statesmen, like Prinetti, stood for insisting on this cession, but were overruled by the Consulta when Austria refused firmly to admit that the *casus foederis* had arisen. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, while reproaching earnestly the action of Austria in 'creating a difficult situation in Europe,' having 'a considerable repercussion on the internal condition in some states' and deeply perturbing the Italian political atmosphere, yet opposed a protest on

Italy's part. . . . The speech of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs was, in fact, a strong presentation of the history of the Austrian movement which resulted in the Annexation of the Jugo-Slav provinces. . . . He pointed out the difficulties and dangers that any other course on Italy's part than that pursued by her would have brought on her, standing, as she would have done, alone, and he reiterated his conviction that Italy's true policy lay in adhering to the Triple Alliance and at the same time cultivating the friendship of England and France. No reiteration of friendly sentiments, however, nor expressions of confidence in Austrian good faith availed to stay the on-sweep of Austria's policy of dominance and absorption. She knew too well the deep-seated antagonism of the Italians to her policy and the profound causes of the Irredentism that made Governmental conventions a feeble palliative. . . . So Austria set herself to the task, on the one side, of rooting out the spirit of Irredentism and rendering her Italian provinces permanently Austrian, in fact, and, on the other, of pushing southward and extending her power into the Balkans, where she proposed to herself to become the heir of their former Suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey, and reaching the seas from which new acquisitions would await her. To achieve the first she proposed to Austrianize the Schools. She would cut up Italianism at the root. The Italian tongue was discouraged, and eventually, where it was necessary to accomplish her end, the Schools were suppressed, as in the case of the Italian University of Trieste. . . . But however Italian Ministers might labor to prevent Irredentism, or at least any public expression thereof, the feeling had become too deep-rooted in the Italian mind to be eradicated, and the spirit too widely diffused throughout Italy to be suppressed. The Trentino and Trieste especially were deemed integral parts of Italy, separated from her by violence and bound in foreign servitude by force. Istria and the Dalmatian coast were likewise considered so by some; but the feeling about Trent and Trieste was universal. Even could it have been suppressed in one age, it contained the elements of an immortal Spring, ever ready to burst forth anew. There was no more chance of their ever being forgot, or left permanently in peace as a part of Austria, than there was of Rome's being forgot or abandoned. . . . Seditious societies were dissolved; their members were prosecuted or chased away. Public meetings were forbidden, and the conditions resembled those in Lombardy in the old days of Austrian Occupation. No amount of discouragement on either side of the line, Austrian or Italian; no amount of repression, and no amount of concession availed to discourage or suppress, much less to cajole the irredentists on either side. The fact was, that they were Free in spirit and Italian, and wanted, on the one side, to be a part of Free Italy and not of Imperial Austria, and, on the other, they wanted to help them to be free. Thus, nothing could extinguish their aspiration. As the blood of the Martyrs is the seed of the Church, so the blood of Patriots is the seed of Liberty. Irredentism had its birth the moment after Garibaldi, on July 25, 1866, sent his laconic reply: 'Ubbidisco' [I obey] to King Victor Emmanuel's announcement to him that the armistice was signed and he must evacuate the Trentino. . . . They were volunteers under three generations of Garibaldis, and fought as exiles fight to rescue their country. Italy was not able to continue the war for their deliverance. . . . Austria pursued a policy of firm repression

without avail. No policy would have availed. After the Triple Alliance was entered into, the Italian authorities endeavored to distract the attention of Italy from the Irredentist regions; but this, too, was without permanent results. The numerous Associations on both sides of the line represented a profound and fundamental conflict of sentiment. . . . Austria, finding the Italian Universities Seminaries of Sedition, as she deemed them, undertook gradually to change their character, and when this did not succeed, she did what was tantamount to abolishing them. The consequences were such a recrudescence of Irredentist feeling, both in the Irredentist Provinces and in Italy herself, that she agreed to make certain concessions to this aroused sentiment, and promised to substitute an Italian Faculty of Law at Trent, Rovereto, or Trieste. It was on the occasion of this new explosion of Irredentism that Signor Tittoni, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, made his memorable speech reaffirming that Italy's policy was to stand by the Triple Alliance Treaty as one of the greatest safeguards of peace in Europe. But whatever the Government might proclaim, the People were not appeased. Societies sprang up, or those existing received new impulse to free Trent and Trieste, and 'incidents' were of frequent occurrence. The old Mazzini spirit seemed to have revived. Appeals and proclamations were circulated secretly calling for the rescuing of the Irredentist Provinces from Austrian rule."—T. N. Page, *Italy and the World War*, pp. 108-113.

(f) Sequence of European events since the Franco-Prussian War.—"Bismarck . . . did more than create an approximately united Germany; he destroyed Europe. Bismarck retarded the work of the French Revolution, gagging France and flinging Europe back into the old régime. After the defeat of France, the first steps towards the reconstruction of Europe, by the restoration of the balance of power, were taken by the French Republic and the Tsar. That, however, is only a brief portion of the story. The normal evolution of every nation in Europe has been disturbed, if not utterly deranged, by the action of Germany in annexing Schleswig-Holstein and in seizing the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. . . . The date of the fall of Bismarck, in 1890, . . . is more than a convenient rallying point for perplexed observers of the European movement. Bismarck gone, responsibility for Germany's destinies was assumed by a young sovereign of exceptionally alert intelligence, fully abreast of his time, and perfectly aware of the deficiencies, as well as of the greatness, of the work of the Founder of the Empire. Bismarck had relied mainly on his political intuition to insure—yet he took the precaution to re-insure by treaty—German prestige. He presided over the beginnings of German economic enterprise without completely comprehending the drift of the time. An astute, daring and unscrupulous diplomacy, varied, when necessary, by a policy of intimidation based on an invincible military force, seemed to him sufficient to maintain his country at the point provisionally guaranteed to her by the Treaty of Frankfort. . . . He came to an arrangement with Austria in 1879, and simultaneously . . . favoured French expansion in Tunis. This was a quick way of alienating Italian sympathy from the Power that not so long before had helped Italy to achieve her independence. 1881 is the date of the Treaty of Bardo, whereby Tunis was given to France; and in 1882 Italy joined Germany and Austria in an alliance which was thus made Triple. [See above: c.] . . .

Almost twenty years had passed since the Franco-German war; ten since the Treaty of Berlin. That Treaty, which had confirmed German hegemony, had established in South-Eastern Europe a series of small States, left by Germany to shift for themselves under the vigilant guardianship of Russia and Austria-Hungary, and calculated, in the German Chancellor's eyes, to absorb the entire attention of those Powers. Bismarck believed that he had crushed and completely isolated France, and that the Eastern Question had been settled for a generation. What he had really done was to render an alliance between the Tsar and the Republic inevitable, and to alienate Russia from Austria-Hungary, while making her the friend of Italy. . . . Meanwhile, France, which had gone to Tunis in 1881, was in Tongking in 1885. England was watching her with jealous eyes. At the same time her domestic difficulties, notably the anti-Republican coalition conspiracy known as Boulangerism, paralysed her energy, and compromised her authority in Europe. Bismarck saw no reason to complain of the situation. Now and then—as in the Schnaebelé affair of April 1887, when he imprisoned the police-commissioner of Pagny, releasing him only after eight days—he invented a frontier incident calculated to remind France that Germany was on her guard. Simultaneously, the same Bismarck who had signed an anti-Russian alliance with Austria and Italy arranged a reinsurance pact with Russia. [See GERMANY: 1887; 1890-1891.] The tendency of Russia to draw nearer to France doubtless interfered with the complete realization of the Bismarckian plan. But Bismarck never considered it beyond his capacity to solve a problem of that kind. He was engaged upon it when [in 1890] his new master, William II., abruptly requested him to resign."—W. M. Fullerton, *Problems of power*, pp. 45-48.—See also GERMANY: 1889-1890.—"The revival of French power and prestige was a fact which the British public only began to realise after 1904, but actually it began immediately after the war of 1870-71. This was why Bismarck had a regular war-scare in 1875, and why he arranged the Dual Alliance in 1879, the Triple Alliance in 1882, and the Reinsurance Treaty in 1887. . . . [Thus] France was absolutely isolated by Bismarck's wonderful system of anti-French alliances. Nevertheless, the French went on with the greatest energy renewing their sources of strength, as is particularly to be seen in the colonial policy of Jules Ferry. Soon Tunis, Tonkin, Madagascar, and the Congo had given to France an enormous place in the sun. [See FRANCE: 1875-1889.] Before the Great War opened, France's sensitive neighbours had begun, not without reason, to fear that she would be able to make up for her deficiency in white soldiers by bringing Colonial troops from over the sea. . . . [In August, 1891] an exchange of letters took place between M. Ribot (French Minister for Foreign Affairs), M. Freycinet (Minister of War for France), and M. de Giers, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Russia. These letters constituted an *Entente Cordiale*, a phrase which now became popular, expressing a definite international friendship without specific alliance. When the *entente* was announced in public speeches, a sigh of relief went up, over all France. . . . [Which had been] living for twenty years absolutely without friends or allies in the middle of the armed camp of Europe, existing almost by sufferance of the powerful and inexorable enemy, who was fashioning a network of military alliances around and against her. It was now recognised throughout Europe

that the French Republic was stable, that French resources were those of a Great Power, and that the French Government could continue to 'practise peace with dignity.' . . . The creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance took altogether about six years, and required much patient and sustained work on the part of the French diplomatists, who especially had to dissipate the prevailing notion that France's frequent ministerial crises meant instability. Gradually the two Governments drew closer together. . . . At last, on August 18, 1892, the draft of a military convention between Russia and France was signed at St. Petersburg. It provided that 'if France is attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all its available forces to fight Germany'; and that 'if Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all its available forces to fight Germany.' . . . In March, 1894, the military convention was ratified, and the *casus foederis* was registered in a treaty. . . . The Entente of Great Britain and France followed surprisingly closely upon a period of strain between the two countries, a period of which the end came with Germany's offer to conclude an accord with France on the basis of a guarantee of the Imperial possession of Alsace-Lorraine, and France's definite refusal of this (February, 1900)."—R. B. Mowat, *History of European diplomacy, 1815-1914*, pp. 250, 252-254, 268.—"With the resignation of Bismarck and the death [1894] of Alexander III, a new movement began in Europe. That movement was to culminate in the removal of Russia from her European spheres of influence, and her exile during a protracted period in Manchuria, where her military power was eventually to be shattered at Mukden (February to March, 1905). . . . The year [1898, following] the Austro-Russian Agreement [of 1897] concerning the Balkans (when the Powers recognized the 'superior interest' of Austria and Russia in the provinces of European Turkey), marks the moment when Russia first began to realize the inconvenience of her Far-Eastern policy, and to doubt the disinterestedness of her German friends. Dreaming of victories in Manchuria, she was forced to neglect the pursuit of her traditional Pan Slavist policy in the Balkans. She was obliged to adopt the policy of the pan-Germans. Partially paralysed in Europe, Russia could neither actively favour, nor effectually arrest, the ambitions of the Balkan States to fling the Turks across the Sea of Marmora, and to extend their boundaries in Macedonia and Thrace. She was constrained to a policy of marking time. Meanwhile Germany, impelled by the ever-increasing momentum of her *Drang nach Osten*, was assuring, through her Austro-Hungarian allies, her economic preponderance in the Balkan States; while, benefiting by the persistent antagonism of Russia and England, she became the protector of the Turkish Empire, and the *concessionaire* of that Baghdad Railway which was intended to be the instrument of the establishment of her protectorate over Asiatic Turkey. [See also GERMANY: 1890-1914: Alteration of foreign policy.] Thus, owing to Russia's policy in the Far East, and owing to the reciprocal jealousies and apprehensions of the Powers, all hope of settling the Eastern Question was indefinitely postponed. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro were left to work out their national salvation alone, and the Macedonians were exposed to periodic massacre. . . . But throughout this period the Balkan nationalities were slowly awakening to self-knowledge. Liberty, national

rancour, and a sense of responsibility were transforming them into self-reliant Powers. The evolution did not escape the notice of good observers; but who could foresee that within a period of only fourteen years the sovereigns of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro were to cross their several frontiers at the head of their allied armies, 'imploping the benediction of the Almighty on their New Crusade,' against the Turk? . . . Already the period of civil war known as the 'Dreyfus Affair' had begun in France. [See FRANCE: 1894-1895; 1894-1906; 1898.] . . . Russia and Germany alone seemed to be happy nations; but Russia, lured eastward out of Europe, partially by German wiles, was already doomed, and Germany alone seemed likely to reap the fruit of her intelligent diplomatic action. In reality she had overstepped the mark. Italy, England and France, colonial rivals, almost bitter foes, had nevertheless one thing in common: all three had been unfortunate; all three were in need of friends. With the departure from the Quai d'Orsay of M. Hanotaux, who had practically paralysed the Dual Alliance by his compliance with the schemes suggested by the German Emperor to the Tsar, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Pyrenean M. Delcassé, was free to adopt a new policy. M. Cambon, who had been appointed ambassador in London in September 1898, was to treat with Lord Salisbury in the name of M. Delcassé for the settlement of the Fashoda crisis. [See EGYPT: 1898 (September-November).] M. Barrère, meanwhile, in December 1897, had arrived as French ambassador in Rome. In November 1898, he succeeded in arranging a treaty of commerce, which indicated that the two 'Latin sisters' were awakening to the fact that the Bismarckian policy of the galliphobe Italian statesman Crispi was not necessarily in the interests of either Power; and this treaty was the first step in that magnificent Mediterranean policy pursued by M. Delcassé, out of which was to come the Anglo-French Entente, England's definitive establishment in Egypt, the French Protectorate over Morocco, the Italian seizure of Tripoli (which France had acquired in 1901), and the Europe of 1910, 1911 and 1912. . . . Thus, while Russia was dragging France towards the disaster of Mukden, February 24 to March 10, 1905, Germany turned with a candid face to the people whose sea-power her own growing navy was already beginning to menace, and sought to convince them of her unalloyed sincerity. So long as Lord Salisbury remained at the head of the Foreign Office, France would strive in vain to thwart Germany's action. For that statesman, even for his august Queen, France and Russia were the hereditary enemies. German policy, in driving Russia into the East, had enhanced England's suspicion of Russia. England regarded opting for Germany as a less dangerous choice than making up with Russia; moreover, she was the deadly foe of Russia's ally. And thus it was that Germany could still continue to develop to their logical limits all the ramifications of the Bismarckian policy; she could still play to her heart's content the part of the honest broker, while, under another disguise, she was actively planting her flag throughout the world. But in October 1899 the Transvaal War broke out, and for two and a half years England's sinews were wrung in the heroic duel. [See SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1899 (September-October); (October-November); (November-December).] Now at last she opened her eyes to those perils of isolation as to which Mr. Chamberlain had warned her in 1898; for her enemies might, for

argument's sake, almost class her among the 'dying nations' on whose territory, in the words of her ironic Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury (May 4, 1898), the living nations were bound to encroach. . . . Lord Salisbury disappeared from the Foreign Office, being succeeded by Lord Lansdowne, in October 1900. A few days later Queen Victoria died and was succeeded by King Edward, who was immediately greeted by French public opinion as a sovereign 'capable of doing much to better the relations between the two countries.' At all events the tension between France and England could last no longer without a war. Something had to be done. For both England and France the hour was ripe for meditation over their individual national problems. They stood, for an instant, silent and face to face, blinking in the glare of the new light that illuminated the dread cross-roads of Fashoda and Ladysmith. . . . France and England were face to face like birds in a cockpit, while Europe, under German leadership, was fastening their spurs, and impatient to see them fight to the death. Then suddenly they both raised their heads and moved back to the fence. They had decided not to fight, and the face of European things was transformed."—W. M. Fullerton, *Problems of power*, pp. 50-58.—See also EUROPE: Modern: Conflicting currents; ENGLAND: 1901 (January).—"From the year 1904, by the formation of the Entente of France and Great Britain, a diplomatic group was established, balancing the Austro-German Dual Alliance. Accordingly, with the equipoise of Europe so nicely adjusted—German and Austria, with Italy in one group, England and France, with Russia in the other—the slightest political tremor made the scales oscillate in an alarming fashion. The international situation was thus delicate and dangerous; still, there is this to be said in favour of the policy of the balance: it produced a better situation than would have existed if there had been no Entente and if the German diplomatic group were in a position to decide everything. The crises may be considered to have had their diplomatic origin in the concession which Germany gained in 1903 from the Ottoman Government, to build a railway line connecting Constantinople with Bagdad. The grant of this concession at last convinced Great Britain that she had lost her pre-eminence with the Porte in favour of the German Government. . . . On the other hand, the formation of the Franco-British Entente was for the time being 'check' to the German plan of operation. So the next event in the diplomatic field is a vigorous move against the Entente, in what might be called one of its weak 'sectors,' in Morocco. . . . [The Kaiser's visit to Tangier, the Casablanca incident, and the Agadir incident (see AGADIR); FRANCE: 1910-1912; ITALY: 1911; MOROCCO: 1905-1906; 1907-1909; 1911-1914] all threatened to bring about a war between Germany and France. After the *Panther* incident] for weeks and months the conversations continued, dealing with most technical points—political, economic, geographical. Many times the conversations seemed on the eve of breaking down altogether. The war-cloud continued to impend over Europe. . . . Every Great Power except the United States felt oppressed in a greater or less degree by the huge armaments it had to maintain. In particular two great forces stood out in obvious rivalry: the British and German Navies. The British Navy had always been large, and British statesmen had never made a secret of their determination to keep it larger than that of any other Power. Accordingly the expan-

sion of the German Navy under William II was inevitably followed by a proportional increase of the British Navy, nicely calculated to maintain its superiority. As it was absolutely certain that the British Government would continue increasing the Navy in proportion to every increase of the German Navy, and as British resources were large enough to keep up the race indefinitely, it might have appeared simple for the two Governments to come to an understanding. A thoroughly statesmanlike effort in this direction was made by Mr. W. S. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, in a speech delivered in April, 1912. Mr. Churchill solemnly undertook that 'if in any particular year, not as a matter of bargain but as a matter of fact,' the German programme of naval shipbuilding were 'reduced or cancelled,' the British programme would be 'reduced or cancelled too.' Thus the German Government, without binding itself by treaty for the future, could slacken the pace, and decrease naval expenses, knowing that the weight of their navy, compared with that of the British, would remain exactly the same. Increased expenditure on ships would be no advantage to Germany, as it would automatically bring about a sixty per centum increase of the British Navy. The German Government took no notice of the offer to come to an understanding on the subject of naval armaments. In the same way, when Lord Haldane went on special mission to Berlin (February, 1912), and held conversations with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor, no agreement could be reached: the new Navy Law—the German programme for future ship-building—had to proceed. About the same time (i.e. on March 27, 1911, and June 14, 1912), the German Government carried through the Reichstag laws for increasing the peace effectives of the army to 625,000 men, and to raise large sums of money for armament. The French Government (Premier, M. Barthou), inevitably met this menace by the re-establishment of the three-years' term of military service (August 8, 1913)."—R. B. Mowat, *History of European diplomacy, 1815-1914*, pp. 282, 287, 289-290.—See also ENGLAND: 1912; 1912-1913; FRANCE: 1913-1914; GERMANY: 1890-1914: Growth of the army, etc.; 1898-1914; WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1900-1915, and after; WARSHIPS: 1870-1905; 1893-1914.

(g) Economic causes of the war.—"The incessant growth in the Empire's population demanded a widening of its territory. Cooped up within a narrow space, the Germans could not breathe freely; they needed new lands that could be peopled, new outlets to drain off some of this superabundant vitality. This, it is claimed by certain economists, is a biological law, and at the same time one of the causes that made the war inevitable."—N. E. L. Beyens, *Germany before the war* (tr. by P. V. Cohn), p. 202.

I. DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN INDUSTRY.—COMMERCIAL POLICY.—"At the beginning of the twentieth century Germany had truly become an industrial power; she could not retrace her steps; should she attempt it, she would provoke a revolution. What would come of that growing population living the life of the factory and having no longer any bond with the soil? 'The whole development of Germany,' wrote Steinberg in 1902, 'is directed, from the natural course of things, toward the industrial and exporting state.' The national economic system was out of equilibrium, a condition of affairs which now gave concern to clear-sighted politicians. They found it necessary to go to the help of agriculture. It was undoubtedly progressing, for it

too had given up traditional methods and was seeking and following the advice of scientists, but what was such progress in comparison with that of manufacture? Prince von Bülow, who was Chancellor at the time when the treaties of 1891-1892 expired, had to adopt a commercial policy. . . . German emigrants, who generally remained grouped together, constituted in the countries where they were settled excellent *points d'appui* from which to launch her commercial enterprises. She directed her endeavors more particularly to the markets of Latin America; perhaps in certain circles there was hope for a time of setting foot politically in the region of the South American temperate zone, for in Brazil in the state of Rio Grande do Sul some two hundred thousand non-assimilated Germans were settled."—A. Viallate, *Economic imperialism and international relations during the last fifty years*, pp. 43, 45.—"The Nationality Act of 1st June 1870 had laid down that German citizenship would be lost by any one who lived for a continuous period of ten years in another country. The bill of 22nd July 1913, based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* (right of blood), and not of *jus loci* (right of domicile), abolished this forfeiture of civic rights. Furthermore, it allowed a German to become naturalized in another country without losing his original nationality. . . . This permission is granted by the authorities in the State of his origin, provided he is vouched for by the nearest German consul (art. 25). Finally, Imperial citizenship may be conferred upon former Germans and on their descendants, even if they are not settled on German soil (art. 33). In thus consolidating the centres of German influence wherever they existed—in the United States and in South America, in the Far East and in Turkey—the Government was not thinking only of gaining for the national products an easier access to the local markets. Its aim was no less political than commercial. By establishing these colonies of a new type in the heart of foreign countries, it endeavoured to set up a sort of Germanic Empire across the seas, as a counterpoise to that British Empire which was the object of its unceasing envy. [See also NATURALIZATION: Germany.] . . . It would be superfluous here to give the figures recorded in all the tables of statistics, proving the enormous development of German industry throughout the forty-four years of peace that have elapsed since the Treaty of Frankfort. Like all growths that are too speedy, this development had its weak points, its alarming symptoms; it did not bear the look of perfect health. In an organism that was shooting up so rapidly, a sudden crisis, a violent illness, was likely to produce fatal complications. Too many enterprises were being founded on advances from banks. The great financial and industrial companies were inflating their share and debenture capital to such an extent that any slackening in production would have threatened to suspend the payment of dividends. Two-thirds of the population lived on the wages earned in workshops and factories. A stoppage in the activity of the latter, involving prolonged loss of work, would have meant a dearth of bread in countless homes and a great outcry of distress from countless throats. It was therefore the imperative duty of the Government, not only to see that the existing outlets for the national industry were kept open, but to provide for the acquisition of new ones. Already some ominous bankruptcies had warned the authorities of what might happen. Over-production would inevitably lead to extreme measures, in order that there might be no conges-

tion. Among these measures, the only infallible one was war, with its invasion of foreign markets by force, its wiping out of those competitors who would not let German labour enjoy the monopoly that it needed. Such, in a crude outline, are the arguments adduced to show the overwhelming importance of economic causes. If from industry we pass to farming on a large scale, which is organized in Prussia on industrial lines, we observe a specious prosperity, depending in no small degree on the renewal of the commercial treaty with Russia. This treaty, concluded at a critical moment, after the Russo-Japanese war, empowered the great Prussian landowners, thanks to surreptitious export bounties, to send their wheat and their rye even to Finland, whereas Russian agricultural produce could only enter Germany after the sale of the German crops.—N. E. L. Beyens, *Germany before the war* (tr. by P. V. Cohn), pp. 205-208.

2. ECONOMIC POLICY.—COLONIAL POLICY.—INFLUENCE OF LOANS.—IMPATIENCE WITH BOUNDARIES.—"German industry and banking were active . . . in the countries of Central and Southern Europe. Here their object was not only economic but decidedly political. 'The heel of Achilles,' said Count Apponyi, 'is its economic policy. . . . If the edifice of the Triple Alliance is to be made enduring, if this, the firmest of all guarantees of European peace, is to abide, the political pillars which alone support it today and which may in time collapse, must be supplemented by economic pillars.' The Germans understood this and they endeavored to remedy this weakness. Their customs policy was based on this idea. They wanted to control the economic development of their allies, who were far behind them and who lacked capital as well as technical personnel. They sent them both, in the hope of remunerative returns of course, but also with the conviction that if they played an important part in the great enterprises of those countries they would bind them to Germany by financial interests difficult to sever and thus they would acquire the means of influencing their policy. The particular object of their efforts, whose pledge never seemed reliable to them, was Italy. Germany was also deeply interested in the Balkan States and the Near East. In the Near East the concession for the construction of a railroad from the Bosphorus to Bagdad promised by the Sultan to the Kaiser in 1898 had aroused great hopes. [See BAGDAD RAILWAY.] Prince von Bülow wrote of it: 'This threw open to German influence and German enterprise a field of activity between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, on the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, and along their banks; this land can hardly be surpassed for fertility and for its great possibilities of development in the future. If one can speak of boundless prospects anywhere, it is in Mesopotamia.' New Germany, however, was mortified because of her inability to create a vast colonial empire for herself. She felt that in default of such an empire, her economic prosperity would never be secure, and this deficiency also wounded her vanity as a world power. In the world's situation at the opening of the twentieth century she knew that she could not satisfy her desire unless there came a general political readjustment. Should such a crisis ever arise, she trusted her army and navy to enable her to take advantage of it. It was above all toward the African continent that she turned her hopes. . . . Germany came late—more than a quarter of a century after France—to take her place in the

world as a capitalist nation. Her industrialization, tenaciously pursued after the creation of the Empire, required a large amount of capital; and so rapid was her industrial progress that her financial structure could not develop at the same rate. This weakness has been on several occasions an impediment and a cause for serious anxiety. The Berlin Börse has always ranked second to the Paris Bourse. Without the help of foreign capital German industry would not have been able to survive many difficult periods, the crises attendant upon too rapid growth. In spite of such difficulties, the German financiers did not hesitate to invest capital abroad in order to open markets for their manufacturing industries. Then a time came when, in spite of the risks, they were compelled to continue this policy; the huge factory that Germany had become had to find ever new outlets, not merely to avoid temporary crises but to save the entire structure from collapse. . . . The ability of a power to lend capital to foreign countries may be a serious weapon in the hands of her statesmen. It furnishes them means of pressure on countries in the course of development and particularly on those in financial straits; it allows them to give efficient support to their allies and to embarrass potential opponents by withdrawing aid to which they have become accustomed. . . . In 1885 Bismarck, being in disagreement with Russia on account of the customs policy, forbade the Reichsbank to advance on the security of Russian state loans, and so brought pressure on Russia to yield. The opening of the French financial market to Russia prepared the way for a political alliance between the two countries. Some ten years later Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, made a *rapprochement* with France as a consequence of financial need which the Berlin market could not satisfy. At the time of the Agadir crisis in 1911, the great French banks suddenly called their loans in Germany, for lending on call in the Berlin Börse had been one of the ways in which the French banks had been using their surplus funds, especially when the difference in the rate of interest made the operation profitable. Germany thus found herself in a difficult situation and avoided a serious crisis only by obtaining aid from American banks, which had at the time idle funds to lend abroad. The financial weapon which France wielded so opportunely, helped to bring about a peaceful solution of the conflict. . . . The whole body of treaties and agreements arrived at during the first decade of the twentieth century, by fixing the limits of the spheres of influence that the signatory powers mutually recognized as belonging to one another, was bound to minimize the dangers of economic imperialism. But Germany had seen with apprehension the signing of these agreements because she interpreted them as an encircling policy pursued obstinately by England to check her progress. She was proud of her rapid development and of her newly won power. 'The German Empire to-day,' wrote Prince von Bülow, 'is a great world power, not only by virtue of its industrial and commercial interests, but of its power in international politics; its power in the sense that its arm can reach to the farthest corners of the world, and that German interest can be injured nowhere with impunity. The sphere of German power has literally been extended over the whole world by the construction of our fleet, so that it can protect German interests scattered over the face of the earth.' This empire, however, did not answer the needs of the Germans. The geographical situation of their country, now that

they were obliged to import such large amounts of foodstuffs and raw materials, for which they had to pay with the exportation of manufactured articles, seemed to them unfortunate; they were far from the great sea routes, access to which might be forbidden them. 'If the English prohibit our passage along their coasts, we are caught in a trap. How much freer is the coast of France on the Ocean itself!' They deplored the scant area of their empire limited by the rigor and uniformity of its climate to a small variety of farm products, and not complemented by colonies located in more favored regions able to compensate for the deficiencies of the home country. 'Foodstuffs have to be imported in large quantities to satisfy our present population. The greater part of our industry also can exist only if its needed materials are imported. . . . England and France, on the contrary, can supply from their transatlantic possessions whatever they lack themselves, and such gigantic states as Russia and the United States are capable of an autonomous existence within their own boundaries.' These advantages were always present in the minds of German statesmen and business men, since industrialization, so tenaciously pursued, had now reached such a degree that the equilibrium of their economic system had been irretrievably lost. Only the building of an immense empire, they thought, stretching like that of England over various climates, could safeguard Germany from the dangers born of her very prosperity. Moreover, this was the path along which contemporary discoveries seemed to them to direct humanity. 'The wealth of the available scientific material to-day is so enormous compared with that of the former ages, that only a big nation can master it. . . . In future the smaller peoples will have only the choice to decide with which one of the big nations they will voluntarily combine, or to which one of them their geographical position will commit them.' And these ideas gave birth among the Pan-Germans, whose influence was being more and more asserted, to plans of a wide scope. 'If one examines all our history and the modern economic state,' said Fritz Bley, 'one must perforce come to the incontrovertible conclusion that Germany, Austria, Italy, the Balkans, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and if possible the Scandinavian countries too, ought, together with their colonies, to join in a common Customs Union, following a policy of free trade or at least reduced protective tariffs as among each other, but enforcing a highly protective system against all outside nations. In no other way can they hope to safeguard their economic existence against the gigantic Russian, British, and Pan-American Empires!'"—A. Viallate, *Economic imperialism and international relations during the last fifty years*, pp. 43, 45-47, 56-59, 112-115.

See also GERMANY: 1890-1914: Alteration of foreign policy; 1890-1914: Expanding industrialism; EUROPE: Modern: Imperialism.

(h) Germany's struggle for world power.—The ambition of certain strong elements in the former German empire to make that empire the dominant power in Europe, if not in the world, and their efforts to attain this goal, is regarded as one of the principal factors which produced the war. This movement had received the attention of many leading German publicists.

I. BERNHARDI (1911).—General von Bernhardi, in particular, writing from the viewpoint of a believer in the right of Germany to dominance, strove to rouse not only German ambition, but Austrian fears of Russia, and Italian fears of

England and France. Thus, in 1911, he said: "In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions, must be the basis of our future development. . . . The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by the hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity, examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces which concern us are weighed one against the other. . . . We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps. On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensive alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In this alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probably unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical national and political conditions. . . . There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. . . . A quarrel between Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining its political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's policy to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered such an alliance possible. The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show many signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough to influence the political position of the Empire. Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its political significance, for the position which belongs to Italy from her geographical situation and her past history . . . cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power. That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by Italians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. We should have considerably strengthened Italy's position on

the Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance. The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive character. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential interests. It is based on a *status quo*, which was fully justified in its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events. Prince Bismarck, in his 'Thoughts and Reminiscences,' pointed out that this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance. The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in order to conquer Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the encroachment of Italy into those regions. . . . England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would—especially in combination with the French Mediterranean squadron—seriously menace the coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against England and France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. . . . France and Russia have united in opposition to the Central European Triple Alliance. France's European policy is overshadowed by the idea of *revanche*. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she has forgotten the hundred years' enmity against England and the humiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the defeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and, if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europe which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for this attack. Her alliance with Russia, her *entente* with England, are inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped, and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility to Germany than from Russia. The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiring a material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany. The establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political annexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers, so clearly exhibit this intention that there can be no possible illusion as to its extent and meaning. Since France has succeeded

in bringing her military strength to approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her North African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing that strength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France will not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do her best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in every quarter of the globe. . . . The French policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on the hostility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quite unthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany can be negotiated before the question between them has been once more decided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that France sides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany but strengthen France. . . . The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, and of the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, is following apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come to an understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in Central Asia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the *status quo*. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with Germany. The Potsdam agreement [1910], whose importance cannot be overestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any aggressive policy on Russia's part. . . . It is improbable, therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention in favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, swept away, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose, meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed. . . . After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the Baltic. Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean, and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself, also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many years been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into Central Europe. Pan-Slavism is still hard at work. . . . England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia [1907] by which the spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms. . . . A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an Anglo-French *entente*. This union is cemented by the common hostility to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two States is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might mask the real objects. This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may well be distasteful to the

English from economic as well as political and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily directed against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint in order to understand the line of thought which guides the English politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found in the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of the world. . . . There is another danger which concerns England more closely and directly threatens her vitality. This is due to the nationalist movement in India and Egypt, to the growing power of Islam, to the agitation for independence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of the Low-German element in South Africa. Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the English position in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the national movement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; it clearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamic movement. She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine the growing power of Turkey, which she officially pretends to support, and is endeavouring to create in Arabia a new religious centre in opposition to the Caliphate. The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, where some seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England, so far, in accordance with the principle of *divide et impera*, has attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. But now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism, thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of Bengal. The co-operation of these elements might create a very grave danger, capable of shaking the foundations of England's high position in the world. While so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home and abroad, English imperialism has failed to link the vast Empire together, either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto. . . . There are clear indications that the policy of the dominions, though not yet planning a separation from England, is contemplating the future prospect of doing so. Canada, South Africa, and Australia are developing. . . . into independent nations and States, and will, when their time comes, claim formal independence. . . . The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany would chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which is the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of the very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the English point of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war. England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, a large part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany before the war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, and to some extent a great benefit, to English industries. After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quite comprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to check the growing power of Germany, and that

a passionate desire prevails in large circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which is building, and attack the objectionable neighbour. English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt to come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be the most desirable course for us."—F. von Bernhardi, *Germany and the next war* (tr. by A. H. Powles), pp. 85-89.—A critic, who died before the war began, said of this work: "In its military character the book is, like General von Bernhardi's other writings, eminently up to date. But what marks out this work from all others of the same kind, giving it something of the distinction of a really epoch-making book, is that it represents a definite attempt made by a German soldier to understand not merely how Germany *could* make war upon England most effectively, but why Germany *ought* to make war upon England. It is in this respect that the book focuses the thoughts of many German writers, historians, thinkers, novelists, pamphleteers, who, again and again, for quite the last forty years, have bent their attention to this subject. Is it possible to find any moral, any ethical justification for a war upon England? The war of 1870 with France was a war of great revenge, of *just* revenge, and for one of the greatest of causes. No war in history, perhaps, was ever more just than the war which Bismarck and Moltke waged against France. When she comes to this war upon England, on the other hand, Germany is face to face with the difficulty that here she has no such motive of retributive justice or revenge. And therefore you find a tendency to shape the question thus: How do England and her Empire stand in the path of the deepest desires and ambitions, and perhaps, also, the highest and most sacred aspirations of Germany? If we ask what those desires, ambitions, and aspirations are, the answer is this: Germany, not less than England, it is contended, is dowered with the genius for empire, that power in a race which, like genius in the artist, must express itself or destroy its possessor."—J. A. Cramb, *Germany and England*, pp. 10-11.

2. INFLUENCE OF NIETZSCHE AND TREITSCHKE IN GERMANY.—"Since the days of Sadowa [1866] and Sedan [1870] Germany has produced two . . . thinkers, Nietzsche and Treitschke. Both were ultimately of Slavonic origin; both were professors, the one of philosophy, the other of history; both lived and thought and taught in the new Germany which sprang from the great wars of 1866 and 1870. They caught the spirit, and they helped to make the spirit, of that new Germany whose note, it has been well said, is *subdual*. Power, more power, and always power—this was the gospel which they found, and preached. 'Political questions are questions of power' was Bismarck's principle. 'Two souls dwell in the German nation,' a Berlin professor wrote. 'The German nation has been called the nation of poets and thinkers, and it may be proud of the name. To-day it may again be called the nation of masterful combatants, as which it originally appeared in history.' . . . It is [a] . . . paradox that the man [Nietzsche] who boasted himself 'the most essential opponent of Christianity' should have been the son of a village pastor. He was born in 1834; he died in 1900. . . . For ten years, from 1860 to 1879, he acted as professor of Classical Philology in the University of Bâle; for the next ten years he was a wandering invalid; for the last eleven years of his life he was insane. The stuff on which his mind worked was partly Greek

literature and art, and partly biology, of which he acquired in later years a somewhat superficial knowledge. From the one he drew an aesthetic interpretation of the world, as a thing non-moral but potentially beautiful; from the other he drew the vision of the new beauty which might enter the world through the evolution of the superman. . . . All things in the world—all intentions and actions of men—are amoral. 'There are no moral phenomena; there is merely a moral interpretation of phenomena.' Nothing is, but thinking makes it so; and all so-called moral values are the creations of human interpretation. To these creations we must address a simple question. Are these existing valuations of intentions and acts as moral or immoral, as beautiful or ugly, of any real value? Or must they be 'transvalued' to suit a new and higher standard? To answer such a question we must first of all examine existing values critically. If we do so, we find that they are not absolute but relative. They are relative to race, and differ from race to race: they are relative to time, and vary from time to time. . . . The morality of to-day is thus a phase, and nothing more; and it is a phase to be condemned. . . . All is not necessarily for the best, when 'lofty independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, are felt to be dangers; when everything that elevates the individual above the herd is called evil, and the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition attains the moral distinction and honour.' . . . 'Life is a state of opulence, luxuriance, and even absurd prodigality: where there is a struggle, it is a struggle for power. Life is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation, at the least and in its mildest form exploitation. The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.' That then is true which enables me to expand in the full opulence of power: that is good which contributes to the unfolding of my power in the full blossom of action. Power is of the few, ultimately perhaps of the one, the Caesar or Napoleon; and since power is the standard, it is therefore the few whose truth is the *vraie vérité des choses*, and whose morality is 'the true morality. . . . Nietzsche seeks to destroy Christian destruction, and to return to a healthy paganism in which there shall be the drunk delight of battle with peers on ringing windy plains. Not peace, but a sword wielded by the will to power—that is the true way of the world. 'Horribly clangs its silvery bow; and although it comes like the night, war is nevertheless Apollo, the true divinity for consecrating and purifying states. . . . National consumption, as well as individual, admits of a brutal cure. . . . Let the little schoolgirls say: "To be good is sweet and touching." Ye say, a good cause will hallow even war. I say unto you: a good war hallows every cause. War and courage have done greater things than love of your neighbour. . . . Against the deviation of the State-ideal into a money-ideal the only remedy is war, and once again war, in the emotions of which this at any rate becomes clear, that in love to fatherland and prince the State produces an ethical impulse indicative of a much higher destiny.' Passages such as these would seem to indicate an aggressive and militant nationalism. But Nietzsche is not consistent; and nationalism, as has already been said, is one of his many *bêtes noires*. . . . His ideal may be said to be a sort of combination of Comte and Galton, of Positivism and Eugenics. Like the Positivist, he would abandon theology, and seek a goal in man-

hood, here on earth; like the Eugenist, he would create the manhood by pure breeding. . . . At first Nietzsche seems to have thought of the superman as a single individual: he repeatedly speaks of Napoleon. Gradually, however, superman passed into super-species. Of the evolution there were apparently to be three stages: first, an aristocracy to rule all Europe; next, a new European race of 'higher men'; and finally, the race of supermen. It is significant that Nietzsche dreams of a united Europe, or a United States of Europe. Nationalism, in his later years, he abandoned. 'Is there a single idea behind this bovine nationalism?' 'We are not nearly German enough to advocate nationalism and race-hatred.' He emphasizes the unity of European culture, and the coming unity of European economics; he looks to the day when men shall be called in honour Good Europeans, 'the heirs of Europe, the rich, overwealthy heirs, the heirs, only too deeply pledged, of millennia of European thought.' . . . His books are a chaos of separate aphorisms and aperçus; and he can at once denounce the State and hold that in war it produces a great ethical impulse—at once laud the will to power, and extol a Spartan self-discipline. His dream of the United States of Europe, and of mankind perfected by Eugenics, may attract, and rightly attract, many noble souls. He did not pander to that exclusive and jealous nationalism which has consumed modern Germany—'that national heart-itch and blood-poisoning' which he detested. . . . The Germans have felt, no doubt vaguely and almost unconsciously, that they are the European aristocracy, destined to 'carry heroism into knowledge and to wage war for the sake of ideas.' Their militarism has drawn new encouragement from a praise of struggle which has indeed nothing to do with the mere soldiers' battle, but which easily slips into a fleshly interpretation. It is quite natural that Bernhardi should quote Nietzsche by name; and indeed much of Bernhardi is simply Nietzsche transcribed. Take for instance these sayings: 'Without war, inferior or demoralized races would only too easily swamp the healthy and vital ones, and a general decadence would be the result. War is one of the essential factors of morality.' So has Nietzsche ministered to that which he despised. Finally, he has helped to swell the contempt and hatred of England which, if one may judge from much . . . [pre-war] German literature, . . . [became] almost a national passion. . . .

"Treitschke was already a professor of history in Berlin while Nietzsche was a professor of philology at Bâle. Unlike Nietzsche, who was unknown to his own generation, Treitschke had great and abounding vogue during the twenty-two years from 1874 to 1896, in which he lectured at Berlin. . . . His lectures at Berlin were attended by soldiers and by administrators as well as by students; and the version of German history and the interpretation of political theory which he taught are living and moulding forces to the present day."—J. E. Barker, *Nietzsche and Treitschke*, pp. 5, 13, 15-17.—"Treitschke, beyond any other German, stands forth as the interpreter of these forces. His interpretations have sunk deep into the German mind; his fiery challenges and impassioned rhetoric have coloured German thought. Though his greatest book deals only with the record of thirty-two years, it is spoken of *sans phrase* as 'the History of Germany,' and 'our great national historian' has become a familiar periphrasis in newspapers and on platforms for Treitschke's name. The real and abstract principles of German history seen

and reinterpreted through Treitschke's medium—that for many men in Germany has become their faith. These are arguments of a unique and immense influence. And what are the feelings towards England which this great historian and orator expresses? He incessantly points his nation onwards to the war with England, to the destruction of England's supremacy at sea as the means by which Germany is to burst into that path of glory and of world-dominion towards which, through all the centuries of her history, she has deliberately moved. . . . He saw Germany thus fitting herself for that high task which he had marked out to one generation after another of students—the day of reckoning with England, the day of reckoning with the great enemy for whom he had nevertheless that kind of regard which every great foe inspires, which England's strength inspires. . . . What are the origins of this antagonism or this antipathy in Treitschke to England and to things English? The question is worth asking; for there is no disputing Treitschke's immense influence not only upon his own generation but upon the whole of modern German thought. This attitude of mind does not begin with him; it is present in the Heidelberg School, in Häusser, for instance, and in Schlosser; and Dahlmann's 'History of the English Revolution' is capable of many interpretations. But in Treitschke the antagonism reaches a height and persistence of rancour or contempt which in so great a man is arresting if not unique. To him the greatness of England passes with the seventeenth century, with Cromwell and Milton. . . . The sentiment has also its roots in history, recent and remote. 'France,' said Bismarck in September 1870, 'must be paralysed; for she will never forgive us our victories.' And in the same spirit Treitschke avers: England will never forgive us our strength. And not without justice he delineates English policy throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as aimed consistently at the repression of Prussia, so soon as English politicians discovered the true nature of that State and divined the great future reserved for it by destiny. . . . For Treitschke it is not genius, it is not valour, it is not even great policy, as in the case of Venice, which has built up the British Empire; but the hazard of her geographical situation, the supineness of other nations, the measureless duplicity of her ministers, and the natural and innate hypocrisy of the nation as a whole. . . . Along with this he has the conviction that such a power can be overthrown. . . . The sincerity as well as the intensity of Treitschke's anti-Englishism is attested by the spontaneity and variety with which it finds expression. . . . His inventiveness is astonishing. Here he takes up a phrase of Montesquieu, who in 'The Spirit of Laws' makes England, so to speak, the hero of that great and perfect book, and he turns Montesquieu's judgment into an occasion for a diatribe not only against French character in the eighteenth century, but against the whole character of English history. . . . Treitschke has defined the aim of Germany, and Treitschke's definition, which has been taken up by his disciples, is this: That just as the greatness of Germany is to be found in the governance of Germany by Prussia, so the greatness and good of the world is to be found in the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind, in a word, of the German character. This is the ideal of Germany, and this is Germany's rôle as Treitschke saw it in the future. For, observe, this world-dominion of which Germany dreams is not simply a material

dominion. Germany is not blind to the lessons inculcated by the Napoleonic tyranny. Force alone, violence or brute strength, by its mere silent presence or by its loud manifestation in war, may be necessary to establish this dominion; but its ends are spiritual. The triumph of the Empire will be the triumph of German culture, of the German world-vision in all the phases and departments of human life and energy, in religion, poetry, science, art, politics, and social endeavour. The characteristics of this German world-vision, the benefits which its predominance is likely to confer upon mankind, are, a German would allege, truth instead of falsehood in the deepest and gravest pre-occupations of the human mind."—J. A. Cramb, *Germany and England*, pp. 71, 91-94, 111-112.—See also HISTORY: 29.

(i) **Germany, the ruler of Middle Europe.**—1. PAN-GERMANISM.—With the same desire for power as that voiced by Bernhardi, other writers advocated the creation of a hegemony in Middle Europe, and the idea of Pan-Germanism. In 1916, writing after the war had already been in progress for two years, Naumann summed up the arguments for this idea as follows: "So long then as the sun still shines on us it must be . . . [Germany's] purpose to enter the first class of the economic world-group Powers. This involves the adhesion of the other Central European States and nations. Except to our comrades of German race living in Austria and Hungary [1916], it is indeed of no special direct interest to these peoples that we Germans should sit in the upper council of universal history. It is not to be expected of them that they should share our historical sentiments, since there beats within them a heart of another race and of different stuff. They will put the question to themselves from their own point of view: whether, in the choice of German, Russian or English leadership, they wish to belong to the German world-union or not. Their position is similar to . . . [what] it would be with us if we were to join the Russian or English union, only with this difference, that the smaller nations have not the possibility of imagining themselves as leaders of economic world-groups. They have in fact only to choose between isolation and adhesion, and for them . . . isolation will hardly be any longer tolerable by the end of another generation. Hence sooner or later they must anyway decide with which union they will or can range themselves, according to geographical position, production and mental leanings. This is a harsh necessity, a heavy fate, but it is the overpowering tendency of the age, the categorical imperative of human evolution. When once the powerful intermediate forms have introduced themselves between territorial and national States on the one hand and humanity on the other, struggles and complaints avail nothing. People may submit to necessity earlier or later, freely or from compulsion, but the universal watchword is spoken and must be complied with. And those who conform to it earlier will in general secure better conditions for the future than those who let themselves be forced and pushed beyond the historical moment. There is no need whatever to proclaim this to opponents with many words, for words are feeble in this connection, but economic experiences will speak. Small States which cannot carry through any tariff war, but need daily imports and exports, must in future be registered with one of the great world-firms, as soon as the super-firms themselves mutually separate off from one another even more than they had done before

the war. If, however, the foundation of the Mid-European union is to be attempted in the midst of this human evolution, it must be admitted as a matter of course that Mid-Europe will be no such natural growth, no such already coagulating organism as the three great unions already in existence. The Mid-European structure must be erected with judgment and deliberation from stones already shaped and repeatedly used in building. Unfortunately it did not grow up out of the old instinct for power before the period when mankind began to make schemes for setting its house in order. This constitutes a weakness and a very considerable practical and politico-technical difficulty. The building of Mid-Europe will be even more an intellectual achievement than the foundation of the German Empire, but it will be the intellectual achievement of that nation which can say of itself without vanity that it is gifted and trained like no other for organising an economic world-group of this nature. . . . No one amongst our neighbours doubts that the Germans can accomplish the economic organisation involved, if it is at all humanly possible. But it is a somewhat different question whether or not we have, in addition to organisation and technique, that indispensable quality for world-union which we have previously termed elasticity, that flexible skill which we find in three different forms amongst Russians, English and Americans. We are somewhat hard, masterful, taciturn, have but little patience for our slower fellow-creatures, and demand that things shall be done precisely as we wish. All this has its good side, but in order to be a leading, directing economic nation some sort of international oil is needed, the art, the great art of managing men, sympathy with others, the power to enter into their nature and aims. Scientifically we can accomplish the thing irreproachably. In retrospect we are the most sympathetic of all nations, but practically we have not seldom been small schoolmasters of the old style or non-commissioned officers with pencil and mustachios. This indeed applies least of all to our leading merchants, but often to our trade secretaries, directors, officials. The German nation as a whole needs first to grow into its new task. But this too it will be able to do if it is necessary. It needs only to be put plainly to us in the first instance. We are still rather too young as a world-group nation, too close to the narrowness of the old provincial manners and the habits of thought of small nations, not yet free enough from the old position of subjection of the pre-'48 period, not sufficiently assured in intercourse, and hence often rude and insolent from want of self-confidence. Respect for those with whom we wish to work in prosperity and failure is not yet a matter of course. I say all this openly and repeatedly with intention because herein lie much greater hindrances than in clauses and statutes. Yet already the race of men who are now returning home from the war, and the race of women who have in the meanwhile worked like men, are more flexible and readier for great things. We all wish to begin anew, and so, and so only, not with our old positiveness, we approach our neighbours and ask whether or no they will enter into our union."—F. Naumann, *Central Europe*, pp. 194-196.—Writing in 1911, O. R. Tannenbergh asserted that "Greater Germany is the goal of the twentieth century. We shall fill Middle Europe with an empire of racial vigor. We shall then be in a position to meet the further duties and demands that are in store for us."—*Gross-Deutsch-*

land: *Die Arbeit des zosten Jahrhunderts*, p. 87.—These theories were not new. As early as 1878 de Lagarde wrote: "Only a Germany that reaches from the Ems to the Danube, from Memel to Trieste, to about the Bug, can compel peace in Europe without imposing a lasting burden on her inhabitants. For only such a Germany can feed herself, only such a Germany can defeat France and Russia. . . . Since, then, all the world desires peace, all the world must desire such a Germany."—P. de Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften, 1878 (Conquest and kultur, p. 52)*.—"The strongest Germanic State on the Continent must take over the hegemony; the smaller ones must sacrifice as much of their independence and their language as is necessary to the permanent insurance of a new imperial unity. The question whether military force would become requisite is secondary, but it is essential that the state which aspires to the hegemony should have at its disposal sufficient intellectual, economic, and military power to reach this end and hold it fast. Which state should it be? It can only be the German Empire, which is now in search of more territory. No one can doubt it. . . . The moral situation, however, is so far favorable to the little Germanic states that a military, fratricidal attack upon them will not be at all necessary. All depends upon Germany's obtaining the hegemony in middle and western Europe by the subjection of France and the incorporation, at the same time or afterwards, of the German Provinces of Austria in any form that may suit our racial purposes. The natural pressure of this new German Empire will be so great that, willy-nilly, the surrounding little Germanic States will have to attach themselves to it under conditions which we set."—J. L. Reimer, *Ein pan-germanisches Deutschland, 1905 (Conquest and Kultur, pp. 53-54)*.—"Do not let us forget the civilizing task which the decrees of Providence have assigned to us. Just as Prussia was destined to be the nucleus of Germany, so the regenerated Germany shall be the nucleus of a future empire of the West. And in order that no one shall be left in doubt we proclaim from henceforth that our continental nation has a right to the sea, not only to the North Sea, but to the Mediterranean and to the Atlantic. Hence we intend to absorb one after another all the provinces which neighbor on Prussia. We will successively annex Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Northern Switzerland, then Trieste and Venice, finally northern France, from the Sambre to the Loire. This program we fearlessly pronounce. It is not the work of a madman. The empire we intend to found will be no Utopia. We have ready to hand the means of founding it and no coalition in the world can stop us."—B. von Schellendorf, quoted in H. A. L. Fisher, *The War, its causes and issues, 1914 (Conquest and Kultur, p. 54)*.—See also PAN-GERMANISM.

2. IDEAL OF A PROUD NATION OF WARRIORS.—"There are the false apostles of to-day who condemn the war as in itself reprehensible. A universal peace in which wolf and lamb shall dwell together in unity is proved possible by means of a multitude of misleading and seductive arguments. Thus do the shadows deepen over the ancient Germanic ideal of a proud nation of warriors, an ideal which is bound to lose its power to attract, particularly in a prolonged peace, when even the most martial-minded see that all chances of testing their prowess are fading gradually away. . . . The warlike spirit must not be allowed to die out among people, neither must the love of peace get the upper hand, for all the greater would be the consternation at

the moment of awakening. If the Fatherland is to remain victorious we must not let our old ideals of manly courage, fearless scorn of death and knightly virtue be destroyed, but must cherish and uphold them to the utmost, both in this generation and in all that are to come."—C. von der Goltz (E. Reich, *Germany's war mania, pp. 186-187*).

3. KAISER'S BLESSING TO GERMAN TROOPS STARTING FOR CHINA.—"In connection . . . with the trouble in China on July 27, 1900, the Emperor addressed troops in Bremerhaven immediately before their departure. In his speech he pointed out: 'The Chinese have trampled on international law, they have, in a manner unheard of in the history of the world hurled foul scorn at the sanctity of the Ambassador and the duties of hospitality. Such conduct is all the more revolting, because the crime was committed by a nation which is proud of its immemorial civilization. Maintain the old Prussian excellency; prove yourselves Christians in the cheerful endurance of suffering; may honor and glory attend your colors and your arms; set an example to all the world of discipline and obedience. . . . May you all prove your German efficiency, devotion, and bravery, bear joyfully all discomfort, and uphold the honor and glory of our arms and colors. You must set an example of discipline, self-domination, self-control. . . . When you meet the foe you will defeat him. No quarter will be given; no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Etzel (Attila) gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again dare to look askance at a German. . . . May the blessing of God attend your flags, and may this war have the blessed result that Christianity may make its way into China.'"—Report in *Bremen Weser Zeitung* (tr. in *London Times, July 30, 1900*).—See also GERMAN Y: 1900 (October 9).

4. WAR AS A NECESSITY.—The idea that war is a necessity is not peculiar to Germany. But in Germany, where the army was one of the chief bonds of nationalism, it was taught by men whose names were revered, and sank deep into the minds of a people, one of whose characteristics was a profound regard for authority. In the book already quoted, Bernhardt taught that "it was always timely progress which has led us to victory, and has given us from the outset a certain amount of superiority over our adversaries. Such a superiority we must try to gain all the more in future as well, since it is only too likely that, with the present state of affairs in the world, we may be forced to fight against superior numbers, while, on the other hand, our most vital interest will be at stake. The political situation as it is to-day makes us look upon such a war as a necessity, on which the future development of our people depends."—F. von Bernhardt, *How Germany makes war*.—"These were the results of cosmopolitanism, the love of peace, humanitarian twaddle, and the deteriorated pre-Jena methods of warfare. Then, if ever, did history furnish proof of the fact that a nation which desires happiness must also be powerful and skilled in arms. It must neither renounce its passionate love of the Fatherland nor lose its power to regard war as an earnest, bitter thing, and an historical necessity. As long as the process of reconstructing states proceeds with the changing seasons, as long as human development does not stand still, so long

will there be war. But those who do not wish to be ruined by it must prepare in peace time to endure the stern armed contest with opponents and rivals. To this end we must spare no pains in educating the rising generation in the spirit of bravery, scorn of danger, and bodily vigor; and never again as of old before Jena must we set a higher value upon the art of war than upon soldiery virtues."—C. von der Goltz, *Jena to Eylau* (E. Reich, *Germany's war mania*, pp. 189-190).

5. THE SIN OF NATIONAL WEAKNESS.—"We find it necessary to distinguish between public and private morality. The rank of the various duties must necessarily be very different for the state and the individual man. There is a whole series of these duties which are imposed upon the individual which are absolutely out of the question for the state. The state's highest law is that of self-assertion; that is for it the absolute morality. Therefore, one must assert that of all political sins, the worst and most contemptible is weakness; it is the sin against the holy ghost of politics. In private life certain weaknesses of the soul are excusable. But of these there is no question in the state; for the state is might, and if it should belie its very essence there would be no judgment severe enough for it. It is indeed political idealism which fosters war, whereas materialism rejects it. What a perversion of morality to want to banish heroism from human life. The heroes of a people are the personalities who fill the youthful souls with delight and enthusiasm. Amongst authors, we as boys and youths admire most those whose words sound like a flourish of trumpets. He who cannot take pleasure therein is too cowardly to take up arms himself for his fatherland. All appeal to Christianity in this matter is perverted. The Bible states expressly that the man in authority shall wield the sword; it states likewise that: 'Greater love hath no man than this that he giveth his life for his friend.' Those who preach the nonsense about everlasting peace do not understand the life of the Aryan race; the Aryans are before all brave. They have always been men enough to protect by the sword what they had won by the intellect. . . . To the historian who lives in the realms of the will, it is quite clear that the furtherance of an everlasting peace is fundamentally reactionary. He sees that to banish war from history would be to banish all progress and becoming. It is only the periods of exhaustion, weariness and mental stagnation that have dallied with the dream of everlasting peace."—H. von Treitschke, *Die Politik* (E. Reich, *Germany's war mania*, p. 221).

6. AIMS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE GERMAN MILITARY (1913): REPORTS BY GERMAN STAFF.—"[(i) *Strengthening the sword.*]—Our new army is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should

be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

"[(ii) *Colonies and secret allies.*]—We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand, we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen organizations, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course, in case of war, we should openly recognize these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realization. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not, it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion. Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

"[(iii) *Small steps to be covered.*]—However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their strong positions can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavorable case, Denmark might be forced by England to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offensive measures from this quarter. In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

"[(iv) *Scandinavia.*]—As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to

follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion.

"[(v) *Belgium.*—But for this, army reorganization, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organization was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests. The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to



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take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.

"[(vi) *Conquests.*—Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question of restoring to Germany her former possessions."—J. R. H. O'Regan, *German War of 1914.*

(j) *Reign of William II.*—There is small doubt that the events which took place during the reign

of William II had a profound effect upon the situation in Europe. The idea of a colonial empire, the development of the navy, the fact that Prussia, with its militaristic tendencies remained predominant were important factors. Furthermore, the electoral system of Prussia had a certain controlling influence. For, while ostensibly providing for universal manhood suffrage, actually it gave undue influence to the militaristic class. "On the 9th of March, 1888, Emperor William I died at the age of ninety-one. He was succeeded by his son, Frederick III, in his fifty-seventh year. The new Emperor was a man of moderation, of liberalism in politics, an admirer of the English Constitution. It is supposed that, had he lived, the autocracy of the ruler would have given way to a genuine parliamentary system like that of England, and that an era of greater liberty would have been inaugurated. But he was already a dying man, ill of cancer of the throat. . . . The reign was soon over, before the era of liberalism had time to dawn. Frederick was King and Emperor only from March 9 to June 15, 1888. He was succeeded by his son, William II. [See GERMANY: 1888: Death, etc.] The new ruler was twenty-nine years of age, a young man of very active mind, of fertile imagination, versatile, ambitious, self-confident, a man of unusual vigor. In his earliest utterances, the new sovereign showed his enthusiasm for the army and for religious orthodoxy. He held the doctrine of the divine origin of his power with medieval fervor, expressing it with frequency and in dramatic fashion. It was evident that a man of such a character would wish to govern, and not simply reign. He would not be willing long to efface himself behind the imposing figure of the great Chancellor. Bismarck had prophesied that the Emperor would be his own Chancellor, yet he did not have the wisdom to resign when the old Emperor died, and to depart with dignity. He clung to power. From the beginning friction developed between the two. They thought differently, felt differently. The fundamental question was, who should rule in Germany? The struggle was for supremacy, since there was no way in which two persons so self-willed and autocratic could divide power. As Bismarck stayed on when he saw that his presence was no longer desired, the Emperor, not willing to be overshadowed by so commodious and illustrious a minister, finally demanded his resignation in 1890. [See GERMANY: 1889-1890.] . . . He [Bismarck] lived several years longer, dying in 1898 at the age of eighty-three, leaving as his epitaph, 'faithful servant of Emperor William I.' Thus vanished from view a man who will rank in history as a great diplomatist and sagacious statesman. After 1890 the personality of William II was the decisive factor in the State. His chancellors were, in fact as well as in theory, his servants, carrying out the master's wish. Down to the outbreak of the Great War there were four: Caprivi, 1890-1894; Hohenlohe, 1894-1900; von Bülow, 1900-1909, and Bethmann-Hollweg, from July, 1909 [to July 1918]. That war was to add three others to the list, whose terms were to prove exceedingly brief, Michaelis, Hertling, and Prince Maximilian of Baden."—C. D. Hazen, *Fifty years of Europe, 1870-1910*, pp. 52-54.

I. REMOVAL OF BISMARCK.—"The extreme political tension was at first somewhat relieved by the removal of Bismarck from the scene, by this 'dropping of the pilot,' after twenty-eight years of continuous service. [See GERMANY: 1889-1890.] The early measures under the new régime showed

a liberal tendency. The anti-Socialist laws, expiring in 1890, were not renewed. This had been one of the causes of friction between the Emperor and the Chancellor. Bismarck wished them renewed, and their stringency increased. The Emperor wished to try milder methods, hoping to undermine the Socialists completely by further measures of social and economic amelioration, to kill them with kindness. The repressive laws lapsing, the Socialists reorganized openly, and have conducted an aggressive campaign ever since. The Emperor, soon recognizing the futility of anodynes, became their bitter enemy, and began to denounce them vehemently, but no new legislation was passed against them, although this was several times attempted. The reign of William II was notable for the remarkable expansion of industry and commerce, which rendered Germany the redoubtable rival of England and the United States. In colonial and foreign affairs an aggressive policy was followed. German colonies proved of little importance, entailed great expense, and yielded only small returns. But the desire for a great colonial empire became a settled policy of the Government, and seized the popular imagination."—*Ibid.*, p. 54.—See also GERMANY: 1890-1914: Alteration of foreign policy; EUROPE: Modern; Imperialism.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAVY.—RISE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY.—"Connected with the growing interest of Germany in commercial and colonial affairs went an increasing interest in the navy. Strong on land for fifty years, William II desired that Germany should be strong on the sea, that she might act with decision in any part of the world, that her diplomacy, which was permeated with the idea that nothing great should be done in world politics anywhere, in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, without her consent, might be supported by a formidable navy. To make that fleet powerful was a constant and a growing pre-occupation of the Emperor. [See GERMANY: 1890-1914: Growth of the army; 1898-1914; WARSHIPS: 1905-1915.] In the political world the rise of the Social Democratic party was the most important phenomenon. It represented not merely a desire for a revolution in the economic sphere, it also represented a protest against the autocratic government of the ruler, a demand for democratic institutions. While Germany had a constitution and a parliament, the monarch was invested with vast power. Parliament did not control the Government, as the ministers were not responsible to it. There was freedom of speech in Parliament, but practically during most of this reign it did not exist outside. Hundreds of men have, during the past twenty years, been imprisoned for such criticisms of the Government as in other countries are the current coin of discussion. This is the crime of *lèse-majesté*, which, as long as it exists, prevents a free political life. The growth of the Social Democratic party to some extent represented mere liberalism, not adherence to the economic theory of the Socialists. It was the great reform and opposition party of Germany. It had, in 1907, the largest popular vote of any party, 3,260,000. Yet the Conservatives, with less than 1,500,000 votes, elected in 1907 eighty-three members to the Reichstag to the forty-three of the Socialists. The reason was this: The electoral districts had not been altered since they were originally laid out in 1869-71, though population has vastly shifted from country to city. The cities have grown rapidly since then, and it is in industrial centers that the Socialists are strongest. Berlin,

with a population in 1871 of 600,000, had six members in the Reichstag. It still had only that number in 1907, although its population was over 2,000,000, and although it would have been entitled to twenty members had equal electoral districts existed. These the Socialists demanded, but for this very reason the Government refused the demand. The extreme opponents of the Social Democrats even urged that universal suffrage, guaranteed by the Constitution, be abolished, as the only way to crush the party. To this extreme the Government did not dare to go. In recent years several questions have been much discussed: the question of the electoral reform in Prussia; of the redistribution of seats, both in the Prussian Landtag and the Imperial Reichstag; and of ministerial responsibility."—*Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.—See also GERMANY: 1907-1914; 1910.

3. PRUSSIA AND THE EMPIRE.—"Prussia was the state that in practice ruled the German Empire. This was what was intended by Bismarck when he drew up the Constitution of the Empire, it was precisely the object of his entire policy. The Constitution was based on the two chief articles of Bismarck's creed, the power of the monarch and the ascendancy of Prussia. This was the accepted idea of the governing classes down to the outbreak of the war. Prussia, as was said in 1914 by Prince von Bülow, the most important Chancellor of the Empire since Bismarck, 'Prussia attained her greatness as a country of soldiers and officials, and as such she was able to accomplish the work of German union; to this day she is still, in all essentials, a state of soldiers and officials.' The Governing classes were, in Prussia, which, in turn, governed Germany, the monarchy, the aristocracy and a bureaucracy of military and civil officials responsible to the King alone. The determining factor in the state was the personality of the King. Neither the Empire, nor the Kingdom of Prussia, was governed by democratic institutions. The Kingdom lagged far behind the Empire, and, so great was its power, that it impeded the development of liberty in the Empire."—*Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

4. ELECTORAL SYSTEM.—QUESTION OF MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY.—"The exercise of the right to vote was so arranged that the ballot of the poor man was practically annihilated. Universal suffrage was rendered illusory. And this was the way it was done. The voters were divided in each electoral district into three classes according to wealth. The amount of taxes, paid by the district, was divided into three equal parts. Those taxpayers who paid the first third were grouped into one class; those, more numerous, who paid the second third, into another class; those who paid the remainder, into still another class. The result was that a very few rich men were set apart by themselves, the less rich by themselves, and the poor by themselves. Each of these groups voting separately, elected an equal number of delegates to a convention, which convention chose the delegates of that constituency to the lower house of the Prussian Parliament. Thus in every electoral convention two-thirds of the members belonged to the wealthy or well-to-do class. There was no chance in such a system for the poor, for the masses. The system gave an enormous preponderance of political power to the rich. The first class consisted of very few men, in some districts of only one; the second was sometimes twenty times as numerous, the third sometimes a hundred, or even a thousand times. Thus, though every man had the suffrage the vote of a single

rich man might have as great weight as the votes of a thousand workmen. Universal suffrage was thus manipulated in such a way as to defeat democracy decisively and to consolidate a privileged class in power in the only branch of the government that had even the appearance of being of popular origin. . . . In 1908 there were 293,000 voters in the first class, 1,065,240 in the second, 6,324,079 in the third. The first class represented 4 per cent, the second 14 per cent, the third 82 per cent of the population. . . . The first class chose the same number of electors as the third. Thus, 370 rich men had the same voting capacity as 22,324 proletarians. . . . This system would seem to be outrageous enough by reason of its monstrous plutocratic caste. But this was not all. This reactionary edifice was appropriately crowned by another device—oral voting. Neither in the primary nor the secondary voting was a secret ballot used. Voting was not even by a written or printed ballot, but by the spoken word. Thus everyone exercised his right publicly in the presence of his superior or his patron or employer or his equals or the official representative of the King. In such a country as Prussia, where the police were notoriously ubiquitous, what a weapon for absolutism! The great landowners, the great manufacturers, the State, could easily bring all the pressure they desired to bear upon the voter, exercising his wretched rudiment of political power. Needless to say, under such a system as this the working classes were almost entirely unrepresented in the Prussian legislature. . . . In the Empire, also, a similar problem became yearly more acute. In 1871, Germany was divided into 397 constituencies for the Reichstag. That number remained the same henceforth down to the war, and, indeed until the Reichstag disappeared in the convulsions of the closing months of 1918. Not a single district gained or lost in representation. Yet from 1871 to 1914 the population of the Empire increased from about forty-one millions to over sixty-seven millions, and there was a great shifting in population from the country to the cities. One of the divisions of Berlin, with a population of 697,000, elected one representative, whereas the petty principality of Waldeck, with a population of 59,000, elected one. The 851,000 voters of Greater Berlin returned eight members; the same number of voters in fifty of the smaller constituencies returned forty-eight. A reform of these gross inequalities was widely demanded, but the demand passed unheeded. [See also SURFRAGE, MANHOOD: Germany: 1844-1917; 1867-1917.] Another subject much discussed during the later years of the Empire was that concerning ministerial responsibility. The indiscretions of Emperor William II made this from time to time a burning question. An interview with him, in which he spoke with great freedom of the strained relations between Germany and Great Britain, was published in the London *Telegraph* on October 28, 1908. At once was seen a phenomenon not witnessed in Germany since the founding of the Empire. There was a violent protest against the irresponsible actions of the Emperor, actions subject to no control, and yet easily capable of bringing about a war. Newspapers of all shades of party affiliation displayed a freedom of utterance and of censure unparalleled in Germany. All parties in the Reichstag expressed their emphatic disapproval. The incident, however, was not sufficient to bring about the introduction of the system of the responsibility of ministers for all the acts of the monarch, and the control of the

ministry by the majority of the Reichstag; in short, the parliamentary system in its essential feature."—*Ibid.*, pp. 57-61.—See also GERMANY: 1908 (November); 1910 (March).

(k) The case from an Austrian viewpoint.—"For years the political barometer of the European ministries of Foreign Affairs had stood at 'storm.' It rose periodically, to fall again; it varied—naturally; but for years everything had pointed to the fact that the peace of the world was in danger. The obvious beginnings of this European tension date back several years, to the time of Edward VII. On the one hand, England's dread of the gigantic growth of Germany; on the other hand, Berlin's politics, which had become a terror to the dwellers by the Thames; the belief that the idea of acquiring the dominion of the world had taken root in Berlin. These fears, partly due merely to envy and jealousy, but partly due also to a positive anxiety concerning existence—these fears led to the encircling policy of Edward VII, and thus was started the great drive against Germany. It is well known that Edward VII made an attempt to exercise a direct influence on the Emperor Francis Joseph to induce him to secede from the Alliance and join the Powers encircling Germany. It is likewise known that the Emperor Francis Joseph rejected the proposal, and that this decided the fate of Austria-Hungary. From that day we were no longer the independent masters of our destiny. Our fate was linked to that of Germany; without being conscious of it, we were carried away by Germany through the Alliance. I do not mean absolutely to deny that, during the years preceding war, it would still have been possible for Germany to avert it if she had eradicated from European public opinion all suspicion respecting her dream of world-dominion, for far be it from me to assert that the Western Powers were eager for war. On the contrary, it is my firm conviction that the leading statesmen of the Western Powers viewed the situation as such, that if they did not succeed in defeating Germany, the unavoidable result would be a German world-dominion. I mention the Western Powers, for I believe that a strong military party in Russia, which had as chief the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, thought otherwise, and began this war with satisfaction. The terrible tragedy of this, the greatest misfortune of all time—and such is this war—lies in the fact that nobody responsible willed it; it arose out of a situation created first by a Serbian assassin and then by some Russian generals keen on war, while the events that ensued took the monarchs and statesmen completely by surprise. The Entente group of Powers is as much to blame as we are. As regards this, however, a very considerable difference must be made between the enemy states. In 1914 neither France nor England desired war. France had always cherished the thought of revenge, but, judging from all indications, she had no intention of fighting in 1914; but, on the contrary—as she did fifty years ago—left the decisive moment for entering into war to the future. The war came quite as a surprise to France. England, in spite of her anti-German policy, wished to remain neutral and only changed her mind owing to the invasion of Belgium. In Russia the Tsar did not know what he wanted, and the military party urged unceasingly for war. As a matter of fact, Russia began military operations without a declaration of war. The states that followed after—Italy and Rumania—entered into the war for purposes of conquest, Rumania in particular. Italy also, of course,

but, owing to her geographical position, and being exposed to pressure from England, she was less able to remain neutral than Rumania. But the war would never have broken out had it not been that the growing suspicion of the Entente as to Germany's plans had already brought the situation to boiling-point. The spirit and demeanor of Germany, the speeches of the Emperor William, the behavior of the Prussians throughout the world—whether in the case of a general at Potsdam or a *commis voyageur* out in East Africa—these Prussian manners inflicting themselves upon the world, the ceaseless boasting of their own power and the clattering of swords, roused throughout the whole world a feeling of antipathy and alarm, and effected that moral coalition against Germany which in this war has found such terribly practical expression. On the other hand, I am fairly convinced that German, or rather Prussian, tendencies have been misunderstood by the world, and that the leading German statesmen never had any intention of acquiring world-dominion. They wished to retain Germany's place in the sun, her rank among the first Powers of the world; it was undoubtedly her right, but the real and alleged continuous German provocation and the ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence created just that fatal competition in armaments and that coalition policy which burst like a terrible thunderstorm into war. It was only on the basis of these European fears that the French plans of revenge developed into action. England would never have drawn the sword merely for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French plan of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the policy inaugurated by King Edward, which was derived not from French, but from English motives. Out of this dread of attack and defense arose that mad fever for armaments which was characteristic of pre-war times. The race to possess more soldiers and more guns than one's neighbor was carried to an absurd extreme. . . . Two possibilities alone remained—either a voluntary and general disarmament, or war. A slight attempt at the first alternative was made in 1912 through negotiations between Germany and England respecting naval disarmament, but never got beyond the first stage. England was no readier for peace, and no more disposed to make advances, than was Germany, but she was cleverer and succeeded in conveying to the world that she was the Power endangered by Germany's plans for expansion. . . . The Aehrenthal policy, contrary to what we were accustomed to on the Ballplatz, pursued ambitious plans for expansion with the greatest strength and energy, thereby adding to the suspicions of the world regarding us. For the belief gained credence that the Vienna policy was an offshoot of that of Berlin, and that the same line of action would be adopted in Vienna as in Berlin, and the general feeling of anxiety rose higher. Blacker and blacker grew the clouds; closer and closer the meshes of the net; misfortune was on the way."—O. Czernin, *In the World War*, pp. 1-6.

(1) European politics in 1914.—The Serajevo crime "aroused intense indignation against the Serbs . . . and all through Europe there rang denunciations of 'that nation of assassins.' There were suspicious features about the crime. The Archduke had favoured *Trialismus*; and the Archduchess was of Slav race. Therefore the murdered pair were more Slavonic in their sympathies than nine-tenths of those who now denounced the Serbs. But there can be no doubt as to the intense in-

dignation which the crime at Serajevo aroused throughout the Austrian dominions; and it excited, what has been so rare in the recent history of the Empire, a passionate and general longing for war. . . . Up to July 23 Austria delayed action. But the *Militärische Rundschau* clamoured for war.—'The moment is still favourable for us. If we do not decide upon war, the war we shall have to wage in two or three years at the latest will be begun in circumstances much less propitious. Now the initiative belongs to us. Russia is not ready; the moral factors are for us, might as well as right. Since some day we shall have to accept the struggle, let us provoke it at once.' Let us . . . take a brief survey of the general situation in Europe in the first seven months of 1914. In Russia there was a very serious strike [see RUSSIA: 1914 (July)], which promised to paralyse not only the tram service but also the transport service of the Empire. Consequently that vast organism seemed likely to move with far more than the traditional amount of circumspection. Difficulties of mobilization have always been great in Russia owing to the sparseness of the population and the primitive nature of the means of communication. Her railways are not all of the same gauge; and the locomotives on different lines are constructed, some to burn wood, others coal or oil. But strategic railways to her western frontier were either planned or were in course of construction, an additional motive why the Germans should act soon. Further, in her three last wars, the Crimean, the Turkish and the Japanese, her organization had proved to be very defective. Consequently, it was a proverb in historical circles that Russia, however strong for defence (as against Charles XII and Napoleon) was weak for offence; and in June, 1914, her offensive power seemed at the lowest point. Russian finances were also judged to be weak. . . . In the spring and summer of 1914 the French Republic was not in good odour. The miserable Caillaux affair [see FRANCE: 1913-1914], with the resulting recriminations between Ministers of State, awakened a general sense of distrust and alarm. Parliamentary Government had long been on its trial, and now it seemed condemned. Groups of men, struggling for power, displaced others so soon as they were hopelessly discredited. Above them there stood . . . M. Poincaré, who typified France; but he seemed powerless before the strife of the factions. Worst of all, some Ministers stood accused of selling State secrets to Germany. Then again, the army was far from strong. True, the Chambers had in the summer passed a law reinforcing three years' military service, a measure which promised to restore the military efficiency latterly open to question. But early in 1914 the supporters of the new Ministry threatened to get that decree repealed. Everything therefore became uncertain. Later on, on July 13, there took place in the Chambers a debate, in which the army was alleged to be ill equipped for war, boots and other necessities being deficient both in quality and quantity. The disclosures sent thrills of alarm through France, of exultation through Germany. . . . The most serious feature in the life of France remains to be noted, the declining birth-rate. If that decline continued, France would obviously become a Power of the second rank. A German official puts it thus: 'The French may arm as much as they like. They cannot from one day to another increase their population.' What of the British Empire? In the year 1914 how did it stand in the eyes of the militant party of Berlin?

Certainly there was much to excite their hopes. The Pan-Germans had long filled their books and journals with disquisitions on the inherent weakness of the British dominions. The arguments were curiously like those used by the French Republicans in 1793, adopted by Bonaparte, and then pressed home in his Continental System. An essay might be written on the theme *Delenda est Carthago*, as applied to England. The idea has captivated many a thinker, from the time of Quesnay and the French Economistes down to the German Agrarians of to-day. . . . Rohrbach [in] his estimate of the defensive power of Australia . . . declared that she could not resist if her four chief towns, all of them near the coast, were occupied by an invader. As for Canada, she was sparsely peopled and had no military force worthy of mention. India was discontended; the handful of white administrators did not understand the people, who were always on the brink of revolt. The appearance of a single Russian army-corps on the Indus would lead to the collapse of British rule. Egypt, the keystone of the imperial arch, could easily be dislodged by the Moslems in a Holy War. Above all, the heart of the Empire was weak; for the British people were too enervated by luxury and selfishness to cope with the difficulties presented by their overgrown Empire. . . . Even those who did not depreciate Great Britain to this extent, proclaimed the need of beating her down. General von Bernhardt in his second book, *Unsere Zukunft* (Berlin, 1912), declared that a naval war with her might be successful; she found great difficulty in manning her fleet by the voluntary system; and (said he), 'she seems to be approaching the limits of her naval capacity. In the second place the Baltic and North Sea Canal will soon be finished, and its completion will yield considerable military advantages to Germany. Lastly, the German navy grows from year to year, so that the conclusion lies near, that the comparative strength of the two navies will gradually be altered to England's disadvantage. In the Mediterranean the Austrian and Italian navies are about to be strengthened.' He then says it is clearly to the interest of Great Britain to provoke a war with Germany as soon as possible. . . . Indeed, writers who neglect the military and naval situation leave out of count the determining factor of the policy of Berlin. Germany has enjoyed an astonishing series of triumphs because she does not go to war for an idea or a principle, but because she awaits a time favourable for dealing a sudden blow. That is the essence of Realpolitik. Even when she does not deal the blow, her diplomacy is coloured by the military and naval situation. . . . She . . . pushed on her navy as fast as possible; but the adoption of the Dreadnought placed her for a time at a great disadvantage, because, after the completion of her first Dreadnoughts in 1911-12, she could not send them through her ship-canal; and in view of the persistence of the Anglo-Russo-French entente, which she found to be solid at the time of the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9, she had to prepare to face a naval war with all three Powers. She then made greater efforts than ever, and so did her Allies, Austria and Italy. By the Naval Act of 1912 she provided that about four-fifths of her marine should always be kept on a war footing; and so threatening was the situation which thus came about that the British Admiralty for a time decided to leave the Mediterranean, a resolve which emphasized our reliance on France in that quarter. It was clear, then, that Germany was beginning to

run us close. Still, she could not well face a war until the great strategic advantages of the Kiel Canal were again at her disposal. Therefore, on naval grounds it was desirable for her to postpone a war until after the completion of that great work. This fact was well understood in naval circles. [See also ENGLAND: 1912-1913; GERMANY: 1890-1914: Strength of the army, etc.; 1898-1914; WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1913; 1914; WARSHIPS: 1905-1915.] . . . But why did she hurry on the Canal so as to be ready by Midsummer, 1914? Here the state of the French and Belgian armies must be considered. The efficiency of the French army was certain soon to increase owing to the operation of the law of 1913, reinforcing three years' military service. [See also MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 26.] The Belgian army also was becoming stronger every year. . . . In 1912, owing to alarming advice respecting German plans, the Chambers at Brussels extended the principle of compulsory service with few exceptions to males physically fit, above the age of nineteen. . . . Finally . . . [the Belgian army] would rise to 340,000. [See also MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 24.] It is certain that Germany took into consideration this increase. The new Army and Taxation Bills introduced into the Reichstag on April 7, 1913, led to an interesting discussion, the Imperial Chancellor stating that it was the duty of the Government to train 60,000 men more every year, in order to meet the proposed increases of the French and Russian armies. He also pointed out the difficulty of acceding to Mr. Churchill's proposal of a Naval Holiday. The Minister for War then stated that the object of the Bills was to render possible an offensive strategy if war came; for 'the best parry is the lunge: the best covering force is the offensive.' . . . [See also MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 29.] The opinion became prevalent that . . . [the new] drastic taxation could not last; and a feeling of restlessness increased. . . . A rupture of the peace of Europe appeared so imminent on the Albanian-Montenegrin disputes as to justify the Powers in taking financial precautions. Those of Germany were especially thorough, probably because her credit suffered severely at the time of the Agadir crisis in 1911. . . . Accordingly, on July 3, 1913, amidst a time of great prosperity, a law was passed authorising the addition of gold and silver equal in value to £12,000,000. This sum was to be added to the imperial reserve of £6,000,000 deposited in 1871 in the fortress of Spandau. In addition, there was in the Banks of Issue bullion of the value of £86,960,000. Thus, the total value of gold and silver reserve was £104,960,000. But the Government was also ready with measures calculated to meet a sudden demand for money. On August 1, 1914, it suspended cash payments at the Banks and issued a large amount of paper notes and silver coins. The imperial reserve was also made available, and the Government immediately established banks for the issue of loans even for very small amounts on the security of goods and securities of all kinds, thereby becoming a paternal pawnbroker. There was therefore no need of a moratorium, and Germany prided herself on the ease with which she adapted herself to a state of war. [See also MONEY AND BANKING: Modern: 1871-1914.] The British Government had no plans ready for meeting the financial strain; and at the close of July . . . [was] face to face with a very serious situation. . . . Far worse, however, was the general political situation of the United Kingdom. The Germans seem to have been singularly impressed with the in-

ability of our Government to deal with 'the wild women' [the suffragettes.] Much space was given in their papers to the outrages of the militants; and many were the comments on the softness and hesitancy of British procedure. . . . The Irish Question produced an even deeper impression. That the British Government should be unable to prevent two sets of Irish volunteers procuring arms and drilling was incomprehensible to the German mind. . . . A heavy responsibility lies somewhere about that whole business. That responsibility will be allotted some day and will prove to be an indirect cause of the war. . . . This further point deserves notice. The Austrian Note to Serbia was sent on July 23, the day on which it became known that the Buckingham Palace Conference on the Irish Question was certain to fail."—J. H. Rose, *Origins of the war*, pp. 96-120.

(m) Ambassador Morgenthau's version of the cause of the war.—Bethmann-Hollweg's. See below: Diplomatic background: 74; 76.

(n) German view of international politics in Europe.—Fear of encirclement.—From the formation of the Entente Cordiale and the subsequent conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement (1904-1907) the vision of an "encircling policy" directed against Germany gradually took hold of the German mind. Not only was that idea uppermost in the thoughts of many German publicists and the general public, but it apparently haunted the imperial government. Unfounded fear and suspicion of the Triple Entente colored German political literature for several years before the war came. The following extracts from a well-known German publicist and from the writings of von Bethmann-Hollweg reflect the prevalent German view. "In 1907, every detail of the Anglo-Russian agreement was perfect; in another year, the decisive blow could be dealt. In June 1908, Edward VII and the Czar met at the Russian naval station Reval. A month and a half later, the meeting of the Czar with the President of the French Republic took place. Meanwhile, the Young-Turkish revolution had broken out in Constantinople, resulting in a temporary shift in the conditions of the Orient. It is a well known fact today, that in the summer of 1908 all Europe not only was in great fear of war, but stood in imminent peril of being embroiled in a bloody conflict. It is no longer a secret that the visit of the French president in Russia had been prepared for some time past. The sudden changes at the Bosphorus, a few days prior to the meeting, could not have been foreseen by any one. The immediate purpose of the two meetings at Reval was the launching of a scheme of intervention in Macedonia. The Macedonian question had, for a number of years, been the most serious point in the inner-Turkish policy; at the same time, it offered to the foreign powers the best possible opportunity for interference. German diplomacy was, of course, well informed as to the steps planned; nor is it a secret today that the German naval forces, as in fact all European navies, were at that time in a state of utmost preparedness. The joint demand of England, Russia, and France with regard to Macedonia would in all probability have been rejected by the Sultan. The Turkish refusal would then have been considered sufficient reason for interference. No matter what the outcome was, each of the powers, party to the agreement, above all, England, was to gain effective control over the territory in question. For Germany, that would have meant the choice between peace and war. Certain it seems that King Edward, the

governing power of the isolation, had set his mark less upon a war than upon forcing Germany to submission without active resistance; in fact, he seemed to be all but convinced that at the critical moment the ruling authorities in Germany would lack courage to declare war. The unexpected revolution in Turkey upset the entire program, so that England had cause to postpone the forceful issue of the crisis in the Orient. . . . Suddenly the crisis seemed to approach from an entirely unsuspected quarter. On October 5 Austria-Hungary proclaimed its sovereignty over Bosnia. Although thereby the actual state of affairs suffered no change in the least, as Bosnia for thirty years had been an Austrian possession under Austria's administration, the annexation caused an enormous excitement in Serbia. For the first time since the misfortune of the Japanese war, Russia, having assured herself of Italy's coöperation, made a hostile move on the Balkans. Ever since the failures in Tunis and Abyssinia, Italy, in consequence of the king's marriage with a princess of Montenegro, had her eye on the Balkans, and public opinion in Italy grew increasingly anxious for the proffered chance to possess a strip of land on the other side of the Adriatic Sea. That ambition realized, the commercial existence of Austria-Hungary would have been endangered, as Italian possessions on both sides of the Straits of Otranto were likely to imperil her outlet upon the open sea. On the other hand, Albania proved a particularly enticing bait to sever Italy's connection with the Triple Alliance and induce her to join the English-Russian-French group directed against Germany. Russia was particularly active in bringing about that conversion. The great Slav empire obviously hoped that, during the impending settlement of the Turkish question, exceptional advantages would be gained by a coöperation with Italy. Early in 1909 the whole situation was in a highly critical stage. Serbia's attitude, stirred up and supported by Russia, forced Austria-Hungary to a partial though vigorously conducted mobilization. Russia was pleased with her own political conduct, which was no doubt calculated to express her readiness to go to war, and the Russian press, together with a number of irresponsible Pan-Slavic organizations, continued to add fuel to the fire which was threatening to break forth into a great European conflagration. It had not been England's aim to force the crisis by a general European war, which could not be avoided if, with Russia's support, the threatening conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia were to break out openly. France had large financial interests in Turkey and in the Balkans, while her navy, owing to the poor quality of powder, was in no condition to fight. Above all, Russia was unable to take the field. Her armed forces had so little recuperated from the effects of the war with Japan, and the subsequent revolution, that she could not enter a great European war with any hope for success. The entire Russian agitation, encouraging Serbia and threatening Austria-Hungary and Germany, was calculated to intimidate the opponent, but was destined to collapse when Germany called the bluff. On March 20 [1909], the German ambassador in St. Petersburg declared that Germany had decided not to influence Austria's independent action with regard to the Servian controversy, and if necessary, to grant her ally every support her life-interests seem to demand. Thereupon Russia was obliged to put her cards on the table, a move equally fatal to Russia's prestige and to the policy of the intended isolation of Germany. For now it had become a

matter of universal knowledge that Russia lacked the military strength required for the successful pursuance of her political aims. A moment of significant consequences for the future was the growing conviction, in the political circles of Russia, that the government had been forced to yield in the Bosnian question by a threatening letter of the emperor to the Czar. So violently did that supposed pressure on Russia act on the public feeling that, since the spring of 1909, it became a conscious factor in the anti-German spirit throughout the empire. In fact, as the story of the letter gained increasing credence in the cultured strata of Russian society, the latent hostility against Germany assumed extraordinary proportions. . . . The Young-Turkish revolution and Russia's military impotence, which came to light a year later as the consequence of her defeat at the hands of Japan, resulted, at least for the time being, in a failure of England's policy of isolation as originally conceived. Britain's policy, it will be remembered, aimed at Germany's immediate or gradual surrender, in fact or in spirit, to the extensive English program in the Orient, by means of dreadnaughts and an alliance with Russia and France. If the English plea had been successful, Germany's defeat would have been overwhelming. Even Prussia's retreat to Olmütz, which may have been considered its closest parallel, presents superior features, as in the present case it would have been impossible to recover from the crushing blow. It seemed as if the death of Edward VII in May, the year following, was an accidental or even predestined occurrence, confirming, as it were, the failure of a policy so zealously pursued by that ruler since the beginning of his reign. Though Edward's death did not alter the fundamental relation of the powers, particularly that between Great Britain and Germany, yet the English policy lost a characteristic which was highly effective though scarcely discernible, namely, the deliberate and active participation of a master mind in shaping a political situation hostile to the interests of the German empire. . . . One of the first symptoms of Russia's reawakened political ambition was the resumption of her oriental policy. The Russian-English agreement of 1907 had already directed Russia's political course toward her old aims in Turkey. The foreign policy in the Far East had to be abandoned; the long cherished plan to change Persia entirely into a tributary state of Russia, and to construct a railroad to the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean, was relinquished in favor of England. Instead, Russia and England entered into an agreement, which bade fair to bring about a speedy dismemberment of the Turkish empire and thereby an indemnity for the Russian losses sustained in the Far East. The new tendency of Russia's oriental policy received its momentum from a number of powerful incentives. First of all, there was need of recovering military prestige. Secondly, a general revulsion of feeling, both in political circles and with the people at large, demanded a return from the chimeras in the Far East to the practical aggressive policy against Turkey—the so-called 'legacy of Peter the Great.' A third incentive was furnished by the internal struggles between the reactionary and the liberal parties, a conflict which was constantly growing more violent. . . . At the present time [1914], the Russian government as well as public opinion exert a stupendous pressure against the Orient. One subject of discussion, above all others, occupies the Russian press, the speakers of Pan-Slavic and similar political gatherings, and even the official military organs—the subject of the Orient. In Constanti-

nople, at the Turkish straits, in Asia Minor, there, so they say, lie the goals of Russia's political future; to attain them is Russia's historical and national mission. Much Russian gold has been expended, much Russian blood has been spilled for the Slavs in the Balkans, so that Russia has indeed a right to their leadership. But for still another reason Russia must be their chosen head; for, once in possession of the Turkish straits, it is her duty to protect them. Austria's and Germany's oriental policies form an obstacle which she must overcome. Austria is an enemy eager to subject the Balkan Slavs for her own purpose; Germany is her ally and accomplice. Moreover, Germany is filled on her own account with a 'longing for the East.' But her presence in the East is not desired, and yet she seeks to rob Russia of her legitimate inheritance. Today, it is hatred against Germany that Russia nurses, hatred, downright and unequivocal, a hatred which is no longer limited to isolated circles but is shared by the entire Russian population. This hostile feeling is still deeper rooted with those that are conscious of the political humiliation which, in 1909 and 1913, Russia suffered at the hands of Germany. Since 1909, an almost feverish zeal has been displayed in the reorganization of the army, not only for the purpose of general defense, but also more especially for the final and decisive struggle for the Turkish Orient. . . . The Russian government now recognizes that it will not be possible to defer the final issue for any great length of time. Accordingly, when Russia proposed to her ally, France, to increase her preparedness for war by introducing the three years' military service, and to grant to the Russian government a credit of six hundred and twenty-five million dollars for war-like preparation in Russia, Germany met the situation by introducing the recent army bill and the military taxes. The Russian minister of finance at first tried to conceal the real purpose of the loan (financial stringency and military preparations), and attempted to explain it by an extensive plan of pioneering activity, such as the building of railroads and the construction of irrigation canals in Asiatic Russia. . . . Competent judges in Germany point to 1915 as the year in which Russia's military preparedness will have attained a moderately high degree of perfection. It can, of course, not be expected that until then all desirable strategic railroads on her western boundary will be completed. Nevertheless, certain important prerequisites for mobilization and readiness for battle may until 1915 be adequately fulfilled. Preparedness for war is obviously a relative concept. No nation is ever fully prepared, as its opponent is likewise at work, and his progress continually demands new measures to counteract whatever advantages may have been gained on the hostile side. This race for supremacy also characterizes Germany and Russia. The Russian strategic railways which had been planned, supposedly by special request of the French general staff, would require several years for their completion. Similarly, the Russian army would reach its highest numerical development, as provided by the recent recruiting laws, not until 1916. And yet, if the political situation would warrant the fatal step, it is not impossible that Russia may resolve to force the decision of the sword some time during the year 1915 or even earlier."—P. Rohrbach, *Germany's isolation* (tr. by P. H. Phillipson), pp. 48-53, 56-57, 96-100, 103-104.

"When Prince Bülow on leaving office in July, 1909, turned over to me [Bethmann-Hollweg] the business of the Imperial Chancellery, he gave me,

in various lengthy conversations, a review of the foreign relations of Germany. This review may be summed up broadly in the statement that our relations with Russia and France being entirely correct, the attitude of England alone gave any cause for anxiety; but that it would be possible with careful handling to establish confidential relations with England also. My own impression was that the general ill-will that had been excited against us among the Great Powers of Europe, other than our allies, by King Edward's policy of encirclement was as bad as it ever had been. Iswolski, who was responsible for the foreign policy of Russia, lost no opportunity of giving the most violent expression to his irreconcilable dislike of Count Aehrenthal and the latter's method of conducting Austro-Hungarian policy. Even the devotion and determination with which the Russian Ambassador, Count Osten-Sacken, the type of the sound diplomat of the old school, threw himself personally into the maintenance of the traditional friendship between Russia and Germany could deceive no one as to the fact that more influential forces in St. Petersburg were carrying their hostility to the Monarchy of the Danube over to its ally, Germany. Our attitude in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09 had, as a matter of fact, been intended to offer the Russian Cabinet a way out of the cul-de-sac that it had got into, and had actually done so. But this attitude had been considered as an affront to Russian national feeling, and Russia had become more and more accustomed to regarding Germany as the principal obstacle to the realisation of its ambitions for exclusive control of the Balkans and of Constantinople. Our relations with France were for the time being undisturbed. The Morocco economic convention concluded in February, 1909, seemed likely to avoid further friction, provided it were properly enforced. . . . In England, King Edward was at the zenith of his power. English politicians very generally lauded him as the great 'peacemaker,' and emphatically rejected all suggestions that the associations with France and Russia entered into by England aimed at a political encirclement of Germany—still less any military enterprise. Lord Haldane, in a speech made on the 5th of July, 1915, had expressly declared that any such opinion was without foundation and contrary to the fact. In this he was to some extent right and to some extent wrong. That King Edward, or to express it more correctly—the official British policy behind him, had planned any military enterprise against us, is in my opinion not the case. But to deny that King Edward aspired to and attained our encirclement is mere playing with words. The fact of the matter was that the communications between the two Cabinets were confined essentially to the dispatch of such formal business as was required by the mutual relations of two States not at war with one another. Further, that Germany found itself opposed by a combine of England, Russia and France in all controversial questions of World policy. Finally, that this combine not only raised every obstacle to the realisation of German ambitions, but also laboured systematically and successfully to seduce Italy from the Triple Alliance. You may call that 'encirclement,' 'balance of power,' or what you will; but the object aimed at and eventually attained was no other than the welding of a serried and supreme combination of States for obstructing Germany, by diplomatic means at least, in the free development of its growing powers. . . . We may learn much in this connection from the significance attached to the position of England in the new alignment of the

Great Powers by the most respected English statesmen without distinction of party. Sir Edward Grey had declared as early as 1905, when the Liberal Party were about to take over the Government, that a Liberal Cabinet would maintain the foreign policy of the former Government. He added that he aspired to better relations with Russia, and that it was desirable not to oppose an improvement in the relations with Germany, but on the condition that such improvement would not prejudice English friendship with France. There you have it—an understanding with Germany, but only in so far as French friendship permits, and later Russian friendship becomes also a condition—that is the guiding principle of English policy from the end of the period of 'splendid isolation' right up to the war. And this principle was a serious matter for Germany. England was well aware that the eyes of France were steadfastly fixed upon Alsace-Lorraine, and could hear the deep notes of the *revanche motif* sounding ever through the harmonies of Russo-French fraternisation. England knew well the conditions in respect of improvement of armaments and development of strategic railways against Germany that France imposed on its ally, Russia, in return for almost every loan. In a word, England was at least in as good a position as ourselves to see right through the hostile tendencies of the Franco-Russian Alliance to the war that had already once loomed up behind them. No one could therefore be surprised at the anxiety with which German eyes followed every development of this English policy. Indeed, King Edward himself, the founder of the policy of encirclement, latterly gave more than one unmistakable indication as to how he wished to have his work regarded. The signal signs of favour that he accorded so energetic a worker for *revanche* as Monsieur Delcassé on the occasion of his fall in the spring of 1906, could not but dissipate any doubt as to the real spirit of the friendship uniting France and England. Sir Edward Grey refrained, as far as he personally was concerned, from showing any actually unfriendly feeling against Germany. It is even questionable whether he himself recognised the full force of the aggressive tendencies of the Franco-Russian policy. Probably he considered it his task to water down these tendencies to the requirements of English policy. There is good reason to think indeed that his plans did not exclude the possibility of a *rapprochement* in certain respects with Germany, and that he considered such a *rapprochement* as reconcilable with the maintenance of a closer relationship with France and Russia. His attitude seems to have been more complex than that of the French and Russian statesmen. Through his subtle brain ran various threads of political thought which possibly did not all lead to the more obvious objects of the Entente. I do not intend to go into the question whether Germany could have given a different turn to these developments of world policy if it had responded in the first years of the century to the English attempts at a *rapprochement* and had modified accordingly its naval programme. In the year 1909, the situation which I am broadly attempting to describe here was based on the fact that England had firmly taken its stand on the side of France and Russia in pursuit of its traditional policy of opposing whatever Continental Power for the time being was the strongest; and that Germany held fast to its naval programme, had given a definite direction to its Eastern policy, and had, moreover, to guard against a French antagonism that had in no wise been mitigated by its policy in later

years. And if Germany saw a formidable aggravation of all the aggressive tendencies of Franco-Russian policy in England's pronounced friendship with this Dual Alliance, England on its side had grown to see a menace in the strengthening of the German fleet and a violation of its ancient rights in our Eastern policy. Words had already passed on both sides. The atmosphere was chilly and clouded with distrust. . . . The external situation in the summer of 1909 may then be impartially summed up as follows: England, France and Russia were associated in close coalition. Japan was affiliated through its English alliance. The grave controversies of earlier times between England and France or England and Russia had been got rid of by agreements from which each party had received material advantages. Italy, whose Mediterranean interests had brought differences between it and the Western Powers but had also brought it into dependence on them, had been steadily drawing closer to their group. The cement that bound the whole structure of the coalition together was the community of interest between the associated Powers created by the British policy of *do ut des* and by the conflict of each separate Power with Germany. The fundamental antagonism to Germany of the Franco-Russian Alliance had been aggravated in the case of France by the first Morocco crisis and in the case of Russia by the Bosnian crisis; in the latter case, be it observed, with gross ingratitude for our attitude during Russia's war with Japan. Japan, for its part, of course, resented the attitude we had taken at Shimonoseki. Finally the economic hostility of England to its German competitor had been given an acutely political character by our naval policy. And consequently Germany had, in my opinion, to endeavour to reduce the main danger that it could not entirely remove (that danger being the alliance of France with Russia), by getting English support of this Dual Alliance restricted as far as possible. This made it necessary for us to try to come to an understanding with England. The Emperor was entirely in agreement with this policy and even described it to me in more than one discussion as the only possible procedure and the one that he himself would pursue with every personal means in his power. . . . At that time German critics were in the habit of asserting that too frequent protestations of our peaceful intentions were less conducive to peace than an inducement to the Entente to pursue a modification of the *status quo*. This consideration is unquestionably of weight in an imperialistic age which calculates mainly in terms of material power, and only incidentally contemplates the maintenance of peace. Such an age was the last decade before the war, and it is possible that such considerations explain more than one pronouncement of the Emperor in which German military power was strongly accentuated. Certainly expressions of this character did not tend to relax the general tension which was straining international relations. But the general unrest in the world was really rooted in that Balance of Power which divided Europe into two camps, anxiously watching each other and armed to the teeth. . . . The confused and fluid condition of parties was most unfavourable to the conduct of foreign affairs. The external position of Germany, as I have described it, was far too serious to allow it to indulge in the luxury of heated internal conflicts which would be welcomed by an unfriendly foreign public opinion as evidence of weakness. For although political life requires an emancipated criticism both of men and of matters,

yet a reckless extravagance in this respect must eventually run the risk of giving the appearance of political immaturity. And it is impossible to give the interests of a country effective representation abroad without an *esprit de corps* sufficient to bridle a contumelious criticism. The German people had taken long in learning to give foreign problems that attention that was required by the entry of Germany into world policy. That is the impression that one gets from reading the annual debate of their representatives in the Reichstag on the Foreign Office vote. Many of the speeches on this occasion, speeches that were bound to make and did make bad blood abroad to no purpose, cannot but make us wonder whether the perils of our external situation were sufficiently realised in these discussions of our foreign policy; even though on the other hand such perils were frequently overestimated on the occasion of debates of Army Bills. The people as a whole showed no inclination for Chauvinistic impulses. The public read neither Nietzsche nor Bernhardt. . . . However untrue may be the view that obtained general acceptance abroad during the war that the German character finds its true expression in Pan-Germanism, it was none the less becoming evident in 1909 that the Pan-German movement had already begun to get a firm footing among the Conservatives and National Liberals. But this did not react upon the policy of the Government. Soon after my entry into office I had occasion to give a sharp repulse to an offensive of the Pan-German Association. I was to learn later, on the occasion of the Morocco crisis in 1911, and during the attempts to come to an understanding with England, to what extent parties who had a strong position in the Prussian administration, in the Army, in the Navy, and in big business, and who had been affected with Pan-German ideas, could and would embarrass the conduct of foreign policy. I do not mean that Conservatives and National Liberals carried on a campaign that contemplated war. But they could not deny themselves gestures that could be interpreted by ill-disposed persons as challenges. And they embarrassed my efforts to eliminate the friction surfaces in foreign affairs by reproaching me with weakness."—T. von Bethmann-Hollweg, *Reflections on the World War* (tr. by G. Young), pt. 1, pp. 9-19, 26-29.

II. DIRECT CAUSE OF THE WAR

"The antagonism which finds expression in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is the central positive cause of the world-war. Of all the other breaches of peaceful relations, it has at least been asserted that each was due to some kind of obligation for rendering assistance, made in anticipation of a war. Only this original declaration of hostilities by Austria against Serbia is universally admitted to have had its own independent cause. There were serious potential causes for war in Europe . . . boundaries that did not conform to natural geographic conditions, or which violated national unity, bitterness due to former wars, conflicting colonial aspirations, naval competition, international suspicion. Europe was like a group of warehouses stored with inflammable material, threatening a general conflagration. One of these warehouses suddenly burst into flames, and the fire very quickly spread to the others. . . . The Archduke Francis Ferdinand left Vienna, June 23, 1914, to attend the military maneuvers in the province of Bosnia, as commander-in-chief of the

Austro-Hungarian armies. On Sunday, June 28, accompanied by his wife, the Countess of Hohenberg, he paid a visit of ceremony to Sarajevo, the seat of the provincial administration. . . . The archduke and duchess narrowly escaped being killed by a bomb thrown at their carriage, as they entered the town, by a youth, Nedjelko Cabrinovic, who injured thirteen bystanders in his murderous attempt. Later in the day they were shot by Gavrio Prinzip with a Browning pistol, as they were riding back from a reception at the town hall. The crime was evidently the execution of a political conspiracy. It was assumed to be an act of revenge for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, a step which Francis Ferdinand had heartily advocated. . . . The findings of the criminal investigation in Sarajevo pointed to the powerful Pan-Serbian society

in an impressive Memorandum that there was not sufficient proof to charge Belgrade with the crime, that Austria would be universally regarded as the disturber of the peace, and that to begin a great war before Bulgaria replaced Roumania as a satellite of the Triple Alliance would be folly. The sentiments of Francis Joseph were expressed in an autograph letter, drawn up by Berchtold, to the Kaiser. 'The crime against my nephew is the direct consequence of the agitation carried on by Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists, whose sole aim is to weaken the Triple Alliance and shatter my Empire. Though it may be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian Government, there can be no doubt that its policy, intent on uniting all Jugoslavs under the Serbian flag, must encourage such crimes and endanger my house and countries if it is not stopped. My efforts



ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND AND HIS WIFE, THE COUNTESS OF HOHENBERG

Narodna Odbrana as the instigator of the crime, and implicated persons in high places in Serbia. . . . On the other hand, we must not lose sight of the fact that the assassin of Sarajevo and his two chief fellow-conspirators, all youths under twenty years of age, were Austro-Hungarian subjects. Another circumstance of the importance in forming a judgment of Serbia's position: six days before the crime was committed, the Serbian minister in Vienna warned the Austrian government that the archduke's visit to Bosnia would be perilous on account of the probable existence of a plot against his life. Austria-Hungary demanded that Serbia accept the findings of the Sarajevo investigation, and in consequence adopt proposals which seemed to threaten her independence, without an opportunity of examining the evidence."—G. H. Allen et al., *The Great War*, v. 1, pp. 143-144, 202, 205-206.—"The headstrong Berchtold instantly resolved to seize the opportunity for the final reckoning with Serbia for which he had been waiting; but on July 1 Tisza warned the Emperor

must be directed to isolating Serbia and reducing her size. After the recent terrible event I am certain that you also are convinced that agreement between Serbia and us is out of the question, and that the peace policy of all European monarchs is threatened so long as this centre of criminal agitation remains unpunished in Belgrade."—G. P. Gooch, *History of modern Europe, 1878-1919*, pp. 532-533.—"The plan, however, was useless unless the unqualified support of the German Kaiser and his army could be secured, as is evident from what follows: The Kaiser gave it his instant and whole-hearted approval and agreed to back it to the limit with his vast military resources. It is now easily seen why the Kaiser's backing was so readily secured. The Pan-German and 'Mittel-Europa' ideas required the crushing of Russia for their realization. The Balkan Peninsula was the backbone of the proposed Central European Empire. The Balkan States must either become the creatures of Berlin or they must be crushed. A strong and united Russia would never

allow her small racial kinsfolk either to be absorbed or crushed by Austria or Germany. . . . The war was to be brought about by picking a quarrel with little Serbia and then proceeding to crush her. This would, of course, bring Russia to her rescue and the real war would begin. This war would be fought with Russia, France, and Serbia on one side, and Germany, Austria, Turkey, and perhaps one of the other Balkan States on the other. Provided such a war was started before Russia recovered from the Russo-Japanese War, the outcome could not be doubted."—J. Goricar and L. B. Stowe, *Inside story of Austro-German intrigue, or how the World War was brought about*, pp. 5-6.—"The years 1914-1915 were regarded in Austria-Hungary as the time limit for starting a successful war against Serbia and Russia. . . . [The Serajevo murder] was at once seized upon by the Ballplatz [Foreign Office in Vienna] and our [the Austrian] General Staff as the God-sent instrument by which they were finally to be able to realize what for six years, in spite of constant intrigues, they had failed to accomplish. The value of the Archduke's assassination for the war party was twofold. First, it obliged both adherents and antagonists of the dynasty to approve of every action taken to vindicate its honour; second, in an international sense, it gave to the harsh action of the Ballplatz a moral support which no other *casus belli* could have received. It was realized that the Archduke's murder would arouse great sympathy in all the monarchical coun-

tries of Europe. These calculations later proved correct. The whole blame for the outbreak of the war was, therefore, at first attributed to the Archduke's assassination. This was the moment for Austria to act. It was only necessary to point to Belgrade, and to make a *causal nexus* between the Archduke's murderer and the Serbian Government. . . . Our [the Austrian] war party dreaded nothing so much as a conference of ambassadors or indeed any influential international conference. It would again spoil their game. I learned that Germany had . . . on the 27th [July] declined to participate in the London conference 'because she would not place Austria before a European tribunal.' Count Berchtold came out on the 28th of July . . . with the statement that Austria-Hungary could neither recede from her demands nor enter into any discussions about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note. . . . The Socialist paper, *Vorwaerts*, of Berlin, on July 28th, in an article entitled 'War or Peace,' said: 'Czarism is not this moment the worst war danger, but the ill-informed Austria which lives under the insane illusion that it needs only to give the signal, and the whole of Europe will sound the bugle to bring the flower of its youth as a holocaust for the assassination of its heir to the throne.' The die was cast. The fatal step, which was to plunge the world into the most terrible catastrophe of history, had been taken."—*Ibid.*, pp. 184, 219-220, 243-244.—See also SERBIA: 1914.

B. DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND TO OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

1.—Introduction: Interpretations of history.—"Every generation writes its own history of the past. It is not so much the acquisition or mastery of new material as the changing attitude of each generation that causes the perpetual re-writing of the long story of man living in community with his fellow-men. Each generation looks at the past from a different angle, and the historian is inevitably controlled by the spirit of his age. Every historian is unconsciously biased by his education and surroundings and in his historical works displays not only his interpretation of the past, but also the point of view of the period in which he lives. Honestly, under the inspiration of the truth-lovers of his time, whether they be bold thinkers or ardent men of science, the writer of history tries to discover and tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. But, in his heart of hearts, if he be not a self-deceived fanatic, he knows well that he cannot free himself from his human limitations, and that his work, whether it be in research, in narration, or in interpretation, can only

approximate the truth. . . . [In ancient times] it was part of the business of an historian to assert impartiality and to declare that his duty was to discover and tell the truth, but his work as an historian was not judged by his truthfulness and impartiality but by his literary skill. All students of history know Lucian's inimitable 'The Way to Write History,' and how the witty Syrian declares that 'the historian's one task is to tell the thing as it happened,' but they also recollect that his whole essay is concerned rather with the way in which the story is to be told than with the method by which truth and impartiality are to be attained. The example of the classical writers of Greece and Rome was supreme until the eighteenth century, and the protestations of truth-seeking and truth-telling were invariably followed by histories that exhibited either the personal views of the writer with regard to the past, or at the very least the influence of the age in which he lived."—H. M. Stephens, *Nationality and history* (*American Historical Review*, Jan., 1916).—See also HISTORY: 33, 34.

ABBREVIATIONS.—In order to avoid needless repetitions of the titles of the principal works and diplomatic papers quoted from, the following abbreviations are employed:

A. R. B. Austrian Red Book, January, 1915.

B. D. C. British Diplomatic Correspondence.

B. G. B. Belgian Grey Book.

Fay S. B. Fay's articles in the *American Historical Review*: I, July, 1920; II, October, 1920; III, January, 1921.

F. Y. B. French Yellow Book.

G. W. B. German White Book, 1914.

Gooss Austrian Red Book, published after the close of the war, containing documents which were omitted from the Austrian Red Book, of 1915.

Headlam History of twelve days.

Kautsky Kautsky's edition of the *German Diplomatic Documents*.

Lichnowsky Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum.

Oman C. W. Oman, *Outbreak of the war*.

R. O. B. Russian Orange Book.

S. B. B. Serbian Blue Book.

In all the "colored" books and papers issued by the different governments, each document, letter, telegram, etc., is numbered. Hence the numbers following any of the above abbreviations refer the reader to that particular exhibit in the book or paper from which the quotation is taken.

2.—Premonitions and warnings.—Who is responsible for the World War? The question has been asked times out of number and as frequently answered—according to the prepossessions of the writer or speaker undertaking to solve the problem. Those who from nationality, ties of kinship or inclination leaned to the side of Germany and her allies, are more or less unanimous in laying the major—if not entire—responsibility for the conflict upon the shoulders of France, Great Britain and Russia; nationals of, and sympathizers with, the "Allies" unhesitatingly ascribe the responsibility to Germany in the first place and to Austria-Hungary in the second. Besides these two classes of whole-hearted partisans there have been not a few from each side whose sympathies or convictions led them to espouse the cause of the opposite camp, or at least to express the belief that their own side was in the wrong. The quantity of material at the student's disposal for investigation is already immense, and will undoubtedly still further increase with time. Though this section is primarily concerned with the diplomatic negotiations immediately preceding the war—from the Serajevo murders of June 28, 1914—it will be apposite to introduce here some literary, political and diplomatic events which happened somewhat earlier, but are intimately connected with the war. Of particular interest are the numerous premonitions and warnings uttered by keen observers long before the war clouds began to darken the political horizon. Thus, in 1912 there appeared in London a book entitled "The Anglo-German Problem," by Charles Sarolea, a Belgian, who began his *introduction* with the following prophetic words: "Europe is drifting slowly but steadily towards an awful catastrophe, which, if it does happen, will throw back civilization for the coming generation, as the war of 1870 threw back civilization for the generation which followed and which inherited its dire legacy of evil. For the last ten years two great Western Powers and two kindred races have become increasingly estranged, and have been engaging in military preparations which are taxing to the utmost the resources of the people, and are paralyzing social and political reform in both countries. . . . Only a year ago England and Germany stood on the brink of war. If after the *coup* of Agadir, Germany had persisted in her policy, the conflagration would have ensued, the storm would have burst out. The war cloud has temporarily lifted, but it has not passed away. The danger is as acute as it was, because the causes which produced the recent outburst are still with us, and the malignant passions are gathering strength with each passing day. This formidable evil is threatening England, but it does not originate in England, and England cannot be held responsible for it. . . . It is Germany and not England which is the storm-centre, the volcanic zone, in international politics. From there have come, ever since 1860, the tension and friction, the suspicion and distrust. It is there that the pagan gods of the Nibelungen are forging their deadly weapons."—C. Sarolea, *Anglo-German problem*, pp. 19-20, 24.—Shortly after the German navy bill was introduced (Feb. 8, 1900), the late Sir Rowland Blennerhasset wrote: "But the true reason why an increase of the [German] navy is supported by ministers and politicians is to prepare for a struggle with England."—*National Review*, Mar., 1900.—Two months earlier, Professor Hans Delbrück had written: "So the German nation has now directed its hate against England. England must have no illusions on this point. . . . The experience of his-

tory shows that in the long run monarchies have always overpowered democracies. The House of Hohenzollern never can be separated from the fortune of the nation."—*North American Review*, Jan., 1900.—On Mar. 22, 1905, the German emperor declared at Bremen: "God has called us to civilize the world; we are the missionaries of human progress. . . . We are the salt of the earth." On Sept. 1, 1907, the emperor said, in a speech at Münster: "The German people will be the block of granite on which our Lord will be able to elevate and achieve the civilization of the world." In 1910 the late Admiral Mahan wrote: "For reasons absolutely vital, Great Britain cannot afford to surrender the supremacy at sea. . . . The British navy is left the sole military force in the world superior to anything that Germany can as yet bring into the field. . . . This removed, neutral or fallen in power, Germany . . . becomes the dominant naval state of the world, as well as the predominant country in Europe." In 1911 the German publicist, Dr. Paul Rohrbach, wrote "Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would well be worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England." In the same year appeared General von Bernhardi's book, "Germany and the next War," in which the author asserted the necessity of Germany acquiring more territory in Africa even at the cost of a war. So long ago as 1884 the German historian Treitschke declared in "Deutschlands Kämpfe": "We have reckoned with France and Austria. The reckoning with England is still to come; it will be the longest and most difficult." In 1900 a book appeared in Germany entitled "Deutschland beim Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts" (Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century), wherein its author declared: "We consider a great war with England in the 20th century inevitable." The German *Koloniale Zeitschrift* of Jan. 18, 1900, prophesied: "The old century saw a German Europe; the new one shall see a German world." In calling attention to this type of verbal and literary prognostications, a London review made this comment: "If a nation constantly proclaims that it is the strongest and greatest people on earth, that its destiny is to dominate the world . . . what wonder that its neighbours take it at its word, and insure one another's prosperity and safety by *ententes* and understandings?"—*Round Table*, Dec. 1911.—Among the foremost of those who visioned the great conflict and preached the doctrine of preparedness for ten years before it came, was the late Earl Roberts, one time commander-in-chief of the British army. On the occasion of his eighty-first birthday, Sept. 30, 1913, he issued an appeal to the nation, in which he sounded this prophetic exhortation: "Fellow citizens and fellow Britishers . . . arm yourselves! . . . Arm and prepare to quit yourselves like men, for the day of your ordeal is at hand!"

3.—Principal sources for diplomatic history to outbreak of World War.—The principal authorities are the diplomatic correspondence published by the various governments. These are: (1) The British diplomatic correspondence published originally on August 5th [1914] as a White Paper, and subsequently reprinted under the title 'Great Britain and the European Crisis.' This may be taken as giving a full, accurate and practically complete record of all the communications dealing with the outbreak of war which passed between the British Government and British representatives abroad from the presentation of the Austrian Note to the declaration of war. . . (2) The French Yel-

low Book. This was published in November [1914]. Like . . . [the English publication] it is very full and it appears to contain in the same way a complete record of the negotiations. In one way it has the advantage over the English Blue Book in that owing to the absence of the French President and Minister for Foreign Affairs during some days the acting Ministry at Paris sent each day a full *résumé* of the situation. These accounts are of great interest as enabling us to follow the gradual development of the situation. In regard to both the British and the French publications it must be noted that their great importance consists in the large mass of evidence accumulated; we have not here to do with isolated and selected despatches. While it would always be possible for any Government which wished to hide its real designs to produce a few despatches written to order, it would be quite impossible to produce so great a bulk of correspondence all of which is completely in the same tone and in complete harmony with itself. The value of these two publications is enhanced by the way in which they corroborate and supplement one another. While there is complete accord in regard to the facts at each stage of the negotiations there is great difference in tone, and in fact they each represent faithfully the spirit and character of the nation. While the British despatches show the extreme caution, moderation, restraint of an intensely practical mind dealing with the precise situation as it presents itself each day, in fact at each hour, the French despatches excel in logical analysis and in the brilliance with which the governing facts are placed in strong relief. Criticism might be made that this very quality causes from time to time a tendency to exaggeration, but it will in all cases eventually be found that what appears to be exaggeration is merely the simple truth. . . . (3) The Russian Orange Book. This was published in September [1914]. While it adds considerably to our knowledge of the course of events, it does not present in the same way a complete picture. There are considerable omissions, and we have none of those graphic descriptions of the state of affairs in other capitals which we owe to the despatches of M. Jules Cambon, Sir George Buchanan, and Sir Maurice de Bunsen. [The omitted despatches were published in 1923 in C. Romberg's 'Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book.'] (4) and (5) The 'Belgian Grey Book' and the Serbian 'Blue Book' naturally deal with only a small portion of the narrative; within these limits the 'Belgian Grey Book' appears to give the full text of the relevant despatches; that of Serbia is chiefly valuable as giving a picture of the conditions in the Austrian capital as they present themselves to the Serbian Minister. (6) The 'Austrian Red Book' was not published until January [1915]; it gives us a very full account of the Austrian case against Serbia, and adds materially to our knowledge of the relations between Austria and Russia. As to the relations between Austria and Germany it is very disappointing, for this which is the most critical point in the negotiations is also that as to which we have least evidence. The despatches contained in it have strong characteristics of their own; considering that they are mostly telegraphic, they are curiously verbose. They give the official Austrian view with moderation and dignity; on the other hand they are superficial; they show no quickness to apprehend the real matter at issue with Russia. (7) . . . There was presented to the Reichstag on August 4 [1914] a document

entitled 'Vorläufige Denkschrift zum Kriegausbruch.' Of this a translation into English . . . [was] officially issued by the German Government under the title of the 'German White Book.' The greater portion of this is occupied with an exposition of the course of events, but to it are attached twenty-seven documents, including the correspondence between the German Emperor and the Czar, and fragments of other telegrams are incorporated in the text. The nature of the publication, therefore, differs greatly from that put forward by the other Governments; in particular, in a large number of cases the telegrams included are obviously only small portions of the original. This in itself is very unsatisfactory, and in addition only those have been selected which appear to illustrate and substantiate statements made in the text. As a presentation of what happened the text itself is extremely unsatisfactory; . . . many statements contained in it cannot be accepted as true, and there are many serious omissions. One can well understand that . . . [in 1915 it would be] very difficult for the German Government to publish their correspondence in a more complete form, for to do so would necessarily draw attention to the inaccuracies and omissions in the 'White Book.' . . . [After] the outbreak of war the German Government . . . from time to time issued in different forms varied explanations as to their action. We have, for instance, a speech by the Chancellor, made in the Reichstag on December 2, 1914, which is chiefly occupied with the relations with Great Britain; a semi-official article in the *North German Gazette* of December 21st deals chiefly with the 'French Yellow Book,' and this is supplemented by an official despatch from the Chancellor to German representatives dated December 24th (1914). Unfortunately these later explanations are of little help; the object of an explanation is presumably to remove difficulties. It cannot be said that in this the German Government have been successful; the explanations which they offer are generally inconsistent with one another, and inconsistent with the facts with which they profess to deal.—J. W. Headlam, *History of twelve days*, pp. viii-xi.—One of the most important diplomatic documents which inadvertently came to light during the course of the war was the famous "Lichnowsky Memorandum" written by Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador to Great Britain from 1912 to the outbreak of war. The document was composed in 1916 and intended only for his private family archives, but it became public in March, 1918, when it created a profound sensation not only in Germany but throughout the world. "After the revolution of November 9, 1918, the new German republic at once made Karl Kautsky assistant secretary of state for foreign affairs, and authorized him to edit the documents which would throw light on the origins of the World War. By March, 1919, he and his assistants had carefully copied, dated, arranged, and annotated a mass of papers contained in eighteen volumes in the archives of the Foreign Office. He was eager to publish this material as soon as possible during the Peace Conference at Versailles, in order to convince the world how completely the new régime had broken with the old Junker rulers of 1914. But the Ebert government feared that Kautsky's known opposition to the Kaiser and the old imperial government might lay his edition of the documents open to the charge of party bias. It therefore delayed its publication until it could be examined and edited by three scholars of different political views, Dr. Walter

Schücking, Count Montgelas, and Professor Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. These co-editors found that Kautsky had done his work most conscientiously and carefully. Meanwhile, however, in June, the Ebert government published a *White Book, Germany Guilty?*, drawn up by Hans Delbrück, the well-known historian, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Count Montgelas, and Max Weber. It was intended as a reply to the report which the Allied commissioners at Versailles had made on the responsibility for the war. But as it repeated many of the old arguments of 1914, trying to exculpate Germany and throw the blame on Austria, it had quite the opposite effect from convincing the world that the new Germany had completely broken with the past. This *White Book*, as Kautsky bitterly complained, was nothing but a 'white-washing book.' He felt all the more aggrieved because he himself had already written a book on the causes of the war, quoting large extracts from the documents, but had agreed not to make it public until after the documents had been officially published. In December, 1919, after many delays, the documents were finally published by the co-editors, in four volumes. They comprise 1123 documents, of which 937 are given *in extenso* and the remainder in a sufficiently full summary. Included also are the complete texts of the secret Triple and Rumanian alliances, translations of which . . . [were] edited by Professor Coolidge. There is no reason to believe that any material documents which passed through the German Foreign Office have been deliberately withheld by the editors. The editors have wisely refrained, absolutely, from all subjective comment, but have conveniently given cross-references, indexes, and all existing official indications as to the exact day, hour, and minute, when despatches were sent and received. This precise information, unfortunately lacking in the various colored books issued at the beginning of the war, . . . makes it possible to determine just how much an official knew when he took an action; it enables one to judge with nicety as to the motives, honesty, and ability of the men in charge of Germany in 1914. Most interesting from the point of view of the Kaiser's psychology are his numerous marginal annotations . . . which led Kautsky to many jibes at royalty As publication of the official compilation of documents was still delayed beyond the date agreed, Kautsky's publishers at last lost patience and published in November, 1919, the work which he had written in the preceding May, *How the World War arose* [*Wie der Weltkrieg entstand.*] It is distinctly a partizan attack on the old régime, and is, of course, much less trustworthy than the documents themselves.

"In Vienna Dr. Richard [Roderich] Gooss did for the Austrian Foreign Office what Kautsky had done for the German. He edited anonymously, without such detailed information as to dates, a three-volume *Red Book* containing 352 documents, dealing with the four weeks prior to the outbreak of war. Like Kautsky, he also published prior to his official compilation a volume summing up his own conclusions and interpretations. It is a valuable book, more temperate than Kautsky's, and contains much information not given in the *Red Book*. It is curious to see how zealously each of these two men, after studying one set of documents, assigns exclusively the whole blame for the war to his own former government. According to Kautsky, Germany eagerly pushed a hesitating Berchtold into the attack on Serbia and a world war. According to Gooss the unsus-

pecting Emperor William was the sacrificial lamb offered up on the altar of Berchtold's reckless perfidy and obstinacy. In addition to the *Kautsky Documents* and the *Red Book*, the two great sources on which writers will largely base the future war of words as to the immediate responsibility for the World War, a flood of exculpatory memoirs and pamphlets followed the German collapse of 1918, similar to that which followed the French débâcle of 1870. Jagow rests his work mainly on his reply to Lichnowsky ['Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges,' *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, Mar. 23, 1918], and on the already well-known material in the various colored books. Pourtalès, the German ambassador at Petrograd, gives a very straightforward account of his share in the events at Petrograd and of his honest efforts to carry out the instructions of his government to keep Russia quiet and preserve the peace by localizing the conflict. His narrative [*Am Scheideweg zwischen Krieg und Frieden*, Berlin, February, 1919] is based on the contemporary notes which he made on his journey home in August, 1914, and on the embassy telegrams which he appears to have taken with him. Bethmann-Hollweg's *Observations* [*Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg*, 1919] still insists that England was chiefly responsible for the war; England encouraged Russia with the hope of support, and Russia was consequently encouraged to interfere in the Austro-Serbian crisis which Germany had intended to localize. Tirpitz, however, like Lichnowsky, takes Bethmann severely to task [in 'My Memoirs'] for having trusted too optimistically in thinking that Russia and France would not dare to call the bluff which Germany was allowing Austria to make. Helfferich [in '*Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges*,' 1919] agrees with Tirpitz that the German Foreign Office and the German people made their great mistake in taking the Serajevo crime so calmly and in thinking that war could be avoided as in 1909 and the later Balkan crises, if only Germany and Austria stood firm. The Austrians, and with good reason, have made little effort to exculpate themselves. Berchtold, who more than any one else was responsible for the World War, has kept silent except for a very short and lame letter of excuse. Count Czernin's interesting volume deals mainly with diplomacy during the war, but in an introductory chapter he expresses the view, in which there may be truth, that the German ambassador at Vienna, Tschirschky, like so many German militarists, 'was firmly persuaded that in the very near future Germany would have to go through a war against France and Russia, and he considered that the year 1914 would be more favorable than a later date. . . . That, however, was his policy, not Bethmann's.' Tschirschky was one of those ambassadors who 'did not keep to the instructions from their governments; they communicated messages correctly enough, but if their personal opinion differed, they made no secret of it, and it certainly weighed in the balance.' Count Tisza, the Hungarian premier, by what we know of his character and attitude in July, 1914, might have been able to tell the truth fearlessly, but he lies in a bloody grave, assassinated [Nov. 1, 1918], his lips sealed forever."—S. B. Fay, I.—"Russia's pre-war relations with the Balkan States, with Serbia in particular, are discussed in the volume by Boghitchewitsch, *Kriegsursachen* (1919). The author, who was Serbian *Chargé d'Affaires* at Berlin until the outbreak of the war, makes it his aim to prove that Russia supported and encouraged aggressive Serbian intentions, and his arguments

attracted very wide attention in the German press. . . . This specious volume was subjected to a searching examination by Dr. Seton-Watson in *The New Europe* (London) for October 16, 1919. On the subject of Russian relations with the *Entente* and Great Britain in particular, an early hint of 'revelations' was contained in Professor Schiemann's accusation that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had concealed from the Emperor documents which, he alleged, tended to show the way in which Great Britain had bound herself to Russia. This charge and the controversy which followed it are to be found in the German papers during March, 1919. During April and May of that year exceptional efforts were made, particularly in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, to upset the whole *Entente* case against the Central Powers.—*New Europe*, Dec. 25, 1919, p. 338.—An intimate picture of the late Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph and his opposition to the Serbian ultimatum is given by Lieutenant-General von Margutti in his book, "Vom alten Kaiser" (Vienna, 1921).—See also bibliography at end of this section.

4.—French diplomatic warnings in 1913.—Alleged growth of German war spirit.—Kaiser and von Moltke warn Belgian king of coming war with France.—Revelations of French Yellow Book.—From the foregoing pages it will be seen how strong the feeling of suspicion which had grown up among the nations of Europe had become. The year 1913 was a period of extreme tension. Austria mobilized against the Balkans: Germany gave warning of mobilization to the army reserves. These facts and the increase in the German army strength, resulting from the army laws of 1911, 1912, and 1913, induced a reaction of fear in France as evidenced by the following extracts, from diplomatic documents (see also below: 5):

"NO. 1. JULES CAMBON [FRENCH] AMBASSADOR . . . AT BERLIN [WROTE] TO M. JONNART, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, . . . MARCH 17, 1913:

" . . . Hitherto, taxation . . . [for military measures] has been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (*personnalité*) of the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power. However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis. The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re-establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilized by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative. . . .

"ENCLOSURE I. REPORT OF LIEUT.-COL. SERRET, MILITARY ATTACHÉ TO THE EMBASSY OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AT BERLIN TO M. ÉTIENNE, MINISTER OF WAR, . . . MARCH 15, 1913:

"The patriotic movement which manifested itself in France has caused real anger in certain circles. . . . For some time now it has been quite a com-

mon thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. . . . More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany. To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. . . . To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to consider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912. This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in filling in the gaps. The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right moment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to France. . . . Germans wish for peace—so they keep on proclaiming, and the Emperor more than anyone—but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favorable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless. . . . The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France."

"ENCLOSURE II. M. DE FARAMOND, NAVAL ATTACHÉ TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY AT BERLIN, TO M. BAUDIN, MINISTER OF MARINE, MARCH 15, 1913:

"In reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Financial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us. Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we know that it deals with "an increase of military strength of immense scope" to use the expression of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. . . . The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October, 1914, the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from 860,000. . . . The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. . . . William II cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer today what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last election 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is

only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists. It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result. . . . In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. The *Kölnische Zeitung* has said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of which has been disavowed by the *Wilhelmstrasse*. But we must be willing to realize the opinion expressed by the *Kölnische Zeitung* is at the present moment that of the immense majority of the German people. . . . When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of material and of defense works, the details of which are not known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be necessary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs. . . . To sum up: In Germany the execution of military reforms always follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provisions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorized by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes in *personnel* and *matériel*. . . . Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do little more. They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice. Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations.'

"No. 2. M. ÉTIENNE, MINISTER OF WAR, TO M. JONNART, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. . . . APRIL 2, 1913:

"I have just received from a reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted.

"ENCLOSURE. MEMORANDUM ON THE STRENGTHENING OF GERMAN ARMY. . . . MARCH 19, 1913:

"I. *General Memorandum on the New Military Laws*.—The increase has taken place in three stages: (1) The Conference of Algieras has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an *Entente* between France, England, and Russia. . . . To meet the English plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better formation of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protection of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort. (2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of

Agadir. At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the English fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. . . . (3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new *loi des cadres*. . . . Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honorable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end. Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutschtum* (German influence) all the world over. The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population.

"II. *Aim and Obligations of our National Policy, of our Army, and of the Special Organizations for Army Purposes*. [See above: Indirect causes: i, 6.] . . .'

"No. 3. M. JULES CAMBON, FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN, TO M. STÉPHEN PICHON, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MAY 6, 1913:

"I was talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the [Balkan War] meeting in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. 'It seems to me,' said Herr von Jagow, 'that we are traveling in a mountainous district. We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising in front of us.' 'The height which we have just surmounted,' I replied, 'was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross.' The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. . . . The mobilization of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to 'attention,' and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. . . . This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco. Now it has been given again about ten days ago—that is to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest confidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. . . . The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. 'We must put on one side,' said General von Moltke, 'all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on

in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favor. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilize, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly, . . . 'we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance.' . . .

"No. 4. M. ALLIZÉ, MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC IN BAVARIA, TO M. STÉPHEN PICHON, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, . . . JULY 10, 1913:

"From a political point of view people are asking what is the object of the new armaments. Recognizing that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed. . . .

"No. 5. REPORT TO M. STÉPHEN PICHON . . . ON PUBLIC OPINION IN GERMANY . . . JULY 30, 1913:

"From observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate men's minds: (1) The [Franco-German-Morocco] Treaty of the 4th of November, 1911, [see FRANCE: 1910-1912], is considered a disappointment for Germany. (2) France—a new France—undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war. Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg students, elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Brandenburg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin celebrating the 50th anniversary of their association, country gentlemen, officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions: The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma. In July, 1911, the 'Coup of Agadir' made the Morocco question for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion of the Empire. . . . Why then did not

Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, since public opinion although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favorable? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt. But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. . . . German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war. There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit England. The forces consist of the following elements: The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct. Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the *grands seigneurs* of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently enlightened to realize the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful. Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital. Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein—conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans. Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states—Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden—are divided by these two opinions:—an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy. These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenseless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling. . . . Finally, it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. . . . People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. . . . Those in favor of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the

stream of warlike desire. Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is *inevitable*. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better. Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on over-population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, *i.e.*, to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses. Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. . . . Others are bellicose from 'Bismarckism' as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. . . . Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are people who heap up pretexts for war. Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows: The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. . . . On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interests. . . . Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. . . . The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character. The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratization of Germany. . . . Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity—all these regard war as good business. Amongst the Bismarckians must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the 'pensioned,' whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the *Post*. They find disciples and political sympathizers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities. The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France, by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the

social problem. Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German *Kultur* wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which, according to the clearest thinkers, is still her possession. . . . We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. . . . They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, 'Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms.' . . . Must war then be considered as inevitable? It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the *Entente Cordiale* and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The English fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained. As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective. People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany.—[*Reports of diplomatic and consular agents.*]

"No. 6. M. JULES CAMBON [FRENCH] AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN, TO M. STÉPHEN PICHON, . . . NOV. 22, 1913:

"I have received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fortnight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff—General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. . . . The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II, whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its certain success. General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success 'for,' he said to the King, 'this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes.' The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret

them in that sense; and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless persisted in their point of view. . . . One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of General von Moltke. . . . If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, 'we must keep our powder dry.'—*F. Y. B., ch. 1.*

In November, 1913, "King Albert of Belgium had visited Potsdam and had been at a banquet with the Emperor and General von Moltke, the chief of staff. The King was grievously distressed at the tone of the conversation, over the walnuts and wine. War seemed in the air. . . . By war, of course, was meant a great European war against a coalition of great powers. . . . It is commonly supposed that Monsieur Cambon got his information about this imperial supper party from King Albert himself or at least from Baron Beyens."—*W. S. Davis, W. Anderson and M. W. Tyler, Roots of the war, p. 223.*—The precarious situation of the former Austro-Hungarian empire, aggravated by the turbulent activities of the various races which inhabited its territories before the war, formed an ever-present preoccupation to the minds of German and Austrian statesmen. The Balkan policies and attitudes of certain powers towards the disruptive elements within the monarchy is thus described by Bethmann-Hollweg: "The political literature of our enemies occupied itself long before the war with the future of Austria-Hungary. They openly discussed whether the Hapsburg Empire should be broken up or whether it should be preserved. That the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph would be an evil day for the Monarchy was an axiom shared by others besides our enemies. In Germany there were lively discussions as to what would then follow, and writers, especially those with Pan-German pens, occupied themselves with ambitious schemes for dividing up the estate without troubling as to the possible effect this might have abroad. Before the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale many voices had been raised in France in favour of detaching Austria-Hungary from the Triple Alliance, and of drawing her over to the Franco-Russian camp. With this end in view much clever work was done in Vienna against the German ally by exploiting Pan-German indiscretions and the sentiments of certain circles there that could not forget Königgrätz. [Sadowa, 1866. (See AUSTRIA: 1862-1866.)] If the Triple Alliance could be broken up, then the door would be bolted and barred against the much-discussed advance of Germany in the East. And, as Austrian and Balkan Slavs penetrated more and more into the political publicity of the West, autonomist ideas again came to the front. These ideas took definite shape with the conclusion of the Triple Entente. The general principle of it was the support at all

costs of the Slav constituents of the Danube Monarchy. The Czechs were almost openly struggling to free themselves from the State, and the South Slavs were in a perpetual ferment. Every demand put forward by these centrifugal forces not only dislocated the solidarity of the Austro-Hungarian Federation but also undermined the whole position of the Central Powers. A natural and necessary complement of the Entente policy was concurrent support of the Slav Balkan States that had an interest in the destruction of the Danube Monarchy. The short-sighted economic policy followed by Austria-Hungary in regard to Serbia had given to the restless activities of the Russian Minister in Belgrade, Hartwig, a favourable opening for fomenting hostility to the Hapsburg neighbour. While the Montenegrin country, insignificant as it was, served as a well-subsidized provincial branch of the Pan-Slavic business centre on the Moskwa. Of course, this development had not followed a direct course. It was not so long ago since England had refused to be diplomatically represented at Belgrade on account of the overthrow of the Obrenovitch dynasty by assassination. But it became more and more the fashion for England and French politicians to bring back reports from their tours in the Slav territories of Austria-Hungary to the effect that the population were impatiently waiting the collapse of the Hapsburg Monarchy, that would be the consequence, it was hoped, of the death of the old Emperor. This view was eagerly accepted and energetically exploited in the political literature of the day. In the Slav territories themselves, agitators were not content with the study of future possibilities, but prepared for direct action through the Press, through pamphlets, through meetings and societies."—*T. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Reflections on the World War (tr. by G. Young), pt. 1, pp. 101-103.*

5.—**French, Russian and German military increase in 1913.**—"In 1913, without waiting for similar movements in France and Russia, a notable increase was authorized by the Reichstag in the German army. The standing peace-army was to be raised from about 720,000 to about 860,000, with a corresponding increase in the reserves. There were to be startling additions to the new motor-tractor and aircraft services, also (as a jealously guarded secret) sundry great mobile howitzers were to be manufactured, which could beat the best forts to powder. . . . The German government alleged that the new quotas for the army were simply to match corresponding increases in France and Russia. As a matter of fact the German increases were first formulated in November, 1912, openly discussed in January, 1913, and became a law June 30, 1914. [See also GERMANY: 1890-1914: Growth of the army.] The French increases were formulated in February, 1913 (after great alarm over the situation in Germany) and only became a law July 19, of that year. [See FRANCE: 1913-1914.] The Russian increases were not even formulated until March, 1913, when the new German programme was patent to all the world. [See RUSSIA: 1914 (August): Status of army.] The 'defensive' character of the German measures can be judged from the statement on June 28, 1913, in the semi-official Kölnische Zeitung: 'This security gives us a free road to a profitable world policy. We are as yet but at the starting-point. Long roads, full of promise, open before us in Asia and in Africa.'—*W. S. Davis, W. Anderson and M. W. Tyler, Roots of the war, p. 481.*—See also WAR, PREPARATION FOR: 1913.

6.—List of principal persons mentioned in the correspondence, showing their official positions.

GREAT BRITAIN

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Sir Edward Grey.

Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Sir A. Nicholson.

French Ambassador: Monsieur Paul Cambon.

Russian Ambassador: Count Benckendorff; *Monsieur de Etter (Counsellor of Embassy).*

German Ambassador: Prince Lichnowsky.

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador: Count Mensdorff.

Belgian Minister: Count Lalaing.

Serbian Minister: Monsieur Boschkovitch.

FRANCE

President of the Republic: Monsieur Poincaré.

President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Monsieur Viviani.

Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs: Monsieur Bienvenu-Martin.

British Ambassador: Sir Francis Bertie.

Russian Ambassador: Monsieur Isvolsky.

German Ambassador: Baron von Schoen.

Austrian Ambassador: Count Scécsen.

RUSSIA

Minister for Foreign Affairs: Monsieur Sazonof.

Minister for War: M. Sukhomlinov.

British Ambassador: Sir George Buchanan.

French Ambassador: Monsieur Paléologue.

German Ambassador: Count Pourtalès.

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador: Count Szápáry.

GERMANY

Imperial Chancellor: Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.

Secretary of State: Herr von Jagow.

Under Secretary of State: Herr von Zimmermann.

British Ambassador: Sir Edward Goschen; Sir Horace Rumbold (*Counsellor of Embassy*).

Russian Ambassador: Monsieur Swerbeiev.

French Ambassador: Monsieur Jules Cambon.

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador: Count Szögyény.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Count Berchtold.

Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs: Baron Macchio; Count Forgach.

British Ambassador: Sir Maurice de Bunsen.

French Ambassador: Monsieur Dumaine.

Russian Ambassador: Monsieur Schebeko.

German Ambassador: Herr von Tschirschky.

ITALY

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Marquis di San Giuliano.

British Ambassador: Sir Rennell Rodd.

French Ambassador: M. Barrère.

BELGIUM

Foreign Minister: M. Davignon.

British Minister: Sir Francis Villiers.

SERBIA

Prime Minister: Monsieur Pashitch.

British Minister: Mr. des Graz; Mr. Crackan-
thorpe (*First Secretary*).

Austro-Hungarian Minister: Baron Giesl.

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF STATESMEN AND DIPLOMATS.

M. Allizé: *French minister to Bavaria at Munich (Germany).*

Mr. Herbert H. Asquith: *British premier, 1908-1915.*

M. Pierre Baudin: *French minister of marine, 1913.*

M. Bapst: *French minister to Denmark.*

M. Barrère: *French ambassador to Italy.*

M. De Bassompierre: *Of the Belgian diplomatic service.*

Mr. Beaumont: *British counsellor of embassy at Constantinople.*

Herr von Below Saleske: *German minister at Brussels.*

Count Benckendorff: *Russian ambassador at London.*

Count Berchtold: *Austrian minister of foreign affairs.*

M. Philippe J. L. Berthelot: *Of the French ministry for foreign affairs.*

Sir Francis L. Bertie: *British ambassador at Paris.*

Dr. Theobald T. F. A. von Bethmann-Hollweg: *German chancellor.*

Baron Beyens: *Belgian minister at Berlin.*

M. Bompard: *French minister to Serbia.*

M. Boschkovitch: *Serbian minister at London.*

M. Bronewsky: *Russian chargé d'affaires at Berlin.*

Herr von Buch: *German minister to Luxemburg.*

Sir George W. Buchanan: *British ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

Sir Maurice de Bunsen: *British ambassador at Vienna.*

M. Paul P. Cambon: *French ambassador at London.*

M. Jules M. Cambon: *French ambassador at Berlin.*

M. Chevalley: *French minister to Norway.*

Count Clary und Aldringen, *Austrian minister at Brussels.*

Mr. Dayrell M. Crackanhorpe: *British chargé d'affaires at Belgrade.*

Count Czernin, *Austro-Hungarian minister at Bucharest.*

M. Henry Davignon: *Belgian minister of foreign affairs.*

M. Théophile Delcasé: *French minister of foreign affairs.*

M. Doumergue: *Former French minister of foreign affairs.*

M. Dumaine: *French ambassador to Austria-Hungary.*

M. Eugene Etienne: *French minister of war, 1913.*

Baron Van der Elst: *Belgian secretary-general to ministry of foreign affairs.*

Count Errembault de Dudzeele: *Belgian minister at Vienna.*

M. De Etter: *Russian counsellor of embassy at London.*

M. Eyschen: *President of Luxemburg government.*

Baron Fallon: *Belgian minister at The Hague.*

M. De Faramond: *French naval attaché at Berlin.*

M. Farges: *French consul, Basle, Switzerland.*

M. De Fleuriau: *French chargé d'affaires at London.*

Herr von Flotow: *German ambassador to Italy.*

Count Forgach: *Austrian under-secretary of state for foreign affairs.*

Mr. James W. Gerard: *American ambassador to Germany.*

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen: *Austrian minister at Belgrade.*

Marquis di San Giuliano: *Italian minister of foreign affairs.*

Sir William E. Goschen: *British ambassador at Berlin.*

Baron Grenier: *Belgian minister at Madrid.*

- Sir Edward Grey: *British foreign secretary.*
 Baron Guillaume: *Belgian minister at Paris.*
 M. O. P. Hartwig: *Russian minister, resident at Belgrade.*
 Herr Josias von Heeringen: *German secretary for war, 1913.*
 M. Isvolsky: *Russian ambassador at Paris.*
 Herr Gottlieb von Jagow: *German secretary for foreign affairs.*
 Sir A. Johnstone: *British minister to Luxemburg.*
 M. Jovanovich. See below: YOVANOVITCH.
 M. Kazansky: *gérant of Russian consulate at Prague, Austria.*
 M. Klobukowski: *French minister at Brussels.*
 Prince Kudachef: *Russian counsellor of embassy at Vienna.*
 Count de Lalaing: *Belgian minister at London.*
 Prince Lichnowsky: *German ambassador at London.*
 Jonkheer Loudon: *Dutch minister of foreign affairs.*
 Baron Macchio: *Counsellor of Austrian ministry of foreign affairs.*
 M. De Manneville: *French chargé d'affaires, Berlin.*
 M. De Margerie: *Of the French diplomatic service.*
 M. Bienvenu-Martin: *French acting-minister of foreign affairs.*
 M. D'Apchier le Maugin: *French consul-general at Budapest.*
 Count Mensdorff: *Austrian ambassador at London.*
 M. Messimy: *Former French minister for war.*
 M. Mollard: *French minister to Luxemburg.*
 Count von Moltke: *chief of German general staff.*
 Mr. Henry Morgenthau: *American ambassador at Constantinople.*
 Herr von Mueller: *German minister at The Hague.*
 Sir Arthur Nicholson: *British under-secretary for foreign affairs.*
 M. Maurice G. Paléologue: *French ambassador to Russia.*
 M. Nicola Pashitch: *Serbian premier and minister of foreign affairs.*
 Dr. Patchou: *Serbian minister of finance.*
 M. Stephen Pichon: *French minister of foreign affairs 1913.*
 M. Raymond Poincaré: *President of the French republic.*
 Count Pourtalès: *German ambassador at St. Petersburg.*
 Sir R. Rodd: *British ambassador at Rome.*
 Sir Horace G. M. Rumbold: *British counsellor of embassy at Berlin.*
 M. Salvjati: *Russian consul-general at Fiume.*
 M. Sergius D. Sazonov: *Russian minister of foreign affairs.*
 M. Schebeko: *Russian ambassador at Vienna.*
 Baron von Schoen: *German ambassador at Paris.*
 Lieutenant-Colonel Serret: *French military attaché at Berlin.*
 M. Sevastopoulo: *Russian chargé d'affaires at Paris.*
 Count Van den Steen de Jehay: *Belgian minister to Luxemburg.*
 M. Strandtman: *Russian chargé d'affaires at Belgrade.*
 Count Stürgkh: *Austrian premier.*
 General Suchomlinof: *Russian minister of war.*
 M. De Swerbeew: *Russian ambassador at Berlin.*
 Count Szapary: *Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg.*
 Count Szecsen: *Austrian ambassador to France.*
 Count Szögyény: *Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Germany.*
 M. Thiebaut: *French minister to Sweden.*
 Count Tisza: *Hungarian premier.*
 Prince Troubetzkoy: *General attached to the military household of the czar of Russia.*
 Herr von Tschirschky: *German ambassador at Vienna.*
 Count de Villers: *Luxemburg minister at Berlin.*
 Sir F. Villiers: *British minister to Belgium.*
 M. René Viviani: *Premier of France.*
 Baron Wangenheim: *German ambassador at Constantinople.*
 Johkheer de Weede: *Dutch minister at Brussels.*
 M. de Welle: *Belgian minister at Belgrade.*
 Brand Whitlock: *United States minister at Brussels.*
 Mr. Y. Yovanovitch: *Serbian minister at Vienna.*
 Herr Alfred F. M. von Zimmermann: *German under-secretary for foreign affairs.*
- 7.—Introductory narrative of events, from "Great Britain and the European crisis," issued by the British Foreign Office in 1914.—"On the 23d June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manœuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin.—Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed. [See also above: Causes: Direct.] No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices. It immediately appeared, from the reports of . . . [the British] representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Government [see below: 14], which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. [See BERLIN, CONGRESS OF.] Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not 'detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces.' Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. [See BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1908.] On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a 'deep injury to the feelings, interests and rights of the Servian people.' Servia's atti-

tude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war; but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. [See also AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1908-1909; SERBIA: 1903-1908.] Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13—successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Serbia grew, Austrian suspicions of her designs deepened. . . [For the Serbian declaration of 1909, see below: 15.]

"In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathize with its motives. But the dangers to European peace which it involved were immediately evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of 'Servian assassins.' Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and called for the condign punishment of Serbia. There were signs that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed. In view of these reports it naturally became incumbent on disinterested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable.

"His [Britannic] Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Serbia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the opinion of the Russian and French—and also of the German—Governments was that the Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Serbia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it,

and which was said to have originated in part on Servian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Serbia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investigations on foot. The Servian Government also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Servian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Serbia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August. It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the 'Balkans for the Balkans,' and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Serbia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 20th July, 'regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence'; if Serbia was to be humiliated; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburg, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development."—*Great Britain and the European crisis (Introductory narrative of events, British Foreign Office, 1914)*.—See also below: 69.

8.—Austro-Serbian quarrel.—Goluchowsky's and Aehrenthal's policies.—Austro-Serb customs convention.—Crisis of 1909.—Serbian minister's version.—Russo-French political and financial activities in Balkans.—Diplomatic documents.—The direct origin of the World War may be traced, more than to any other cause, to the long-standing political and economic feud between Austria and Serbia. Count Goluchowsky, Aehren-

thal's predecessor at the Austrian foreign office, had for ten years been accustomed to play off the Slav against the non-Slav Balkan states, *i.e.*, Rumania and Greece versus Bulgaria and Serbia, inclining generally towards the former, and treating the latter in a magisterial manner, which aroused bitter resentment. Aehrenthal reversed that policy; he granted Bulgaria the abolition of the "capitulations," a relic of the old times of Turkish rule, and ratified a convention with Rumania defining to her satisfaction the fishery rights in the Danube. He next proceeded to come to friendly terms with Serbia. The quarrel between that country and the Dual Monarchy had begun by the "discovery" of a secret customs convention on the point of being concluded between Bulgaria and Serbia. All the press joined in an angry chorus of reprobation, and also blamed Goluchowsky for not having known of this arrangement. As a matter of fact, he had known of it, the first negotiations in this sense a year previously having been duly reported both to the foreign office and in the press. He seemed, however, to have either forgotten all about it or to have strangely neglected the matter. In order to punish Serbia, the frontier was shut against her live-stock and negotiations for a commercial treaty was suspended. This brought about a succession of ministerial changes in Serbia, until the Pashitch ministry came in with the programme of concluding a foreign loan. Bound up with this loan was a contract for armament, and urged on by the Vienna press, Goluchowsky had insisted on a considerable portion of this contract being given to Austrian firms as a condition of taking off the restriction against importation of live-stock and making a commercial treaty. Serbia rebelled against this treatment; the result was a bitter quarrel and an almost complete cessation of commerce between the two countries, after the expiration of a two months' moratorium given by Austria-Hungary for the fulfilment of current engagements. If there was an official boycott, though, a most active trade in contraband went on across the Danube, and Serbia having disposed of most of her cattle and pigs during the couple of months, suffered little, if at all, more than Austria did from want of meat. Serbia also succeeded in concluding her loan, and received a great deal of encouragement from foreign capitalists, whilst Austria-Hungary remained in an attitude of ill-disguised sulkiness. On Aehrenthal taking the reins, nothing was done for a few months, until the beginning of March, 1907, when a note was handed in at Belgrade which drew a sponge over the past, and stated the readiness of Vienna, after the treaties with Rumania and Bulgaria had been concluded, to resume negotiations with Serbia, only stipulating that none of the concessions asked for and granted or refused during previous correspondence should be taken as having ever been mentioned. In other words, the whole of the misunderstanding was to be buried, and normal relations were to be resumed. Aehrenthal's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 threatened to set the Balkans ablaze. (See also AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1908-1909; BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1908; SERBIA: 1903-1908.) Serbia and Montenegro made preparations for war, and the situation at last became so dangerous that the quiescence of Turkey had to be bought by a variety of concessions and a sum of over \$10,000,000, although Aehrenthal had frequently stated that financial compensation was out of the question. It proved a costly triumph for Austria. Serbia continued to

urge her claims, and it was believed in Vienna that Russia and England were at her side. In the early part of 1909 everything was ready for war on the south-eastern frontier, but Serbia was forced to yield when it became evident that Germany had compelled Russia to withdraw all hope of practical support. Great Britain induced Austria and Serbia to come to terms; all the powers then followed the lead which Russia had been compelled to take. For Austria, the result of the crisis was that her trade with the Balkan states had been injured, an indemnity had been paid to Turkey, and, worst of all, she had lost that position of freedom which, two years previously, had seemed to be within reach. The other powers were alienated by the breach of the Berlin Treaty, and Austria-Hungary was shackled to Germany by the debt of gratitude owed for the latter country's timely intervention at St. Petersburg. The following review of the relations between Austria and Serbia during the decade preceding the outbreak of the war, by M. Yovanovitch, Serbian minister to Vienna during 1912-1914, indicates the Serbian frame of mind towards the various crises which had darkened the Balkan horizon up to 1914: "From the period of Metternich (1773-1859) to that of Count Berchtold (Austro-Hungarian foreign minister in 1914), the policy of the Danubian Monarchy was consistent. Serbia was regarded as one of the provinces which should be annexed for the benefit of the Habsburg Empire, whose principal object was to assure itself an outlet at Salonika and the possession of the entire eastern coast of the Adriatic. When, in 1904, that energetic diplomatist, Baron Aerenthal, accepted the *portfolio* of Foreign Affairs, political interest in the Balkans was centred on the question of Macedonian reforms. The Baron, being an ardent and ambitious patriot, was desirous of raising the weakened prestige of the Habsburg Monarchy, and for this reason was not in favour of the introduction of the international reforms which had been projected; and while the British Government insisted that the problem of Macedonia should be settled by common agreement among all the Great Powers, he, on his part, carried on underhand negotiations to the opposite purpose with Sultan Abdul Hamid. Although Aerenthal was finally obliged to accept the views of the British Government, he nevertheless continued to work unceasingly and untiringly to obtain particular advantages for Austria-Hungary. In 1908, Aerenthal negotiated with the Porte for the construction of a railway-line which would have joined up the Balkan frontier in the north with Skoplye (Uskub) and Salonika; and when, in the month of July, 1908, the Young Turk Revolution broke out [see TURKEY: 1908; 1909], he decided to put into execution, with the least possible delay and without consultation with the Entente, a scheme which he had cherished from the moment of his accession to office—namely, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This *coup-d'état*, it should be remembered, was carried out in October, 1908, with the knowledge and consent of Germany, and in accord with Bulgaria, which became at the same time an independent kingdom. Now, in view of the development of events in Turkey and of the aggressive attitude of Germany towards both Russia and France, it was clear to Serbian statesmen that Austria-Hungary would not content herself merely with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that, although she had renounced the privileges granted her by the Treaty of Berlin, of maintaining garrisons in the

Sandjak of Novi-Bazar [see *NOVI BAZAR*], she would push her programme still further afield. It was precisely for these reasons that Serbian statesmen made strenuous efforts to reach an agreement with the other Balkan States, so that they might be in a position to defend themselves against a danger which was becoming more menacing to their existence day by day. [See also *JUGO-SLAVIA: 1868-1917*.] The chief difficulty in the way of an arrangement was Bulgaria. As a matter of fact, Serbo-Bulgarian relations were already very delicate. At the commencement of the year 1907, when the Bulgarian Cabinet was presided over by M. Alexander Malinoff, . . . very slight aggravation of the situation would have precipitated an armed conflict between Serbia and Bulgaria. Austria-Hungary was fully alive to this situation, and set herself not only to impede any *rapprochement*, but actually to embroil the two states. Simultaneously, Viennese diplomacy endeavoured to incite Turkey against the Balkan peoples, particularly Bulgaria. We therefore find Baron Aerenthal sowing strife between Serbia and Bulgaria, and between Turkey and the Balkan States. On the other hand, being discontented with the attitude of the Young Turks, whose advertised programme, had it been put into execution, would have upset the calculations of Austria-Hungary, he prepared his own particular project, which, as it happened, accorded perfectly with the plans elaborated by the Pan-Germans. This scheme sought the creation in the western part of Turkey-in-Europe of a series of autonomous provinces, as a result of which there would have been an autonomous Macedonian province, an autonomous Greek province, and an autonomous Albanian province. According to the projected arrangement, the largest of these vassal states was to be Albania, in which territory would have been incorporated a great part of Old Serbia, and also a large tract of Western, Eastern, and Southern Macedonia, although these territories englobed only an insignificant number of Albanians. This great autonomous Albania was to be under the protection of Austria-Hungary. When the real purport of this scheme was understood in Sofia, the eyes of certain members of the Bulgarian Government were opened, and they at length grasped the real intentions of Austria-Hungary in regard to the Balkan Peninsula. . . . It was the opinion of Viennese diplomacy that Turkey would speedily overcome the joint forces of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece [in 1912], and it was probably for this reason that no effort was made by Austria-Hungary to stifle the conflict at its commencement. But when the Serbs took Koumanovo and Skoplye (Uskub) and entered Bitolye (Monastir), it was realised that an error of judgment had been committed. [See also *BALKAN STATES: 1912: First Balkan War; 1912-1913*.] Count Berchtold [who had succeeded Aehrenthal in 1912], was a rich aristocrat, a lover of music and the classics, and an ardent sportsman. . . . The next development in the Monarchy was the inauguration of a great press campaign against Serbia, whose victories had greatly increased her prestige in Europe, and, what was more to the point, among the Southern Slav subjects of the Habsburgs. The arrival of the Serbian army on the shores of the Adriatic provoked a demand on the part of the military party in Austria-Hungary for immediate and energetic action against the Serbian State. The danger of a new conflagration was indeed great, and both Dr. Kramarz and Professor Masaryk . . . acquainted the Belgrade Government of the serious-

ness of the menace. It was at this critical juncture, again, that a member of the Vienna Reichsrat, Professor Redlich—probably at the instigation of the Austro-Hungarian Government—offered the Serbian Government a Customs union with Austria-Hungary 'in order that the Monarchy might recognize the acquisitions made by Serbia in the war against Turkey.' It may be added in passing that at this particular moment the Bulgarian ex-Premier, Dr. Daneff, was received with great cordiality at Budapest, where the Austro-Hungarian Delegations were in session, and he declared in various interviews 'how well disposed towards Serbia were the governing circles of the Monarchy.' . . . Nevertheless, the press of Vienna and Budapest, acting under the direction of the official Press Bureau, had already prepared public opinion, both at home and abroad, for war against Serbia, the apparent object being to influence the Austrian Delegations in favour of armed intervention. . . . Towards the end of November and the beginning of December, 1912, Austria-Hungary had become violently incited against Serbia as a result of this campaign of invective and calumny, and it was at this juncture that I reached Vienna to take up my appointment as Serbian Minister. The very day of my arrival in Austria I became conscious of the effect which had been created by the Press upon the public. . . . Prior to presenting my credentials to Count Berchtold I had met several colleagues and journalists, whose conversation clearly indicated that the anger of the military party in Austria-Hungary was growing apace. . . . It may be said that right until the end of my mission in Vienna the official attitude of Austria-Hungary towards Serbia was unfriendly, and, for the most part, in favour of war. It would be incorrect, however, to say that all official circles were at one as to the advisability of embarking on a military enterprise. . . . On its part the Serbian Government showed itself disposed to do all in its power consistent with the dignity of an independent State to close up the fissures of discord. With this object in view, *pourparlers* were engaged in concerning a Treaty of Commerce, communications over the joint waterways of Serbia and Hungary, and other matters in general. In all these negotiations the Austro-Hungarian Government strove incessantly to secure an exceptional economic position in the Balkans which would have ensured to her a preponderating voice in political, military, and financial affairs. . . . During the course of these negotiations, the military continued to rattle the sword in a menacing fashion, and to prepare for war against Serbia. A serious situation was reached in the months of February and March, 1913, when Austria-Hungary demanded that Serbia should withdraw her troops from Albania and particularly from Durazzo and Skudar (Scutari) without delay. This difficulty was overcome by Serbia giving way, but in August of the same year [1913], Austria desired to attack Serbia, because in the Treaty of Bucharest Serbia had not consented to cede to Bulgaria at least a part of Western Macedonia—Kotchana and Shtip. The following October she sent a new ultimatum to Serbia, ordering her to withdraw her troops from the strategical positions which the Serbian army had occupied towards the end of September after the great Albanian raid into Serbian territory. On each occasion the ultimatum was accompanied by a partial mobilisation of the Austro-Hungarian army, and each time Serbia found herself obliged to submit to the recommendations of the Great Powers. At the commencement of the year 1914, many fresh

indications showed that Austria-Hungary had not abandoned her intention of inflicting military punishment upon Serbia. At that period, negotiations for the repurchase of the Oriental Railway were being carried on between Belgrade and Vienna. Now the Austrian Government had secretly and surreptitiously bought up the greater part of the shares of this Society from the German banks, and a few in addition from Austrian banks, in order that it might present itself as the principal, if not the unique proprietor and negotiator of the Oriental Railway Company. Its intention from the very commencement was that the sector of the railways which had been ceded to Serbia by the Treaty of Bucharest should be administered by Austro-Hungarian employees, who should even have the right of determining the tariffs. Under no conditions could Serbia accept this pretension, and a slight aggravation of the situation would have provoked a conflict. This, however, was avoided, and negotiations actually seemed to take a favourable turn, thanks to the attitude of the Serbian Minister of Public Works. It now became more evident than ever at Vienna that the peace of Europe hung by a very slender thread. There were never-ending rumours that Germany could not afford to wait until Russia was fully prepared for war—a position which, it was stated, she would reach by the beginning of 1917. The Emperor William arrived at Konopischt on a visit to the Heir-Apparent to the Habsburg crowns; at Trieste the new Austrian *Dreadnoughts* were being finished in feverish haste; and the Press discussed the probabilities and eventualities of war with less restraint than formerly. About this time, several of my acquaintances in Germany wrote me to the effect that the Berlin Government was straining every nerve to prepare for war. . . . Although Count Berchtold was the nominal head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, very considerable influence was exercised by Count Forgatch, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade and a well-known figure in the days of Baron Aerenthal. Forgatch, although in favour of an active and energetic policy in respect of Serbia, directed the words and actions of the *Ballplatz* [the Vienna Foreign Office] in a very skilful manner. Thus Serbia, like other Powers, observed the indications and symptoms of the storm, but was unable to obtain proof of the militant intentions of the Central Empires. Among such indications figured my conversations on the subject of the Oriental Railways and the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest [Aug. 10, 1913] with the German Ambassador, von Tschirsky [Tschirschky]. I begged him, as a man whose words carried considerable weight at the *Ballplatz*, to use his influence in the direction of a pacific settlement of these two questions, in which Austro-Hungarian diplomacy was principally directed against Serbia. This German, who had no love for the Slavs, but who absolutely despised the Austrians, at once remarked to me in most brutal fashion: 'Until there has been a war between you and Austria-Hungary, not one of the questions that you are actually negotiating with that country can be settled. Yes! first the war, and then the settlement.' And in striking fulfilment of this prophecy, Austria-Hungary availed herself of the pretext provided by the assassination of the Archduke Francis-Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg, and proceeded to that military action against Serbia which precipitated the world-war."—Y. Yovanovitch, *How Austria willed war* (*Balkan Review*, London, *Mar.*, 1919, pp. 73-85).

The atmosphere of mutual suspicion in the Balkans does not appear to have been created by efforts of imagination. Russian and Serbian suspicions of Austrian designs were fully reciprocated by the Dual Monarchy and with some show of justice. The following diplomatic correspondence sheds some light upon Russo-French political and financial activities in the Peninsula previous to the outbreak of the war:

"(359) THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO SAZONOFF. CONFIDENTIAL REPORT, FEB. 2-15, 1911: 'Having read with the greatest attention and impartiality the reports of our representatives at Sofia and Belgrade as well as of our Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, I come to the conclusion that all news of the Serbian Government derived from secret sources is to be accepted only with reservations. The weak side of the Serbians is their constant need of political intrigues which are devoted to but one purpose—not to admit good relations on the part of Russia to those Powers with which Serbia's relations are bad. The whole atmosphere of Belgrade is saturated with unjustifiable sensitiveness and excitement. The Serbian Government will not concede that Russia should conclude an agreement with Austria upon any basis whatsoever; if it is not the Serbian Government that calls our attention to the deep and treacherous designs of Austria, then it is the Serbian General Staff. At this moment when the relations of Serbia to Turkey are by no means satisfactory, there is no doubt in the minds of the Serbians that Turkey has concluded some pact with Austria. I am entirely of the opinion of our Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople that Austria-Hungary has no design upon the Sandjak. I have arrived at this conclusion not only on account of the repeated declarations of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Delegations that Austria has no intention of continuing the policy of territorial acquisitions in the Balkans, but also by reason of the consideration that only thus could an agreement with Russia be reached, which is a direct political necessity for Austria. The *rapprochement* with France which would be so desirable for Austria is also possible only under these circumstances. The union of all Slav nationalities must naturally be the goal of Russian policy, but one asks oneself how is this to be achieved, now that the King and the Government of Bulgaria manifest such distrust of Serbia? I consider it to be my duty to say, that I am entirely of the opinion of our Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, that we must seriously consider the necessity of arriving at a new agreement with Vienna, in order to protect our interests as far as possible in a peaceful manner. It depends entirely upon the Imperial Government to judge when the favourable moment for a new Balkan agreement of this kind shall have arrived. On me merely devolves the duty of rendering the Balkan intrigues which are directed against such an agreement, ineffective and which might easily, and contrary to our desire, lead to a complete rupture with Austria. . . .'

"(364) MEMORIAL BY M. N. RAFFALOWITCH [THE FRENCH ECONOMIST] REGARDING AUSTRIAN INFLUENCE IN FRENCH BANKS. MAY 14, 1914: ' . . . In consequence of political events, Austria has during recent years had no access to the Paris market, and neither the efforts of her representatives, nor her close connections with the French world of finance, have helped her in this respect.

. . . The former German subject Ullmann occupies an important position in the *Crédit Lyonnais*;—although he entertains no immediate relations with Austria, he stands very close to the *Diskontogesellschaft* of Berlin which exercises a great influence at Vienna. The *Crédit Lyonnais* has on several occasions circulated Austrian and Hungarian values on the Paris market and has disposed of treasury certificates of these two states among its clients. There is no need of mentioning Rothschild, for, although he is very much interested in Austrian business, his influence in Paris is steadily diminishing. Finally, the *Union Parisienne* has a Balkan bank which depends directly upon Viennese and Budapest financial firms and which is under the local control of the Austrian *Donner*. It is essential, above all things, to remark that up to recently the French banks in the Balkans have proceeded in common with the Austrians, who have thereby been able to exploit French capital. The fundamental changes in the political structure of the Balkan Peninsula are bound to influence the Franco-Austrian relations in an unfavourable sense. In order to attain this end, we on our part must proceed in a very systematic fashion. In this we must discriminate between the efforts of the Austrians to float their values on the Paris Bourse, and to proceed hand in hand with the French banks in the Balkans. So far as the former efforts are concerned, these need not seriously disquiet us since they represent an "attempt with inadequate means." The French banks have altogether too great a fear of the interference of their government, and of the protest of public opinion, to determine light-heartedly upon such an operation which might be reduced to nothingness by a single newspaper article or by a single step on the part of Russia. . . . With reference to the co-operation of the French and Austrian banks, we may here too be able to play a very useful rôle. When for example, the Austrian banks, with a view to eventual participation, applied the other day to the French group which is examining the question of the internationalisation of the Eastern Railway in Serbia, it sufficed for the Russian representative to declare that the Russian group would not participate in such a combination, to induce the French to give the Austrians a negative answer. When one French group reproaches another with being too close to the Austrians this is usually only a *ruse de guerre*. We on our part must recognize the fact that all of the chief French groups stand very close to Austria and that it would be difficult to tell which of them are most under Austrian influence. We must set up the one general rule,—that we must not leave the French alone with the Austrians in any questions or countries in which we have an interest. Where the French are to co-operate with Russian elements there will no longer be any room for Austrians. Besides, this means to us the one possibility of being informed at the right moment of everything that we wish to prevent. . . .'

"(523) SAZONOFF TO THE RUSSIAN MINISTER AT SOFIA. CONFIDENTIAL LETTER. . . . MARCH 2, 1914: . . . 'The letters and reports received from you, since your arrival at Sofia, depict the difficult conditions prevailing in Bulgaria since the last war, and which she has not yet succeeded in overcoming. His skillfulness enables King Ferdinand to veer around between the numerous difficult complications of the domestic situation and his wish to improve his relations with Russia as much as possible, without compromising himself in his

relations with Austria on whose sympathy his Government is at present dependent. Considering the complicated political situation, the Russian representative can essentially adopt only a waiting attitude. This, of course, does not prevent a friendly exchange of views with the King or leading personalities. But these conversations cannot inspire us with much confidence, as you rightly observed in your letter of February 5. They give us no guarantee for the future, for even Daneff himself, although the watchword "Russophile" had been given him, was not prevented at that time from playing with Austria instead of siding with us. I may consequently call your attention to the circumstance that the present Cabinet does not enjoy our confidence. The more so as the reputation of the personalities who compose it, is very dubious. The coming election will perhaps bring a majority for the Radoslavoff Cabinet. What attitude would you adopt in this case? Perhaps we could support Bulgaria in certain concrete cases if a guarantee is given us that Bulgaria is acting independently of the members of the present or possible future Cabinets. But it is difficult to effect a rapprochement between Russia and Bulgaria and between Bulgaria and Serbia through the good offices of Russia unless a complete change in public opinion and a change of the Government takes place. For as long as the present Ministers are in power, it is advisable for us to observe reserve and extreme caution. . . . A ministerial change . . . would lead to active support on our part. For instance, it would render it possible for us to accelerate the final settlement of the Bulgarian Loan at Paris and to prepare the way for a rapprochement between Bulgaria and Serbia. But even then, we shall observe extreme caution and only advance by degrees, for, otherwise, we should incur the danger of shaking Serbia's confidence in ourselves and of alienating Roumania from us, if, at the same time we should not succeed in binding Bulgaria to us by the closest ties.'

"(524) THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO SAZONOFF. LETTER. APRIL 3, 1914: 'However deplorable the Second Balkan War has been from the point of view of the Slavs, one cannot deny that the result of this war, so far as it is a question of special Russian interest, has been advantageous to us. Indeed what would have happened if wisdom had prevailed at Sofia at the conclusion of the armistice with Turkey, and if the Bulgarian Government had been willing to accept the justifiable demands of Serbia as to the alteration of the agreement existing between them, and the entirely unjustifiable, but relatively modest, demands of Roumania. So far as the expansion of her territory and strength of her population are concerned, Bulgaria would have become the greatest of the Balkan States; Roumania would have hastened to approach her, probably Turkey too, and if finally even a rapprochement with Austria had been brought about—which I have always thought possible even before the war with Serbia—a block hostile to us would have been formed in the Balkans, consisting of Austria, Bulgaria, Roumania and Turkey. Now, however, under existing political conditions, Austria is entirely isolated in the Balkans and every attempt on her part to alter the status quo would meet with decided resistance on the part of the League—Roumania, Serbia and Greece. For this reason, everything must be avoided that could set Roumania at variance with Serbia and Greece, an end which Austrian diplomacy will probably try to attain.

In this respect, Austria possesses an efficacious means in Albania. It must be understood at Belgrade and Athens that every imprudence on their part can only be of service to Austria, as it would evoke Roumania's dissatisfaction, whilst Austria and Italy, left to themselves in Albania, would ultimately quarrel. This situation, and the knowledge that the Vienna Cabinet has committed an error in supporting Bulgaria during the last crisis, are calling forth in Austria and Hungary that vague general apprehension which has become apparent of late. . . .'

"(534) THE RUSSIAN MINISTER AT SOFIA TO SAZONOFF. TELEGRAM, APRIL 9-22, 1914: 'According to various reports, negotiations are in progress at Berlin as to a Bulgarian loan of about 250 million francs. Up to the present, the German Government has not given its consent on account of Roumanian protests. Apparently, one has now succeeded in persuading Roumania to give up her negative attitude, and at Sofia it is assumed that the loan will be raised on condition that there is to be no expenditure on military armaments. It is a question of life and death to the Radoslavoff Cabinet to raise such a loan in the course of the next month, and it will consequently accept all conditions.'

"(535) THE SAME TO THE SAME. TELEGRAM, APRIL 26, 1914: 'It appears to me more and more probable, that the loan will be raised. I am making efforts, together with the French Minister here, to prove to the King and public opinion here, that the financial policy of the present Bulgarian Government with regard to the economic and political situation is fatal for the country. According to my information, it is to be assumed that English and Belgian money will be employed for the loan. Do you not believe it possible to prevent this? The French Minister asserts that his Government is doing everything possible to prevent French capital from going to Bulgaria. . . . We must make the utmost efforts to thwart the plans of Radoslavoff and Tontcheff.'

"(536) THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT PARIS TO SAZONOFF. TELEGRAM, APRIL 29, 1914: 'Doumergue has just confirmed to me that he has given categorical instructions to the French banks to place no means at Bulgaria's disposal in the shape of a Bulgarian loan in Germany. According to the French Government's information from Berlin, the negotiations at Berlin have been fruitless, which Doumergue attributes to the refusal of the French banks.'

"(537) SAZONOFF TO RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT LONDON. TELEGRAM, APRIL 23-MAY 6, 1914: 'I deem it extremely important to frustrate Bulgaria's intention to raise a loan in Germany, and I beg the British Government to direct its representative at Sofia to support our Minister in the fulfillment of his instructions to restrain Bulgaria from a disadvantageous financial operation which would be bound to lead to the complete economic subjection of Bulgaria by Germany. The French Minister at Sofia has already undertaken successful steps in this connection.'

"(538) THE RUSSIAN MINISTER AT SOFIA TO SAZONOFF. TELEGRAM, MAY 13, 1914: 'Urgent. After the steps taken in London and Paris, we have exhausted all our resources to prevent the raising of the loan. But the necessity of a loan is making itself felt here more and more. In con-

sequence of this consideration, and in order to prevent the Austro-German influence here from growing stronger, I have decided to propose a final means, after having discussed it at length to-day with my French colleague and the representatives of the French banks. We might bring it to the King's cognizance that Russia, who does not trust the present Government, but who is as solicitous as before as to Bulgaria's political and financial independence, will now make the following proposal. France will be induced to advance the money needed by the country—about 100 millions—to the King personally, without imposing the onerous conditions now being discussed at Berlin. At the same time the declaration must be made that, until the conclusion of a loan, France will renounce to be repaid the 75 millions, and Russia the 45 millions treasury notes due for military supplies. The representative of French financial interests at Sofia is convinced that such an operation is tantamount to the realisation of the loan and will render it impossible for the Berlin banks to obtain the loan. Apart from the fact, that we are removing Bulgaria from Austrian influence in future, the influence of Austria and Germany here will also be weakened in this way, and, sooner or later, the present Cabinet will be brought to fall, whereas an immediate removal of the Ministers not agreeable to us would entail great difficulties.'

"(533) SAZONOFF TO THE RUSSIAN MINISTER AT BELGRADE. TELEGRAM. . . . JULY 7, 1914: 'Confidential. The recent events in Serbia, which have led to an accentuation of the anti-Serbian feeling at Vienna, induce us to advise the Serbian Government to treat with the utmost caution all questions which might tend to accentuate this feeling and thus create a dangerous situation. We are consequently of the opinion that it would be advisable to postpone the negotiations concerning the Serbo-Montenegrin rapprochement a little, for these negotiations have already attracted the attention of Austria-Hungary and even of Germany. I beg you to communicate confidentially this opinion to Pashitch.'

—B. de Siebert, *Entente diplomacy and the world* (tr. from original texts, G. A. Schreiner, ed.), pp. 304, 306-307, 312-314, 441-443, 450-452.—See also AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1914.

9.—Alleged imperial council at Potsdam on July 5, 1914.—Much controversy has raged around an alleged imperial council supposed to have been held at Potsdam on July 5, 1914. The best authority we have is the evidence of Henry Morgenthau. (See below: 74.) All German sources deny that such a council was ever held; Bethmann-Hollweg denied it, and his version of the events of that day is strongly supported by the Kautsky *Documents*. Hence there is every reason to believe that Baron Wangenheim was romancing when he gave Mr. Morgenthau that vivid description of what had "happened" in his presence. As Wangenheim died in Constantinople in October, 1915, we are left in the dark as to his veracity. Bethmann-Hollweg said that on July 5 Count Szögyény lunched with the German emperor at Potsdam and delivered to the latter a memorandum on the Balkan situation together with a personal letter from the Austrian emperor. (See below: 76.) Kautsky in his *Documents* proves the truth of this statement. The memorandum in question had been prepared by the Austrian Foreign Office before the Serajevo murders, which led to some slight changes being introduced at the end of it. The private or

personal letter from the Austrian to the German emperor read as follows: "I am sending you a memorandum drawn up by my Minister of Foreign Affairs, prior to the frightful catastrophe at Serajevo, which after that tragic event now appears especially noteworthy. The attack on my poor nephew is a direct result of the agitation of the Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavs whose single aim is the weakening of the Triple Alliance and the disruption of my Empire. Serajevo is not the deed of a single individual, but the result of a well-arranged plot whose threads reach to Belgrade; and though presumably it will be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian government, there can be no doubt that its policy of uniting all the South Slavs under the Serbian flag promotes such crimes and that a continuation of this situation spells lasting danger for my dynasty and for my territories. This danger is heightened by the fact that Rumania, in spite of its existing alliance with us, is in close friendship with Serbia and permits in its own territory just as hateful an agitation against us as does Serbia. . . . I fear that Rumania can only be saved for the Triple Alliance in case we do two things: prevent the establishment of a new Balkan League under Russian protection by joining Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance; and give it clearly to be understood in Bucharest that Serbia's friends cannot be our friends, and that Rumania can no longer count upon us as allies, unless she cuts loose from Serbia and suppresses with all her power her own agitation in Rumania which is directed against the existence of my Empire. The aim of my government must henceforth be to isolate and diminish Serbia. The first step in this direction must be to strengthen Bulgaria and secure an alliance with her. Bulgaria can then unite with Rumania and guarantee her territorial integrity; and Rumania will then perhaps retreat from the dangerous path into which she is led by her friendship with Serbia and her rapprochement with Russia. If this should succeed, a further attempt could be made to reconcile Greece with Bulgaria and Turkey, and so form a new Balkan League under the protection of the Triple Alliance; its purpose would be to set a dam to the Pan-Slav flood and assure peace to our lands. This will only be possible when Serbia, which at present forms the pivot of the Pan-Slav policy, is ejected from the Balkans as a political factor. After the last frightful events in Bosnia, you too will be convinced that a friendly settlement of the opposition which divides Austria from Serbia is no longer to be thought of, and that the peace policy of all European monarchs is threatened so long as the source of criminal agitation in Belgrade lives on unpunished."—*Kautsky*, no. 13.—This letter was first published in *Deutsche Politik*, May 16, 1919. Berchtold's memorandum appeared in the same publication shortly after.

ALSO IN: Gooss, *Austrian Red Book*, v. 1, no. 1.

It was these two documents which Count Szögyény presented at Potsdam on July 5. The Count himself describes the affair thus in his report to Count Berchtold: "After I had brought it to the knowledge of Emperor William that I had a letter to deliver, I received Their Majesties' invitation to lunch today [July 5] at noon in the New Palace. I gave His Majesty the letter and the accompanying memorandum. He read both documents in my presence with the greatest attention. At first he assured me that he had expected an earnest action on our part against Serbia, but that in view of the statements of Francis Joseph, he must keep in view a serious European complica-

tion and therefore wished to give no definite answer until he had consulted with the Chancellor. After luncheon when I again emphasized the seriousness of the situation, His Majesty authorized me to report that in this case also we could reckon on Germany's full support. He thought action ought not to be delayed. Russia's attitude would doubtless be hostile, but he had been prepared for that for years; and if it should even come to a war between Austria and Russia, we could be convinced that Germany would stand by our side with her accustomed faithfulness as an ally. Russia, furthermore, he thought, was in no way ready for war and would certainly ponder very seriously before appealing to arms. His Majesty said he understood how hard Francis Joseph, with his well-known love of peace, would find it to invade Serbia; but if we had really decided that military action against Serbia was necessary, he would be sorry if we left unused the present moment which was so favorable for us. Early tomorrow morning Emperor William intends to go to Kiel to start from there on his northern cruise. But first he will talk with the Chancellor, and for this purpose he has summoned him for this evening to the New Palace."—*Gooss*, v. 1, no. 6.—"On the next day, after Bethmann, accompanied by Zimmermann, had discussed the matter with Emperor William, the chancellor officially defined Germany's attitude to Szögyény as follows: 'Austria must judge what is to be done to clear up her relation to Serbia; whatever Austria's decision may turn out to be, Austria can count with certainty upon it, that Germany will stand behind her as an ally and friend.'"—*Ibid.*, no. 7.—"Thus the Kaiser and Bethmann chose their policy. They gave Austria a free hand and made the mistake of putting the situation outside of their control into the hands of a man as reckless and unscrupulous as Berchtold. They committed themselves to a leap in the dark. They soon found themselves involved . . . in actions which they did not approve, and by decisions which were taken against their advice; but they could not seriously object or threaten, because they had pledged their support to Austria in advance, and any hesitation on their part would only weaken the Triple Alliance at a critical moment when it most needed to be strong. Bethmann and the Kaiser on July 5 were not criminals plotting the World War; they were simpletons putting 'a noose about their necks' and handing the other end of the rope to a stupid and clumsy adventurer who now felt free to go as far as he liked."—*Fay*, I.—In a footnote the author says, "as the Kaiser himself frantically wrote on July 30 after learning of Grey's warning, Russian mobilization, and Berchtold's persistent rejection of all proposed peaceful solutions: In addition to encirclement by the Entente, 'wird uns die Dummheit und Ungeschicklichkeit unseres Verbündeten zum Fallstrick gemacht' [will the stupidity and clumsiness of our ally have been made a noose for our necks]."—*Kautsky*, no. 401.—"However, though no such general conference [as the alleged imperial council] took place on July 5 at which a European war was plotted, the date is momentous, for it does mark the moment at which Berlin gave Berchtold a free hand against Serbia. Until July 5 Berchtold had not dared to take energetic action against Serbia; partly because he knew that his colleague Tisza, the Hungarian premier, was strongly opposed to a sudden and unprovoked attack on Serbia; and partly because he did not feel sure of German support. Germany had hitherto been taking a reserved and moderating

attitude in regard to Austrian adventures in the Balkans. Even before the Serajevo crime Berchtold had tried in vain 'to open Tschirschky's eyes to the danger that Austria was in.' [Count Hoyos in Vienna wrote to ambassador Pallavicini in Constantinople on June 26, 1914: "Meanwhile, a long Memorandum is being prepared for Berlin, which is soon to be sent, and the Minister (Count Berchtold) is doing his utmost to open Tschirschky's eyes."] Two days after Serajevo [June 30, 1914], when even serious people in Vienna 'were expressing frequently the hope that Austria had now the excuse for coming to a final reckoning with the Serbs,' Tschirschky still [Kautsky *Documents*, no. 7] used every opportunity to warn calmly but very energetically and earnestly against any over hasty steps. He pointed out above all else that Austria must be clear as to exactly what she wanted, and remember that she did not stand alone in the world, that she must consider her allies and the European situation, and especially the attitude which Italy and Rumania would take in regard to Serbia. (Note.—Highly significant of Emperor William's eagerness to have Austria act quickly and vigorously against Serbia are his marginal comments on this despatch. He underlined both the passages placed in quotation marks above: beside the first he wrote 'now or never,' and beside the second, in condemnation of Tschirschky's restraining attitude of moderation: 'Who authorized him to this? That is very stupid! It's none of his business, for it is purely Austria's affair to consider what to do in this matter, for it will be said afterwards, if things go wrong, that Germany was not willing!' Tschirschky will please drop this nonsense! Matters must be cleared up with the Serbs *and that soon*. That's all self-evident and as clear as daylight.')

—Fay, I, p. 631.

—Up to July 5, Tschirschky accurately represented the moderating views of the Berlin Foreign Office, for on July 4 Szögyény telegraphed to Berchtold, 'Zimmermann recommends the greatest precaution and advises that no humiliating demands be made upon Serbia' [*Red Book*, v. 1, no. 5]. But after July 5 his attitude changed. Henceforth Tschirschky appears to have urged Berchtold to the speedy and energetic action against Serbia desired by Emperor William [*Red Book*, v. 1, nos. 10, 44; Kautsky *Documents*, nos. 35, 40-41, 49, 94]. Accordingly, on Tuesday morning, July 7, Berchtold, now confident of German support, called a ministerial council at Vienna at which the leading ministers and the chiefs of the army and navy were present."—*Ibid.*, pp. 631-632.

—"Our knowledge as to the attitude and actions of that statesman was very considerably enlarged by the publication of a further Austrian Red Book, as well as a similar semi-official collection of documents [the Gooss edition], which show that Count Berchtold at the Council held at Vienna on 7 July, 1914, urged the necessity for an immediate war with Serbia, adding that he had received private assurances of support from Berlin. . . . The assurances Count Berchtold spoke of were presumably those given on 5 July; that is to say, before the conciliatory Serbian answer. Subsequent to this, and with the recognition of the fact that Russia would stand by Serbia, and thereby a European war ensue, the German statesmen appear to have realized the gravity of the situation and made some ostensible attempt to exercise moderation on Vienna."—*"Tramontana," Some new sources of European history (New Europe, Dec. 25, 1919)*.

10.—Calm before the storm.—After the Serajevo murders, which happened on June 28 (see

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1914 (June)], the world generally and Europe in particular breathlessly waited for something of tremendous import to happen. Twenty-five days passed without a cloud appearing on the international horizon; Austria held the center of the stage, yet neither word nor sign emanated from the Vienna Foreign Office. On July 22 the Hungarian Minister President stated in Parliament that the situation was not serious enough to arouse any fear of complications. The Serajevo tragedy had almost faded away as a newspaper sensation; European affairs seemed to have resumed their normal course; a British battleship squadron under Admiral Beatty was paying a friendly visit to Kiel; the French president and his prime minister were away on a visit to St. Petersburg (Petrograd), and most of the diplomatic representatives accredited to European capitals were enjoying summer vacations. It was a deceptive calm preceding the most terrific storm in human history.


11.—Austrian reticence as to intentions towards Serbia.—"The Serbian Minister, M. Yovanovich, had more than one conversation at the Austrian Foreign Office [during the four weeks following the murders at Serajevo] but they were confined to a discussion of the quarrel which was going on between the newspapers of the two countries. On both sides very bitter language was used, but this was nothing new; violent attacks on other States and nations are, even in peace time, unfortunately not peculiar to the Press of Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade. Austrian papers demanded the condign punishment of the whole Serbian race; Serbian papers answered by rehearsing the crimes of Austria. The Austrian Press would make the Serbian nation and Government responsible for the murder; the Serbian Press answered, if not by justifying the crime, by putting forward the reasons which might have inspired it, and in particular they attributed it to the misgovernment and ill-treatment of the Southern Slavs who inhabited the Dual Monarchy. The point was made that in Serbia the Government had no control over the Press, while in Austria and in Hungary there was an organised system by which the papers could be influenced by the Government. . . . There were also mutual recriminations as to the treatment of Serbians in Austria and in Hungary, and demonstrations made against subjects of the Monarchy in Serbia. . . . All this was, however, comparatively unimportant; as had happened before, these popular demonstrations would within a short time have died out. The only matter of real interest was the action which the Government of Austria-Hungary proposed to take. As to this no information could be obtained. Their intentions were veiled under complete secrecy. M. Yovanovich wrote on July 7, 'In authoritative circles the excitement continues undiminished. Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary respectively, and to the Minister for Finance, Mr. Bilinski, which calls for calmness, it is impossible to determine what attitude the Government will adopt towards us. For them one thing is obvious; whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must now or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been decided; this is being discussed, especially in high Catholic and military circles. The ultimate decision will be taken only



COUNT BERCHTOLD



WOODROW WILSON



BETHMANN-HOLLWEG




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
SIR
EDWARD GREY



DAVID LLOYD GEORGE



GEORGES
CLEMENCEAU



RAYMOND
POINCARÉ



VITTORIO
EMANUELE ORLANDO



SERGIUS
DMITRIEVICH SAZONOV

NOTED STATESMEN OF THE WORLD WAR

after it has been definitely ascertained what the inquiry at Sarajevo has brought to light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings of the inquiry.'—*Headlam*, pp. 19-21.

12.—Awaiting Austrian action.—French and British diplomats' reports.—Austrian and German ambassadors confer with Grey.—German secret war documents.—Private and official correspondence.—“Would the demands to be directed to Serbia be confined to requiring their co-operation in the investigation and punishment of the conspiracy and to preventing similar crimes in the future, or would they take this opportunity to force the Serbian nation to surrender the great ambitions by which they had been inspired? Would they attempt to require a complete alteration in the policy and spirit of the Government, and insist on a return to the position of subordination to Austria which had existed during the reign of the last two kings of the dynasty of the Obrenovitch? On this depended the future of Serbia and also of Europe. [The anxiety was not confined to Serbia; there was throughout Europe] an uneasy feeling based indeed, not on any actual knowledge of the intentions of Austria, but on the recognition that Serbia was the most dangerous point in Europe, and on an appreciation of the consequences which might result if Austria were to take this opportunity, as she well might, for bringing to a point the long-standing controversy with Russia over the political position of the Serbian kingdom. There was, indeed, every ground for anxiety. . . . To Europe the Austro-Hungarian Government maintained a silence as impenetrable as to Serbia. It was known that demands were to be made on Serbia; the nature of these demands in all detail were being constantly discussed, obviously on good information, in the Austrian and Hungarian papers, but to the other Powers not a word was said.”—*Headlam*, p. 23.—This growing uneasiness is clearly shown in the following correspondence between the ambassadors at the various capitals and their home governments.

“No. 8. M. DUMAINE, FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA, TO M. RENÉ VIVIANI, . . . JULY 2, 1914:

“The crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian military circles and among all those who are not content to allow Serbia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has acquired. The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intolerable to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of resort to military measures.

“No. 9. M. DE MANNEVILLE, FRENCH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT BERLIN, TO M. RENÉ VIVIANI, JULY 4, 1914:

“The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, and has today repeated to the Russian Ambassador, that he hoped Serbia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident that this would be the case because Serbia, if she acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilized world against her. The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in the rela-

tions between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so.

“No. 10. M. PALÉOLOGUE, FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT ST. PETERSBURGH, TO M. RENÉ VIVIANI, . . . JULY 6, 1914:

“In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Sazonoff pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian press against Serbia are in danger of producing in his country. Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Serbian territory, M. Sazonoff interrupted him: ‘No country,’ he said, ‘has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course. May this warning not be in vain.’

“No. 11. M. D'APCHIER LE MAUGIN, FRENCH CONSUL-GENERAL AT BUDAPEST, TO M. RENÉ VIVIANI, . . . JULY 11, 1914:

“Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Serbian question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. . . . With regard to this *démarche* it seems that the word has been given to minimize its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word ‘*démarche*,’ with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression ‘*pourparlers*,’ which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all its for peace. All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes in war and fears it. . . . The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is *preparing a coup*, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. . . .

“No. 12. M. DUMAINE, FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA, TO M. RENÉ VIVIANI, . . . JULY 15:

“Certain organs of the Vienna press, discussing the military organisation of France and Russia, represent these two countries as incapable of holding their own in European affairs; this would ensure to the Dual Monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities for subjecting Serbia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. The *Militärische Rundschau* frankly admits it. ‘The moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day; let us

provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honor, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned—to be or not to be—which is in truth the great matter today.' Surpassing itself, the *Neue Freie Presse* of today reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, 'Our relations with Serbia require, however, to be made clear.' These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security can result only from a *war to the knife* against Pan-Servism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Servian race.

"No. 13. M. DUMAINE, FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA, TO M. RENÉ VIVIANI, . . . JULY 19:

"The Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has added a section containing political information emanating from a trustworthy source. I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he has obtained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note to Serbia, which the papers have for some days been persistently announcing. . . .

"No. 14. MEMORANDUM, (EXTRACT FROM CONSULAR REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN AUSTRIA) . . . JULY 20:

"From information furnished by a person specially well informed as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism; much will be demanded of Serbia; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in co-operation with Austrian officials, to keep strict control over Anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the subtrefuges by which Serbia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply; that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will begin. There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organisation to perfection. . . . Now, for the last ten days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. . . . The fact is significant.'

"No. 15. M. JULES CAMBON, FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN, TO M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, . . . JULY 21:

"It has come to my knowledge that the Servian representative at Berlin declared, at the Wilhelm-

strasse, yesterday, that his Government was ready to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only for judicial cooperation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Serbia. In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at the diplomatic audience today mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect. . . .

"No. 16. M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS [IN FRANCE TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADORS AT] LONDON, ST. PETERSBURG, VIENNA, ROME . . . JULY 21, 1914:

"I specially draw your attention to information of which I am in receipt from Berlin; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday and attributes it to the anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question. M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when Austria makes the *démarche* at Belgrade which she judges necessary in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her with her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator.

"No. 17. M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS [TO THE FOUR FRENCH AMBASSADORS AS ABOVE]. . . . JULY 22, 1914:

"M. Jules Cambon having questioned Herr von Jagow on the tenor of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he knew nothing of the text; our Ambassador expressed his great astonishment at this. . . . M. Barrère also discussed the same question with the Marquis di San Giuliano who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance that he is working at Vienna in order that Serbia may not be asked for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Serajevo. . . . I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his influence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly conversation how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Serbia.

"No. 18. M. DUMAINE, FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO M. BIENVENU-MARTIN: . . . JULY 22, 1914:

"Nothing is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, who is prolonging his stay at Ischl, is trying to obtain from the Emperor. The intention of proceeding against Serbia with the greatest severity, of having done with her, of 'treating her like another Poland,' is attributed to the Government. . . . In any case it is believed the *démarche* will be made at Belgrade this week.

The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Servians; M. Jovanovich believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch [Serbian premier] wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Servian army; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the Monarchy to paralyze the effort directed against his country.

"No. 19. M. PAUL CAMBON, FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT LONDON, TO M. BIENVENU-MARTIN: . . . JULY 22, 1914:

" . . . Sir Edward Grey told me [yesterday] that he had seen the German Ambassador, who stated to him that at Berlin a *démarche* of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a *démarche* of this kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the circumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured themselves that the Servian Government had been cognisant of it and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the consequences. For if it could not be proved that the Servian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe. The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador who also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian relations. This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to accept without a protest.

. . . Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, asked him to recommend his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far.

"No. 20. M. BIENVENU-MARTIN TO LONDON, BERLIN, ST. PETERSBURG, AND ROME: PARIS, JULY 23:

"According to information collected by the French Ambassador at Vienna, the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government had been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations. The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory; in answer to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the

Austrian note, and the demands which would be formulated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these assurances. In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch [Serbian premier] wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country. . . .

"No. 21. M. ALLIZÉ, FRENCH MINISTER AT MUNICH, TO M. BIENVENU-MARTIN: . . . JULY 23.

" . . . The President of the Council said to me today that the Austrian note the contents of which were known to him (*dont il avait connaissance*) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious."—*F. Y. B.*, nos. 8-21.

"No. 1. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR H. RUMBOLD, BRITISH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT BERLIN, . . . JULY 20, 1914:

"I asked the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia. He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable. I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up. The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia. I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial. The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be known. . . .

"No. 2. SIR H. RUMBOLD . . . TO SIR EDWARD GREY: . . . BERLIN, JULY 22, 1914:

"Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. . . .

"No. 3. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR M. DE BUNSEN, . . . JULY 23, 1914:

"Count Mensdorff told me today that he would be able tomorrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia today by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would

all be set out in the paper that he would give me tomorrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia. As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight. But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with, a time limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time limit could always be introduced afterward; that, if the demands were made without a time limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favor of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed. Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an inquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909 Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighborhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself. . . . I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other. Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favorable recently."—*B. D. C.*, nos. 1-3.

Documentary indications of German knowledge of Austrian terms prior to presentation of ultimatum to Serbia.—The secret war documents preserved in the German imperial archives were published by the Republican government in December, 1919. The following five documents, taken from this collection, reveal (a) the view of the German Foreign Office on the crisis as confidentially expounded by von Jagow to Prince Lichnowsky; (b) the accurate forecast of Austro-Hungarian intentions towards Serbia given on July 18, 1914, by the German foreign under-secretary to the Bavarian charge d'affaires, in Berlin, which the latter transmitted to his government; (c) a statement by the German ambassador, von Wedel, in Vienna, successor to the late Tschirschky concerning the latter's attitude on the ultimatum to Serbia; (d) an acknowledgment by Zimmerman that the text of the ultimatum was received in Berlin twelve hours before its presentation at Belgrade; and (e) a dis-

patch from the German chancellor to the chargé d'affaires attending the kaiser on his holiday cruise in Norwegian waters.

(a) PRIVATE LETTER FROM THE GERMAN SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS VON JAGOW TO PRINCE LICHNOWSKY, THE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON:

"BERLIN, JULY 18, 1914: DEAR LICHNOWSKY, Your opinion of our policy, which your Serbian report contains, is always valuable to me, and I believe that the Imperial Chancellor thinks similarly about the matter. I cannot deny either that many of your remarks are justified. But we have an alliance with Austria (this can't be helped): hic Rhodus, hic salta. Whether this alliance with the continuously disintegrating structure of states on the Danube is to our advantage is also open to discussion, but I say with the poet—I believe it was Busch: 'If this company no longer suits you, look for other provided you have got it.' And a completely successful relationship with England we have unfortunately not succeeded in creating so far, in fact could not after what has happened in the past—if we can ever succeed at all. Austria which, because of her lack of aggressive strength, has continuously lost more and more of her prestige, can hardly be counted any longer as a full-fledged Great Power. The crisis in the Balkans has weakened her position still more. Because of this decline of Austria's political power our group of allies has also been decidedly weakened. Austria no longer intends to tolerate the Serbian underground propaganda, nor the continually provocative attitude of the little neighbor at Belgrade.—Notice the language of the Serbian press—and that of Mr. Pashitsch. She recognizes that she has missed many chances and that she can still act, but not so in a few years. Austria wants to settle her affairs with Serbia now and has informed us of this. During the whole Balkan crisis we successfully mediated in the interest of peace without having forced Austria at critical moments into passivity. The fact that, nevertheless, we are in Austria often unjustly accused of being lukewarm, is a matter of indifference to me. We have not now driven Austria to her decision. But we cannot and must not stop her. If we did this, then Austria could justly accuse us, as could we ourselves, of having denied her the last chance for political rehabilitation. Then the process of her disintegration and of her internal decay would only be accelerated. Her position in the Balkans is, indirectly, also inadmissible to us. The maintenance of Austria, and of a very strong Austria, is for internal and external reasons a necessity for us. That she cannot forever be maintained I willingly admit. But, in the meantime, combinations may perhaps be found. We must try to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Whether this succeeds, will depend, first of all, upon Russia and, in the second place, upon the moderating influence of the members of the Entente. The more determined Austria shows herself, the more energetically we support her, the more likely it is that Russia will keep quiet. Some blustering at Petersburg will not be wanting, no doubt, but Russia is not really prepared now. Neither France nor England will want a war now. In a few years Russia will be prepared, according to all competent opinion. Then she will destroy us by means of her large number of soldiers; then she will have built her Baltic fleet and her strategic railroads. Our group in the meantime will be becoming continually weaker.

This is known in Russia and quiet is absolutely desired there for several years. I gladly believe your cousin Benckendorff that Russia does not want any war with us now. Sazonoff also assures us of the same thing, but the Government of Russia, which today is still peace-loving and half-way friendly towards Germany, is continually becoming weaker, while the attitude of the Slavs is continually becoming more anti-German. How Russia really treats us, we were shown last fall. During the Balkan crisis she could not thank us enough for our pacifying influence. The acute crisis had hardly passed when the unfriendliness about Liman, etc., began. [See above: Causes: Indirect: n.] If localization cannot be achieved and if Russia attacks Austria, then the *casus fœderis* exists, and we cannot sacrifice Austria. We would then be in a position of isolation which could scarcely be called proud. I want no preventive war, but if the struggle presents itself we cannot retreat."—*Kautsky, no. 72.*

(b) VON SCHOEN, THE BAVARIAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT BERLIN, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, MUNICH:

"BERLIN, JULY 18, 1914: On the basis of conversations which I had with Under-Secretary Zimmermann and, further, with the Balkan and Triple Alliance Referendary at the Foreign Office and with the Austro-Hungarian Counselor to the Ambassador, I have the honor to inform your Excellency of the following in regard to the discussion with Serbia intended by the Austro-Hungarian Government: The step which the Vienna Cabinet has decided to undertake at Belgrade and which will consist of the presentation of a note, will be made on the 25th of this month. The reason for the postponement of the action until the present moment is that it is desired to await the departure of M. Poincaré and Viviani from Petersburg so that it will not be so easy for the Powers of the Dual Alliance to come to an understanding on a possible counteraction. Till then Vienna is assuming the appearance of peacefulness by the absence at the same time of the Ministers of War and the Chief of the General Staff, and pressure has also been brought to bear upon the press and the exchange, not without success. That the Vienna Cabinet is acting very skillfully in this connection is admitted here; it is only regretted that Count Tisza, who is said to have been opposed at first to firmer action, has already lifted the veil somewhat by his statements in the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies. As Herr Zimmermann told me, so far as has now been determined, the note will contain the following demands: 1. The promulgation of a proclamation by the King of Serbia, in which it shall be stated that the Serbian Government is entirely dissociated with the pan-Serbian movement and disapproves of it. 2. The initiation of an investigation against the accomplices in the murder of Sarajevo and the participation of an Austrian official in this investigation. 3. Proceedings against all who are connected with the pan-Serbian movement. A time limit of 48 hours is to be given for the acceptance of these demands. That Serbia cannot accept such demands, which are irreconcilable with her dignity as an independent state, is evident. The result would therefore be war. Here there is complete agreement that Austria should use the opportune hour, despite the danger of further complications. Whether Vienna will really make an effort itself, still appears to be doubtful to both Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann. The

Under-Secretary remarked that Austria, thanks to her indecision and unsteadiness, has now really become the sick man of Europe, as formerly Turkey was, whose dismemberment Russians, Italians, Roumanians, Serbians and Montenegrins are awaiting. A strong and successful action against Serbia would result in Austrians and Hungarians again feeling themselves to be a political power, would revive her prostrate economic life and suppress foreign aspirations for many years. Because of the indignation which now exists throughout the whole Monarchy over the bloody deed, one could probably also be sure of the Slavic troops. As General Conrad von Hoetzendorf is said to have himself admitted, in a few years, with the further operation of Slavic propaganda, this would no longer be the case. The opinion here, therefore, is that for Austria this is a fateful hour, and for this reason, upon an inquiry from Vienna, it has been declared here without hesitation that . . . [Germany] should agree to every action which will be determined upon there, even at the risk of a war with Russia. The full powers which were given Count Hoyos, the chief of the Cabinet of Count Berchtold, who had come here to present an autograph letter of the Emperor and a detailed promemoria, were so extensive that the Austro-Hungarian Government was empowered to negotiate with Bulgaria as to admission to the Triple Alliance. It seems that Vienna did not expect from Germany such unreserved intervention on behalf of the Danube Monarchy and Herr Zimmermann has the impression that the eternally fainthearted and undecided officials at Vienna feel almost annoyed because, from the German side, there has been no admonition to be cautious and restrained. How vacillating Vienna is in its decision is proved by the fact that Count Berchtold, three days after he had an inquiry made here regarding an alliance with Bulgaria, had telegraphed that he still had doubts as to allying himself with Bulgaria. It would also be more satisfactory to Berlin if the action against Serbia were not deferred so long and the Serbian Government not given time, perhaps under Russo-French pressure, to offer satisfaction on its part. What position the other powers will take towards an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia will, according to opinion here, depend largely upon whether Austria will be satisfied with a thrashing of Serbia, or will also demand territorial compensation for herself. In the former case it would be possible to localize the war; in the latter, however, larger complications would probably be inevitable. In the interest of the localization of the war, the Imperial [German] Government will, immediately after the presentation of the Austrian note at Belgrade, start a diplomatic action with the Great Powers. Calling attention to the fact that the Emperor is on his northern trip, and the Chief of the Great General Staff as well as the Prussian Minister of War on leave of absence, it will insist that it has been just as much surprised by the action of Austria as the other Powers. (I take the liberty of inserting here that even the Italian Government has not been taken into confidence.) It will explain that it is to the common interest of all monarchical states that the 'Anarchist Nest at Belgrade' be destroyed, and it will work to the end that the Powers take the position that the discussion between Austria and Serbia is an affair between these two states. A mobilization of German troops will not be undertaken and our military influence will be brought to bear upon Austria not to mobilize her entire army and especially

those troops stationed in Galicia, so as not to bring about automatically a counter-mobilization on the part of Russia, which would force us also, and then France, to take similar measures, and thus bring on a European war.

"The question whether the localization of the war will succeed, will be decided in the first place by the attitude of Russia. If Russia absolutely does not want war against Austria and Germany, she can in this case—and that is the most favorable fact in the present situation—very well remain inactive and take the position towards Serbia that she, just as little as the other civilized states, endorses a method of struggle which proceeds by means of bomb-throwing and revolver shots. This especially so long as Austria does not threaten the national independence of Serbia. Herr Zimmermann assumes that England, as well as France, who would hardly wish for a war at present, will influence Russia to adopt a peaceful attitude; furthermore, he takes for granted that 'bluffing' is one of the favorite methods of Russian policy, and that the Russian likes to threaten with the sword but, in the decisive moment, does not like to draw it for others. England will not prevent Austria from holding Serbia to account. However, an annihilation of the country she will hardly permit; on the contrary, loyal to her traditions, she will probably intervene here also for the principle of nationality. A war between the Dual and Triple Alliance would hardly be welcome to England at the present moment, merely in consideration of the situation in Ireland. Should it, nevertheless, come to this, we would, according to opinion here, find the English cousin on the side of our opponents, since England fears that France, in case of a defeat, would sink down to the rank of a second rate power and the 'balance of power' thus be destroyed, whose preservation England considers necessary for her own interest. Italy would receive very little pleasure from a castigation of Serbia by Austria, to whom she would hardly be willing to grant a strengthened position in the Balkans. As the *Chargé d'Affaires* von Bergen, the Referendary for Triple Alliance affairs at the Foreign Office, told me, the relation between Vienna and Rome is again anything but friendly. Vienna is very much put out over the Italian *chargé d'affaires* in Albania, Aliotti, who seems to have carried on considerable intrigue against Austria, and Ambassador von Mérey, therefore, received several days ago an order to demand of Italy that she change her whole policy, since otherwise a continued understanding would not be possible. The order is said to have been worded so strongly that San Giuliano was quite wrought up, and this tension between Austria and Italy greatly aggravates the situation. The partitioning of Serbia or merely the annexation by Austria of Mount Lovcen in Montenegro, which commands the Bay of Cattaro, would not be suffered by Italy without compensation. It does not seem improbable that Italy is calling out her reserves for the purpose of occupying Valona in this case, an act which she tries to justify by her internal political conditions. Herr Zimmermann is of the opinion that Austria should not oppose this, since Valona would become a new tendon of Achilles for Italy, and the distance between Brindisi and Valona is too large for the Italians to succeed in completely blocking the Adriatic. Perhaps one can also deduce from a statement of the Austro-Hungarian Counselor to the Ambassador, according to whose opinion Valona might well be given to the Italians, that Vienna has already familiarized

itself with the possibility of an occupation of southern Albania by the Italians. As I have very confidentially been informed, the Counselor to the [German] Ambassador at Vienna, Prince Stolberg, who was here several days ago, was ordered to talk over the question of compensation to Italy with Count Berchtold, and to insinuate in an unofficial way that Italy would probably be won over permanently if Austria would agree, in case of large territorial expansions, to a cession of the southern part of the Trentino, i. e., that part of the archbishopric Trent which had never belonged to the old German Empire. That the Vienna Cabinet will approve this idea is, however, hardly expected here and in order not to cause bad feeling by an official suggestion of this kind, the Counselor to the Ambassador and not the Ambassador, who is also at Vienna, has been ordered purposely to turn the conversation to the Trentino.

"As to Bulgaria, the Austro-Hungarian Embassy here assumes that King Ferdinand would use the outbreak of a war between Austria and Serbia to strike against Serbia, so as to win back the territory lost by the Peace of Bukarest [1913]. Since the danger exists that Roumania, as in the Second Balkan War, would turn against Bulgaria, an exercise of influence on the part of Russia in this direction, who will not undertake anything directly against Bulgaria, will probably also not be wanting at this time. King Carol, whose attitude of late has been very unsatisfactory, has been informed from here, in unequivocal terms, that Germany would take the side of Bulgaria in case Roumania does not abandon Serbia. According to the answer of the King, it is assumed here that Roumania will keep peace in case the prospect of compensation is held out to her. As such, the territory around Vidin, whose population consists mainly of Roumanians, would come under consideration. In this way, Roumania would of itself probably have been won back to the Triple Alliance. Greece, which would not be averse to seeing a diminution of Serbia, would be compensated in the Epirus and would, in exchange, have to cede Kavalla to Bulgaria. As far as Montenegro is concerned, it is hoped here that the intelligent King Nikita will find it advantageous to let the Serbs fight alone against Austria. For the cession of the Lovcen, which Austria, in case of such a far-reaching revision of the Balkans, would probably demand for herself, Montenegro could be compensated in northern Albania. What the fate of the Duchy of Albania will be, can hardly be determined today. For the present, the unhappy condition will continue which has been characterized in Paris by the words: 'Les caisses sont vides, le trône est Wied, tout est vide,' and has caused the prince to receive the nickname 'Le Prince du Vide.'"—*Kautsky*, no. 386.

(c) THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA, COUNT B. WEDEL, TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BARON VON DEM BUSSCHE (PRIVATE LETTER):

"VIENNA, 9/5/1917. DEAR BUSSCHE: Stumm wrote to me shortly before his leave of absence that Czernin had said that Tschirschky had declared to Count Berchtold in July, 1914, that, if Austria did not decide upon energetic action against Serbia, we would be forced to consider a different foreign policy. I would like to try to settle this. The documents contain nothing about it. Stolberg considers it impossible that the prudent Tschirschky should have made such a state-

ment. In order to be sure, I asked Berchtold. He answered my question in the negative and told me that Tschirschky had explained to him that Berlin considered energetic action against Serbia to be desirable. Upon my question as to whether Tschirschky had used any pressure to force the Imperial and Royal Government to this, he said: 'No, I did not use any pressure.' That would, in fact, have been incomprehensible since Vienna itself was urging such a procedure and wanted to make sure of our support. I will not fail to draw Czernin's attention to his mistake. There are also people here at the Ballplatz who would like to put the blame for the war upon our shoulders, and invent such tales. The note to Serbia only became known at Berlin on the day on which it was presented at Belgrade. Tschirschky, that is to say, had not sent it by telegaph but by mail. Jagow at that time told Szögyény that the fault of the note consisted in making retreat impossible; a note might be as sharp as possible, but must always leave a way out in case the other party is willing to yield."—*Kautsky, no. 1, appendix II.*

(d) EX-SECRETARY OF STATE, ZIMMERMANN, TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BARON VON DEM BUSSCHE (PRIVATE LETTER):

"BERLIN, SATURDAY, AUGUST 11, 1917: DEAR BUSSCHE: The statement of the *Evening News* is actually correct in so far as we had, it is true, received the Serbian Ultimatum about twelve hours before delivery. On the other hand, I can positively not recall confiding this to an American diplomat. A denial can therefore be issued, but I venture no opinion as to whether this would be of any use, considering that the fact of our cognizance of this matter cannot, after all, be kept secret forever."—*Kautsky, no. 2, appendix II.*

(e) VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES OF THE IMPERIAL SUITE:

"BERLIN, JULY 23, 1914: Austro-Hungarian note is to be presented this afternoon or evening and published at Vienna tomorrow morning. Ultimatum would therefore expire the evening of the 25th. Our attitude for the present will be that it is an affair which concerns only Austria and Serbia. Only the intervention of another power would drive us into the conflict. That this should happen at once, namely that England should immediately decide to interfere, is not to be assumed. The trip of President Poincaré, who leaves Kronstadt to-night, visits Stockholm the 25th, Copenhagen the 27th, Kristiania the 29th and arrives at Dunkerque the 31st, would in itself delay all decisions. The English fleet, according to information from the Admiralty Staff, is to disperse the 27th and proceed to its home ports. Any premature recall of our fleet might cause general uneasiness and be regarded with suspicion, particularly in England. After notification of Admiral von Mueller, please make report to His Majesty accordingly. Am adding to this that the Admiralty Staff makes the following report: 'If the possibility of an immediate declaration of war by England is to be considered, then from a military point of view an attack upon our fleet by the English fleet is to be counted upon with certainty. Our fleet, with its great numerical inferiority, must not in any event be exposed to this possibility. As soon as the possibility of the outbreak of a war with England within any six days has to be reckoned

with, the fleet must be recalled.'"—*Kautsky, no. 89.*

13.—Behind the veil in Vienna.—Official report of historic ministerial council at Vienna on July 7, 1914.—Statement of promise by Germany of unconditional support.—Austria-Hungary decides for war.—Peril of European war foreseen.—Berchtold's desire for military action regardless of consequences.—Fear of "Greater Serbia" propaganda.—It was not until the publication of the second "Austrian Red Book" at the end of 1919, edited by Dr. Roderich Gooss, and approved by the Austrian republican government, that any exact knowledge was forthcoming as to the real attitude of the Austro-Hungarian government in general and that of Count Berchtold in particular, during the period between the Serajevo assassinations and the declaration of war on Serbia. The official report of the meeting of the ministerial council held in Vienna, July 7, reveals that Berchtold alleged that he had received certain assurances from Berlin, and that he had drawn amply upon the "blank check" thus handed him. The members present at the meeting were: Count Stuerghk, Austrian premier, Count Tisza, Hungarian premier, von Bilinski, Joint minister of finance, General von Krobatin, war minister, General Conrad von Hoetzendorff, chief of staff, and Rear-Admiral von Kailer. Count Hoyos acted as recording secretary and Count Berchtold presided over the meeting. The latter opened the session by remarking "that the Ministerial Council had been convened to discuss the measures to be taken to remedy the evil internal conditions which obtained in Bosnia-Herzegovina in connection with the tragedy of Serajevo. In his opinion there were various internal measures, the application of which to Bosnia seemed to him to be in order against the critical situation, but, first of all, clarity should be reached on the question whether the time had not arrived to render Serbia harmless for good by the application of force. Such a decisive blow could not be struck without diplomatic preparations, and he had therefore got into communication with the German government on the subject. The latter had led to a very satisfactory result, as both the German Emperor and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had most emphatically assured us of the unconditional support of Germany in case of warlike complication with Serbia. Now we must still reckon with Italy and Rumania, and here he agreed with the opinion of the Berlin cabinet that it would be better to act and then await any possible demands for compensation. He realized that a war with Serbia might lead to a war with Russia, but Russia was at present following a policy which, taking a far-sighted view, aimed at a combination of the Balkan states, including Rumania, for the purpose of utilizing them against the monarchy at an opportune moment. He was of the opinion that we must take into account the fact that our situation, as opposed to such a policy, was bound to become worse, especially as passive toleration would surely be construed by our Southern Slavs as a sign of weakness and would lend force to the drawing power of the two border states. The logical conclusion to be drawn from these considerations would be to get a start on our opponents and, through a timely settlement with Serbia, put a stop to the process of development already in full swing, which might not be possible later. Count Tisza agreed that the situation had changed during the last few days because of the facts established by the investigation, and because of the attitude of the Serbian press, and he emphasized the fact that he, too, considered

the possibility of war measures against Serbia closer at hand than he had believed immediately after the Serajevo assassinations. He would never consent, however, to a surprise attack upon Serbia without preliminary diplomatic action, as seemed to be the intention, and as, unfortunately, had been discussed in Berlin by Count Hoyos, because it was his opinion that in such a case we would occupy a very bad position in the eyes of Europe and would very probably have to reckon with the hostility of all the Balkan States except Bulgaria, which at present was too weak to assist us to the proper extent. We ought first to formulate unconditional demands upon Serbia and only present an ultimatum if Serbia did not yield to them. These demands must be severe, indeed, but not impossible of fulfilment. If Serbia accepted them we would be able to show a striking diplomatic success and our prestige in the Balkans would rise. But if our demands were not accepted then he, too, would favor military action. But he must emphasize beforehand that with such action we must aim at the diminution of Serbia's power but not at her complete destruction, because on the one hand Russia would never permit that without a life-and-death struggle, and on the other because he, as Premier of Hungary, would never be able to agree to the annexation of a part of Serbia to the [Austrian] monarchy. It was not Germany's affair to determine if we should now strike Serbia or not. He personally was of the opinion that it was not unconditionally necessary at the present moment to make war. At present we must take into account the fact that there was a very strong agitation against us in Rumania; that, in view of the excited state of public opinion, we would have to reckon with a Rumanian attack, and that at all events we would have to keep a good-sized force in Transylvania in order to intimidate the Rumanians. Now that Germany has happily cleared the way for the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, there is opened to us a very promising field for successful diplomatic action in the Balkans by uniting Bulgaria and Turkey and attaching them to the Triple Alliance, thus creating a counterbalance against Serbia and Rumania, and then being able to force Rumania to return to the Triple Alliance. Upon the European field it must be taken into consideration that the relation of strength between France and Germany would steadily become worse for the former, because of its low birth-rate, and that in the future Germany would constantly have more troops available against Russia. These were all considerations that must be weighed in the case of such an important decision as was to be arrived at today, and therefore he must again point out that he would not unconditionally decide for war, in spite of the crisis in Bosnia, which, furthermore, could be remedied by an energetic reform in administration; he believed, rather, that a proper diplomatic victory—one which would include a severe humbling of Serbia—would be better adapted to improve our position and to make possible a profitable Balkan policy. In answer to this Count Berchtold, presiding, remarked that the history of recent years had shown that diplomatic victories over Serbia had, it was true, temporarily raised the prestige of the monarchy, but that the tension actually existing in our relations with Serbia had merely become greater. Neither our success in the annexation crisis [1908-1909 (see BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1908)] nor the one connected with the creation of Albania, nor the subsequent yielding of Serbia in consequence of our ultimatum

in the autumn of the preceding year, had changed anything in the actual conditions. A radical solution of the problem created by the Greater Serbia propaganda systematically carried on from Belgrade, the distintegrating effects of which upon us are noticed as far as Agram and Zara, was only possible through an energetic intervention. Regarding the danger of a hostile attitude by Rumania mentioned by the Hungarian premier, the chairman remarked that at present this was less to be feared than in the future, when the joint interests of Rumania and Serbia would constantly increase. Of course King Carol [of Rumania] had occasionally expressed doubts as to his ability to fulfil his duty as an ally toward the monarchy by active military service in case it became necessary. On the other hand it was hardly to be assumed that he would allow himself to be induced to take military action against the monarchy or be unable to withstand any public sentiment for such action. For the rest there must be considered Rumania's fear of Bulgaria, which would be bound to somewhat restrain the former's freedom of movement even under the present circumstances. So far as the Hungarian premier's remarks regarding the comparative strength of France and Germany were concerned, he [Berchtold] believed it unnecessary to point out that the diminishing increase in population of France was offset by the disproportionately higher increase in the population of Russia, so that the assertion that Germany would in the future have more troops available against France hardly appeared to hold good.

"The premier [Count Stuerghk] remarked that today's council of ministers had really been called for the purpose of discussing the internal measures to be used in Bosnia and Herzegovina that would be calculated on the one side to make present investigation, begun on account of the assassination, a success, and on the other to counteract the Greater Serbian movement in Bosnia. Now these questions must give place to the main question of whether we ought to settle the internal crisis in Bosnia by an expression of force against Serbia. This main question had now become timely after two months, first of all because the commander of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the basis of his observations and his acquaintance with Bosnian conditions, proceeded on the hypothesis that no internal measures could be successful unless we decided to strike a powerful blow at Serbia on the outside. On the base of . . . [observations made by] General Potiorek we must consider the question as to whether the schismatic activity proceeding from Serbia could be stopped, and whether we could even retain the two provinces if we did not proceed against the kingdom. During the last few days the entire situation had taken on a different aspect, and there had now been created a psychological situation, which, in his opinion, was unconditionally forcing us into a war with Serbia. He agreed, indeed, with the Hungarian premier that we, and not the German Government, must decide if a war was necessary or not; but he must still remark that it was bound to exercise a very great influence upon our decision when, as we had heard, we had been assured of unconditional loyalty by the ally whom we must regard as the most faithful supporter of our policy in the Triple Alliance and, furthermore, had been urged to act at once, after we had made inquiries there. Count Tisza certainly ought to attach importance to this circumstance and remember that we, through a policy of hesitation and weakness, ran the risk of no longer

being so sure of this unconditional support of the German Empire at a later period. This was the second matter of weight to be considered in reaching our decision, along with the interest in restoring orderly conditions in Bosnia. How the conflict was to be begun was a matter of detail, and if the Hungarian government was of the opinion that a surprise attack *sans crier gare* [without shouting a warning], as Count Tisza had said, was not practical, then another way must be found: nevertheless, he urgently desired that, whatever might happen, quick action be taken and our national economic life be spared a long period of unrest. All these were details alongside of the principal question as to whether it was to come unconditionally to warlike action or not, and there the interest in the prestige and the existence of the monarchy, whose South Slavic provinces he would consider lost if nothing happened, was decisive above all else. Therefore, today it should be decided in principle that it should and will come to action. He, too [Stuergkh], shared the opinion of the chairman that the situation would not be bettered at all by a diplomatic victory. If, consequently, the road of preliminary diplomatic action were to be taken because of international reasons, this must be done with the firm intention that this action dare only end in a war. The Finance Minister [von Bilinski] observed that Count Stuergkh had referred to the fact that the commander of the provinces wanted war. General Potiorek for two years had occupied the standpoint that we would have to undergo a trial of strength with Serbia in order to retain Bosnia and Herzegovina. We ought not to forget that the provincial commander, being on the spot, was the best judge of matters. Herr von Bilinski also entertained the conviction that the decisive struggle was unavoidable sooner or later. He had never doubted that Germany would stand by us in a grave case, and already in November, 1912, he had received the most positive assurances from Herr von Tschirschky [German ambassador at Vienna] along that line. The recent events in Bosnia had produced a very dangerous sentiment among the Serbian population, particularly because the Serbian pogrom in Serajevo had made all the Serbs very excited and embittered, and consequently one could no longer decide who among the Serbs was still loyal and who was for greater Serbia. In the country itself this condition could never be remedied; the only way to accomplish that was by a definite decision as to whether the Greater Serbia idea had a future or not. Although the Hungarian premier [Count Tisza] would now be content with a diplomatic victory, he [Bilinski] could not be so from the standpoint of the Bosnian interests. The ultimatum that we sent to Serbia last autumn had aggravated the sentiment in Bosnia and merely increased the feeling of hatred for us. It was a current topic among all the people there that King Peter [of Serbia] would come and free the people. The Serb only understands force; a diplomatic victory would make no impression in Bosnia, and would be more likely to do harm than good. The Hungarian premier asserted that he, indeed, had the highest opinion of the present provincial commander as a military man; but so far as the civil administration was concerned it could not be denied that it had completely failed, and that it must be reformed unconditionally [*unbedingt*]. He [Tisza] did not want to go into details about this now, especially as it was not the proper time to undertake great changes; he must point out, however, that the

most indescribable condition must prevail among the police in order to have made it possible for six or seven characters known to the police to place themselves on the day of the assassination along the route of the murdered heir-apparent, armed with bombs and revolvers, without a single one of them being noticed by the police and removed. He could not understand why the conditions in Bosnia could not be essentially bettered through a thorough reform.

"The Minister for War [Krobatin] expressed the opinion that a diplomatic victory was of no value. Such a success would only be interpreted as weakness. From a military standpoint he must emphasize the fact that it would be more advantageous to carry on war at once than at a later time, as in the future the comparative conditions of strength would be disproportionately shifted to our disadvantage. So far as the forms of beginning the war were concerned, he must



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COUNT TISZA

stress the fact that the two great wars of the last few years, the Russo-Japanese and the Balkan wars, had been begun without preliminary declarations of war. He thought that at first only the mobilization provided for against Serbia should be carried out, and that general mobilization should be delayed until it could be seen if Russia was going to move. We had already let pass two opportunities to settle the Serbian question, and each time postponed the decision. If we were to do the same thing now and fail to react to this recent provocation it would be regarded in all the South Slav provinces as a sign of weakness, and we should be strengthening the agitation against us. From a military standpoint it would be desirable if the mobilization were put into effect at once and with as much secrecy as possible, and an ultimatum were only sent to Serbia after mobilization had been accomplished. This would be an advantageous action in connection with the Russian military forces, also, as just now the ranks of the Russian frontier corps were not at full strength because of the harvest furloughs. At

this point there ensued a lengthy discussion over the objects of a warlike action against Serbia, in connection with which the view of the Hungarian premier that Serbia must, indeed, be reduced in size, but not entirely destroyed, was accepted. The Austrian Premier [Stuergkh] insisted that it would be a good idea to remove the Karageorgevitch dynasty and give the crown [of Serbia] to an European prince, as well as to bring about a certain relation of dependency of the diminished kingdom upon the monarchy in a military way. Count Tisza still held to the opinion that a successful Balkan policy for the monarchy could be effected through the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance and he pointed out the fearful calamities of a European war under the present conditions. It must not be overlooked that all sorts of future eventualities were imaginable—such as the sidetracking of Russia through Asiatic complications, a war of revenge upon Serbia by a revived Bulgaria, etc.—which might make our position in regard to the Greater Serbia problem materially more favorable than was the case at present. In this connection Count Berchtold remarked that, of course, one could imagine various eventualities that would make the situation favorable for us. He feared, however, that there was no time for such a development. One must reckon with the fact that from a hostile side a decisive struggle against the monarchy was being prepared and that Rumania was assisting French and Russian diplomacy. It dared not be assumed that the policy with Bulgaria could offer us a complete substitute for the loss of Rumania. But, in his opinion, Rumania was not to be won again so long as the Greater Serbia agitation existed, for this also entailed the Greater Rumania agitation, and Rumania could only proceed against this latter if it were to feel itself isolated in the Balkans by the destruction of Serbia and were to understand that it could only find support in the Triple Alliance. Besides, one must not overlook the fact that not the first step had yet been taken toward the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance. . . . Of course, the attitude of the Radoslavoff ministry (in Bulgaria) afforded no reason to doubt that it was still resolved to lend a willing ear to positive proposals that might be made by us in Sofia along the line indicated. But at present this position could not yet be regarded as a firm foundation for our Balkan policy, especially as the present Bulgarian government rested upon a very shaky base, and, as the adhesion to the Triple Alliance might be disavowed by public opinion, always to a certain degree under Russian influence, and the Radoslavoff ministry be turned out. It must also be remembered that Germany had only previously approved the proposed deal with Bulgaria on condition that it was not to be aimed against Rumania. It would not be easy entirely to fulfil this condition and uncertain situations might develop from it in the future. [At this stage followed a long debate on the question of the proposed war, which resulted in the following conclusions:]

“[1] That all those present desired the quickest possible decision of the controversy with Serbia, either by war or peaceful means.

“[2] That the council of ministers was prepared to accept the view of the Hungarian premier according to which mobilization is to be effected only after concrete demands have been presented to Serbia and after these have been rejected an ultimatum served. On the other hand, all those present except Count Tisza, were of the opinion that a purely diplomatic victory, even if it ended

with a striking humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless, and that, consequently such far-reaching demands must be presented to Serbia as to make their rejection foreseen, so that the way to a radical solution through a military attack would be prepared. Count Tisza remarked that he was anxious to meet the views of all those present, and consequently he would also make a concession by admitting that the demands be sent to Serbia should be very hard, but nevertheless not of such a kind as to expose our intention of making unacceptable demands. Otherwise we would have an impossible legal ground for a declaration of war. The text of the note must be studied very closely, and in any case we would like to see the note before it was sent. He must also emphasize the fact that he, for his part, would be obliged to draw the proper conclusions if his views were not considered. At this point the session was adjourned until the afternoon. [The meeting was resumed in the afternoon.] At the request of the chairman the Minister for War addressed the following questions to the Chief of the General Staff:

“[1] Whether it were possible first to mobilize against Serbia, and only subsequently against Russia also, if it became necessary.

“[2] Whether large bodies of troops could be retained in Transylvania for the purpose of intimidating Rumania.

“[3] Where would the struggle against Russia be begun?

“In response to these questions the Chief of the General Staff gave secret explanations and consequently asked that these answers be not included in the record. On the basis of these answers there developed a long debate over the prevailing conditions of strength and the probable course of a European war: this, because of its secret character, was not adopted for putting down in this report.

“At the conclusion of this debate the Hungarian premier repeated his view regarding the question of war and directed another appeal to those present to examine their decision very carefully. Thereupon were discussed the points which would be embodied in the note as demands upon Serbia. In regard to these points no definite decision was made in the ministerial council; they were merely taken up in order to arrive at an idea of what demands could be made. Then the Chief of the General Staff and the representative of the naval command left the council, which occupied itself with the internal condition in Bosnia and the measures to be taken there. . . .

“In general it was not possible to lay down a definite program for internal administration before the main question—as to whether war was to be waged upon Serbia—had been decided. The Chairman [Berchtold] pointed out that even though there existed a difference of opinion between Count Tisza and all the others present, they had got closer together; in all probability the proposals of the Royal Hungarian Premier would also lead to the military settlement with Serbia thought necessary by himself and the other members of the conference. Count Berchtold informed the Minister that he intended to go to Ischl on the 8th inst. to present a report to his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty. Count Tisza asked the Chairman also to present a most respectful report that he was to make of his view of the situation. After a communique for the press had been prepared, the Chairman ended the session. . . .

“BERCHTOLD,

“Secretary, A. Hoyos.

"I have taken note of the contents of this note.
Aug. 16, 1914.

"FRANZ JOSEF."

"The text of the communiqué to the press referred to is given as follows by the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*:

"The joint Ministerial Council today was called for the purpose of occupying itself with the ordering of measures which are to be applied to the internal administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time the Ministerial Council took this opportunity to discuss in advance in a general way the joint budget for next year, for which purpose the Chief of the General Staff and the representative of the naval command were called in to explain some technical questions."—*New York Times Current History, Dec., 1919, pp. 455-460.*

14.—Second Austro-Hungarian ministerial council.—Final details on war scheme.—Tisza's non-aggrandisement resolution.—Dependence of Serbia by deposition of dynasty.—Wiesner's report.—Serbian government not accessory to assassination.—On July 19, 1914, a ministerial council was held in Vienna, at which the demands on Serbia were passed unanimously. The following is the report of the proceedings:

"COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR COMMON AFFAIRS,
(JULY 19, 1914). . . .

"Protocol of the Council of Ministers for Common Affairs held in Vienna July 19, 1914, the minister of the Imp. and Roy. House and of Foreign Affairs presiding.

"Present: The Imp. Roy. Premier Count Stürgkh, The Roy. Hung. Premier Count Tisza, the Imp. and Roy. Common Finance-minister, Dr. von Bilinski, the Imp. and Roy. War-Minister F. Z. M. von Krobatin. The Imp. and Roy. Chief of the General Staff G. of I. Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Representative of the Naval Commander Vice-Admiral von Kailer. Secretary: Councillor of Legation: Count Hoyos.

"Subject under discussion: the forthcoming diplomatic action against Serbia. Before the council of common ministers was constituted and the sitting was opened by the minister in the chair, an informal discussion on the text of the note to be presented to the Servian government, took place and the text was definitely settled. The Minister in the Chair then opened the council of ministers and proposed that the note should be presented to the Royal Servian government on the 23rd July at five in the afternoon, so that the term of 48 hours would expire on Saturday, 25th inst. at five in the afternoon and the order for mobilization could be published in the night from Saturday to Sunday. It was Count Berchtold's belief that it is improbable that the news of our step would be publicly known before the President of the French Republic had left Petersburg but even if this were the case, he did not think that it would do any harm since we had fully considered the duties of etiquette and had waited until the visit was over. To a prolongation of the delay he must object on diplomatic grounds. Berlin was beginning to get nervous and news of our intentions had already transpired in Rome, so that untoward incidents could not be guarded against, if action were again postponed. Under the prompting of this declaration, made by the presiding minister, the council voted by common assent that the note should be presented on the 23rd inst. at five in the afternoon. The Roy. Hungarian Premier (Count Tisza) declares that if the

news of the presenting of the ultimatum should reach Budapest from Belgrade on the Thursday, he would speak on the subject in the Hungarian house of deputies. This was taken into account. The Chief of the General Staff (Baron Conrad) remarked that for military reasons he was in favour of a speedy beginning of the impending action. The news he had lately received from Serbia showed that three situations had by degrees been created. First large numbers of troops had been collected along the Bulgarian and Albanian frontiers; next there were reports of great numbers of soldiers having been transported to Old-Servia. Of these he had taken no account, because it was shown that they were merely exchanged for reserves. During the last three days however, he had received more serious news. First he was informed that two regiments, the 6th and the 17th, had been transferred from New-Servia to Old-Servia, and yesterday he heard from a very trustworthy confidential person in Bulgaria, that three divisions had been ordered north. Of course he would have to get these news verified. If they proved true, he must ask to be allowed to take speedy counter-measures. Next the question of proclaiming the state of siege in all the territory of the monarchy inhabited by South-Slavs was discussed and after a long debate, it was unanimously resolved that the state of siege would not be proclaimed before the mobilisation was published, not only to avoid a bad impression in foreign countries, but also among our own population. The same was resolved for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the state of siege was also to be put in force at the same time as the mobilisation. The Imp. Roy. War-minister (Krobatin) then communicated the diverse measures for the mobilisation, which he had caused to be prepared. His explanations showed that everything necessary could be completed for the Imperial sanction on Wednesday, 22th inst. and that arrangements had been made with both governments with regard to measures to be taken by the administrative authorities in both countries. The Council of Ministers then resolved to send a private letter to the chief commander of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the common finance-minister, informing him of the intentions of the Imp. and Roy. government with regard to Serbia. At the express desire of the Roy. Hungarian Premier (Tisza) the Chief of the General Staff gives private information on the mobilisation, and answers in the affirmative Count Tisza's question whether in the case of a general mobilisation, the garrisons remaining in Transylvania for its safety, were sufficiently strong to ensure order in case of internal disturbances. The garrisons were *Landsturm*-formations, commanded by officers. An experienced general would take the command. These troops would certainly not be sufficiently strong to resist an attack on the part of the Roumanian army. These troops were recruited in such a manner, that there were very few Hungarian Roumanians among them. The Roy. Hungarian Premier was satisfied with this answer and declared that the Roy. Hungarian government would provide reinforcements of the *gendarmes* in Transylvania and he would, if necessary, send a Royal commissioner there, who would act jointly with the commander of the troops, to maintain order in Transylvania, where immediately after the mobilisation, the state of siege will be proclaimed. On the proposition of the Imp. Roy. Premier (Count Stürgkh) the question is discussed in principle, what should be done, if Italy sent an expedition to Valona. The Minister in the

Chair (Berchtold) explains that he did not think such an action on Italy's part at all probable, but that diplomatic measures against such an eventuality were being taken. Should Italy decide otherwise, the Imp. and Roy. government would *pro forma* have to share the undertaking, but it is too early to consider this eventuality seriously just now. The Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) then begged the council to vote the resolution, of which he had spoken at their last meeting, and from which the Royal Hungarian government made the whole action depend. The council of ministers must express unanimously that the action against Serbia was not in any way connected with plans of aggrandisement on the part of the monarchy, and that not any portion of Serbia should be annexed, except slight frontier regulations, imposed by military considerations. He must absolutely insist that such a resolution be voted unanimously by the council. The Minister of the Chair (Berchtold) declares that even before this discussion he had the intention of declaring as much in Rome. The Imp. Roy. Premier (Stürgkh) expressed his belief, that even if the annexation of Serbian territory remained out of the question, Serbia might be made dependent upon the monarchy by the deposition of the dynasty by a military convention and by other corresponding measures. Certainly the resolution of the council of ministers must not be voted in such a manner that corrections of the frontier lines, which might become necessary from a strategic point of view would have to be renounced. The Imp. and Roy. War-minister (Krobatin) declared that he would vote the resolution on the condition, that besides corrections of the frontier lines the occupation of a bridgehead on the other side of the river Save, for instance in the Schabatz district, would be allowed. After this the following resolution was unanimously voted: The Common Council of Ministers at the proposition of the Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) votes that as soon as the war begins, the monarchy declares to the foreign powers that no war for conquest is intended, nor is the annexation of the kingdom contemplated. Of course the strategically necessary corrections of the frontier lines, or the reduction of Serbia's territory to the advantage of other states or the unavoidable temporary occupation of Serbian territory is not precluded by this resolution. The Minister in the Chair (Berchtold) mentions with gratification that on all points the council is perfectly agreed and closes the conference.

"I have taken cognisance of the contents of the protocol. VIENNA, AUGUST 5, 1914.

"FRANCIS JOSEPH, m. p.

"Clerk of the Council, A. HOYOS, m. p.

"BERCHTOLD, m. p."

—A. R. B., pt. 1, June 28 to July 23, 1914, pp. 53-58.

Both the Austro-Hungarian authorities and the press had from the beginning laid the blame for the Serajevo assassinations upon the Serbian government, whose alleged complicity in the crime was eventually taken for granted. Count Berchtold had sent Herr von Wiesner, an official of the foreign office, to Serajevo to investigate the matter. The report of this investigation follows:

"COUNCILLOR VON WIESNER TO THE IMP. AND ROY. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SARAJEVO, JULY 13, 1914.

"Cypher. It is the firm belief of all persons in authority here, that Serbia is busily spreading

propaganda for Greater Serbia—not to speak of the press—through societies and other organisations, and that everything is done with the knowledge and sanction of the Servian government. Civil and military authorities have given me the material upon which they base their belief; it may be classified as follows: The material of the time *before the assassination* contains no proofs that the Servian government promoted propaganda. There is not much, but sufficient material to prove that the movement originates in Serbia and is tolerated by the government.

"*Judicial inquiry on assassination.* There is nothing to prove or even to suppose that the Servian government is accessory to the inducement for the crime, its preparation or the furnishing of weapons. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that this is altogether out of question. From evidence of accused persons, ascertained almost indubitably that the crime was resolved upon in Belgrade and that preparations were made with the coercion of Servian state-officials Ciganovic and Major Tankosic, who jointly provided bombs, Brownings, ammunition and prussic acid. Guilt of Pribicevic not ascertained; reports about him based on regrettable misunderstandings on part of examining police organs. There can be no doubt that bombs came from army stores in Kragujevac, but there is no proof that they were obtained for the crime, as they might have been in the hands of the Komitadschis since the war. Evidence of accused persons leaves scarcely a doubt that Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, with bombs and weapons upon them, were secretly smuggled across the frontier to Bosnia by Servian organs, under the direction of Ciganovic. These organised transports were directed by the frontier-captains at Schabatz and Loznica and were contrived by frontier guards. Though it is not ascertained that they knew the purpose of the journey, still they must have accepted secrecy of mission. Other information gives insight into organisation of propaganda carried on by 'Narodna Odbrana.' This is valuable material, which will be useful, but has not yet been sifted; will be delivered without loss of time. . . ."—A. R. B., pt. 1, June 28 to July 23, 1914, pp. 44-45.

This document was in Berchtold's possession before he entered the council chamber on July 19, but he did not impart the information to the assembled ministers, thus leaving them under the impression that the Serbian government was in some way responsible for the murders. Wiesner's report was first printed after the meeting of the preliminary peace conference to decide the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. (See below: 75).

"The crime of Sarajevo' was the spark that lit the magazine which set the world aflame. The fuse apparently lay unlighted for a month and then the explosion came. The magazine had been stored by Austria-Hungary and she had only waited for the match to fire it. It seems unquestionable that the conspiracy that resulted in the Archduke's assassination was wide-spread enough to include among its members a number of Serbians, who were filled with the Pan-Serb Spirit that had grown under Austria's repressive rule, and that several of these participated in the work that led up to the terrible deed. [Among them was Colonel Dragutin Dimitryevitch, chief of the intelligence section of the Servian general staff, who planned the assassination without the knowledge of his government.] But the immediate actors were Serb subjects of the Austrian-Hungarian Emperor, who looked to Serbia as their

Mother Country."—T. N. Page, *Italy and the World War*, pp. 140-141.

15.—Austrian case against Serbia.—Text of ultimatum.—On July 23, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian minister at Belgrade presented the following note to the Serbian government:

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government: 'Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to announce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.' The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders. Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions. This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world. It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service. The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigations do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy. To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in

other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda. In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13-26 July the following declaration: 'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909. The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.' This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army.

"The Royal Servian Government further undertake:

"1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

"2. To dissolve immediately the society styled 'Narodna Odbrana,' to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

"4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

"5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June, who are on Servian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankosic and of the individual named Milan Ciganovic, a Servian State em-

ployé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

"8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

"9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

"10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.

"ANNEX

"The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last, has up to the present led to the following conclusions:

"1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voijsa Tankosic.

"2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez, by the man Milan Ciganovic and Commander Voijsa Tankosic at Belgrade.

"3. The bombs are hand-grenades, coming from the arms depot of the Servian Army at Kragujevac.

"4. In order to insure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

"5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organized by Ciganovic.

"By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabec (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic of Loznica, with the assistance of various individuals."

Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, dispatched copies of the ultimatum to Austrian diplomatic representatives abroad, with the following instructions:

"I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accred-

ited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above. On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier. Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation. No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom. Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity. A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces. Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary. In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary. The patience of the imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible. The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade. In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hun-

garian Monarchy. The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade. In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British [French, German, etc.] Government a *dossier* elucidating the Serbian intrigues, and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers. You are authorised to leave a copy of this dispatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.—VIENNA, JULY 24, 1914."

16.—"Dossier" on Austro-Serbian relations.—Austrian comment on ultimatum.—"Two days after the rupture with Serbia, the Vienna Foreign Office sent to its Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petrograd, and Constantinople a very lengthy document, which was called 'the Dossier with reference to the Great Serbian propaganda and its connection with the Serajevo murders.' It was a collection of material of heterogeneous sorts, and of very varying value. A good deal of it was occupied with matters dating back to the year 1908-9, when there had been imminent danger of war with Serbia, over the question of the Austrian annexation of Bosnia. To prove that there had been preparations for raising insurrection in Bosnia at that time, had little value in 1914, since Serbia had made her submission in March 1909, and had dropped all open and official protest against the annexation under the threat of war. Austria did not allege that the Serbian Government had been implicated in any propaganda since the date. But the complaint was that M. Pasitch and his colleagues had not devoted themselves during the last five years to suppressing provocative language in the press of the Serbian opposition, and to dissolving or punishing private clubs and societies which indulged in laudation of the Pan-Slav idea, or spoke with sympathy of the sufferings of Bosnians or Croats under the Austrian or Hungarian yoke. . . . The next section of the *dossier* deals with Serbian clubs and societies, especially the Narodna Odbrana, whose avowed objects were the strengthening of the national consciousness, physical culture, increase of material well-being, educational improvement, &c. 'Strengthening of the national consciousness' was interpreted by many members of the Narodna as meaning 'the maintenance of spiritual union with our brothers across the frontier,' and this implied the extension of the work of the society for Pan-Serbian propaganda [see also PAN-SERBISM] into Bosnia, Croatia, &c. Some of the extracts from the publications of the societies read harmlessly enough, others (no doubt) are definitely anti-Austrian, and speak of the reunion of all the South Slavs as the great aspiration of the future. . . . The second main section of the *dossier* consists of Austrian police reports. Some of these are obviously worthless, and the reader can only wonder that it was thought advisable to print them. The first, and longest, for example, purports to be the confessions of one Trefko Krstanovitch, a journeyman baker, who, on being arrested on suspicion, in July 1914, was released, after giving the police a long account of machinations of the Narodna Odbrana in 1908-10. A great deal of it was hearsay: a certain

amount was alleged adventures on secret service, including some tales about a projected murder of a Serbian refugee in Bosnia, which never came off. That it should be thought possible to compromise important Serbians by the evidence, extracted in prison, of an obscure adventurer who said that he had left the service of the Narodna because he was not paid enough, shows the depths to which the Austrian police could descend. The second document is entirely third-hand stuff about what a certain Jaglitich had been told by a certain Klaritch concerning the activities of the Narodna. The third and most important document purports to sum up the confessions of the five persons who had been participants in the plot for the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, including Prinzip the actual assassin. This was the evidence which was supposed to implicate Major Tankositch and the probationary railway clerk Tchiganovitch in the organisation of the conspiracy. . . . The last section of the *dossier* consists of a series of extracts from the Serbian press for July 1914, some of them tactless enough considering the atrocity of the Serajevo crime. These screeds repeat in various forms the fact, ever offensive to Austrians and Hungarians because of its essential truth, that 'all murders and outrages up to the present time in Austria have arisen from one and the same source: the oppressed nationalities in the Monarchy were obliged to have recourse to this method of protest because no other was open to them. In the chaos of a reign of terror it is natural and quite intelligible that an era of assassinations should have come into being.' A good many of these effusions were provoked by the outburst in the Austro-Hungarian press of wholesale accusations against 'Serbian murderers' during the days which immediately followed the Serajevo crime. The offensive Serbian paragraphs were by no means more violent than the Austrian leading articles which had preceded them. The *dossier*, in short, is interesting as an exhibition of Austro-Hungarian official mentality, rather than for any light which it brings to bear on the actual facts which preceded the outbreak of the war. It had no effect either on the diplomatists to whom it was delivered or on European public opinion."—Oman, pp. 46-48.

"ANNEX I A. FROM THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MATERIAL:

"VIENNA, JULY 27.—The 'dossier' mentioned in the Austro-Hungarian circular note to the foreign Embassies concerning the Serbian dispute is made public today. In this memorial, attention is called to the fact that the movement originating in Serbia, which has an object to tear away the southern portions of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy and unite them to Serbia, strikes far back into the past. This propaganda, always the same in purpose, changing only in means and intensity, reached its climax at the time of the annexation crisis, and came out openly at that time with its aims. While, on the one side, the entire Serbian press preached for war against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, associations were formed—to say nothing of other means of propaganda—which prepared such warfare, among which the Narodna Odbrana was the most important. Originating in a revolutionary committee, this association became entirely dependent on the Serbian Foreign Office, under the direction of statesmen and officers, among them Gen. Jankovic and former Minister Ivanovic. Among the founders are also Major

Oja Tankovic and Milan Pribicevic. This association had as an object the formation and equipment of bodies of volunteers for the coming war against Austria-Hungary. In addition to the memorial, a quotation is given from the association's official organ, which bears the same name, Narodna Odbrana, and is issued at the association's headquarters, wherein, in several articles, the activities and aim of this society are set forth. Therein it is stated that part of the main task of the Narodna Odbrana is to effect union between its brothers far and near on the other side of the border, and with all the rest of our friends in the world. Austria is mentioned as the first and greatest enemy. Just as the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of war with Austria, it also preaches a holy truth about our national situation. The closing chapter contains an appeal to the Government and people of Serbia to prepare in every way for the struggle which the annexation foreshadowed. The memorial tells of the Narodna Odbrana's activities at that time, as set forth in a statement of a komitadji raised by the association; it maintained a school under the direction of two of its principal members, of whom one was Tankovic, for the instruction of bands of men—schools which Gen. Jankovic and Capt. Milan Pribicevic inspected regularly. Furthermore, the komitadjis were instructed in shooting, bomb-throwing, laying of mines, blowing up of railway bridges, &c. . . . [Men of trust and missionaries stirred up adults and unthinking youths. Thus] Milan Pribicevic persuaded former Honved officers and a lieutenant of gendarmes to leave army service in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy under serious circumstances. In the schools where teachers were educated an agitation of wide scope was developed. The wished-for fight against the Austro-Hungarian empire was also prepared militarily to the point that Servian emissaries were commissioned to destroy means of transportation, etc., and to kindle revolts and panics, in case of the outbreak of hostilities. . . . Furthermore, it is told how bombs and arms were secretly smuggled into Bosnia, which leaves no doubt that this is a well-prepared and often utilized road for the secret aims of the Narodna. One inclosure contains a quotation from the minutes of the court-martial in Serajevo concerning the investigation of the attack on the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife. According to this, Princip, Crabinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic, and Papovic appear as having confessed that they, in company with the fugitive Mehmed-basic, organized a plot for the murder of the Archduke and that they kept watch on him for this purpose. Crabinovic is said to have confessed that he threw the bomb and that Gabrilo Princip carried out the attempt with the Browning pistol. Both men acknowledged that in doing the deed they premeditated murder. . . .

"ANNEX I B. THE CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE TO THE IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS IN PARIS, LONDON, ST. PETERSBURG:

"BERLIN, JULY 23, 1914.—The statements of the Austro-Hungarian Government as to the conditions under which the attempt on the life of the Austrian Crown Prince and his wife occurred make clear the aims of the Pan-Servian propaganda, and the means which it employs to accomplish its ends. . . . The Servian machinations go back many years. Servian Chauvinism showed itself in an especially marked form during the Bosnian crisis. That there was no conflict as a result of Servia's

provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary at this time was due to the moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intervention of the great powers. The assurances of future good behavior which the Servian Government then gave have not been kept. Under the very eyes, or, at least, with the silent consent, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has continually grown in scope and intensity; the latest crime, the threads which lead to Belgrade, must be placed to its account. It has become unmistakably apparent that it is incompatible both with the dignity and the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy that it should continue to look on inactively at the plotting across the border, which continually jeopardizes the integrity of its territory. . . . I ask your Excellency to express yourself in the above terms to the representative of (Mr. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (Mr. Sazonof) and to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned. We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure. I shall await with interest a telegraphic report from you as to the result of your interview. [As presented by the German ambassador in London to Sir E. Grey on July 24, the above note was somewhat differently worded.]

"ANNEX 2. THE [GERMAN] IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE CONFEDERATED GOVERNMENTS OF GERMANY:

"JULY 23, 1914: Confidential! Kindly make the following announcement to the Government to which you are accredited: In view of the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Government has made known in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the plot to which the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince and his wife were victims was hatched in Servia, with the connivance, at least, of officials of the Servian Government. It is a product of the Pan-Servian efforts which, during a number of years, have become a source of lasting disquietude for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for all Europe. . . . The answer of the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government made on the 23d of the month through its representative in Belgrade makes clear that those at the head of Servian affairs are not inclined to give up the policy hitherto adopted by them, nor their activity as agitators. Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish to give up forever its position as a great power, has nothing left to it but to back up its demands with strong pressure, and, if necessary, by the adoption of military measures. Certain elements in Russia consider it a natural right and the duty of Russia energetically to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary. In fact, the *Novoe Vremya* considers itself justified in making Germany responsible for the European conflagration that might result from such a move by Russia, if it does not compel Austria-Hungary to back down. Here the Russian press takes a wrong view. It was not Austria-Hungary that brought on the conflict with Servia, but Servia, which by unscrupulous favoring of Pan-Servian aspirations even in parts of Austria-Hungary's territory, has jeopardized the very existence of the latter, and created

conditions which finally found expression in the dastardly crime of Serajevo. If Russia feels constrained to take sides with Serbia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it. But she must bear clearly in mind that in so doing she makes Serbia's aspirations to undermine the conditions necessary for the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, identical with her own, and that she alone must bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Serbian question, which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize. . . . The attitude of the Imperial German Government in this matter is clearly outlined. The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs against Austria-Hungary has, as its principal aim, the dissolution or weakening of the Triple Alliance by means of the destruction of the Danube Empire, and, as a result, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our closest interests, therefore, summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty to save Europe if possible from a general war demands also that we support the efforts to localize the trouble in accordance with the policy which we have successfully followed for the last forty-four years in the interests of the preservation of the peace in Europe. But if, contrary to hope, the trouble should spread owing to the intervention of Russia, then true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire. We shall draw our sword only if obliged to do so, and we shall do it then in the firm conviction that we bear no responsibility for the calamity which a war must needs bring to the nations of Europe.

"ANNEX 3. TELEGRAM FROM GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN VIENNA TO IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR:

"JULY 24, 1914: Count Berchtold to-day summoned the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Serbia. After going over the historical developments of the last few years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy did not wish to appear against Serbia in the rôle of a conqueror. He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure against Serbian machinations, that Austria-Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly behavior of Serbia toward the monarchy, that she had no intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans. The Chargé d'Affaires, who as yet had no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the explanations of the Minister ad referendum adding that he would immediately transmit them to Sasonow."—*B. D. C., Annexes nos. 1A, 1B, 2, 3.*

In the Kautsky *Documents* the foregoing (Annex 3), with the comments written by Emperor William, appears as follows:

"THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, VIENNA, JULY 24, 1914.

"Entirely superfluous! Will create an impression of weakness and an impression of apology which is entirely wrong towards Russia and must be avoided. Austria has her

"In order to prove his good will towards Russia, Count Berchtold invited the Russian chargé d'affaires to come and see him in order to explain to him in detail the position of Austria-Hungary toward Serbia. After recapitulating the historical development of the past three years, he empha-

good reasons; has proceeded accordingly; now this cannot be put in a kind of discussion afterwards."

"Jackass! the Sand-schack she must take back, otherwise the Serbs will get to the Adriatic."

"That comes of its own accord and must come. Austria must become preponderant in the Balkans over the other small states at the expense of Russia; otherwise there will be no peace."

"Very weak!"

On July 24, the British ambassador at Vienna reported to Sir Edward Grey as follows:

"No. 7. SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY.

"VIENNA, JULY 24: Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent. Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 P. M. tomorrow. [The time limit was later set for 6 P. M.] His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any power."—*B. D. C., no. 7.*

Austrian public opinion at this juncture is evidenced by the following extract:

"THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERBIA. (From *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 25, 1914.)

"BERLIN, JULY 24: The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade at 6 o'clock last night handed to the Servian Government a verbal note with the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government. In the note the answer is requested by 6 P. M., July 25. . . . The *Fremdenblatt* [Vienna]

writes, among other things, as follows: 'The crime of Serajevo has revealed to the whole world the dangers that threaten us, and has directed our attention to the pressing need of insuring quiet and safety to ourselves at any cost. The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade today made known to the Servian Government the demands which we must make to it today. It is the result of long, careful consideration and does not go any further than absolutely necessary. We must insist on the demands as they stand; for this is a matter of underground passages extending from Servia directly to the heart of our South Slavic territories. Conditions that we cannot allow to continue have made themselves apparent on the threshold of our house as a result of the encroachment of the Pan-Servian idea. Servia has covered herself with a network of societies which, with the pretext of fostering culture, preach the doctrine of hatred of us throughout the country. Emissaries are sent out to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia to incite the populace to revolt and to picture to them an imminent union of those territories with the Servian Kingdom. The Servian Government, in spite of its emphatic declaration, has done nothing to stop this movement; its tolerance has had the effect of silent consent. . . . The results of this agitation have frequently been felt in our economic life. Thousands of careers have been blasted as a result of the alarming crises following the constantly recurring Pan-Servian scare. Were we to endure all this without stepping in to take decided action against it, the same agitators who continually, for the sake of rhetorical effect, accuse us of the misuse of power, would call this a sign of weakness, lack of will, and fear. They would state that we do not dare to defend ourselves, and in that way they would find new supporters and would feel encouraged to a doubly strong attack. While we are making our will felt, we are bringing the Servian people themselves to a realization of their position. They will see that they have been deceived, that the movement for a greater Servia will break against an iron wall, that the monarchy is determined to spurn them. The feeling that we have to deal with a condition that has become unbearable, that a stop must be put to it, is so strong among our people that complaints concerning the long delay in dealing with the situation are getting louder.'

—B. D. C.

17.—Effect of ultimatum in Belgrade.—"The Serbs were terror-stricken. They knew that part of the Austrian demands were justifiable; that the Pan-Serbist propaganda had been undeniably unfriendly; and that there had been unseemly rejoicings in Belgrade at the news of the murder of the archduke. Besides, Serbia had been in bad odor in Europe ever since the killing of King Alexander [in 1903]. Russia was not anxious for war, and France very loath to pour out blood and treasure purely over a Balkan squabble. England was still more unwilling. As a result the Serbs almost literally fell on their knees. They did everything but pawn their national independence. For practical purposes they assented to every one of the drastic Austrian demands save only those requiring that Austrian officials should conduct investigations and trials on Serbian soil, and they would accept this so far as it 'agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.' If Austria was not satisfied with this reply Serbia would be glad to refer all mooted questions 'to the decision of the international tribunal of The

Hague.'"—W. S. Davis, W. Anderson and M. W. Tyler, *Roots of the war*, p. 498.—"The Austrian note to Serbia will remain a famous document hundreds of years after the millions who first read it have mouldered in their graves. It marks the end of one era in the world's history, the beginning of yet another. The French Revolution is commonly held to fairly begin with the fall of the Bastille. A revolution in the polity and economy of the entire world was undoubtedly to begin with the delivery of that type-written paper by the peaceful-looking Freiherr von Giesl. The document was instantly recognized as charged with dynamite."—*Ibid.*, p. 494.—See also above: 15; SERBIA: 1914.

18.—British government view on ultimatum.—"Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum. Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that 'the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted.' The dispute between Austria and Servia did not necessarily affect that interest; it was a dispute between two Governments with which Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake; and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Servia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a 'spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice'—by a 'loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned.' It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis."—*Great Britain and the European crisis (Introductory narrative of events, British Foreign Office, 1914)*.—See also ENGLAND: 1914.

19.—Serbian appeal to Russia.—On July 24, the day after the Austrian ultimatum had been presented at Belgrade, the prince regent of Servia telegraphed to the tsar: "We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legislation, which would need time. We

have been allowed too short a time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated goodwill which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded."—*R. O. B., no. 6.*

20.—*Danger of time limit in ultimatum.*—When a copy of the Austrian note was presented in London to Sir Edward Grey, he complained at the outset of the danger of imposing a time limit, and immediately telegraphed to De Bunsen at Vienna, as follows:

"No. 5. SIR E. GREY TO SIR M. DE BUNSEN, . . . JULY 24:

"Note addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff. In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia. I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits. I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation. Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Serbia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part. I said that if Serbia had procrastinated in replying a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Serbian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

[At the same time the British foreign minister telegraphed the chargé d'affaires at Belgrade to counsel Serbia to act with circumspection. The following documents give some idea of the tension of the situation.]

"No. 8. MR. CRACKANTHORPE, BRITISH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT BELGRADE, TO SIR EDWARD GREY, . . . JULY 24:

"Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who ear-

nestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them. This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

"No. 12. SIR E. GREY'S REPLY TO MR. CRACKANTHORPE, JULY 24:

"Serbia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests. It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favorably to as many points as the time limit allows. Servian Minister here has begged that his Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government. I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

"No. 22. MR. CRACKANTHORPE, BRITISH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT BELGRADE, TO SIR EDWARD GREY, . . . JULY 25, 1914:

"I have seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views. They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Serbian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government. I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

"No. 13. NOTE COMMUNICATED BY RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR [IN LONDON] JULY 25:

"M. Sazonof telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914: 'The Communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen. In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them. In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer

advice to the Servian Government. A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations. Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna. M. Sazonof hopes that his Britannic Majesty's Government will share to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.' [NOTE: The double dates: 11th (24th) July, are those of the Julian and Gregorian calendars, respectively.]

"NO. 14. SIR E. GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE AND TO SIR G. BUCHANAN, JULY 25, 1914:

"Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations. In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris, (St. Petersburg,) you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute."

—*B. D. C.*, nos. 5, 8, 12, 22, 13, 14.

21.—Efforts at mediation.—British proposal.—Departure of Austro-Hungarian minister from Belgrade.—Mobilization ordered by Serbia.—The first task of the British Foreign Minister "was to send for the French Ambassador, whom he informed of his conviction that the only chance of mediation was that Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, who had no direct interests in Serbia, should act jointly and simultaneously in Vienna and Petrograd. Cambon replied gloomily that nothing could be said in Petrograd till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action; that in two days Austria would march into Serbia, since the Serbians could not possibly accept the ultimatum; that Russia would be compelled by public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and, therefore, that when the Austrian attack began it would be too late for mediation. The same afternoon the Foreign Secretary saw the German Ambassador, who brought a circular note denouncing Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy, approving the Austrian procedure, and expressing the opinion that the matter concerned Austria and Serbia alone. Sir Edward declared that if the ultimatum did not lead to trouble with Russia he had no concern with it. But he was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take, and in view of the extraordinary character of the Austrian note, and the short time allowed, he felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned. The only chance was that the four other Great Powers should mediate and gain time, and this was only possible if Germany would propose and participate in such advice at Vienna."—G. P. Gooch, *History of modern Europe, 1878-1919*, pp. 536, 537.

"NO. 10. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE [PARIS], JULY 24, 1914:

"After telling M. Cambon today of the Austrian communication to Serbia which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday [see

above: 20] I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it: but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any power interested in Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg. . . . I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible for the four powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it. M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other powers. I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia. He replied that it was so. I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

"NO. 11. SIR E. GREY TO SIR H. RUMBOLD [Counsellor of British embassy at Berlin], JULY 24:

"German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Serbia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the powers. I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. . . . The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia become threatening. The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. Prince Lichnowsky said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands in toto. . . ."

—*B. D. C.*, nos. 10, 11.

"At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, 'the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin.' What was Germany's

attitude? Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum; officially, the German Government called it 'equitable and moderate,' and said that they 'desired urgently the localisation of the conflict.' Everyone desired that; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. . . . Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm."—*B. D. C., Introduction.*

"During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to 'pass on' the message to Vienna. . . . The Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria. But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired; and after all Serbia did not need advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power—Germany not excepted—had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Serbia ordered a general mobilisation. But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with 'passing on' the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham."—*Ibid., no. 4.*

On July 26, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed instructions for the proposal for mediation which he had already discussed with the ambassadors in London:

"No. 36. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE, SIR H. RUMBOLD AND SIR R. RODD, LONDON, . . . JULY 26, 1914:

"Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg could be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference."—*B. D. C., no. 36.*

On July 27, Sir Maurice de Bunsen reported the state of affairs at Vienna:

"No. 41. SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY, VIENNA, JULY 27, 1914:

"I have had conversation with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment. . . ."—*B. D. C., no. 41.*

To the proposal for mediation the following replies were given:

"No. 42. SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY, PARIS, JULY 27, 1914:

"Your proposal as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday, is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so."—*B. D. C., no. 42.*

"No. 43. SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY, BERLIN, JULY 27, 1914:

"Your telegram of 26th July.

"Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to cooperate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was no intention on the part

of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments. In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany.' He said that if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation."—*B. D. C.*, no. 43.

From St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan reported:

"No. 44. SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY, ST. PETERSBURG, JULY 27, 1914:

"Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that . . . to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. . . .

"No. 45. SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY, ST. PETERSBURG, JULY 27, 1914:

"Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of today [See No. 44], I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

[The same day, Goschen reported that Germany had modified her attitude.]

"No. 46. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN, LONDON, . . . JULY 27, 1914.

"German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of Europe. . . ."—*B. D. C.*, nos. 44-46.

"France and Italy promptly accepted the proposal; but the Kaiser declared that he would only take part in mediation at Austria's express wish, 'since in vital matters people consult nobody.' The Foreign Secretary rejoined that the Serbian reply, which he had just seen and which went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands, was obviously due to Russian prompting, and it was therefore at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. Serbia's reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause, and Germany could urge this course at Vienna. Lichnowsky reported that he found the Minister for the first time in bad spirits.

'He spoke very gravely and seemed very definitely to expect us to use our influence to settle the question. Everybody here is convinced that the key is in Berlin, and that, if Berlin wishes peace, it will hold back Austria.' The Chancellor, who earnestly desired peace but had completely lost control of the situation, telegraphed Lichnowsky's dispatch to Vienna, adding that, having already declined the proposal for a conference, it was impossible to reject the new suggestion. 'By rejecting every sort of mediation we should be made responsible before the whole world for the conflagration. Our situation is all the more difficult as Serbia has apparently given way very far. We cannot, therefore, reject the rôle of mediator and must lay before the Vienna Cabinet the English proposal. Ascertain Berchtold's view of the English plan and of Sazonoff's wish to negotiate direct with Vienna.' Unfortunately for the peace of the world Vienna was resolved on a final reckoning with her troublesome neighbour. 'The integral acceptance of the ultimatum,' reported Sir Maurice de Bunsen, 'was neither expected nor desired. When it was rumoured that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known that it had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations with Belgrad, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight. . . . Count Mensdorff was instructed to inform Sir Edward that Serbia had not accepted the demands, that Austria must proceed to force, and that she counted on British sympathy in the struggle forced on her. The Ambassador explained that the reply might on paper seem satisfactory, but that the co-operation of Austrian officers and police which alone would guarantee the cessation of the subversive campaign against Austria had been refused. Sir Edward retorted that the response of Belgrad involved the greatest humiliation he had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing that Austria had treated it as a blank negative.'—G. P. Gooch, *History of modern Europe*, pp. 537-540.

22.—Russian attitude on ultimatum.—Arbitration proposal accepted.—"On July 24 the German Government told the Powers that it approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the 'Great Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great Power, could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, even, if necessary, by military measures; and that the question was one which concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and Servia. Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against Servia alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs told the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct was provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were impossible of acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria began military measures against Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. . . . To the Austro-Hungarian Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day . . . that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quite insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; and he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges against Servia. On July 25 Russia told England that Servia would punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all the demands

of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If Serbia appealed to arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leave the arbitration in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy—the four Powers whom Sir Edward Grey had suggested as possible mediators.”—Oxford Faculty of Modern History, *Why we are at war* (Prefatory note to Appendix VII, pp. 58-60).

23.—Russian appeal for British solidarity in Triple Entente.—Sazonov's prophecy.—“If Austria was determined at any cost to have the reckoning with Serbia of which she had been baulked in 1913, and which she regarded as essentially defensive, Russia was no less resolved to honour her reiterated promises of support to her Balkan protégé. Moreover, the military party looked forward with confidence to a conflict of which Constantinople might be the prize. In the Central Empires it was hoped and in some quarters sincerely believed that she would stand aside while Serbia was receiving her chastisement; but there was no ground for such a supposition. After reading the Austrian ultimatum . . . Sazonoff described it to Sir George Buchanan as provocative and immoral, and expressed the hope that the British Government would proclaim its solidarity with Russia and France. The Ambassador replied that he did not expect any unconditional engagement of armed support, since direct British interests were nil, and a war for Serbia would never be sanctioned by British opinion. Sazonoff retorted that the general European question was involved, that Great Britain would sooner or later be dragged in if war broke out, and that she would render it more probable if she did not from the outset make common cause with France and Russia. The French Ambassador joined in the appeal; and Sir George concluded his dispatch by expressing his opinion that, even if we declined to join them, France and Russia were determined to make a strong stand.”—G. P. Gooch, *History of modern Europe, 1873-1919*, p. 540.

“No. 9. SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY,
ST. PETERSBURG, JULY 24, 1914:

“I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him. . . . He begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters. . . . [At the meeting] he hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue. In reply to these remarks I

observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia could not be tolerated. But, supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Serbia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria? M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably tomorrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to. I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Serbia. French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack upon Serbia by Austria would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war, if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped his Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria. President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum. It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.”—*B. D. C.*, no. 6.

That the British ambassador correctly indicated the policy of his government is shown by Sir Edward Grey's reply to this report, July 25:

“You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of his Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday, and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government. I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over

a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it. The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate. No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial, and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential."—*B.D.C., no. 24.*

On the next day Sazonov repeated his plea that Great Britain should take a definite stand with Russia and France. The British ambassador reports to Sir Edward Grey as follows:

"No. 17. SIR G. BUCHANAN, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT ST. PETERSBURG, TO SIR E. GREY, JULY 25:

"I saw . . . [Sazonov] this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris [see above: 20] and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade. The minister . . . said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening. . . . [Sazonov] said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. . . . [Sazonov] thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1909, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers. If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration. On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Bal-

kans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate."—*B.D.C., no. 17.*

24.—Belgian anxiety.—Determination to maintain neutrality.—Meanwhile Belgium began to show anxiety. On July 24, the day after the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had been launched at Belgrade, the Belgian foreign minister, M. Davignon, in sending copies of that ultimatum to the Belgian diplomatic representatives at Berlin, London, Paris, St. Petersburg and Vienna, wrote as follows:

"SIR:—The Belgian Government have had under their consideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfill the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers. The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad. In these circumstances I have proposed to the King [Albert] and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening. I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary. I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instructions. This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the mobilisation of the Belgian army, if contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

"ENCLOSURE IN No. 2 [Translation].

"Sir: The international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government. Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties

of a neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 10, 1839; and those duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circumstances may be. The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers. All necessary steps to ensure respect to Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defence. It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers. In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take note of it. A similar communication has been made to the other Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.'—*B. G. B., no. 2.*

—See also BELGIUM: 1914: World War.

25.—Reply of Serbian government to Austro-Hungarian note.—To the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, Serbia replied as follows:

"The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant [old style—July 23], and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

"[a] Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupstina [Serbian parliament] and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th [old style—March 31] March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved.

"[b] The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the

time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

"[c] For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them.

"[d] Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the 'Journal officiel,' on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration: 'The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements.

"[e] The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour.' This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

"[f] The Royal Government further undertake:—1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupstina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

"[g] 2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the 'Narodna Odbrana' and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature

through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the 'Narodna Odbrana' Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

"[h] 3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

"[i] 4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

"[j] 5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

"[k] 6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communication as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

"[l] 7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June [old style—June 28] was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

"8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

"9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after

the crime which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

"10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out. If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

"BELGRADE, JULY 12 (25), 1914."

(The italic letters in brackets [a], [b], etc., do not belong to the original text. They have been inserted above merely as a convenient guide to the Austrian government's criticisms of those sections thus marked. [See below: 26.]

"It was 5.45 P.M. when this formal humiliation of a weak nation before a strong one was placed in the hands of Von Giesl, the Austrian minister. That noble gentleman evidently did not feel required to waste much time studying its clauses, to see whether under their 'evasive' and 'unsatisfactory' phrases (so the Vienna papers soon announced) there might not be terms admitting of accommodation and peace. Also little time was wasted telegraphing the document to Vienna and weighing its terms in Franz Josef's cabinet: for practical purposes the Serbs might just as well have flung back brave defiance. At 6.30 P.M. Freiherr von Giesl handed in a note at Belgrade 'that not having received a satisfactory answer within the time limit set, he was leaving Belgrade with the entire staff of the legation.' . . . Diplomatic relations were broken, and the mobilization of troops opposite the Serbian capital and the approach of Austrian river monitors [on the Danube] indicated that bullets would soon supersede protocols. In Buda-Pesth and Vienna there was parading and huzzaing in the streets. Serbia was weak and very much hated. It was generally felt that Russia would not dare to stir in the face of Germany. The short easy war seemed very popular. The invasion of Serbia would be merely a promenade."—W. S. Davis, W. Anderson and M. W. Tyler, *Roots of the war*, p. 499.

26.—Austrian government's criticisms on Serbian reply.—On July 29 the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published a long message from Vienna, dated July 27, in which the Serbian reply to the ultimatum was reproduced in sections; at the end of each section there appeared a paragraph headed "Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government." These comments follow: the letters in brackets indicate the sections to which they refer as marked in the preceding division, 25.

"[a] The Royal Servian Government limits itself to the statement that since it made the declaration of March 18, 1909, no effort has been made

by the Servian Government or its officers to alter the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thereby it consciously and willfully evades the grounds on which we base our course, since we did not make the claim that it and its officials had undertaken anything of an official nature along this line. Our grievance rather is this, that it failed to suppress movements directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy in spite of the pledges made in the note in question. Its pledge consisted of this, that the entire trend of its policies was to be changed and pleasant, neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy brought about; not merely to refrain from officially taking up the question of Bosnia's belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. . . .

"[b] The contention of the Royal Servian Government that utterances of the press and the activities of societies have a private character and are not under the control of the State is contrary to the practice of modern States, even under the freest interpretation of the rights of the press and societies, which are of public legal character and both subject to State supervision. Moreover, Servian practice is to exercise such control. The charge against the Servian Government is that it has entirely failed to inspect its press and societies whose acts hostile to Austria-Hungary were known to it. . . .

"[c] This contention is incorrect. The Servian Government had been carefully advised as to certain definite persons who were suspected, and it was not only in the position but bound by its internal laws to begin an action spontaneously. It did nothing at all along these lines. . . .

"[d] Our demand read as follows: 'The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda that is directed against Austria-Hungary. . . .' The change made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us infers that such a propaganda against Austria-Hungary does not exist or that it is unknown to the Royal Government. This formula is not sincere, and conceals something in order that the Servian Government later may reserve an avenue of escape, saying that in its declaration it did not disavow the existence of the present propaganda, and did not recognize it as inimical to the monarchy, whereupon it could mislead further to the contention that it would not be pledged to suppress a propaganda like the present one. . . .

"[e] The formal declaration demanded by us was as follows: 'The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries . . . took part in. . . .' Also in this choice of words and in the additional clause 'in accordance with advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government,' it is shown that the Servian Government is carrying out the object indicated above—to allow itself free rein in the future. . . .

"[f] We had demanded: 'The suppression of all publications that arouse people to hatred and contempt for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and whose tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.' We thus wished to obligate Servia to take measures for having such attacks in the press cease in future; we wished, therefore, to be sure that we had won certain success in this direction. Instead, Servia offers to make certain laws that may lead to the above result, to wit: (a) A law by which the individuals may be punished for above-mentioned statements of the press hostile to the monarchy. This is nothing to us, especially, as it is well known that the punishment of individuals for press misdemeanors

is possible only in very rare cases, and, under a correspondingly lax handling of such a law, even these few would not be punished. Thus this is a suggestion which in no wise answers our demand, and therefore does not offer us the slightest guarantee of the result desired by us. (b) An addition to Article XXII of the Constitution to the effect that confiscation be allowed—a suggestion that likewise must fail to satisfy us, since the existence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us. What would be of use would be the promise of the Government to enforce it, which promise is not made to us. Therefore these suggestions are thoroughly unsatisfactory, all the more so as they are of an evasive nature, since we are not told within what space of time these laws will be enacted, and since if the enactment of the laws should be refused by the Skupstina—to say nothing of the possible resignation of the Government—all would remain as it was. . . .

"[g] The anti-monarchical propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and the associations affiliated with it fills all public life in Servia; it is therefore a quite unreliable statement on the part of the Servian Government to maintain that it knows nothing about this society. To say nothing of the fact that the demand made by us is not entirely granted, since we furthermore demanded: That the means of propaganda of these associations should be confiscated. That the reorganization of the dissolved associations under other names and in other forms should be prevented. Concerning these two points the Belgrade Government preserves complete silence, so that we have no assurance, in the partial agreement given us, that an end will be put to the anti-Austrian associations, especially of the 'Narodna Odbrana,' by their dissolution. . . .

"[h] Upon this point also the Servian Government demands proof that, in the public instruction courses of Servia, there is an anti-Austrian propaganda, although it must be aware that the books employed in the Servian schools contain such matter, and that a great part of the Servian teachers are in the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated associations. Moreover, in this case also, the Servian Government has not met a part of our demands, since, in its text, it left out this addition desired by us, 'as well as the body of teachers and the means of teaching are concerned'—an addition which clearly shows where the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian schools is to be sought. . . .

"[i] In view of the fact that the Royal Servian Government makes the discharge of the officers and employes in question from military and civil service dependent on whether they are found guilty after trial, its accession to our demand is limited to those cases where such persons have committed acts laying them open to legal penalties. Since, however, we demand the elimination of those officers and employes who are making an anti-Austrian propaganda, which in Servia is not usually punishable by law, it would seem that in this case also our demands have not been met. . . .

"[j] International law has as little to do with this question as criminal procedure. The question is purely one of national policing, to be solved by special agreement. Servia's statement is, therefore, incomprehensible and, on account of its vague form, would give rise to insurmountable difficulties if an endeavor were made to arrange the agreement. . . .

"[k] Our demand was perfectly clear and not to be misunderstood. We wished: (1) The institution of a legal investigation against those impli-

cated in the plot. (2) That Austro-Hungarian representatives should take part in the investigation, ('recherche,' in contradistinction to 'enquête judiciaire.') (3) We did not desire that Austro-Hungarian representatives take part in the Servian legal proceedings; all we wished them to do was to co-operate in the police preliminaries, and help get together and corroborate the evidence for the investigation. If the Servian Government misunderstands us it does so purposely, since the difference between 'enquête judiciaire' and the simple 'recherches' must certainly be plain to it. Since it wished to be free of all control in the proceedings to be instituted, which, if properly conducted, would have results highly undesirable for it, and as it has no loophole for plausibly declining our co-operation in the police proceedings (analogous cases for such police intervention exist in great number) it has taken a ground that gives to its refusal the appearance of right and to our demand the stamp of impossibility. . . .

"[I] This answer is insincere. Ciganovic, according to our investigation, went on a furlough three days after the crime, when it became known that he was concerned in the plot, and repaired to Ribari in the service of the Prefect of Police of Belgrade. So that it is incorrect to say that, between June 15 and 28, Ciganovic was already out of the Servian service. To this must be added that the Prefect of Police of Belgrade, who himself had brought about the departure of Ciganovic, and who knew where the latter was, declared in an interview that there was no man of the name of Milan Ciganovic in Belgrade."—*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 29, 1914.—See also AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1914-1915.

27.—British protest against Austrian aggressive attitude.—On July 27 both Count Mensdorff, the Austrian ambassador to London, and the German ambassador had interviews with Sir Edward Grey, upon which Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British ambassador at Vienna as follows:

"No. 48. SIR E. GREY TO SIR M. DE BUNSEN, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA . . . JULY 27, 1914:

"Sir: Count Mensdorff told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. . . . Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary. . . . He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs

against Servian territory. I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador [see below: 31] this morning about that reply. Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria. I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. . . . It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative."—*B. D. C.*, no. 48.

28.—First declaration of war: Austria-Hungary against Serbia.—Dismissal of Serbian minister from Vienna.—"On Tuesday (July 28) war was at last declared. The declaration was sent in the most contemptuous and discourteous form, by means of an open telegram to the Servian Government."—*Headlam*, p. 173.—The fateful document launched by Count Berchtold read as follows:

"The Royal Government of Serbia, not having replied in a satisfactory manner to the Note which had been delivered to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, which Note was dated July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself under the necessity of providing for the safeguarding of its own interests and, to that end, to have recourse to the force of arms. Austria-Hungary therefore considers itself from this moment in a state of war with Serbia.

"*The Minister for Foreign Affairs,*
"COUNT BERCHTOLD."

On the same day the Serbian minister in Vienna received his passports with the following note:

"As no satisfactory reply has been given to the note which the Imperial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary handed to the Royal [Serbian] Government on the 10/23 instant, I have been compelled to instruct Baron Giesl to leave the Servian capital and to entrust the protection of the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to the German Legation. I regret that the relations which I have had the honor to maintain with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated, and I avail myself of this opportunity to place at your disposal the enclosed passports for your return to Servia, as well as for the return of the staff of the Royal Legation. [Signed] BERCHTOLD."—*S. B. B.*, no. 42.

29.—Imperial rescript on Austro-Serbian quarrel.—Austrian version.—On the same day (July 28) the official Austro-Hungarian version of the dispute was set forth in an Imperial Rescript and Manifesto signed by the late Emperor Francis Joseph and addressed to Count Stürgkh, Austrian prime minister:

"ISCHL, JULY 28.

"DEAR COUNT STÜRGKH:

"I have resolved to instruct the Ministers of my Household and Foreign Affairs to notify the Royal Servian Government of the beginning of a state of war between the Monarchy and Servia. In this fateful hour I feel the need of turning to my beloved peoples. I command you, therefore, to publish the inclosed manifesto: 'To my peoples! It was my fervent wish to consecrate the years which, by the grace of God, still remain to me, to the works of peace and to protect my peoples from the heavy sacrifices and burdens of war. Providence, in its wisdom, has otherwise decreed. The intrigues of a malevolent opponent compel me, in the defense of the honor of my Monarchy, for the protection of its dignity and its position as a power, for the security of its possessions, to grasp the sword after long years of peace. With a quickly forgetful ingratitude, the Kingdom of Servia, which, from the first beginnings of its independence as a State until quite recently, had been supported and assisted by my ancestors, has for years trodden the path of open hostility to Austria-Hungary. When, after three decades of fruitful work for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I extended my Sovereign rights to those lands, my decree called forth in the Kingdom of Servia, whose rights were in nowise injured, outbreaks of unrestrained passion and the bitterest hate. My Government at that time employed the handsome privileges of the stronger, and with extreme consideration and leniency only requested Servia to reduce her army to a peace footing and to promise that, for the future, she would tread the path of peace and friendship. Guided by the same spirit of moderation, my Government, when Servia, two years ago, was embroiled in a struggle with the Turkish Empire, restricted its action to the defense of the most serious and vital interests of the Monarchy. It was to this attitude that Servia primarily owed the attainment of the objects of that war. The hope that the Servian Kingdom would appreciate the patience and love of peace of my Government and would keep its word has not been fulfilled. The flame of its hatred for myself and my house has blazed always higher; the design to tear from us by force inseparable portions of Austria-Hungary has been made manifest with less and less disguise. A criminal propaganda has extended over the frontier with the object of destroying the foundations of State order in the southeastern part of the monarchy; of making the people, to whom I, in my paternal affection, extended my full confidence, waver in its loyalty to the ruling house and to the Fatherland; of leading astray its growing youth and inciting it to mischievous deeds of madness and high treason. A series of murderous attacks, an organized, carefully prepared, and well carried-out conspiracy, whose fruitful success wounded me and my loyal peoples to the heart, forms a visible bloody track of those secret machinations which were operated and directed in Servia. A halt must be called to these intolerable proceedings and an end must be put to the incessant provocations of Servia. The honor and dignity of my monarchy must be preserved unimpaired, and its political, economic, and military development must be guarded from these continual shocks. In vain did my Government make a last attempt to accomplish this object by peaceful means and to induce Servia, by means of a serious warning, to desist. Servia has rejected the just and moderate demands of my Government and refused to con-

form to those obligations the fulfillment of which forms the natural and necessary foundation of peace in the life of peoples and States. I must therefore proceed by force of arms to secure those indispensable pledges which alone can insure tranquillity to my States within and lasting peace without. In this solemn hour I am fully conscious of the whole significance of my resolve and my responsibility before the Almighty. I have examined and weighed everything, and with a serene conscience I set out on the path to which my duty points. I trust in my peoples, who, throughout every storm, have always rallied in unity and loyalty around my throne, and have always been prepared for the severest sacrifices for the honor, the greatness, and the might of the Fatherland. I trust in Austria-Hungary's brave and devoted forces, and I trust in the Almighty to give the victory to my arms.

"FRANZ JOSEF."

30.—Austrian emperor and the outbreak of war.—Opposition to ultimatum.—Intimate picture of fateful days.—Nevertheless, it was believed that the aged monarch was opposed to the war. In 1921, the Vienna correspondent of *The Times* (London), contributed to his paper some extracts from Lieutenant-General von Margutti's book, "Vom alten Kaiser," showing the monarch's futile opposition to the Serbian ultimatum. It may be mentioned that the "Frau Schrott" referred in the book was the old emperor's most intimate companion in his later days. "From the very first," says von Margutti (who was attached to the emperor's staff), "the initiated had no doubt whatever that the aged Kaiser was entirely opposed to the war. The whole court was penetrated by this conviction. 'Thus Count Paar, the general aide-de-camp, told me in the critical stage that the Emperor was terrified over the outbreak of war. When I remarked cogently that he ought therefore to have avoided it, Paar could make no other reply than to lay the blame on the Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold. Subsequently Paar sought to exculpate him also from the collective responsibility, and laid it on Berchtold's collaborators at the Foreign Office, Counts Forgach and Hoyos, the Ministers von Musulin and Wiesner, further, the Joint Finance Minister, von Bilinski, and, last but not least, the Chief of the General Staff, Conrad von Hoetzendorf. Frau Schrott frequently expressed herself to me in similar terms on the strength of direct remarks made to her by the Emperor. She laid especial emphasis on the fact that the Kaiser had been absolutely opposed to any war, that he would never have let one loose, and that he would never even have thought of an ultimatum, had not Germany, in the person of Herr von Tschirschky, insisted on it. Kaiser Francis Joseph had, she said, expressly stated that Germany had categorically demanded the sharp form of the ultimatum to Servia, which finally led to war. The German method of procedure, excluding all conciliation, had also found weighty supporters in Vienna, at the head being the all-powerful Lord High Steward, Prince Montenuovo, who with his partisans finally succeeded in breaking down the Kaiser's originally fixed love of peace.' Frau Schrott smiled and shrugged her shoulders when General Margutti reminded her that Count Berchtold had publicly stated that Germany had only been informed of the contents of the ultimatum after it had been dispatched. The Kaiser had, she said, told her, not once, but repeatedly, that he was utterly and en-

tirely opposed to the ultimatum, and had only allowed it to be sent in order to please Germany. General Margutti gives a vivid account of a family dinner at Ischl on the fateful Saturday, July 25, 1914. In order to grasp its importance it must be recalled that after the burial of the murdered Franz Ferdinand, the Kaiser retired to his summer residence at Ischl, near Salzburg. It was there that the Emperor received the news from Vienna that a great Serb conspiracy had been discovered and that on July 7 a Cabinet Council had decided on taking diplomatic steps against Serbia. It was only due to Tisza's warnings that a blow was not struck at once. Three weeks went by, at the end of which Count Paar showed Margutti the proposed ultimatum and asked him what he thought of it. 'It means war,' said the latter. After long discussion Paar came round to Margutti's opinion and endeavoured to have a committee of the Delegations consulted. Berchtold, however,



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overrode all objections and dispatched the ultimatum on Thursday, July 23. Two days were allowed Serbia in which to reply. The two days went by. On the Saturday, the critical day, the Duke of Cumberland and his family were . . . over from Gmünden to lunch with the Kaiser. . . . 'From my seat at table,' writes Margutti, 'I was able to watch the aged monarch closely during the meal. It was not difficult, to see how completely absent were his thoughts and how he had to collect them in order to keep up the necessary conversation with his neighbours and perform his duties as host. As though by arrangement, no allusion was made to the Serbian affair.' Margutti went to the Chancery, where Count Berchtold joined him from 5:30 to 6:45 silently waiting for tidings from Vienna. No sooner had Berchtold gone than the fateful news came. Margutti rushed with it to the villa. The Kaiser's agitation was extreme. His hands trembled so violently that he could hardly put on his spectacles. His voice completely changed. His remark that rupture of diplomatic relations did not necessarily mean war was unhappily not fulfilled. . . . From the very first day

of the war, Francis Joseph was, says General Margutti, pessimistic. Among the congratulatory telegrams on August 18 was one from the Chief of the Rumanian General Staff, wishing success in the war. On reading it the Kaiser mournfully shrugged his shoulders and remarked:—'Will this war have a happy issue for us? Already everything points the other way!'—*The Times* (London), July 5, 1921.

31.—Austrian precipitation of war.—Italian efforts at compromise.—Russia involved.—Bethmann-Hollweg to Tschirschky on British attitude (July 27).—Pledge plan.—Bethmann-Hollweg on peace proposals.—Ministerial council at Vienna (July 31).—'Had Austria accepted the Serbian reply as satisfactory, she would have secured a notable diplomatic victory and would probably have been able to cripple Serb influence so effectively as to nullify the effect of the Treaty of Bukarest [or Bucharest, Aug. 10, 1913 (see BULGARIA: 1913: Second Balkan War)] and reestablish her own influence in the Balkans; she would have punished Serbia for the murder of the Archduke and would have received guarantees for the future. But Austria was apparently determined that her troops should enter Serbia and to all appearances had made up her mind to find the Serb reply unsatisfactory. The Austrian Minister in Belgrade spent only forty minutes in an examination of the document, supposed to be of all-importance, declared it unsatisfactory, and immediately left for Vienna. At the moment, no reason was given for the rejection of Serbia's response, and it was not until July 28, that a brief note explained that the Serb answer made no real concessions, and was entirely evasive in character. Once more Serbia attempted to avert the open hostilities that threatened. On July 28, the Serbian *Chargé d'affaires* at Rome made a proposition to the Italian Foreign Minister which displayed Serbia's eagerness to find any solution, no matter how humiliating for herself: 'If some explanation were given regarding the mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene . . . Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian note.' And the Italian Minister suggested that if Austria considered that she would compromise her dignity by giving explanations to Serbia, she might communicate them to the Powers, who would pass them on to Serbia. But Austria would not consider this last proposal and . . . [at noon] of July 28, declared war on Serbia. Everything now depended upon the attitude taken by Russia.'—C. Seymour, *Diplomatic background of the War, 1870-1914*, pp. 259-260.—'On Monday night [July 27] Bethmann telegraphed to Tschirschky at Vienna the full text of Lichnowsky's report of his latest conversation with Grey. Grey had pointed out the conciliatory character of Serbia's answer, hoped Austria would not begin hostilities, and said that he was urging moderation at Petrograd, and that Germany ought to do likewise at Vienna. After emphasizing the bad impression which a further refusal of all mediation would make, Bethmann added: 'We cannot reject the rôle of mediator and must place the English proposal before the Vienna Cabinet for its consideration. Request Count Berchtold's opinion on the British proposal, as well as on Sazonov's wish to negotiate directly with Vienna.' [See below: 69.] The basis on which the Kaiser was willing to act the mediatory rôle between Russia and Austria is what may be called the 'pledge plan.' Though he had been greatly impressed with the extremely conciliatory character of Serbia's reply, when it finally came to him on Tuesday morning, he never-

theless thought Austria ought to have some pledge as a guarantee that the Serbs would live up to their conciliatory promises. Tuesday night the mediatory proposal which he sketched was embodied by Bethmann in the following telegram to Vienna: [aside from a declaration to Russia that it intends no territorial acquisition in Serbia] 'the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of repeated questions as to its purposes, has left us in the dark. The answer now at hand of the Serbian Government to the Austrian ultimatum makes it evident that Serbia has in fact met the Austrian demands in so wide-reaching a manner that if the Austro-Hungarian Government adopted a wholly intransigent attitude, a gradual revulsion of public opinion against it in all Europe would have to be reckoned with. . . . [Russia will be satisfied] if the Vienna Cabinet repeats in Petrograd the definite declaration that territorial acquisitions in Serbia lie far from its purpose, and that its military measures aim solely at a temporary occupation of Belgrade and other definite points of Serbian territory in order to compel the Serbian Government to a complete fulfilment of the demands and to serve as guarantees for future good behavior to which Austria-Hungary unquestionably has a claim after her experiences with Serbia. The occupation could be regarded like the German occupation in France after the Peace of Frankfort as security for the demand of the war indemnity. As soon as the Austrian demands were fulfilled, a withdrawal would follow. . . . You are immediately to express yourself in this sense to Count Berchtold emphatically and have him take the proper step in Petrograd. You are carefully to avoid giving the impression that we wish to hold Austria back. It is solely a question of finding a method which will make possible the accomplishment of Austria's purpose of cutting the vital nerve of Great Serbian propaganda without at the same time unchaining a world war, and in the end, if this is unavoidable, of improving as far as practicable the conditions under which it is to be waged. Wire reply.' To this telegram Bethmann had received no reply by Wednesday evening at the time of the military council at Potsdam, even though twenty-four hours had elapsed, and telegrams even at this time of crowded wires ordinarily were transmitted between Vienna and Berlin within three or four hours. Therefore he sent on Wednesday evening three more telegrams to secure an immediate answer. In the meantime, however, while he could get no answer from Vienna on the 'pledge plan,' he began to receive reports from the other capitals which seemed to indicate bad faith or stupidity on the part of his ally. . . . On Wednesday afternoon, July 29, while still waiting in vain for a reply from Berchtold as to the 'pledge plan,' Bethmann took up two more peace proposals which had been suggested, and supported both energetically at Vienna. One was the suggestion from Sazonov for a negotiation by 'direct conversations' between Vienna and Petrograd. Bethmann had already handed this suggestion on to Vienna without comment as soon as it had been received by him on July 27. But it had been at once flatly rejected by Berchtold, because Sazonov had intended that the direct conversations should take up modifications of the terms of Austria's ultimatum. Berchtold was determined not to enter into any negotiations which might touch the 'local' issues existing purely between Austria and Serbia. As an additional reason for his refusal to 'converse directly' on Austro-Serbian relations, he pointed out that the time for a peaceful settlement of those relations was passed, since the declaration

of war and the opening of hostilities had already taken place. As a result 'direct conversations' between Vienna and Petrograd had come to a halt on July 28, with the result that Sazonov was much incensed. . . . How far Berchtold . . . was from the slightest intention of really and honestly yielding to mediation and stopping the Austrian advance in Serbia is . . . unmistakably revealed in the protocol of the minutes of the ministerial council held on Friday morning, July 31. After stating Grey's last proposal and Bethmann's strong urging that it be accepted [see below: 38], Berchtold pointed out that experience showed that mediatory powers always tried to reach a compromise by forcing one power to pare down the conditions it had made. It was probable that they would attempt this now also, when in the present conjuncture France, England, and Italy also would represent the Russian standpoint, and we [Austria] should have a very doubtful support in the present German ambassador in London. . . . If the action should end now merely with a gain of prestige, it would in his opinion have been undertaken wholly in vain. From a mere occupation of Belgrade we should gain absolutely nothing, even if Russia should give her consent to it. All this would be mere tinsel [*Flitterwerk*]. Russia would come forward as the savior of Serbia, and especially of the Serbian army. The latter would remain intact, and in two or three years we should again have to look forward to the attack on Serbia under much more unfavorable conditions. He had therefore had an audience with Francis Joseph. His Majesty had at once declared that there could be no check placed upon military operations, but accepted the proposal 'that we should carefully avoid accepting the English proposal in actual substance, but that in the form of our answer, we should pretend to be ready to meet it. . . .' Berchtold's colleagues agreed with him or went even further. Tisza, who had now completely changed his attitude, made no opposition. To Stürgkh 'the very thought of a mediatory conference was so odious that he preferred to avoid even the pretense of accepting one.' Bilinski was equally hostile to a conference, because 'the course of the London Conference was so horrible to recall to memory, that all public opinion would reject the repetition of such a spectacle.'"—*Fay, II, pp. 41-43, 47-48.*

32.—War guilt of Count Berchtold.—His falsification of records.—"Following the publication by the Austrian Foreign Office [in 1919] of the first part of a Red Book giving the official documents found in the Austro-Hungarian archives which recorded the events leading up to the outbreak of the World War, certain Hungarian publicists seized upon the report of the joint ministerial council of July 7, 1914, in Vienna [see above: 13] . . . as evidence that the late Count Stephan Tisza, then Premier of Hungary, through his objections to the procedure of the council, had shown himself a lover of peace. But the second and third parts of the Austrian Red Book, published in December, 1919, showed that, although the Count had been cautious at the first council, at the second, held on July 19, he had been already converted to the doctrine of force and entered heartily into the plans for aggression. The Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, in its issue of Dec. 27, 1919, devoted a long article to the Red Book, and asserted that its contents also proved that Count Leopold von Berchtold, who, as Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, presided over the council of July 7 and constantly urged war upon Serbia, was guilty of wholesale falsifications in his work of 1915, called 'The Diplo-

matic Documents of the Antecedents of the War.' How quickly Count Tisza was converted to the plan to coerce Serbia, regardless of consequences, says this Austrian Socialist newspaper, is shown by the following 'very secret' report sent to Berlin on July 14, 1914, by von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna: 'Count Tisza looked me up today after his conversation with Count Berchtold. The Count said that he had always been the one so far who had counseled caution, but that every day strengthened in him the sentiment that the monarchy [Austria] must come to an energetic decision in order to show its vitality and to put an end to the intolerable conditions in South Slavia. 'It was with difficulty that I decided to advise war,' said the Minister, 'but I am now firmly convinced of its necessity and I shall work with all my strength for the greatness of the monarchy. . . . *The note to Serbia will be so worded that an acceptance is as good as excluded.*' . . . At the close Tisza warmly shook my hand and said: 'Now, united, we shall calmly and firmly face the future' On July 24, 1914, the Hungarian Premier telegraphed to Berchtold as follows: 'I ask your Excellency to emphasize, in my name if necessary, that in case of no satisfactory answer from Serbia it would be imperatively necessary immediately to order mobilization. Any hesitation in this matter would be bound up with fateful consequences.' In taking up the case of Count Berchtold's Red Book of 1915, the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* remarks that while the Count only mentioned sixty-four official documents covering the period from May 29 to Aug. 24, 1914, the Foreign Office's publication gives 352 for the period from July 2 to Aug. 27, 1914. Furthermore, it avers that Count Berchtold not only omitted many important documents from his book, but he also 'touched up' the dispatches which he printed so as to make the reader believe that the World War had been willed by the Entente and that the central empires were the innocent victims. Then the Vienna newspaper proceeds to cite some examples of the Count's work, as follows: 'Through the entire course of the negotiations before the outbreak of the war there runs the assertion that Serbia had already ordered general mobilization on July 25, 1914, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. So Grey's efforts for peace were answered on July 26, [Berchtold to Count Mensdorf, the Austrian Ambassador in London], 'that almost at the same time as he [Grey] had directed his note to Prince Lichnowsky [German Ambassador in London], that is, yesterday at 3 o'clock, Serbia had already ordered general mobilization, which shows that in Belgrade there was no inclination toward a friendly arbitration of the matter.' On July 28 Berchtold again notified Count Mensdorf in London that: 'Your Excellency will lay great emphasis in your conversation with Sir Edward Grey upon the circumstance that the general mobilization of the Serbian Army was ordered for the 25th at 3 P. M.; we had not previously made any military preparations, but were forced by the Serbian mobilization to go into them on a big scale.' But what was the real situation regarding the Serbian order? On July 24, 1914, Baron von Giesl sent a really extremely belligerent report from Belgrade to Berchtold, which nevertheless contained the following: 'Serbia's present military weakness, due to the uncertain and sacrifice-entailing situation in New Serbia, even if not overlooked by far-sighted politicians, is regarded even by them as a *quantité négligéable*, just because the Monarchy, for internal and external reasons, is considerably feeble and incapable of any

energetic action. That the serious words already spoken by our authoritative officials are regarded as a bluff is evident from the fact that no measures for preparing the army—or at least none worth speaking of—are being taken; the reservists are being dismissed without arms in small groups from New Serbia to Old Serbia, and no arrangement has yet been made for the mobilization of the second levy. All reports to the contrary are thus far lacking confirmation.' . . . On July 25, 1914, Berchtold gave instructions to Ambassador Count Szapary in Petrograd. . . . Count Szapary was instructed by Berchtold to tell Sazonov [the Russian foreign minister] 'that we are going to the limit in order to put through our demands and do not even shrink from the possibility of European complications.' These last words, which plainly show that the . . . [Austrian government] knew very well whither they were driving, Berchtold omitted. The world has been told that the Russian policy of those days was absolutely belligerent; the version, as is known, ran that Russia had 'suddenly fallen upon' the innocent Central Powers. But on July 26, 1914, Szapary reported to Berchtold on the sentiment in Petrograd and about his interview with Sazonov, and in this report were the following sentences: 'Had impression of great nervousness and worry. Consider desire for peace sincere, military declarations in so far correct that complete mobilization has, indeed, not been ordered, but preparatory measures very far reaching. They were plainly trying to gain time for fresh negotiations and for continuation of the work of arming. The internal situation also gives undeniable cause for serious worry. Main feature of the sentiment, hope in Germany and mediation by his Majesty. Although the immediate information of the German Military Attaché indicates nervousness on the part of Sazonov, and mobilization only against Austria in case the Serbian border is crossed, rather seems to betray the intention of exercising diplomatic pressure, there must not be left out of the calculation, together with the falsity of promises here, the lack of unity between the diplomatic and the military procedures, as well as the importance of gaining time for the Russian mobilization.' All this left out, falsified away! Berchtold omitted the following parts from Szapary's report of his conversation with Sazonov to Berchtold of July 27. (The report is only a couple of lines in length in the Berchtold Red Book; the correct report occupies, in a true reproduction, more than three pages!): 'M. Sazonov received me, in contrast with his very impatient attitude on Friday, very amiably. He referred to the above-mentioned communications of Count Pourtalès [German ambassador at Petrograd] and said if I had not announced myself he would have asked me to call upon him, so as to talk openly with me once. Friday he had been somewhat surprised and had not controlled himself as well as he could have wished, and then our conversation surely was only a purely official one.' Here follow the declarations of the Ambassador, after which he reports on Sazonov's answer: 'M. Sazonov animatedly agreed with me and showed himself uncommonly pleased over the tendencies of my statements. He made many promises that in Russia, not only he, but the whole Cabinet and, what is of the most weight, the sovereign, were animated with the same feelings toward Austria-Hungary. He could not deny that in Russia old grudges were entertained against the Monarchy; he, too, had them, but still this all belonged to the past and must not play any rôle in practical politics; and so far as the Slavs were concerned, indeed he

ought not to tell this to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, but he had no feelings for the Balkan Slavs. They were even a heavy burden for Russia and we could hardly imagine what one had already had to endure for them. Our aim, as I had described it to him, was perfectly legitimate, but he opined that the way in which we were seeking to accomplish it was not the safest. . . . At the close of his interview M. Sazonov again expressed, in the warmest terms, his joy over the explanations that I had given and that had materially calmed him. He will also report this to Emperor Nicholas, whom he will see day after tomorrow on his reception day.' This is, as we have said, the report of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador and it certainly does not indicate any insuperable desire for war by Russia. Naturally Berchtold couldn't use this, so he falsified it away. And now another example of how everything was twisted around through lying. Berchtold's last crime, as is known, was the rejection of Grey's proposal of mediation, which was sent to him by the German Imperial Chancellor through Tschirschky—because it was made by Grey to the German Ambassador. In his circular telegram to the Ambassadors in Berlin, London and Petrograd Berchtold reproduced the report of Tschirschky, and in it there was also the following: 'To the Italian Ambassador, whom Sir E. Grey received shortly after Prince Lichnowsky, the English Secretary of State said he believed he could procure every possible satisfaction for Austria-Hungary. There would be no question of a meek drawing back by Austria-Hungary, as the Serbs under all circumstances would be chastised and, with the consent of Russia, be compelled to subordinate themselves to the Austro-Hungarian desires. Therefore, Austria-Hungary could obtain guarantees for the future also without unchaining a World War.' Thus the world, even the Austro-Hungarian world, would have recognized, even then, that the rejection of this proposal was a crime and a piece of insanity. Therefore, Berchtold suppressed this entire section, simply falsified it away." —*New York Times Current History*, Apr., 1920, pp. 157-159.

33.—Russian opposition to localization of dispute (July 28-31).—Pressure on England by France and Russia.—Russian crown council (July 26).—Russian mobilization, German "Threatened State of War" (July 31).—German mobilization (August 1).—Report by British ambassador on Russian mobilization.—"Turning point" interview between Sazonov and Pourtalès, German ambassador at St. Petersburg. — Austrian mobilization. — "The short time-limit, the withholding of the *dossier*, and the excessive and humiliating demands on Serbia, all seemed to indicate that Austria was determined on war at once with Serbia. It was particularly deceitful on Austria's part to have pretended for three weeks that the demands would be mild, and such as Serbia could surely accept, and then to face the little kingdom with an ultimatum which seemed to indicate that Austria wanted war and would soon cross the frontier into Serbian territory. Moreover, Poincaré and the French prime minister had only left Russia a few hours before. They were now on the high seas, where it was difficult, if not impossible, for Sazonov to get into touch with them. Furthermore, he shrewdly suspected that much that Szápáry had asserted was not true. But he did not know for certain, as we do now, how perfidiously Berchtold had acted in carefully suppressing the Wiesner report, which wholly exculpated the Serbian govern-

ment, in deliberately framing the ultimatum so that Serbia could not accept it, and in holding back the *dossier*, because an impartial examination of it by Europe would not have borne out Austria's charges. Therefore, Sazonov concluded that his own wisest course was to seek to have the Austro-Serbian question treated as a question in which Europe was interested. He must not allow the 'localization,' which meant the inevitable humiliation or defeat of a small power by a great one. Accordingly, after his interview with Szápáry on Friday morning, Sazonov hurried at once to the French embassy, after telephoning to the British ambassador to join him there. Sazonov, Paléologue, and Buchanan went over the situation carefully. Sazonov said that he regarded 'Austria's conduct as both provocative and immoral; that Austria would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted and he hoped that England would not fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France.' . . . This discussion between the three representatives of the Triple Entente reveals the situation which became clearer as the crisis became more serious: France and Russia pressed England to join them in a statement of solidarity, which could be used as an effective counter-bluff, or even as a threat, to prevent Austria and Germany from acting against Serbia. But to this Buchanan and Grey would not, at first, agree. They did not encourage Russia's strong action by holding out the hope of British armed support, as so many Germans have asserted. On the contrary, Sir Edward Grey was very reserved and cautious as to saying or doing anything which might encourage Russia to mobilize and so precipitate a crisis. All his thoughts and efforts were directed toward finding some peaceful solution for the crisis and avoiding anything which might aggravate it. They are too well known to need repeating here. It was only very gradually, as Germany and Austria deliberately blocked all his earlier peace proposals, that Grey became finally convinced of the *mala fides* of the Central Powers and consequently began to give Lichnowsky the 'friendly warnings.' . . . In a somewhat stormy interview . . . [Sazonov argued that the affair] was a European one and not one to be 'localized'; it was for Europe to examine the *dossier* and investigate whether Serbia had lived up to her promises or not. Austria could not be both prosecutor and judge. These arguments Pourtalès promised to report to Berlin. . . . Finally Sazonov exclaimed, 'If Austria gobbles up Serbia, we shall make war on her.' . . . [On July 25 an important Crown Council was held, at which the czar presided. We have no precise record of what took place at this council but] at least two definite decisions were taken. First, it was agreed that the troops throughout the empire should at once be recalled from their summer training camps to their standing quarters. . . . The second decision taken by the Crown Council was one desired by Sazonov and is probably accurately indicated by the account of it which he gave to the French: At the council of ministers of the twenty-fifth, which was held in the presence of the Tsar, the mobilization of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered; this mobilization, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia and not until after notice had been given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations, even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically

and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed. . . . In other words, for the Tsar, Sazonov, and all the diplomats, this Crown Council meant that Russia intended to threaten Austria with a 'partial mobilization' in case Austria crossed the Serbian frontier. But even this partial mobilization was to take place only if and when Sazonov should decide it should be done. And even if Belgrade were occupied, he might still continue to negotiate for peace. He did not need to break off diplomatic relations with Austria nor yield to the militarists in his own country. . . . The suggestion of 'direct conversations' between Petrograd and Vienna, as the most hopeful way out of the crisis, was a sincere and well-meant effort of the German ambassador. But, as we now know from Berchtold's intentions, there was not the slightest possibility of Austria's being willing to modify even the phraseology of her demands. As it turned out, his refusal of the 'direct conversations' tended to the embitterment, rather than to the amelioration, of the relations between Russia and Austria. . . . Neither Pourtalès nor Eggeing had been told anything of the decision which Russia had made for 'general mobilization' on July 30. They knew nothing of it until the next morning after the news had already been printed in the Russian newspapers and been posted up in the streets. As soon as Eggeing learned of it, he hastened to Pourtalès, who sent off a despatch at 10:20 A. M.: 'General mobilization of the army and navy ordered. First mobilization day, July 31.' This reached Berlin at 11:40 A. M. Bethmann telephoned it to the Kaiser at Potsdam. The Kaiser motored at once to Berlin and in a meeting with Bethmann and the militarists decided about 1:00 P. M. to order the 'Threatened State of War.' Until the arrival of this official despatch from Pourtalès, confirming the German suspicions that Russia had been secretly mobilizing, Bethmann had been able to restrain the Kaiser and the militarists from taking any irremediable military steps; but with 'Threatened State of War,' the whole German military machine was set in swiftest possible motion, though formal mobilization was not declared until the following day. The militarists were now in complete control. In Berlin, as well as in Petrograd, war was now inevitable. Neither the 'Russian formula' which Sazonov had proposed to Pourtalès, nor the personal appeal which Pourtalès made on his own initiative to the Tsar at Peterhof, nor the Kaiser's efforts at Vienna, nor Sir Edward Grey's efforts, could have any possible chance of success. If the German government, on July 31, had really desired peace, it would have been possible for it simply to answer Russian mobilization by German mobilization, and stand on the defensive. But the German militarists insisted that mobilization meant war and therefore Bethmann despatched the ultimata to Russia and to France, to which but one answer was possible on their part."—*Fay, III, pp. 230-234, 238-239, 251, 254.*—On the 29th we find the British ambassador, Buchanan, summing up the situation as follows in a telegram to Sir Edward Grey:

"Partial mobilisation was ordered to-day. I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria. The Austrian Gov-

ernment has now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your [Grey's] proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador, if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him [Sazonov], and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with the Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept. Throughout the Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government."—*B. D. C., no. 78.*

"That this was the true sequence of events on the afternoon of 29th July is . . . decisively demonstrated by the subjoined Memorandum, drawn up by Sir George Buchanan on the 15th September, 1917, in response to a definite enquiry from Mr. Balfour as to what had really happened at the fateful meeting of the Russian Ministers. It will be noted that the story as told by him differs somewhat from the chaotic narratives given by the Russian War Minister and Chief of the Staff at the trial of the former in September 1917:

“(Confidential.) SEPTEMBER 15, 1917.

“No official report of the proceedings was published, but after referring to our own archives, and to statements given to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Sazonov], I believe that the following is a correct account of what took place: Up to July 28th, when Austrian general mobilisation and declaration of war on Serbia were published, Russia had only taken preparatory steps for a mobilisation in the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Kazan, and Moscow. On July 29th orders for partial mobilisation were signed, to be directed solely against Austria, as the Emperor had refused to yield to strong pressure brought to bear upon him by his military advisers who, on technical grounds, and in view of secret preparations made by Germany, had insisted on its being made a general one. The military authorities, however, without his Majesty's knowledge, did make secret preparations for a general mobilisation, though on being questioned by the Emperor on the subject General Sukhomlinoff denied it.”

“It is clear then that both the Czar and M. Sazonoff, who was, of course, the main informant of Sir George Buchanan, were in favour of only partial mobilisation against Austria, and that both of them spoke and acted during the early afternoon hours of the 29th July as if that measure only had been authorised. . . . Meanwhile it must be borne in mind that this action [of Sukhomlinov and Januschkevitch] was unknown except to themselves for the moment, and did not influence the words or actions of the Czar and the Foreign Minister in the early afternoon.”—*Oman, pp. 62-63.*—

"Immediately after the Ukase for the mobilisation of the four south-western army districts had been signed, M. Sazonoff had an interview with Count Pourtalès, which may be styled the turning point of the whole series of negotiations, the fact which finally settled that war was inevitable. Down to September 1917 only a partial account of this interview could be constructed, for want of sufficient first-hand evidence. But since the German Government has permitted Count Pourtalès to communicate to a Swiss newspaper his account of the whole matter, it is possible to compare his version with that of M. Sazonoff. In the German White Book all that appears is the following, evidently fragmentary, extract from the Count's despatch to the German Chancellor: 'The Secretary (Sazonoff) tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Serbia. I could merely promise to report the conversation, and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Serbia, i.e., an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration—a great concession on the part of a State engaged in war—should therefore be permitted to attend to its affairs with Serbia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Serbia. I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austria-Serbian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger. It was impossible to dissuade Sazonoff from the idea that Serbia could not now be deserted by Russia.' (*German White Book*, p. 21)."—*Oman*, p. 63.

"The much more enlightening narrative of the German Ambassador in the *Basler Nachrichten* of the 20th September, 1917, runs as follows:

"On July 29th, between 1 and 2 o'clock, Sazonoff told me that Russia had determined to mobilise against Austria, and that the Imperial Ukase proclaiming mobilisation would be published that same afternoon. I answered that the step was, in my opinion, full of consequences in the highest degree, and that it made a peaceful solution of the conflict difficult if not impossible. I reminded him that I had asked him some days back to use his influence in the most urgent way to stop the employment of military pressure. Sazonoff answered that the mobilisation was against Austria and not against us [Germany]. Whereupon I was forced to remind him of our treaty of alliance with Austria, which would cause German mobilisation automatically. . . . About 7, in another interview with Sazonoff, I brought to his knowledge a telegram of our Chancellor, in which it was stated that any further development of Russian military preparations would compel us to take counter-measures, and that meant war [*dies würde aber den Krieg bedeuten*]. By means of this telegram I made it clear to Sazonoff that this was no mere matter of threats, and that I had only friendly intentions in giving him this information. My revelation could be no surprise to him, after what I had told him several days before as to Russian military preparations.'

"The Chancellor's telegram, which the German Government, for its own reasons, did not print in the White Book, and only published in the pages of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* on the 7th October, 1917, ran as follows:

"I beg you to explain once more to M. Sazonoff, with great earnestness, that we shall be compelled to mobilise if any further measures for Russian mobilisation are taken. And in that case European War can hardly be averted."

"It will be noted that Count Pourtalès, on his own showing, went even a little further than the Chancellor's telegram authorised him to go. He said that Russian mobilisation 'meant war'—while the Chancellor said that 'European war could hardly be averted.' There is a clear shade of meaning between the two phrases, though the intention may have been the same. The weak explanation given in the German communiqué for the suppression of this telegram for three years and three months, is that the Chancellor's words were no more than a repetition of the warning already given to the Russian Government on the 26th July. It cannot be disputed that Count Pourtalès administered to M. Sazonoff at their second interview what practically came to an ultimatum. Russia must not mobilise against Austria, or Germany mobilises too—and that means war.' But Russia had just issued the mobilisation decree for the Austrian front—and therefore German mobilisation must be 'automatic,' and war apparently 'automatic' also as the result of the sequence of events. Perhaps the most interesting part of the grave words used by Count Pourtalès to M. Sazonoff in this momentous interview, is that they seem to have been the direct result of an appeal from Vienna to Berlin on the previous day. The subjoined letter of the 28th July is printed in the *Austrian Red Book*:

"COUNT BERCHTOLD TO COUNT SZÖGYÉNY AT BERLIN, JULY 28, 1914. (Telegraphic.)

"I request your Excellency to go at once to the Chancellor or the Secretary of State and communicate to him the following in my name: According to mutually consistent reports, received from St. Petersburg, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow, and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonoff has indeed given an assurance on his word of honour, as has also the Russian Minister of War, that mobilisation has not up to now been ordered; that latter has, however, told the German military attaché that the military districts, which border on Austria-Hungary—Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan—will be mobilised, should our troops cross the Serbian frontier. Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the Cabinet at Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation of the above districts amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore, should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most extensive military counter-measures, not only by the Monarchy but by our Ally, the German Empire. In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be taken by Germany alone; nevertheless we are ready to take this step in conjunction with Germany. Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all

that is involved in a threatening attitude.' (*Austrian Red Book*, no. 42).—*Oman*, pp. 63-65.

"Sir Edward Grey's conversation with Lichnowsky on the morning of July 31st took place, and his Instructions to Berlin were despatched, in ignorance of the fact that Russia, who had mobilised fifty-five divisions on July 29th in answer to Austria's twenty-two, had now mobilised her entire forces. According to Sukhomlinoff, the Russian War Minister, the Tsar signed the order for general mobilisation on the afternoon of July 20th; but, after a friendly telegram from the Kaiser, he ordered that mobilisation should only take place against Austria. The War Minister, however, and the Chief of the Staff allowed general mobilisation to continue, while concealing this from the Tsar and denying it to the German Military Attaché. Their disobedience was not discovered at the time; for, in the afternoon of July 30th, Sazonoff, the War Minister and the Minister of Marine, on learning of the bombardment of Belgrade, agreed that general mobilisation was necessary. The Tsar's consent was obtained the same night, and in the early hours of July 31st the capital was placarded with notices. A few hours later Austria also ordered general mobilisation."—A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, ed., *Cambridge history of British foreign policy, 1783-1919*, v. 3, pp. 498-499.

34.—Potsdam military council (July 29).—German bid for British neutrality in event of war.—Neutrality of Netherlands to be respected.—Hint of action in Belgium.—British refusal to promise neutrality.—British rejection of German overtures.—"Until the . . . publication (in 1919) of the *Kautsky Documents* and the new *Austrian Red Book* it . . . [was] believed by many that at a famous military council at Potsdam on the evening of Wednesday, July 29 [1914], the German militarists triumphed over the civilian diplomats and that the Kaiser at that time gave the fatal decision for war. The reason for this belief is natural. At the close of the council Bethmann returned to Berlin, sent for the British ambassador [Sir Edward Goschen], and 'proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. . . . Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British government that the Imperial government aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. About the French colonies he was unable to give a similar undertaking.'"—*B. D. C.*, no. 85.—"It has quite naturally been believed that the German Chancellor would never have taken this step, so extraordinary, so apparently self-incriminating, and as it turned out, so infelicitous, unless he knew that Germany had already taken the decision for war. But if one looks more closely at the actions of these men during those frightful sleepless days and nights, one comes to the conviction that the prevailing belief is not wholly correct. Bethmann still had the upper hand over the militarists during the following day. He had been able to persuade the Kaiser that no decision should be taken until an answer had been received from Vienna to a proposal which had been urged by England and Germany in the interests of the peace of Europe. And it was not until two days later, about noon of July 31, after the arrival in Berlin of official news of the Russian mobilization, that is, mobilization against Germany as well as against Austria, that the Kaiser took the final decision to issue the fatal proclamation of 'Imminence of War.' During these three days, July 29 to 31, Germany was mak-

ing a real, though belated, effort to induce Austria to accept a peaceful solution."—*Fay*, II, pp. 37-38.—The ambassador's report to Sir Edward Grey on this remarkable interview deserves to be reproduced in full:

"I was asked to call upon the Chancellor [Bethmann-Hollweg] tonight. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam. He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was, of course, at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization of his desire. In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty. Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of today to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you."—*B. D. C.*, no. 85.

Thus, according to the German chancellor, "it depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium." "This is the first time that the name of Belgium is mentioned with reference to the Austro-Servian dispute, and it is well to mark this moment. . . . Germany confessed that thereafter the fate of the little nation that she has guaranteed would be at the mercy of military operations."—E. Waxweiler, *Belgium neutral and loyal*, p. 92.—The British reply to the German neutrality proposal was as follows:

"SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO BERLIN, FOREIGN OFFICE, JULY 30, 1914:

"His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace, for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates. You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will."—*B. D. C., no. 101.*

35.—Case of Belgium.—Belgian-British military conversations in 1906 and 1912.—Decision by German general staff to advance through Belgium.—Moltke's note of July 25.—"The points of interest in the Belgian Grey Book are not very numerous. But we see how early in the development of the Servian imbroglio the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Davignon, made preparations to meet a possible invasion. [See above: 24.] . . . We see also that France, on July 31, before she was approached by Sir Edward Grey on the subject, gave assurances that she would not violate Belgian neutrality. . . . On the same day M. Davignon wrote to the representatives of Belgium at Berlin, London, and Paris, authorizing them to state that Belgium would do her utmost to defend her neutrality [see also BELGIUM: 1914: World War; Germany and Belgian neutrality]. . . . We are told of the assurances given by Germany, privately in 1911 and publicly in 1913, of her intention to respect Belgian neutrality; and we learn that these assurances were confirmed by the German Minister at Brussels on July 31, 1914. The text of the German ultimatum of August 2 to Belgium, and the interview of Baron van Elst with the German Minister at Brussels in the small hours of August 3, give the excuses alleged by Germany for her invasion of Belgium. . . . The case for Belgian neutrality is stated clearly and with dignity in the reply given on August 3 to the German ultimatum. . . . We are given also the precise terms of the offers of support given by Great Britain to Belgium . . . and of very interesting offers by Great Britain to Holland and Norway."—Oxford Faculty of Modern History, *Why we are at war (Prefatory note to Appendix VII, p. 254)*.—"After Brussels had been captured by the Germans, [August, 1914] certain documents

were found in the Belgian archives, which were published to support the charge of Germany that Belgium had before the war surrendered her neutrality. These documents show the following: (1) In April, 1906, General Ducarne, Chief of the Belgian General Staff, reported to the Belgian minister of war the results of some conversations that he had had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, military attaché of the British legation at Brussels. At these interviews plans were discussed for sending British troops to Belgium to aid her against Germany in case war broke out. Colonel Barnardiston 'referred to the anxieties of the general staff of his country with regard to the general political situation, in view of the possibility of war soon breaking out.' The discussion covered details as to the number of British troops to be furnished, places of disembarkation, methods of transportation, etc. It is also stated that Colonel Barnardiston gave General Ducarne much secret information regarding the 'military circumstances and the situation' of Belgium's 'Eastern neighbor.' The term 'allied forces' was used in the documents for the British and Belgian troops. At one of these conferences an agreement was reached as to a plan of combined operations in case Antwerp were attacked by the Germans. Colonel Barnardiston is represented as saying that this plan had the approval of the chief of the British general staff; but he insisted that these conversations were not binding on his Government, and that they were not known by any one except the general staff, the English minister at Brussels, and himself. He 'did not know whether the opinion of his sovereign had been consulted.' On the margin of the document was the following statement: 'The entry of the English into Belgium shall not take place until after the violation of our [Belgian] neutrality by Germany.' On April 23, 1912, a similar conversation was held between the British military attaché in Brussels, who was now Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, and the Belgian chief of the general staff, who was now General Jungbluth. At this meeting 'Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had available for dispatch to the Continent, an army composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she needed for home defence. Everything was ready. The British Government, at the time of the recent events, would have immediately landed troops on our territory, even if we had not asked for help. The general protested that our consent would be necessary for this. The military attaché answered that he knew that, but that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our territory, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event.' The general added that, 'after all, we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from going through.' One of the documents found was a dispatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian minister at Berlin, to the Belgian minister for foreign affairs, dated December 23, 1911. The burden of this dispatch was that the Belgian Government was acting unwisely in making arrangements as if the only danger of attack was from the side of Germany. Belgium's neutrality, he thought, was in as much danger from the French as the German side. He said: 'From the French side the danger threatens not only in the south from Luxemburg; it threatens us along our whole common frontier. For this assertion we are not dependent only on surmises. We have positive facts to go upon.' Another document found was 'a map showing (it is alleged) the method of deployment of the French army.' These

documents were published on October 13, 1914, by the *North German Gazette* and were also afterwards printed in English and commented on by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, German agent in America. These two advocates for Germany contend that these documents prove that England had intended, in case a Franco-German war broke out, to send troops to Belgium and thus violate the neutrality of Belgium; that Belgium by listening to and keeping secret the 'whisperings' of Great Britain had compromised her neutrality; and that she should have notified the other signatories of the treaty of 1839, especially Germany, of the suggestions of England. They charge that the negotiations prove



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that Belgium had entered into a convention with Great Britain against Germany, and that the French military map, together with other facts mentioned in the documents, go to show that France was a party to this convention."—O. P. Chitwood, *Immediate causes of the Great War*, pp. 150-154.—"At Berlin, Berchtold's failure to heed any of Bethmann's efforts for peace and his delay in replying to Bethmann's telegrams greatly embarrassed the Chancellor's struggle to keep the upper hand over the militarists. In his arguments with them and with the Kaiser, his position was undermined by continually having to say 'No word from Vienna.' By July 29 he was already being pressed strongly by Moltke and by Berlin public sentiment to take a decision. Every additional hour of indecision lessened the advantage of Germany's speedy mo-

bilization through which they hoped, if war should come, to win an overwhelming victory over France before they had to meet a large force on the eastern frontier. Their mobilization plan contemplated going through Belgium, to which Bethmann personally was strongly opposed on moral grounds. But in the preceding months, though he must have known of the existence of this plan, he had not chosen to resign his office as a protest. Perhaps he had been so absorbed in his policy for a better understanding with England, that he had never looked squarely in the face the violation of international law which Moltke contemplated, if his own Bagdad Railway and African colonial agreements with England should fail. Now, when suddenly faced with the imminence of war with Russia, brought on by Austria's action and his own negligence, he was unable to meet Moltke's arguments of strategic military necessity. Aside from the moral objection, he might urge the practical one that it might bring in England against Germany. Moltke admitted that the addition of England to Germany's enemies would be a serious difficulty in the matter of provisioning Germany, particularly if the war should last long. But still he advised against buying England's neutrality at the price of sparing Belgium, even if this would have been possible, which he did not think was the case. An advance into France from Alsace-Lorraine would have cost the German army fully three months, and given Russia such a start that a victory on both fronts would not be possible. Therefore the only way to victory was to Paris *via* Belgium. Accordingly, on July 29, Bethmann was forced into the foolish act of making the bid for British neutrality which instantly roused suspicions abroad as to the German militarist intention. A courier was also dispatched by Jagow to the German ambassador at Brussels, bearing a sealed document. It was not safe to trust this even to a ciphered telegram, nor was it desirable to reveal even to the ambassador himself the crime which after all it might not be necessary to put into practice. On opening it, the ambassador merely found instructions to keep safely another sealed envelope which he would find enclosed, but which he was to open only if subsequently instructed by telegram from Berlin. This inner envelope contained the detailed demands which Moltke had written with his own hand on July 25, for eventual presentation to Belgium, if war should come. It included the absolutely fictitious statement, for which there was never the slightest evidence either on July 29 or later, that 'there lies before the Imperial Government reliable information in regard to the intended advance of French troops in the Meuse district Givet-Namur. They leave no doubt of France's purpose to attack Germany through Belgian territory.' Givet-Namur was the line on which Moltke, months before, had determined to advance if war should come. Moltke also made arrangements for post-dating the document and making it appear that this 'reliable information' had only arrived as hostilities were beginning. Neither in his 'scrap of paper' conversation nor in his book, did Bethmann stultify himself by adopting as his own this fictitious allegation of Moltke's. Nor in his book does he seek, as many Germans have so laboriously attempted to do, to establish any justification for the violation of Belgium from the 'disclosures' revealed subsequently by the German investigation of the Belgian archives. These disclosures, of course, whether there is any incriminating evidence in them or not, being subsequent to the invasion of Belgium, are no more a justification for that act than

Frederick the Great's later revelations from the Dresden archives justified his attack on Saxony at the opening of the Seven Years' War."—*Fay, II*, pp. 48-49.

36.—Belgian neutrality.—Situation since 1911.—“In 1911, during the controversy which was aroused by the announcement of the Dutch plans for the fortification of Flushing [Vlissingen], certain papers had announced that in case of a Franco-German war, Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested that a declaration made in the German Parliament during the debate on foreign policy would have the effect of quieting public opinion and setting at rest the suspicions which were regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he highly appreciated the feelings which had inspired the request made by Belgium. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating the neutrality of Belgium, but he thought that if a public declaration to that effect were made, Germany would weaken her military position *vis-à-vis* of France who, reassured on her northern frontier, would transfer all her troops to the eastern side. [*B. G. B.*, no. 12].”—E. Waxweiler, *Belgium neutral and loyal*, p. 17.—“In 1913 still more precise declarations were made during the sitting of the Reichstag Committee on the Budget of April 29th. The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, whose semi-official character is well known, reported it in the following terms: ‘A member of the Social Democratic Party said: “In Belgium the approach of a Franco-German war is viewed with apprehension, because it is feared that Germany will not respect Belgian neutrality.” Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied: “The neutrality of Belgium is determined by international conventions, and Germany is resolved to respect these conventions.” This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democratic Party. Herr von Jagow observed that he had nothing to add to the clear statement which he had uttered with reference to the relations between Germany and Belgium. In reply to further interrogations from a member of the Social Democratic Party, Herr von Heeringen, Minister of War, stated: “Belgium does not play any part in the reorganization of the German scheme of military reorganization; the scheme is justified by the position of matters in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties.” A member of the same party having again referred to Belgium, Herr von Jagow again pointed out that his declaration regarding Belgium was sufficiently clear.’ [*B. G. B.*, no. 12, *Enclosure*.] All these declarations summed up and amplified a statement made by the German Minister in Belgium, Baron von Wallwitz, at a banquet in Antwerp in 1905, the year of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Belgian independence. ‘Respect for Belgian neutrality,’ he said, ‘is a political axiom for Germany and it could never be disregarded without incurring the most serious consequences.’ In spite of these assurances, the course of European politics made a deep impression on those responsible for the Government of Belgium. . . . There was a growing impression in the chancelleries and military circles of certain capitals that a European war was imminent. To complete her uneasiness, in 1912 Belgium received from a Sovereign who belonged neither to the Triple Entente nor to the Triple Alliance, and whose great wisdom and long experience of European politics was well-known in diplomatic circles, King Charles of Rou-

mania, the friendly advice to keep a careful watch on the defence of all her frontiers: ‘The miracle of 1870,’ he said, ‘will not be repeated: Belgium runs a great danger of seeing her neutrality violated by one of her three neighbours.’ At the same time other warnings reached Belgium; plans for a surprise invasion of Belgian territory by German troops were discovered, and the military arrangements made by France on her northern frontier took a definite form. Moreover, these fears received disturbing confirmation from German military writers. For instance, General von Bernhardt, who was widely read in Germany, published at the end of 1911, under the title of *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg*, a book which was full of statements which were very alarming for Belgium. I repeat some of the most characteristic of them: ‘The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely opposed to the essential nature of the State; the State can only attain her high moral ends by competition with other States. . . . No natural obstacle or powerful barriers there [in Belgium and Holland] stand in the way of hostile invasion, and neutrality is only a paper bulwark. To the south also the Rhine barrier could easily be turned by going through Switzerland, although on this side there are serious geographical natural obstacles.’ At last, in 1913, [the Belgian] Parliament passed a measure for a far-reaching reorganization of the army. Before the public discussion of the question, the Minister for War, Monsieur de Broqueville, was careful to furnish to Parliament the confidential communications which, as stated above, the Government had received. This was done during a secret sitting, and these statements exercised a decisive influence on the vote which was taken.”—E. Waxweiler, *Belgium neutral and loyal*, pp. 18-22.

37.—Belgium prepares for the worst.—French declaration on neutrality (July 31).—Frontier closed to trains by Germany.—Belgian mobilization ordered (July 31).—British concern over Belgian neutrality.—“On Monday the 27th (July), the [Belgian] Government received from the Belgian Minister at Berlin alarming information on the course which the Austro-Serbian dispute was taking. ‘War,’ says Baron Beyens in his message, ‘seems inevitable, and we can only expect the worst consequences. Belgium must from now on take thought for all the precautions required by the situation.’ Next day, a telegram from the Belgian Minister at Vienna announced that Austria-Hungary had declared war on Servia. At this moment the Belgian Government did not hesitate. On Wednesday, the 29th July, they decided to place the army on a strengthened peace footing—a measure of simple precaution, as they hastened to explain to the Belgian Ministers abroad. [See also BELGIUM: 1914: World War.] . . . Up to this moment nothing extraordinary had happened in Belgium. But on the 31st July the Minister for Foreign Affairs had two interviews of the greatest importance. The French Minister called to show him a telegram from the *Agence Havas* announcing that *Kriegsgefahr* (a state of danger of war) had been proclaimed in Germany, a step which involved certain measures of precaution caused by a state of tension in the relations of Germany with another country. The French Minister at Brussels on this occasion made the following declaration: ‘I take advantage of this opportunity to declare to you that no incursion of French troops will take place in Belgium, even if large forces were massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to have the re-

sponsibility of carrying out the first act of hostility toward Belgium. Instructions to this effect will be given to the French authorities."—*B. G. B.*, no. 9.—"The second call made on July 31st was that of the British Minister. He was directed to inform the Belgian Foreign Minister that England expected that Belgium would do her utmost to maintain her neutrality; an early reply was expected. The Minister also announced that England had just asked Germany and France separately if they were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality so long as no other Power violated it. England desired and expected that the Powers would maintain and observe that neutrality. . . . Lastly, on the same day, Friday, July 31st, the Belgian railway authorities were informed by the German railway administration that trains could no longer cross the German frontier. Thus the situation suddenly assumed a character of exceptional gravity. On the same day the Government ordered the mobilization of the army, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed all the Belgian Legations abroad of this position by telegram [*B. G. B.*, no. 10]: 'The Minister of War informs me that mobilization has been decreed and that Saturday, August 1st, is the first day of mobilization.' At the same time the King, anxious that all the guarantees upon which the country had a right to depend should be fulfilled, and relying on the warmth of his personal relations with the German Emperor, wrote to the latter a personal letter, reminding him of the right which Belgium possessed to inviolability."—E. Waxweiler, *Belgium neutral and loyal*, pp. 26, 31.

38.—Late German attempts to prevent war.—British proposal for mediation.—Serbian willingness to yield.—British warning.—Bethmann's telegrams to Vienna.—Austrian general mobilization.—German warnings to Austria.—"Sazonov had concluded, though mistakenly, that because Berchtold flatly refused to discuss Austro-Serbian relations, he was also unwilling to converse at all with Russia. To re-open 'direct conversations,' and to clear up what seemed to be an unfortunate misunderstanding between Vienna and Petrograd, Bethmann sent now three more telegrams to Vienna very late on Tuesday night. After mentioning hopefully the interchange of telegrams which had begun between the Kaiser and the Tsar, and minimizing the danger of the rumored Russian military preparations, Bethmann added severely: The refusal of every exchange of views with Petrograd would be a serious mistake for it provokes Russia precisely to armed interference, which Austria is primarily interested in avoiding. We are ready, to be sure, to fulfil our obligations as an ally, but must refuse to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world conflagration frivolously and in disregard of our advice. Please say this to Count Berchtold at once with all emphasis and with great seriousness. The other plan which Bethmann also cordially took up late Tuesday night was Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria and Russia, either by the four Powers, or by Germany alone, on the basis of Serbia's very conciliatory original answer and the news from Rome that she was now ready for the sake of peace 'on condition of certain interpretations to swallow even articles 5 and 6, that is, the whole of the Austrian ultimatum.' This proposal of Grey's was eagerly welcomed by Bethmann as a possible happy solution. In sending it on to Vienna, he genuinely again 'pressed the button,' by adding: 'Please show this to Berchtold immediately and add that we regard such a yielding

on Serbia's part as a suitable basis for negotiation along with an occupation of a part of Serbian territory as a pledge.' But Berchtold was still deaf to the button; he eventually made the characteristic reply that, though the integral acceptance of Austria's note would have been satisfactory before hostilities had begun, 'now after the state of war has begun, Austria's conditions must naturally take another tone.' Grey's proposal was all the more eagerly welcomed by Bethmann, partly because Grey quickly supplemented it by embodying the two very points which Germany, herself had already been urging at Vienna and Petrograd in her 'pledge plan,' viz., a new statement by Austria of her intentions in Serbia which would satisfy Russia, and a pledge in the shape of the temporary military occupation of Belgrade which would satisfy Austria; and partly because Grey gave his first 'warning.' As Lichnowsky reported his conversation with Grey: to him [Grey] personally a suitable basis for such mediation seemed to be that Austria, after the occupation perhaps of Belgrade or other places, should announce her conditions. Should Your Excellency [Bethmann], however, undertake the mediation as I was able to propose to him early this morning as a possibility, this would, of course, suit him just as well. . . . [At the close of the conversation Grey] said he wanted to make me a friendly and private statement. . . . It would be possible for her [England] to stand aside so long as the conflict is limited to Austria and Russia. But if we and France should be drawn in, then the situation would immediately be a different one, and the British government under the circumstances, would be forced to rapid decisions. In this case it would be impossible to stand aside for long and to wait; 'if war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe that the world has ever seen.' He was far from wishing to utter any kind of threat; he merely wanted to save me from being misled and himself from the reproach of insincerity and, therefore, chose the form of a private explanation. Upon hearing of this alarming possibility that England might not remain neutral. . . . Bethmann immediately transmitted the whole conversation to Vienna and proceeded to 'press the button' very vigorously: 'If Austria refuses all negotiations, we are face to face with a conflagration in which England will be against us, Rumania and Italy according to all indications will not be for us, and we shall stand two against four Powers. Through England's opposition the main blow will fall on Germany. Austria's political prestige, the military honor of her army, as well as her just claims against Serbia, can be adequately satisfied by her occupation of Belgrade or other places. Through her humiliation of Serbia, she will make her position in the Balkans as well as in her relation to Russia strong again. Under these circumstances we must urgently and emphatically urge upon the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the adoption of mediation in accordance with the above honorable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences which would otherwise follow would be for Austria and for us an uncommonly heavy one.' To this urgent request by Germany for Austria's acceptance of a solution which perhaps even yet might have avoided the conflagration of Europe, Berchtold gave no definite or frank answer. Bethmann's telegram, inclosing Lichnowsky's conversation with Grey, after being deciphered was handed to Tschirschky Thursday, July 30, while he was at lunch with Berchtold. Berchtold listened, pale and silent, while they were read through twice; Count Forgách took notes; finally Berchtold said

ne would at once lay the matter before the Emperor. . . . After Berchtold had departed . . . Tschirschky spent a good part of the afternoon setting forth long and earnestly to Forgách and Hoyos all of Bethmann's arguments. It was useless. Instead he was cynically informed by these two intimate advisers of Berchtold that 'in view of the feeling in the army and in the people any checking of the military operations in progress was out of the question . . . Conrad von Hoetzendorff [Austrian chief-of-staff] would lay before the Emperor this evening the order for general mobilization, as a reply to the measures which have already been taken.' He was also finally told that Berchtold could not give any answer until the following morning, for the reason that Tisza, who would not be in Vienna until then, must be consulted. Later in the evening Tschirschky learned that Austria had decided to order general mobilization, *i.e.*, against Russia as well as against Serbia, and that Berchtold's answer to the 'pledge plan' would 'presumably not be absolutely negative.' What this dubious phrase meant is now clear from Berchtold's double-faced procedure as revealed, on the one hand, in his pretended attitude to the Russian ambassador, and, on the other, in his real attitude as reported in the minutes of the ministerial council of Friday morning. With the Russian ambassador he took up conversations again in a most friendly manner and to all the Powers pretended that Austria was ready to 'consider favorably' Grey's proposal. To the British ambassador in Vienna, he gave the impression, as Bunsen later wrote to Grey, that Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue, is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st of August by Count Mensdorff [the Austrian ambassador in London] to the effect that Austria had neither 'banged the door' on compromise, nor cut off the communications. . . . Unfortunately these conversations were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. . . . For some days the reports of the Russian 'measures preparatory to war' had become very alarming. The statements of the Russian minister of foreign affairs did not harmonize with those of the Russian minister of war, and both were contradicted by the apparently unmistakable evidence of very wide-reaching military activities. On the morning of Thursday, July 30, it was known in Berlin that Russia had officially admitted 'partial mobilization,' and it was suspected, probably with good reason, that she had done much more. Nevertheless, Bethmann appears still to have kept the upper hand during the day. At its close he gave the Prussian cabinet a long and still hopeful summary of the situation; he declared that he was still supported by the Kaiser in the determination that no decision for war should be taken, until an answer had been received from Austria as to her acceptance of the 'pledge plan.' Though the Kaiser by this time was in a very excited state of mind, as indicated by a raving philippic against his Austrian ally as well as against the Entente enemies who had 'encircled' Germany, he was persuaded by Bethmann to make a personal appeal to Francis Joseph. This was followed by another telegram of Bethmann's own, warning Berchtold of the terrible consequences of a refusal to accept the 'pledge plan' which was now being urged by both England and Germany. But the militarists were already getting the upper hand. Early in the evening Moltke had advised the Austrian chief-of-staff to order the general mobilization of the

whole Austrian army. Before 11:20 P.M. Bethmann had been told by the General Staff that Russia's military measures were so alarming that a speedy decision by Germany was necessary, unless Germany was to be taken by surprise.—*Fay, II, pp. 44-47, 50-51.*

39.—*Intervention of United States ambassador.*—At this point the United States ambassador at Berlin, J. W. Gerard, sought to intervene. "Acting on my own responsibility, I sent the following letter [on July 30] to the Chancellor: 'Your Excellency: Is there nothing that my country can do? Nothing that I can do towards stopping this dreadful war? I am sure that the President would approve any act of mine looking towards peace.—YOURS EVER, (Signed) JAMES W. GERARD.' To this letter I never had any reply."—J. W. Gerard, *My four years in Germany, p. 132.*

40.—*Telegrams between Prince Henry, for the Kaiser, and King George.*—"Localization" of conflict desired.—Kaiser's telegram to President Wilson through Ambassador Gerard.—"While the last fatal moments were passing the discussion of the mobilisation-orders at Petrograd [St. Petersburg], Berlin, and Vienna, there were no less than three separate side-issues raised, all of which centred in London. The first of them was a personal correspondence by telegram between the King of England and the German Emperor, dealing with possible mediation at Vienna and Petrograd. With this there was complicated, two days later, a suggestion about the neutrality of France, which arose from a misconception in a telephone-conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey, and was transmitted to Berlin in an erroneous shape. By the time that the error had been discovered, war had already broken out. The third side-issue, if so it may be called, arose from an appeal by the French Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Secretary, requesting an answer from the Cabinet as to the attitude of Great Britain in the event of the outbreak of war, and founding the request on the general principles of the existing *Entente* with France. The correspondence on this point, which was disappointing in its first stage to M. Cambon and the Government which he represented, was destined to take a very different turn two days later, in consequence of the sudden development of the question of Belgian neutrality. To proceed first to the series of Royal telegrams. The earliest of the series which stands on record is one from Prince Henry of Prussia, the Emperor's brother, to his cousin the King of England, to whom he had been paying a visit a week before. The Prince, as the subsequent telegrams show, was acting as the mouthpiece of his brother, who answered in person the reply which King George despatched to Prince Henry:

"HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA TO HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE, . . . JULY 30, 1914.

"I arrived here [Berlin] yesterday and have communicated what you were so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William, who was very thankful to receive your message. William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He is in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures which amount to mobilisation, and that these measures were taken five days ago. We have also received information that France is

making military preparations, while we have not taken measures of any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbours continue their preparations. This would then mean a European war. If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible misfortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view this would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the peace of Europe. I might add that Germany and England should now more than ever give each other mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster which otherwise appears inevitable. Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military preparations of his two neighbours may end in compelling him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless. I have informed William of my telegram to you, and I hope that you will receive my communication in the same friendly spirit which has inspired it.

"[Signed] 'HENRY.'"

"What was the message which Prince Henry, in the first paragraph of his telegram, says that he has passed on to the Kaiser to the satisfaction of the latter? [According to the telegram sent from London by Prince Henry and] the statements which William II made to President Wilson a few days later, in the famous 'Gerard telegram,' the message was one of a rather startling effect, viz., 'H. R. H. Prince of Prussia was received by his Majesty King George V. in London, who empowered him to transmit to me verbally that England would remain neutral if war broke out on the Continent involving Germany and France, Austria and Russia. This message was telegraphed to me by my brother from London after his conversation with H. M. the King, and was repeated verbally on July 29.'"—*Oman*, pp. 97-99.

The prince's telegram from London is thus given by Kautsky (no. 374):

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,

"Before my departure from London, to be exact, on Sunday morning (July 26th), I had, at my own request, a short conversation with Georgie, who was perfectly clear regarding the seriousness of the present situation, and assured me that he and his Government would leave no plan untried to localize the struggle between Austria and Serbia. His Government had therefore made the proposal that Germany, England, France and Italy—as you, of course, already know—should intervene in the endeavour to keep Russia in check. He hoped that Germany would be able, in spite of her alliance with Austria, to join in this plan to prevent a European war, to which, so he said, we were nearer than ever before. He continued in these exact words: "We shall try all we can to keep out of this and shall remain neutral." (*Wir werden alles aufbieten nicht hineingezogen zu werden und werden neutral bleiben.*) That this utterance was meant seriously I am convinced, as I am of the fact that England will remain neutral. Whether she will be able to do so permanently I cannot say, but have my doubts in view of the relationship with France. Georgie was in a very serious mood, reasoned logically and was most seriously and honestly endeavouring to avert the possible world conflagration, in which endeavour he relied greatly upon

your assistance. I communicated the substance of the conversation to Lichnowsky (as early as July 26th—κ.) with the request that he would transmit it to the Chancellor.

"Your faithful and obedient brother,
'HENRY.'"

[Kautsky questions the trustworthiness of Prince Henry's report of the conversation.] As to the question of neutrality, it is obvious that all that was said was, we shall endeavour to remain neutral so long as we can. Henry himself doubts whether this will be possible permanently. William, however, saw in this a promise binding in all circumstances."—K. Kautsky, *Guilt of William Hohenzollern*, pp. 159-161.—"It must be confessed that this form of the King's message is simply incredible. The King of Great Britain and Ireland is a constitutional Sovereign, acting in high matters of state through his Ministers. He does not make personal assurances binding the policy of the realm, save with the counsel and consent of his Cabinet. But Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and their colleagues had certainly not pledged the kingdom to neutrality in the event of the outbreak of that European war which they were endeavouring to stave off. As we have seen in the dealings of Sir Edward Grey with Prince Lichnowsky, and equally in the negotiations at Berlin, a promise of neutrality was the last thing that the British Government had any intention of giving to Germany. To have done so would have left her free to deliver her attack without any fear of British intervention; it would have served to make a declaration of war easy, which was the very reverse of the intention of Great Britain. King George cannot possibly have given any such message to Prince Henry as the Kaiser asserts, and one would have supposed that the latter was sufficiently versed in British constitutional usages to know that the pledge which he reports in the telegram to the American President was one which no King could give in [Great Britain]. . . . We cannot be far out in believing that the message was purely to the effect that the King would be delighted to do what he could to avert war. This is made certain by the measures which King George actually took on receiving his cousin's telegram, asking for the use of his influence on Russia for pacific ends. He sent to the Czar, through Sir Edward Grey, in proper constitutional fashion, a copy of the German *communiqué* complaining of Russian mobilisation, and threatening war unless it was immediately countermanded, with the following comment:

"I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world."

"On the previous night the King had replied to the telegram of Prince Henry, which invited his pacific mediation at Petrograd, in the following terms, which sufficiently show what his original message to his cousin must have been:

"HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA, . . . JULY 30, 1914.

"Thanks for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly desire that such a misfortune as a European war—the evil of which could not be remedied—may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Serbian territory, as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries (note—The 'other countries' must mean Germany, France, and Russia, apparently) suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe.

"[Signed] 'GEORGE.'

" . . . This message fits perfectly well into the known sequence of diplomatic happenings, and thereby differs absolutely from the alleged message put into King George's mouth by the Kaiser in the 'Wilson telegram.' It is at this point in the story that we run upon the most surprising points in the Kaiser's interesting if confused narrative given in that document. It may be best to print the paragraphs with which we are concerned in full: 'On the 30th my Ambassador in London reported that Sir Edward Grey in the course of a "private" conversation, told him that if the conflict remained localised between Russia—not Serbia—and Austria, England would not move, but if we mixed in the fray she would take quick decisions and grave measures, *i.e.*, if I left my ally Austria in the lurch, to fight alone, England would not touch me [*B. D. C.*, no. 89]. This communication being directly counter to the King's message to me, I telegraphed to him on the 29th or 30th, thanking him for his kind message through my brother, and begging him to use all his power to keep France and Russia, his allies, from making any warlike preparations calculated to disturb my work of mediation, stating that I was in constant communication with His Majesty the Czar. In the evening the King kindly answered that he had ordered his Government to use every possible influence with his allies to refrain from taking any provocative military measures. At the same time His Majesty asked me if I would transmit to Vienna the British proposal that Austria was to take Belgrade and a few other Serbian towns and a strip of country, as a *mainmise* to make sure that the other Serbian promises on paper should be fulfilled in reality. This proposal was at the same moment telegraphed to me from Vienna for London, quite in conjunction with the British proposal. Besides, I had telegraphed to His Majesty the Czar the same, as an idea of mine, before I received the two communications from Vienna and London, as both were of the same opinion. I immediately transmitted the telegram *vice-versâ* Vienna and London. I felt that I was able to tide the question over, and was happy at the peaceful outlook. While I was preparing a note to His Majesty the Czar the next morning, to inform him that Vienna,

London, and Berlin were agreed about the treatment of affairs, I received the telephones from his Excellency the Chancellor that in the night before the Czar had given the order to mobilise the whole Russian army, which was, of course, also meant against Germany, whereas up till then the southern armies had been mobilised against Austria.' We have already shown that the alleged message from Buckingham Palace sent through Prince Henry cannot have been of the character that the Kaiser declared for the best of reasons. The warning given to Prince Lichnowsky by Sir Edward Grey on the 28th July is, however, not unfairly reproduced in the telegram. But now comes the difficulty. The Kaiser acknowledges that he received the King's telegram of the 30th July offering the solution made by Sir Edward Grey, as to an Austrian occupation of Belgrade as a preliminary for a satisfactory settlement. But he then alleges that he received a similar offer from Vienna, and that he sent it on at once to King George. It was officially denied from London that any such telegram from Vienna was ever received by King George or by the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs."—*Oman*, pp. 98-100.—This telegram, however, is reproduced by *Kautsky*, no. 477.

41.—Appeal of French president to King George.—"Meanwhile the President of the French Republic sent in to King George the letter to which allusion is made in M. Cambon's last quoted despatch [*F. Y. B.*, no. 80]. Its terms were these—

"THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC TO HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE.

"PARIS, JULY 31, 1914.

"DEAR AND GREAT FRIEND,

"In the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound to convey to your Majesty the information which the Government of the Republic have received from Germany. The military preparations which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events. From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the *Entente cordiale* would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken. It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable. But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the *Entente* between

Great Britain and France, the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government of the Republic and of all France. It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend. We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our Allies an attitude of moderation, from which they have not swerved. In concert with your Majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines. But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present moment the more Great Britain, France and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace. I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely reaffirmed. Pray accept the expression of my most cordial sentiments.

“R. POINCARÉ.”

“This impassioned appeal had not the desired effect. On the next morning King George, having consulted his Ministers, made a reply to the effect that he still did not despair of peace, and that it was impossible to give the answer for which the President hoped.

“HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

“BUCKINGHAM PALACE, AUGUST 1, 1914.

“DEAR AND GREAT FRIEND,

“I most highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and frankly. You may be assured that the present situation in Europe has been the cause of much anxiety and pre-occupation to me, and I am glad to think that our two Governments have worked so amicably together in endeavouring to find a peaceful solution of the questions at issue. It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not without hope that the terrible events which seem so near may be averted. I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercising in refraining from taking undue military measures on the frontier and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one. I am personally using my best endeavours with the Emperors of Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an amicable settlement. As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which

might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon. Believe me, M. le Président.

“[Signed] ‘GEORGE R. I.’”

—*Oman*, pp. 108-109.

“The reply was the only one which could be sent in the circumstances. But we may feel that it was only with deep regret that nothing more could at this moment be said. [See also ENGLAND: 1914.] They had, in fact, to deal with the precise situation as it stood at that moment, and in particular it would be necessary to consider, as each particular case arose, whether this was action of such a kind as to force Great Britain out of its attitude of neutrality.”—Headlam, p. 327.—Would more decided action by Sir Edward Grey at an early stage have prevented the war? “We must first ask, At what early stage? Suppose after Agadir or on the announcement of the new German Navy Law in 1912 the Foreign Secretary had, in cold blood, proposed a formal alliance with France and Russia, and in execution of military conventions consequential upon the alliance had begun to raise by compulsion an army adequate to . . . [British] responsibilities and to the part . . . [Great Britain was] playing in the world's affairs . . . who shall say whether that would have prevented or precipitated the war? But what chance was there of such action being unitedly taken? The Cabinet of the day would never have agreed to it. . . . But if the Cabinet had been united upon it, the House of Commons would not have accepted their guidance. Therefore the Foreign Minister would have had to resign. The policy which he had advocated would have stood condemned and perhaps violently repudiated; and with that repudiation would have come an absolute veto upon all those informal preparations and non-committal discussions on which the defensive power of the Triple Entente was erected. Therefore, by taking such a course in 1912 Sir Edward Grey would only have paralysed Britain, isolated France and increased the preponderant and growing power of Germany. Suppose again that now after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the Foreign Secretary had proposed to the Cabinet that if matters were so handled that Germany attacked France or violated Belgian territory, Great Britain would declare war upon her. Would the Cabinet have assented to such a communication? I cannot believe it. If Sir Edward Grey could have said on Monday that if Germany attacked France or Belgium, England would declare war upon her, might there not still have been time to ward off the catastrophe? The question is certainly arguable. But the knowledge which we now have of events in Berlin to show that even then the German Government were too deeply committed by their previous action. They had before their eyes the deliberate British announcement that the Fleet was being held together. That at least was a serious if silent warning. Under its impression the German Emperor, as soon as he returned to Berlin, made on this same Monday and succeeding days strong efforts to bring Austria to reason and so to prevent war. But he could never overtake events or withstand the contagion of ideas. However this may be, I am certain that if Sir Edward Grey had sent the kind of ultimatum suggested, the Cabinet would have broken up, and it is also my belief that up till Wednesday or Thursday at least, the House of Commons would have repudiated his action. Nothing less than the deeds of Germany would have converted the British nation to war. To act in advance of those deeds would have led to an exposure of division worse

than the guarded attitude which . . . [was] maintained, which brought . . . [the] country into the war united. After Wednesday or Thursday it was too late."—W. L. S. Churchill, *World crisis*, pp. 215-217.

42.—German ultimatum to Russia.—On Aug. 1 Sazonov sent the following secret telegram to the Russian diplomats abroad:

"At midnight the Ambassador of Germany declared to me, by order of his Government, that if within twelve hours, that is at midnight of Saturday, we did not commence demobilization, not only in regard to Germany but also in regard to Austria, the German Government would be forced to give the order of mobilization. To my question if this was war the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it."—*R. O. B.*, no. 70.

43.—Second declaration of war: Germany against Russia.—No reply to Germany's ultimatum was sent by Russia, and at 7.10 P. M. on the evening of August 1, the following declaration of war was presented by the German ambassador:

"No. 76. NOTE PRESENTED BY THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AT ST. PETERSBURG, JULY 19 (AUGUST 1), 7:10 P. M.

"The Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer*) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude*) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows: His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.—F. POURTALÈS."

* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the note."—*R. O. B.*, no. 76.—See also RUSSIA: 1914 (August): Declaration, etc.

"The German declaration of war on Russia took effect at mid-day on the 1st August, the Ultimatum giving twelve hours notice having been delivered by Count Pourtalès on the preceding night. Two hours after the designated moment had elapsed, a telegram from the Czar reached Berlin; there seems every reason to believe that it had been delayed upon the way. It will be seen that its words presuppose that a settlement was still possible, despite of the fatal document that had been sent in upon the 31st:

"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries, and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply."

"To this the Kaiser replied that the time-limit had expired, that he was unable to discuss the subject raised, and that an immediate acquiescence in the preceding German demand for instant demobilisation was the only way in which war might still be averted:

"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war could still be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

"As the German army was now mobilised, this demand that Russia should demobilise without any corresponding promise on the part of the Kaiser was clearly absurd. If it meant anything, it was a final attempt to enforce the Imperial will by a last supplementary threat. But it is improbable that William II had by this moment any expectation that his cousin would yield, or any desire that he should. The projected war had been launched on Europe, and further exchange of telegrams was obviously useless. War, then, between Germany and Russia began at noon on the 1st August. There remained the question of war between Germany and France."—Oman, p. 110.—"Another incident of these crowded days deserves some record, as it has been quoted in Germany as an instance of Great Britain having stood in the way of a localisation of the war. This impression is produced by suppressing a telegram in which it is shown that the whole episode arose from a mistake upon the part of Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador. On August 1 Sir Edward Grey, still feeling round for some way in which the evil might be minimised, suggested through the telephone to Prince Lichnowsky that if both Germany and France could see their way to stand out, the conflict would then be limited to Austria and Russia. This practical and possible suggestion was transmitted to Berlin in the absurd form that Britain would hold France out of the war, while Russia would be abandoned to Germany and Austria. The Kaiser lost no time in assenting to so delightful a proposal. It was at once pointed out to Prince Lichnowsky that he had made a mistake, and the Prince telegraphed to Berlin a correction of his previous message. This second telegram was suppressed by the German Government, while, some weeks afterwards, they published the inaccurate dispatch in order to give the world the impression that Britain had actually made a move towards peace which had been withdrawn when it was found that it was eagerly welcomed by Ger-

many. The very idea that Britain could in any way pledge the actions of France is grotesque upon the face of it. Whilst making this false suggestion as to the action of Britain, the German Government carefully concealed the fact that Sir Edward Grey had actually gone the extreme length in the interests of peace, of promising that we should detach ourselves from our Allies if a conference were held and their attitude was an obstacle to an agreement."—A. C. Doyle, *British campaign in France and Flanders, 1914*, pp. 19-21.—See also below: 38.

44.—Attitude of the Kaiser.—The perturbation of the Kaiser's mind at this time is shown by his comments upon the diplomatic documents submitted to him in the days which immediately preceded the declarations of war. "Upon a telegram of July 30th from the German Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office, in which, among other things, it was reported that Sazonoff had stated that the Russian mobilization could not be stopped, the Emperor penned the following:

"If mobilization can no longer be stopped—which is not true—why then did the Czar call upon my mediation at all three days afterwards without mentioning the issuing of the mobilization orders? That shows clearly enough that the mobilization has seemed too sudden even to him and that afterwards, to quiet his conscience, he made this move here, pro forma, although he knew that it was no longer of any use, since he does not feel strong enough to stop the mobilization. Frivolity and weakness are going to throw the world into the most terrible war, which aims eventually to destroy Germany. For that is clear to me beyond all doubt: England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves—on the ground that we are confronted with our casus foederis towards Austria—to carry on a war of annihilation against us, taking the Austro-Serbian conflict as a pretext. Hence Grey's cynical remark to Lichnowsky, "as long as the war remains confined to Russia and Austria, England will remain quiet and only if we involve ourselves and France in it would he be forced to move actively against us." That is, either we should basely betray our ally and deliver her up to Russia—thereby destroying the Triple Alliance—or, for our loyalty to our ally, be pounced upon and punished by all of the Triple Entente, by which their jealousy will finally receive the satisfaction of totally ruining both of us. This in a nutshell is the true situation which, slowly and surely initiated by Edward VII, promoted by him and, in spite of denials, systematically developed by means of discussions of England with Paris and Petersburg, is being finally completed and put into operation by George V. The stupidity and clumsiness of our ally is thereby turned into a noose for us. Thus the famous "encircling" of Germany has now at last become an accomplished fact, in spite of all the attempts of our politicians and diplomats to prevent it. The net has been suddenly drawn together over our heads and England, smiling scornfully, has scored the most brilliant results from her tenacious, purely anti-German world-policy, against which we have proven ourselves powerless, for while we are struggling isolated in the net, she is making out of our loyalty to Austria a rope for our political and economic destruction. A wonderful accomplishment, which excites admiration even from him who is sent to destruction by it! Edward VII is, after his death, still stronger than I, who am alive! And yet there have been people who have believed that England could be won over or be pacified by means of this or that petty

measure!!! Unceasingly, unyieldingly she has pursued her purpose with notes, proposals for naval holidays, scares, Haldane, etc., until she was ready. And we walked into the trap and even introduced the program of one-ship-a-year, in the pathetic hope of thereby pacifying England!!! All warnings, all entreaties on my part have been in vain. Now we are earning the English so-called gratitude for all this! Out of the dilemma into which our loyalty towards the venerable old Emperor has brought us, a situation is created which gives England the desired pretext for annihilating us with the hypocritical appearance of justice, namely to help France on account of the maintenance of the notorious balance of power in Europe, i.e. the playing off of all European states against us for the benefit of England! Now all of these machinations must be unsparingly uncovered and the mask of Christian peaceableness must be openly and firmly torn from her, and the Pharisaical hypocrisy of pacifism must be exposed on the pillories!! And our consuls in Turkey and India, agents, etc., must incite the whole Mohammedan world to a wild revolt against this detestable, lying and unscrupulous nation of shopkeepers, for if we are to bleed to death then England shall at least lose India.—W."—Kautsky, *no.* 401.

45.—Popularity of the war in Russia.—"Since the conclusion of the war with Japan [in 1905] Russia had been feverishly reorganizing her army and navy, in response to Germany's gigantic increase of military expenditure. The third and fourth Dumas eagerly supported the Government's efforts to improve the army and navy, although the representatives of the House were refused participation in the work of reorganization. [See also RUSSIA: 1914 (August): Status of army.] The clash with Germany seemed inevitable, and the only question was whether Germany would give Russia and France time to get ready. Both Russia and France heartily welcomed, in the meantime, the change in England's traditional policy of 'splendid isolation.' Great Britain and Russia came to an understanding concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet; the unofficial Triple Entente was growing in pace with the increase of Teutonic influence in the Near East, for the Pan-Germanistic dream about a straight diagonal line—Berlin-Bagdad, threatened the welfare of all the three nations concerned. For Russia in particular, a Germanized Constantinople would mean the end of her ambitions. Since Peter the Great an outlet into an ice-free sea has been the historical need of the Empire; Arkhangelsk [Archangel] in the North is frozen most of the year; Vladivostok is ice-bound three months, and is too remote, especially since Russian interests in the Far East received a serious check; the Baltic Sea is closed half a year, and is, besides, at the mercy of Germany; the Black Sea is of unstable use as long as the 'key' is in the hands of Turkey, or, for that matter, of any power which may block the outlet into the Mediterranean. . . . The grievances of the Russian people against Germany have been not only of an economic and political nature. In the minds of the *intelligentzia* and of the oppressed masses the name of Germany, but particularly of Prussia, has been associated with the crimes of Russian bureaucracy. Since the middle of the eighteenth century—in fact, since Peter the Great—German influence has been preponderant in various fields of Russian life: at the Court, in the army and navy, among the higher bureaucrats, in commerce; German colonists have occupied some of the best land in the West and in the South. Any Russian schoolboy will give you a list of Russian

tyrants and oppressors with such names as Bühren, Pahlen, Benckendorff, Berg, Plehve, Minn, Riman, Kaulbars, or of such distinguished nonentities of the army and navy as Stakelberg, Stark, Stössel, Rennenkampf, Grippenbergr. . . In a word, the war with Germany is [1914] in the eyes of the majority of the people associated, rightly or wrongly, with the struggle against everything pernicious in Russia, against bureaucracy, militarism, and despotism. This explains the wonderful unity of all ranks and classes, of the *intelligentsia* and the masses, of the conservatives, liberals, and revolutionists, of the landowners, manufacturers, peasants, and workingmen—in the common purpose of defeating 'Wilhelmism,' to use the expression of an old revolutionary."—A. Kornilov, *Modern Russian history*, v. 2, pp. 343-346.—See also RUSSIA: 1914 (August): Relations with Germany.

46.—Russian foreign minister Sazanov on crisis.—"20TH JULY, (2D AUG.) 1914. . . The Imperial Government, to which the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its delivery at Belgrade, having taken note of the demands contained therein, saw that among the number were some that it was entirely impossible to comply with, while others were presented in a form incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. Finding inadmissible the diminution of the dignity of Serbia contained in these demands, as well as the tendency of Austria-Hungary to assure her preponderance in the Balkans, shown by these very exigencies, the Russian Government pointed out in the most friendly fashion to Austria-Hungary that it would be desirable to submit to a new examination the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not believe it possible to consent to a discussion of the note. The moderating action of the other powers at Vienna was likewise not crowned with success. . . Recognizing the exaggerated character of the demands presented by Austria, Russia had previously declared that it would be impossible for her to remain indifferent, without at the same time refusing to employ all her efforts to obtain a pacific issue which would be acceptable to Austria and would satisfy her *amour-propre* as a great power. At the same time Russia firmly established that she admitted a pacific solution of the question only in a measure which would not imply the diminution of the dignity of Serbia as an independent State. Unfortunately all the efforts made by the Imperial Government in this direction remained without effect. The Austro-Hungarian Government, after evading (*s'être dérobé*) every conciliatory intervention of the Powers in its conflict with Serbia, proceeded to mobilize, officially declared war on Serbia, and the following day bombarded Belgrade. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accused Serbia of having prepared and executed the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a crime of the Common Law against a whole people and a whole Government drew to Serbia by its evident inanity the large sympathies of all circles of European society. As a consequence of this method of acting on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government, despite the declaration of Russia that she could not remain indifferent to the lot of Serbia, the Imperial Government judged it necessary to order the mobilization of the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. Such a decision was necessary because after the date of the handing of the Austro-Hungarian note

to the Servian Government and the first steps of Russia five days had passed and meanwhile the Cabinet of Vienna had made no step to meet our pacific efforts—on the contrary the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian Army had been decreed. The German Government was informed of the measures taken by Russia. It was at the same time explained to it that these measures were only the consequence of the Austrian armaments, and in no wise directed against Germany. At the same time the Imperial Government declared that Russia was ready to continue the *pourparlers* in view of a pacific solution of the conflict, either by means of direct negotiations with the Cabinet of Vienna, or, following the proposal of Great Britain, by means of a conference of the four great Powers not directly interested, namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy. However, this attempt of Russia equally failed. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with us, and the Cabinet at Vienna evaded participation in the projected conference of the Powers. Nevertheless Russia did not discontinue her efforts in favor of peace. Replying to the question of the Ambassador of Germany, under what conditions we would still consent to suspend our armaments, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions would be the recognition by Austria-Hungary that the Austro-Servian question had taken the character of a European question, and the declaration of this same Power that she would consent not to insist on demands incompatible with the sovereign rights of Serbia. The proposal of Russia was judged by Germany to be unacceptable for Austria. Simultaneously there was received at St. Petersburg the news of the proclamation of the general mobilization by Austria-Hungary. At the same time hostilities continued on Servian territory and Belgrade was again bombarded. The failure of our pacific proposals obliged us to increase the military measures of precaution. The Cabinet of Berlin having addressed to us a question on this subject, it was replied that Russia was forced to commence arming to safeguard herself against all eventualities. While taking this measure of precaution, Russia none the less did not discontinue to seek with all her powers an issue from the situation and declared herself ready to accept any method of solution of the conflict which would meet the conditions posed by us. Notwithstanding this conciliatory communication the German Government, 18 (31) July, addressed to the Russian Government a demand for the suspension of her military measures by midday of the 19th July, (1st August,) threatening in the contrary case to proceed to a general mobilization. Next day, 19th July, (1st August,) the Ambassador of Germany transmitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the name of his Government the declaration of war."—*R. O. B.*, no. 77.

47.—German inquiry as to intentions of France.—René Viviani reported on August 1:

"The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she wishes for it against France. Yesterday when Herr von Schoen came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, although there has been no direct dispute between France and Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used all our efforts for a peaceful solution and are still continuing to do so, added that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to the President of the Republic, and asked that we would be good enough to make arrangements as to him personally

(*des dispositions pour sa propre personne*); we know also that he has already put the archives of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed with Russia to begin negotiations."—*F. Y. B.*, no. 120.—See also below: 69.

48.—German ultimatum to France.—Projected demand of French fortresses.—French mobilization.—German invasion of Luxemburg.—Claims of frontier violation.—Belgium invaded.



RENÉ VIVIANI

—Third declaration of war (Aug. 3): Germany against France.—On July 31, the German ultimatum was delivered at the Foreign Office in Paris by von Schoen, the German ambassador. An account of his interview with Viviani, the prime minister, is told with fairness and accuracy. Writing in the spring of 1921, he says: "I was instructed to inform the French premier that Russia's mobilization had compelled us to proclaim a state of 'impending danger of war', which must be followed by mobilisation, unless Russia suspended all her military preparations against us within twelve hours. Mobilisation would inevitably mean war; I was therefore to ask whether France would remain neutral in a Russo-German war. The answer was to be given within eighteen hours. The instructions further state that in case of France promising to remain neutral, which was unlikely, a guarantee was to be given, in the form of conceding us a right to occupy the fortresses of Toul and Verdun for the duration of the war with Russia. In the

conversation which I had with M. Viviani on the evening of July 31st, he professed to my surprise, to have no information of a Russian general mobilisation against us, and said he only knew of a partial mobilisation against Austria-Hungary and general precautionary measures. He would not abandon hope that the worst might yet be avoided. On my pointing out that not only the whole Russian army, but the fleet had also been mobilised, a clear proof that the measure was directed against us, M. Viviani could make no reply. He promised to give an answer to the question of neutrality the next afternoon, after the Cabinet Council. His ignorance of the Russian general mobilisation seems very remarkable, in view of the fact that it had been publicly proclaimed in the early morning of that day in St. Petersburg, had been ordered the evening before, and undoubtedly decided on even earlier. . . . Paris could not be in any doubt that the Russian mobilisation was equivalent to war . . . as this was a principle on which stress had been laid when concluding the alliance. In the course of the night M. Viviani telegraphed to St. Petersburg that he proposed merely answering my enquiry as to neutrality by saying that France would be guided by her own interests. . . . If the French official reports published of the interview represent that my question only extended to 'France's attitude', that is misleading. In reality, what I said was, that after the Russian mobilisation and our ultimatum which would probably not be accepted, our decision now depended mainly on France's attitude, as to which I therefore asked for a statement. . . . Of course, I did not allude in any way to making over the fortresses as a guarantee, as this question could only arise in case of the French answer being in the affirmative. . . . The answer was given the next day, August 1st, before the expiration of the eighteen hours, and was as follows: 'France will do what her interests demand'. M. Viviani . . . said, apparently in order to justify the vagueness of the answer, that he had reason to believe the general situation had changed, and was considerably easier. Russia had accepted in principle a fresh proposal made by Sir Edward Grey as to the suspension of military preparations all round, and negotiations, and Austria-Hungary had again expressly stated that she would not encroach on the Serbian territorial *status* and Serbian sovereignty. This revived the hope of a peaceful settlement which had been abandoned. I had heard nothing from Berlin of this fresh proposal, and was therefore not in a position to say anything definite. I never for a moment doubted that the answer to the question as to neutrality was a refusal, in spite of its being so indefinite; I also told M. Viviani at once, without his contradicting me, that I took it to be in the negative, and that my government would probably do the same. There was consequently no object in raising the question of the fortresses. It is obvious that the idea was not a happy one. . . . From a political point of view it was a mistake. . . . If the French had even for only a passing moment thought of agreeing to the proposal of neutrality, the demand for the surrender . . . would have nipped any understanding in the bud. The *faux pas* can only be accounted for by assuming that the demand . . . must have been urged on those responsible for our foreign policy by parties with no political training, and that the reason for not refusing it was only the certainty that France's attitude would make it useless to raise the question, which was, in fact, the case. After trying for years to decipher the

telegraphic instructions concerning the surrender of the fortresses, the French at last succeeded, and they made capital out of this discovery by professing to regard it as further proof that we wished for war. This interpretation of it seems absolutely arbitrary. The idea of asking that the fortresses should be surrendered was not the result of a desire to bring about a rupture under any circumstances, but of a mistaken calculation."—F. von Schoen, *Memoirs of an ambassador* (tr. by C. Vesey), pp. 192-196.—"Justice to France requires the explicit statement that the conduct of her Government at this awful juncture was faultless. She assented instantly to every proposal that could make for peace. She abstained from every form of provocative action. She even compromised her own safety, holding back her covering troops at a considerable distance behind her frontier, and delaying her mobilisation in the face of continually gathering German forces till the latest moment. Not until she was confronted with the direct demand of Germany to break her Treaty and abandon Russia, did France take up the challenge; and even had she acceded to the German demand, she would only, as we now know, have been faced with a further ultimatum to surrender to German military occupation as a guarantee for her neutrality the fortresses of Toul and Verdun. There never was any chance of France being allowed to escape the ordeal. Even cowardice and dishonour would not have saved her. The Germans had resolved that if war came from any cause, they would take and break France forthwith as its first operation."—W. L. S. Churchill, *World crisis, 1914*, pp. 217-218.—In his "Memoirs," posthumously published in Berlin, Dec., 1922, Count von Moltke says: "I now (Aug., 1914) demanded of the Kaiser and his immediate advisers, as a guaranty of French goodwill, temporary possession of the fortresses of Verdun and Toul. This proposal was rejected on the ground that it indicated lack of confidence in England." The French account of the crucial interview is curious. M. Viviani, in his circular dispatch to all the ambassadors of the republic abroad, says that he opened up the conversation by recapitulating the various efforts made by France for a peaceful settlement, and demonstrating the desperate situation created by the dispatch of the ultimatum to Russia on the preceding day: "The German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts made by France towards an honorable settlement of the Austro-Serbian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the *pourparlers* which have been carried on since yesterday:

"(1) An English compromise, proposing, besides other suggestions, suspension of military preparations on the part of Russia, on condition that the other Powers should act in the same way; adherence of Russia to this proposal.

"(2) Communications from the Austrian Government declaring that they did not desire any aggrandisement in Serbia, nor even to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were ready to discuss *even the basis* of the Austro-Serbian question at London with the other Powers.

"I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all *pourparlers*, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when this Power had just accepted the English formula (which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the countries which have mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with

France. Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a 'glimmer of hope' for some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace. Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of France was not doubtful. It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures required for protection against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on her."—*F. Y. B.*, no. 125.—"It will be noted that M. Viviani does not say that he gave any categorical answer such as that reported by the German Ambassador. Indeed, he denies that Baron von Schoen made any fresh request for a reply to his question regarding French neutrality. What surprised him was that the Baron did not ask for his passports, and went no further in suggesting the inevitable rupture than the remark that 'the attitude of France was not doubtful.' But German mobilisation being now declared, France somewhat tardily followed the example. The orders were published from the War Office at 3.40 on this afternoon [August 1]. The President of the Republic sent for the British Ambassador, and gave him an *exposé* of the situation, as follows: 'French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of ten kilometres so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier, and have made incursions on it. Notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace. The French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace, and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.' [*B. D. C.*, no. 134.] It created general surprise that no German declaration of war followed the expiration of Baron von Schoen's eighteen-hour limit. The explanation was that the Germans were intending to get the benefit of their violation of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality, before opening active operations against France and putting her upon her guard. The situation was explained when, on the early morning of the 2nd August, the Germans rushed from both sides into the neutral territory of Lux-

emburg, and in the afternoon sent in their demand for free passage to the Belgian Government. It can, accordingly, only provoke amazement when we find the German Ambassador appearing at mid-day at the French Foreign Office to make the solemn assurance that the invasion of Luxemburg was not an act of hostility, but only 'for the protection of the railways of the Grand Duchy.' . . . The words used were as follows:

"NOTE HANDED IN BY THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR, PARIS, AUGUST 2, 1914.

"The German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not constitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely preventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, are under German administration.

"[Signed] 'VON SCHOEN.' [F. Y. B., no. 133.]

"Meanwhile, though no declaration of war yet came, a whole sequence of violating of the French frontier by German troops took place on the 2nd August, one of them at least on such a scale and penetrating so deep into the country that it is impossible to regard it as the mere freak of an irresponsible junior officer. The Germans alleged similar acts on the part of the French, but . . . the one series of outrages is amply proved and documented, while the other not only vanishes into vague rumour when investigated, but consists of stories incredible in themselves, which (one would have supposed) no civilised Government would have ventured to put on paper in a serious document. It was only after 6 o'clock on the 3rd August, when the Belgian as well as the Luxemburg frontier had already been violated by the German troops, that the declaration of war which had been expected on the 1st August finally came to hand at Paris. The terms in which the German Ambassador asked for his passports were the following:

"LETTER HANDED BY THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO M. RENÉ VIVIANI, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DURING HIS FAREWELL AUDIENCE, AUGUST 3, 1914, AT 6.45 P.M.:

"M. LE PRÉSIDENT,—The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel; one has thrown bombs on the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that, in the presence of these acts of aggression, the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power. At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity. My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end, it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Em-

bassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German consulate-general in Paris. Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

"[Signed] 'VON SCHOEN.'"

—*Oman*, pp. 110-113.—See also below: 69.

49.—Conditional British naval support promised France.—"While Great Britain was still declining to commit herself, the great conflict had begun. Austria and Serbia had been enemies since July 28; and on the afternoon of August 1 Russia and Germany were at war. No reply was sent to the German ultimatum, and Russian troops crossed the frontier into East Prussia before the expiration of the time-limit. . . . The anticipated outbreak of hostilities between Germany and France compelled Great Britain to define her attitude; and on the morning of August 2 the Foreign Secretary was empowered by the Cabinet to promise conditional naval support to France."—G. P. Gooch, *History of modern Europe, 1878-1919*, pp. 549-550. —In the afternoon of the same day, Sir Edward Grey made a statement in Parliament of his notification to the French ambassador as follows:

"After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum: 'I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.' I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany tomorrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet."—*B. D. C.*, no. 148.

50.—Case of Luxemburg.—Guaranteed neutrality.—German invasion.—In a treaty dated May 11, 1867, the second article ran as follows: "'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, under the Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State. It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other States. The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of Neutrality stipulated by the present Article. That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the collective Guarantee of the Powers signing as Parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral State.' The third article provided for the demolition of the fortifications of Luxemburg and its conversion into an open town, the fourth for its evacuation by the Prussian garrison, and the fifth forbade the restoration of the fortifications. Such then was the treaty guaran-

teeing the neutrality of Luxemburg, which was proposed, it may be observed, by Prussia herself [see also LUXEMBURG: 1780-1914]; but, until the treaty was broken by the very Power which had proposed the neutrality, only one incident need be noted in the history of the country, namely, the part it played in the war of 1870-1. On December 3, 1870, Count Bismarck issued from Versailles a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors, calling attention to the fact that both the French and the Luxemburgers had violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy mainly by giving facilities for French soldiers to return to France. Precautions were taken by the Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such abuses occurring in the future, and as no violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg was committed by the Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors were satisfied with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped. At the end of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted to obtain Luxemburg as compensation for the loss of Metz."—Oxford Faculty of Modern History, *Why we are at war (Prefatory note to Appendix VII, p. 23)*.—On Aug. 2, 1914, Sir Edward Grey wrote: "M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament tomorrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point."—*B. D. C., no. 148*.—The same day the minister of state of Luxemburg wired to Sir Edward Grey: "The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways, which are leased to the Empire."—*B. D. C., no. 129*.—Later in the day a second message arrived in London from the same minister: "I have the honor to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts: On Sunday, the 2d August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly toward the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armored trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of his Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin."—*B. D. C., no. 147*.—See also LUXEMBURG: 1914-1918.

51.—Germany demands free passage through Belgium (Aug. 2).—Contrast between attitude toward Belgian and Swiss neutrality.—At seven o'clock in the evening of August 2, Herr von Below

Saleske, German minister at Brussels, handed to the Belgian foreign minister, M. Davignon, a note written in German, demanding a passage through Belgium for German troops:

"BRUSSELS, AUGUST 2, 1914.

"IMPERIAL GERMAN LEGATION IN BELGIUM.

"(Very Confidential)

"Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

"The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defense of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory. In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:

"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

"2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

"3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessities for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

"4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

"In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

"The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighboring States will grow stronger and more enduring."—*B. G. B., no. 20*.

"Germany was asking Belgium to open her frontier to German armies. Assuming that Belgium had the desire or considered that it was to her interest to accede to this demand, was it in her power to do so? As a state, Belgium is a diplomatic creation. . . . It was created 'Perpetually Neutral' by the Treaty of 1839 (Article 7). [See also BELGIUM: 1839-1914.] Perpetual Neutrality, or to use a more exact expression, Permanent Neu-

trality, is a curious notion of international law. It has been elaborated entirely for the purpose of meeting certain political necessities. . . . To say that a State is protected by Permanent Neutrality is to say that it is excluded from any war whatsoever. Permanent Neutrality tends essentially . . . to safeguard small States against the encroachments of powerful neighbours in such a way as to maintain equilibrium between the great countries. With a view to this object, Permanent Neutrality binds by reciprocal obligations the neutralized State and the States which have sanctioned its neutrality. . . . Belgium could not open her frontier to the German armies because she had entered into a formal obligation with regard to England, Austria-Hungary, France, and Russia, Powers which were co-contractors with Prussia, not to abandon the neutrality that she had by convention accepted in 1839. To grant a passage to the German armies was clearly to show favour to one of the belligerents, namely Germany, to the detriment of the other, namely France, both of whom moreover were parties to the convention. Again, Germany could not have really expected that Belgium would accept her demand, for the very day on which her armies were crossing the Belgian frontier, namely on the 4th of August, she received from Switzerland—the only nation . . . whose international situation could be compared with that of Belgium—a notification that she would remain neutral during the war. What did Germany reply?

'The Government has had the honour to receive the circular note addressed on the 4th of August of this year to the signatory Powers of the Treaty of 1815 in which the Federal Council declares that in the course of the present war the Swiss Confederation will maintain and defend by all the means at her disposal her neutrality and the inviolability of her territory. The Imperial Government has taken cognizance of this declaration with sincere satisfaction and is convinced that the Confederation, with the support of its strong army and the indomitable will of the entire Swiss people, will repel every attempt to violate its neutrality.'

Thus Germany counted upon Switzerland doing exactly that which she was asking Belgium not to do!"—E. Waxweiler, *Belgium neutral and loyal*, pp. 41-42, 48-49.

52.—Belgian reply.—German demand refused.—The German note had been delivered at 7 P. M. on August 2. Six and a half hours later, at 1.30 A. M., the German minister asked for an interview with Baron van der Elst, secretary-general to the Belgian Foreign Office. The German minister told the latter that "he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared. The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below [Saleske] where these incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed by France."—*B. G. B.*, no. 21.

The same morning, August 3, at seven o'clock, M. Davignon handed Belgium's reply to the German minister:

"The German Government stated in their note of the 2d August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops. The German Government, therefore, considered themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms. This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government. The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government. Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader. The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia. Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality. The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her, constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law. The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe. Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality. If this hope is disappointed, the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights."—*B. G. B.*, no. 22.

M. Davignon telegraphed to the Belgian diplomatic representatives at Berlin, St. Petersburg, London, Paris, Vienna and The Hague:

"BRUSSELS, AUGUST 3, 1914: At 7 p. m. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in the event of a refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was allowed within which to reply. Our answer has been that this infringement of our neutrality would be a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honor of the nation. Conscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack by all the means in her power."—*B. G. B.*, no. 23.

At noon on the same day M. Davignon sent the following dispatch to his representatives at the five principal capitals:

"As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ultimatum which expires this morning, 3d August, at 7 o'clock. As no act of war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided that there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers. The French Minister has made the following statement to me upon the subject: 'Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made, it is probable that—unless of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance.' I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done."—*B. G. B., no. 24.*

—See also BELGIUM: 1914: World War.

53.—**King of the Belgians' appeal to King George.—British response.**—On August 3, King Albert of the Belgians addressed the following telegram to King George (in French): "Mindful of the numerous marks of friendship of your Majesty and of your Majesty's predecessors, as well as the friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870 and of the proofs of sympathy which she has once again shown us, I make the supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium.—Albert."—*B. G. B., no. 25.*

On the same day the Belgian minister in London replied to M. Davignon's telegram (see above: 52):

"I showed your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Sir Edward Grey] who has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany."—*B. G. B., no. 26.*

54.—**France offers troops to Belgium.**—On August 3, the British minister in Brussels reported: "French Government have offered through their Military Attaché the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been received today: 'We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take.'"—*B. D. C., no. 151.*

55.—**Position of Italy.—Declaration of neutrality.—Secret treaty with France concluded in 1902.—Terms of Triple Alliance.**—Though a member of the Triple Alliance since 1882, Italy refused to enter the war in 1914 on the side of her allies, Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the grounds that the purely defensive terms of her agreement called for her active coöperation only in the event of one or both of her allies being attacked. "In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied: 'The war under-

taken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.'"—*B. D. C., no. 152.*

Yet there was another reason, which was not revealed to the world until the end of 1918, after the close of the war. Italy and France had formed a secret agreement in 1902 not to fight against each other. "In 1900, a few months after the accession of Victor Emmanuel III, M. Barrère [French ambassador at Rome] drew up together with the Marquis Visconti-Venosta [Italian foreign minister] the Notes in accordance with which France gave up her interest in Tripoli while Italy recognized French rights in Morocco. No subject of contention was left between the two nations. This is what M. Barrère remarked in 1902 to M. Prinetti, that patriotic and courageous minister of whom death was destined to rob Italy too soon. The Rome government was at that time preparing to renew the Triple Alliance. Seeing that all possibility of conflict between Italy and France had disappeared, Italian policy was bound to exclude any thought of an attack on our country [France]. M. Prinetti agreed, and thence arose the agreements dated November, 1902. Italy bound herself not to join in any attack on France. She also undertook not to participate against France in any war which our country might have declared, but which, in reality, was imposed on her by the enemy's will. France, on her side, bound herself by identical obligations to Italy. Such were the agreements the text of which was sent by Count Torielli, the Italian ambassador, to M. Delcassé, by the express, and possibly even the repeated, orders of M. Prinetti. For reasons which can be guessed, this text remained strictly secret. The public did not suspect the importance of the Franco-Italian bond, for it only read a short declaration made in a speech by M. Delcassé. Herr von Bülow, Chancellor of the German Empire, was permitted to jeer at the 'pirouetting' which Italy allowed herself with France. But the mutual promise made by France and Italy contributed decisively to keep the peace of Europe for a dozen years. And when the Central Empires at last succeeded in letting loose war, the pact of 1902 was found to be so completely in harmony with Italian sentiment and national interest, that one might say no diplomatic act was ever more emphatically ratified by peoples and by events."—*Le Temps, Paris, Dec. 22, 1918.*—It was not until October, 1919, that the full terms of the Triple Alliance became public. According to these, "Italy was not expected to come to the aid of Germany in a war with Russia; in 1896 Italy had informed her partners that she would not join them in any war in which France and England were aligned on the same side; and, furthermore, Italy was not to be called upon to fight against Great Britain."—*New York Times, October 24, 1919.*—See also TRIPLE ALLIANCE: Predicament of Italy; Content of the treaties.

56.—**British foreign minister's statement to Parliament.—Anglo-French military consultations between 1912-1914.—Disposition of fleets.—Conditional promise of naval support.**—On the afternoon of August 3, when it had become evident that war was imminent, Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister, rose in the House and made a full statement of the obligations into which the government had entered.

"Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other. Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly. In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most in favour of peace, which most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved. We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace. I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first. There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple *Entente*, for some years past. The Triple *Entente* was not an alliance—it was a

diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—also a Balkan crisis—originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, and more was never promised. In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeiras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced upon France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France. I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. [See also ENGLAND: 1912.] That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, 'If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts.' There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they should give that support when the time arose. As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister [Asquith], who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That as the most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think

much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet. The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Governments.

“[SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE, BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN PARIS, JULY 30, 1914:]

“SIR,—M. Cambon [French ambassador in London] reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. . . . He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He . . . [shows] that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit. I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.’ [B. D. C., no. 105.]

“[SIR EDWARD GREY TO M. CAMBON, NOV. 22, 1912:]

“FOREIGN OFFICE, NOVEMBER 22, 1912.

“MY DEAR AMBASSADOR,

“From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the gen-

eral peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.’ [B. D. C., no. 105, Enclosure 1.]

“[M. CAMBON'S REPLY TO SIR EDWARD GREY:]

“FRENCH EMBASSY, LONDON,

“NOV. 23, 1912.

“DEAR SIR EDWARD,

“You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other. Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.’ [B. D. C., no. 105, Enclosure 2.]

“Lord Charles Beresford.—What is the date of that?”

“Sir E. Grey.—The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and *a fortiori*, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe that which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be. Well, sir, I will go

further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. [See MOROCCO: 1911-1914.] In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question. The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Serbia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

"I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared those differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter. The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this

going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. . . . But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that today we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, 'No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict.' Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country. Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador . . . [a] statement. [See above: 49.] . . . Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every

hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium. . . . [Here Sir Edward Grey went at some length into the question of Belgium, describing the attitude of former British governments with regard to the imposed neutrality of 1839.] I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:

“The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day.”

“From the German Government the reply was: ‘The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor.’ Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers: ‘Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.’ It now appears from the news I have received to-day—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality. Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that . . . [a] telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians

by our King—King George [see above: 53, B. G. B., no. 25]. Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone. I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. . . . ‘We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin.’

“No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone’s words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power? It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are

closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed. I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken place; mobilisation of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say. The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

“What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, ‘We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter’ under no conditions—the Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences. My object has

been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. . . . We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment’s notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. . . . The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent. The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it. . . . We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. . . . Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris. . . . I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.”—*Great Britain and the European crisis*, pp. 90-95.—See also ENGLAND: 1914 (August 3).

57.—Virtual declaration of war against Belgium by Germany.—Second ultimatum.—At six in the morning of August 4 the German minister presented the following note to the Belgian foreign minister:

“SIR.—In accordance with my instructions, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take—if necessary by force of arms—those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace of France.”—*B. G. B.*, no. 27.

58.—British note to Belgium.—Belgium expected to resist violation of neutrality.—England offers to join Russia and France in defense of Belgium.—On August 4, the day of the German invasion of Belgium, the British minister at Brussels presented this note to the Belgian government: “I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon

Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Government expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal. In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium."—*B. G. B.*, no. 28.

59.—Great Britain and Belgian neutrality.—Warning to Germany.—“On the early morning of the 3rd August the Belgian Government had returned an uncompromising refusal to the German Note of the previous night, which demanded a free passage across Belgium for the armies of the Kaiser. Much at the same hour King Albert made that formal appeal to King George V, demanding diplomatic intervention on the part of Great Britain for the protection of Belgium, which has been already quoted. [See above: 53.] With the news as to the invasion of Luxemburg already to hand, the British Government could have little doubt that a violation of the soil of Belgium was about to take place. It had already been hinted at in the ominous interview between the German Chancellor and the British Ambassador at Berlin on the 29th of July [see above: 34], which had drawn such indignant comment from Sir Edward Grey. It was, no doubt, in consequence of that interview that the British Government had, on the 31st July, addressed the formal demand to France and Germany, requesting them to state definitely that they intended to respect the neutrality of Belgium. To this demand the French Government had made a prompt and satisfactory reply, while the German Secretary of State had made a dilatory answer, refusing any immediate assurances. ‘A reply might disclose a certain amount of the German plan of campaign in the event of war, and he was doubtful if any answer at all would be given. Moreover, it was considered that certain unfriendly acts had already been committed by Belgium, *e.g.*, a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under embargo.’ The urgent telegrams received in London on the morning of the 3rd August only showed that the worst suspicions that might have been drawn from German utterances of the 29th and 31st of July were about to be fulfilled. On Saturday the 1st August the British Cabinet had met, not only to discuss the consequences of the German Ultimatum to Russia, which ran out on that day, but to consider the very unsatisfactory reply that had been made from Berlin as to the security of Belgian neutrality. . . . It is clear that he [Sir E. Grey] and the Cabinet had, up to the 1st August, retained some hope of succeeding with one of the mediation schemes, believing that Germany would shrink from adding Great Britain to the list of her enemies. For, as Prince Lichnowsky had been warned at the same interview, if Germany was intransigent and unreasonable, and forced war on France, ‘we should be drawn in.’ By the 1st August it was clear that Germany had pushed matters to the breaking-point, though it was yet to be two days before she declared war on France. The French Ambassador had put the definite question to Sir Edward Grey: ‘If Germany attacks France, will you help her?’ The answer was that: ‘So far as things have gone at present, we could not take any engagement.’ Up to the present moment, as M. Cambon was told, the Cabinet did not feel, and public opinion did not

feel, that any treaties or obligations were involved. Further developments might alter the situation, and cause Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, if not a decisive, yet an important factor in determining their attitude. But no definite engagement could be undertaken at the present moment. These were the words of the 31st July. By the morning of the 1st August the eminently unsatisfactory and dilatory answer of Berlin with regard to Belgian neutrality was to hand. The Cabinet discussed it, and came to the conclusion that Prince Lichnowsky must be warned that here lay a definite cause of rupture, unless some pledge was promptly given. The way in which the information was given him appears in the subjoined despatch of Sir Edward Grey.

“No. 123. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN, AUG. 1, 1914:

“I told the German Ambassador today that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.’ [*B. D. C.*, no. 123].”—*Oman*, pp. 137-138.

60.—Great Britain offers with France and Russia to defend also neutrality of Norway and Holland.—On August 4 the Belgian minister in London reported to M. Davignon: “The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to join France and Russia in offering an alliance to the said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. I observed to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is violated.”—*B. G. B.*, no. 37.

61.—German invasion of Belgium (Aug. 4).—Belgian appeal to treaty signatories.—British protest and ultimatum to Germany.—French and Russian response.—Early on August 4 M. Davignon informed his representatives at London, Paris and St. Petersburg that German troops had entered Belgium: "The Belgian Government regrets to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory [see BELGIUM: 1914: World War], violating the engagements which they have undertaken by treaty. The Belgian Government are firmly decided to resist by all the means in their power. Belgium appeals to England, to France, and to Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defense of her territory. There should be a concerted and common action, having as its object to resist the measures of force employed by Germany against Belgium and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium for the future. Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defense of the fortified places."—*B. G. B., no. 40.*

The same morning Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen in Berlin the text of King Albert's appeal to King George, adding:

"His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply."—*B. D. C., no. 153.*

Shortly after, when the report of the second German ultimatum to Belgium reached London, and that Belgian territory had been entered by German troops, Sir Edward Grey wired to Goschen:

"... In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock tonight. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves."—*B. D. C., no. 159.*

—See also ENGLAND: 1914 (August 4).

The next day M. Davignon telegraphed to the Belgian heads of missions in all countries having diplomatic relations with Belgium the following protest: "By the treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the

King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs: 'Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually neutral.' Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected. In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty. It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours. The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of Article X of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality, such nation cannot be considered as a hostile act. I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing."—*B. G. B., no. 44.*—Meanwhile, also on August 5, Sir F. Villiers, British minister in Brussels, announced: "I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty of 1839."—*B. G. B., no. 48.*—From London the Belgian minister reports that "Great Britain agrees to take joint action in her capacity of guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the provisioning of Antwerp."—*B. G. B., no. 49.*—On the same day M. Davignon reported from Brussels: "The French and Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian territory."—*B. G. B., no. 52.*

62.—British ambassador's final efforts for peace.—"Scrap of paper" incident.—Great Britain issues ultimatum to Germany demanding respect for Belgian neutrality.—Official refusal.—The following report of Sir Edward Goschen was written immediately after his return to London. It is dated August 8, and describes his last interviews with German statesmen and his efforts to secure the neutrality of Belgium in the war which was now inevitable. Particular interest attaches to his parting conversation with the imperial chancellor, in the course of which the latter used the phrase which has become historic, namely, that the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality was but "a scrap of paper." The report is addressed to Sir Edward Grey, and is here reproduced from "Great Britain and the European Crisis," issued by the British government.

"SIR, In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant [see above: 61] I called upon the Secretary of State [Herr von Jagow] that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer

must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

"During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date [see above: 61], and in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

"Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

"I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very

agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree, just for a word—'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I pro-



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tested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, 'But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding

fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

"After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p. m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched (note.—"This telegram never reached the Foreign Office").

"At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

"In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet, issued by the *Berliner Tageblatt*, was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

"After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin.

He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, 'Certainly not, until the morning.' It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the '*pestilential Tageblatt*,' which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete. On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message: 'The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles.' I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery. On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed. The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly

kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier. Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counselor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me. I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands."

—See also ENGLAND: 1914 (August 4).

63.—Bethmann-Hollweg's post-bellum explanation of the "scrap of paper" interview.—British declaration of war.—Could England have prevented war?—Views on British policy.—Nearly five years after the historic interview, on June 12, 1919, the *Düsseldorfer Nachrichten* published an extract from Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's book. "This deals with the conversation he had on August 4, 1914, with Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin. [See above: 62.] The ex-Chancellor writes:

"'Enemy propaganda has made capital particularly out of the reports which Sir Edward Goschen made to his Government concerning his last conversation with me in August (Blue-book No. 160). The Ambassador forgets to observe in his report that he began the conversation with the question whether I could not give him another answer than Herr von Jagow to the English ultimatum. On my replying in the negative the Ambassador asked whether if, to his regret, war should finally be decided upon after this we could not have before separating one more private and personal conversation concerning the terrible situation in which the world had been placed. I immediately declared myself ready for this, and asked the Ambassador to take a seat at my table. I then certainly spoke in strong words of the world calamity which I foresaw as the necessary consequence of England's entrance into the war, and, when he later repeatedly alleged Belgian neutrality as a decisive point, I impatiently exclaimed that in comparison with the frightful result of a German-English war the treaty of neutrality was only a scrap of paper. The expression may have been an inadvertence (*Entgleisung*)—my blood boiled at the repeatedly exaggerated emphasizing of Belgian neutrality, which

is just what did not drive England into the war, and at the entire lack of sensibility for the fact that the English declaration of war must destroy world property compared with which even the violation of Belgian neutrality weighed lightly. That private conversations should be officially exploited has appeared to me to be an unusual diplomatic practice. If it were done, however, then in that case Sir Edward Goschen, to whom my excitement seemed so striking, ought at least also to have reported that on taking leave he burst into tears and asked to be allowed to remain a little longer in my ante-chamber, because he could not show himself in such a condition to the *personnel* of the Chancellery in attendance.'"—*The Times* (London) *Weekly Edition*, June 20, 1919.—On June 17, 1919, the German Socialist paper *Vorwärts*, which had been suppressed during the war, made its re-appearance and published a letter from Prince Lichnowsky, who denied the statement of Herr Bernstein made at the Social-Democratic Conference that he had said that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had begged the Kaiser, on July 31, 1914, on his knees, to refrain from war. "I know [the prince writes], on the contrary, that the Kaiser did not desire war and was heart-broken at the outbreak, and I believe that one word from the Imperial Chancellor would have been enough to persuade the Kaiser to avert the catastrophe by accepting the British and German mediation advocated by me, or by a mediation proposal of his own. The declaration of war on Russia, which started the world war, took place with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's fullest assent."—*Ibid.*

The British ultimatum was dispatched from London early in the afternoon of August 4. At 11 P.M. Greenwich mean time (midnight in Berlin), no satisfactory reply had been received to the ultimatum; an hour and a quarter later (12.15 A.M., August 5), the Foreign Office in London issued the following statement: "Owing to the summary rejection by the German Government for assurances that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected, His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports and His Majesty's Government have declared to the German Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Germany as from 11 P.M. on the 4th August."

Of preparations for mobilization Lord Haldane writes: "To say . . . that we were caught unprepared is not accurate. Compulsory service in a period of peace was out of the question for us. . . . At eleven o'clock on Monday morning, August 3, 1914, we mobilised without a hitch the whole of the Expeditionary Force, amounting to six divisions and nearly two cavalry divisions, and began its transport over the Channel when war was declared thirty-six hours later. We also at the same time successfully mobilised the Territorial Force and other units, the whole amounting to over half a million men. The Navy was already in its war stations [see ENGLAND: 1914 (July-August)], and there was no delay at all in putting what we had prepared into operation. . . . [The prime minister, who was acting as war secretary], asked me to go to the War Office and give directions for the mobilization of the machinery with which I was so familiar, and I did this on the morning of Monday, August 3, and a day later handed it over, in working order, to Lord Kitchener."—Viscount Haldane, *Before the war*, pp. 40-50.

"England declared war on Germany on Tuesday, August 4, and on the 5th the mobilization of Regulars, Special Reserves, and Terri-

torials was ordered. On Wednesday, August 5, a Council of War was held at 10, Downing Street, under the Presidency of the Prime Minister. Nearly all the members of the Cabinet were present, whilst Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener, Sir Charles Douglas, Sir Douglas Haig, the late Sir James Grierson, General (now Sir Henry) Wilson, and myself were directed to attend."—Field Marshal Viscount French, 1914, p. 3.

"Now that the narrative has been told and the documents analysed, it is right to present what seem to be the legitimate inferences and conclusions. 1. The military masters of Germany wanted war from the beginning in order to attack France and Russia, and to carry out their ambitions, but always on the condition that they could count on British neutrality, as in



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1870. 2. On the formation of the Liberal Government on 12th December 1905, three Ministers, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Haldane, and Sir Edward Grey, laid the foundation for a different policy, namely, a policy of British intervention if Germany should make an unprovoked attack on France. They did this within a month, probably within a few days of taking office, by means of communications with the French Ambassador and of military and naval conversations between the General Staffs of the two countries, who worked out plans for joint action in war if Great Britain should intervene. They did it behind the back of nearly all their Cabinet colleagues, and, what really matters, without Parliament being in any way made aware that a policy of active intervention between France and Germany was being contemplated. 3. As time went on . . . [the British] Entente with France was still further developed . . . and France was encouraged more and more to expect that Great Britain would stand by her in

arms if she were attacked by Germany without giving provocation. [See also ENGLAND: 1912.] By 1913 . . . [the British] Entente with France had become such that, to use Mr. Lloyd George's phrase, we were under an obligation of honour to join her in arms, if so attacked. 4. Under . . . [the] Constitution such obligations, or even formal Treaties, can be undertaken on behalf of the Crown by the advice of Ministers without Parliament being informed. At all events that is so in theory. Parliament can, of course, refuse supplies to support any engagement of which it disapproves when it comes to know of it, but cannot require to be consulted before it is made. 5. Now it may have been perfectly right, in view of the threatening attitude of Germany, that . . . [Great Britain] should have a defensive understanding or even an alliance with France in 1906, or in any subsequent year. Obviously that would be a new departure of tremendous importance, and one which could be reliably and effectively taken only if it were known to and approved by Parliament as a national policy, with its limitations fixed by Parliament and proper provision made by Parliament so that we should not be caught unprepared. For it would expose . . . [the nation] to the risk of war on land against the greatest military Power in the world. 6. Sir E. Grey made it clear in his speech of 3rd August 1914 that in his opinion our honour as well as our interest required that we should support France in arms, though up to the present moment he and his coadjutors have always maintained that they had kept our hands free and that Parliament was quite free to decide for either peace or war. 7. But Parliament was never warned by Ministers of the great danger in which we stood of being drawn suddenly into a war which would threaten our national existence. If it had been warned we might have been better prepared with men and ships and guns and ammunition, or might have adopted a wiser and more open policy. 8. The last chance of maintaining peace was when the crisis came in July 1914. A plain timely statement to Germany that if she attacked France we should be on the side of France and Russia would 'for a certainty,' as President Wilson says, have prevented war. The military masters of Germany would not have faced the fearful risk. That statement was not made. Ministers would not agree to make it, and no wonder. It involved responsibility. They had no firm foothold of Parliamentary support such as would fortify them in giving a warning which, if disregarded, meant a war of unprecedented magnitude. And they had no foothold of Parliamentary support because Parliament had not been either consulted or informed as to the policy. 9. Secret diplomacy has undergone its 'acid test' in . . . [Great Britain]. It had every chance. The voice of party was silent. The Foreign Minister was an English gentleman whom the country trusted and admired, who was wholly free from personal enmities of every kind, and who wanted peace. And secret diplomacy utterly failed. It prevented us from finding some alternative for war, and it prevented us from being prepared for war, because secret diplomacy means diplomacy aloof from Parliament. Let us have done with it for good."—R. T. R. Loreburn, *How the war came*, pp. 216-218.—"England went into the war from three mixed motives: to fulfill her obligations to France, to preserve her honor in upholding her guarantee of Belgian neutrality, and to protect her own safety and material interests against German aggression. That Grey, in his speech in Parliament, very skillfully put forward

very prominently the second of these motives, there is no doubt; and if he believed, as of course he did, that England ought under the circumstances to fight, he did so wisely; for this was the motive which would most clearly and powerfully appeal to Parliament and the British public. On the other hand, it is doubtful if one can agree with Lord Loreburn's further criticism of Grey for not making a plain, timely statement to Germany that, if she attacked France, England would be on the side of France and Russia. It is very doubtful, in view of the strong anti-British feeling in Germany, the blind Pan-Germanism, the power of the militarists, and the Kaiser's sensitiveness to a second rebuff after Agadir, whether such a threat would not have had exactly the opposite effect in Germany. It would have been regarded as the proof and culmination of British 'encirclement.' Even granting that it might have postponed the war over the Austro-Serbian crisis for some months, it would have so increased the Anglo-German embitterment that some other occasion would probably have soon set Europe on fire after Germany had made further frantic naval and military preparations. As Buchanan wisely told Sazonov, on July 27, 'Germany's attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace. England could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend, who was anxious to preserve peace.' Moreover, such a threat by England might have served as a dangerous encouragement to the Russian militarists in their aggressive aspirations toward Constantinople and the Straits. Grey had to choose a policy; because he chose one which did not turn out successfully, it is not necessarily true to say that he chose the wrong one. If a criticism of Grey is to be made, it is that he, like Bethmann and Sazonov, was too optimistic—too little aware of the monstrous influence which the militarists would acquire in Vienna, Berlin and Petrograd."—*Fay, III, p. 254.*

64.—Effect in Berlin of British declaration of war.—Street scenes: German correspondent's testimony.—"The English declaration of war entered into the very soul of the German people, who stood as a sacrifice to a political miscalculation that had its roots less in a lack of thought and experience than in boundless arrogance. [When the news arrived, a mob swept around from Unter den Linden into the Wilhelmstrasse to attack the British embassy. (See Germany: 1914; also above: 62.)] About the same time I was a witness of those laughable scenes which took place on the Potsdamer Platz in Berlin, where, in complete misjudgment of the whole political situation *Japanese* were carried shoulder high by the enthusiastic and worthy citizens of Berlin under the erroneous impression that these obvious arch-enemies of Russia would naturally be allies of Germany. Every German that was not blind to the trend of true 'world-politics' must surely have shaken his head over this lamentable spectacle. A few days afterwards Japan sent its ultimatum against Kiaotchao! It was the same incapability of thinking in terms of true world-politics that led us . . . to believe that we might find supporters in Mexico and Japan of the piracy we indulged in as a result of America's intervention in the war, the same incapability that blinded us to the effect our methods must have on other neutrals such as China and the South American States. And although one admits the possibility of a miscalculation being made, yet a miscalculation with regard to England's attitude was not only the height of political stupidity, but showed an absence of

moral sense. *The moment England entered the war, Germany lost the war.*"—H. Stuermer, *Two war years in Constantinople* (tr. by E. Allen), pp. 24-25.

65.—President Wilson tenders offer of mediation.—On August 5, the day after Great Britain's declaration of war against Germany, President Wilson addressed to the German and Austrian emperors, the tsar, King George and President Poincaré the following message: "As official head of one of the powers signatory to The Hague Convention, I feel it to be my privilege and my duty, under Article III of that Convention, to say to you in a spirit of most earnest friendship that I should welcome an opportunity to act in the interest of European peace, either now or at any other time that might be thought more suitable, as an occasion to serve you and all concerned in a way that would afford me lasting cause for gratitude and happiness." The message was formally acknowledged by the belligerents, and the war took its tragic course.

66.—Scenes in St. Petersburg.—Reception of England's verdict.—"On the Tuesday [July 28] Count Pourtales, the German ambassador, lunched with us, and I can well remember his hurried, nervous manner, his quick movements of denial when . . . [the British ambassador] warned him that Germany would lead the world into the most terrible war of history if she did not change her attitude. War was the last thing Germany wanted, and war with England was out of the question. His [the German ambassador's] words were emphatic, his voice had an almost hysterical insistence, and there was a very real look of trouble in his pale-blue eyes when at last he said good-bye to my father and went slowly from the room. . . . On Saturday morning [August 1] one still clung desperately to the hope that some miracle might even now, at the last moment, avert the catastrophe. But that afternoon the German ambassador, arriving at the Foreign Office, handed the declaration of war to Monsieur Sazonoff, and then turned away to the window, shaken by a storm of tears. The same evening Monsieur Sazonoff, the French ambassador, the Greek minister and his wife, and one or two other men were dining with us. Ordinary conversation was quite out of the question, there was only one topic, and that nobody yet seemed able to grasp—it seemed so impossible to believe that it was really an accomplished fact. My father had to leave in the middle of dinner to motor down to Czarskoe [Selo] for a special audience with the Emperor [Nicholas II]. Four times during the evening Monsieur Sazonoff was called away; the bell of the telephone pealed incessantly; the square outside was a dense crowd of people singing the national anthem. Till late on in the night crowds besieged the doors of the embassy, cheering for the British fleet, and always asking the same question—Would England help? Would England join with them? My father, returning after midnight, could hardly drive up to the door. The motor was surrounded by a cheering multitude of soldiers, officers, workmen, and well-dressed women; eager hands were held out to him, questions poured in on every side. The next day all the officers of the garrison assembled in the Winter Palace, and after a solemn service in the royal chapel, the Emperor came out onto the balcony and announced to the huge crowd assembled on the square the declaration of war. All during the next two days crowds thronged to the embassy, carrying French, Russian, and English flags, wait-

ing patiently for my father to appear. Every moment the telephone-bell rang and anxious voices inquired whether we had not yet had any definite news. Once the report spread that England had declared war, and almost at once an enormous crowd assembled before the door and would hardly listen to my father's message that, as yet, we had no official confirmation of the news. It was written up in the town, they said; it must be true. And it was said that all the British fleet had been ordered out to sea. They were sure England would not desert them. . . . And all the time, quietly, steadily, unceasingly, the soldiers were leaving for the front. There was no ostentation and show about any of those departures, no flags or blaring military bands, and very little cheering. Only in the early mornings long lines of khaki-clad figures marching away with grim, set faces and unwavering eyes, and sometimes tramping beside them a woman with a shawl over her head and child held in her tired, patient arms, a woman whose eyes had shed so many tears that now, when the final moment had come, they had no tears left to shed, could only stare out in front of them, facing the emptiness of all the future days with the weary, hopeless apathy of despair. And then at last, at five o'clock on the Wednesday morning, one of the secretaries came into my father's room to tell him that the telegram we had been waiting for had come, the telegram that said in so few words such tremendous tidings—'WAR GERMANY ACT.' . . . A little later in the morning I went with another friend to write down my name for a course of first-aid training in one of the big Russian hospitals. The sister who received us looked us over curtly. There was no vacancy at present. We must wait six weeks for the next course. 'Oh, but, please,'—I felt that six weeks of inactivity was not possible—'I am English, and we have just heard that England has declared war on Germany. Can't you make an exception?' Her face changed instantly. 'You are English? I will ask Baroness Wrangel, who is the superior of our hospital, what can be done. Will you give me your name, please?' She disappeared, and the line of other girls waiting their turn glowered at us somewhat resentfully. Within two minutes the sister returned. 'Will you please come?' she said. 'The superior would like to speak with you herself.' She led the way down a narrow passage, and ushered us into a big, dark room where we were received by an old lady with a pale, worn face, made all the more spiritual by her nunlike head-dress and dark-brown robe. 'You are the daughter of the British ambassador?' She held out her thin, white hand, her voice quivering with anxiety. 'Tell me—you have had news? I had heard the question so often before; this time I was able to answer freely that we had had the official telegram, and that England was at war with Germany. 'God be praised!' The white, trembling fingers made the sign of the cross, the tired, faded eyes filled with sudden tears. After that, everything was easy, and we left the hospital with our names written down, having promised to come and begin work the next morning.'—M. Buchanan, *City of trouble*, pp. 14-16, 17-20.—See also RUSSIA: 1914: Relations with Germany.

67.—Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.—The following note was handed by the ambassador of Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg to the minister of foreign affairs July 24 (August 6), at 6 o'clock in the evening: "By order of his Government the undersigned Ambassador of Austria-Hungary has the honor to notify his Excellency

the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia the following: Seeing the menacing attitude taken by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Serbia and in presence of the fact that following this conflict Russia, according to a communication from the Cabinet of Berlin, has deemed it advisable to open hostilities against Germany, and that this latter consequently finds herself in a state of war with the said power, Austria-Hungary considers herself equally in a state of war with Russia from the present moment."—*R. O. B.*, no. 79.

68.—Final report of British ambassador in Vienna.—The final report written by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British ambassador to Vienna, is an important contribution to the contemporary history of events. The report which is dated London, Sept. 1, 1914, reads thus: "The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments. The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Serbia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz [Austrian Foreign Office]. Except Herr von Tschirschky, who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the under-secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking. So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the 'Neue Freie Presse' and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Serbia. The official 'Fremdenblatt,' however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications. On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum.

Its integral acceptance by Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning. The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Serbia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Serbia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. [See also AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1914-1915.] The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Serbia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis. On the 28th July I saw

Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Serbia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Serbia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

"His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Serbia. The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von M. Tschirschky abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to sub-

mit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff to the effect that Austria had neither 'banged the door' on compromise nor cut off the conversations. M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at Vienna that 'the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia.' M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 8th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the

Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

"The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The 'Neue Freie Presse' was violently insulting towards England. The 'Fremdenblatt' was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

"The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

"On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by domestic usage. On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August. After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other

places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of *Chargé des Archives*. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

"Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 P.M. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route, we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August."—*Great Britain and the European crisis*.

69.—German official statement.—Foreign Office statement in German White Book.—Kaiser and tsar telegrams.—"On June 28 last the successor to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by the revolver shots of a Servian band of conspirators. An investigation of the crime by Austro-Hungarian officials has revealed that the plot to take the life of the Archduke was planned and promoted in Belgrade with the co-operation of official Servian individuals and was carried out with weapons from the Servian Government depot. This crime was bound to

open the eyes of the whole civilized world, not only with regard to the object of Servian politics as relating to the existence and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also with regard to the criminal means that the Pan-Servian propaganda did not hesitate to employ in order to attain these ends. The ultimate object of these policies was to revolutionize gradually and finally to bring about a separation of the southwestern region of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy from that empire and unite it with Servia. The repeated and formal declarations of Servia to Austria-Hungary to bring about good neighborly relations did not change this trend of Servian politics in the least. For the third time in the course of the last six years Servia has brought Europe to the verge of a world war in this manner. She could only do this because she believed herself supported by Russia in her endeavors. As a result of the developments of the year 1908 growing out of the Turkish revolution, Russian policies had begun to organize a league of the Balkan States directed against the existence of Turkey, under Russian patronage. This alliance of the Balkan States [see BALKAN STATES, 1912; Balkan League; SERBIA; 1909-1913] which was successful in crowding Turkey out of her European possessions in 1911, came to grief over the question of the disposition of the spoils. Russian policy was not, however, frightened by this failure. It was the idea of Russian statesmen that there should be formed a new Balkan League under Russian patronage, whose activities should be directed this time not against Turkey, which had been driven from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The idea was that Servia should cede to Bulgaria the section of Macedonia that she had won in the last Balkan war and offset the loss by the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the expense of the monarchy of the Danube. For this purpose Bulgaria, by her isolation, was to be made pliable, Rumania, as the result of a propaganda undertaken with the aid of France, was to be chained to Russia, and Servia was to be referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duty as an ally. However, recognizing the vital interests of Austria-Hungary which were at stake, we could neither advise our ally to a compliance that would have been inconsistent with her dignity, nor could we deny her our support in this great hour of need. We were all the more unable to do this inasmuch as our interests also were seriously threatened as a result of the continuous Servian agitation. If Servia, with the help of Russia and France, had been allowed to imperil the existence of the neighboring monarchy any longer, this would lead to the gradual downfall of Austria and would result in submission to Slavic sway under the

Russian sceptre, thus making the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe untenable. A morally weakened Austria breaking down as the result of the advance of Russian Pan-Slavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could count and upon whom we could rely, such as we need in view of the attitude of our eastern and western neighbors, which has constantly grown more threatening. We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand in her action against Serbia. We have taken no part in the preparations.

"Austria chose the way, laying before the Serbian Government in detail the immediate relation between the murder and the general Servian movement, not only tolerated by the Serbian Government, but supported by it, which an investigation of the murder at Serajevo had established. At the same time Serbia was asked by Austria to put an absolute end to these activities and to allow Austria to punish the guilty parties. Austria demanded as a guarantee for the carrying out of the proceedings participation in the investigation on Serbian territory and the definite dissolution of the various Pan-Servian societies carrying on an agitation against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government set a time limit of forty-eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of her terms. One day after the Austro-Hungarian note had been handed to it the Serbian Government began mobilization. When, after the expiration of the time limit, the Serbian Government made a reply which, while satisfying the demands of Austria-Hungary on certain points, made known emphatically with regard to the essential ones its intention to refuse the just demands of the monarchy by means of temporizing and the introduction of new negotiations, Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia without having recourse to further negotiations or allowing herself to be put off by Servian assurances, the value of which she knows well enough—to her sorrow. From that moment Austria was actually in a state of War with Serbia, which was publicly proclaimed by means of the official declaration of war on the 28th of the month. From the very beginning of the conflict we took the stand that this was an affair of Austria which she alone would have to bring to a decision with Serbia. We have therefore devoted our entire efforts to localizing the war and to convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary was compelled to take justified defensive methods and appeal to arms. We took the stand emphatically that no civilized nation had the right in this struggle against lack of culture [*Unkultur*] and criminal political morality to prevent Austria from acting and to take away the just punishment from Serbia. We instructed our representatives abroad in that sense. At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government informed the Russian Government that her (Austria's) move against Serbia was entirely a defensive measure designed to put a stop to Servian agitation, but that Austria-Hungary was compelled by necessity to demand guarantees of a continued friendly attitude on the part of Serbia toward the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Austria-Hungary, the note to Russia stated, had no intention of bringing about a disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans. Both the French and the English Governments, replying to our explanation that the German government wished and was trying to localize the conflict, promised to work in the same interest. In the meantime these efforts did not succeed in preventing Russia's interference in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

"The Russian Government issued an official communiqué on July 24, according to which it would be impossible for Russia to remain indifferent in the Servian-Austrian conflict. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sazonof, made this position known to the Imperial [German] Ambassador, Count Pourtalès. On the afternoon of July 26 the Austro-Hungarian Government again explained through its Ambassador in St. Petersburg that Austria-Hungary had no plans of conquest, but only wished to have peace at last on her frontiers. In the course of the same day the first reports of Russian mobilization reached Berlin. On the evening of the 26th the Imperial [German] Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were directed to call the attention of the English, French, and Russian Governments energetically to the danger of this Russian mobilization. After Austria-Hungary had officially declared to Russia that she did not seek the acquisition of any territory in Serbia, the decision for world peace lay entirely in St. Petersburg. The same day the Imperial [German] Ambassador at St. Petersburg was directed to make the following statement to the Russian Government: 'The military preparatory measures of Russia will compel us to take counter-action which must consist in the mobilization of the army. Mobilization, however, indicates war. Inasmuch as we know France's obligations toward Russia, this mobilization would be directed simultaneously against Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia wishes to let loose such a European war. Inasmuch as Austria-Hungary will not impair the continuance of the Servian Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can adopt a policy of waiting. We shall be all the more able to support Russia's wish not to allow the integrity of the Servian Kingdom to be called into question, since Austria does not call this integrity into question herself. It will be easy to find a basis of agreement in the further course of the affair.'

"On July 27 the Russian Minister for War, Suchomlinof, gave the German Military Attaché his word of honor that no mobilization order had as yet been issued. He said that for the present preparatory measures were being taken, no horses being levied and no reservists being called in. In case Austria-Hungary were to cross the Servian boundary, the military districts facing Austria, those of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, would be mobilized. Under no circumstances would there be a mobilization of the districts lying on the German front: St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. In answer to the Military Attaché's question as to what was the object of mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian War Minister shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. Thereupon the Military Attaché indicated that measures to mobilize against Austria-Hungary were also decidedly threatening to Germany. In the following days reports concerning the Russian mobilization followed each other in quick succession. Among these were reports concerning preparations on the German border, such as the declaration of a state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. On July 27 the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived. The Fourteenth Corps discontinued its manœuvres and returned to garrison duty. In the meantime we continued to exert our most energetic influence on the Cabinets to insure the localization of the conflict. On the 26th Sir Edward Grey had suggested that the differences between Austria-Hungary and Serbia be

laid before a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy, with himself presiding over the sessions. To this suggestion we replied that, while we approved his tender, we could not take part in such a conference because we could not call upon Austria to appear before a European court in her controversy with Serbia. France agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, but it was finally brought to naught because Austria, as was to be expected, held herself aloof. True to our conviction that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair, but would have to take into consideration only the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our efforts to bring about an understanding between these two powers. We were also willing, after declining the conference idea, to transmit a further proposal by Sir Edward Grey to Vienna, in which he urged that Austria-Hungary either agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations. The Austro-Hungarian Government, in full appreciation of our mediatory activity, replied to this proposal that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, it was too late.

"In spite of this we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy. Unluckily, all of these mediatory acts were soon overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France. On July 29 the Russian Government officially announced, in Berlin that it had mobilized four army districts. At the same time additional reports reached us of rapidly progressing military preparations by France on land and sea. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning which he reported as follows by telegraph:

"The Minister tried to persuade me to agree in behalf of my Government to a conversation of four parties to devise means of moving Austria-Hungary to give up those demands touching on the sovereignty of Serbia. While I agreed to a complete transmission of the conversation, I took the stand that, since Russia had decided on the ominous step of mobilization, it was difficult for me to exchange any opinions on this subject, and it almost seemed impossible to do so. I said that what Russia now demanded of us in respect to Austria-Hungary was the same thing of which Austria-Hungary was accused regarding Serbia—a usurpation of the rights of sovereignty; that Austria-Hungary had promised to be considerate of Russian interests by declaring her territorial disinterestedness, a great concession on the part of a nation waging war. For this reason, I said, an opportunity should be given the Dual Monarchy to settle her dispute with Serbia alone. There would be time enough to come back to the subject of safeguarding Servian sovereignty when peace terms were to be concluded. I added very earnestly that at the present moment the Austro-Servian affair was secondary to the danger of a European conflagration, and I made every effort to show the Minister the greatness of this danger. It was impossible to change Sazonof's mind on the point that Russia could not desert Serbia now."

"Similarly the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg reported by telegraph on the 29th as follows,

regarding an interview with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army:

"The Chief of the General Staff asked me to call and informed me that he had just come from His Majesty. He stated that he had been instructed by the Minister for War to assure me again that everything had remained the same as it had been explained to me by the minister two days ago. He offered me a written confirmation and gave me his word of honor in the most formal manner that mobilization had begun nowhere, that is to say, not a single man or horse had been levied up to that hour, three o'clock in the afternoon. He stated that he could not answer for the future, but he could declare most emphatically that no mobilization was desired by His Majesty in the districts touching on our boundary. However, many reports have reached here and also Warsaw and Vilna of the levying of reservists in various parts of the empire. I therefore told the General that I was confronted with a riddle as the result of his announcements to me. On his word as an officer he repeated, however, that such reports were untrue; that a false alarm may have been raised here and there. In view of the positive, numerous reports before me of actual levying, I am compelled to consider the conversation as an attempt to mislead us with regard to the extent of the measures that have already been taken."

"Inasmuch as the Russian Government, in reply to the several inquiries regarding the reasons for its threatening attitude, several times alluded to the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had not yet begun any conversations in St. Petersburg, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, at our request, was directed on July 29 to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof. Count Szapary was authorized to make known to the Russian Minister the contents of the note to Serbia which had been, as it were, overtaken by the declaration of war, and to receive any suggestions that might still come from the Russian side, as well as to discuss with Sazonof all questions touching directly on the Austro-Russian relations. Shoulder to shoulder with England we continued to work without cessation for mediation, and supported every suggestion in Vienna which we believed showed hope of the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As late as the 30th we transmitted an English proposal to Vienna which established this basis of negotiation, that Austria-Hungary, after succeeding in marching into Serbia, should dictate her terms there. We had to assume that Russia would accept this basis. While these efforts of ours for mediation, supported by English diplomacy, were being continued with increasing urgency in the time from July 29 to the 31st, there constantly came new and increasing reports concerning Russian mobilization measures. The assembling of troops on the places on the Russian western boundary no longer left any doubt of the fact that Russian mobilization was actively going on against us, while at the same time all such measures were denied anew on word of honor to our representative at St. Petersburg. Even before the reply to the last English-German mediation proposal, the basis of which must have been known in St. Petersburg, could reach Berlin from Vienna, Russia ordered a general mobilization. On the same day an exchange of telegrams took place between his Majesty the Kaiser and King and Czar Nicholas in which his Majesty called the Czar's attention to the threatening character of

the Russian mobilization and to the continuance of his own activity as mediator.

"On July 31 the Czar directed the following telegram to his Majesty:

"I thank you from my heart for your mediation, which permits a gleam of hope that everything can yet be settled peaceably. It is a technical impossibility for us to halt our military preparations which became necessary through Austria's mobilization. We are far from desirous of war. So long as the negotiations continue with Austria concerning Serbia, my troops will not undertake any challenging action. I solemnly pledge you my word as to that. I am trusting in the grace of God with all my might and hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe. Your sincerely devoted

"NICHOLAS."

"To this his Majesty the Kaiser replied:

"Upon your appeal to my friendship and your plea for my help, I have undertaken a mediatory action between your Government and the Austro-Hungarian Government. While this negotiation was under way your troops were mobilized against Austria-Hungary, which is allied with me, as a consequence of which my mediation was almost made illusory, as I have already informed you. Notwithstanding this, I continued it. Now I am in receipt of reliable reports of serious preparations for war on my eastern boundary also. Responsibility for the safety of my empire compels me to take counter defensive measures. I have carried my efforts for the maintenance of world peace to the utmost limit. It is not I that bear the responsibility for the calamity that now threatens the entire civilized world. Yet at this moment it lies in your power to stave it off. No one threatens the honor and might of Russia, which might have awaited the result of my mediation. The friendship for you and your empire has always been sacred to me, and I have been faithful to Russia when she was hard pressed, especially in her last war. It is still possible for you to maintain the peace of Europe if Russia will decide to put a stop to the military measures that threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary."

"Even before this telegram reached its destination the mobilization of the entire Russian fighting force, which had been ordered in the forenoon of the same day, openly directed against us, was in full swing. The Czar's telegram, however, was sent at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. After the mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was ordered on the afternoon of July 31 to advise the Russian Government that Germany had declared a state of war as a counter move to the mobilization of the Russian Army and Navy, which would have to be followed by mobilization unless Russia ceased her military preparations against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and so advise Germany. At the same time the Imperial Ambassador at Paris was directed to request an explanation from the French Government within eighteen hours as to whether, in the case of a Russo-German war, France would remain neutral. The Russian Government destroyed the painstaking mediatory work of the European State Chancelleries, shortly before its successful outcome, by her mobilization, which endangered the

safety of the German Empire. The mobilization measures, concerning the seriousness of which to the Russian Government no doubt was allowed to arise from the beginning, together with her continued denial, show clearly that Russia desired the war. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered the message that had been given to him for Mr. Sazonof on July 31 at midnight. After the expiration of the time limit set for Russia without the receipt of an answer to our inquiry, his Majesty the Emperor and King ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and the Imperial Navy at 5 P.M. on Aug. 1. In the meantime the imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to hand a declaration of war to the Russian Government in case no favorable reply was issued before the expiration of the time limit. However, before a report regarding the execution of this order arrived, Russian troops crossed our border and advanced on German territory, namely, as early as the afternoon of Aug. 1. "By this move Russia began the war against us.

"In the meantime the Imperial Ambassador at Paris put the question that he had been ordered to present before the French Cabinet at 7 P.M. on July 31. To this the French Prime Minister made an ambiguous and unsatisfactory reply at 1 o'clock in the afternoon of Aug. 1. This does not give a clear picture of the French position, since it was limited to the statement that France would do what her interests seemed to warrant. A few hours later, at 5 in the afternoon, the complete mobilization of the entire French Army and Navy was ordered. On the morning of the following day France opened hostilities. Concluded on Aug. 2, noon."—*Denkschrift und Aktenstücke zum Kriegsausbruch* [Memorandum and documents on the outbreak of war.]—Aug. 3, 1914. [See above: 47, 48.]

"On the evening of July 29th that celebrated telegram from the Tsar arrived, which later aroused so much stir, as in the German White Book, issued at the beginning of the war, which contained all the Tsar's telegrams, this particular one was 'forgotten.' It reads:

"Thanks for your conciliatory and friendly telegram. In contrast to it, the official communication made to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister was couched in quite a different tone. I beg you to explain the difference. [Now then! —W.] It would be well to submit the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference. [!—W.] I rely on your wisdom and friendship.

"Your loving,
"NICKY."

"[Thanks likewise.—W.]"

Thereupon Bethmann-Hollweg at once telegraphed to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg: 'I beg your Excellency to explain the alleged discrepancy between your language and His Majesty's telegrams at once in a conversation with M. Sazonof. The idea of the Hague Conference will of course be quite out of the question in this case.'" —K. Kautsky, *Guilt of William Hohenzollern*, pp. 182-183.—The bracketed remarks with [—W.] were written on the margin by the Kaiser; all these comments are reproduced by Kautsky.

70.—No separate peace.—Declaration of Triple Entente.—The following declaration was signed Sept. 4, 1914, at the Foreign Office in London:

"The undersigned duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, hereby declare as

follows: The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies.

"(Signed)

"PAUL CAMBON
"COUNT BENCKENDORFF
"EDWARD GREY."

71.—Lichnowsky memorandum.—Prince Lichnowsky, who had been German ambassador to London at the outbreak of the war wrote in 1916 a long memorandum, in which he made various revelations and expressed his opinions, of the events which led up to the great tragedy. Although its author intended this record only for his family archives, it was published in Germany without his authority, and was afterwards translated into Swedish and English. The memorandum, which begins with a statement of the circumstances which surrounded his appointment to the embassy, reads as follows:

"KUCHELNA, 16 AUGUST, 1916.

"Baron Marschall died in September, 1912, having held his post in London for a few months only. His appointment, which was due mainly to his age and the plotting of a younger man to get to London, was one of the many mistakes made by our Foreign Office. In spite of his imposing personality and great reputation, he was too old and tired to be able to adapt himself to a purely foreign and Anglo-Saxon milieu. He was more of a bureaucrat and a lawyer than a diplomat or statesman. He set to work to convince Englishmen of the harmless character of our fleet, and naturally succeeded in strengthening an entirely opposite impression. To my great surprise I was offered the post in October. After many years' work I had withdrawn to the country, as no suitable post had been found for me . . . Thus eight years passed, and thirteen since I had left Vienna as Ambassador. That was actually my last political employment. I do not know to whom my appointment in London was due. At all events, not to his Majesty, as I did not belong to his immediate set, although he was always gracious to me. I know by experience that his candidates were frequently successfully opposed. As a matter of fact, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter wanted to send Baron von Stumm to London. He met me at once with undisguised ill-will, and tried to frighten me by rudeness. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was amiable to me, and had visited me shortly before at Grätz. I am, therefore, inclined to think that they settled on me, as no other candidate was available. Had Baron von Marschall not died, it is unlikely that I should have been dug out any more than in previous years. The moment was obviously favorable for an attempt to come to a better understanding with England.

"[(i) MOROCCO QUESTION.] "Our obscure policy in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of our peaceful intention, or, at least, had raised doubts as to whether we knew what we wanted or whether our intention was to keep Europe in a state of suspense and, on occasion, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who was a long time in Paris, said to me: 'The French had begun to forget la revanche. You have regularly reminded

them of it by tramping on their toes.' After we had declined Delcassé's offer to come to an agreement regarding Morocco, and then solemnly declared that we had no political interest there—an attitude which agreed with Bismarckian political conditions—we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a Kruger Number Two. To him also, as to the Boers, we promised the protection of the mighty German Empire, and with the same result. Both manifestations concluded, as they were bound to conclude, with a retraction, if we were not prepared to start a world war. The pitiable conference of Algéiras could alter nothing, and still less cause Delcassé's fall. Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japanese and Russo-British rapprochement. In face of 'the German peril' all other considerations faded into the background. The possibility of another Franco-German war had been patent, and, as had not been the case



PRINCE KARL MAX VON LICHNOWSKY

in 1870, such a war could not leave out Russia or England. The valuelessness of the Triple Alliance had already been demonstrated at Algéiras [see FRANCE: 1904-1906; ITALY: 1906: Part of Italy; MOROCCO: 1905-1906], and, immediately afterward, the equal worthlessness of the agreements made there when the Sultanate fell to pieces, which was, of course, unavoidable. Meanwhile, the belief was spreading among the Russian people that our foreign policy was weak and was breaking down under 'encirclement,' and that cowardly surrender followed on haughty gestures. It is to the credit of von Kiderlen-Wächter, though otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he cleared up the Moroccan situation and adapted himself to circumstances which could not be altered. Whether the world had to be upset by the Agadir coup is a question I do not touch. This event was hailed with joy in Germany, but in England caused all the more uneasiness in that the British Government waited in vain for three weeks for a statement of our intentions. Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech [on July 21, 1911], intended to

warn us, was a consequence. Before Delcassé's fall and before the Algeiras conference we could have obtained harbors and bases on the West Coast, but that was no longer possible.

"[ii] ENGLAND SOUGHT AGREEMENT.] When I came to London in November, 1912, people had become easier about the question of Morocco, especially since an agreement had been reached with France and Berlin. [See also MOROCCO: 1911-1914.] Lord Haldane's mission had failed, it is true, as we demanded promises of neutrality instead of contenting ourselves with a treaty which would insure us against a British attack or any attack with British support. Sir Edward Grey had not, meanwhile, given up the idea of coming to an understanding with us, and made such an attempt first on economic and colonial grounds. Through the agency of that qualified and expert Councilor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, an exchange of opinions had taken place with regard to the renewal of the Portuguese colonial treaty and the Bagdad Railway, which thus carried out the unexpected aim of dividing into spheres of interest both the above-mentioned colonies and Asia Minor. The British statesman, old points in dispute both with France and Russia having been settled, wished to come to a similar agreement with us. His intention was not to isolate us but to make us in so far as possible partners in a working concern. Just as he had succeeded in bridging Franco-British [Lichnowsky is in error here; the Anglo-French Agreement was Lord Lansdowne's work] and Russo-British difficulties, so he wished as far as possible to remove German-British difficulties, and by a network of treaties—which would finally include an agreement on the miserable fleet questions—to secure the peace of the world, as our earlier policy had lent itself to a co-operation with the Entente, which contained a mutual assurance against the danger of war.

"[(iii) GREY'S DESIRES.] This was Sir Edward Grey's program in his own words: "Without infringing on the existing friendly relations with France and Russia, which in themselves contained no aggressive elements, and no binding obligations for England; to seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer together. In England, as with us, there were two opinions, that of the optimists, who believed in an understanding, and that of the pessimists, who considered war inevitable sooner or later. Among the former were Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the Ministers in the Radical Cabinet, as well as leading Liberal organs, such as *The Westminster Gazette*, *The Manchester Guardian*, and *The Daily Chronicle*. To the pessimists belong especially Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly made his meaning clear to me; leading soldiers such as Lord Roberts, who insisted on the necessity of conscription, and on 'the writing on the wall,' and, further, the Northcliffe press, and that leading English journalist, Mr. Garvin of *The Observer*. During my term of office they abstained from all attacks and took up, personally and politically, a friendly attitude. Our naval policy and our attitude in the years 1905, 1908, and 1911 had, nevertheless, caused them to think that it might one day come to war. Just as with us, the former are now dubbed shortsighted and simple-minded, while the latter are regarded as the true prophets.

"[(iv) TURKEY AND THE BALKANS.] The first Balkan war led to the collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which had been identi-

fied with Turkey for many years. [See also BALKAN STATES: 1912: First Balkan War; 1912-1913.] Since the salvation of Turkey in Europe was no longer feasible, only two possibilities for settling the question remained. Either we declared we had no longer any interest in the definition of boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula, and left the settlement of the question to the Balkan peoples themselves, or we supported our allies and carried out a triple alliance policy in the east, thereby giving up the rôle of mediator. I urged the former course from the beginning, but the German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter. The chief question was Albania. Our allies desired the establishment of an independent State of Albania, as Austria would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic, and Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach Valona or even the territory north of Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is known, favored Serbian, and France Greek, desires. My advice was now to consider the question as outside the alliance, and to support neither Austrian nor Italian wishes. Without our support the establishment of Albania, whose incapability of existence might have been foreseen, was an impossibility. Serbia would have pushed forward to the coast; then the present world-war would have been avoided. France and Italy would have remained definitely divided as to Greece, and the Italians, had they not wished to fight France alone, would have been obliged to consent to the expansion of Greece to the district north of Durazzo. The greater part of civilized Albania is Greek. The southern towns are entirely Greek, and, at the time of the Conference of Ambassadors, deputations from the larger towns came to London to carry through the annexation to Greece. In Greece today whole groups are Albanian, and the so-called Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The amalgamation of the preponderating Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with the Greek State was, therefore, the best solution and the most natural, if one leaves out of account Scutari and the northern part of Serbia and Montenegro. His Majesty [the Kaiser] was also in favor of this solution on dynastic grounds. When I encouraged the monarch by letter to this effect, I received violent reproaches from the Chancellor for supporting Austria's opponents, and he forbade all such interference in the future, and even direct correspondence. We had eventually, however, to abandon the tradition of carrying out the Triple Alliance policy in the East and to acknowledge our mistake, which consisted in identifying ourselves with the Turks in the south and the Austro-Magyars in the north; for the continuance of that policy, which we began at the Congress in Berlin and subsequently carried on zealously, was bound in time, should the necessary skill in conducting it fail, to lead to a collision with Russia and a world war.

"[(v) TURKEY, RUSSIA, AND ITALY.] Instead of uniting with Russia on the basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom the Russians also did not wish to drive out of Constantinople, and confining ourselves to economic interests in the East, whilst at the same time refraining from all military and political interference and being satisfied with a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, the goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus. In Russia, therefore, the opinion arose that the way to Constantinople and to the Mediterranean lay through Berlin. Instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, which were once free and are very different from the Russians, of which fact we have already

had experience, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors. The dire mistake of our Triple Alliance and our Eastern policies, which drove Russia—our natural friend and best neighbor—into the arms of France and England, and kept her from her policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more evident, as a Franco-Russian attack, the only hypothesis justifying a Triple Alliance policy, had to be eliminated from our calculations. As to the value of the alliance with Italy, one word only. Italy needs our money and our tourists after the war, with or without our alliance. That our alliance would go by the board in the event of war was to be foreseen. The alliance consequently was worthless.

"[(vi) AUSTRIA'S POSITION.] Austria, however, needed our protection both in war and peace, and had no other *point d'appui*. This dependence on us is based on political, national, and economic grounds, and is all the greater in proportion to the intimacy of our relations with Russia. This was proved in the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust, no Vienna Minister had been so self-conscious with us as Count Aehrenthal was during the last years of his life. Under the influence of a properly conducted German policy which would keep us in touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal, and is tied to us even without an alliance and without reciprocal services; under the influence of a misguided policy, however, we are tied to Austria-Hungary. An alliance would therefore be purposeless. I know Austria far too well not to know that a return to the policy of Count Felix Schwarzenberg or to that of Count Moritz Esterhazy was unthinkable. Little as the Slavs living there love us, they wish just as little for a return to the German Kaiserdom, even with a Hapsburg-Lorraine at its head. They are striving for an internal Austrian Federation on a national basis, a condition which is even less likely of realization within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. Austro-Germans look on Berlin as the centre of German power and Kultur, and they know that Austria can never be a leading power. They desire as close a connection as possible with the empire, but not to the extent of an anti-German policy. Since the seventies the conditions have changed fundamentally in Austria, and also perhaps in Bavaria. Just as here a return to Pangerman particularism and the old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so there a revival of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzenberg is not to be contemplated. But by a constitutional union with Austria, which even without Galicia and Dalmatia is inhabited at least to the extent of one-half by non-Germans, our interests would suffer; whilst, on the other hand, by the subordination of our policy to the point of view of Vienna and Budapest, we should have to '*épouser les querelles de l'Autriche*.'

"[(vii) BALKAN QUARRELS.] We therefore had no need to heed the desires of our allies. They were not only unnecessary but dangerous, inasmuch as they would lead to a collision with Russia if we looked at eastern questions through Austrian eyes. The transformation of our alliance with its single original purpose into a complete alliance, involving a complexity of common interests, was calculated to call forth the very state of things which the constitutional negotiations were designed to prevent, namely, war. Such a policy of alliances would, moreover, entail the loss of the sympathies of the young, strong, and growing communities in the Balkan Peninsula, which were ready to turn to us and open their market to us. The

contrast between dynastic and democratic ideas had to be given clear expression, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side. King Carol told one of our representatives that he had made an alliance with us on condition that we retained control of affairs, but that if that control passed to Austria it would entirely change the basis of affairs, and under those conditions he could no longer participate. Matters stood in the same position in Serbia, where against our own economic interests we were supporting an Austrian policy of strangulation. We had always backed horses which, it was evident, would lose, such as Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, and finally—and this was the most miserable mistake of all—Count Berchtold.

"[(viii) BALKAN WARS.] Shortly after my arrival in London, in 1912, Sir Edward Grey proposed an informal exchange of views in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan War, since, at the outbreak of that war, we had unfortunately declined the proposal of the French Government to join in a declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality on the part of the powers. The British statesman maintained from the beginning that England had no interest in Albania, and would, therefore, not go to war on the subject. In his rôle of 'honest broker' he would confine his efforts to mediation and an attempt to smooth away difficulties between the two groups. He, therefore, by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente Powers, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he lent his good-will and powerful influence toward the establishment of an understanding. Instead of adopting the English point of view, we accepted that dictated to us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London and I was his second.

"My duty was to support his proposals. The clever and experienced Count Szögyényi was at the helm in Berlin. His refrain was '*casus foederis*,' and when once I dared to doubt the justice of this phrase I was seriously warned against Austrophobia. Referring to my father, it was even said that I had inherited it. On every point, including Albania, the Serbian harbors in the Adriatic, Scutari, and in the definition of the Albanian frontiers, we were on the side of Austria and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or Russian point of view. On the contrary, he nearly always took our part in order to give no pretext for war—which was afterward brought about by a dead Archduke. It was with his help that King Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Otherwise there would have been war over this matter, as we should never have dared to ask 'our allies' to make concessions. Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with care, calm, and tact. When a question threatened to become involved he proposed a formula which met the case and always secured consent. He acquired the full confidence of all the representatives.

"Once again we had successfully withstood one of the many threats against the strength characterizing our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us all along the line, as she never got an opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal State, and Serbia was driven away from the sea. The conference was thus a fresh humiliation for Russia. As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed the Russian program without German interests being brought into play. Bismarck had to minimize the mistake of the Congress by a secret treaty, and his attitude

in the Battenberg question—the downward incline being taken by us in the Bosnian question—was followed up in London, and was not given up, with the result that it led to the abyss. The dissatisfaction then prevalent in Russia was given vent to during the London Conference by an attack in the Russian press on my Russian colleague and on Russian diplomacy. His German origin and Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to myself were all made use of by dissatisfied parties. Although not a particularly important personality, Count Benckendorff possessed many qualities of a good diplomat—tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an agreeable personality, and a natural eye for men and things. He sought always to avoid provocative attitudes, and was supported by the attitude of England and France. I once said: 'The feeling in Russia is very anti-German.' He replied: 'There are also many strong influential pro-German circles there. But the people generally are anti-Austrian.' It only remains to be added that our exaggerated Austrophilism is not exactly likely to break up the Entente and turn Russia's attention to her Asiatic interests.

"[(ix) PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY.] At the same time (1913) the Balkan Conference met in London, and I had the opportunity of meeting the leading men . . . of the Balkan States. The most important personage among them was M. Venizelos. He was anything but anti-German, and particularly prized the Order of the Red Eagle, which he even wore at the French Embassy. With his winning amiability and *savoir faire* he could always win sympathy. Next to him a great rôle was played by Daneff, the then Bulgarian Prime Minister and Count Berchtold's confidant. He gave the impression of being a capable and energetic man, and even the influence of his friends at Vienna and Budapest, at which he sometimes laughed, was attributable to the fact that he had let himself be drawn into the second Balkan war and had declined Russian intervention.

"M. Take Jonescu was often in London, too, and visited me regularly. I had known him since the time when I was Secretary at Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter's friends. His aim in London was to secure concessions for Rumania by negotiations with M. Daneff. In this he was supported by the most capable Rumanian Minister, M. Misu. That these negotiations were stranded by the Bulgarian opposition is known. Count Berchtold—and naturally we with him—was entirely on the side of Bulgaria; otherwise we should have succeeded by pressure on M. Daneff in obtaining the desired satisfaction for the Rumanians and have bound Rumania to us, as she was by Austria's attitude in the second Balkan war, while afterward she was estranged from the Central Powers. Bulgaria's defeat in the second Balkan war and Serbia's victory, as well as the Rumanian advance, naturally constituted a reproach to Austria. [See BALKAN STATES: 1913; 1913-1914.] The idea of equalizing this by military intervention in Serbia seems to have gained ground rapidly in Vienna. This is proved by the Italian disclosure, and it may be presumed that the Marquis di San Giuliano, who described the plan as a 'pericolosissima avventura,' (an extremely risky adventure,) saved us from a European war as far back as the Summer of 1912. Intimate as Russo-Italian relations were, the aspiration of Vienna must have been known in St. Petersburg. In any event, M. Take Jonescu told me that M. Sazonoff had said in Constanza that an attack on

Serbia on the part of Austria meant war with Russia. In the Spring of 1914 one of my Secretaries, on returning from leave in Vienna, said that Herr von Tschirschky (German Ambassador in Vienna) had declared that war must soon come. But as I was always kept in the dark regarding important things, I considered his pessimism unfounded. Ever since the peace of Bucharest [Aug. 10, 1913] it seems to have been the opinion in Vienna that the revision of this treaty should be undertaken independently, and only a favorable opportunity was awaited. The statesmen in Vienna and Bucharest could naturally count upon our support. This they knew, for already they had been reproached several times for their slackness. Berlin even insisted on the 'rehabilitation' of Austria.

"[(x) ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS.] When I returned to London in December, 1913, after a long holiday, the Liman von Sanders question had led to our relations with Russia becoming acute. Sir Edward Grey called my attention with some uneasiness to the consequent unrest in St. Petersburg, saying: 'I have never seen them so excited.' Berlin instructed me to beg the Minister to urge calm in St. Petersburg and help to solve the difficulty. Sir Edward was quite willing, and his intervention contributed not inconsiderably to smoothing matters over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in St. Petersburg served in a like manner on several occasions when it was a question of carrying through something of which our representative there was completely incapable. During the critical days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: 'If ever you want something done in St. Petersburg you come to me regularly, but if ever I appeal for your influence in Vienna you refuse your support.' The good and dependable relations I was fortunate in making not only in society and among influential people, such as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with others at public dinners, had brought about a noticeable improvement in our relations with England. Sir Edward devoted himself honestly to further this rapprochement, and his intentions were especially noticeable in two questions—the Colonial Treaty and the treaty regarding the Bagdad Railway.

"[(xi) AFRICAN AGREEMENT.] In the year 1898 a secret treaty had been signed by Count Hatzfeldt (then German Ambassador in London) and Mr. Balfour, which divided the Portuguese colonies in Africa into economic-political spheres of interest between us and England. As the Portuguese Government possessed neither the power nor the means to open up or adequately to administer its extensive possessions, the Portuguese Government had already at an earlier date thought of selling these possessions and thereby putting their finances in order. Between us and England an agreement had been reached which defined the interests of the two parties and which was of, all the greater value because Portugal, as is well known, is completely dependent upon England. This treaty was no doubt to secure outwardly the integrity and independence of the Portuguese Empire, and it only expressed the intention of giving financial and economic assistance to the Portuguese. Consequently it did not, according to the text, conflict with the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, dating from the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles II. and which guaranteed the territories of the two parties. Nevertheless, at the instance of the Marquis Soveral, who presumably was not ignorant of the Anglo-German agreement, a new treaty—the so-called Windsor treaty—which

confirmed the old agreements, was concluded in 1899 between England and Portugal.

"[(xii) ENGLAND'S GENEROUS ATTITUDE.] The object of the negotiations between us and England, which had begun before my arrival, was to alter and amend our treaty of 1898, which contained many impossible features—for example, with regard to the geographical delimitation. Thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the British Government, I succeeded in giving to the new treaty a form which entirely accorded with our wishes and interests. All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of longitude, was allotted to us, so that we reached the Congo territory from the south. Moreover, the valuable islands of San Thomé and Principe, which lie north of the equator, and therefore really belonged to the French sphere of interest, were allotted to us—a fact which caused my French colleague to make lively, although vain, representations. Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the frontier was formed by the Likungo. The British Government showed the utmost readiness to meet our interests and wishes. Sir Edward Grey intended to prove his good-will to us, but he also desired to promote our colonial development, because England hoped to divert Germany's development of strength from the North Sea and Western Europe to the world-sea and Africa. 'We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development,' a member of the Cabinet said to me.

"[(xiii) CONGO STATE.] Originally, at the British suggestion, the Congo State was to be included in the treaty, which would have given us a right of pre-emption and a possibility of economic penetration in the Congo State. But we refused this offer, out of alleged respect for Belgian sensibilities! Perhaps the idea was to economize our successes? With regard also to the practical realization of the real but unexpressed object of the treaty—the actual partition at a later date of the Portuguese colonial possessions—the new formulation showed considerable advantages and progress as compared with the old. Thus the treaty contemplated circumstances which would enable us to enter the territories ascribed to us, for the protection of our interests. These conditional clauses were so wide that it was really left to us to decide when really 'vital interests were concerned, so that, in view of the complete dependence of Portugal upon England, we merely needed to go on cultivating our relations with England in order, later on, with English assent, to realize our mutual intentions. The sincerity of the English Government in its effort to respect our rights was proved by the fact that Sir Edward Grey, before ever the treaty was completed or signed, called our attention to English men of business who were seeking opportunities to invest capital in the territories allotted to us by the new treaty, and who desired British support. In doing so he remarked that the undertakings in question belonged to our sphere of interest.

"[(xiv) WILHELMSTRASSE INTRIGUES.] The treaty was practically complete at the time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. A conversation then took place in Berlin under the Presidency of the Imperial Chancellor, (Herr von Bethmann Hollweg,) in which I took part, and at which special wishes were laid down. On my return to London I succeeded, with the help of my Counselor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, who was working upon the details of the treaty with Mr. Parker, in putting through our last proposals also. It was possible for the whole treaty to be initiated by Sir Edward Grey and myself in August, 1913, be-

fore I went on leave. Now, however, new difficulties were to arise, which prevented the signature, and it was only a year later, shortly before the outbreak of war, that I was able to obtain authorization for the final settlement. Signature, however, never took place. Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign only if the treaty was published, together with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899; England has no other secret treaties, and it is contrary to her existing principles that she should conceal binding agreements. He said, however, that he was ready to take account of our wishes concerning the time and manner of publication, provided that publication took place within one year, at latest, after the signature. In the [Berlin] Foreign Office, however, where my London successes aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage, [the reference is apparently to Herr von Stumm,] who played the part of Herr von Holstein, was claiming the London Embassy for himself, it was stated that the publication would imperil our interests in the colonies, because the Portuguese would show their gratitude by giving us no more concessions. The accuracy of this excuse is illuminated by the fact that the old treaty was most probably just as much long known to the Portuguese as our new agreements must have been, in view of the intimacy of relations between Portugal and England; it was illuminated also by the fact that, in view of the influence which England possesses at Lisbon, the Portuguese Government is completely powerless in face of an Anglo-German understanding.

"[(xv) DISASTROUS MISTAKE.] Consequently it was necessary to find another excuse for wrecking the treaty. It was said that the publication of the Windsor Treaty, which was concluded in the time of Prince Hohenlohe, and which was merely a renewal of the treaty of Charles II., which had never lapsed, might imperil the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as being a proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy! On this I pointed out that the preamble to our treaties said exactly the same thing as the Windsor Treaty and other similar treaties—namely, that we desired to protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the integrity of its possessions! In spite of repeated conversations with Sir Edward Grey, in which the Minister made ever fresh proposals concerning publication, the [Berlin] Foreign Office remained obstinate, and finally agreed with Sir Edward Goschen [British Ambassador in Berlin] that everything should remain as it was before. So the treaty, which gave us extraordinary advantages, the result of more than one year's work, had collapsed because it would have been a public success for me. When in the Spring of 1914 I happened, at a dinner in the embassy, at which Mr. Harcourt [then Colonial Secretary] was present, to mention the matter, the Colonial Secretary said that he was embarrassed and did not know how to behave. He said that the present state of affairs was intolerable, because he [Mr. Harcourt] wanted to respect our rights, but, on the other hand, was in doubt as to whether he should follow the old treaty or the new. He said that it was therefore extremely desirable to clear matters up, and to bring to a conclusion an affair which had been hanging on him for so long.

"When I reported to this effect I received a rude and excited order, telling me to refrain from any further interference in the matter. I now regret that I did not go to Berlin in order to offer his Majesty my resignation, and that I still did not lose my belief in the possibility of an agree-

ment between me and the leading [German] personages. That was a disastrous mistake, which was to be tragically avenged some months later. Slight though was the extent to which I then still possessed the good-will of the Imperial Chancellor—because he feared that I was aiming at his office—I must do him the justice to say that at the end of June, 1914, in our last conversation, before the outbreak of war, he gave his consent to the signature and publication. Nevertheless, it required further repeated suggestions on my part, which were supported by Dr. Solf, [German Colonial Secretary,] in order at last to obtain official consent at the end of July. Then the Serbian crisis was already threatening the peace of Europe, and so the completion of the treaty had to be postponed. The treaty is now one of the victims of the war.

"[(xvi) BAGDAD RAILWAY TREATY.] At the same time, while the African agreement was under discussion, I was negotiating, with the effective co-operation of Herr von Kühlmann, the so-called Bagdad Railway Treaty. This aimed, in fact, at the division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was carefully avoided in consideration of the Sultan's rights [see also BAGDAD RAILWAY: The plan]. Sir Edward Grey declared repeatedly that there was no agreement between England and France aiming at a division of Asia Minor. In the presence of the Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic questions in connection with the German treaty were settled mainly in accordance with the wishes of the Ottoman Bank. The greatest concession Sir Edward Grey made me personally was the continuation of the line to Basra. We had not insisted on this terminus in order to establish connection with Alexandretta. Hitherto Bagdad had been the terminus of the line. The shipping on the Shatt-el-Arab was to be in the hands of an international commission. We also obtained a share in the harbor works at Basra, and even acquired shipping rights on the Tigris, hitherto the monopoly of the firm of Lynch. By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra became our zone of interest, whereby the whole British rights, the question of shipping on the Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments were left untouched, as well as all the district of Bagdad and the Anatolian railways. The British economic territories included the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the French Syria, and the Russian Armenia. Had both treaties been concluded and published, an agreement would have been reached with England which would have finally ended all doubt of the possibility of an Anglo-German co-operation.

"[(xvii) GERMAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT.] Most difficult of all, there remained the question of the fleet. It was never quite rightly judged. The creation of a mighty fleet on the other shore of the North Sea and the simultaneous development of the Continent's most important military power into its most important naval power [see also GERMANY: 1890-1914: Growth of the army, etc.; 1898-1914] had at least to be recognized by England as uncomfortable. This presumably cannot be doubted. To maintain the necessary lead and not to become dependent, to preserve the supremacy of the sea, which Britain must have in order not to go down, she had to undertake preparations and expenses which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. A threat against the British world position was made in that our policy allowed the possibility of warlike development to appear. This possibility was obviously near during the Morocco crisis and the

Bosnian question. People had become reconciled to our fleet in its definite strength. Obviously it was not welcome to the British and constituted one of the motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for England's joining hands with Russia and France. On account of our fleet alone, however, England would have drawn the sword as little as on account of our trade, which it is pretended called forth her jealousy and ultimately brought about war. From the beginning I adopted the standpoint that in spite of the fleet it would be possible to come to a friendly understanding and rapprochement if we did not propose new votes of credit, and, above all, if we carried out an indisputable peace policy. I also avoided all mention of the fleet, and between me and Sir Edward Grey the word was never uttered. Sir Edward Grey declared on one occasion at a Cabinet meeting: 'The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me.'

"[(xviii) NAVAL HOLIDAY.] During my term of office the then First Lord, Mr. Churchill, raised the question of a so-called naval holiday, and proposed, for financial reasons as much as on account of the pacifist inclinations of his party a one year's pause in armaments. Officially the suggestion was not supported by Sir Edward Grey. He never spoke of it to me, but Mr. Churchill spoke to me on repeated occasions. I am convinced that his initiative was honest, cunning in general not being part of the Englishman's constitution. It would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill to secure economies for the country and to lighten the burden of armament, which was weighing heavily on the people. I maintain that it would have been difficult to support his intention. How about the workmen employed for this purpose? How about the technical personnel? Our naval program was settled, and it would be difficult to alter it. Nor, on the other hand, did we intend exceeding it. But he pointed out that the means spent on portentous armaments could equally be used for other purposes. I maintain that such expenditure would have benefited home industries.

"[(xix) NO TRADE JEALOUSY.] I also succeeded, in conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, in keeping away from that subject without raising suspicion, although it came up in Parliament, and in preventing the Government's proposal from being made. But it was Mr. Churchill's and the Government's favorite idea that by supporting his initiative in the matter of large ships we should give proof of our good-will and considerably strengthen and increase the tendency on the part of the Government to get in closer contact with us. But, as I have said, it was possible in spite of our fleet and without naval holidays to come to an understanding. In that spirit I had carried out my mission from the beginning, and had even succeeded in realizing my program when the war broke out and destroyed everything. Trade jealousy, so much talked about among us, rests on faulty judgment of circumstances. It is a fact that Germany's progress as a trading country after the war of 1870 and during the following decades threatened the interests of British trade circles, constituting a form of monopoly with its industry and export houses. But the growing interchange of merchandise with Germany, which was first on the list of all European exporting countries, a fact I always referred to in my public speeches, had allowed the desire to mature to preserve good relations with England's best client and business friend, and had

gradually suppressed all other thoughts and motives. The Englishman, as a matter of fact, adapts himself to circumstances and does not tilt against windmills. In commercial circles I found the greatest good-will and desire to further our common economic interests.

"[(xx) DIPLOMACY AND SOCIETY.] In other circles I had a most amiable reception, and enjoyed the cordial good-will of the Court, society, and the Government. No one there interested himself in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even the French representative, in spite of the imposing personality and political success of the last named. Only the German and American Ambassadors attracted attention. . . . The King, very amiable and well meaning and possessed of sound understanding and common sense, was invariably well disposed toward me and desired honestly to facilitate my mission. . . . We were received in London with open arms and both parties outdid one another in amiability. It would be a mistake to undervalue social connections in view of the close connection in England between society and politics, even though the majority of the upper ten thousand are in opposition to the Government. Between an Asquith and a Devonshire there is no such deep cleft as between a Briand and a Duc de Doudeauville, for example. In times of political tension they do not foregather. They belong to two separate social groups, but are part of the same society, if on different levels, the centre of which is the Court. They have friends and habits in common, they are often related or connected. A phenomenon like Lloyd George, a man of the people, a small solicitor and a self-made man, is an exception. Even John Burns, a Socialist Labor leader and a self-taught man, seeks society relations. On the ground of a general striving to be considered gentlemen of social weight and position such men must not be undervalued. In no place, consequently, is an envoy's social circle of greater consequence than in England. A hospitable house with friendly guests is worth more than the profoundest scientific knowledge, and a learned man of insignificant appearance and too small means would, in spite of all his learning, acquire no influence. The Briton hates a bore and a pedant. He loves a good fellow.

"[(xxi) GREY AND ASQUITH.] Sir Edward Grey's influence in all questions of foreign policy was almost unlimited. True, he used to say on important occasions: 'I must lay that before the Cabinet,' but it is equally true that the latter invariably took his view. Although he did not know foreign countries and, with the exception of one short visit to Paris, had never left England, he was closely informed on all important questions, owing to many years' Parliamentary experience and natural grasp. He understood French without speaking it. Elected at an early age to Parliament, he began immediately to occupy himself with foreign affairs. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office under Lord Rosebery, he became in 1906 [December, 1905] Secretary of State under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman [prime minister, 1905-1908], and filled the post for ten years. . . . He can be called a Socialist in the ideal sense, for he applied his theories even in private life, which is characterized by great simplicity and unpretentiousness, although he is possessed of considerable means. . . . His simple, upright manner insured him the esteem even of his opponents, who were more easily to be found in home than in foreign political circles. Lies and intrigue were foreign to his nature. . . . Words-

worth is his favorite poet, and he could quote him by the hour. His British calm did not lack a sense of humor. . . . This is the man who was called 'the Liar Grey' and the 'originator of the world war.' Asquith is a man of quite different mold. . . . He treated all questions with an experienced business man's calm and certainty, and enjoyed good health and excellent nerves, steeled by assiduous golf. . . . He only rarely occupied himself with foreign affairs. When important questions cropped up, with him lay the ultimate decision. During the critical days of July Asquith often came to warn us, and he was ultimately in despair over the tragic turn of events. On Aug. 2, when I saw Asquith in order to make an attempt, he was completely broken, and, although quite calm, tears ran down his face.

"[(xxii) EVE OF WAR.] The rage of certain gentlemen [in Berlin] over my success in London and the position I had achieved was indescribable, Schemes were set on foot to impede my carrying out my duties, and I was left in complete ignorance of most important things, and had to confine myself to sending unimportant and dull reports. Secret reports from agents about things of which I could know nothing without spies and necessary funds were never available for me, and it was only in the last days of July, 1914, that I heard accidentally from the Naval Attaché of the secret Anglo-French agreement for joint action of the two fleets in case of war. Soon after my arrival I became convinced that in no circumstances need we fear a British attack or British support of a foreign attack, but that under all conditions England would protect France. I advanced this opinion in repeated reports with detailed reasoning and insistence, but without gaining credence, although Lord Haldane's refusing the formula of neutrality and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis [see MOROCCO: 1911-1914] were clear indications. In addition, the above-mentioned secret agreements were known to the [German foreign] department. I repeatedly urged that England, as a commercial State, would suffer greatly in any war between the European great powers, and would therefore prevent such a war by all available means; but, on the other hand, in the interest of the European balance of power, and to prevent Germany's overlordship, would never tolerate the weakening or destruction of France. Lord Haldane told me this shortly after my arrival. All influential people [in Great Britain] spoke in the same way. At the end of June I went to Kiel by the royal orders a few weeks after I had received the honorary degree of Doctor at Oxford, an honor no German Ambassador since Herr von Bunsen had received. On board the *Meteor* [the Kaiser's yacht] we received the news of the death of the Archduke, the heir to the [Austrian] throne. His Majesty [the Kaiser] complained that his attempts to win the noble Archduke over to his ideas were thereby rendered fruitless. How far plans for an active policy against Serbia had already been made at Konopischt I am not in a position to judge. As I was not informed about intentions and events in Vienna I attached no further importance to the matter. I could only observe that the feeling of relief outweighed the other feelings of the Austrian aristocrats. One of the guests on board the *Meteor* was the Austrian Count Felix Thun. In spite of glorious weather seasickness had kept him to his cabin. After receiving the news he became well. Shock or joy had cured him. On reaching Berlin I visited the Chancellor, and said I considered the situation of our foreign

policy very satisfactory, as we were on better terms with England than we had been for a long time. In France a pacifist Government was at the helm. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg did not seem to share my optimism, and complained of the Russian armaments. I tried to calm him, and pointed out especially that Russia had absolutely no interest in attacking us, and that such an attack would not receive Anglo-French support, as both countries, England and France, desired peace. Then I called on Dr Zimmermann, who represented von Jagow, and learned from him that Russia was about to mobilize 900,000 new troops. From his manner of speaking he was evidently annoyed with Russia, who was everywhere in our way. There was also the question of the difficulties of commercial politics. Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was working eagerly for war. But I learned that Herr von Tschirschky [German Ambassador at Vienna] had received a rebuff for having reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna toward Serbia. On my return journey from Silesia I only remained a few hours in Berlin, but I heard there that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia to put an end to this intolerable situation. Unfortunately I undervalued the importance of this information. I thought nothing would come of it, and that it would be easy to settle the matter if Russia threatened. I now regret that I did not stop in Berlin, and at once declare that I could not agree to such a policy. [the world had heard various reports of a meeting in Potsdam, as early as July 5, between the German and Austrian authorities, at which meeting war was alleged to have been decided on. Here Prince Lichnowsky says:] I learned afterwards that at the decisive discussion at Potsdam on July 5th the Austrian demand had met with the unconditional approval of all the personages in authority; it was even added that no harm would be done if war with Russia did come out of it. It was so stated at least in the Austrian report received at London by Count Mensdorff (the Austrian Ambassador to England). [See above: 9.] Subsequently, I received instructions to work to obtain a friendly attitude on the part of the English press, if Austria dealt Serbia a deathblow, and by my influence to prevent so far as possible public opinion from becoming opposed to Austria. Remembering England's attitude during the annexation crisis [1908], when public opinion sympathized with Serbian rights to Bosnia, and her kindly favoring of national movements in the time of Lord Byron and that of Garibaldi, one thing and another indicated so strongly the improbability of British support of the proposed punitive expedition against the Archduke's murderers, that I felt bound to issue a serious warning. I also sent a warning against the whole project, which I characterized as adventurous and dangerous, and advised moderation being urged on the Austrians, as I did not believe in the localization of the conflict.

"[(xxiii) JAGOW'S MISTAKEN BLUFF.] Herr von Jagow answered that Russia was not ready, that there would be some fuss, but that the more firmly we held to Austria the sooner would Russia give way. Austria, he said, had already accused us of flabbiness, (flaumacherei,) and so we must not get into a mess. Opinion in Russia, he added, was becoming more and more pro-German, so we must take the risks. In view of this attitude, which, as I subsequently found out, was the result of Count Pourtalès's reports that Russia would in no circumstances move, and caused us to urge Count Berchtold to the greatest possible energy,

I hoped for salvation in English intervention, as I knew Sir Edward Grey's influence with St. Petersburg in the direction of peace could prevail. I availed myself, therefore, of my good relations with the British Foreign Minister to beg him confidentially to advise moderation on the part of Russia in case Austria, as appeared probable, should demand satisfaction from the Serbians. In the beginning the attitude of the English press toward the Austrians was quiet and friendly, as the murder was condemned. Little by little, however, voices increased in number insisting that, however necessary the punishment of a crime might be, no elaboration of it for a political purpose could be justified. Austria was urgently called upon to act with moderation. The whole world outside Berlin and Vienna understood that it meant war, and world war. The British fleet, which happened to be assembled for review, was not demobilized. The Serbian answer corresponded with British efforts, for actually M. Pashitch had accepted all but two points, about which he was prepared to negotiate. Had England and Russia wanted war in order to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been given, and the unspeakable note would have remained unanswered. Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian answer with me, and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of the Belgrade Government. We even discussed his proposal for intervention, which should insure an interpretation of these two points acceptable to both parties. With Sir Edward Grey presiding, M. Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and I were to meet, and it would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the points under discussion, which were mainly concerned with the part to be taken by Austrian officials in the inquiries at Belgrade. With good-will all could have been cleared up in two or three sittings, and a simple acknowledgment of the British proposal would have brought about a *détente* and further improved our relations with England. I therefore urged it forcibly, as otherwise a world war stood at our gates. In vain. It would be, I was told, wounding to Austria's dignity, nor would we mix ourselves up in that Serbian matter. We left it to our allies. I was to work for the localization of the conflict. It naturally only needed a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war. What a fine success it would have been!

"[(xxiv) CLAMOR FOR WAR.] After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted upon war. I could get no other answer [from Berlin] than that it was an enormous 'concession' on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation of territory. Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without annexations of territory a country can be humiliated and subjected, and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation which she would not stand. The impression became ever stronger that we desired war in all circumstances. Otherwise our attitude in a question which, after all, did not directly concern us was unintelligible. The urgent appeals and definite declarations of M. Sazonoff, [Russian Foreign Minister,] later on the positively humble telegrams of the Czar, the repeated proposals of Sir Edward, the warnings of San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister] and of Bollati, [Italian Ambassador in Berlin,] my urgent advice—all were of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred. The more

I pressed, the less willing they were to alter their course, if only because I was not to have the success of saving peace in the company of Sir Edward Grey. So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his well-known warning. [See ENGLAND: 1914.] I replied that I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister said to me repeatedly: 'If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen.'

"[(xxv) GREY'S PEACE EFFORTS.] After that events moved rapidly. When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course, we answered the Russian mobilization—after Russia had for a whole week negotiated and waited in vain—with our ultimatum and declaration of war. Sir Edward Grey still looked for new ways of escape. In the morning of Aug. 1, Sir W. Tyrrell came to me to say that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Should we remain neutral if France did the same? I understood him to mean that we should then be ready to spare France, but his meaning was that we should remain absolutely neutral—neutral therefore even toward Russia. That was the well-known misunderstanding. Sir Edward had given me an appointment for the afternoon, but as he was then at a meeting of the Cabinet, he called me upon the telephone, after Sir W. Tyrrell had hurried straight to him. But in the afternoon he spoke no longer of anything but Belgian neutrality, and of the possibility that we and France should face one another armed, without attacking one another. Thus there was no proposal whatever, but a question without any obligation, because our conversation, as I have already explained, was to take place soon afterward. In Berlin, however—without waiting for the conversation—this news was used as the foundation for a far-reaching act. Then came Poincaré's letter, Bonar Law's letter, and the telegram from the King of the Belgians. The hesitating members of the Cabinet were converted, with the exception of three members, who resigned.

"[(xxvi) PEACE HOPES DESTROYED.] Up to the last moment I had hoped for a waiting attitude on the part of England. My French colleague also felt himself by no means secure, as I learned from a private source. As late as Aug. 1 the King replied evasively to the French President. But in the telegram from Berlin, which announced the threatening danger of war, England was already mentioned as an opponent. In Berlin, therefore, one already reckoned upon war with England. Before my departure Sir Edward Grey received me on Aug. 5 at his house. I had gone there at his desire. He was deeply moved. He said to me that he would always be ready to mediate, and, 'We don't want to crush Germany.' Unfortunately, this confidential conversation was published. Thereby Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg destroyed the last possibility of reaching peace via England. Our departure was thoroughly dignified and calm. Before we left, the King had sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsoby, to me, to express his regret at my departure and that he could not see me personally. Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole family lamented our going. Mrs. Asquith and her friends came to the embassy to say good-bye. A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honor was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing sovereign. Thus ended my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy. At the railway station in London Count Mensdorff [Aus-

trian Ambassador] appeared with his staff. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain in London. But to the English he said that it was not Austria, but we, who wanted the war.

"[(xxvii) A BITTER RETROSPECT.] When now, after two years, I realize everything in retrospect, I say to myself that I realized too late that there was no place for me in a system which for years has lived only on tradition and routine, and which tolerates only representatives who report what one wants to read. Absence of prejudice and an independent judgment are combated, want of ability and of character are extolled and esteemed, but successes arouse hostility and uneasiness. I had abandoned opposition to our mad Triple Alliance policy, because I saw that it was useless and that my warnings were represented as Austrophobia and an *idée fixe*. In a policy which is not mere gymnastics, or playing with documents, but the conduct of the business of the firm, there is no such thing as likes and dislikes; there is nothing but the interest of the community; but a policy which is based merely upon Austrians, Magyars, and Turks must end in hostility to Russia, and ultimately lead to a catastrophe. In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We should have had to send to Petersburg a representative who, at any rate, reached the average standard of political ability, and we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired neither to dominate the Straits nor to throttle the Serbs. M. Sazonoff was saying to us: '*Lâchez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français*,' and M. Cambon [French Ambassador in Berlin] said to Herr von Jagow: '*Vous n'avez [pas] besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout*.' We needed neither alliances nor wars, but merely treaties which would protect us and others, and which would guarantee us an economic development for which there had been no precedent in history. And if Russia had been relieved of trouble in the west, she would have been able to turn again to the east, and then the Anglo-Russian antagonism would have arisen automatically without our interference—and the Russo-Japanese antagonism no less than the Anglo-Russian. We could also have approached the question of limitation of armaments, and should have had no further need to bother about the confusions of Austria. Austria-Hungary would then become the vassal of the German Empire—without an alliance, and, above all, without sentimental services on our part, leading ultimately to war for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interests demanded exactly the contrary.

"[(xxviii) ARRIVAL AT BERLIN.] On my arrival in Berlin I saw at once that I was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe of which our Government had made itself guilty in opposition to my advice and my warnings. The report was persistently circulated by official quarters that I had let myself be deceived by Sir Edward Grey, because if he had not wanted war Russia would not have mobilized. Count Pourtalès, whose reports could be relied upon, was to be spared, if only because of his family connections. He was said to have behaved 'splendidly,' and he was enthusiastically praised, while I was all the more sharply blamed. 'What has Russia got to do with Serbia?' this statesman said to me after eight years of official activity in Petersburg. It was made out that the whole business was a perfidious British trick which I had not understood. In the Foreign

Office I was told that in 1916 it would in any case come to war. But then Russia would have been 'ready,' and so it was better now. As appears from all official publications, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation: 1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world war must have been known to us—whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference. 2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply. 3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way we without Austria having been attacked replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march—so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement. In view of these indisputable facts it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world war.

“[(XXIX) GERMANY'S WAR SPIRIT.] Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is destroyed which constitutes a permanent threatening of our neighbors? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again have to take up arms and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? Were these people not right who prophesied that the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi dominated the German people—the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil; that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers and the caste of warriors who rule and who fix our ideals and our values—not the civilian gentleman; that the love of dueling which inspires our youth at the universities, lives on in those who guide the fortunes of the people? Had not the events at Zabern [see GERMANY: 1913] and the Parliamentary debates on that case shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedoms are valued among us, when questions of military power are on the other side? Cramb, an [English] historian who has since died, an admirer of Germany, put the German point of view into the words of Euphorion:

“Träumt Ihr den Friedenstag?
Träume, wer träumen mag!
Krieg ist das Lösungswort!
Sieg, und so klingt es fort.”

“Militarism, really a school for the nation and an instrument of policy, makes policy into the instrument of military power, if the patriarchal absolutism of a soldier-kingdom renders possible an attitude which would not be permitted by a democracy which had disengaged itself from military-junker influences. That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialization, and in spite of socialistic organization, the living, as Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still gov-

erned by the dead. The principal war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Germany, will be achieved.—See also above: Causes: Indirect: h, 2.

“[(XXX) JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE.] Today, after two years of the war, there can be no further doubt that we cannot hope for an unconditional victory over Russians, English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, and that we cannot reckon upon the overthrow of our enemies. But we can reach a compromised peace only upon the basis of the evacuation of the occupied territories, the possession of which in any case signifies for us a burden and weakness and the peril of new wars. Consequently, everything should be avoided which hinders a change of course on the part of those enemy groups which might perhaps still be won over to the idea of compromise—the British Radicals and the Russian Reactionaries. Even from this point of view our Polish project is just as objectionable as any interference with Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens—to say nothing of the mad submarine war scheme. Our future lies upon the water. True, but it therefore does not lie in Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. That is a reversion to the Holy Roman Empire, to the aberrations of the Hohenstaufens and Hapsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not the policy of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes.

“[(XXXI) RUINOUS RESULTS.] Triple Alliance policy is a relapse into the past, a revolt from the future, from imperialism, from world policy. Central Europe is mediaevalism; Berlin-Bagdad is a *cul de sac*, and not a road into the open to unlimited possibilities, and to the world mission of the German people. I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other State; I am only an enemy of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert us from our aims, and to bring us on to the sloping plane of Continental policy. It was not German policy, but Austrian dynastic policy. The Austrians had accustomed themselves to regard the alliance as a shield, under whose protection they could make excursions at pleasure into the East. And what result have we to expect from the struggle of peoples? The United States of Africa will be British, like the United States of America, of Australia, and of Oceania, and the Latin States of Europe, as I said years ago, will fall into the same relationship to the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters of America to the United States. They will be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon; France, exhausted by the war, will link herself still more closely to Great Britain. In the long run, Spain also will not resist. In Asia, the Russian and Japanese will expand their borders and their customs, and the south will remain to the British. The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxon, the Russian, and the Japanese and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His sphere of power will be that of thought and of trade, not that of the bureaucrats and the soldiers. The German appeared too late, and the world war has destroyed the last possibility of catching up the lost ground, of founding a colonial empire. For we shall not supplant the sons of Japheth; the program of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of mankind in British expansion and British imperialism, will be realized.

“Tu regere imperio populos Romano, memento. Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem, Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.”

—*Lichnowsky's memorandum* (*New York Times Current History*, 1918).

On March 15, 1918, *Politiken*, the organ of the Swedish socialists of the extreme left, published this historical document. It was a so-called "memorandum" by Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, who before and at the time of the commencement of the war was the ambassador for the German empire in London. After quoting at length from the "memorandum," the editor says: "It is to be remembered that these words are not those of an Englishman. They are the words of one of the noblest of the German nation, to which the German Emperor entrusted the most important foreign post and with whom William II in his youth was closely associated." And the editor concludes: "Who bears the blame that the German people were goaded into a furious hate and thereby into a war spirit? Only those in the service of the junker class, who are the ruling military caste in Germany, in control of the government. The pan-Germans in their megalomania are the ones who brought about this calamity upon the German people."

72.—Lord Bryce on Lichnowsky memorandum.

—"The secret memorandum which Prince Lichnowsky wrote as a record and vindication of his conduct while German Ambassador in England is the most important single document which has come before the world since the first days of the war. It was not meant to become known during the war, perhaps not within his own lifetime. It was written, not to justify England but to criticize the policy which tied Germany to Austria, and was published without and indeed against its author's will. It may have been composed partly to relieve the writer's own feelings, an impulse which those will understand who are prevented by considerations of public duty from vindicating their conduct to the world. It may also have been due to a sense, natural to men who have borne a part in great events, that they owe it to posterity to contribute what they can to the truth of history. Anyhow it has exposed him to danger and the persecution of the German Government, and this persecution is evidence of the importance they attach to it as a condemnation of their conduct. The truth of its contents has been confirmed, if indeed it needed confirmation, by the statements of Herr von Jagow, late German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Herr Muhlon, one of the Krupp Directors. Prince Lichnowsky appears in this document as a man of clear vision and cool judgment, an acute observer of social as well as political phenomena, a good witness both to what he noted during his residence here and to what he knew of the action of his own Government. . . . [Germany] tried to represent the war as having been forced upon . . . [her] by Great Britain. Germany, it was said, was merely defending herself against an unprovoked attack. She desired to live at peace with her neighbors, developing her own resources, cherishing no aggressive designs. Her enormous army and navy had been created only to protect her against the jealous and malicious enemies by whom she was surrounded, and especially against Great Britain. Britain, it seems, was envious of Germany, being herself a decadent nation. This was the prevailing German view. She feared the commercial competition of Germany and tried to keep the latter out of all foreign markets. British policy, so they said, under the direction of King Edward VII., had formed

alliances with France and Russia in order to hem in Germany, and after trying to block Germany's outlets in Africa and Asia contrived this war to destroy by arms a rival whom she could not face up to in trade and manufacturing industry. . . . A large part of the German press, inspired and controlled by the German Government, had for some time past been holding up England as the persistent foe of Germany. It now . . . represented Sir Edward Grey as having plotted to bring about the war and as having urged Russia to refuse a peaceful solution, and it added the equally groundless charge that England had secretly planned with Belgium to attack Germany through Belgian territory. . . . It was this conviction of the malevolence and grasping ambition of England that created that ferocious hatred of the English. . . . Now what was the truth? The British people bore no hatred whatever toward the German people. King Edward VII. meant no harm to Germany when he showed his liking for the French, neither did his Ministers when they took steps to remove the differences that had been causing trouble between ourselves and France, and again when they came to a friendly understanding with Russia. These arrangements were made in the interests of European peace and good-will, not in order to damage Germany. . . . British men of science and learning adopted the immense contributions Germany had been making to the progress of knowledge, and they had many personal friends in Germany. British statesmen did not desire to add to British possessions abroad, feeling that we had already all we needed and that the greatest interest of the British Empire was universal peace. No section of our people, neither traders, thinkers, writers, nor statesmen, had any idea of the dangers to peace which lay, as we know now, in the mind and purpose of those who ruled Germany. . . . All this every Englishman knows. I repeat it only because it has now received not only confirmation but also valuable further proof in the Lichnowsky memorandum, proof unsolicited and un contemplated, and moreover unimpeachable because it comes from one who bore a leading part in what it records, and who never meant to let it become known.

"First, the memorandum bears witness to the pacific spirit of the British people. . . . Secondly, the memorandum shows that the attitude of the British Government of Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign Minister, was entirely pacific. The admirable characterization of Sir Edward . . . testifies to his perfect straightforwardness and constant wish to maintain good relations with Germany, and after describing how 'the simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him the respect even of his opponents,' it adds: 'This is a true picture of the man who is decried in Germany as a liar and the instigator of the world war. . . . Thirdly, still weightier evidence of the good-will of the British Government is supplied by an account given of the concessions made to the German wishes in Asia and Africa. . . . In pursuance of this policy the British Government went a long way to meet the German wishes in respect to the Bagdad Railway. . . . Not less large were the concessions made in South and Central Africa. . . .

"The memorandum shows how earnestly [Sir Edward Grey] . . . labored for peace at Berlin, at St. Petersburg, at Vienna, and how all his attempts were baffled by the settled purpose of the German Government to force on the war. Great Britain may, like other nations, have in the past sometimes indulged her ambition, sometimes

abused her strength, sometimes embarked in wars that might well have been avoided, but on this occasion at least she is blameless. Never in her long history had she had so perfectly clear a conscience as in the case of this war. Her people neither contemplated it nor desired it. . . . Neither when the war began did Great Britain wish to do more than prevent Germany from destroying Belgium and mortally wounding France. Sir Edward Grey spoke truly for the nation when, as the memorandum records, he said: 'We don't want to crush Germany.'—*New York Times*, May 12, 1918.

73.—Memoranda and letters of Dr. W. Mühlon.—Coincident with the publication in Germany, early in 1918, of the Lichnowsky memorandum, there also appeared in pamphlet form in Germany a letter written by a certain Dr. Mühlon, a former member of the Krupp directorate then residing in Switzerland, corroborating the Lichnowsky memorandum. The *Leipziger Volkszeitung* of Mar. 20,



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1918, reported that the Lichnowsky and Mühlon memoranda were discussed by the Main Committee of the Reichstag on Mar. 16. In the course of the debate Vice Chancellor von Payer tried to minimize the value of Mühlon's statements by asserting that the former Krupp director was a sick, nervous man who no doubt did not intend to injure his country's cause, but who was hardly responsible for his actions because of his many nervous breakdowns. Mar. 21, 1918, the *Berliner Tageblatt* printed the text of Dr. Mühlon's letter which was evidently written before Helfferich's resignation in Nov., 1917. In fact Mühlon states that Helfferich was vice-chancellor at the date the letter was written.

"[(i) TALK WITH HELFFERICH.] In the middle of July, 1914, I had, as I frequently had, a conversation with Dr. Helfferich, then Director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and now Vice Chancellor. The Deutsche Bank had adopted a negative attitude toward certain large transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey, in which the firm of Krupp, for business reasons—delivery of war material—had a lively interest. As one of the reasons to justify the attitude

of the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Helfferich finally gave me the following reason: 'The political situation has become very menacing. The Deutsche Bank must in any case wait before entering into any further engagements abroad. The Austrians have just been with the Kaiser. In a week's time Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to Serbia, with a very short interval for the answer. The ultimatum will contain demands such as punishment of a number of officers, dissolution of political associations, criminal investigation in Serbia by Austrian officials, and, in fact, a whole series of definite satisfactions will be demanded at once; otherwise Austria-Hungary will declare war on Serbia.' Dr. Helfferich added that the Kaiser had expressed his decided approval of this procedure on the part of Austria-Hungary. He had said that he regarded a conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between these two countries, in which he would permit no other State to interfere. If Russia mobilized, he would mobilize also. But in his case mobilization meant immediate war. This time there would be no oscillation. Helfferich said that the Austrians were extremely well satisfied at this determined attitude on the part of the Kaiser. When I thereupon said to Dr. Helfferich that this uncanny communication converted my fears of a world war, which were already strong, into absolute certainty, he replied that it certainly looked like that. But perhaps France and Russia would reconsider the matter. In any case, the Serbs deserved a lesson which they would remember. This was the first intimation that I had received about the Kaiser's discussions with our allies. I knew Dr. Helfferich's particularly intimate relations with the personages who were sure to be initiated, and I knew that his communication was trustworthy.

"[(ii) KAISER FOR WAR.] After my return from Berlin I informed Herr Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach, one of whose Directors I then was at Essen. Dr. Helfferich had given me permission and at that time the intention was to make him a Director of Krupps. Herr von Bohlen seemed disturbed that Dr. Helfferich was in possession of such information, and he made a remark to the effect that the Government people can never keep their mouths shut. He then told me the following. He said that he had himself been with the Kaiser in the last few days. The Kaiser had spoken to him also of his conversation with the Austrians, and of its result; but he had described the matter as so secret that he [Krupp] would not even have dared to inform his own Directors. As, however, I already knew, he could tell me that Helfferich's statements were accurate. Indeed, Helfferich seemed to know more details than he did. He said that the situation was really very serious. The Kaiser had told him that he would declare war immediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time people would see that he did not turn about. The Kaiser's repeated insistence that this time nobody would be able to accuse him of indecision had, he said, been almost comic in its effect.

"[(iii) GERMAN DUPLICITY.] On the very day indicated to me by Helfferich the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia appeared. At this time I was again in Berlin, and I told Helfferich that I regarded the tone and contents of the ultimatum as simply monstrous. Dr. Helfferich, however, said that the note only had that ring in the German translation. He had seen the ultimatum in French, and in French it really could not be regarded as overdone. On this occasion Helfferich also said

to me that the Kaiser had gone on his northern cruise only as a 'blind'; he had not arranged the cruise on the usual extensive scale, but was remaining close at hand and keeping in constant touch. Now one must simply wait and see what would happen. The Austrians, who, of course, did not expect the ultimatum to be accepted, were really acting rapidly before the other powers could find time to interfere. The Deutsche Bank had already made its arrangements, so as to be prepared for all eventualities. For example, it was no longer paying out the gold which came in. That could easily be done without attracting notice, and the amount day by day reached considerable sums. Immediately after the Vienna ultimatum to Serbia the German Government issued declarations to the effect that Austria-Hungary had acted all alone, without Germany's previous knowledge. When one attempted to reconcile these declarations with the events mentioned above, the only possible explanation was that the Kaiser had tied himself down without inviting the co-operation of his Government, and that, in the conversations with the Austrians, the Germans took care not to agree upon the text of the ultimatum. For I have already shown that the contents of the ultimatum were pretty accurately known in Germany. Herr Krupp von Bohlen, with whom I spoke about these German declarations—which, at any rate in their effect, were lies—was also by no means edified. For, as he said, Germany ought not, in such a tremendous affair, to have given a blank check to a State like Austria; and it was the duty of the leading statesmen to demand, both of the Kaiser and of our allies, that the Austrian claims and the ultimatum to Serbia should be discussed in minute detail and definitely decided upon, and also that we should decide upon the precise program of our further proceedings. He said that, whatever point of view one took, we ought not to give ourselves into the hands of the Austrians and expose ourselves to eventualities which had not been reckoned out in advance. One ought to have connected appropriate conditions with our obligations. In short, Herr von Bohlen regarded the German denial of previous knowledge, if there was any trace of truth in it, as an offense against the elementary principles of diplomacy; and he told me that he intended to speak in this sense to Herr von Jagow, then Foreign Secretary, who was a special friend of his.

"[(iv) GERMAN GOVERNMENT BLAMED.] As a result of this conversation Herr von Bohlen told me that Herr von Jagow stuck firmly to his assertion that he had nothing to do with the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and that Germany had never made any such demands. In reply to the objection that this was inconceivable, Herr von Jagow replied that he, as a diplomatist, had naturally thought of making such a demand. When, however, Herr von Jagow was occupying himself with the matter and was called in, the Kaiser had so committed himself that it was too late for any procedure according to diplomatic custom, and there was nothing more to be done. The situation was such that it would have been impossible to intervene with drafting proposals. In the end, he [Jagow] had thought that non-interference would have its advantages—namely, the good impression which could be made in Petersburg and Paris with the German declaration that Germany had not co-operated in the preparation of the Vienna ultimatum."—*Krupp director confirms Prince Lichnowsky's indictment* (*New*

York Times Current History, May, 1918, *Supplement*, pp. xx-xxii).

(v) LETTER TO THE NORDDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG ON THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA AND RUSSIA'S MOBILIZATION.—"Long known and not denied by the German government are, I take it, the chief points in my statement, namely: 1. That, as the Germans conceived, Austria-Hungary was to chastise Serbia and no other Power was to interfere in the affair. 2. That Russian mobilization meant immediate declaration of war by Germany. Both these positions were grave political mistakes. The relation of Russia to Serbia was closer than that between ordinary allies. Germany, which explained its attitude of support as regarded Austria-Hungary by pleading its duties as an ally, was bound to recognize that Russia was, at the very least, in the same position as regarded Serbia. The peril involved in Germany's rigid attitude toward Russian mobilization was shown when it sprang upon the world its declarations of war at the moment when Vienna and St. Petersburg had discovered a common basis for peaceful negotiations. What is perhaps new in my statement is that the personal attitude of the Emperor was decidedly in line with these two points of view. No one, however, who knew the conditions obtaining in Germany could have doubted, even in default of positive evidence, the strong stand personally taken by the Emperor. That the alleged ignorance of the ultimatum to Serbia and the claim to have played no part in the shaping of the Austro-Hungarian plans against Serbia were, on Germany's part, only sophistical juggling with words, was proved long ago, apart from other evidence, by the introduction to the German White Book. In reply, at the same time, to an article recently published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which disputes my assertions, I make the further statement that my memoranda do not indicate that the Emperor had decided, no matter what happened, to bring on the World War. In a narrower sense, however, he was responsible for its outbreak. He had decided on a sanguinary chastisement of Serbia. Why, instead of risking a World War, in which the laurels of victory were not to be bought cheap, should he not rather have decided to win over his friend, the Czar, by argument, in order thus to increase Germany's power? This time, however, his play was over rash. He was obliged to follow it up in earnest when he failed to prevent Russian mobilization. We may well believe that, in those critical days, Berlin went so far as to put a degree of pressure on Vienna, urging that connections with St. Petersburg be not wholly cut off, but that efforts be made to delay the Russian mobilization. Nevertheless, when the mobilization came, it was not Vienna that declared war against Russia. On the contrary, Vienna was on the direct road to an understanding. It was the Emperor in Berlin, maintaining the solemnly assumed but nevertheless insane attitude which, regardless of consequences, he had seen fit to take from the outset. When the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* expressly declares that Berlin expressly and uniformly emphasized the view that Russian mobilization meant war, it concedes the main point: by the threat of a greater wrong and calamity the world was to be frightened out of its effort to avert from Serbia a lesser wrong and calamity, and so not only Serbia but all the world was to be subjected to a brutal, although possibly bloodless duress, which was decisively to establish Germany's future position.

"The other assertions of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which are meant only to throw its readers off the track, are scarcely worth discussing. I said nothing about a Potsdam crown council on July 5 [see above: 9]; I said only that in a conversation with the Austrians the Emperor had committed himself in such and such a manner. I have, moreover, no occasion to deny that the negotiations concerning the difficult situation created by the murder in Serajevo were conducted by the agencies in whose competence the matter lay. I maintain, however, that they were conducted on the lines laid down by the Emperor: no one has any right to interfere in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; Russian mobilization means instant war. I do not for a moment dispute, I have indeed already reaffirmed, that efforts were made to preserve the peace. These efforts, however, were not directed towards an understanding; their purpose was to secure an unconditional surrender to the German point of view. In a word, they were efforts to preserve peace by threats of war. Further protest needs to be made only against the assertion of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* that the Sukhomlinof trial has conclusively shown that the real culprits who set the world on fire are to be found in St. Petersburg. This trial has brought out nothing new, except certain internal occurrences connected with the Russian mobilization. These are of no greater importance than would be, let us say, decisive evidence that the German Emperor also wavered before he decided to proceed to extremes. It is the facts that are of importance. Mobilization did not necessarily mean war. No people knew this better than the Austrians, who were accustomed to long mobilizations without war. Of those who are to blame in the broader sense for the World War there may be a plenty, and their guilt may date far back. Of those to blame in the narrower sense there are but few; and, as regards the occurrences here under discussion, they are to be found in Berlin and in Vienna."—*International Conciliation pamphlet, Sept., 1918.*

(vi) GERMANY AND BELGIUM.—In the same letter, Mühlon went on to state that the occupation of both Belgium and Holland, as a military necessity, in case of war, had often been discussed. In the event of a simultaneous war with France and Russia, the overthrow of France "in the quickest possible way," before Russia could strike, had been decided upon. This decision meant also a demand for passage by the German armies through Belgium in a descent upon northern France. The demand had been made and refused, with the consequent occupation of Belgium by Germany. Charges had been made that Belgium intended to break her neutrality, but this charge, Mühlon contended, was refuted by the relations between the Belgian government and the Krupps before the war. The Krupps, he said, had kept the guns for the fortifications of Antwerp in storage at the request of Belgium. From this fact alone he concluded that it was evident that Belgium herself had every desire to maintain friendly relations with the German Empire. (See BELGIUM: 1914: Germany and Belgian neutrality.) In this respect, a Belgian statement of the orders for guns and ammunition, which had been placed with the Krupps, is of interest. "All Belgium's supply of artillery, both guns and ammunition, as well as part of her other war *matériel*, comes from Germany. At the most the Krupp works allowed some Belgian factories to co-operate in

the manufacture of certain guns and projectiles. At the time of the outbreak of war delivery was awaited of a considerable part of the following orders which had been entrusted to Krupps with the co-operation of Belgian firms: 30,000 universal shells (7.5 cm.). 18,000 fuses with detonators. 70,000 double-acting fuses. 4 eclipse guns (28 cm.). 4 embrasure guns (28 cm.). In addition various orders had been placed with other German firms such as Werner, Siemens & Halske, Siemens & Schücker, Ehrardt, etc. If Belgium had contemplated military co-operation with France, would she not have given her orders to French firms? Moreover, during the course of the war, a highly critical situation arose for the Belgian army. Not having received from Germany all the expected deliveries and, on the other hand, having been obliged to transfer into France its base of operations together with all its elements of production, it found itself amongst ammunition of a quite different type from its own. And it was only after serious study of the matter by Belgian and French engineers that a way was found of solving the complicated problem of supplying the Belgian army, equipped with German *matériel*, with munitions of a somewhat modified French type."—E. Waxweiler, *Belgium neutral and loyal*, pp. 161-163.

(vii) A REMARKABLE LETTER.—Herr Mühlon authorized the *Humanité*, a Paris Socialist paper, to publish the following remarkable letter which he addressed from Bern, on May 7, 1917, to Herr von Bethmann-Holweg, then Imperial Chancellor. It was published Mar. 31, 1918.

"However great the number and weight of the mistakes accumulated on the German side since the beginning of the war, I nevertheless persisted for a long time in the belief that a belated foresight would at last dawn upon the minds of our Directors. It was with this hope that I put myself to a certain extent at your disposal, in order to collaborate with you in Rumania, and that I indicated to you that I was disposed to help in Switzerland, where I am living at present, if the object of our efforts was to be rapprochement of the enemy parties. That I was, and that I remain, hostile to any activity other than reconciliation and restoration I proved soon after the opening of hostilities by the definite resignation of my Directorship of Krupps' works. But since the first days of 1917 I have abandoned all hope as regards the present Directors of Germany. Our offer of peace without indication of our war aims, the accentuation of the submarine war, the deportations of Belgians, the systematic destruction in France, and the torpedoing of English hospital ships have so degraded the Governors of the German Empire that I am profoundly convinced that they are disqualified forever for the elaboration and conclusion of a sincere and just agreement. The personalities may change, but they cannot remain the representatives of the German cause. The German people will not be able to repair the grievous crimes committed against its own present and future, and against that of Europe and the whole human race until it is represented by different men with a different mentality. To tell the truth, it is mere justice that its reputation throughout the whole world is as bad as it is. The triumph of its methods—the methods by which it has hitherto conducted the war both militarily and politically—would constitute a defeat for the ideas and the supreme hopes of mankind. One has only to imagine that a people exhausted, demoralized, or hating violence,

should consent to a peace with a Government which has conducted such a war, in order to understand how the general level and the chances of life of the peoples would remain black and deceptive. As a man and as a German who desires nothing but the welfare of the deceived and tortured German people, I turn away definitely from the present representatives of the German régime. And I have only one wish—that all independent men may do the same and that many Germans may understand and act. In view of the fact that it is impossible for me at present to make any manifestation before German public opinion, I have thought it to be my absolute duty to inform your Excellency of my point of view.”—*Krupp director confirms Prince Lichnowsky's indictment (New York Times Current History, May, 1918, Supplement, xxii-xxiii).*

74.—Origin of the war: American ambassador's version.—Documentary refutation.—“This war is no accident. Neither did it come about through the temporary breakdown of European diplomacy. . . . The spirit and motive behind it were the spirit and motives that brought about the war between Prussia and Denmark (in 1864), the war between Prussia and Austria (1866) and the war between Prussia and France (1870). It was undertaken in the furtherance of a definite programme of Prussian imperialism. . . . On August 18, 1914, as American Ambassador at Constantinople, I called on the Marquis of Pallavicini, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to congratulate him on the Emperor's eighty-fourth birthday. After exchanging the usual diplomatic compliments suitable to such an occasion, he spoke of the condition of the Emperor's health and his great mental and physical activity in spite of the strain to which he was subjected. The conversation then turned to the war, which was in its third week, and His Excellency told me that when he visited the Emperor in May His Imperial Majesty had said that war was inevitable because of conditions in the Balkans. The Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Sarajevo on June 28; yet weeks before that the Austrian Emperor had confided to his Ambassador to Turkey that war was inevitable. A still more remarkable confirmation came to me from Baron Wangenheim, the German Ambassador at Constantinople. [See above: 9.] In an outburst of enthusiasm after the arrival of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* in the Dardanelles, he having directed their movements by wireless while they were endeavoring to escape from the British fleet, the German Ambassador informed me that a conference had been held in Berlin in the early part of July at which the date of the war was fixed. This conference was presided over by the Kaiser; the Baron Wangenheim was present to report on conditions in Turkey. Moltke, the Chief of Staff, was there and so was Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. With them were the German leaders of finance, the directors of the railroads and the captains of industry whose aid was essential to the Kaiser in putting his vast military machine into operation. Each was asked if he was ready for war. All replied in the affirmative except the financiers, who insisted that they must have two weeks in which to sell foreign securities and arrange their loans. At the time this conference was held, nobody outside the inner circles of the Berlin and Vienna Governments dreamed of war as a result of the Sarajevo assassinations. They took good care that no suspicions should be aroused. The Kaiser went straightway to Norway on his yacht. The Chancellor left Berlin for a rest. The diplomatic corps had no intimation of

the impending calamity, and the British Ambassador went away, leaving the embassy to the Chargé d'Affaires. The same drug was used in Vienna, and even when the blow fell the Russian Ambassador was absent from his post on vacation. As the British White Book shows, it was not until July 20 that Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, asked the German Ambassador in London whether he had any news of what was going on in Vienna in regard to Serbia. Many days before the British Foreign Secretary asked this question war had been formally decided upon in Berlin and Vienna and everything was being made ready to raise the curtain upon the most ghastly drama of history. . . . It was not to me alone that Baron Wangenheim told the story of this Berlin conference. Only recently the Marquis Garroni, the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, announced that Baron Wangenheim said the same thing to him, Italy at that time being a member of the Triple Alliance. My diary shows that the conversation with the German Ambassador took place on August 26. This was about six weeks after the fateful council in Berlin in which the Kaiser gave civilization over to fire and sword, and all the details of the meeting were still fresh in Baron Wangenheim's mind. The decision for war which the Austrian Emperor had confided to his Ambassador to Turkey in May, and which the Kaiser fully revealed to his lieutenants in July, was the culmination of plans that had been under way for twenty-five years. . . . Throughout all his policies for a quarter of a century runs this Weltmacht motif [of the Kaiser], like the motif of a Wagnerian opera. Year in and year out, the Kaiser brooded over this ambition, in which he was the central figure of a stupendous moving picture, directing and controlling the destinies of the world.”—H. Morgenthau, *World* (New York), Oct. 14, 1917.

The following documents seem to throw some light on the origin of the statement that a conference was held at Potsdam:

“MEMORANDUM OF THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BARON V. D. BUSSCHE,

“BERLIN, AUGUST 30, 1917

“On the day after the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in July, 1914 had handed to H. M. the Emperor the letter of the Emperor Francis Joseph, delivered by Count Hoyos, and the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg and the Under Secretary of State Zimmerman had been received in Potsdam, a conference of military personages took place with His Majesty at Potsdam. There were present: His Excellency Capelle for Tirpitz, Captain Zenker for the Admiralty Staff, representatives of the War Department and of the General Staff. It was decided, at all events, to take preparatory measures for a war. Corresponding orders were thereupon issued.—Source absolutely trustworthy. ‘BUSSCHE.’”

Two years afterwards (1919) von dem Bussche on enquiry wrote, “I am sorry I cannot recall the source. Perhaps Mueller. Date of noting this down might perhaps refresh my memory. Also possible that I mistakenly characterized source as trustworthy.” In 1919 also von Capelle denied that a conference was held at Potsdam on July 5, but, in common with the other persons mentioned, stated that he had a private interview with Emperor William on the morning of that day, in the course of which the emperor said that the Czar,

according to his opinion, "would not in this case place himself on the side of the murderers of the Prince. Besides, Russia and France were not prepared.—England the Emperor did not mention.—Upon advice of the Chancellor he would start on his northern trip, in order to allay any disquiet. Nevertheless, he wanted to inform me of the tense situation so that I could be thinking about the future."—*German secret war documents (International Conciliation, no. 150, May, 1920).*

75.—Commission to decide responsibility of authors of the war, 1919.—"The Preliminary Peace Conference at the plenary session on the 25th January, 1919 (Minute No. 2), decided to create, for the purpose of inquiring into the responsibilities relating to the war, a commission composed of fifteen members, two to be named by each of the Great Powers (United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) and five elected from among the Powers with special interests. The Commission was charged to inquire into and report upon the following points:

"1. The responsibility of the authors of the war. . . .

"The Commission was constituted as follows: *United States of America:* Hon. Robert Lansing, Major James Brown Scott; *British Empire:* Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, K. C., M. P., or Sir Earnest Pollock, K. B. E., K. C., M. P., Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey; *France:* Mr. André Tardieu (alternate: Captain R. Masson), Mr. F. Larnaude; *Italy:* Mr. Scialoja (alternates: Mr. Ricci Busatti, Mr. G. Tosti), Mr. Raimondo, later, Mr. Brambilla (3rd February), Mr. M. d'Amelio; *Japan:* Mr. Adatei, Mr. Nagaoka, later, Mr. S. Tachi (15th February); *Belgium:* Mr. Rolin-Jaequemyns; *Greece:* Mr. N. Politis; *Poland:* Mr. C. Skirmunt, later, Mr. N. Lubienski (14th February); *Roumania:* Mr. S. Rosental; *Serbia:* Professor Slobodan Yovanovitch, (alternates: Mr. Koumanoudi, Mr. Novacovitch). . . . Mr. Lansing was selected as Chairman of the Commission. . . .

"On the question of the responsibility of the authors of the war, the Commission, after having examined a number of official documents relating to the origin of the World War, and to the violations of neutrality and of frontiers which accompanied its inception, has determined that the responsibility for it lies wholly upon the Powers which declared war in pursuance of a policy of aggression, the concealment of which gives to the origin of this war the character of a dark conspiracy against the peace of Europe. The responsibility rests first on Germany and Austria, secondly on Turkey and Bulgaria. The responsibility is made all the graver by reason of the violation by Germany and Austria of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, which they themselves had guaranteed. It is increased, with regard to both France and Serbia, by the violation of their frontiers before the declaration of war. Many months before the crisis of 1914 the German Emperor had ceased to pose as the champion of peace. Naturally believing in the overwhelming superiority of his army, he openly showed his enmity towards France. General von Moltke said to the King of the Belgians [at Potsdam, in November, 1913]: 'This time the matter must be settled.' In vain the King protested. The Emperor and his Chief of Staff remained no less fixed in their attitude. . . . Austria suddenly sent Serbia an ultimatum that she had carefully prepared in such a way as to make it impossible to accept. Nobody could be deceived; 'the whole world understands that this ultimatum means war' (Lichnowsky

Memoir). According to M. Sazonof, 'Austria wanted to devour Serbia.' M. Sazonof asked Vienna for an extension of the short time limit of forty-eight hours given by Austria to Serbia for the most serious decision in its history. Vienna refused the demand. On the 24th and 25th July England and France multiplied their efforts to persuade Serbia to satisfy the Austro-Hungarian demands. Russia threw in her weight on the side of conciliation. Contrary to the expectation of Austria-Hungary and Germany, Serbia yielded. She agreed to all the requirements of the ultimatum, subject to the single reservation that, in the judicial inquiry which she would commence for the purpose of seeking out the guilty parties, the participation of Austrian officials would be kept within the limits assigned by international law. 'If the Austro-Hungarian Government is not satisfied with this,' Serbia declared she was ready 'to submit to the decision of The Hague Tribunal.'

"A quarter of an hour before the expiration of the time limit, at 5.45 on the 25th, M. Pachich, the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered this reply to Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister. On M. Pachich's return to his own office he found awaiting him a letter from Baron Giesl saying that he was not satisfied with the reply. At 6.30 the latter had left Belgrade, and even before he had arrived at Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Government had handed his passports to M. Yovanovitch, the Serbian Minister, and had prepared thirty-three mobilization proclamations, which were published on the following morning in the *Budapesti Kozlöni*, the official gazette of the Hungarian Government. On the 27th Sir Maurice de Bunsen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: 'This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia.' At midday on the 28th Austria declared war on Serbia. On the 29th the Austrian Army commenced the bombardment of Belgrade, and made its dispositions to cross the frontier.

"The reiterated suggestions of the *Entente* Powers with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the dispute only produced evasive replies on the part of Berlin or promises of intervention with the Government of Vienna without any effectual steps being taken. On the 24th July Russia and England asked that the Powers should be granted a reasonable delay in which to work in concert for the maintenance of peace. Germany did not join in this request. On the 25th July Sir Edward Grey proposed mediation by four Powers (England, France, Italy and Germany). France and Italy immediately gave their concurrence. Germany refused, alleging that it was not a question of mediation but of arbitration, as the conference of the four Powers was called to make proposals, not to decide. On the 26th July Russia proposed to negotiate directly with Austria. Austria refused. On the 27th July England proposed a European conference. Germany refused. On the 29th July Sir Edward Grey asked the Wilhelmstrasse [German Foreign Office] to be good enough 'to suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent a war between Austria and Russia.' She was asked to say what she required. Her reply was evasive. On the same day, the 29th July, the Czar Nicholas II despatched to the Emperor William II a telegram suggesting that the Austro-Serbian problem should be submitted to The Hague Tribunal. This suggestion received no reply. This important telegram does not appear in the German White Book. It was made

public by the Petrograd *Official Gazette* (January, 1915). The Bavarian Legation, in a report dated the 31st July, declared its conviction that the efforts of Sir Edward Grey to preserve peace would not hinder the march of events. As early as the 21st July German mobilization had commenced by the recall of a certain number of classes of the reserve, then of German officers in Switzerland, and finally of the Metz garrison on the 25th July. On the 26th July the German fleet was called back from Norway.

"The *Entente* did not relax its conciliatory efforts, but the German Government systematically brought all its attempts to nought. When Austria consented for the first time on the 31st July to discuss the contents of the Serbian note with the Russian Government and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador received orders 'to converse' with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Germany made any negotiation impossible by sending her ultimatum to Russia. Prince Lichnowsky wrote that 'a hint from Berlin would have been enough to decide Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and to declare that he was satisfied with the Serbian reply, but this hint was not given. On the contrary they went forward towards war.' On the 1st August the German Emperor addressed a telegram to the King of England containing the following sentence: 'The troops on my frontier are, at this moment, being kept back by telegraphic orders from crossing the French frontier.' Now, war was not declared till two days after that date, and as the German mobilization orders were issued on that same day, the 1st August, it follows that, as a matter of fact, the German army had been mobilized and concentrated in pursuance of previous orders. The attitude of the *Entente* nevertheless remained still to the very end so conciliatory that, at the very time at which the German fleet was bombarding Libau, Nicholas II gave his word of honor to William II that Russia would not undertake any aggressive action during the *pourparlers*, and that when the German troops commenced their march across the French frontier M. Viviani telegraphed to all the French Ambassadors 'we must not stop working for accommodation.'

"On the 3rd August von Schoen went to the Quai d'Orsay [French Foreign Office] with the declaration of war against France. Lacking a real cause of complaint, Germany alleged, in her declaration of war, that bombs had been dropped by French aeroplanes in various districts in Germany. This statement was entirely false. Moreover, it was either later admitted to be so or no particulars were ever furnished by the German Government. Moreover, in order to be manifestly above reproach, France was careful to withdraw her troops ten kilometers from the German frontier. Notwithstanding this precaution, numerous officially established violations of French territory preceded the declaration of war. The provocation was so flagrant that Italy, herself a member of the Triple Alliance, did not hesitate to declare that in view of the aggressive character of the war the *casus fœderis* ceased to apply."—*English official text of the report presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, Mar. 29, 1919, ch. 1.*

CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT.—"1. The war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable. 2. Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the *Entente* Powers and their re-

peated efforts to avoid war. . . . [With regard to the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, the commission arrived at following conclusion:] The neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by the treaties of the 19th April, 1839, and that of Luxemburg, guaranteed by the treaty of the 11th May, 1867, were deliberately violated by Germany and Austria-Hungary."—*Ibid.*

Against this report, the German delegation made a vigorous protest, as follows:

"It is impossible, in this place, to fully discuss the remote reasons of the Austro-Serbian conflict, which were on one side the 'Greater-Serbia' agitation threatening the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, on the other side the commercial oppression of the Serbian people. A categorical denial, however, must be opposed to the allegation that a secret plot was laid between Berlin and Vienna to crush Serbia. In a memorandum presented to the Reichstag on August 3rd, 1914, the German Government openly declared that it had acceded to the opinion held in Vienna concerning the situation created through the attempt of Serajewo and that it had approved of an action which there was considered necessary. In Berlin the aims of this action were not known in their particulars, but they were strictly circumscribed and did not implicate any annexation. It is well known that Count Tisza expressly urged that any such idea should be given up, otherwise he would not consent to the ultimatum. . . . It is true that, Serbia not having kept her promises in the past, Austria was convinced that she could not content herself with diplomatic results, but that she ought to insist on the impression which a military expedition was expected to produce. Germany acceded to this point of view and encouraged Austria. . . . The action against Serbia was not, it is true in contradiction with the methods at the time being employed also by other nations and it was undertaken in good faith in order to eliminate a matter of conflict which for many years had threatened the entire world with the danger of war. Nevertheless, in 1914 the German Government itself thought that the ultimatum had gone too far. . . . The conciliatory character of the Serbian answer has been recognized by the German Government itself in its note of July 28th. . . . Animated by the desire to localise the Austro-Serbian conflict even diplomatically, the Berlin Government had at first adopted a negative attitude as to the proposals of mediation which were especially made by England; they thought that by these methods the danger which was continually threatening the peace of the world, would not be removed. It is, however astonishing that the report of the Commission does not mention that the idea of direct conversations between Vienna and Petersburg had been suggested by Germany and that Sir Edward Grey himself had recognized this method 'as the most preferable of all.' . . . Pressure was exerted by the Government of Berlin upon the Vienna Cabinet ever since the 28th of July. . . . By the mediation proposed in the afternoon of July 29th (Blue Book, no. 88) the way to preserve peace was found. Berlin, readily having complied with the proposition, insisted on obtaining the adhesion of Vienna in such categorical terms as hardly ever have been employed amongst allies in a decisive hour. Most certainly it is not the fault of the German Government if the diplomatic negotiations which were so nearly approaching a happy solution, were suddenly interrupted by military measures of the adverse party. As to the documents

published by the Servian Minister in Paris, the report of von Wiesner of July 13th, 1914 was never brought to the knowledge of Berlin. The telegram of the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szögyeny, of July 25th, 1914, insisting that in case of a declaration of war, military operations ought to be opened at once, corresponds to the point of view mentioned above that the best way of avoiding an extension of the conflagration would be a localisation and consequently a rapid solution of the Servian conflict. As to Count Szögyeny's telegram of July 27th concerning the refusal of the propositions of mediation which England might eventually make, the German Commission having applied for information to the Ex-Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and the Secretary of State von Jagow, got from both sides the identical answer that this report could not be correct. The Commission considers the statement of both gentlemen as trustworthy, all the more as the Austrian Ambassador was old beyond his age. As a matter of fact—and this is the main point—the German Government did not proceed in such a way, but ever since July 28th did its utmost to make Austria accept a mediation. As to taking up of direct negotiations success did not fail (Red Book, no. 50). Nevertheless, the report of the Ambassador of Austro-Hungary is one of the numerous details which prove that an enquiry by a neutral commission is especially urgent. . . . Germany had agreed to the Austrian intention of putting an end to the 'Greater-Servia' agitation, if necessary by force of arms. It would have been of essential importance, if immediately after the arrival of the Servian answer on July 27th the Cabinet of Vienna would have been caused to abstain from any irremediable measures, for the very same day the Berlin Government had got the impression that Servia had shown herself very conciliatory. But from the 28th, after having thoroughly examined the Servian answer, the greatest possible efforts were made to induce Vienna to yield. Berlin particularly and most energetically supported Sir Edward Grey's proposal of the afternoon of the 29th, by which Austria was granted the satisfaction due to her according to the opinion of all the great Powers. It escapes the knowledge of the undersigned why the Cabinet of Vienna did not at once reply to this proposal. This is one of the most essential points which still needs to be cleared up. As to Berlin—according to diplomatic documents—a change of opinion from the 26th to the 28th of July is evident, and in the conviction of the undersigned, it must be attributed to a want of energy that the last consequences were not drawn as early as the 27th. Germany did not want the world war, although this risk had been taken into consideration as a possibility. To quote the words of the Commission's report, for more than forty years the German Government was regarded as the 'champion of peace.' (Yellow Book, No. 6.) Plans of conquest lay far from the thoughts of the leading German statesmen. It was different in Russia. Without war, the intentions of the leading Pan-Slav circles were not to be realised. These anti-peace elements achieved their desire in the last decisive days; for at the very moment when peace seemed assured, Russia adopted measures making it impossible. The undersigned cannot refrain from giving expression to the opinion that if pressure had been put on Petersburg by London and Paris as strong as that exercised by Berlin on Vienna, the fatal step which war-loving military men enforced against the will of the Tsar,

would not have been taken. HANS DELBRÜCK, COUNT MAX MONTGELAS, MAX WEBER, ALBRECHT MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY.—*Is Germany guilty? (German White-book concerning the responsibility of the authors of the war, pp. 43-49, 49-50).*

76.—Origin of the war: German chancellor's version.—Dr. Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, German imperial chancellor from 1909 to 1917—eight years to a day—and who died on Jan. 1, 1921, was born at Hohenfinow in Brandenburg in 1856, a descendant of one of the oldest patrician families, who were engaged as bankers at Frankfurt-on-Main. In the summer of 1919 the *Berliner Tageblatt* published some advance extracts from his forthcoming volume of reminiscences. The following observations on the origin of the World War were reproduced in that journal:

"A legend has become widely current to the effect that the war started in the Crown Council which the Kaiser is alleged to have held in Potsdam on July 5, 1914. [See above: 9.] Even some Germans believe this fairy tale, although our opponents, who certainly would not have overlooked such a find, have not been able to give us any information concerning such a Crown Council in their official publications, and although even a most superficial investigation would have proved that a majority of the persons alleged to have been present at the Council were neither in Potsdam nor Berlin. The actual facts are as follows: On July 5, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Count Szogyenyi, after breakfast with the Kaiser, handed the latter a personal letter from the emperor Franz Josef, accompanied by a memorandum from his government. The memorandum developed a comprehensive Balkan programme, looking a long way forward, and intended to oppose vigorous diplomatic measures to Russia's plans. In view of the hostility of Serbia and to provide against the unreliability of Roumania, it was proposed to establish closer relations with Bulgaria and Turkey. The purpose was to organize a Balkan league, excluding Serbia, under the patronage of the Central Powers. The tragedy at Serajevo was cited as a proof that the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia had gone too far to be reconciled, and that the former country would have to count upon the obstinate, implacable and aggressive hostility of Serbia. The personal letter from Emperor Franz Josef summarized the ideas presented in the memorandum, and called attention to the fact that the peace policy of the Great Powers would be threatened if the agitation at Belgrade was allowed to continue. The Kaiser received the two documents with the remark that he would not be able to reply to them until he had conferred with the Imperial Chancellor. At noon of the same day, July 5, the Kaiser received me with Secretary Zimmermann, who was acting in place of Secretary von Jagow, who was on a vacation. The place was the park of the new palace in Potsdam. No one else was present. I previously knew the tenor of the Austrian document, a copy of which was communicated to me and Mr. Zimmermann. After I had reported upon its contents, the Kaiser stated that he cherished no illusions as to the real seriousness of the situation created in the Danube monarchy by the Greater Serbia propaganda. It was not our business, however, to advise our ally how to act in respect to the assassination at Serajevo. Austria-Hungary must attend to that herself. We were the more obligated to refrain from direct suggestions and advice because we would have to employ all our influence to pre-

vent the Austro-Serbian conflict from becoming an international controversy. The Emperor Franz Josef must know, however, that we would not fail Austria-Hungary in a serious crisis. Our own vital interests demanded the integrity of Austria. He regarded favorably the plan of bringing Bulgaria into the alliance, but nothing must be done in this connection to alienate Roumania. These views coincided with my own. Returning to Berlin, I gave an audience to Count Szogyenyi, and informed him that the Kaiser was not blind to the danger caused by the Pan-Slav and Greater Serbia propaganda. In view of the attitude of Roumania and the efforts to organize a new Balkan alliance against Austria-Hungary, we would support Austria's endeavors to win Bulgaria for a triple alliance. At Bucharest we would endeavor to steer Roumanian policies into channels friendly for the Entente. The Kaiser could not take a positive attitude regarding the questions in controversy between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, since they were not within his jurisdiction. Emperor Franz Josef, however, could rest assured that the Kaiser would always stand loyally behind Austria-Hungary, as required by his duties as an ally and demanded by their ancient friendship.

"On July 6, the Kaiser left for his Scandinavian tour, and on the 14th of July he replied to the letter of Emperor Franz Josef from Bornholm to the same general effect. The legend of a Crown Council and of certain decisions made at such a council, amounts to nothing more than this. No such council was ever held. France demonstrated its ill will from the beginning by its zealous efforts to throw doubt upon the candor of our efforts in favor of peace, and to foster the impression that we were employing the Serbian incident merely as a pretext for attacking France. Mr. Jules Cambon employed the most skillful arguments in his reports to support his false assumption that the people in Berlin were eager for war. The efforts which we made at Paris to calm the distrust and excitement of her Russian allies, met not only with great distrust, but were immediately distorted in the public press. It was obvious that the people in Paris were doing their best to compromise German diplomacy in the eyes of their allies and to play the part of shrewd colleagues and make their Russian partners skeptical. At the same time the French Ministry considered its principal task to be to arrange for England's entry into the war. The English and French documents give a vivid picture of the pertinacity and tenacity which Mr. Paul Cambon exhibited in his negotiations with Sir Edward Grey. In these conversations Grey sedulously maintained the contention that England's hands were still free, but he did not discourage M. Carbon, and the latter finally got the English statesman compromised. When France obtained an assurance, on August 1, that the British fleet would prevent the German fleet from passing down the Channel and would protect the French coast against German attacks, the bargain was nailed. That was the moment when England finally sacrificed its neutrality and entered a formal engagement. France had obtained her desire. In its intrigues to procure England's aid, the French cabinet employed still another measure which is characteristic of its attitude in this crisis, and that was—I can designate it by no other word—untruthfulness in its account of actual events. Not only M. Viviani, but also M. Poincaré [the French president] have personally asserted throughout that the Russian mobilization followed general

mobilization in Austria. But it has already been proved and become a notorious fact that the Russian mobilization was published in Petrograd early on the morning of July 31, while Austria did not decide to mobilize until several hours later. The French cabinet here bases its case on a false statement. The French political leaders have treated Germany's military attitude in an equally uncandid manner. On July 29 I instructed our ambassador in Paris, Baron von Schoen, to point out to the French government that a continuance of military preparation on the part of France would force us to take protective measures. We would have to proclaim a state of war peril which was not identical with mobilization, but would undoubtedly increase the tension. We hoped, however, nevertheless, that peace would be maintained. M. Viviani distorted this message in the telegram of August 1 to M. Paul Cambon in London that we had threatened to proclaim a state of war peril immediately and had begun a general mobilization under the mask of such a measure. On August 1 M. Viviani told Baron von Schoen, when the latter informed him of Germany's mobilization, that he was astonished that Germany should resort to such a measure at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was occurring between Russia and Austria and the other Powers. M. Viviani, therefore, acknowledged that diplomatic measures still promised success, but charged Germany with arbitrarily disturbing these efforts, although he knew that Germany was largely responsible for the fact that diplomatic negotiations had been started and that it was Russia, through her mobilization, that wrecked this plan. If the Tsar himself, in his telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser stated beforehand that the military measures to which his court would force him would lead to war, and if Sir Edward Grey on July 30 regarded a stoppage of the Russian military measures as affording even a weak prospect of maintaining peace, then there is no justification whatsoever for assuming that M. Viviani did not recognize the significance of Russia's mobilization, to which Germany's mobilization was merely a reply. Finally, it is very striking indeed, that M. Viviani on July 31, at seven in the evening, when Baron von Schoen notified him of our ultimatum to Russia, pretended that he was not informed of the alleged complete Russian mobilization. Such innocent ignorance is simply inexplicable. A cause that hides behind falsehoods cannot be a good cause. No doubt can exist as to the purpose which the French cabinet had in mind in pursuing such a policy. In every way, even in dishonorable ways, an impression must be created that the general mobilization in Russia had been provoked by the Central Powers. Such an impression had to be created in order to back up the political work in England, and, above all, to influence public sentiment at home. . . . When the war fell upon us from the East, Germany was in a critical situation on the West. We foresaw, with certainty, that France would not leave its Russian ally in the lurch. When France replied to our inquiry with the famous statement that it would consult its own interests in the matter, we had no choice but to declare war on France. Thereupon, we appeared the assailants, although we were absolutely certain that we were exposed to an assault by the French army. I do not think we possibly could have avoided being placed in this position. The suddenness of the military measures which Russian mobilization forced upon us,

did not permit us to defer military precautions against France or leave us time for diplomatic intervention to better our political position."

77.—German ex-chancellor's review of European politics leading up to war.—"It is perfectly true that we agreed with Austria when she announced that action against Serbia was necessary, after the Serajevo murder, and that we also expressly stated that we were prepared to carry out the obligations of our alliance, in case further warlike complications should result from the action against Serbia. Therefore, we have never said, or in any way suggested, that Austria's action had taken us by surprise, consequently not by pointing to the Emperor's Scandinavian trip, and the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister's absence on leave. We were not, indeed, aware of the text of the ultimatum before it was sent. The assertion to the contrary is incorrect; at all events, as far as I am personally concerned. I also considered the ultimatum too strong, when it subsequently came to my knowledge. In the course of events our policy took this view of mine fully into account. More of this later. First, as to the reason for our attitude towards Austria's action against Serbia. What was the general political situation? No one will dispute to-day that, since 1871, France's high policy had been firmly directed to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, and that of Russia—with particular intensity since the Japanese war—to supremacy in Constantinople. In pursuing these plans, Russia systematically tried to undermine Austria-Hungary's position in the Balkans, with the help of Serbia. Both Powers were pursuing aims which could only be realized by war. In their joint policy both Powers had England's avowed support. It is obvious that this situation became increasingly perilous for Germany, the more her Austrian ally's position was weakened by Serbia's intrigues, carried on with Russian help. It must be remembered that President Wilson's great programme of a conciliatory League of Nations, which even now still awaits its realization, had no acceptance, at all events at that time, and that national self-limitation, in the interest of the maintenance of peace, was not in any way regarded as a general precept of international morality; that, on the contrary, to many, unrestrained will for power was a virtue, and war a loyal method of putting it into practice. I think the Russo-Japanese war, the Boer war, and the Italian war in Tripoli are classical instances of this. Germany had to reckon with this state of affairs, if she was to appreciate the importance of the Serbian intrigues against Austria rightly. And that was the reason, the only reason, why Germany agreed to the action against Serbia. If Austria-Hungary passively tolerated being further undermined, Germany had to look forward to a state of affairs in which, alone and, as it were, friendless, she would have to face France's *revanche* policy, supported by the Russian alliance and English friendship. How little we intended to let loose a general war is shown by our whole subsequent attitude. I may briefly recapitulate the main points.

"Our efforts to localize the Austro-Hungarian conflict was certainly not a mistaken idea; Sir Edward Grey had himself adopted and supported it most energetically. Our intention was frustrated solely by Russia, who considered herself entitled to bring the dispute before her Forum. We then tried to mediate between Vienna and Petersburg. You will remember that, in the first

instance, England proposed a conference for this purpose, but then expressly associated herself with our proposal of a direct exchange of opinion between Vienna and Petersburg. You will further remember that we strongly urged the Vienna Cabinet to smooth over the misunderstandings which had arisen between it and the Petersburg Cabinet, and gave it to understand in the clearest imaginable way that we were certainly prepared to fulfill our obligations as allies, but must refuse to be drawn into the world conflagration by Austria through disregard of our advice. Do you think that one uses such language to one's ally, one's only ally, and at the same time wants a war which one cannot fight without this ally? Finally, you will remember how, in consequence of our efforts, the conversation between Vienna and Petersburg was started, when, suddenly, contrary to the assurances we had been expressly given, Russia mobilized her whole army. That this general mobilization was war, the war an all-powerful party in Russia wanted—well, I think after the revelations of the Sukhomlinov trial, that no human being can doubt that any longer. Those are facts which nothing can alter. To saddle us with the blame for the war is to pronounce enemies innocent who pursued joint plans for decades, which they could only realize if war broke out, but who object to our rising up in arms against them. That is not fair; it is unfair. How is it that, in spite of these facts, of which I have repeatedly spoken in the Reichstag, almost the whole world has come to believe in Germany's guilt? I will say quite frankly what I think about this too. I long for the day to come when I can contribute to bring about the victory of truth before an impartial court of justice, which ought certainly to have all the material from both sides at its disposal. Whether the Bavarian Government has been right in choosing the present moment for its publications, I cannot judge, for I am not aware of their motive. I am afraid that only confusion can result from one-sided and fragmentary publications, and I doubt whether it is right to rouse passions at this moment when we are to approach peace. For this reason, I will not speak now, for my part, of the astonishing propaganda with which our enemies have understood how to discredit us throughout the world by a mixture of truth and untruth, and to represent themselves, on the other hand, as the exclusive unselfish champions of all great and noble human ideals. I will rather speak quite frankly and soberly of our own share of blame for the world-wide disaster. First of all, a short word about Belgium. It is well known how the unfortunate position of constraint and distress, brought about by our marching into Belgium, gave us the reputation of being barbarians, and led to our being credited with the blame for the war. I spoke frankly and straightforwardly about Belgium on August 4. You know how, later on, what I said then was accounted to me as a crime by a large section of our public opinion. I still abide by every word I said then, and have nothing to add.

"Then Alsace-Lorraine. President Wilson, as is well known, demands, in his Fourteen Points, reparation for the wrong done to France by Prussia, in 1871, in respect of Alsace-Lorraine, which, as the President expressed it, had unsettled the peace of the world for almost fifty years. A discussion of whether Germany acted wrongly in making her annexation of 1871, or whether that annexation is to be judged from the standpoint of international

right and wrong similarly to the innumerable annexations our present enemies have made in the course of history—discussion of this would perhaps hardly be profitable now. The President's words, however, clearly express the recognition that it was in practice France's aspirations to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine which allowed the world no peace during the last half century. Where I think we were to blame was in not having understood how to treat Alsace-Lorraine in such a way as to make its inhabitants gradually forget the change in their political nationality, and at the same time prevent the feeling from gradually taking form, as it has done, in many parts of the world, that we did a great wrong in 1871, a feeling which was certainly not general in the year 1871, particularly in England and America. In the history of the world England's example has often shown how the violence of conquests is gradually forgotten. Above all, however, we must admit that by failings in our national character, and faults in our general behavior, we contributed to the warlike tension which pervaded the political atmosphere, not in the last decade alone. Words were repeatedly uttered which might be interpreted as provocation. Pan-German agitations did us great harm, both at home and abroad, and, above all, the so-called fleet policy led us into disastrous antagonisms. To this may be added a variety of shortcomings in our domestic policy. Excuse me from finding further fault with our own flesh and blood, at a moment when we stand defenseless after our troops' heroic fight of four and a half years, and when powerful internal convulsions make the national organization tremble. Just as I have outlined only the main points of our enemies' responsibility, so also with regard to our share of the blame. Let history judge. Only those have a right to live who can and do look the truth fearlessly and clearly in the face. We will be frank as regards our own guilt, but, however hard fate may have hit us, it shall not wrest false admissions from us. We are no Pharisees, but neither are we slaves. Precisely in the deepest misfortune we retain the firm will to cooperate even in the very difficult future, in the great tasks of humanity, which the world-wide disaster of this war has written in letters of blood on the firmament. We shall only be able to do it if we hold our own now and in the future, free from the dross of the past."—*Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (quoted in *Littell's Living Age*, Feb. 1, 1910, pp. 261-264).—"Whatever the ex-Chancellor's faults—and the [German] newspapers are exceedingly sparing in praise of his character and statesmanship—he certainly was Wilhelm's loyal servant to the last minute. Neither in his first volume of memoirs, 'Reflections on the World War,' nor before the National Convention's Committee of Investigation of the Causes of the War did he ever betray his master by throwing light upon the fatal conference between William and himself just before the outbreak of the war, although, according to persons who should know something about Bethmann-Hollweg, he never ceased to try to modify the Kaiser's heedless and arrogant course."—*New York Times*, Jan. 4, 1921.—This last paragraph came from Berlin by wireless on January 3, two days after the ex-chancellor's death.

78.—Controversy over war responsibility.—"The Germans generally never believed that the Kaiser's Government had deliberately started the war with the view of controlling the world. Prince Lichnowsky expressed the liberal view when he

asserted that the responsible leaders felt it necessary to have a war before Russia had so improved her railroads and other facilities for rapid mobilization as to overcome the advantage thus far possessed by Germany. The belief in the Pan-Slav threat dominated the minds of the German General Staff, which was convinced that sooner or later Germany must be at grips with Russia in a fight for existence, and that it would be suicidal for Germany to wait until Russia's hordes could be poured down upon her. In the French Yellow Book, issued during the war, there is a report of an interview between von Moltke, head of the German General Staff, and the King of Belgium, an interview at which the Kaiser was present, in which von Moltke said flatly that Germany must fight Russia before the latter improved her military position. Among the Allies, and more especially in England, there has been a disposition on the part of some impartial publicists to accept this theory, with some modifications, as the basis of German action in the events which led up to the war. The war lords, fed upon the casuistries of Machiavelli and the cynicism of Frederick the Great, having conjured up a phantom monster, which they named Pan-Slavism, became the slaves of their own creation. Americans have, with few exceptions, not accepted this explanation, and have felt that the German Government was set upon deliberate provocation of a world war, but it is only fair to recognize a certain shift of opinion in this respect abroad. Be this as it may, it is certain that the Russian bogey was accepted by the great majority of the Germans during the war. They still held to this when the whole German structure tumbled into chaos, but they were now on the defensive as to the Cabinet of 1914. So many of the assertions and promises of that authority had been disproved by events. So many of the blood and iron men had turned out bags of wind. It was not impossible to argue in Berlin itself that the arrogance and conceit bred by commercial and industrial success had turned German heads and lent undue allurements to the Pan-German bait of 'world markets.' Even the monarchists were prepared to admit that some of their supermen had worn asses' heads—and not a few hit pretty hard at the sacred Kaiser.

"The welter of confused argument and recrimination continued up to about six months ago, when there was a sudden wave of passionate protest against all allied accusations, which has since developed into a truculent charge that the Allies themselves were the guilty ones. To what extent this attitude was suggested by the Government to the warriors, statesmen, publicists, politicians and journalists who made the demonstrations can only be surmised. As not a few of the Government leaders participated, it is certain that the Administration was, at least, sympathetic. It has always been the habit of the German Government to guide the friendly editors in foreign politics, at least. . . . The archives of the German Foreign Office had been searched by Kautsky, admittedly a savage critic of the Kaiser and the Junkers. The Socialist, Bauer, while Foreign Minister, had done the same in Austria. Nothing had been found to support the allied charge of a purpose to control Europe or bring on war, said the Germans. But, they added, France and England have not opened their archives. Why haven't they? In a recent discussion of the question Professor Delbrück makes clear the attitude now assumed by the great majority of Germans in the following words: 'One finds frequently in the German literature and

press the contention that Germany was not, as the Entente insisted, the only guilty one. That is insufficient and misleading.' He goes on to say that the question to be answered is limited to the contention of the Entente as expressed in Article 231 of the Peace Treaty, together with the ultimatum of June 16 and the accompanying memorandum, whereby Germany is charged with having deliberately planned and forced the war, with the object of securing the hegemony of the world. Taking note of the assertion by supporters of the Entente that the charge as actually made to Germany did not extend so far, making no reference to world hegemony, but limiting itself to the assertion that Germany had forced the war by its threat to compel acquiescence in a certain solution of the questions at issue, the professor finds that there is no real difference between the two forms, and he declares positively that both are simply and demonstrably false in every particular. This is not the declaration of a mad monarchist. Professor Delbrück has been accepted by so careful a publication as the English Contemporary Review as a responsible spokesman for his people, and Professor Headlam-Morley, who answered his article in that periodical, said of him, 'both during the war and since, all that he has written on this subject shows the qualities with which so serious an international controversy should be conducted.' So Delbrück's challenge bespeaks the conservative view of the Germans today, and when he calls upon the German Government to insist upon a revision of the Peace Treaty and of the agreement as to reparations, because these were based upon a theory of deliberate German guilt since proven unjustified, he issues a call to the German nation which will be heard from again and again. It is not, Delbrück asserts elsewhere, 'the one who declares war who is the breaker of the peace, but he who compels it.' The one who compelled it, of course, according to this theory, was Russia. Again he says, Germany 'acted like a surgeon who operates on a cancer patient to save his life, facing the danger that the operation may kill him. The patient, the world's peace, died under the operation, and now the world calls the surgeon a murderer.' He finds the proof that Germany's intentions were innocent in the latest official papers, which show a state of unpreparedness, and in the writings of von Tirpitz and von Moltke, both of whom allege that they did not wish war at that time, because both were convinced that Germany would be defeated by the Entente. From this it would appear that von Moltke's hindsight was better than his foresight, as this latter was indicated in his interview with King Albert, already referred to. Summed up by Georg Karo in the *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, the causes of the war were: Russia's determination to secure Constantinople; French revenge; English desire to destroy Germany's commercial rivalry. The German eagle was enveloped in a net where all his struggles were in vain. He paints a picture of simple, naïve Prussia, trusting—too trusting—and incapable of dealing with the cunning Russians, English and French, who not only had long decided upon a war of destruction, but had even arranged to force the issue so that Germany would appear to be the aggressor. Delbrück varies the argument slightly. It was Serbia's determination to take Bosnia, Dalmatia, Istria, Croatia, Krain and Carinthia, which would have finished Austria. In this Serbia was supported by Russia, which found her valuable in the struggle for Constantinople. Russia considered the time ripe for the

conquest of that city and the creation of a Pan-Slav State."—C. J. Rosebault, *Germany's amended plea of not guilty* (*New York Times Book Review*, Aug. 7, 1921).

"Austria and Germany were gradually isolated, and France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy began to draw together. Italy was ostensibly a member of the Triple Alliance until 1914, but we now know that she was not a loyal member at any time during the present century, and that, by 1902, she had an understanding with France that she would not join any other State in a war upon the French Nation. . . . However, it is to be borne in mind that the Italian Foreign Minister from 1910 to 1914, the Marquis of San Giuliano, took a renewed interest in the part of Italy in the Triple Alliance, and that Italy was on better terms with her old allies than at any previous time after 1902. Moltke, in 1914, counted definitely on Italian military aid in the World War. Along with the diplomatic arrangements and entanglements went an ominous and expensive armament race. . . . If possible, there has been an even more mistaken impression on this point than with respect to the view that Germany was solely responsible for the World War. The sober facts indicate that Germany and Austria were together maintaining an armament establishment on land and sea only a little more than half as extensive or expensive as that of England, France and Russia combined. France, usually represented as pacific, unprepared and defenseless, was in 1913-14, planning an army two-thirds larger per capita than that contemplated by Germany in her latest military bill before the World War. Stress has been laid upon the peculiar and unique danger of the linking of autocracy and militarism in Germany and Austria. Such a combination is doubtless dangerous and deplorable, but it was not more noticeable in Germany and Austria than in Russia. . . . The war spirit in the British Navy and in the militaristic group in France was about as virulent and aggressive as that of Potsdam or Vienna from 1912-1914. . . . In addition to . . . [the] menacing general alignments and diplomatic antagonisms, it is essential to understand that there was especially high tension in the Spring of 1914. . . . In 1913 Germany and France provided for great increases in their land armament, and England began what almost might be called war measures in her navy organization and procedure. In the Spring of 1914 Austria could scarcely restrain herself from attacking Serbia, in spite of German opposition in the previous year. Germany was frightened by the cumulative progress of the Franco-Russian rapprochement and the substitution of a more chauvinistic French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and even more by the Russo-British naval conversation of 1914. German soldiers, statesmen and publicists openly declared that, though pacific in intent, Germany was prepared for a vigorous defense against a wanton attack. Russia was controlled by the militaristic group, who were encouraged by Poincaré and his followers in France. . . . By the middle of June this feverish excitement and mutual suspicion had become alarmingly apparent alike to domestic observers and to foreign visitors. A crisis in such a state of affairs was likely to precipitate a panic and make it difficult to obstruct and control headstrong and arbitrary action. Such was the European situation when Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, was slain in Serajevo on June 28, 1914."—H. E. Barnes, *Assessing the blame for the World War* (*New York Times Current History*, May, 1924).

C. PREPARATION FOR WAR

(a) **Mobilization and concentration.**—As soon as the probability of war loomed darkly over Europe, the complex machinery of mobilization was set in motion. Millions of men exchanged their productive tools of peace for the destructive implements of war. From farm and factory, studio and office, they flocked to barracks, public places and concentration areas. Up to August 4, when Great Britain entered the war, the European situation presented a curious tangle of international complications. Austria was at war with Serbia alone; Belgium was at war with Germany, but not with Austria; Italy, the third partner in the Triple Alliance, had declared her neutrality. France, Great Britain and Russia were at war with Germany, but not with Austria-Hungary. Nor were mobilization activities limited to belligerents alone. Some of the smaller neutral European states, fearing a still further spread of the conflagration, openly or secretly placed themselves in a state of defense. On July 28, the British fleet was sent to its war station. "It must go there at once, and secretly; it must be steaming to the north while every German authority, naval or military, had the greatest possible interest in avoiding a collision with [the British]. If it went thus early it need not go by the Irish Channel and northabout. It could go through the Straits of Dover and through the North Sea, and therefore the island would not be uncovered even for a single day. . . . [It was] decided that the fleet should leave Portland at such an hour on the morning of the 29th as to pass the Straits of Dover during the hours of darkness . . . and with the utmost precaution proceed to Scapa Flow. . . . [The order given to Sir George Callaghan, the commander-in-chief of the home fleets, reads as follows:] 'To-morrow, Wednesday, the First Fleet is to leave Portland for Scapa Flow. Designation is to be kept secret except to flag and commanding officers. As you are required at the Admiralty, Vice-Admiral 2nd Battle Squadron is to take command. Course from Portland is to be shaped to southward, then a middle channel course to the Straits of Dover. The Squadrons are to pass through the Straits without lights during the night and to pass outside the shoals on their way north. *Agamemnon* is to remain at Portland, where the Second Fleet will assemble.' . . . The German ambassador lost no time in complaining of the movement of the Fleet to the Foreign Office. According to the German Official Naval History, he reported to his Government on the evening of the 30th that Sir Edward Grey had answered him in the following words: 'The movements of the Fleet are free from all offensive character, and the Fleet will not approach German waters.' 'But,' adds the German historian, 'the strategic concentration of the Fleet had actually been accomplished with its transfer to Scottish ports.' This was true. We were now in a position, whatever happened, to control events, and it was not easy to see how this advantage could be taken from us. A surprise torpedo attack before or simultaneous with the declaration of war was at any rate one nightmare gone forever."—W. L. S. Churchill, *World crisis*, pp. 224-226.—See also ENGLAND: 1914 (July-August).—"On July 29th, the [British] Government, . . . at 2 P. M., ordered the precautionary measures arranged by the General Staff to meet an immediate prospect of war, to be put in force. These affected the Regular troops only, and in-

cluded the recall of officers and men on leave and furlough, and the manning of the coast defences. The Belgian Government decided to place the Army upon its 'reinforced peace footing.' [See BELGIUM: 1914: World War.] On the same day, the 29th, the British Ambassador at Berlin was asked by the Chancellor to give assurance of England's neutrality if Russia should attack Austria and an European conflagration ensued. [See above: Diplomatic background: 34.] To this significant enquiry Sir Edward Grey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, responded on the 30th by a refusal to entertain the proposal." J. E. Edmonds, *Military operations, France and Belgium (History of the Great War, p. 24)*.—"Sir Edward's conversation with Lichnowsky on the morning of July 31 took place, and his instructions to Berlin were dispatched in ignorance of the fact that Russia, who had mobilized 25 divisions on July 29 in answer to Austria's 22, had now mobilized her entire forces. According to Sukhomlinoff, the Russian War Minister, the Tsar signed the order for general mobilization on the afternoon of July 29; but, after a friendly telegram from the Kaiser, he ordered that mobilization should only take place against Austria. The War Minister, however, and the Chief of the Staff allowed the general mobilization to continue [see above: 38], while concealing it from the Tsar and denying it to the German Military Attache. Their disobedience was not discovered at the time; for in the afternoon of July 30, Sazanoff, the War Minister and Minister of Marine, on learning of the bombardment of Belgrad, agreed that general mobilization was necessary. The Tsar's consent was obtained the same night, and early next morning the capital was placarded with notices. A few hours later Austria ordered general mobilization, and Germany proclaimed *Drohende Kriegsgefahr*. [See above: 33.] The Tsar appeared to the German Ambassador hardly to realize the significance of what he had done, and in a telegram to King George he described the German ultimatum which followed as quite unexpected; but his Foreign Secretary and War Minister could be under no such delusion. On July 25, Sir George Buchanan had warned the former that if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. Similar advice had been proffered from Paris, which was not consulted before the irrevocable step was taken. . . . The Austrian ultimatum [to Serbia] was beyond comparison greater than the guilt of the Russian mobilization, because it was first in time and invited the response which it received. The world war was nevertheless precipitated by the action of Russia at a moment when conversations between Vienna and Petrograd were being resumed, when Bethmann-Hollweg was at length endeavoring to restrain his ally, and when the Tsar and the Kaiser were in telegraphic communication. The ultimatum which was dispatched to Petrograd on the afternoon of July 31, demanding the cessation of general mobilization within twelve hours, was hailed throughout Germany as the inevitable reply to the dread menace of invasion. Had the German Government, on the other hand, been as anxious for peace as the British Cabinet, it might, like Austria, have answered the Russian mobilization by counter-mobilization. In the opinion of Falkenhayn, Minister of War, the ultimatum, though justifiable, was

over hasty and unnecessary; but the Chancellor, convinced that Russia meant business, supported the demand of Moltke, Chief of Staff, for the declaration of war in order that she should not have a longer start in gathering her gigantic forces for the onslaught. Moltke added that to negotiate under the pressure of Russian mobilization would be a national humiliation."—G. P. Gooch, *History of modern Europe, 1878-1919*, pp. 546-547.—On the 31st "Germany made a formal proclamation of 'imminent danger of war' (*drohende Kriegsgefahr*), which meant practically the introduction of Martial Law and the suspension of the usual civil rights, and permitted the calling to the colours of six classes of the Reserve; at the same time she presented an ultimatum to the effect that, unless Russia ceased mobilization within twelve hours, she herself would mobilize upon both frontiers. Significantly enough, Turkey also ordered mobilization upon this day. Sir Edward Grey, meanwhile, sent an identic request to Germany and France to enquire whether they would respect Belgian neutrality. On the 31st July

... [It was proposed that orders for the annual training of the Territorial Force should be cancelled.] The Government considered, however, that the countermanding of the orders for Territorial training would be construed as not less, menacing than the order for mobilization itself; and they shrank from any measure which might seem to extinguish the last hope of peace. At 12 noon on the 1st August, the German ultimatum to Russia expired, and a general conflagration became inevitable. The [British] Cabinet at 2 P.M. on the 2nd cancelled the orders for Territorial training and at 6 P.M. those for the manœuvres of the Army, but still issued no orders for mobilization. The Royal Navy was quite ready for active service; and the French Ambassador was assured that, if the German Fleet should enter the North Sea or the Channel with hostile designs against France, the British Fleet would give France its protection. [See also above: Diplomatic background: 49.] Beyond this conditional promise of naval intervention the Cabinet would not go without consulting Par-



RECRUITING NEAR MALMESBURY, ENGLAND

France answered with an unequivocal affirmative. [See also above: Diplomatic background: 36.] Germany, however, sent only an evasive reply; and on the 1st August both France and Germany ordered general mobilization. The beginning of mobilization in France raised a serious question for Great Britain. There was, it is true, no promise of assistance to France, and the British Government was free to decide, untrammelled, for peace or war. But a scheme had been elaborated, in the event of certain contingencies, between the General Staffs of the two countries; and an essential point in this scheme was that the first movement of the British advanced parties, stores and so forth, should begin on the first day of mobilization. Assuming this coincidence of movement and mobilization, it was reckoned that six divisions—or four, if six could not be spared—one cavalry division and one cavalry brigade could be transported from Great Britain to concentration areas between Avesnes and Le Cateau, and would be ready to advance from them on the sixteenth day after the order for mobilization had been issued. That the British mobilization, if it should take place at all, would be later than the French was now obvious.

Parliament. Parliament was consulted on the following day, the 3rd August; but in the meanwhile a most momentous event had occurred. . . . Whilst coming down to the House . . . [Sir Edward Grey] had been informed that King Albert had telegraphed to King George invoking England's diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. . . . [On August 3, the British War Office issued the following communique: 'With reference to this afternoon's announcement of the Government of their decision to mobilize, it is officially stated that the Proclamation will be signed to-morrow and the necessary orders for the Reserves to return to the colours and the Territorials to be embodied will then be issued.' (See also ENGLAND: August 3.)] It was now clear that . . . mobilization must take place at least three days later than the French, and that even so movement could not be simultaneous with it. The Government, however, reckoned that by this delay they had gained more than they had lost by securing the unanimity, or approximate unanimity, of the nation and the benevolence of neutrals. On the 3rd August, at 6.45 P.M., Germany declared war on France, making alleged violation of her frontier by patrols and of her terri-

tory by aviators a pretext. Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, declared that she would maintain her neutrality in the impending struggle. . . . On the morning of the 4th August . . . [Germany] declared war on Belgium, and two of her cavalry divisions passed the frontier; and in the afternoon the heads of infantry columns also entered Belgium. [See also above: Diplomatic background: 61.] Early in the afternoon of the 4th August Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Berlin instructing him to ask for his passports if no satisfactory answer were given regarding the observation of Belgium's neutrality by 12 midnight (11 P.M. Greenwich mean time). . . . At 4 P.M. on the 4th August . . . the order for mobilization of the Expeditionary and Territorial Forces was issued by the British Government. As a matter of fact, mobilization occurred at an extremely awkward moment, for the 3rd August had been Bank Holiday and, as usually is the case in the middle of summer, Territorial units were in the act of moving to various camps for their annual training when the orders cancelling it arrived. Hence arose the question whether the existing time-tables for concentration should stand, or whether the movements by railway should be postponed. The Cabinet decided for a short postponement, and gave orders . . . that the embarkation of the Expeditionary Force should not begin until the 9th, and for the present to hold back the 4th and 6th Divisions. Meantime the mobilization of the various units proceeded with the smoothness which had been anticipated. In all essentials everything went 'according to plan'; and even the task of collecting 120,000 horses was accomplished within twelve days."—J. E. Edmonds, *Military operations, France and Belgium, 1914 (History of the Great War, pp. 24-28, 30)*.

The following table makes the dates of mobilization clear:

- July 25, 3 P.M. Serbia orders general mobilization.
- July 25, 9.30 P.M. Austria orders mobilization of 8 out of 15 army corps, i.e., partial mobilization in the south against Serbia alone.
- July 28, 5 P.M. England orders the first fleet to Scapa Flow.
- July 29. Russia orders mobilization of the four military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, i.e., partial mobilization in the south against Austria.
- July 30, 4 P.M. Tsar decides to order general mobilization of all the Russian forces. Mobilization orders dispatched about 7 P.M.
- July 31, 11.30 A.M. Francis Joseph orders general mobilization of the Austria-Hungarian army.
- August 1, 3.40 P.M. General mobilization of the French army and navy.
- August 1, 5 P.M. General mobilization of the German army and navy.
- August 2, 1.25 A.M. English Naval Reserve called up to complete the mobilization of the navy.
- August 3, 11 A.M. Decision to mobilize the British army (six divisions, i.e., the Expeditionary Force).
- August 4, 4 P.M. Proclamation issued for mobilization of the Expeditionary and Territorial Forces.

(b) Plan of campaign.—Routes into France.—German strategy.—French military theories.—

Plan XVII.—The German military plans for a war on two fronts—against France and Russia simultaneously—had undergone considerable revisions and modifications during the forty years preceding the outbreak of war in 1914. The great von Moltke (1800-1891), as well as his successor Count Waldersee leaned to the opinion that such a war could best be conducted by a defensive campaign on the west and an offensive on the east, that the French should be held passive so far as possible while Russia was being defeated, after which France, deprived of her sole ally, could be more easily brought to terms. "The plan of campaign which was inaugurated in August 1914 was conceived by General Count von Schlieffen [1833-1913], one of the greatest soldiers who ever lived. It was planned by him, in the event of France not respecting Belgium's neutrality, or of Belgium joining France. On this assumption the advance of the German main forces through Belgium followed as a matter of course. Any other plan of campaign would have been crippled, owing to the danger from Belgium to the German right flank, and would have precluded a quick and decisive blow at France, which was essential in order to meet in time the great danger of a Russian invasion into the heart of Germany. In the assumed military situation, as countless war-games had abundantly demonstrated, an offensive against Russia, with simultaneous defensive operations in the West, implied, as a matter of course, a long war, and was, therefore, rejected by Count von Schlieffen. When there was no longer any doubt as to the attitude of France and Belgium, Count von Schlieffen's scheme was carried into execution."—E. von Ludendorff, *Ludendorff's own story, pp. 28-29*.—For an offensive campaign against France there were four principal routes of invasion open to Germany: "She could, for example, concentrate her main armies in the valley of the Rhine with bases at Strassburg and Mülhausen, and in the country about Metz to enter by the so-called Lorraine gateway. An advance westward from between Strassburg and Mülhausen would encounter the steep east-facing scarp of the Vosges Mountains, a topographic feature which . . . imposes practically impossible conditions upon a German offensive. On the other hand the main advance from this region might be made by turning either end of the mountain barrier, passing through the Belfort gateway between the Jura Mountains and the southern end of the Vosges; or between the north end of the range and Luxembourg, through the gateway of Lorraine. In the first instance the ring fortifications of Belfort block the way, and since they effectively command every transportation line through the pass their complete reduction would be necessary before an advance would be possible. From the southern foothills of the Vosges to the neutral territory of Switzerland in the Jura foothills the distance is but ten or fifteen miles, and the narrowness of the gap would favor the defense and prevent satisfactory maneuvering of the attacking forces. Firmly entrenched in the gateway, their left flank secure against the difficult Vosges and their right flank protected by the neutral Swiss hills, supported by one of the four strongest fortified camps in France and supplied with adequate rail connections with the rear. The French armies could render an advance into their country by this route a slow and costly undertaking. Rapidity of action was the very essence of the German plan of campaign. German strategists and statesmen frankly asserted that to win the war the German armies must drive swiftly to the heart of France and bring that country to

her knees before Russia had time to mobilize and become a pressing danger in the east. In the German plan no route of invasion was practicable which would impose on the advance any appreciable delay. The Lorraine gateway is broad and since the war of 1870, largely in German territory. Metz is an admirable fortified base and is connected with Strassburg by excellent rail communications. It was by this route that the Prussian armies passed in the former war, whereas at the gate of Belfort they knocked in vain. West of Metz the German border is closer to Paris than at any other point. Here, then, would seem to be an appropriate point from which to launch the main attack upon the French capital. But to reach this conclusion is to forget the surface configuration of the Paris Basin. Just over the French border is the broad, marshy plain of the Woivre. Dominating it on the west is the steep escarpment crowned at short intervals by permanent fortifications from Verdun to Toul, and offering exceptionally advantageous positions for temporary field

first route, the invading armies would encounter the same difficult terrain of the Paris Basin. To a lesser degree the route from Cologne, around the north side of the Ardennes, is open to the same objections. There remains the fourth route, by way of the Belgian plain. Entering, as before, by the Liège gateway, invading armies could spread westward around the northern side of the Ardennes, through Louvain and Brussels, swinging gradually southwest past Mons and Charleroi, Cambrai and Le Cateau, on past St. Quentin, and so down to Paris. The left flank could profit by the Sambre-Oise valley route, while the right flank could swing as far out over the plain as circumstances required. The pathway here is broad and level and no topographic obstacle bars the way. It is a route which enables an invader to take in the flank the entire series of plateau barriers farther east. Roads and railways are excellent and numerous, permitting the rapid simultaneous advance of different columns of troops. The country is fertile and highly productive, providing sus-



RESERVISTS ON THE WAY TO RAILROAD STATION, BERLIN

works commanding the plain below. At the two points mentioned the only practicable gateways through the barrier are heavily fortified. Beyond to the west the same unfavorable topography is repeated again and again; always a steep scarp toward Germany, commanding a plain over which the invading troops must advance; always a gentle back slope down which the defending armies might retreat to the next scarp if too heavily pressed, while rearguards on the formerly occupied crest held the invaders temporarily at bay. If victorious along one plateau scarp, the invading armies would be checked at the next and compelled to fight the battle anew. Delays at the fortified gateways must be expected even if the forts were invested and the main armies pressed on to the barrier next west. Narrow and few in number, the gateways afford insufficient lines of communication for vast armies advancing and fighting. . . . Clearly the route from the middle Rhine country westward into France must be eliminated as the main path of invasion in a campaign demanding rapidity of action as its chief object. A second route of invasions from the northeast following the course of the Moselle trench to Luxemburg and thence into France by way of Longwy or Metz. As in the

tenance for large armies. With the occupation of this route would go the conquest of deposits of coal and iron of immense importance to the invaders. Back of the armies operating in France would be a broad network of first-class lines of communication and supply. . . . There existed, however, some serious objections to an advance on Paris by way of the Belgian plain. The distance from the nearest point on the Franco-German boundary, near Metz, to Paris is about 170 miles as the aeroplane flies. From the German-Belgian border to Paris, via the Belgian plain, the distance is approximately 250 miles. The latter route is, therefore, nearly fifty per cent. longer than the legitimate route directly from German territory into France. Not only this. The longer route involved the violation of Belgian neutrality, and if Belgium and England were faithful to their treaty obligations and true to their national honor, must inevitably bring the Belgian army and the British army and navy into the field against the invader. Yet this was precisely the route over which the great mass of the German armies were hurled."—D. W. Johnson, *Topography and strategy in the war*, pp. 20-25.

"When called upon, the German armies were

mobilized in 1914 with the same perfection of organization and equipment that signalized the mobilization of 1870, but in 1914 the 'prearranged' plan went far beyond the frontier, and instead of the mobile armies of 1870, there was a continuation of the plotted-out schedule. The German plan of 1914 was a repetition of the German plan of 1870, which was directed against the French armies, but always with the ultimate object of the capture of Paris. This goal of his strategy was emphasized by the Moltke of 1870 in no uncertain words. He described his plan as 'fixed from the first upon the enemy's capital, the possession of which is of more importance in France than in other countries.' In 1914 the plan of war of the German Great General Staff also had for its military objective the French armies. It was again the German aim to 'attack the enemy at once' with overwhelming momentum, as in the war of 1870, but again the ultimate goal of the German strategy was the possession of Paris. This must be kept in mind to understand the strategy of the German drive in 1914. Their constant effort was to smash and thrust aside the French armies, in order that they might occupy Paris. It is wrong to say that the Germans were attempting the capture of the French capital as their one military objective. Their plan was first to deal with the French armies, but their firm belief was that to take Paris, with an enormous levy of money upon the city, would again paralyze France, as in 1870. . . . It must be admitted that success in winning this final goal would have justified the strategy of the Germans, but the execution of this plan of war had been committed for years to a new 'opening'—to borrow a term from chess. Instead of making a direct invasion of France, across the border between the two countries, the German Great General Staff had deliberately planned, in defiance of international law and with full intention of breaking all treaties, to invade France through neutral Belgium, with a supporting army in Luxemburg. This had been plotted out for years in advance, and all their machinery of mobilization and invasion had been tied fast to this plan, to avoid the difficult frontier terrain and the theoretical strength of the French frontier fortresses."—T. G. Frothingham, *Guide to the military history of the World War, 1914-1918*, pp. 12-14.—"Obviously if Germany were attacked by France and Russia, her only hope of success lay in destroying each in detail; therefore in a swift conquest of France first, leaving her free to take Russia next. Equally obviously, therefore, Germany *must* take the offensive. Speed was essential—a long-drawn struggle meant starvation, bankruptcy, and inevitable defeat, especially with Britain's sea power against her. . . . She could leave Austria, stiffened by Germans, largely to hold Russia whilst she flung the whole weight of her might against France. Her man-power was seven to four against France and Britain combined, in a short war—her artillery and munitions were vastly more than seven to four. To turn the French fortified zone north of Verdun by a rush through Belgium had indeed been an open secret in German military writings. It has led to its being accepted as a truism, and this has led nearly every writer upon this war to see what he went forth to see—the swift rush of the German hosts through Belgium on to Paris."—H. Macfall, *Germany at bay*, pp. 110-111.

"Germany's declaration of war did not take France by surprise. For more than a generation she had prepared for the struggle. . . . If she was unprepared, it was only in the sense that the

[French] General Staff had staked everything on a plan which was humanly impossible; while it counted so absolutely upon the success of that plan that it neglected to take even ordinary precautions to meet the situation which was bound to arise in the event of a reverse. In 1911 General Michel was Vice-President of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, and also the designated Commander-in-Chief of the French armies in the event of war. In February of that year he submitted to the then Minister of War, Messimy (himself a soldier), a plan of campaign, based upon a theory that the Germans would invade France by the left bank of the Meuse, and would execute a turning movement on such a vast scale as would, from the outset, necessitate putting their reserves in the first line. Michel, therefore, proposed taking strategic safeguards against this movement, and also making a much more extensive use of the French reserves than had been previously contemplated. A month later Michel gave a conference in which he criticised and opposed the idea of an offensive à *Vouvrance* which was then so popular in French military circles. He therefore incurred the hostility of the younger members of the Staff as well as some of his own immediate colleagues; while even Pétain, then a colonel, was heard to say that Michel had lost the confidence of the Army. In July Messimy obliged the latter to place part of his proposal before the Conseil Supérieure de la Guerre. He received no support whatever, and Messimy, therefore, forced him to resign the vice-chairmanship as well as the eventual leadership in time of war. . . . Whatever may be the measure of Michel's ability, later events proved that his vision of the future was correct. He foresaw both what Germany would do and what was necessary for the protection of France. . . . Messimy finally offered the post to Joffre, who was already a member of the Conseil Supérieure de la Guerre, and would not come under the age-limit for several years. . . . The General Staff was dominated by a group of comparatively young and extremely ambitious officers, who were entirely possessed by the conviction that an offensive à *Vouvrance* would win the next war with Germany and that nothing else could; that the conflict would be of short duration and the first battles decisive; which latter opinion was also held by von Schlieffen. . . . In one sense it is true that only an offensive can lead to a decision. But that dictum does not mean that an offensive will always succeed. The time, to some extent the number of the opposing forces, and, in these days, above all, the comparative artillery strength must be taken into account. But while the French General Staff adopted the doctrine with enthusiasm, it entirely lost sight of these considerations. . . . Even Bernhardt, the great apostle of the offensive, has written: 'If we want to count upon military successes, we must not forget that attack is infinitely more difficult than ever, and that the assailant, to obtain the victory, needs to have a very marked superiority. It is the task of strategy to assure it.' It was the greatest fault of the French General Staff, before 1914, that it entirely neglected or ignored that task, apparently believing that material disadvantages could be overcome by engendering, through constant teaching and orders, a spirit of aggression. Nor did all British military authorities share the blind faith of the French General Staff that an offensive à *Vouvrance* was a sure road to a speedy victory. In August, 1914, Lord Kitchener not only warned the French military mission that the war would be a long one, but he also expressed

the opinion that the French plan was dangerous. . . . In 1913 a pamphlet appeared, entitled *La Concentration allemande*, which, to all intents and purposes, gave utterance to the views and plans of the General Staff. Although it was published anonymously, military circles were generally aware of the identity of the author [Lieutenant-Colonel, afterwards General, Buat]. In order to strike the imagination, Buat pretended that, while travelling in Germany, he had found a copy of the German plan of campaign, which had been left in a railway carriage. According to this, the Germans would enter France with twenty-two army corps—that is, one million three hundred thousand men—of whom nine hundred thousand would belong to

the active army and four hundred thousand would be reservists, who would be given only such secondary missions as the occupation of conquered territory. Part of these forces were to come by the right bank of the Meuse. Buat, therefore, concluded that the French forces ought to face north-east on a line extending from Belfort to Mézières. Incidentally, he thus disclosed to the Germans the French plan of concentration. As a matter of fact, the then existing plan XVI *bis* provided for a concentration exactly from Belfort to Mézières, although its successor, the more famous Plan XVII, extended the line to Hirson. [This plan became operative in April, 1914].—L. Lyon, *Pomp of power*, pp. 18-24.

D. FIRST YEAR OF WAR: 1914


I. WESTERN FRONT

(a) Belgium invaded.—Retreat of the Allies.—“When during the night of the 3rd-4th August it became clear that the Germans intended to advance through Belgium, with or without permission, the Belgian Staff at once took the measures necessary for the defence of their country's neutrality against Germany. . . . On the morning of the 4th, when German cavalry crossed the Belgian frontier and moved upon Visé, north of Liège, it found the bridge over the Meuse broken, and the western bank held by Belgian troops. Two regiments were then pushed northward to Lixhe (3 miles north of Visé), where they crossed the river by a ford. The Belgians, finding their left threatened, thereupon fell back on Liège. By evening the heads of six small German columns of all arms which had crossed the frontier were nearly two miles into Belgium. Further concentrations were also reported to the south; and it became evident that a very large army threatened invasion along the lines of advance guarded by the fortress of Liège and by the 3rd Division. . . . For eighteen days the Belgians . . . faced . . . German invasion, delaying the hostile advance during a most critical period, and gaining time which was of priceless value to the Allies. In addition to this great strategic advantage, the fact that the first German operations against fortresses, conducted under the conditions obtaining in modern warfare, were so rapidly successful gave warning to the French to readjust their conceptions of the defensive value of their fortified front, and reorganize it on lines calculated to counter the effect of bombardment by heavy howitzers.”—J. E. Edmonds, *Military operations, France and Belgium, 1914 (History of the Great War, pp. 31-32, 35-36)*.—“It is probably quite true that the defence of Liège lasted longer than the Germans expected, but there seems no foundation for the idea that the delay which it entailed was in any way serious in its results on the plan of campaign. It is true that on the 10th of August von Bülow, who commanded the German Second Army, was ordered to be in position west and south of Liège on the 12th; that he found himself unable to comply with the order, as only one of the forts had fallen; and consequently he was not in the required position until the 17th. This looks at first like a loss of five days. But, as we know, ‘The pace of the wheel of the German Armies was to be regulated by that of the First and Second Armies’ (G. H. Q. Orders to the First Army). The concentration of the First Army east-

north-east of Aix-la-Chapelle was not completed until the 14th of August and it was actually a day earlier than this that its Commander, von Kluck, in accordance with orders from G. H. Q., began his advance, as the way through Liège had by then been cleared, so that it is difficult to see how the start could have been made any earlier. Had the Second Army gone forward to the line beyond Liège on the 12th, as arranged, it would still, it seems, have had to wait for the First Army—which was to play the leading rôle in the forthcoming operations—to come up level with it. But if further proof is necessary of the contention that the resistance of Liège counted for little in the subsequent course of the campaign, it will be found in the fact that from the beginning of the general advance the Germans were actually in front of their time-table. ‘By the 22nd day of mobilisation (23rd of August) the five Armies on the right were to have wheeled forward to the line Ghent-Mons-Sedan-Thionville. They were actually, as we know, slightly in advance of this in 1914. By the 31st day (1st of September) they were to be on a line Amiens-La Fère-Réthel-Thionville. Again, the Germans were slightly in advance of their plan.’ It seems clear, then, that the theory of the delay caused by the resistance of Liège is not borne out by the facts.”—“X,” *Some legends of 1914 (Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, no. 469, Feb., 1923, p. 90)*.—See also BELGIUM: 1914: World War; 1914: Germany and Belgian neutrality.—“The difficulty of the situation was that Belgium could have no settled plan of campaign. She had to face many ways and watch all her neighbours, and in her peace dispositions had one division in Flanders with an eye on England, one at Liège with an eye on Germany, and two near the French frontier to deal with France. After the German ultimatum, and not till then, the whole army faced eastward. On 5th August the Belgian forces were still in process of mobilization on the line of the river Dyle covering Brussels and Antwerp. The church bells were still ringing their summons at midnight, and the dogs were being collected from the milk carts to draw the mitrailleuses. The 1st Division was moved from Ghent to Tirlemont, the 2nd from Antwerp to Louvain, the 5th from Mons to Pervyse, the 6th from Brussels to Wavre. The movements were protected by the cavalry divisions, concentrated at Gembloux and moving on Waremmes, and two detached mixed brigades at Tongres and Huy. The 3rd Division was rushed to Liège, and the civic guard of that city took their stand by the side of the regulars. At full strength the force

should have numbered over 30,000 men; but as the mobilization was incomplete, it was little more than 20,000. The defenders of Liège were in the same position as the attackers—an improvised force, hastily put together and imperfectly equipped. No stranger medley of colour could be found in Europe than such a field army which lacked a field dress—the men of the line in their blue and white; the *chasseurs à pied* with their peaked caps, green and yellow uniforms, and flowing capes; and the Civic Guard, with their high, round hats and red facings. . . . By the afternoon of Tuesday, 4th August, the Belgians held the line of the south-eastern forts from Boncelles to Barchon, and cavalry patrols covered the gap between Pontisse and the Dutch frontier.”—J. Buchan, *History of the*

First Army of Kluck, and the Second Army of Bülow, forming the German right wing, were prepared to move through Belgium against the French left. The three armies in the center were to advance through the Ardennes upon the Central Meuse, and against the sector of Verdun. The German army of General Heeringen on the left was to oppose the expected French offensive in Alsace. The movements of these German armies had been timed to follow the ‘Schlieffen plan’ of a wide enveloping sweep through Belgium against the Allied left. The expected dislocation of the Allied armies on the left was to be followed by a drive of the German armies against the central group of French armies, the whole manœuvre pivoting upon Verdun. . . . Early on the fourth



BELGIANS DEFENDING THE RIVER BANK NEAR HAMME, BELGIUM

The bridge has been blown up to impede the progress of the Germans

Great War, v. 1, p. 128.—“The German forces brought into being for the assault on France were made up and placed as follows: On the extreme right, in the region of Aix-la-Chapelle, northeast of Belgium, was the German First Army, General Kluck; next in line the Second Army, General Bülow, near Limberg. These two armies, operating together, were to form the German right wing. In the center, ranged in order from west to east, were the army of Duke Albrecht of Württemberg; the army of the German Crown Prince; the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. (An additional German army under General Hausen was formed soon after, which was placed between the armies of Bülow and Duke Albrecht.) These three armies in the center were grouped upon the Neuchâtel-Metz line, and occupied Luxemburg. The army of General Heeringen was in the vicinity of Strassburg in Alsace, and formed the German left. . . . The

[August] the vanguard of Kluck’s army, commanded by General Emmich, began the fateful invasion of Belgium by occupying Visé. Advancing from Visé, this force was before Liège on the afternoon of August 4. Here an over-confident presumption that there would be no serious resistance by the Belgians was evident. Liège was a modern ring fortification of about thirty-one miles in circumference, with six major and six minor forts. Yet it is known that the Germans planned to take Liège by a *coup de main*, and they attempted an assault supported only by field artillery. This weak attack was repulsed by the Belgians,—and the Germans awoke to the fact that the Belgians intended to make a serious resistance against German invasion.”—T. G. Frothingham, *Guide to the military history of the World War, 1914-1918*, pp. 17-18.

Upon orders for general mobilization, the French


troops "proceeded to move to the places allotted to them by Plan 17. Before they had all reached their positions a modification of the plan became necessary; a modification which had been foreseen as probable and for which provision had been made. On August 4 the Germans attacked Liège, and German cavalry appeared in Belgium west of the Meuse. The 5th Army was thereupon ordered to take ground to its left towards the Sambre and the 4th Army to take its place around Mézières. On August 7 the advanced parties of the British Expeditionary Force landed in France; Sir John French had been asked by Joffre to assemble his little army just south of the fortress of Maubeuge, where it would be on the left of the 5th French Army in its new position. The principles of Plan 17 remained unchanged; there was still to be an advance by the 1st and 2nd Armies into Alsace and Lorraine, to be followed by an advance of the 3rd and 4th Armies into Luxembourg, which had been occupied by the Germans, and into the Ardennes. [See below: h, to k.] The 5th Army and the British Army held a watching brief on the left flank and were to be ready to advance into Belgium, either eastwards across the Meuse or northwards towards Brussels."—F. B. Maurice, *Military operations (Nations of today: France, v. 1, p. 182.)*—The French advance into Alsace-Lorraine was "politically advantageous in that it had strengthened French morale and had stirred up all France to seek the reconquest of the 'lost provinces,' but from a strictly military standpoint it had been unsuccessful if not disastrous. There remained the principal business of giving aid to the hard pressed Belgians and of checking the flood of German invasion before it had rolled quite to the French frontier. On August 20, with the arrival of the British Expeditionary Force under Field Marshal Sir John French and with the posting of a French army south of Namur and of two other French armies in the Ardennes, General Joffre gave orders for an offensive. On the next two days the French offensive in southeastern Belgium broke down completely. . . . The French were soon in precipitate retreat from the Ardennes toward Sedan, Montmedy, and Longwy, across the border. To the west, the Allies still had a chance of success if General Lanrezac's army and the British could obtain a decisive result. This was unfortunately not the case. . . . Obviously General von Kluck intended to overwhelm the two British corps and turn the flank of the allied line. Unwilling to be either outflanked or overwhelmed, General French abandoned his precarious position after a hot contest at Mons, August 23-24, and conducted a hasty retreat."—C. J. H. Hayes, *Brief history of the Great War, pp. 28-30.*—"On August 21 General French's army was in position near Mons in Belgium on the left of the French armies. At this time there were five French armies in line numbered in order from east to west. The French left had been swung forward into Belgium, and it rested near Charleroi in touch with the British at Mons. In this region of Charleroi the first engagement with the advancing Germans took place (August 22) and the British army was also engaged (Mons, August 23). It soon became evident to the French commander that the German thrust was too powerful to be checked by the forces at his command in his advanced positions. . . . It clearly was necessary for the French general not only to abandon all thoughts of an offensive for the time being, but to give up any idea of holding his ground in Belgium. Convinced of this, General Joffre ordered a retreat, and he began to fight a cool, wary, retiring battle, falling

back successively from the lines of the Meuse and Aisne (August 23-28). All this time he was gathering his strength and preparing to take the offensive in turn when the right opportunity came." [See below: o.]—T. G. Frothingham, *Guide to the military history of the World War, 1914-1918, pp. 23-25.*

(b) Defense of Liège.—"Leman, a great [Belgian] soldier, defended the forts built by Brialmont. Both defender and designer were justified of their work. On August 5 the seventh German Corps attempted to rush the gaps between the forts. These gaps were three miles wide, but were filled with entrenched infantry. The attack was boldly pressed home, but it completely failed. The German loss was considerable. Two other corps were called up, and again on August 7 the attack was renewed, but with no better result. . . . There were 25,000 in the town and 120,000 outside, but they were still outside at the end of the assault. Liège, however, had one fatal weakness. Its garrison was far too small to cover the ground. With twelve forts three miles apart it is clear that there were intervals of, roughly, thirty-six miles to be covered, and that a garrison of 25,000 men, when you had deducted the gunners for the forts, hardly left the thinnest skirmish line to cover the ground. The instant that they spread out there were bound to be places where they could march almost unopposed into the town. This was what happened. The town was penetrated, but the forts were intact. General Leman, meanwhile, seeing that the town itself was indefensible, had sent the garrison out before the place was surrounded. Many a Belgian soldier fought upon the Yser and helped to turn the tide of that crowning conflict who would have been a prisoner in Germany had it not been for the foresight and the decision of General Leman. The Germans were, in the town upon the 8th, but the forts still held out and the general advance was grievously impeded. Day followed day, and each beyond price to the Allies. Germany had secretly prepared certain monstrous engines of war. . . . These were huge cannon of a dimension never before cast—42 centimeters in bore (16 in.). More mobile and hardly less effective were some smaller howitzers of 28 centimeter calibre . . . from the Austrian foundries at Skoda. Brialmont, when he erected his concrete and iron cupolas, had not foreseen the Thor's hammer which would be brought to crush them. One after another they were smashed like eggs. . . . But already the second week of August was at an end—the British were crowding into France, the French line was thickening along the frontier."—A. C. Doyle, *British campaign in France and Flanders, 1914, pp. 45-47.*—"On August 6, while the Germans were in force before [Fort] Barchon in a night attack, an attempt was made on General Leman, who occupied temporary headquarters with the General Staff in the Rue Sainte Foy. Towards half-past four in the morning a body of about one hundred men with two officers . . . represented themselves to the advanced posts of the fort of Pontisse as being Englishmen who had come to the aid of Liège and asked to be conducted to the General Staff. They were soldiers of a Hanoverian regiment and bore on their sleeves a blue band with the word 'Gibraltar' which caused them to be taken for British sharpshooters. . . . A German officer asked of the sentinel on the door an interview with General Leman. The officers of the latter, who now appeared, understood the ruse at once, and drew their revolvers. Shots were exchanged. . . . The Germans attempted to enter the offices, of which the doors had been closed. They fired through the

windows, and even attempted to attack the house by scaling the neighbouring walls. General Leman, who was working, ran out on hearing the first shots. He was unarmed. He demanded a revolver. Captain Lebbe, his aide-de-camp, refused to allow him to expose himself uselessly. . . . With the help of another officer, the captain placed his general in safety. [After the Germans had been beaten off] the general retired . . . to the fort of Loncin. . . . Every place swarmed with Germans, 40,000 at least, an army corps which had spent a day and a night in fortifying themselves. . . . Fighting took place well into the night, the enemy being repulsed at Boncelles twice. . . . General Leman considered that he had obtained from his troops the maximum effort of which they were capable and ordered a retreat. It was executed in good order, and the enemy had suffered so severely that they did not dream of pursuit. . . . Although

would be a cruel massacre, but that the higher interests of Belgium compelled him to impose this sacrifice on the town of Liège. At 9 p.m. fresh shells fell on different parts of the city. . . . This bombardment lasted till 2 a.m. . . . On Friday, August 7th, at 3 a.m., the bombardment of Liège began again, chiefly directed against the citadel, where only a few soldiers now remained. These evacuated the place after setting fire to some provisions they were unable to carry off. The population . . . took refuge in the cellars. . . . On this Friday the Germans penetrated into the town at five o'clock in the morning by the different bridges which had remained intact. . . . Count Lammsdorf, Chief of the Staff of the 10th Corps, Commander of the Army of the Meuse, arrested Burgomaster Kleyer at the Town Hall, and conducted him to the citadel. . . . He was simply authorized to pass through the German lines with a safe conduct, to



MOUNTING A 12-INCH AUSTRIAN HOWITZER

The type of gun used by the Germans in the operation against Liège and Namur

this retreat left behind a few men with several guns, it may be said to have been effected in good order. . . . The terrified population from Bressoux began to arrive. There were people half dressed, but who carried some object which to them seemed the most precious. . . . The men carried children, while women followed painfully loaded with household goods. . . . The cannon thundered all night. The second bombardment lasted till two o'clock. Several projectiles now fell upon the citadel, where everything was in readiness to set fire to the provisions and ammunitions. . . . By ten a.m. the citadel had been evacuated, only very few persons remaining, among them a major, who hastily hoisted a white flag. Burgomaster Kleyer awaited developments at the Town Hall. At half-past three, he received envoys, who demanded the surrender of the town and forts. Put into communication with General Leman, who was all the time at Loncin with his staff, they informed him that if the forts persisted in their resistance, the town would be bombarded a third time. General Leman replied that the threat was an idle one, that it

discuss the matter with General Leman, or even with the King himself. . . . It was finally decided to approach General Leman with a message which was entrusted to the burgomaster, the Bishop of Liège, and M. Gaston Grégoire, permanent deputy. These gentlemen repaired to the citadel in search of the promised safe conduct. They were met there, according to the demand of Count Lammsdorf, by some prominent Liège citizens, to whom he had expressed his desire to explain the situation. At the moment the three delegates were about to depart on their mission, with a good faith upon which it would be foolish to insist, the German commander declared that all the persons present were detained as hostages. . . . The same day at 9 a.m. the last train left Liège for Brussels with numbers of fugitives . . . about five thousand. From this moment and for several days Liège was absolutely cut off from the rest of the world. On Saturday, August 8, while the Germans were methodically organizing the occupation of Liège, Burgomaster Kleyer was authorized to wait upon the King, in order to discuss the surrender of the

forts. . . . The King was consulted, and the reply brought back to Liège was the one the mayor had foreseen.

"The same day saw the appearance of the following order of the day addressed to the soldiers of the army of Liège:

"Our comrades of the 3rd Army Division and of the 15th mixed brigade are about to re-enter our lines, after having defended, like heroes, the fortified position of Liège. Attacked by forces four times as numerous they have repulsed all assaults. None of the forts have been taken; the town of Liège is always in our power. Standards and a number of prisoners are the trophies of these combats. In the name of the Nation I salute you, officers and soldiers of the 3rd Army Division and the 15th mixed brigade. You have done your duty, done honour to our arms, shown the enemy what it costs to attack unjustly a peaceable people, but one which yields in its just cause an invincible weapon. The Fatherland has the right to be proud of you. Soldiers of the Belgian Army, do not forget that you are in the van of immense armies in this gigantic struggle, and that you await but the arrival of our brothers-in-arms in order to march to victory. The whole world has its eyes fixed upon you. Show it by the vigour of your blows that you mean to live free and independent. France, that noble country which has throughout history been associated with just and generous causes, is hurrying to our aid and her armies will enter our territory. In your name I address them a fraternal salute.—ALBERT."

"General Leman was shut up in Loncin, one of the chief forts, which commanded the road towards Wareme and Brussels. . . . The enemy was anxious to cut all the communications between the forts, but soldiers volunteered for carrying messages to the different commanders. Several succeeded, but many were killed, for the investment became steadily tightened. Indeed, certain gaps, where the ground was most broken, could not be swept by the guns from the forts, and, under cover of the night, troops ensconced themselves there comfortably. Moreover, the Germans, having received reinforcements and heavy artillery, undertook the siege systematically, first of Barchon, which it was unable to take by storm any more than Boncelles, but which it subjected to a formidable deluge of shells. Barchon could only reply haphazard to heavy guns the position of which it could not tell. It was, indeed, deprived of its observation posts, and was in the position of a blind man desperately parrying the blows of an adversary who could see where to strike. The struggle was not for long, and the fort, reduced to impotence, left a wide breach through which the invader scrambled. Through there he could also introduce his heavy siege guns, howitzers of 28, and even pieces of 42 cms. The enemy then followed a tactic which was to succeed rapidly. He attacked the different fortifications in a reverse way. Thus Loncin, Lantin, Liers, and Pontisse were bombarded by batteries placed in the citadel itself and to which the Belgians could not reply without shelling the town and doing frightful damage. . . . Forts Boncelles and Embourg were attacked by guns placed on the hill at Tilff, a pretty village, which would have been completely destroyed had the firing been responded to. Finally, along the line of the plateau of Herve, no longer dominated by Barchon and Fléron, now destroyed, the enemy was able to bring into the very centre of the town four of

those howitzers of 42 cms. which were later to bombard Namur, Maubeuge, and Antwerp. The following are the dates on which the different forts succumbed: Barchon and Evegnée fell on August 9th. . . . Pontisse, which had so usefully barred the passage of the enemy below Visé, did not give way till the 12th. On the 13th Embourg surrendered after a twenty-six hours' bombardment. The same day saw the fall of Chaudfontaine and Namèche, where two accidents happened worthy of being related. A shell burst on a cupola gun as it was finishing its movement after being loaded. The whole gun was shattered and ten men were wounded. A little while later, a shell entered the fort through the embrasure and set fire to the powder magazine. The 14th saw the fall of Boncelles, Liers, and Fléron. Boncelles was bombarded unceasingly for a whole day and the following morning. It was nearly destroyed, and may be considered as the fort which was the centre of the worst carnage of German soldiers. To get the better of the obstinate resistance of Fléron (Commandant Mozin), the Germans united twenty guns by an electric battery and fired them all off at the same time upon the fort, which trembled in its massive foundations. On the 15th, Loncin and Lantin fell, the defenders firing until they were overcome by asphyxia. On the 16th, it was the turn of Flemalle, and on the 18th, of Hollogne. General Leman in Fort Loncin continued to maintain the defense until he fell unconscious from asphyxiating gas and in this condition was captured by the Germans."—C. Browne, *Defence of Liège* (*English Review*, Apr., 1915).—See also below: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: X. Alleged atrocities: a, 2.

(c) Movements in Belgium during siege of Liège.—I. GERMAN ADVANCE.—On August 9 the Germans made overtures to King Albert through the Dutch government to cease from hostile opposition and allow the German armies free passage through his kingdom, solemnly asserting that they had no intention of appropriating Belgian territory. The Belgian government replied that it would remain faithful to its international obligations. German troops which had crossed the left bank of the Meuse, north of Liège, tried to outflank the left wing of the Belgian army in the field, but failed. On August 12, 4,000 German cavalry, 2,000 infantry and 18 guns attempted to force the passage of the Gette at Haelen. To oppose them the Belgians had 2,400 cavalry, 410 cyclists and 12 guns with which they sustained the attack until the arrival of the 4th Combined Brigade at 3 p.m. enabled them to take the offensive. By 6 p.m. the Germans were forced to retire, abandoning dead and wounded. But the pressure of enemy forces compelled the Belgians to fall back step by step. Only at Enghezee on August 16, where heavy fighting took place, were the Germans forced to withdraw, the Belgians pursuing them for two days. On the 18th the 6th division drawn up on the plain of Walhain-Saint-Paul effected its junction with a division of French cavalry. On this date the Germans after a night attack drove the Belgians out of Tirlemont. Owing to the German strength, the right wing and center of the Belgian army fell back upon Antwerp, while the French cavalry withdrew towards Charleroi. The retreat on Antwerp was protected by the Belgian left wing and a portion of the center, which became involved in hard fighting near Louvain and at Aerschot. The Germans in vast numbers moved towards the southwest and the west, and it became obvious that they intended to enter Brussels, which,

being unfortified, could not be defended. On August 16, therefore, the government, most of the ministers of state, the queen and royal children, and some representatives of foreign powers left for Antwerp. The wounded from the hospitals of the capital were also moved, as well as the funds of the National Bank, with the plates for printing bank notes.—Based on *Belgian official reports*.

2. **GERMANS OCCUPY BRUSSELS.**—At 2 p.m. on August 20 about 40,000 German troops of all arms under General Sixt von Arnim entered Brussels. The occupation in force was only for a day. Von Kluck's right was wheeling northward and several divisions of cavalry were sweeping westwards towards Bruges and Ghent. "The occupation of Brussels was for the German armies an obvious and necessary move. It was to the outside world a signal consecration of their triumph. There was an urgent necessity to retrieve the check received at Liège, and to produce a moral effect on the Belgian population. Moreover Brussels was the headquarters of the Government, and its occupation by the enemy meant the dislocation of the whole administrative machinery. Brussels was also the centre of the Belgian railway system, on the cross-roads of the Antwerp, Ghent, Liège, and Charleroi lines. It was highly important, even for 'strategic reasons,' that Brussels should be in German hands. Nor was Brussels less important as a centre of supplies and provisions. Brussels could be held with a few troops, and the maximum of military advantage could be secured at the minimum of cost. The German army entered Brussels on a glorious August afternoon to the rhythm of their famous goose-step. . . . The actual corps of occupation was only about 30,000, but for days a continuous stream of soldiers, over 600,000, was poured into the city on the way to the shambles of the battlefield. . . . That no excesses should have been committed was due no doubt to the restraint of public opinion, but not least to the firmness of Burgomaster Max. . . . Through diplomatic skill, firmness and dignity, he ensured the safety of Brussels. The slightest mistake on the part of the civic authorities might have spelt disaster to the city. The slightest popular disturbance in the Quartier des Marolles might have brought down on the city the vengeance of the conqueror. Although no outrages were perpetrated, Brussels was made to feel heavily the yoke of the invader. The Germans continued in the city their methods of predatory warfare. Huge quantities of foodstuffs were commandeered for the 600,000 German troops that were continually passing through. Payment was made in grim mockery in bills on the National Bank of Belgium. A war indemnity of 200,000,000 francs was imposed on the city of Brussels, and one of 450,000,000 francs on the province of Brabant. In order to ensure the payment of this huge indemnity by a ruined city and by a stricken province, the Germans revived the abominable practice of hostages. Baron Lambert de Rothschild was mulcted to the extent of 10,000,000 francs. The venerable M. Solvay, the leader of Belgian industry, was subjected to a fine of 30,000,000 francs."—C. Sarolea, *How Belgium saved Europe*, pp. 138-139.

(d) **Sack of Louvain.**—"The Germans entered Louvain on August 19th. The Belgian troops did not attempt to hold the town, and the civil authorities had prepared for the Germans' arrival. They had called in all arms in private possession and deposited them in the Hôtel-de-Ville. This had been done a fortnight before the German

occupation, and was repeated, for security, on the morning of the 19th itself. . . . The German entry on the 19th took place without disturbance. Large requisitions were at once made on the town by the German command. The troops were billeted on the inhabitants. . . . It was vacation time, and the lodgings of the University students were empty. Many houses were shut up altogether, and these were broken open and pillaged by the German soldiers. They pillaged enormous quantities of wine, without interference on the part of their officers. . . . On August 20th the German military authorities covered the walls with proclamations: 'Atrocities have been committed by (Belgian) franc-tireurs.'—'If anything happens to the German troops, *le total sera responsable*' (an attempt to render in French the Prussian doctrine of collective responsibility). Doors must be left open at night.




ALBERT I
King of the Belgians

Windows fronting the street must be lighted up. Inhabitants must be within doors between 8.0 p.m. and 7.0 a.m. Most of these placards were ready-made in German, French and Russian. There were no placards in Flemish till after the events of August 25th. Yet Flemish was the only language spoken and understood by at least half of the population of Louvain. Hostages were also taken by the German authorities. . . . On the morning of August 25th there were few German troops in Louvain. The greater part of those that had entered the town since the 19th had passed on to the front in the direction of Malines, and were now engaged in resisting the Belgian sortie from Antwerp, which was made this day. As the Belgian offensive made progress, the sound of the cannon became louder and louder in Louvain, and the German garrison grew increasingly uneasy."—A. J. Toynbee, *German terror in Belgium*, pp. 89-93.—About 8.0 p.m. when everyone in obedience to

the rules of the occupying army had to be at home, a shot rang out, followed rapidly by two more, and then by a terrible fusillade. This was heard at several points in the town. With the crackling of rifles was mingled the rattling of machine guns. The windows of the houses splintered under a hail of bullets. At the first shots the inhabitants sought shelter in cellars and other hiding-places. Those who ventured up to the attics saw the sky reddened with light. The Germans had set fire to several quarters of the town and the university with its celebrated library . . . [was] ablaze, systematically set on fire with faggots and chemicals. Under orders

were herded down to the Place de la Station. The Germans selected haphazard from the men the victims destined to be executed. On Wednesday morning the shooting ceased and quiet temporarily returned. The Germans announced that all able-bodied citizens were needed to fight the flames. All who obeyed the summons were made prisoners and taken to the station to be deported to Germany. Later in the day of August 26, the German soldiers started again to fire at intervals, to plunder, and to burn. On Thursday, August 27, German soldiers went through the town announcing to the people that Louvain was to be bombarded at noon



GENERAL PLAN OF THE GERMAN INVASION OF BELGIUM AND FRANCE

of their officers the German soldiers smashed in the doors of the houses dragging the inmates from their hiding-places, with the cries, "There has been firing! Civilians have fired!" Hand grenades and incendiary pastilles were hurled into the rooms. Several of the inmates were haled out and instantly shot. The Germans pretended that a plot had been hatched by civilians, that there had been firing on the troops and the whole responsibility for what had happened was thrown on the citizens of Louvain. During the night many persons had been shot without inquiry. The Germans had become panic stricken and obsessed by the thought that franc-tireurs had fired on every group which they met in the darkness. As the houses burned and the soldiers continued to loot the townspeople

and everyone must leave at once. Then a pitiful flood of fugitives began to pour out of the city. By 11 o'clock Louvain was dead, but for the crackle of houses on fire. Then the regular sack began. There was no longer any talk of bombardment. Systematically the houses were stripped of their contents by the Germans and whatever could not be carried off was destroyed. The burning continued, simultaneously with the sack down to September. The following explanation is offered: On the night of August 25, when German soldiers were coming back from Malines, shots rang out. The German soldiers in the town imagined that the enemy was coming, others that the civilians were beginning to attack. The former fired on their own comrades, taking them for

Belgian or French soldiers; the latter riddled the fronts of the houses with bullets. The supposition is that there was a mistake, then a panic.—Based on L. van der Essen, *Invasion and war in Belgium*, pp. 184-198.—See also below: Miscellaneous auxiliary services: X. Alleged atrocities: a, 9.

(e) **Fall of Namur.—Retreat on Antwerp.**—"Beyond Liège the invading forces spread out like a fan. On the extreme right a force advanced north-west to outflank the Belgian army covering Brussels and to mask the fortress of Antwerp, and this right wing, again, was the first to move. . . . The main column . . . took Aerschot and Louvain on August 10th. During the next few days it pushed on to Malines, was driven out again by a Belgian sortie from Antwerp on Aug. 25th, but retook Malines before the end of the month, and contained the Antwerp garrison along the line of the Dyle and the Démer. This was all that the German right flank column was intended to do, for it was only a subsidiary part of the two armies concentrated at Liège. As soon as Antwerp was covered, the mass of these armies was launched westward from Liège into the gap between the fortresses of Antwerp and Namur—von Kluck's army on the right and von Bülow's on the left. By August 21st von Bülow was west of Namur, and attacking the French on the Sambre. . . . These armies had all crossed the Meuse south of the fortress of Namur, and, to retain connexion with them, von Bülow had had to detach a force on his left to seize the line of the Meuse from Liège to Namur and to capture Namur itself. The best German heavy artillery was assigned to this force for the purpose."—A. J. Toynbee, *German terror in Belgium*, pp. 17-19.—The bombardment of Namur began 10 A.M. on August 21. "Before long the forts Marchevette and Maizeret were silenced. Maizeret had received shells at the rate of twenty a minute, and had only been able to fire ten shots in reply. Marchevette held out till it was blown up on the next day. About the same time—that is, early on the morning of Friday, the 21st,—the III. Army on the right bank of the Meuse directed a terrific bombardment against Forts Andoy, Dave, St. Héribert, and Malonne, and a German force was pushed across the Meuse into the southern part of the angle between it and the Sambre. All that day an infantry battle continued, for the Belgians hoped for a French advance from Dinant to their relief. But . . . the French at Dinant had their hands full with their own affairs. On the Saturday morning part of the French 8th Brigade under General Mangin arrived, but they were too late to give much assistance. That day, when the skies were darkened by an eclipse of the sun, panic reigned in Namur. Incendiary bombs were dropped by German airplanes, and stray shells crashed into the outlying buildings. The weather was heavy with thunder, and Nature and man combined to create pandemonium. Some time on that Saturday Michel [Belgian commander of Namur], seeing that resistance was futile, like Leman at Liège, to save his force for the field army, drew off many of his troops by the western route, which was still open. . . . The Belgians in the river angle were compelled to escape as best they could, and their only outlet was to the south-west. The enemy had shut the gate at Bois de Villers, but two Belgian regiments hacked a road through and managed to reach Philippeville. On their way they found themselves entangled with a French army coming south from the Charleroi direction, and had their first news of the retreat of the whole Allied

line. Eventually . . . they came in seven days to Rouen, whence they took ship to Ostend, and joined the main Belgian forces. On Saturday afternoon, the 23rd, the Germans entered Namur."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, p. 148.—See also Miscellaneous auxiliary services: X. Alleged atrocities: a, 4.—The Belgian main army under General Seilliers de Moranville which defeated but unbroken had retired to the protection of the Antwerp forts, numbered with new volunteers about 120,000 men. On August 23 they marched south and drove the enemy out of Malines, an operation of considerable strategic importance, for Malines commanded the shortest railway communication between Germany and West Flanders. At this time von Boehn's 9th Corps *en route* to reinforce von Kluck was marching towards Bruges and Ghent. Uhlans had attacked Ostend and were repulsed by the Civic Guards, and on the 24th 2,000 British marines occupied the town. The Belgian offensive deprived von Kluck of his reinforcements and brought von Boehn hurrying eastward. Antwerp on the 24th was bombed by Zeppelins and a number of civilians were killed. The Belgian army on a forty-mile front, its right on Termonde, its left at Aerschot, pushed on. German communications with Brussels were threatened. But although the Belgians maintained a stubborn resistance they were slowly forced back on Antwerp.—Based on *Belgian official reports*.


(f) **Siege of Antwerp.**—Although the siege and subsequent fall of Antwerp occurred during September and early October, after the battles of the Marne and the Aisne, the sequence of events may be narrated here in continuation of the preceding section. "During the first fortnight of September the Belgian army had made several gallant sallies against the German troops of occupation. The main object of these efforts was to relieve the pressure on the Allies in France, but another motive was in the minds of the Belgian Staff. Sooner or later it was certain that the Germans would make an attempt upon the city, and the lessons of Liège and Namur were beginning to be understood. The great howitzers must not be allowed to come within range of the forts, and the Belgian lines of defense must be far to the south, beyond the Nethe, and along the roads from Malines to Louvain and Brussels. By 17th September they had been driven back from the line of the Malines-Louvain railway. By 25th September, after two days' hard fighting, they were on the railway line between Malines and Termonde. Here, on the 26th, there was a moment of success. The enemy was driven from the village of Audeghem and pressed back on Alost, while at Lebbeke next day there was also a German repulse. The day after the Germans regained most of the ground they had lost; but their left seems to have given up the idea of forcing an immediate crossing of the Scheldt, owing to the strength of the forces which the Belgians had massed on the northern bank. Meanwhile the main attack was beginning to develop against the first line of the Antwerp defences. Malines—what was left of it—had been subjected to a new cannonade on Sunday the 27th, and on the Monday the great siege howitzers were so far advanced to the north that they were within range of the southern forts, and the bombardment of Antwerp began."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, p. 290.

I. **BOMBARDMENT OF ANTWERP.—SURRENDER OF CITY.**—"Antwerp was not only the sole stronghold of the Belgian nation: it was also the true left flank of the Allied front in the west. It guarded

the whole line of the Channel Ports. It threatened the flanks and rear of the German armies in France. It was the gateway from which a British army might emerge at any moment upon their sensitive and even vital communications. No German advance to the sea-coast, upon Ostend, upon Dunkirk, upon Calais and Boulogne, seemed possible while Antwerp was unconquered. My own feeling at the outbreak of the war had been that if the right things were done, Antwerp ought to hold out for two or even three months, that is to say, until we knew the result of the main collision of the armies on all the fronts—French, Russian, Austrian. . . . I thought that Antwerp should be made to play its part in the first phase of the war by keeping as many German troops as possible out of the great battle.”—W. L. S. Churchill, *World crisis*, pp. 359-360.—The German bombardment opened on September 28. At the same time the enemy endeavored to force the Scheldt between Termonde and Ghent, with the idea of cutting off the retreat of the Belgian army. The river was defended by the 4th Army Division, which was posted chiefly in the vicinity of Termonde. The Wavre-Ste. Catherine Fort was first to suffer and was silenced by the afternoon. Fort Lierre was bombarded on the following day, shells of all kinds falling at the rate of twenty to twenty-five a minute. The Germans on October 1-2 made three assaults on the fort but were repulsed. They entered unopposed on the 3rd when the fort was in ruins. Wavre was destroyed, Wallhem silenced, and to the south Fort Koningshoeyck also. To the west the Germans cleared Termonde and the Belgians were forced across the Scheldt. The fortresses were now abandoned, the Belgians falling back to the north bank of the Nethe to previously prepared entrenchments.—Based on *Belgian official reports*.—“Late in the evening of October 2, came the startling information that the Belgian Government had suddenly decided to retire to Ostend and to withdraw the Field-Army from Antwerp, leaving the fortress troops to hold it as long as they could. It was a position that for naval reasons alone could not be accepted without an effort to prevent the breakdown of our [*i.e.*, the British] plans that it meant—particularly since the measure seemed from our reports to have been dictated not so much by immediate military necessity as by a sense of being abandoned by the Allies. The French, moreover, had now promised two Territorial Divisions, with a full complement of cavalry and artillery. . . . The great difficulty was time. . . . The main point was to enhearten the Belgians to hold on for a few days, and for this some prompt and practical evidence that they were not forgotten was necessary. It was decided, therefore, that the [British] First Lord of the Admiralty [Winston S. Churchill] should proceed forthwith to Antwerp . . . and see what could be done. At the same time, as an earnest of what was to come, the Royal Marine Brigade was ordered to proceed at once to Antwerp to assist in holding the place. . . . The effect of these preliminary steps was immediate. As soon as the Belgian Government were informed of them they agreed to make no move until Mr. Churchill arrived. . . . He reached Antwerp . . . [after 3 P.M. on] October 3, and it was quickly apparent that the Belgians were as ready as ever to play a bold game so long as there was a shadow of hope. By the afternoon a provisional agreement had been come to which promised at least a substantial gain of time for General Joffre’s plans to develop without any undue risk to the Belgian Field Army.”—S. Corbett, *Naval operations* (*His-*

tory of the Great War based on official documents, v. 1, pp. 189-190).—The well-to-do citizens departed for Holland and England. Late in the night of October 4 a brigade of British Royal Marines, 2,000 strong, arrived from Ostend and took position to the left of the Belgians on the Nethe. Two British naval brigades (6,000 men) under General Paris of the Royal Marines, arrived on October 5. An armored train and six naval guns followed. The arrival of the British created an electrical effect on the Belgians, who got the impression that an army corps was on its way to help them. The Germans had between 300 and 400 guns in operation and villages to the rear of the Belgians were destroyed. Attempts were made October 3-5 to cross the Nethe, but the Germans did not succeed until the 6th. All hope of holding the city was given up by October 8 and a general exodus began. Frantic crowds sought to escape. They fled across the Scheldt to Ghent, but the majority made for the Dutch frontier. Many fell exhausted by the wayside. Bergen-op-Zoom received 200,000 refugees and the Dutch people found food and shelter for all. On the evening of the 6th the Belgian army began to retreat; the 3rd Division which covered the most exposed flank had the hardest task, for it was forced to make night marches without any rest. From Antwerp to Ghent difficulties were increased by combats with the enemy at Lokeren and at Oostacker. The Belgians arrived at Tronchiennes on October 9, thoroughly exhausted. The 12th Line Regiment and the greater part of the 3rd Division were sent by train to Nieuport on the following day, where they were allowed three days’ rest. On the 14th the Belgians took up positions on the Yser. The troops were informed that they were to hold the Yser to the uttermost for the next forty-eight hours; the fate of the Allies depended upon it.—Based on *Belgian official reports*.—The bombardment ceased on October 9; the forts had been silenced. Shortly after noon German officers entered the city, and the German army swept through the streets and beyond in pursuit of the retreating Belgians.

2. BRITISH AT ANTWERP.—“One night . . . [Lord Kitchener] was in bed asleep, when Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, bursting into the room, pleaded for the War Minister’s permission to leave at once for Antwerp. In spite of the late hour, Sir Edward Grey arrived in the middle of the discussion, and while he was engaging Lord Kitchener’s attention Mr. Churchill slipped away. He was next heard of when a telegram was put into Lord K.’s hands in which his impetuous colleague asked bravely to be allowed to resign his great office, to be given the command of a Naval Brigade, and pleading that reinforcements should be hurried out to those ‘forlorn and lonely men,’ as he called them, who were vainly trying to hold on to the Antwerp lines. . . . Upon the issue whether it was better to have tried and failed at the instance of this whimsical genius, whose pride could not endure the desertion of the little Belgian Army, fair judgment is unlikely to be delivered by his contemporaries. . . . Winston Churchill’s attempt was given a poor chance.”—Viscount Reginald Escher, *Tragedy of Lord Kitchener*, pp. 67-68.—“After the departure of the Belgian Field Army the further defence of the remaining lines of Antwerp was left to the fortress troops, the 2nd Belgian Division, and the three British Naval Brigades, who held on their front the equivalent of more than five complete German divisions. . . . At midnight on the 7th the Germans, having



Maps prepared specially for the NEW LARNED
under direction of the editors and publishers.

advanced their artillery, began to bombard the city and the forts of the inner line. The forts melted under the fire, and a great proportion of the civil population fled through the night, lighted by conflagrations. . . . The enemy's attack was pressed continuously, and the enceinte of the city was considered to be untenable by the evening of the 8th. The Belgian Division and the British Naval Brigades evacuated Antwerp that night, crossed the Scheldt safely, and began their retreat by road and rail on Ghent and Ostend. . . . German patrols, after many precautions, entered Antwerp towards evening on the 9th, and on the 10th the stouthearted Governor, who had retired to one of the surviving forts, capitulated."—W. L. S. Churchill, *World crisis*, pp. 389-390.

(g) **First French operations.**—1. **DEPLOYMENT OF FRENCH ARMIES.**—On August 2, and before a declaration of war, German troops invaded French soil near Longwy and near Sirey-sur-Vezouze. Owing to the Germans passing through Belgium, French concentration was subsequently modified by the commander-in-chief in order that the principal French effort might be directed to the north. From the first week in August it was evident that the length of time required for the British army to move would delay French action in connection with it. This delay is one of the reasons that explains the French failure at the end of August—Based on *French official reports*.—The French army, inclusive of the Territorial Army and its reserves, numbered rather more than 4,000,000 men, of whom 1,500,000 formed the active first-line army, behind which stood a reserve army of about 600,000 while the remaining 2,000,000 consisted of the Territorial Force with its reserve divided into three bodies of about equal strength. "The French forces were divided into five armies: each army comprising three or four army corps and several groups of three or four reserve divisions. General Joffre was in command with the title of Commander of the Armies of the East and North-east. The First Army, General Dubail, was stationed on the frontier of Alsace; the Second Army, General Castelnau, Lorraine; Third Army, General Ruffey, north of Verdun; Fourth Army, General de Langle de Cary, at first in the second line, was soon placed at the frontier of the Ardennes; Fifth Army, General Lanrezac, at Mézières; a corps of cavalry, General Sordet, at the extreme left; Group of reserve division, General Valabrègue, at Hirson; group of reserve division, General Léon Durand, at Nancy, re-attached to the Second Army; group of reserve division, General Pol Durand, north of Verdun, re-attached to the Third Army. Reserve divisions were temporarily left on the Alpine frontier; others were attached to the fortresses of Maubeuge, Verdun, Toul, Épinal; reserve corps and territorials, commanded by General d'Amade were in positions of surveillance close to the northern frontier, while troops from Algiers and Morocco were kept in readiness to reinforce the armies as circumstances demanded. The strong points and isolated forts of the northern frontier which were not equal to the necessities of defence were left undefended with the exception of Maubeuge. Lille, the great depot for military stores and supplies, was declared an open town. The maritime ports, Calais, Dunkirk and Boulogne, were maintained as British naval and military bases."—General G. L. Niox, *La Grande Guerre, 1914-1918*, pp. 17-18.

2. **GERMAN ARMIES.**—The formation of the German armies and their starting points are given above. (See (a) Belgium invaded.) Von Kluck

commanded the 1st Army; von Bülow the 2nd and von Hausen the 3rd; the 4th was under the duke of Württemberg and the 5th under the crown prince of Prussia; the 6th was commanded by the crown prince of Bavaria, the 7th by von Heeringen, and the 8th by von Deimling. In addition, there was a group of Landwehr under von Gaede in Upper Alsace. To the extreme right of the German advance large bodies of cavalry operated under the command of von Marwitz. Each army was composed of three or four army corps. The effectives were estimated at from 1,200,000 to 1,400,000. "The French commander-in-chief had considered the possibility that the Germans would violate Belgian neutrality, but he did not count on anything more than a diversion. He believed that the main attack would be made on the Lorraine front, and that an energetic offensive on that front would result in menacing the communications of the German army with their base on the Rhine and consequently paralyze their efforts in Belgium."—*Ibid.*, p. 20.—"Now the opening moves of the Germans put two alternative problems of their intentions to the French Staff. The chief fear of the French Staff was lest Belgium, being overawed by the Germans, should let the German hosts sweep through Belgium unopposed before the French and British armies had completed their concentration. On the other hand, the threat in Belgium might simply be a blind to take the French mind from the German frontier, north of which enormous massing of German armies was taking place. . . . The German was massing in enormous force for an attack on Nancy, on what is called by the French Staff the 'Grand Couronné'—and, if victorious, they could smash through the French fortified zone at the 'Trouée de Mirecourt' (Gap of Mirecourt) and, besieging Toul to the north of it, and Épinal to the south of it, thus masking them, pour easily into France on a fifty-mile front. As Germany invaded Belgium her Staff noted with keen satisfaction that the ring-forts of Liège were as paper defences against her heavy artillery, since as the French fortress barrier was also relying largely on ring-forts, they would have crumpled in like fashion. But France also noted it, and at once mended the error. However, before the effects of heavy German artillery on Liège were apparent, Joffre had decided that the German concentration above Verdun and near Nancy meant the taking of French armies in rear if the German broke through the Grand Couronné . . . and the likelihood of it was at once assumed by the French Staff, and taken for granted fortunately, and acted upon accordingly, or the communication of the French armies north of Toul would have been lost."—H. Macfall, *Germany at bay*, pp. 112-113.—"The German general staff . . . for many years before the war had been secretly increasing the number and efficiency of their reserve troops. This work had been initiated in 1904 by v. Ludendorff when he was a colonel in the Great General Staff in Berlin, and when war came the Germans were able to add not one division but one army corps of reserve troops to each regular army corps. True, these reserve corps were not fully equipped with artillery, but they were none the less able to take their places in the battle line."—F. B. Maurice, *Military operations (Nations of today: France, v. 1, 180-181)*.

(h) **French offensive in Alsace-Lorraine.**—"The French Staff had not overlooked so obvious a probability as the invasion of Belgium in force by Germany. The doubtful points in the problem were however how far north the German movement would extend and in what strength it would

be made. The answers to these questions depended upon the strength of the armies which Germany deployed on the frontier of France and Belgium. This strength actually amounted to 10 cavalry, 44 active and 28 reserve infantry divisions; and of these no less than 5 cavalry, 20 active and 14 reserve divisions were destined to fall upon the French left flank. At French G.H.Q. however it was not anticipated that this latter force would exceed 3 or 4 cavalry and 22 infantry divisions. Therefore the indications of a German movement into Belgium west of the Meuse were received with equanimity, for it was considered that if the enemy were strong in that direction he would be weak in the centre, which the 3rd and 4th Armies would then break through, thus menacing the retreat of the Germans marching on Brussels; or, alternatively, it was held that if the Germans were strong in their centre they would be weak west of the Meuse and their right flank would be destroyed by the 5th Army, with the Belgian and the British armies acting in co-operation. The invasion of Alsace began then in accordance with Plan 17, on August 8, by an Alsace group which had been formed in the neighbourhood of Belfort under the command of General Pau. This group occupied Mülhausen on August 8, but was forced to evacuate that place two days later under German pressure. On August 14 the main invasion of Alsace-Lorraine was begun by General Pau's group, together with the 1st Army under General Dubail and the 2nd Army under General de Castelnau, a force altogether of more than 500,000 men. The French armies made steady if somewhat slow progress, and occupied Saarburg on August 18. The Germans awaited them in a carefully-selected and strongly-entrenched position, which was attacked on August 20 in the battle of Morhange-Saarburg. The French infantry of the 2nd Army attacked with splendid courage and dash, but being unsupported by any heavy artillery were unable to make a real impression on the German defences, and after the failure of this attack de Castelnau's right was counter-attacked and driven back. On the left of the 2nd Army the magnificent 20th Corps commanded by General Foch more than held its own at Morhange and secured the retreat of the Army which the defeat of the right had made inevitable. On Castelnau's right Dubail's 1st Army had been equally heavily engaged round Saarburg, which it had been forced to evacuate; but the success of the Germans was sensibly less than that which they had gained against the 2nd Army, and Dubail was prepared to renew the battle on the 21st when he received the news of Castelnau's retreat and was compelled to conform, carrying back with him Pau's group. The Germans, following up with more zeal than discretion and seeking to break through to Nancy, were met along the frontier, where a series of attacks delivered by them between August 25 and 27 were all repulsed. So ended the first French offensive.—F. B. Maurice, *Military operations (Nations of today: France, v. 1, pp. 182-183)*.

"On the 20th we held the approaches to Colmar both by the plain and the Vosges. The enemy had undergone heavy losses and abandoned great stores of shells and forage, but from this moment what was happening in Lorraine, on our left, prevented us from further carrying out our success, for our troops in Alsace were needed elsewhere. On August 28 the Alsace army was broken up, only a small part remaining to hold the region of Thann and the Vosges. The purpose of the operations in Alsace was, namely, to retain a

large part of the enemy forces far from the northern theatre of operations. It was for our offensive in Lorraine to pursue still more directly by holding before it the German army corps operating to the south of Metz. This offensive began brilliantly on August 14. On the 19th we had reached the Saarburg region and held Dieuze, Morhange, Déline and Château-Salins. On the 20th our success was stopped. The cause is to be found in the strong organization of the region, in the power of the enemy's artillery operating over ground that had been minutely surveyed, and finally owing to the failure of certain units. On the 22nd, in spite of the splendid behavior of several of our army corps (notably the 20th, under General Foch) we were back on the Grand Couronné of Nancy (and on Mortagne), while on the 23rd and 24th the Germans concentrated reinforcements—three army corps at least—in the region of Lunéville and forced us to retire to the south. The retreat was only temporary. On the 25th after two vigorous counter-attacks, one from south to north and the other from west to east, the enemy had to fall back. From that time a sort of balance was established in this terrain between the Germans and ourselves. Maintained for fifteen days it was afterwards modified to our advantage."—*French official reports*.—On the morning of August 21, "the I, II, and III. German armies were bearing down on the angle of the Sambre and the Meuse in an arc 70 miles long—Kluck with four corps, Bülow with the better part of five, and Hausen with four—a total of at least 25 divisions, supported by a great force of cavalry. Before them lay Lanrezac's Fifth Army, as yet only of four corps, now getting into position on the Sambre, the fortress of Namur, garrisoned by the Belgian fourth Division, and on Lanrezac's left the British army of two corps, the concentration of which was expected to be completed on that day. On the 20th Joffre, from his headquarters far away at Vitry-le-François in Champagne, had given orders for an advance across the Sambre. The British were to move north-east in the direction of Nivelles, between Brussels and Charleroi, while Lanrezac marched against Bülow. The idea of the French Commander-in-Chief was a blow at the flank of the advance through Belgium. He considered the advance of Langle and Ruffey, which began on the 20th, as his main operation, and the attack of Lanrezac and the British as a supporting movement. It was a plan foredoomed to disaster, for, while it took into account Bülow, it ignored Kluck, and knew nothing of Hausen."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War, v. 1, pp. 145-146*.

(i) *Battle of Charleroi*.—This was the title given to a series of sanguinary attacks delivered by the 5th French Army (General Lanrezac) from August 22 to the 29th, on the Sambre and between the Sambre and the Meuse. Charleroi is the most important town in this region, but it was never the center of a battle. When the great turning movement of the German armies from Belgium was in full swing Lanrezac's Fifth Army, which was at the left of the deployment of the French armies, was ordered to move farther to the left and occupy the crossings of the Meuse and the Sambre, co-operating with the 4th group of divisions of reserve (Valabrègue) which stood near Hirson. The high command believed that this army operating in connection with the Belgian and British armies which were assembling at Maubuge and around Mons, could not only hinder the German advance, but carry out an offensive movement towards the north, while the 4th Army (de Langle de Cary)

and the 3rd Army (Ruffey) penetrated the Ardennes to menace their lines of communication from the rear. On August 15 a division of the 5th Army occupied the crossing of the Meuse at Dinant; a detachment was sent to Namur and positions were taken on the Sambre. But the 3rd German Army (von Hausen) took Dinant, and the forts of Namur were bombarded August 21-23. The 4th Belgian Army at Namur was repulsed. The 2nd German Army (von Bülow) attacked the Sambre on both banks.—Based on *French official reports*.—"Namur had been the pivot of the French position. Lanrezac held an angle, and the loss of the apex of that angle meant that each of the two sides was outflanked. . . . Lanrezac, who had pressed for an earlier advance into Belgium, only received Joffre's orders to cross the Sambre on the 20th. . . . On Friday, the 21st, part of his army was still concentrating, for the advance had been fixed for the 23rd, by which time the British would have been well started on their flank wheel. . . . Most of his reserve divisions were not yet in their place. Through no fault of his own, he had to accept battle on ground not of his choosing and at a time appointed by the enemy. For, on the morning of the 21st, Bülow had reached the left bank of the river, wheeling by his left, and by midday the action had begun. . . . Saturday, the 22nd, saw the main battle of Charleroi. . . . By darkening, Bülow had shaken himself free of the mining district, and was in position four miles south of the Sambre. . . . Thinking that he had only Bülow to deal with. . . . [Lanrezac] sent word to the British Commander-in-Chief at Mons that evening asking him to strike north-eastward at Bülow's flank. Sir John French rightly declined. He had already had news of Kluck [who attacked him next day]. On Sunday, the 23rd, Lanrezac attacked with his right. . . . But his centre was already in straits, and the cavalry in front of the 18th corps on his left was giving ground before Bülow's envelopment. . . . Early in the evening came a deluge of ill tidings. Namur, the pivot, was falling—had already fallen. Langle and Ruffey had failed utterly and were back on the Meuse. . . . A new German army, the Saxon III, [von Hausen] had appeared on his right and had taken Dinant. Last, and not least, Kluck had revealed himself against the British—not a matter of two corps as had been supposed, but at least four corps and several cavalry divisions. Lanrezac acted promptly. He dispatched his first corps to Dinant, where it brilliantly disputed the passage of the river with the Saxons. It could not stay the invader, but it delayed him, and saved the communications of the Fifth Army. But he clearly could not stay. The British were in straits, and he was instructed by Joffre to send Sordet's cavalry to their support. That evening he ordered a general retirement, and the first battle in the north was lost to the Allies."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, pp. 149-151.—Bülow's army meanwhile did not halt at Maubeuge, where there was no force in the field (August 27) and whose means for defense were inadequate, but detached a body of troops for siege operations. The place capitulated September 7 with 40,000 men, having held there an important number of forces which the enemy afterwards needed in the battle of the Marne. After the fight at Guise the 5th French Army continued the retreat and passed the Marne at Château-Thierry.—Based on *French official reports*.—The Allied failure at Charleroi aroused much controversy. "The battle of Charleroi completed the demolition of the strategy of the General Staff,

and forced Joffre to abandon Plan XVII. . . . The General Staff subsequently blamed Lanrezac for ordering the retreat (as he did on his own responsibility) and breaking off the conflict of Charleroi. . . . While the report of the Commission sur la Métallurgie says, without qualification, that 'the battle of Charleroi was lost before it was begun; the great merit of the Commander of the 5th Army was to have dared to prevent it from turning to a disaster and to have taken upon himself to break the battle before the whole left wing of the Allies was enveloped.' . . . On September 3rd Lanrezac was relieved of his command."—L. Lyon, *Pomp of power*, pp. 34-36.

(j) Battles of the Ardennes.—"Meanwhile the attack of the 3rd and 4th French armies into the Ardennes had begun, and on August 21 the 4th Army under General Langle de Cary, advancing on the front Sedan-Montmédy, crossed the Semoy and with Ruffey's 3rd Army on its right opened the battle of the Ardennes. The French troops at once found themselves involved in very difficult, hilly and wooded country in which their artillery could give them little assistance, a country in fact, as the Germans had foreseen, admirably adapted for defence. Langle de Cary's centre was roughly handled owing to the Germans discovering a gap between two of his corps, and Ruffey could make no real progress. Such was the situation on the 23rd, when events further north at length opened the eyes of Joffre to the true situation. The Germans had entered Liège on August 7, though, as the forts still held out, that fact was not known at French headquarters; but on the 18th the Belgian army was attacked on the River Gette and driven back towards Antwerp, so that it was clear that the Germans had crossed the Meuse in considerable strength."—F. B. Maurice, *Military operations (Nations of to-day, France: v. 1, pp. 183-184)*.—When the 5th Army (Lanrezac was ordered to extend on the left the strategic deployment, relying on the Belgian and British armies, the 4th (de Langle de Cary), which should have concentrated on the second line to form the mass of reserve, was advanced to the front line, between the 5th and 3rd armies. On the 4th and 3rd Armies devolved the task of penetrating the Ardennes, operating on the German lines of communication and cutting them off from their Rhine base. The German 4th Army (Duke of Württemberg) had fortified strong positions there since the outbreak of the war. The French Intelligence Department failed to learn of the enemy's dispositions before the attacks were made. The columns of the 4th Army advanced, isolated from each other; without knowledge of what was before them, or on their flanks. On August 22-23 they hurled themselves against defenses that they could not conquer, and at Paliseul, Bertrix, Bouillon, Straitmont and Neufchâteau they lost heavily. At Rossignol the French colonials lost all their cannon and a considerable part of their effectives. The 4th Army was forced to fall back on the Semoy, then to the Meuse. Ruffey's 3rd Army's principal objective was Virton. Attacking on August 22 he was himself attacked on the right flank by the 16th Corps and other German troops out of Metz. His flank should have been protected by a group of the divisions of reserve (Pol-Durand) but it had been withdrawn to form the new 6th Army of Maunoury. The 3rd Army was faced by the left wing of the 4th German Army and right wing of the 5th Army. The attack on Virton consequently failed and a retreat was made after heavy losses had been incurred. The enemy bombarded Longwy

and captured it August 26. Montmédy was occupied on August 30. The 6th Army or Army of Lorraine (Maunoury) had been formed with the Group of divisions of reserve (Pol-Durand), divisions brought from the Alpine frontier and from Toul, Verdun and Meuse forts. General Maunoury took command in the evening of August 21. Some of his divisions were already heavily engaged. They had taken Étain and were advancing on l'Othain (August 23) when the order came (August 26) to dissolve the Army of Lorraine and at once transport the units to the region of Paris. The new army (Maunoury) retained the number 6 and reformed in the environs of Amiens, but after the fighting (August 29) at Proyart, Framerville, and Chaulnes the enemy not having changed his line of march, the 6th Army was brought back, following the British retreating movement, and took

which had previously been reconnoitered, resting on the left on the fortress of Maubeuge and extending on the right to Janlein southeast of Valenciennes. The English had opposed to them the 4th and 9th German army corps, while the 2nd was executing a turning movement on the left from the direction of Tournai, but they never took contact with this corps. Consequently they fought at about equal numbers."—A. Arnoux, *European War*, v. 1, p. 79.—"The forces which . . . awaited the German attack numbered about 86,000 men, who may be roughly divided into 76,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 312 guns. . . . Close to Mons, where the attack was expected to break, since the town is a point of considerable strategic importance, there was a thickening of the line of defence. . . . The front of the army covered nearly twenty miles, an excessive strain upon so small a force in the



SURRENDER OF LONGWY

(From drawing by Hans W. Schmidt)

a position on the heights above the right bank of the Ourcq in readiness to assist eventually in the defense of Paris, while the offensive of the 3rd Army in the Ardennes and that of the 2nd Army at Morhange took place at the same date, east and west of Metz, but they were not combined actions. The generals who commanded had no advance information of their respective actions, so they could not decide together how to oppose the forces that would come from Metz.—Based on General G. L. Niox, *La Grande Guerre, 1914-1918*, pp. 27-29.

(k) Battle of Mons.—"On the 23rd [August] Sunday, towards three in the afternoon, a strong force of Germans attacked the British along the line of the Condé-Mons Canal, forcing the second corps to retreat to Bray and the cavalry to evacuate Binche, which the Germans promptly occupied. The British were to a certain extent surprised, and the powerful German artillery played havoc among them, with the result that that night the British forces were compelled to fall back to a position

presence of a compact enemy. If one looks at the general dispositions, it becomes clear that Sir John French was preparing for an attack upon his right flank. From all his information the enemy was to the north and to the east of him, so that if they set about turning his position it must be from the Charleroi direction. Hence, his right wing was laid back at an angle to the rest of his line, and the only cavalry which he kept in advance was thrown out to Binche in front of this flank."—A. C. Doyle, *British campaign in France and Flanders, 1914*, pp. 60-61.—"It was evident from the outset that the canal loop had been singled out as the object of the enemy's special attentions. . . . It was also fairly obvious to both sides that, if the enemy succeeded in crossing the canal in the neighbourhood of the salient, the line of defense along the straight reach to Condé would have to be abandoned. . . . The bombardment increased in volume as the morning advanced and as fresh German batteries arrived on the scene, and at 8 a.m. came the first infantry attack. This first

attack was launched against the north-west corner of the canal loop. . . . The attack, however, soon became more general and the pressure quickly extended for a good mile and a half to either side of the Nimy bridge. . . . About nine o'clock the German infantry attack, which had been threatening for some time past, took definite shape and four battalions were suddenly launched upon the head of the Nimy bridge. The bridge was defended by a single company of the [Royal] Fusiliers under Captain Ashburner and a machine gun in charge of Lieut. Dease. The Germans attacked in close column, an experiment which, in this case proved a conspicuous failure, the leading sections going down as one man before the concentrated machine-gun and rifle fire from the bridge. The survivors retreated with some haste behind the shelter of one of the plantations, where they remained for half an hour. Then the attack was renewed, this time in extended order. The altera-

Gordons, on the right of the Middlesex, also suffered severely, but the Royal Scots beyond them were just outside of the zone of pressure, and their casualties were few. The attack along the straight reach of the canal towards Condé was less violent, and was not pressed till much later in the day."—E. W. Hamilton, *First seven divisions*, pp. 20-24.

(1) Attack on the canal.—British retreat.—“Towards midday the attack against the straight reach of the canal became general. The whole line was shelled, and the German infantry, taking advantage of the cover afforded by the numerous fir plantations . . . worked up to within a few hundred yards of the water, and from the cover of the trees maintained a constant rifle and machine-gun fire on the defenders.”—*Ibid.*, p. 25.—“The attack now spread along the whole line of the canal; but except at the loop the enemy could make no impression. There, however, numbers told at last, and about the middle of the afternoon



GERMAN ARTILLERY FORCING THE RETREAT OF THE ENGLISH
FLEET FROM THE BELGIAN COAST

(From drawing by George Hänel)

tion in the formation at once made itself felt on the defenders. This time the attack was checked but not stopped. . . . The position on the Nimy bridge was growing very desperate . . . To the right of the Nimy bridge the 4th Middlesex were in the meanwhile putting up a no less stubborn defence, and against equally desperate odds. Major Davey, whose company was on the left, in touch with the right of the Fusiliers, had fallen wounded early in the day, and the position at that point finally became so serious that Major Abell's company was rushed up from reserve to its support. During this advance Major Abell . . . and a third of the rank and file fell, but the balance succeeded in reaching the firing-line trenches and—with this stiffening added—the position was successfully held for the time being. Captain Oliver's company, in the centre of the Middlesex line, was also very hard pressed, and Col. Cox sent up two companies of the [Royal] Irish Regiment to its support, another half company of the same regiment being at the same time sent to strengthen the right of the Middlesex line at the Obourg bridge. . . . The

Third Division was ordered to retire from the salient, and the Fifth Division on its left directed to conform. Bridges were blown up . . . and by the night of the 23rd, after various vicissitudes, the Second Army Corps had fallen back as far as the line Montreuil-Wasmes-Paturages-Frameries. That the retirement, though successful, was expensive, is not to be wondered at, when it is remembered that throughout this action, as we now know, the Second Army Corps was outnumbered by three to one.”—*Retreat from Mons*, pp. 33-34.—“About 5 p.m. I received a most unexpected message from General Joffre, by telegraph, telling me that at least three German Corps . . . were moving on my position in front, and that the 2nd (German) Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and the 5th French Army [General Lanrezac] on my right were retiring, the Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur.”—Field Marshal Sir John French, *Dispatch*, Sept. 7, 1914.

I. GERMAN BRIDGE COMPLETED.—“By night the Germans had completed their pontoon bridges across the canal, and it became evident that they were advancing in great force in the direction of Frameries, Paturages and Wasmes. Sir Horace [Smith-Dorrien] realized that the 3rd Division had been too severely knocked about during the day to hold the position unaided for long against the weight of troops known to be advancing. He accordingly motored over to the . . . [commander-in-chief] to ask for the loan of the 5th Brigade which was at Bougnies, four miles off. . . . This was readily granted him, and without delay the 5th Brigade set out, half of it remaining in Frameries, and the other half passing on to Paturages. In the meanwhile, however, came a most unwelcome change of programme. The first line in the Mons salient had been obviously untenable for long, and had been recognized as such by our commanders, but the line now held was a different matter altogether, and there was every reasonable expectation that it could be successfully defended, at any rate for a very considerable time. At 2 a.m., however, Sir Horace received the order to abandon it and retire without delay to the Valenciennes to Maubeuge road, as the French on our right were retreating. . . . This unexpected order . . . involved difficulties of a grave nature with regard to the clearance of the transport and impedimenta generally, and severe and costly rear-guard actions seemed inevitable.”—E. W. Hamilton, *First seven divisions*, pp. 30-31.—“Lanrezac's defeat [at Charleroi] put the British troops on the left flank at once in the most deadly peril. . . . Lanrezac's loss of the crossing of the Sambre on the 22nd of August to Bülow, brought Bülow's right swinging down on Haig's (1st) army corps at Binche at noon on the next day, the 23rd. The German corps which struck Haig was making for Maubeuge in rear of the 1st British corps. It was, however, badly mauled on its Sambre flank by the French from Thuin on the Sambre. The mauling it got from Haig soon afterwards would have annihilated it if Charleroi had held; but Charleroi was gone. The 2nd British corps (Smith-Dorrien) had loose fighting with advanced bodies. . . . French must have been astounded at [the message from Joffre], . . . as he was expecting to advance to Joffre's trapping of the German right wing. He did not break off action, but made ready to do so if necessary; and sent up his airmen to report. About what had happened in general he must have been utterly in the dark. And on came the Germans. . . . Joffre must now have been in the greatest anxiety for his bastion of British steel on his flank—for, if it went, he was turned. He brought every effort to bear to stave off the peril. [Joffre then ordered the great retreat.]”—H. Macfall, *Germany at bay*, pp. 126-128.

(m) Explanation of fall of Belgian fortresses.—“Military critics have wondered at the fall of Namur, and certainly at first sight the immediate collapse of Namur was only less surprising than the persistence of the defence of Liège. The Namur forts were apparently quite sufficiently manned and equipped. They had ample ammunition. The town had a superabundance of provisions. Yet the formidable stronghold fell to the enemy almost at the first attack, as soon as the Germans brought their heavy artillery. Several explanations have been given. It has been said that the little Belgian Army was not sufficient to defend and garrison three such forts as Liège, Namur, and Antwerp, and at the same time keep in reserve a field force. It has been said that the desertion of the Allies utterly

demoralized the besieged. Neither explanation seems to me adequate. The Belgian garrison amounted to 26,000 well-trained troops. They were sufficiently prepared for any sacrifice. As a matter of fact, out of that gallant division of 26,000 only 12,000 survived. But from the beginning there was a misunderstanding as to the relative parts to be played by the Belgians and by the Allies, and it is that misunderstanding which ultimately proved fatal. The Belgians depended on the Allies to oppose the approach of the enemy. They made no sorties, trusting to outside co-operation. They kept to the defensive, whereas a vigorous offensive alone could have saved the situation. It is true that, the German heavy siege guns once placed in position, nothing could save the Namur forts. But it would have been possible to prevent the Germans from bringing out their heavy artillery. It is the inaction of General Michel which lost the stronghold to the Belgian Army, and that inaction was entirely the result of the misunderstanding referred to. If the Allies had clearly intimated that they were not going to co-operate with the Belgians, the Belgians would have exchanged their defensive for offensive tactics, Namur would have been saved, a joint Belgian and French army would have harassed the Germans in the rear, and the advance of the enemy into France would have been checked.”—C. Sarolea, *How Belgium saved Europe*, pp. 130-132.

(n) The great retreat.—General French's first report.—Battles of Landrecies and Le Cateau.—Battle of Guise.—Fighting in Lorraine.—Joffre's new plan.—“The Germans had proved strong enough to check the two great French attacks on either side of Metz, and to march through Belgium, west of the Meuse, in great force. So the whole structure of Plan 17 came tumbling down, and the Allied left flank was suddenly and unexpectedly exposed to envelopment and destruction. Joffre at once formed a new plan to meet this danger. He decided to swing back his centre and left pivoting on Verdun, and to constitute on his left a mass capable not only of checking the German advance but of outflanking and enveloping the enemy's right. On the 25th he announced his intention of constituting this mass of his 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies, the British Army, and a new 6th Army to be formed in the neighbourhood of Amiens under General Maunoury of troops drawn from the French right flank and from the garrison of Paris. On the 26th however the British 2nd Corps was forced by Kluck to stand and fight at Le Cateau, where it was attacked by very superior numbers, and Sir John French, fearful of being caught in a trap, ordered a precipitate retreat across the Somme and behind the Oise.”—F. B. Maurice, *Military operations (Nations of today, France: v. 1, pp. 184-185)*.—“Concentration of the British Expeditionary Force was practically complete on the evening of Friday, the 21st ultimo [August], and I was able to make dispositions to move the force during Saturday, the 22nd, to positions I considered most favourable from which to commence operations which the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the campaign. . . . The forward reconnoissance was intrusted to Brig. Gen. Sir Philip Chetwode with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send forward a few squadrons to assist in this work. . . . From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's army corps, with perhaps one cavalry division, were

in front of my position; and I was aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitering operations. The observations of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate. . . . The right of the Third Division, under Gen. Hamilton, was at Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the commander of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre behind Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 P. M. I received a most unexpected message from Gen. Joffre, by telegraph, telling me that at least three German corps, viz., a reserve corps, the Fourth Corps and the Ninth Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and the Fifth French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur. . . . In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position, I had previously ordered a position in the rear to be reconnoitred. . . . When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German threatening on my front reached me. . . . I determined to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th. A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout the night, and at daybreak on the 24th the 2nd Division from the neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche. . . . Under cover of this demonstration the Second Corps retired on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. . . . The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially entrenched themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 p.m. Towards midday the enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left. . . . With the assistance of the Cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great losses in doing so. At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the 10th Brigade in position between Jenlain and Bry, and the Cavalry on the outer flank. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position. . . . The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion of the troops. The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau and rearguards were ordered to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5.30 a.m. The Fourth Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday, the 23d, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a brigade of artillery with divisional staff were available for service. I

ordered Gen. Snow to move out to take up a position with his right south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road south of La Chaprie. In this position the division rendered great help to the effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position. . . . Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my exposed flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II.) to envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the Corps Commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could towards the general line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont. The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the retirement. Throughout the 25th and far into the evening the First Corps continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of the Forêt de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had intended that the Corps should come further west so as to fill up the gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further in without rest. The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9.30 p.m. a report was received that the 4th Guards Brigade in Landrecies was heavily attacked by troops of the 9th German Army Corps who were coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought most gallantly and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his 1st Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent messages to the Commander of the two French Reserve Divisions on my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his Corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were able at dawn to resume their march south towards Wassigny on Guise. At daybreak [on the 24th] it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second Corps and the 4th Division [at Le Cateau]. At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face of such an attack. I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable of movement. The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any way. There had been no time to entrench the position properly, but the troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them. . . . At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted;

and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the Artillery, which had itself suffered heavily. . . . Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit. . . . The retreat (to the Oise) was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's pursuit. On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordêt and the French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially assisting my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai. General d'Amade also, with the 61st and 62nd French Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras on the enemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British forces. This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23rd August, and which really constituted a four days' battle."—Field Marshal Sir John French, *Dispatch*, Sept. 7, 1914.—"By August 28-29 the whole Army was in touch once more on the line Noyon-LaFère, and on Sunday the 29th, for the first time for eight days, the Army actually rested. . . . While the men rested, their commanders took stock."—*Retreat from Mons*, pp. 81-82.—"Joffre, at his headquarters in Champagne, awoke on the morning of Monday, the 24th, to confront a falling world. The battles of the frontier had one and all ignominiously failed. His three offensives had been met and broken, and the main armies of France hurled back inside their borders. He had used up his only general reserve. In almost every detail of war he had been outwitted by the Germans. He had to face the tragic fact that this first round had been won by the enemy, not by superior numbers, but by superior skill. Moreover, the fighting had shown the French inferior in many important details—the use of airplanes, heavy artillery, and wired entrenchments—all matters vital to a war of defence. The Germans were pouring through Lorraine against Castelnau and Dubail, already weakened by defeat, who stood precariously in front of Nancy and the Gap of Charmes. If the eastern fortress line fell, there might be a second Sedan, and who could guarantee its security after Liège, Namur, and Morhange? Great armies were flooding over the Ardennes to the Meuse, and the German right wing, far stronger than his wildest imagining, was swinging round the weak Allied left, brushing aside the feeble Territorial divisions. The northern forts had been neglected, as had those of the Falaises de Champagne, and there was no defence to bar the road to Paris. . . . It was the strength of Joffre in adversity that he had the courage to face the most unwelcome facts. He must break off contact with the enemy right and centre, now sweeping down more than a million strong from the north and north-east, must retreat and continue to retreat till the time came to resume the attack. . . . It is clear from his 'General Instruction No. 2,' of 25th August [see below: o], that he had not envisaged the full results of the frontier débâcle. He hoped for a resumption of the offensive somewhere on the Somme or the Falaises de Champagne. But this false calculation did not vitiate the soundness of his general policy. Its essentials were—first, a stand at all costs in the east by Dubail and Castelnau, holding Nancy if possible, but in any case the line Toul-Epinal-Belfort; a short retreat by the Third and Fourth Armies pivoting on Verdun;

a withdrawal of the Fifth and British Armies till such time as they could be reorganized and strengthened; and the provision of two new armies as a 'mass of manoeuvre' to aid his left and centre in the ultimate reaction. . . . We have seen that after Morhange the First and Second Armies ranged themselves in rectangular formation across the Gap of Charmes, Castelnau from the Grand Couronne of Nancy southward to Rozelieures, and Dubail thence eastward to the line of the Vosges. There was an open space in the angle of their junction, and thither the enemy pressed after the fall of Lunéville on the 24th. Dubail brought up two corps into the angle with three divisions of Conneau's cavalry, and when on the morning of the 25th the Germans entered Rozelieures they were almost at once driven out of it. That afternoon Castelnau struck at one flank with Foch's 20th Corps, and on the other wing Dubail reached the Meurthe and Mortagne at Lamath and Blainville. The Germans could only escape by a hasty retreat, and by the 26th the French had closed the Gap of Charmes and held a line from the east side of the Grand Couronne to St. Dié in the south. It was a brilliantly conceived and perfectly executed action, a forehint of the great battle which was to open a fortnight later, and for the moment it secured the eastern front. The Imperial Crown Prince also suffered a check. Maunoury with three reserve divisions formed at the time a group in Ruffey's Third Army, and had been entrusted with the task of watching movements from Metz. On the 24th he obtained intelligence that the Crown Prince, believing that the whole Fourth Army had been disastrously engaged at Virton, had resolved forthwith to turn Ruffey's right on the Othain. On the 25th Maunoury anticipated him by driving in his left flank. Had the attack been forced home, the whole German V. Army might have been imperilled. But that night Maunoury and his divisions were recalled, for Joffre had urgent need of them in the north. The retreat of the Allied armies of the right and centre was by the left, pivoting on Verdun."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, pp. 160, 162-163.—The British retreat on the 25th "caused a big gap in the Allied front between the 5th Army and Maunoury's Army forming east of Amiens, a gap which became wider when on the 26th the 5th Army [Lanrezac] turned about and made a fine attack in the direction of St. Quentin, administering in the battle of Guise a severe check to Bülow's 2nd Army. On the 26th also Kluck, swerving away from the British front, attacked and drove Maunoury's troops back from the Avre. The 5th Army was now in a very critical position; its right was endangered by the advance of v. Hausen's 3rd Army, its front was engaged with Bülow's 2nd Army, and its left, no longer covered by the British, was threatened by Kluck. An appeal to England from Joffre and from the French Government brought Lord Kitchener to Paris to modify the rate of the British retreat, and at a conference there on September 1 an agreement was happily reached, while on the same day the British forces succeeded in arresting the progress of Kluck's march against the left of the 5th Army. To protect the right of that Army Joffre had formed a new 9th Army, composed in the first instance of the left wing of the 4th Army placed under the command of General Foch. Despite these remedial measures it was clear that a prolonged retreat would be necessary to extricate the 5th Army sufficiently to enable it to take part in the great counter-offensive against the German right which Joffre had planned. On September 2

therefore the French Commander-in-Chief ordered a general retreat of his left towards the Seine and advised the Government to leave Paris, where General Gallieni had been installed in command. On the evening of the 2nd captured documents disclosed to Joffre that Kluck was marching not on Paris but against the left of the 5th Army, and the next day Gallieni, making the same discovery, proposed an attack by Maunoury's Army, by this time considerably strengthened and under his direction, and by the British Army, against Kluck's right. Joffre however desired not a local but a mass attack by the 4th, 9th, 5th, British and 6th Armies, and for this he had to wait until the 5th Army had been extricated from danger. Not until the evening of September 4 did he decide that the moment had come. Then, on hearing both that Kluck had continued to plunge southwards, exposing his right flank and rear to Maunoury, and that the 5th Army had freed its flanks from danger, he turned to his staff and said, 'Very well, gentlemen, we will fight on the Marne.' . . . Ere the great retreat was ended Joffre had taken drastic action to improve the efficiency of his armies. Ruffey was removed from the command of the 3rd Army to be replaced by Sarrail, while Franchet d'Esperey succeeded Lanrezac in charge of the 5th, and a large number of corps and divisional commanders, who had not proved equal to the first severe test of war, were replaced by more energetic leaders."—F. B. Maurice, *Military operations (Nations of today, France: v. 1, pp. 185-186)*.—See also below: o; p.)

(o) *Battle of the Marne*.—Strategic controversy.—South-eastward deflection of the German armies.—Joffre's instructions of August 25.—General Allied retirement to the Marne (August 29).—The gigantic series of conflicts conveniently lumped together under the title of "the first battle of the Marne" have given rise to much mystery and controversy. Who or what circumstance was responsible for its strategic inception? Some claim the credit for the French generalissimo, General Joffre; others attribute it to General French, while yet a third school of thought asserts that the battle was the result of a fortuitous course of circumstances. Certain it is that the first great German rush was halted on the banks of the Marne; here, what had been an almost unbroken and victorious advance came to an abrupt end and was converted into a retreat. In order to grasp the significance of this historic event it is necessary to understand in outline something of the chain of strategic developments which, according to not a few authorities, prevented a decisive victory for German arms. "The strategical conception dominating the initial deployment of the German Armies on the Western front and the invasion of Belgium and France . . . [was in 1919-1920] disclosed by the publications of several German General Staff officers, and their statements are confirmed by the order issued on 5th September [1914] by the German Supreme Command. The strategic objective was to outflank the French by the west and drive them eastwards against the Swiss frontier. On completion of the deployment, the Sixth and Seventh Armies, under the senior army commander, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, were to advance against the Moselle, below Frouard (5 miles north-north-west of Nancy), and the Meurthe; they were to hold fast the French forces (the First and Second Armies) assembled there, and prevent any of them from being transferred to the left wing to oppose the main German advance. If attacked seriously, Prince Rupprecht

was to retire to a prepared position flanked by Strasbourg and Metz. Meanwhile, the great wheel on Thionville was to be continued. By the 22nd day of mobilization (23rd August) it was expected that the first Armies on the right would have reached the line Ghent-Mons-Sedan-Thionville; by the 31st day (1st September) the line Amiens-La Fère-Rethel-Thionville. Whilst the other Armies held their ground—the Second Army digging in on the line of the Oise or Oise-Aisne and thus covering Paris on the north side—the First Army, with all its original fourteen divisions, was to sweep over the lower Seine, past the west of Paris and round the south. It was to be followed by Ersatz divisions, detailed to complete the investment of the fortress. When they were in position, the First Army, reinforced by the Sixth Army and by every division that could be spared from the other Armies, was to advance eastwards and drive the French against their Moselle fortresses, the Jura and Switzerland. The same plan was to be pursued if the enemy abandoned the Oise, and withdrew behind the Marne and the Seine. To give sufficient weight to the blow which was to crush the Allies' left, roll up the line from the westward and, in conjunction with the advance of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies, push the entire line of battle south-east towards neutral territory, five of the ten cavalry divisions and twenty-six out of the total of the whole seventy-two divisions on the western front were allotted to the two Armies under General von Bülow. In order that the merits of the plan may be judged it may be added here in anticipation of the narrative, that the part of it which involved swinging round the west of Paris was abandoned on the evening of the 30th August. On that date the First Army turned south-east to exploit the supposed success of the Second Army at Guise. The Supreme Command on the morning of the 31st gave its approval of this movement. It was already beginning to find that it had not sufficient troops to carry out the original plan. . . . The plan was strategically bad, for it was out of proportion to the means available. . . . Thus von Moltke no doubt gladly accepted, for tactical purposes, the solution offered by the inward wheel of the First Army, and evolved a reduced plan in which the outer flank should pass east instead of west of Paris. On the 3rd September an order was accordingly issued to the First and Second Armies to force the whole French Army away from Paris in a south-easterly direction towards the Swiss frontier. . . . It may be noted that in the original plan, dated 1905, drawn up by Graf Schlieffen, von Moltke's predecessor, fifty-three divisions were allotted to the five Armies, First to Fifth, for the great wheel; in 1914 there were fifty-five. Of the nine new divisions which became available in the interval, eight were allotted to the Sixth and Seventh Armies to ensure the inviolability of the Reichsland, whilst only one was added to the right wing, which however also received one division originally allotted to the Russian frontier. Comparing now the initial plans of the two belligerents, we see what had happened as regards the main French attacks: that made by the Armies of Dubail and Castelnau on the 14th August south of Metz found the German Sixth and Seventh Armies on the defensive, in strong positions. The general strategic advantage remained with the Germans: their 345,000 men, including the detachments in Upper Alsace, contained about 456,000 French. The offensive of the Armies of Ruffey and de Langle de Cary north of Thionville, commencing on the 21st August, encountered the German Fourth and Fifth

Armies, which he begun on the 17th to wheel forward to the line Thionville-Givet. Thus two Armies met two Armies of about equal strength. The result of the above operations was, practically, equilibrium, but it left three German Armies, von Hausen's, von Bülow's and von Kluck's, comprising in all thirty-four divisions, free to deal with Lanrezac's Army, the tiny British Army of four divisions, and the almost equally small Belgian Army of six divisions—thirty-four divisions against twenty, with a frontier destitute of natural obstacles, guarded only by obsolete fortresses, and the shortest and most direct road to Paris in front of them. The first step in the German plan had therefore been successful, as regards its objectives; the line laid down for the first stage of the wheel on Thionville had been reached, and Liège and Namur had been taken; it was unsuccessful only in that the Belgian Army had not been forced away from Antwerp, which it entered, after rear-guard fighting on the 20th. Surprise has sometimes been expressed that the Germans did not push at least detachments to the Channel ports in August, 1914, when there was no force available to oppose them except some [British] Territorial units. It would appear that they did intend to do so, but the necessity of investing the Belgian Army in Antwerp absorbed the two corps, III. Reserve and IX. Reserve, which had been selected for this purpose; and when the opening phase of the campaign was going so nearly according to plan, and there seemed a certainty of winning the war in a few days by a defeat of the French in a super-Sedan in the open field, it would have been strategically unjustifiable to divert a single man to seize a section of the coast."—J. E. Edmonds, *Military operations, France and Belgium, 1914 (History of the Great War, pp. 43-46)*.

"The rapid onrush of the Germans seemed irresistible, and, in the first days of September, when General Joffre withdrew still farther to the region of the Marne, and the French Government left Paris for Bordeaux, many thought that the German drive was sure of success. But it must be remembered that, as the German armies advanced, it became increasingly difficult for them to maintain their momentum. The German Staff, in its eagerness to hurl the massed German forces against the French, had failed to hold an army reserve. In addition to the exhaustion due to their continued rapid movements, the Germans were getting farther away from their bases all the time, and the task of supplying the armies as well as keeping the ranks filled grew harder day by day. On the other hand, the French were being correspondingly helped, as they drew back into their own territory. They were nearer their bases, and General Joffre, with these advantages, was also gathering new forces. These movements were not merely the acts of a general forced to retreat. This fact is proved by General Joffre's instructions to his army commanders in the order dated the night of August 25. This general order gave explicit directions to his subordinates for the manœuvres which were to follow. The first paragraph is very remarkable: 'It being impossible to execute the offensive movement which had been projected, the subsequent operations will be carried out in a manner to constitute on our left by the united strength of the 4th and 5th armies, the British army, and new troops gathered in the eastern region, a massed force capable of taking the offensive, while the other armies will for the necessary time hold in check the efforts of the enemy.' This order effectually disposes of any idea that General Joffre's later change to the offen-

sive came only from mistakes of his enemy and from lucky chances. . . . The paragraph noted is as good an account of what afterwards actually happened as if it had been written after the event."—T. G. Frothingham, *Guide to the military history of the World War, pp. 24-25*.—"The majority of French military critics admit, more or less openly, the vital defects in Plan XVII. . . . In giving evidence before the Commission sur la Métallurgie Joffre asserted that the battle of the Marne was the outcome of a plan which he had conceived on August 25. The report of the evidence shows that the President of the Commission was not disposed to agree with that statement. Nor does it seem to accord with the facts as known. It is on record that after Charleroi, after Joffre had admitted the compulsory abandonment of his offensive, Sir John French tried, and tried in vain, to find out from him what was his new plan. . . . It was, indeed, French himself who was the first to propose that a stand should be made on the Marne. On September 1st he submitted a memorandum embodying this plan which Joffre rejected on the following day as being impracticable under existing conditions. In any event, the necessary precedent of the Marne was the Battle of the Ourcq, which was engaged by Gallieni and the troops which were defending Paris."—L. Lyon, *Pomp of power, pp. 38-39*.—"There is no evidence that at any time . . . [the Germans] regarded Paris as the main object of attack, though all their armies were cheered by the promise of a speedy entry into the French capital. . . . They were not blind to the peculiar importance of Paris; Bernhardt had classed it with Vienna as one of the two capitals the capture of which had a decisive military importance; but the taking of it, while Joffre's armies remained intact, might well prove a doubtful blessing. . . . For investment they simply had not the men. By the end of August, when the resolution of the French Government and of Gallieni was apparent, they may well have been convinced that even the capture of Paris would not mean the demoralization of France. . . . On the night of 2nd September Kluck was informed that the intention was to drive the French in a south-easterly direction away from the capital, and was ordered to follow in echelon behind Bülow and make himself responsible for the flank protection of the German front. That he chose to disregard this order was not the fault of Great Headquarters. But in a sense he was justified in his disobedience. Great Headquarters wished to have both success and security, and the two were incompatible."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War, v. 1, p. 203*.

The British commander-in-chief reported that in the evening of August 28 his force was followed closely by two German cavalry columns, moving southeast from St. Quentin. "The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the Third and Fifth Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme General Gough, with the Third Cavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlands of the Guard with considerable loss. General Chetwode, with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, encountered the eastern column near Cérizy, moving south. The Brigade attacked and routed the column, the leading German regiment suffering severe casualties and being almost broken up. The 7th French Army Corps was now in course of being railed up from the south to the east of Amiens. On the 29th . . . the French 6th Army got into position on my left, its right resting on Roye. The 5th French Army was behind the line of the Oise between La Fère and Guise. The pursuit of the enemy was very vigorous; some five

or six German corps were on the Somme, facing the 5th Army on the Oise. At least two corps were advancing towards my front, and were crossing the Somme east and west of Ham. Three or four more German corps were opposing the 6th French Army on my left. This was the situation at 1 o'clock on the 20th, when I received a visit from General Joffre at my headquarters. I strongly presented my position to the French Commander-in-Chief. . . . He told me that he had directed the 5th French Army on the Oise to move forward and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checking pursuit. He also told me of the formation of the 6th French Army on my left flank, composed of the 7th Army Corps, four Reserve Divisions, and Sordêt's Corps of Cavalry. I finally arranged with General Joffre to effect a further short retirement towards the line Compiègne-Soissons, promising him, however, to do my utmost to keep always within a day's march of him. . . . Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish an advance base at Le Mans. In spite of a severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard Xth and Guard Reserve Corps of the German Army by the 1st and 3rd French Corps on the right of the 5th Army, it was not part of General Joffre's plan to pursue this advantage; and a general retirement on the line of the Marne was ordered, to which the French Forces in the more eastern theatre were directed to conform."—Field Marshal Sir John French, *Second report, Sept. 17, 1914.*

1. BRITISH RETIREMENT TO THE SEINE.—ADVANCE ON SEPTEMBER 6.—"A new Army (the 9th) had been formed from three corps in the south by General Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the 5th and left of the 4th Armies. Whilst closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy on at all points until a favourable situation was created from which to assume the offensive, General Joffre found it necessary to modify from day to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing to the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the general situation. In conformity with the movements of the French Forces, my retirement continued practically from day to day. Although we were not severely pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually. On the 1st September, when retiring from the thickly wooded country to the south of Compiègne, the First Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by some German cavalry. They momentarily lost a horse artillery battery, and several officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help, however, of some detachments from the Third Corps operating on their left, they not only recovered their own guns, but succeeded in capturing twelve of the enemy's. Similarly, to the eastward, the First Corps, retiring south, also got into some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe rearguard action ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the Fourth Guards Brigade suffered considerably. On Sept. 3 the British forces were in position south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been requested by Gen. Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as possible, and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the necessary dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had been effected, I was asked by the French Commander-in-Chief to continue my retirement to a point some twelve miles in rear of the position I then occupied, with a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. This retirement was duly carried out. In

the meantime the enemy had thrown bridges and crossed the Marne in considerable force, and was threatening the Allies all along the line of the British forces and the Fifth and Ninth French Armies. Consequently several small outpost actions took place. On Saturday, Sept. 5, I met the French Commander-in-Chief. . . . [He] announced to me his intention of wheeling up the left flank of the Sixth Army, pivoting on the Marne and directing it to move on the Ourcq; cross and attack the flank of the First German Army, which was then moving in a southeasterly direction east of that river. He requested me to effect a change of front to my right—my left resting on the Marne and my right on the Fifth Army—to fill the gap between that army and the Sixth. I was then to advance against the enemy in my front and join in the general offensive movement. These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, Sept. 6, at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened on a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the left flank of the 6th French Army, through Lizy on the Marne, Maupertuis, which was about the British centre, Courtaçon, which was on the left of the 5th French Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of the 9th Army under General Foch, and so along the front of the 9th, 4th and 3rd French Armies to a point north of the fortress of Verdun. . . . About Sept. 3 the enemy appears to have changed his plans and to have determined to stop his advance south direct upon Paris, for on Sept. 4 air reconnaissances showed that . . . [the enemy's] main columns were moving in a southeasterly direction generally east of a line drawn through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. On Sept. 5 several of these columns were observed to have crossed the Marne, while German troops, which were observed moving southeast up the left bank of the Ourcq on the 4th, were now reported to be halted and facing that river. . . . Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging on Montmirail, while before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were located in the neighbourhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La Ferté-Gaucher, and Lagny."—*Ibid.*

2. POSITION OF OPPOSING FORCES.—"About noon on Sept. 6, after . . . the advance of the 6th French Army north of the Marne toward the Ourcq became apparent, the enemy realized the powerful threat that was being made against the flank of his columns moving southeast, and began the great retreat which opened the battle. . . . On the evening of the 6th September, therefore, the fronts and positions of the opposing armies were roughly as follows: (i) Allies.—6th French Army: Right on the Marne at Meaux, left towards Betz. British Forces: On the line Dagny-Coulommiers-Maison. 5th French Army: At Courtaçon, right on Esternay. Conneau's Cavalry Corps: Between the right of the British and the left of the French 5th Army. (ii) Germans.—4th Reserve and 2nd Corps: East of the Ourcq and facing that river. 9th Cavalry Division: West of Crécy. 2nd Cavalry Division: North of Coulommiers. 4th Corps: Rebais. 3rd and 7th Corps: South-west of Montmirail. All these troops constituted the first German Army, which was directed against the French 6th Army on the Ourcq, and the British Forces, on the left of the 5th French Army south of the Marne. The second German Army . . . was moving against the centre and right of the 5th French Army and the 9th French Army."—*Ibid.*—"In telling the tale of the Marne to-day chronicle will not suffice. It is simplest to group the action

under three heads: the fight of the Allied left—Maunoury, the British, and Franchet d'Esperey—in their effort to envelop the enveloper; the resistance of the Allied centre and right centre—Foch, Langle [de Cary], and Sarrail—against the German attempt to pierce their front; and the stand of the Allied right—Castelnau and Dubail—against the Bavarians at Nancy. . . . Both sides recognized the gravity of the coming battle. On the morning of 6th September the French Generalissimo issued from the old château of Marshal Marmont at Châtillon-sur-Seine the following order to his men: 'At the moment when a battle is about to begin on which the salvation of the country depends, it is my duty to remind you that the time has gone for looking back. We have but one business on hand—to attack and repel the enemy. Any troops which can no longer advance will at all costs hold the ground they have won, and allow themselves to be slain where they stand rather than give way. This is no time for faltering, and it will not be tolerated.' We possess an order issued to the German 8th Corps at Vitry: 'The object of our long and arduous marches has been achieved. The principal French troops have been forced to accept battle after having been continually driven back. The great decision is without doubt at hand. For the welfare and honour of Germany I expect every officer and man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fighting of the last few days, to do his duty unswervingly and to his last breath. Everything depends on the result of to-morrow.'—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, pp. 215-216.—'On September 7 both the 5th and 6th French Armies were heavily engaged on our flank. The 2nd and 4th Reserve German Corps on the Ourcq vigorously opposed the advance of the French toward that river, but did not prevent the 6th Army from gaining some headway, the Germans themselves suffering serious losses. The French 5th Army threw the enemy back to the line of the Petit Morin River after inflicting severe losses upon them, especially about Montceaux, which was carried at the point of the bayonet. The enemy retreated before our advance, covered by his Second and Ninth and Guard Cavalry Divisions, which suffered severely. Our cavalry acted with great vigor, especially General De Lisle's brigade, with the Ninth Lancers and Eighteenth Hussars. On Sept. 8 the enemy continued his retreat northward, and our army was successfully engaged during the day with strong rearguards of all arms on the Petit Morin River, thereby materially assisting the progress of the French armies on our right and left, against whom the enemy was making his greatest efforts. On both sides the enemy was thrown back with very heavy loss. The First Army Corps encountered stubborn resistance at La Trétoire (north of Rebas). The enemy occupied a strong position with infantry and guns on the northern bank of the Petit Morin River; they were dislodged with considerable loss. . . . Later in the day a counter-attack by the enemy was well repulsed by the First Army Corps, a great many prisoners and some guns again falling into our hands. On this day (Sept. 8) the Second Army Corps encountered considerable opposition, but drove back the enemy at all points with great loss, making considerable captures. The Third Army Corps also drove back considerable bodies of the enemy's infantry and made some captures. On Sept. 9 the First and Second Army Corps forced the passage of the Marne and advanced some miles to the north of it. The Third Corps encountered considerable opposition, as the

bridge at La Ferté was destroyed and the enemy held the town on the opposite bank in some strength, and thence persistently obstructed the construction of a bridge; so the passage was not effected until after nightfall. During the day's pursuit the enemy suffered heavy loss in killed and wounded, some hundreds of prisoners fell into our hands and a battery of eight machine guns was captured. . . . On this day the Sixth French Army was heavily engaged west of the River Ourcq. The enemy had largely increased his force opposing them; and very heavy fighting ensued, in which the French were successful throughout. The left of the Fifth French Army reached the neighborhood of Château Thierry after the most severe fighting, having driven the enemy completely north of the river with great loss. . . . The advance was resumed at daybreak on the 10th up to the line of the Ourcq, opposed by strong rearguards of all arms. The First and Second Corps, assisted by the cavalry divisions on the right, the Third and Fifth Cavalry Brigades on the left, drove the enemy . . . [northward]. Thirteen guns, seven machine guns, about 2,000 prisoners, and quantities of transport fell into our hands. On this day the French Fifth and Sixth Armies had little opposition. As the First and Second German Armies were now in full retreat, this evening marks the end of the battle which practically commenced on the morning of the 6th inst.'—Field Marshal Sir John French, *Second dispatch*, Sept. 17, 1914.

"Much has been written to recount the story of this great battle, and doubtless for the next century controversy will rage over the event and its results. . . . Between September 6 and 12 the German Army was driven back pell-mell from the Seine to the Marne, a distance of sixty-five miles, whilst the front extended from Paris to Verdun. Their losses in officers, men, prisoners, guns, machine guns, and war material were enormous. Most desperate battles were fought all along the line. . . . Whatever the original conception may have been, I claim for the Allies that its fulfilment was crushed forever and a day at the Battle of the Marne. Splendidly, however, as the Allied armies fought, skilfully as each of the various corps and armies which were engaged supported one another, it was the Germans themselves who deliberately threw away whatever chance they ever had of securing a decisive victory. We have seen that so late as the morning of September 6, Joffre and I were still so certain that the German thrust was in full career that an advance by the British Army in an almost easterly direction was ordered and partially undertaken. Yet at that time von Kluck's great 'advance' had for some hours become a counter-march in hurried 'retreat.' Why this sudden change? Because he then discovered that his communications were about to be threatened on the Ourcq. Surely the most inexperienced of generals might have anticipated some such threat, and, further, might have realized that the line of the river Ourcq afforded him the most convenient and efficient means of securing flank protection. . . . When the Allied armies look back to this great battle and realize what was accomplished, they cannot fail to remember with a thrill of pride that they fought and badly defeated an army not only flushed with the knowledge that it had effected a tremendous inroad into the enemy's territory, but which also enjoyed one other incalculable advantage; it was commanded and led by a sovereign who possessed absolute authority—military and civil. . . . As regards the tactical aspect of the Battle of the Marne, I believe that the name of

Marshal Joffre will descend to posterity with that battle as one of the greatest military commanders in history; I believe that the battles fought and won throughout the great length of the line over which they took place by the armies of France under their splendid leaders, will outshine for valour and skill even those glorious deeds of the past, the memorials of which deck their colours with imperishable laurels. For the British Army I claim that we carried out the rôle assigned to us, and that our rapid passages of the various river lines in face of great opposition, and our unexpected appearance on the lines of retreat of the forces opposing the Fifth and Sixth Armies were practically decisive of the great result."—Field Marshal Viscount French, 1914, pp. 140-143.

(p) *Battle of the Marne.—French account.*—"The 1st German Army (von Kluck) which forced the retreat of the British Army appeared to have Paris for its objective, but after leaving Senlis the line of march inclined towards the east. This army was not strong enough to attempt alone the operation against Paris and by allowing the distance that separated it from the other German armies to be increased there was risk of being cut off. The Governor of Paris (Galliéni), who had followed with close attention the movements of the 1st German Army, saw the advantages to be derived by attacking it before it could establish contact with the nearest German Army (2nd Army, Gen. Bülow). The French Commander-in-chief also shared this opinion and on September 4 issued General Orders for the French Armies to form a front. . . . The Battle of the Marne fought on a front of 200 kilometers was in reality a series of related battles. The 6th Army (Maunoury) and the British Army against the 1st German Army; the 5th and the 9th French Armies against the 2nd and 3rd German Armies; the 4th and the 3rd French against the 4th and the 5th German Armies. Von Kluck in pursuit of the British had passed the Marne, his army extending to Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Ferté-Gaucher. The 4th German Corps of Reserve served as flank guard to protect this movement against the 6th French Army (Maunoury). In the evening of September 5 Maunoury clashed with the enemy on the heights which border the right bank of the Marne and the Ourcq. Fighting ensued at Chambry on the right, Barcy, Marcilly, Puisieux, Etavigny on the left. Von Kluck hurried to recross the Marne, also the Ourcq, and pushed forward towards Acy-en-Multien and Nanteuil-le-Haudoin to disengage his right flank (September 7 and 8). Reinforcements were sent to Maunoury, whose left held ground with difficulty. The 4th French Corps arrived by train from the Meuse and one division was sent to the support of the British Army. General Galliéni, in order to move the other division to the front as soon as possible, requisitioned 1,100 Paris auto-taxis carrying five men each, and quickly transported the troops to Nanteuil (September 8). The fighting became intense. The Germans captured Nanteuil, while heads of columns pushed on to the extreme left towards Baron. The situation was serious for the French until 9 at night, but the enemy having disengaged his rear lines did not press the advantage. At twilight on September 10 the Germans everywhere were retiring in the direction of Soissons. This ended the Battle of the Ourcq. The recoil of the 1st German Army arrested the advance of the 2nd Army (Bülow) on the left, and successively the other armies. The straightening of the line of the British Army, between the 6th

and 5th French Army, brought it to the Marne, which was crossed downstream from Château-Thierry. On September 10 the 5th French Army crossed the Marne at Château-Thierry driving back the 2nd German Army (Bülow) and reaching Rheims, but did not occupy the heights. The Germans having obtained strong reinforcements in a reserve corps left after the siege of Maubeuge, checked the French drive, and counter-attacked and held the 55th French Army on the Aisne."—General G. L. Niox, *La Grande Guerre 1914-1918*, pp. 33-36.

1. *FOCH AND THE 9TH FRENCH ARMY.*—"The 9th French Army of General Foch comprised the 9th and 11th Corps, the Morocco division and the 42nd Division. This army was ordered to cover the right of the 5th Army by establishing a connection with the 4th Army and hold the southern outlets of the marshes of Saint Gond. The 9th Army had placed the advance-posts at the outlet of the roads which crossed the marsh of Saint Gond, that is at Château de Saint-Prix, etc. This army had to combat a powerful effort made by the 3rd German Army. The advance-posts at the southern outlets of the marsh were withdrawn; the Morocco division held the Château de Mondement on a height which dominated the plain, the 9th and 11th Corps prolonged the French right to Fère-Champenoise. The 6th, 7th, and 8th of September were days of fierce conflicts. The Germans occupied the Château de Mondement and fortified it. The situation was critical, but in the evening after failing in two counter-attacks the French regained the position in a third assault. But the right wing of the 9th Army lost Fère-Champenoise and General Foch called on the 5th Army, whose forward movement had not been checked, to cover his left by occupying the Château de Saint-Prix, then by a daring movement he brought over from his left to his right the 42nd Division (Grossetti). This division did not arrive until late in the evening of September 10, but it was in time to force the 3rd German Army (von Hausen) to follow the retiring movement of the 2nd Army (Bülow). Foch's 9th Army occupied Fère-Champenoise in the night of September 10-11. Continuing his movement he passed the Marne downstream from Chalons, at 11 in the morning. The 9th Army faced the Prussian Guards belonging to the 2nd Army, and the Saxon Corps of the 3rd Army who were energetic fighters. The 4th French Army (Langle de Cary) had resisted a powerful drive made by the 4th German Army (Duke of Württemberg) and had lost and then regained Sermaize. Reinforced by the 21st Corps which arrived from the Vosges, Langle de Cary was enabled to resume the offensive and crossed the Marne at Vitry on the 10th. The right of the 4th Army formed the connection between the 4th Army and the 3rd (Sarrail) at Revigny-sur-Saulx. The German 5th Army (Crown Prince) had Revigny for its objective, and owing to superior numbers could have pierced the French line, but the powerful resistance displayed by the 5th Corps of the 3rd Army at Revigny-Wassin-court and the arrival in the midst of the battle of the 15th Corps from Lorraine, defeated the German effort. The situation of the 3rd Army (Sarrail) which formed the right wing of the great battle line of the French Armies was precarious. It devolved upon this army to maintain connection with the 4th Army on the left and with the right to protect Verdun. It was in a position to be attacked from the rear by an offensive from Metz. The fort of Troyon had in fact been bombarded

and destroyed. The enemy occupied Saint-Mihiel and had established a bridgehead on the left bank of the Meuse. But the 5th German Army had to conform to the order for a general retreat. It fell back in the Argonne as far as the route of Vienna-le-Château, le Four-de-Paris, Varennes, by which communications were maintained between the Champagne and Lorraine. In the general retreat the German armies retired from left to right beginning with the 1st Army (von Kluck) at the extreme right which retired September 10, to the 5th Army (Crown Prince) which followed on September 12. But when the German Armies halted their retreat the French were unable to pursue them as they lacked masses of manœuvre, and cavalry and munitions. That was all there was to the battle; neither on one side, nor on the other were there manœuvres. But it was General Gallieni, Governor of Paris, who had the intuition to see when the time had come to stand and strike and he was able to inspire Joffre with the same sentiment. The orders were given. He attacked first, and the other armies followed. On a front of 200 kilometers from the Ourcq to the Meuse the general direction of the fighting got out of the hand of the Commander-in-Chief, but during the six days' fighting, he was ready with suggestive advice at critical moments and the words were often on his lips 'Hold fast! The enemy is weakening,' and in bringing up opportunely reinforcements to strengthen feeble points in the lines."—*Ibid.*, pp. 37-40.

2. VICTORY OF THE MARNE.—On September 6 General von Kluck by his inflection towards Meaux and Coulommiers exposed his right to the offensive action of the French left. This was the starting point of the victory of the Marne. "On the evening of Sept. 5 our left army had reached the front Penchard-Saint-Soufflet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued its attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening of the 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the front. Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th the Germans . . . in great haste . . . reinforced their right . . . [and] obtained some successes by attacks of extreme violence. They occupied Betz, Thury-en-Valois, and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. But in spite of this pressure our troops held their ground well. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and, being reinforced, prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat toward the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th we established ourselves on the Aisne."—*French official sources*.

3. LEFT OF VON KLUCK'S ARMY THREATENED.—"Why did the German forces which were confronting us and on the evening before attacking so furiously retreat on the morning of the 10th? Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from the south to the north to face our left the enemy had exposed his left to the attacks of the British Army, which had immediately faced around toward the north, and to those of our armies which were prolonging the English lines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bring about. This is what happened on Sept. 8 and allowed the development and rehabilitation which it was to effect. On the 6th the British Army had set out from the line of Rozcy-Lagny and had that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the 7th and 8th it continued its

march, and on the 9th had debouched to the north of the Marne below Château-Thierry, taking in flank the German forces which on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, our left army. Then it was that these forces began to retreat, while the British Army, going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval. The rôle of the French Army, which was operating to the right of the British Army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking on its left. It had on its right to support our centre, which from Sept. 7 had been subjected to a German attack of great violence. Finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps and the reserve corps which faced it. On the 7th it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached and crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers, mitrailleuses, and 1,300,000 cartridges. On the 12th it established itself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in contact with our centre, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat in haste.

"Our centre consisted of a new army created on Aug. 29, and of one of those which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in Belgian Luxemburg. . . . The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of his enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 10th to pierce our centre to the west and to the east of Fère-Champenoise. On the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of our new army, which retired as far as Gouragançon. On the 9th, at 6 o'clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on the left the other army corps also had to go back to the line Allemant-Connantre. Despite this retreat the General commanding the army ordered a general offensive for the same day. With the Morocco Division, whose behavior was heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left toward the marshes of Saint Gond. Then with the division which had just victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sézanne, and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack in the evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the guard, which had thrown back his right army corps. The enemy, taken by surprise by this bold manœuvre, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat. On the 11th we crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry, driving the Germans in front of us in disorder. On the 12th we were in contact with the enemy to the north of the Camp de Chalons. Our other army of the centre, acting on the right of the one just referred to, had been intrusted with the mission during the 7th, 8th, and 9th of disengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the 10th that, being reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make its action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But, perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormous expenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th the result had none the less been attained, and our two centre armies were solidly established on the ground gained. To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to cover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on the flank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne. But a wide interval in which the Ger-

mans were in force separated them from our centre. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very brilliant success for our artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of the Sixteenth German Army Corps. . . . The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of the left. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating between Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before our two armies of the East, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy had evacuated. The offensive of our right had thus prepared and consolidated in the most useful way the result secured by our left and centre. Such was the seven days' battle in which more than two million men were engaged. To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it was gained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating. Under their pressure the German retreat at times had the appearance of a rout. In spite of the fatigue of our men, in spite of the power of the German heavy artillery we took colors, guns, shells, more than a million cartridges and thousands of prisoners. A German corps lost almost the whole of its artillery, destroyed by our guns."—*Ibid.*

"The situation with which the Allies were now confronted was by no means clear. If the retreat of the German Armies from the Marne had been followed by disorganization and loss of *morale*, as appeared probable from the numerous stragglers and the mix-up of units evident from the prisoners captured, the operation of converting confusion into disaster must be of the nature of a pursuit. If, on the other hand, their power of resistance, though diminished by heavy loss, was unbroken, as had been the case of the Allies in the retreat to the Seine, the problem of completing their discomfiture would involve bringing them to action again, and winning a fresh battle before pursuit, properly so called, could be resumed. Orders quite appropriate to the pursuit of a broken and disorganized enemy can be wholly unsuited to the very different problem of beating an unbroken foe. They may well lead to the defeat of one's own army, for the latter situation clearly demands that battle should be delivered with all one's forces united. The enemy certainly appeared to be disorganized, and there were undoubtedly very weak spots in his front. In any case, it was of vital importance that no time should be lost, and no opportunity given to the Germans to reorganize and to reinforce these vulnerable places. Unfortunately for the Allies, there was heavy rain both on the 11th and 12th September, and only two reconnaissance flights were made on the one day and very few on the other. . . . G. H. Q. orders for the 12th were that the pursuit should be continued, and that the crossing-places of the Aisne should be seized and the high ground on the northern side of the river secured. The day was dark, with torrents of rain which turned the roads into seas of mud, so that observation and movement were both equally difficult."—J. E. Edmonds, *Military operations, France and Belgium, 1914 (History of the Great War, pp. 314-315)*.

4. POSITION OF THE GERMAN ARMIES.—"The situation in which the German First Army stood on the 9th September made its withdrawal northwards a comparatively easy task, for it fitted in with the tactical exigencies of the moment. Part of its right, in its endeavour to envelop the French, was already facing south, and its left (von Linsin-

gen), owing to the British advance, had already been ordered back, part over the Ourcq, to the line May en Multien—Crouy—Coulombs. Consequently all that had to be arranged further was that the centre should conform and then all divisions of the Army could retire northwards together. The movement of von Linsingen's wing was completed early enough for the retirement to be begun before the B. E. F. could come up with him. Von der Marwitz with the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions, 5th Division and Kraewel's Brigade formed the general rear guard. By the night of the 10th September, the German rear guards were on an east and west line beyond the upper Ourcq, opposite the front of both the B. E. F.—just approaching that river—and the French Sixth Army, from about eight miles east of Fère en Tardenois to Crépy en Valois. Next day von Kluck made a short march to the Aisne; and on the 12th he began sorting out his divisions into their proper corps, and occupied a line on the heights north of the Aisne."—*Ibid.*, pp. 319-320.—Von Kluck knew that the English were coming, but did not know, apparently, from what point. . . . When he discovered that they were coming from Havre and even from Nantes he swung about, and thereafter, until the German retreat, there remained in northern France only cavalry and some reserve troops to serve as a screen for the flank. Von Kluck then swept southwest against Paris, creating great uneasiness there. . . . Then for the reasons already given von Kluck turned south, leaving Paris on the right (west). Von Bülow from Charleroi came south to Guise, and, after Von Kluck had flanked the French out of their positions there, continued by way of Rheims. Von Hausen advanced by way of Rocroi and Châlons. The Duke of Wurtemberg advanced by way of Sedan through the forest of the Argonne and along the Marne Valley. The Crown Prince came through the Argonne against Verdun, Clermont, and Ste. Menehould."—E. V. Stoddard, *How Joffre and Foch saved the French army (World's Work, June, 1915, pp. 187-193)*.


5. FRENCH POSITION.—"When the Allies' retreat started, the English, newly arrived, were on the extreme left (west). They went back as best they could, their 80,000 men helpless before von Kluck, until at La Fère their battered regiments, with the help of a French corps, turned against two of von Kluck's and defeated them, while at Montépilloy they roughly handled the German's cavalry. Thereafter they were able to move back in better order. Before that their retreat had been a nightmare. Lanrezac's army, of four corps, was on the left (west) of the French line next to the English. A rear guard had been left at Charleroi, sacrificed so that the rest of the army might escape. Their losses were great but von Bülow was checked. . . . The centre army, the four corps of De Langle, retreated on Châlons by way of Vouziers under continual pressure from von Hausen and the Duke of Wurtemberg. On the right (east) Ruffey's army, now commanded by Sarrail, consisting of three corps, retreated from the region of Longwy at their leisure. Its offensive had been effective before the retreat began, and when, on September 1st, two corps of the Crown Prince's army advanced against it, the 5th and 6th corps attacked them and threw them back in a brisk action at Cierges. . . . When the order to stop the retreat was given the Allies' left was at Crécy, about fifteen miles east of Paris,

and from this point the English, three small corps under [General] French, stretched in a southeasterly direction, a dozen miles from Vauquois. The nearest French army was that of D'Espérey—who had succeeded Lanrezac—its left ten miles away at Courchamps, while the gap between it and the English was filled by three divisions of cavalry. The right was twenty miles away at Sézanne where the new army of Foch, composed of Africans and reserve troops, three corps in all, stretched twenty miles to Sommesous. Then came another gap of ten miles with artillery and cavalry until the left of De Langle's army was reached at Sompuis, whence it stretched twenty-five miles to Sermaize. Then another gap, and Sarrail's army lying in a northeasterly direction from Revigny to Souilly. Then a gap and the fortress of Verdun. Troops from the garrison of Paris and Maunoury were placed between French and Paris. A division under Maunoury was near Meaux. Coutanceau, commander of Verdun, sent a division to connect the right of the French army with this point. The French armies lay in the form of a bow about 150 miles long with its right near Verdun and its left near Paris but separate from both. Into the hollow of this bow the Germans poured their troops and all but succeeded in breaking it. The German armies were opposed to the Allies as follows: that of Von Kluck against the English, the cavalry-filled gap, and D'Espérey's left; Von Bülow against D'Espérey's right and Foch's left; Von Hausen against Foch's right, the cavalry between that and De Langle, and against De Langle's left; the Duke of Wurtemberg against De Langle and the Crown Prince against Sarrail."—*Ibid.*

6. HOW THE GERMANS BLUNDERED.—"This was the great tactical blunder of the Germans. They threw all their forces against the French positions as if in pursuit of the enemy, holding nothing in reserve to overcome some weakness should it develop. When the French counter offensive began they had nothing to call up to meet it. Another blunder was that of Von Kluck in placing too low an estimate on the French and English on the west. A third was perhaps unavoidable; the German movement to succeed must needs be speedy but it was so fast that the army got ahead of its supplies. . . . But the great blunder was the tactical one of the weak, unsupported centre. . . . In the first phase each general fought his army as best he could: on the west Von Kluck apparently paid no attention to the English troops, believing that they had been so thoroughly mauled as to have lost their organization and be worthless, or to the French garrison of Paris. He held in reserve one corps on his right (west) to hold off any possible offensive of the Allies on that flank, and with the rest of his army moved forward toward Troyes as if there were nothing in the way. Orders of his given on September 5th with regard to the position of his troops well south of where the fighting took place make amusing reading in the light of after events. He attacked on the 5th late and gained some ground. Galliéni sent Maunoury from Paris with a division which took its position about Meaux on Von Kluck's flank, and other troops from Paris were held in reserve between that and the capital. Among these were the troops which went to war in taxicabs."—*Ibid.*

7. VON KLUCK ROUTED.—"On the morning of the 6th the German advance was counter-at-

tacked by the English, and this unexpected episode halted it absolutely. Then the French under Maunoury began to exert pressure on Von Kluck's right and by moving north threatened to turn it. One corps was drawn from the centre, where it had opposed the English, and with great rapidity was thrown against the French near Meaux and extended until it threatened to outflank them. The corps which were held in reserve between this point and Paris were not brought into action and Von Kluck's manœuvre was therefore successful in temporarily checking the movement on his flank. But at the same time it allowed the English to advance and threaten to cut off his right from his left (September 7th), while late in the day the French began to move around his flank again. Against D'Espérey and the cavalry between him and the English, Von Kluck's offensive had met with some success and he was able to withdraw another corps from his centre and throw it on his right, actually succeeding in outflanking the French flanking movement (September 8th). But this allowed D'Espérey to advance against the weakened centre and left, and on the night of the 8th there was nothing for Von Kluck to do but get his troops out of what threatened to become a bag for the whole army. . . . By eliminating the German right the numerical preponderance of the Germans over the French was overcome, and D'Espérey was, by his advance, able to threaten the right of the German armies which still held the field. Foch's left was forced to give a little ground, but his centre held fairly well. It was posted on a series of slight elevations back of the marshes of St. Gond, and here, particularly about the group of connected buildings known as the Château de Mondemont, some of the most desperate fighting of the whole battle took place. For three days the French succeeded in holding this position; on the fourth they were driven out, but when the Germans occupied the buildings the French artillery made the place a perfect hell. . . . The right of Foch's army was forced to give ground almost constantly before the assaults of the Guard (Von Bülow), half of the 12th Saxon corps, and all the 13th Saxon corps of reserve (Von Hausen). Foch's right was bent back to Herbisse, and on the 9th the 12th Saxon reserve corps had begun to enter Maily. De Langle was in somewhat better condition than Foch. His centre, well posted on high ground back of the Saulx River and the Marne-Rhine canal, held well enough, beating off almost easily the attacks of the Duke of Wurtemberg. The Germans forced their way across the canal but were unable to dislodge their opponents. But De Langle's left (west) was attacked by the other half of the 12th Saxon corps, the 10th Saxon corps (Von Hausen), the 8th corps (Wurtemberg), while the 12th corps of reserve had broken through the cavalry screen between him and Foch and was advancing on Maily. To meet this he had to reserve the 17th corps on his left. His right was forced to give some ground and a German corps (the 18th of reserve) had broken through beyond it toward Sermaize and Vassincourt and reached Robert Espagne (September 8th). Sarrail had lost less ground than any of the others (except on the west where Von Kluck had been thrown back). The Crown Prince had attacked him and the fighting had been very severe, but the difficult nature of the country made defense more easy. This was the situation of the various battles—



FIRST BATTLE OF THE MARNE

as I have said, it is better to consider them as yet as disconnected engagements—on the night of the 8th and morning of the 9th before the beginning of the general French offensive: On the west Von Kluck routed and D'Esperey beginning to advance and able to help Foch, who was in a precarious position, his left weakened, his centre unsteady, and his right all but demolished; the other army of the centre, that of De Langle, though it had not been forced to give quite so much ground as Foch's, under heavy pressure on all its positions and cut off from the armies on either flank by heavy forces of German troops; on the east Sarrail, though holding stronger positions than the other armies, was threatened on the flank by the Germans at Robert Espagne. It seemed that the French centre was smashed and that in spite of the success on the right the battle had gone against them. It seemed so, for Joffre's answer to the German attack had not yet been made. It was under these conditions that Foch sent his superb message to his commander-in-chief. 'My left has been forced back, my right is routed. I shall attack with the centre.' There was sound sense back of the seeming braggadocio of this remark, for the Germans had weakened their centre, never too strong owing to the positions of Von Bülow and Von Hausen, and there was a good chance that Foch, unaided, might break it. But at this time the battle lost its character of separate engagements and Joffre unified it. On the 8th and 9th two corps had arrived from Lorraine with the confidence of a recent victory, and with them Joffre proceeded to plug the holes in his line. The 15th corps had reached the neighborhood of Bar-le-Duc on the 8th. The inhabitants tell how during the first days the sound of battle grew nearer until the very houses shook under the concussion of the guns and the German advance seemed irresistible. Then the French artillery began to pass through the streets going toward the front, and after a short time the roar increased in volume and began to grow more distant. . . . How complete the French victory was is shown by the fact that the Germans were unable to hold the extremely strong line of the Marne, though the necessity of repairing the bridges across this river which the Germans had destroyed delayed the French [considerably]. . . . The advance of the French was so rapid in the centre that not only were brigades and regiments mixed in the hurry of the retreat but portions of corps and even of armies became confused with each other. Though the French did not annihilate or cripple the German army, the battle miscalled of the Marne was a decisive one.—*Ibid.*

"Marshall Joffre stated that toward the end of August, 1914, the Allies had on the Western Front 83 infantry and 12 cavalry divisions opposed to a German force of 85 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions. Reginald Kann, in the *Revue de Paris* of July 15, 1919, counting only active and reserve divisions, estimates the strength of the Germany concentration in the west at 70 divisions, and this estimate agrees with the number of enemy units shown on the French official maps for August and September, 1914. It is certain that the Allies were at least equal in strength, and it is altogether probable that the Allied armies had a considerable superiority in numbers over the Germans throughout the first Marne campaign. . . . Certain French writers give Foch credit for dealing the left wing of the II and right wing of the III German Armies

the knockout blow at Fère Champenoise, that started the retreat to the Aisne. As a matter of fact, Foch's IX Army had been driven back all along the line, particularly on the right, when the German Army Command No. 3 was informed of the withdrawal of the II German Army, and was compelled, thereby, to fall back itself. When Foch countered with the 42d Division, the German retreat was already under way, so all the 42d Division did, at the most, was to speed up the Germans. . . . Answering the Joffre-Galliéni dispute as to who is entitled to the credit for the Maunoury envelopment, all one can say is that Joffre conceived the idea and Galliéni saw the opportunity. Finally, as to the Hentsch incident, facts and investigation show that Hentsch did not exceed his authority and order the retreat of von Bülow's II Army—he did not have to do so, since von Bülow did it himself and admits it in his own report. . . . The German failure was not due to the defective plan so much as it was due to defective command and execution. As Napoleon and Foch have said, everything is in the execution; so, had the Germans had a von Schlieffen in command in 1914, they would have won, von Moltke plan or no von Moltke plan."—W. K. Naylor, *Marne miracle*, pp. 15-17.

(q) German versions.—"According to Princess Blücher ('An English Wife in Berlin'), it was not until the 23rd of September, 1914, that it began to leak out in Germany that there had been a disaster on the Marne. All that the official bulletin of the 10th of September, 1914, had to tell about the battle had been: 'The portions of the Army which had pursued up to and over the Marne east of Paris were attacked between Meaux and Montmirail by superior forces. They have held the enemy during the two days' heavy fighting and have even made progress. As the approach of strong enemy columns was reported, the right wing was drawn back. The enemy nowhere followed. As victory-booty in these actions, fifty guns and several thousand prisoners have up to now been taken.' No further news about the Western front was given to the German public until the 13th of September. . . . It was then told: 'The operations in the Western theatre of war, with regard to which details cannot yet be published, have led to a new battle that stands favourably for us. The unfavourable information with regard to our Armies that the enemy is spreading by all possible means is false.' . . . Gradually, however, the magnitude of the disaster became public property. . . . [although] it was not until June, 1919, when the Saxon Major-General Baumgarten-Crusius published his book 'Die Marneschlacht, 1914,' 'compiled from War records' . . . that some of the facts began to be known. . . . Since then other books on the Marne have appeared, among them those of the commanders of the German First and Second Armies, and there have been numerous magazine articles and letters on the subject of Colonel Hentsch. Finally, the result of the Court of Enquiry on him in 1917 . . . [was published in 1920] in the *Militär Wochenblatt*, and we have practically the whole story. Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch actually did have a great say in the orders for the retreat from the Marne, and his name will doubtless be connected with the battle for all time. . . . On mobilization he . . . accompanied Supreme Headquarters into the Field. He appears, however, to have been principally employed in liaison work in August-September, 1914, and was therefore well known to the Army

Staffs."—J. E. Edmonds, *Scapegoat of battle of the Marne, 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch and the order for the German retreat (Army Quarterly, Jan., 1921)*.—"Without knowledge of what happened on the German side, the end of the battle of the Marne is something of an enigma. Although the information available is not quite complete, and two of the officers principally concerned in the decision to retreat—Generaloberst von Moltke and Oberst Hentsch—are dead, the three Army commanders of the right wing—von Kluck, von Bülow and von Hausen—and von Kuhl (von Kluck's Chief of the Staff) have written their versions; and Generalmajor von Baumgarten-Crusius has compiled a lengthy account from official sources, containing operation orders and extracts from the war diaries, and more recently has published extracts from a statement written by Hentsch, which practically tell the whole story. The lengthy German *apologia must*

loop south of the Marne, north-east of Meaux. On receipt during the night of the information that the IV. Reserve Corps had been in action with strong French forces, instructions were sent to General von Linsingen, commanding the II. Corps, to start as soon as possible to its assistance, and his two divisions crossed the Marne at Vareddes and the Ourcq at Lizy, respectively, and cooperated with the IV. Reserve Corps on the 6th. During the day, the IV. Corps also, instead of halting at Doue, was moved back over the Marne north of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and at 10:30 P. M. was ordered to make a night march to the assistance of the right wing. Thus by the morning of the 7th, the II., IV. [Corps] and IV. Reserve Corps were engaged against Maunoury, but the III. and IX. Corps were still south of the Marne. During the 6th September the rear guards of the II. and IV. Corps, and the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions were in action against the British. The



COMPANY OF THE FAMOUS GERMAN UHLANS

necessarily be given here in a very condensed form. On the evening of the 5th September, the German First Army had four corps and two cavalry divisions south of the Marne, along the Grand Morin, and a flank guard of one corps and one cavalry division north of the Marne near Meaux, facing west. Part of the latter force, advancing to clear up the situation, had come in contact with General Maunoury's troops during the afternoon. At 10 P. M. von Kluck gave the following orders preparatory to getting into position between the Marne and Oise to face Paris. They were to take effect at 5 A. M. next day. Whilst his left corps, the IX., and the flank guard stood fast, the other three corps were to face about, and begin wheeling to the right on the IX. Corps. Very full directions were given as regards transport, which was to be got clear at once; and the withdrawal was to be covered by the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions and weak rear guards of the II. and IV. Corps on the Grand Morin. In detail, the III. Corps was to march to La Ferté Gaucher, the IV. to Doue and the II. in two columns to Isle les Meldeuses and Germigny, in the

III. and IX. Corps were attacked by the French Fifth Army and the IX. was only extricated from envelopment by the intervention of the Second Army, under whose orders von Kluck had temporarily placed these two corps. Meanwhile, the Second Army, in accordance with O. H. L. [*Oberste Heeres-Leitung*] instructions, was wheeling gradually to the right, so as to face Paris on the line Montmirail—Marigny le Grand; its left thus came into collision with General Foch's Ninth Army. By the morning of the 7th von Kluck seems to have become thoroughly alarmed. According to von Bülow, he sent him the following messages, which von Kluck does not give or allude to in his own book: 10:10 A. M. 'II., IV. and IV. Reserve Corps heavily engaged west of the Lower Ourcq. Where are the III. and IX.? What is the situation there? Reply urgent.' 11:15 A. M. 'Assistance of III. and IX. Corps on Ourcq is very urgent. Enemy considerably reinforced. Send corps in direction La Ferté Milon and Crouy.' At 1:15 P. M. von Kluck issued orders to these corps also to press forward to Ourcq battlefield as fast as possible and by the shortest route. He

states that, 'owing to the increasing gravity of the situation, divisions had to be thrown in simply as they became available, and thus became separated from the corps.' He therefore formed four groups under the four corps commanders. Sixt von Arnim, von Quast, von Lochow and von Linsingen. The effect of the change of front of the whole First Army, which from facing south beyond the Marne now faced west beyond the Ourcq, and of the simultaneous wheel back of the Second Army to the right to face south-west towards Paris, was to create a gap in the German front from west of Montmirail to Lizy on the Ourcq—some twenty miles. To fill the gap there were available only the Guard and 5th Cavalry Divisions of von Richthofen's Corps and the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions of von der Marwitz's Corps. To support them von Kluck on the 8th September sent the 5th Division, Kraewel's Composite Brigade formed of units of the IX. Corps, and part of the 3rd Division. As his divisions came up von Kluck endeavoured to outflank Maunoury from the north, and, in view of the British advance, ordered the destruction of the Marne bridges. He was nearly captured, as he himself tells us, on the evening of the 8th near La Ferté Milon by a raid of General Cornulier-Lucinière's Provisional Cavalry Division. Of the Second Army von Bülow says: 'Although the fight on the 8th September made further progress in the centre and on the left wing, no decisive result was achieved. The unsupported right wing, —13th Division and X. Reserve Corps—on the other hand, in order not to be enveloped, had to be withdrawn in the evening to the line Margny—Le Thout.' Von Bülow now, on the evening of the 8th, seems to have lost heart. Aeroplanes had reported the advance of the British columns 'northwards via Rebas and Doue (3rd and 5th Divisions); a third column (4th Division) advancing north-eastwards from La Haute Maison'; and Franchet d'Espérey was continuing the attack on his right, with one column wide on the west moving to outflank him. He says, 'in these circumstances the probability of a break-through of strong enemy forces between the First and Second Armies had to be reckoned with, unless the First Army decided to retire in an easterly direction and regain touch with the Second Army.' Far from doing so, it was attacking westwards. Von Bülow's map shows the French Fifth Army and the British Expeditionary Force breaking in between him and von Kluck and enveloping his right, and the latter's left wing, on either side of the gap,—a sufficiently alarming situation to face. This situation would become even more critical on the 9th September, if the pressure developed. Von Kluck, however, had a piece of luck, as one of his brigades (Lapel's, belonging to the IV. Reserve Corps) which had been left behind in Brussels came up and appeared almost behind Maunoury's left flank. He, as reported by General von Kuhl, his Chief of the Staff, took a totally different view of the situation from von Bülow. 'On the right wing of the First Army a successful decision was certain. The Army had been so disposed that the enemy's (Maunoury's) northern flank was enveloped and a brigade was to be sent to interrupt his line of retreat. On the 9th the fight was making favourable progress and the enemy had begun to give way. A decision was certain to be obtained by next morning: we were convinced of it. . . . Generaloberst von Kluck had not underestimated the danger of an

advance of the British into the gap between the First and Second Armies. He did not, however, consider that much could be expected from the British troops. After their long retreat and many defeats, they could, he thought, be effectually held up on the Marne [which they were not]. Even if they succeeded in advancing, the victory over Maunoury on the 10th would compel them to make a hasty retreat. Further, the British would not dare to make an unsupported advance whilst the French were being defeated on their left, and their communications with the sea threatened. Even if the right wing of the Second Army were forced back, it would not affect the final issue: rather, if the victory of the First Army were decisive, it would make the enemy's position more precarious.' Von Kuhl himself, writing later, takes a somewhat different view. He says: 'After it was established that the Second Army had decided in the morning to retire and at midday the troops were already in retreat, as there was no means of reversing this decision, the First Army Command had to conform. Even a victory over Maunoury could not prevent us from having our left flank enveloped by superior force, and from being driven away from the main army. The First Army stood isolated.' All this time, from the 5th to the 9th September, no orders came from the Supreme Command, which was established more than 130 miles away at Luxembourg, in no better communication with the Armies than was possible by wireless and by liaison officers in motor cars. Much of its attention seems to have been directed towards the Russian front. Tannenberg had been fought (26th-29th August) and Samsonov's Army annihilated, but the battle of the Masurian Lakes against Rennenkampf was beginning only on the 8th September. On the south-east front, though the Austrians had some small initial successes on the left at Krasnik (25th August), and Komarow (26th August to 2nd September), the Russians had steadily pressed on, and had routed the Austrians at the first battle of Lemberg (31st August to 2nd September), and on the 6th, the very day of the commencement of the battle of the Marne, continuing their offensive, they began the battle of Grodek (6th to 12th September) and drove the Austrians headlong across the San. From the evidence of the German operation orders, it would appear that up to the 4th September the Supreme Command assumed that in France all was going well and according to plan. On the right, the First and Second Armies were forcing the French away from Paris southeastwards; on the left the Sixth and Seventh were pressing on to the Moselle. In the centre the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies were 'heavily engaged against superior forces'; but strategically their slow progress was of advantage, because it gave time for the wing Armies to move forward and envelop the enemy. It looked as if the French would either be surrounded in the open field, or if by withdrawal they evaded the 'pincers' preparing for them, would be driven up against the Swiss frontier. In the orders of the 4th September, 7.45 P. M., the failure to enclose all the French Armies and the B. E. F. was recognized. 'The enemy has evaded the envelopment of the First and Second Armies, and part of his force has joined up with those about Paris.' The First and Second Armies were therefore detailed to face Paris and act against any attack from that direction, whilst the Fourth and Fifth Armies were to press south-

east and the Sixth and Seventh take the offensive westwards against the Trouée des Charmes between Toul and Épinal, so as to drive together, enclose and capture the French Armies of the right that were opposing them. Thus von Moltke seems to have conceived two separate battles, one near Paris, and the other near Verdun. The Third Army was to be prepared to take part in either, as required. So important did he consider the attack in Lorraine, that when the threat from Paris began to materialize, he still persevered there, instead of sending every man who could be spared from the left to the vital right wing in accordance with the original plan. For this purpose there were trains actually waiting on the sidings. It was not until the 9th September that orders were given for the transfer of the XV. corps from the Seventh Army to the west. So confident was Great Headquarters of success, that arrangements were actually made on the 7th for the visit of the Kaiser to his victorious Armies, and he was due to be at Second Army headquarters on the evening of the 8th, when a meeting of a very different kind took place there, as will be seen. No orders were sent to the First and Second Armies from O. H. L. on the 5th, 6th, 7th or 8th—it seems to have still assumed that all was going well near Paris; the critical aspect of the situation there and the imperative necessity of co-ordinating the operations of the Armies forming the German right wing escaped its attention until the 8th September, when after a five days' battle the attempt of the Sixth and Seventh Armies to break through in Lorraine and cross the Moselle had to be abandoned. In its dilemma, the Supreme Command on the morning of the 8th September despatched Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch of the Intelligence Section of the General Staff to visit the Fifth, Fourth, Third, Second and First Armies—a round trip of some 400 miles—to bring back a clear idea of the situation. . . . Hentsch's report of what occurred at Second Army headquarters is as follows: 'I discussed the situation thoroughly with Generaloberst v. Bülow, General von Lauenstein (his Chief of Staff) and Oberstleutnant Matthes (Operations) on the evening of the 8th September in the Château of Montmort. We weighed every possibility for avoiding a retreat; the tone of the Army Staff was calm and confident. At 5:30 A. M. on the 9th September I examined the situation once again with General von Lauenstein, on the basis of the reports that had come in during the night. After the First Army had withdrawn the III. and IX. Corps from the Marne to its right wing, there was no other possibility but to go back across the Marne at once.' Von Bülow gives more definitely the reasons that forced the retreat upon him. He adds to what he had already said on the evening of the 8th: 'When early on the 9th September numerous enemy columns crossed the Marne between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Château-Thierry, there remained no doubt that the retreat of the First Army was, for both tactical and strategical reasons, unavoidable, and that the Second Army must also go back, in order not to have its right flank completely enveloped.' From this statement of von Bülow, it seems clear that it was the advance of the B. E. F. [British Expeditionary Force] which had influenced him in making the decision to retreat. This view is confirmed by a statement of an officer of the German Great General Staff, as follows: 'At Second Army headquarters

the order for retreat was given without consultation with the two neighbouring Armies, and only after an aeroplane report had come in of the advance of five long columns against the Marne between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Château-Thierry. Generaloberst von Bülow now sent a wireless message to the First Army that he was beginning the retreat behind the Marne between Damery and Épernay. Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch had left before this happened, to order the retirement of the First Army to the north-east.' General von Kuhl urged that the attack of the First Army was at that moment in full swing and that retreat would be a difficult matter, as formations were much mixed and the troops were very tired. Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch replied that, nevertheless, no other course was open but to retire, at any rate, as far as Soissons, with the left wing behind the Aisne, and emphasized that his instructions were to be operative in spite of any further information which might be received, as he had 'full full-powers (*volle Vollmacht*).' General von Kuhl states that, 'in spite of lively protests, the headquarters of the First Army had to obey and, with heavy hearts [at 2 P. M., German time], issued orders for the retreat.' Hentsch's account is somewhat different. It is: 'The situation of the First Army about midday [when the conference took place] was such that the left wing had *already* received the order to go back to the line Crouy-Coulombs. The possibility of the Second Army holding the line of the Marne was therefore out of the question; it must go further back, if its flank and rear were not to be enveloped by the British on the 10th at latest.'—J. E. Edmonds, *Military operations, France and Belgium, 1914 (History of the Great War, pp. 296-305)*.—"Von Kluck's hints that, but for the orders given him to retreat, he would have been able 'to exploit the success already commenced against Maunoury' and then turn against the British Army, 'if, after the fight at Montbertoin, it ventured to push forward,' seem to have little to justify them. . . . No one can say with certainty what would have happened in a battle of 1914 if something that was not done had been done; but it would appear that the decision made by von Bülow and acted on by Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch, saved the German Army from a greater disaster than it actually suffered. Fighting with both flanks enveloped, its front broken, enemy cavalry in its rear, its supply of ammunition nearly exhausted, without organized lines of communications, in a hostile country, and with no reinforcements in sight, it was, to say the least of it, in such an unfavourable strategical situation that there was only one course: retreat."—J. E. Edmonds, *Scapegoat of the battle of the Marne, 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch, and the order for the German retreat (Army Quarterly, Jan., 1921, pp. 357-358)*.

(r) End of the German retreat (September 12).—German positions.—"At dawn on the 11th [September] the British Army broke up from its billets and bivouacs and the further pursuit of the enemy began. The three corps crossed the Ourcq practically unopposed, and during the day the cavalry reached the line of the Aisne, the First, Second, and Fourth Cavalry Brigades passing the night on the high ground about Couvrelles and Cerseuil, while the Third and Fifth Cavalry Brigades bivouacked south of Soissons. As regards the main body, the First Corps, on the right, reached the line Bruyères—Oulchy-le-Château. In the centre the Second Corps was about St. Remy. On the

left the Third Corps lay slightly in advance, about Louatre. Orders were issued during the night for the British Army to deploy along the south bank of the Aisne between Bucy and Bourg, and on the following day—Saturday, the 12th September—the first real check to the British advance was experienced. Reconnaissances by the cavalry ascertained that strong hostile detachments, supported by artillery and machine-guns, were holding the town and bridge of Braine and the heights beyond. It was becoming clear that the Germans had retired in accordance with a prearranged plan. From the opposition encountered by the French 6th Army to the west of Soissons, by the British Third Corps south-east of that place, by the Second Corps south of Missy and Vailly, and from other indications all along the line, Sir John French found himself, during the afternoon, faced with a new situation. The field-marshal came to the conclusion that the enemy had, for the moment at any rate, arrested the retreat and was preparing to dispute the passage of the Aisne with some vigour. South of Soissons, as has already been narrated, the Germans were holding an advanced post against the French 6th Army. To its aid came the Fourth Division of the British Third Corps, which had arrived at Buzancy during the morning. . . . As regards the French 5th Army, covered as it was by the 2nd Cavalry Corps, its advance seems to have been absolutely uninterrupted. On the 12th it prolonged the line of the British with its right thrown back and facing generally north-east, so that it lay on the line Fismes-Epernay. The French 9th Army likewise had no difficulty to contend with during the day and reached the Marne between Epernay and Châlons. On the following day a move was apparently made towards Rheims, Châlons remaining as the headquarters of the army commander, General Foch. On the side of the Germans, General von Bülow held the ground from the left of the 1st Army about Berry-au-Bac, eastwards and south-eastwards along the Suippe and towards Rheims. . . . The first object on which the commander of the French 4th Army concentrated his attention [on Sept. 11] was the capture of Vitry-le-François. . . . [which] was evacuated by the Germans before noon, the French 12th Corps passing through the town and halting for the night astride of the Marne a few miles further north. . . . The German IVth Army and such Saxon troops of the IIIrd Army as had been pinned against the Marne offered but little resistance, falling back to their allotted sector of the new German position on the left of General von Bülow. The German Vth Army, however, gave more trouble. For the rôle of the Crown Prince [at Verdun] was to mark time as the pivot of the great German wheel, and he appears to have carried out the task with some skill. His attitude on the morning of the 11th was almost entirely passive, for his mission was to gain time, and he probably realized that time could be gained equally well and with less risk by awaiting attack than by initiating it, especially if the troops awaiting the attack were set to work to strengthen their positions, as the German Vth Army was. An impressive calm, therefore, heralded in the 11th September between Revigny and Verdun. It was, however, soon broken by General Sarrail, for whom a policy of attack was obviously prescribed. The left corps of his 3rd Army—the 15th—was still working in close connexion with the right of the 4th Army, and during the day this co-operation bore fruit. For late in the afternoon the 15th Corps crossed the Marne Canal, occupied Revigny and deployed

south-west with its right upon that town, while later still a movement was made towards Brabant-le-Roi. Opposed to this corps during the day had been the German XVIIIth Reserve Corps, which was rather roughly handled by the French and had to acknowledge the loss of four guns, five machine-guns, and other spoil. This success of the 15th Corps reacted on the 5th Corps immediately to its right, for the guns of the former aided the latter to retake Laimont and Villotte-devant-Louppy; while still further to the right the 6th Corps and the two Reserve Divisions had been feeling for the enemy and discovering that a retrograde movement was taking place, until they were checked by an entrenched position which the Germans had constructed south of Souilly. The day therefore closed with a slight gain for the left flank of the French 3rd Army, while the Crown Prince's left maintained its ground. There is some disagreement as to the dates of the further stages of the retirement of the German Vth Army after the 11th September, but it would appear that on the 12th the French 3rd Army again attacked and found the German trenches more formidable than ever. These, however, were almost certainly occupied merely by rear-guards, which enabled the main body to fall back upon a line running north-east and south-west through Triaucourt. From there the retrograde movement was continued, pressed by General Sarrail, who saw the importance of recovering for Verdun the St. Ménehould-Clermont-Verdun line of railway. The Crown Prince finally brought his army to rest across the Forest of Argonne, his right about Vienne-la-Ville, his centre at Varennes and his left at Montfaucon."—F. E. Whitton, *Marne campaign*, pp. 236-237, 239-240.—After the retreat of the German armies from the Marne to prepared positions on the Aisne, their front lines were reformed as follows: 1st and 2nd Armies on the right bank of the Aisne; 3rd Army (formerly von Hausen's, who was succeeded by von Einem) on the heights dominating Rheims from the north and east; 4th Army on the Aisne between Rethel and Vouziers (this army was later moved to Flanders); 5th Army in the Argonne joined with Metz by the road of Four-de-Paris and Varennes. The 6th, 7th and 8th Armies were in Lorraine and Alsace; the 6th (Crown Prince Rupprecht) was soon afterwards moved to Flanders.

(s) **Battle of the Aisne.—Allied attack.—German counter-offensive.**—"General Joffre, when stopped at the Aisne, decided to assume the offensive at once. Although he issued new instructions, the only change in previous plans for the strategical pursuit was that the Fifth Army (General d'Esperey) should operate with the Sixth Army, the British Army, and the XIII Corps as a group; while the Ninth, Fourth and Third Armies should operate as a group and penetrate the German line by rupture near Verdun. In the left group, the attack of the right of the British Army (General French) and the left of the French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey) reached the Chemin des Dames. The right group was not able to dislocate the German line near Verdun. No progress was made in enveloping the German right. The Germans used the methods of position warfare successfully in defending in these operations. The new chief of the German General Staff, von Falkenhayn, estimated that the sensitive German right flank should be protected by extension to the sea, and that the extension should be on the line of the Somme. This would be the shortest line to the sea and would also cut the British line of com-

munications via Calais. Von Falkenhayn's plan of operations was to seize the initiative at once by a counter-attack on the Aisne, to divert the attention of General Joffre from the German right by an attack in Lorraine, and to gain sufficient troops by withdrawals from the Eastern front, from reserves in Germany, and by the adoption of siege methods (position warfare) from the Oise to Switzerland, with which to extend the German line along the Somme River to the sea, and, later, to resume the envelopment of the western flank of the Allies' armies. The plan of maneuver called for the capture of the Chemin des Dames with the view of securing the initiative, and also, that commanding position. The attack was launched September 17 on a ninety mile front along the Aisne. The battle reached its height of violence September 19 and 20, in an effort to capture the Chemin des Dames. The Allies, using the method of position warfare in defense, repulsed the German attacks, September 21. The plan of maneuver for the offensive in Lorraine called for a converging attack on the Verdun salient. That offensive had several objects. They were: To divert attention from the exposed German right flank; to secure better protection, for the German line of communications through Carignan and for the Briey mining area; to shorten the line and gain troops with which to extend the line to the sea. The attack was launched September 19. The northern attack by two corps of the German Fifth Army progressed in the direction Varennes-Clermont and threatened the Paris-Verdun railroad, but was stopped, September 24, by General Sarrail's Third Army. The southern attack by an army detachment (von Strantz) was more successful, and, capturing St. Mihiel, crossed the Meuse on a foot bridge whose destruction had been overlooked. It was stopped, September 22, by a coördinated converging attack by the First Army (General Dubail), the Third Army (General Sarrail) and the 3d group of division reserves, before it had cut the Paris-Nancy railroad, but it did cut the Commercy-Verdun railroad. The line thus gained made the St. Mihiel salient which was held by the Germans for the next four years.—C. R. Howland, *Military history of the World War, v. 1, pp. 65-68*.—"Germany in retreat had lost the offensive, but had again snatched the initiative; she was about to dictate to her enemies the form of the struggle—to compel them to accept a trench battle, well suited to her own stubborn and mechanical genius. . . . When the Allied troops on the 13th and 14th of September first became dimly cognizant of the nature of the German position they did not realize its full meaning. They could not know that they were on the glacis of the new type of fortress which Germany had built for herself, and which was presently to embrace about a fifth part of Europe. On the 11th and 12th they had believed the enemy to be in full retreat, and when they felt his strength their generals were puzzled to decide whether he meant to take a serious stand, or was only fighting delaying actions preparatory to a further retirement to the Sambre or beyond. Had Joffre known the strength of the Aisne positions, he would probably from the beginning have endeavoured to turn them on the west—or what would give far more decisive results—to break through the Crown Prince's army in the east, and so get between them and their own country. As it was, he decided to make a frontal attack, which would be the natural course against an enemy in retreat who had merely halted to show his fangs. The fighting on the Aisne was to continue for

many weary months, and to show a slow and confusing series of trench attacks sandwiched between long periods of stagnant cannonades. But the First Battle of the Aisne in the strict sense of the word—the battle during which the Allied plan was a frontal assault—lasted for six days only, and on the widest interpretation not more than a fortnight. It represented a delaying action, while Germany changed from her first to her second plan of campaign. The first action was one of advanced Allied cavalry and strong German rearguards. On Saturday, 12th September, Maunoury's Sixth Army was in the forest of Compiègne, with its right fronting the enemy in the town of Soissons. It had secured several good artillery positions on the south bank, and spent the day in a long-range duel with the German guns across the river, in the endeavour to 'prepare' a crossing. Practically all the bridges were down, and since the Aisne is fully fifteen feet deep, the only transport must be by pontoons. It took some time to capture a German post on the Mont de Paris, south of Soissons. On Maunoury's right the British 3rd Corps was busy at the same task just to the east of Soissons. East of it, again, the two other British corps were advancing in echelon, while the cavalry was driving the enemy from the ground around the lower Vesle. . . . On the 12th Allenby discovered that the Germans were holding Braisne and the surrounding heights in some force, and drove them out, and cleared the stream. Shortly after midday the rain began, and . . . [the British] advance in the afternoon was handicapped by transport difficulties in the heavy soil. . . . East of the British, Franchet d'Esperey brought his army up to the Vesle, and Langle was moving down the upper Suippe. . . . Sunday, the 13th, was the beginning of the passage of the Aisne. The French Sixth Army constructed pontoons at various places under a heavy fire, and several divisions were got over. Vic and Fontenoy were the chief crossings, for a pontoon bridge at Soissons itself was made impossible by the guns on the northern heights. A number of French Infantry did succeed in making a passage by means of the single girder which was all that was now left of the narrow-gauge railway bridge. To the east the British operations during the day were full of interest. The 3rd Corps attempted the section between Soissons and Venizel. The Aisne was in high flood, and the heavy rain made every movement difficult. . . . On the evening of that difficult Sunday we may summarize the situation by saying that, on the fifteen miles of front allotted to the British, they had crossed the river at most points, and had entrenched themselves well up the farther slopes. . . . During the night of the 13th, while the German searchlights played upon the sodden riverside fields Joffre decided that the following day must be made to reveal the nature of the German plans. Accordingly on the 14th, while the engineers were busy strengthening the new bridges and repairing some of the old for heavy traffic, a general advance was begun along the whole western section of the front. Maunoury carried the line of the river between Compiègne and Soissons, and attacked vigorously right up to the edges of the plateau. From Vic his Zouaves advanced up the deep cleft of Morsain through St. Christophe, and seized the villages of Autrèches and Nouvron on the containing spurs. By the evening, or early the next morning, he had won his way far up the heights, and was suddenly brought up against the main German position on the plateau itself. There he found himself held, and of all the Allied commanders was the first to

realize the nature of the defensive trenches which the enemy had prepared. The fate of the British 3rd and 2nd Corps was much the same. . . . The chief offensive was entrusted to Sir Douglas Haig's 1st Corps, which, . . . was mostly on the northern bank between Chavonne and Moulins, where to the east begins the first lift of the Craonne plateau. It was directed to cross the line Moulins-Moussy by 7 a.m., a section where the northern heights are more withdrawn from the Aisne. . . . About four in the afternoon the commander of the 1st Corps [British] ordered a general advance. From then till daylight departed there was a heavy engagement, which resulted in a clear British success. [See below: 5.] At nightfall they held, not indeed the Chemin des Dames, but a position which ran from a point on the northeast of Troyon, through Troyon and Chivy to La Cour de Soupir, while the cavalry carried it down to the Soissons road west of Chavonne. The whole day's work was well conceived and brilliantly executed, and gave the Allies for the first time an entrenched position on the plateau itself. On the day before Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army had in large part crossed the Aisne east of Bourg, and on the 14th the first assault began on the Craonne plateau. On the evening of that day the eastern flank of the British 1st Corps was safeguarded by French Moroccan battalions, which entrenched themselves in echelon on its right rear. [See below: 3.] The Germans held the river crossing at Berry-au-Bac, an important point, for there the highroad runs from Rheims to Laon. Along the Suippe the Ninth Army was feeling the German strength in the impregnable trenches on the northern slopes, and finding it so great that the advance checked. Farther east in north Champagne, Langle's Fourth Army had occupied Souain, and, like its colleague to the west, was becoming aware of the fortress in which the enemy had found shelter. At the moment, however, the German High Command was greatly perturbed. No intelligible orders came from Great Headquarters, and Bülow, who had the direction of the main battle, was preparing to fall back on La Fère; it was his habit to see defeat before he was beaten. But in the night the first reserves arrived and on the 15th came the news that the 9th Reserve Corps had come to strengthen Kluck's endangered right. That day, Tuesday the 15th, saw an enemy reaction, a series of violent counter-attacks along the western front. Maunoury's Sixth Army was the chief sufferer. From their main position at Nampcel the Germans drove the French out of their posts on the crests of the spurs, recaptured Autrèches, and forced the French right out of the Morsain ravine and off the spurs of Nouvron. By the Wednesday morning the French were back on a line close to the Aisne, and only a few hundred yards north of their original crossing-places at Vic and Fontenoy. Soissons was heavily shelled, and all the northern part of the town was gutted by fire. The French left, however, continued its flanking movement up the Oise on the west side of the forest of Laigue, and on this day made considerable progress in the direction of Noyon, where, however, it was suddenly checked by the arrival of the 9th Reserve Corps. On the British left the 4th Division of the 3rd Corps was severely handled, but stood stoutly to the ground it had won south of Vregny. The 5th Division felt the weight of the same onslaught. . . . In the evening it was forced back almost to the line of the stream, and held the ground between Missy and Ste. Marguerite—a line dominated everywhere by the guns on the

heights. . . . Haig on the right had a long day of counter-attacks, which he succeeded in repulsing, and the 4th (Guards) Brigade in particular gave the enemy much punishment. By the evening the British line was fairly comfortable, except for the precarious situation of the 4th and 5th Divisions. Next day, the 16th, there was a sudden lull on the British front. Sir John French had contemplated a second attack on the Chemin des Dames, which would give relief to the hard-pressed 4th and 5th Divisions; but the news from Franchet d'Esperey convinced him that it would be highly dangerous. For the French Fifth Army had found the enemy on the Craonne plateau too strong for them, and the Moroccan battalions, echeloned on the British right, had fallen back, and so left that flank in the air. [See below: 3.] Accordingly the 6th Division, which had arrived that morning from England, was kept in reserve on the south bank of the Aisne, instead of being sent to support the 1st Corps in a forward movement. But on the 17th events moved more swiftly. Maunoury had received reinforcements, and the right of the French Sixth Army checked the German attack, and won back all the ground they had lost. They drove the Germans right back from the edge of the plateau to their main position behind Nampcel, and in particular cleared them out of the quarries of Autrèches, which had given them deadly gun positions. This French success eased the situation of the British 4th and 5th Divisions, and the centre of . . . [the British] line was left in peace. Not so . . . [the British 1st Division] perched high up on the plateau at Troyon, and looking towards the Chemin des Dames, which spent an unceasing day of attacks and counter-attacks. Farther to the east the French Fifth Army was still assaulting in vain the Craonne plateau, and the Ninth Army had fallen back from the Suippe to just outside Rheims. The Germans were now on the hills north of that city, and were able to pour shells into it. The heights of Brimont were won by them, and though the French made desperate efforts to retake them, and for a moment looked like succeeding, they continued to hold the ground. These heights were only 9,000 yards from the city. More important still, they had worked round the French position on the east, and had won the hill of Nogent-l'Abbesse, though the French remained in possession of Pompelle, the southern spur. Here the German advance stopped, for west of Rheims lay the high wooded ground of Pouillon, and south the heights known as the Montagne de Rheims, both old prepared positions for the defence of the Marne. The battle here resolved itself into the artillery duel which was to last for months, and which played havoc with that noblest monument of French Gothic, the cathedral of Rheims. Farther east, Langle's army held its own, but made little progress. It was still some three miles short of the Bazancourt-Grand-Pré railway, and had cause for anxiety about its communications with Foch. One last event of the 17th must be recounted. Bridoux' 1st Cavalry Corps, operating from Roye, made a brilliant raid as far east as Ham and St. Quentin, during which its commander fell. On the next day there was little doing in the daytime, but at night there was a general attack on the 1st and 2nd British Divisions. Elsewhere Maunoury was striving fruitlessly against Kluck's position, and his left was pressed back by the German 9th Reserve Corps; Franchet d'Esperey was beating in vain on the Craonne escarpment; Foch's army was hard pressed at Rheims; and Langle found the Wurtembergers in Champagne a

barrier which he could not break. This Friday, 18th September, may be taken as the end of the Battle of the Aisne in its strict sense, for it marked the conclusion of the attempt of the Allies to break down the German positions by a frontal attack. Five days' fighting had convinced them that here was no halting-place for a rearguard action, but the long-thought-out defences of an army ready and willing for battle. The forces were too evenly matched to produce anything better than stalemate, and continued assaults upon those hidden batteries would only lead to a useless waste of life. . . . The general situation was strategically bad. The enemy, from whom they hoped that they had wrested the offensive at the Marne, was beginning to recover it. Bülow's attack on Rheims was a dangerous blow at their centre, and if Langle failed in Champagne the Allied front might be pierced in a vital spot. The determined assault upon Verdun . . . was also a ground for uneasiness. Fortress was now an anxious word in French ears. Sarrail had none too many men, and if the Imperial Crown Prince, aided by the Bavarians, could break through the Heights of the Meuse the Allied right would be turned, and a clear road laid open for the invaders from Metz and the Rhine. The situation demanded a counter-offensive which should promise more speedy results than a frontal assault upon the Aisne plateau. Accordingly, as early as 16th September, Joffre changed his strategy. He resolved to play the German game, fling out his line to the west, and attempt to envelop Kluck's right. Such a movement, if successful, would threaten the chief German communications by the great trunk line of the Oise valley, and if it could be pushed as far as La Fère, or even as far as the junction of Tergnier, would compel the retreat of the whole German right. Accordingly, orders were given for two new armies to form on Maunoury's left, aligning themselves in an angle to the northwest. The first was the reconstructed Second Army, under Castelnau, who for the purpose surrendered his command in Lorraine to Dubail. On its left was to be formed the Tenth Army, under General Louis Maud'huy. . . . For the three weeks on from Friday, 18th September, the Battle of the Aisne, so far as Maunoury and French were concerned, degenerated into a sullen trench warfare, with no possibility of any great movement. Both sides were in position and under cover. Sporadic attacks had to be faced, especially by the British 1st Division at Troyon, and there were many counter-attacks, by which more than once the advanced German trenches were won. But, generally speaking, these weeks showed few incidents. The worst fighting was over by the 18th, and we had now acquired the trick of this strange burrowing. But if the gravest peril had gone, the discomfort remained. . . . During these weeks the French armies of the centre and left had a difficult task, and the hardest was that of Sarrail's army around Verdun. That great fortress, as we have seen, had been menaced by the Imperial Crown Prince during the Battle of the Marne, and his left wing had bombarded Fort Troyon from the high ground to the west of the Meuse. In the general German retreat on 10th-12th September he had retired north of Verdun, and his right no longer lay at Ste. Menchould, commanding the pass of Les Islettes and the main railway from Verdun, but had fallen back two days' march almost as far north as the pass of Grand-Pré, which was the terminus of the branch line from Bazancourt. Verdun was promptly cleared by the French general of most of the

bouches inutiles, its civilian inhabitants. Seven thousand were ordered out of the town, a tariff for foodstuffs was drawn up, and everything was made ready for a prolonged siege. But Sarrail was determined that it should be no siege in the ordinary sense, and that the German howitzers should never be permitted within range. By earthworks and entrenchments the fortified zone was largely extended. The lines of the Crown Prince found themselves brought to a halt in a semicircle, with their right on the Argonne at Varennes, passing northward by Montfaucon and Consenvoye, and joining up with the German army in the Woëvre."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, pp. 269-281.

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF BATTLE AREA.—"The Aisne Valley runs generally east and west, and consists of a flat-bottomed depression of width varying from half a mile to two miles down which the river follows a winding course to the west, at some points near the southern slopes of the valley and at others near the northern. The high ground both on the north and south of the river is approximately 400 feet above the bottom of the valley, and is very similar in character, as are both slopes of the valley itself, which are broken into numerous rounded spurs and re-entrants. . . . The slopes of the plateau overlooking the Aisne on the north and south are of varying steepness, and are covered with numerous patches of wood, which also stretch upward and backward over the edge on to the top of the high ground. There are several villages and small towns dotted about in the valley itself and along its sides, the chief of which is the town of Soissons. The Aisne is a sluggish stream of some 170 feet in breadth, but, being 15 feet deep in the centre, is unfordable. Between Soissons on the west and Villiers on the east (the part of the river attacked and secured by the British forces) there are eleven road bridges across it. On the north bank a narrow-gauge railway runs from Soissons to Vailly, here it crosses the river and continues eastward along the south bank. . . . The position held by the enemy is a very strong one, either for delaying action or for a defensive battle. One of its chief military characteristics is that from the high ground on neither side can the top of the plateau on the other side be seen, except for small stretches. . . . Another important point is that all the bridges are under direct or high-angle artillery fire. The tract of country above described, which lies north of the Aisne, is well adapted to concealment, and was so skillfully turned to account by the enemy as to render it impossible to judge the real nature of his opposition to our passage of the river or accurately to gauge his strength."—*Ibid.*

2. GENERAL BRITISH ADVANCE.—On the morning of the 13th "I ordered the British forces to advance and make good the Aisne. The First Corps and the cavalry advanced on the river. The First Division was directed on Chamouille via the canal bridge at Bourg, and the Second Division on Courtacon and Presles via Pont-Arcy, and on the canal to the north of Braye via Chavonne. On the right the cavalry and First Division met with slight opposition and found a passage by means of the canal, which crosses the river by an aqueduct. The division was therefore able to press on, supported by the cavalry division on its outer flank, driving back the enemy in front of it. On the left the leading troops of the Second Division reached the river by 9 o'clock. The Fifth Infantry Brigade were only enabled to cross, in

single file and under considerable shell fire, by means of the broken girder of the bridge, which was not entirely submerged in the river. The construction of a pontoon bridge was at once undertaken, and was completed by 5 o'clock in the afternoon. On the extreme left the Fourth Guards Brigade met with severe opposition at Chavonne, and it was only late in the afternoon that it was able to establish a foothold on the northern bank of the river by ferrying one battalion across in boats. By nightfall the First Division occupied the area of Moulins-Paissy-Geny, with posts at the village of Vendresse. The second Division bivouacked as a whole on the southern bank of the river, leaving only the Fifth Brigade on the north bank to establish a bridgehead. The Second Corps found all the bridges in front of them destroyed except that of Condé, which was in possession of the enemy and remained so until the end of the battle. In the approach

in the direction of Chivres and Vregny with the object of securing the high ground east of Chivres, as a necessary preliminary to a further advance northward. This attack made good progress, but at 5:30 P. M. the enemy's artillery and machine gun fire from the direction of Vregny became so severe that no further advance could be made. The positions reached were held till dark. The pontoon bridge at Venizel was completed at 5:30 P. M., when the Tenth Infantry Brigade crossed the river and moved to Bucy-le-Long. The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade moved to Billy-sur-Aisne, and before dark all the artillery of the division had crossed the river, with the exception of the heavy battery and one brigade of field artillery. During the night the positions gained by the Twelfth Infantry Brigade to the east of the stream running through Chivres were handed over to the Fifth Division. . . . In the evening the enemy retired at all points and in-



GERMANS IN THE TRENCHES DURING THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE, SEPTEMBER, 1914

to Missy, where the Fifth Division eventually crossed, there is some open ground which was swept by a heavy fire from the opposite bank. The Thirteenth Brigade was therefore unable to advance; but the Fourteenth, which was directed to the east of Venizel at a less exposed point, was rafted across, and by night established itself with its left at St. Marguërite. They were followed by the Fifteenth Brigade; and later on both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth supported the Fourth Division on their left in repelling a heavy counter-attack on the Third Corps. On the morning of the 13th the Third Corps found the enemy had established himself in strength on the Vregny plateau. The road bridge at Venizel was repaired during the morning, and a reconnoissance was made with a view to throwing a pontoon bridge at Soissons. The Twelfth Infantry Brigade crossed at Venizel, and was assembled at Bucy-le-Long by 1 P. M., but the bridge was so far damaged that artillery could only be man-handled across it. Meanwhile the construction of a bridge was commenced close to the road bridge at Venizel. At 2 P. M. the Twelfth Infantry Brigade attacked

trenched himself on the high ground about two miles north of the river, along which runs the Chemin-des-Dames. Detachments of infantry, however, strongly intrenched in commanding points down slopes of the various spurs, were left in front of all three corps with powerful artillery in support of them. During the night of the 13th and on the 14th and following days the field companies were incessantly at work night and day. Eight pontoon bridges and one foot bridge were thrown across the river under generally very heavy artillery fire, which was incessantly kept up to most of the crossings after completion. . . . Preparations were also made for the repair of the Missy, Vailly and Bourg bridges so as to take mechanical transport. The weather was very wet and added to the difficulties. . . . On the evening of the 14th it was still impossible to decide whether the enemy was only making a temporary halt, covered by rearguards, or whether he intended to stand and defend the position. With a view to clearing up the situation I ordered a general advance. The action of the First Corps on this day under the

direction and command of Sir Douglas Haig was of so skillful, bold and decisive a character that he gained positions which alone have enabled me to maintain my position for more than three weeks of very severe fighting on the north bank of the river. The corps was directed to cross the line Moulins-Moussy by 7 A. M. On the right the General Officer commanding the First Division directed the Second Infantry Brigade (which was in billets and bivouacked about Moulins), and the Twenty-Fifth Artillery Brigade (less one battery), under Gen. Bulfin, to move forward before daybreak, in order to protect the advance of the division sent up the valley to Vendresse. An officer's patrol sent out by this brigade reported a considerable force of the enemy near the factory north of Troyon, and the Brigadier accordingly directed two regiments (the King's Royal Rifles and the Royal Sussex Regiment) to move at 3 A. M. The Northamptonshire Regiment was ordered to move at 4 A. M. to occupy the spur east of Troyon. The remaining regiment of the brigade (the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment) moved at 5:30 A. M. to the village of Vendresse. The factory was found to be held in considerable strength by the enemy, and the Brigadier ordered the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment to support the King's Royal Rifles and the Sussex Regiment. Even with this support the force was unable to make headway, and on the arrival of the First Brigade the Coldstream Guards were moved up to support the right of the leading brigade (the Second), while the remainder of the First Brigade supported its left. About noon the situation was, roughly, that the whole of these two brigades were extended along a line running east and west, north of the line Troyon and south of the Chemin-des-Dames. . . . The enemy had a line of intrenchments north and east of the factory [north of Troyon] in considerable strength, and every effort to advance against this line was driven back by heavy shell and machine-gun fire. . . . By 10 o'clock the Third Infantry Brigade had reached a point one mile south of Vendresse, and from there it was ordered to continue the line of the First Brigade and to connect with and help the right of the Second Division. . . . From this period until late in the afternoon the fighting consisted of a series of attacks and counter-attacks. The counter-strokes by the enemy were delivered at first with great vigor, but later on they decreased in strength, and all were driven off with heavy loss. . . . The enemy [later] obtained a footing between the First and Second Corps, and threatened to cut the communications of the latter. Sir Douglas Haig was very hardly pressed and had no reserve in hand. I placed the cavalry division at his disposal, part of which he skillfully used to prolong and secure the left flank of the Guards Brigade. Some heavy fighting ensued, which resulted in the enemy being driven back with heavy loss."—*Ibid.*

3. GERMAN STAND ON SEPTEMBER 15.—"About 4 o'clock the weakening of the counter-attacks by the enemy and other indications tended to show that his resistance was decreasing, and a general advance was ordered by the army corps commander. Although meeting with considerable opposition and coming under very heavy artillery and rifle fire, the position of the corps at the end of the day's operations extended from Chemin-des-Dames on the right, through Chivy, to Le Cour de Sopir, with the First Cavalry Brigade extending to the Chavonne-Soissons road. On


the right the corps was in close touch with the French Moroccan troops of the Eighteenth Corps, which were intrenched in echelon to its right rear. During the night they intrenched this position. . . . On the morning of the 15th, after close examination of the position, it became clear to me that the enemy was making a determined stand; and this view was confirmed by reports which reached me from the French armies fighting on my right and left, which clearly showed that a strongly intrenched line of defense was being taken up from the north of Compiègne, eastward and southeastward, along the whole Valley of the Aisne up to and beyond Rheims. A few days previously the Fortress of Maubeuge fell, and a considerable quantity of siege artillery was brought down from that place to strengthen the enemy's position in front of us. During the 15th shells fell in our position which have been judged by experts to be thrown by eight-inch siege guns with a range of 10,000 yards. Throughout the whole course of the battle our troops have suffered very heavily from this fire, although its effect latterly was largely mitigated by more efficient and thorough intrenching, the necessity for which I impressed strongly upon army corps commanders. . . . On the 16th the Sixth Division came up into line. It had been my intention to direct the First Corps to attack and seize the enemy's position on the Chemin-des-Dames, supporting it with this new reinforcement. I hoped, from the position thus gained, to bring effective fire to bear across the front of the Third Division, which, by securing the advance of the latter, would also take the pressure off the Fifth Division and the Third Corps. But any further advance of the First Corps would have dangerously exposed my right flank. And, further, I learned from the French Commander in Chief that he was strongly reinforcing the Sixth French Army on my left, with the intention of bringing up the allied left to attack the enemy's flank, and thus compel his retirement. I therefore sent the Sixth Division to join the Third Corps, with orders to keep it on the south side of the river as it might be available in general reserve. On the 17th, 18th, and 19th the whole of our line was heavily bombarded, and the First Corps was constantly and heavily engaged. On the afternoon of the 17th the right flank of the First Division was seriously threatened. . . . The Northamptonshire Regiment, under cover of mist, crept up to within a hundred yards of the enemy's trenches and charged with bayonet, driving them out of the trenches and up the hill. A very strong force of hostile infantry was then disclosed on the crest line. . . . The enemy's attack was ultimately driven back with heavy loss. . . . On the 18th I discussed with the General Officer commanding the Second Army Corps and his divisional commanders the possibility of driving the enemy out of Condé, which lay between his two divisions, and seizing the bridge, which has remained throughout in his possession. [But] . . . I decided that it was not necessary to incur the losses which an attack would entail, as, in view of the position of the Second and Third Corps, the enemy could make no use of Condé, and would be automatically forced out of it by any advance which might become possible for us. On this day information reached me from Gen. Joffre that he had found it necessary to make a new plan and to attack and envelop the German right flank. It was now evident to me that the battle in which we had been engaged since the 12th inst. must


last some days longer, until the effect of this new flank movement could be felt and a way opened to drive the enemy from his positions."—*Ibid.*

4. GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE.—"On the evening of the 19th and throughout the 20th the enemy again commenced to show considerable activity. On the former night a severe counter-attack on the Third Division was repulsed with considerable loss, and from early on Sunday morning various hostile attempts were made on the trenches of the First Division. During the day the enemy suffered another severe repulse in front of the Second Division, losing heavily in the attempt. In the course of the afternoon the enemy made desperate attempts against the trenches all along the front of the First Corps, but with similar results. After dark the enemy again attacked the Second Division, only to be again driven back. Our losses on these two days were considerable, but the number, as obtained, of the enemy's killed and wounded vastly exceeded them. . . . On the night of the 21st another violent counter-attack was repulsed by the Third Division, the enemy losing heavily. On the 23d the four 6-inch howitzer batteries, which I had asked to be sent from home, arrived. Two batteries were handed over to the Second Corps and two to the First Corps. They were brought into action on the 24th with very good results. Our experiences in this campaign seem to point to the employment of more heavy guns of a larger calibre in great battles which last for several days, during which time powerful intrenching work on both sides can be carried out. These batteries were used with considerable effect on the 24th and the following days. On the 23d the action of Gen. de Castelnau's army on the allied left developed considerably, and apparently withdrew considerable forces of the enemy away from the centre and east. I am not aware whether it was due to this cause or not, but until the 26th it appeared as though the enemy's opposition in our front was weakening. On that day, however, a very marked renewal of activity commenced. A constant and vigorous artillery bombardment was maintained all day, and the Germans in front of the First Division were observed to be 'sapping' up to our lines and trying to establish new trenches. Renewed counter-attacks were delivered and beaten off during the course of the day, and in the afternoon a well-timed attack by the First Division stopped the enemy's intrenching work. During the night of the 27th-28th the enemy again made the most determined attempts to capture the trenches of the First Division, but without the slightest success. Similar attacks were reported during these three days all along the line of the allied front, and it is certain that the enemy then made one last great effort to establish ascendancy. He was, however, unsuccessful everywhere. . . . The same futile attempts were made all along our front up to the evening of the 28th, when they died away. . . . The fact that between Sept. 12 to the date of this dispatch [Oct. 8] the total numbers of killed, wounded, and missing reached the figures amounting to 561 officers, 12,080 men, proves the severity of the struggle."—*Ibid.*—On September 23 the Germans captured St. Mihiel and established the troublesome salient of that name, which they held for four years.

5. EXTENT OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE.—CONFLICT AROUND TROYON.—Few conflicts in history exceed "in magnitude or importance the battle which commenced on the banks of the Aisne on September 13,

1914. The numbers engaged were upwards of two millions. The area involved stretched on September 13 from Verdun to Noyon, a distance of about one hundred and thirty miles, and included Laon and Soissons, Rheims and Compiègne. The immense battle-line lengthened from day to day. On September 28, its western extremity was Peronne. On October 2, gun defied gun from Verdun to Laon, from Laon to Arras. The Battle of the Aisne . . . became itself part of one gigantic conflict which raged from the bounds of England to the confines of Switzerland. The thunder of the guns reverberated from the cliffs of Dover to the gorges of the Swiss Jura. But of the whole battle-line of the Aisne no section was more strategically important than that occupied by the British. Not one of the separate engagements of the British or of the French, which together comprised the battle, was more strategically important or more stubbornly contested than that fought in the woods and on the hill-sides around Troyon. . . . Shortly after midnight on September 14, the 2nd [British] Infantry Brigade, billeted in Moulins, began to muster. The conditions, indeed, were favourable to a night attack. Rain fell at intervals. Heavy mist intensified the darkness. Nevertheless, Brigadier-General Bulfin could not but feel anxiety as to his prospects of success. The force under his command . . . only numbered some 4,000 men. . . . There was ground for believing, and it was afterwards clearly established, that in the previous week the Germans had carefully selected their position, had taken all ranges, had dug gun-pits and trenches, with the object of making a determined stand here, rather than upon the banks of the Aisne between Cœuilly and the Pont-Arcy. Only a few hours before, on the morning of the 13th, the whole 1st British Division had met with little opposition in crossing the river. But the formidable position in which the enemy had retired, south of the line of the Chemin des Dames, looked down at the wooded slopes around Troyon across a wide valley almost destitute of cover. . . . The Germans might well be expected to offer considerable resistance. Signs, moreover, were not wanting of the constant watchfulness and activity of both the opposing armies. Desultory firing and the occasional screech of a shell broke the silence at intervals. . . . Great searchlights swept ceaselessly the death-ridden valley of the Aisne. . . . Bulfin awaited somewhat anxiously the return of the officers' patrol he had sent out to reconnoitre. . . . Shortly before three o'clock [Bulfin's reconnaissance party] . . . reported to the General a considerable force of the enemy near a factory north of Troyon. Troyon lies on the Laon road, about half-way between Cerny and Vendresse. . . . At three o'clock Bulfin ordered the King's Royal Rifles and the Royal Sussex Regiment to move forward from Moulins. The advance was made as noiselessly as possible. Everything depended upon the enemy being surprised. At length the British drew near. The apprehensions of some of the officers were at one point alarmed by hearing a sudden sharp cry. A stray shot, an effect of the general desultory firing, had shattered the arm of one of the men. . . . Soon the British came into touch with the German outposts. To conceal their approach now was hardly possible, and they pushed on rapidly till they gained the ground to the north of Troyon. A large factory, occupied by an expectant foe, now impeded further advance. The Germans opened fire. The alarm given, the German batteries in the entrenchments near the fac-





Maps prepared specially for the **NEW LARNED**
under direction of the editors and publishers.

tory also opened fire. Meanwhile, the British had formed a firing line, and had begun to creep forward. . . . All efforts to advance, however, were soon checked by the continuous fusillade. . . . Light rain and soaking mist aggravated the discomforts but lessened the dangers of the men. Reinforcements were at hand. At four o'clock the Northamptonshire Regiment had left Moulines and advanced to occupy the hills east of Troyon. A considerable time passed with the line, thus extended, keeping up a hot fire and advancing where possible. All efforts to dislodge the enemy from the factory proved futile. It was held in considerable force. The darkness, the mist, the rain-sodden ground, hampered the advance of the artillery. . . . Dawn would soon break. It was not unlikely that the Rifles and the Sussex Regiment would be unable to maintain their position when revealed by daylight. About six o'clock, therefore, Bulfin directed the Loyal North Lancashires, who had proceeded from Moulines to Vendresse, to support their comrades at Troyon in a determined effort to make headway. The effort proved unavailing. Shortly afterwards, however, the 1st Infantry Brigade arrived. The Coldstream Guards were hurried to the right, the Grenadier, the Irish, and the Scots Guards to the left, of the 2nd Brigade. These reinforcements soon made themselves felt. . . . A vigorous attack was now made upon the German lines. The position was rushed at the point of the bayonet. Unsupported by artillery, the British met with a heavy rifle and shell fire before they reached the enemy's trenches. Tremendous hand-to-hand fighting followed. . . . The Germans had so far shown a partiality for artillery duels, for steady advance in packed masses, for the weight of numbers. They were not accustomed to calculate, nor inclined to rely, upon the dash and the *élan*, as the French say, of a charge with the cold steel. Unable to withstand the furious British assault, they abandoned five guns in a hurried retreat. . . . The capture of the factory could only be effected after a desperate struggle and with considerable loss. The Loyal North Lancashires lay opposite the position. . . . [They] could not hesitate while other regiments on their right and left were striking vigorously at the foe. A party of them forced a passage over shattered doors and barricades, over ruined furniture, over the piled corpses of the slain. Some prisoners and several machine guns fell into their hands. The position thus won was held . . . throughout the day. The morning, which had dawned amid the roar of action, was cold and windy, and showed the British how formidable was their task. The line to which the Germans had retreated was strong. Concealed artillery strengthened their entrenchments, which covered a long stretch of rising open ground. The fusillade recommenced and continued with renewed violence. At about nine o'clock the screech of shells coming from the British lines announced that at last the British artillery was able to render the infantry effective support. . . . It is necessary to mention the position of the Allies on either flank of the brigades engaged, which belonged to the 1st Division. To the right of the line of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, on the further side of the spur of hills to the east of Troyon, the troops from French Morocco were entrenched in echelon. . . . On the left of the 1st Division the 2nd Division had been advancing since an early hour towards Ostel and Braye. The 6th Infantry Brigade, the right wing of the 2nd Division, at nine o'clock reached Tilleul. Here its progress was checked by that artillery and rifle

fire which had checked effectually the progress of the brigades north of Troyon. A dangerous interval of ground disconnected the firing lines of these two forces. Sir Douglas Haig . . . immediately ordered [the 3rd Infantry Brigade] to continue the line of the 1st Brigade and to connect with and aid the right of the 2nd Division. This disposition was speedily justified. No sooner had the 3rd Brigade covered the interval, than a heavy shrapnel fire was opened upon them, and a strong hostile column was found to be advancing. . . . The commanding officer of the 3rd Brigade, Brigadier-General James Landon, took prompt and decisive action. Two of his battalions made a vigorous counter-attack. A battery of field-guns was rushed into action, and opened fire at short range with deadly effect. The German artillery, hurling a continuous shower of shells during the whole day upon and around Vendresse, could not inflict on the British such slaughter as one deadly hail of shell and bullet could inflict upon the close masses of German infantry. The advancing column, menaced on either flank, hastily recoiled. Both British and German lines were now strongly held. . . . British and Germans advanced and retired in turn, surging and receding like breakers on a sea-coast. . . . Artillery boomed continually from the hill-sides. . . . The aeroplanes, despite rain and wind, were continually upon the alert. . . . Many instances are recorded of the successes and checks of that strenuous day. At one point the enemy were shelled out of their trenches and abandoned two machine guns. . . . At another point a battalion of the Guards, the Camerons, and the Black Watch delivered in turn a fierce assault upon the German lines. It was necessary to traverse about half a mile of open ground. They went off with a cheer. The air was full of the scream of shrapnel and the whistle of bullets. So hot and so concentrated was the fusillade that the British were compelled to retire with severe loss. Equally unsuccessful but not less heroic was a charge of the Welsh Regiment. . . . It was about four o'clock in the afternoon before a perceptible weakening of the German counter-attacks and resistance indicated that a general advance might safely be undertaken. Sir Douglas Haig ordered his whole corps to push forward. The enemy still offered considerable opposition, and maintained very heavy artillery and rifle fire. It was not found possible to advance far. Cerny was in possession of the Germans. The day had been long and strenuous. The enemy had been forced back a considerable distance. The troops were very weary. Nevertheless, most of the contested ground from the Chemin des Dames on the right to Chivy onward was occupied by the British before night fell. . . . They had gained a very considerable stretch of difficult and dangerous ground, covered with woods that harboured the infantry and concealed the artillery of the enemy. They had had to contest every yard, to dig trenches continually, to creep forward slowly, and occasionally to retire. They had captured 600 prisoners and twelve guns. They had repulsed repeated and prolonged attacks. The Commander-in-Chief asserted in a dispatch that the advanced and commanding position they had won alone enabled him to maintain his ground for more than three weeks of very severe fighting on the northern bank of the Aisne. The casualties had indeed been severe. One brigade alone had lost three of its four colonels. But the captured trenches showed that the Germans had suffered far more heavily."—A. N. Hildreth, *Troyon: An engagement in the battle of the Aisne*, pp. 3-14.

(t) Transfer of British troops.—Foch at Noyon.—Battle of the Lys.—Even before the commencement of the German counter-attack on the Aisne, Sir John French had become uneasy about his communications. For, there was practically nothing to bar the way to the sea in Flanders but the small Belgian army. If the Belgians could be overcome before aid could reach them, and if the French and British could be induced to overstay their limit of time on the Aisne, nothing could stop the German hosts from reaching the coast of Belgium and the Channel ports. Possibly they might overrun the north-west of France; perhaps take Paris in the rear. Certainly, if they reached the Channel ports, they would control the Channel, and threaten the southern coast of England. Already von Falkenhayn, who had succeeded von Moltke as Chief of Staff, had moved his headquarters to Charleville on the Meuse, and by the end of September he had begun to move the flower of his troops to the north. "Heeringen's VII Army replaced Bülow on the heights of the Aisne, and Kluck held the angle of the front on the Oise. North of him Bülow's II Army was moved to face Castelnau and Maud'huy's right, while the VI Army of Bavaria was sent to the country around Arras and Lille. Most significant of all, the Duke of Wurtemberg was marching to the extreme right with his IV Army, heavily reinforced, to open the one gate that remained. These changes, which were partially known to the Allied Staff, reinforced Sir John French's case. On 29th September he formally approached Joffre, and on 1st October the French Commander-in-Chief accepted [the plan of moving the British army from near the centre of the Allied line to the extreme left where it had originally been. Joffre] brought up reserves to take the place of the British, and arranged for the creation of a new Eighth Army, under General d'Urbal to support the left of the line. He also took Foch whose reputation was now the most brilliant of all army commanders, and put him in general charge of the operations north of Noyon. The French and British Staffs worked in perfect concord, and the result was a brilliant piece of transport. The whole thing was done without noise or friction. Gough's 2nd Cavalry Division was the first to go on 3rd October, and the three infantry corps followed from left to right, till on the 10th the 1st Corps detrained at St. Omer. Some of our soldiers passed near enough to the Channel to see the vessels of the senior service out on the grey waters. We won the race to the sea, but only by the narrowest margin. The Germans' sally was stronger than we had dreamed, and a host of new corps, of which the investing force from Antwerp [which fell on October 10] was only a small part, was about to pour westward over the Flanders flats. . . . [On October 8, Foch met Sir John French at Doullens and arranged a plan of operations by which] the road between Béthune and Lille was fixed as the dividing line between the British command and Maud'huy. . . . To the north it was arranged that the British 2nd Corps should take its place at Maud'huy's left. . . . By the close of September Castelnau's position was fixed west of Roye and Lihons [see below] while Maud'huy had taken up ground from the north end of the Somme plateau to Lens. A Territorial division was in Lille as an advance guard of the outflanking movement. . . . [By Oct. 1, Arras, a railway centre of great strategic importance, was occupied by Maud'huy] who was pushing eastward on the road to Douai. But presently he found himself in difficulties as the German VII Army

came into line, and for the first week of October was heavily engaged in the flats east of Arras between the Scarpe and the town of Lens. He was aware that the enemy was outflanking him, and he had only nine divisions and a cavalry corps wherewith to hold all north-eastern France till the British should arrive. He was forced back upon Arras. . . . [Lille was lost on the 12th, but Maud'huy and Castelnau held on until the British began to come up.] We turn to the task of the British army, which during the first three weeks of October was coming into line north of Maud'huy. . . . On 11th October Smith-Dorrien, with the British 2nd Corps, had marched from Abbeville to the line of the canal between Aire and Béthune. On his right was . . . Conneau [2nd Cavalry Corps] connecting him with Maud'huy, and on his left Hubert Gough's 2nd Cavalry Division, which was busily engaged in driving German cavalry out of the forest of Neippe. Sir John French's plan at this time for the 2nd Corps was a rapid dash upon La Bassée and Lille. Smith-Dorrien was directed . . . [to move against the line Laventie-Lorgies to threaten the flank of the Germans in La Bassée. Smith-Dorrien, however, found on Oct. 12 that a frontal attack was impossible, and he resolved to try to isolate La Bassée]. His object was to wheel to his right, pivoting on Givenchy . . . so as to threaten the right flank and rear of the enemy's position on the high ground of La Bassée.—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, pp. 287, 330-332.—This movement resulted in a struggle for La Bassée, and brought on the action known as the battle of the Lys. "The arrival of reinforcements enabled the British troops to assist in the extension of the Allies' line where the Germans advanced from the northeast and east, holding a front extending from Mont Descats, about ten miles northeast of Hazebrouck, through Meteren, five miles south of that point, and thence to Estaires, thirteen miles west of Lille, on the River Lys. South of the Lys the German lines extended to three miles east of Bethune to Vermelles. The Allies encountered resistance all along the line on the 12th and 13th [Oct.], when the enemy's right fell back hastily. Bailleul, seventeen miles northwest by west of Lille, which had been occupied by the foe for eight days, was abandoned without a shot being fired. . . . [On October 14] our left wing advanced, driving the enemy back, and on the night of the 15th we were in possession of all the country on the left bank of the Lys to a point five miles below Armentières. The enemy retired from that town on the 16th, and the river line, to within a short distance of Frelinghien, fell into our hands. The state of the crossings over the Lys indicated that no organized scheme of defense had been executed, some of the bridges being in a state of repair, others merely barricaded, while one was not even defended or broken."—*British official reports.*

1. CROSSING OF THE LYS.—"The resistance offered to our advance on the 15th was of a most determined character. The fighting consisted of fiercely contested encounters, infantry attacks on the villages being unavailing until our howitzers reduced the houses to ruins. Other villages were taken and retaken three times before they were finally secured. The French cavalry here gave welcome support, and on the evening of the 16th the resistance was overcome, the enemy retiring five miles to the eastward. Describing an incident of the fighting on this night, the narrative says that the important crossing of the Lys at Warneton was strongly held by the Germans with a barricade

loopholed at the bottom to enable the men to fire while lying down. Our cavalry, with the artillery, blew the barricade to pieces and scattered the defenders. . . . During the 17th, 18th, and 19th of October our right encountered strong opposition from the enemy about La Bassée, where they had established themselves behind embankments. On the centre and the left we made better progress, although the Germans were everywhere entrenched, and, in spite of the bombardment, held some villages on the Lys. At the close of each day a night counter stroke was delivered against one or another part of our line, but they were all repulsed. Tuesday, Oct. 20, a determined but unsuccessful attack was made against virtually the whole of our line. At one point where one of our brigades made a counter attack 1,100 German dead were found in a trench and forty prisoners were taken. Meanwhile a body of British troops was moved from its former line facing north, on the east of Paris, to a position facing east, in the northwest corner of France, by which a portion of the British Army was enabled to join with the incoming stream of reinforcements. . . .

"On Wednesday, the 21st, the new German formation again pressed forward in force vigorously all along our line. On our right, south of the Lys, an attack on Violaines was repulsed with loss to the assailants. On the other hand, we were driven from some ground close by, to the north, but regained it by a counter attack. Still further north the Germans gained and retained some points. Their total casualties to the south-east of Armentières are estimated at over 6,000. On the north of the Lys, in our centre, a fiercely contested action took place near La Gheir, which village was captured in the morning by the enemy and then retaken by us. . . . On our left our troops advanced against the German 26th Reserve Corps near Passchendaele, and were met by a determined counter offensive, which was driven back with great loss. At night the Germans renewed their efforts unsuccessfully in this quarter. . . . Thursday, the 22d, saw a renewal of the pressure against us. We succeeded, however, in holding our ground in nearly every quarter. South of the Lys the enemy attacked from La Bassée, and gained Violaines and another point, but their effort against a third village was repulsed by artillery fire alone, the French and British guns working together very effectively. On the north of the river it was a day of minor attacks against us, which were all beaten back. The Germans advanced in the evening against our centre and left, and were again hurled back, though they gained some of our trenches in the latter quarter. By this time the enemy had succeeded in bringing up several heavy howitzers, and our casualties were considerable. On Friday, the 23d, all action south of the Lys on our right was confined to that of the artillery, several of the hostile batteries being silenced by our fire. In the centre their infantry again endeavoured to force their way forward, and were only repulsed after determined fighting, leaving many dead on the ground and several prisoners in our hands. North of the Lys attacks at different points were repulsed. On our left the 22d was a bad day for the Germans. Advancing in our turn, we drove them from some of the trenches out of which they had turned us on the previous evening, captured 150 prisoners, and released some of our men whom they had taken. As the Germans retreated our guns did great execution among them. They afterwards made five desperate assaults on our trenches, advancing in mass and

singing 'Die Wacht am Rhein' as they came on. . . . During the fighting in this quarter on the night of the 22d and on the 23d the German losses were again extremely heavy. . . . The spectacle of these devoted men chanting a national song as they marched on to certain death was inspiring. It was at the same time pitiable. . . . On Saturday, the 24th, action on our right was once more confined to that of artillery, except at night, when the Germans pressed on, only to be repulsed. . . . On Sunday, the 25th, it was our turn to take the offensive. This was carried out by a portion of our left wing, which advanced, gained some ground, and took two guns and eighty prisoners. . . . In the centre the fighting was severe, though generally indecisive in result, and the troops in some places were engaged in hand-to-hand combat. . . . Up to the night of the 25th, therefore, . . . we maintained our position against the great effort on the part of the enemy to break through the west, or to force us back, which started on the 20th."—*Ibid.*


(u) Battle of Flanders.—I. DRIVE FOR CHANNEL PORTS.—"Having been balked in the first drive for Paris, the German High Command conceived the idea of compensating itself by a drive for the Channel ports. The conquest of Belgium had given new value to those ports as German sea bases. Antwerp now furnished a headquarters for German submarine activities within easy range of the English Channel. . . . From the day, late in September, 1914, when . . . the U-9 sank the British warships *Hogue*, *Cressy*, and *Aboukir* within the space of half an hour, the possibility of some offensive action against England had begun to stir the German imagination. . . . The protection of the British lines of communication across the Channel to Boulogne and Havre was left to light vessels. [The Grand Fleet was stationed at Scapa Flow, in the Orkneys.] To destroy those communications, both by submarine attack and by pushing along the coast to Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, would not only produce consternation in England, but would gravely compromise the Allied position in Northern France. The Germans also intended to use the submarine as a commerce destroyer and blockader. Possession of Bruges, with its canals to Zeebrugge and Ostend, gave them, with Antwerp, an admirable operating base, close to the main lines of English commerce. If they could also seize the French coast opposite Dover they might hope practically to seal Dover Strait. A slight delay in organizing the new contingents lost Germany her best chance to reach Dunkirk and Calais. Early in October the Allied left wing rested on Béthune. German cavalry occupied the valley of the Lys River, north of Béthune, with advance guards beyond Bailleul. The British Expeditionary Army left the Aisne on October 5th and began to detrain a few days later at St. Omer. From that point it marched north-east to form a junction with the Belgian army, which was retreating from Antwerp, covered by British cavalry under General Rawlinson. The German cavalry in the Lys Valley could not hold their ground and retired east of Ypres to Roulers, the British gaining the line from Armentières north through Ypres to Dixmude. Before the German concentration in the north was completed all the gaps in the Allied line to the sea had closed. The German attempt to break through began on October 17th and lasted until November 17th. It was made by probably six hundred thousand troops, most of them new divisions, although they were supported by Rupprecht's Bavarian army, and the Prussian Guard

was hurried up from the south eventually to take part in the five-day assault on Ypres. German tactics had not yet changed. Heavy mass formations were used in attack, and the casualties corresponded with the ardour and courage of the troops, which all observers admitted to be high."—W. L. McPherson, *Strategy of the Great War*, pp. 147, 149-150.

2. DIXMUDE.—"The first blow fell on the Belgians and French who held the lines from Dixmude to the sea. Here Generals Foch and Grossetti performed wonders. They were greatly outnumbered, but held on by utilizing all the advantages of a terrain strikingly adapted to defence. In this flat, soggy region artillery was handicapped and the

fully characterized as 'contemptible.'"—*Ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

3. GERMAN TACTICAL BLUNDERS.—"The battle of Flanders cost the Germans vastly greater losses than the first battle of the Marne did. It was the death-blow to the old German system of battle tactics. It proved that dense masses of infantry could not of their own strength break through trench lines held by much inferior forces. Modern weapons had too greatly augmented the power of the defensive to beat down frontal infantry attacks. Henceforth—at least on the West Front, where the quality of the opposing troops was fairly equal—frontal attacks would prove futile until some new devices had been found for restoring superiority to the offensive. The new problems of trench deadlock had to be faced and solved. . . . Lieutenant-General Baron Freytag-Loringhoven intimates, in his *Deductions from the World War*, that the Germans lost the battles of the Yser and Ypres because they used too many new formations. 'These new troops,' he holds, 'could not be equal to coping with the difficult conditions which prevailed at Ypres.' He says further: 'In their case the period of training was not really adequate to transform them into thoroughly efficient battle-troops. The experience of the officers, very few of whom were on the active list at the time, with all their good will, was not really adequate and the same was true of their physical fitness. This applies equally to a large proportion of the men in the ranks, that is to say, of the young war volunteers.' . . . A curious apology! Opposed to the Germans in Flanders was a motley force of very uneven quality—of many races, tongues, and degrees of military experience. It fought day in and day out, with only the scantiest reserves. The Germans had ample reserves. They also sent to Belgium Crown Prince Rupprecht's first-line Bavarian army and the Prussian Guard. If the Channel ports were worth taking sound leadership would have forbidden an attempt to take them with second-class troops, while better troops were holding the line from Arras down to Belfort, on which the fighting had died down. Here again, as at the Marne, the German High Command undervalued the enemy. Freytag-Loringhoven criticizes Joffre for not extending his line north more rapidly. But Joffre had relatively small reserves on hand in October, 1914. He was forced to do the best he could with what he had. The German High Command, on the contrary, had a choice. It cannot excuse itself for failure on the ground that it preferred to employ new formations instead of seasoned ones. The Flanders campaign ended, as the Marne campaign did, in a big German reverse. The second German bid for a decisive success on the West Front failed. The Allies, rallying in the nick of time, saved the Channel ports, as they had saved Paris two months before."—W. L. McPherson, *Strategy of the Great War*, pp. 151-154.



STRUGGLE FOR THE CHANNEL PORTS

German infantry was cut to pieces advancing in masses across the open. By sheer weight the Germans finally took Dixmude and passed the Yser River. But they were stopped when the Belgians dammed the river near its mouth, where British warships covered their positions, and flooded the lowlands. The overflow barrier proved effective for the rest of the war. Further south the Germans tried, early in November, to crush the famous Ypres salient. They drove the British back from the neighbourhood of Roulers and took the heights east and south-east of Ypres. But they were never able to reach the city itself—a mass of ruins—which held out then just as it held out later. . . . Apparently indefensible, commanded on two sides by the Passchendaele and Messines ridges, it was nevertheless defended by the sheer grit of that army which in the early days of the war William II . . . [was alleged to have] scorn-

4. SIEGE WARFARE.—Siege warfare from the Oise to the Vosges lasted from September 13 to November 30. The operations were of secondary importance conducted on both sides with the same idea of wearing down troops and artillery with the view to influencing the decisive result in the struggle in the north. As early as September 1 the commander-in-chief had directed our left army to have as important forces as possible on the right bank of the Oise. Precise orders were issued on September 17. The Germans had an advantage over us—the concentric form of their front which shortened the length of their transports. In spite

of this inferiority we arrived in time. From the middle of September to the last week in October fighting went on continually to the north of the Oise, but all the time we were fighting we were slipping northwards. On the German side this movement brought into line eighteen new army corps. On our side it ended in the formation of three fresh armies on our left, and the transport into the same district of the British army and the Belgian army from Antwerp. "The movement began on our side only with the resources of the army which had held the left of our front during the battle of the Marne, reinforced on Sept. 15 by one army corps. This reinforcement, not being sufficient to hold the enemy's offensive, . . . a fresh army was transported more to the left, with the task 'of acting against the German right wing in order to disengage its neighbor . . . while preserving a flanking direction in its march in relation to the fresh units that the enemy might be able to put into line.' To cover the detrainments of this fresh army in the district Clermont-Beauvais-Boix a cavalry corps and four territorial divisions were ordered to establish themselves on both banks of the Somme. In the wooded hills, however, which extend between the Oise and Lassigny the enemy displayed increasing activity. Nevertheless, the order still further to broaden the movement toward the left was maintained, while the territorial divisions were to move toward Bethune and Aubigny."—*French official report.*

5. OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN FRANCE.—"The march to the sea went on. From the 21st to the 26th all our forces were engaged in the district Lassigny-Roye-Péronne, with alterations of reverse and success. It was the first act of the great struggle which was to spread as it went on. On the 26th the whole of the Sixth German Army was deployed against us. We retained all our positions, but we could do no more; consequently there was still the risk that the enemy, by means of a fresh afflux of forces, might succeed in turning us. Once more reinforcements, two army corps, were directed no longer on Beauvais, but toward Amiens. The front was then again to extend. A fresh army was constituted more to the north. From Sept. 30 onward we could not but observe that the enemy, already strongly posted on the plateau of Thiepval, was continually slipping his forces from south to north, and everywhere confronting us with remarkable energy. Accordingly, on Oct. 1 two cavalry corps were directed to make a leap forward and, operating on both banks of the Scarpe, to put themselves in touch with the garrison of Dunkirk, which, on its side, had pushed forward as far as Douai. But on Oct. 2 and 3 the bulk of our fresh army was very strongly attacked in the district of Arras and Lens. Confronting it were two corps of cavalry, the guards, four active army corps, and two reserve corps. A fresh French army corps was immediately transported and detrained in the Lille district. But once more the attacks became more pressing, and on Oct. 4 it was a question whether, in view of the enemy's activity both west of the Oise and south of the Somme, and also further to the north, a retreat would not have to be made. General Joffre resolutely put this hypothesis aside and ordered the offensive to be resumed with the reinforcements that had arrived. It was, however, clear that, despite the efforts of all, our front, extended to the sea as it was by a mere ribbon of troops, did not possess the solidity to enable it to resist a German attack. . . . Finally, to the north, on the Lille-Estaires-Merville-Hazebrouck-Cassel

front, our cavalry and our territorials had their work cut out against eight divisions of German cavalry, with very strong infantry supports. It was at this moment that the transport of the British Army to the northern theatre of operations began."—*French official report.*

6. ARRIVAL OF THE BELGIAN ARMY.—"There remained the Belgian Army. On leaving Antwerp on Oct. 9 the Belgian Army, which was covered by 8,000 British bluejackets and 6,000 French bluejackets, at first intended to retire as far as to the north of Calais, but afterwards determined to make a stand in Belgian territory. Unfortunately, the condition of the Belgian troops, exhausted by a struggle of more than three months, did not allow any immediate hopes to be based upon them. . . . On the 16th we made progress to the east of Ypres. On the 18th our cavalry even reached Roulers and Cortemark. But it was now evident that, in view of the continual reinforcing of the German right, our left was not capable of maintaining the advantages obtained during the previous few days. To attain our end and make our front inviolable a fresh effort was necessary. That effort was immediately made by the dispatch to the north of the Lys of considerable French forces, which formed the French Army of Belgium. . . . These reinforcements were equivalent altogether in value to five army corps, a division of cavalry, a territorial division, and sixteen regiments of cavalry, plus sixty pieces of heavy artillery. Thus was completed the strategic manoeuvre defined by the instructions of the General in Chief on Sept. 11 and developed during the five following weeks. . . . The movements of troops carried out during this period were methodically combined with the pursuit of operations, both defensive and offensive, from the Oise to the North Sea. On Oct. 22 our left, bounded six weeks earlier by the Noyon district, rested on Nieuport, thanks to the successive deployment of five fresh armies—three French armies, the British Army, and the Belgian Army. Thus the co-ordination decided upon by the General in Chief attained its end. The barrier was established. It remained to maintain it against the enemy's offensive. That was the object and the result of the battle of Flanders, Oct. 22 to Nov. 15."—*Ibid.*

7. OPERATIONS IN FLANDERS.—"The German attack in Flanders was conducted strategically and tactically with remarkable energy. . . . On Oct. 30, General von Deimling . . . issued an order declaring that 'the thrust against Ypres will be of decisive importance.' It should be noted also that the Emperor proceeded in person to Thielt and Courtrai to exalt by his presence the ardor of his troops. Finally, at the close of October, the entire German press incessantly proclaimed the importance of the 'Battle of Calais.' . . . This decision would be obtained if our left were pierced or driven in. To reach Calais, that is, to break our left; to carry Ypres, that is, to cut it in half; through both points to menace the communications and supplies of the British expeditionary corps, perhaps even to threaten Britain in her island—such was the German plan in the Battle of Flanders. It was a plan that could not be executed. The enemy, who had at his disposal a considerable quantity of heavy artillery, directed his efforts at first upon the coast and the country to the north of Dixmude. His objective was manifestly the capture of Dunkirk, then of Calais and Boulogne, and this objective he pursued until Nov. 1. On Oct. 23 the Belgians along the railway line from Nieuport to Dixmude were strengthened by a French division. Dixmude was occupied by our marines (fusiliers marins).

... On the 29th the inundations effected between the canal and the railway line spread along our front. On the 30th we recaptured Ramscapelle, the only point on the railway which Belgians had lost. On the 1st and 2d of November the enemy bombarded Furnes, but began to show signs of weariness. On the 2d he evacuated the ground between the Yser and the railway, abandoning cannon, dead and wounded. On the 3d our troops were able to re-enter the Dixmude district. The success achieved by the enemy at Dixmude at this juncture was without fruit. They succeeded in taking the town. They could not debouch from it. The coastal attack had thus proved a total failure."—*Ibid.*

8. GERMAN DEFEAT AT YPRES.—"The enemy had now begun an attack more important than its predecessor, in view of the numbers engaged in it. This attack was intended as a renewal to the south of the effort which had just been shattered in the north. Instead of turning our flank on the coast, it was now sought to drive in the right of our northern army under the shock of powerful masses. This was the Battle of Ypres. . . . Ypres was solidly covered, and the connections of all the allied forces were established. Against the line thus formed the German attack was hurled from Oct. 25 to Nov. 13, to the north, the east, and the south of Ypres. From Oct. 26 on the attacks were renewed daily with extraordinary violence, obliging us to employ our reinforcements at the most threatened points as soon as they came up. Thus, on Oct. 31, we were obliged to send supports to the British cavalry, then to the two British corps between which the cavalry formed the connecting link, and finally to intercalate between these two corps a force equivalent to two army corps. Between Oct. 30 and Nov. 6 Ypres was several times in danger. The British lost Zandvorde, Gheluvelt, Messines, and Wyttschaete. The front of the Allies, thus contracted, was all the more difficult to defend; but defended it was without a recoil. The arrival of three French divisions in our line enabled us to resume from the 4th to the 8th a vigorous offensive. On the 10th and 11th this offensive, brought up against fresh and sharper German attacks, was checked. Before it could be renewed the arrival of fresh reinforcements had to be awaited, which were dispatched to the north on Nov. 12. . . . By the 14th our troops had again begun to progress, barring the road to Ypres against the German attacks, and inflicting on the enemy, who advanced in massed formation, losses which were especially terrible in consequence of the fact that the French and British artillery had crowded nearly 300 guns on to these few kilometers of front. Thus the main mass of the Germans sustained the same defeat as the detachments operating further to the north along the coast. The support which, according to the idea of the German General Staff, the attack on Ypres was to render to the coastal attack, was as futile as that attack itself had been. During the second half of November the enemy, exhausted and having lost in the Battle of Ypres alone more than 150,000 men, did not attempt to renew his effort, but confined himself to an intermittent cannonade. We, on the contrary, achieved appreciable progress to the north and south of Ypres, and insured definitely by a powerful defensive organization of the position the inviolability of our front."—*Ibid.*—At this stage of the campaign France had more than 2,500,000 men at the front; every unit of the force was stated to be at full war strength.

(v) Battle of the Yser.—I. BELGIAN VERSION.—After the retreat from Antwerp the Belgian field army when it established itself in the Yser was reduced to 80,000 men including only 48,000 rifles. Of cannon there were 350 of 75 millimeter caliber. The mortars numbered 24 of 150 millimeter size. The field army had recently escaped from Antwerp across the Flanders plains and their supply of ammunition was small, and it was impossible at the time to replenish it. "Deprived of a great part of their equipment, clad in uniforms covered with clay and mud, the men appeared to have reached the limit of human endurance and to be incapable of making another effort, however brief. It was at this crisis that the King addressed to the army his admirable Order of the Day. Appealing to the tenacity and courage of his soldiers he stated that it was necessary to continue the struggle until they had joined the armies of the Allies, with which connections had just been established. . . . The King did not disguise the fact that a supreme struggle was at hand. What he demanded of his troops was that they should fight to the death. A mass of 150,000 Germans, formed of new troops, and supported by at least 500 cannon of all calibres, including the heavy pieces that had just smashed the defenses of Antwerp, was about to break itself against this Belgian Army, which was clinging to the last shred of its native soil, physically overmatched, but animated by the purest spirit of sacrifice and devotion. Only on Oct. 15 had this army succeeded in reassembling on the Yser. The next day, the 16th, the battle began. From the 16th to the 20th of October the German effort steadily increases, the conflict goes on developing. On the 20th Nieuport and Dixmude are in flames. The enemy succeeds in penetrating into Lombaertzyde, but cannot get through. He wishes at any cost to break the line of the Yser before reinforcements can arrive. He redoubles his blows. It is at this juncture, in the night of Oct. 21-22, that an event of extreme gravity takes place. Under cover of the darkness the enemy has made a dash across the bridge of Tervaete into the dangerous loop which the Yser throws out toward the east at that place. The hour is agonizing in the extreme, for if the enemy extends his advantage it means that the piercing of the front is inevitable. The Belgian troops, worn out as they are, succeed in holding him; but the next day they have to abandon the bridgehead at Schoorbakke. On the 24th the Germans attempt a supreme effort against Dixmude. Fifteen successive assaults rage about the bridgehead, fifteen assaults which become hand-to-hand combats in the black night, and which break themselves against the courage of the French marines and of the Belgians, certain units of which count seventy-two consecutive hours of fighting! On the 25th the Belgian command, seeing no other means of prolonging the resistance, plans to inundate the ground between the Yser and the railway. The flood is to serve as a last rampart. The preparatory work is begun. . . . Imperceptibly the water has begun its work. The enemy, who does not yet suspect the intervention of this new adversary, is preparing for a last effort. He takes Ramscapelle, from which he is driven out on the 31st, and his retreat is transformed into a rout when he suddenly perceives the flood mounting everywhere around him, cunning and invincible. . . . The battle of the Yser is ended. During these 360 hours of desperate combat the Belgian Army has constantly given all its power, without rest or

pause. . . . In their ragged uniforms they no longer look like human beings. The number wounded in the last thirteen days of October exceeds 9,000; the killed or missing are more than 11,000. . . . But thanks to its stoical, voluntary sacrifices, the Belgian Army has barred the way to Dunkerque and Calais; the left wing of the Allies has not been turned; the enemy has not gained possession of the coast from which he expected to menace the very heart of England."—*Account of Commandant W. Breton, Belgian General Staff.*

2. FRENCH ACCOUNT.—"The line of the Yser which the Belgian Army had to defend was 36 kilometers long, between Nieuport on the sea and Dixmude. The Yser canalised by dikes was not a serious obstacle. The brigade of French Marine Fusiliers attached to the Belgian Army and a brigade of two Belgian regiments (General Mesner) held the position at Dixmude. They were supported on the right by two French territorial divisions . . . and . . . a Corps of Cavalry. . . . The Belgian divisions were distributed along the line of the Yser with advance posts on the northern bank. Two divisions and the cavalry were in reserve at Lamperwyse. The German brought against the Yser line the siege corps from Antwerp and the 4th Army (Württemberg) brought from Champagne. From the beginning of the fight their attacks were vigorously pressed. The Belgians were about to abandon Nieuport when the timely arrival of an Anglo-French flotilla consisting of four monitors and other boats opened on the enemy an enfilading fire that checked his advance. During October 20, 21, and 22 the German attacks increased in violence and . . . in the night of October 23-24 the marine fusiliers at Dixmude were heavily bombarded. They repulsed fifteen assaults. . . . The situation became critical. It was known that the Germans were being heavily reinforced. The Belgian Army was compelled to fall back to the railway line which ran from Nieuport to Dixmude whose embankment offered a rampart from three to six feet high. A call was sent out for help. Fortunately on October 23 the French 42nd Division (Grossetti) composed of seasoned troops arrived and occupied Nieuport and recaptured [Lombertzyde]. . . . The sea-dykes were opened on October 27 and the country was flooded from the Yser to the railway. When the Germans became aware of their danger, they tried to take advantage of the crossing of the Yser which they had won, by making a furious attack on Ramschapelle . . . [which they took] on October 30. . . . The Kaiser wished to express to his troops by his presence the importance he attached to their success, but the 42nd French Division hurried from Nieuport and fell upon Ramschapelle and in a short time, such was the dashing spirit displayed in the attack, recaptured the lost village. The Belgians returning to the firing line responded to the hurrahs of the French troops with their angry war cry 'Louvain! Louvain!' The conflict at Ramschapelle marked the close of the operations of the Belgian Army and of the series of fights to which was given the name of the Battle of Yser. Dixmude was now only a heap of ruins, but the defenders did not abandon it until November 10, having defended foot by foot every pile of crumbling stone. The remnants of valiant troops, composed of 200 Belgians, 200 Senegalese, and 500 marines got away by the right bank, the Germans, being only in possession of some small islets in the midst of the flood where they had established listening posts. Until the close of the year 1914 in this part of the front there were only some un-

important offensives among the dunes of Lombartzyde. The Belgian Army was now reduced to 32,000 rifles; it had broken the offensives of seven divisions of Germany's best troops; most of its guns were worn out. The brigade of marine fusiliers had lost the greater part of their effectiveness and eight out of ten of their officers."—General G. L. Niox, *La Grande Guerre, 1914-1918*, pp. 51-53.

(w) Battle of Ypres-Armentières.—1. NEW PLAN OF OPERATIONS.—"As General Foch was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief to supervise the operations of all the French troops north of Noyon, I visited his headquarters at Doullens on Oct. 8 and arranged joint plans of operations as follows: The Second Corps to arrive on the line Aire-Bethune on the 11th of October, to connect with the right of the French 10th Army and, pivoting on its left, to attack in flank the enemy who were opposing the 10th French Corps in front. The Cavalry to move on the northern flank of the Second Corps and support its attack until the Third Corps, which was to detrain at St. Omer on the 12th, should come up. They were then to clear the front and act on the northern flank of the Third Corps in a similar manner, pending the arrival of the First Corps from the Aisne. The 3rd Cavalry Division and 7th Division, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, which were then operating in support of the Belgian Army and assisting its withdrawal from Antwerp, to be ordered to co-operate as soon as circumstances would allow. In the event of these movements so far overcoming the resistance of the enemy as to enable a forward movement to be made, all the Allied Forces to march in an easterly direction. The road running from Bethune to Lille was to be the dividing line between the British and French Forces, the right of the British Army being directed on Lille."—Field Marshal Sir John French, *Dispatch*, Nov. 29, 1914.

2. OPERATIONS OF SECOND ARMY CORPS (OCTOBER 11-31).—"The great battle . . . may be said to have commenced on October 11th, on which date the 2nd Cavalry Division, under General Gough, first came into contact with the enemy's cavalry who were holding some woods to the north of the Bethune-Aire Canal. These were cleared of the enemy by our cavalry, which then joined hands with the Divisional Cavalry of the 6th Division in the neighbourhood of Hazebrouck. On the same day the right of the 2nd Cavalry Division connected with the left of the Second Corps, which was moving in a north-easterly direction after crossing the above-mentioned canal. By the 11th October Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had reached the line of the canal between Aire and Bethune. I directed him to continue his march on the 12th, bringing up his left in the direction of Merville. Then he was to move East to the line Laventie-Lorgies, which would bring him on the immediate left of the French Army and threaten the German flank. On the 12th this movement was commenced. The 5th Division connected up with the left of the French Army north of Annequin. They moved to the attack of the Germans who were engaged at this point with the French; but the enemy once more extended his right in some strength to meet the threat against his flank. The 3rd Division, having crossed the canal, deployed on the left of the 5th; and the whole Second Corps again advanced to the attack, but were unable to make much headway owing to the difficult character of the ground upon which they were operat-

ing, which was similar to that usually found in manufacturing districts and was covered with mining works, factories, buildings, etc. . . . Before nightfall . . . they had made some advance and had successfully driven back hostile counter-attacks with great loss to the enemy and destruction of some of his machine guns. On and after the 13th October the object of the General Officer Commanding the Second Corps was to wheel to his right, pivoting on Givenchy to get astride the La Bassée-Lille road in the neighbourhood of Fournes, so as to threaten the right flank and rear of the enemy's position on the high ground south of La Bassée. This position of La Bassée has throughout the battle defied all attempts at capture, either by the French or the British. On this day Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien could make but little progress. . . . The fighting of the Second Corps continued throughout the 14th in the same direction. . . . On the 15th the 3rd Division fought splendidly, crossing the dykes, with which this country is intersected, with planks; and driving the enemy from one entrenched position to another in loop-holed villages, till at night they pushed the Germans off the Estaires-La Bassée road, and establishing themselves on the line Pont de Ham-Croix Barbée. On the 16th the move was continued until the left flank of the Corps was in front of the village of Aubers, which was strongly held. This village was captured on the 17th . . . and at dark on the same day the Lincolns and Royal Fusiliers carried the village of Herlies at the point of the bayonet after a fine attack. . . . On the 18th powerful counter-attacks were made by the enemy all along the front of the Second Corps, and were most gallantly repulsed; but only slight progress could be made. From the 19th to the 31st October the Second Corps carried on a most gallant fight in defence of their position against very superior numbers, the enemy having been reinforced during that time. . . . On the 19th the Royal Irish Regiment stormed and carried the village of Le Pilly, which they held and entrenched. On the 20th, however, they were cut off and surrounded, suffering heavy losses. On the morning of the 22nd the enemy made a very determined attack on the 5th Division, who were driven out of the village of Violaines, but they were sharply counter-attacked . . . and prevented from coming on. The left of the Second Corps being now somewhat exposed, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien withdrew the line during the night to a position he had previously prepared, running generally from the eastern side of Givenchy, east of Neuve Chapelle to Fauquissart. On the 24th October the Lahore Division of the Indian Army Corps . . . having arrived, I sent them to the neighbourhood of Lacon to support the Second Corps. Very early on this morning the enemy commenced a heavy attack, but, owing to the skilful manner in which the artillery was handled and the targets presented by the enemy's infantry as it approached, they were unable to come to close quarters. Towards the evening a heavy attack developed against the 7th Brigade, which was repulsed, with very heavy loss to the enemy. . . . Later, a determined attack on the 18th Infantry Brigade drove the Gordon Highlanders out of their trenches, which were retaken by the Middlesex Regiment. . . . The 8th Infantry Brigade (which had come into line on the left of the Second Corps) was also heavily attacked, but the enemy was driven off. In both these cases the Germans lost very heavily, and

left large numbers of dead and prisoners behind them."—*Ibid.*

3. OPERATIONS OF THIRD ARMY CORPS (OCTOBER 13-18).—"By the evening of the 11th October the Third Corps had practically completed its detrainment at St. Omer, and was moved east to Hazebrouck, where the Corps remained throughout the 12th. On the morning of the 13th the advanced guard of the Corps . . . occupied the position of the line Strazeele Station-Caestre-St. Sylvestre. . . . A French Cavalry Corps under General Conneau was operating between the Second and Third Corps. The Fourth German Cavalry Corps . . . was known to be occupying the position in the neighbourhood of Meteren; and they were believed to be further supported by the advanced guard of another German Army Corps. In pursuance of his orders, General Pulteney proceeded to attack the enemy in his front. The rain and fog which prevailed prevented full advantage being derived from our much superior artillery. The country was very much enclosed and rendered difficult by heavy rain. The enemy were, however, routed; and the position taken at dark, several prisoners being captured. . . . As Bailleul was known to be occupied by the enemy, arrangements were made during the night to attack it; but reconnaissances sent out on the morning of the 14th showed that they had withdrawn, and the town was taken by our troops at 10 a.m. on that day. . . . On the morning of the 15th the Third Corps were ordered to make good the line of the Lys from Armentières to Saily, which, in the face of considerable opposition and very foggy weather, they succeeded in doing, the 6th Division at Saily-Bac St. Maur and the 4th Division at Nieppe. The enemy in its front having retired, the Third Corps on the night of the 17th occupied the line Bois Grenier-Le Gheir. On the 18th the enemy . . . occupied the east bank of the river as far as Wervick. On this day I directed the Third Corps to move down the valley of the Lys and endeavour to assist the Cavalry Corps in making good its position on the right bank. To do this it was necessary first to drive the enemy eastward towards Lille. A vigorous offensive in the direction of Lille was assumed, but the enemy was found to have been considerably reinforced, and but little progress was made. . . . Since the advance from Bailleul the enemy's forces in front of the Cavalry and Third Corps had been strongly reinforced, and on the night of the 17th they were opposed by three or four divisions of the enemy's cavalry, the 19th Saxon Corps, and at least one division of the 7th Corps. Reinforcements for the enemy were known to be coming up from the direction of Lille."—Field Marshal Sir John French, *Dispatch*, Nov. 29, 1914.

4. OPERATIONS OF CAVALRY CORPS (OCTOBER 11-19).—"Following the movements completed on the 11th October, the 2nd Cavalry Division pushed the enemy back through Flêtre and Le Coq de Paille, and took Mont des Cats, just before dark, after stiff fighting. On the 14th the 1st Cavalry Division joined up, and the whole Cavalry Corps under General Allenby, moving north, secured the high ground above Berthen, overcoming considerable opposition. With a view to a further advance east, I ordered General Allenby, on the 15th, to reconnoitre the line of the River Lys, and endeavour to secure the passages on the opposite bank, pending the arrival of the Third and Fourth Corps. During the 15th and 16th this reconnaissance was most skilfully and energetically

carried out in the face of great opposition, especially along the lower line of the river. These operations were continued throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th; but, although . . . strong forces of the enemy [were] . . . held in check, the Cavalry Corps was unable to secure passages or to establish a permanent footing on the eastern bank of the river."—*Ibid.*

5. OPERATIONS OF FOURTH ARMY CORPS (OCTOBER 16-20).—"At this point in the history of the operations under report it is necessary that I should return to the co-operation of the forces operating in the neighbourhood of Ghent and Antwerp under Lieutenant-General Sir H. Rawlinson, as the action of his force about this period exercised, in my opinion, a great influence on the course of the subsequent operations. This force, consisting of the 3rd Cavalry Division, under Major-General the Hon. Julian Byng, and the 7th Division, under Major-General Capper, was placed under my orders. . . . I directed Sir Henry Rawlinson to continue his operations in covering and protecting the withdrawal of the Belgian Army, and subsequently to form the left column in the eastward advance of the British Forces. These withdrawal operations were concluded about the 16th October, on which date the 7th Division was posted to the east of Ypres on a line extending from Zandvoorde through Gheluvelt to Zonnebeke. The 3rd Cavalry Division was on its left towards Langemarck and Poelcappelle. In this position Sir Henry Rawlinson was supported by the 87th French Territorial Division in Ypres and Vlamertinghe, and by the 89th French Territorial Division at Poperinghe. . . . A very difficult task was allotted to Sir Henry Rawlinson and his command. Owing to the importance of keeping possession of all the ground towards the north which we already held, it was necessary for him to operate on a very wide front, and, until the arrival of the First Corps in the northern theatre—which I expected about the 20th—I had no troops available with which to support or reinforce him. Although on this extended front he had eventually to encounter very superior forces, his troops, both Cavalry and Infantry, fought with the utmost gallantry, and rendered very signal service."—*Ibid.*

6. FAILURE TO OCCUPY MENIN.—"I considered . . . that the possession of Menin constituted a very important point of passage, and would much facilitate the advance of the rest of the Army. So I directed the . . . Fourth Corps to advance the 7th Division upon Menin, and endeavour to seize that crossing on the morning of the 18th. The left of the 7th Division was to be supported by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and further north by the French Cavalry in the neighbourhood of Roulers. Sir Henry Rawlinson represented to me that large hostile forces were advancing upon him from the east and north-east, and that his left flank was severely threatened. I was aware of the threats from that direction, but hoped that at this particular time there was no greater force coming from the north-east than could be held off by the combined efforts of the French and British Cavalry, and the Territorial troops supporting them, until the passage at Menin could be seized and the First Corps brought up in support. . . . Rawlinson probably exercised a wise judgment in not committing his troops to this attack in their somewhat weakened condition; but the result was that the enemy's continued possession of the passage at Menin certainly facilitated his rapid reinforcement of his troops and

thus rendered any further advance impracticable. . . . On the 19th October the First Corps, coming from the Aisne, had completed its detrainment and was concentrated between St. Omer and Hazebrouck. A question of vital importance now arose for decision. I knew that the enemy were by this time in greatly superior strength on the Lys, and that the Second, Third, Cavalry and Fourth Corps were holding a much wider front than their numbers and strength warranted. . . . I was also aware that the enemy was bringing large reinforcements up from the east which could only be opposed for several days by two or three French Cavalry Divisions, some French Territorial troops, and the Belgian Army. After the hard fighting it had undergone the Belgian Army was in no condition to withstand, unsupported such an attack; and unless some substantial resistance could be offered to this threatened turning movement, the Allied flank must be turned and the Channel Ports laid bare to the enemy."—*Ibid.*

7. FIRST ARMY CORPS ORDERED TO ADVANCE BEYOND YPRES (OCTOBER 19).—"I judged that a successful movement of this kind would be fraught with such disastrous consequences that the risk of operating on so extended a front must be undertaken; and I directed Sir Douglas Haig to move with the First Corps to the north of Ypres. From the best information at my disposal I judged at this time that the considerable reinforcements which the enemy had undoubtedly brought up during the 16th, 17th, and 18th had been directed principally on the line of the Lys and against the Second Corps at La Bassée; and that Sir Douglas Haig would probably not be opposed north of Ypres by much more than the 3rd Reserve Corps, which I knew to have suffered considerably in its previous operations, and perhaps one or two Landwehr Divisions. At a personal interview with Sir Douglas Haig . . . I communicated the above information to him, and instructed him to advance with the First Corps through Ypres to Thourout. The object he was to have in view was to be the capture of Bruges and subsequently, if possible, to drive the enemy towards Ghent. . . . The Belgian Army were rendering what assistance they could by entrenching themselves on the Ypres Canal and the Yser River; and the troops, although in the last stage of exhaustion, gallantly maintained their positions, buoyed up with the hope of substantial British and French support. . . . Having given these orders to Sir Douglas Haig, I enjoined a defensive rôle upon the Second and Third and Cavalry Corps, in view of the superiority of force which had accumulated in their front. As regards the Fourth Corps, I directed Sir Henry Rawlinson to endeavour to conform generally to the movements of the First Corps."—Field Marshal Sir John French, *Dispatch*, Nov. 29, 1914.

8. ADVANCE OF FIRST CORPS (OCTOBER 20-21).—"On the 20th October they reached the line from Elverdinghe to the cross-roads one and a half miles north-west of Zonnebeke. On the 21st the Corps was ordered to attack and take the line Poelcappelle-Passchendaele. Sir Henry Rawlinson's Command was moving on the right of the First Corps, and French troops, consisting of Cavalry and Territorials, moved on their left under . . . General Bidon. The advance was somewhat delayed owing to the roads being blocked; but the attack progressed favourably in face of severe opposition, often necessitating the use of the bayonet. Hearing of heavy attacks being made upon the 7th Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division on his

right, Sir Douglas Haig ordered his reserve to be halted on the north-eastern outskirts of Ypres. Although threatened by a hostile movement from the Forêt d'Houthulst, our advance was successful until about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when the French Cavalry Corps received orders to retire west of the canal. Owing to this and the demands made on him by the Fourth Corps, Sir Douglas Haig was unable to advance beyond the line Zonnebeke-St. Julien-Langemarck-Bixschoote. As there was reported to be congestion with French troops at Ypres, I went there on the evening of the 21st and . . . [with Haig and Rawlinson] I interviewed General De Mitry, Commanding the French Cavalry, and General Bidon, Commanding the French Territorial Divisions. They promised me that the town would at once be cleared of the troops, and that the French Territorials would immediately move out and cover the left of the flank of the First Corps. I discussed the situation with the General Officers Commanding the First and Fourth Army Corps, and told them that, in view of the unexpected reinforcements coming up of the enemy, it would probably be impossible to carry out the original rôle assigned to them. But I informed them that I had that day interviewed . . . General Joffre, who told me that he was bringing up the 9th French Army Corps to Ypres, that more French troops would follow later, and that he intended—in conjunction with the Belgian troops—to drive the Germans east. . . . I directed the General Officers Commanding the First and Fourth Corps to strengthen their positions as much as possible and be prepared to hold their ground for two or three days, until the French offensive movement on the north could develop. It now became clear to me that the utmost we could do to ward off any attempts of the enemy to turn our flank to the north, or to break in from the eastward was to maintain our present very extended front, and to hold fast our positions until French reinforcements could arrive from the south. During the 22nd the necessity of sending support to the Fourth Corps on his right somewhat hampered the . . . First Corps; but a series of attacks all along . . . [its] front had been driven back during the day with heavy loss to the enemy. . . . At 6 a.m. on the morning of the 23rd a counter attack to recover the lost trenches was made . . . under Major-General Bulfin. The attack was very strongly opposed and the bayonet had to be used. After severe fighting during most of the day the attack was brilliantly successful, and over six hundred prisoners were taken. On the same day an attack was made on the 3rd Infantry Brigade. The enemy advanced with great determination, but with little skill, and consequently the loss inflicted on him was exceedingly heavy; some fifteen hundred dead were seen in the neighbourhood of Langemarck.”—*Ibid.*

9. ARRIVAL OF FRENCH 9TH ARMY CORPS.—“In the evening of this day a division of the French 9th Army Corps came up into line and took over the portion of the line held by the 2nd Division, which, on the 24th, took up the ground occupied by the 7th Division from Poelzelhoek to the Becelaere-Passchendaele road. On the 24th and 25th October repeated attacks by the enemy were . . . repulsed. On the night of the 24th-25th the 1st Division was relieved by French Territorial troops and concentrated about Zillebeke. During the 25th the 2nd Division, with the 7th on its right and the French 9th Corps on its left, made good progress towards the north-east. . . . Owing

to constant marching and fighting, ever since its hasty disembarkation in aid of the Antwerp Garrison . . . [the 7th] division had suffered great losses, and were becoming very weak. I therefore decided temporarily to break up the Fourth Corps and place the 7th Division with the First Corps under the command of Sir Douglas Haig. The 3rd Cavalry Division was similarly detailed for service with the First Corps. . . . On receipt of orders, in accordance with the above arrangement, Sir Douglas Haig redistributed the line held by the First Corps as follows: (a) 7th Division from the Chateau east of Zandvoorde to the Menin road. (b) 1st Division from the Menin road to a point immediately west of Reytel village. (c) 2nd Division to near Moorslede-Zonnebeke road.”—Field Marshal Sir John French, *Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1914.*


10. CRISIS OF THE BATTLE OF YPRES (OCTOBER 29-31).—“On the 29th of October the first of the three Great Days began. . . . The action opened at dawn with a terrific bombardment by the massed German artillery, and was succeeded by an attack straight down the great Menin road by the vast mass of the German column. Simultaneously the Germans advanced minor columns to the attack along the roads to Reutel and Zandvoorde and such intermediate by-roads and spaces that converged upon the British line. The main attack had as its objective the seizing of Kruseik Hill, and despite the ghastly slaughter of Germans that took place along the fire-swept Menin road, the surviving masses, pressing forward literally over mounds of their dead and dying comrades, succeeded in seizing the hill at about two o'clock in the afternoon, having endured that merciless blizzard of death for some eight hours. Everywhere else along the front they had been repulsed and had not succeeded in reaching our trenches. Braving the most appalling losses they attacked again and again, but each time the merciless British fire consumed them. Then came Sir Douglas Haig's order for a general British counter attack. Our men swept forward, cheering as they flashed their gleaming bayonets, and the German attack was everywhere hurled back broken upon its lines. Kruseik Hill was stormed and regained with a vast slaughter of the resisting Germans and the fortunes of the day were again favourable to the Allies. In the night the Germans received a very strong reinforcement of no less than three corps. . . . The attack next morning came not along the Menin road, but south at Zandvoorde and Hollebeke. No less than five Army Corps, some 300,000 men attacked the low hills held by the 7th Division and the Cavalry Division. . . . The German troops had received the Imperial Order, they had been told that upon them depended the vital issue of the campaign, and in truth this was so, for their failure was no less our lasting victory. The field grey masses swarmed the lower slopes under a blaze of crackling, unerring rifle fire from the trenches, while the vault above them was thrashed by shrapnel from the guns. Wave after wave of men surged on to meet with annihilation. The dead men hampered the living, and when at last the inestimable mass of survivors reached the trenches held by the Cavalry Division, the British, who had suffered few casualties, simply melted away in the woods behind and withdrew to another position in the rear. The Germans did not dare face those deadly woods from which the incessant ripple of skirmishers' musketry still flayed them. They halted on the Zandvoorde ridge to reform, and during the pause Sir Douglas

Haig was able to withdraw the whole southern line and reform it along the Klein Zillebeke ridge from Gheluvelt to the canal. The French, ever ready in coöperation, were able to send over to the right flank three infantry battalions and a cavalry brigade from the 9th Corps. Meanwhile the thrust at Hollebeke had been held by the Cavalry of the 2nd Division, and they had inflicted terrible losses upon the attacking columns whose hopeless task it was to turn Hollebeke to ease the attack upon Zandvoorde. The situation was critical, but there were still some small reserves in hand for emergency, and the position was still tenable. The failure of the Zandvoorde-Hollebeke turning movement was manifest, so on the following day, the memorable 31st of October, 1914, the German assault was renewed on the original line down the Menin road, while at the same time a simultaneous attack was delivered from Zandvoorde. At daybreak a French reinforcement that had come over from the 9th Corps counter-attacked southeast of Gheluvelt, but the masses of enemy were impenetrable and the attack was halted. The fortunes of the day centred upon Gheluvelt, and despite all efforts the 1st Division was at last driven in and its flank forced to retreat down the road toward Ypres. The attack from Zandvoorde had also been pressed home so that the 7th Division had not only their left flank enfiladed at Gheluvelt but their right flank on the Klein-Zillebeke ridge turned. They too had to retreat through the woods toward Ypres. At this critical juncture Sir John French was at Hooze and in personal touch with the march of events. As the Germans drove their huge column along the Menin road into the British Salient they exposed an ever-growing vulnerable flank. Sir John French seized his opportunity. This flank was promptly attacked from the North by all troops that could be mustered from the 1st Army Corps and 27,000 men—the 1st Division and part of the 2nd Division—were hurled against this weak point. It was a master stroke. The enemy were held, the retiring British troops rallied, and the great mass of the German thrust attacked from front and flank was mown down wholesale. For a brief moment they held together, then the rout commenced and the broken masses streamed back through the deadly woods toward their own lines. Despite the incessant three days' fighting the victorious British pursued with rifle and bayonet, while the 6th Cavalry Brigade cleared the woods of little isolated bodies and stragglers. It was a grim bit of work, that rout of the German masses, when the débris of the vast broken fighting machine tried to escape back to their own lines. That belt of woodland and hills round Ypres proved the last resting place of many thousands of Germans. The battle was destined to drag on another fifteen days, but the great effort was over. The Germans had suffered a hammer blow from which they could never recover. The crisis was past, for Sir John French's master stroke had brought victory. The pressure on the Allied line slackened and the road to Calais was still closed."—H. B. C. Pollard, *Story of Ypres*, pp. 29-36.

II. GERMAN ATTACK OF OCTOBER 31.—"General Moussy . . . moved to the attack early in the morning, but was brought to a complete standstill, and could make no further progress. After several attacks and counter-attacks during the course of the morning along the Menin-Ypres road, south-east of Gheluvelt, an attack against that place developed in great force, and the line

of the 1st Division was broken. . . . The retirement of the 1st Division exposed the left of the 7th Division, and owing to this the Royal Scots Fusiliers, who remained in their trenches, were cut off and surrounded. . . . Shortly after this the Headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Divisions were shelled. The General Officer Commanding 1st Division was wounded, three Staff Officers of the 1st Division and three of the 2nd Division were killed."—Field Marshal Sir John French, *Dispatch*, Nov. 29, 1914.

12. RECOVERY OF GHELUVELT.—"Meantime, on the Menin road, a counter-attack delivered by the left of the 1st Division and the right of the 2nd Division against the right flank of the German line was completely successful, and by 2.30 p.m. Gheluvelt had been retaken with the bayonet. . . . The left of the 7th Division, profiting by their capture of Gheluvelt, advanced almost to its original line; and connection between the 1st



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and 7th Divisions was re-established. The recapture of Gheluvelt released the 6th Cavalry Brigade, till then held in support of the 1st Division. Two regiments of this brigade were sent at once to clear the woods to the south-east, and close the gap in the line between the 7th Division and 2nd Brigade. They advanced with much dash, partly mounted and partly dismounted; and, surprising the enemy in the woods, succeeded in killing large numbers and materially helped to restore the line. About 5 p.m. the French Cavalry Brigade also came up to the cross-roads just east of Hooze, and at once sent forward a dismounted detachment to support our 7th Cavalry Brigade. Throughout the day the extreme right and left of the First Corps' line held fast, the left being only slightly engaged, while the right was heavily shelled and subjected to slight infantry attacks. In the evening the enemy were steadily driven back from the woods on the front of the 7th Division and 2nd Brigade; and by 10 p.m. the line as held in the morning had practically been

reoccupied. . . . The rally of the 1st Division and the recapture of the village of Gheluvelt at such a time was fraught with momentous consequences."—*Ibid.*

13. STAUNCH DEFENSE BY THE THIRD ARMY CORPS (OCTOBER 20-31).—"In the meantime the centre of my line, occupied by the Third and Cavalry Corps, was being heavily pressed by the enemy in ever-increasing force. On the 20th October advanced posts were forced to retire, and at dusk it was evident that the Germans were likely to make a determined attack. This ended in the occupation of Le Gheir by the enemy. As the position of the Cavalry at St. Yves was thus endangered, a counter-attack was decided upon and planned by General Hunter-Weston and Lieutenant-Colonel Anley. This proved entirely successful, the Germans being driven back with great loss and the abandoned trenches reoccupied. . . . Besides the very undue length of front which the [Third] Corps was called upon to cover (some 12 or 13 miles), the position presented many weak spots, and was also astride of the River Lys, the right bank of which from Frelinghein downwards was strongly held by the enemy. It was impossible to provide adequate reserves, and the constant work in the trenches tried the endurance of officers and men to the utmost. . . . On the evening of the 20th October the enemy made a sharp attack on Le Gheir, and on the line to the north of it, but were repulsed. About midnight a very heavy attack developed against the 10th Infantry Brigade south of Croix Maréchal. A portion of the trenches . . . was gained by the enemy and held by him for some hours till recaptured. . . . The enemy in the trenches were all bayoneted or captured. . . . On the evening of the 30th the line of the 11th Infantry Brigade in the neighbourhood of St. Yves was broken. A counter-attack carried out by Major Prowse with the Somerset Light Infantry restored the situation."—*Ibid.*

14. CAVALRY IN THE TRENCHES (OCTOBER 22-31).—"On October 20th, while engaged in the attempt to force the line of the River Lys, the Cavalry Corps was attacked from the south and east. . . . On the 21st October a heavy attack was made on the 2nd Cavalry Division, which was compelled to fall back. . . . On the 22nd . . . the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade, less one battalion . . . [proceeded] to Wulverghem in support of the Cavalry Corps. . . . On the 23rd, 24th and 25th several attacks were directed against the Cavalry Corps and repulsed with loss to the enemy. On the 26th October . . . General Allenby . . . [endeavoured] to regain a more forward line, moving in conjunction with the 7th Division. But the latter being apparently quite unable to take the offensive, the attempt had to be abandoned. . . . The 1st Cavalry Division in the neighbourhood of Messines was also threatened by a heavy infantry column. General Allenby still retained the two Indian Battalions of the 7th Indian Brigade, although they were in a somewhat exhausted condition. After a close survey of the positions and consultations with the General Officer . . . [of] the Cavalry Corps, I directed four battalions of the Second Corps, which had lately been relieved from the trenches by the Indian Corps, to move to Neuve Eglise under General Shaw, in support of General Allenby. . . . It now fell to the lot of the Cavalry Corps, which had been much weakened by constant fighting, to oppose the advance of two nearly fresh German Army Corps for a period of over forty-eight hours, pending the arrival of a French reinforcement. Their action was com-

pletely successful. . . . After the critical situation in front of the Cavalry Corps, which was ended by the arrival of the head of the French 16th Army Corps, the 2nd Cavalry Division was relieved by General Conneau's French Cavalry Corps and concentrated in the neighbourhood of Bail-leul."—*Ibid.*

15. THIRD CORPS HOLDS ITS GROUND.—"The Third Corps in its position on the right of the Cavalry Corps continued throughout the same period to repel constant attacks against its front, and suffered severely from the enemy's heavy artillery fire. The artillery of the 4th Division constantly assisted the French in their attacks. . . . The Lahore Division arrived in its concentration area in rear of the Second Corps on the 19th and 20th October. . . . [Part of] the Division from the 25th October onwards were heavily engaged in assisting the 7th Brigade of the Second Corps in fighting round Neuve Chapelle. Another brigade took over some ground previously held by the French 1st Cavalry Corps. . . . On the 28th October especially the 47th Sikhs and the 20th and 21st Companies of the 3rd Sappers and Miners distinguished themselves by their gallant conduct in the attack on Neuve Chapelle, losing heavily in officers and men."—*Ibid.*

16. INDIAN TROOPS.—"After the arrival of the Meerut Division at Corps Headquarters the Indian Army Corps took over the line previously held by the Second Corps, which was then partially drawn back into reserve. Two and a half brigades of British Infantry and a large part of the artillery of the Second Corps still remained to assist the Indian Corps in defence of this line. Two and a half battalions of these brigades were returned to the Second Corps when the Ferozepore Brigade joined the Indian Corps after its support of the Cavalry further north. The Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade arrived in the area during the 1st and 2nd November, and the Jodhpur Lancers came about the same time. These were all temporarily attached to the Indian Corps. Up to . . . [Nov. 29, 1914] the line held by the Indian Corps has been subjected to constant bombardment by the enemy's heavy artillery, followed up by infantry attacks. . . . On the 13th October the 8th Gurkha Rifles of the Bareilly Brigade were driven from their trenches, and on the 2nd November a serious attack was developed against a portion of the line west of Neuve Chapelle. On this occasion the line was to some extent pierced, and was consequently slightly bent back. The situation was prevented from becoming serious by . . . the 2nd Gurkha Rifles."—Field Marshal Sir John French, *Dispatch*, Nov. 29, 1914.

17. RENEWED GERMAN ATTACKS ON THE FIRST ARMY CORPS (NOVEMBER 2-12).—"Whilst the whole of the line has continued to be heavily pressed, the enemy's principal efforts since the 1st November have been concentrated upon breaking through the line held by the First British and 9th French Corps, and thus gaining possession of the town of Ypres. From the 2nd November onwards the 27th, the 15th and parts of the Bavarian 13th and 2nd German Corps, besides other troops, were all directed against this northern line. About the 10th instant, after several units of these Corps had been completely shattered in futile attacks, a division of the Prussian Guard, which had been operating in the neighbourhood of Arras, was moved up to this area with great speed and secrecy. Documents found on dead officers prove that the Guard had received the Emperor's special commands to break through and

succeed where their comrades of the line had failed. They took a leading part in the vigorous attacks made against the centre on the 11th and 12th; but, like their comrades, were repulsed with enormous loss. . . . The First Corps was brilliantly supported by the 3rd Cavalry Division under General Byng. Sir Douglas Haig has constantly brought this officer's eminent services to my notice. His troops were repeatedly called upon to restore the situation at critical points, and to fill gaps in the line caused by the tremendous losses which occurred. Both Corps and Cavalry Division Commanders particularly bring to my notice the name of Brigadier-General Kavanagh, Commanding the 7th Cavalry Brigade, not only for his skill but his personal bravery and dash. . . . On the 5th November I despatched eleven battalions of the Second Corps, all considerably reduced in strength, to relieve the infantry of the 7th Division, which was then brought back into general reserve. Three more battalions of the same Corps . . . were subsequently sent to reinforce the troops fighting to the east of Ypres. . . . The battalions of the Second Corps took a conspicuous part in repulsing the heavy attacks delivered against this part of the line. I was obliged to despatch them immediately after their trying experiences in the southern part of the line and when they had had a very insufficient period of rest; and, although they gallantly maintained these northern positions until relieved by the French, they were reduced to a condition of extreme exhaustion. . . . In remarking upon the general military situation of the Allies as it appears to me at the present moment, it does not seem to be clearly understood that the operations in which we have been engaged embrace nearly all the Continent of Central Europe from East to West. The combined French, Belgian, and British Armies in the West and the Russian Army in the East are opposed to the united forces of Germany and Austria acting as a combined army between us. Our enemies elected at the commencement of the war to throw the weight of their forces against the armies in the West, and to detach only a comparatively weak force, composed of very few first-line troops and several corps of the second and third lines, to stem the Russian advance till the Western Forces could be completely defeated and overwhelmed. Their strength enabled them from the outset to throw greatly superior forces against us in the West. This precluded the possibility of our taking a vigorous offensive, except when the miscalculations and mistakes made by their commanders opened up special opportunities for a successful attack and pursuit."—*Ibid.*

18. SUMMARY OF BATTLE.—“In this great fight [the British losses] were little short of 50,000. The fact that the enemy did not recoil and that there was no sensational capture of prisoners and guns has obscured the completeness of the victory. . . . One judges victory or defeat by the question whether an army has or has not reached its objective. In this particular case, taking a broad view of the whole action, a German force of at least 600,000 men set forth to reach the coast, and was opposed by a force of less than half its numbers who barred its way. The Germans did not advance five miles in a month of fighting, and they lost not less than 150,000 men without any military advantage whatever, for the possession of such villages as Gheluvelt, Wytshaete, or Messines availed them not at all. . . . Ypres was a Plevna—but a Plevna which

remained for ever untaken.”—A. C. Doyle, *British campaign in France and Flanders, 1914*, p. 311.—“Within hearing of the guns of Ypres, roaring their last challenge, the greatest British soldier passed away. Lord Roberts landed at Boulogne on 11th November on a visit to his beloved Indian troops. On the 12th he was at the headquarters of the corps, and went about among his friends, speaking their own tongue, and greeting many of them who had fought with him during the frontier wars. The strain proved too great for the veteran; he caught a chill in the bitter weather; and . . . on the night of Saturday, the 14th the end came. It was fitting that the master-gunner should die within sound of his guns, that the most adored of British soldiers should have his passing amid the army he had loved so well.”—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, p. 369.

19. BRITISH DEFENSE AT YPRES.—ALLIED PLANS.—“The Allies carried out the evacuation of Antwerp, which was no longer tenable, and the Belgian Army retreated through Ghent, covered by the British 7th Division and the Naval Division, and preceded by the 3rd Cavalry Division. By October 15, 1914, the retreat had been safely accomplished, and much of the Belgian Army, very weary and disorganized, lay in the forest of Houlthoult near Ypres. The remainder lay round Ostend. The city of Ypres itself was full of wounded, and four miles away towards Armentières the English cavalry patrols were in touch with the enemy, and with the remainder of the British forces that had been fighting round Armentières, checking the westward expansion of the German line while the retreat from Antwerp was in progress. This, then, was the position when the British first entered Ypres. The Belgian Army, exhausted but safe, had gained the line of the Yser Canal. The British force that had been separated—part at Antwerp, the other at Lille—had joined again, and both French and British were straining every nerve to pour up more reserves of troops to hold the line of the Yser from Nieuport to Ypres. It had been a race against time, and the Allies had won. . . . On the evening of the 20th [October] the Allied forces were in the position . . . and the stage was set for the first battle of Ypres. It is difficult to set a period to a modern battle, but authorities agree that this battle lasted from the 20th of October to the 17th of November, a period of twenty-seven days. Field-Marshal Viscount French himself specifies Saturday the 31st as the most critical of all.”—H. B. C. Pollard, *Story of Ypres*, pp. 16-18.—The section of the front to the north of our forces was the first to meet the recrudescence of violence in the shape of an attack in the neighborhood of Dixmude and Bixchoote. Early on October 30, “hearing heavy firing towards Ypres, I went to Haig's Headquarters at Hooze. Whilst I was with Haig, Allenby came in. . . . By the evening the Second and Third Cavalry Divisions had fallen back to the Canal, and the enemy was in possession of Hollebeke. Shortly after dawn on . . . 31st of October, we had news that a serious infantry attack was developing on the left of the Fourth Division in the valley of the river Douve. . . . But the great events of the day took place between Gheluvelt on the north and Messines on the south. . . . About noon . . . I left Allenby in order to join Haig at Hooze, east of Ypres. A battalion of French arrived to support the troops fighting at Messines just as I was leaving. . . . On reaching the eastern exit of the town, on my way to Hooze, I was stopped by a guard specially posted. . . . Shells

were screaming overhead and bursting with reverberating explosions in the adjacent fields. This spectacle filled me with misgiving and alarm. . . . The Château of Hooge, where First Army Headquarters were situated, has long since been erased from the face of the earth in the severe fighting which has raged about it. But as I found it on that October afternoon, it was a typical modern red-brick château, approached by a gate and a short avenue from the road. Shells were falling about the place, and the château was already beginning to show the effects of artillery fire. I found Haig and John Gough, his Chief of Staff, in one of the rooms on the ground floor, poring over some maps and evidently much disconcerted. But, though much perturbed in mind and very tired in body and brain, Haig was as cool and alert as ever."—Field Marshal Viscount French, 1914, pp. 247, 249, 252-254.—"In spite of the immense losses suffered by the enemy during the five day attack against Ypres (Oct. 29-Nov. 2), the cessation of their more violent efforts on the latter day did not signalize the abandonment of the whole project, but merely the temporary relinquishment of the main offensive until fresh troops had been massed to carry on what was proving to be a costly and difficult operation. Meanwhile the interval was employed in endeavoring to wear out the Allies by repeated local attacks of varying force and to shatter them by a prolonged and concentrated bombardment. After eight days of comparative relaxation we were under constant pressure from Nov. 3 to Nov. 10. The next day saw a repetition of the great attempt of the Germans to break through our lines to the French coast. As day broke on the 11th the Germans opened fire on our trenches to the north and south of the road from Menin to Ypres. A few hours later they followed this by an infantry assault in force. This attack was carried out by the First and Fourth brigades of the Guard Corps, which have been sent for to make a supreme effort to capture Ypres, since that task had proved too heavy for the infantry of the line. As the attackers surged forward they were met by our frontal fire, and since they were moving diagonally across part of our front they were also attacked on the flank by artillery, rifles, and machine guns. Though their casualties before they reached our line must have been enormous, such was their resolution and the momentum of the mass that . . . they succeeded in breaking through our line in three places near the road. They penetrated some distance into the woods behind our trenches, but were counter-attacked again, enfiladed by machine guns and driven back to their line of trenches, a certain portion of which they succeeded in holding, in spite of our efforts to expel them. November 12 was marked by a partial lull in the fighting all along our line. To the north a German force which had crossed the Yser and entrenched on the left bank was annihilated by a night attack with the bayonet, executed by the French. . . . Immediately on our left the French were strongly attacked and driven back a short distance, our extreme left having to conform to this movement. Our allies soon recovered the ground they had lost; however, and this enabled us to advance also. . . . The fact that on this day the advance against our line in front of Ypres was not pushed home after such an effort as that of Wednesday tends to show that for the moment the attacking troops had had enough. Although the failure of this great attack by the Guard Corps to accomplish their object cannot

be described as a decisive event, . . . it [has] . . . a dramatic interest of its own. Having once definitely failed to achieve this object by means of the sheer weight of numbers, and having done their best to wear us down, the Germans brought in fresh picked troops to carry the Ypres salient by an assault from the north, the south and the east. That the Guard Corps should have been selected to act against the eastern edge of the salient may be taken as proof of the necessity felt by the Germans to gain this point in the line. Their dogged perseverance in pursuance of their objective claims whole-hearted admiration. The failure of one great attack, heralded as it was by an impassioned appeal to the troops made in the presence of the Emperor himself, but carried out by partially trained men, has been only the signal for another desperate effort in which the place of honor was assigned to the corps d'élite of the German Army."—British official report (*New York Times Current History*, Jan., 1915, pp. 672-674).—"At this time all our ideas in regard to the framing of plans in the West were evolved and guided almost entirely by the progress of the campaign in Poland and Galicia. After the Battle of the Marne, when we were at the Aisne, we were still hopeful of effecting a great flanking movement which should lead to more or less decisive results, or at least clear Northern France and Belgium of the enemy's troops. It has been shown how the development of events obliged us to modify our hopes and anticipations until, at the close of the first battle of Ypres, we certainly felt at our own General Headquarters that the Allied forces of Great Britain, France, and Belgium could effect nothing of importance unless and until one of two things happened. Either there must be a considerable augmentation of our forces, including a vastly increased supply of heavy artillery, machine guns, trench artillery, and ammunition, or, the enemy's forces on the Western Front must be so weakened by the necessity of sending troops to stem the Russian advance in the East as to enable the Allies with their available forces to assume the offensive with success."—Field Marshal Viscount French, 1914, p. 307.—"It is estimated that the Allies lost 100,000 men between Oct. 15 and Nov. 15, 40,000 of these were British casualties, the remainder French and Belgian. German losses are put at 250,000. About 1,200,000 German troops were employed. These statistics must be accepted with extreme reserve."—General G. L. Niox, *La Grande Guerre*, 1914-1918, p. 55.—A British estimate of German losses in the encounters collectively named the battle of the Yser places the number at 120,000.

20. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.—WINTER CAMPAIGN.—"After the check on the Marne the Germans fell back to the line of the Aisne and made their stand in previously prepared trenches on the northern bank of the river, about two miles from the water's edge. When the Allies caught up they forced the passage of the Aisne and made a desperate attempt, which lasted nearly a week, to drive the Germans from their positions. The successful defensive battle of the Aisne was the German answer to the successful offensive battle of the Marne. In the middle of September General Joffre had planned to shift his attack by extending his left wing and outflanking the Germans in the direction of the English Channel and the North Sea. This movement developed into a great series of battles which also had taken the name of a river, the Yser. So far as this plan included the hope of freeing Flanders

from the invader, it broke down when, on October 9, Antwerp surrendered. A remnant of the Belgian Army marched out of the city to the west and reached the Allied lines, of which they held the extreme end resting upon the sea. The German line swung round its right wing behind them and conquered nearly all of Belgium. It was now the Allies' turn, having failed in an attempt to outflank the German line and so compel its retirement, to stand and resist an assault which the Germans made with great masses of troops in an attempt to break through the extreme left flank of the Allied line. The menaced portion of the line extended almost due north and south from the banks of the river Somme, near Albert, to Nieuport at the mouth of the river Yser on the North Sea. The Germans could not hope to outflank this line, for it rested on the sea! Apparently their object was to force it back far enough to capture Calais, which is only twenty miles from the English coast, bring up batteries of great guns and establish there an armed harbor defended by minefields from which they could the more easily attack and harass England. Although they several times indented the Allied line and drove back the troops defending it, they were never able to break through in such numbers as to hold their gain; still less to attack the broken line on the flanks and so compel a general retirement."—P. Van Dyke, *Western front (New York Times Current History, Jan., 1915, p. ii)*.—The battle of Flanders died away on November 11. Arras had been reduced to ruins by the Germans in a fifteen days' bombardment; Rheims had suffered severely, and the whole country south of Arras and around Bapaume, Albert, Chaulnes and Péronne had been laid waste. Having secured the necessary gun-positions, the Germans began a violent bombardment of Ypres on November 1, creating terrible panic and destruction. By the 5th the surging tide of war had flowed back south from the sea-coast into France. German reinforcements poured into the country. The Belgian coast line from Ostend to Holland was in German hands; also the port of Zeebrugge, soon to become a base for German submarines; arteries of inland communication fell to the invaders—the ship-canal from Zeebrugge to Bruges, the Canal de Ghent, the Scheldt from Ghent to Antwerp, and the railroad lines from Antwerp to the coast. From Emden, Bremerhaven, Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, Kiel and Heligoland it had hitherto been impracticable to strike at the British fleet or to attempt raids on British territory; but with Ostend and Zeebrugge at their disposal, the Germans could now hope to make such attempts, as indeed they successfully carried out when the submarine campaign developed during the later stages of the war. From the coast to the Swiss frontier the long drawn-out struggle of wear and tear continued with unimportant results to either side. During the early days of December certain indications along the whole front of the allied line led the French and British commanders to believe that the enemy had withdrawn considerable forces from the western theatre. Arrangements were made with the Eighth French Army for an attack to be commenced on the morning of December 14. Operations began at 7 a. m. by a combined heavy artillery bombardment by the French and British. The British objectives were the Petit Bois and the Maedelsteed Spur, lying respectively to the west and the southwest of the village of Wyttschaete. The Royal Scots, in face of a terrible machine-gun and rifle fire, carried the Ger-

man trench on the west edge of the Petit Bois, while the Gordon Highlanders advanced up the Maedelsteed Spur, forcing the enemy to evacuate their front trench. As the 32nd French Division on the left had been unable to make any progress, further British advance into the Wyttschaete Wood was impracticable. The ground was devoid of cover and so water-logged that a rapid advance was impossible, the men sinking deep in the mud at every step. From Dec. 15 to 17 the offensive operations were continued, but were confined chiefly to artillery bombardment. On the 18th and 19th the Indian Corps attempted to take advantage of what seemed a favorable opportunity to launch attacks against the advanced trenches on its front. Two lines of the enemy's trenches were captured with little loss, but at daybreak it was found that the position was practically untenable. Both flanks were in the air, and a supporting attack, which was late in starting, failed of success. By the night of Dec. 19 nearly all the ground gained had been lost. From Dec. 20 the enemy commenced a heavy artillery fire on the whole front of the Indian Corps, followed by infantry attacks, which were in especial force against Givenchy, and between that place and La Quinque Rue. One Indian brigade (Sirhind) was driven back, and the 47th Sikhs with another Indian brigade were sent in support. Two British regiments and two battalions of French Territorials under General Carnegie were ordered to launch a counter-attack to retake by a flank movement the trenches lost by the Sirhind Brigade. Givenchy was captured and the Germans driven out of two lines of trenches. During the night reinforcements arrived from Haig's Corps, of which three brigades were employed the following morning, and by the 22nd a considerable gain of ground had been achieved. On the same day Sir Douglas Haig took over command from General Willcocks.—Based on Field Marshal John French, *Dispatch, Feb. 2, 1915*.—"The scrambling and unsatisfactory Battle of Givenchy [was] a violent interlude in the drab records of trench warfare. It began with a considerable inroad of Germans into our territory and heavy losses of our Indian Contingent. It ended by a general return of the Germans to their former lines, and the resumption by the veteran troops of the First Division of the main positions which we had lost. Neither side had gained any ground of material value, but the balance of profits in captures was upon the side of the Germans, who may fairly claim that the action was a minor success for their arms, since they assert that they captured some hundreds of prisoners and several machine guns. The Anglo-Indian Corps had 2,600 casualties, and the First Corps 1,400, or 4,000 in all. . . . About the same date as the Battle of Givenchy there was some fighting farther north at Rouge Banc . . . where some German trenches were taken. . . . Henceforward peace reigned along the lines for several weeks—indeed Christmas brought about something like fraternisation between British and Germans, who found a sudden and extraordinary link in that ancient tree-worship, long anterior to Christianity, which Saxon tribes had practised in the depths of Germanic forests and still commemorated by their candle-lit firs. For a single day the opposing forces mingled in friendly conversation and even in games."—A. Conan Doyle, *British campaign in France and Flanders, 1914, pp. 337-338*.—Early in the month King George V paid a visit to the British troops at the front.

(x) Belgian mission to the United States.—“In order to inform neutral countries—and America in particular, where the statements of German agencies were designed to mislead the public—what was our actual rôle in the great European conflict, the Belgian Government decided to send an official mission to the United States. This mission was composed of M. Carton de Wiart, Minister of Justice—who was president of the mission, . . . Envoy Extraordinary of the King of the Belgians to the President of the United States—and of three Ministers of State, representing the three great Belgian political parties; MM. de Sadeleer, Hymans, and Emile Vandervelde. The mission left Antwerp on the 30th of August, and on the 1st of September was received in special audience by the King of England, to whom it bore the expression of the gratitude of the Belgian nation for the fidelity and alacrity with which England had fulfilled her obligations as



CARDINAL MERCIER

a guarantor of Belgian neutrality. The day before the mission landed in New York, with a view to discounting the impression it should have produced, the Emperor of Germany sent to President Wilson . . . [a] telegram in which he denounced the pretended acts of violence committed by the Belgians, and notably by women, upon the German wounded. He added that such violence had necessitated acts of repression which pained him extremely. . . . The Belgian mission was received at the White House on the 16th of September. Replying to the speech of M. Carton de Wiart, the President . . . expressed, in significant terms, his keen admiration for the Belgian people and his respect for their King. . . . After he had received the Belgian mission and conferred with it . . . President Wilson replied to the Emperor's message. . . . The . . . mission was then received by the principal Universities of the United States: New York, Harvard, and Chicago. Then, having received in Canada a truly triumphant welcome from the authorities and the population of the Dominion, it had opportunities of conferring with

a number of American notabilities—and with Mr. Roosevelt in particular—enlightening them as to the situation in Belgium, . . . and thereby contributing to create throughout the United States that potent and wonderful current of sympathy and solidarity which presently found expression in the organisation of relief for the population of the occupied provinces.”—A. V. J. Gerlache de Gomery, *Belgium in war time*, pp. 104-105.—See also BELGIUM: 1914: Belgian mission.

(y) Cardinal Mercier and the Germans.—From the day the Germans occupied Brussels, Cardinal Mercier, primate of Belgium, continued at his post and, speaking through his clergy, inspired his people with courage and fortitude; urging them to be patient, to do nothing to invite persecution from the invader while awaiting the day of deliverance. The German governors, first von der Goltz and his successor von Bissing, tried to silence Cardinal Mercier, but never succeeded. The Cardinal's famous Pastoral Letter sent to all the churches to be read on January 3, 1915, recalled the present sufferings of the country and adjured Belgians to “remain faithful to their King and their laws.” Informed of this letter the Germans withdrew the cardinal's permission to visit the other bishops in his motor car. At the same time they forbade the priests to make the letter known to their parishoners; they even proceeded to seize the pamphlet in the presbyteries. The priests refused to obey the injunction and the beginning of the *mandamus* was read from the pulpits on Jan. 3, 1915. To compel the priests to discontinue reading the letter, a declaration signed by von Bissing was shown them in which it was stated that after Cardinal Mercier had been informed by the governor that his Pastoral might have an exciting effect on the people that he no longer insisted that it should be read by his clergy from the pulpit. This declaration Cardinal Mercier pronounced to be false. “They have done everything to make me sign mitigations of my letter: I have not signed them. Now they seek to separate my clergy from me, by forbidding them to read it.” The German governor published a declaration that “The Cardinal Archbishop of Malines has in no manner been prevented in the free performance of his ecclesiastical office.” The cardinal in rebuttal described the invasion of the presbyteries by German soldiers throughout the night of January 1, 1915, when they seized, or endeavored to seize, the Pastoral Letter sent to the priests. Threats of severe punishment were made to the clergy if they attempted to read the letter. Even the cardinal's dignity had not been respected. Before sunrise on January 2 he was ordered to present himself that day before the governor-general to justify his letter to the clergy. On the following day he was forbidden to preside at the benediction in the cathedral of Antwerp. He was also forbidden to visit the other Belgian bishops. Despite the seizure of many thousands of copies of the Pastoral Letter by the Germans and the arrest of the printer it continued to circulate among the people. There were more than a dozen different editions in French, two in Flemish and several typewritten editions. Throughout the war the indomitable prelate was a thorn in the side of the German rulers, while his attitude towards them was always correct and diplomatic. To him belongs much of the credit for having kept patriotism alive in the hearts of his countrymen through the darkest hours when it seemed that they must resign all hope of deliverance and ac-

cept the yoke of the invaders.—Based on J. Mas-sart, *Belgians under the German eagle* (tr. by B. Miall), pp. 239-245.

(z) Summary of occupation of Belgium by Germans. See BELGIUM: 1914: World War; 1914-1918: German occupation, to 1914-1918: African campaign.

II. EASTERN FRONT

(a) Russian plan of campaign.—“Let us consider briefly the general plan of the Russian campaign against the Teutonic allies. At the beginning of the war one was tempted to measure the distance from the western border of Poland to Berlin and consider this as the distance Russian armies had to move in order to threaten the German capital. This, however, was to ignore the absolute dependence of armies under thoroughly safeguarded lines of communication. It would manifestly be impossible for a large Russian army to concentrate in western Poland and move on Berlin so long as an unbeaten German army occupied the morainic country of East Prussia, and a similar Austrian army existed in the rugged plateau upland of Galicia; for as soon as the advance on Berlin was started, the line of communication running from Russia through Poland to the army at the front would be in peril from a southward advance of the Germans debouching from the morainic hills, or a northward advance of the Austrians descending from the Podolian Plateau. If either advance succeeded in severing, even for a short period, those arteries which alone enabled an army in the field to live, disaster to the Russians would speedily follow. It would be more accurate, therefore, to draw a line from the eastern point of the Prussian border southeastward to the eastern border of Galicia, and consider this as the line from which the Russian advance on Berlin must be measured. This, roughly, doubles the length of the advance. Already in possession of the territory immediately in front of the center of this line, the Russians had to concern themselves with the hostile territory at the north and south. On the north the task was the more serious. Here were combined the most highly perfected military machine and the most difficult topography. In order to make an advance on Berlin from western Poland feasible, Russian armies must drive the Germans out of all that part of Prussia projecting east of the west Poland border. This would involve not only the traversing of the morainic hill and lake country, but in addition the passing of a very serious obstacle, the broad, shallow trench of the lower Vistula which cuts across the neck of the peninsula of eastern Prussia. The strength of this defensive line lies in the fact that the invaders would have to cross the broad, flat floor of the valley under fire from artillery posted on the crest of the western valley wall, and would also have to negotiate an unfordable river of great breadth and volume; and in the further fact that each end of this line is guarded by a powerful fortress, Thorn at the south and Danzig at the north. In several respects the topography in the south favored the Russian plans. No topographic barrier along the boundaries between Russia and Galicia prevents an easy invasion of the latter, whereas the formidable barrier of the Carpathians does separate Galicia from the rest of Austria-Hungary. Galicia is, therefore, a peripheral province, which is for topographic reasons peculiarly isolated from the rest of its country and there-

fore more easily subject to conquest by a neighboring power. During the invasion the deep gorge of the lower Dniester, and farther west the marshy flood-plain of the upper Dniester, would serve as admirable protections for the left flank of the invading army. Once the Austrian armies were pushed westward toward Cracow or southward over the Carpathians, the few passes over the latter could be held by small detachments of troops, and the left flank of the westward-moving Russian army would then have the effective protection of a mountain barrier; for while several roads and railways cross through the passes, they are so readily controlled that the strategic importance of the barrier is not greatly diminished. Austrian reinforcements would have to defile through the passes and along the few narrow mountain roads in greatly extended columns, a formation which would render them vulnerable to attacks by inferior numbers. No sudden assault of serious magnitude upon an army flank which is protected by a mountain barrier is feasible so long as the defending troops properly perform their functions. With these favorable topographic elements was combined the further favorable fact that the Austrian armies were less formidable than the Prussian military machine. Political conditions in Austria-Hungary also dictated a vigorous Russian offensive in Galicia, since a nation composed of heterogeneous elements, some of them held in subjection against their will, can be more easily driven to seek peace after military reverses than can a nation which is better unified. Topographic, military, and political considerations combined, therefore, to induce the Russian General Staff to subordinate the East Prussian campaign to far greater movements in Galicia.”—D. W. Johnson, *Topography and strategy in the war*, pp. 59-61.—“The configuration of Russia made invasion in the ordinary sense a hopeless task. The strongest army would be apt to melt away before it reached Moscow or Petrograd. But with the Russian field forces stationed in Western Poland an opportunity was given to Germany and Austria of striking a blow without the handicap of insuperable natural obstacles. A glance at the map will show that Russian Poland . . . [projected] into the territory of the Teutonic League in a great salient, which is roughly 200 miles from north to south and 250 from east to west. This land is a monotonous wind-swept plain, through which from south to north flows the river Vistula. About the center stood the capital, Warsaw, reputed one of the strongest citadels in Europe, and around Warsaw lay the group of fortresses called the Polish Triangle. The southern apex was Ivan-gorod, on the Vistula; the eastern, Brest Litovsk; the northern, Warsaw itself, while to the north-west lay the advanced fort of Novo Georgievsk. This triangle was a fortified region with three fronts—two towards Germany, and one towards Austria; and the various fortresses were fully linked up with railways. The southern frontier of Russian Poland was purely artificial, for there was no continuous barrier till from fifty to one hundred miles south of it, where the range of the Carpathians protects the plains of Hungary against attacks from the north. Galicia is simply a flattened terrace at the base of this range, watered by the upper Vistula and its tributaries, the Wisloka, the San, and the upper streams of the Bug. But in the north of Russian Poland, between the river Narev and the sea, is a country where campaigning is difficult. It is mainly swampy forest, but as it nears the Baltic coast

it becomes a chain of lakes and ponds with woodland of birch and pine between them. On the very edge of the sea, along the river Pregel and the large Lagoon called the Frisches Haff, there is a belt of firmer land which of old was the main highway between Prussia and Muscovy. This was the German province of East Prussia, a district unfriendly to the invader, as Napoleon found in his campaign of Friedland and Eylau. East of the Polish salient, and dividing it from Russia proper, lies a curious piece of country around the river Pripet. It is a vast tangle of streams, ponds, and marshes, covering some 30,000 square miles, and is called the Marshes of Pinsk, from the chief town of the neighbourhood. This district barred the march of armies, and a way must be taken to the north or south. On the north the road lay along the valleys of the Narev and the Niemen, where was a chain of fortified crossings. South, on the side toward Galicia, there were the three fortified towns of Lutsk, Dubno, and Rovno. The salient of Russian Poland was, therefore, defended on its western side by the Polish Triangle, on the north by the chain of forts along the Narev and Niemen, on the south by the forts south of Pinsk, and on the east by the great marshes of the Pripet. Its communications with Russia passed north and south of these marshes. Only on the Galician side and the front towards Posen did the nature of the land offer facilities for offensive campaigning. The German frontier defences consisted of the Silesian fortresses of Breslau and Glogau, guarding the line of the Oder; the strong city of Posen on the Warta, opposite the point of the Russian salient; and a powerful line of forts on the lower Vistula, guarding the road from East to West Prussia. Thorn on the Vistula and Danzig at its mouth, held the river valley; while Graudenz, much strengthened of late years, formed a link between them. Dirschau and Marienburg guarded the road and railway crossings of the Vistula delta. The northern entrance to the Frisches Haff lagoon was guarded by Pillau, and at its eastern end, at the mouth of the Pregel, stood Königsberg, the second strongest of German fortresses, barring the coast road and railway to Russia. In Galicia the true Austrian line of defence was the Carpathians, but north of it were the fortified city of Cracow, the old capital of Poland, and the great entrenched camp of Przemysl. It is important to grasp the configuration of this frontier district, for it determined the initial strategy of the campaign. Russia was bound to assume the offensive, in order to relieve her allies who were bearing the brunt of the German onslaught in the West. Her natural line of attack was through Posen, for that angle of her frontier was only 180 miles from Berlin. There was another reason: the salient of Poland went racially much farther west than the Warta, and included the bulk of the province of Posen and a considerable part of West Prussia. Germany had never been successful with her resident aliens, and she had been peculiarly unsuccessful with her Poles, all her schemes of Prussianization and land settlement having ended in something very like a fiasco. In moving westwards by the Posen route, Russia would be moving among a race who, in spite of all they had suffered from the Empire of the Tsars, still preferred a Slav to a Teuton. [See POLAND: 1914-1917.] But this direct western advance obviously could not be made and its flanks had been safeguarded by the conquest of East Prussia and Galicia—until the Russian armies, that is to say, could be deployed safely

on a front which we may define by the lower Vistula, the Warta, and the upper Oder. Russia's first task, therefore, was to defeat the Germans in East Prussia and the Austrians in Galicia, and so find a straight line of deployment for her main advance. Her centre, till her long mobilization was completed, must be her weakest point, and the Polish fortresses had not been kept at a strength which would allow her to trust in them. She could not concentrate on her Posen frontier, scarcely even on the Vistula; the Bug was the nearest line up to which she might hope to clear her flanks. These flanks were not less important to the Teutonic League. Austria, alone of the two allies able to put great forces into the field at once, lay not west but south-west, while Germany had long realized that Warsaw would most readily fall to an attack by flank and rear. For both combatants, and for purposes of both offence and defence, the vital areas were East Prussia and Galicia, and the snout of western Poland might for the moment be disregarded.—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, pp. 180-182.

(b) Distribution of opposing armies.—The mobilization of the Russian armies was carried out more rapidly than the German General Staff had counted on, and in the third week of August they had reached their positions behind the Bug, the Narev and the Niemen. Under the supreme command of the Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the Tsar, the five separate armies were concentrated as follows: Army of the Niemen, General Rennenkampf, Kovno-Grodno. Army of the Narev, General Samsonov, echeloned along the Warsaw-Mlawa railway. Army of Poland, General Ivanoff, Brest Litovski-Cholm. 1st Galician Army, General Brusilov, opposite Tarnopol. The armies of the Niemen and the Narev had been partly mobilized for some time prior to the German declaration of war, and were ready to take the field by the end of the first week in August. From the first the Russians suffered from inferior railway communications. On the German side there was a network of railways converging in Poland and all were connected by a strategical line running along the frontier. Troops could be moved from point to point with ease, an impossibility for the Russians whose railways were not connected by lateral lines. On the Russian side of the frontier along the whole length of the 500-mile front from Memel to Cracow there were only seven railway lines leading from the interior of Poland to the German frontier. The German forces were thus concentrated. General von François commanded five or six corps distributed along the East Prussian frontier, having opposed to him the armies of Rennenkampf and Samsonov. In Galicia two Austro-German armies of 300,000 each were concentrated. The First Army was commanded by General Dankl, its position being in the salient formed by the Vistula and San rivers with its left resting on Cracow and its right on the fortress of Przemysl. The Second Army under General Auffenberg was in position at right angles to the first Army, covering the approaches to Lemberg from the East. By the end of August there were altogether about a million men in Galicia north of the Carpathian mountains.

(c) Invasion of East Prussia.—Beginning of Galician campaign.—1. INITIAL RUSSIAN SUCCESSSES.—Already the day after the German declaration of war. Rennenkampf's cavalry crossed the

frontier, cut the strategical railway at Lyck and drove the German outposts in the direction of the lakes. The main body of his army crossed the frontier at Suwalki and Wirballen on August 7, and attacked von François near Insterburg on the 16th. Von François retired to Königsberg. General Samsonov during this time had advanced from the southwest of the Masurian lakes and falling upon the German 20th Corps at Frankenau defeated it with severe losses. "As soon as it became evident that Germany's efforts were being concentrated on the campaign in France and that few troops had been left to guard East Prussia, the two northern Russian armies began an invasion of East Prussia, in agreement with the French. The frontier was crossed [in force] on August 17. General Rennenkampf's army aimed for Königsberg, while General Samsonoff moved in the direction of Danzig [by way of Mlava and Soldau]. . . . August 20 General Rennenkampf defeated the Germans at Gumbinnen, occupying Insterburg August 23 and threatening to besiege Königsberg. General Samsonoff's army also penetrated far into the province [and entered Allenstein on the 25th]. The advance of these Russian armies caused a great panic in East Prussia. People fled before the dreaded Cossacks, and refugees began to appear in Berlin. The whole province was said to be in the hands of the Russians as far as the River Vistula. It was at once necessary for the German Staff to correct this situation. Outside of any military results, the fact that the Russians were overrunning East Prussia would have had a bad moral effect upon the Germans, who were united in their belief in a victorious war. In this emergency, by one of the strange chances that have occurred so often in history, the man was at hand suited to the occasion. In Hanover there was living in retirement General von Hindenburg, an old German general who had made a special study of strategic and tactical conditions in East Prussia. He knew the country in which the Russian armies were operating as well as if it had been his own garden. In fact, he had prevented the East Prussian lakes and their surrounding country from being improved for commercial purposes, so convinced was he of the strategic value of this lake region as a defense against invasion. He had studied and rehearsed every tactical use of the difficulties of the country as an aid to defending armies. Hindenburg had been out of favor with the German Emperor and the General Staff, but he was so evidently the right man for the emergency that the German General Staff appointed him to the command in East Prussia. A French historian states that the old general was in a café in Hanover, on August 22, when he received telegrams telling him that he had been given the command in East Prussia, that reinforcements were being hastened to his aid, and that General Ludendorff would report to him, to act as his Chief of Staff, with a special train to take him to East Prussia." —T. G. Frothingham, *Guide to the military history of the World War, 1914-1918*, pp. 31-32.—In Galicia the Austrians were first to move. On August 10 General Dankl crossed the frontier, captured Krasnik and forced General Ivanov across the Bug river. Retiring before Dankl the Russians assailed Auffenberg's army with powerful forces. General Ruský's 1st Galician Army crossed the northeastern boundary of Galicia and captured Sokol on August 14. In six days' march he was within thirty miles of Lemberg. General Brusilov's was meanwhile advancing westward from Kiev against Auf-

fenberg's right flank. He took Tarnopol on August 27 and then Halicz, and turning north moved against Lemberg.

2. GERMAN RECONQUEST OF EAST PRUSSIA.—"On reviewing the situation General von Hindenburg could not but see that the Russian position was one of great strategic peril. The invading columns were separated by about a hundred miles, and had the extremely difficult Masurian Lake country between them. He decided, therefore, to throw a striking force with the utmost rapidity against General Samsonov's southern column, while containing the Russian northern column with the garrison of Königsberg. His first step was to concentrate his striking force east of the Vistula between the fortresses of Graudenz and Thorn. For this there were available the troops which had retired southwestwards before the Russians, the 1st Corps brought by sea from Königsberg to



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Dantzig, and various reserve divisions from the Posen frontier—in all some three to four army corps. Advancing rapidly into East Prussia, where he was well served by an admirable network of strategic railways, he had taken up a position with his left between Osterode and Allenstein and his right about Soldau on the 26th August. Right opposite the centre of his line, which was slightly concave, was the hamlet of Tannenberg, from which the battle takes its name. The XXth Corps had been left in Königsberg to contain the Russians in the north. Fate now played into the hands of the German commander, for General Samsonov, elated by his easy triumph at Frankenau, had conceived the daring resolution of pushing westward to make himself master of the crossings of the Vistula, his chief objective apparently being the second-class fortress of Graudenz. The nature of the country added greatly to the risk, for the innumerable lakes compelled him to advance upon a broad front with but little communication between the many columns into which his force was

necessarily subdivided; and further, the thick woods with which the land was covered rendered all reconnaissance, whether by cavalry or by aircraft, a matter of considerable difficulty. On the 26th the Russian advanced guards came in contact with the German troops, but for a time General Samsonov seems to have been under the delusion that he had to do merely with unenterprising rear-guards. He was soon, however, to be undeceived, for the following day . . . von Hindenburg retorted with a vigorous counter-attack. This was at first directed against the Russian left in the neighborhood of Soldau, and though it was in reality but a feint, it succeeded in cutting off the Russians from the main road and railway leading to Mława. The main attack was against the Russian right, and to that quarter of the field the German commander hurried thousands of troops in taxicabs, motor-omnibuses, and lorries, swinging forward his left as these reinforcements arrived. Samsonov now found that his five corps were in serious danger of being hemmed in within a region where the avenues for escape were but few. One exit alone remained open, a defile of solid ground between the marshes near Ortelsburg. For two days the Russians made heroic efforts to gain time for the withdrawal of their trains, but Hindenburg's left flank was too strong and too well handled."—F. E. Whitton, *Marne campaign*, pp. 107-108.


3. BATTLE OF TANNENBERG.—"Gradually, during the period of August 24-26, the battle plan took shape in all its details. . . . It depended solely on Rennenkampf himself, for if he knew how to make the most of his success at Gumbinnen, and advance quickly, my plan would be unworkable. . . . We discovered by degrees that Rennenkampf was advancing only slowly. . . . From August 27 onward, only two cavalry brigades stood between Lake Mauer and the river Pregel, facing twenty-four very strong infantry and several cavalry divisions of Rennenkampf's. The defensive chain of lakes was thus open, on the west; and in any case it would have been quite easy to turn it and completely isolate Königsberg. Our decision to give battle arose out of the slowness of the Russian leadership and was conditioned by the necessity of winning in spite of inferiority in numbers, yet I found it immensely difficult to take this momentous step. The corps came up here in the rear of the Narew Army, which was advancing from Neidenburg to Allenstein. In this way they exposed their rear, without adequate protection to Rennenkampf's army, which was only two or three days' march away. When the battle began in real earnest on the 27th and, in contrast to previous wars, was not finished in one day, but continued until the 30th, Rennenkampf's formidable host hung like a threatening thunder-cloud to the northeast. He need only have closed with us and we should have been beaten. But Rennenkampf brought his army forward over the Allenburg-Gerdauen-Neidenburg line so slowly that we had time to win a brilliant victory. Few knew the anxiety with which I watched the Niemen Army during those long days. . . . The reinforced 20th Army Corps had passed through difficult and exhausting days. On the 23d it stood facing south, on the heights northeast of Gilgenburg, while the enemy was approaching from Neidenburg—that is, from the southeast. The 3d Reserve Division was still assembling. The 1st Army Corps had just begun to detrain near Deutsch-Eylau. General von Scholtz was successful in beating off superior enemy forces, but

while holding the heights east of Gilgenburg he was obliged to withdraw his left flank sharply west of Hohenstein, about as far as Mühlen. Although uncomfortable for the troops, this movement had its good points, for the Russians thought they had won. They did not believe in any further German resistance, still less in a German attack. They saw the road open into German territory east of the Vistula. On the 24th we got into touch with General von Scholtz and actually met him at Tannenberg. He . . . gave us a lucid account of the great achievements of the troops under his command since the beginning of the campaign, and the great difficulties encountered in the last battles. . . . On the journey from Marienburg to Tannenberg, an intercepted enemy wireless message was sent us which gave a clear idea of our opponents' dispositions for the next few days. The Narew Army was advancing, its left wing in echelon, its 6th Corps directed *via* Ortelsburg, on Bischofsburg, which was reached or passed by the 26th, and its 13th Corps directed from Neidenburg through Passenheim to Allenstein. The 15th and 18th Corps, with which General von Scholtz had been engaged during these days, was following. On the 26th, the most southerly echelon was to be found somewhere near Wapłitz. Still farther back to the left, and pushed west, the 1st Corps, covered by several cavalry divisions, was moving through Mława and Soldau, against Lautenberg and Strasburg [on the Drewenz.] It was a question of breaking up this movement of the enemy by an attack from the west with the southern group of the Eighth Army. . . . I proposed to General von Hindenburg that an attack be made in the direction of Usdau by the 1st Army Corps on the line Deutsch-Eylau-Montowo, and by the right wing of the reinforced 20th Army Corps from the direction of Gilgenburg, so as to throw back the Russian 1st Corps to the south, beyond Soldau. Then, our 1st Army Corps was to break through in the direction of Neidenburg, in conjunction with the 1st and 17th Army Corps and 1st Reserve Corps, in order to surround at least the main body of the Narew Army. We had to confine ourselves to this plan if we wished to succeed. . . . But matters did not develop as smoothly as would appear from this short sketch. All the troops were exceedingly exhausted, and their vitality had been reduced by continual fighting. . . . It was doubtful whether the enemy would give us time to carry out our plans. But the greatest difficulties were due to the refugees, numbering many thousands, some on foot and some in vehicles, who blocked the roads behind Von Scholtz's force. . . . On August 24 and 25 our headquarters were at Rosenberg, and on the 26th at Löbau. We took advantage of these last two days to get into touch with commanders and men in various parts. . . . The attack on Usdau was to begin at 4 A. M. on the 27th. . . . Just as we left Löbau for Gilgenburg the joyous news reached us that Usdau had fallen. I considered the battle won. However, this was somewhat premature. Soon after it transpired that Usdau had not yet been taken, and it fell only late in the afternoon. From a tactical point of view the Narew Army was now broken through. The 1st Army Corps threw the enemy back beyond Soldau and marched upon Neidenburg. The 20th Army Corps, greatly exhausted as it was, was not so successful, and the 41st Infantry Division, near Cross Gardienen, made no progress. Nor was any ground won farther north. . . . We returned to Löbau in the afternoon not altogether satisfied. On 000

arrival, news came through that the 1st Army Corps had been routed and that the remnants of this corps were arriving in Montowo. . . . A telephone inquiry to the railway commandant there brought out the fact that troops of the 1st Army Corps were collecting at that point, but later on it appeared that it was a question of only one battalion that had found itself in a very tight corner and given way. Another rather alarming discovery was that a number of supply columns were hurriedly retreating through Löbau. . . .

"Late that night we received news in Löbau that the 1st Army Corps had reached Wartenburg. The Russian 6th Corps was in full retreat before the 17th Army Corps beyond Ortelsburg, and was again defeated south of Bischofsburg. Smaller

Division had attacked Waplitz in a fog and had been driven back. This division, which had suffered heavy casualties, was now holding positions west of Waplitz and anticipating a hostile counter-attack with the greatest anxiety. . . . If the enemy attacked the right wing of the 20th Army Corps in great force, a grave crisis might result, and, at the best, the battle would be prolonged. Now there was Rennenkampf's chance to intervene. But the enemy made no attack upon the 41st Infantry Division and the Niemen Army did not advance. . . . The enemy front appeared to be wavering. . . . We ran right into a momentary panic, created by Russian prisoners who were being taken to the rear in great numbers. This incident created an unfavorable impression, as



BATTLES OF TANNENBERG AND THE MAZURIAN LAKES

forces were sent in pursuit, while the main body of the 17th Army Corps bivouacked at and to the north of Mensguth, on the evening of the 27th. Nothing remained to be done on the 28th but to give orders for the 1st Army Corps to occupy Neidenburg. In the mean time the corps had already made a turning movement in that direction. The 20th Army Corps was to carry out the attack which had been fixed for the 27th, and more especially to push forward the 41st Infantry Division. Von der Goltz's Landwehr Division was to attack Hohenstein. The 1st Reserve Corps and the 17th Army Corps were moved up west, covered against attack from Ortelsburg, to positions on a line running from Allenstein to Passenheim. Early on the 28th we went to Frögenau and established ourselves in the open at the eastern end of the village. . . . Our first impressions were by no means favorable. Neidenburg had certainly been taken, but the 41st Infantry

the disorder spread far to the rear. . . . We were not at all clear as to how things stood with the individual units; but there was no doubt that the battle was won. Whether or not it would prove a real Cannae was uncertain. . . . The retreat of the Russians was to be cut off. During the night we learned further details. The Russian 13th Corps had advanced from Allenstein on Hohenstein, and had pressed the Landwehr severely. The 1st Reserve Corps had come down southwest of Allenstein—its further advance would close the ring round the Russian 13th Corps and thus conclude the whole operation, while the 1st and 17th Army Corps cut off the retreat of the other divisions. On the morning of the 29th I decided to go to Hohenstein to try to disentangle the congestion caused by the troops getting mixed up. Operations against Rennenkampf's army had to be initiated, whether he advanced or stood where he was. Still another incident occurred before we

were certain of victory. Early on the 29th we received a message by aeroplane that a hostile army corps was marching on Neidenburg from the south and was nearing the town. It was therefore coming up in the rear of the 1st Army Corps, which, with its front facing north, was fighting the retreating Russians. Almost at the same moment we were called up from Neidenburg and informed that hostile shrapnel was falling on the town. Then we were cut off. All available troops were set marching in the direction of Neidenburg, to support the 1st Army Corps in the engagement we anticipated. But General von François had saved himself already by his own energy, and the enemy displayed more hesitation than the situation justified. . . . East of Hohenstein our own columns were getting entangled with masses of Russian prisoners, and it was no easy task to restore order. . . . The battle was drawing to a conclusion. The 3d Reserve Division had broken through the enemy lines and reached Muschaken, east of Neidenburg. The Russians, retiring through the thick woods, tried to break through the German ring at several points. At Muschaken, in particular, very heavy fighting took place on the 30th, but without in any way influencing the issue of the battle. General Samsonow shot himself and was buried near Willenberg without being recognized. His widow, who was in Germany in connection with matters concerning prisoners of war, was able to trace his grave by a locket which had been taken for identification purposes from the body of the fallen general when he was buried. The Russian generals who were taken prisoner arrived at Osterode and reported to General von Hindenburg. . . . The widely circulated report that thousands of Russians were driven into the marshes and there perished is a myth; no marsh was to be found anywhere near."—General E. von Ludendorff, *Ludendorff's own story*, pp. 56-68.—"The Russian defence broke and before long the retirement degenerated into a rout. Hundreds of guns were abandoned in the mud which reached to the axle trees. . . Little more than one corps reached Ortelsburg, in full flight towards the frontier. In killed and wounded the Russians had suffered over 20,000 casualties, while between 80,000 and 90,000 prisoners are said to have fallen into German hands. The invasion of East Prussia had therefore failed. It had led to the hurried retreat of one column and had involved the other in overwhelming disaster. Nevertheless it would be idle to judge the Russian effort by the mere touchstone of victory or defeat. The invasion had come at a moment when the fortunes of the Allies were at the lowest ebb, and its initial success had exercised a profound influence on the general situation. The fact that it had taken place at all, had proved the unsoundness of the calculations of the German General Staff as to the speed with which Russia could mobilize. . . . After nearly a month's fighting the Russians had been forced to yield up the terrain they had won at the expense of some 100,000 casualties. But the sacrifice had not been in vain, for from the end of August large German reinforcements, earmarked for the Western Front, had been diverted to the east, and whole corps had apparently been withdrawn even from France and Belgium at the very moment when the great issue was about to be engaged on the Marne. . . . Hindenburg was acclaimed as the greatest soldiers of the day and saluted as the Arminius of the twentieth century."—F. E. Whitton, *Marne campaign*, pp. 110-112.

(d) Invasion of Galicia.—I. RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF LEMBERG.—RETREAT OF RENNENKAMPF IN THE NORTH.—"Lemberg was of considerable importance to the Austrians, for besides being the administrative capital of Galicia it was also a strategic point, owing to its being situated at the junction of the railways leading to Cracow, Vienna, and Transylvania. Further, it was the advanced base of the Austrian IInd Army, and immense quantities of ammunition and supplies had in consequence accumulated in the place. Strictly speaking, Lemberg was not a fortress, but it was surrounded by semi-permanent works, though these were quite inadequate against modern artillery. On the 31st August the Russian 2nd and 3rd Armies on their fifty-mile front made a further step forward. The Austrian right wing was turned [by Brussilov] and almost destroyed, several thousand prisoners being made. On the other flank the right of the Russian 2nd Army [under Russky] swept round north of the city, and threatened the communication of the Austrian IInd Army, in spite of an advance by forced marches on the part of German troops operating in Western Poland. On the following day the Russians gained possession of the advanced works which lay some twelve miles from the city, the defenders flying in complete disorder, and a further success was secured by a force acting beyond their extreme left wing, Czernowitz, the chief town of the Bukovina, falling into Russian hands. The 3rd of September witnessed the retirement of the Austrians towards Przemysl, during which operation the Cossacks did such execution that the retirement degenerated into a rout, and the same day saw the entrance of the Russian troops into Lemberg. An immense quantity of supplies and ammunition fell into the victors' hands, and the total number of prisoners taken during the attacks of the town and in the retreat of the defenders has been estimated at 100,000. The Austrian Government now began feverishly to strengthen the defences at Vienna, and plans were made to transfer the administration to Prague or Innsbruck. . . . The Russian 2nd and 3rd Armies had before them the demoralized remainder of the Austrian IInd Army of General Auffenberg in Galicia. The bulk of this army was in position about Grodek, on the railway between Przemysl and Lemberg, but portion of it had been driven northwards to Rawaruska; there it united with the main body of the IIIrd Army which had hitherto been in second line. In Southern Poland General Dankl with his 1st Army had made successful progress towards the line Lublin-Cholm in spite of the resistance of the 1st Army of the Russians. To take the latter sector of this portion of the theatre of war first. At the moment of the fall of Lemberg the advance of General Dankl had reached its high-water mark, for on the 3rd September his line stretched from Opole on the left to the north-west of Krasnostav, whence it curved towards Zamosc and Hrubieszow. The fall of Lemberg of course materially altered the situation not only in Galicia but also in Southern Poland, and General Dankl was obviously in a position of some peril with two victorious Russian armies pressing on towards his base at Przemysl. Two courses lay open to him, one—the more obvious and commonplace—being to fall back at once and unite his army with that of General Auffenberg on the San, the other, and bolder, being to ease the situation in Galicia by a resolute continuance of the offensive and to attack the Russian 1st Army before it could be reinforced. General Dankl had just received con-

siderable reinforcements, for portion of the Austrian IIIrd Army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had come into line upon his left, and German troops from Breslau had also been sent to him. This circumstance emboldened him to decide on continuing his offensive. Unfortunately for General Dankl, the Russian higher command had only been awaiting a favourable issue at Lemberg to reinforce the right wing in Southern Poland, and that city once taken, reinforcements were hurried to the 1st Army. Large bodies of troops had been concentrated at Radom, west of the Vistula, two military bridges had been thrown across that river to facilitate the rapid reinforcement of the Russian right wing, and the Russian railways had been working at high pressure in this region of the war. Consequently, when the Austrian 1st Army advanced to the attack on the 4th September it experienced a resistance greater than had been expected. The attack collapsed, although the centre of the Russian 1st Army had to give way slightly. This withdrawal, however, placed the Russian 1st Army in a more favourable situation for effecting an envelopment. After waiting a couple of days for the arrival of all his reinforcements, General Ivanov, who now commanded the 1st Army, on the 6th September retook with a counter-stroke which proved a complete success. The Austrian left, commanded by the Archduke Joseph, was expelled from its position between Opole and Turobin on the 9th and was driven south-west in disorderly retreat towards Sandomir. The position of General Dankl now became distinctly precarious, and though he held on stubbornly on the line Turobin-Tomasov he was forced off this on the 10th September and was driven across the frontier. His defeat had been accelerated by pressure on his right rear, for the Russian 2nd Army, leaving Lemberg, took Rawaruska in reverse, while the 3rd Army pinned the broken remnant of General Auffenberg's IIrd Army to Grodek. Severe fighting developed, and on the 12th September terminated in complete disaster for the Austrian arms. The portions of the Austrian IIrd and IIIrd Armies which were holding on to Rawaruska were attacked on three sides and gave way, leaving General Dankl completely in the air. The vanquished troops fled behind the San and took refuge under the guns of Przemysl. Nor did this complete the tale of Austrian misfortune. General Brusilov, the commander of the Russian 3rd Army, had split up his force into three columns, and it was his centre and right which had been operating against Grodek. His left wing seized Mikolaiev [Mikalajov] on the 4th September, taking forty guns, and within the next ten days occupied Stryj and Czernowitz, the capital of Bukowina. By the 12th September the Austrian armies had paid the penalty for incorrect conclusions and for faulty strategy. The Austrian General Staff had gambled on the slowness of the Russian mobilization and had advanced on a rather hazardous campaign, the danger of which had not been realized owing to the ease with which the 1st Army had advanced towards Lublin and Cholm. The strategy was open to criticism, for the 1st and IIrd Armies had been moving on divergent lines, with the result that the success tended to separate them still further and to make mutual support impossible. Meantime "after the crushing defeat at Tannenberg [in East Prussia], the fugitives of General Samsonov's southern column retired by Johannsburg and Lyck towards the frontier to seek shelter behind the fortresses of Ostrolenka, Lomzha, and Osowiec. Detaching the 1st

Corps to deal with the remainder of General Samsonov's army, General von Hindenburg moved the bulk of his forces by the Allenstein-Insterburg railway to deal with the northern column under General Rennenkampf. That commander, however, had received early news of the disaster at Tannenberg, and immediately renouncing all idea of laying siege to Königsberg, he retreated as rapidly as possible towards the Niemen. He had got clear of Interburg before the leading columns of General von Hindenburg were within striking distance, but on the former battlefield of Gumbinnen he was compelled to fight a rear-guard action with the left wing of the Germans. Successfully beating off the attack he continued his retirement towards the east, followed by the enemy who advanced towards the line Lyck-Wirballen. The exact chronology of the next few days is somewhat obscure, but, by the 15th, the German commander had possessed himself of the towns of Suwalki and Augustowo. It will be sufficient to record that by the 12th September . . . General Rennenkampf, avoiding disaster, had regained Russian territory and was in full retreat towards the Niemen." —F. E. Whitton, *Marne campaign*, pp. 107-112.

2. RUSSIAN VICTORY AT RAWA-RUSSKA.—HINDENBURG'S CAMPAIGN FOR RELIEF OF GALICIA.—AUSTRO-GERMAN DEFEAT.—NEW AUSTRO-GERMAN OFFENSIVE.—CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIAN POLAND.—The Austrian commander, General Dankl, evacuated Lemberg on September 3 and fell back on the Grodek position west of the town. On the same day General Ruskay entered Lemberg and appointed General Bobrinsky governor. "By this time General Ivanoff's concentration having been completed, he attacked General Dankl on the 6th, and after a six-day battle finally defeated him near Rawa Ruska, taking 100,000 prisoners and an immense quantity of war material. Both Austrian Armies then fell back behind the San, and the Russians invested Przemysl. By the 15th September the whole of Eastern Galicia was in Russian occupation and [Jaroslav was captured and Przemysl invested September 23], and Russian Armies were threatening Cracow both north and south of the Vistula. When the news of the Austrian defeat in Poland reached the Kaiser he ordered a large German Army of eighteen corps to concentrate on the line Thorn-Czestochowa-Cracow, with the intention of opposing the Russians, who had begun to move westwards across the Vistula and San rivers. German officers were meanwhile sent to Cracow to rally the beaten Austrian Army, which was to act on the right of the German Army, throw the Russians in Galicia back across the San river, and relieve Przemysl. By the first week in October an Austro-German Army, reported to be 1,000,000 strong, was concentrated on the above-mentioned front, under the command of General Hindenburg, whose headquarters were shifted from East Prussia to Czestochowa. The army advanced very rapidly through Poland and Galicia, the Germans moving in two columns, one north of the Pilitza river, the other south of it, the Austrian Army, under General Dankl, prolonging the line to the right of the Germans down to the Carpathian mountains. Warsaw was the objective of the northern German column, Ivangorod of the southern column, the rôle of the Austrians being to clear Galicia. Falling back according to traditional custom before the German advance, the Russians awaited the enemy behind the Vistula, and then attacked the advancing columns with great energy, defeating the northern column outside Warsaw on October

20th, and the southern column at Kozenice on October 27th. The Germans thereupon fell back on Kalisz and Czeszochowa, destroying the railways behind them, and delaying the Russian pursuit. When the German Army was disposed of, the Grand Duke Nicholas turned his attention to the Austrians, who held the line of the Vistula from Rozehof down to Sandomier, as well as the line of the San river down to the Carpathian mountains. The Austrian Army was badly defeated at Sandomier on November 5th, and retreated towards Cracow. This necessitated the retirement of the Austrians from the San river, the bulk of the troops retreating over the Carpathian passes, as their direct line of retreat through Galicia was intercepted by the Russians, who [had] . . . again invested Przemysl. Hindenburg meanwhile hastened back to Thorn, where he immediately set himself the task of organising a new army out of the beaten one, reinforced with all available troops taken out of the Oder and Vistula fortresses. . . . [He summoned General Mackensen to his aid from Danzig and forthwith] formulated another plan of campaign, by means of which he intended to turn the tables on his antagonist, and carry the war back to Poland. The German commander in East Prussia was first of all reinforced, and ordered to remain strictly on the defensive in the entrenched positions which he had taken up guarding the eastern approaches to the Masurian lakes. A large central army was ordered to concentrate at Thorn, partly composed of troops falling back from Poland, partly of new formations brought rapidly up to the rendezvous . . . The exact strength of this army is not known, but the *Army Messenger*, the official organ of the Russian War Office estimated it to be composed of twelve corps, which would give it an approximate strength of 500,000 men. This force was intended to move rapidly up the left bank of the Vistula, and by threatening Warsaw force the Russians to concentrate between the Vistula and the Warta, by this means taking pressure off the Silesian frontier. After placing General Mackensen in executive command of the Thorn Army, Hindenburg went down to Kalisz, and there with equal promptitude he collected another army, which was destined to operate against the left flank of the Russian Army opposing Mackensen's advance. The German commander holding the defensive position on the line Czeszochowa-Cracow, covering the approaches into Silesia meanwhile received similar orders to those given to the General on the frontier of East Prussia. He was under no circumstances to attempt an offensive movement, but was to hold on to his entrenched position with as few men as might be found necessary for the purpose. The Marshal, who had been appointed in November Generalissimo of both Austrian and German troops in the eastern theatre of war, then went on to Cracow, where in consultation with the Austro-Hungarian General Staff he organised a new offensive movement to be undertaken by Austro-Hungarian troops with the object of re-conquering Galicia, and safeguarding Cracow [the key to both Austria and Germany] from the attack with which it was being threatened by the Russians advancing up both banks of the upper Vistula. Hindenburg's plan of campaign covered the whole of the eastern theatre of war, and was so conceived as to neutralise the initial strategical advantage which the Poland salient conferred on Russia. The success of offensive operations on the big scale required by modern war conditions depends primarily on railway communications, and

these are as perfect in the eastern provinces of Prussia as they are imperfect in Poland. . . . There are two practically parallel strategical railways running all round Poland with branch lines leading from all the important junctions to the frontier. . . . North and west of the Vistula there is not a single lateral railway line in Poland connecting the main trunk lines which lead down to the German frontier. Admirable as the Russian organisation . . . proved to be, the movements of the Russian armies . . . [were] paralysed throughout the war by the inferiority of the Russian railway communications as compared with those of the Germans on the other side of the frontier. Though the Grand Duke [was] . . . manœuvring on interior, and his adversary on exterior, lines, there . . . [was] no occasion when his movements . . . [were] not forestalled by the German commander owing to the facilities he . . . possessed for the rapid concentration of troops at any given strategical point. . . . Mackensen opened the new campaign on the 10th November, deploying his army on a fifty-mile front between the Vistula and Warta rivers, and making use of both rivers for bringing up supplies of food and ammunition. Pushing the Russian advanced guards back, Mackensen reached the line Wlochowek-Kolo on the 13th, when the Russians, taken wholly by surprise, fell back behind Kutno. Mackensen then advanced to the line Plock-Leczycza-Uniejow, where a three days' battle took place, ending with the further retirement of the Russians . . . on the 18th. Then began a series of violently contested battles . . . without any positive decisions being obtained on either side. On the 20th, two German corps, including some battalions of the Prussian Guard, succeeded in breaking through the Russian line at Strykow, and reaching Koljuschki, an important railway junction on the Warsaw-Czeszochowa line. There they were pulled up by Russian reinforcements arriving from the East, and were driven south to Rzgow and Tushin. They were surrounded on three fronts by Russian troops, but owing to the non-arrival of a certain Russian General at the rendezvous fixed, they succeeded on the 23rd, but not till after they had suffered heavy loss, in cutting their way through to the north, and re-joining the main German Army at Strykow. Finding his further advance eastwards blocked, General Mackensen took up an entrenched position extending from Schadek through Zgierz to Ilayo, on the Vistula. The Russian right wing, which had meanwhile been clinging to the Vistula in the neighbourhood of Gombin, then fell back to the lower Bzura river in order to defend the approaches to Warsaw. At this time there were twelve German corps deployed between Schadek and the Vistula. The fighting during the operations . . . [was] very severe, and the Germans were much shaken by the enormous losses which they . . . suffered, and by the knowledge of their failure to reach Warsaw. By the end of November, Mackensen's position was very precarious, and unofficial news from Petrograd led many to think that his retreat was imminent. On the 1st December, however, Hindenburg's flank movement against the Russian left wing began to take effect, large bodies of Austro-German troops crossing the Warta river in the neighbourhood of Sieradz, and moving towards the line Zdunskawola-Lask. This was another surprise attack for the Russians, and the Grand Duke had to meet it by withdrawing troops from the Silesian frontier till reinforcements could be hurried up from the Bug river. The movement came just in time to save Mackensen

from retreating, and gave that General a fresh lease of life in Poland. Finding the flank attack was developing on a considerable scale, the Grand Duke Nicholas decided to withdraw his left wing from its position west of Lodz in order to preserve his communications with Warsaw. Lodz was evacuated by the Russians on the 5th December, and occupied by the Germans on the 6th. On this date the Russian line of defence extended from the Warta river to the Vistula through Novoradomsk-Petrokof-Lowicz-Ilayo. About this time another movement of German troops was made from the direction of Soldau and Mlawa with the intention of reaching the Narew river, and getting in rear of Warsaw. . . . On the 6th December, 'this force reached the line Ctechanow-Przasnysz, but it never got nearer than this to the Narew river, for it was attacked on the following day by the Russian Army, which had been watching this part of the frontier, and was driven back into East Prussia.' . . . Meanwhile, during the second week in December, General Mackensen, with his eye always on Warsaw, began to concentrate effort against the Russian positions west of the lower Bzura river, a specially vigorous offensive being directed against Sochaczew with a view to securing the passage over the river at that point. The German attack met with no appreciable success. The Russians gave up some ground west of the Bzura, but held on to all the passages over that river from Lowicz to Ilayo."—A. M. Murray, *Fortnightly history of the war*, pp. 41-42, 81-84.

3. RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN WESTERN GALICIA.—AUSTRIAN PASSAGE OF THE CARPATHIANS, AND RETREAT.—ADVANCE ON CRACOW.—STORMING OF CARPATHIAN PASSES.—WAR IN NORTHERN POLAND.—FIGHTING IN GALICIA.—SITUATION IN JANUARY, 1915.—"While events were progressing as described in Poland, the Russian Army of Galicia, under General Ivanoff, after detaching a force to invest the fortress of Przemysl, was steadily pushing its way through Western Galicia, and securing possession of the passes into Hungary over the Carpathian mountains. On his way west, General Ivanoff met with continuous opposition from the Austrians, who disputed the passages over each of the tributary rivers, the Wistoka and the Dunajec, which, rising in the Carpathians, flow north across the [former] province of Galicia into the Vistula. General Ivanoff succeeded, however, in driving the Austrians before his advance, and during his three weeks' progress through the province he captured as many as 50,000 prisoners of war. The Russian advanced guard reached Wieliczka, some five miles south of Cracow, on the 1st December, while the main Russian Army was deployed on both banks of the Vistula along the line Proszowice-Niepolowice-Bochnia. The investment of Cracow seemed imminent. The situation, however, again became modified, owing to a new offensive movement of the Austrians—another of Hindenburg's surprises—who crossed the Carpathians in considerable force at the beginning of the second week in December, capturing Neu Sandec on the 12th, and concentrating on a line east and west of the Dunajec valley, thus compelling the Russians to fall back from Cracow to oppose this new attempt to re-conquer Galicia. At this time there were said to be nearly 200,000 Austrian troops north of the Carpathians, but the Grand Duke met this concentration with a counter concentration of Russian troops, who brought the Austrian advance to a standstill, and prevented the enemy from getting possession of the important strategical railway which connects Cracow with Przemysl. During the next month

continuous attempts were made by General Mackensen to cross the Bzura and Rawka rivers at various points, but they only resulted in failure. Attacks in mass formation were first of all tried, and when these tactics failed resort was had to sapping with the same result. . . . Up to the middle of January 1915 not a single German had succeeded in reaching the east bank of either of the two rivers mentioned above, and Warsaw seemed as far off as ever. Lower down in South Poland the Russians continued to hold the line of the Nida against repeated attacks by General Dankl's troops, who remained pinned to their positions on the right bank. The Russians at this time held a nearly continuous line of entrenched positions ex-



GENERAL IVANOV

tending across the centre of Poland along a 150-mile front from the lower Vistula west of Warsaw, to the upper, east of Cracow. They on their side made no attempt to advance westwards, being content to stand on the defensive, while the Germans wasted their strength in their efforts to get to Warsaw. All this time continuous fighting took place in Galicia, resulting in the Austro-Hungarian Army which had come across the Carpathian Mountains being driven back into Hungary with heavy loss of men and *matériel*. . . . East of the Dunajec river Galicia was now clear of the enemy. The Dukla Pass was occupied by Russian troops on December 27th, and the Uszok Pass on January 4th. Two considerable sorties from Przemysl were repulsed, and the investing cordon was drawn closer round the fortress. Austro-German troops still held the line of the Dunajec from Tarnow, which was in Russian possession, down to Neu

Sandec, which was held by the enemy. Hindenburg fully realised the value of the Dunajec position, which was the last line of defence against a Russian Army advancing on Cracow, and he knew that if Cracow was lost Silesia would be lost too. Having cleared Galicia, the Russians then started to clear the Bukovina with the object of securing their left strategical flank, and getting possession of the passes into Transylvania. Sturmetz and Radautz were occupied on December 31st, Suczawa on January 2nd, Gura Humora on the 4th, and Kimpolung on the 6th. . . . On the 16th the Russian advanced guards stormed the Kirlibaba pass, and were then in command of the two main routes into Hungary, the one leading to Maramaros-Sziget on the Visso river, and the other to Dees on the Szamos river. These movements opened up the prospect of a new theatre of war, with a new battle-front extending from the Bukovina to the Servian frontier, Roumanian intervention being at that time expected to take place in the early spring. On his right strategical flank the Grand Duke Nicholas showed the same offensive activity as on his left. A new Russian movement was in process of development north of the lower Vistula in Poland. . . . The whole of the right bank of the lower Vistula from Warsaw down to its junction with the Skrawa was in Russian possession. The commander of the Russian Army, advancing in this direction, if he was supplied with bridging material, might at any point throw a force on to the left bank of the river, and intercept Mackensen's communication with Thorn. The situation in the middle of January was highly interesting, and presented an abundance of possibilities which might at any moment have become realities. The general position in the eastern theatre of war at this period of the campaign may be summed up by saying that in the centre of their 500-mile battle-line, extending from East Prussia to the Bukovina, the Russians were standing on the defensive, while on both strategical flanks they were developing offensive movements."—A. M. Murray, *Fortnightly history of the war*, pp. 84-86.


4. INVESTITURE OF PRZEMYSL.—Przemysl was not only a strongly fortified place but a beautiful city as well, surrounded with flower gardens and orchards. In September, 1914, when the Russians made their whirlwind advance, there was, according to official reports from Vienna, an army of 80,000 based on that city. With a large part of this army, General Boveerig was reported to have moved to the line of the Wisloka to give aid to Dankl's hard-pushed troops as they made their stand on that river. It was understood that many of von Auffenberg's soldiers, as they fell back, were employed as a garrison for the fortress. At the time of its investment it was said to contain about 100,000 men, with its defense in charge of General Kusmanek. Afterward the strength of the garrison was increased. The isolation of the fortress of Przemysl was completed by the fall of Jaroslav and the occupation of Radymno, a town on the main Cracow railway on the left bank of the San, about eight miles east of Jaroslav and fifteen miles north of the fortress. And so it remained isolated, save for a short period when the tide of invasion was driven back. During this time it was again in communication with Cracow. The Russians took it as a matter of course that the fortress would soon fall to them. Its fate was predicted in the newspapers of the Allies; but, in preparation for defense, stores of all kinds had been hurried into it, and plans had been laid for stout resistance. It had a determined commander

in General Kusmanek. The first shots were fired on Sept. 18, 1914. The city was surrounded on September 20, and an unbroken bombardment with many desperate sorties ensued until October 2, when the Russians sent out a white flag to the city and demanded its surrender. General Kusmanek's reply was that he would not discuss surrender until he had exhausted all powers of resistance. The attack reached its height on Oct. 5, 1914. The Russians stormed again and again, hills of corpses outside the works testifying to furious attacks they made. They succeeded in carrying temporarily one of the outer works, eleven battalions having succeeded in approaching these defenses undetected, because of damage to an Austrian searchlight. Suddenly they stormed the walls. The garrison retreated to the casemates, from which they defended themselves with rifles and machine guns. The Russians forced their way to the casemates and a hand-to-hand struggle with bayonets, gun butts, and hand-grenades followed. When Austrian reinforcements, hastily telephoned for, arrived, the attacking party was already retiring, leaving their dead and wounded in the casemates and on the wall. Rockets and light shells illuminated their retreat. Food supplies within the fortress were constantly growing less, and desperate sorties were made by the garrison in an effort to break through the besieging line during November and December, 1914. The Russian position at this time was so critical that the relief of the fortress was hourly expected.—Based on *Austrian official report*.

5. SUMMARY OF RUSSIAN OPERATIONS IN GALICIA.—The operations against Austria involved the movement of more than a million Russian troops against about a million of Austrians and Hungarians. "At the commencement of the war the invasion began from three different directions, and the Russian troops were formed into three great groups, each composing many army corps, the total aggregating twenty. These movements started from three bases. Brussilov [moved] from the extreme east, with his base on Odessa. . . . Simultaneously Ruskys's army started with its innumerable army corps and auxiliary troops, having Kiev for its base. . . . The last great group of army corps, commanded by Ewertz, had its base on Brest-Litowsk, and moved south via Lublin to drive out the opposing Austrians in their front, and take the whole in the flank. This, in a very broad and general way, was the movement planned and the general scheme of strategy, which, it may be said, was carried out to the letter. The greatest weakness of Russia at the start of the hostilities was in her lack of strategic lines of railroad. . . . Had Russia had more railheads at the frontier, she would no doubt have swept Eastern Galicia before the Austrians could have concentrated in any great force. But the lack of such facilities enabled the enemy to prepare defences hurriedly at many points, and to contest the Russian advance at every step. . . . The army of Brussilov was the most distant from strategic centre aimed at (Lemberg), and hence had the farthest to go, and perhaps in the early days the hardest fighting. The Austrians, with their superior railway facilities, were able to prepare a preliminary line of resistance to this army, along the bluffs and high ground between the forks of the stream known on local maps as Zlota Lipa, and here they made their first stand, a battle which in any other war would have taken columns to describe, but which in this struggle falls into the class of a mere skirmish. From this point the Austrians fell back

on a second line of defence, and one which was, in fact, an extremely strong one. This was the hills and ridges east of the river called Gnila Lipa. By the time this position was reached by the Russians, Brussilov's left was in touch with Russky's right that had crossed the boundary around Radziwitow. The position now defended by the Austrians extended from the town of Halicz on the Dniester river, which was the Russian southern flank, in a practically unbroken line through and north of Krasne. The battle which was engaged over this extended line lasted for periods, in different parts of the position, of eight to ten days in the south, to nearly two weeks on the Krasne position itself. The Austrian line was a very strong one and was defended with an intelligence

big Austrian stand on their main line of defences. Heavy masses of them fled via Halicz, blowing up a fine steel bridge in their retreat. But the Russians, in spite of their days of incessant marching and heavy fighting, were not to be denied, and, throwing a pontoon bridge over the river, followed up their victory. This movement threatened to envelop the whole Austrian right, as a glance at the map will show, and rendered the defence still going on around Krasne no longer tenable. Orders were therefore hurriedly given for the abandonment of that hard-fought field. It must be understood however, in justice to the Austrians, that, even after thirteen days of resisting the Russians, their line in this part of the field was not broken, nor even severely shaken; and their retirement was



GALICIA AND THE CARPATHIAN REGION

and vigour which for days on end promised to thwart utterly the Russian efforts to break through. Trenches by the mile, with bombproofs, barbed-wire entanglements, and all the other devices of modern field fortifications had been erected to block the advance of the invading troops. Modern field guns, machine guns and field howitzers were all turned against the Russians, and their losses were undoubtedly very heavy. Some of the details of the general line were contested for eight and nine days, being now taken by one side and now by the other, with each assault and counter-assault leaving the piled-up heaps of the dead and wounded in its wake. All this time Ewert's numerous army corps were slowly pressing down from their base on Brest Litowsk, driving back heavy forces of the Austrians. But these columns were not determining factors in the first big fight before Lemberg. It was the collapse of the Austrian defence towards the south of the line that broke down the first

due to the strategical exigencies created by Brussilov's enveloping movement on the south. The Austrians then evacuated their base at Lwow (Lemberg), and without offering any further resistance in the city, retired to their newly-created and even stronger position extending through Grodek and north to Rawa Ruska. Here, for the first time, all the Russian armies were in touch, as all the Austrians were also. Ewerts and his numerous corps had forced back his antagonists to the line between Rawa Ruska and Bitgoraj. This then presented an enormous front, with all the armies of both sides in touch with each other, and all engaged practically at the same time. It is difficult to form more than the merest approximate estimate of numbers engaged, but it is safe to put the total on both sides as above 2,500,000. . . . [This battle] was without doubt the hardest fought struggle, and on the most gigantic scale that the war had seen up to the time when it took place. Ewerts on

the north would not be denied his advance, and his repeated assaults on the Austrians resulted in bending in their left day by day until their line was bent into a right angle, with Rawa Ruska on the north-eastern corner. Here for eight days a battle raged which the annals of history certainly cannot up to this time duplicate, for the ferocity and bitterness of attack, and the stubbornness and courage of the defence. The Austrians, let it be said, were in an extremely strong position round this quaint little town, and were prepared to defend themselves to the last ditch, which in fact they did to the letter. At the extreme corner of the defence . . . they fought for six days with an endurance which was almost incredible. Here there are no less than eight lines of defence in little more than a mile. Each of these was held to the last minute, and some of them changed hands several times before the Russians came finally over them. Each trench tells its own story of defence. . . . This, then, was the first great phase of the invasion of Galicia. The Russians at the conclusion of this part of the campaign held Galicia up to the river San and Yaroslav, and had swept everything in this zone before them with the exception of the fortified position of Przemyśl. . . . The Russians, after six weeks of campaigning, were left in absolute control of the whole of Galicia, up to a line running from the Carpathians on the south, through Przemyśl and along the river San to the important town of Yaroslav. If one goes back over this campaign and studies out the movements from the start of the war, one cannot but be enormously impressed with the remarkable achievement accomplished by the Russian Army in a comparatively short campaign. Starting from widely separated bases, with meagre railway facilities, they manœuvred three giant armies, each composed of many corps and all working in general union, and achieved, without one effective setback, a series of victories of enormous magnitude. They did this in the face of an enemy whom history will show to have been by no means weak. . . . After the terrible fighting that had gone on for weeks, there followed a period of recuperation and refilling of the wastage of both armies. The Russians engaged the forts of Przemyśl and took the town of Sambor, and rested for a little. In the meantime the Austrians, encouraged by their German allies, were making frantic efforts to pull themselves together. The fragments of the army that had escaped through the passes of the Carpathians were taken by rail to Cracow, while the army that went that way was reinforced and stiffened up, and the whole reorganized and whipped into shape for further operations. . . . The Austrians began . . . [the second phase of the Galician war] by a terrific attack on Sambor, which was held by the Russians. Their impetus was so great that for several days it seemed possible that the Russians might be dislodged permanently from their hard-won position on their left flank. Indeed at Lemberg, where the guns could plainly be heard, there were constant rumours of Austrian victories. But their offensive ultimately failed, and the tide of battle gradually ebbed from round Sambor, and the interest shifted to a point which is between Sambor and Przemyśl. Here the Austrians concentrated a number of army corps, less than four, and made a heroic effort to break the Russian line, with the idea of taking Lemberg, which was a practicable scheme, entirely dependent on the success of their attack. For a day or so their efforts seemed to be showing results, and a number of the hospitals in Lemberg were ordered

to be readiness for an instant removal. But this also failed, and also the Sambor movement, with a dreadful loss to the Austrians in dead and wounded, besides more than 5,000 prisoners taken by the Russians."—S. Washburn, *Field notes from the Russian front*, pp. 111-116, 118-119, 121-122.

III. BALKANS

(a) Serbia.—Beginning of the war.—"Austria had not been more successful in her operations in Serbia. Her two first line corps had been withdrawn from Bosnia and sent north, and she attempted to conquer the country with second line troops. For some weeks there was much desultory and unrelated fighting, such as Balkan wars have often shown. The most serious engagements were along the line of the lower Save, more especially the struggle for Shabatz and the railway which connected with Losnitza on the Drina. On 12th August Shabatz fell, but on the 16th the Serbians checked the Austrian advance in that neighborhood. On the same day a strong Austrian force from Bosnia, under General Potiorek, crossed the Drina and took the towns of Lesnitza and Losnitza, its object being to co-operate with the Shabatz contingent and pen the Serbians in the triangle of land between the Save and Drina and Jadar. But on the 19th the Serbian Crown Prince attacked the Bosnian army on both banks of the Jadar, and after four days' hard fighting completely defeated it. The fire of their Creusot guns began what the rifle and the bayonet completed, and the troops, which had learned their trade at Kumanovo, Uskub, and Monastir, drove the Austrians with great loss across the Drina. By the 24th August Shabatz was evacuated, and the Serbians could claim with truth that they had cleared their country of the enemy."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, pp. 194-195.

1. INVASION OF SERBIA.—AUSTRIAN DEFEAT.—"The first plan for the Teutonic conquest of Serbia was based on the natural disposition of the Austrian forces north of the Danube and the Save, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . and also by the emplacement of the Serb capital, within easy and immediate reach of the aggressors. All this left them the choice of alternatives in the mode of progression, as they could execute the main thrust or the covering move on either side. By attacking Belgrade and pushing on from there; or by crossing the Drina under cover of a demonstration on the Danube, the Austrians were in a position to force strategic developments on their adversaries. . . . The plan . . . to outflank the Serbian forces from the west was quite above his [General Potiorek's] powers. . . . [The Serbian commander-in-chief], General Putnik, was no doubt led by the demonstration on the Danube. The Austrian bombardment of Belgrade started as early as July 30. . . . The early concentration of the Austrians opposite Shabatz, to the north of the Save, was a powerful one. . . . The first plan of concentration of the Serbian forces was carried out on the assumption that the Austrians would strike on, and from the Danube. Belgrade in consequence was almost completely evacuated and groups of Serbian divisions which formed the three armies under General Putnik were concentrated between the rivers Kolubara and Morava facing north. . . . When, however, the real direction of the Austrian thrust was known, General Putnik . . . executed a rapid change of front, occupying the very heights [which line the Jadar valley on both sides] from

where the Austrians intended to strike. . . . When the invading hordes from Bosnia issued across the frontier into the Jadar valley they found . . . the Serbs . . . in possession of the passes, and Putnik's main body was within reach of the key positions. The Austrians were gradually involved in a set of disconnected actions which spread confusion amongst them, and which resulted in their discomfiture and complete rout. Their rear columns which were still on the march when the action began got hopelessly entangled with the advanced forces, and supports in all parts were only brought up piecemeal to the scene of action. Such were the effects of Putnik's masterly counter-manceuvre . . . which, it must be noted, enabled him to score a first-rate victory with worn out troops against a superior army of fresher and better equipped units; for the Austrians were no less than five complete army corps, and had executed no forced marches. Not five days after the opening operations, the western Austrian divisions were dispersed, and sent flying in all directions (Aug. 20) and, soon after, the northern force lost its pivot at Shabatz and retreated across the Save, the victory yielding to the Serbs over 4,000 prisoners, some 70 cannon, and an immense amount of material and munitions, the total casualties of the foe being computed at 30,000, whilst the victors only lost, all told, 18,000 men. After the battle [August 25] the Serbians, . . . anxious to put an end to the bombardment of the capital which had been proceeding almost without intermission since July 30, performed a deconcentration of their forces and gathered them up along the Save, which they crossed . . . September 5-6 to . . . Obrenavatz. . . . The movement . . . carried the divisions of the Serbian 1st Army (General Boyovitch) almost as far, as Semlin and beyond Mitrovitz."—C. de Souza, *Germany in defeat*, pp. 6-II, 15, 17.

2. SECOND AUSTRIAN ATTACK.—SERBIAN RETREAT.—On September 10-11 when the Serbians were on the point of entering Semlin fresh Austrian forces crossed the Drina once again. "The Austrians, in better order this time and also in larger numbers than before, reached their battle positions in fairly good time; they could not occupy them all, for the Serbs were swift again and succeeded in getting hold of the key to the region, the wooded and hilly district between Krupani and the Drina. This and their employment of siege tactics on rapidly organised ground, enabled them to put up a successful fight for near six weeks. But the conditions which had made them victorious in the former instance were now non-existent; nor were their hastily-erected fortifications solid enough to withstand the battering of the foe. . . . Besides this, a new menace was developing for the Serbs in the north, strong hostile columns having forced the crossings of the Save between Obrenavatz and Belgrade. In such conditions General Putnik's decision to abandon his positions and to retreat was, therefore, inevitable. . . . The elated Austrians pursued him closely and endeavored . . . to envelop his forces. These forces reached their original line of concentration between the Kolubara and the Morava on November 12, the Austrian pressure in that line starting November 15. The Serbian positions were strong. In spite of the fact that the 1st Army on the left was driven back by the foe near Uzitsa and that thus the Serbian communications were threatened in the south, General Putnik would nevertheless have held his ground with success on the Lazarevatz-Valievo-Uzitsa front. The objection against this, however, was

that in her isolated situation Serbia could little afford to establish a siege front inside her territory—and then there was the possibility of a strategic success such as General Putnik had thought of and planned. The Lazarevatz-Valievo line, therefore, was only held temporarily by restricted portions of the Serbian forces, whilst behind this effective screen thus cunningly spread out, the bulk of the troops continued their retrograde movement to positions further in the rear. When, on November 28th, the latter were securely occupied, the rear elements who were engaged in delaying the enemy, retired, and fell back in good order on their supports. The Austrians were thus left in undisputed possession of the more advanced line, which gave them the impression that they had won a victory, and that they had nothing more to do now than to pursue a defeated and demoralised adversary. Their western columns joined the northern ones which advanced from Belgrade on December 2nd, and with no further misgivings as to their ultimate prospects they pushed confidently southwards with the intention of crossing the Lower Morava, and of entering Kragujevatz in a day or two."—*Ibid.*, pp. 17-20.

3. SECOND AUSTRIAN DEFEAT.—"As General Putnik had rightly surmised, they soon found themselves in a similar situation to that which had brought disaster upon them in the first encounter on the Jadar. Their front was too widely extended and they were not prepared to meet with resolute opposition. Ere they became aware of the true state of affairs, they were fiercely attacked by the Serbs, who were in a position now to deal at ease with their surprised adversary. The Austrian columns once more became entangled, the generals had no time to prepare and combine movements, nor to organise the defence of the ground they had just occupied. All this had been foreseen by Marshal Putnik. On the Suvabor heights, the 1st Serbian Army, now under . . . General Mischitch, broke the Austrian right; then the 3rd Army, under General Sturm, drove in the enemy's centre near Vlaska. Again, like at Shabatz, the northern hostile forces tried to retrieve the day by intense and hurried action on the Serbian right, but the success of the 1st Serbian Army in the south was decisive; it sealed the fate of the foe. The credit of the victory . . . [was] given to General Mischitch, who was created a marshal. . . . On December 10 the . . . Austrians were in headlong flight along the whole front, and on December 15 they were driven in confusion across the Drina and the Save, leaving in the hands of the victors 40,000 prisoners, 133 field-guns, 71 machine guns . . . [while their slain was] computed at 60,000."—*Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.—See also SERBIA: 1914-1918.

(b) Greece.—Attitude toward war.—The second Balkan "war had proved . . . that Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, acting in concert, formed a formidable Power, and it was evident that if the Serbo-Greek alliance was by effluxion of time allowed to solidify, a heavy bar would be placed, not merely in the way of the expansion of the Central Empires to the south-east, but in the way of that maritime control of the Levant to which they aspired. On the other hand, since if Greece could be detached from this combination the balance would be entirely altered, it was of manifest importance that the Hellenic kingdom should become subservient to German-Austrian aims."—E. Danc, *British campaigns in the Nearer East*, v. 1, ch. 2.—At a council of ministers held at Athens, Aug. 3, 1914, in the royal palace under the presidency of the king, His Majesty agreed on all points

as to the attitude of Greece in the Austro-Serbian conflict, which attitude would be one of absolute neutrality as long as Bulgaria and Turkey remained neutral. General Dousmanis, chief-of-staff of the army stated that the army was in excellent condition and that all preparations for a mobilization had been taken.—Based on *Greek official statement*.—"In September, 1914, Venizelos informed the Entente that if Turkey joined the Central Powers Greece would assist them in the war against the Turks on condition that she was guaranteed against a Bulgarian attack. Great Britain responded by promising that the Turkish fleet should not be permitted to leave the Dardanelles; and the Entente permitted a Greek occupation of North Epirus without prejudice to its future. Constantine, however, telegraphed to the Kaiser that he would not attack Germany's allies unless they attacked him. Early in December the Entente offered South Albania, with the exception of Valona, if Greece would at once join their ranks. Venizelos demanded a guarantee from Roumania that Bulgaria would not attack, but Roumania refused, and Venizelos was forced to remain neutral."—G. P. Gooch, *History of modern Europe, 1878-1920*, p. 581.—See also GREECE: 1914.

(c) Bulgaria.—Neutrality.—When Austria-Hungary declared war on July 28, 1914, Bulgaria announced its decision to maintain strict neutrality. On October 15 of the same year at the opening of the Bulgarian Parliament the Prime Minister Radoslavov read a speech by Tsar Ferdinand in which it was stated that "no matter what political combinations are formed around us the Government is resolved to maintain absolute neutrality until the end." In conclusion he said, "If we are ever led by force of circumstances to enter some arrangement whereby Bulgaria will obtain something more in the way of territory, this will come from the will of the entire Bulgarian Concert." Later in the year a strong movement began in favor of a more aggressive policy. "Bulgaria," said the Bulgarian General Savov in December, "will keep neutral as long as she can. We must insist on the correction of the mistakes made by the Treaty of Bucharest. We are resolved in case this should prove necessary, to take back by force of arms the territory that belongs to us and that has been snatched from us. The Bulgarian Army is ready and will do its duty up to the end when the interests of the country demand it."—Based on *Bulgarian official statement*.—See also BULGARIA: 1914.

(d) Rumania.—Policy in 1914.—Death of King Carol.—In August, 1914, the Council of the Crown of Rumania decided on maintaining neutrality in the war. During the month there were public manifestations in favor of the Entente powers, especially France. General Pilot and other military officers who fought on the side of France in 1870 carried on a violent campaign against Austria. The government endeavored to suppress such demonstrations and regiments were kept in readiness in parks and public buildings prepared to take severe measures against anti-Austrian outbreaks. King Carol, who belonged to a branch of the Hohenzollern family, was bound to the Emperor Francis Joseph by an old friendship. He had not ceased to feel coldly towards Russia, having never admitted that the diminution of his kingdom after Plevna was the right thing. Rumanian aspirations could be summed up in the word Transylvania, which comprised all the Austro-Hungarian territories occupied by Rumanians, with the understanding that Transylvania was the

most important as regards Rumanian popularity. Actually the Rumanian claims on the Austro-Hungarian territories were the following: Transylvania—57,250 square kilometers, 2,850,000 inhabitants, of whom 1,750,000 are Rumanians. The Banat—28,510 square kilometers area, and 1,730,000 inhabitants, of whom 700,000 are Rumanians. Chrishana—Area, 41,338 square kilometers, and 2,920,000 inhabitants, of whom 1,100,000 are Rumanians. Mamoresh—Area, 9,270 square kilometers, and 360,000 inhabitants, of whom 120,000 are Rumanians. Bukovina—Area, 10,471 square kilometers, and 900,000 inhabitants, of whom 300,000 are Rumanians. Total area, 147,280 square kilometers, and 8,760,000 inhabitants, of whom 3,970,000 are Rumanian claims on Bessarabia must be mentioned, tants of trans-Carpathian Rumania, nearly 4,000,000 are Rumanians, 2,200,000 Hungarians, 1,000,000 Serbo-Croatians, 730,000 Germans, and so on. Rumanian claims on Bessarabia must be mentioned, as they involved hostility to Russia. The efforts made by Germany and Austria-Hungary to win over Rumania, or at least to induce her to refrain from prosecuting her claims to Transylvania were pursued with indefatigable energy and perseverance. The same methods were employed in Bucharest as at Sofia, on an even larger scale. King Carol died in the first week of October, 1914, and was succeeded to the throne by his nephew Ferdinand, like his predecessors a Hohenzollern and a Roman Catholic, and numbering among his near relatives the king of the Belgians and his namesake Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria. His Majesty is first cousin to King George and the late tsar of Russia and the Princess Nicholas of Greece. The Entente Powers were encouraged to hope that under the new ruler Rumania would at the opportune moment join sides with them. In the Rumanian Parliament in December, Independent deputies voiced their admiration for Serbia's and Belgium's brave struggle against overwhelming odds and demonstrated that Rumania should enter in the war on the side of the Entente Powers. The passage through Rumania of guns and ammunition from Germany to Turkey, and the taking over of medical supplies by Germany, intended for the Rumanian army were sternly reprehended.—Based on *Rumanian official statement*.—See also RUMANIA: 1914-1918.

(e) Albania.—Revolution.—Internal conditions.—In July, 1914, a revolution broke out in Albania and at the end of August the insurgents threatened Durazzo. Then Prince William of Wied who had accepted the crown of Albania decided to leave the country. In his address to the Albanians he stated that his absence would only be temporary, but everyone was convinced that he would never come back. The Prince, Princess Sophie, Tourkhan Pasha (the Albanian premier) and members of the court on September 3 embarked on the Italian yacht *Misurata* and proceeded to Venice. The International Commission took charge of the government. The Albanian Senate elected Essad Pasha president and expressed to him the congratulations for the confidence the nation had in him. (See also ALBANIA: 1908-1914.) But peace did not smile on Albania and soon her troubles increased. By the last week of October 1914 there were six Italian warships at Avlona and a sanitary station was established for the relief of Albanian refugees driven from Epirus by Greek bands. Italy carried out the decision of the London conference as she was the only neutral power among the signatories to the Albanian settlement. By the end of October 1914 Albania was under six different régimes. Scutari and

its neighborhood was governed by a local commission composed of Moslems and Christians. Avlona was also administered by a commission. The Mirdites formed a separate state under Prenk Bib Doda. The Malissors remain isolated under their patriarchal institutions. The southern districts were appropriated by the Greek invaders. Durazzo and the central regions obeyed Essad Pasha, who enjoyed the title of prime minister and was recognized by the International Commission. That shadowy body, now reduced to four members, personated the ghost of the European concert. Except in the south the country was remarkably tranquil under its indigenous institutions. After he had left Albania Prince William of Wied received a telegram from the king of Italy assuring him of support in the future. The prospects of the prince as sovereign of Albania were seriously compromised by his inclusion in the German General Staff. The Italian government announced that her purpose was solely humanitarian in landing marines to protect the sanitary mission at Avlona. The British and French governments notified Italy that there was a strong movement among young Turks of Smyrna who planned a raid on Albania with the intention of reannexing the country to Turkey. Italy occupied Saseno, one of the Ionian Isles which completely dominates Avlona, so that it could never be made a military base. On Jan. 3, 1915, insurgents calling themselves "The Musliman Committee" addressed a letter to the government at Durazzo demanding that the ministers of Serbia and France should be consigned to them. An attack on the city began that day. After the Italian ships had fired a few cannon shots the insurgents' musket fire ceased. On January 4, the Italian colony and legations of Italy, France and Serbia embarked on Italian ships.

(f) Alliance between Montenegro and Serbia. See MONTENEGRO: 1914-1918.

IV. TURKEY

(a) Why Turkey entered the war.—"Many people entirely misunderstood the significance of the declaration of war by Turkey against Russia, France, and England. Why these despairing gasps of the dying? they ask. . . . For several years Turkey has been in extreme peril. It was condemned to death by the Triple Entente some time ago, and the prediction of the British Prime Minister in a . . . public speech that this war would end the existence of Turkey as an independent power was only the publication of the sentence of death long since decided upon. . . . But for the protection of Germany the political existence of Turkey would be already a thing of the past. . . . The entrance of Turkey into the war has long been foreseen, and its vast significance has long been clear to students. Some trained observers go much further: Sir Harry Johnstone, a traveler, statesman, and diplomat of repute, has declared: 'Constantinople is really the core of the war.' In diplomatic circles in Vienna . . . there was a general agreement that the loss of Salonika, which the Turk was forced to hand over to Greece at the end of the Balkan wars, was a vital blow to the Triple Alliance, and its recovery would be of sufficient importance to justify the risk of a European war to accomplish it. . . . At the beginning of the twentieth century keen observers saw clearly that the old order of things, which had preserved the Turk so long in the face of many enemies, had passed away beyond a peradventure and

had left the Turk in great peril. Ever since the decay of the strength of the Ottoman Empire the Turk had been hardly pressed in Europe by Russia and by Austria, both of whom coveted sections of his dominions, and both of whom would have been glad to obtain Constantinople, the gateway between Europe and Asia. Of the two, Russia was more insistent because her interests made the control of the exit from the Black Sea imperative for her. The Turk, however, until very recently, was himself strong enough to throw considerable obstacles in the face of the invader; he was probably in 1900, more efficient than in 1850; but his enemies had grown by leaps and bounds. He was confronted by a new Austria and a new Russia. What was worse, the Balkan nations, who had long been subject peoples, ill-organized, poverty stricken, had grown with the help of the Turk's enemies into sturdy, self-reliant, independent communities with good-sized armies and something approaching national wealth. The long years of subjection had left behind a consuming hatred of the Turk in their breasts; as Christians, they hated the Turk as the Infidel; and they promised themselves some day the control of Constantinople in the interest of Christianity. The neighbors of the Turk had grown formidable and would be able to make short work of him unless help arrived. There was none to be had from his past friends; so much was only too clear. . . . The old order had changed: the Turk's friends were now his enemies bent on his destruction. Yet there had never been a time when the Sick Man was more desperately determined to get well, when life had seemed to him so entirely desirable. The passing of the old order caused no grief among the Turks—outside of those few henchmen who had long drawn a fat revenue from foreign nations. The Turks had become fired with ambition, with democratic conceptions, highly inconsistent with the state of things which the old order had so long sanctioned. The new democrats declared indignantly that Turkey had been for years conducted for the benefit of foreign nations; it should be conducted in the future solely in the interests of Turkey. They were roused to enthusiasm by the past history of the Ottoman empire and burned to reconquer its old provinces, to establish a closer relationship between the provinces which remained. An imperialistic movement, a nationalistic revival, if you will, was preached in Turkey by ardent enthusiasts whose words fell on willing ears. . . . And now appeared an ally, unfortunately a Christian, in fact a peculiarly devout Christian, but one able to save the Turk from his foes, glad to foster his ambitions. The plans of Germany for her future involved the creation of a great confederation of states stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. . . . Of this Confederation, Turkey would be an integral and essential part. Adrianople, the key to the Balkans; Salonika, key to the Ægean; Constantinople, controlling the outlet to the Black Sea and the crossing to Asia Minor; the land approaches of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys—all these the Turk had, all these an alliance with him would give Germany. The stronger the Turkish State, the better organized, the larger its army and fleet, the greater its resources, the more useful it would be to Germany and the more thoroughly it would insure the success of Pan-Germanism. It had been for the interests of England and France to keep Turkey weak. . . . Germany, on the contrary, wished an active agent to pursue an aggressive policy in her favor. If the Sick Man could get out of bed only

with assistance, Germany was anxious to help him; and the Turk vastly preferred an alliance with a Power which was eager to make him well to one with Powers almost afraid to keep him alive. The Turks wished a capable government, a good army, a State deserving of independence, and were overjoyed to find Germany ready and desirous to foster this ambition."—R. G. Usher, *Why Turkey entered the war* (*World's Work*, Jan., 1915, pp. 125-130).

1. PAN-ISLAM.—EFFECT OF STRATEGICAL POSITION OF CONSTANTINOPLE.—"Germany was equally ready to have the Turk gratify his imperialist and religious ambitions. Pan-Islam would destroy the political control of England and France in northern Africa and in Egypt. It might even overturn the British Empire in India. This would be the greatest possible service any one could render Germany, and it might be one which Germany could accomplish in no other way. If the Triple Entente was the greatest foe of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Germanism should be its greatest friend. Where ambition and interest coincide, coöperation is simple. In complete accord, therefore, the Germans and the Turks undertook the reorganization of Turkey. . . . Turkey, they saw, was not a nation in the European sense of the word; it was not even a single race. . . . Far from being an economic unit with a single interest vital to all its inhabitants, it produced nothing essential to the outside world which its inhabitants could depend upon exchanging for European manufactured goods. . . . Normally and naturally the Turk should be a middleman, a distributor rather than a producer. . . . Constantinople itself, controlling the narrow passage which formed the exit of the Black Sea, was in a position to foster or hinder the entire trade of southern Russia with the rest of the world. . . . In this important strategic position, economically valuable to others but not to its inhabitants, had been collected a peculiar and extraordinary conglomeration of races, creeds, and interests; few of which had much in common, and all of which cherished for each other antipathies and jealousies almost as old as history. The Turk has governed this vast territory and this conglomeration of races and religions by a peculiarly weak political fabric which seemed in the nineteenth century to combine in one structure all the disadvantages of centralization, and all those of decentralization. . . . A series of so-called statesmen had taken European bribes in Constantinople; numerous incompetent and venal officials had robbed the populace with the help of the soldiers in the provinces, and this Government plus the army was Turkey. Turkey had, indeed, been sick, but that particular kind of illness, the Turks thought, could be cured; and the Germans agreed with them."—*Ibid.*, pp. 130-132.—See also PAN-ISLAMISM.

2. REORGANIZATION OF TURKEY: EFFECT ON POWERS.—"The reorganization of Turkey was duly observed by the Triple Entente and its purpose thoroughly well understood. Their opposition to it was prompt, and Italy attempted by the Tripolitan War to rob the Turk of one of his distant provinces. Having seized Tripoli with the consent of the Triple Entente, Italy then changed sides, returned to the Triple Alliance and took Tripoli with her. The result was a prompt reversal of the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and placed England and France in such danger that they saw the moment had probably come when it would be positively to their advantage to gratify Russia's ambition and allow her to seize Constantinople. The Tripolitan War suspended the sword of Damocles over the Turk's head. The

Balkan War threatened for a time to annihilate him. The prompt aid of Austria and Germany as stout representatives in the international conclave, the mobilization of the Austrian army, the knowledge that Germany was ready to mobilize, saved the Turk. [But] . . . Macedonia . . . was lost entirely, and much of Thrace, with Salonika, the key of the Ægean, was also lost and fell into the hands of the Turk's enemy, Greece. The reorganized state was now undeniably in great peril; and the probability of an outbreak of a European war in the near future, the knowledge that the Turk must himself defend Constantinople and the Bagdad Railway, urged the Germans and the Turks to great efforts in reorganizing the army and providing equipment. The fleet also received attention; two battleships were building in England and another was purchased from one of the South American states. There would this time be no escape. The death sentence had been passed upon the Turk, and if he waited for his enemies to gather and descend upon him defense would be problematical. . . . England, on the outbreak of the war, seized the two battleships building in England, and, therefore, weakened the Turkish strength in the Black Sea. The deficiency was supplied by sending two German cruisers to Constantinople and selling them to the Turkish Government. [The Germans judged that the] time had come when the Turk must openly join in the war, send his troops to the frontier in order to hold the invader as far as possible from Constantinople. Indeed, action at this time might allow the Turk to accomplish results of the utmost importance."—*Ibid.*, pp. 133-135.—"Enver Pasha, Minister of War, the strong man of Turkey, had long resolved to side with the Central Powers in the event of a world war, and the majority of his countrymen shared his ambitions. British sympathies with the malcontent Christian races were as unconcealed as Russia's age-long desire to occupy Constantinople, and promises to guarantee the integrity of the empire were regarded as worthless. The Entente, it was believed, stood for partition, the Central Powers at most for economic exploitation, and the lesser evil was naturally preferred. On August 1 [1914] Germany and Turkey signed a treaty, in which the *casus fœderis* would arise when Russia entered the war. The condition was fulfilled on the same afternoon, and Austria adhered to the pact. Turkey was promised military support, and her territorial integrity was guaranteed against Russia. The decision remained a secret to most of the Turkish Ministers, and neutrality was maintained till Turkey was ready to strike. [See also TURKEY: 1914: Turkey at outbreak of World War.] . . . The entry of Turkey into the war was the first resounding diplomatic success scored by either side, and its results were far-reaching. The scope of the struggle was immensely enlarged, and both the dangers and the prizes were increased. As rulers of tens of millions of Mohammedans who looked to the Sultan of Turkey as their Caliph, the British Empire and France were confronted with the problem of Pan-Islamic solidarity and discontent. Great Britain had now to defend the Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, Egypt and the Persian Gulf, and was forced to rely in far greater measure on the aid of India, who had already sent troops to the western front. The formula 'Berlin-Bagdad' seemed to assume concrete shape. . . . Russia, unlike Great Britain, hailed the belligerence of Turkey with delight, since it provided the opportunity of realizing her secular ambition. Victory over the Central Powers could

give her little beyond an unwelcome increase of Polish malcontents, while victory over Turkey would turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake, substitute the Cross for the Crescent on the dome of St. Sophia, and secure the coveted control of the Straits. On November 14 Sir George Buchanan informed Sazonoff that Russia might have Constantinople and the Straits, and the Foreign Minister's face lit up with joy. On March 4, 1915, Sazonoff handed to the French and British Ambassadors a Memorandum claiming the following territories as the result of a victorious war—Constantinople, the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Marmora and the Dardanelles; Thrace to the Enos-Midia line; the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the river Sakaria; the islands in the Sea of Marmora, with Imbros and Tenedos. This arrangement assigned to Russia the whole of Turkey in Europe except a patch around Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse, reserved as a bait for Bulgaria; the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus; and about eighty miles of the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor. The French and British Governments expressed their readiness to agree to Russian wishes, provided that their own claims, both in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere, should be satisfied. Constantinople was to be recognized as a free port for the transit of goods to Russia, with a free passage through the Straits for merchant ships; British and French rights in Asiatic Turkey, to be defined later, were to be recognized, the Sacred Places were to be protected and Arabia to be placed under an independent Mohammedan ruler; and the neutral zone in Persia was to be added to the British sphere. While accepting these demands in principle, Russia made a few reservations. It should be made clear, she suggested, whether the Sacred Places were to remain under Turkish sovereignty or whether independent States were to be created. The caliphate should be separated from the Ottoman dynasty; freedom of pilgrimage should be guaranteed; and the inclusion of the larger part of the neutral zone of Persia in the English sphere was conceded. On March 12 [1915] accordingly Great Britain and France announced their assent to the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits. 'A sincere recognition of mutual interests,' telegraphed Sazonoff in delight to Benckendorff, 'will secure for ever firm friendship between Russia and Great Britain.' The wheel had indeed come full circle when the old antagonists of the Crimean war were leagued together to drive the Turks, bag and baggage, across the Bosphorus."—G. P. Gooch, *History of modern Europe, 1878-1919*, pp. 567-570.

(b) Turkey and the war.—"The appearance of a German General, Liman von Sanders, in Constantinople shortly after the second Balkan War in 1913, if it did not make the Great War inevitable, drove the Turkish Alliance in case of war inevitably to the German side. He succeeded to more than the position of General Colmar von der Goltz, appointed to reorganize the Turkish army in 1882. Accompanied by a German staff, the Kaiser's delegate began at once to act as a kind of Inspector-General of the Turkish forces, and when war broke out they fell naturally under his control or command. The Turkish Government appeared to hesitate nearly three months before definitely adopting a side. The uneasy Sultan, decrepit with forty years of palatial imprisonment under a brother who, upon those terms only, had borne his existence near the throne, still retained the Turk's traditional respect for England and so did his Grand Vizier, Said Halim. So

did a large number of his subjects. With tact and a reasonable expenditure of financial persuasion the ancient sympathy might have been revived. . . . Most disastrously for our cause, the tact and financial persuasion were all on the other side. The Allies, it is true, gave the Porte 'definite assurances that, if Turkey remained neutral her independence and integrity would be respected during the war and in the terms of peace.' Unfortunately for our peace, Turkey had discovered that at the Powers' perjuries Time laughs. . . . The Allies had refused loans which Berlin hastened to advance, and the very day before war was declared had seized two dreadnought battleships, *Sultan Osman* and *Reshadie*, then building for Turkish service in British dockyards. Upon these two battleships the Turks had set high, perhaps exaggerated hopes, . . . for they regarded them as insurance against further Greek aggression among the islands of the Asiatic coast. Coming on the top of the Egyptian occupation, the philanthropic interference with sovereign atrocity, the Russian alliance, and the refusal of loans, their seizure overthrew the shaken credit of England's honesty, and one might almost say that for a couple of Dreadnoughts we lost Constantinople and the Straits. With lightning rapidity, Germany seized the advantage of our blunder. At the declaration of war, the *Goeben*, . . . accompanied by the fast light cruiser *Breslau*, [was stationed off Algeria]. . . . After bombarding two Algerian towns, they coaled at Messina, and, escaping thence with melodramatic success, eluded the Allied Mediterranean command, and reached Constantinople through the Dardanelles. . . . When Sir Louis Mallet and the other Allied Ambassadors demanded their dismantlement, the Kaiser, with constrained but calculated charity, nominally sold or presented them to Turkey as a gift, crews, guns, and all."—H. W. Nevins, *Dardanelles campaign*, pp. 6-8.

(c) Decision to join Central Powers.—"On the receipt of the news of the outbreak of hostilities [in August, 1914] a Council of Ministers was called together at Constantinople. As Secretary of War, Enver Pasha proposed that Turkey should declare forthwith on the side of Germany and Austria. He found himself in a minority. Next he urged the necessity of a partial mobilization of reserves. That was agreed to. The Sultan personally was opposed to hostilities and the majority of the Divan shared his opinion. Negotiations were accordingly set on foot for concluding with the Ambassadors of the Entente Powers a formal agreement of neutrality. . . . Tidings came of sweeping German successes in France. . . . Enver at every meeting of the Council showed himself more urgent and aggressive. The Council, however, was already divided when *Goeben* and *Breslau* steamed up the Dardanelles and dropped anchor before Constantinople. . . . [The] spectacle of two German warships lying off the Golden Horn at once stimulated the Turkish war party and depressed the opposition. . . . In the circumstances, Enver Pasha and the German Government realised that they must force the pace. Either on secret instructions or their own initiative they [*the Goeben* and *Breslau*] attacked Odessa and the Russian Black Sea port of Theodosia. On learning this the Turkish Government was profuse in its apologies. A deputation of Ministers waited on the French Ambassador with the offer of an apology to Russia, and of an indemnity to defray damages. The reply of the Entente Powers was to demand that all German naval and military instructors in the Turkish service must leave Con-

stantinople. The demand was met by evasion. Time was sought to be gained by a counter-proposal that the matter should be referred to the mediation of Italy and the United States. This, considered a subterfuge, was rejected and the original demand insisted upon. The Divan was now in a difficulty. To accede meant war with Germany and Austria; to refuse, war with the Entente. After a prolonged and stormy meeting the Council, swayed by Enver and Talaat, decided by a majority for refusal. Four of the Ministers, Djavid Bey, the most influential advocate of a peace policy, Mahmud Pasha, Oskam Effendi, and Boustan Effendi, forthwith resigned. The Ambassadors of the Entente Powers applied for their passports, and on November 1 they left Constantinople. . . . To involve Turkey in the War meant a menace at once to the Anglo-Persian oil-fields at the head of the Persian Gulf, and to the oil fields of the Caucasus. It meant, of course, also the closing of the Dardanelles, and the cutting of the shortest route to Russia to and from the West, seeing that the Baltic route was now barred. As an inducement, Germany could offer two apparently rich prizes—Egypt and the oil-fields of the Caucasus, once also in Turkish hands and now lost, and the source, like Egypt, of tempting wealth. Since, further, notwithstanding the Balkan War, there was a conviction among many Turks that, with the aid of German military science, these dazzling prospects would infallibly be realised, it is hardly surprising that, stimulated by cupidity, dreams of a great revival of Turkish power swept away considerations of prudence. . . . The advantages immediately derived by Germany from the diversion were first the closing of the Black Sea route; secondly, the obligation thrown upon Russia of dispatching a strong force into the Caucasus, and, thirdly, the necessity imposed upon Great Britain of taking steps for the effectual defence of Egypt. To that extent Germany added to the embarrassments of her antagonists. And she obtained the command of a force of first-class fighting men which might be raised to a strength of 750,000. In the fifteen divisions of the Turkish regular army filled up to establishment strength there were 300,000 of all arms. Steps were taken at once to embody a further ten divisions. Later the number of divisions was raised to fifty, but on a reduced footing, giving a nominal total of three-quarters of a million men. At no time, however, in the course of the War was a force of that strength simultaneously in the field. . . . It is doubtful if the figure at any time exceeded half a million.”—E. Dane, *British campaigns in the Nearer East*, v. 1, ch. 2.—See also TURKEY: 1914: Turkey at outbreak of World War.

(d) Turkish version of Black sea engagement.—The official Turkish version of the events that led to the severance of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Entente was published Oct. 31, 1914. “While on the 27th of October a small part of the Turkish fleet was manœuvring in the Black Sea, the Russian fleet, which at first confined its activities to following and hindering every one of our movements, finally, on the 29th, unexpectedly began hostilities by attacking the Ottoman fleet. During the naval battle which ensued the Turkish fleet, with the help of the Almighty, sank the mine-layer Pruth, . . . inflicted severe damage on one of the Russian torpedo boats, and captured a collier. A torpedo from the Turkish torpedo boat Gairat-i-Millet sank the Russian destroyer Koubanietz, and another from the Turkish torpedo boat Mouavenet-i-Millet inflicted serious dam-

age on a Russian coastguard ship. Three officers and seventy-two sailors, rescued by our men and belonging to the crews of the damaged and sunken vessels of the Russian fleet, have been made prisoners. The Ottoman imperial fleet, glory be given to the Almighty, escaped injury, and the battle is progressing favorably for us. The Imperial Government will no doubt protest most energetically against this hostile action of the Russian fleet against a small part of our fleet. Information received from our fleet now in the Black Sea is as follows: From accounts of Russian sailors taken prisoners and from the presence of a mine-layer among the Russian fleet, evidence is gathered that the Russian fleet intended closing the entrance to the Bosphorus with mines and destroying entirely the imperial Ottoman fleet after having split it in two. Our fleet, believing that it had to face an unexpected attack, and supposing that the Russians had begun hostilities without a formal declaration of war, pursued the scattered Russian fleet, bombarded the port of Sebastopol, destroyed in the city of Novorosiysk fifty petroleum depots, fourteen military transports, some granaries, and the wireless telegraph station. In addition to the above, our fleet sunk in Odessa a Russian cruiser and damaged severely another. . . . Five other steamers full of cargoes lying in the same port were seriously damaged. A steamship belonging to the Russian volunteer fleet was also sunk, and five petroleum depots were destroyed. In Odessa and Sebastopol, the Russians from the shore opened fire against our fleet. The officers and crews of the mine-layer Pruth were subjected to a rigid examination. Eight or ten days ago the Pruth, lying in the roadstead of Sebastopol, received a cargo of mines and was put under the command of officers who for a number of years past had been training on board the Russian depot ship in Constantinople and therefore had become familiar with the ins and outs of the Bosphorus. As soon as it became known that a small part of the Turkish fleet went out to the Black Sea, the Russian fleet sailed from Sebastopol, leaving only an adequate squadron for the protection of the city, and on Oct. 27 put to sea, taking a southerly direction with the rest of its forces. On the next day the mine-layer Pruth left Sebastopol and steamed southward. The Russian fleet, acting in different ways, intended to fill with mines the entrance of the Bosphorus, attack the weak squadron of the Ottoman fleet, at that time on the high seas, and cause the destruction of the rest of the Turkish fleet, which, being left in the Bosphorus, would rush to the assistance of the light flotilla, and, encountering the mines, would be destroyed. Our warships manœuvring on the high seas met the mine-layer Pruth as well as the torpedo boats accompanying her, and thus took place the events already known from previous communications. . . . This successful action on the part of our squadron, which only by chance came to be on the high seas at the time of the naval battle, is itself one of the utmost importance for us, as it assures the future of our fleet.” These events were followed on October 30 by Russia’s declaration of war, and on November 5 by the British and French declaration of a state of war with Turkey. The British declaration was accompanied by an order in council formally annexing the island of Cyprus.

(e) Turkish official note.—“The embassy of Turkey communicates the official note issued by the Turkish Government in reply to the circular addressed by Sir Edward Grey to the powers. This

reply, which bears the date of the 14th of November, says:

'England complains that Turkey, without any preliminary notice, bought two warships from Germany. It should be borne in mind, however, that before war was declared, the English Government ordered the seizure of two dreadnoughts that were being built for Turkey in British yards, and that one of these dreadnoughts, the "Sultan Osman," was seized half an hour before the appointed time when the Turkish flag was to have been raised over the ship; and that finally no indemnity was paid for these confiscations. It is natural, therefore, that Turkey, finding itself deprived of the two warships that were considered indispensable for the defense of the Empire, hastened to remedy the loss by acquiring the two ships offered in a friendly spirit by the German government. England complains of the closing of the Dardanelles. But the responsibility for this act falls on the British Government, as will appear from the following reasons, which determined the Turkish Government to take the final decision: In spite of the neutrality of Turkey, England, under the pretext that German officers were serving on Turkish ships, declared officially that Turkish war vessels would be considered as hostile craft, and would be attacked by the British fleet anchored at the entrance of the Straits. In view of this hostile declaration Turkey found itself compelled to close the Dardanelles in order to ensure the safety of the capital. And as to the claims of England, it is evident that the presence of German officers on the Turkish warships was a question of internal politics and should not, therefore, have given rise to any protest on the part of a foreign power.' The note goes on to say that England, though asked to intervene in behalf of Turkey during the Balkan war, did everything that was in its power to bring about the downfall of the Turkish Empire. And when Adrianople was recaptured by the Turkish Army, the British Prime Minister did not hesitate to threaten Turkey with collective punishment on the part of the great Powers if the city were not evacuated by the Turkish forces. The note continues as follows: 'The designs of the British are not limited to the countries of Europe; they extend to the Gulf of Persia. England has carried out its plan of impairing the sovereign rights of Turkey and of opening up a way of access into Arabia, for a long time coveted by the English. Faithful to its policy of hostility, England has ever opposed the attempts at reforms in Turkey. It exerted all its influence to prevent the Powers from furnishing expert technical help to the Turkish Government. The Kaiser alone, disregarding the intrigues of Great Britain, authorized S. E. Liman von Sanders, Pasha, to reorganize the Turkish Army; that army which is today challenging the British forces.' After having recalled the Franco-British convention of 1904 which 'passed a sentence of death on Morocco and on Egypt,' and the agreement with Russia in reference to Persia, the note concludes: 'England for more than a century has been striving to destroy the freedom of the Moslem so as to open up their countries to the greedy exploitation of the British merchants. The English Government, pursuing its program of hatred against the Moslem states, has succeeded in giving to its policy a religious color which ensures to it the support and the adhesion of the English people, puritanic and fanatical. Let us be grateful to God who has given us the opportunity of vic-

toriously defending the welfare of Islam against its three ruthless enemies, England, Russia, and France.'—Tr. from the *Corriere della Sera* (Rome), Nov. 16, 1914.

(f) **Attempt to foment a "Holy War."**—Shortly after Turkey's declaration of war the Sultan issued a Fetva, or proclamation announcing a "Holy War" (Arab, Djihad or Jihad). All Mussulmans capable of bearing arms, and even Mussulman women were called upon to fight against the sultan's enemies against whom he had declared war. "The so-called 'Holy War,' if it had succeeded, would have been one of the greatest crimes against human civilisation that even Germany has on her conscience, remembering as we do her recent ruthless 'frightfulness' at sea, and her attempt to set Mexico and the Japanese against the land of most modern civilisation and of greatest liberty. A successful 'Djihad' spreading to all the lands of Islam would have set back by years all that civilisation so patiently and so painfully won. The Holy War would have been a case of letting the wildest fanaticism loose against the armies of law and order and civilisation. . . . But the attempt against colonial civilisation did not succeed. The 'Djihad,' proclaimed as it was by the Turanian pseudo-Chaliph . . . was doomed to failure from the very start from its obvious artificiality. It was a miserable farce or rather a tragi-comedy, the ending of which was the defection of the Arabian Caliphate."—H. Stuermer, *Two war years in Constantinople* (tr by E. Allen), pp. 127-128.

(g) **Turkish army.**—At the beginning of the war against the Entente, Turkey is believed to have mobilized fifty-two divisions of 15,000 men. The number constituting a division greatly varies. All Turks capable of bearing arms can be called to the colors. Since 1908 Christians and Jews have been conscripted but many escape fighting by paying a fine. Those actually enrolled do menial work and non-combatant duties. "Turkey's military strength depends wholly on the Moslem population. Before the war liability to service extended over twenty-five years. About 100,000 young Moslems reach the age of twenty every year, 70,000 of whom were taken for the conscription. Service in the Nizam, or active army, was for three years, after which the conscript passed into the Ihtiat or Reserve, or active army, for six years. Then he was transferred to the 1st Class Redif for nine years, and finally passed into the Mustafiz, or Landsturm, for the remainder of his obligatory period of military service; but in Asia service in the Mustafiz only lasted for two years. Young men not accepted for the colours after a few weeks' drill were placed in the 2nd Class Redif, and remained with it for eighteen years, after which they were transferred to the Mustafiz. Until the war broke out the Mustafiz register was irregularly kept, and no Mustafiz men were mobilised for the Balkan War of 1912. For some months before the outbreak of the World War . . . German officers had been occupied in revising the mobilisation registers, and the following estimate of strength, as worked out by them, may be taken as approximately correct—

Nizam and Ihtiat	
Troops	380,000
1st Class Redif	270,000
2nd Class Redif	360,000
Mustafiz	90,000
<hr/>	
Total	1,100,000

... Large additions ... were made to these numbers by calling up all Mustafiz men, and enrolling the classes of 1916, 1917, 1918. On the 1st June, 1916, Turkey cannot have had less than 600,000 men in the field, with an equal number of men training at the depots."—A. M. Murray, *Fortnightly history of the war*, pp. 9-10.

(h) Egypt.—British protectorate.—Turkish advance through Sinai.—"From the outbreak of the war, the head of the intrigue against British authority was the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi. He had been in regular correspondence with Constantinople and Berlin, and it seemingly was not doubted either by the Germans or by the Turks that his influence would render the so-called National movement formidable. A plot had been set on foot for undermining the fidelity of the Egyptian army, and assurances given that on the first appearance of a Turkish force on the frontier the Egyptian troops might be depended upon to rise against the British occupation. [See also EGYPT: 1914: World War.] In November, 1914, on the declaration of war with Turkey, Abbas fled to Italy, then neutral. Later, he made his way to Vienna, where he was received with every outward mark of respect, and from Vienna travelled through Rumania to Constantinople. In Egypt, however, it speedily became apparent that thirty-eight years of British administration had wrought a profound change. Abbas was deposed, the country declared a British protectorate, the Prince Hussein Kamel, second and favourite son of Ismail Pasha, was raised to the throne with the title of Sultan. . . . Without sea-power, a Turkish attack on Egypt must be carried out across Sinai, a hundred and more miles of stony waterless desert, divided from an equally arid mass of mountains on the south, by a tract of waterless sand. The region is rainless. Yet it was across this tract that the Germans had persuaded the Turks that their military science would enable them without command of the coast to transport a modern army with all the machinery of modern war. In part the feat was to be facilitated by the laying down of a light railway. Sober-minded men might well have had their misgivings, and for that reason probably Djemal Pasha had been picked out for the Damascus command. More than any other of the Young Turk party he was noted for his Anglophobia. . . . The preparations had been in train before war was declared, and the force that set out, early in November, consisted of the 8th Corps, part of the 4th, a body of skirmishers who had been employed during the Italian War in Tripoli, and were inured to desert fighting, and as a vanguard some 2,000 Bedouin irregulars. . . . The British had a small force at El Arish on the coast, but that post had been withdrawn, and the only troops east of the canal were a battalion of Gurkhas, and the Bikanir Camel Corps at Katiyeh, the western end of the El Arish route. Advancing without opposition to El Arish and finding that place evacuated, the enemy reconnoitred the track to the west, and on November 21 his irregulars appeared before Katiyeh and engaged in a skirmish with the Camel Corps. Nothing more was seen of him until January 28, [1915] when there was another attack or demonstration at Katiyeh, driven off with loss by the Gurkhas. This attack was a ruse. In the interval the expedition, leaving part of the 8th Corps in garrison, had been making its way south from there along the Wady-el-Arish, a stony valley extending inland from the coast to the sandy tract of the interior. From

that point, by following the Pilgrims' Route from Mecca, the Suez Canal may be reached near Toussoum, where the general flatness on the eastern side of the canal is broken by sand dunes."—*British official report.*

(i) Mesopotamia.—British operations.—In "September, 1914, Sir Edmund Barrow, military secretary at the India Office, had drawn up a memorandum urging the occupation of Basra [Mesopotamia] on the three grounds that it would tend to safeguard Egypt, to impress the Arabs and to protect the Anglo-Persian Oil Installation. Upon that recommendation the 6th Division out of the troops intended for service in Europe was reserved for an expedition to the Persian Gulf. For many years the British authorities in India had had political relations with the semi-independent Arab sheiks who ruled the territories at the head of the Gulf or adjoining its western shores, and Sir Percy Cox, selected to accompany the expedition as political officer, received instructions to get into touch with the Sheiks of Koweit, Murrannah, and Najd [Nejd]. In view of the call for prompt action the Poona brigade, part of the 6th Division, in the middle of October embarked under the command of Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, as an advance force. It was to occupy Abadan, the island in the Shatt-el-Arab on which were situated the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's refineries. Consisting of the 2nd Dorsets, the 20th Punjab Infantry, the 10th (Wellesley) Rifles, the 117th Mahrattas and two batteries of light guns, the advance force reached Bahrein, at the head of the Gulf, on October 23. The first operation was to capture the Turkish fort of Fao, at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab. Following a bombardment by the gunboat *Odin*, the garrison of the fort were overpowered. Having secured this post, General Delamain sailed with his flotilla up the estuary, and disembarking his troops at Saniyeh, on the Turkish shore opposite Abadan, proceeded, on November 7, to form an entrenched camp. . . . News of the British landing must have reached the Turks at Basra immediately on their arrival. No time was lost, therefore, in pushing down to Saniyeh a strong force. . . . On November 11 the reconnaissance came within a short day's march of the British camp. The Mahrattas and Punjabis were sent out to deal with it. In the skirmish the Turks were defeated. . . . Reinforcements were sent from Basra, and proceeded to entrench at Sahain, four miles north of Saniyeh, thus cutting the route to Basra by land. Two days later, however, on November 13, Lieut.-General Sir A. A. Barrett sailed up the Shatt-el-Arab from India and reached Saniyeh with the remaining troops of the 6th Division—the Ahmednagar Brigade, and the Belgaum Brigade. The first (Brigadier-General D. H. Dobbie) was formed of the 1st Oxford L.I., and the 103rd and 119th Mahrattas; the second (Brigadier-General C. I. Fry) of the 2nd Norfolks, the 110th Mahrattas, the 7th Rajputs and the 114th Rajputanas. With the force were the 48th Pioneers, the 3rd Sappers and Miners, and the 33rd Cavalry. As soon as practicable after the disembarkation the Turks at Sahain were (November 15) attacked by the Poona brigade and dislodged. But on the 17th word was brought in that the main Turkish force from Basra was advancing. A general British attack was accordingly decided upon, and the whole force moved out. At Sahil, nine miles north of the British camp, the Turkish army was discovered posted with its left on the estuary,

and its right, where its artillery was chiefly in position, covered by groves of date palm. In front was a bare and level plain. As it seemed advisable to throw the weight of the British attack towards the enemy's left, where our gunboats were able to assist by enfilading the hostile trenches, while holding his right, and thus to turn him off the river, and by forcing him at the same time off the Basra route imperil his retreat, the British infantry had to advance in open order across this exposed tract. They carried out the manœuvre, however, with dash and coolness, and this intrepidity so impressed the Turks that they broke before the British could close. The Turkish casualties chiefly suffered in the pursuit, and were reckoned at 1,500 men. Those of the British force were 353, but the killed only numbered 38. Not only was the road to Basra cleared by this action: the Turks had been disorganised. To follow up the blow, part of the British force was embarked on two river steamers, and preceded by the gunboats made for Basra by water. The rest of the troops meanwhile pressed the retreating enemy by land. Some distance below Basra an attempt had been made to block the fairway by sinking three steamers across it. A battery of Turkish guns posted to cover the barrier was rapidly put out of action and some hours' work sufficed to blow up the obstruction. On November 22, that having been done, the flotilla and advanced troops pushed on at full speed. They reached Basra early on the same day. Rumour had affirmed that the Turks had evacuated the place, and the report was found to be true. . . . Part of the Turkish forces having retired upon Kurna, Lieut.-Colonel Frazer was on December 3 sent up the estuary with a detachment of the Norfolks and Indian troops, accompanied by three gunboats, two armed launches, and an armed yacht. Going on ahead while Frazer put his men ashore four miles below Kurna, on the western bank of the Tigris, the gunboats found the enemy strongly posted at Mezera, on the east bank, where Turkish batteries covered the navigable channel. In this part of its course, though the Tigris is 300 yards wide, it is on the whole shallow. . . . On approaching Kurna, Lieut.-Colonel Frazer soon learned that the place was held in a strength quite beyond his small force to confront. He accordingly withdrew and sent for reinforcements. These, . . . under the command of General Fry, arrived on December 7. An attack upon Mezera was then resolved upon, and the Turks were driven out. The capture of Mezera enabled the British, if they chose, to cross the river six miles above Kurna, and the plan of crossing at that point was adopted. Though it was a dangerous service, men of the Sappers and Miners Corps gallantly swam the stream, carrying a line attached to a hempen cable which was then hauled across, and with a flat-bottomed dhow which had been towed up, formed a ferry. In the meanwhile, the Turks in Kurna had sat tight, evidently uncertain as to the direction of the main attack, and probably thinking the crossing of the river higher up a ruse. Since the town is close to the point where the Tigris and Euphrates join, the appearance of the main British force to the north and west completely cut them off. The British troops at once began to throw up entrenchments. Seeing this, a party of Turkish officers came out under a white flag to parley. General Fry insisted on unconditional surrender, and there was nothing for it but to comply. Next day (December 9) the garrison of

1,200 men laid down their arms. The equipment taken included nine guns. So far the British blows had proved to be swift. The hold on the estuary and the course of the Tigris as far as Kurna, 120 miles from the sea, was secure. But the organisation difficulties with which the British commander found himself confronted at Basra in establishing a basis for future operations gave the enemy an opening. Notwithstanding the loss of Kurna and Mezera, a Turkish force advanced to the Karun, the river which flows into the Shatt-el-Arab from the east. The pipe line from the oil-fields is carried along the southern bank of this stream. Evidently these enemy troops were the reinforcements whose destination had been Kurna. Finding that place already lost they had struck east towards Ahwaz, where, as part of the plan for patrolling the pipe line, the British had established a post. In the face of overwhelming numbers the post had to withdraw, and a small expeditionary force sent up to recover the position found the Turks too strong to be dislodged. As the Turks were also at Nazariyeh on the Euphrates, 68 miles west of Kurna, General Barrett found that to meet all the demands upon his division forthwith would have involved its dispersal over a wide extent of country. Already the force had been reduced by the placing of garrisons at Koweit, Mezera and Kurna, and by the pipe line patrol. Further dispersal would, in the circumstances, have been highly imprudent. . . . The Turks were on both sides of him—on the east at Ahwaz, threatening the oil-fields, and on the west at Nazariyeh on the Euphrates. It was by no means an easy situation, and the less easy because, notwithstanding his repulse, the enemy was known to be preparing to renew the attack. . . . That this renewed offensive would take the form of a converging movement [seemed probable] and it was plain that the way to meet it was by anticipatory blows which would defeat the several enemy forces in detail."—E. Dane, *British campaigns in the Nearer East*, v. 1, pp. 34-41.

(j) Dardanelles project.—"The question of a possible attack upon the Dardanelles, as a preliminary to securing mastery over the maritime route from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and to dealing Turkey simultaneously a staggering blow, had not escaped the British Admiralty and War Office. The objects to be achieved by the successful execution of such an enterprise were so manifest, the consequences of a military triumph in this quarter were bound to be so far-reaching, that no special knowledge of the factors was indeed required to enable the importance of the matter to be realised. . . . By those responsible for setting the campaign in motion, the conquest of the Hellespont was rightly regarded as merely a preliminary to further combinations of war. The real objective that they had in view was Constantinople and the Bosphorus—especially the latter. For they realised that the acquisition of this remarkable maritime defile by British, French, and Russian naval and military forces would assure to Russia the means both of exporting the agricultural produce which she possessed in abundance and of importing the war material of which she stood sorely in need, would effect a cleavage of the Sultan's dominions into two parts, and would set up an insuperable barrier against that Teutonic pressure towards the east of which signs had been apparent even before the dramatic events of August, 1914, provided Germany with an opportunity for gratifying her Oriental ambi-

tions. The fall of Constantinople would exercise a tremendous moral effect throughout Turkey and the whole Mohammedan world. So daring and decisive a stroke delivered by the forces of the Entente could, moreover, hardly fail to secure an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the Allies on the part of the Balkan States, and it might well induce all those kingdoms definitely to make common cause with belligerents who had given a demonstration so convincing of their fighting potentialities and of their capacity for conducting war. As it turned out, the project in reality never got beyond its introductory stage. The attempt to win the Dardanelles, first by naval effort and afterwards by the superposition of a military expedition on a great scale upon the original operation, came to naught. . . . The problem had, as it happened, been carefully examined by the British Admiralty and War Office some years earlier. A memorandum had been drawn up in 1906 by the General Staff, in which there occurred a passage that clearly indicates the conclusion which expert sailors and soldiers had then come to as to the expediency of attempting to force the Dardanelles by ships alone. 'Military opinion,' runs this passage, 'looking at the question from the point of view of coast defence, will be in entire agreement with the naval view that unaided action by the fleet, bearing in mind the risk involved, is much to be deprecated.' The memorandum, moreover, took a discouraging view of the prospects of conjunct naval and military operations for securing possession of the Straits. The position taken up in the document was that a purely naval attack would not be justifiable under any circumstances, while an amphibious undertaking was bound to prove a most difficult and dangerous operation of war. . . . A combined British and French squadron bombarded the batteries at the mouth of the Dardanelles on the 3rd of November, the ships firing at long range for a few minutes. The works replied, and from their feeble performance it was possible to deduce the capabilities of the Turkish guns. Nothing further worthy of note happened after this affair till the 13th of December, when a British submarine (commanded by Lieutenant Holbrook) proceeded up the Straits and succeeded in sinking an old Turkish battleship—[the *Messudieh*]—a very fine feat of arms in view of the rows of minefields under which the vessel had to pass. There was, however, no intention of undertaking serious operations in this quarter until the early days of January."—C. E. Callwell, *Dardanelles*, pp. 2, 4-5, 7.—See also BALKAN STATES: 1914-1916.

(k) Assyro-Chaldeans join Allies. See ASSYRO-CHALDEANS: In World War.

(l) War in Transcaucasia.—"A glance at the map will show that the Russian Caucasian border has on the south Persia for two-thirds of its length and Turkey for one-third. Since Persia was a negligible military Power, this meant that her north-western territory gave each of the belligerents a chance of turning the flank of the other. . . . South of Lake Urmia the Turks took the offensive. . . . [(See below: 1915: VI. Turkey: d.) The struggle in Transcaucasia, upon which Germany built high hopes and Enver expended all his energy was, however, the more vital part of the Eastern campaign]. . . . Enver's strategy was ambitious to the point of madness, but it was skilful after a fashion. He resolved to entice the Russians from Sarikamish across the frontier, and to hold them at some point as far distant as possible from the railhead. Then, while thus engaged, he would

swing his left centre in a wide enveloping movement against Sarikamish, and with his left push round by Ardahan and take Kars in the rear."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, pp. 506-508.—"The Russian province of Transcaucasia is mainly a great trough extending nearly across the isthmus from the Black Sea to the Caspian, confined on the north by the Caucasus range, with the loftiest peaks in Europe, and on the south by the vast mountainous mass of Armenia. The Turks were eager to recover the fortress of Kars and the port of Batum, which had been taken from them by the Russians in 1878; the Germans hoped that an invasion of Transcaucasia would distract the Russians from operations on their European front; and Germans and Turks alike were lured by the prospect of controlling the natural resources of this province, particularly the rich oil-wells of Baku. Kars guarded the route from Erzerum, the Turkish advanced base, to the heart of Transcaucasia. A main railway line traverses the province from the Black Sea to the Caspian, sending off branches on both sides, one of which runs southwestward from Tiflis and forks at Alexandropol, one arm extending through Kars to Sari Kamish, fifteen miles from the Turkish frontier, the other bearing off to the southeast through Erivan and running for a considerable distance along the border of Persia. Erzerum, on the other hand, the Turkish fortress facing Kars, was about 500 miles from the railhead on the most direct land route to Constantinople. Late in 1914 the Turks had concentrated the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Corps, with three other divisions, on the Russian border, an army of about 150,000 men in all, under the command of Hassan Izzet Pasha, when Enver Pasha, who was also present with a large German staff, conceived the bold project of seizing Kars and cutting off the Russian army by a series of rapid maneuvers in defiance of the rigorous winter climate of these lofty regions. His plan was to recede before the Russians on his right, drawing them as far as possible from their railhead, while with his left he executed an enveloping movement against Sari Kamish, Kars, and the connecting railway. The Russians crossed the frontier and occupied Keupriköj on November 20, 1914, when the execution of the Turkish plan began. While the Eleventh Turkish Corps occupied the attention of the Russians in front, the Ninth and Tenth on the left advanced against Sari Kamish and Kars, and the First, which had landed at Trebizond, marched on Ardahan with the view eventually of cutting the railway back of Kars. The Eleventh Corps withstood and even drove back their opponents until by December 25th the Ninth and Tenth Corps had made their way over the storm-swept ridges and were descending on Sari Kamish and the railway and the First Corps had reached the vicinity of Ardahan. But the problems of supplying the Turkish armies and maintaining communication by primitive routes, rendered almost impassable by snow, presented enormous difficulties. The more concentrated position of the Russian forces enabled them to deal with their adversaries' columns in detail. They defeated the Tenth Corps in a fierce struggle at the end of December. The retreat of the Tenth Corps exposed the left flank of the Ninth, which was surrounded and captured near Sari Kamish. The Turkish First Corps was defeated and put to flight with heavy losses on the 17th. Enver's plan resulted in a complete failure and Transcaucasia was freed from the danger of invasion. The campaign subsided into desultory operations while the Russians cleared the whole

frontier region of the enemy."—G. H. Allen et al., *Great War*, v. 4, pp. 321-323.

V. JAPAN

(a) **Ultimatum to Germany.**—Declaration of war.—Japan's military power.—On Aug. 15, 1914 the Japanese government presented an ultimatum to Berlin, demanding the delivery of the leased territory of Kiao-chau into Japanese custody before September 15. Eight days were allowed for a reply, and when none was forthcoming, Japan declared war on Germany on August 23. (See also JAPAN: 1914-1918: In the World War). Her treaty arrangements with Great Britain pledged Japan to police the East and protect British Asiatic interests if her ally became engaged in war elsewhere. The presence of German troops and warships in the Far East constituted a menace to the peace of that region. The military power of Japan was confined to operations in Asia. She sent no troops to Europe, and only a few of her smaller units to the Mediterranean. Later in the war, Japanese warships scoured the Pacific and convoyed Australian troopships to the European theater of war. The war strength of the Japanese army of the first line at the outbreak of the war was about 600,000 combatant troops organized in nineteen divisions, but behind these were a second line of Kobi troops, while the Kokumin, or Land-sturm, formed a third line for home defense. The expediency of sending men to Europe was debated by the Allied and Japanese governments, but it was believed by the latter that they could best serve the cause by placing their arsenals and workshops at the disposal of Russia.

(b) **Imperial rescript issued at Tokio, Aug. 23, 1914.**—"We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan . . . declare war against Germany and We command Our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and We also command all Our competent authorities to make every effort, in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim by all means within the limits of the law of nations. Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which We view with grave concern, We on our part have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiao-chau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while its armed vessels cruising seas of Eastern Asia are threatening Our commerce and that of our Ally. Peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy. Accordingly, Our Government and that of His Britannic Majesty, after full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests, contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance [see ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE], and We on Our part being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means commended Our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, Our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice. It is with profound regret that We in spite of our ardent devotion to peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while We are still in mourning for Our lamented Mother. It is Our

earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of Our faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the Empire be enhanced."

(c) **Address of the Japanese foreign minister, Baron Kato, to the Imperial Diet.**—Following is the text of Baron Kato's speech, delivered before the Imperial Diet Sept. 5, 1914:

"As you all are aware the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain [see JAPAN: 1895-1902; ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE] has for its object, the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in Eastern Asia, insuring the independence and integrity of China as well as the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in that country, and the maintenance and defence respectively of the territorial rights and of the special interests of the contracting parties in Eastern Asia. Therefore inasmuch as she is asked by her Ally for assistance



BARON TOMOSABURO KATO

at the time when the commerce in Eastern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain regard alike as one of their special interests, is subjected to constant menace, Japan, which regards that alliance as the guiding principle of her foreign policy, cannot but comply with such request and do her part. Besides in the opinion of the Government the possession by Germany, whose interests are opposed to those of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, of a base of her powerful activities in one corner of the Far East is not only a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent peace of Eastern Asia, but is also in conflict with the more immediate interests of our own Empire. The Government, therefore, resolved to comply with the British request and if necessary in doing so to open hostilities against Germany and after the imperial sanction was obtained, they communicated this resolution to the British Government. Full and frank exchange of views between the two Governments followed and it was finally agreed between them to take such measures as may be necessary to

protect the general interest contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance. Japan had no desire or inclination to get herself involved in the present conflict. She only believed that she owed it to herself to be faithful to the Alliance and strengthen its foundation by ensuring the permanent peace of the East and by protecting the special interests of our two allied Powers. Desiring, however, to solve the situation by pacific means, the Imperial Government gave on August 15th the following advice to the German Government: 'Considering it highly important and necessary, in the present situation, to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions: First. To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn. Second. To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to eventual restoration of same to China. The Imperial Japanese Government announce, at the same time, that, in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying an unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.' But until the last moment of the time allowed for the purpose, namely, noon August 23rd, the Imperial Government received no answer from the German Government. Thus the two countries having unfortunately entered upon a state of war, the Imperial Rescript declaring war on Germany was issued the same day. . . . While regretting that Japan was compelled to take up arms against Germany, I am happy to believe that the army and navy of our illustrious Sovereign will not fail to show the same loyalty and valor with which they distinguished themselves in the past, so that we all may be blessed with an early restoration of peace."

(d) Capture of Tsing-tao.—"August 1914 found British interests and the vast trade that centred at Hong-kong in danger: German armed vessels prowled the seas, and the German naval base of Tsing-tao was busy with warlike preparations. Great Britain appealed to Japan to free their joint commerce from the menace. The Japanese Prime Minister, Count Okuma, might well hesitate, however, before recommending intervention. Was he the right minister to direct a war? He was nearer eighty than seventy years old, and recently had been for seven years in retirement; his Government had a minority in the Diet, and to the Genro his name was anathema; he claimed the allegiance of no party, and the powerful military and naval clans, Choshu and Satsuma, were openly hostile. . . . To temporize while events revealed themselves in Europe would be safer than immediate action; while to remain neutral might lead to the transference to the Japanese of much trade with China now in British hands, inevitably hampered by the menace of German commerce-

destroyers. Nevertheless, Count Okuma's Cabinet came to a bold and loyal decision. Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister, reassured Great Britain of active Japanese aid, and on August 15 sent an ultimatum to Germany. . . . The ultimatum was timed to expire at noon on August 23. That day arrived without satisfaction having been given to Japan. Within a few hours the 2nd Japanese squadron steamed off towards Tsing-tao. Before the outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain, Vice-Admiral the Graf von Spee, who commanded the German Pacific squadron, had steamed away from Tsing-tao with most of his ships. To use Tsing-tao as a naval base while engaging in commerce-raiding seemed a sound and practicable plan, since the British and Australian naval forces, though superior, were hardly strong enough simultaneously to blockade the harbour and to search the seas. The plan was, however, rendered impossible by the Japanese ultimatum, and the Admiral, after having lingered for some weeks in the Western Pacific, departed for other seas and other adventures. Such was the result of Japan's action, and thus dangerous were the tactics that Japan's action had frustrated. For Tsing-tao, situated upon one of the two peninsulas, divided by two miles of waterway, enclosing the bay of Kiaochau, with its safe and spacious anchorage for vessels of any size, constituted one of the most important naval bases on the Chinese coast. It had, indeed, been described as the key to Northern China. Dominating the eastern coast of the Shantung peninsula, the port formed the centre of the semicircular area known as Kiaochau, extending on a radius of 32 miles around the shores of the bay, with a population of 60,000. This area was, under the Chinese-German agreement as to Tsing-tao, influenced and controlled by Germany, though not strictly subject to her, and regarded as neutral territory. Its surface was mainly mountainous and bare, though the lowlands were well cultivated, but in parts it was rich in mineral wealth, large but undeveloped supplies of coal being present. . . . The heights which surrounded the bay offered admirable sites for fortification, while the land-approaches to Tsing-tao were guarded by formidable defences stretched across its peninsula. In many quarters the stronghold was regarded as a second Port Arthur."—A. N. Hilditch, *Battle sketches, 1914-1915*, pp. 83-85.

I. STRENGTH OF FORTIFICATIONS.—"The Germans had paid particular attention to defence, so much so, indeed, that over five-sixths of the white inhabitants were engaged in military occupations. Five thousand German marines constituted the normal garrison, though the outbreak of war in August called about a thousand more men—volunteers, reservists, and sailors—to the colours. The complement of the *Kaiserin Elisabeth*, an Austrian cruiser sheltering in the harbour, left for Tientsin, having received orders to disarm their ship, but returned in time to join the defenders. The garrison was amply provided with weapons, stores, and munitions. Most of the German ships off the Chinese coast at the outbreak of war, indeed, had made immediately for Tsing-tao, and discharged upon its wharves many thousand tons of cargo. When war with Japan became inevitable, therefore, the defenders could anticipate a successful resistance, provided the expected instantaneous victories in Europe materialized. Elaborate preparations were made for the defence. The harbour mouth was blocked by three sunken vessels, enabling only small craft to enter. Chinese

villages within the leased territory, and the bridge where the railway crossed the boundary, were destroyed, partial compensation being paid to the inhabitants. Native labourers were engaged to throw up earthworks to strengthen the town fortifications. Many foreigners, women, children, and non-combatants, meanwhile, had left the town. On Friday evening, August 21, at roll-call, the Governor, Captain Meyer-Waldeck, read out a message from the German Emperor exhorting the garrison to defend the town to their utmost, and to do their 'duty to the last.' . . . The following day a diversion occurred which opened hostilities propitiously for the Germans. The British destroyer *Kennet*, encountering the German destroyer *S. 90* off the coast, gave chase. The *S. 90* immediately made for port, and the *Kennet*, in the ardour of pursuit, closed in unawares within range of the German land batteries. The latter opened fire, and before she could draw off the *Kennet* sustained ten casualties, though little material damage. Next day the term of the Japanese ultimatum expired. It was doubtful at what point the Japanese would begin operations, or what tactics they would adopt. The fear was prevalent among Germans that the enemy would enter Chinese territory to reach the town from the land: newspapers under German influence, indeed, circulating in Chinese coast towns, started a press campaign with the object of stirring the Chinese Government to oppose by force any Japanese landing in her territory. Outposts were placed by the Germans along the shores of the neutral zone to watch for developments: they desisted, on August 24, the approach of Japanese warships. Vice-Admiral Sadakichi Kato, who commanded the approaching squadron, immediately upon arrival took measures to protect himself against danger from mines. Seven islets clustering round the mouth of Kiao-chau Bay were occupied, to form a convenient local naval base, while mine-sweepers swept the surrounding seas. No less than a thousand mines were taken from the water. A blockade of the whole Kiao-chau coast was declared, as commencing from 9 a.m., August 27, and war vessels patrolled the shores, some seventy miles long. Action soon began, and continued during ensuing days, with shells that at intervals screamed towards the town. The position was, however, reconnoitred carefully. Japanese airmen went up frequently to scan the fortifications and to drop bombs. All protruding structures, spires and factory-chimneys, had been levelled to the ground by the Germans so as to afford no mark for fire. Bombs were dropped on the railway station and on one of the numerous barrack buildings. The operations continued spasmodically into September, while Kato was awaiting the approach by land of a co-operating army which had now disembarked on the northern coast of the Shantung peninsula, about 150 miles due north of Tsing-tao." —*Ibid.*, pp. 86-88.

2. ATTACK BY LAND.—"The landing was effected on September 2, without hindrance or opposition on the part of the Chinese. The Government, following the precedent of the Russo-Japanese War, immediately published a declaration refusing to hold itself responsible for the obligations of strict neutrality in areas that formed, within Lung-kow, Lai-chau, and the neighbourhood of Kiao-chau Bay, passage-ways essential to the belligerent troops. It was, of course, incumbent upon the Powers involved to respect Chinese property and administrative rights. Japan, therefore, was permitted to make use of the main roads to trans-

port an army to the rear of Tsing-tao. The forces landed composed a division numbering 23,000, and commanded by Lieutenant-General Mitsuomi Kamio. An advance-guard was sent forward without delay, but soon found its way rendered impassable by torrential floods which at this time swept down upon and devastated the province of Shantung, bridges, roads, and even villages being submerged and destroyed, with great loss of life, largely owing to Chinese official incompetence. The Japanese, after covering 20 kilometres in two days, reached a stream so swollen that crossing was impossible. The artillery had to return to Jung-kow. German diplomacy, meanwhile, exasperated at its inability to prevent a Japanese landing, had not been inactive. The German and Austrian ministers at Peking, on hearing of the Japanese landing, protested strongly. China, it was claimed, ought to have forestalled and resisted the landing, but instead had deliberately extended the war-zone in order to facilitate Japanese movements. She would be held responsible for any injury to the German cause or property. To this China replied that, if it was incumbent upon her to prevent by force Japan operating in her territory, it was equally her duty to prevent by force Germany fortifying and defending Tsing-tao. China had endeavoured, indeed, but unsuccessfully, to preclude belligerent operations in her territory: only after the Japanese landing, when she was powerless to do otherwise, had she extended the zone of war. As to the responsibility, she reiterated her previous declaration. The baffled Germans fell back on threats: the right was reserved to visit upon China dire consequences for her alleged breach of neutrality. . . . An anomaly of the situation was that British local interests had long conflicted with Japanese national interests. Japan's activities had, at every stage of her recent history, reduced British opportunities. Japanese trader competed with British trader for the markets of China, and Japan's share of the annual trade expansion was increasing, that of Great Britain decreasing. High tariffs and preferential rates had closed Corea and Manchuria to British enterprise. It is easy to estimate in what commercial jealousy and rivalry such circumstances had resulted. While the expediency of the British-Japanese alliance was fully recognized, and its consequences admitted to be the freedom of the China seas from menace of commerce-destroyers, nevertheless the fact remained that the hostilities against Tsing-tao would constitute a fresh impulse to Japanese expansion. . . . On September 12 Japanese cavalry reached Tsimo, ten miles outside the Kiao-chau zone. No trace of the enemy north of the Pai-sha River had been seen, beyond a German aeroplane that occasionally passed overhead on reconnoitring flights. On the following day a number of sharp skirmishes with outposts occurred, and one Japanese patrol found its way to the small town of Kiao-chau, situated at the head of the bay, some 22 miles from Tsing-tao itself. The brushes with the Germans became of daily occurrence, and in one of them a high official of the German Legation at Peking, who had volunteered for service, was killed. On September 17 the Japanese attacked Wang-ko-huang, 13 miles from Tsimo, the enemy being in a fortified position and provided with machine-guns. At sunset, however, they abandoned the village and withdrew under cover of darkness, leaving behind quantities of equipment and supplies. . . . About September 18, after hostile patrols had been driven away

from the shore by the fire of destroyers, Japanese artillery and troops were landed at Laoshan Bay, north of Tsing-tao, just within the leased territory. . . . [This move was considered necessary in order to clear the hinterland before troops could be landed in safety nearer to the objective fortress.] On September 19 . . . 1,000 of the 2nd South Wales Borderers, a force so small as to be nominal, under Brigadier-General Barnardiston, left Tientsin and proceeded to Wei-hei-wei. Transport mules having here been taken on board, the expedition on September 22 coasted down the eastern shore of Shantung, and next day landed at Laoshan Bay. . . . Meanwhile, it was probably about this time, or shortly after, that the *Triumph*, a British battleship of nearly 12,000 tons displacement, 19½ knots speed, and four 10-inch guns primary armament, joined the Japanese squadron off Tsing-tao. A spasmodic bombardment had been maintained during the preceding weeks, and seaplanes had been busy, bombing and range-finding. The wireless station, the electric-power station, and several ships in harbour were damaged by explosive missiles. Little could be done, however, from the sea alone, and the attack by land, owing largely to transport difficulties, had still to develop. But the weather was now improving considerably. Another set-back to Japanese military ardour was, indeed, constituted by the marked reluctance of the Germans to form a line of resistance. German outposts, upon encountering hostile patrols, invariably retired after offering faint opposition. When the British troops, after a circuitous march of 40 miles, much hampered by bad roads, came up in the rear of the Japanese, then preparing to assault the enemy's advanced positions on high ground between the rivers Pai-sha and Li-tsun, the part that it had been arranged they should take in the Japanese attack, on September 26, fell through owing to a disinclination of the Germans to fight. Their resistance was so meagre that the Allies were hardly engaged, and next day gained without difficulty the easterly banks of the Li-tsun and Chang-tsun rivers, only seven miles north-east of Tsing-tao. The enemy at all points fell back, and the advance upon the town continued. The Japanese had now drawn their lines across the neck of the narrow peninsula upon which Tsing-tao stands. There were indications that the main forces were now in contact. The only obstacle, but a formidable one, between the invaders and the forts themselves was constituted by the dominating height of Prince Heinrich Hill, from whose crest, rising some five miles from the town, all the forts could be bombarded. General Kamio estimated that three days of fighting would be required for its capture: it was as all-important to the defence as to the attack, and was sure to be strongly held. The forts themselves, of the latest type, were elaborately constructed, and equipped with concrete and steel cupolas, mounting high calibre pieces. They commanded both landward and seaward approaches to the town, those nearest the invading Japanese being situated upon, and named Moltke Berg, Bismarck Berg, and Iltis Berg. Earth redoubts and trenches between formed the German line of defence. Plans for the most considerable engagement, the assault of Prince Heinrich Hill, that had so far taken place, to begin on Sunday, September 27th, were made by the Japanese General. It developed more speedily than had been expected. German artillery opened a terrific cannonade upon the Japanese lines, while three warships shelled the attacking right wing from the bay. The German fire

was heavy and accurate. Japanese warships and aeroplanes, and also the British battleship *Triumph*, however, created a diversion that relieved the assaulting forces. . . . For many hours the great guns, thundering their challenges from sea and land and estuary, maintained continual uproar. Fighting continued into the night, and early next morning was renewed. But the defenders seemed to lack enthusiasm. It is doubtful, indeed, whether their forces were sufficiently numerous to hold with strength their advanced positions, and at the same time to man adequately their main fortified positions. During the morning of the 28th the Germans withdrew from Prince Heinrich Hill, leaving fifty of their number and four machine-guns in Japanese hands, and many dead upon the slopes. The Japanese casualties numbered 150. By noon the whole position was in the attackers' hands, and the beleaguered town, visible from the height, was now face to face with siege. German officers who knew all the points, weak and strong, of the defences, could not but realize their inability to withstand the siege guns which Japan would sooner or later bring to the attack. But the heavy artillery was yet far away. A month was to elapse before the pieces could be dragged across the difficult country, and emplaced in prepared positions on Prince Heinrich Hill. This month, which covered the whole of October, saw many interesting incidents, and betrayed no signs of idleness on the part of besiegers or besieged. The Germans, indeed, proved extraordinarily prodigal in ammunition, firing on an average 1,000 to 1,500 shells daily, a fact which lent support to the current view that, while undesirous of incurring their emperor's displeasure, they realized the hopelessness, so far as Tsing-tao was concerned, of their emperor's cause. Warships in the bay assisted the cannonade from the forts, and Lieutenant von Pluschow, the airman of the single aeroplane the town possessed, ventured forth at intervals to reconnoitre or to bomb. Life in the town itself continued to be quite normal."—A. N. Hilditch, *Battle sketches, 1914-1915*, pp. 88-94.

3. CLOSING IN ON THE FORT.—"Japanese and British, meanwhile, drew their lines closer and closer to the fortress by sap and mine, though hindered greatly by terrible weather, and occasionally having slight encounters with the enemy. . . . At sea the operations were also spasmodic. At the end of September a landing force occupied Lao-she harbour, in the vicinity of Tsing-tao. . . . Mine-sweeping had constantly to be maintained, under fire from the shore, and proved a dangerous task. . . . Some German gunboats, however, among them the *Cormoran* and the *Iltis*, were apparently sunk about this time, either deliberately by the Germans, or from the fire of the Japanese guns. A torpedo flotilla bombarded one of the barracks, moreover, to some effect, while Japanese aeroplanes were also active. . . . [A railroad] line ran from Tsing-tao and Kiaochau to the junction of Tsi-nan, a distance of about 250 miles, passing through the towns of Wei-hsien and Tsing-chau. It was German built and almost wholly German owned. From some points of view it might reasonably be said to constitute an adjunct, if not a part, of the leased territory itself. In any case the Japanese claimed that, since the outbreak of war, the line had been consistently utilized to bring reservists, supplies, and ammunition to the town. . . . The railway, being still under German control, constituted a menace in the Japanese rear, which the latter, upon consolidating their position towards the end

of September, took measures to remove. After occupying Wei-hsien, they began to arrange for the seizure of the whole line as far as Tsi-nan itself. Hints of such action drew forth protests from China, whose Government, however, adopted too compromising an attitude. The Japanese Government was firm. China's right to formal protest was admitted, but the occupation was stated to be an urgent military necessity, and without any prejudice to Chinese claims after the war. Since China was unable to enforce the neutrality of the line, flagrantly violated by the Germans, the Japanese had no alternative but to bring it under their own control. . . . Its fate, since China did not admit the contention that it was purely German, was to be decided after the war. A bellicose attitude noticeable in Chinese military circles became very marked when, three days later, on October 6, unquestionably in breach of the arrangement, Japanese soldiers arrived at Tsi-nan, and took over the control of the rolling stock on the Shantung line. . . . But the Chinese Government submitted under further strong protest, and with a request that the troops should be withdrawn. The Japanese action occasioned, however, further distrust among British residents in the Orient. Meanwhile, a second British force, consisting of 500 Sikhs, was being prepared to reinforce General Barnardiston."—A. N. Hilditch, *Battle sketches, 1914-1915, pp. 94-97.*

4. BOMBARDMENT OF TSING-TAO.—"At one o'clock on October 12, Captain Meyer-Waldeck, the Governor of Tsing-tao, received a joint wireless message from the commanders of the besieging troops and the blockading squadron, offering a safe escort out of the town to Tientsin of neutrals and non-combatants. He at once assented. Delegates met next day at ten o'clock to discuss details, and on the 15th the American consul, accompanied by German women and children and Chinese subjects, left the town. On the previous day there had been a combined sea and air attack upon forts Iltis and Kaiser, in which the *Triumph* participated and suffered the only Allied casualties. It is recorded that, before reopening bombardment after the departure of the non-combatants, the Japanese, ever polite, signalled 'Are you now quite ready, gentlemen?' . . . Two days later, days notable for torrential rains, which intensified the discomforts of the troops ashore, the Japanese suffered a severe naval loss, [when] the *Takachiho*, an old cruiser of some 3,000 tons, . . . fouled a mine, released by and adrift in the rough seas. . . . Two hundred and seventy-one officers and seamen lost their lives. The rough weather . . . hindered operations till the end of the month. The landing of the Sikh contingent at Laoshan Bay on October 21 was, indeed, attended by great difficulties and some loss of life. A strong southerly gale had raised high seas, and enormous lighters and sampans, employed for disembarkation, were thrown high and dry upon the beach. . . . Trouble ahead threatened in connection with transport arrangements. . . . The column, however, at length set off, and made a march memorable for hardship and difficulty. . . . During eleven hours 6 miles were covered, by which time the Sikhs were completely exhausted with digging carts or mules out of the mud, hauling them out with drag-ropes, reloading overturned carts, or unloading those immovable. Next day the column was on the road at seven o'clock, and covered 13 miles. . . . A few days later, on October 30, after the Sikhs had rested and recovered, the whole British force, now some 1,500 strong, moved up to the

front in readiness for the bombardment of Tsing-tao, which had been arranged to begin next morning in celebration of the birthday of the Mikado. . . . The Japanese shooting . . . displayed remarkable accuracy, some of the first projectiles bursting upon the enormous oil-tanks of the Standard Oil Company and the Asiatic Petroleum Company, . . . and for many hours the heavens were darkened by an immense cloud of black petroleum smoke which hung like a pall over the town. . . . Fires broke out also on the wharves of the outer harbour, in which during the day a gun-boat, apparently damaged fatally by a shot which carried away her funnel, disappeared. The redoubts and infantry works particularly were heavily bombarded. . . . The Germans did not on this first day of general bombardment reply strongly, two only of the forts persistently firing. . . . The bombardment continued for a week. . . . The German shelling, though severe, was far less heavy, because, it is said, the men in the forts, sheltering most of the time in bomb-proof caverns, issued forth only at night and during pauses of the Japanese to return the fire. . . . Officers on board the *Triumph* observed that the largest German guns, of 12-inch calibre, were consistently directed upon their vessel. . . . The *Triumph* singled out for attack Fort Bismarck especially, and two of the German 6-inch guns were early put out of action. . . . On November 2 the Austrian cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, which had, with the German gunboats still afloat, been engaging vigorously in the fighting, sank, having probably been blown up deliberately, and the floating dock also disappeared. . . . The wireless and electric power stations were wrecked, and large attacking forces crept further forward, despite severe fire, and entrenched closer to the enemy's lines. . . . [On the 4th and] the two following days, the Allied trenches were pushed forward until they were right up to and almost half round the nearest German forts. Many casualties were suffered, but the German fire was kept down by the Japanese guns, whose accuracy was remarkable. . . . So effective was the bombardment that during November 5 and 6 plans were prepared for the final assault."—*Ibid, pp. 97-103.*

5. FINAL ASSAULT.—"It was arranged that a general infantry attack should be made as soon as practicable. The garrisons in the forts, meanwhile, were beginning to exhaust their ammunition, of which they had been, during the preliminary operations, strangely prodigal. Guns lay silent for other reasons than structural injury, though the latter cause, indeed, was frequent, a single shot, in one case, from the *Suwo*, the Japanese flagship, having destroyed a 24-cm. gun and killed eight men on Fort Hui-tchien-huk. In the town itself the streets, not immune from falling projectiles, were deserted; . . . it was realized that the end was not far distant. Early in the morning of November 6 the airman von Pluschow flew away across Kiao-chau Bay, and did not return. He escaped with the Governor's last dispatches into Chinese territory, where his machine was interned. That day and night saw no cessation of the firing, the guns of the defenders still roaring at intervals. About an hour after midnight the first impulse of the general attack took effect. While a particularly heavy artillery fire kept the Germans in their bomb-proof shelters, the central redoubt of the first line of defence, which had been badly shattered by the bombardment, was rushed by a storming party headed by General Hoshimi Yamada. Engineers had in the

darkness sapped right up to the barbed-wire entanglements, which being cut provided way for the infantry, who, while part held the enemy in front, rushed the redoubt on both flanks. Two hundred prisoners were taken, and the Japanese flag was hoisted. The besiegers were through the German line, but the position had to be consolidated, or disaster would follow. Danger from the flank was, however, soon obviated by advances in other parts of the line. Just after five o'clock a battery on Shao-tan Hill was captured; half an hour later another battery in Tao-tung-chien redoubt was taken, and Fort Chung-shan-wa, the base of the German right wing, fell. The shadows were still dense, and the final phase of the siege, viewed from Prince Heinrich Hill, presented a sight brilliant with many flashes and flaming fire-works, and a sound dominated by the thunder of the batteries. But dawn, as the besiegers began in mass to close in upon the main line of forts Itis, Moltke, and Bismarck, was breaking. It was decided to storm these positions forthwith, since the German fire, owing to exhaustion of the ammunition, was dying away. Governor Meyer-Waldeck, who had been wounded, realized now that further resistance was futile. Shortly before six o'clock he sent Major von Kayser, his adjutant, accompanied by another officer and a trumpeter, from the staff headquarters bearing the white flag: at the same time a signal of surrender was made from the Observatory. This was not, however, observed, while von Kayser's party, coming under fire, was dispersed by a shell which killed the trumpeter and the adjutant's horse. Meanwhile, Japanese and British were closing in, and were tensely awaiting the final assault. It was never made. Soon after seven o'clock a welcome sight relaxed the tension of the troops, torn, dirty, and weary, calling forth cheers from the British, and shouts of 'Banzai!' from the Japanese. The campaign was over: Tsing-tao had fallen. White flags were fluttering from the forts. That evening delegates from the two armies met and signed the terms of capitulation, which were unconditional. Honours of war were accorded the defenders, the Governor and his officers being permitted to retain their swords. The Allies marched into the town, and on November 10 the garrison was formally transferred. Over 4,000 Germans were sent to Japan as prisoners, and large quantities of war material were confiscated. The captures included 30 field-guns, 100 machine-guns, 2,500 rifles, 40 motor-cars, £1,200 in bullion, and 15,000 tons of coal. All ships in harbour, and also the floating dock, had been destroyed, but it seemed probable that the *Kaiserin Elizabeth* could be successfully raised. Sufficient provisions were found to feed 5,000 persons for three months, and the victors were able to regale their appetites with luxuries such as butter, crab, or salmon, which were plentiful. Looting, however, was strictly forbidden. . . . Measures, meanwhile, were at once taken to restore the town to its normal condition. . . . The Japanese casualties numbered 236 killed and 1,282 wounded; the British, 12 killed and 53 wounded. On November 16 the Allies formally took possession of Tsing-tao; and a memorial service was held for the dead."—A. N. Hilditch, *Battle sketches, 1914-1915*, pp. 103-105.

VI. AFRICA

(a) German colonies.—Capture of Togoland and Cameroons.—In 1914, Germany possessed

four colonies in Africa. Beginning from the west, the first colony, Togoland, is about the size of Ireland, and is bounded on one side by French Dahomey and on the other by the British Gold Coast. About a million natives inhabit it and about 400 whites. Farther south the German Cameroons lay between British Nigeria and French Congo and extended from Lake Chad on the north to the Ubangi and Congo rivers. Its area was about one third larger than the German empire in Europe. Its population is about 3,500,000 containing 2,000 whites. Following the western coast-line past the Congo mouth and Angola the important colony of German Southwest Africa (now the Protectorate of Southwest Africa) is reached. The area is some 320,000 square miles and it stretches from the Angola border to its march with Cape Colony on the Orange river. Its native population used to be 300,000 but owing to the Herero campaign at the beginning of the war it was under 100,000, while the whites numbered 15,000. The last and greatest of the German colonies was German East Africa, about twice the size of European Germany. The population in 1914 was about 8,000,000 including 5,000 whites. The first blow in the colonial war was struck in Togoland. That small colony was in an impossible strategic position, with French and British territory enveloping it on three sides, and a coast-line open to the attack of British warships. Its military forces were at the outside 250 whites and 3,000 natives. In the early days of August a British cruiser summoned Lome, and the town surrendered without a blow. The German forces fell back one hundred miles inland to Atakpame, where was situated Kamina, one of the chief German overseas wireless stations. Meantime Captain Bryant of the Royal Artillery had led part of the Gold Coast Regiment across the western frontier in motor cars, while the French in Dahomey had entered on the east. By Monday, August 10, the whole of southern Togoland was in the hands of the Allies, and Captain Bryant, with a small French contingent, advanced against the government station of Atakpame. On August 25, he crossed the river Monu, and by August 27, with very few casualties, he occupied Atakpame, destroyed the wireless station, and secured the unconditional surrender of the German troops. Togoland had become a colony of the Allies, normal trade was resumed, and in two months' time there was nothing to distinguish it from Dahomey and the Gold Coast.—Based on J. Buchan, *Nelson's history of the war, v. 4, ch. 23*.—The Cameroons campaign began with the invasion of German territory by three British columns, one of which was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel P. Maclear, who crossed the frontier near Yola a few days after the declaration of war with a detachment of the Nigeria regiment, his object being to seize Garua, the northern capital of the Cameroons, by a *coup de main*. The force reached Garua on August 29, 1914, and captured one of the forts defending the town, but a heavy counter-attack by superior enemy forces compelled it to beat a hasty retreat across the frontier. It suffered severely on the way, losing five officers killed, of whom one was the commander of the column. Another column started at the same time from Ikon and occupied Nsanakang, five miles over the frontier, on August 29, but being surprised by the Germans on the night of September 6 it fell back on Ikon, while a third force which had come from Calabar was held up in front of Rio del Rey. Meanwhile Major General C. M. Dobell, inspector-

general of the West African Frontier Force, organized an Anglo-French force at Lagos and on September 22 appeared off Duala, his transports being convoyed by H. M. S. *Cumberland* and *Dwarf*. After a short bombardment by the ships the town surrendered on the 27th.—Based on *British official reports*.—The conquest of the Cameroons is thus summarized by Major General Sir Charles Dobell commanding the Allied forces, after the capitulation of Duala: "The number of troops of both nations at my immediate disposal at the commencement of the campaign amounted to 4,300 West African native soldiers; on the 21st November, 1915, this number had been increased to 9,700, including Indian troops. In these numbers the British and French forces were approximately equal. I fully realized, that the conquest of a country which is some 306,000 square miles in area, . . . defended by a well-led and well-trained native force, plentifully supplied with machine guns, was no light task. . . . I entertained no doubts as to the ability of the Royal Navy to overcome the difficulties and make a landing at Duala feasible, and my best hopes were realized when I was informed that H. M. S. *Challenger* could force a passage through the sunken wrecks and other obstructions in the Cameroon River, and reach a point 7,000 yards from the town. This was made possible owing to the mine sweeping and other preparatory work which had been carried out. . . . On my summons for the surrender of the Colony being refused, and after duly notifying the German Commandant of my intention, I ordered a bombardment of the town to commence early on 26th September [1914]; this in combination with a land demonstration, made by way of one of the neighbouring creeks, was sufficient to induce the Commandant, on 27th September, to surrender the towns of Duala and Bonaberi, with a small strip of land in their environs. The surrender of Duala secured us a safe and convenient base for the future absorption of German territory; further, the capture of stores, supplies, field guns, and the removal of over 400 German Europeans was a great loss to the German Field Force, whilst the seizure of the large amount of shipping and numerous small craft in the harbour was an inestimable advantage to us. My first object was to consolidate the position already won, and with this object in view an Allied force was allotted the task of clearing the country up to and including the Japoma Bridge, Midland Railway, whilst a British force commenced to make headway toward Maka on the Northern Railway line. . . . By the first week in October we had made good the country as far as Maka and the left bank of the Dibamba creek. The Japoma railway bridge, 900 yards in length, was broken in two places, but a fine feat was performed by the French tirailleurs in forcing this passage under a galling rifle and machine gun fire. . . . I now judged that I could move a force by the Wuri River on Jabassi, so as to secure Duala from any attack from the north-east; a mixed Naval and Military force, supported by armed craft, was organized and an attack was delivered on 8th October. It is regrettable that this operation was not at first successful, difficult country, novel conditions, and the fact that our native troops encountered machine-gun fire for the first time are contributory causes to failure; nevertheless it became necessary completely to reorganize the force and repeat the operation, with the result that Jabassi was taken on 14th October. From this place a force was pushed out to Njamtan,

and the country around Jabassi was cleared of the enemy. My next objective was Edea, on which place I determined an advance should be made from three directions, two by land and one by river. Strong forces were moved from Japoma and by the Njong River to Dehane, thence by a track towards Edea. . . . The combined movement was entirely successful and Edea was occupied on the morning of 26th October. This result had not been achieved without hard fighting, particularly on the part of the force operating by the line of the railway. . . . During the latter half of October the small force under Lieut.-Colonel Haywood was continuously engaged with the enemy on the line of the Northern Railway, but had made such good progress that I was in a position to arrange for an attack on Victoria, Soppo, and Buea. . . . The opposition met with cannot be described as serious, but the country was very trying to troops; the energy with which our advantage was pushed appeared to demoralize the Germans, and by the 15th November we had secured Buea, with Soppo and Victoria. . . . With the double object of striking an effective blow at the enemy and at the same time relieving the pressure on the southern frontier of Nigeria I decided to clear the whole of the Northern Railway of the enemy, and for this purpose concentrated a force at Mujuka, under command of Colonel Gorges, on 30th November. This force gradually fought its way to the North and reached Nkongsamba (railhead), which was surrendered to us on 10th December. . . . The advance was continued to Dschang, which was occupied on 3rd January, and the fort destroyed; most of the hostile resistance was met with at the Nkam River, but our columns rarely remained unmolested and experienced difficulties in operating in a class of country totally different from that to which they had by then become accustomed. I decided, as soon as the fort at Dschang had been destroyed, that the place should be evacuated and Nkongsamba, with its outpost at Bare, should be our most advanced position. It was unfortunate that we could not continue to hold Dschang, as our withdrawal gave a false impression to the natives and emboldened the enemy. However, with the troops at my disposal I did not feel strong enough to maintain and supply a post 55 miles north of railhead, in a difficult and mountainous country."—Major-General Sir Charles Dobell, *Official report, Mar. 1, 1916*.

(b) Southwest Africa.—In 1914 the white population of German Southwest Africa, and all save a small percentage were Germans, numbered less than 15,000 all told. But of that total one-third were garrison and another third reservists. Administratively the colony involved a heavy annual loss. An expensive system of railways had been laid down. Business to justify this outlay there was not. The railways were military and strategic. In addition there were great stores of military equipment and supplies and arsenals at Tsumeb and Kalkfontein on a larger scale than the largest demand of mere defense. When war broke out opinion in the Union (of South Africa) was of three shades. Settlers of British descent were eager for hostilities, a feeling shared by those of Dutch descent who liked the idea of engaging in active service. The great majority of the National party, true to the British imperial connection, were ready to follow the lead of General Botha. A minority, not very considerable, thought the opportunity favourable for severing the tie with Great Britain. Swayed by that feeling, they were disposed to take a favorable view of German

chances. The number who were actively pro-German, favorable, that is, to German predominance within and over the Union, were, however, a mere fraction even of this minority. General Botha held the decision in his own hands, and unfortunately for their projects the Germans had reckoned without him. Not only were General Botha and General J. C. Smuts men of military experience who could not fail to see the meaning and intention of German measures in Southwest Africa; they were statesmen capable of taking and of acting upon long views. The Cape statesmen knew that German professions regarding the independence of the Union were hollow. The nominally independent Union was meant to be a German dependency, and between a German dependency and a British dependency the choice was between military and commercial constraint and

had thought out a sound plan of campaign. According to all the available indications the Germans, in the event of hostilities, expected the main attack from across the Orange river. On the face of things, indeed, it did not seem probable that an inroad would be attempted with large forces from the coast across the desert belt. Such operations were not, it was apparently thought, likely to be more than a diversion. The water and transport problems were deterrent. Besides, even assuming that the coast desert could be crossed in force, there were the boundary mountains to penetrate. On their slopes facing towards the coast these are totally bare of vegetation, masses of rock worn and broken by time into the wildest and most fantastic outlines. A German force, when hostilities were declared, took possession of the port and buildings at Walfisch Bay. During June and July, 1914, some thousands of men who had served with the German forces in the colony and passed into the reserve had been sent out again to bring up the garrison to war strength. The main body of the troops were now concentrated to the south, less, however, with the intention of standing upon the defensive than of launching, when the moment came, a counter-offensive in association with disaffected elements in the Union, whose numbers and influence the German government had been led greatly to exaggerate. This proposed counter movement was the substance of the German plan. Safe on the side of the coast, they had apparently little doubt in any event of being able to obstruct an advance from south to north across Great Namaqualand. Whether or not he surmised the nature of the German plan, and the probability is that he did, General Botha's scheme was calculated most effectively to circumvent it. The first of the Union forces, five regiments of the South African Mounted Rifles, the Witwatersrand Rifles, and three batteries of the Transvaal Horse Artillery, under the command of Brigadier General Lukin, sailed from Cape Town on September 2. They landed at Port Nolloth in Little Namaqualand. From Port Nolloth through the hills, which here south of the Orange river come close to the coast, there is a light railway. It runs inland some fifty miles or so to Steinkopf, and then turns south to O'okiep, a copper mining center. At Steinkopf, Lukin was to establish his base, since he was then within striking distance, a matter of forty-five miles, from Raman's Drift, one of the main crossings of the Orange river. The country between is difficult, very hilly and rough, and almost wholly devoid of water. On its face this move was intended to check any German incursion into Union territory from Nababis. But it served incidentally to divert attention from the next step—the seizure of Lüderitzbucht, and the more so because at Upington, 100 miles east of Nababis, preparations were afoot for an advance by a column of Union Mounted Infantry to cooperate with Lukin. A fortnight after Lukin's force had embarked there sailed from Cape Town in four transports an expedition of Union regulars, two regiments of infantry, a section of the Cape Garrison Artillery, a battery of the Citizen Artillery, and a squadron of the Imperial Light Horse. The destination of these troops, who were commanded by Colonel Beves, was Lüderitzbucht, and the flotilla, escorted by H. M. S. *Astraea*, arrived off that place on September 18. Knowing that retention of the town, even were it possible, was less important than control of the railway, with the power to destroy it, the German commandant had ordered



GENERAL BOTHA'S CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN
SOUTHWEST AFRICA

freedom. Looking towards Southwest Africa and the cloud there gathered; knowing that it was at once a menace to freedom and the common welfare; and having now the control of their own affairs and the power to undo past mistakes of British imperial policy, the Union government speedily made up their minds that it was alike their duty and their interest to rid the sub-continent of this threatening portent. Having so decided they lost no time in passing to acts. The formal requisition to move came from the British government at home. The reply of the South African government to the requisition from London was prompt and affirmative. There was some difference of view in the Federal Parliament, but the overwhelming weight of opinion both in the House and outside proved to be with General Botha, and when the necessary proportion of the Reservists were called up they responded unhesitatingly. (See also SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1914.) The South African government, however, did more than decide promptly. General Botha

an immediate evacuation, and had retired along the railway to Kolmanskuppe, some ten miles inland.—Based on E. Dane, *British campaigns in Africa and the Pacific*, ch. 1, and pp. 29-34.

1. SOUTH AFRICAN REBELLION.—On September 26 at Sandfontein, a small force of South African Mounted Rifles and Transvaal Horse Artillery were forced to surrender to the Germans. About two weeks later the cause for this and other failures revealed an ugly state of things in the northwest of the Cape province. Colonel S. G. Maritz, who had fought on the Dutch side in the South African War, commanded the British forces. General Botha suspected his loyalty and dispatched Colonel Brits to take over his command. Maritz refused to come in and delivered an ultimatum. This declared that unless the government guaranteed that before a certain date Generals Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers, Kemp, and Muller should be allowed to come and meet him and give him their instructions, he would invade the Union. To quote a dispatch of the governor general: "Maritz was in possession of some guns belonging to the Germans, and held the rank of general commanding the German troops. He had a force of Germans under him, in addition to his own rebel commando. He had arrested all those of his officers and men who were unwilling to join the Germans, and had then sent them forward as prisoners to German South-West Africa. Major Bouwer saw an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South-West Africa [Dr. Seitz], guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a republic, ceding Walfisch Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz. Major Bouwer was shown numerous telegrams and helio messages dating back to the beginning of September. Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, rifles, ammunition, and money from the Germans, and that he would over-run the whole of South Africa." The immediate result of this discovery was the proclamation of martial law throughout the Union and a general strengthening of the Union forces. Meantime Maritz proved a broken reed to his new allies. His one asset was an intimate local knowledge of the waterless northwest. He fixed his base near Upington, on the Orange, and dispatched a portion of his command of 2,000 to march southward up the Great Fish river against Kenhart and Calvinia. Colonel Brits lost no time in harrying the Upington commando, and on October 15 captured a part of it at Ratedrai, many of the men voluntarily surrendering. Maritz then moved west down the Orange to Kakamas, where Colonel Brits fell upon him so fiercely that he lost all his tents and stores, and was compelled to withdraw, wounded, over the German frontier. He made another sally on the 30th, but was conclusively beaten by Brits at Schuit Drift, and driven finally out of the colony. The South African rebellion which had been fomented by General Hertzog (whom Botha dismissed from the ministry), Delarey, Beyers, De Wet and old Boer leaders was not long in revealing itself. On October 24 De Wet seized Heilbron in the north Free State and Beyers' commando threatened Pretoria. General Botha summoned the burghers to put down the revolt—and 30,000 responded. De Wet, Beyers and Kemp were soon on the run. De Wet on November 7 at Doornberg defeated a Union force under General Cronje. His army numbered about 2,000 men. Botha having pretty well cleared the Transvaal on November 11 got

in touch with De Wet east of Winburg. General Botha's plan was to surround the whole rebel force, two Union armies, under Colonels Brits and Lukin, working round its flanks. De Wet was completely defeated. He at first fled south, but presently doubled back, and on the 16th was at Virginia, on the main line. Presently some of the rebel commandants began to come in, and many who had taken up arms, attracted by the clemency of General Botha's proclamation, laid them down again. De Wet was aiming at a junction with Beyers, who was in the Hoopstad district at the time. On the 15th, Colonel Celliers had fallen upon Beyers at Bultfontein, and had beaten him thoroughly. Accordingly De Wet fleeing from Virginia down the Sand and Vet rivers, found Celliers ahead of him, and heard of Beyers' disaster. He saw that the game was up, and halted his force near Boshof. There seems to have been considerable disaffection in its ranks, and in a final address to them he advised all who were tired of fighting to hide their rifles and go home. Many took the advice, including two of his sons, many yielded themselves to the Union forces, but De Wet himself, with twenty-five men, made one last dash for liberty. On November 21 he tried to cross the Vaal, and was driven back by Commandant Dutoit. In the evening, however, with a following now reduced to six, he managed to slip over the river about Bloemhof, and took the road for Vryburg and the northwest. The end came finally on December 1, when, at a farm called Waterburg, about a hundred miles west of Mafeking, De Wet and his handful surrendered to Colonel Jordaan. He was taken to Vryburg, and two days later entered Johannesburg a prisoner.—Based on J. Buchan, *Nelson's history of the war*, v. 3, ch. 23.—See also SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1914.

2. END OF THE REBELLION.—With the capture of De Wet the rebellion was virtually at an end. Kemp fled west. He had some fighting at Kuruman, from which he headed south-west across the Southern Kalahari. He was engaged again north of Upington, and it was a very battered remnant which ultimately crossed the border of German Southwest Africa. Early in December, General Botha organized a great sweeping movement from Reitz, which ended in the surrender of Wessels with the only large body of rebels still in the field. Beyers, with a small commando, after his defeat at Bultfontein had haunted the southern shore of the Vaal between Hoopstad and Kroonstad. On the morning of December 8 he fell in with a body of Union troops under Captain Uys, and was driven towards the river. He and some companions endeavored to cross the Vaal, which was in high flood, and, midway in the stream, he found his horse failing, and slipped from its back to swim. His body was found two days later.—Based on J. Buchan, *Nelson's history of the war*, v. 4, ch. 32.—Maritz and Kemp with about 1,200 men were defeated by Colonel Van der Venter at Upington on January 23, and Kemp, surrendered unconditionally a few days later. Maritz fled back to German territory.—See also SOUTH AFRICA, UNION OF: 1914.

(c) East Africa.—German plans.—Bombardment of Zanzibar.—When war was declared in August, 1914, the Germans in East Africa were ready. The thousand miles of central railway from Dar-es-Salem to Ujiji had just been completed for traffic. The German planters, some 3,000 in number, were of course called out. Of guns, machine-guns, rifles and military tools of all

charge of this post, held out against all the efforts to rush the position. He was relieved eventually by a column made up of the Jind Infantry and the King's African Rifles. The enemy was compelled to retreat, and it proved to be the end of his Mombasa project. With the door at Mombasa open the British held the means of, in time, turning the balance. Meanwhile, on the British side the decision had been formed to pass to the offensive, and a plan had been adopted for squeezing the Germans out of their positions along the frontier by on the one flank attacking them at Longido, and on the other turning them by a landing in their right rear at Tanga. If successful, this latter operation would enable a move to be made inland along the railway to Wilhelmstal, and force evacuation of the Usambara plateau, a dominating rise it was desirable to seize. In accordance with the decision, there was sent from India a further reinforcement of 6,000 troops under the command of Major General Aitken. Tanga was their destination, and the transports arrived off that port on November 2. The British information was that the town was not defended. Likely enough, when that intelligence was gleaned the town was not, but either the enemy had got wind of the intended descent, or suspected it. At any rate, he had thrown a strong garrison into the place. Further, he had very carefully barricaded the streets and loopholed the houses, and the woods and cane bush by which Tanga was surrounded had been elaborately set with traps and entanglements. On the arrival of the ships, General Aitken sent ashore a summons to the German commandant to surrender. The demand was refused. As it soon became evident that the place was held in strength, the direct attempt to land was not persisted in. In face of the enemy's guns the attempt would have been impracticable. Not willing to give the project up, however, General Aitken two days later threw part of his force ashore at the South end of the bay. To reach the town the troops had to struggle through the bush. The infantry resistance met with was not serious, but the enemy batteries were turned upon the advance, their fire guided by a variety of ingenious devices. The cane bush grows to a height of eight feet or more, so that to detect movement through it by direct observation was not easy. But the enemy had set traps which, when disturbed, signalled the range to his gunners. In spite of this, the attacking troops fought their way forward to and into Tanga. There the fighting became a succession of furious street combats, and the storming of barricades and houses. Possibly enough, if at this point the rest of the Expeditionary Force had been thrown ashore at the port, the place might have been won, but on the transports the situation seems to have been thought less favorable than it was. Hence the attacking column, instead of the support they had looked for, received the order to withdraw. Their losses, of course, were further increased during the retirement and they were sufficiently serious—nearly 800 officers and men. Though it did not in any way shake the morale of the force, this was an unpleasant check, rendered none the less unpleasant by the lack of success which had also attended the Longido enterprise. The cause in that instance was a breakdown in the water transport. The troops fought well, but after hours of hard fighting in the tropics men parched with thirst which no means are found of relieving are in almost the most intolerable position it is possible to imagine. The defenses won had to be evacuated. There was

little use in retaining conquered positions when they could only be held at the risk of perishing from lack of water. But though the grand scheme for a converging offensive had fallen through, another effort was made to relieve Mombasa from menace, for until that was done no important advance towards the interior could be undertaken. Accordingly, the enemy was attacked at Vanga and driven out, and the town garrisoned by a force of Indian infantry under the command of Colonel Ragbir Singh. Unwilling to sit down under this reverse, the Germans attempted a recapture, and with a powerful column. The defense was brilliant. The garrison fought until they had fired their last shot. Their gallant commander had fallen beating off an assault. Happily, just at this critical juncture, the distant boom of guns and roll of rifle fire announced that relief had arrived. The German forces were pressed back over the frontier. Substantially this was the situation when, in April, 1915, the command was transferred to Brigadier General Tighe. The Germans still held Taveta. Beyond that, however, their plan had come to nothing. It is here advisable to glance at operations in other parts of this vast theater of hostilities. They include some of the most romantic episodes and adventures of the war.—Based on E. Dane, *British campaigns in Africa and the Pacific*, ch. 5.

2. CAPTURE OF KARUNGU.—ATTEMPT TO INVADE UGANDA.—In September, 1914, part of the force under the command of Major General von Wehle had seized Karungu, a small port on the Victoria Nyanza just across the British East Africa boundary. The purpose of von Wehle's advance was occupation of the port and railway terminus at Kisumu, and the isolation of Uganda. Apparently it had been assumed, first, that the British, concerned for the defense of Mombasa, would have few troops at this inland end of the railway, and, secondly, that a German invasion and occupation of Uganda would prove fairly easy. Both assumptions turned out to be wrong. With the arrival of reinforcements from India the British, instead of weakening their force at Kisumu, had strengthened it, and they reacted promptly. Two squadrons of the East African Mounted Rifles were sent from Kisumu to Karungu on the steamer *Winifred*. But the German attack on the latter place was supported by the German armed steamer *Mwanza*, and *Winifred*, chased off by her, was compelled to return. A mounted column, however, was sent south to Karungu overland, and the Germans fell back. The real reason for withdrawal was the resistance met with on the Uganda boundary from the native troops of the protectorate. The resistance was stiff, so stiff that von Wehle could make no headway. In January, in fact, he found himself placed on the defensive. Not only had his invasion of Uganda been beaten off with a considerable loss on his side, but *Mwanza* had been attacked and disabled, and east of the Victoria Nyanza the British column from Karungu had crossed the German frontier and captured Shirati. That, however, was by no means the worst. Sent up country with his brigade, General Stewart had made Karungu his headquarters, and in order once for all to cripple the German operations against Uganda, lost no time in organizing an expedition across the lake to Bukoba. Stewart's force, which included British as well as Indian troops and a detachment of Driscoll's Frontiersmen, who had joined as mounted scouts, was to cooperate with a Uganda column moving down the Kagera river. The enterprise

proved entirely successful. While a demonstration was made from the water front a battalion of Lancashires, previously thrown ashore at day-break some miles to the south, attacked from inland, entered the town and speedily mastered it. The munitions and military stores found were large. So far as time allowed these were seized and shipped. The remainder were destroyed, and to the Germans the loss was more serious than that of men. The destruction of their base at Bukoba meant that Uganda was henceforth safe from their attentions.—Based on E. Dane, *British campaigns in Africa and the Pacific*, ch. 5.

3. OPERATIONS IN NYASSALAND.—CAPTURE OF GERMAN POSSESSIONS IN THE PACIFIC.—In the south at the outbreak of the war the King's Rifles reserves had been called out, volunteers enrolled and the mobilization was completed at Livingston, capital of Nyassaland, in a little over a week. Captain Barton, D. S. O., Northampton Regiment, had command of the force which was divided into double companies. The troops were embarked in the Lake Nyassa flotilla and were concentrated at Karungu by August 22. The Germans had placed an armed steamer *Hermann von Wissmann* in the lake and Commander E. L. Rhodes in the British armed steamer *Gwendolin* found the boat in the German port of Sphinkhaven, destroyed it and made prisoners of the crew. This was on August 13. On land the Germans were out first. On August 20 they crossed the Songwe river—the boundary—and seized Kapora which they had laid out as an advanced post. Barton leaving a detachment at Karungu marched on Rufira where the Germans were concentrated. They were held up by the enemy at the crossing of the Lufira river but scattered their opponents and moved on. This effort was to hold Barton while the German main body attacked Karungu, but here the British put up a stout defense for four hours—when Captain Griffith arrived with a double company and forced the enemy to retire. Barton with the remainder of his force fell upon them crossing the Kassa river and they were completely routed. The Nyassaland adventure was never renewed.—*Ibid.*

VII. GERMAN PACIFIC ISLANDS

In August and September, 1914, joint Australian and New Zealand expeditions took possession of the German island colonies and the great semi-continental area of New Guinea. German Samoa was captured by the British without opposition on August 29. German New Guinea, which with the Bismarck Archipelago off the coast has an area of 90,000 square miles, was attacked by an Australian expeditionary force (Admiral Patey) early in September. After eighteen hours of bush fighting Herbertshöhe and Rabaul, the seat of the government, were garrisoned by a naval force under Commander Beresford, September 12-14. On Sept. 13, 1914, the British flag was hoisted over Rabaul and Admiral Patey read a proclamation formally setting out the occupation. The Caroline islands, first occupied by Japan, were turned over to New Zealand. The Marshall and Solomon islands were likewise occupied on Dec. 9, 1914, thus completing the tale of Germany's colonial possessions in the Pacific.—See also PACIFIC OCEAN: 1914-1918.

VIII. CANADA AND OTHER BRITISH DOMINIONS

(a) Canada.—First contingent of Canadians dispatched to England.—“Nothing could dem-

onstrate the vitality and energy of the Canadian people more convincingly than the manner in which they met the news of the outbreak of the war. They were hardly in a condition, one would think, to bear any additional burdens. [See also CANADA: 1914 (July).] The news of the declaration of war came suddenly, and with a spontaneity that has astonished the world, Canada recognized that this was her war quite as much as it was the Old Country's. . . . With the announcement that British troops were to cross the Channel to take their place alongside the French and Belgian armies, came the realization that Canada's manhood would also have to take its place in the firing line. . . . All over Canada there was the same enthusiasm. Financial depression was forgotten, and even party feeling—politics play a large part in Canadian life—was laid aside, and the people of Canada stood united like one man, animated with one sole object, to 'see the thing through.' . . . The Opposition no less than the Government flung themselves wholeheartedly into the work of speedily putting to some practical purpose the sentiments that had stirred the people of Canada to the very depths. Quickly a contingent of 33,000 men was raised, and the village of Valcartier, about eighteen miles from Quebec, was in a few weeks turned into a military camp. Crops were gathered in, and farmsteads disappeared to make way for rows of white tents. The peaceful village was replaced by a martial city complete with streets, sewers, and water mains, electric lights, and telephone. The troops began to roll in from every quarter of Canada. There was no lack of men to volunteer for service. Recruiting went on briskly, and men had to be turned away in scores and await formation of further contingents. In a few weeks the contingent of 33,000 men were dispatched to . . . [England] to undergo training on Salisbury Plain. [See CANADA: 1914 (September-October).] The transports were convoyed over by British warships and landed . . . without being interfered with by the enemy . . . In the meantime the Royal Canadian Regiment, a Regular regiment, had been dispatched to garrison Bermuda, and further contingents for service at the front . . . were . . . recruited.”—A. B. Tucker, *Canada and the Great War (Oxford pamphlets, pp. 4-7)*.—See also CANADA: 1914-1918: Canadian Military and Naval Activities.

(b) India.—Immediately upon the outbreak of the war “the Maharaja of Nepal, with its population of 5,000,000, its 30,000 soldiers and 250 modern guns, placed the entire resources of his state at the disposal of the King-Emperor; the Maharaja of Bikaner, who afterwards fought in France, telegraphed the Viceroy that: ‘I and my troops are ready and prepared to go at once to any place, whether in Europe or India, or wherever our services might be usefully employed, in interest of the safety, honour, and welfare of our Sovereign and his dominions’; the Nizam of Hyderabad sent word that ‘my sword and the whole resources of my State are His Majesty's to command, for England and the Empire’; the ruler of the ancient state of Rewa asked the Viceroy: ‘What orders from His Majesty for me or my troops’; the Rajah of Pudukota offered ‘all I possess’ and asked permission to raise and lead a regiment of his subjects; the Gaekwar of Baroda proffered all his troops and resources. . . . On Sept. 8th the British Secretary of State for India received a dispatch from the Viceroy (Lord Hardinge) stating that: ‘The Rulers of the Native States in India, who number nearly seven hundred in all, have with one accord rallied to the defense

of the Empire and offered their personal services and resources of their states to the war. . . . Twenty-seven of the larger states in India maintain Imperial Service Troops, and the services of every corps were immediately placed at the disposal of the Government of India on the outbreak of war. The Viceroy has accepted from twelve states contingents of cavalry, infantry, sappers and transport, besides a camel corps from Bikaner, and most of them have already embarked. . . . The Indian Expeditionary Force was the first contingent from the Empire, outside of Great Britain, to see active service. Two other contingents were also despatched from India and one of them operated from the Persian Gulf up to the Tigris and included British regiments as well as Mahratta Light Infantry battalions; another acted in East Africa with the Lancshires, the 101st Grenadiers, etc., and was composed of the 13th Rajputs, the 38th Dogras, and other regiments. British troops formed a portion of the Force which went to France and all its Artillery batteries were composite in character. There was plenty of material to draw upon. The Indian Army in peace time consisted of about 75,000 British troops, 160,000 Indian troops, 100,000 troops maintained by Native States, 212,000 Imperial Service troops (Native) 22,000 Burma Military Police and 35,000 Native reservists, with 37,000 men in Volunteer Corps. In the contingent there were ten Gurkha regiments and others made up of Rajputs, Jats, Mahrattas, Madrasis, Dogras, Brahmans; amongst the Mohammedans there were Pathens, Punjabis and Baluchis; there were, of course, Sikhs and a few Christians. On Sept. 25th the first Indian Force, numbering about 70,000, landed at Marseilles, France."—J. C. Hopkins, *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, 1914, pp. 120, 121, 123.

(c) *Australia*.—"Australia was able to take an active part in the War during its first five months through the possession of a fleet of battleships. The Commonwealth had available in its own waters the battle-cruiser *Australia* of 19,000 tons, carrying eight 12-inch guns and running 25 knots; two second-class cruisers of the Bristol type, 4,800 tons (the *Melbourne* and the *Sydney*) with 6-inch guns and a speed of 25 knots; one second-class cruiser, the *Encounter*, lent by the Admiralty, with three destroyers and two submarines. Action was taken by the Government before the outbreak of War. On Aug. 3rd, when the issue trembled in the balance, H. E. Sir R. C. Munro-Ferguson (who had been appointed Governor-General on Feb. 7th) cabled the Colonial Secretary as follows: 'In the event of war Commonwealth of Australia prepared to place vessels of Australian Navy under control of British Admiralty when desired. Further prepared to despatch Expeditionary Force of 20,000 men, of any suggested composition, to any destination desired by the Home Government. Force to be at complete disposal of Home Government. Cost of despatch and maintenance would be borne by this Government.' . . . [The offer was gratefully accepted and] on Aug. 10 the Commonwealth Navy was formally handed over to Admiralty control until the end of the war. . . . The 1st Australian Imperial Force, as eventually despatched from Melbourne on Oct. 17th, was composed of 798 officers and 19,545 men, 1,884 horse and 6 18-pounder, 9-inch firing guns and 24 machine guns. The troops required 23 large passenger ships for conveyance and were conveyed to Egypt with great secrecy and in ultimate safety (Dec. 3rd) by a Fleet of British, Australian, French and Japanese war-ships."—J. C. Hopkins, *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, 1914, pp. 97, 98, 101.

(d) *New Zealand*.—On Aug. 3rd, proclamations were issued placing the New Zealand Naval forces under Admiralty control and calling out the Royal Naval Reserves. New Zealand also proposed to raise a contingent immediately and in response to suggestions from London this took the form of a mounted Rifle Brigade, a Field Artillery Brigade and an Infantry Brigade. The New Zealand government assumed all financial responsibility for these troops and for a force of 200 Maoris which were sent to Egypt. "Within three weeks' time the New Zealand Force was complete and its Citizen Army . . . had supplied 8,000 men and also a small contingent for service in Samoa. . . . About the middle of October the Force, including Batteries and field ambulances and signal corps and some 4,000 horses, was on board transports in Wellington Harbor with a convoy of battleships in attendance which included one of Japan's first-class battle-cruisers and various British and Australian ships."—J. C. Hopkins, *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, 1914, p. 105.

(e) *Union of South Africa*.—"When war broke out the Botha Government [in the Union of South Africa] acted at once and a cable from the Chief Justice and acting Governor-General, Lord de Villiers, was sent on Aug. 4th to the Colonial Secretary as follows: 'The Government fully recognizing the obligations of the Union in the event of hostilities, wishes to assure you of its preparedness to take all such measures as may be necessary for the defence of the Union. Should His Majesty's Government require the Imperial troops now stationed in South Africa, and who are not connected with garrison artillery in any other part of the world, Ministers would gladly employ the Defence Force of the Union for the performance of the duties entrusted to the Imperial troops in South Africa.' Mr. Harcourt, on the 6th, gratefully accepted the offer, and announced the immediate recall of all troops not absolutely required for special duties. [The Union Defence Force was at once mobilized and the premier announced that] in accordance with the wishes of the Imperial Government it was their intention to undertake offensive operations against German South West Africa. . . . An amendment in the Assembly, moved by General Hertzog, had deprecated offensive action against the German territories and was defeated by 92 to 12; a similar motion in the Senate was beaten by 24 to 5. In his speech the Premier stated that the Defence Force had been mobilized and that in accordance with the wishes of the Imperial Government it was their intention to undertake offensive operations. . . . It was announced a little later that General Botha would take command of the Forces himself and to his rank of Honorary General in the British Army was added that of General."—J. C. Hopkins, *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, 1914, pp. 109-110.

(f) *Newfoundland*.—"When War commenced . . . [Newfoundland] was anxious to help in every possible way. It had immediately available Naval Reserves numbering 600 trained sailors and fishermen. The population was only 240,000 with revenues of about \$4,000,000, but Sir W. E. Davidson, the Governor, on Aug. 8th, cabled the Colonial Secretary that: 'Authority is desired by my Ministers to enlist special men for service abroad by land and by sea. Ministers undertake to raise force of Naval Reserve by the 31st October to thousand efficient, available for naval service abroad for one year, and are willing to meet all local expenses. Several hundred efficient, local brigade training officers for enlistment for land service abroad. Five hundred

could, I believe, be enlisted within one month. Propose to induce serviceable men between 18 and 36 years enlist; training home defence wherever corps' instruction available. Material for further draft would be formed by these.' . . . [This offer was accepted, and the Government also undertook] to raise at once a Newfoundland Regiment of 500 men for land service abroad and to recruit a force for later despatch. The first Newfoundland Contingent embarked with the first Canadian Contingent and reached England in due course where they trained with the Canadians on Salisbury Plain."—J. C. Hopkins, *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, 1914, pp. 126-127.

(g) **British Crown Colonies.**—"When the immediate danger of invasion had been removed [by the wreck of the *Karlsruhe*] the British West Indies' claim to participate actively in the war could no longer be refused. In Jamaica a body entitled the Jamaica War Contingent Committee, of which Mr. William Wilson, O.B.E., was the moving spirit, had been formed to raise voluntary subscriptions for sending a war contingent overseas. The Governor of the colony, Sir William Manning, then took the matter up with the Imperial Government, and to the intense joy of the people it was announced in May 1915 that contingents for active service could be accepted from Barbados, Jamaica, British Guiana, and Trinidad. Recruiting committees were immediately set up and West Indians flocked to the colours. But the movement was not confined to the larger islands and British Guiana. The smaller colonies and British Honduras could not be denied the privilege of serving their King and Empire, and, following upon their urgent representations, recruiting was opened throughout the West Indies. [In 1916 Bermuda sent a battery of artillery.]"—C. Lucas, *Empire at war*, v. 2, p. 334.

IX. NAVAL OPERATIONS

(a) **Control of the sea.**—British navy: Ships, harbors and personnel.—Navies of France, Germany, Austria and Russia.—Plans of sea campaign.—"When hostilities opened, the naval fleets of the countries involved were concentrated in well-defined theatres of operations. Disregarding the small detachments on independent or foreign service, the bulk of Great Britain's fleet faced the German high seas fleet in North Europe [see above: Preparation for war: a], while the French navy was opposed to the Austrian navy in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Russia's navy had not been rehabilitated since the Russo-Japanese war, but the few ships she had guarded Russian Baltic and Black Sea coasts. . . . At the beginning of the war the Allies had superior sea power and consequent potential control in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, North Sea—in short, in all sea areas excepting those adjacent to the ports and naval bases of the Central Powers, namely, the Adriatic near Austria's ports, the North Sea and the Baltic adjacent to Germany's ports, and the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus, under the control of Turkey. . . . When nations of maritime importance are at war, relative control of the sea, or certain parts of the sea, belongs to the belligerent whose sea power has practically driven the sea power of the other from the areas in question, so that the maritime operations of the former, both naval and commercial, are practically unhindered, while the maritime operations of the latter are for the time being practically non-existent."—C. C. Gill, *Naval power in*

the war, 1914-1917, pp. 19, 13, 11.—The British naval "organisation in Home Waters was based on three fleets, in progressive states of readiness for war. In the First were a fleet flagship and four battle squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 4th consisting of 'Dreadnoughts,' and the 3rd of eight 'King Edwards,' the last development of the 'Majestic' type. In July 1914 the 'Dreadnought' battleships in commission numbered twenty against the German thirteen, and ship for ship the German, though better protected, were inferior in gun power to our own, while against the *Agamemnon* and the eight 'King Edwards' they had five 'Deutschlands' and five 'Braunschweigs' of inferior armament. The First Fleet had also a squadron of four battle-cruisers, all except one being of the latest type, with eight 13.5-inch guns, against which the Germans could show on the North Sea three of an earlier type armed with 11-inch guns. In cruisers our First Fleet entirely over-weighted the [German] High Seas Fleet. Besides the cruisers attached to the battle squadrons, it had four squadrons, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th (of which, however, the 4th was actually in the West Indies), and a light cruiser squadron. It had also attached to it the first four flotillas of destroyers, each comprising a cruiser leader and twenty units. This was in effect the 'Grand Fleet,' which was intended to be in position to occupy the North Sea at the outbreak of war, and it was always kept in full commission ready for immediate action. The Second Fleet consisted of the *Lord Nelson* (four 12-inch, ten 9.2-inch) as Fleet flagship with the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons, that is, five 'Duncans,' eight 'Formidables,' and the *Vengeance*, each armed with four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch, to which the Germans could oppose only five 'Wittelsbachs' and five 'Kaiser Friedrichs,' armed with four 9.4-inch and fourteen to eighteen 5.9-inch. These obsolescent German ships also formed [a second fleet, designed, with the older armored and protected cruisers], . . . to operate in the Baltic and keep the Russian Fleet in check. Assigned to our own Second Fleet were two cruiser squadrons, the 5th and 6th, but this was for administrative purposes only. They formed no part of its war organisation, but . . . were allotted other duties of immediate importance. In the same way there was nominally attached to it the bulk of the Home Defence Patrol Flotillas. They comprised seven flotilla cruisers, four patrol flotillas and seven flotillas of submarines. Except for the submarines this fleet was not on a war footing, but was manned by what were called 'Active Service Crews,' consisting of all the specialist officers and about three-fifths of the full complement of men."—J. Corbett, *Naval operations (History of the Great War based on official documents)*, v. 1, pp. 11-12.

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was placed in supreme command of the home fleets. "The great bulk of the navy was concentrated in home waters, although imperial requirements necessitated the presence of a few squadrons in foreign waters. In the Mediterranean were three battle-cruisers, seven cruisers of different types, and a complement of torpedo craft and submarines. In Asia, on the East Indian and China stations, were a couple of battleships, some half-dozen cruisers, and other smaller vessels. In Australasian waters there were two small but powerful squadrons. Various cruisers and gunboats were stationed on the African and American coasts, while five cruisers were in the Western Atlantic. . . . As regards home bases for the support of the British Navy, the Napoleonic wars had resulted in the chief of them

being sited on the south coast of England. The new menace across the North Sea had, however, the effect of bringing the east coast of Great Britain into greater prominence, and the growth of the German Navy was followed by the construction of additional bases on what had now come to be the strategic coast line. . . . The dockyard at Chatham [was] for building and repairing all but the largest types of warships, and of recent years an artificial harbour had been constructed at Dover which was chiefly used as a headquarters for British torpedo craft. On the Firth of Forth, at Rosyth, a British repairing dockyard with three large docks had been commenced, but . . . was not complete when war broke out; while further north at Cromarty was a commodious harbour . . . defended by batteries manned by Royal Marines. In addition to Dover, torpedo bases existed at Sheerness (where there was a dockyard for their repair), Harwich, the Humber, Rosyth, and Scapa Flow in the Orkneys; while naval air stations had been organized at the Isle of Grain, Felixstowe, Great Yarmouth, Dundee, Montrose, and Fort George near Cromarty. The number of men actually serving when war broke out was, in round numbers, 151,000. To reinforce these there were three reserves available. The Royal Fleet Reserve, formed in 1900, consisted of seamen, stokers, and marines who had served in the Royal Navy and who, for a retainer, accepted the liability of recall. On the 1st January, 1914, the total strength of this reserve was just under 28,000. Next came the Royal Naval Reserve, consisting of officers and men of the mercantile marine and fishing industry, who received short terms of training in peace. Its strength on the above date was between 17,000 and 18,000. In 1910 the formation of a Trawler Section of the Royal Naval Reserve had been decided on—a far-seeing and most valuable decision in view of the important work which 'mine-sweeping' was found to demand. Lastly there came the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve consisting of men chiefly in civil life whose taste for the sea led them to undergo naval instruction in their leisure time."—F. E. Whitten, *Marne campaign*, pp. 50-52.—"The French navy comprised twenty-two battleships, nineteen armoured cruisers, twelve light cruisers, eighty-four destroyers, one hundred and thirty-five torpedo boats, and seventy-eight submarines. As early as 1912, the Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France resulted in the general scheme that France would look out for British naval interests in southern Europe, while Great Britain would protect French naval interests in northern Europe. France had only four cruisers engaged in distant service. Germany's navy consisted of thirty-five battleships, five battle cruisers, nine armoured cruisers, forty-five light cruisers, one hundred and forty-three destroyers, and about thirty-five submarines. This fighting strength was concentrated in home waters except for one battle cruiser, two armoured cruisers, eight light cruisers, and one destroyer on duty abroad. Austria's navy numbered twelve battleships, ten cruisers, eighteen destroyers, sixty-three torpedo boats, and ten submarines. All of these, with the exception of one armoured cruiser on the China station, were in home waters."—C. C. Gill, *Naval power in the war, 1914-1917*, p. 20.—With regard to Russia's naval power, "her Black Sea Fleet for the purpose was off the board, and in the Baltic she had only four battleships in commission. . . . She had also there four of her new fleet of eight 'Dreadnoughts' which had been launched in 1911, but only two of them were approaching comple-

tion. Besides these she had the *Ryurik*, in which the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral von Essen, flew his flag, and four cruisers. . . . A force relatively so weak could only be regarded by the Military Authority, under whose supreme direction it was, as part of the defence of the capital. Their policy was one of concentration in the Gulf of Finland. . . . Except, therefore, for such influence as the Russian Fleet could exert by forcing the Germans to watch it with a superior force, it could have no effect upon our own disposition."—J. S. Corbett, *Naval operations (History of the Great War based on official documents, v. 1, p. 9)*.—On the outbreak of war the French armoured cruisers *Dupleix* and *Monicarm* and the Russian light cruisers *Askold* and *Zemchug*, in the Far East, were placed under British command. "Broadly speaking, Great Britain's plan of naval campaign at the outbreak of hostilities aimed: first, to destroy the enemy fleets with superior forces, or, failing in this, to confine the enemy fleets and restrict his trade by a system of distant blockades; second, to convert potential control of the high seas into active control by destroying, capturing, or bottling up enemy men-of-war operating on foreign stations. On the other hand, the weaker German and Austrian navies instituted a different kind of campaign. The Teutonic powers planned: first, to operate the home fleets so as to protect their coast lines and control as wide as possible sea areas beyond, thereby preventing a close blockade and permitting commercial intercourse with neighbouring neutral countries; second, to use their naval vessels abroad so as to inflict the greatest possible damage on their enemies before being cornered and destroyed by superior Allied sea power or escaping to the shelter of home or friendly ports, as was the case when the *Goeben* and *Breslau* eluded numerous enemy ships in the Mediterranean and steamed safely through the Dardanelles to Constantinople; third, to interfere with and damage enemy commerce by means of submarines and commerce destroyers, such as the *Moewe*; and fourth, the Teutonic powers planned to lessen the disparity of force between their navies and the superior navies of their enemies by so-called attrition warfare, harassing and menacing the enemy in all possible ways, instituting raids with fast air and sea squadrons, attacking with mines and torpedoes, and watchfully seeking opportunity to fall upon a detached portion of the enemy fleet with a superior force."—C. C. Gill, *Naval power in the war, 1914-1917*, pp. 14-16.

(b) Opening of hostilities.—First encounters at sea.—Four British warships sunk.—The day after Great Britain had declared war on Germany, August 5, a British destroyer flotilla, shepherded by H. M. S. *Amphion*, was patrolling the approaches to the Channel when it surprised a small Hamburg-American liner, the *Königin Luise*, sowing mines off the estuary of the Thames. A destroyer gave chase and torpedoed the German craft; of its crew of 130, fifty were saved by the British. The *Amphion* herself next morning struck a mine and sank, with a loss of one officer and 130 men. British cruisers patrolling the North sea were attacked by German submarines. On August 10 it was announced that the German submarine *U-15* had been sunk by the cruiser *Birmingham*. On the 7th the *Suffolk* encountered the German cruiser *Karlsruhe* some 200 miles south of Bermuda in the act of coaling from the Hamburg-American liner *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, the last German liner to run out of New York before war was declared. The *Karlsruhe* escaped by superior speed and was sub-

sequently wrecked in the West Indies. A Franco-British squadron entered the Adriatic sea on August 16, sank an Austrian cruiser the next day, and on the 24th bombarded Cattaro. On the 27th *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* was sunk by H. M. S. *Highflyer*, and the German cruiser *Magdeburg* was destroyed in the Gulf of Finland. The naval battle in the Bight of Heligoland was fought on the 28th, and on September 3, the British warship *Speedy* was sunk by a mine. The *Oceanic* was wrecked on the north coast of Scotland on September 8, and on the 10th the *Emden* first appeared in the Bay of Bengal. On the 13th the German cruiser *Hela* was sunk by a British submarine, and on the following day the British *Carmania* sank the German vessel *Cap Trafalgar* on the east coast of



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South America. The British gunboat *Pegasus* was disabled by the *Königsberg* at Zanzibar. "At sea the prospect appeared satisfactory, but few could have foreseen the lessons which the Navy was to give and take in this and the following months. The German Admiralty, in place of the fleet action to which they felt hopelessly unequal, now began to develop their submarine offensive, and on September 3 achieved their first success. The *Pathfinder* (Captain Martin Leake) the flotilla leader of the Forth Destroyer Patrol, was torpedoed by the U 21 and sank in four minutes with nearly all hands. This gain was more than balanced by the loss of the German light cruiser *Hela*. . . . But it could not be expected that the submarine account between the two navies could be kept even for long, since the power in control of the sea was offering daily an immensely greater number of targets than the enemy. On September 20 the three cruisers *Cressy*, *Hogue*, and *Aboukir*, which had

previously been employed on the Dogger Bank Patrol, were ordered to watch the area known as the Broad Fourteens, moving to the south at night and north again at daylight. At 6.30 a. m. on the 22nd the squadron was slowly steaming abreast, two miles apart, when the *Aboukir* felt an explosion on her starboard side and began to sink. Captain Drummond, supposing that he had struck a mine, signalled to the other ships. The *Hogue* (Captain Wilmoſ Nicholson) closed him at once and hoisted out her boats, but was herself struck immediately by two torpedoes. The *Cressy* (Captain R. W. Johnson) also had her boats out when at 7.17 she too was torpedoed twice. All three ships sank within three-quarters of an hour. The boats, with the help of two Lowestoft trawlers and two Dutch steamers, saved 777 men and 60 officers; 60 more officers and 1,300 men went down. The ships were obsolete, but the men were a serious and lamentable loss. We suffered here from a lack of precaution due to inexperience of submarine war: the German success, by their own account, was the work of a single boat, U-29 (Commander Weddigen), which was ordered to the Straits of Dover and accidentally fell in with our cruisers on the way. Three weeks later, on October 15, the Tenth Cruiser Squadron were cruising between Peterhead and the Naze in line abreast at ten-mile intervals, when at 10.30 p. m. the *Hawke* was torpedoed and out of her company of 500 only 3 officers and 46 men were picked up. . . . On October 27, while the Second Battle Squadron was putting to sea from the Mull anchorage for battle practice, the dreadnought *Audacious* struck a mine laid a few days before by the Norddeutscher liner *Berlin*, armed and fitted as a mine-layer. She struggled on in a heavy sea, and the White Star liner *Olympic* took off her crew and tried to tow her, but she steadily settled down, and at the end of twelve hours suddenly blew up and sank. In spite of the fact that her condition had been visible to a number of ships and several thousand people, some of whom had even photographed her from the deck of the *Olympic*, the Cabinet, at Admiral Jellicoe's request, decided to suppress the news of the disaster. Of all the concealments of the war this was the one most keenly resented and ridiculed."—H. J. Newbolt, *Naval history of the war, 1914-1918*, pp. 41-42, 50-51.

(c) British attack in the Bight of Heligoland. —Commerce raiders.—"Towards the end of August, 1914, the submarines under Commodore Roger Keyes discovered a rôle of quite unexpected utility. Their immediate function had been to watch the approaches to the Channel, so as to stop any attempt by the German Fleet to interfere with the transport of the Expeditionary Force into France. In doing this, they found that they had exceptional opportunities for observing the enemy's destroyers and light craft, and, as soon as the safety of the transports seemed assured, they constituted themselves the most efficient scouts possible. They soon found themselves in possession of an extensive knowledge of the habits of the Germans. It was this knowledge that led to the decision to sweep the North Sea up to Heligoland and cut off as many of the enemy's light craft, destroyers, and submarines as possible. The expedition included almost every form of fast ship at the Commander-in-Chief's disposal. First the submarines were told off to certain stations, presumably to be in a position to attack any reinforcements which might be sent out from Wilhelmshaven or Cuxhaven. Then, in the very earliest

hours of the morning, the two light cruisers *Arethusa* and *Fearless* led a couple of flotillas of destroyers into the field of operations. . . . The two flotillas, with their cruiser leaders, swept round towards Heligoland in an attempt to cut off the German cruisers and destroyers and drive them, if possible, to the westward. Some miles out to the west, Rear-Admiral Christian had the squadron of six cruisers of the *Euryalus* and *Bacchante* classes ready to intercept the chase. Commodore Goodenough, with a squadron of light cruisers, attended Vice-Admiral Beatty, with the battle-cruisers, at a prearranged rendezvous, ready to cut in to the rescue if there was any chance of *Arethusa* and *Fearless* being overpowered. The expedition obviously involved very great risks. It took place within a very few miles of bases in which the whole German Fleet of battleships and battle-cruisers was lying. It was plainly possible that the attempt to cut the German light cruisers off might end in luring out the whole Fleet, and one of the conditions contemplated was that Admiral Beatty, instead of administering the quietus to such German cruisers as survived the attentions of the two Commodores, might find himself condemned to a rearguard action with a squadron of German battleships. . . . *Arethusa*, *Fearless*, and the destroyers found themselves in action soon after seven o'clock with destroyers and torpedo-boats. Just before eight o'clock two German cruisers were drawn into the affray, and *Arethusa* had to fight both of them till 8.15, when one of them was drawn off into a separate action by *Fearless*, which in the ensuing fight became separated from the flagship. By 8.25 *Arethusa* had wrecked the fore-bridge of one opponent with a 6-inch projectile, and *Fearless* had driven off the other. Both were in full flight for Heligoland, which was now in sight. Commodore Tyrwhitt drew off his flotillas westward. He had suffered heavily in the fight. Of his whole battery only one 6-inch gun remained in action, while all the torpedo tubes were temporarily disabled. . . . The ship had caught fire, and injuries had been received in the engines. *Fearless* seems now to have rejoined, and reported that the German destroyer Commodore's flagship had been sunk. By ten o'clock Commodore Roger Keyes, in the *Lurcher*, had got into action with the German light cruisers and signalled to the *Arethusa* for help. Both British cruisers then went to his assistance, but did not succeed in finding him. All *Arethusa's* guns except two had meantime been got back to working order. At eleven o'clock *Arethusa* and *Fearless* engaged their third enemy, this time a four-funnelled cruiser. *Arethusa*, it must be remembered, still had two guns out of action. The Commodore therefore ordered a torpedo attack, whereupon the enemy at once retreated, but ten minutes later he reappeared, when he was engaged once more with guns and torpedoes, but no torpedo hit. . . . Salvo after salvo was falling between twenty and thirty yards short, but not a single shell struck. . . . At this point the position was reported to Admiral Beatty. This cruiser was finally driven off by *Fearless* and *Arethusa*, and retreated badly damaged to Heligoland. Four minutes after, the *Mainz* was encountered. *Arethusa*, *Fearless*, and the destroyers engaged her for five-and-twenty minutes, and when she was in a sinking condition Commodore Goodenough's squadron came on the scene and finished her off. *Arethusa* then got into action with a large four-funnelled cruiser at long range, but received no hits herself, and was not able to see that she made any. It was now 12.15. *Fearless* and the

first flotilla had already been ordered home by the Commodore. The intervention of the battle-cruisers was very rapid and decisive. The four-funnelled cruiser that had been the last to engage *Arethusa* was soon cut off and attacked, and within twenty minutes a second cruiser crossed the *Lion's* path. She was going full speed, probably twenty-five knots, and at right angles to *Lion*, who was steaming twenty-eight. But both *Lion's* salvos took effect. . . . *Lion's* course was now taking her towards known mine-fields, and the Vice-Admiral very properly judged that the time had come to withdraw. He proceeded to dispose of the cruiser he first attacked—which turned out to be *Köln*—before doing so. The expedition had been a complete success. Three German cruisers had been sunk and one destroyer. Three other cruisers had been gravely damaged, and many of the German destroyers had been hit also. Our losses in men were small, and we lost no ships at all. *Arethusa* had perhaps suffered most, though some of the destroyers had been pretty roughly handled. But all got safely home, and none were so injured but that in a very few days or weeks they were fit again for service."—A. J. H. Pollen, *British navy in battle*, pp. 232-234, 236-237.—The *Berliner Tageblatt* reported: "The small craft fought heroically to the bitter end against overwhelming odds. Quite unexpectedly the *V-187* was attacked by a flotilla of English destroyers coming from the north. Hardly had the first shot been fired when more hostile destroyers, also submarines, arrived and surrounded the German craft. The *V-187*, on which, in addition to the commander, was the flotilla chief, Captain Wallis, defended itself to the utmost, but the steering gear was put out of business by several shots, and thus it was impossible to withdraw from the enemy. When the commander saw there was no further hope, the vessel was blown up so as not to fall into the enemy's hands. But even while she sank the guns, not put out of action, continued to be worked by the crew till the ship was swallowed up in the waves. . . . The enemy deserves the greatest credit for their splendid rescue work. The English sailors, unmindful of their own safety, went about it in heroic fashion. Boats were put out from the destroyers to save the survivors. While this rescue work was still under way stronger German forces approached, causing the English torpedo boats to withdraw, abandoning the small rescue boats which they had put out, and those who had been saved were now taken from the English boats aboard our ships. When the thunder of the guns showed the enemy was near and engaged with our torpedo boats, the small armored cruiser *Ariadne* steamed out to take part in the scrap. As the *Ariadne* neared the outpost vessels it was observed that various of our lighter units were fighting with the English, which later, however, appeared to be escaping toward the west. The long-suppressed keenness for fighting could not be gainsaid and the *Ariadne* pursued, although the fog made it impossible to estimate the strength of the enemy. Presently, not far from the *Ariadne*, two hostile cruisers loomed out of the mist—two dreadnought battle cruisers of 30,000 tons displacement, armed with eight 13.5-inch guns. What could the *Ariadne*, of 2,650 tons and armed with ten 4-inch guns, do against those two Goliath ships? At the start of this unequal contest a shot struck the forward boiler room of the *Ariadne* and put half of her boilers out of business, lowering her speed by fifteen miles. Nevertheless, and despite the overwhelming superiority of the English, the fight lasted half an hour. The stern of the

Ariadne was in flames, but the guns on her fore-deck continued to be worked. But the fight was over. The enemy disappeared to the westward. The crew of the *Ariadne*, now gathered on the fore-deck, true to the navy's traditions, broke into three hurrahs for the War Lord, Kaiser Wilhelm. Then, to the singing of 'Deutschland Ueber Alles,' the sinking, burning ship was abandoned in good order. Two of our ships near by picked up the *Ariadne's* crew. Presently the *Ariadne* disappeared under the waves after the stern powder magazine had exploded. The first officer, surgeon, chief engineer, and seventy men were lost. In addition, many were wounded.—*German story of the Heligoland fight (New York Times Current History, Jan., 1915).*

(d) German attack on British coast.—“On November 3 a German squadron of three battle-cruisers, *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, and *Von der Tann*, the large cruiser *Blücher*, and three light cruisers appeared off Yarmouth in the haze of early morning and opened fire on the town without effect. They also fired upon the *Halcyon* gunboat . . . and the destroyer *Lively*, the former of [which] gave the alarm to Commodore Tyrwhitt. The fleets and flotillas from Scapa to the Channel were immediately set in motion, but by three o'clock when the different concentrations had taken effect, the enemy had fled home again. Incredible as it seemed at the moment, his raid, which looked like a belated attempt to disturb our operations on the Belgian coast, was a mere 'run-away ring,' a demonstration intended to cause 'fear and panic' in the east of England. It cost us one submarine, D5, which unfortunately struck a mine: it cost the Germans an armoured cruiser, the *Yorck*, which was lost in returning through their own mine-fields.—H. J. Newbolt, *Naval history of the war, 1914-1918*, pp. 56-57.—In December a second and much more successful raid was made. Scarborough, the Hartlepoons, and Whitby were bombarded by a squadron, whose composition was never officially announced. The garrison artillery dealt with *Von der Tann*, and her disappearance was credibly attributed to injuries sustained in a collision, which damage to her steering gear, effected by the north country gunners, had prevented her evading. At Scarborough, 18 were killed and 70 wounded; in Whitby, three killed. Casualties were heaviest at Old Hartlepool, where 600 houses were damaged, 119 persons killed and 300 wounded.

(e) Movements of German Pacific squadron.—*Naval battle off Coronel*.—“Admiral von Spee, the German Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, sailed from Tsingtau (Kiauchau), in the last week of June [1914], with the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and on August 5, immediately after the British declaration of war, these two powerful ships were reported as being near the Solomon Islands. They were subsequently reported at New Guinea on the 7th August, and coaling at the Caroline Islands on the 9th. After this they vanished into the immense Pacific with its innumerable islands, and no one could tell where they would re-appear. As the days succeeded one another and grew into weeks, our concern on their account extended and multiplied. . . . The mystery of their whereabouts affected the movements of the New Zealand and Australian convoys, and . . . very anxious decisions were forced upon us. . . . When at length more than five weeks had passed without any sign of their presence, we took a complete review of the whole situation. All probabilities now pointed to their going to the Magellan Straits or to the West Coast of South America. . . . There was nowhere where they could do so much harm

as in the Straits of Magellan. . . . Accordingly, on the 14th September, the Admiralty sent the following telegram to Rear-Admiral Cradock, who commanded on the South American station. 'The Germans are resuming trade on West Coast of South America, and *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* may very probably arrive on that coast or in Magellan Straits. Concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, making Falkland Islands your coaling base, and leaving sufficient force to deal with *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe*. . . . When you have superior force, you should at once search Magellan Straits with squadron. . . . Two days later all uncertainties, and with them our anxieties, vanished, and news was received that both *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had appeared off Samoa on the 14th September. There was nothing for them to hurt there. . . . A week later, the 22nd, they were at Papeete, which they bombarded, destroying half the town and sinking the little French gunboat *Zélée* which was in harbour. They left the same morning, steering on a northerly course. . . . Then once again silence descended on the vast recesses of the Pacific. . . . Nothing more happened for a fortnight. On October 4, wireless signals from the *Scharnhorst* were heard by Suva wireless station, and also at Wellington, New Zealand. From this it appeared that the two vessels were on the way between the Marquesas Islands and Easter Island. We passed our information to Admiral Cradock (Oct. 5) with the following telegram: 'It appears from information received that *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* are working across to South America. A *Dresden* may be scouting for them. You must be prepared to meet them in company. *Canopus* should accompany *Glasgow*, *Monmouth* and *Otranto*, and should search and protect trade in combination.' . . . [On the 8th Cradock reported.] 'There are indications that *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* may be joined by *Nürnberg*, *Dresden* and *Leipzig*. I intend to concentrate at Falkland Islands and avoid division of forces. I have ordered *Canopus* to proceed there, and *Monmouth*, *Glasgow* and *Otranto* not to go farther north than Valparaiso until German cruisers are located again.' . . . This was an important telegram. It showed a strong probability that the enemy was concentrating with the intention to fight. In these circumstances we must clearly concentrate too. . . . In order that there should be no mistake, I wrote . . . [to the First Sea Lord Prince Louis of Battenberg]: 'In these circumstances it would be best for the British ships to keep within supporting distance of one another, whether in the Straits or near the Falklands, and to postpone the cruise along the West Coast until the present uncertainty about *Scharnhorst-Gneisenau* is cleared up. They and not the trade are our quarry for the moment. Above all, we must not miss them. W. S. C.' The First Sea Lord the same evening added the word 'Settled.'—W. L. S. Churchill, *World crisis*, pp. 442-446.—“To the German naval authorities, commerce raiding offered a field for rendering valuable service. The *Emden* was dispatched to the southern seas. The *Leipzig* and the *Nürnberg* proceeded across the Pacific, and began to prey upon the western coast of South America. Half the maritime trade of Chile was carried in English ships. Many of them might be seized and destroyed at little risk. The Admiral, with his two remaining vessels, the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, successfully evaded the hostile fleets for some time. . . . He got into touch with friendly vessels. By skilful manœuvring he finally brought five warships, with colliers, together near

Valparaiso. The German ships were all of recent construction. . . . Each ship carried torpedo tubes, and the speed of each was about twenty-two or twenty-three knots an hour. The *Dresden*, however, could go twenty-seven knots. The squadron possessed all-important allies. Several German merchant-marine companies, notably the Kosmos, plied along the Chilian coast. . . . Von Spee's great stumbling-block was coal. The laws of war prevented him from sending more than three of his warships into a neutral port at the same time, from staying there more than twenty-four hours, from taking more coal than was necessary to reach the nearest German harbour, from coaling again for three months at a port of the same nationality. But if German merchantmen, hampered by no such restrictions could constantly renew his supplies, the difficulty of fuel could be to some extent met. Provisions and secret information as to British movements could also be obtained through the same source. . . . If they preyed ruthlessly upon English merchantmen, laden with the wealth of the West, if they made a descent upon the Falkland Islands, if then they were to disappear into the wide Pacific, a career of splendid adventure and of unbounded usefulness would earn for them both the respect and the plaudits of the world. Australian and Japanese warships were sweeping the eastern Pacific for them. . . . But so vast was the area that they might elude their enemies for months. British ships were already cruising near the Horn, possibly unaware that a concentration of the Germans had been effected. It was not unlikely that von Spee might be able to cut off and to destroy stray units of the patrolling squadrons."—A. N. Hilditch, *Battle sketches, 1914-1915*, pp. 148-150.—"The existence of Admiral von Spee's squadron left our overseas possessions and our great trade routes at the mercy of enemy raids. Till it was hunted down no overseas port could feel security, and the Australian and New Zealand Governments, busy with sending contingents to the fighting fronts, demanded not unnaturally that this should be made the first duty of the British Navy. Whether the squadron kept together or split into raiding units it was no light task to bring it to book when it had the oceans of the world for its hunting ground. Sooner or later it was doomed, and von Spee, hampered with difficulties of coaling and supplies, could only hope for a brief career. But during that career a bold man might do incalculable damage to the Allies and deflect and cripple all their strategic plans, and the German admiral was a most bold and gallant commander. . . . His squadron now comprised two armoured cruisers—the *Gneisenau* and the *Scharnhorst*; and three light cruisers—the *Dresden*, *Leipzig*, and *Nürnberg*. . . . This squadron set itself to prey upon our commerce routes, remembering that the British navy was short in cruisers of the class best fitted to patrol and guard the great trade highways. . . . So soon as definite news came of von Spee's whereabouts, Cradock sailed [from the West Indies] south to the Horn. He had in his squadron, when formed, the twelve-year-old battleship, the *Canopus*, two armoured cruisers, the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth*, the light cruiser *Glasgow*, and an armed liner, the *Otranto*, belonging to the Orient Steam Navigation Company. None of his vessels was strong either in speed or armament. [Admiral Cradock] had no illusions about the dangers of his task, for he knew that if he met von Spee he would meet an enemy more than his match. During these weeks weather conditions made communication with the Admiralty exceptionally difficult:

he was not aware that an Anglo-Japanese squadron was operating in the North Pacific; and he seems to have regarded the charge of all the western coasts as resting on himself alone. In this spirit of devotion to a desperate duty he left the slow *Canopus* behind him, and with his two chief ships but newly commissioned and poor in gunnery, set out on a task which might engage him with two of the best cruisers in the German fleet. . . . The opponents, Cradock from the south and von Spee from the north were moving towards a conflict like one of the historic naval battles, a fight without mines, submarines, or destroyers, where the two squadrons were to draw into line ahead and each ship select its antagonist as in the ancient days. The *Glasgow*, which had been sent forward to scout, a little after 4 o'clock in the afternoon of 1st November sighted the enemy."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, pp. 443-446.—"The *Glasgow* swept round to northward, calling to the flagship with her wireless. Von Spee, anticipating this move, at once set his wireless in operation, in order to jamb the British signals. Captain Luce soon picked up the *Monmouth* and the *Otranto*, and the three ships raced northwards towards the flagship, the *Glasgow* leading. At about five o'clock the *Good Hope* was seen approaching. The three ships wheeled into line behind her, and the whole squadron now proceeded south. Von Spee, coming up from that direction in line ahead, about twelve miles off, changed his course and also proceeded south, keeping nearer to the coast. . . . Firing had not opened. The washing of the seas and the roaring of the wind deafened the ear to other sounds. . . . The two squadrons, drawing level, the Germans nearer to the coast, raced in the teeth of the gale, in two parallel lines, to the south. Sir Christopher Cradock could not but realize that the situation was hazardous. He had three vessels capable of fighting men-of-war. The *Otranto* was only an armed liner, and must withdraw when the battle developed. . . . His protective armour was weaker than that of the enemy. Nor did his speed give him any superiority. Though the *Glasgow* was capable of twenty-six knots, the flagship and the *Monmouth* could only go to twenty-three. But there was another consideration which the Admiral might weigh. Coming slowly up from the south, but probably still a considerable distance off, was the battleship *Canopus*. Her presence would give the British a decided preponderance. She was a vessel of some 13,000 tons, and her armament included four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch pieces. How far was she away? How soon could she arrive upon the scene? Evening was closing in. Cradock was steering hard in her direction. If the British, engaging the enemy immediately, could keep them in play throughout the night, when firing must necessarily be desultory, perhaps morning would bring the *Canopus* hastening into the action. It was possible that the Germans did not know of her proximity. They might, accepting the contest, and expecting to cripple the British next morning at their leisure, find themselves trapped. But in any case they should not be allowed to proceed without some such attempt being made to destroy them. It must not be said that, because the enemy was in greater force, a British squadron had taken to flight. Perhaps it would be better, since darkness would afford little opportunity of manœuvring for action, to draw nearer and to engage fairly soon. It was about a quarter past six. The Germans were about 15,000 yards distant. Cradock ordered the speed of his squadron to seventeen knots. He then signalled by wireless to the *Canopus*, 'I am going

to attack enemy now'. The sun was setting. . . . Von Spee's manoeuvre in closing in nearer to the shore had placed him in an advantageous position as regards the light. The British ships, when the sun had set, were sharply outlined against the glowing sky. The Germans were partly hidden in the failing light and by the mountainous coast. The island of Santa Maria, off Coronel, lay in the distance. Von Spee had been gradually closing to within 12,000 yards. . . . A few minutes after sunset, about seven o'clock the leading German cruiser opened fire with her largest guns. Shells shrieked over and short of the *Good Hope*, some falling within five hundred yards. As battle was now imminent, the *Otranto* began to haul out of line, and to edge away to the south-west. The squadrons were converging rapidly, but the smaller cruisers were as yet out of range. The British replied in quick succession to the German fire. As the distance lessened, each ship engaged that oppo-



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site in the line. The *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* had to bear the brunt of the broadsides of the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*. The *Glasgow*, in the rear, exchanged shots with the light cruisers, the *Leipzig* and the *Dresden*. The shooting was deadly. The third of the rapid salvos of the enemy armoured cruisers set the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* afire. Shells began to find their mark, some exploding overhead and bursting in all directions. In about ten minutes the *Monmouth* sheered off the line to westward about one hundred yards. She was being hit heavily. Her foremost turret, shielding one of her 6-inch guns, was in flames. She seemed to be reeling and shaking. She fell back into line, however, and then out again to eastward, her 6-inch guns roaring intermittently. Darkness was now gathering fast. The range had narrowed to about 5,000 yards. The seven ships were all in action. . . . The British could fire only at the flashes of the enemy's guns. Often the heavy head seas hid even the flashes from the gunlayers. It was impossible to gauge the effect of their shells. The fore-turret of the *Good Hope* burst into flames, and she began to fall away out of line towards

the enemy. The *Glasgow* kept up a continual fire upon the German light cruisers with one of her 6-inch guns and her port batteries. A shell struck her below deck, and men waited for the planks to rise. No explosion nor fire, however, occurred. But the British flagship was now burning brightly forward, and was falling more and more out of line to eastward. It was about a quarter to eight. Suddenly there was the roar of an explosion. The part about the *Good Hope's* after-funnel split asunder, and a column of flame, sparks, and debris was blown up to a height of about two hundred feet. She never fired her guns again. Total destruction must have followed. Sir Christopher Cradock and nine hundred brave sailors went down in the stormy deep. The other ships raced past her in the darkness. The *Monmouth* was in great distress. She left the line after a while, and turned back, steaming with difficulty to north-west. She had ceased firing. The vessels had been travelling at a rate which varied from seven to seventeen knots. The *Glasgow*, now left alone, eased her speed in order to avoid shells intended for the *Monmouth*. The Germans dropped slowly back. The *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau* now concentrated their salvos upon the *Glasgow*. The range was about 4,500 yards. A shell struck the second funnel: five others hit her side at the waterline, but fortunately not in dangerous places. Luce, her captain, since the flagship was no more, was senior officer. He brought his vessel round and moved rapidly back. The *Monmouth* had now fallen away to a north-easterly course. Luce stood by signalling, Could she steer north-west? She was making water badly forward, Captain Brandt answered, and he wanted to get stern to sea. The enemy were following, Luce signalled again. There was no reply. The *Glasgow* steamed nearer. The *Monmouth* was in a sinking condition. Her bows were under water, and the men were assembled at the stern. The sea was running very high. Rain and mist had come on, though a moon was now rising. The enemy had altered course, and were approaching in line abreast about 6,000 yards away. A light kept twinkling at regular intervals from one of the ships. They were signalling in Morse, and evidently were forming plans of action. Firing was still proceeding intermittently. It was about half-past eight. Captain Luce could see nothing for it but to abandon the *Monmouth* to her fate. To rescue her crew, under such conditions, was impossible, while to stand by and endeavour to defend her would be folly. The *Glasgow* was not armoured, and could not contend with armoured vessels. Of the two guns she possessed capable of piercing the enemy's armour, one had been put out of action ten minutes after the start. If she stayed and fought to the end, 370 good lives, in addition to the sufficiently heavy toll of 1,600 in the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth*, would be needlessly sacrificed. The *Canopus*, moreover, must be warned. She was coming up from the south to sure destruction. She could hardly be expected successfully to combat the whole German squadron. Nevertheless, it must have been with heavy hearts that the men of the *Glasgow* turned away to seek safety in flight. . . . At about a quarter past nine the *Nürnberg*, which had not been engaged in the main action, came across the *Monmouth*. It is said that, though in a sinking condition, the British ship attempted to ram her enemy. But the *Nürnberg* began to bombard her, and she capsized. The *Glasgow* steamed off in a north-westerly direction. A few minutes before nine the enemy became lost to sight. Half an hour later many distant flashes of gunfire, the

death-struggle of the *Monmouth*, were seen. The play of a searchlight, which lasted a few seconds and then disappeared, was also observed. The vessel bore round gradually to the south. Her wireless was put into operation, and she made efforts to get through to the *Canopus*. But the Germans had again set their apparatus in motion, and the messages were jammed. Only after some hours was the *Glasgow* successful. Steaming hard at twenty-four knots through the heavy seas, her engines and boilers fortunately being intact she at length joined the battleship. The two ships made straight for the Falkland Islands."—A. N. Hilditch, *Battle sketches, 1914-1915*, pp. 153-158.

(f) Falkland islands prepare for defense.—**Movements of *Canopus* and *Glasgow*.**—"The news of the disaster aroused great alarm in the colony. Before the day on which the two ships arrived was over the dismay was further increased. The *Canopus* at first expected to stay ten days. Her presence inspired a feeling of security. If the enemy put in an appearance, this battleship and even the damaged *Glasgow* could give good account of themselves. But now Captain Grant of the *Canopus* received a wireless message from the Admiralty, instructing him to proceed immediately to Rio de Janeiro with the *Glasgow*, the Brazilian government having granted permission for the latter to enter the dry dock there for urgent repairs. But seven days only were allowed for this purpose. In the evening the warships cast off and steamed away to northward. Stanley [the chief town] was now in an unenviable situation. A powerful German squadron, flushed with victory, was probably making for the Islands. The colony was almost defenceless. . . . The Governor at once called a council of war. There could be little doubt that a descent would be made upon the colony. The position was full of peril. But resistance must certainly be offered. The few women, children, and old men who still remained at Stanley must be sent away immediately. . . . In order to add to the mobility of the defending force, it would be well to bring in another hundred horses from the 'camp.' Every man should be mounted. These measures were duly carried out. Every preparation was made and every precaution taken. . . . Books, papers, and money were removed from the Government offices, and from the headquarters of the Falkland Islands Company. What was not sent away was buried. The official papers and code-books were buried every night, and dug up and dried every morning. . . . All offices were closed and business was suspended. This state of tension lasted several days. At length, from the look-out post above the town, a warship, apparently a cruiser, was seen making straight for the wireless station. When she got within range she turned broadside on. Her decks were cleared for action. There was a call to arms. Church and dockyard bells pealed out the alarm. Non-combatants streamed out of the town into the 'camp.' The volunteers paraded, and lined up with their horses. It would soon become a question whether to resist a landing or to retire. In any event the men were ready and provided with emergency rations. But no firing sounded. Signals were exchanged between the vessel and the shore. It was a false alarm. The newcomer was H. M. S. *Canopus*."—A. N. Hilditch, *Battle sketches, 1914-1915*, pp. 158-159.

I. RETURN OF "CANOPUS."—"She had proceeded, in accordance with her orders, towards Rio de Janeiro with the *Glasgow*. When two days' journey off her destination, however, she received

another message. She was directed to return and to defend the Falklands in case of attack. These instructions were received with mingled feelings. To fight alone a powerful squadron was by no means an attractive prospect. Duty, however, was duty. The *Canopus* turned about, and retraced her passage. She set her wireless in operation, and tried to get through to Stanley. But for some reason she was unable to do so. It was concluded that the Germans had made a raid and had destroyed the wireless station. Probably they had occupied the town. The outlook seemed serious. The *Canopus* had her instructions, however, and there was no drawing back. The decks were cleared for action. Ammunition was served out. Guns were loaded and trained. With every man at his post the ship steamed at full speed into the harbour. Great was the relief when it was found that all was well. The inhabitants were not less relieved. . . . Nevertheless, it was almost certain that some raid upon the Islands would be attempted. Guns were landed from the ship, and measures were taken to make the defence as effective as possible. Perhaps if the enemy blockaded Stanley, the British would be able to hold out until other warships, certain to be sent to avenge the defeat, arrived. Relief could hardly be expected for two or three weeks. . . . Meanwhile, November passed into December without any appearance of the Germans off the Falklands. The tension became very much relieved. Women and children were brought back to Stanley, after being away a month or six weeks. Messages emanating from the hostile squadron, registered by the wireless station, indicated that the enemy were still in the vicinity. But the condition of the colony became again almost normal."—*Ibid.*, pp. 159-161.

2. VON SPEE AND CHILEAN NEUTRALITY.—BRITISH ADMIRALTY PLANS.—ARRIVAL OF STURDEE'S SQUADRON IN FALKLAND ISLANDS.—"But completely as he had the situation in hand, von Spee was experiencing increasing problems and difficulties with regard to supplies of coal and provisions. Without these he was impotent. He had been employing German merchantmen to great advantage for refueling. But trouble was brewing with the Chilean authorities. Many signs were leading the latter to suspect that, contrary to international law, German traders were loading at Chilean ports cargoes of coal and provisions, contraband of war, and were transferring them at sea to the German warships. There were other causes of complaint. Juan Fernandez, the isle of romance and of mystery,¹ the home of the original of Robinson Crusoe, was said to have been degraded into use as a base for apportioning the booty, coals and victuals, among the belligerent vessels. The island was a Chilean possession. It was practically certain that von Spee's squadron had stayed there beyond the legal limit of time. A French merchantman had, contrary to rule, also been sunk there by the *Dresden*, within Chilean territorial waters. Inquiries in other quarters were being made, moreover, as to the friendly wireless stations which the Germans had been utilizing secretly in Colombia and Ecuador; while a rumour was current in the United States that neutral vessels had been seized and pillaged on the high seas. Von Spee soon found that he was nearing the end even of his illegitimate resources. He had tried the patience of the Chilean authorities too far. About the middle of November they suddenly prohibited, as a provisional measure, the vessels of the Kosmos Company from leaving any Chilean port. On

November 24 a Government ship was sent to Juan Fernandez to investigate, and to see that Chilian neutrality was upheld. Many such signs seemed to warn von Spee that the time was appropriate to a sudden disappearance. He gathered his squadron for a descent at last upon the Falklands."—*Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.—See also CHILE: 1914.—"Our plans for the second clutch at von Spee were now conceived as follows: (1) Should he break across the Pacific; he would be dealt with by the very superior Japanese 1st Southern Squadron, based on Suva to cover Australia and New Zealand. . . . At Suva also were the *Montcalm* [French] and *Encounter*. Another strong Japanese squadron (four ships) was based on the Caroline Islands. (2) To meet him, should he proceed up the West Coast of South America, an



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Anglo-Japanese Squadron, comprising *Australia* (from Fiji), *Hizen*, *Idzumo*, *Newcastle*, was to be formed off the North American Coast. (3) Should he come round on to the East Coast, *Defence*, *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, *Kent* were ordered to concentrate off Montevideo, together with *Canopus*, *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, and not seek action till joined by *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, thereafter sending the *Defence* to South Africa. (4) Should he approach the Cape station, he would be awaited by *Defence* and also *Minotaur* . . . together with the old battleship *Albion*, and *Weymouth*, *Dartmouth*, *Astræa* and *Hyacinth*, light cruisers; the Union Expedition being postponed for 14 days. (5) Should he come through the Panama Canal, he would meet the *Princess Royal*, as well as the *Berwick* and *Lancaster*, of the West Indian Squadron, and the French *Condé*. (6) Cameroons were warned to be ready to take their shipping up the river beyond his reach. (7)

Should he endeavour to work homewards across the South Atlantic, he would come into the area of a new squadron under Admiral de Robeck to be formed near the Cape de Verde Islands, comprising the old battleship *Vengeance*, the strong armoured cruisers *Warrior* and *Black Prince* and the *Donegal*, *Highflyer*, and later *Cumberland*. Thus to compass the destruction of five warships, only two of which were armoured, it was necessary to employ nearly thirty, including twenty-one armoured ships, the most part of superior metal, and this took no account of the powerful Japanese Squadrons, and of French ships or of armed merchant cruisers, the last-named effective for scouting."—W. L. S. Churchill, *World crisis*, pp. 466-467.—"When the news of Coronel arrived the new Board of Admiralty, in which Lord Fisher was First Lord, decided to carry out a suggestion already made by their predecessors, and detach two battle cruisers to deal with Admiral von Spee. Admiral Sturdee, who had been Chief of the Staff, was appointed on November 9 to be Commander-in-Chief in the South Atlantic and South Pacific and to take out with him a squadron consisting of *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, with the armoured cruiser *Carnarvon* and the cruisers *Kent* and *Cornwall*. He put to sea on November 11, and the expedition was so successfully kept secret that not only the British public, but also the German Admiralty, was in complete ignorance of it. The squadron rendezvoused at Abrolhos Rocks, a remote islet in the South Atlantic, and proceeded on its southward sweep with the seven ships spread out to extreme visual signalling distance, so as to avoid the use of wireless messages which might have betrayed their movements. Admiral Sturdee was making for the Falkland Islands, where Port Stanley, defended only by the *Canopus*, lay open to attack by Admiral von Spee. To attack the islands was, in fact, the latter's intention, and as we look at the map of South America it is easy to imagine the converging course of the two squadrons making for what now appears to be an irresistibly pre-ordained meeting. On the west side the five German cruisers with their colliers are running in close formation down the coast of Patagonia, with victory astern and expectation ahead of them. On the other side of the ever-narrowing continent the British squadron, flung out in wide line, is netting the Atlantic from the coast-line to a distance of two hundred miles out to sea. On the morning of December 7 the outlook at the Falklands saw smoke streamers on the horizon. An hour later the *Invincibles* were off Port Stanley and the islands were saved."—H. J. Newbolt, *Naval history of the war, 1914-1918*, pp. 61-63.

3. COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH SQUADRON.—SECRET DISPATCH.—SURPRISE OF VON SPEE.—FLIGHT AND PURSUIT.—The strategic movements leading up to the Falkland islands sea fight will long be memorable in naval history as an example of complete, overwhelming surprise and a remarkable coincidence of circumstances—favorable to the British—which led an unsuspecting foe into a trap set by a superior force. Neither of the opposing squadrons knew the whereabouts of the other; on the German side, indeed, the very existence of Sturdee's armada was even unsuspected. A most fortunate accident for the latter was his arrival at Port Stanley, after so long a voyage, just a few short hours before the appearance of the Germans. Only a narrow margin of luck and judgment saved the British squadron from being a day too late. On November 9, while the two

principal ships, *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, were being fitted out at Devonport, England, for the purpose of hunting down von Spee, the dock-yard superintendent reported that the earliest possible date for completing necessary arrangements would be midnight, November 13. First Lord of the Admiralty Churchill at once issued the order: "Ships are to sail Wednesday 11th. They are needed for war service and dockyard arrangements must be made to conform. If necessary dockyard men should be sent away on the ships to return as opportunity may offer. You are held responsible for the speedy despatch of these ships in a thoroughly efficient condition. Acknowledge." The ships duly sailed on November 11th, "and in the nick of time. They coaled on November 26 at Abrolhos [off Brazil], where they joined and absorbed Admiral Stoddart's squadron (*Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, *Kent*, *Glasgow*, *Bristol* and *Orama*) . . . and without ever coming in sight of land or using their wireless they reached Port Stanley . . . on the night of [Monday] Dec. 7. . . . They immediately began to coal."—W. L. S. Churchill, *World crisis*, pp. 473-474.—It was Sturdee's intention, after coaling and engine repairs, to sail again on Wednesday, the 9th, to get around Cape Horn before the enemy came east. On Tuesday morning, the 8th, however, the signal station reported two strange warships from the south. "Coaling operations had recommenced at 6.30 that morning. The colliers were hurriedly cast off, and the decks were cleared for action. Officers and men were delighted at the prospect of an early fight. The Germans had saved them a long cold search around the Horn by calling for them. There was going to be no mistake this time. The enemy could not escape. Sturdee's squadron was superior both in weight and speed to the German. . . . The speed of the battle cruisers was twenty-eight knots; of the three middle-class cruisers, twenty-two to twenty-four knots; and of the light cruisers, twenty-five to twenty-six knots. In size, in armament, in speed, the British squadron would decidedly preponderate. Admiral Sturdee, however, was determined to take no risks, and to minimize loss in men and material by making full use of his superior long-range gunfire, and of his superior speed. He would wait, screened by the land, until the Germans had drawn nearer. . . . Meanwhile he watched the enemy closely. At about a quarter to nine, Captain Grant of the *Canopus* reported that the first two ships sighted were now about eight miles away: the other two were still at a distance of some twenty miles. The *Kent* passed down the harbour and took up a position at the entrance. Five minutes later the smoke of a fifth German vessel was observed. When, in about half an hour's time, the two leading enemy ships made a threatening move in the direction of the wireless station, the Admiral ordered a swift counterstroke. Officers upon the hills above the town signalled the range, 11,000 yards, to the *Canopus*. She opened fire with her 12-inch guns. The Germans hoisted their colours and drew back. Their masts and smoke were now visible from the upper bridge of the *Invincible* across the low land bounding Port William on the south. Within a few minutes the two cruisers altered course and made for the harbour-mouth. Here the *Kent* lay stationed. It seemed that the Germans were about to engage her. As, however, they approached, the masts and funnels of two large ships at anchor within the port became visible to them. The *Gneisenau* and the

Nürnberg could hardly expect to contend alone with this force. They at once changed their direction, and moved back at increased speed to join their consorts."—A. N. Hilditch, *Battle sketches, 1914-1915*, pp. 166-168.—When von Spee's leading ship, the *Gneisenau*, came in sight of the main harbor, "a terrible apparition broke upon German eyes. Rising from behind the promontory, sharply visible in the clear air, were a pair of tripod masts. They meant certain death (only *dreadnoughts* carried tripods). . . . There was no hope for victory. There was no chance of escape. A month before, another Admiral and his sailors had suffered a similar experience. . . . [The *Gneisenau*] immediately turned round and, followed by one of her light cruisers, made off




REAR-ADMIRAL STURDEE

at full speed to join her main body. In a few moments the whole of the German squadron was steaming off in a westerly direction with all possible speed. At 10 o'clock, the *Kent*, *Carnarvon* and *Glasgow* having already sailed, Admiral Sturdee came out of the harbour in the *Invincible*, followed by the *Inflexible* and *Cornwall*; while the light cruisers, one of whom (the *Bristol*) had her engines actually opened up, hurried on after as fast as possible. The whole five ships of the German squadron were now visible, hull down on the horizon about fifteen miles away. The order was given for general chase, but later on, having the day before him, the Admiral regulated the speeds, the battle-cruisers maintaining only about 20 knots. This, however, was quite sufficient to overhaul the Germans, who after their long sojourn in the Pacific without docking were not able to steam more than 18 knots in company.

Even so, the *Leipzig* began to lag behind, and shortly before 1 o'clock, the *Inflexible* opened fire upon her at 16,000 yards."—W. L. S. Churchill, *World crisis*, pp. 474-476.

4. NAVAL BATTLE.—DESTRUCTION OF VON SPEE'S SQUADRON.—"At about a quarter past eleven it was reported from a point in the south of East Falkland that three other German ships were in sight. They were probably colliers or transports. The *Bristol* signalled the information to Admiral Sturdee. He at once ordered her, with the armed liner *Macedonia*, to hasten in their direction and destroy them. The newcomers made off to southwest, and the British followed. Meanwhile the rest of the squadron, now travelling at twenty-three knots, were slowly closing upon the enemy. The distance had narrowed to 15—16,000 yards. The British were within striking range. Nevertheless, Sturdee decided to wait till after dinner

attempt, veering off to the south, to scatter and escape. Flame and smoke issued from the *Leipzig*, before she drew clear, where a shell had struck. Sir Doveton Sturdee directed the *Glasgow*, *Kent*, and *Cornwall* to pursue the German light cruisers. With his remaining vessels, the *Invincible*, the *Inflexible*, and the slower *Carnarvon*, he turned upon the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, and began operations in earnest. The interval of sunlight which had opened the day with such promise was of short duration. The sky became overcast. Soon after four o'clock the air was thick with rain-mist. From 1.15 onwards for three hours a fierce duel was maintained between the two British battle-cruisers and the two German armoured cruisers. The enemy made every effort to get away. They replied to the British fire for some time having dropped back to within 13,500 yards. But shortly after two o'clock they changed their course, and began to haul out to south-east. The *Invincible* and the *Inflexible* had eased their speed, and the range now widened by about 3,000 yards. A second chase ensued. A full-rigged sailing-ship appeared in the distance at about a quarter to three. Her crew must have beheld an awe-inspiring scene. Shortly before the hour firing recommenced. The action began to develop. Great coolness and efficiency were shown on board the British vessels. Every man was at his battle-station, behind armour. Fire-control parties were at their instruments. Water from numerous hoses was flooding the decks as a precaution against fire. The roaring of the discharges, the screaming of the shells, the clangour of metal upon metal, the crashes of the explosions, made up a tumult that was painful in its intensity. During intervals in the firing came the rushing of the waves and of the breeze, and the grinding and grunting of the hydraulic engines in the turrets, where swung, training constantly upon the enemy, the greater guns. The Germans soon began to show signs of distress. The *Scharnhorst* particularly suffered. Dense clouds of smoke, making it difficult for the British accurately to gauge the damage, rose from her decks. Shells rending her side disclosed momentarily the dull red glow of flame. She was burning fiercely. The firing on both sides was deadly, though the German had slackened considerably. But the British vessels, through their preponderance in gunfire, suffered little damage. Their 12-inch guns hit their marks constantly, while 8.2-inch guns of the *Scharnhorst* were accurate, but ineffective. She veered to starboard at about 3.30, to bring into play her starboard batteries. Both her masts and three of her four funnels were shot away. At length the German flagship began to settle down rapidly in the waters. It was about a quarter past four. There was a swirl of the seas and a rush of steam and smoke. The *Scharnhorst* disappeared. She went down with her flag flying to an ocean grave, bearing 760 brave men and a gallant admiral, whose name will deservedly rank high in the annals of German naval history. The *Gneisenau* passed on the far side of her sunken flagship. With the guns of both battle-cruisers now bearing upon her alone, the German was soon in sore straits. But she fought on gallantly for a considerable time. At half-past five she had ceased firing, and appeared to be sinking. She had suffered severe damage. Smoke and steam were rising everywhere. Her bridge had been shot away. Her foremost funnel was resting against her second. Her upper deck was so shattered that it could not be crossed and every man upon



BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

before engaging. His guns could outdistance those of the enemy. It would be advisable for him to keep at long range. The Germans, on the other hand, would be forced, when firing commenced, to alter course and draw in, in order to bring their own guns into play. The men had their midday meal at twelve o'clock as usual. It is said that comfortable time was allowed afterwards for a smoke. The *Invincible*, *Inflexible*, and *Glasgow* at about 12.30 increased their speed to between twenty-five and twenty-eight knots, and went on ahead. Just after a quarter to one there was a signal from the Admiral: 'Open fire and engage the enemy.' A few minutes later there were sharp commands. The ranges were signalled, and the bigger guns were laid. Fiery glares and dense clouds of smoke burst suddenly from their muzzles. The air quivered with their thunder. Shells went screaming in the direction of the nearest light cruiser, the *Leipzig*, which was dropping rapidly astern. The firing was uncomfortably accurate. The three smaller German cruisers very soon left the line, and made an

it had been killed. An exploding shell had hurled one of the gun-turrets bodily overboard. Fire was raging aft. Her colours had been shot away several times, and hoisted as often. One of the flags was hauled down at about twenty to six, though that at the peak was still flying. She began to fire again with a single gun. The *Invincible*, the *Inflexible*, and the *Carnarvon*, which had now come up, closed in upon the doomed vessel. Firing was recommenced. The *Gneisenau* was not moving. Both her engines were smashed. Shells striking the water near her sent up colossal columns of water, which, falling upon the ship, put out some of the fires. She soon began to settle down in the waves. All her guns were now out of action, and Sturdee ordered the 'Cease fire.' There could be little doubt that her stubborn resistance was nearing its end. The German commander lined up his men on the decks. The ammunition was exhausted. The ship would soon go down. Some six hundred men had already been killed. . . . At six o'clock the *Gneisenau* heeled over suddenly. Clouds of steam sprang forth. Her stem swung up into the air, and she sank. Large numbers of her crew could be seen floating in the icy waves, hanging on to pieces of wreckage, and uttering terribly uncanny cries. The sea was choppy. Drizzling rain was falling. The British steamed up immediately. All undamaged boats were got out. Ropes were lowered. Life-boys and spars were thrown to the drowning men. But many of them, numbed by the freezing water, let go their hold and sank. About 180, among them the captain of the *Gneisenau*, were saved. . . . Meanwhile, battle had been in progress elsewhere. The *Bristol* and the *Macedonia* had overtaken the transports *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, had captured their crews, and had sunk the ships. The armed liner accompanying them, the *Eitel Friedrich*, had, however, made off and got away by means of her superior speed."—A. N. Hilditch, *Battle sketches, 1914-1915*, pp. 169-173.—"In the meantime *Glasgow*, by clever fighting, had delayed the German light cruisers and enabled *Kent* and *Cornwall* to come up. The *Dresden*, instead of turning back to the help of her consorts, used her superior speed to run out of sight in the gathering rain-mist. *Glasgow* and *Cornwall* sank the *Leipzig* in a running fight of four hours. The *Nürnberg* broke away in the hope of outrunning *Kent*, whose nominal speed was a knot less than hers, but *Kent's* engineers were equal to the emergency, and, by feeding the furnaces with all kinds of wood, they brought her in four hours within range of her enemy. An hour and a half afterwards the *Nürnberg* was a beaten ship, and at half-past seven she too sank. She had hit *Kent* some twenty times, killing four men and wounding twelve. The losses in the other ships were almost *nil*—two killed and four wounded in all. The enemy, on the other hand, lost two thousand men, of whom by far the greater number were killed by gunfire. Admiral Sturdee's ships and ships' companies were therefore practically unimpaired, and this immense difference between his loss and the enemy's is the most decisive proof which could be asked of his ability as a fighting commander. A still more striking aspect of his victory, which was completed not long afterwards by the destruction of the *Dresden*, is that by this one blow the cruiser-net completed the clearance of the Seven Seas within four months of the outbreak of war."—H. J. Newbolt, *Naval history of the war, 1914-1918*, pp. 64-65.—The two vessels which escaped

destruction turned back into the Pacific, where they were lost sight of for some weeks.

(g) Japanese navy in the war.—"At the outbreak of the terrible hostilities between the great powers of Europe the action of Germany had compelled our ally, Great Britain, to declare war against that country. . . . First, the Japanese Government approached the German Government with moderate advice. On the refusal of the latter Japan found herself unavoidably involved in the present war under the terms of her treaty of alliance with Great Britain. The sole ground of Japan's participation in this terrific war being that already mentioned, the plan of operations of the Japanese Navy was arrived at in consultation with the chief of the British Navy. Consequently, the general movements of our fleet were . . . [when] necessary, carried out in conjunction with the British Navy."—*Official Japanese report (New York Times Current History, Dec., 1916)*.

I. BATTLE AT KIAO-CHAU.—"Directly after the declaration of war by Japan the main force of the First Japanese Fleet was dispatched to the region extending from the Yellow Sea to the northern part of the Eastern Sea for the purpose of searching for and warding off any attack by the hostile squadron. Meanwhile, the Second Japanese Fleet hastened simultaneously to the open sea outside Tsing-tao and began the attack on that German stronghold. The British battleship *Triumph* and the destroyer *Usk* were both placed under the command of the Second Japanese Fleet, and thus took part in the operation. At this time the main body of the enemy's Eastern Fleet was playing hide-and-seek among the South Sea Islands, while the rest of their vessels sought safety under the guns of the Tsing-tao fortress—not daring to steam out of port. In presence of this situation the Japanese Navy steadily and watchfully awaited the further development of the chances of war. At the end of August, 1914, the first transport of the Japanese besieging army started for Tsing-tao, the First Japanese Fleet securely convoying it in conjunction with a portion of the Second Fleet, which took upon itself the duty of safeguarding navigation in the direction of the Yellow Sea. Either directly or indirectly the navy assisted the army transports to reach their destination without any hitch. Subsequently a part of the Second Fleet assisted the landing of the besieging army at a certain point in the vicinity of Tsing-tao. Meanwhile the Second Japanese Fleet, accompanied by another force, and strengthened by torpedo and destroyer flotillas, as well as a specially commissioned flotilla, were all concentrated in the direction of Kiao-Chau, and kept the strictest watch over the enemy by day and night. Having forced the main body of the German fleet deep within the port, a force was dispatched to sea, notwithstanding the greatest risk of terrific storms, to clear the way for the transport of the second part of the besieging army by clearing the seas of mines, &c. Furthermore, the Japanese aeronautical squadron was sent up repeatedly and hovered above the danger zone of the hostile fortifications. The *Takachibo*, the specially commissioned boat, had succeeded in cutting the enemy's maritime cables which connected them with the outside world. In the middle of September, 1914, when the second transportation of the Japanese troops took place, the first fleet had again resumed the task of convoying it. The main force of the second fleet had, from Sept. 28 onward, together with its mine-sweeping work, co-operated with the besieging

army in the repeated bombardments of the German forts. At the same time it assisted in rendering the blockade more and more effective. The naval heavy guns section, which had already joined the besieging army in the neighborhood of Tsing-tao, had successfully commenced the bombardment of the hostile squadron, bottled up inside the port since Oct. 14—a bombardment which seriously handicapped the preconceived plans of the German warships. Subsequently it gave substantial help, in co-operation with the army, in the tremendous attacks against the very strong German positions. On the completion of the preparations about the end of October, 1914, for the attack on the Tsing-tao fortresses the Second Japanese Fleet began a severe cannonade from the 20th against the German forts and camps and joined in the general assault of the besieging army which commenced on Oct. 31. Upon the surrender of the enemy on Nov. 7, 1914, *en bloc*, the blockade was raised by a proclamation of Nov. 10, thereby bringing to a conclusion the Japanese operations in this direction. In these operations the Japanese Navy lost the following vessels: The cruiser *Takachibo*, *Sirataye*, a destroyer, torpedo boat No. 33, the specially commissioned steamers the *Chokmon-Maru III.* and *VI.*, as well as the *Kohyoh-Maru*. [The following enemy warships were sunk or damaged: the cruiser *Kaiserin Elisabeth*, 5 gunboats, 2 destroyers.]—*Ibid.*

2. EASTERN AND CHINA SEAS.—“Directly after the outbreak of the war the Third Japanese Squadron was intrusted with the protection of sea-borne commerce in the region extending from the southern part of the Eastern Sea to the China Sea. As the war developed it extended its vigil as far as the east of the Philippine Islands, and at the same time it undertook the maintenance of communications between the different operating squadrons. But, as the enemy warships were completely driven from the Eastern Seas by the beginning of November, 1914, the Third Japanese Squadron was after that date given the task of keeping watch over the German vessels.”—*Ibid.*

3. INDIAN OCEAN.—“A division of the Japanese squadron dispatched to the South Seas, led by Captain Kwanji Kato, commander of the *Ibuki*, had proceeded to Singapore on Aug. 26, 1914, and joined the British Eastern Squadron. At that time the allied squadrons assumed a waiting attitude while exercising a strict watch over the adjacent seas. On Sept. 10, 1914, one of the enemy warships, the *Emden*, appeared in the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Seas. The Japanese division, largely increased in numbers, exerted the best of its power to hunt down such enemy warships, while another part of the Japanese fleet convoyed the transports carrying the Australian and New Zealand contingents. The enemy warships continued their activities, thereby rendering navigation in the Indian Ocean dangerous. The result was that on Oct. 15, 1914, another Japanese division was dispatched to co-operate with the British squadron. On Nov. 9 the *Emden* attacked the Cocos Island, when she was destroyed by the Sydney, thus putting an end to the operations in those waters. Subsequently the *Ibuki* had, either independently or in conjunction with the British warships, convoyed the great fleet of transports from the British oversea dominions, and thus carried the footprints of Japan as far as Aden.”—*Official Japanese report (New York Times Current History, Dec., 1916).*

4. PACIFIC OCEAN.—“At the beginning of the war a division of the German fleet was operating

off the North American coast and in the vicinity of the Hawaii. There was much uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the main body of the German fleet previously cruising around the South Sea Islands, together with those German and Austrian warships which escaped from their eastern bases in Tsing-tao before the Japanese declaration of war. Consequently, the moment war was declared by the Mikado the Japanese Navy dispatched a fighting division of its First Fleet to the Pacific, with a view to safeguarding the international trade routes as well as searching for these German and Austrian vessels. Soon afterward another body of the First Japanese Fleet was dispatched to the South Seas. Its object was to protect the Australian trade routes and to search for German vessels. The two naval divisions were able in co-operation to do splendid work. The enemy, however, tried strenuously to evade our ships, so that the Japanese vessels occupied all his important strategical positions scattered throughout the South Seas and thereby deprived him of all his naval bases. At the same time, all the natives of the possessions thus occupied were treated with the greatest consideration by the Japanese Navy, being allowed to continue their daily life perfectly unmolested and undisturbed. . . . Meanwhile these Japanese squadrons in the South Seas exercised enormous pressure, either directly or from afar, upon the remnant of the enemy warships scattered all over the high seas, as well as upon the main body of the German fleet cruising off the Chilean coasts.”—*Ibid.*

5. WEST COAST OF AMERICA.—“Before this the Japanese Government had been compelled, in consequence of the disturbances in Mexico, to send out at the end of the year 1913 a man-of-war, the *Izumo* (commanded by Captain Keijiroh Moriyama), in order to protect their own people in that country. Then followed the great European war in 1914. Thereupon the Japanese Navy commissioned the *Izumo* to insure the safety of the trade routes along the western coasts of America. Simultaneously two other warships were dispatched from Japan to join Captain Moriyama's vessel for the purpose of engaging in the warlike operations against any hostile vessels in those waters. This has come to be known as ‘The division dispatched to America’ which consisted of the *Izumo*, *Hizen*, and *Asama*. Subsequently Captain Moriyama was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral and was made the Commander in Chief of this division. The British warship the *Newcastle*, and the *Rainbow* of the Canadian Navy, were also attached to the command of Rear Admiral Moriyama in those waters. Events developed very favorably for the Japanese Navy, and on Oct. 15, 1914, one of the German warships, the *Gaël*, while entering Honolulu Harbor, Hawaii, escorting some transport steamers, was discovered by a portion of the Japanese division which was cruising in that vicinity. Thereupon the Japanese vessels put on speed to get outside the harbor and kept a close watch on the German ships in order to prevent their escape. On Nov. 7, 1914, these enemy vessels were at length interned by the American authorities in Hawaii. Later, the main body of the German fleet appeared off the coast of Chile, and it became fairly plain that nearly all of the enemy vessels, which had thus far been scattered on all seas, had succeeded in reuniting. This reunion of the hostile ships constituted an entirely new phase of the operations of the Japanese Navy in the Pacific. At this time the British Australian squadron


happened to be cruising along the western coast of America. The Moriyama squadron acted in concert with this British force, both bringing pressure to bear upon the German fleet by cruising down to the south. In taking this course they supplemented the vigorous action of another British squadron from a different direction. The joint plan of operations was continued for some time, until at length, on Dec. 9, 1914, a severe defeat was inflicted upon the German fleet by the British squadron off the Falkland Islands, when the great majority of the enemy ships were destroyed. Apart from the Japanese division already mentioned dispatched to the American coast, the Japanese Navy sent a further division to those waters with a view to dealing with the remnant of the German warships as well as to protecting the trade of Japan and other friendly countries. On March 10, 1915, however, one of the hostile warships, the *Prince Eitel Friedrich*, escaped into a United States port and was there disarmed. Four days later another enemy warship, the *Dresden*, was also successfully destroyed off Juan Fernandez by some British men-of-war. Thus the operations in these waters were brought to a satisfactory close.—*Ibid.*—See also JAPAN: 1914-1918: In the World War.

(h) Romance of the *Emden*.—End of a long chase.—The story of the German commerce raider *Emden* here presented is partially based on articles by Commander L. A. Cotton, U.S.N., and Lieutenant H. von Mücke (Executive officer of the *Emden*), the latter translated by Lieutenant Commander J. H. Klein, Jr., U.S.N. "The *Emden* was a small German cruiser of 3600 tons displacement, having two masts and three funnels and armed with ten 4.1-inch and eight 5-pounder guns and two submerged torpedo tubes. Her speed was about 25 knots and her maximum coal capacity 900 tons. In the early days of August, 1914, the little *Emden* was in the harbour of Tsingtao in the German leased territory of Kiaochow in the province of Shantung, China. She did not remain there for many days, however, for on August 6 she inaugurated her war career by capturing a Russian volunteer-fleet vessel near Quelpart Island. The *Emden* accompanied her prize into Tsingtao, filled her bunkers and got out at sunrise the next morning. Of the *Emden's* subsequent movements her Executive officer writes: 'During the evening of August 12, we came in the neighbourhood of the island where we expected to meet the cruiser squadron and found the outpost vessels. In the middle lay the powerful cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, with colliers alongside busy coaling. Farther to the left the slender *Nürnberg*, also engaged in coaling. . . . The *Emden* was ordered to anchor . . . close to the flagship. . . . The captain reported aboard the flagship for orders from the squadron commander, and made the proposal to him to detach the *Emden* from the squadron and to send her to the Indian Ocean to carry on a cruise of "commerce destruction." The next day saw the squadron in column, followed by the colliers, on an easterly course. . . . Along toward midday several signals were hoisted high on the flagship: "*Emden* detached, wish you much success," read the signal. In an elegant turn our ship sheered out of column, a "thank-you" signal for the squadron commander's wishes at the mast head, then a semaphore to the *Markomannia*, "Remain with *Emden*," and soon, on an opposite course, we lost sight of the other ships of the squadron. All knew that we had seen each other for the last

time. We had now reached the point where, in order to reach the open ocean, we had to pass through the narrow straits. These straits swarmed with fishing craft and such other small ships. The nights being bright moonlight, the *Emden* was visible for a considerable distance. The captain did not relish the idea of meeting so many sailing vessels. He spoke to me about it, saying that he wished to avoid meeting any sort of ship for fear our presence and course in those waters would become known to everybody. All the English men-of-war had either two or four smokepipes; none had three like the *Emden*. Then I conceived the idea of a building up a fourth smokepipe. . . . Soon we had built, by means of wooden laths and sail cloth, an elegant smokepipe, and when this was in place we resembled the English cruiser *Yarmouth*. . . . And so we arrived in the Bay of Bengal at the end of the first week in September. For about five days an English warship, probably the *Minotaur*, steamed parallel to and close by us, as we knew by the strength of her radio signals. By and by her signals became weaker until they ceased entirely. We did not sight her.' The next time the *Emden* was heard from she was in the Bay of Bengal, a matter of 4000 miles from Tsingtao even by direct route and in what may be termed the heart of the enemy's sea area. On September 14 the Italian S.S. *Loredoro* arrived off Calcutta and reported that she had on the previous day been held up by the *Emden*, and on September 16 the British S.S. *Kabinga* arrived with the crews of five other British steamers that had been sunk by the *Emden* in the Bay of Bengal between September 10 and 14. Since there was no German prize court available, the *Emden* proceeded with her captures as follows: The first ship captured was manned with a prize crew and forced to accompany the *Emden*. Then when the second capture was made the more valuable of the two captured ships was sunk by a mine or by gun fire, after the crew had been removed to the other vessel or to the *Emden*. This procedure was followed with each subsequent capture until the captured personnel became too numerous to be accommodated when they were all placed upon the one remaining ship and she was released. On September 16 it was learned that the *Emden* had coaled on the previous day in False Bay (British) about 120 miles from Calcutta. Three British cruisers and three French destroyers were sent in pursuit, a pursuit that proved to be long if not merry. On September 18 the quarry was located—but not by a man-of-war—about 20 miles off the mouth of Rangoon River, she having sunk the day before the British S.S. *Clan Matheson*. One Japanese cruiser now joined in the chase, which proceeded apace. Doubling back across the Bay of Bengal the *Emden* appeared next about a mile off the harbour of Madras at nine o'clock at night on September 22. The Madras light was lighted and working, and the lights of the city were all ablaze. The first intimation to those on shore that an enemy was near was the turning on of the searchlights of the *Emden*. Quickly picking up the large oil tanks of the Burma Oil Company she opened fire upon them. A few salvos and they were burning briskly. Firing ceased, search-lights were extinguished and the *Emden* disappeared into the darkness whence she had come. She had in these few minutes inflicted a damage of more than \$100,000. From Madras she steamed slowly down the coast, appearing off Pondicherry on September 24, having captured and sunk five more British steamers

in the meantime. At this stage a British cruiser seems to have been within 50 miles of the *Emden*, but the latter appeared to be able to determine with fatalistic accuracy alike where enemy merchantmen were and men-of-war were not. About this time, a Russian cruiser joined in the 'Emden hunt,' but unrestrained the *Emden* passed out of the Bay of Bengal, around Ceylon, and lay athwart the Aden-Colombo trade route. To the westward of Ceylon up to September 27 she sank five more British steamers and captured a collier with 7000 tons of Welsh coal. During the first two weeks of October the *Emden* was rumoured to be in the Makassar Strait, east of Borneo, at Padang on the Straits of Malakka and southeast

himself what followed on board the Russian cruiser *Jemtchug* peacefully lying at anchor in the harbour. Suddenly the quartermaster on watch sings out 'Man-of-war standing in from the eastward, sir!' . . . Of course, the ship slowly standing in around the point must be the British cruiser *Yarmouth*, thought he, or one of the *Chikuma* class of Japanese cruisers, all known to be in near-by waters. Slowly and with outward calm the stranger stood in for the usual anchorage of the *Yarmouth*, next to the berth of the *Jemtchug*. Now she has reached a point on the *Jemtchug's* beam and only about 300 yards away. On the stranger all are tense and alert, while on the *Jemtchug* sleep still holds the crew and officers—



CRUISER "EMDEN" BESIEGING MADRAS

(From a drawing by Hans Bohrdt)

of Sumatra, but in reality she seems to have been far away at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago. There she cleaned her boilers, was heeled over and had her bottom scraped and painted as far as practicable. Then she steamed north again to near the Laccadive Islands. Here from October 15 to 19 she sank five more steamers and a large Tasmanian dredger and captured another large collier. Meanwhile two more Japanese cruisers and one more Russian cruiser joined the searching force. All trace of the *Emden* was lost for ten days, and she made her next appearance 1700 miles from where she had been last reported. At early dawn on October 29 the quiet of a sultry summer night still hung over the harbour of Penang (British). . . . Slowly from around the point to the eastward a steamer appeared, indistinct as to details and vague as to characteristics, but to the trained eye clearly a man-of-war. Any naval officer can picture to

the last sleep for many, the next few moments proved. Suddenly the German ensign fluttered from the stranger's truck, a flash of light rippled along her broadside and a salvo hurled death and destruction into the inert *Jemtchug*. . . . Torn by shell and sundered by torpedo and listing badly, the *Jemtchug* began to sink at once, but a few more salvos in rapid succession and a second torpedo made assurance doubly sure. . . . Disappearing out the western entrance of the harbour was the instrument of destruction, the *Emden*, for the stranger was none other than she. With the aid of a dummy funnel and the artistic use of paint and canvas she had succeeded in her disguise as the *Yarmouth* in the early morning light, and now was rapidly disappearing from view unscathed and undaunted. . . . Two French destroyers at anchor in Penang harbour quickly raised steam and gave chase, but in vain, for the *Emden* was not seen again for more than 10 days.

After the Penang raid, two more cruisers, two gunboats, three destroyers and an armed merchant cruiser were added to those exclusively engaged in searching for the *Emden*. This brought the number so engaged up to 19 all told, and in addition a large force was being used in convoy duty in the Far East, almost entirely on account of the *Emden's* activities. The next exploit of the *Emden* brought to an end her eventful career. At daylight on November 9 she ran in for the harbour on South Keeling Island in the Cocos or Keeling group. She still had her dummy funnel rigged, but its effectiveness as a disguise had vanished with the Penang exploit. The harbour on South Keeling is an important British submarine cable and radio station. As soon as the *Emden* was sighted, the word was cabled to London, Adelaide, Perth and Singapore, but what was more important, it was flashed into the air by radio that all who could might hear. Passing near the Cocos Islands was an army expedition from Australia, bound for the Suez Canal and with it, thanks largely to the *Emden* menace, was a strong naval convoy. The *Emden* used her radio outfit to the best of her ability to interfere with the message being sent, but the keen ear of the radio operator on the British cruiser *Minotaur* caught it just the same. One of the units of the convoy was the Australian cruiser *Sydney*. Faster, larger and more powerful than the *Emden*, she was just the ship for the job at hand, and away she steamed full speed for South Keeling and the *Emden*. Meanwhile the *Emden* had entered the harbour and immediately landed a party of five officers, seven petty officers and 35 men, who proceeded to destroy the radio and cable-stations. The *Emden* stood back to the harbour entrance to keep watch. . . . The party did not respond promptly enough, and at 9.30 the *Emden*, leaving her landing party behind, headed out at full speed as the *Sydney* came charging up. The action began, at the harbour entrance at a range of only about 4000 yards. Before she turned to head away, the *Emden* fired a broadside salvo that injured both fire control stations on the *Sydney* and destroyed one of her range finders. Then she turned and the chase began, and the fight continued bow to stern. The *Sydney* had 2 knots superiority in speed, and 6-inch guns against the *Emden's* 4.1-pounders. Slowly the *Sydney* hauled out and up, and brought her broadside to bear, almost out of range of the *Emden's* battery. Soon the *Emden* lost a funnel, and almost immediately thereafter a mast. Then another funnel went by the board, and fire broke out aft. . . . Outraged and outstripped by her larger adversary, the *Emden* ran on the reef at North Keeling. With flag still flying, and burning fiercely, she still continued firing her one available gun, and not until the *Sydney* had reluctantly fired three more salvos into her, was the flag hauled down on the mass of blackened and twisted steel that had been the *Emden*. She made a game fight against heavy odds, as is freely admitted by her vanquishers. The casualties on the *Emden*, as is usual with the vanquished in a naval action, were enormous, only four officers and about 75 men being saved, and a number of these were wounded. The *Sydney* was but little damaged, and her casualties amounted only to three killed and 15 wounded."—C. C. Gill, *Naval power in the war, 1914-1917*, pp. 195-205.

(i) Operations against occupied Belgium.—Patrols.—Blockading squadron.—Apart from the general warfare in the North sea, a completely

separate series of operations were undertaken by the navy. "It will be remembered that during September and October, after the failure of the German arms on the Marne, desperate efforts were made by their troops to force an advance along the coast and secure Calais for a base for their torpedo craft and for their projected invasion of England. In consequence the Allied Army Commanders made requests to the Admiralty for assistance in support of the flank of the hard-pressed little Belgian Army to prevent this objective from materialising. Valuable ships could not be spared in these early days, but on October 17 a fleet of heterogeneous warships, under the command of the late Rear-Admiral Hood, left these shores to partake in a bombardment of the enemy's troops and positions along the Belgian coast. The operations were commenced on the next morning, by the three monitors *Humber*, *Severn* and *Mersey*, and the scouts *Attentive* and *Foresight*, with several destroyers. The batteries at Westende and Middlekirke were engaged, and machine guns were landed from *Severn* to assist in the defence of Nieuport, one officer being killed whilst leading the men. During the first few days shrapnel caused many casualties on the ships, but no ships were lost, although *Amazon* was badly holed. On the 23rd great assistance was given to the Belgian Army near Nieuport, and the batteries at Ostend were also engaged. Submarines were seen, but they were unsuccessful in their attacks; and it will be remembered that on the next day *Badger* rammed one of these craft, and it is possible that it was one of the submarines which had ineffectually attacked the destroyer *Myrmidon* and the sloop *Wildfire*. Of course the enemy at once took counter-measures, and by the 28th they had brought up heavy guns which replied very vigorously to our ships. Larger warships were then sent for, including the battleship *Venerable* and the cruisers *Brilliant* and *Sirius*, to engage the bigger pieces. This day the enemy's fire was particularly accurate, and several casualties occurred. . . . Although no losses in ships were sustained, the sloops *Vestal* and *Wildfire* were somewhat damaged. On November 9 the first bombardment ceased, as the country around Nieuport was inundated, and the warfare had been reduced exclusively to trench work. Indeed hardly any troops were to be seen, and the rush for Calais had thus been prevented with great success and at very little cost. Admiral Hood's force comprised the battleship *Venerable*, the cruisers *Attentive*, *Foresight*, *Brilliant* and *Sirius*, the three monitors *Humber*, *Mersey*, *Severn*, the gunboats *Hazard*, *Bustard*, *Excellent*, the sloops, *Rinaldo*, *Vestal*, *Wildfire*, the submarines C 32 and C 34, and the destroyers *Amazon*, *Cossack*, *Crusader*, *Maori*, *Mohawk*, *Nubian*, *Viking*, *Crane*, *Falcon*, *Flirt*, *Mermaid*, *Myrmidon*, *Racehorse*, *Syren*. In addition there were placed under his command the five French destroyers *Aventurier*, *Capitaine Mehl*, *Dunois*, *François Garnier* and *Intrépide*. Considering that this collection of ships was constantly operating within a few hours' steaming from the enemy's ports, it speaks volumes for the supremacy, moral as well as material, which we had then attained over the enemy. No interference beyond unfruitful submarine attacks was attempted during the three weeks in which this fleet was at work."—R. H. Gibson, *Three years of naval warfare*, pp. 67-69.—"To meet the increasing submarine menace the Admiralty was engaged in reorganising the whole system of patrols. For some time the increasing

numbers of anti-submarine craft had outgrown the original organisation, and the conflicting calls for further protection which kept coming in from all quarters could only be met by a comprehensive system which would embrace the whole of our coasts. On December 8 [1914] . . . a 'Submarine Attack Committee' [was set up] with Captain L. A. B. Donaldson at its head. Its function was to develop and organise the various methods of attack, which at this time were ramming gunfire, explosive sweeps and indicator nets, the latter as yet in an early experimental stage. At the same time a scheme was being worked out for apportioning all the Home waters into twenty-three Patrol areas, each with its base close to the local Naval Centre, so as to ensure the rapid transmission of intelligence gained by the patrols. The duties of the Patrol would be not only to act against submarines, but also to prevent mine-laying and spying. The actual sweeping of mines remained a separate organisation. To provide what was necessary it was calculated that seventy-four yachts and 462 trawlers and drifters would be required, besides motor boats for inshore work wherever suitable waters were found. . . . [The most disturbing effect of the raid on the east coast in December, 1914] was the minefield which the German light cruiser had laid. Whether or not the enemy's chief object in laying it was to entrap ships acting against them and to cover the retirement of the raiding force, what they actually achieved was a serious interference with our coastwise traffic and an increased pressure on our hard-worked North Sea minesweepers. Hitherto these flotillas had only had to keep clear a swept channel from the Downs to Flam-borough Head—that is, inside the minefields which the Germans had laid off the Eastern counties and the Humber, and which we had purposely left intact. Now the channel had to be continued northwards past Scarborough, and until it was swept all navigation between the Tyne and Flam-borough Head had to be stopped. The minefield was particularly difficult to locate. It was only known by the loss of passing coasters, and the work of clearing a channel past it is typical of the unceasing drudgery by which the devoted minesweepers contributed so much and so obscurely to the war. . . . By Christmas eve the swept channel was complete as far as Scarborough, but there was still more to do. On Christmas morning the mine sweeping trawler *Night Hawk* was blown up off Whitby and foundered with a loss of six men. Further south two merchant steamers were struck, one the Norwegian s.s. *Gallier*, and in assisting her the drifter and trawler skippers gave a fine example of their devotion. In spite of heavy weather two drifters, the *Hilda* and *Ernest* and the *Eager*, stood by her till she sank, and the trawler *Solon*, though it was dark and low water and the injured vessel showed no lights, proceeded to search for her in the mine-field. From now onward the channel was declared safe in daylight, and some fifty steamers that had accumulated in the Humber were allowed to proceed."—J. S. Corbett, *Naval operations (History of the Great War based on official documents, v. 2, pp. 17-18, 46-48)*.—The blockade was exercised by the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which, "from 1914 to 1917, held the 800 miles stretch of grey sea from the Orkneys to Iceland. In those waters they intercepted thousands of ships taking succour to our enemies, and they did that under Arctic conditions and mainly in the teeth of storm and blizzard, and out of that 10,000

they missed just four per cent., a most remarkable achievement under the conditions. . . . The Straits of Dover was one locality where this blockade was exercised, owing to the narrow waters, and the numerous vessels of the Royal Navy stationed there, and the minefields, no surface vessel could evade being searched in the Downs. The other locality was . . . the 800 miles of sea between Iceland and the Orkneys which was patrolled by the 10th Cruiser Squadron. . . . [The ships of the squadron were commanded by captains from the navy, and officered and manned by men drawn from the naval reserve and the mercantile marine. At the outbreak of the war, the 10th Cruiser Squadron was composed of cruisers of the *Edgar* class, a gunboat and four armed merchant cruisers. The storms of the first winter, however, proved that the obsolescent cruisers were not fitted for this work. After the *Crescent* and *Edgar* were nearly lost in the terrific gale off the Shetlands mail steamers and other suitable vessels were taken from the merchant service and were found to be generally more suited to meet the conditions.] Accordingly, towards the end of November, 1914, the 'Edgar' class were paid off, and their departure marks the end of the first phase of operations of 10th Cruiser Squadron, during which period 319 vessels had been intercepted and dealt with by the Squadron. The submarine menace had begun to make itself felt, the 'Hawk' had been torpedoed and sunk with a loss of 525 officers and men, and 'Theseus' fired at and missed on the same day."—R. G. O. Tupper, *Blockade of Germany (Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Feb., 1923)*.

X. WAR IN THE AIR

(a) Air craft strength of the belligerents.—**Aerial operations.**—At the outbreak of hostilities the belligerent nations had the following number of effective air craft available: Great Britain: Aeroplanes 120; pilots 80; Airships, first class 4; second class 2. France: Aeroplanes 500-600; pilots 700; Airships, first class 4; second class 10. Russia: Aeroplanes 500; pilots 600; Airships, first class 4; second class 3. Belgium: Aeroplanes 30; pilots 50; no airships. Germany: Aeroplanes 700; pilots 1,000; Airships, first class 18; second class 6. Austria: Aeroplanes 120; pilots 200; Airships, first class 1; second class 1. Not one of the Allied nations had devoted so much attention to the development of an effective aerial service as Germany before the war. Aviators of all nationalities were invited to Germany to instruct hundreds of army officers who were learning how to fly. Aeroplane factories and engineering works were built all over the empire. Russia at the outbreak of the war surprised even Germany by the extent of her aerial powers. The Grand Duke Nicholas, commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, had determined that Russia should become a first class air power and aided by the famous Sikorsky and a Scotchman, Mackenzie-Kennedy, a score of different aircraft were designed, ranging from the Sikorsky giant biplanes to the baby monoplane. France had great numbers of aeroplanes available when the war began, but she had no facilities for their construction in quantity. This was quickly remedied after the government took over the work of supply and the French air service soon ranked with the best. The British Flying Corps did not come into existence until 1912. In August, 1914, and for some months afterward Britain was entirely dependent on

France for her supply of aeroplane engines. For the most part the machines were biplanes. There were a few monoplanes soon adapted for military purposes. They included Martynsyde monoplanes, 60 h.p. Antoinette motors; Flanders 70 h.p. with Renault engines; Deperdussin, Nieuport and Blériots fitted with 80 h.p. Gnome engines. The biplanes were Shorts (60 h.p.), Gnoms, Caldrons, B. E.'s, Renaults, and Farmans. Germany possessed some 34 different types of aeroplanes mostly fitted with the Mercedes engine that gave from 100 to 125 h.p. and an average speed of seventy-five miles an hour. At Mons the R. F. C. which had accompanied the British troops to France proved their value. At a critical moment in the great German enveloping movement an aerial report disclosed to General Smith-Dorrien the fact that his advanced division was faced by three German army corps supported by strong reserves in place of the three divisions which he had been led to think were opposing him. During the German advance on Paris the French flying service, vastly inferior in numbers to the German, accomplished wonders through reckless daring in attack. A few of their achievements at this time may be mentioned. At the Marne an ammunition column was blown up. Friburg station filled with troops was demolished and there were heavy casualties; food trains were destroyed; artillery emplacements wiped out; and an entire transport park at La Fère was reduced to ashes. On the eastern front, where the Russian drive led to a succession of victories, the Germans found their air service more than outmatched by their opponents. The greater number of the German aeroplanes were dispatched to the western front and Zeppelins of the latest type were substituted in their place, but such was the accuracy of Russian anti-aircraft gunners that four airships were wrecked, or brought down within a short time. On the west the Belgian-German seaboard had become a basic position for German air raids, torpedo boat sorties and submarine attacks. Three months after the outbreak of hostilities Nieuport, Ostend, and Zeebrugge were only accessible from the air. Thence began that long grim struggle between the British naval air craft at Dunkirk and the whole array of Germany's armed might. British seaplanes were active during the winter of 1914-1915, patrolling, not only the British but many miles of the German sea coast as well. They bombed German ammunition dumps, concentrations, stations, docks, harbors, submarines and their bases. On Christmas day seven sea-planes, a fleet of light cruisers and several submarines attacked German warships off Cuxhaven. Two Zeppelins, four sea planes, and some submarines appeared on the scene and engaged. The Zeppelins were driven off. The German warships in Cuxhaven harbor were bombed and a Zeppelin shed outside the town was destroyed. Only one British machine failed to return. This one fell into the sea and the pilot was rescued by a Dutch trawler. He was not interned in Holland but as a "shipwrecked sailor" was allowed to return to England.—Based on E. Middleton, *Great War in the air*, v. 1, ch. 3-4.—See also AVIATION: Development of airplanes and air service: 1914-1918.

XI. POLITICAL SITUATION IN BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES

(a) Great Britain.—After the outbreak of the war Great Britain was forced to change her mili-

tary policy to meet the crisis. The Expeditionary Force had to be largely reinforced as quickly as possible. The Territorial Force purely for home defense became in a short time an army of volunteers for foreign service. The people were slow to awaken to the seriousness of the war as they were not threatened by invasion. After the first feverish days of excitement things quieted down and in the commercial world the motto was "business as usual." The Government, acting with the great financial houses, devised measures to restore confidence and safeguard the national credit. The moratorium and the new note issues were easily put through, but courage was required to guarantee outstanding bills of exchange for two billion dollars and to find means to save the Stock Exchange from bankruptcy. Among industries the cotton trade suffered the most. There was a feeling of security among the people, and when the government announced a plan of new taxation and the raising of a war loan of \$1,750,000,000 there was little opposition. Large sums were subscribed to war charities. The Briton expressed his indignation with Germany because of Belgium in the public press and in books and pamphlets but had not yet realised the gravity of the crisis, or the danger that threatened his country and civilization. This detached attitude hindered recruiting. A clumsy censorship which kept the news of British army achievements from the public was also to blame for the lack of public enthusiasm. As soon as the people were made to understand the situation through public meetings the volunteers flocked to the colors. Thousands of Durham miners enlisted when they were told of the German destruction of Belgian coal pits. By Christmas, 1914, there were about 2,000,000 inhabitants of the British Isles under arms.—See also ENGLAND: 1914-1918: Defense of the Realm Acts, 1914-1918: Taxation policy.

(b) France.—From the first France recognized the seriousness of her position, for the enemy was on her frontiers. The attitude of the people was calm, but grimly determined to crush the invader. In wars of the past waged by France the soldier was dominated by the politician, but from the August outbreak of war the politicians had little to do with making military appointments. General Joffre had his own way, at least for a long time, and dismissed generals and promoted lesser grades with startling suddenness, when judged by precedents in French warfare.—See also FRANCE: 1914.

(c) Russia.—In a vast country made up of many races and nationalities it would be impossible to describe in a general way the attitude of the people towards the war. There was a great deal of apparently sincere enthusiasm displayed at the outbreak of the war alike by the intelligentsia and the mujiks. Even among the unlettered classes, and that means about 80 per cent of the population, the war had a popular appeal to many because the soil of "Holy Russia" was threatened by the invader. The student class, the nursery of revolutionists, accepted cheerfully the repeal of the law that gave it freedom from conscription. The revolutionary groups did not offer any serious opposition to the war from which they hoped in good time to reap substantial benefits. That the populace in general accepted loyally the ban on alcohol, which cost the government many millions of revenue, was a hopeful sign in time of war. The constitution and conduct of the General Staff inspired confidence. The Grand Duke Nicholas, and the Generals Ivanov, Russky and

Brussilov were popular.—See also RUSSIA: 1914 (August); Relations with Germany; 1914-1915.

(d) Germany.—There was no lack of war enthusiasm in Germany. The whole empire was aflame with martial spirit and there were few who doubted that the war would not be a short one and conclude with the triumph of the German armies. In the Socialist groups there were many opponents to the war, but the majority caught the fever of the hour, and the Russian invasion of East Prussia caused a general rally to the ranks of the imperialists. Only Liebknecht and a few others stoutly opposed the war from the first day. The German government, controlling the press and every avenue of publicity, never ceased to belittle the military power of the enemy while magnifying even the slightest successes of the German armies in the field. Unlike London and Paris, the German cities were brightly lit at night and there was no war-gloom visible on the surface of public life, whatever anxiety as to the outcome of the war might be felt underneath. It was a wise move on the part of the government to create this cheerful atmosphere of hope and enthusiasm and to hide from the people the threatening dangers as far as possible. For Germany's communications with the outer world were severed except through Scandinavia and Holland, Italy and Rumania. The pinch must soon be felt but meanwhile every effort was made to keep the spirit of the people at war heat. This was easier to accomplish with the docile Germans than with almost any other people, accustomed as they were to accept Government dictation.—See also GERMANY: 1914.

(e) Turkey.—The Ottoman empire, as the Allied Powers well knew, was committed to fight with Germany long before she openly declared war. General Liman von Sanders had become a sort of inspector-general of the Turkish army and a large German element was introduced into the Turkish fleet. German gold, arms, and men were introduced through Bulgaria. When an attempt was made to preach a Holy War or *Jehad* it was represented in Turkey that the Kaiser had become a convert to Islam. Stories were circulated that the Mohammedan subjects of Britain, Russia and France had revolted. The Turkish people were voiceless in opposing the war and the government was controlled by the army which in turn was ruled by the Committee of Union and Progress, Enver Pasha, and his German paymasters. In September the bulk of Mohammedan India and the leaders of Mohammedan opinion in British Africa were on the side of the Allies and were already moving to the assistance of Great Britain. Thousands of Arab Moslems were fighting with the French on the western front.—Based on *British reports*.—See also TURKEY: 1914: Turkey at the outbreak of the war.

(f) Belgium.—In internal politics, Belgium before the war seemed divided between Flemings and Walloons, between a more than conservative attitude and a liberalistic tendency. The language question had become acute; Socialism had become strong enough to compete with the Catholic party, and to force the passage of the Compulsory Education Act. The new Army Act had just gone into force, and consequently the army was in course of reorganization. In her foreign relations, she was determined to stand on her guaranteed neutrality. Of Germany she was nervous, not to say suspicious. As an anxious student of foreign affairs, she saw cause for great disquiet in the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. In common with every other nation in Europe, she feared that a

war between these two nations would occasion a general conflagration. She saw clearly, if France did not, that her level country was the easiest road by which an invading army could enter French territory, and had a prevision that the Prussian guarantee of her neutrality would not prove to be a very strong defense.—See also BELGIUM: 1914: World War, to 1914-1918: African campaigns.

(g) Austria-Hungary.—“In modern Europe Austria Hungary stood over as a relic from the Middle Ages, a remnant of the old Germanic Empire left behind in the movement towards self-conscious nationality. . . . The Empire was a union of two states, each ruled by a minority and in the interest of that minority, and it may fairly be said that the majority of the population was anti-Austrian and anti-Hungarian. The thing was an anomaly unique in Europe, and could only maintain its existence by setting one part of the people against the other. Every year it became harder for the statesmen of Vienna to keep the inorganic mass from dissolution. . . . Though universal suffrage existed, it was not combined with responsible government; for the Emperor appointed the administration, and if he desired, he could, under paragraph 14 of the constitution, govern without parliamentary sanction. . . . Hungary was the home of every kind of electoral corruption. Public funds were spent brazenly on gerrymandering elections; returns were falsified; troops were turned out to ‘preserve order’ in doubtful districts, which meant that a reign of terror kept the Slav and Rumanian voters from the polls; and any politician who ventured to protest was likely to find himself in prison on a charge of treason. The oligarchy throughout the Empire used a form of popular government to establish a tyranny as complete as the most naked mediaeval absolutism. This oligarchy had none of the world-ambition of their German neighbours; they were too weak to desire more than to hold what they had. The Austrian German was an agreeable pleasure-loving type, easily swayed from Berlin. The Magyer represented one of the toughest race stocks in Europe, proud, courageous, a lover of liberty for himself, but a despot for others. Both Vienna and Budapest sought above all things to be maintained in their privileges. They suffered from a haunting dread of the new Slav states beyond the Danube, of the great Slav power of Russia, and of their own malcontent Slav peoples. They hated the fashionable cant of democracy as much as any Junker, and were very ready to accept a helping hand from Germany, whose constitution was not unlike their own, who likewise hated democracy, and who shared their fear of Slaventum. This alliance was made easy in the case of the Magyer, who was in temperament if not in manners, akin to the Prussian. For Germany, too, the Dual Monarchy was a sheer necessity. Without the control of Austria-Hungary she could not realise her dreams of a *Drang nach Osten*, which would provide a continuous block of territory, economically self-sufficient and strategically invulnerable, to counterbalance the sea-united British Empire. Without her friendship her flank would be turned in a European war. Hence for years in policy, in economics, and in military preparation the strong gauntlet of the Hohenzollern had guided the fumbling hand of the Hapsburg. Austria could not in the nature of things be a very docile or cordial ally, but there was no doubt about the loyalty of her governing classes. Only by the help of Germany could they defend their privileges, and it was

very certain that they would never cast down their glove for war without Germany's instigation and assent."—J. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, v. 1, pp. 31-33.—See also AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: 1914-1915.

(h) Serbia.—Serbia was in a state of ferment. She had just come through two ruinous wars, in which indeed she had gained some territory, but with it had acquired an alien population, which she could not hope to assimilate for many years. She had not succeeded in obtaining an outlet to the sea, one of the things which she had sought, and which, if not a vital matter, was an object of the highest importance to her national welfare. Her people were for the most part peasant agriculturists, tenacious of liberty, brave and hardy, who within a century had fought against Turkey five times and Bulgaria twice. Her culture was primitive on the whole, but she had begun to look toward the West rather than the East for her ideals, and desired to settle down under a fairly representative government, headed by a native dynasty, and guided by Pashitch "a sane and politic statesman." It is true that fear of Turkey had been succeeded by a fear of Austrian encroachment, which had become little less than an obsession, and was the most powerful motive in her desire to head a Balkan league. But from almost every point of view it was undoubtedly to her interest to keep the peace, and for this reason she had swallowed her national pride and acceded to all but two of the Austrian demands, and these she was prepared to discuss.—See also SERBIA: 1914-1918.

XII. NEUTRAL NATIONS

The action that Italy would take in the war was of vital importance to France and Austria, for she held a strategical position on the flank of both countries. If she cast her lot with her colleagues of the Triple Alliance, the French wing was menaced; if she joined the Allies she could turn the Austrian left while her fleet was superior to Austria's in the Mediterranean. She had reasons for disliking Austria for holding that coveted part of the peninsula popularly known as Unredeemed Italy, and for suspecting France whose assistance, under Napoleon III, to establish a kingdom had been paid for at an extravagant price. French colonization of the North African littoral had also alarmed her. She wanted Trieste, the hinterland of Istria and the Trentino, to rule in the Adriatic and hold the Albanian port of Valona. German statesmen knew Italy's ambitions and that she would readily break from the Triple Alliance when a chance came to achieve them. Her relations with France were so good when the war broke out, and she declared her neutrality, that France only kept a small body of troops on the Italian frontier. With Great Britain, Italy's relations were friendly. The majority of the Italian people were in favor of joining the Allied Powers, but the treasury was not in a prosperous condition, the national debt was heavy, and the well-trained army lacked guns and equipment. Then began the diplomatic struggle between the Allies and the Central Powers to gain the support of Italy which culminated ten months later in Italy entering the war on the side of the Allies. (See also ITALY: 1914: Preparation for war). Rumania's action depended on Italy and also on Bulgaria. Her king was a German of the Catholic branch of the Hohenzollerns. Russia she suspected since the Peace of Berlin had deprived

her of Bessarabia, and Austria possessed Transylvania. Neutrality could only benefit her, for she remained the one important granary for the Teutons and the only source of oil for them after Russia had seized Galicia. The sympathies of her people were largely with the Allies and with the death of King Carol on October 10, 1914, the chief dynastic bond with Germany was severed. In the case of Holland, Denmark, and Sweden there could be no question of intervention. (See SCANDINAVIAN LEAGUE.) Denmark sympathized with the Allied Powers, but public opinion in Holland rather inclined to the side of Germany, and Sweden had an old dislike and fear of Russia. Holland suffered the most, for she was compelled by the Rhine Acts to forward to Germany any consignments arriving on a through bill of lading, and Britain was forced to take stringent measures including the absolute prohibition of export of certain foodstuffs to Dutch territory. But materials for making war munitions reached Germany through Holland and Scandinavia in spite of all.—Based on J. Buchan, *Nelson's history of the war*, v. 3, ch. 22.—The real character of the German invasion of Belgium was brought home to the Dutch by the flood of refugees seeking refuge in Holland. It began August 4, 1914, when the frontier town of Visé was attacked and set on fire. The capture of Liège, the occupation of Brussels, the fall of Antwerp increased the multitudes flying for refuge. "No barrier on the Holland border could have kept the flood of Belgian refugees out. . . . But Holland did not want a barrier. She stood with open doors and arms, offering an asylum to the distressed and persecuted. [See also NETHERLANDS: 1914-1918.] . . . Belgium and Great Britain bore by far the largest part of the financial burden of caring for the refugees, but Holland gave freely and generously what was more important: a prompt and sufficient welcome and shelter from the storm; abundant supplies of money for immediate needs, food and clothing, personal aid and care, nursing and medical attendance, all of which was needed at once. The number of refugees thus cared for was about a million. From the outbreak of the war there was a rush of Americans to get home by way of Holland. Incredible multitudes scattered about Russia, Germany, Austria and parts of Switzerland poured into the country and many were unable to get cheques cashed. The American Minister to the Netherlands (Henry Van Dyke) arranged with the Dutch Foreign Minister to get American checks and drafts cashed by personally endorsing them in his official capacity." There was never a day that an American fugitive from the war homeward bound could not obtain what cash he needed to live on and get to the United States. In the later part of August the U. S. S. *Tennessee* arrived with \$2,500,000 in gold to help the Americans and the first use of the money was to take up checks and drafts on which the Bank of Netherlands had advanced money. The loss in these transactions was less than five per cent of the amount handled. "And we banked for some very poor people, too."—Based on H. Van Dyke, *Fighting for peace*, pp. 15-30.

(a) United States.—The attitude of the people of the United States during the first months of the war could not be defined in general terms. The suddenness of the catastrophe which plunged the great nations of Europe into war produced varied opinions owing to the mixture of races in the country. But despite the German and certain Irish elements which applauded German victories and even condoned the invasion of Belgium, the

nucleus of a great movement of sympathizers in the Allies and their cause was formed by some of the most prominent statesmen and publicists. The German Ambassador Bernstorff, who had married an American lady, cultivated the press and was assisted in this work by Herr Dernburg, a former German colonial minister, in America ostensibly for the Red Cross, but in reality to spread German propaganda and "explain" German war methods. His mission failed; he was never taken seriously, and in a few months left the country. Britain's campaign at sea injured some American industries, but others benefited by the war. Britain's uncertain attitude towards the Declaration of London made it hard for neutrals, but the American and British governments were disposed to put a friendly construction on their differences and there was never any real danger of a breach in their relations, though the pro-German element in the United States strove desperately to create one.—Based on *American official records*.—See also MONROE DOCTRINE: Relation to World War.

(b) **Contraband and restraint of trade.**—At the outbreak of the war, the belligerent nations, especially Great Britain and Germany, formulated rules in relation to contraband. (See CONTRABAND: In the World War.) The United States had an active interest in these rules and on Aug. 6, 1914, the American ambassador in London was instructed to inquire whether the British government was willing to agree that the laws of naval warfare as laid down by the Declaration of London in 1909 should be applicable to naval warfare during the conflict in Europe, provided that the governments with whom Great Britain was, or might be, at war also agreed to this application. The British foreign minister replied on August 22 that it had been decided to adopt generally the rules of the declaration, subject to certain modifications and additions which were deemed indispensable to the efficient conduct of their naval operations. On Aug. 20, 1914, an Order in Council was issued directing the adoption and enforcement of the Declaration of London, subject to additions and modifications. On October 22 the following note was sent by the American State Department:

"Your No. 864, October 19, Declaration of London.

"Inasmuch as the British Government consider that the conditions of the present European conflict make it impossible for them to accept without modification the Declaration of London, you are requested to inform His Majesty's Government that in the circumstances the Government of the United States feels obliged to withdraw its suggestion that the Declaration of London be adopted as a temporary code of naval warfare to be observed by belligerents and neutrals during the present war; that therefore this Government will insist that the rights and duties of the United States and its citizens in the present war be defined by the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States irrespective of the provisions of the Declaration of London; and that this Government reserves to itself the right to enter a protest or demand in each case in which those rights and duties so defined are violated or their free exercise interfered with by the authorities of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

"[LANSING,
"Acting secretary of state.]"

On December 23 a proclamation was issued by the British government revising the list of articles

to be treated as contraband of war. The following articles were thus designated. This list was added to from time to time as the war continued.

SCHEDULE I:

1. Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive, component parts.
2. Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds and their distinctive component parts.
3. Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war.
4. Ingredients of explosives, viz., nitric acid, sulphuric acid, glycerine, acetone, calcium acetate and all other metallic acetates, sulphur, potassium nitrate, the fractions of the distillation products of coal tar between benzol and cresol, inclusive, aniline, methylaniline, dimethylaniline, ammonium perchlorate, sodium perchlorate, sodium chlorate, barium chlorate, ammonium nitrate, cyanamide, potassium chlorate, calcium nitrate, mercury.
5. Resinous products, camphor, and turpentine (oil and spirit).
6. Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and their distinctive component parts.
7. Range-finders and their distinctive component parts.
8. Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character.
9. Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war.
10. All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character.
11. Articles of camp equipment and their distinctive component parts.
12. Armour plates.
13. Ferro alloys, including ferro-tungsten, ferromolybdenum, ferro-manganese, ferro-vanadium, ferro-chrome.
14. The following metals: Tungsten, molybdenum, vanadium, nickel, selenium, colbalt, hæmatite pig-iron, manganese.
15. The following ores: Wolframite, scheelite, molybdenite, manganese ore, nickel ore, chrome ore, hæmatite iron ore, zinc ore, lead ore, bauxite.
16. Aluminum, alumina, and salts of aluminium.
17. Antimony, together with the sulphides and oxides of antimony.
18. Copper, unwrought and part wrought, and copper wire.
19. Lead, pig, sheet, or pipe.
20. Barbed wire, and implements for fixing and cutting the same.
21. Warships, including boats and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war.
22. Submarine sound signaling apparatus.
23. Aeroplanes, airships, balloons, and aircraft of all kinds, and their component parts, together with accessories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection with balloons and aircraft.
24. Motor vehicles of all kinds and their component parts.
25. Tires for motor vehicles and for cycles, together with articles or materials especially adapted for use in the manufacture or repair of tires.
26. Rubber (including raw, waste, and reclaimed rubber) and goods made wholly of rubber.
27. Iron pyrites.
28. Mineral oils and motor spirit, except lubricating oils.
29. Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture, of munitions of war,

for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land and sea.

SCHEDULE II:

1. Foodstuffs.
2. Forage and feeding stuffs for animals.
3. Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes suitable for use in war.
4. Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money.
5. Vehicles of all kinds, other than motor vehicles, available for use in war, and their component parts.
6. Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks, and their component parts.
7. Railway materials, both fixed and rolling stock, and materials for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones.
8. Fuel, other than mineral oils. Lubricants.
9. Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war.
10. Horseshoes and shoeing materials.
11. Harness and saddlery.
12. Hides of all kinds, dry or wet; pigskins, raw or dressed; leather, undressed or dressed, suitable for saddlery, harness, or military boots.
13. Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments.

Given at our court at Buckingham Palace, this Twenty-third day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, etc., etc.

The continued seizure and detention of neutral vessels destined to neutral ports become so frequent that on Dec. 26, 1914, Secretary Bryan sent the following note to be handed to the British Foreign Office:

"The present condition of American foreign trade resulting from the frequent seizures and detentions of American cargoes destined to neutral European ports has become so serious as to require a candid statement of the views of this Government in order that the British Government may be fully informed as to the attitude of the United States toward the policy which has been pursued by the British authorities during the present war. . . . The Government of the United States has viewed with growing concern the large number of vessels laden with American goods destined to neutral ports in Europe, which have been seized on the high seas, taken into British ports and detained sometimes for weeks by the British authorities. During the early days of the war this Government assumed that the policy adopted by the British Government was due to the unexpected outbreak of hostilities and the necessity of immediate action to prevent contraband from reaching the enemy. For this reason it was not disposed to judge this policy harshly or protest it vigorously, although it was manifestly very injurious to American trade with the neutral countries of Europe. This Government, relying confidently upon the high regard which Great Britain has so often exhibited in the past for the rights of other nations, confidently awaited amendment of a course of action which denied to neutral commerce the freedom to which it was entitled by the law of nations. . . . It is a . . . matter of deep regret that, though nearly five months have passed since the war began, the British Government have not materially changed their policy and do not treat less rigorously ships and cargoes passing between neutral ports in the peace-

ful pursuit of lawful commerce, which belligerents should protect rather than interrupt. The greater freedom from detention and seizure which was confidently expected to result from consigning shipments to definite consignees, rather than 'to order,' is still awaited. It is needless to point out to His Majesty's Government, usually the champion of the freedom of the seas and the rights of trade, that peace, not war, is the normal relation between nations and that the commerce between countries which are not belligerents should not be interfered with by those at war unless such interference is manifestly an imperative necessity to protect their national safety, and then only to the extent that it is a necessity. It is with no lack of appreciation of the momentous nature of the present struggle in which Great Britain is engaged and with no selfish desire to gain undue commercial advantage that this Government is reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the present policy of His Majesty's Government toward neutral ships and cargoes exceeds the manifest necessity of a belligerent and constitutes restrictions upon the rights of American citizens on the high seas which are not justified by the rules of international law or required under the principle of self-preservation. . . . Articles listed as absolute contraband, shipped from the United States and consigned to neutral countries, have been seized and detained on the ground that the countries to which they were destined have not prohibited the exportation of such articles. Unwarranted as such detentions are, in the opinion of this Government, American exporters are further perplexed by the apparent indecision of the British authorities in applying their own rules to neutral cargoes. . . . In a word, a legitimate trade is being greatly impaired through uncertainty as to the treatment which it may expect at the hands of the British authorities. We feel that we are abundantly justified in asking for information as to the manner in which the British Government propose to carry out the policy which they have adopted, in order that we may determine the steps necessary to protect our citizens, engaged in foreign trade, in their rights and from the serious losses to which they are liable through ignorance of the hazards to which their cargoes are exposed. In the case of conditional contraband the policy of Great Britain appears to this Government to be equally unjustified by the established rules of international conduct. As evidence of this, attention is directed to the fact that a number of the American cargoes which have been seized consist of foodstuffs and other articles of common use in all countries which are admittedly relative contraband. In spite of the presumption of innocent use because destined to neutral territory, the British authorities made these seizures and detentions without, so far as we are informed, being in possession of facts which warranted a reasonable belief that the shipments had in reality a belligerent destination, as that term is used in international law. . . . That a consignment 'to order' of articles listed as conditional contraband and shipped to a neutral port raises a legal presumption of enemy destination appears to be directly contrary to the doctrines previously held by Great Britain and thus stated by Lord Salisbury during the South African War: 'Foodstuffs, though having a hostile destination, can be considered as contraband of war only if they are for the enemy's forces; it is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used, it must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of their seizure.' . . . The Government of the United States readily admits the full right of a belligerent

to visit and search on the high seas the vessels of American citizens or other neutral vessels carrying American goods and to detain them *when there is sufficient evidence to justify a belief that contraband articles are in their cargoes*; but His Majesty's Government, judging by their own experience in the past, must realize that this Government can not without protest permit American ships or American cargoes to be taken into British ports and there detained for the purpose of searching generally for evidence of contraband, or upon presumptions created by special municipal enactments which are clearly at variance with international law and practice. . . . The Government of the United States, still relying upon the deep sense of justice of the British nation, which has been so often manifested in the intercourse between the two countries during so many years of uninterrupted friendship, expresses confidently the hope that his Majesty's Government will realize the obstacles and difficulties which their present policy has placed in the way of commerce between the United States and the neutral countries of Europe, and will instruct its officials to refrain from all unnecessary interference with the freedom of trade between nations which are sufferers, though

not participants, in the present conflict; and will in their treatment of neutral ships and cargoes conform more closely to those rules governing the maritime relations between belligerents and neutrals, which have received the sanction of the civilized world, and which Great Britain has, in other wars, so strongly and successfully advocated.

"BRYAN."

The German government was also asked whether it purposed to abide by the terms of the Declaration of London, and the response was made that it was intended to do so, provided the provisions of the declaration were not disregarded by other belligerents. The German government also published a list of articles to be considered as contraband and this agreed with the articles designated in the Declaration of London. In October, 1914, copper and lead were declared to be conditionally contraband by the German government, and in November all wrought and unworked lumber was also declared contraband, as was sulphur, crude or refined, and sulphuric acid. Aluminum and nickel were declared contraband in December, 1914.—See also FOOD REGULATION: 1914-1915; U.S.A.: 1922: Economic situation.

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