

Resigned
SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMA

03625

AIR

Chief, SE
Chief, EE
Chief of Station, Frankfurt

15 May 1952

KESOX/LORCHELI

GIGORDANO's "Base of Work"

A paper entitled "Base of Work" written by Marie K. GIGORDANO in fall of 1951 on his acceptance of work with DIGLAIM is hereby forwarded to you. The training program incorporated in this plan is the first written by GIGORDANO, and is greatly expanded in his later plans, forwarded as Attachment B to MEMA 0099 and Attachment A to MEMA 0099.

Approved:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

- Distribution:
- ✓ 2 SE w/2 Att's. (direct)
 - 1 EE (direct)
 - 2 COS w/1 Att. []
 - 2 MOB w/1 Att. & Original

1- ENCL

SECRET
COPY

136A-71(6) 74-613 2123
~~136A-48~~

BASE OF WORK.

A. General Situation.

Facts:

1. I have been recommended
 - a) by an Estonian personage who had a high rank and position in the independent Estonian Republic and who finds himself now being in exile, authorized to deal on behalf of Estonian Republic,
 - b) for a special job which corresponds to my military education and my former activity, and which job is in close connection with the re-liberation of Estonia,
 - c) to the representatives of an Institution of the United States of America whom my recommender finds duly qualified for dealing with such work.
2. I have been assured from the side of my recommender that accepting this job I will be counted being in service of the Independent Estonian Republic.
3. The dispute over the authority to lead the affairs of the Estonian Government in Exile has not yet been settled between the leading Estonian politicians and the official representatives of the Republic living and working in the western democratic world.
4. I am aware of the political accusations rised against the a/m recommending personage, as well as I am aware of his belonging to the Estonian Socialist Party. I have no definite proofs of his guiltiness or of his having been in some contact with the com-munists, as can be read out of some Estonian exile newspapers.

Conclusions:

1. In view of the a/m facts, and willing to ^{do} my soldier's duty, I have at present not to follow this proposal to work for the benefit of my homeland, the independent Estonian Republic, together with the American authority to which I was recommended.
2. Having got no Estonian superior here who could give me a corresponding order, I enter this job on my own responsibility, acting as an Estonian commissioned officer led by the high principles which were in viger in the Estonian Army. I shall do this work under the protection as needed in general, and especially in view of the accusations mentioned under p.4 of the "facts".

I am convinced that this enterprise has for its far aim, as far as connected with my work, the re-liberation of the Estonian Republic. I commit myself to the orders and regulations of this special Institution of the United States to which I have been recommended. Doing so I hold it for my duty and right to draw the attention of my American superiors to the decisions, orders or any other action, as to my best knowledge and understanding, are harmful or useless for our general aim.

74-613-2123-1 (dup)

4. I shall continue to do this work so long this will be found necessary by the American authorities concerned, or so far I will not receive other orders from my Estonian responsible authorities (recognized Estonian Exile Government or the official representatives of the Independent Estonian Republic) who act in accordance with the higher American authorities.
5. I hope that the men whom I will have to lead and I myself, will be taken by the American authorities as selected anti-communist warriors of the Estonian Republic, which state still is recognized by the United States, and that we therefore will be treated accordingly.
6. I hope that I shall profit of the full trust of my American superiors and that I will be given enough facilities and means without which it will be impossible to lead this enterprise to some results and to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. I hope that all precaution and the best technical facilities will be used for obtaining the best results with the least casualties and hardship to the executors, so that this work will not harm the Estonian people instead of helping to its liberation, as aimed.

Entering this job I ask for the assurance that no information gained as a result of this undertaking, will be passed, neither directly nor indirectly, to the communists.

This my request is based on, and influenced by the accusations raised in exile against some members of the Estonian underground movement of the time of World War 2, whose information, given in confidence to the Western Powers, were later found in the hands of the Russians and communists, and just used against the Estonians who were struggling for their lives and for the freedom against the same communists.

B. Aims of Work.

- 1) Collecting information about
 - a) the life in Estonia in general, and especially:
 - 1) the too active communist functionaries and their misdeeds (This information could be used successfully by the "voices")
 - 2) bigger general misdeeds or actions of the communist regiment. (For possible hindering by quick branding by the "voices" or by some other ways)
 - 3) reliable persons still in Estonia who are able and willing to help the Western "eyes", and who could be pillars for an underground movement.
 - b) all kinds of military information
 - c) all kinds of industrial information
- 2) Stimulation or creation of an underground movement.

C. Checking of the Reliability and of the Fitness of the Aspirants.

Supposition: The aspirants have been duly checked before their departure from their present country of stay, as to their physical and moral fitness and anticommunist reliability.

Complementarily to this the following is advised:

- a) A detailed life history to be written in own handwriting by every aspirant. Nothing to be hidden! Different little true happenings, which are good memorized, to be related. This may be very important for the later work and for the cases when suspicions arise that a man has been grasped by the enemy and is working under pressure. Different questions may be put him then on the base of this detailed life history for checking of his actual status.
- b) An oath has to be taken that the aspirant will work for the independent Estonian Republic only and that he will hold no contact and will give no information outside of this institution.
- c) A hidden listening system to be installed in the living rooms of the aspirants. This is not proposed for some malicious spying, but for learning about the character of the aspirants and for finding out the worries they may get in course of their stay here, which worries or characteristic particularities may influence negatively the progress of a man for the foreseen work or the safety of the enterprise.

-4-

D. Training

Different subjects to be taught and practiced for obtaining :

a. Physical fitness

- 1) Sports and hygiene. The physical fitness of the men must be preserved and ameliorated. Life in rough climatical and in very primitive accommodation conditions, as near as possible to the real conditions of life in which they will have to do the work.
- 2) Self-defense.
- 3) Building and installation of subterranean hiding places.

b. Ability in seeing, hearing and reporting events and facts.

- 4) Development of attention and memory.
- 5) Composition of messages
- 6) Wireless
 - Theory and mechanics
 - Skill in reception and in work with the key
 - Practical traffic.
- 7) Codes and ciphers.

c. Applied knowledge.

- 8) Security precautions and masking
- 9) Russian language
- 10) Topography and orientation
- 11) Geography of Estonia and of the bordering countries
- 12) Mechanics, general-, motor-, and weapon-
Using Russian and American (which the Russians may still use)
motor-vehicles
- 14) Use of Russian fire-arms
- 15) Recognition of Russian weapons
- 16) " " " uniforms and badges
- 17) Orientation over the life in Estonia and in Soviet Union,
to be obtained by systematic listening to the Soviet-Estonian and Russian broadcasts and by reading of the Soviet-Estonian and -Russian, as well as Estonian exile newspapers.

Remark: 6 and 9. Information is needed from the Radio-Goniometric service concerning the characteristics of work of the Russian wireless-stations placed in Estonia or in the neighbourhood, as well as of those of the Red Navy in Baltic Sea near Estonia:

- a) which frequencies they use,
- b) which traffic codes they use, the international Q & Z codes and amateur-abbreviations, or Russian own abbreviations
- c) how are their calls composed; are these fixed, every station bearing the same call all the time, or changeable; in which manner are these changed
- d) description of their normal way of traffic
- e) do they use letters or numbers in coded messages, how are the single code-groups composed.

FORM NO. 35-5
DEC. 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12345678

MAY 22 1952

SECRET

PAGE No.

SECURITY INFORMATION

FROM: MUNICH ROUTINE
 TO: OPERATIONS 22 MAY 52
 ACTION: SR (1-3) IN 45209
 INFORMATION: RI (4-5-6), ADMIN (7), AD/PC (8), GAL (9), CFD (10-11-12),
 EE (13-14), S/C (15-16-17)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (I) 60A AR-380-5

MUNI 8432

TO: WASHF INFO: FRANF CITE: MUNIF

REDSOX LCHOMELY

RE: WASH 47823 (OUT 76751)

1. MONTHLY PAYMENTS \$50 TO WIFE IN U.S. IN ADDITION SUBJECT'S SALARY TO CONTINUE TILL STATUS SUBJECT CHANGED.

2. SALME KURVEL, ACCOUNT NUMBER BN 58300, NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK, JAMAICA BRANCH. ADDRESS: CARE OF MAEKASK, 164-0389 (AS A RCVD) AVENUE, JAMAICA 3, LI, NY. (PORTION GARBLED, BEING SVCD) PLEASE CANCEL.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

TOR: 0257Z 22 MAY 52

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1308-3
1308-2

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO. MGMA 09735

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR
Chief, EE

DATE: 23 May 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

~~SECRET~~
DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT: GENERAL—RED SOX/LCHOMELY

SPECIFIC— PRQ Part II of Mario K. Giordano

Ref: WASH 38920

As requested in reference, PRQ Part II for Mario K. Giordano is hereby forwarded.

Approved:

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AM	SR
AR	EE
IN	
PS	
RI	
DBS	NTD
PI	
SP	FSP

Distribution:

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 - 1 EE (direct)
 - 2 COS w/1 Att.
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- EMS/taf

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[]
CLASSIFICATION

To SR
28 May 52
fka. KAPOK

130A-73

130A-78

51-28A

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

~~SECRET~~~~KAPDK
DESENSITIZED~~PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

36. Mario K. Giordano.

37. Giordano tried to establish an intelligence contact with the U.S. in 1949 through Colonel SHIPP, on whose advice he sent two letters to Colonel Robert A. SCHOW, then Deputy Director for Intelligence Division, EUCOM. The letters were never answered, and Giordano's first contact was through [] in December 1950, after [] had recommended Giordano to [] as the most qualified Estonian agent trainer. Giordano expressed to [] his willingness to work on an American-Estonian enterprise, and reaffirmed this willingness when contacted by [] jointly on 18 February 1951. A contact with Giordano was signed in September 1951.

38. Giordano could be turned over to any DYCLAIM officer by any other DYCLAIM officer through personal introduction or pre-arranged recognition signals.

39. Giordano is primarily motivated by a desire for the restoration of the independence of Estonia, and a personal desire to make that restoration possible through his own contribution. Strong feelings of patriotism, of love for country, and of his duty as a professional army officer combine to make this participation in the restoration the predominant motive for his actions. His secondary motivation is hatred of Communism, acquired through personal experience, and expressed in the belief that Communism will eventually destroy not only Estonia but the entire Western world if it is not combatted now. Not to be disregarded, is Giordano's desire to continue working in his profession, intelligence work, and particularly in his speciality, agent training and dispatch. Although Giordano is an extreme nationalist, this nationalism could be sublimated to Giordano's other motives. As attested by his war-time record, Giordano can be influenced to undertake anti-Communist work not related to Estonia if convinced that such an indirect contribution to the liberation of Estonia is the most valuable contribution he can now make, (particularly if this work lies within the field of agent training and dispatch). As stated in the carriage test, Giordano has considerable powers of auto-suggestion. This trait can be used to assist us in sublimating his motivation.

40. Giordano has been checked with CIC, ID EUCOM and DYCLAIM files which include, in the case of the latter, considerable biographical information obtained in British interrogations in 1945/6 with which biographical data submitted by Giordano conforms. No derogatory information has been received through traces.

41. The following factors contribute to our control of Giordano:

- A. Giordano's motivation as outlined in no. 39.
- B. Giordano's conception of soldier's honor on the basis of which he undertook work with DYCLAIM. (See his statement "Base of Work" forwarded as Attachment to MGMA 09625.)
- C. Physical presence of Giordano's wife and two sons in the U.S.
- D. Realization on the part of Giordano that only through our assistance can we hope to rejoin his family in the U.S. whether as an immigrant or a visitor.
- E. Realization on the part of Giordano that having turned down opportunities for emigration to countries other than the U.S., he now has little chance of leaving Germany without our assistance.

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-2-

Attachment to MGMA UJ 135

~~KAPOK~~
~~DESENSITIZED~~

F. Financial dependence on his salary, increased by the necessity for maintaining his family in a separate location, and by his own realization that there are few remunerative jobs for displaced persons in Germany today.

Control over Giordano would be considerably increased by enabling him to emigrate to the U.S., which would bring him physically under U.S. government control, morally under obligation of loyalty to the U.S. above all other governments, and practically under our control during the probationary period before he could become a full citizen. Control would also be increased by giving Giordano an opportunity to do the type of work for which he was hired, as our inactivity and indecisiveness has led him to doubt our intentions, a doubt which will eventually lead to his feeling his obligations towards us less binding.

42. Until recently, Giordano stated that he did not know by which branch or cover organization of the AIS he was hired. He later claimed to have discovered the true name of the organization by deduction. As it was felt that further conversation on this point might give him an opportunity to deduce information he did not already have, no effort has been made to learn the accuracy of Giordano's deductions or whether they pertain to the real name of BYCLAIM or one of its cover organizations in Germany.

43. Giordano worked for the Estonian Intelligence Service from May 1929 until July 1940, attached throughout this period to the General Staff and from January 1934 to July 1940 to the Second Division of the General Staff in which he became director of subdivision A. Subdivision A was concerned with intelligence on western countries, controlled the Estonian attaches in those countries and liaised with foreign attaches stationed in Estonia. On 3 July 1940, Giordano was removed by the Soviets, subsequent to his refusal to work for the Soviets as an agent, and escaped with the assistance of CELLARIUS and KÖRNER. From July 1940 until July 1944, he worked with both the German and Finnish intelligence services against the Soviets, starting this work on his own request for the assistance of the Germans in working for the liberation of Estonia. His first assignment, from September 1940 to June 1941, was the compilation of reports on Soviet industry from studying Russian technical literature and newspapers in the National Scientific Division of I.G. Farben in Berlin. Concurrently he visited camps of resettled Volksdeutsche, many of whom were actually ethnic Estonians, trying to locate volunteers for work in the liberation of Estonia and disseminating confidential pamphlets in the camps to counteract Nazi propaganda and maintain the spirit of Estonian nationalism.

In June 1941 Giordano was released from I.G. Farben and was assigned to the German KOF which liaised with the Finnish Communications Division of the General Staff. His job was to instruct Estonian agents to be sent to Estonia, and to control communications with the dispatched agents. He continued this work in Tallinn, arriving there in September 1941 immediately after the liberation of Tallinn. In Tallinn he was assigned to Abwehrstelle I, and then to the Aufklärungskommando 102, until the latter left Estonia in mid-July 1944. From this time until May 1945, Giordano worked with the German intelligence service only. After a period of service as liaison officer, he transferred in October 1944 to Frontaufklärungs Kommando 166 (M) under Captain NEUMANN, again instructing and dispatching agents to Estonia. The teams he dispatched during this period were secretly instructed by him to remain in Estonia until it would be possible, at the end of the war, to make contact with the western allies and fight the Soviets

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-3-
SECRET

Attachment to MCMA

05135

DESENSITIZED

with their aid. To accomplish this, while still in Rostock, Giordano sent two Estonians equipped with w/t sets through the German lines across the Elbe to contact the Americans and ask their assistance. The men were arrested by the Germans and the attempt failed. Giordano was himself interned for fifteen months after reporting himself to the British authorities in Hamburg on 4 May 1945. He remained in contact with the British until Spring 1947 when all of his men had been released and rehabilitated.

His connection with the British was then broken until Spring of 1950 when the British Intelligence Service recontacted him and he flew to London to discuss their offer. Giordano did not accept because the British could not guarantee the safety of his family in the case of emergency, and could offer him no hope of emigration. He did, however, serve as interrogator for the British in the case of the Estonian provocateur who arrived in Berlin as a German repatriate in 1950. So far as we can ascertain Giordano is not now in contact with any intelligence service other than DYCLAIN.

44. Giordano has furnished good information on the activities of Estonian emigre organizations, on individuals of potential operational use, and on former intelligence associates and their current activities. He is not primarily suited to information gathering although he is a capable and experienced intelligence interrogator.

45. Giordano was hired to be chief trainer and w/t instructor for the training and dispatch of an Estonian group, and was expected to assume the duties of recruiter and assessor if necessary in setting up the group.

46. Giordano has been given no training by DYCLAIN. Prior to World War II, he had experience in information compilation, intelligence liaison and collection, and wireless operation. During World War II he had experience in interrogation, recruiting and assessing agents, training Estonian and Russian agents, managing w/t communications for dispatched agents, and participated in the training and dispatch of the following teams:

- Five 3-man Estonian teams from Finland to Estonia in July 1941.
- Two 7-man Estonian teams from Finland to Russia in 1942.
- Five 3-man Russian teams from Finland or Pleskau to Russia in 1942/4.
- One 2-man Latvian team from Germany to Latvia in December 1944.
- One Estonian team from Germany to Estonia in December 1944.
- Five 3-man Estonian teams from Germany to Estonia in April 1945.

47. From personal and ex-professional contacts.

48. Giordano's contract, signed in September 1951, provided him with 700 DM per day on authorized trips, and 30 days notice on the part of either party prior to termination of service.

49. Giordano feels that commitments concerning aid for his emigration have been made although he realizes that he has no concrete basis on which to assume that these commitments bind us to a guarantee of his emigration.

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~~DESENSITIZED~~

Giordano might be able to pass as a native German, but could not pass as native of any other country.

51. Middle class from lower middle-class family.

52. Giordano is extremely devoted to his family and is probably not subject to temptations of the opposite sex. He drinks very moderately and has an almost old maidish horror of excessive drinking, of which he has a fairly limited conception.

53. Giordano has strict concepts of honor and obligation to which he adheres, is sincere, intelligent, diligent, and does not consider himself above lowly tasks. He is extremely thorough and systematic, and used to very hard work. He is self-reliant and is capable of great self-discipline and of living an isolated life. As a professional army officer, Giordano is accustomed to receiving and following orders, some of which may be based on information to which he will never have access.

However, Giordano is inclined to stubbornness, which occasionally renders him difficult to handle. This can be counteracted by clearly defining, in writing, Giordano's job and the lines and limits of his authority in performing that job, and enforcing strict adherence to those limits.

54. Giordano would collaborate with any western power which could offer him the opportunity to work for the liberation of Estonia. He is personally opposed to the British, the Swedes, and the Germans, but would use the aid of any of these to accomplish this end. However, he feels that the U.S. offers the greatest if not the only hope of assistance to all the Communist-dominated countries and prefers collaboration with the U.S. to all other countries.

55. Giordano's language abilities, contacts with Estonians and with intelligence personalities, experience in the fields of intelligence collection, intelligence compilation, interrogation, w/t, agent instruction, agent operational planning and dispatch, as applied to Latvians and Russians as well as Estonians, make him suitable for the training of Estonian or non-Estonian agents for dispatch, or for various jobs such as: w/t instructor, interrogator, intelligence analyst, leg-man, interpreter, translator, paramilitary instructor, etc.

57. Personally from subject.

SECRET

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SECURITY INFORMATION

26 May 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Covert Funds Division
FROM: SR/Baltic
SUBJECT: Payment of Funds
REF: IN-41953; IN-45209; OUT-76751

1. In compliance with a request from the field in references a and b, it is requested that a sum of fifty dollars (\$50.00) be deposited monthly to the account of:

Mrs. Salme KURGVEL
Account Number EE 58300
National Bank of New York, Jamaica, N.Y.

Mrs. KURGVEL is aware of the fact that her husband is employed by the U.S. Government in Germany.

2. The \$50.00 monthly payment will continue until Mrs. KURGVEL's husband immigrates to the United States. This branch will inform you when the payments are to be discontinued.

3. In addition it is requested that a sum of five hundred dollars (\$500.00) be deposited in Mrs. KURGVEL's account as retroactive payment on her allowance.

4. Funds for these payments are to be chargeable against the LCHOMELY project. Please inform extension 2538, when this transaction has been approved.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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1308-3

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
Attn: CROB

27 May 1952

Chief, RR
Chief, SE
Operational/Adsoz
Immigration of Mario GIORDANO

REC-2174
EX-100

REF : a. MOA-14355 b. MUI-5769

1. The general requirements for immigration to the United States under Section 8, Public Law 110 are set forth in reference a. Inasmuch as PL 110 appears to be the only means left to GIORDANO for immigration, it is requested that the documents needed to initiate proper action be forwarded to Headquarters.

2. A check of Headquarters files indicates that the following documents on GIORDANO are available at Headquarters and need not be sent again.

- a. PRQ, Part I
- b. Results of Carriage test
- c. Security clearances

Time we still need a copy of GIORDANO's latest medical examination, the field assessment, the case officers evaluation, and a four or five page biographical statement. Although a great deal of biographical material has been submitted on GIORDANO, a concise 4 or 5 page statement as indicated in paragraph 4 reference a is not available.

3. Upon receipt of these materials we shall begin processing the request for immigration.

JFE/les

[]

EE/so _____

SR/so _____

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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Hargrave

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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MAY 28 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PAGE No.

To: MUNICH, FRANKFURT ROUTINE
FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 28 MAY 52
CONFIRMATION: EE (1-6) OUT 80046
INFORMATION: R1 (7-8-9), ADSO (10), OPS (11), ADPC (12), CAL (13),
CFD (14-15-16), SR (17-18), S/C (19-20-21)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 43059

TO: MUNIFG INFO: FRANFG CITE: WASHFG
RE: MUNI 8432 (IN 45209)

Handwritten mark

BEFORE FURTHER ACTION IN REF PLEASE FURNISH CONTRACT AND/OR ANY TYPE OF COMMITMENTS MADE TO SUBJECT. UPON RECEIPT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN AS REQUESTED. IN FUTURE CASES BEFORE ANY TYPE OF PAYMENT CAN BE MADE IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE ON FILE HQS THE INTENT OR AN EXECUTED CONTRACT FOR REVIEW BY GENERAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

B. TWEEDY
RELEASING OFFICER

CHD
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

P. DE SILVA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0107Z 29 MAY 52

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130B-5 130B-4

16-52225-2 GPO

FORM NO. 34-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

03 JUNE 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 48667

ROUTING	
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TO: OPERATIONS
FROM: MUNICH
SR (1-2-3)

ROUTINE

1457Z 3 JUNE 52

INFORMATION: (4-5-6) AD/PG (7) CAL (8) AD/SO (9) OPS (10) CFD (11-12-13)
EE (14-15-16) S/C (17-18-19), AL/PT (20)

MUNI 5586

TO: WASHFC INFO: FRATG CITE: MUNIFG

REDSON HOMEY

RE: WASH 43059 (OUT 8/046)

1. CONTRACT SIGNED 5 SEPTEMBER 51, VALID ONE YEAR, PROVIDES FOLLOWING: FURNISHED QUARTERS, UTILITIES, 700 DM'S MONTHLY SALARY, 25 DM'S PER DIEM ON AUTHORIZED TRAVEL, ASSISTANCE IN EVENT OF EVACUATION. CONTRACT TERMINABLE BY EITHER PARTY ON 30 DAYS NOTICE.

2. COPY CONTRACT FOLLOWS. NO OTHER COMMITMENTS MADE. PLEASE NOTIFY WHEN ACTION TAKEN.

1 A132

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SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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COPY NO. 130 2-6 (44)
1308-5

AIR

SECURITY INFORMATION

MOHA 10002

SECRET

12 June 1952

Chief, BOB

Chief of Station, Frankfurt

WESOX/Baltic

Request for Information from HOC

Please forward all information available in the Berlin Documents Center on the following individuals:

1. Alexei KURGVEL, Estonian army captain born on 13 September 1904 in Karssears, Estonia who served during World War II with I.G. Farben in Berlin, Abwehrstelle I in Tallinn and Aufklärungskommando 102 in Tallinn.
2. Otto Bong, Latvian volksdeutsche born in Malmo, Sweden on 4 May 1918, who served during World War II in Abwehrstelle Ostland and FATHUPP 212.

FRAN NOTE: Upon receipt of this memo, MOB was queried on the reason for requesting this type trace. MOB replied with: "Attached request (MOHA-10002) was initiated on the basis of HQ's request handcarried to The Baltic Section by [] asking that OSOB/K trace at HOC all agents formerly employed by OIS and now working for us. According to [], HQ does not have traces on #1." Regret delay in passing this memo on to you. 10 July 1952 - JHF

Distribution:
2 BOB
2 OGS
-2 SE
1 KE
2 MOB

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DATE 2008

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74-1-341-14 130A-7
130A-51

VIA: AIR

SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO. ^{2P} MEMA 10113

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

MICROFILMED: OCT 19 1969

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR
Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

DATE: 18 June 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/HOMELY
SPECIFIC— Giordano's Contract

REF: WASH 43059

1. A copy of ^{MA} Giordano's contract is hereby forwarded to you.
2. Please amend the typographical errors in paragraph 48 of MEMA-09735 according to the terms of the contract hereby forwarded to read as follows:

Giordano's contract, signed in September 1951, provides him with 700 DM per month as compensation, 25 DM per diem on authorized trips, and 30 days notice on the part of either party prior to termination of service.

Approved:

Per

Distribution:

- 2 SR w/2att (direct)
- 2 EE (direct)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

(4)

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

INDEX

Security Information

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CLASSIFICATION

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C O N T R A C T

The purpose of this contract is to define the extent of the obligations which we incur towards you in availing ourselves of your services. In addition, the contract contains certain commitments to which you must bind yourself before we can consider utilizing such services. In affixing your signature to this document, you will indicate that you have read and understood the terms of this contract and that you willingly commit yourself to all its conditions.

1. In consideration of your services, you will receive a monthly compensation of 700 DM until the expiration of this contract.
2. You will be furnished quarters and utilities at our expense.
3. Expenses which you incur in traveling and in otherwise carrying out your duties will be reimbursed in all cases in which the expenses have been directed and authorized by us. You will be required to render a full accounting of all such expenses in order to receive reimbursement. You will be authorized per diem in the amount of 25 DM while traveling to cover hotel and eating expenses.
4. In the event of the evacuation of Germany, you and members of your immediate family residing with you at the time will be given such assistance as can be accorded, resembling that given to American citizens on duty in Germany.
5. You must pledge your word to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which comes to your knowledge as a consequence thereof. Your attention is directed to the fact that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1917 and other applicable laws and regulations. Termination of this contract will not release you from your pledge to maintain secrecy.
6. This contract goes into effect on _____ and shall be terminated one year from that date. At that time, it may be renewed if both parties to the contract so desire. At any time, either party may terminate this contract with written advance notice of one month. Such notice will become effective one month from the date of receipt.

Signature _____

Witness _____

September, 1951

(4)

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FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

JUN 20 1952

23 JUN 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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TO: MUNICH FRANKFURT
 FROM: JOHN F. EVANS SR 7552
 SPECIAL OPERATIONS ROUTINE
 SR ((1-2)) 1944Z 25 JUNE 52
 INFORMATION: (3-4-5), AD/PC (6), CAL (7), FE (8-9-10), ADMIN (11), AL/PT (12),
 S/C (13-14-15)

WASH 47147

TO: MUNICH INFO: FRANKFURT CITE: WASHFO
 REF MUNI 8526 (IN 48067)
 REDSOX

1. PLS CONFIRM CONFIRMATION THAT FIELD CONTRACT AMENDED TO INCLUDE MONTHLY AND RETROACTIVE PAYMENTS MRS. GIOFRANO. IF CONTRACT NOT AMENDED CASE CHIEF OF STATIONS APPROVAL.
2. ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT PARA 1.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
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 SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2006

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 1308-8

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FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 15859

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01 JULY 1952

TO: OPERATIONS
FROM: MUNICH

ROUTINE

SR (1-5)

045Z 02 JULY 1952

INFORMATION: RI (6-7-8), ADMIN (9), AD/PC (10), CAL (11), S/C (12-13-14),
EE (15-16-17), AL/PT (18)

MUNI 8987

TO: WASHFG INFO: FRANFG CITE: MUNIFG

RE: WASH 47147 (OUT 86370)

REDSOX HOMELY

CONTRACT AMENDED PER PARA 1 REF.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECURITY INFORMATION

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COPY NO.

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(44)

Security Information

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B/A

MEMORANDUM

8 July 1952

TO: [] [] 'LCHQ:ELY
FROM: [] [] /MO
SUBJECT: Medical Report - Alexei Kunstman

This man was examined at my office on 30 June 1952.

- a. History: 1926 - Hydroarthrosis (water on the knee) left knee - no recurrence.
1936 - Pneumonia.
1934 - 1938 - High alcohol consumption.
- b. Physical Examination: Liver edge palpable - few small scars about right thumb - rash over sternum.
- c. Laboratory Studies: Chest x-ray, urinalysis, and serologic test for syphilis, within normal limits.
- d. Disposition: Qualified for full duty.

Sincerely,

[]

ENH/mnc

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

Security Information

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~~130A-52~~

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA FOUCH)

Security Information
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CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. MGM A-10348

TO : Chief, SR
Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt *1/8/52*

DATE: 8 July 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/LCHOMELY
SPECIFIC— Immigration of Subject of MGQ-W-14436

Reference: MGQ W 14436

Subject's biographical statement is hereby forwarded as requested in reference. Subject's medical report will be forwarded under separate cover.

[]

Approved:

Rca
_____ *My*

Distribution:

- 2 SR w 2 atts.
- 1 EE w no atts.
- 2 COS [] w 1 att.
- 2 MCB w 1 att.

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DATE 2006

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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Biographical Statement

Alexei KURGVEL was born in Kuressaare, Saaremaa Estonia on 13 September 1904. As Estonia was then occupied he was a Russian citizen until the declaration of Estonian independence in 1920, when he became an Estonian citizen. As an Estonian citizen in Germany he has the following identity papers:

Deutsches Personal Ausweis AQ 111053, issued in Wentorf
Temporary Estonian passport issued in London in 1948, extended in 1950
Estonian Internal Identity papers, issued in Narva in 1926/7
Estonian Military Identity papers no. 375, issued in Tallinn in June 1937

I Education

1911-1912 private school in Kuressaare
1912-1915 Ministeeriumi Kool (public grammar school) in Kuressaare
1915-1923 Gymnasium in Kuressaare
1923-1926 Military School in Tallinn
Graduated as lieutenant in Technical Troops with radio speciality
1929-1932 Military Academy, Tallinn
1943-1944 Political-Economic Division, University of Tartu

II Employment

February-May 1926 radio operator, signal battalion, Tallinn
June-August 1926 staff of 2nd Infantry Division, Tartu
October 1926-
April/May 1929 staff of 1st Infantry Division, Narva, in charge of signal unit
1933-January 1934 assistant to Chief, Operational Division Staff d 1, Infantry Division, Rakvere
Jan.34-July 1940 2nd Division General Staff, first as officer on call, later as Director Subdivision "A"
Removed 3 July 1940 on order of Russians
1 Sept.1940-June 1941 Scientific co-worker, National Scientific Division, I.G. Farben, Berlin; compiled information on Russian industry from overt sources.
June 1941-Sept 41 In Finland as Estonian Officer attached to KOF, Finland and Finnish General Staff
Sept.41 -Aug. 44 with Aufklarungskommando 102 and Abwehrstelle I in Tallinn
Aug 44- Oct. 44 liaison officer responsible to Commander-in-Chief of the German Army Division "Narva" and Commander-in-Chief of Army Corps operating in Southern Estonia
Oct.44 May 45 Frontaufklarungs Kommando 166 (K)
May 45 - Aug 46 Internement by British
Aug 46 - Spring 47 Unemployed
16 Sept 47 - 20 Oct. 48 interpreter and director camp offices, DP Camp Kungla, Stolzenau/Weser
Oct. 48 -15 Sept 49 office director and deputy camp director, Dp Camp Essex, Lingen/EMS
27 Oct. 1949- 30 Sept. 1951 clerk for 502 Iro Documentation Center, Wentorf
Sept. 51 - present DYCLAIM employment.

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III Military record

commissioned 2nd lieutenant 1926
commissioned 1st lieutenant February 1929
commissioned Captain 24 February 1934
(For further details see employment record.)

IV Family Status

Mother: Maria KURGVEL nee TOOMPUU, born 29/7/1868 in Estonia, died in 1965, nationality Estonian, occupation housewife.

Father: Johann KURGVEL, born Estonia 14/2/1871, died 1926, nationality Estonian, occupation baker and gardener.

Sisters: Esenia KURGVEL, born 14 December 1899 in Kuressaare now living at Loherilagen 3, Hagersten Sweden, c/o EINMANN, nationality Estonian, employed by insurance company in Stockholm.

*Esenia
Sister of
ALEXI KURGVEL*

Nadezhda (Nadia) KURGVEL, married to Herman MARIPUU, born 2 March 1909 in Kuressaare, now living at Bergsgatan 32, Enkoping, Sweden, employed as housewife and parttime school teacher in local Estonian school, nationality Estonian.

Olga KURGVEL, born 1898 in Kuressaare, remained with mother in Kuressaare in October 1944. She had been secretary for the school affairs division of the district administration of Kuressaare. Present location not known.

Sinaida KURGVEL, born 1902 in Kuressaare, died while trying to escape from Kuressaare in October 1944.

Elisaveta KURGVEL, married to KEREMAN, born in 1906 in Kuressaare, died while trying to escape from Kuressaare in October 1944.

Wife: SALME KURGVEL, nee EPLER, born 12 January 1909 in Narva Estonia, married on 25 October 1928 in Narva Estonia, emigrated to U.S. on 21 January 1952 under E.C. number 271-032, has filed application for citizenship so far as is known; is now working as practical nurse in the Hospital of the Holy Family, Dean & Hoyt Streets, Brooklyn, N.Y., and living at the following address; c/o MAEKASK, 164-03 89 Ave., Jamaica 32, L.I., N.Y.

Mother-in-Law: Ida EPLER, nee LIBLIK, housewife, remained in Tartu area after Second Soviet Occupation in 1944, present location unknown.

Father-in-Law: Karl EPLER, merchant in Narva, remained in Tartu after Second Soviet Occupation in 1944; present location unknown.

Sons: Jaan KURGVEL, born 23 January 1931 in Tallinn, Estonian nationality, emigrated to U.S. in September 1950 after receiving scholarship to Agricultural College, Clemson, South Carolina, from the World Association of Students. Emigrated under E.C. number 4 177 260.

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cut US?
Rein KURGVEL, born May 1939 in Tallinn; emigrated to U.S. with Salme
KURGVEL on 21 January 1952.

V BYCLAIM Association *with E. C. 116*

See PRQ Part II, # 37.

VI Physical Description

See PRQ Part I.

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SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

SECURITY INFORMATION
Security Information

NO. MGMA 376

SECRET

MGMA-10376

TO : Chief, SR
Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

DATE: 8 July 1952

~~DESENSITIZED~~
KAPOK

SUBJECT: GENERAL—^O REDSOX/LCHOMELY

SPECIFIC— Addenda to PRQ Part II of Mario K. Giordano

REF: MGMA 09735

1. Additional information on Giordano's relations with BROADWAY is hereby forwarded.

2. Giordano was first connected with BROADWAY after his release from interrogation Camp in August 1946. On his release he was requested by FSS 93 to report twice monthly to Lüneberg for his instructions. According to Giordano, BROADWAY Headquarters had evidently requested that he be put on ice for some future action. Giordano went to Lüneberg twice monthly, but was never given any instructions. In spring 1947 he wrote a strong letter to FSS 93 breaking the contact and stating that he felt he could do more for the Estonians by being free than by being bound to an unproductive agreement. Giordano had no further contact with BROADWAY until spring of 1950 when he was recontacted while awaiting emigration from Wentorf. On BROADWAY invitation Giordano went to London for one week where he was requested by BROADWAY to collect information on Estonia in Germany. Giordano accepted, but only on a tentative basis as he was then expecting to be able to emigrate to the U.S. in the near future, and BROADWAY was unable or unwilling to assure him of emigration to England. Giordano worked on a regular paid basis at first, spending most of his time interrogating returned German PWs. After two months he concluded that it was impossible to keep an eight-hour office job and continue his interrogating. Having reported this to BROADWAY, he continued his work receiving no salary but being repaid for his expenses. He also monitored Soviet broadcasts for the British using a radio set given him by BROADWAY. By summer of 1951 he had ceased doing any work for BROADWAY. His last contact with them was in August when they requested him to participate in another interrogation. He refused as his agreement with DYCLAIM was pending and his emigration difficulties were occupying all of his free time. His only remaining tie after August was the possession of the radio set which he did not return to BROADWAY until January 1952 when he closed his apartment in Wentorf. His reason for not returning it earlier was that he thought its absence from Wentorf prior to his wife's departure would have been marked on by the other DPs who thought it was Giordano's personal set. Giordano said when he went to the FSS offices he found no one he recognised, and gave the set to a Latvian requesting that notification of its return be forwarded to BROADWAY Headquarters.

Appro

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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MGM-A-10347

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 12 1972
MICROFILMED

8 July 1952

JP

Chief, SR
Chief, EE
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

REDSOX/LCHOMELY

① Immigration of Mario K. Giordano

Reference: MGQ-W-14436

1. The following papers requested by Headquarters for the initiation of Giordano's immigration processing under Section 8 Public Law 110 are hereby forwarded:

- a. Case Officer's Evaluation
- b. Field Assessment

2. ERQ Part II was forwarded as attachment to MGM-A-09735. The biographical statement and medical report are being forwarded under separate cover.

Approved:

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 12 1972
MICROFILMED

Distribution:

IP/AN HAS INDEXED THIS DOCUMENT AS AN ENTIRE BASIC. THE ATTACHMENTS ARE NOW PART OF BASIC.

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Case Officer Evaluation

Giordano is a mature man with the reserve and self-sufficiency usually ascribed to the Nordic type. Two factors which appear to have dominated his life from an early age are his devotion to his country and to his family. All his major decisions have been made in accord with or rationalised to coincide with one of these factors, and personal ambition and avidity have played a surprisingly small part. Because he comes from a patriarchal, closely-knit family and because he married successfully, separations and vicissitudes have increased rather than decreased his family attachments. He is able to feel very close to his wife and sons although he has again been separated for many months. As long as he is doing what he feels best for his country, he appears to be more concerned about the security of his wife and children than his proximity to them.

All of the Giordano family, consisting of Giordano and his five sisters, were impressed in childhood with the virtues of honesty, hard work and devotion to duty. All succeeded in raising themselves above their father's lower-middle class status and educational level while retaining pride in their parents. Unable to afford a university education, Giordano obtained admission to military school as an officer candidate. His education at the expense of the Estonian government and his commission as a career officer increased his feeling of patriotic dedication. He still considers himself bound to fight the Estonian cause by the oath he took on receiving his commission. During World War II, Giordano's activities throughout the period in which Estonia was alternately threatened by Russia and Germany must have required considerable rationalisation and self-explanation. In order to clarify Giordano's attitude during this period and in order to shed some light on his attitude towards working for Estonia with a foreign power, various incidents in his war-time career are enlarged on below although they have been reported previously in other memoranda.

Giordano handled his first encounter with the Soviets with the lack of tact and forethought characteristic of him when his basic ideas are challenged. On June 24, 1940, while serving in the 2nd Section of the Estonian General Staff in a position of liaison with foreign military attaches, Giordano was summoned by the Soviets and requested to submit reports on all military attaches in Estonia. Giordano, rather than sparring for time and planning an escape, categorically refused to spy, stating that the Soviets could shoot him at once if they wished. One of the Soviet officials told Giordano to reconsider his answer, and suggested that in due time Giordano would realize the consequences of refusing. One week later Giordano's commander in chief was asked to transfer him from the 2nd Section. Giordano reported his conversation with the Soviets to his immediate superior, Colonel SAARSEN, and with the latter's approval arranged an escape to Germany with the assistance of CELLARIUS, then naval attaché, and CELLARIUS' aide KORNER.

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Giordano made no personal or official agreements with the Germans concerning future cooperation with Germany. However on arrival in Berlin, he reported to the Estonian MA, Colonel JAKOBSEN, and on JAKOBSEN's advice offered his services to CANARIS in working against the USSR and for Estonia. CANARIS suggested a position in I.G. Farben. However, Giordano would not accept German citizenship, a prerequisite for work in I.G. Farben. After Giordano had refused repeatedly to become a German citizen, an arrangement was made whereby Giordano was given a German citizen's travel document in his true name. The only two Germans in I.G. Farben who knew that Giordano was not a German citizen were the director and the intelligence liaison. During this period Giordano's work was anti-Soviet but not directly connected with Estonia. He was however active in Estonian interests as without the knowledge of his German superiors he contacted Estonians around Berlin to urge them to remain Estonians and not become Germans. He also disseminated a confidential pamphlet in Estonian camps for the same purpose with the aide of Colonel SAARSEN.

Handwritten initials

Giordano's transfer to KO Finland in June 1941 was offered him by CANARIS in accordance with Giordano's desire to work directly for Estonian liberation. Giordano again refused German citizenship, which was this time offered him personally by CANARIS, and became attached to the Finnish General Staff as an Estonian Captain. The Germans appeared to assume that Giordano would accept citizenship as they paid him as a German officer during his first month in Finland. They later were forced to recognize his independent status and the protection accorded him by his position vis a vis the Finnish General Staff. While in Finland he became extremely critical of the German policy towards Estonians, whom the Germans had begun to treat as a subject nation rather than as a friendly independent power fighting a common enemy. Although he worked with the Germans and tried to do his best, and although he has retained great respect for his German war-time chiefs, Peter Georg NEUMANN, CELLARIUS and CANARIS, he gradually became more outspoken in his opposition to German policy. The following quotations from his letters to his wife during this period illustrate his attitude while in Finland:

"... I am trying to work so as not to be ashamed of receiving my income, but I have no desire to work and can hardly do it. I do not like to do meaningless and empty work. Unfortunately one must be satisfied with little now, until it is known in certain circles that the Estonian is a good coworker and can give his best when one lets him work independently with his people ..."

During this period Giordano reaffirmed that he would never undertake anything against his sense of honor and would remain true to his nationality. His greatest comfort appears to have been a sort of fatalism, a resigned belief that during a period of upheaval there can be no real justice, and a hope for the future. He tried to use his influence *secretly* submitting reports to the Germans

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concerning German policy in Estonia and the advantages the Germans would accrue by following a more liberal policy. His first report, written on 7/5/43 and addressed to CELLARIUS, pointed out that it would be better for the Germans to have 1,000,000 friendly people fighting with them than 1,000,000 suppressed passive people seeing only their own ruin before them. As CELLARIUS refused to forward this report, Giordano wrote a second covering the position of Estonians in regard to the British and the Balt Deutsche, German mistakes in matters of politics, agriculture and military tactics in Estonia, and recommendations for a future German policy in Estonia. Giordano's third report, written on 15/2/44 and addressed to the Chief, Abteilung "Ausland" of the Finnish General Staff, began with a statement by Giordano that as an Estonian officer and a Finnish officer he considered it his duty to report on the situation in Estonia. Giordano requested that the Finns forward his report to the Oberkommando of the German Wehrmacht and to the Führer himself, and sent copies directly to CELLARIUS and the German general liaising with the Finnish General Staff.

Giordano's third report concluded that ^{in view of his data} the situation in Estonia had become so critical that Estonians could no longer work with Germans. As a result of this report both he and his German chief in Estonia, Lieutenant Colonel HOPF were summoned to the Headquarters of the Heeresgruppe Nord in Estonia. Accused of slandering the German Army, Giordano selected some of the most derogatory passages in his report and stated that all were based on fact. Unable or not sufficiently interested to disprove his statements, the Heeresgruppe Nord released Giordano and permitted him to continue working with Colonel HOPF. The only concrete result Giordano was able to achieve was to persuade the Germans not to blow up a waterworks near Tallinn during their retreat in 1944.

In his own work Giordano claims to have been able to obtain commitments from the Germans for his Estonian coworkers and also to instruct his last two teams, sent in fall 1944 and spring 1945 respectively, to remain in Estonia after the German collapse and await contact with the Allies. Giordano was then convinced that immediately after conquering the Germans, the Allies would turn on their second enemy, the U.S.S.R. He was so convinced of this that in the spring of 1945 he sent two of his w/t operators and his wife across the Elbe to contact the advancing Americans and persuade the Allies to establish w/t contact with the Estonians inside Estonia. This attempt failed as before contacting the Americans, Giordano's wife and companions were arrested by the Germans and had to destroy their papers.

Giordano continued to look for an opportunity to interest the Allies in work against the Soviets throughout his post war stay in Germany. His first contact was with the British who although not interested in trying to revive contact with Giordano's w/t operators inside Estonia, apparently wished to keep him on hand for possible future operations. Giordano broke this contact him-

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self after a half year of inactivity by writing the British an extremely strong letter (of which Giordano retained a copy.) The letter expressed Giordano's continued willingness to assist the British Empire in any way towards regaining Estonian independence, and his hope that the British politicians would end the delay in acting for the liberation of Estonia and against Communism before it was too late for the welfare of the British Empire. Aside from efforts to get in touch with the AIS through Colonel SHIPP and others, Giordano was not connected with any other intelligence service except the British for whom he collected information on Estonia from debriefings of PWs from spring 1950 to the end of summer 1950. He would consider it dishonest to give us any vital information on the British without British knowledge, and conversely would not work with the British without our knowledge. He has, however, stated his willingness to work with any democratic intelligence service for the liberation of Estonia, and would undoubtedly make every effort, given an opportunity, to transfer to the most active service, even though he believes that America as a nation offers the greatest if not the only hope to Communist-dominated countries.

As the account above indicates, although Giordano has respect for authority and discipline, he is stubborn and outspoken in pursuing a course he feels is right regardless of the authorities involved. Because of his strong sense of honor, he would pursue a course contrary to his higher authorities only with their full knowledge unless he considered that course outside the limits of his commitments. For this reason it is particularly important that commitments between Giordano and BYCLAIM be stated firmly and specifically and that adherence on both sides be strictly enforced.

Giordano has a well-above average intelligence and considerable initiative in fields with which he is familiar. Outside his specialties he has little initiative and would require considerable direction to be productive. He is systematic and sensible except for occasional highly imaginative and equally impracticable ideas. He is hard-working, conscientious and energetic. Since his association with us he has on his own initiative studied radio techniques, prepared lectures for training, and compiled information on Estonia from overt sources in an elaborate card file. This work has occupied him ten to twelve hours per day seven days per week. One example of his predilection for hard work is his full-time enrollment at the University of Tartu from 1943-1944 because he did not have enough to do in the army to keep busy. His present comparative inactivity would probably have led to his quitting long ago if it were not for his patience and his fatalistic belief that more time is spent waiting than acting.

Giordano is rather shy and does not seem to feel the need of social contacts. Possibly because he has lived alone a great deal he has developed almost old-maidish habits. He is extremely neat

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and orderly, and has a passion for keeping records. For example, all of his correspondence since 1946 is filed in separate folders with carbon copies of his own writings. His daily activities follow a completely predictable pattern, even including his manner of greeting and taking leave. He is extremely temperate in his habits, smoking little and drinking only on social occasions. He says that he drank heavily while working with the military attaches in Tallinn between 1934 and 1938, but claims that although he had a tremendous capacity he derived little enjoyment from alcohol and drank only as a social duty. During his spare time he takes walks or reads current articles on politics and foreign affairs in English and German magazines.

In accordance with Estonian military traditions, Giordano has remained aloof from internal politics. He is suspicious of REI's association with the Soviets in 1940, although he recognizes that the ENR is the most active anti-Communist group in Sweden today. He also recognizes the lack of leadership in EEKO. His own inclination is, outside of the military group in Sweden in favor of the Estonian diplomats. He hopes that Karel PUST may be able to form a nucleus for the unification of the Estonian emigration in the U.S. In international politics his main motive has been consistent opposition to Communism. In his capacity as liaison to foreign military attaches in Estonia he worked particularly closely with the Poles, Germans and Finns, feeling then as now the closest affinity with the Finns. Although he is opposed to the policy of the German politicians, Giordano has respect for the German military intelligence because the officers with whom he dealt fulfilled their commitments. He is somewhat prejudiced against the British because of their lack of activity following World War II and their lack of assistance to Estonian intelligence officers who had furnished them information prior to the war. He is, however, willing to work with the British and has done so.

Security in March
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Security Information

Field Assessment

Giordano has had 23 years of experience in intelligence work, the major portion of which has been spent in working against the USSR. He has had experience in information compilation and analysis, intelligence liaison, intelligence and CE interrogations, w/t training and management, recruitment and assessment of Estonian, Latvian and Russian agents and instruction for the dispatch into the USSR of Estonian, Latvian and Russian agents. During World War II he participated in the dispatch into Soviet-occupied territory of 19 agent teams totalling about 70 agents in addition to assessing and recruiting hundreds of agents. He is considered by other Estonians as the best Estonian intelligence officer in technical matters of recruitment, assessment, training and dispatch.

Giordano is a captain in the Estonian army with experience in the signal corps and on the General Staff. He has area knowledge of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, and speaks Estonian, Russian, German, English and some French and Finnish. He is dedicated to the defeat of Communism and the liberation of Estonia at the price of any necessary personal sacrifice, and believes that cooperation with the United States offers the best if not the only possible means to accomplish this end. He is capable of recruiting and training agents of non-Estonian nationality and would be willing to do so in order to be working towards the defeat of Communism. He is highly recommended as a senior consultant-instructor and is considered the best qualified of the entire Estonian emigration for this position.

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Courier AIR

SECRET *LC Honou*
ps/Robins
MM 40384

Chief, SR
Chief, EE
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

9 July 1952

REDSOX/ Operational

Medical Report of Subject of MQQ W 14436

Reference: MQQ W 14436

Subject's medical report, dated 30 June 1952, is hereby forwarded to you. The report is the last of the papers requested in reference for the initiation of subjects processing for immigration under Section 8 of Public Law 110.

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Approved:

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- 1- EE
- 1- COS w/1 att.
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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File GIORDANO

MEMORANDUM

10 July 1952

TO: /LCHGREELY/REDSOX
FROM: /MO
SUBJECT: Kunstman, Alexei

1. The above named individual underwent a routine medical examination at my office, but has not received the immunizations deemed necessary for indigenous personnel.
2. We will gladly arrange for these upon notification.

Sincerely,

[]

ENE/mnc

Handwritten notes:
H. C. ...
T. H. ...
A. ...

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FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

Journal
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 JULY 1952

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TO: MUNICH FRANKFURT SR 3582

FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS DEFERRED

SR (1-4) 2053Z 26 JUL 52

INFORMATION: RI (5-6), EE (7-8), AD/SO (9), OPS (10), STC (11),
S/C (12-13-14)

WASH 11935

TO: LHMIF INFO: FRANK CITE: WASHF

REISCK HOMELY

RE MUNI 9264 (IN 21671)

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]

PLS PROVIDE ALL AVAILABLE DETAILS RE GIORDANO'S IMMIGRATION CASE, ESPECIALLY
FILE NO. OF CASE, EXACT DATE, PLACE, BSI, SPELLING OF NAME USED BY GIORDANO,
WHETHER GIORDANO APPEALED BSI DECISION.

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DATE 2006

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VIA: AIR
/SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

SECURITY INFORMATION

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TO : Chief, SR
Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
SUBJECT: GENERAL REDSOX/HOMELY

DATE: 1 August 1952

Deadline:	Check one!
Hq Action Req. by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hq Comments Req. by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para by cable	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

SPECIFIC: ~~Emigration of Aleksandr KURGVEL~~

REF: WASH 11935

1. As requested in reference, a summary of KURGVEL's emigration procedure is forwarded here with as attachment A (for Washington only). The summary was prepared by KURGVEL himself.

2. Attachment B consists of a letter written by KURGVEL in November 1951 to reappeal the BSI decision. On the advice of the BSI to await the emigration of his wife and son, he did not submit the letter. It is included here as an explanation of KURGVEL's views on his rejection by the BSI.

Approved:

[Signature]

Distribution:

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

130A-95(9)
1507/09

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29 July 1952

SUMMARY of the U.S. IMMIGRATION CASE
of Mr. Aleksei KURGVEL

Applied for immigration to U.S.A. in Nov. 1948.
 Sponsorship granted in April 1949.
 Documented for immigration to U.S.A. by I.R.O. in June 1949.
 Called for processing to U.S. Immigration Processing Center in WENTORF
 on 15 Sept 1949, under E.C.No. 72219.
 Opened his full secret activity report to the Security Section of the
 D.P. Commission in Wentorf in Oct 1949.
 Automatically suspended as a Baltic Ex-soldier in Oct 1949.

Second Call Forward for Processing in Wentorf in April 1951,
 under E.C.No. 256388, as the first sponsor had withdrawn
 being unable to wait for so long time.

Accepted by the D.P. Commission on 2 May 1951.
 Visa issued in July 1951.

Held back by the I.N.S. WENTORF on 3 July 1951.

Summoned by the Board of Special Inquiry of the INS in Wentorf, 31 July. / 1951

- The BSI ruled (2 v. 1) that:
- 1) Aleksei KURGVEL is inadmissible to the United States under Section 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948, as amended, in that that he has been a member or participated in a movement which has been hostile to the United States or form of government of the United States, to wit: the German army and the Nazi Party;
 - 2) Aleksei KURGVEL is inadmissible to the United States under Section 10 of the Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948, as amended, in that he is not an eligible displaced person as specified under Section 2(b) of that Act;
 - 3) Salme and Rein KURGVEL are inadmissible to the United States under Section 10 of the Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948, as amended, in that they are not eligible displaced persons as specified in the visas of their immigration visas.

Mr. Kurgvel appealed. The main points of his appeal were:

"Point 1 of the Conclusions bases upon false groundings:

- a) I have never been a member and I have never participated in the Nazi Party.
- b) I have never been a member and I have never participated in a movement which has been hostile to the United States or the form of government of the United States.

If the majority of the Board means with the word "movement" the German Army, then:-

- c) I get a member of the Wehrmacht after being compulsorily mobilized in August, 1944.
- d) I served on the Eastern Front only and didn't bear arms against the United States or its Allies on the Western Front.
- e) I started using the help of the German Army for my fight against the communists long before 8 Dec 1941. Doing so I did not know that the communist USSR will be later an Ally of the democratic United States.
- f) I had to do my duty of an Estonian officer. I couldn't do anything by my own means only. I had to find help. There was no other power available in Europe at that time who could help me. Thus, this using of the German help was not voluntary in character.

H/w att. 1 to MGMA-10733

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"The Authorities of the United States could be morally obliged to oppose to my application of immigration because of the disputable eligibility under the Statute of the IRO, when they, after a careful consideration of the case in full details, as to the sense and to the formal prescriptions of the appropriate laws, will find me not to be eligible.

Such a finding of fact has not been made by the Board, and therefore point 2 of the Conclusions of Law seems not to be substantiated.

What is said about point 2, corresponds equally to point 3 of the Conclusions of Law, this point being a conclusion of point 2 only.

All these my expositions are⁺ explained in and testified by the attached enclosures and in my writings mentioned on the page 4 of this writing."

(Copied from "Enclosure No 1" to the letter of 2 Sept 1951 sent by Mr. Kurgvel to the Representative of the LWF at Wentorf, who had to brief his appeal.)

"I have done my duty of a qualified Estonian commissioned officer only, as would have done any honest soldier. The United States do recognize the independent Estonian Republic. Doing so, the States do recognize the duties of an Estonian officer, too. I should not be worth to be admitted into the States, if I had not behaved as I did."

(Copied from the a/m letter to the Representative of the LWF).

The matter was discussed with Mr. S. B. Rawitz, Acting Assistant Commissioner, I.N.S. in Munich on hand of the a/m letter of Mr. Kurgvel on 4 Sept 1951. As a result of this discussion Mr. Kurgvel was advised to withdraw his appeal under the condition that his family will then be found admissible for immigration as DP's, and he himself will be given an other possibility to immigrate to the U.S.A. without prejudice to his reaplication within one year.

Mr. Kurgvel agreed and withdrew his appeal (Copies of 2 letters attached.)

A second meeting of the BSI took place on 7 Sep 1951 in Munich. Mr. Kurgvel had to sign an affidavit (copy attached) and he was told, without further discussion of the case, that his status remains unchanged whereas his family has been found admissible for immigration into the United States.

Mr. Kurgvel filed a new application with the U.S. Consulate in Munich on 7 Sep 1951 for his separate immigration, as it was suggested that he may be processed under Section 3(c) of Public Law 744.

Mr. Kurgvel was called by the Consulate for processing on 19 Oct 1951. The processing was stopped because of the suspicion that he can not be processed under Sect. 3(c) being excluded under Sect. 13 of the same Law.

At that time the immigration of his family was still not yet settled because of the difficulties with the IRO (Split of Family case). Therefore Mr. Kurgvel was advised not to file any new appeal, as this could have endangered the immigration of his family even more.

The family of Mr. Kurgvel (Mrs. Salme Kurgvel and their son Rein) immigrated to U.S. under E.C. No 271032, arriving in New York on 31 Jan 1952.

His son Jaan Kurgvel immigrated in Sep 1950 under EC No 72260 (Stud) having received a scholarship in Agricultural College at Clemson, S.C. through the World Student Relief.

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SECRET

COPY.

5 September, 1951

U.S. Immigration and Naturalisation Service
APO 407-A, Munich Funk Kaserne

To: Mr. Almanza Trippe
Officer in Charge

Ref: your file 407-2573

I hereby notify you that I wish to withdraw the appeal of myself and family from the exclusion decision of the Board of Special Inquiry convened at Hamburg, Germany on July 31, 1951 for the reason that we intend to seek permission to reapply for immigration to the United States under the regular immigration quota.

Attached hereto is a request in triplicate to the Acting Assistant Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalisation to reapply within one year after exclusion.

Respectfully yours,

Aleksei Kurgvel
Villa D 6, Emigration Center
(24a) Wentorf

COPY.

5 September, 1951

U.S. Immigration and Naturalisation Service
APO 407-A, Munich Funk Kaserne

To: Mr. Sidney B. Rawitz
Acting Assistant Commissioner,
Immigration and Naturalisation Service

Ref: Board of Special Inquiry File no. 407-2573

It is respectfully requested that I and my family be granted permission to reapply for immigration to the United States within one year after exclusion by the Board of Special Inquiry.

For your information I was found inadmissible to the United States by the Board of Special Inquiry convened at Hamburg, Germany on July 31, 1951 under Section 10 and 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948 as amended, and my wife, Salme, and minor son, Rein, were found inadmissible to the United States under Section 10 of the Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948 as amended.

I have this date notified the officer in charge of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Munich, that my appeal from the excluding decision of the Board of Special Inquiry is being withdrawn.

Respectfully yours,

Aleksei Kurgvel
Villa D 6, Emigration Center
(24a) Wentorf

COPY.

MUNICH
GERMANY

AFFIDAVIT

I, ALEKSEI KURGVEL, depose and say:

That I have been excluded from admission to the United States under the US Immigration Laws without prejudice to my reapplication within one /year.

It is my desire that my wife, SALME KURGVEL, and my son, REIN KURGVEL, precede me to the United States if they may be found /admissible.

P. P. O.

/admissib.

I consent to their immigration to the United States with full knowledge that I may be permanently separated from them.

(Signature)

ALEKSEI KURGVEL

Subscribed and Sworn to Before Me This
7th day of September A.D.1951
at Munich, Germany

S: Paul F. Lockwood
US Immigration Inspector

NOV 9 1951
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According to the letter 407-2575 of the I.N.S. Munich to the U.S. D.P. Commission in Wentorf, dated September 19, 1951, Mr. Kurgvel "was excluded as an alien inadmissible under Section 13 of Public Law 744, as amended, without prejudice to reapplication within one year. His wife and son were found admissible on condition that they are found to be eligible displaced persons by the Displaced Persons Commission and presentation of valid immigration visas." - Thus Section 10 of the same Law was not mentioned as a reason for disqualification of Mr. K. any longer.

The numbers of the Estonian quota visas issued to Kurgvels:

Aleksei Kurgvel - No	77/2122 (probably)	in July, 1951, thus not used.
Salme Kurgvel - "	78/2122	
Rein Kurgvel - "	79/2122	

Security Information
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Aleksai Kurgvel, B.C.No 256388

ATTN 10133

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *Len*

(not sent)

November 7, 1951

To:
Mr. Sidney B. Rawits,
Acting Assistant Commissioner,
and
Mr. Almanza Tripp,
Officer in Charge,
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Munich, Funk Kaserne.

Ref.: Board of Special Inquiry File No 407-2573 and my letters of 5 Sept.

In view of the fact that your kind advice, which brought me to the filing of the above letters and to the second hearing of my case before the BSI on 7 September, has brought no possibility for my family's immigration into the United States, as was presumed, I hereby request that my abovementioned letter of 5 Sept, concerning the withdrawal of my appeal from the excluding decision of the Board of Special Inquiry convened at Wentorf on July 31, 1951, be disregarded, and my appeal be given the quickest possible consideration.

I know that the INS and the BSI have to defend the American interests and to respect the American laws. I do the same, and therefore I opened my full secret activity report to the American Authorities.

I find that the American laws are on my side and allow my immigration into the United States. Many American Authorities and members of the INS have found the same. I have no right to think that these Authorities had come to their approving decisions by lack of knowledge of, and/or lack of respect for, the American laws.

I find that there is one force only which could be interested in hindering me to go to the States - the international communists. I have never hidden my anti-communist attitude and I know positively that the communists are still interested in me. Therefore it may be possible that the communists have misled the INS by presenting some false information incriminating me. But I have never been told by the BSI or the INS of any such accusation which I could not refute and which, therefore, could have been found to be a reason for my inadmissibility. So I must suppose that an error has happened somewhere in my immigration case.

"Errare humanum est". I should be very much obliged to anybody who will teach me that I and the American Authorities who have found me admissible are in error, and not the BSI who has found the contrary.

This is not only for my and my family's immigration, this is also for the restoration of my soldier's honor, that I must ask for the reconsideration of this case.

To enlighten the case and to facilitate the review I repeat:

- A) I find the decision of the BSI of 31 July 1951 erroneous because:
1) I have never been a member of, and I have never participated in, the German Nazi Party as was found by the BSI;

-2-

H/w att. 2 to MGMA-10733

CS COPY

2) My working in contact with the German Army during World War II can not be taken as "being a member" or having "participated in a movement which has been hostile to the United States or form of government of the United States, because:

a) an ARMY is not a MOVEMENT, as is clearly seen from the relationship of points (d) and (f) of Section 702.8 of the Regulations of the Displaced Persons Commission, Washington, D.C., as revised in connection with the amendment of the DP Act of 1948;

b) nor can the special part of the German Army with which I worked, the Intelligence Service (Abwehr 1), be taken for an undertaking of the Nazi Party. Its far distance from the Party was witnessed by the facts:

- that its Chief, Admiral Canaris, was sentenced and hanged by the Nazi politicians; *see note*

- that after the formal take over by the Party on the highest level of this Service there was no change in the old correct line of work in the unit with which I worked (Detachment 166 M): we received our orders not from the new political head of the Service, but directly from the G.H.Q. of the Navy on the Eastern Front (MOK Ost), and the technical instructions from the old leader of the Wehrmacht Intelligence Service on the Eastern Front (Leiter Abwehr I Ost);

- that besides the mentioned service of the Wehrmacht there existed a parallel Intelligence Service of the Nazi Party, called "SS Jagd Verbände", whose proposal for collaboration I refused in December 1944/January 1945;

c) I have not borne arms against the United States or its Allies on the western Front. I have borne arms only against the communist USSR on the Eastern Front. These acts have been clearly separated from each other in the DP Act, as amended, as explained in the aforementioned Regulations of the DP Commission /Sect. 702.8 (f)/.

3) The decision concerning my ineligibility was made by the BSI on the basis that my concealment of facts before the IRO "appears to be pertinent and may possibly have been a reason for disqualification".

This finding of the BSI could prove to be true only if the IRO were to be given my full secret activity report and if the IRO were to apply its old communist-influenced regulations for the eligibility officers. But:

a) I am not entitled - and also not prepared - to report my full activity to the IRO, of which communist Russia is a member and, although no longer paying its share, in which its agents may still be;

b) I have reported my full activity to the American Authorities and none of them has found me to be ineligible because of this activity itself;

c) As to the Constitution of the IRO, my activity fits under the conditions of eligibility as fixed in Remark 1 to Section 2 (b) of Part II of this Constitution, namely: my activity constitutes a "mere continuation of (my) normal peaceful activity" as a professional commissioned officer of the Estonian Army, which I did with no "specific purpose of aiding the enemy against the Allies" but to help free Estonia, which activity "shall not be considered to constitute "voluntary assistance"; which last would have been a reason for disqualification. When I commenced my activity against Russia, she was not one of the Allies. Naturally I could not cease this activity when she did become one, because she did not change her attitude against Estonia, she remained the worst enemy of Estonia.

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- 4) The BSI could not have come to such a decision of my ineligibility if my activity and its reasons had been given due consideration in the light of the Constitution of the IRO, as such, and of the amendments made in Section 13 of the DP Act, by which not fighting against the United NATIONS, but against the United STATES has been left in the DP Act as a ground for inadmissibility for soldiers of world war II.
- 5) By granting me a second hearing on 7 September and by declaring my family to be admissible, the BSI and the INS have showed that they are not bound by the inner regulations of the IRO eligibility officers according to which the eligibility of the family depends from the eligibility of the family-head.

Since that is so, then the BSI and the INS are also not bound by the other sections of the old communist-influenced inner regulations of the IRO eligibility, according to which alone I could have been found ineligible.

As the BSI found me ineligible not because of my activity itself but because of the possibility that the IRO could have disqualified me (when applying the old regulations which are in strict contradiction to the DP Act, as amended), then this decision of the BSI can not correspond to the intent of the DP Act, as amended, and must, therefore, be erroneous.

- B) The main data of my military service and anti-communist, and anti-nazi activity.

In September 1923 I entered Estonian Army (Military College).

On 1 Dec. 1924 the communists, coming from Russia, tried a coup d'etat in Estonia. The Estonian recognized then already that the treaties signed with the communists have no value, that the communists are and remain enemies of the democratic people, whatever they may talk and promise. I was aware of this fact, too, and in

February 1926 I started my career of a professional commiss. officer. Since 1934 I worked in the II Section (Intelligence and Foreign Relations) of the Estonian G.H.Q.

In Sept. 1939 the communist Russia oppressed a treaty of "mutual defence" upon Estonia.

In June 1940 the same communist Russia occupied Estonia, violating all the treaties still in vigour between the USSR and Estonia, took over the power and formed a n Estonian communist puppet government.

In the night of 24/25 June 1940 I was made a proposal to enter the Russian Secret Service as a spy. I refused but was "granted time to think over the situation". As I did not change my attitude,

on 3 July 1940 my dismissal from the G.H.Q was ordered by the Russians. It was clear to me what would happen had I remained in the hands of communists then: murdered or deported to Russia, to die there, as happened to over 95 % of my comrades who could not escape.

I was not released from my officer's duties by the legal Estonian Government. I had to remember and to follow my Oath of Allegiance: "to remain trusty to the democratic Estonian Republic, to defend the Estonian Republic against its enemies, using all my wits and strength". I could not do anything when remaining in Estonia and thus caught by the lurking communists.

On 4 July I fled, helped by the German Military Attaches. I did this not only for saving myself and my family, but for remaining able to do my duty as an Estonian officer.

The Germans were the single foreign force who dared to offer a possibility of flight before the communist persecution to some Estonian

-4-

Officers, despite the fact that Nazi Germany was in very good relations with the communist Russia in those days. I had no possibility to escape to any other country.

Arrived in Berlin I reported to the Estonian Military Attache in Germany who had refused to return to Estonia as was ordered by the puppet government. On his knowledge I reported to the German Wehrmacht Intelligence Service and asked to be applied against the communists who were annihilating Estonia.

In August 1940 I was offered to enter German citizenship. I refused.

Sept. 1940 - June 1941 I had to earn my own and the family's living by doing statistical-informational work with the "I.G. Farben" in Berlin.

In the same time I looked for volunteers among the Estonians who escaped to Germany in January 1941 under the mask of "Umsiedlung", who would be prepared to participate in re-liberation of Estonia from the communists. Simultaneously I "preached" to the Estonians in camps of these "Umsiedler": - not to surrender to the German Nazi propaganda which liked to convert these Estonians to exalted Nazi-Germans. This my work brought me to drawing of the leaflet, a copy of which is attached to the brief filed by the Representative of the Lutheran World Federation Mr. Christiansen on my behalf, to the IMS in Munich (Enclosure No 2).

From June 1940 to August 1944 I worked together with the Intelligence Services of the German Wehrmacht and of the Finnish Army, enjoying the position of an Estonian volunteer in Finnish Army, in Captain's rank. I participated in re-liberation of Estonia and later in sending Estonian and Russian volunteers as agents behind the Russian front. My main task during all this time was to help Estonia and the Estonians deported from Estonia to Russia.

During this time the offer to accept the German citizenship was repeated to me 2 or 3 times together with an offer to enter the German Army, the Wehrmacht. I refused all these offers.

Although wanted by the German "Sicherheits Dienst" as an Estonian patriot, but protected by my status of an officer of the Finnish Army, I drafted and filed two big memoranda branding the German Nazi politics in Estonia and demanding the restoration of the Estonian Republic.

In February 1944, in connection with this my political activity I was temporarily suspended from my work and I was summoned before the highest chief of the Intelligence Service of the German "Heeresgruppe Nord" of the Eastern Front. Having based my writings on facts only, I was rehabilitated.

In August 1944 I was released on my own request from the Finnish Army and from the German unit to which I was detached.

Immediately after this I was compulsorily enlisted by the Germans in Tallinn, as an Estonian officer.

I was sent as an Estonian Liaison Officer to the C.I.C. of the German Wehrmacht operating in Estonia. My task was to protect the Estonian units against the false accusations which the German Liaison Officers of these units reported to the higher German H.Q.'s.

In October 1944, after withdrawal of German troops from Estonia and second occupation of Estonia by the communists, I joined the unit "loök" of the German Wehrmacht Intelligence Service. This unit worked in contact with the German Navy in the Baltic Sea and was the single institution with whose help I could go on, in those turbulent days of German chaotic retreat, working for the future benefit of Estonia.

In December 1944 the Intelligence Service of the Nazi Party, the "SS Jagd Verbände" asked me to join this organisation and to help them to organize some Estonian work. I refused this offer because I realized from the first talks I had, that this work was not scheduled to come to the benefit of the Estonian people and of the Estonian Republic.

In April 1945 I tried to contact the American Army Intelligence Service in Germany, but failed. So I could not report my Estonian work which I had prepared for being used by the western Democracies, after the German collapse, for the unavoidable fight against the communists, be this fight "cold" or very hot.

On May 4, 1945 I came through the front line and reported myself, my men and the above-mentioned Estonian work to the British Intelligence Service.

I was held by the British until August 1946, when I was released and helped as a Displaced Person or Refugee to my family in a DP camp in British Zone of Germany.

I have told already why I could not report my full activity to the international U.N.R.R.A. and later to the I.R.C.

I told my full story to the Security officers of the DP Commission in Wentorf as soon as I got in touch with them in October 1949.

I have done my duty of an Estonian officer only. I did this as a real soldier under the stake of my own and my family's life and security. I did this in an unwavering faith that the western Democracies, although temporarily compelled to collaborate with the communist Russia, will remain democratic themselves and will therefore help free these democratic States which the communist Russia swallowed during World War II.

The United States have not recognized the annexation of the Estonian Republic by the communist Russia. The States still recognize the independent Estonian Republic. Doing so the States are entitled to demand that an Estonian officer fulfill his duty against his endangered Republic, like an American officer has to do his duty. The United States would have the right not to let me immigrate into the States had I not fought the communists enemies of Estonia, had I not used every help available to me for this fight. The United States have used the help of communists against the Nazi Germany, because it saw the States menaced by the last. Why could I not use the help of the German Wehrmacht against the same communists who were annihilating the Estonian people and Republic? The States have changed its politics; The communist Russia is not more an Ally, but an enemy. The DP Act was changed accordingly. I have not changed my policy: I have remained anti-communist as I have been all the time. Why, then, am I inadmissible for immigration into the United States?


Aleksel Kergel.

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Chief, SR
Chief, EE
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

1 August 1952

REDSOX/110M1LY

Emigration of Aleksei KURGVEL

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

MICROFILMED: _____

REF: WASH 11935

1. As requested in reference, a summary of KURGVEL's emigration procedure is forwarded here with as attachment A (for Washington only). The summary was prepared by KURGVEL himself.

2. Attachment B consists of a letter written by KURGVEL in November 1951 to reappeal the BSI decision. On the advice of the BSI to await the emigration of his wife and son, he did not submit the letter. It is included here as an explanation of KURGVEL's views on his rejection by the BSI.

Approved:

Distribution:

- 2 SR w/2/att (direct)
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Chief, SR
Chief, EE
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

1 August 1952

REDSOX/HOMELY

Emigration of Aleksel KURGVEL

REF: WASH 11935

1. As requested in reference, a summary of KURGVEL's emigration procedure is forwarded here with as attachment A (for Washington only). The summary was prepared by KURGVEL himself.

2. Attachment B consists of a letter written by KURGVEL in November 1951 to repeal the BSI decision. On the advice of the BSI to await the emigration of his wife and son, he did not submit the letter. It is included here as an explanation of KURGVEL's views on his rejection by the BSI.

Approved:

Distribution:

- 2 SR w/2/att (direct)
- 1 EE (direct)
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- 2 MOB

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DATE 2006

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FORM NO. 35-83 -
NOV 1951

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR. REP, MUNICH ROUTINE
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 INFORMATION: RI (6-7) CFI (8) OPS (9) STC (10) E (11-12) S/C (13-14-15)

MUNI 9431

TO: DIR THRU SFRAN CITE: SMUNI
 REDSOX HOMEY
 RE: WASH 11935 (OUT 93311)

1. ALEKSEI KUROVEL APPLIED NOVEMBER 48. PROCESSED WENTORF
 SEPTEMBER 49 EC 72219. SUSPENDED OCTOBER 49. REPROCESSED WENTORF
 APRIL 51 EC 256388. ACCEPTED BY DP COMMISSION 2 MAY 51. VISA 77/2122
 ISSUED JULY 51. SUSPENDED 3 JULY BY INS WENTORF. 31 JULY ENTIRE FAMILY
 FOUND INADMISSABLE BY BSI MUNICH UNDER SECTIONS 13 AND 18 OF PL 744.
 BSI FILE NUMBER 407-2573. APPEALED DECISION. WITHDREW APPEAL 5 SEPT-
 EMBER IN ORDER ALLOW WIFE AND SON TO EMIGRATE. NO ACTION SINCE INS
 LETTER 407-2575 19 SEPTEMBER 51 STATING SUBJECT EXCLUDED UNDER SECTION
 13 WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND MAY RE-APPLY WITHIN ONE YEAR.

2. POUCH FOLLOWS. WHO LEAVING FROM WASH 7
 AUGUST INFORMED ON CASE.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

COPY NO. 130A-86
130A-60 (44)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Immigration of Aleksei KURGWEL

It is recommended that permanent residency in the United States be granted to Aleksei KURGWEL, an Estonian national and a former captain of the Estonian army, under the terms of Section 8 of Public Law 110 of 1949. This recommendation is based on the following facts:

1. Captain KURGWEL has been employed by the CIA in Germany since September 1951, and has rendered outstanding service to this Agency through his participation in contemplated top secret missions for the penetration of the Baltic States (USSR). He has performed these duties competently, diligently, and patiently.
2. Captain KURGWEL's services are considered essential for the future training and dispatching of Estonian agents into the Estonian SSR, and for future training of Baltic agents for unconventional warfare. These services are to be performed in the United States.
3. Because of Captain KURGWEL's knowledge of some CIA top secret operational plans into the Estonian SSR, it is essential to our security that he be removed from Europe.
4. Captain Aleksei KURGWEL's U.S. immigration visa was suspended in July 1951 by the Board of Special Inquiry in Munich under Sections 13 and 10 of Public Law 744 because of his services in German I. S. during World War II from June 1941 to May 1945. (See Background and Biography points 10 and 13-c.)
5. Inasmuch as Captain KURGWEL has been declared inadmissible to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act by a Board of Special Inquiry of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, his immigration is possible only under Section 8 of Public Law 110 of 1949.

Enclosures:

- A. Justification
- B. Background and Biography

Acting Chief, SR Division

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B **SECRET**
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

ENCLOSURE A

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Justification for Action

1. Captain KURGVEL was employed by CIA in September 1951 as the principal Estonian agent trainer for OSO-OPC operations. He is considered by other Estonians and his case officer as one of the best Estonian intelligence officers in matters of recruitment, assessment, training, and dispatch of agents. Since he has had 23 years of experience in intelligence work it would be a time-consuming and financially a costly process to train and educate an American officer of similar qualifications for agent operations into the Estonian SSR.

2. Since September 1951 Captain KURGVEL has been working efficiently and diligently with the CIA in Germany by direct participation in the planning of missions for the penetration of the Estonian SSR. His immigration into the United States is essential for the implementation of the training of Estonian agents in the United States.

3. Because of Captain KURGVEL's direct participation in the spotting, interrogation, and assessment of prospective CIA agents, and because of the fact that he is well known to European services, it is advisable that he be removed from Europe for security reasons. Inasmuch as his services can be most advantageously used in the United States, it is desired to remove him to the United States.

4. Although no firm commitments have been made that Captain KURGVEL would be permitted to immigrate into the United States for services rendered to the United States Government he is under the firm conviction that this was at least an implied part of the bargain. Captain Alexsei KURGVEL's U.S. immigration visa was suspended in July 1951 by the Board of Special Inquiry in Munich under Section 13 and 10 of Public Law 744 because of his services in German armed forces and with German I. S. during World War II from June 1941 to May 1945. (See Background and Biography points 10 and 13-c.)

5. Captain KURGVEL and his family were declared inadmissible to the United States under Section 30 and 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948, as amended, by a Board of Special Inquiry of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, convened at Wetzlar, Germany, 31 July 1951. The case was appealed and at a second Board of Special Inquiry - convened in Munich, 7 September 1951 - Captain KURGVEL's family was granted permission to immigrate to the United States but KURGVEL's own status remained unchanged. Although KURGVEL was advised orally by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he could apply for the regular Estonian quota in a year's time, the waiting period for the regular quota is too long to permit KURGVEL to be utilized operationally in the United States by 1 January 1953. Consequently, application of Section 8 Public Law 110 is the only method by which he can immigrate to the United States in time to be operationally useful to CIA.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ENCLOSURE B

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Background and Biography

1. Captain KURGVEL is an Estonian General Staff officer with twenty-three years of experience in intelligence work. Much of his experience has been in gathering intelligence on the USSR.
2. He has had experience in compiling and analyzing information, intelligence liaison, intelligence and CE interrogations, radio training and management, recruitment and assessment of Estonian, Latvian and Russian agents, and in the training of agents for dispatch into Estonia and the USSR. During World War II he trained and dispatched nineteen agent teams into Soviet occupied territory.
3. He has an excellent area knowledge of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, and speaks, reads and writes fluent Estonian, Russian, German, fair English, and some French and Finnish.
4. He is dedicated to the defeat of Communism and the liberation of Estonia at the price of any necessary personal sacrifice, and believes that cooperation with the United States offers the best, if not the only, means of accomplishing this end.
5. He is capable of recruiting and training agents of non-Estonian nationality and would be willing to do so in order to be working towards the defeat of Communism.
6. Although he worked with the German Army Intelligence during World War II, he was opposed to the policy of the German politicians. He is somewhat prejudiced against the British because of their lack of assistance to the Estonian intelligence officers who had furnished information to the British prior to the war, and because of their lack of activity against the Soviet Union following World War II.
7. He is extremely temperate in his habits, smoking little and drinking only on social occasions.
8. He is well-above average in intelligence, and has considerable initiative in fields with which he is familiar. He is systematic and sensible, hard working, conscientious and energetic. Since his association with the CIA, he has, on his own initiative, studied radio techniques, prepared lectures for training, and compiled information on Estonia from overt sources in an elaborate card file. This work has occupied him from ten to twelve hours per day seven days per week. His long waiting period to become active in agent training and dispatch would probably have led to his quitting long ago if it were not for his patience and fatalistic belief that more time is spent waiting than acting.
9. Because of his strong sense of honor, he does not present a security problem. He would pursue a course contrary to his higher authorities only with their full knowledge, unless he considers that course outside the limits of his commitments. However if the commitments between the United States Government and KURGVEL are stated firmly and specifically, KURGVEL can be

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CONFIDENTIAL

expected to carry out his part strictly in accordance with the agreements made.

CONFIDENTIAL

10. Captain KURGVEL was forced to escape from Estonia in 1940 after he refused to work for the Soviet Army Intelligence against the Western powers. However he refused to become a German citizen or to abandon the Estonian national interests even when working through and with the German Army Intelligence. He never hid his Estonian patriotism from his German superiors, and openly defended his course of action at the German Army Intelligence Headquarters.

11. Captain KURGVEL has continued to look for an opportunity to interest the Western allies in his anti-Soviet activity throughout his post-war stay in Germany. His first attempt to contact the Americans before the end of the war failed and he was captured by the British, who first imprisoned him, and then contacted him for intelligence work. Captain KURGVEL broke this contact himself after a half year of inactivity.

12. Aside from efforts to contact American Intelligence through Colonel W.E. SHIPP, United States, Military Attache in Baghdad in 1949, Captain KURGVEL was not connected with any other intelligence agencies, except the British for whom he collected information on Estonia from the debriefing of PW's for a few months in 1950.

13. Biographical Statement:

a. Captain Aleksed KURGVEL was born in Kuressaare, Saaremaa Estonia on 13 September 1904. As Estonia was then occupied he was a Russian citizen until the declaration of Estonian independence in 1920, when he became an Estonian citizen. As an Estonian citizen in Germany he has the following identity papers:

- (1) Deutches Personal Ausweis AQ 111053, issued in Venterf
- (2) Temporary Estonian passport issued in London in 1948, extended in 1950.
- (3) Estonian Internal Identity papers, issued in Narva in 1926/27
- (4) Estonian Military Identity papers No. 375, issued in Tallinn in June 1937.

b. Education

1911-1912 private school in Kuressaare
1912-1915 Ministerium Kool (public grammar school) in Kuressaare
1915-1923 Gynnasium in Kuressaare
1923-1926 Military School in Tallinn - Graduated as lieutenant in Technical Troops with radio speciality
1929-1932 Military Academy, Tallinn
1943-1944 Political-Economic Division, University of Tartu

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c. Employment

Feb.-May 1926 radio operator, signal battalion, Tallinn
June-Aug. 1926 staff of 2nd Infantry Division, Tartu
October 1926-
April-May 1929 staff of 1st Infantry Division, Narva, in charge
of signal unit
1933-Jan. 1934 assistant to Chief, Operational Division Staff
d 1, Infantry Division, Rakvere
Jan. 24-July 1940 2nd Division General Staff, first as officer
on call, later as Director Subdivision "A".
Removed 3 July 1940 on order of Russians.
1 Sept. 1940-June 1941 Scientific co-worker, National Scientific
Division, I.G. Farben, Berlin; compiled information
on Russian industry from overt sources.
June-Sept 1941 in Finland as Estonian Officer attached to IOF,
Finland and Finnish General Staff
Sept. 41-Aug. 1944 with Aufklarungskommando 102 and Abwehrstelle
I in Tallinn
Aug.-Oct. 1944 with liaison officer responsible to Commander-in-Chief
of the German Army Division "Narva" and Commander-
in-Chief of Army Corps operating in Southern Estonia
Oct. 44-May 1945 Frontaufklarungs Kommando 166 (K)
May 45-Aug 1946 Internment by British
Aug 46-Spring 1947 Unemployed
16 Sept 47-20 Oct. 1948 interpreter and director camp offices,
IP Camp Kungla, Stolzenau/Weser
Oct 48-15 Sept 1949 office director and deputy camp director,
IP Camp Esser, Lingen/EMs
27 Oct 49-30 Sept 1951 clerk for 502 Iro Documentation Center,
Wentorf
Sept. 51-present DTICLAIN employment

d. Military record

commissioned 2nd lieutenant 1926
commissioned 1st lieutenant February 1929
commissioned Captain 24 February 1934
(For further details see employment record)

e. Family Status

- (1) Mother: Maria KURGVEL nee TOOMPUU, born 29/7/1868 in Estonia,
died in 1945, nationality Estonian, occupation housewife.
- (2) Sister: Keenik KURGVEL, born 14 December 1899 in Kuressaare
now living at Loherilagan 3, Hagersten Sweden, c/o EIMANN,
nationality Estonian, employed by insurance company in
Stockholm.

Kadeszha (Nadia) KURGVEL, married to Herman MARIUU, born
2 March 1909 in Kuressaare, now living at Bergsgatan 32,
Enkoping, Sweden, employed as housewife and parttime school
teacher in local Estonian school, nationality Estonian.

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Olga KURGVEL, born 1898 in Kuressaare, remained with mother in Kuressaare in October 1944. She had been secretary for the school affairs division of the district administration of Kuressaare. Present location not known.

Sinida KURGVEL, born 1902 in Kuressaare, died while trying to escape from Kuressaare in October 1944.

Elisaveta KURGVEL, born 1906 in Kuressaare, died while trying to escape from Kuressaare in October 1944. Married to KEREMAN.

Father: Johann KURGVEL, born Estonia 14/2/1871, died 1926, nationality Estonian, occupation baker and gardener.

Wife: SALME KURGVEL, nee EPLER, born 12 January 1909 in Narva Estonia, married on 25 October 1928 in Narva Estonia, emigrated to U.S. on 21 January 1952 under E.G. number 271-032, has filed application for citizenship as far as is known; is now working as practical nurse in the Hospital of the Holy Family, Dean & Hoyt Streets, Brooklyn, N.Y., and living at the following address; c/o MAREKAS, 164-03 89 Ave., Jamaica 32, L.I., N.Y.

Mother-in-law: Ida EPLER, nee LIHLIK, housewife, remained in Tartu area after Second Soviet Occupation in 1944, present location unknown.

Father-in-law: Karl EPLER, merchant in Narva, remained in Tartu after Second Soviet Occupation in 1944, present location unknown.

Sons: Jaan KURGVEL, born 23 January 1931 in Tallinn, Estonian nationality, emigrated to U.S. in September 1950 after receiving scholarship to Clemson Agricultural College, South Carolina, from the World Association of Students. Emigrated under E.G. number 4 J 172 266.

Rein KURGVEL, born May 1939 in Tallinn, emigrated to U.S. with Salme KURGVEL on 21 January 1952.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

*Project 4000 in August
went out at the
end of August or
early part of September -*

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Immigration of Aleksei KURGVEL

It is recommended that permanent residency in the United States be granted to Aleksei KURGVEL, an Estonian national and a former captain of the Estonian army, under the terms of Section 5 of Public Law 110 of 1949. This recommendation is based on the following facts:

1. Captain KURGVEL has been employed by CIA in Germany since September 1951, and has rendered outstanding service to this Agency through his participation in contemplated top secret missions for the penetration of the Baltic States (USSR). He has performed these duties competently, diligently, and patiently.
2. Captain KURGVEL's services for the U.S. interest are considered essential in the future training and dispatching of Estonian agents into the Estonian SSR, and for future training of agents for unconventional warfare under the hot war conditions. These services will be performed in the United States.
3. Because of Captain KURGVEL's knowledge of some CIA top secret operational plans into Estonian SSR, it is essential to our security that he be removed from Europe.
4. Inasmuch as Captain KURGVEL has been declared inadmissible to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act by a Board of Special Inquiry of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, his immigration is possible only under Section 5 of Public Law 110 of 1949.

Enclosures:

- A. Justification
- B. Background and Biography

C []
Chief, SR Division

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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130A-95 (5)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ENCLOSURE A

Justifications for Action

1. Captain KURGWEL was contracted by CIA in September 1951 as a principal Estonian agent trainer for OSO-OPC operations. He is considered by other Estonians as the best Estonian intelligence officer in technical and CE matters of recruitment, assessment, training and dispatch. Since he has had 23 years of experience in intelligence work, most of which has been spent in working against the USSR, it would be a time-consuming and financially a costly process to train and educate an American officer of similar qualifications for Estonian SSR operations.

2. Since September 1951 Captain KURGWEL has been working efficiently and diligently with the CIA in Germany, by his direct participation in contemplated top secret missions by OSO for American penetration of the Estonian SSR. His immigration into the U.S. is essential for the implementation of Estonian agent training in the United States.

3. Because of Captain KURGWEL's direct participation in spotting, interrogations, assessments of agents, and general cooperation in Baltic operations, it is essential for security reasons that he be removed from Europe and made available to agent training units in the United States.

4. Although no firm commitments have been made to Captain KURGWEL that he would be permitted to immigrate into the United States for his services rendered to CIA, he is under firm conviction that this was at least an implied part of the bargain.

5. Captain KURGWEL and his family were declared inadmissible to the United States under Section 10 and 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948, as amended, by a Board of Special Inquiry of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, convened at Wenzdorf, Germany, 31 July 1951. The case was appealed and at a second Board of Special Inquiry - convened in Munich, 7 September 1951 - Captain KURGWEL's family was granted permission to immigrate to the United States but KURGWEL's own status remained unchanged. Although KURGWEL was advised orally by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he could apply for the regular Estonian quota in a year's time, the waiting period for regular quota is too long to permit KURGWEL to be utilized operationally in the United States by 1 January 1953. Consequently no other avenue is open except Section 8, Public Law 110.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ENCLOSURE B

Background and Biography

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1. Captain KURGWEL is an Estonian General Staff Army officer with 23 years of experience in intelligence work, the major portion of which has been spent in working against the USSR.
2. He has had experience in information compilation and analysis, intelligence liaison, intelligence and CE interrogations, w/t training and management, recruitment and assessment of Estonian, Latvian and Russian agents and in instruction for the dispatch into Estonia and SSR of Estonian, Latvian and Russian agents. During the World War II he participated in the dispatch into Soviet occupied territory of 19 agent teams totalling about 70 agents, in addition to assessing and recruiting hundreds of agents.
3. He has an excellent area knowledge of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, and speaks, reads and writes fluent Estonian, Russian, German, fair English, and some French and Finnish.
4. He is dedicated to the defeat of Communism and the liberation of Estonia at the price of any necessary personal sacrifice, and believes that cooperation with the United States offers the best, if not the only, means of accomplishing this end.
5. He is capable of recruiting and training agents of non-Estonian nationality and would be willing to do so in order to be working towards the defeat of Communism.
6. In his capacity as liaison to foreign military attaches in Estonia he worked particularly closely with the Poles, Germans and Finns, although he was opposed to the policy of the German politicians. He is somewhat prejudiced against the British because of their lack of assistance to Estonian intelligence officers who had furnished the British information prior to war, and because of the British lack of activity following World War II.
7. He is extremely temperate in his habits, smoking little and drinking only on social occasions. He admits drinking heavily while working with the foreign N/A's in Tallinn 1974-78, as a social duty but derived little enjoyment from alcohol.
8. He has a well-above average intelligence and considerable initiative in fields with which he is familiar. He is systematic and sensible, hard working, conscientious and energetic. Since his association with CIA, he has on his own initiative studied radio techniques, prepared lectures for training, and compiled information on Estonia from overt sources in an elaborate card file. This work has occupied him from 10-12 hours per day seven days per week. His long waiting period to become active in agent training and dispatch

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SECURITY INFORMATION

would probably have led to his quitting long ago if it were not for his patience and fatalistic belief that more time is spent waiting than acting.

9. Because of his strong sense of honor, he does not present much of a security problem. He would pursue a course contrary to his higher authorities only with their full knowledge, unless he considers that course outside the limits of his commitments. However if the commitments between CIA and KURGWEL are stated firmly and specifically, KURGWEL can be expected to carry out his part strictly in accordance with the agreements made.

10. Captain KURGWEL had to escape from Estonia in 1940 after he refused to work for the Soviet Army Intelligence against the Western powers. However he refused to become a German citizen or to abandon the Estonian national interests even when working through and with the German intelligence organs, with the full knowledge of the German government and his superior officers, and openly defended his course of action at the German Intelligence Headquarters.

11. Captain KURGWEL continued to look for an opportunity to interest allies in his anti-Soviet activity throughout his post-war stay in Germany. His first attempt to contact Americans before the end of the war failed and, he fell into British hands, who first imprisoned him, and later wanted to keep him in reserve for possible future operations. Captain KURGWEL broke this contact himself after a half a year of inactivity.

12. Aside from efforts to get in touch with American Intelligence through Colonel W. E. SHEPP, U.S. Military Attache in Baghdad in 1949, Captain KURGWEL was not connected with any other intelligence agencies, except the British for whom he collected information on Estonia from debriefing of PW's for a few months in 1950.

13. Biographical Statement

- a. Captain Aleksei KURGWEL was born in the city of Kuressaare, on island Saaremaa, Estonia on 13 September, 1904. He has an equivalent of High School and 2 years of college liberal arts education, and is a graduate of Tallinn Military School and Military Academy.
- b. Employment - He worked for the Estonian Intelligence Service from May 1929 until July 1940, attached throughout this period to the General Staff. From 1934 to 1940 he was a director of Subdivision A of the Second Division. On 3 July 1940 Captain KURGWEL was removed from his position by the Soviets because of his refusal to work for Soviets as an agent for the Soviets, and escaped with the assistance of the German MA into Germany.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

From July 1940 to August 1941 Captain KURBYEL worked with the Abscher of the German Wehrmacht and of the Finnish Army, enjoying the position of an Estonian volunteer in the Finnish Army, in Captain's rank. In August 1941 Captain KURBYEL was released, on his own request, from the Finnish army and from the German unit, and was immediately forced by the Germans to enlist in Tallinn, as an Estonian officer, in the capacity of Estonian Liaison Officer for the German Wehrmacht operating in Estonia. From October 1941 to 4 May 1945 he was attached to the German Wehrmacht Intelligence Service. On May 4, 1945 KURBYEL reported to the K, and was held by the British until August 1946. From August 1946 to April 1947 Captain KURBYEL was in a DP camp. From September 1947 to September 1949 he was employed as an interpreter and deputy director of DP camps in Germany. From October 1949 to September 1951 he served as a clerk for IRO Documentation Center, Yomborf, from where he joined CIA. Captain KURBYEL's military record shows that he was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in 1926, 1st Lieutenant in 1929, and Captain in 1931.

c. Family Status - Captain KURBYEL is married to an Estonian national, Salsu Palear, who emigrated to the U.S. in January, 1952. His son Jaan KURBYEL, born 23 January 1931 in Tallinn, emigrated to the U.S. in September 1950. He is studying at Agricultural College of South Carolina. His younger son Hein KURBYEL, born May 1939 in Tallinn, emigrated to the U.S. with his mother in January, 1952. His father and mother died in Estonia; his two sisters died in an attempt to escape from Estonia in 1944; the fate of his two sisters, who remained in Estonia, is unknown; while his fifth sister, who was successful in escaping from Estonia in 1944, is living in Sweden.

d. Physical Conditions - According to the latest physical examination of 30 June, 1952 Captain KURBYEL was qualified for full duty.

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FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

JG 5 1952

ROUTING

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4 AUGUST 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 2475

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TO:

DIRECTOR CIA

FROM:

SR REP UNION

ROUTINE

SR (1-5)

1811Z 4 AUG 52

INFORMATION:

RI (6-7-8), ADMIN (9), CPP (10), S/C (11-12-13), EE (14-15-16)

SMUNI 9452

TO: DIR

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX HOWELY

REF: A. SMUNI 8262 (IN 41953)

E. DIR 47147 (OUT 86074)

C. SMUNI 8987 (IN 15859)

CAN BE INFORM GIO DANO THAT REF B PARA 2 ACTION HAS BEEN
TAKEN?

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

1304-87

(44)

FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

1304-87

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

5 Aug 152

Wartime activities of Aleksei KURGVELZ, an Estonian nationalist who cooperated with a German Naval Intelligence Officer, Peter Ernst Georg NEUMANN (Captain) from 1940-1945, described in KURGVELZ file. KURGVELZ acted as w/t specialist and trained agents to be dropped in Estonia and Latvia. KURGVELZ surrendered in May, 1945 to the British was interrogated, released, and lives in British Zone, Lingen/EMS. Both Karlsruhe and EDM feel NEUMANN, who offered his services late in 1948 and in March 1949, along with those of KURGVELL, is insecure and probably known to Soviet authorities because of his wartime activities. It is believed that the Soviets have made inquiries about NEUMANN.

XX-8698 8/20/45 and others.

Wartime activities of Edouard GRANT, who also worked for ABWEHh in the Baltic and was associated with NEUMANN and CELLARIUS, see GRANT file, XX-10668, 2/11/46.

Further information in interrogation of Captain NEUMANN, see NEUMANN file.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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Security Information

130A-88
130762

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SECURITY INFORMATION

6 August 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: SEC/SPB
FROM: SR/Baltic
SUBJECT: Captain Aleksed Kurgval

1. It is requested that subject be granted a covert security clearance to permit him to be used in the United States as a contract agent trainer, by October 1952.
2. Subject is presently employed by DYULAIN in Germany. His wife and child are residing in New York City. Subject was excluded from emigrating as a DP under Section 10 and 13 of Public Law 744. As a result it may become necessary to request subjects immigration into the United States under Section 8 of Public Law 110.
3. The following documents are attached.
 - a. PRQ, Part I
 - b. PFM, Part II
 - c. Medical report
 - d. Results of carriage
 - e. Case officers evaluation
 - f. Field assessment
 - g. Operational clearance and field traces.Please return these documents to this Branch.
4. In making any investigation that may be necessary it is requested that no U.S. government interest be shown, unless a cover of checking for immigration purposes can be adopted.
5. For additional information please call [] of this branch, extension 3582, Room 2502 "J".

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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130A-89
130A-63

SECRET

7 Aug 52
14 July 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Covert Funds Division

FROM: Chief, SR/Baltic

SUBJECT: Salme KURGVEL

Ref: A. MUNI 8262 (IN 41953) B. MUNI 8932 (IN 45209)
C. WASH 47147 (OUT 86070) D. MUNI 8987 (IN 15859)

1. In compliance with references A and B it is requested that a sum of fifty dollars (\$50.00) a month be deposited to the account of:

Mrs. Salme KURGVEL
Account Number BN 58300
National Bank of New York, Jamaica, New York

These payments are to be retroactive to 1 September 1951 and will continue until Mrs. Kurgvel's husband immigrates to the United States. This branch will inform you when payments are to be discontinued.

2. A copy of Mrs. Kurgvel's husband's contract is attached. Amendment to the contract authorizing the additional payment to Mrs. Kurgvel is contained in references C and D.

3. It is requested that payment be made by GFD directly to Mrs. Kurgvel's bank account by sterile check, but on an irregular rather than monthly basis. The first payment should be for the sum of five hundred dollars (\$500.00) and should be made as soon as practical. Subsequent payments will be made at three or four-month intervals upon your receipt of a request for payment from this branch.

4. The payments are to be charged against SR Developmental Funds. For any further details please contact [] of this branch, extension 3582, 2504-J. Please inform [] when the first payment has been made so that the field can be informed by cable.

Attachments: Copy of contract
Request for payment

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

1308-10

Security Information
SECRET

GIORDANO

14 August 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: [] /LCHQ/ELY/REDSOX
FROM: [] /MO
SUBJECT: Immunizations Due
ATTN: []

1. According to our records, Alexei Kunstman has not received the immunizations deemed necessary for indigenous personnel.
2. We will gladly arrange for these upon notification.

Sincerely,

[]

Distribution: Original and 1 - Addressee
1 - []
1 - Medical Files

ENH/mnc


DVR DVR

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

Security Information
SECRET

130A-90
1639-63R



Name Name Nom Nom	ALAN ...
Geboortsdag Date of birth Date de naissance Den postens dag Geburtsort Date of birth Date de naissance Den postens dag Geburtsort	10. Oktober 1905 Königsberg
Staatsangehörigkeit Nationality Nationalité Nazi name	Swabian
Beruf Occupation Profession Beruf	Büroangestellter
gegenwärt. Wohn- od. Aufenthaltsort present place of residence and address actuelle permanente ou séj. II actuelle permanente ou séj. II	München 5. Welfenstr. 13
vorherige Wohn- od. Aufenthaltsort previous domicile domicile précédent domicile précédent	Royal Post
Haare und Gesicht Hair and face Cheveux et visage	...
Farbe der Augen Color of the eyes Couleur des yeux	...
Unveränd. Kennzeichen Permanent distinguishing marks Marques permanentes	...
Veränd. Kennzeichen Temporary distinguishing marks Marques temporaires	...
Adressen Addresses Adresses	...



UNTERSCHREIBUNG
SIGNATURE

Unterschrift des Käufers (Kaufvertrag)
Signature of the purchaser (purchase contract)

Unterschrift des Ausstellers (Identifizierung)
Signature of the issuer (identification)

Von der zuständigen Behörde (Prätorium)

Nachfolgende Entscheidung auf Grund der Gesetzes zur
 Verhängung von Nationalsozialistischer Strafe vom 22. März 1943

Entscheidet über die Freisetzung von Nazisten
 nach dem Gesetz vom 5. März 1943.

Person, die freigesetzt zu werden ist, ist die Freisetzung des
 Nazisten nach dem Gesetz vom 5. März 1943.

Die Freisetzung ist zu bewilligen, wenn die Freisetzung
 nach dem Gesetz vom 5. März 1943.

Die Freisetzung ist zu bewilligen, wenn die Freisetzung
 nach dem Gesetz vom 5. März 1943.

Deutsche Kennkarte

German Identity-card
 Carte d'identité allemande
 Федеральная Идентификационная Карточка

Zur Beachtung!

1. Der Inhaber der Kennkarte hat diese stets bei sich zu führen und sie auf Verlangen einer Behörde sowie des Besizers des Fahrzeuges bei ohne Verzug vorzulegen.
2. Es ist strafbar, wenn Inhaber der Kennkarte ein anderes Auto fahrtauglich zu machen oder eine fremde Kennkarte zu benutzen.
3. Der Verlust der Kennkarte ist dem nächsten Unterpunktwort sowie der Behörde, die sie ausgestellt hat, unverzüglich zu melden.
4. Die Kennkarte ist anzuhängen, bis sie zurückgegeben ist.

Kennkarte Place of Issue Lieu d'émission Место выдачи	M. W. A. G. A. G. W.
Kennkartennummer Number Номер	SP 51 197
Issued to Name of Имя владельца	M. D. Bremer

Application for Temporary Travel Document in lieu of Passport
 Demande de Titre Temporaire de Circulation tenant lieu de Passeport
 Antrag auf Erteilung eines vorläufigen Reiseausweises an Stelle eines Reisepasses

Anmerkungen:

- (a) Auszufüllen von allen Personen, die vorläufige Reiseausweise beantragen.
 (b) Dieser Antrag muß in Maschinenschrift oder in deutlicher Blockschrift ausgefüllt werden, und zwar in zweifacher Ausfertigung. Zwei Paßbilder müssen dem ersten Antrag um Erteilung eines vorläufigen Reiseausweises angeheftet werden. Die Paßbilder müssen an der in diesem Formular dafür vorgesehenen Stelle befestigt werden und mit dem Namen des Antragstellers auf der Rückseite in Blockschrift versehen sein.
 (c) Ehegatten haben gesonderte Anträge zu stellen, gleichgültig, ob sie einen gemeinsamen oder zwei gesonderte Reiseausweise wünschen.
 (d) Kinder unter 15 Jahren werden in dem hiermit beantragten Reiseausweis eingeschlossen, soweit sie unter Ziffer 12 aufgeführt sind. Wenn gesonderte Reiseausweise für Kinder unter 15 Jahren gewünscht werden, muß ein besonderer Antrag gestellt werden.
 (e) Jede Frage muß vollständig beantwortet werden. Erforderlichenfalls sind die Worte „nein“ oder „nicht zutreffend“ einzusetzen.
 MIT JEDER FALSCHEN ANGABE, DIE IM ZUSAMMENHANG MIT DIESEM ANTRAG GEMACHT WIRD, SETZT SICH DER ANTRAGSTELLER DER GEFAHR GERICHTLICHER VERFOLGUNG AUS.

- A. 1. Familienname K U N S T M A N N 6. Volle Anschrift in Deutschland München
 2. Familienname bei Geburt Welfenstr. 13
 3. Vorname(n) Alexander 7. Jetzige Staatsangehörigkeit des Antragstellers
 (Rufname(n) unterstreichen) DEUTSCH
 4. Geburtsort (Kreis, Land) Hamburg 8. Staatsangehörigkeit bei Geburt Deutsch
 5. Geburtsdatum 18.10.1906 9. Ledig, verheiratet, geschieden, verwitwet verh.
 10. Beruf oder Beschäftigung des Antragstellers, Name des Arbeitgebers, Art der Beschäftigung oder Anstellung
Büroangestellter
 11. Beschreibung des Antragstellers
 Größe 174 cm Haarfarbe dunkelblond Augenfarbe grau
 Unveränderliche Kennzeichen fehlen
 12. Einzelheiten über begleitende Kinder unter 15 Jahren (nur auszufüllen, wenn Familienpaß gewünscht wird)
 Namen Geburtsdatum und Geburtsort Geschlecht
keine
 13. Ehegatten haben anzugeben, ob sie einen gemeinsamen oder zwei gesonderte Reiseausweise wünschen
 14. Für welche Länder wird der Reiseausweis beantragt? alle W.-Eur. Länder
 15. Grund Ihrer Ausreise, z. B. Auswanderung, Rückkehr zu Ihrem früheren Wohnsitz, Geschäftsreise, Besuchs- oder Ferienreise, Arbeitsaufnahme usw. Besuchs- und Ferienreise
 16. Name und Staatsangehörigkeit des Vaters
 17. Haben Sie bereits früher einen vorläufigen Reiseausweis beantragt? Falls ja, wann und wo?
Nein
 18. (a) Sind Sie ethnazifiziert worden? nein
 (b) Wenn ja, in welche Gruppe sind Sie eingestuft worden?
 19. (a) Nummer des Personalausweises (Kennkarte)
 (b) Ausstellende Behörde

B. ICH VERSICHERE, DASS DIE OBIGEN ANGABEN DER WAHRHEIT ENTSPRECHEN UND ICH WEISS, DASS EINE FALSCHEN ANGABE GERICHTLICHE VERFOLGUNG NACH SICH ZIEHEN KANN.

Datum

15 Aug 52

Unterschrift

130A-91
137-620

Confidential.

Estonian Captain K. S. Diplom
Alekeei KURGVEL

Munich, 1 September, 1952

Thoughts after one year
in employ of the American Intelligence Service.

The difficulties which were connected with my engagement will get evident if we remember that it took over 8 months since the first approach to me, on 9 December, 1950, when I declared my readiness for co-operation, and nearly 7 months since my first contact with Mr. Davis on 13 February, 1951, when I repeatedly declared my readiness for co-operation, and that besides the oral pourparlers 11 letters and cables had to be exchanged before the contract was laid for for signature on 5 September, 1951. And even after that it took nearly 2 months and the exchange of many more letters, and cables and notes before it was clear on both sides that the High Employer, as well as the employee are both willing and allowed to co-operate. This happened under reciprocal understanding and assertions that the matter is of very urgent character.

Which were the reasons of these difficulties on my side? (These on the side of the Employer are unknown to me.)

My troubles were:

1) The inner fight between two senses of duty: towards my homeland, and towards my family, which seemed to interfere. Sacrificing myself for the work for my homeland I had to separate from my family, letting my wife together with one minor son alone in very bad time of DP-emigration, when every family did all to stay together so the family members could support each other.

2) The feeling that I was not fully trusted by my prospective employer, especially after I was rejected from immigration to the States under the DP Act.

3) The doubt whether the employer was solid enough and able to solve the heavy task for which my co-operation was asked, if he could not help to settle the immigration of my family and of myself to the States in a way which I found being the best in view of my beforestanding work and of which I was told that the employer was of the same mind (that this way would have been the best one).

I felt the grave responsibility for my family as well as for the men whom I had to convince for co-operation and for going to work in extremely dangerous situations, if co-operating with an only semi- or quasi-qualified authority (as I have never been told who really is my employer).

I understood that a good and successful co-operation between an alien group of which I was foreseen a leader and an American Authority of Intelligence Service is possible only if the mutual trust is complete. I, on my side did all I could, to reach this. I debate my own suspicions and forced myself to trust the solidity and the ability of my employer. I convinced my family to immigrate to the States without me, suggesting to my wife that I surely will follow her with my employer's help after a reasonable delay, as was promised.

I did so despite the warnings received from many good friends advising me not to trust the oral promises of persons whom one does not know well enough. I did this because I thought having seen enough proofs to the fact that my employer is an official authority of the United States, and finding that I, as an officer of the Estonian Republic still recognized by the States, have to trust such an official employer, although not seeing much trust towards myself.

During the first months of my employment I worked partly in Munich, partly in Wentorf, where my family stood and fought for the immigration into the States. So far I did not have any direct orders as to the work besides settling the immigration of my family, I used every moment for collecting information about the situation in Estonia. Later, when working and living-rooms were found for me in Munich, I stood and worked here. My family emigrated to the States in January, 1952. I think this was possible only thanks to the efficient help of my employer, for which I am grateful.

During this year I have:

- 1) written a) 16 items about the base of work, the tuition plans and my experiences, making some proposals for the future work 69 pages
 - b) 1 report about the characteristics and the possible use of the aspirants selected in Sweden, and about some other ways of collecting information about Estonia 20 pages
 - c) 3 reports about one person who came from Estonia and the information he gave 20 pages
 - d) 2 reports about the situation in Estonia (Districts of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa) 37 pages
 - e) ca 10 different information notes, reports and lists of possible candidates
 - f) ca 60 different letters and cables in connection with the work.
- 2) read all available to me Soviet-Estonian and Exile-Estonian newspapers, wrote, typed or cut out of them over 4,800 information notes (mostly in quadruplicate) concerning the situation in Estonia and systematized these into card- and ordinary files. (The two first reports mentioned under "d" here-above are worked out on hand of these files.)
 - 3) studied different problems in connection with the tuition and use of the agents and the communication to them.
 - 4) made 13 journeys in connection with finding and proofing the aspirants and collecting information, being on these occasions outside Munich for 53 days.

Am I satisfied with my work and with the results of it? I am not. I liked to do much more. I have not been lazy or idle. I have never limited my work to the official working hours. I did as much as I could, and as well as I could. I think the results would have been better had I a fixed plan of work, could I see the way I had to go. This, sorry, was often missing. I suffered often under some uncertainty, never knowing which will be the next step

in my work, often in uneasy waiting for things to happen or orders to be given very soon, but not always coming in the sheduled time. In this uncertainty I felt often like a robot who has to run fast after a button was pressed upon, or like a man who grops his eyes bound, and not as a trusted, acknowledged, competent, and responsible officer and co-operator. Therefore, I am sorry, we can not see better results. But I do not find this being somebody's, or especially my, guilt. Perhaps it was the situation as such.

Would I like to continue?

Yes, supposed that

- 1) the employer likes it, and
- 2) some conditions will be changed.

It is possible that the employer finds my work not worth of better pay than the DM 700 and the promised additional \$ 50 as a support to my family in the States (which up to 19 August were not yet paid to my wife). I find that the time I am losing here costs me, now that my family is in the States and I myself. for work's sake. renounced to emigrate to some other country, much more than it costed when I entered into your service, when I and my family were still waiting for the possibility to emigrate to the States as DPs. At that time the 700 DM were a comparatively reasonable pay for my time, because I could afford my family for tis money to some extent bearable conditions of life in Germany.

As this sum of 700 DM was not asked by me but proposed by the employer, so I saw therein the good will of the employer to treat me in a honest and solide way, the more, because during the period when the immigration of my family to the States was finally cleared, I was promised the revision of the pay conditions, without having asked for this directly. But this revision has taken a little too long time, and felt out a little to low. The equivalent of DM 700 and \$ 50 is approximately \$ 217. My friends, Estonian officers and other functionaries in my age, who were luck to immigrate to the States, do earn monthly round about \$ 400 and more, and this not working in their learned professions, but on very different occasional works. This means for me, and especially for my family in the States, a relative loss of at least \$ 183 every month. I am not envious of my friends. Being to some extent idealist and working not for money but for following my duty of an Estonian officer, I may bear the hardness coming from such underpayment, but I can not let my family suffer threefold: 1) under our separation, 2) under the special character of my work and employment so that my wife can answer to no question of her neighbors and acquaintances about my work because she knows that this is secret, that she can not know much of it herself and is not allowed even to say the few she knows, and 3) under the very insufficient support I can give her in her American conditions of life. It is right that nobody, and especially not the employer, has forced my family to immigrate from Germany to the States. But it is right, too, that I had never consented to do this work with my family here exposed to all the danger connected with such a work, and without any efficient protection against it in their and mine status of Estonian DP-refugees. I found their immigration into the States absolutely needed for the work I was sheduled to do here.

Now there have happened many bad situations my wife had to undergo because of the unadequate support I have been able to give her. The people there seem to know that the families of the American officers who are in Europe receive a great percentage of the salary paid out in the States. Our friends know what kind of work I did during the peace time in Estonian Army and during the war time. They know that my work was generally appreciated. During the DP-emigration process I was told by my friends many times that "you will not be allowed to emigrate, you are needed here in Europe because of your special experiences". When it then really happened that I was not allowed to immigrate to the States and this was done by absolutely fictive reasons, and when my family despite this and the opposite regulations of the IRO, could immigrate as DPs, then it is quite normal that these friends, although having been told nothing of my real work either by me or by my wife, do suppose that I am working in my old field, in any case not as an occasional worker on an occasional job but as a qualified officer. And so they think my pay being better than their earnings are and do wondering why my wife is so short of money. They must think that Mr.K is either so stingy or he does not care much of his family when he supports them so miserably, much worse than they support their families. So it comes that my wife is still living, to the amazement of the other Estonian DP-Americans, in one room together with our 13 years old son, in an apartment of an Estonian super (house servant), being unable to rent a small apartment - she can't afford paying monthly \$ 30 to \$ 90.

Recently there was an opportunity to rent a small apartment of two rooms on reasonable pay, but under the condition that the furniture had to be bought from the store of the houseowner. My wife was not able to pay in cash the needed \$ 570 for the furniture and thought that she can do this paying by instalments, as had done other Estonian families living in the same house. But the owner did not agree to this. He inquired about the salary and the working place of my wife. Finding her salary not high enough, as an assurance against his risk, he asked about my job and the support my wife is receiving from me. Having heard that I am working with the American Army and that her support is only \$ 150 per month (my wife told even more than she had received), this gentleman had turned very categorical and has told that to such people he can not pay on instalments because the States are defending these people and in case that my wife would not pay the instalments he would find no help against her. Unable to borrow from a bank, as therefore she would have needed a certificate showing my income, which she does not possess, my wife proposed to buy this time only the thing she needed very urgently and for which she could pay in cash. But even this proposal was not accepted and she was even refused as the tenant of this free apartment of 2 rooms.

Now I must blame myself for my modesty and long and too quiet and futile waiting for fulfilment of the promise given to me by my employer in this matter of adequate supporting of my family. I have done myself all what I could for helping my family, leaving for myself often less than 100 DM per month. I have been living like an ascetic, in hope that this will not last for long, that the matter will be settled soon and to the satisfaction of both sides. I was astonished and thought this being an error when I was told on 30 June, 1952, that the support for my family has been fixed for \$50 per month. I told that I find this being

unsatisfactory. I was told that this support will be paid retroactively and I was asked to wait until September, when a new contract could be agreed upon. We are in September now.

This is not a notice. I have told that I should like to go on working with the American Intelligence Service, like I was asked by the high Estonian personality who till now has some reason to feel himself in the highest leading position of the first representative of the Estonian Republic this side the Iron Curtain, who brought me in contact with your Service and recommended me to you. I should do this despite the abovementioned difficulties and some disillusiones I and my family have had, because I understand that misunderstandings may happen everywhere, especially when the contractors do not know the habits of each other well enough. I should like to do this because I still hope some help from this my co-operation to my country, as I still hope for future help of the United States for Estonia against the communists.

But doing so I can not neglect my family. Therefore I must ask, in case that my co-operation is still wanted, to grant my family and myself a reasonable pay. I do not know what are paid the American officers, but I think that a qualified officer of intelligence service, especially when forced to live separately from his family, is paid a little better than a usual good worker (I think of my friends in the States whom I mentioned above).

I do not tell any fixed sums. I do not ask hundreds of dollars for myself here, as I am not an American officer, although I do not find myself less qualified or less worth only because of being an officer of a small and occupied country. But I dare ask for my family a support which corresponds to that received by your officers' families when these officers are in such an exposed service and separated from their families.

Furthermore I must be able to inform my family whether and when they can surely count with my immigration to the States and joining them, so they will not need suffer under the uncertainty and the suspicions uttered by so many friends in the States, who think to know the American life and ways better than I do and who, therefore, fear that I shall not be helped over, although this has been promised.

I should like to know myself more exactly my position when working with your Service, and my family needs an official certificate showing my legal position and situation when working with your Service (be the employing authority called therein the American Army or what else will be found right) so she (my wife, especially) suffering under the fact of being a soldier's or officer's wife and family, could feel also some security of this status, and will not be forlorn when on one good day there may happen something to me.

And then I should like enjoy myself of a little more trust, so I could be informed of what is really going on and so I could give a real hand and had not to grope in the darkness of ignorance of the situation like a blind man who, despite his best will, can not render a full work of a seeing one.

Sorry, I have to trouble you with such questions. But I have no other way to help myself and my family, as I have no Estonian superiors here who could care for me and my family, and I even am not allowed and I am not in the position to contact the

Estonian official Representative in the States in this matter.

I do not beg for alms. I hope still being able to support my family, like my co-refugees are in the States and in other emigration countries. But I am 48 and thus I have no time to waste. I must earn my own and my family's living and I must care for the coming years of old age.

2
2
If I am not the man you really need, what you could have understood during this one year, or if you can not grant me and my family the conditions I need for my work, or if you still can not trust me enough, then, please, inform me accordingly. If you, additionally to this, can not help me over to the States, then, please, tell me this, too, the sooner the better, so I could see how I could help my family and me myself.

To your information:

I am Estonian Captain (Kapten K.S.diplom) which means something equal to American Captain, General Staff. This grade I possess since February, 1934. Since 1935 I worked as Deputy, and later as Chief of Section in the II Department of General Staff, a post foreseen usually for a Lt-Colonel, and I was paid accordingly.

Although having my 5 years in Captin's grade in 1939 I was not promoted Major because of the special policy in use in the Estonian Army at that time. According to this policy the younger officers on well paid advanced posts had to wait with promotion for the benefit of the very old and good captains who could not be given such outstanding posts with good, fixed pay. So they were promoted and got a little better pay on their old posts, whereas the younger captains on their good posts had to satisfy themselves with the honor of doing colonels' work and receiving appropriate pay, as the promotion quota did not allow to promote all the captains who had served their 5 years.

2
During the war I was paid by the Germans according to my Estonian grade of Captain, on the same base with the German Hauptmanns', as it was the ruling in the German Army that not the post and the work, but the grade of an officer fixed the pay-group.

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEP 6 - 1952

5 SEP 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 33365

ROUTING	
1	
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP MUNICH ROUTINE
 SR 6 1600Z 5 SEP 52
 INFORMATION: CFI, OPS, STC, CPP, EE 2, RI 3

MUNI 9895

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN CITE: SMUNI
 REDSOX/LCHOMELY

1. RENEWAL GIORDANO CONTRACT DUE 5 SEPT (MGMA. 10113).
2. ACCORDING DOB CONSULTANTS NORMALLY RECEIVE \$5,000 SALARY. IF DOB PLANS FUTURE USE GIORDANO CONSULTANT STATUS, SUGGEST CONTRACT BE SIGNED HERE INCLUDING FOLLOWING:
 - A. MONTHLY 500 DM (\$100) HERE, \$300 TO FAMILY IN U.S.
 - B. INCLUSION PARAS 2, 3, 4 OLD CONTRACT.
 - C. REMAINDER MODELLED ON GAMBARD CONTRACTS BROUGHT MUNI BY KIVETT.
 - D. CANCELLATION DATE DIORDANO DEPARTURE FROM GERMANY.
3. BELIEVE INCREASE NECESSARY DUE FAMILY EXPENSES IN U.S. WHERE THEY RIDICULED BY FRIENDS FOR LACK OF SUPPORT FROM HUSBAND.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

COPY NO.

1308-11

(44)

SECRET
Security Information

Date: September 5, 1952

Mr. Mario K. Giordano

Dear Mr. Giordano:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a contract agent for certain services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for such services you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of \$4200 per annum. Of this amount, \$250 will be deposited monthly to the account of your wife in the United States. You will receive the equivalent in German currency of \$100 monthly. No taxes will be withheld from these amounts, and it will be your responsibility and your wife's responsibility to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations.

2. Travel. Expenses which you incur in traveling and in otherwise carrying out your duties will be reimbursed in all cases in which the expenses have been directed and authorized by the Government. You will be authorized per diem in the amount of 25 DM in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel.

3. Benefits. In the event you receive an injury or disability while engaged in the performance of this contract, you will be entitled to medical, surgical, hospital services and supplies, transportation and disability benefits in such amount as in the sole discretion of the U. S. Government is proper, provided said benefits shall not exceed a total of \$5000.

In the event of your death while directly engaged in the performance of services required under this contract, the United States Government will pay the sum of \$5000 to your heirs or the legal representatives of your estate.

4. Evacuation. In the event of the evacuation of Germany, you and members of your immediate family residing with you at the time will be given such assistance as can be accorded, resembling that given to American citizens on duty in Germany.

5. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

6. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing or training are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein to the extent that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

7. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

SECRET
Security Information

1308-12(2)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
Security Information

8. Term. This contract is effective as of 5 September 1952, and shall continue thereafter for a period no longer than your residence in Germany or one year, whichever period is shorter, unless sooner terminated by the Government either:


- (a) By 30 days actual notice to you from the Government, or
- (b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

You may, in turn, terminate this contract upon written advance notice, which will become effective one month from the date of receipt. Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from the Government accepted by you. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY 
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:


Mario K. Giordano

APPROVED:

NOV 3 1952
ENCLOSURE

SECRET
Security Information

Security Information

SECRET

17 Sept 52

ABBASIN

Giordano Contact Report.

1. [] met with Giordano at 2030 to discuss details of contract. [] had expected difficulties in some cases, not in others, and decided the best thing in any case was to present HQ version for Giordano opinion.

2. It should be pointed out that the view of this contract is Giordano's first "proof" that he is associated with the US Government. He has gradually come to feel so, over a period of time, but has never written the words on paper before.

3. It should also be said that [] misjudged Giordano to a considerable extent with regard to what he would accept in a contract and what he would not. This was due, probably, to [] dealings with the CAMBAROs, who were practically no trouble on this score, and who, in fact, never had contracts. However, [] does not censure G. on this score; G.'s situation, as he points it out, certainly differs:

a. Giordano is now 48. He has been in intelligence work for over 20 years, and a Captain in Intelligence since 1934--18 years. In another year, he will have been married 25 years. He has a wife and two sons in the US, one son going to Clemson *and the other aged 15.*

b. He is separated from his family, mainly because of his work. He feels this to be true because he gave up a chance to emigrate to Canada on the advice of [] who felt, as we all did at that time, that his chances for the US were good.

4. Therefore, his views on the contract, taking it by paragraphs, were as follows:

a. Compensation. He first asked how this figure was arrived at. [] had to answer that he did not know; that HQ had set it. G. pointed out that his wife had written that all his friends in the States, and they not working at their specialities, were making about \$400 per month--in non-dangerous work and living with their families. He then promptly disclaimed an interest in money as such, saying that he hated this type of work and continued it only because he felt it his duty as an Estonian officer, but that at his advanced age and in view of the lack, in this contract, of any type of security for him, he felt obliged to request at least some sort of security for his family. In this and other connections, he then requested that consideration be given to simply granting him the salary, rights and privileges, within the framework of covert activity, of an Estonian captain. [] said that we made no reference to past, present or future military grades, but only to the ability and usefulness of the individual, in setting conditions of employment, and consequently that he believed HQ would refuse any such comparable rank arrangement. (G. had, by the way, an arrangement of this sort in the Abwehr.) G. reluctantly accepted that statement, and went on to say that his main concern was his family; that if he were shot down, in or because of his line of duty, at that instant, his family would have no protection whatsoever.

b. Status. The wording of this paragraph naturally concerned G. He asked, "If I am not an employee of the US Government, what am I?" [] said that he also ~~Security~~ the wording of this paragraph as unfortunate,

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130B-17 (4)

SECURITY
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and that the word "employee" had a technical meaning in this context; that what it amounted to simply was that employees of the United States, also United States citizens, had certain rights as such and without further definition, which were not available to him. G. said he understood this and accepted it, but that he felt that perhaps some of these benefits, if they included added security to the family of the employee, could ~~xxx~~ be extended to him. [] said he would take the matter up with HQ.

c. Term. G. understood the verbiage to mean that actually he was only employed on a month-to-month basis, that he could be told at any time, "Sorry, we have no further use for you," and that then he would be up the creek. He requested at least the possibility of emigration. [] said that he could not and would not give any such assurance (G. will never realize that DYCCLAIM is not the Abwehr, and that it does not control ~~xxx~~ immigration). G. then asked if it would at least be possible for him to visit his family. [] said he would look into the matter.

5. [] left at 2300 after giving the assurance that he would communicate Giordano's opinions to HQ and would have an answer for him ~~in~~ in 15 days. This was believed necessary because of Giordano's statement that time was passing, he was not getting younger, and his wife was on the verge of nervous collapse from separation from him and worry about the future. Therefore, he said, he felt he had to take some immediate action, even while still working and being faithful with the US, towards emigration from Germany to another country, probably Canada.

6. G. [] believes that Giordano's points are, in the main, valid ones. Certainly his 20-odd years of experience, ~~xxx~~ including his dispatch of 22 teams for the Abwehr into Russian-held Estonia, should receive some consideration. His expenses, with his family in the States and a son in college, are certainly as high as many US residents. [] did not feel, by the way, that this was the time to mention his paying for his own quarters, as suggested by HQ.) His work does involve a certain amount of danger, although not much; however, a concession on this point would probably cost us nothing and would make a definite impression on him. He is separated from his family, and although it is certainly ~~xxx~~ not our fault, he feels that he could not engage in such work were his family in Germany because of the possible risk to them. On the month-to-month basis angle, what he would like is an assurance that if we could not use him in one connection we would use him in another, or else some sort of social security clause. [] certainly can't blame him for wanting that, but will have to leave it to HQ to say what can be approved. The least that should be included is something to the effect that we will do our best to place him. It must be realized that he is, as are few others, a professional intelligence worker who knows almost no other work and who frankly says so, albeit he classes himself as a career officer in Estonian intelligence.

7. [] recommends the following:

a. Salary at \$5000. This would meet his "400-per-month" friends on even ground. If this could be tied in any way to the salary of an American captain, so much the better. A separation allowance would be preferable, but we can probably get away without it if it would raise too much of a fuss. [] understands, however, that it or a similar thing is granted in some cases.

b. Free housing. Actually, the present situation is that he works in an operational apartment-office, requisitioned, and rents a couple of rooms as cover. Leave it out of the contract, if you want, but in that case [] believes the cost of the ~~security~~ apartment should be authorized as a

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security and cover requirement. This would not have to be mentioned in the contract, but in a dispatch or cable to cover [] with the local financiers.

c. Mention the fact that he's an Estonian patriot in some innocuous place, and/or the fact that the US is proud of Estonia and will never stab it in the back. That might be a little tricky, but some lawyer/bureaucrat should be able to do a fine job.

d. Include some statement to the effect that we'll do our best, if we have to drop him, to place him somewhere else. In the first place, that won't cost anything, and in the second, judging from the average disposal case, we would probably do it anyway.

e. Eliminate the paragraph on "Status". It seems to be covered in "Unauthorized Commitments", and in its present form only creates confusion. But if the lawyers insist on it for some reason, [] can explain it away; it just creates a bad psychological effect.

f. Grant something on death benefits, if death is in line of duty. ✓ We haven't lost a consultant yet.

g. Give [] something to say regarding when he will see his family next. He doesn't even know that it is planned he will go to the States as a trainer; he has simply been told it will be outside Europe. If you have even a glimmer of a chance for immigrating him, let us know; it will be passed verbatim, with no commitments. Also, on that Jan 1 date: is that planned for whether his immigration is cleared or not? If you are considering bringing him in black, let us know what he can tell his wife and if he can see his family. The point of this is that he's a good man, but he's going quietly nuts in this period of indecision and worry about the future. It's not that he's not busy; he's working on all sorts of studies, which are excellent; but he can't see the pattern. [] has trouble seeing the pattern himself, sometimes, but Giordano is way out on the end of the line--a position it's hard to get used to after 20 years in the know.

8. [] will attach a suggested contract to this. He would appreciate an answer before 1 October on at least the vital points. Correction or elimination of psychological verbiage is not a vital point; social security aspects are. On receipt of a cable regarding those aspects, [] will present the decision to G. with as much pressure towards acceptance as possible.

9. [] will formalize this thing and send it through the mill in the near future.

10. Just as an added comment, [] believes the HQ desks should try to impress the General Counsel etc. with the fact that we here are dealing with intense patriots who at the most are ideologically motivated and at the least won't admit, even to themselves, that they are not so motivated. These contracts are obviously drawn up for some solid American citizen who views things on a business-like basis with no good-of-the-cause thrown in. Perhaps these are intended only as samples; if so, OK, but if they are intended as Bibles, an attempt to convert the General Counsel would be viewed with favor and delight out here. [] stated, in connection with [] that the only valid contracts are those written by the GC and sent out here; if the two he brought are examples, the GC should have its psychological head examined. Its legal head is doing fine.

Thanks for the audience,

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PS: Due to the rush of [] departure, I have not had time to write the draft mentioned above. You can probably do it better than I in any case, because of your propinquity to the GCO. However, I have one suggestion about the business re Estonian nationalism, etc: if it could be included in a sort of cover letter, not actually part of the contract but looking to G. as if it were, it would serve the same purpose and get by the GCO easier.

The attached draft is the one I showed him. If you see fit to approve that, with the changes mentioned above, I can use it and add the cover sheet here. PLEASE CABLE A PSEUDO TO BE USED FOR SIGNING.

I firmly believe he will quit unless we give him some assurance of seeing his family and/or sufficient income to make up for the separation. He had and probably has a good chance of getting to Canada. His attitude is complicated by nervousness brought on by the situation.

It would be practically impossible to use [] brother in this, according to the judgement of all those here who have met both of them. I have not met both of them, but I am forced to agree.

Sorry not to be able to go into details of his trip to Sweden here, but unless we get this wound up there won't be any trip. Will try to send that with [] who is scheduled to leave next week, or some other visitor at that time.

[]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

Handwritten
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 SEPT 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 57219

ROUTING	
1	<i>J</i>
2	<i>a</i>
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TO: SR REP GLENNY:
(MUNICH)(FRANKFURT)

SR

8547

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

SR 6

2240Z 25 SEP 52

INFORMATION: CFI, OPS, STC, CPP 2, EE 2, CAO, RI 3

Handwritten signatures and initials

DIR 20916

TO: SEUNI

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: DIR

REISOR AEBALIN

REF: LIR 19195 (OUT 54689)

1. REQUEST GIOERANO ACCEPT CONTRACT AS CARRIED BY ADDITIONAL
CLAUSE GRANTING DISABILITY DEATH BENEFIT INSURANCE \$5000 IS APPROVED AND WILL
BECOME PART OF CONTRACT. EXACT WORDING OF CLAUSE BEING POUCHED. CONTRACT TO
BE SIGNED IN REAL NAME.

2. EXPECT IMMIGRATION DECISION BEFORE CHRISTMAS. POUCHING HQ VIEWS ON
 MEMO.

3. RE PARA 2 REF. EQUIVALENT OF \$100 PAID IN DE FOR HIMSELF.

EE/FI

SR/FI/LE

SR/FI

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

130B-15 (44)

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AEBASIN

26 Sept 52

1. Suggested GIORDANO contract attached. This does not include all the "verbiage" (I'm getting tired of that word) that I would have included had I not already shown him a draft without it. I have a copy of this, to which you can refer if necessary.

2. GIORDANO will leave Monday for Sweden, to ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ check on the present attitudes of the candidates and arrange for their trips to Germany. The future will have to depend on the results of his visit.

3. From the viewpoint of continuity, perhaps you would like to toy with the idea of sending one of the persons who would be working with them ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ to Muni about 1 December or earlier. In fact, I'd like to accent this point; I believe that [] is rather against [] doing any more on this than absolutely necessary. If DOB could send such a person on TDY, to be here as soon as the candidates are accepted, it would help things immensely. [] simply does not have the personnel available so that ^{DUR} an American could be constantly in the house with the trainees, as DOB and [] prefer and even require. GIORDANO would, of course, live with them, but if the American is essential, I'm afraid DOB will have to supply, unless [] will commit otherwise. TDY would be at the most 1 November to 1 January; the person involved should be one who would work on it later, so as to give that continuity which was lost on the []

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DATE 2008

1308-17

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29 SEPT 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 4424

ROUTING	
1	2
2	2
3	Chase
4	Boasol
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP, MUNICH

ROUTINE

SR 6

1432Z 29 SEPT 52

INFORMATION: CFI, OPS, STC, CPP 2, EE 2, CAO, RI 3

[Handwritten initials/signature]

30UN1 4218

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN CITE: 30UN1

REDSOX/AEBASIN

REF DIR 29916 (OUT 57219)

SINCE GIORDANO SEEMS FILLING WAIT, SUGGEST [] CARRY
CONTRACT MUNI. ASSIGN PSEUDO IF REQUIRED FOR SIGNATURE.

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COPY NO.

1308-18

(4)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

104-927

2 OCT 52

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
Col of, SR

INFO: RUDOLX - Frankfurt

Operational/Person
GIBRALTAR's Contact

REF : [] Report on GIBRALTAR's Contact, 17 September 1952

ASST: RUDOLX - Frankfurt

1. [] brought back [] report on contact with GIBRALTAR with the enclosure, and Headquarters has studied it with a great deal of interest.

2. Headquarters appreciates [] efforts in handling GIBRALTAR and keeping him going mentally and physically over a protracted period of time. We also feel that [] had explained Headquarters' position to GIBRALTAR quite accurately regarding the amount of compensation under a new contract, i.e., that the compensation paid to our candidates is according to the personal usefulness, plus the individual risks involved. When the time comes that GIBRALTAR will perform more extensive functions, Headquarters has plans to increase his compensation, provided of course that GIBRALTAR's performance and the quality of services rendered will warrant it.

3. As to GIBRALTAR's wife's allegations about the other "Venice" standing power in the U.S., it should be pointed out that hardly any of them are earning \$500 per month as white collar workers. Epi, who earns \$400 a month in the U.S., was mostly engaged in various fields of physical labor, which we feel, GIBRALTAR would not like to perform at his age. Further more, many wives of professional technicians are working in order to supplement or augment their husbands' incomes.

4. Headquarters feels that [] as well as GIBRALTAR should realize that \$500 annual compensation for a man working in Germany represents quite a substantial income, and GIBRALTAR should feel rather contented if not happy about it, since in all fairness to Headquarters, we have been quite generous in our considerations.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

5. Regarding GIOREDA's feelings about economic security for his family, we have made an arrangement with the General Counsel, to provide him with \$3000 disability and death benefit insurance policy, the content of which is attached to his new contract. After his arrival into the U.S., and procurement of his first citizenship papers, he will be in a position to take out a more substantial insurance policy, at a very minimal cost to him.

6. It should be pointed out to GIOREDA, that while we sympathize with him in his feelings about the financial security of his family, due to the circumstances beyond his and our control, he should realize that there are very few Germans, as well as Americans, who are in a position to provide themselves or their families with an extensive economic security. GIOREDA's son will soon complete American college, and should be in a position to take care of himself, and, if need be, to provide some support to his family.

7. As to the "status" situation, explanation to GIOREDA was quite correct. As "employee" of an American government unit he is a citizen of the U.S. for at least 5 years. Further more, GIOREDA is not working "legally" but "within" the U.S. Government under U.S. contract and instructions, for which he receives a consideration of \$4300 while in Germany, which provides GIOREDA with the opportunity to perform his patriotic duty as an American citizen, with the aid and assistance of the U.S., due to the fact that U.S. interests happen to be sympathetic to his cause. As stated above, after the procurement of his first U.S. citizenship papers, while still associated with the U.S. Government, he will have an opportunity to provide his family with more extensive life insurance coverage.

8. Temp. The 30 day transitional provision works far both sides. Although we have spent a considerable amount of funds on GIOREDA so far, we are not certain we would not like to have him working with us against his will should he decide to disassociate himself. Thus we are also taking a risk. Likewise, we cannot undertake support's operations with us unconditionally for an indefinite time. Placing the world outlook and the relations with GIOREDA's activities, it is quite probable that his association with us may be of a considerable duration, under mutually satisfactory circumstances. Further more, we have spent a great deal of time and effort in helping him finally to emigrate into the U.S., and are continuing our endeavors to expedite his emigration into U.S. On the last point we expect to get a final decision before Christmas. We do hope, but cannot promise definitely that GIOREDA will be able to see his family by next Christmas. It should be possible to make it clear to GIOREDA that the U.S. Government can not only violate the framework of the immigration laws passed by Congress. Headquarters has requested covert security clearance for GIOREDA, as soon as other government agencies will approve our immigration application under Section 5, Public Law 110 he will be brought into the U.S., so that he can live with his family.

9. Reimbursement. As you know it is the headquarters policy to provide all practical assistance to the people who have worked satisfactorily with us. In any event, when GIOREDA establishes his residence in the U.S., he and his family will be subject to the same provisions of social security as other people living in the U.S. It would be more constructive to direct his mind from the economic worries of old age and unemployment towards the importance of the patriotic tasks at hand and ahead, for which purpose he associated himself with us.

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10. Compensation

SECURITY INFORMATION

- a. GIORDANO's salary for the time being is to remain at \$750 a month or \$9000 per annum. After he has undertaken the task of training agents in the U.S., we intend to increase his compensation to \$2000, if his performance proves satisfactory to Headquarters.
- b. Headquarters suggest that GIORDANO's housing arrangements continue as up to now for the time of his stay in your area, without specifying it in the contract.
- Points c, d, e, and g are explained above, and need no further elaborations.
- f. We are enclosing GIORDANO's contract with the disability and death benefits insurance provisions for his and your signature.

11. On point 10 in [] memorandum of 17 September, Headquarters feels that the General Council is acting in accordance with directives and requirements imposed upon it from above. Therefore it is desirable that the agents be conditioned psychologically into accepting the terms of the contracts, as submitted by the General Council, rather than for us to induce the General Council to change its established policy.

12. You have handled GIORDANO very well over an extended period, and we hope that you will succeed in keeping him in line for 2 or 3 months more, by which time his resignation case will be settled, and Headquarters will have DOB ARMSIE Project going with GIORDANO's participation.

Attachment: as noted above

APPROVED: _____

2 Oct 1952

SECRET

SECRET

16 October 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, PLANS/Project Branch
FROM: Chief, SE/2
SUBJECT: Disability and Death Benefits Insurance for GIORIANO
(REDBOX/ C J)

1. It is requested that Mario K. GIORIANO, FI agent, be granted disability and death benefits insurance policy in the amount of \$5000, and it be made part of 1952-53 agent contract, beginning 1 October 1952.
2. GIORIANO is quite concerned over financial security of his family while employed by CIA as an indigenous agent trainer assistant. It is not planned to infiltrate GIORIANO himself into denied area. The addition of this insurance provision will help us to improve his morale and relieve GIORIANO mentally from his occupational hazards.

APPROVED: _____
Chief, SE/21

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SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
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DATE 2006

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130B-20

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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Security Information

Date: 31 Oct 52

Mr. Mario K. Giordano

*Dupl
5 Sept 52*

Dear Mr. Giordano:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a contract agent for certain services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for such services you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of \$4200 per annum. Of this amount, \$250 will be deposited monthly to the account of your wife in the United States. You will receive the equivalent in German currency of \$100 monthly. No taxes will be withheld from these amounts, and it will be your responsibility and your wife's responsibility to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations.

2. Travel. Expenses which you incur in traveling and in otherwise carrying out your duties will be reimbursed in all cases in which the expenses have been directed and authorized by the Government. You will be authorized per diem in the amount of 25 DM in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel.

3. Benefits. In the event you receive an injury or disability while engaged in the performance of this contract, you will be entitled to medical, surgical, hospital services and supplies, transportation and disability benefits in such amount as in the sole discretion of the U. S. Government is proper, provided said benefits shall not exceed a total of \$5000.

In the event of your death while directly engaged in the performance of services required under this contract, the United States Government will pay the sum of \$5000 to your heirs or the legal representatives of your estate.

4. Evacuation. In the event of the evacuation of Germany, you and members of your immediate family residing with you at the time will be given such assistance as can be accorded, resembling that given to American citizens on duty in Germany.

5. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

6. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing or training are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein to the extent that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

7. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

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Security Information

8. Term. This contract is effective as of 5 September 1952, and shall continue thereafter for a period no longer than your residence in Germany or one year, whichever period is shorter, unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

- (a) By 30 days actual notice to you from the Government, or
- (b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

You may, in turn, terminate this contract upon written advance notice, which will become effective one month from the date of receipt. Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from the Government accepted by you. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY [Signature]
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

[Signature]
Mario K. Giordano

APPROVED:

NOV 8 1952
RECEIVED

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Security Information

AIR

^{sub}
Security Information

EGMA-1705

EE

SECRET

Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

12 November 1952

Chief of Base, Munich

REDSOX/AREASIN

Contract of Mario K. GIORDANO

- References: (a) EGOM-927 of 14 October 1952
(b) DIR-25162 of 25 October 1952

1. Attached herewith are two copies of a contract with Mario K. GIORDANO. One copy has been retained at [] .

2. GIORDANO signed his contract with a minimum of reluctance, helped by the excellent suggestions of Reference (a) and a letter from his wife saying that \$150 had been deposited in her account on 20 October. What reluctance he did express - he again brought up his possibility of emigration to Canada - was dispelled when [] pointed out to him ("on a personal basis") that if he emigrated to Canada he would have no chance of entering the U.S. and no chance of aiding the fight for Estonian independence, whereas if he stayed with us he could fight for Estonian independence while "all our resources" worked on his emigration. []'s doubts that the logic of this has ever been imperceivable to GIORDANO; Canada was merely a bargaining point which allowed him a graceful exit.

3. Also attached are Parts "B" of the Acknowledgement of Pseudonym forms Nos. SD-04574 and SD-04575. It will be noticed that although this is not the Headquarters form, the number is a Headquarters serial number, taken from a regular form which was discarded after this form was signed. A supply of the Headquarters numbered forms would be appreciated by []

4. It should also be noted that the pseudonym GIORDANO is the one which we normally use in correspondence. Since it was used in the printed contract, it is now known to GIORDANO and will be used by him for financial and legal signature in the future. It had been our understanding, however, that the pseudonym known to the subject for such purposes is not normally used in correspondence. If this is still valid, we request that Headquarters assign GIORDANO a new pseudonym or cryptonym to be used only in DYLAIM correspondence.

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DATE 2006

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74-6341-109
1308-22(3)

Security Information

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EGMA-1705

- 2 -

12 November 1952

5. Since the effective date of this contract is 5 September, financial adjustment must be made in the allotment to his wife to compensate for the 20 October payment. Assuming that the 20 October payment included \$50 each for September and October according to the old contract, we assume this would mean his wife would receive \$650 shortly after 5 December (providing no interim payments have been made) and \$250 monthly thereafter for the duration of the contract. We should appreciate knowing the approximate times and the method by which payments will be made, so we can inform GIORDANO.

6. The contract was actually signed on 31 October, after receipt of Reference (b). We have, however, left the date on the contract blank in case another date is preferable to Headquarters in view of the 5 September effective date.

7. Since the signing of the contract, GIORDANO's frame of mind and outlook have visibly improved. This may be partially due to the fact that [] read to him, purportedly from a "letter from Headquarters," a short eulogy of appreciation for his patience, recognition of his ability and patriotism, and faith in the future. GIORDANO seemed genuinely touched by Headquarters' thoughtfulness.

APPROVED:

Distribution:

- ✓ 1 - EE w/o att.
- 2 - SR w/h att.
- 3 - COM w/o att.
- 2 - MOB w/2 att.

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AIR

Amquel
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EGMA-1706

Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

12 November 1952

Chief of Base, Munich

REDSOX/AKBASIN

Transmittal of Acknowledgement of Pseudonym Forms

Reference: EGMA-1706 dated 12 November 1952

1. Herewith are transmitted Parts A of Nos. SD-04574 and SD-04575. Parts B were forwarded with Reference.

APPROVED:

Distribution:

- ✓ 1 - EE w/o att.
- 2 - SR w/2 att.
- 3 - COM w/o att.
- 2 - MOB w/o att.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

NOV 19 1952

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Information

SECRET


130A-96(3)
30A-60a

14-242-910

NO. SD-04574 A

Date 24 October 1952

I do hereby declare that my true and legal signature is:

(Signature) 
(Printed or typewritten) Aleksei Kurgvel

WITNESS:




~~1308-68~~

NO. SD-04574 B

Date 24 October 1952

I do hereby acknowledge that in my relations with the United States Government I will use the following signature:

(Signature) 
(Printed or typewritten) Mario A. Giordano

WITNESS:



~~1308-210~~

NO. SD-04575

Date 24 October 1952

I do hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the original as shown to me by the person who signed the same.

(Signature) *Aleksei Kurgvel*
(Printed Name) Aleksei Kurgvel

WITNESSES:

I []



NO. SD-04575

Date 24 October 1952

I do hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the original as shown to me by the person who signed the same.

(Signature) *Mario K. Giordano*
(Printed Name) Mario K. Giordano

WITNESSES:

I []



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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

VIA: ATR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

Doc. No. EGMA-1727

Security Information
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

13P

TO : Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

DATE: 14 November 1952

FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AEBASIN

SPECIFIC— GIORDANO Visit to Sweden, 28 Sept - 20 Oct 1952

Reference: A. MUNI-0565, 21 October 52

DOC. MICRO. SER. B. 44-CSSMK, 24 October 52

OCT 12 1972
MICROFILMED

Doc. Action Rep.	by cable	
Sea. para	by pouch	
Doc. Action Rep.	by cable	
Sea. para	by pouch	
Exp. info and files		✓

1. Attached are copies of Mario K. GIORDANO's report on his trip to Sweden.

2. No further comment is believed necessary, except that GIORDANO has been instructed to tell his sister to destroy the "Tammi" receipt. It is requested that the accountability for the 500 Swedish Kronor advanced to GIORDANO be transferred to the debit of [redacted] in Munich since GIORDANO has turned his accounting for it in here.

3. GIORDANO knows nothing further about [redacted]; suspicious because of his sourceless funds, than is reported.

IR/AN HAS indexed this document AS AN ENTIRE BASIC. Attachment ONE IS NOW PART of the BASIC.

704
Distribution:
1 - EE w/l att.
✓ 2 - SR w/l att.
1 - [redacted] w/l att.
3 - [redacted] w/l att.
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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

Security Information

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October 1952

MY VISIT TO SWEDEN IN OCTOBER 1952

Reason: To meet three or four recruits and to invite them to come to Germany for a short visit for tests.

Cover : Visiting my sisters and friends during my leave time.

PREPARATIONS

The application for the Swedish visa was filed on 20 August 1952, with the Swedish Consulate in Frankfurt. Thereby two passports were mentioned: my TTD, issued by the Combined Travel Board of the Allied High Commission for Germany, and my Estonian Temporary Passport, issued by the Estonian Consulate in London. In both documents the German Re-Entry Permit was missing at that time.

I applied for the Re-Entry Permit (to be stamped into my Estonian passport) in the German Polizeipräsidium, in Munich, on 23 August. I was told that the procedure will take some six weeks.

Why a new Re-Entry Permit could not be stamped in my old TTD and why a new TTD was issued, which, alas, could not be used, are known to the Authority better than to me. [A Berlin TTD had to be issued.]

My Estonian passport with the German Re-Entry permit was returned to me on 18 September. Approximately at the same time I received a new TTD, to be used in case that the Estonian one could not be used.

As there was no possibility to go to Sweden by ship, without crossing Denmark, I applied for the Danish Transit Visa, on 18 September, as soon as my passport was in order, and I was asked to send my passport to the Danish Embassy in Bonn.

Having received back my passport (but still without the Danish visa) I applied for Swedish money in equivalent of DM 200.00. On this occasion I was told in the "Landesbank" that I, as a foreigner, have to file an application for "Zuerkennung der Deviseninländerereignschaft", supplying different documents, among them certificates showing:

- 1) by which authority I am employed and how much paid, and
- 2) that I am registered with the "Finanzamt" and paying the income or salary tax.

As I was not in possession of these two certificates and they could not be obtained without a longer delay, I had to withdraw my application for Swedish money.

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Thus I started on 28 September without any Swedish or Danish money, prepared to tell the Authorities, if asked, that I shall be the guest of my sisters who will supply me with some money, too. (The necessary money had to be sent for me to the address of one of my sisters in Sweden.)

I received the Swedish visa without any trouble on 29 September. The Danish Embassy in Bonn had not yet received the authority to issue me the visa, but this was received by phone from Copenhagen on the same day, 30 September 1952.

Aware of the urgency of my visit, I did not stop in Hamburg, although this was planned, but, having warned my sister in Stockholm, arrived there on Wednesday, 1 October, in the evening.

IN STOCKHOLM

On proposal of my sister I attended, on 2 October, an Estonian concert. I found no reason to refuse the proposal as I could not tell my sister the real reason of my visit, and I even found it right to show myself openly together with my sister. During the intermission Mr. Karl TALPAK approached me and expressed his regret because of the failure of the enterprise into which he had led me (he was the man who contacted me on behalf of Mr. Rei in December, 1950). I comforted him by saying that this does not matter, this was not his fault, and - maybe - this failure is also good for something - the general political situation may not yet be ready for such operations and we would have lost our friends in vain.

(Mr.) A. VAKMA, who happened to be on the same ferry with which I came to Malmoe, and Mr. A. REI attended the same concert, but they did not happen to come too close to me, and I think they did not see or recognize me.

FIRST MEETING WITH MR. HEINSOO

I could not reach Mr. HEINSOO on 2 October although I called at his address twice. Having received his telephone number I called his office and we met on 3 October.

Mr. HEINSOO knows my real name, having learned this from an Estonian paper which wrote about my visit to Stockholm in January, 1952. Thereupon I, to win his confidence, identified myself by showing my old Estonian Army Identity Card.

After I had explained the aim of my visit, he said he was still ready to cooperate but he saw much trouble in settling the visit to Germany. He had been on leave already and had only one week of leave in reserve. He had just promised his boss not to take this leave now because there was a shortage of clerks in the firm. But he thought that he could, anyway, get free

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for two weeks, from 25 October up to 9 November. He promised to start the preparations and to tell me the next meeting of the results and of the possible difficulties.

He promised to contact Mr. Palusaar and to ask him, without speaking of my visit, about his intentions in case that his mother cannot be cared for by the Authority I was representing in January.

Asked whether he has seen some other persons whom I met in January in his room, he described Mr. Palk, whose real name he did not know, and told about having seen him sometimes at dances. He asked whether I would contact this man, too, and whether he will have to be taught and to work together with him - he said he did not like this man. I did not deny my intention to contact Mr. Palk; I asked for his reasons of dislike and said that his visit to Germany after later activity could be arranged in a way that he and Mr. Palk will not need to meet or to know of each other, not to speak of working together with a person whom he dislikes. Mr. Heinsoo said that he had the impression that this man is of exalting and not quite stabilized and developed character and that he dislikes also some friends of him. I had every reason to trust Mr. Heinsoo. Having heard from him such a characterization of Mr. Palk, I told him the real name of the man and asked him to get some information about him.

Compared with the impression I had of Mr. Heinsoo during the first meeting in January, he seemed to be a little more nervous and had started smoking, but made still a very good impression.

LOOKING FOR MR. PALK

No Swede whom I met in Gustavsberg, Gamla Kontoret, knew Mr. Palk. The single Estonian who still lived in the Gamla Kontoret (the old office) Mr. Aleksander Mihkels, said he knew Mr. Palk but said that he had left Gustavsberg long ago. As to his information, Mr. Palk was working with the Firm "Atlas Diesel". Mr. Mihkels was very curious about me and so I had to tell my story: I was Mr. Martinson, knowing Mr. Palk from Tallinn. Mr. Mihkels advised me to go to Mr. Pork, a good friend of Palk, who lives in Gustavsberg and surely knows his new address. He proposed to guide me to Mr. Pork, but I refused, pretending to have an appointment in Stockholm and, having lost much time already, being in a hurry. Mr. Palk characterized Mr. Pork in January as an unreliable person, and I was not sure whether Mr. Pork knew me or not; whether he is an ex-Captain of the Estonian Army who knows me.)

My failure to contact Mr. Palk I reported to Munich in a letter. Then I tried to find the new address of Mr. Palk in the address file of the Estonian Committee in Stockholm, where I asked for addresses of some six or more persons, chatting with the clerk so to distract her attention from the

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names I was asking for. Mr. Palk's name was registered but with a quite old address.

Having seen how difficult it was to find the Gamla Kontoret, as I do not speak Swedish and the Swedes did not speak either English or German, I did not dare to go myself to "Atlas Diesel" and therefore I asked my sister to phone the Personnel Section of this firm and ask for Mr. Palk's address. She did so but was told that such a person is unknown there, does not work with Atlas Diesel.

On my request my sister went to the central registry "Mantalsverket" in Stockholm, but there, too, Mr. Palk was not registered. This means that he lives somewhere outside Stockholm, maybe in some of the many suburbs (like Gustavsberg, some 20 km from Stockholm) which do not belong to the town of Stockholm. Not wanting to contact Mr. Rebane, who probably knows the new address of Mr. Palk. I left the search for him until having received an answer to the letter sent to Munich.

MEETING MR. RÄTSEP

The promised money-letter being not received either by my sister in Stockholm or the other sister in Enköping, I asked my sister in Stockholm on 7 October for a new loan and started the trip to Göteborg, to meet Mr. Rätsep. He too had changed his address, but I learned the new one when calling by phone, using the old number. Mr. Rätsep was not in on two evenings and thus I met him on 9 October.

He said it was quite impossible to come to Germany now. He has a good job, he is receiving 1100 Kronor per month, and he cannot leave the work for weeks without losing the job. Besides, he has been on leave in Germany this summer and it would be striking if he should go "on leave" to Germany again now.

Mr. Rätsep spoke also of his nervousness which makes him fear that he is not suitable for such a long-lasting special work. He thinks he is still able for a short commando-job but not for such a long informant's job where nobody knows when it may finish. Also he spoke of the special danger bound with this undertaking, resulting from the fact that too many people seem to know of it, and among them people whom he personally cannot trust. He told me four names of persons whom he cannot trust fully, but who seems to know of the enterprise: ~~Malmet, Laaban, Miller and Linnuste~~. He finds that Mr. Rebane and his lieutenants have worked too improvedly, approaching people whom they did not know well enough, using ordinary post in their corresponding and even sending letters to the wrong persons: he had received a letter addressed to Mr. Riis and probably Mr. Riis received the letter addressed to him. Mr. Rätsep assured me that he would like to cooperate later

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in some commando-operation, but he thinks it impossible to go on with us now. But he wanted to think the matter over once more and asked me to come back for a second talk. I promised to come although it seemed clear to me that we had lost this man, too.

MEETING (COLONEL MAASING)

I visited Colonel Maasing on 13 October. He told me that the secrecy of my mission seems not to be guarded well enough. So Mr. Klesment, Member of the Estonian Panel of "Free Europe", and Mr. Kaiv, Estonian Consul-General in the States, visiting him, have spoken also of me and of my work. This shows that both have been informed by somebody of it. I understood that Mr. Klesment as well as Mr. Kaiv are both interested in intelligence work, too, the former for "Free Europe" and the second for some American Senators. I do not think that the American authorities had informed the above-named Estonian personalities of my modest role in this. Nor could this have been done by Col. Maasing or Col. Saarsen, as do not know much of it and who surely know to keep silence. Thus remains the circle around Mr. Rei, Mr. Rebane and other leading members of the ERN as the possible source of the leak. I can understand that Mr. Rei could trust Mr. Klesment, his deputy in ERN and member of his Government. I learned, too, that Mr. Klesment and Mr. Kaiv are good old school-friends and may thus trust one another. I have also nothing to say against their knowledge of my work and against the fact that they spoke of it to Col. Maasing who is highly estimated and trusted by the majority of the Estonian refugees, but can we be sure that if leakage exists, this is not reaching to other, less reliable persons, too?

As to the difficulty of the situation in Estonia, concerning intelligence work, Col. Maasing thought that there is no alleviation to see, except one: the daily "Rahva Hääli" can now be obtained much easily. Col. Maasing offered me a complete collection of one month's copies. I thanked him but did not take the offered papers, referring to the risk of being searched when passing the many frontiers and such material could bring some inconvenience to one harmless person who has visited his sisters and friends. Besides, I thought in my mind that these papers are not so very seldom in the American hands in Munich, too, as I have seen some copies when visiting the Estonian Section of the Voice of America in Munich.

FINAL MEETING WITH MR. HEINSOO

On 14 October Mr. Heinsoo told me of his suspicions that Mr. Rei knows of this enterprise. He asked me directly whether this is so or not. I had to tell the truth. Thereupon Mr. Heinsoo said that in this case he cannot continue to cooperate with us. He said he had tried to find out, after our first meeting, whether he could go on with this enterprise in case that Mr. Rei knows of it, or not. He said he had found confirmation of his fear that the enterprise is endangered if Mr. Rei, and through him the whole

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ERN, know of it. He has proof that the Swedish authorities know already of the enterprise. He revealed to me that he collaborates with the Swedish counter-espionage and that his Swedish boss has asked him, not too long after my first visit in January, when he will jump into Estonia? This was asked in a joking manner, and he answered the same way that he did not yet know the date. He had reasons to fear that the leakage is coming from the ERN and he is not sure whether this is going only to the honest Swedish authorities, or to the communists, too. He asked whether the American Authorities have received all the six photographs and his original life history written by him in Estonian. For the German translation of the life history, he had to sign a blanco questionnaire before this was filled in. He feels not sure that one copy of his life history has not been given to the communists together with his photograph.

Mr. Heinsoo thinks that if going to Germany he will have to inform his Swedish boss (of counter-espionage) of the real cause of this journey, and this, he understands, would not be in our interests. He even thinks that he will not be given the Swedish Exit- and Re-Entry Permit under these circumstances. Asked whether he would cooperate if he does not need to go to Germany but could use the cover of emigrating to Canada, he answered that on this way, too, he would have some trouble: he has a good girl whom he does not like to give up dishonestly, leaving her behind when "emigrating to a surer country."

He would like to work for his Country together with the American Authorities, and likes also me as an intermediary; he finds nothing to blame us for, as we have worked with due caution, but he can't say the same of the ERN by whose help the contact was reached. He trusted Mr. Rebane because the latter was trusted by his elder brother who served in the Finnish Army together with Mr. Rebane, and because Mr. Rebane participated in helping his brother and other Estonian ex-soldiers to go from Sweden to England, in 1945. But now he can't trust Mr. Rebane any longer, especially because of his too leftist political friends and his close contact with the ERN. He knows of an Estonian organization in Sweden which is led by very sure people, and in whose ranks he, too, has the possibility to work for his homeland when the time will come. This idea seemed to comfort him in his uneasy situation of refusing the cooperation with the Americans in this enterprise.

Asked about Mr. Palusaar's attitude he said that Mr. Palusaar sees no possibility of cooperation if the Organization cannot care for his mother.

Asked about his dislike toward Mr. Palk, Mr. Heinsoo said that he personally would not work together with him because he finds him being at least too imprudent in making friends. Mr. Heinsoo suspects one of Mr. Palk's friends, Mr. E. Tiits, of some clandestine contacts because this man, having been unemployed for two months, had enough money to buy an expensive photo-camera.

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MEETING COLONEL SAARSEN

I visited Colonel Saarsen twice: on 3rd and on 16th October. The first was a plain courtesy visit and we hardly touched the real aim of my trip. He asked me to give him a ring later, as his daughter, too, would like to meet me. I phoned on 15th and we agreed for a meeting on the next day, early in the morning, as he had a day off. This time Col. Saarsen seemed to be a little bothered and warned me to be very cautious in my undertakings and contacts because these have been reported to the Swedish authorities. He said it was luck that my activity was reported to the Swedish military authorities and not to the civilian one, but he was not sure that these will not hear of it soon too, and therefore he personally is prepared that he, too, will be asked about my activity, because he interceded for my visa in January, 1952.

MEETING THE REPRESENTATIVE OF (DYCLAIR) IN STOCKHOLM

A young gentleman brought an envelope with money to my sister in Stockholm on 8th or 9th October. My sister had to sign a receipt over 3100 Swedish Kronor. The bearer said that he would like to meet me after my return to Stockholm and had promised to ring my sister on Tuesday, 14 October. The meeting, then, was fixed for the next day. My sister introduced me to the gentleman and left us alone. I returned 2600 Kronor, which I could not use and gave my receipt for further 500 Kronor, so that the 3100 Kronor, which my sister had received, were balanced. As the visitor could not return the signature of my sister, I asked him to sign a new receipt stating that he has received back the 3100 Kronor handed over to my sister. This signature is with my sister now.

The visitor was prepared to receive from me some voluminous things, but I had nothing to give but the money. He told not knowing anything of my affairs. As I had no answer from Munich concerning Mr. Palk's new address, I asked the visitor to report my worry to his boss, giving only the first name and the first letter of the family name of Mr. Palk which I thought being enough for the visitor's boss to understand whom I sought. I asked the visitor to give a ring to my sister during the next day if there were some new information, mentioning that in the opposite case I shall leave Stockholm on Friday morning, 17 October. No call came.

Thus I saw no possibility of meeting Mr. Palk and left Stockholm for Göteborg, being already one day too late to meet Mr. Rätsep as was agreed upon earlier.

In Göteborg I tried to contact Mr. Rätsep in the factory where he works. Asking by phone for Mr. Rätsep, I was told a long story in Swedish, which I could not understand. I then called at his address and was told by the landlady that Mr. Rätsep was neither in nor in the factory, would not come back that night and probably even not the next one. So I left Göteborg without having met Mr. Rätsep for the second time. I did so because I was

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sure that his refusal was quite firm on the first meeting and he would probably have nothing to add that could have been of special interest to our enterprise.

Not liking to be seen by some Estonians back in G8teborg, I started for Malmoe the same afternoon, 17 October, with an occasional rural train. Having spent the night in Angelholm, I arrived in Hamburg on 19 October in the morning. There I stopped to take out the German money I had sent to my own name "Postlagernd" when starting the journey from Bonn, and arrived in München on 20 October at 1130.

RESUME

Of the five men we had in reserve in Sweden none is left:

1. Heinsoo resigned, finding the enterprise endangered by the participation of the circle of the ERN.
2. Rätsep resigned, finding: a) himself being unfit for such an enterprise of long duration; b) finding it impossible to come to Germany now, and c) that the enterprise is endangered because too many "politicians" know of it, among them possibly some of two leftist inclination.
3. Palk could not be located and was characterized negatively by Heinsoo, who can be trusted. His consent to participate given in January, was based upon emotional grounds and not on logical reflection.
1. Palusaar resigned because nobody will care for his mother. Also he is handicapped by his nearsightedness.
2. Toomla was disqualified before this visit to Sweden, mainly because of his head wound.

Of the three men whom I tried to contact personally, two had changed addresses, the change being unknown to us. It was good that no letters were sent to these old addresses: these could have fallen into these hands and could have caused much trouble. Thus my journey, although having only negative results as to the continuation of the work, was justified on security grounds.

The enterprise is lost in its first, preparatory period, and is to be given off. The main reason of the failure is the participation of some politicians in it whom the best of the selected aspirants did not trust because of their too leftist political relations and because of the too imprudent way these politicians worked when starting the enterprise.

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It is impossible to start new recruiting in Sweden.

There are only bad prospects of finding suitable recruits among the few and mostly old and sick Estonians who remained in Germany. Besides, recruiting and teaching of such people now in Germany, after the unhappy story with the BDJ, can hardly be recommended. 1

There are still some few thousand Estonians in England. But recruiting among them would probably cause interferences from the British authorities.

It remains to try find recruits among the Estonians in the States, where their selection and tuition would not be bound with such special difficulties as we would meet in Germany, Great Britain or Sweden, caused by the alien nationality of the recruits as well as of the staff workers seen from the sovereign standpoint of the country where this would be done.

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CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN

1. The politicians in general and the exile politicians in particular, must not be mixed into the details of intelligence work which is made by help of the refugees. This work has to be done by thoroughly checked, very reliable specialists who are conscious of the need of full-scale secrecy and conspiracy, and are able to keep to this.
2. Nothing, not even on the very general level which is not bound with details, can be done together with politicians who themselves or whose friends are under some suspicion and whom the active bearer of the work, the agents, do not trust.
3. A person can be contacted with the aim of recruiting him for intelligence work only if the contacting authority is to some reasonable degree sure that the person will be able to do such work and is reliable. This sureness can be obtained only by long systematic observation of the life, contacts and habits of a person.
4. A person who was contacted and gave his consent for cooperation has to be put through all necessary final tests as quickly as possible. Long delays may bring different new factors which may influence the first honest and weighted decision of the aspirant.
5. It is very difficult to take the recruits from one country to another without attracting the attention of the lurking enemy agents and of the authorities of the third countries. Therefore the recruits have to be found in the same country where they will be checked, taught and prepared for the work.
6. It is very difficult to find among the refugees good people who are ready to leave their normal life and jobs which they have obtained by hard work, to be taught and used in intelligence work during this time of political indecision. It is also difficult to take persons out of their daily lives to be taught in special courses for possible future special activity. Could the physically and psychologically checked and selected young refugees not be taught in all the main subjects needed for an agent during their compulsory military service, without speaking to them of going to work as agents and without binding the people by anything in their future decisions? During this special tuition period the teachers will have the possibility to find out which of these people are able and could consent to immediate use as agents in their native country. These people could be contacted in due time by appropriate persons, and if they consent, if necessary, after being released from the military service, they will be ready to start after a short final instruction period.

Such a unit where the refugee-soldiers could be taught does not need to consist of only soldiers of one nationality. There may be many nationalities together; only some subject, like Geography of the corresponding country and subjects bound with different languages, have to be taught separately. Or there could be American soldiers together with refugee-Americans of one other nationality. Such young people, having lived for a longer period in this at-

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mosphere of a family of elite soldiers, and being not bound too closely with everyday life, will surely consent more easily or even ask themselves for the possibility to work as agents in their own country, then anybody out of normal life who, although a good patriot, would find it difficult to throw away his comfortable and safe living conditions for something that is quite unknown and very dangerous.

The main part of such soldiers, who will not be asked to work as agents, and these who will refuse such a proposal, will constitute a good reserve of well-trained people for future commando-operations or for open fighting in the very special circumstances in which the re-liberation of the now communist-occupied countries will sometime have to be done.

7. The part of the intelligence work to be done by the agents is the heaviest and the most dangerous, but not the most efficient one. Much more is obtained by minute study of different written materials like books, magazines and newspapers still obtainable even from Estonia. When because of such study a good picture of the conditions and of the situation in one country is obtained, the agents can be sent out well equipped, well instructed and with precisely fixed missions. Then only they will be able to procure valuable information and reliable answers to the questions put to them for checking and for completion of the already available picture. Then only an agency can answer for the great risk into which it is sending the agent, then only this risk and the possible casualties are justified. There are not too many ways by which these materials are still available from behind the Iron Curtain. We do not know when the communists will close these last ways quite hermetically; this may happen any day. Therefore much stress has to be laid on securing and procuring of great stocks of old materials as well as of the new ones so long as this is still possible, and on minute study of these materials.

8. Overlapping, in principle, is necessary in intelligence work, but it must be systematic and coordinated. If too many independent and competitive bodies are trying to do intelligence or similar clandestine work in one and the same small country (like in the Estonian case the CIA, the Free Europe and different other surely well intended American interests, plus many other groups out of Great Britain, Sweden and who knows from which other countries), then this will bring no good results but can lead to great misunderstandings, if not to great disaster in the target-country where the agents of different organizations will fight or trouble each other. To avoid such a fatal mess, resulting from chaotic work, a coordinator of activities has to be found for every object country. This must be an esteemed and reliable personality of whose anti-communist attitude can be no suspicion, who cannot be accused of other political extremities, and whom the majority of his own national group of refugees could respect as their leading military authority. Such a personality, if silently acknowledged and supported by the U.S., could help a great deal to organize the work on a solid national basis and to avoid misunderstandings between different interests. (Giordano suggests [redacted] as a suitable personality. When [redacted] pointed out the difficulties, especially his resident in Sweden,

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Giordano said that he thought [] would be agreeable to moving to the U.S., since he is planning to send his child to college there. [] said he would pass the suggestion along to Headquarters, but was not hopeful.

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EGMA - 2347

10 DEC. 1952

Chief, EE (Att. Chief, SR)

Chief of Base, Munich

Att: []

RELSOX/AEBASIN

Change in address for Subject of Reference

Ref: MUNI-6432, 19 May 1952, Paragraph 2.

1. Subject's new address is: 30-70, 34th Street, Apt. 1F
Astoria, Long Island, New York
2. The bank account should remain the same until further notice.

[]

Approved

Distributions:

2 - SR

1 - EE

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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JPY

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FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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ROUTING	
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TO: DIRECTOR CIA
 FROM: SR REP MUNICH
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 INFORMATION P 2, EE 2, FI/RI 2

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ROUTINE
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MUNI 1507
 TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN CITE: SMUNI
 REDSOX AEBASIN
 BE: EGQW 927, PARA 8

POSSIBLE GIVE GIORDANO RAY HOPE BEFORE XMAS?
 END OF MESSAGE

Mr. Short believe not to be filed
A. J. ...

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FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

Kingfield file
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 DECEMBER 1952

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ROUTING	
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TO: **SR REP GERMANY:**
(MUNICH)(FRANKFURT)

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FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

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INFORMATION: PP 2, EE 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 32524

TO: SMUNI

INFO: SFRAM

CITE: DIR

REDSOX AEBASIN

REF: MUNI 1507 (IN 21603)

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

EE/FI

SR/FI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

COPY NO.
20A-71
130A-99

6(44)

AIR

ECMA-3055

19 DEC 52

Chief of Station, Frankfurt

INPG: REDSOX-FRANKFURT

Chief, SR

Operational/REDSOX/ABBASIN

Marie A. Giordano

RMP: ECMA-1705
ECMA-1544

ATTN: REDSOX-MUNICH

1. Dispatch #ECMA-1705 with enclosures has been received and your efforts in concluding the contract are appreciated.
2. Re paragraph (5) we shall make arrangements here for financial adjustments and payments to Giordano's wife in conformity with the contract provisions. A check for the balance due up to the end of November 1952 will be mailed to Mrs. Giordano's bank in New York on or about 12 December, 1952, and thereafter at two or three months intervals. According to our calculations the 12 December check will amount to \$700.00: \$200.00 for the month of September, and \$250.00 each for the months of October and November.
3. Enclosed are three sets of Headquarters' numbered forms for the acknowledgment of pseudonym as requested in your dispatch.
4. Re paragraph (4) Headquarters is assigning Giordano the following cryptonym for use in KUBARK correspondence: ~~AE-LING~~.
5. In reference to your ECMA-1544, paragraph (2)(c), Headquarters is extremely interested in your exploration of action agent recruitment possibilities. It is hoped that your station will succeed in locating two or three suitable candidates by January or February 1953 for mission training in the U.S. Although we realize that the pool of agent material in your area has diminished considerably, you may discover by luck and diligent effort with ~~ABEENS~~'s assistance some suitable assets among the residue.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

~~1308~~

6. For your information, the answer to AB-LUNG's immigration question is expected in the course of 4-6 weeks. Should he raise the question, you can inform him that every effort is being made to reach a final decision within the above-mentioned period

Enclosure: 3 copies of Acknowledgment
of Pseudonym Form No. SD-
09090

APPROVED _____

19 Dec. 1952
JT:pw

DEC 21 1952
RECEIVED

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Soviet Russia Division
Attn: SR/2
FROM : Security Officer
SUBJECT: Aleksei KURGVEL

DATE: 23 Dec. 52

1. The DCI has approved subject's entry into the United States for permanent residence under the provisions of Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949, and has recommended that the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization approve his case. It is expected that, barring unforeseen circumstances, the above approvals will be received by the Agency during the first week in January.

2. There is enclosed two copies of an affidavit to be signed by subject prior to his departure from abroad. These affidavits should be witnessed by a case officer, who should sign his name in the appropriate place. One copy of the affidavit should be returned to this office and one copy maintained in your files. It is not necessary that the affidavit be received in this office prior to subject's movement to the United States. Your assurance that he has signed will be sufficient to make arrangements for his movement once the approval has been granted by the Attorney General and the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization. If the form of this affidavit is not suitable, please contact this office in order that another may be drawn up to suit the subject's case.

3. Your office should maintain close contact with this office in order that subject's entry into the United States may be effected in the most secure manner and with the least amount of difficulty.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

[Signature]
Alien Affairs Officer

Attachments: 2

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

130A-72
130A-100(3)

S E C R E T

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, being first duly sworn, do depose and say:

1. I have been informed that the Government of the United States of America is giving consideration to my entry into the United States of America for permanent residence, and I hereby declare that if such status is granted to me:

(a) I will not discuss with anyone the circumstances surrounding my having been granted permanent residence status except appropriate officials of the United States Government.

(b) It is my intention in good faith to reside permanently in the United States and to become a citizen thereof, subject to my eligibility under the applicable laws and regulations.

(c) I will support and defend the Constitution and Laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and will bear true faith to the same.

(d) I will do everything possible to further the intelligence mission and National security of the United States, and will conform to such standards of conduct as are beneficial to the Government of the United States in the furtherance of its intelligence mission and the National security thereof, and in my conduct will conform to such guidance and direction as may be given to me by appropriate officials or employees of the Government of the United States. I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct or by any other means, information and intelligence of which I have been or may be the recipient which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States.

(e) I will not advocate, teach, or be a member of, or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches opposition to all organized government; I will not become a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party of the United States, any other totalitarian party of the United States, the Communist Political Association, the Communist or other totalitarian party of any state of the United States, of any foreign state, or of any political or geographical subdivision of any foreign state, or of any section, subsidiary, branch, affiliate, or subdivision of any such association or party, or the direct predecessors or successors of any such association or party; I will not advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism, or the economic and governmental doctrines of any other form of totalitarianism; I will not become affiliated with any organization which advocates such doctrines of world communism or doctrines of any other form of totalitarianism.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

2. I hereby recognize that the status of permanent residence in the United States is a status of a conditional nature, and that my failure to abide by and uphold the laws and the Constitution of the United States, as well as the provisions of this affidavit, may result in my deportation from the United States if required in the best interests of the United States.

3. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____ 19____.

-2-

S E C R E T

82

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 DECEMBER 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 77268

ROUTING	
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TO: SR REP GERMANY:
(MUNICH)(FRANKFURT)
FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

[Handwritten initials]
SR
ROUTINE
2003Z 24 DEC 52

3264

SR 6

INFORMATION: PP 2, EE 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 33431

TO: SMUNI

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: DIR

REDSOX AEBASIN

REF: MUNI 1507 (IN 21603)

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL GRANTED. FINAL APPROVAL PROBABLY COME FIRST WEEK
JANUARY.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

EE/FI *[Handwritten signature]*

[Handwritten signature]
SR/FI

IT IS FORB'

MESSAGE

COPY NO.

130A-701

9

(44)

130A-73

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

300A-3215

24 DEC 52

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Info: REDSOX-FRANKFURT

Chief, SR

Operational/REDSOX/ABBASIN

ABELUNG Immigration

ATTN: REDSOX-MUNICH

1. The subject's immigration permit procedure now has reached a stage where it is possible to expect a final decision by the early part of January, 1953.

2. Enclosed are two (2) copies of affidavit, which ABELUNG should fill in and sign in his true name, and witnessed by the case officer. One of the copies should be returned to Headquarters and the other is for retention in the subject's file.

3. Headquarters requests that your station pouch all the material assembled by ABELUNG at your station to the home office, regardless of the form or shape it is in. Any material which has been given out to other branches of your station should be assembled and pouches together with the material now physically in your possession. Likewise, it is requested that all ABELUNG personal files be pouches for Headquarters' examination, even though they may represent the subject's personal property.

4. It is hoped that the news of approaching immigration possibilities will brighten up the morale of the subject - the reward he has well earned.

Attachment:
As noted above.

24 December 1952

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

ES/PI _____

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SR/PI _____

130A-102

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 DEC 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 24639

ROUTING	
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
FROM: SR. REP MUNICH

ROUTINE

0122Z 31 DEC 52

SRB
JT

SR 6

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, EE 2, FI/RI 2

MUNI 1636

TO: DIR

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX AEBASIN

GIORDANO ADVISES NO PAYMENTS MADE INTO WIFE'S ACCOUNT SINCE OCT. ADVISE WHEN TO BE RESUMED.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

COPY NO.

1308-25

(4)

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

Kennel
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

31 DECEMBER 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 78281

ROUTING	
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TO: ~~SR REP GERMANY:~~
(MUNICH)(FRANKFURT)

SR

3264

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

SR 6

2252Z 31 DEC 52

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, EE 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 34060

TO: SWNI

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: DIR

REDSOX AEBASIN

REF: MIMI 1686 (IN 24631)

PAYMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER, ~~SEPTEMBER~~ ^{THRU} DECEMBER WILL BE DEPOSITED

8 JANUARY.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

EE/FI

SR/FI

PEER DE SILVA

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

130B-26

(44)

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

TO : Chief, Staff C
ATTENTION: Staff C/SPB
FROM : Chief, Special Security Division
SUBJECT : JO-3721
#50562

JAN 12 1953

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 12 August 1952 requesting a covert security clearance for use of the Subject in the U. S. on a contract basis as an agent trainer under Project AEBAMIN. It is understood that this clearance will result in the cancellation of a previous operational clearance issued to the same requesting division in June 1951.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances", a covert security clearance is granted for the covert use of the Subject as described in your request set forth in paragraph 1 above.

3. The Subject is not to represent himself as, nor is he to be represented as, an employee of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-9. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET.

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

18 January 1953

TO : SR/Baltic [])
FROM : FI/STC/SFB
SUBJECT: KURGVEL, Captain Aleksei

1. Your request for clearance to use Subject dated 6 August 1952 was processed and transmitted to the Chief, Special Security Division, for final action.
2. The results of this action are attached.

Attachment:
Memo. 12 Jan. 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

130A-75
130A-103(2)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECURITY INFORMATION

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Soviet Russia Division

DATE: 15 January 1953

FROM : Security Officer

SUBJECT: Aleksei KURGVEL

1. On 7 January 1953 the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization concurred in the DCI's recommendation that subject be admitted to the United States for permanent residence in accordance with provisions of Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949.

2. Plans may now be formulated to bring subject into the United States, and a member of your office should consult with this office so that travel details and subject's entry can be arranged in the most secure manner. The affidavits attached to our memo of 23 December 1952 should be signed by the subject and witnessed by the case officer. Assurance that this procedure has been accomplished is required before subject's travel can be approved.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

[Signature]

Alien Affairs Officer

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

130A-7h

130A-10f

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 JANUARY 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 6:04P

ROUTING	
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TO: SR REP GERMAN:
(MUNICH)(FRANKFURT)

SR 3264

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

CONF: SR 6

0056Z 22 JANUARY 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, EE 2, I&S 2

DIR 36854

TO: SMMI

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: DIR

REDSOX ABBASIN

REF: DIR 33431 (OUT 77268)

1. ENTRY PERMIT AND CLEARANCE GRANTED.
2. CABLE VALIDITY DATE ABLING PASSPORT.
3. WILL ARRANGE VISA AND ADMITTANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

EE/PI _____

I & S

SR/PI
PLER-DE SILVA

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 130A-107

FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

130A-107 (44) 8

AIR

EGMA 3175

Security Information
Security Information

SECRET

Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)
Chief of Base, Munich

21 January 1953
Attn: E]

Operational/REDSOX/AEBASIN
AELUNG Emigration

Ref: EGQW 2499, EGQW 3215

1. Forwarded as Attachment A is one copy of affidavit executed by AELUNG as per Para 2 of reference.

2. Attachment B is for your retention and includes the following AELUNG (formerly LCHOMELY) project files:

- a. Giordano Reports
- b. Giordano Personal
- c. Giordano's Writings
- d. LCHOMELY Contact Reports

3. Attachment C includes Giordano's personal files and reports to be retained by Headquarters only on the condition that he emigrates to the U.S. Failing emigration, these files are to be returned to him after your perusal of them. Included in this attachment are:

- a. Old notes concerning the 5 groups of agents sent to Estonia in April 1945; a base for an Estonian code (not completed)
- b. Second copies of reports 1951-1952
- c. Third copies of reports 1951-1952
- d. Fourth copies of reference files (A through K include names of persons still residing in Estonia obtained from newspapers and periodicals; P and Q are lists of local events and kolchozes):

Series: A,B,C,D,F,G,H,J
 No letter - 001 to 999
 No letter - 001 to 150
 E letter - 223 to 616
 K letter - 001 to 275
 P letter - 001 to 918
 Q letter - 001 to 193

Large cards without indicated letter were begun earlier and include 245 listings (2 copies of each).

DATE:	28 JAN 1953
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INFO:	
BOARD	CHRONO

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

COPY

130A-77
130A-105-2
74-1747-14

Security Information

SECRET

4. Included in Attachment D are Giordano's personal files which are definitely to be returned to him. These include the following works:

- a. History (translation of diary)
- b. Book: History of the Estonian Army Corps of the Soviet Army (in Estonian)
- c. Reports to the Germans 1943-1944
- d. Emigration I
- e. Emigration II
- f. Emigration - Estonian part
- g. Period of British Detention (POW), May 1945-Sep 1946
- h. Fight for Emigration of Estonian Soldiers to USA
- i. Professional Works - Correspondence 1948-1950
- j. Personal Papers - Employment and Recommendations
- k. Old Notes - Personal History and Life in DP Camps
- l. Old Notebooks 1944-1945

5. We are forwarding these files which we think will be of interest to you on the assumption that AELUNG activities will continue at least in part in such form at Headquarters. It is hoped that the attachments listed above satisfy Headquarters requirements and that we can look forward to a favorable emigration decision in the very near future.

Approved:

Distribution:

- 2 SR (w/1 ea Att A, B, C, D)
- 1 EE
- 3 COM
- 2 CSOB

*Being paid via Jap
SEPARATE COVER*

Security Information

SECRET

VIA: POUCH
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

D. WATCH NO. EGBA-A-2676

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 21 January 1953

TO : Chief, MOB
FROM : Chief, BOB
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/REDSOX
 SPECIFIC— Aleksel KURGVEL
Ref: EGMA-437, EGBA-696, EGMA-2703

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

In view of the statement in EGMA-437, we submitted the pertinent information on Aleksel KURGVEL (forwarded in EGMA-2703) directly to the American director of the Berlin Document Center. He personally conducted the re-check of the Center's files and again found no record or information on KURGVEL. *[Handwritten mark]* may be confusing the Berlin Document Center with another agency where he saw a record on KURGVEL.

[Handwritten scribble]

Approved: *[Signature]*

copy

hand doc filed 74-6-33-1-470

Distribution:
2-MOB
3-COM
3-EE
1-BOB

ROUTING SLIP

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130A-100 Mo-File-Draft-Copy

Comments:

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

130A-78
130A-100

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

^{Subj}
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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23 JAN. 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 30774

TO: DIRECTOR CIA
 FROM: SR REP MUNICH
 ACTION: SR 6
 INFORMATION: EE 2, FI, FI/OPS, CFD 3, FI/RI 2

ROUTINE
 0326Z 23 JAN. 53

UPB

MUNI 2015
 TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN CITE: SMUNI
 REDSOX/AEBASIN
 RE: MUNI 1686 (IN 24631)
 DIR 34060 (OUT 78281)

RE SECOND REF GIORDANO STATES NO PAYMENTS TO WIFE AS
 OF 16 JANUARY. WE THEREFORE CABLING \$500 FOR 2 MONTHS PAYMENT.

9/16.58 through 3/ Dec. 52
750
166.55. 20. Nov. 1950
Sept.

END OF MESSAGE

15 for surf
19/ Recd by house

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 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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COPY NO. 1308-27 (4)

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

Murquel
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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23 JANUARY 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 83739

TO: SR REP GERMANY
(MUNICH)
FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

SR 3264

ROUTINE

CONF: SR 6

1901Z 24 JAN 53

INFORMATION: FI/ADMIN, EE 2, DD/P-ADMIN, CFD 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 37459

TO: MUNI

INFO: SPRAN

CITE: DIR

REDSOX/AEBASIN

REF: MUNI 2015 (IN 30774)

1. DEPOSIT \$916.58 REACHED BANK 19 JANUARY, DUE DELAY PAYROLL OFFICE.
2. YOUR REMITTANCE WILL COVER JANUARY, FEBRUARY PAYMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

RE/1

SR/1

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

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130B-28

(44)

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

Kurgvel
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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26 JAN 53

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

IN 31584

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP MUNICH

ROUTINE

ACTION: SR 6

1928Z 26 JAN 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, EE 2, FI/RI 2, I&S 2

MUNI 2046

TO: DIR

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX AEBASIN

REF: DIR 36854 (OUT 82848)

1. RE PARA 2 REF, TEMP ESTONIAN PASSPORT NO. 349 ISSUED ALEKSEI KURGVEL ESTONIAN LEGATION LONDON 30 APRIL 48 VALID 30 APRIL 53. TTD ISSUED ALEXANDER KUNTSMANN BERLIN 30 AUGUST 52 VALID 30 AUG 54.

2. COMPLYING WITH GERMAN MISSION MEMO 6 JAN 53.

END OF MESSAGE

*Issued by Combined Travel Board
of the Allied High Commission for
Germany*

Visit visa -

*Time place arrival 2 days
means flight no
2 days prior -*

Referring to signing of Affidavits - and sending copy to HQ,

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
DO NOT MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

COPY NO. 130A-108.
130A-80 (4)

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGQA- 9109

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

30 JAN 1953

DATE: 27 January 1953

TO : Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

SUBJECT: GENERAL REDSOX/Operational

SPECIFIC Affidavit of Aleksei KURGVEL
(Reference: EGMA-3175)

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE
MICROFILMED

1. Transmitted herewith a copy of an affidavit executed by Aleksei KURGVEL.
2. This affidavit was removed from EGMA-3175, thereby averting a violation of security.

Approved:

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

Distribution:
2 - SR w/att a/s
1 - EE w/o att

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

RT COPY

[Handwritten marks]
74-1-169

NOV 1951 35-82

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 JANUARY 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 84818

ROUTING	
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TO: SR REP GERMANY:
(MUNICH)(FRANKFURT)

JOHN TORPATS

SR 3264

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

CONF: SR 6

2151Z 29 JAN 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, EE 2, FI/RI 2, I&S 2, EE/FI

DIR 38168

TO: SEUNI

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: DIR

REDSOX AEBASIN

REF: MUNI 2064 (IN 31584)

1. ODACID AUTHORIZING AMCONSUL MUNI ISSUE AELUNG VISITORS VISA. REQUEST YOU OBTAIN VISA ON ESTONIAN PASSPORT.
2. ARRANGE TRANSPORT COMMERCIAL PLANE.
3. CABLE TIME, PLACE, FLIGHT NUMBER AT LEAST 2 DAYS PRIOR ARRIVAL U.S.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPT ON 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

EE DIV

I & S

MR. KNOTT

SR/FI

PEER DE SILVA

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY

COPY NO.

130A-110

130A-92

(44) 9

SEC
SECURITY INFORMATION

2 February 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO: SR/FI/DB

FROM: Chief, SR/2

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Training for Mario K. GIORDANO

1. It is requested that arrangements be made to give subject covert training beginning on or about 15 February, 1953. The program should include indoctrination in surveillance, surreptitious entry, the standard tradecraft subjects, and a w/t refresher course. If possible, the duration of the program should be about six weeks.

2. Arrangements for a training site in the Washington area should be made by TR(8).

3. Subject has worked for KUBARK nearly 1½ years in Europe. However he has never had formal tradecraft training. He is a former Estonian officer who speaks and writes relatively fluent English. It is planned to use him as an assistant in the instruction of agent personnel in the U.S. and in the preparation of operational material in the Estonian language. Covert security clearance has been granted by STC.

4. The subject is expected to arrive in the U.S. during the early part of February.

5. It is also requested that a desk and file space be provided for the subject in a DB safehouse, where he can handle classified material and where classified matters can be discussed with the subject by Headquarters personnel.

6. For any further information and discussion of the matter, please contact [redacted], Rm. 2508 J Bldg., extension 3264.

7. Attached please find Request for Covert Training, Form #51-93, for submission to TR(8).

[redacted]
for [redacted]

Attachment
Form #51-93

SEC
SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

BOA-B
(30A-111) (3)

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13 FEBRUARY 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 89239

ROUTING	
1	2
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4	<i>Board</i>
5	
6	
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TO: SR REP GERMANY;
(MUNICH)(FRANKFURT)

SR 3264

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

CONF: SR 6

2206Z 16 FEB 53

PBF
BJT

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, EE 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 40985

TO: SMUNI

INFO: CFRAN

CITE: DIR

RETSOK AEBASIN

REF: MUNI 2334 (IN 36971)

1. RE PARA 2 ~~YES~~ YES.

WY

WHAT IS IT?

2. ~~RETSOK~~ (AELING ~~ASSISTANT~~ U.S.)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SE DIV

SR/FI

PERE DE SILVA

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

130A-113

1307-85

(44)

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

Morgan
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 37918

ROUTING	
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4	<i>Board</i>
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA.
FROM: SAC, REP. MUNICH
ACTION: SR 6

ROUTINE

1403Z 15 FEB 53

B.F.
JT
Reply

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PF 2, EE 2, I&S 2, FI/RI 2

MUNI 2365

TO: DIR

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX AEBASIN

RE: DIR 38163 (OUT 34813)

1. VISA ISSUED BUT CONSULATE ANTICIPATES ¹⁴⁴⁵ ODURGE DIFFICULTIES ON ARRIVAL U.S. UNLESS ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH ODURGE, SINCE EST PASSPORT VALID ONLY TO 30 APRIL.

2. ALTERNATIVES:

- A. PREARRANGE WITH ODURGE
- B. USE BERLIN TTD INSTEAD OF EST DOCUMENT
- C. SEND EST PASSPORT LOND FOR EXTENSION

3. SUBJECT CAN LEAVE IMMEDIATELY UNDER A OR B. DELAY FOR C ABOUT TWO WEEKS. ADVISE.

4. CONSULATE HAS CABLED STATE REQUESTING COMMENTS ON PARA 1 ABOVE

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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FORM NO. 35.82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 FEBRUARY 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

89874

ROUTING	
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TO: SR REP GERMANY:
(MUNICH)(FRANKFURT)

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

CONF: SR 6

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, EE 2, FI/RI 2, I&S 2

C

]

SR

3264

ROUTINE

2205Z 18 FEB 53

PF
JT ✓

DIR 41422

TO: SMUNI

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: DIR

REDSOX ARBASIN

REF: A. MUNI 2365 (IN 37618) B. ~~DIR 38168 (OUT 84848)~~

HTL

1. USE BERLIN TTD. AMCONSUL MUNI INFORMED BY ODACIP.
(DIR 38168 (OUT 84848));
2. PLS COMPLY REF B PARA 3.

HTL

^

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

EE DTV

SR/PT

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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COPY NO.

130A-115

130A-07

9
744)

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

17 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/TDS

ATTENTION : []

SUBJECT : Special Training of Mario K. Giordano

1. It is requested that a covert training course be arranged by your office for an indigenous, contract employee to be used in Project AERASIN in this country.

2. Under the anticipated operational plans of SR division, there is a need for capable and thoroughly trained instructors who could instruct AERASIN agent trainees in Tradecraft and other subjects and who might serve as translators of agent materials. It is requested, therefore, that the above named subject be trained by your office as soon as practicable.

3. Attached is a Request for Covert Training, Form 51-93, with particulars as regards employee's background and list of subjects in which training is desired. Giordano has been granted covert security clearance by STC.

4. Please direct all inquiries in connection with this request to [] 1510 J Building, Ext. 3608.

[]
Chief, SR/100

Attachment

SR/DOB/WO:wdg

Distribution:

Orig & 2

[] - 1
Chrono to Liaison Office - 1
Chrono to Hdqts. Files - 1

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

130A-114
130A-8b

SECRET

REQUEST FOR COVERT TRAINING			
IMPORTANT: Student must be deep cover employee, have full security clearance, and project approved before this form is submitted.			
NAME OF STUDENT (PSEUDONYM) MARIO K. GIORDANO		THIS DATE 29 Jan. 1953	
TRAINING ALIAS (TO BE ENTERED BY CTB)		APPROVED PROJECT (NAME OR NO.)	
NAME OF OPERATIONS OFFICER	TELEPHONE 3264	AEBASIN	
OPERATIONS OFFICER (NAME)			
NAME OF ALTERNATE OPERATIONS OFFICER	TELEPHONE 3264	DATE OF STUDENT'S SECURITY APPROVAL 12 Jan. 1953	
STUDENT'S BACKGROUND			
U.S. CITIZEN <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	AGE 49	MARITAL STATUS Married	FORMAL EDUCATION COMPLETED (HIGHEST) High School-College
LANGUAGE QUALIFICATIONS Estonian, Russian, German, English		FLUENT ENGLISH Read <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO Write <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO Speak <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
PREVIOUS CONNECTIONS WITH ANY U.S. OR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, OR SECURITY SERVICE (GIVE NAMES, DATES AND GENERAL NATURE OF DUTIES PERFORMED) 16 Sept. 47 - 20 Oct. 1949 Inspector & Director D Peamp. Germany 27 Oct. 1949 - 30 Sept. 1951 IRO Documentation Center " 1 Oct. 1951 - present KNBARK employe, Munich, Germany			
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ANY EXPERIENCE OR QUALIFICATIONS FITTING STUDENT FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT Area and language knowledge and previous experience in agent training, including radio operation			
GENERAL INFORMATION OF ASSISTANCE IN DETERMINING INSTRUCTOR'S APPROACH Specific approach will be decided in subsequent conferences with TR-DB on technical subjects.			
GEOGRAPHICAL ASSIGNMENT			
COUNTRY OR AREA WHERE STUDENT WILL OPERATE U.S.		STUDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF AREA - Subject has native knowledge of area in which opn. is to take place <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> RESEARCH AND STUDY IN AREA FOR _____ YEARS	
STUDENT'S STATUS			
IS STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		IS CAREER AGENT <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO IF "NO", BRIEFLY EXPLAIN: Covert associate	
IF CAREER AGENT CONTRACT PROVIDES			
DEATH BENEFITS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		HOSPITALIZATION EXPENSES <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
DISABILITY BENEFITS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		MEDICAL EXPENSES <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	

FORM NO. 51-93
APR 1950

SECRET

SECRET

COVER, OBJECTIVES AND DUTIES		
STUDENT TO LIVE WITH FAMILY DURING TRAINING <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	STUDENT TO FOLLOW NORMAL BUSINESS ROUTINE DURING TRAINING <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF COVER UNDER WHICH STUDENT WILL OPERATE <i>U.S. Government translator</i>		
LIST PRIMARY OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED IN FIELD <i>Training in tradecraft - instructing agents, and as an interpreter in Commo instruction, when called upon by DPB. Collation and preparation of operational material in native language. Consultant on operational area.</i>		
SCHEDULE		
TRAINING TO START (DATE)	TRAINING TO BE COMPLETED (DATE)	RECOMMENDED CITY FOR TRAINING (CONSISTENT WITH COVER) <i>Washington, DC</i>
STUDENT AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FULL TIME <input type="checkbox"/> PART TIME - INDICATE PORTION OF DAY OR WEEK AVAILABLE:		
TRAINING SUBJECTS (CHECK THOSE TO BE GIVEN)		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SECURITY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INTRA-FIELD COMMUNICATIONS	MICROFILMED NOV 1950
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COVER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RECRUITING AGENTS	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBSERVATION AND DESCRIPTION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TRAINING OF AGENTS	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INTERVIEWING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AGENT MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INTERROGATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOUBLE AGENT MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GENERAL CI METHODS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REPORTING	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SURVEILLANCE	<input type="checkbox"/> CE OPERATIONS	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONES AND MIKES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMMUNIST THEORY	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTACTING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SOVIET I.S.	
<input type="checkbox"/> INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF OTHER COUNTRIES (specify) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Border Crossing</i>		
SPECIALIZED COURSES: indicate by an F, R, or C, on the lines provided, whether instruction is to be familiarization, refresher or comprehensive.		
<input type="checkbox"/> CRYPTOGRAPHIC TRAINING (CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE OBTAINED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO)		
<input type="checkbox"/> PHOTOGRAPHY		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> S/W <i>C</i>		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> W/T <i>R</i>		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE METHODS <i>C</i>		
STUDENT'S PARTICULAR ATTRIBUTES OR APTITUDES TO BE OBSERVED OR EVALUATED IN TRAINING		
<i>Please direct all queries in connection with this request to</i>		
AUTHORITY	<i>1510 J Bldg, X-3808</i>	
SIGNATURE		AUTHORIZED REQUESTOR

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

P.7511

18 February 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO: Special Contracting Officer
VIA: FI Plans/Project Branch
FROM: Chief, SR/2
SUBJECT: GIORDANO, Mario K.

1. The subject's contract, dated 5 September 1952, paragraph 8 stipulates that it is effective for one year or no longer than the subject's residence in Germany, whichever period is shorter.
2. Since the subject is to leave Germany within a few days for the U.S., it is requested that the following part of paragraph 8 in the contract be deleted: "a period no longer than your residence in Germany or...", and "whichever period is shorter".
3. This request is made in order to avoid complications with the subject's salary between the time of leaving Germany and the date of signing a new contract.
4. Request for a new contract for the subject will be submitted shortly by this office.

SC 7

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

P.7121

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

COVERT PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACT
INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

Complete Only Applicable Blanks Case Officer []
Tele. Ext. 3264
Date 18 February 1953

I. General

- A. Pseudonym Mario K. Giordano B. Project ABRASIN
- C. Staff Agent , Career Agent , Contract Agent x,
Contract Employee , Consultant , Covert Detail ,
Other (see CFR, Part 11.1) Covert associate
- D. Is ultimate conversion to staff status anticipated? no
- E. Is the individual presently engaged by CIA in any
capacity? yes Describe Agent instructor
- F. Clearance: Security x, O/C , P.O.C. Date 1 Jan 53
- G. T/O: Does this individual block a project T/O slot? no
Slot No.
- H. Acknowledgement of pseudonym on file in SR/2

II. Proposed Assignment

- A. Duties (cutout, courier, reports, liaison and contacts,
major or part-time operational duties, administrative, etc.)
Principal Indigenous Agent Instructor
- B. Anticipated Duration Indefinite
- C. Permanent Post (City and Country) U.S.A.

III. Personal Qualifications

- A. Citizenship Estonian B. Age 50
- C. Normal Resident (City and Country) N.Y. City, U.S.A.
- D. Marital Status Married E. Number of dependents
(including spouse) 3
- E. Education (check) High School x, College x, Post Grad-
uate x
- G. Military Status: Retired x, Reserve , Draft eligible
- H. (1) Highest salary earned (2) Last salary earned
\$4,200.00
- I. Special qualifications for assignment (area experience, lan-
guage, contacts, technical or professional skills, general
proven abilities) Former Estonian General Staff Officer,
W/T experience. Trained infiltration missions into USSR, area
experience, language, confidence of prospective agents in the
subject's skills and patriotism.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

S-E-C-R-E-T

130832

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

IV. Cover Activity Proposed

- A. U.S. Government _____ Other _____
B. CIA Proprietary x _____
 CIA Subsidized _____
C. Does the individual have a cover activity which was previously established without the assistance of CIA and which will be continued? no
D. If the answer to (C) is no, explain CIA part in establishing the cover, indicating the amount of compensation which will be paid by the cover activity for bona fide services with reimbursement from CIA. Cover will be Department of Defense special translator and consultant. This cover has been set up by CIA SR/DB
E. Will any portion of the compensation or allowance paid by the cover activity be offset against amounts due from CIA? no
If so, guaranteed minimum _____

V. Special Field Conditions

- A. Will the agent be able to make frequent contact with a CIA base possessing forms and regulations? Yes x No _____
B. If so, does the base have adequate communication facilities? yes
C. Would detection of the possession of operational data probably result in the arrest of the individual or jeopardy to his safety? Yes _____ No x

Emoluments and Conditions of Employment
(Add "R" within (), if reimbursable by CIA)

VI. Compensation:

	CIA	COVER	
A. Basic	\$ 4800 p.a.	\$ _____	()
B. Additional (Post Differential)	\$ _____	\$ _____	()
C. Profit participation or bonus	\$ _____	\$ _____	()
D. Total	\$ 4800 p.a.	\$ _____	()

VII. Quarters

Furnished by: Govt. _____ Cover _____ Individual x

- 2 -

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

VIII. Allowances: (Normally granted only to residents of the United States)

	CIA	COVER
A. Living-quarters	\$ _____	\$ _____ ()
B. Cost-of-living	\$ _____	\$ _____ ()
C. Other	\$ _____	\$ _____ ()
D. Total	\$ _____	\$ _____ ()
E. Basis (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____	(per CIA Regs.) (Sub. Compliance)	(Other)

IX. Operational Expenses: (Check proper space. If maximum limit, give dollar value.)

- A. Purchase of information. Yes No _____
- B. Entertainment. Yes No _____ Limit Depends on specific assignment
- C. Use of personal vehicle basis no
- D. Other (describe) per diem & travel allowance limit
to be paid when sent on official (amount) _____
trips.

X. Travel Expenses:

- A. Individual with dependents without dependents _____
- B. If "with" dependents, identify relationship life and son
- C. Household effects From N.Y. to Washington area up to \$300.00
- D. Personal vehicle _____
- E. Will any travel expense be paid by cover? (Describe and add "R" if reimbursable.) _____
- F. Basis (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____
(per CIA Regs.) (Sub. Compliance) (Other)

XI. Miscellaneous Benefits: (Except in special cases, applicable only to Staff and Career Agents. Check as appropriate.)

- A. Death and Disability:
 - (1) Per Federal Employees' Compensation Act
 - (2) Other (give details) \$5,000 according to contract 5 Sept. 53
- B. Leave: (If other than per CIA or State Dept. regulations, give amounts) In accordance with CIA Regulations
- C. Retirement Reserve
- D. Continuance pay and allowance per Missing Persons Act _____
- E. Overseas Insurance:
 - (1) Life _____
 - (2) Hospitalization _____
- F. Rehabilitation rights _____

- 3 -

*No. This benefit reserved for
S-E-C-R-E-T agents on hazardous missions in
Security Information the field.*

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

XII. Term

- A. Duration of contract one year
B. Effective date of contract:
(1) On execution (check) x (2) Other (specify) _____
C. Renewable: Yes x No _____
D. Termination Notice 15 days or immediately in case of security
(number of days, if any) breach
E. Forfeiture of return travel for resignation prior to contract
term. Yes _____ No _____ (Explain) _____

XIII. Additional or unusual requirements, justifications or explanations.

XIV. Will agent take title to CIA property? Yes _____ No x

[]
Approving Officer

[]
Signature of Case Officer

P.7525

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

18 February 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO: Special Contracting Officer
THROUGH: FI Plans/Projects Branch
FROM: Acting Chief, SR/2
SUBJECT: Request New Contract for Mario K. GIORDANO

1. Attached herewith is a complete form requesting a new contract be made for Mario K. GIORDANO.
2. The subject is due to arrive into the United States in the course of a few days.
3. The existing contract, dated 5 September 1952, effective for one year or for a period no longer than the subject's residence in Germany, whichever period is shorter, will expire on the date of his departure from Germany.
4. In order to have the subject covered by contract for financial and security reasons, it is suggested that a new contract be dated from the approximate date of his departure, which is 22 February 1953.
5. At the time of signing this contract, 5 September 1952, it was agreed that the subject's salary will be increased from \$4,200 per annum to \$4,800, upon his arrival into the United States, when he will be actively engaged in agent training.
6. Upon his arrival the subject will become actively engaged in agent training activities and therefore we request that the salary increase be included in the new contract. Besides the subject will have a considerable increase in his rental payments when he moves himself and his family into the Washington area from New York, which was foreseen during the negotiations of 1952 contract.

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

JT/lsh

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO 83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 39116

ROUTING	
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TO: DIRECTOR CIA

FROM: SR REP MUNICH

ROUTINE

2335Z 19 FEB 53

ACTION: SR 6

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, EE 2, FI/RI 2

BF
JT

MUNI 2439

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX AEBASIN

RE: DIR 40985 (OUT 89239)

1. RE PARA 1, AELUNG HAS NO INFO.

2. RE PARA 2, AELUNG ISSUED VISA FOR ESTONIAN PASSPORT.

ETA IDLEWILD AIRPORT 1135 AM 26 FEB, PANAM FLIGHT 123.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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COPY NO. 130A-116
130A-88 (4)

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

Secret
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 FEB 53

SECRET

IN 40307

SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING	
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP MUNICH
 ACTION: SR 6
 INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, EE 2, FI/RI 2

ROUTINE
 1311Z 25 FEB 53

*BTF
JT*

SMUNI 2486

TO: DIR INFO:SFRAN CITE: SMUNI

REDSOX AEBASIN

IMMEDIATE ACTION

PARA 2 MUNI 2439 (IN 39116) NEW ETA: 26 FEB 1000 AM NYT
 PANAM FLIGHT NO 101.

END OF MESSAGE

Alien affairs in Ir S notified of change

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 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2008

SECRET
 SECURITY INFORMATION

30A-29
136A-117

COPY NO.

(4)

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AIR

^{Kuigoch}
Security Information
SECRET

EGMA 3915

Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)
Chief of Base, Munich
Operational/REDSOX/AEBASIN
Forwarding of AELUNG Files

26 February 1953
Attn: []

Ref: EGQW 3215, EGMA 3175

1. With the departure of AELUNG for the U.S. on 25 February, we are forwarding the remaining AELUNG files to Headquarters. These files are for Headquarters retention except for two items in Attachment D (Parcel No. 4) which AELUNG requests be returned to him: (1) Correspondence File and (2) Map of Estonia.
2. Attachment A lists in detail the contents of Attachments B through F (shown in Attachment A as parcels No. 1 through No. 5).

Approved:

Distribution:
 2 SR w/1 ea Att A and (1 only Att B,C,D,E,F S/c)
 1 EE w/Att A
 3 COM w/Att A
 2 [] w/1 ea Att A

RECEIVED
FEB 27 1953

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
COPY

130A-90
130A-118 (2)
74-61-1-14

Security Information
SECRET

Attachment A to BGMA 3915

Content of Parcels.

- No 1. Notes concerning the districts of SAAREMAA, HIIMUMAA, PÄRNUMAA, LÄÄNEMAA, VIILJANDIMAA, JÄRVAMAA, VALGAMAA and VÖRUMAA, including the towns in these districts.
A few copies of the daily "Rahva Hääl"
- No 2. Notes concerning the districts of HARJUMAA, Virumaa, TARTUMAA, JÕGEVAMAA, JÕHVIMAA, the towns in these districts and the town of NARVA.
Notes of larger size, the old and new ones.
" concerning the Russians in different districts.
A few copies of "Rahva Hääl", the booklets "Tõde Kodumaalt" and "Uuesti Kodumaal.". 3 copies of "Pilt ja Sõna".
- No 3. Notes concerning TALLINN, and "Location Unknown".
" E 617-999, L 001-021, P.917-999, Q 300-429 with the sign " - "
" D 001-399, cuttings from "Rahva Hääl"
Exposes concerning SAAREMAA, HIIMUMAA and PÄRNUMAA.
One Correspondence - File.
One Map of Estonia 1:300000
A few copies of RAHVA HÄÄL, and some old notes.
- No 4. Notes of General Register from "A" to "U".
" D 401-999 and F2J 001-629 (cuttings from Rahva Hääl.)
Notes "P" and "Q" with the sign "+", complete set.
one rubber stamp "Pasport võdan"
A few copies of "Rahva Hääl" and "Sirp ja Vasar"
- No 5. Notes of General Register from "V" to the end.
" " Russians, General Register - complete.
" "K" 110-999, with the sign "-"
" concerning Tallinn, the set "/"
Two booklets "Tõde Kodumaalt" - newspapers.

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information
Date:

Feb 1953

Mr. Mario Giordano

Dear Mr. Giordano:

Reference is made to your contract effective 5 September 1952 with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, for the purchase of information and services of a confidential nature.

Effective 23 February 1953 said contract is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto and in lieu thereof the following contract is substituted:

The United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, hereby contracts with you as a covert associate for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and service you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of \$4800 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to CIA. Taxes will be withheld from this amount and submitted by CIA in the name of the "United States Government". You will report the source of such income as directed by CIA.

2. Travel. (a) You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses from your permanent post of duty overseas to the United States. Further, you will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence during such travel.

(b) CIA will advance or reimburse you funds, not to exceed a total of \$300, for the travel and transportation expenses of your dependents and their household effects from the New York, New York area to the Washington, D. C. area.

(c) You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such domestic travel as may be directed or authorized by CIA. This will include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel while away from Washington, D. C. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under these sub-paragraphs must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with CIA regulations.

3. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information as specifically approved by CIA. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with CIA regulations.

4. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, assigns, or legal representatives under

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this paragraph will be processed by CIA in its discretion and in such manner as not to impair the past, present, or future security of you or CIA.

(b) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to CIA employees. Such leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of CIA.

(c) Civil Service Retirement deductions will not be made from your wages since your employment hereunder is not a covered employment under the Civil Service Retirement Act. However, your status is that of an employee of the United States Government paid from Government funds. Therefore, if in the future you are employed by the United States Government in a status covered by the Civil Service Retirement Act, periods of service under this contract will be available as creditable service for retirement purposes, upon deposit by you of a sum equal to the total deductions which would have been made had you been under the Civil Service Retirement Act during the period you serve under this contract.

5. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by CIA to evidence this relationship.

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by CIA from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

7. Instructions. Instructions received by you from CIA in briefing or training are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

8. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

9. Term. This contract is effective as of 24 Feb. '53, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated by CIA either:

- (a) By 15 days actual notice to you from CIA, or
- (b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from CIA accepted by you.

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Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY _____
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:



Mario K. Giordano

APPROVED:

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Security Information

Date 9/3/53

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, FINANCE DIVISION
(Attention: CERTIFYING OFFICER) *K. Antonio Giordano*
SUBJECT: Covert Personal Services Contract with _____
(Pseudonym)

A Covert Personal Services Contract has been negotiated with the agent whose pseudonym appears above. The following information is furnished for your convenience:

Employed under Project AE-BASIN Project Symbol 3420-53-013
Covert associate (Cryptonym) Number _____
Type of Agent _____ (See CFR 14.1)
Nationality: U.S. _____ Alien, 1st papers _____ Other _____
Type of Cover: U.S. Govt. _____ Other CIA Proprietary

The agent has signed the attached statement concerning the disposition of his pay.

Remarks:

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

[] 3264

Case Officer/Telephone Extension

Division Chief

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

130331

Copy (in file)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

10 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/TRS
ATTENTION : []
SUBJECT : Special Training of Mario Giordano
REFERENCE : Memorandum Same Subject 17 February 1953

1. In compliance with verbal request made to [] by [] of your office, a formal request for special training of the subject to be used in Project AEBASIN in this country is made hereby.

2. Subject will be used as an instructor in Tradecraft and other subjects of AEBASIN agent trainees and as a translator of training materials for the same project.

3. It is requested that training of the subject begin at the earliest possible date to meet the requirements of SR Division. This request has precedence over that contained in memorandum of 18 Dec 52 addressed to you and requesting special training of instructors for Project AERODYNAMIC.

4. It is requested that the duration of this training project be of approximately three weeks and that the following subjects be included in the projected course of instructions:

- a. Training Techniques and Methods
- b. Assessment and Recruitment of Agents
- c. Cover and Security
- d. Tradecraft to include the following:
 - (1) Clandestine Communications
 - (2) Agent Handling
 - (3) Observation and Description
 - (4) Reporting
 - (5) Surveillance

5. The following is biographical information on subject named above:

Name: Mario Giordano
Nationality: Estonian
Age: 49
Occupational Background: University Graduate
Language: Estonian, Russian, German and English

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DATE 2006

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(1) SECURITY INFORMATION

Copy

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SECURITY INFORMATION

6. Covert security clearance has been granted to subject by Staff C on 12 January 1953. Subject will use U.S. Government cover, that of translator for Department of Defense.

7. Please refer all questions regarding this request to [redacted], 1512 "J" Building, Extension 3808.

[redacted] Chief, SR/DOB]

SR/DB/WO;wdg;ds
Distribution
[redacted] - 1
[redacted] - 1
[redacted] - 2
DB Files - 2
Chrono - 2

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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17 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB

SUBJECT: Special Project Training Plan for Project
AEBASIN.

GIORDANO

1. The following outlines the Special Project Training Plan for Project AEBASIN.

1. Originator: SR/DOB

2. Approvals: CSR/DOB; SR/RX; Ops Training/FI;
STC; DD/TRS

3. Case Officer: [redacted] 1512 "J" Bldg.
Extension 3808

4. Chief Instructor: [redacted]

5. Purpose: To train one Estonian in Tradecraft and allied subjects so that, upon completion of the training period, he will be qualified to instruct and train others and act as a translator of training materials for Project AEBASIN.

6. Clearances: SPB has been advised by SR that Staff C clearance regarding the trainee has been obtained. A copy of this memorandum is being submitted to Staff C for clearance and approval of the training program.

7. Number of Trainees: One

8. Nationality: Estonian

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9. Biographical Data: The only information SPB possesses regarding the trainee is as follows:
Name - Mario K. Giordano (Pseudonym)
Nationality - Estonian
Age - Forty-nine
Educational Background - High School and University graduate
Language - Estonian, Russian, German and English.
10. Time Table: Training will commence on Thursday, 19 March 1953 and will be completed on or about Friday, 3 April 1953.
11. Cover: Trainee will use U. S. Government cover, that of translator for the Department of Defense.
12. Training Area: The training will take place in a safehouse in Washington, D. C. under the control of SPB.
13. Language of Instruction: English
14. Courses of Instruction: Appendix I
15. Finances: Financial arrangements are being handled by SR/DOB.

2. Copies of this memorandum are distributed by hand as follows:

Original and 1 - Chief, SR/DOB (*note: one copy given Walt or Schirmer's office*)
1 - DD/TRS
1 - Staff C
2 - SPB/TRS

[
]]
Chief, Special Projects Branch, TRS

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APPENDIX I

PROJECT AEBASIN

SCHEDULE OF INSTRUCTION

19 March through 27 March 1953 - Tradecraft Training (The material presented during this week is taken from the Basic Training Tradecraft Manual prepared by TDS/TRS)

- (1) Nature and Characteristics of Clandestine Activity
Clandestine Activity of the Individual and the Group
Clandestine Activity of the Sovereign State
Relationship of Overt to Covert Activity
Elements of Clandestine Activity
- (2) The Nature of Clandestine Action (By Political Entities)
- (3) Principles of Organization for Clandestine Activity
Concepts of Compartmentation
- (4) Concepts of Cover and Concealment
Requirements of Cover
The Cover Problem as Applied to Individuals, Groups
- (5) Basic Obstacles to Clandestine Activity
Active Opposition
Administrative and National Boundaries as a means
of Compartmentation
- (6) Clandestine Communications
Introduction and Concepts of Clandestine Communications
Criteria for Clandestine Communications
Methods of Clandestine Communications
Principles in the Use of Codes, Secret Writing, Micro-
photography and Ciphers
Cutout Devices: Accommodation Address, Drops, The
Courier, The Intermediary or Cutout
The Personal Meeting
Signals
The Safehouse

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(7) Agent Personnel
Introduction
Agents and Their Functions

(8) Spotting
Check and Investigation
Selection of Agents
Recruiting Methods
Training, Briefing and Debriefing
Handling of Agents
Termination of Agents

30 March - 1 April - Instruction Training - Principles, Outlines,
Aides, etc.

2 April - Observation, Description and Reporting

3 April - Surveillance (Physical and Technical)

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13 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB

ATTENTION: ()

SUBJECT: Training Report on Special Project AEBASIN

1. Pursuant to a request received from your office, the Special Projects Branch of TRS arranged a training program for student Alex covering a period from 19 March through 3 April 1953. This training was conducted as scheduled, a copy of which has been previously furnished to you.

2. The instructors who participated in this Project have reported that Alex was a most attentive student; cooperative, interested and participated freely in discussions concerning the topic at hand. He was somewhat self-conscious in regard to his knowledge and understanding of the English language but the persons dealing with him felt he understood and comprehended all the instruction given.

3. Alex seems adequately equipped both in theory and personal experience to meet his assignment with a high degree of skill and competence. His approach to his personal participation in intelligence work appears to be quite stable. He employed sound logic in arriving at conclusions and seems quite flexible and able to adapt himself to meet most situations. His implied motivation is of the highest order. He is amiable and sincere and should experience little difficulty in influencing others. Although he is modest, almost to a fault, he leaves the impression that he feels himself to be fully competent to fulfill his responsibilities.


4. It is recommended that in the future, American personnel dealing with Alex should undertake to build his confidence relative to American competence in the field of intelligence. Although no actual criticism

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of American methods or techniques were voiced, there were references implying rather pointedly that, on the basis of past experience, some doubt does exist especially in the matter of administration and handling by American personnel.

5. At the close of the training program the Subject expressed a desire to have available to him certain areas in which Survival, Caching, Weapons, Concealment Devices and First Aid training could be given.


Chief, Special Projects Branch, TRS

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Chief, SR/DOB
1 - SPB Files

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27 May 1953

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief, DOB/AR
FROM : Chief, Communications Section, DOB
SUBJECT: Communications Assessment Report
AELUNG

1. The results of the code aptitude and mathematics tests given to AELUNG were as follows:

Code Aptitude - 99.4%
Mathematics - 90 %

2. AELUNG should have no trouble in learning the Morse code nor should he find any difficulty in learning the technical aspects of commo training.

Assessor

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VIA: ATR
(Specify air or sea pouch)

Dispatch No. EGMA-

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

To : Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

Date 19. Juni 1953

FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

Attn: []

INFO: COM

SUBJECT: GENERAL- REDSOX/AEBASIN
SPECIFIC- Overpayment in Salary of AELUNG

1. Due to a misinterpretation of the exchange rates used in paying AELUNG locally according to his Headquarter's contract, he was paid 1000 DM on 6 November 1952 for the months of September and October 1952. Subsequent interpretation made it clear that he should actually have received 344.72 DM for September and 420 DM for October (DIR-34755).

2. This overpayment was made by the undersigned, whom AELUNG knew as "Emil." AELUNG understood at the time that some adjustment would probably be necessary, and that it would probably not be to his favor.

3. It is requested that AELUNG be asked to reimburse this amount, either in DM (235.28) or dollars (\$56.00). The amount should then be T/A'd to MOB/Finance as a credit to [] account.

E -]

19 June 1953

Distribution:

2 - SR (1 handcarried by []
1 - EE
3 - COM
2 - MOB

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

16-68049-1 GPO

Form W-4
(Revised October 1948)
U.S. Treasury Department
Internal Revenue Service

EMPLOYEE'S WITHHOLDING EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE

Employer: Keep this certificate in your files.

(Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages)

Print full name ALEXEI KURGVEL Social Security No. _____

Print home address 30-70 34th St. ASTORIA LI. NY

FILE THIS FORM WITH YOUR EMPLOYER. Otherwise, he is required by law to withhold tax from your wages without exemption.

HOW TO CLAIM YOUR WITHHOLDING EXEMPTIONS

- I. If you are SINGLE, write the figure "1"
- II. If you are MARRIED, one exemption is allowed for the husband and one exemption for the wife.
 - (a) If you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2"
 - (b) If you claim one of these exemptions, write the figure "1"
 - (c) If you claim neither of these exemptions, write "0"
- III. Additional exemptions for age and blindness:
 - (a) If you or your wife will be 65 years of age or older at the end of the year, and you claim this exemption, write the figure "1"; if both will be 65 or older, and you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2"
 - (b) If you or your wife are blind, and you claim this exemption, write the figure "1"; if both are blind, and you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2"
- IV. If during the year you will provide more than one-half of the support of persons closely related to you, write the number of such dependents. (See instruction 3 on other side.)
- V. Add the number of exemptions which you have claimed above and write the total

1
1
2
3

I CERTIFY that the number of withholding exemptions claimed on this certificate does not exceed the number to which I am entitled.

Dated 24 June, 1953 (Signature) Alexei Kurgvel

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

ATTENTION: Chief, SR/2
[redacted], Room 2508 J Bldg.
Chief, Special Security Division

24 AUG 1953

LETTER ADDRESS
#94582

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 20 July 1953 requesting that a Post Office box be established in the Washington, D. C. area.

2. Confirming verbal advice to [redacted] of your office on 20 August 1953, the following Post Office box has been established:

[redacted]

3. This box will be serviced at least twice a week and will be maintained for a period of one year. All expenses will be charged to Project AEBASIN/FI, Finance No. [redacted]. When mail is received at this Post Office box, [redacted] or [redacted] Room 2508 J Building, extension 3204, will be notified.

4. Any questions you may have concerning the establishment or servicing of this box may be referred to [redacted], 2706 I Building, extension 2425.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

[redacted]

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DATE 2006

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1308-34 1308-34

SECURITY INFORMATION

10 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB

SUBJECT [] and Mario K. Giordano

In accordance with the policy of transferring indigenous instructors from the Branch Projects under which they were recruited, prior to the establishment of DOB, to DOB, it is requested that subject individuals be transferred at the earliest opportune time from Project AERASIN to the relevant DOB Project.

[]
Chief, SR/2

GRB:pw

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DATE 2008

SECURITY INFORMATION

1308-37 1308-35

SECURITY INFORMATION

15 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Finance Division
Agent Payroll Section
Attn: []

REFERENCE : EGMA 8276, 19 June 1953

SUBJECT : Mario K. Giordano - Transmittal of Refund of
Overpayment in the Field

1. Reference dispatch states that while Subject was employed in the field he was overpaid \$56.00 by []. Subject agrees to the accuracy of this statement and has refunded to this Branch the amount of overpayment.

2. Please deposit the enclosed \$56.00 to [] account. This Branch will forward a dispatch to the field stating the subject has paid the \$56.00 and that the money has been deposited to [] account.

3. Attached are field vouchers 7706, 7764 and 06888 covering expenses, salary and bonus for Subject.

h. For any further information, please contact []
2508 "J" Bldg., extension 3264.

[]
Chief, SR/2

Attachments
As noted above.

Distribution:
FD.....2
SR/BF.....1
SR/2.....2

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1308-38 1305-36

DATE 21 Sep 1953 RECEIPT NUMBER A286 (2004)
THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF \$ 56.00 DOLLARS
FROM Fifties inc. and 200
FOR CV 144.2 Ret on Adv. x 8547

Low 10.5 [U]
OFFICIALS
1308-37 1308-39

FORM NO. 33-14
FEB 1947

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24 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Transportation Division
Attn: []

SUBJECT : Aleksai KUROVEL's Luggage Transportation Costs.

*P.W.
No invoice
by available
Bill:
1.61*

1. Aleksai KUROVEL, a non-citizen employee of this Branch, was hired in Germany and, after a period of employment there, was transferred to the United States at the request of SR Division. Mr. KUROVEL's contract, signed 24 February 1953, specifically commits the U.S. Government to pay the cost of transportation of his luggage and household goods.

2. Mr. KUROVEL is working at present for the SR/2 Branch as an instructor in Project AEBASIS, appropriation #14-3420-53-013. The cost of transportation of Mr. KUROVEL's luggage should be charged to that account.

3. SR/2 would appreciate receiving a copy of the invoice.

[]

[]
Chief, SR/2

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8 October 1953

PROJECT: AEBASIN

PSEUDONYM: Mario K. Giordano

CRYPTONYM: AE-LUNG (no longer in use)

ALIASES: Mr. Clayton at the Safe Office
Mr. Alex Kuper on Project TU#105

WORK ASSIGNMENT: Consultant, Interpreter, Instructor on TU #105

SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT: Preparation of Training Materials, Lectures for TU#105
Communications Interpreter and Translator on the Project

DATE OF BIRTH: 13 September 1904

PLACE OF BIRTH: Saaremaa, Estonia

LANGUAGE FACILITY: Estonian - fluent
Russian - fluent
German - fluent
English - fair
Finnish and Polish - slight

Contracts:

23 February 1953 - 1 year for \$4,800 per year with 15 days termination notice

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Former Captain of Estonian General Staff. Approximately 26 years of intelligence experience which includes intelligence compilation, and analysis, intelligence liaison, CE interrogations, W/T training and management, recruitment and assessment of agents (Russians, Estonians, Germans, Latvians), agent training and their dispatch into the USSR prior to, during and after WW II.

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Security Information

12 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Personal File, Case of
Mario K. GIORDANO (pseudo)

1. The following are extracts from the subject file which may be considered derogatory. Your attention is respectfully invited to the fact these extracts become isolated and out of context, since they are selected to list derogatory items only. This presents a lopsided view which is more than counterbalanced in the full file. Since this is so unsatisfactory and does not achieve what we truly wish, future evaluations will be based on a ledger which will reflect "credit" as well as "debit" entries.

2. Following are the selected extracts and summaries:

In 1939, Alex was Chief of Section "A" and Deputy Chief of the IId Bureau of the Estonian General Staff in Tallinn with rank of Captain. (See document #E - Alex' undated ltr to Mr. Shipp). Was with this staff 7 years as well as 5 years with the German and Finnish Secret Services. (Ibid).

Document F, Paragraph 7 of page 1 - The Germans (the Abwehr of the Wehrmacht) helped Alex and his family out of Estonia into Germany. Alex was given a good position in the I. G. Farbenindustrie. In 1941 began work in "Abwehr I" together with the Finnish in Helsinki (Ibid, Paragraph 1 of page 2). Alex quit the Finnish Army in 1944. The Abwehr evacuated Alex' family to Germany although Alex claims he was not in the Abwehr at this time. Alex was then appointed an Estonian Liaison Officer with C-in-C of German Army Group NARVA operating in Northern Estonia. After the Germans retreated from Estonia in September 1944, Alex was again assigned to "Abwehr I", where he remained until 4 May 1945. (Ibid Paragraph 2, p. 2)

Document G, dtd 24 Aug 49: "Aleceei Kurguel is known to our station in Karlsruhe and was once considered for intelligence operations into the USSR, but the matter was not pursued because of doubt about the security of Kurguel's wartime associate, one Korv. Captain Peter Ernst Georg NEUMANN, with whom Kurguel operated in Riga and other Baltic points, dispatching agents into Soviet-controlled territory by boat and plane. DAD is being informed of these latest Kurguel approaches and asked to explore the matter further."

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Document M, Paragraph 1a: "He (Alex) worked as a w/t specialist for NEUMANN and trained agents to be dropped in Estonia and Latvia. He (Alex) has not been enlisted for operational work because of doubts about the security of his war-time associate, NEUMANN, who is probably known to Soviet authorities."..... "He (Alex) worked for the Abwehr in Finland from 1941 to 1943 and with NEUMANN in 1944 and 1945, mounting plane and boat expeditions to Estonia and Latvia."
Paragraph 4 states: "There is no information in our files on the other individuals mentioned in reference (58-CFGRG)."
Paragraph 5 states: "Check was made with IDEUCOM with negative results."

Document N, Paragraph 4c, page 2, quotes from WFFA-7049, dtd 12 Feb 51. Because of special treatment received in Bonn, it "confirms source's opinion that CELLARIUS (Alexander) has been chosen by ADENAUER and General Hans SPEIDEL (who is a good friend of CELLARIUS) as one of the chiefs of the German secret intelligence. On 7 February, in Paris, we asked [] if he had known subject (Aleksai Kurguel) during subject's visits to Finland during the war. Source stated that though he had never met him personally, he has heard of him at great length and holds the highest opinion of his intelligence potentialities, considering him one of the fifteen or twenty top intelligence men in Europe. Based on information received, subject appears to be an old hand in the intelligence field and quite closely connected with influential intelligence operators such as Cellarius and Saarsen. From all indications, Cellarius appears to have been chosen by Adenauer and Speidel for an important post in the West German intelligence service now being formed."

Document P. Aleksai Kurguel granted OC on 30 Jun 51 as "an agent acting as Operational Staff Chief on operations out of Germany into Estonia under project ICHOMELY. This clearance is granted on the CONDITION that the results of any contemplated field checks will be sent to this office for transmittal to R&S. The files reflect in a report from Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, that in June 1950 subject was not enlisted for operational work because of doubts about the security of his war-time associate, Neumann, who is probably known to Soviet authorities. Another friend and associate of subject was a Colonel W. Saarsen, who was connected with the Japanese Intelligence and Estonian Intelligence from 1938-1944."

Document S, Paragraphs 2 and 3: "On three occasions when Giordano (Alex Kurguel) was interrogated re his war-time experience, he showed complete lack of emotional control and began profound weeping. Fact that Giordano considered for employment ZACABAL known to at least four persons in Hamburg. This information known because DREXEL GIBSON, D.P. Commission, brought case GIORDANO to ZACABAL Frankfurt."

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Document V: "Proceeding cautiously re GIORDANO until details arrive. However, on basis of results of carriage and personal contact, feel GIORDANO trustworthy and emotionally stable."

Document W, Paragraphs 1-3: "Impossible arrange emigration GIORDANO to U.S. as declared ineligible DP by BSI/INS under sections 10 and 13..... GIORDANO claims he was once promised emigration by our organization and as he has given up chances to emigrate to Australia and Canada on basis of that promise, he feels justifiably wronged. He had previously refused to work for JAYHAWK on basis they could not promise emigration to England. Feeling of wrong plus worry over fate of wife and child in Germany makes work with GIORDANO extremely difficult unless emigration can be arranged immediately for wife and child.....GIORDANO essential to LCHOMELY unless substitute with equal knowledge of languages and experience in clandestine operations can be obtained without delay. Feel GIORDANO highly qualified and motivated. Arrangement of emigration will increase security, control and motivation, whereas failure to arrange will lead to lack of faith, inferior work and probably necessity to break relations."

Document DD, Paragraph 2 (of a 12 Dec 51 report to [redacted]): "When GIORDANO was interrogated (in 1951) he apparently realized that his service with the German Abwehr would certainly be discovered and cause him to be rejected from immigration to the U.S. As the interrogation progressed, his nervousness increased until he reached a point where he could no longer control his emotions and began to weep. To persons who have not dealt with Displaced Persons and have not interrogated them on points which would either permit or prohibit entrance into the U.S., such emotional action would appear quite reasonable, especially when one would consider all the hardships that these displaced persons have suffered in the past ten years. However, the undersigned has interrogated countless Legionnaires and other displaced persons - some, to whom Giordano "fate" under the Germans would have seemed like a Utopia, - but seldom has the undersigned witnessed such emotional reaction as Giordano displayed during the initial as well as subsequent interrogations."

Document MM, Paragraph 5 of Enclosure A: "Captain Kurguel and his family were declared inadmissible to the United States under Sections 10 and 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of 25 June 1948, as amended, by a Board of Special Inquiry of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, convened at Westorf, Germany, 31 July 1951. The case was appealed and at a second Board of Special Inquiry - convened in Munich, 7 September 1951, Captain Kurguel's family was granted permission to immigrate to the United States but Kurguel's own status remained unchanged."

Paragraph 6 of Enclosure B: "Although he worked with the German Army Intelligence during World War II, he was opposed to the policy of the German politicians. He is somewhat prejudiced against the British because of their lack of assistance to the Estonian intelligence officers who had furnished information to the British prior to the war, and because of their lack of activity against the Soviet Union following World War II."

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Document TT: Medical Report, dtd 8 Jul 52: ".....1926 - Hydro-arthralgia (water on the knee) left knee - no recurrence ----- 1934-1938 - high alcohol consumption....."

UU

Document VV, page 4, lines 8-12: "Aside from efforts to get in touch with the AIS through Colonel Shipp and others, GIORDANO was not connected with any other intelligence service except the British for whom he collected information on Estonia from debriefings of PW's from spring 1950 to the end of summer 1950."

Lines 21-30: ".....Although Giordano has respect for authority and discipline, he is stubborn and outspoken in pursuing a cause he feels is right regardless of the authorities involved. Because of his strong sense of honor, he would pursue a course contrary to his higher authorities only with their full knowledge unless he considered that course outside the limits of his commitments. For this reason it is particularly important that commitments between Giordano and DYCLAM be stated firmly and specifically and that adherence on both sides be strictly enforced."
Lines 32-35: "....Outside his specialties he has little initiative and would require considerable direction to be productive. He is systematic and sensible except for occasional highly imaginative and equally impracticable ideas." (The next eleven lines of this same paragraph completely refutes this - which makes this particular report rather confusing. Perhaps it was a mistake in typing.)

Document EEE: "Wartime activities of Aleksel Kurguel, an Estonian nationalist who cooperated with a German Naval Intelligence Officer, Peter Ernst Georg Neumann (Captain) from 1940-1945) described in Kurguel's file. Kurguel acted as W/T specialist and trained agents to be dropped in Estonia and Latvia.....Both Karlsruhe and FDM feel Neumann, who offered his services late in 1948 and in March 1949, along with those of Kurguel, is insecure and probably known to Soviet authorities because of his wartime activities. It is believed that the Soviets have made inquiries about Neumann." (This information is undated.)

Document IIII, Paragraph 4: "It is recommended that in the future, American personnel dealing with Alex should undertake to build his confidence relative to American competence in the field of intelligence. Although no actual criticism of American methods or techniques were voiced, there were references implying rather pointedly that, on the basis of past experience, some doubt does exist especially in the matter of administration and handling by American personnel."

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Security Information

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Document 4, Paragraph 2, page 1: "In 1944 Kurguel returned to Estonia and became the IO between the Estonian Home guard and the OKW and also the IO between the Estonian SS Legion and the Wehrmacht. Later he became associated with a German Naval Intelligence Officer, Korv. Capt. Peter Ernst Georg Neumann, who was working out of Riga, Latvia. Kurguel acted as W/T Specialist for Neumann and trained agents to be dropped in Estonia and Latvia.....As one of the projects, in April, 1945, fifteen men were chosen for a special mission. These men had already been provided by Kurguel, without the knowledge of Neumann with double codes and ciphers and told that he, Kurguel, might join the British to "carry on the fight against the Russians." These men were sent in, but nothing was heard from them."

Paragraph, page 2:....."2) No Estonian sources available to this organization have ever included Kurguel in lists of prominent pro-Allied Estonian Intelligence personalities residing abroad."

Paragraph 2, page 2: "Korv. Capt. Neumann is known to our station at Karlsruhe. Late in 1948 and in March, 1949, he offered his services, and those of Kurguel, for agent operations in the Baltic, but both Karlsruhe and FBW felt that Neumann is insecure and probably known to the Soviet authorities because of his wartime activities. It is believed that Soviet authorities have been making inquiries about him. Karlsruhe has no derogatory information on Kruguel himself and felt that of the two Kurguel would carry the brunt of the work."

Document 5 (Part II, PRQ), Paragraph: ".....Giordano is inclined to stubbornness, which occasionally renders him difficult to handle. This can be counteracted by clearly defining, in writing, Giordano's job and the lines and limits of his authority in performing that job, and enforcing strict adherence to those limits."

[]
Assistant Operations Officer, T/C

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

13 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Officer, SR/DOB
ATTENTION : Operations Officer, SR/DOB
SUBJECT : Request for Technical Interview for Indigenous Contract Employees

1. It is hereby requested arrangements be made to polygraph the following indigenous contract employees, presently assigned to the Tradecraft Section for duty:

[] (Special Entry - Section 8)

2. According to our records the individuals listed in paragraph 1 above have never received a technical interview either after their arrival in the United States or during their employment with our organization.

3. The remaining personnel of the Tradecraft Section were polygraphed in the United States on the dates following their names:

(b) Mario A. GIORLANO(p) - 12 January 1953

[]

[]
Assistant Operations Offr.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

130A-97
130A-125

30 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Alexei Kuznetsov
FROM: [redacted]
SUBJECT: Regulations Governing Your Work.

1. Office Procedures.

a. You are now working for the Department of the Army, Language and Area Evaluation Section, Training Branch, G-3. Most of your work will be done here. However, there will be occasions when you will be given instructing and training assignments which may require your presence elsewhere.

b. Our office hours are 0745 to 1615 with a half hour off for lunch in the middle of the day. The staff officer in charge of all activities at this office is [redacted] will assign you all your general tasks. Special assignments within these general tasks may be assigned by other staff officers designated by [redacted] will help you handle whatever problems, personal or otherwise, you may have in connection with your work here.

c. An outside char force will keep our office spaces clean. This presents a security hazard. It is your responsibility to keep your desk and working spaces absolutely clear when you are not in your room. At the end of the working day, prior to an individual leaving the place of work, nothing will be left on top of the desk and only pencils and blank paper is left in the desk drawers.

d. At the end of the working day all material, whether produced by you or used as a reference, must be locked in the safe in the central office under the supervision of [redacted] or a designated staff officer. All paper trash, including carbons, second sheets, etc., will be placed in a special envelope and put in the safe with other classified material. The last person in the room is responsible.

e. One room of our offices serves as our library and conference room. As your work permits one hour of each day may be spent reading professional books, newspapers and periodicals in order to keep as much up-to-date in current affairs and professional matters as your duties permit.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT 1309-126(4)
DATE 2006

f. The Army has allocated each of us our own office space. This will allow you privacy and the chance to work uninterrupted. You may go into the office of another person only when it is necessary to consult with another co-worker in order to accomplish a given task.

2. Security Considerations.

a. You will use the following cover where required in your contacts.

(1) "I am employed by the Department of the Army, Language and Area Evaluation Section, Training Branch, G-3 as a translator, instructor and consultant. The name of my supervisor is [] (This is for cover purposes only.) The office telephone is LI 39520, Ext. 384. Our office is located on the second floor of Wing #7 of Guam Hall, Oklahoma Ave. and C Street N.E."

b. You will use this cover only at those times you find it necessary to do so. Details will be given only on specific request. Ordinarily you will find that the name of your employer, your supervisor and telephone number and extension will suffice.

c. It is your responsibility to report immediately all instances of the use of this cover by you including all related incidents.

3. We are all working here on a "need-to-know" basis. This means that no one, here or elsewhere, has any need to have any information regarding your background, your former work, your present work, etc., unless it is required in the performance of your duties. Not only are you not to give such information to individuals not assigned to the office but you should not ask for any information not needed to perform your work. As an example, as pointed out above, you may be given special teaching, research or training assignments. The discussion of such work is naturally forbidden except with [] or those designated by him.

4. In order to preserve the security of this office, the appearance of normalcy consistent with the cover must be maintained at all times whenever you or the premises are observed by outsiders. There will be times when our office spaces will be visited by outsiders: a building inspector, fire inspector, repairman, the char force or a person lost and trying to find his way. When this happens, preserve the appearance of normal office routine and most certainly do not carry on any conversation in a foreign tongue.

5. There is a cafeteria in Midway Hall which is located next to

Guam Hall. It is open for lunch from 1100 to 1330. If you wish to eat in the cafeteria do not go in the company of more than one co-worker. There is always the chance of slipping into using a foreign tongue if you converse in a group. This will only attract unnecessary attention to you and, as a consequence, will arouse curiosity about you, your place of work and co-workers.

6. We do not want to pry into your private life or that of your family. However, because of your status in this country and the nature of our work, there may be times when it will be necessary to discuss some aspects of your private life. Most of you are well experienced in our work and realize only too well that security is of such paramount importance that every single precaution must be exercised in order to avoid compromising yourselves and your work. It logically follows that certain rules of conduct with respect to security must always be observed. We live these rules of conduct in order to protect you, your work and yourselves and to minimize the risk of compromise. Therefore:

a. You must adhere strictly to your cover story at all times and never discuss your work with any unauthorized person, including your family and your co-workers here.

b. Avoid asking personal questions. If you do not, you will not be inviting others to ask you questions in return.

c. You must report to [] all instances of being requested or being required to give the particulars of your cover employment.

d. You must report all instances of suspected surveillance, undue interest in you and your duties by others and any similar undue interest in your family by whomsoever.

e. You must report by memorandum all changes in your personal status (financial, social, etc.). This includes such items as income from other than U.S. Government sources, indebtedness over \$100, participation in a commercial business, participation or membership in clubs or other activities of a social or political nature. The above actions and intentions to take such actions should be reported promptly.

f. You must advise us of any changes of address of telephone number.

g. You must submit to [] for approval any article, translation, or letter prior to publication or any other communications for the press you intend to give out or send.

h. You must advise us immediately in person or by phone if you become involved in a legal action, accidents requiring medical attention, traffic violations or any contact with law enforcement authorities. This will be followed by a written memorandum explaining all details as soon as practicable.

i. Finally, you must report all incidents not covered above which, in your estimation, may concern the security of our work or otherwise be of interest to the United States Government.

7. In case of emergency during working hours please call your office at LI 39520, Ext. 383. After working hours, call Oliver 4-6835. If you are at work and your family wishes to contact you in case of an emergency, instruct them to call you at LI 39520, Ext. 383, and ask for you by your family name. Since all these calls go through a central switch board English must be spoken at all times.

8. After you have read and understand the instructions contained herein, please sign the certification below.

I hereby certify that I have this date, 25 March 1954, read and fully understand the instructions contained in this letter and will observe and carry them out to the best of my ability, knowing that willfully failing to do so may result in the severance of my contract with the U.S. Government.

Oliver King

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Chief, Soviet Russia Division
Attn: Chief, SR/DOB

DATE: 24 Feb. 54

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT: Aleksei KURGVEL

1. The subject entered the United States on 26 February 1953 under Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949. A review of our files indicates that subject is employed by your office.

2. This office has the responsibility of maintaining current information on all recipients of Section 8 benefits until such time as they become U. S. citizens or have otherwise ceased to be an alien residing in the United States. In this connection, the Agency component in control of the alien should report periodically to this office the progress of the alien's rehabilitation, as well as current location, employment and any information which may have a bearing on the security of the Agency.

3. In this connection, it would be appreciated if you will submit a progress report on the subject containing the above mentioned information. The report should be submitted bi-annually until such time as the subject becomes a U. S. citizen, or is no longer under your supervision.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA:

[]
[]
Alien Affairs Officer

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET130A-29
304-127

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

Date: 24 FEB 54

C
O
P
Y

Mr. Mario K. Giordano

Dear Mr. Giordano:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Covert Associate for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for services performed pursuant to this contract, you will be compensated at the rate of \$5,000 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Taxes will be withheld from these amounts and submitted by the Government in the name of the "United States Government." You will report the source of such income as directed by the Government.

2. Travel (a) The Government will advance or reimburse you funds, not to exceed a total of \$300 for the travel and transportation expenses of your dependents and their household effects from the New York, New York area to the Washington, D.C., area.

(b) You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such domestic travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government. This will include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel while away from Washington, D.C. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under these sub-paragraphs must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations.

3. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by the Government in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to ten (10) calendar days' leave per contract year. Such leave may be accrued during the term of this contract or any renewal hereof but payment in lieu of unused leave will not be authorized. Such leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government.

(c) Civil Service Retirement deductions will not be made from your wages since your employment hereunder is not a covered employment under the Civil Service Retirement Act. However, your status is that of an employee of the United States Government paid from Government funds. Therefore, if in the future you are employed by the United States Government in a status covered by the Civil Service Retirement Act, periods of service under this contract will be available as creditable service for retirement purposes upon deposit by you of a sum equal to the total deductions which would

130B-39 (2)

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have been made had you been under the Civil Service Retirement Act during the period you serve under this contract, plus interest as provided in the rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission.

4. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents ~~which~~ may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

5. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws dated 24 June 1948 as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

6. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

7. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

8. Term. This contract is effective as of 24 February 1954, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

- (a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or
- (b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from the Government accepted by you. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By _____
Contracting Officer

Accepted:

Mario K. Giordano

APPROVED:

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Mario K. Giordano

Dear Mr. Giordano:

Reference is made to your contract effective 24 February 1954, with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature.

Effective 10 February 1955, said contract is amended by deleting the figure \$5000 in the first sentence of paragraph one entitled "Compensation" and substituting in lieu thereof the figure \$5200.

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY _____
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

*Shown to Subject by
Val on 17 Mar '55*

SECRET

130 B-42

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SCO []
29-226 Curie Hall
FROM : Special Support Staff, Medical Office
1303 J
SUBJECT: GIOEDANO, Mario K. (p)

DATE: 2 March 1954

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Office and found physically qualified for departmental duties only.
NOTE: Subject should be treated for anemia.

[]
Administrative Officer,
Special Support Staff

MD/EJC:mjs
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - SR/DOB
1 - File

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

Mr. Mario K. Giordano

Dear Mr. Giordano:

Reference is made to your contract, as amended, effective 24 February 1954 with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature.

Effective 15 October 1955, said contract, as amended, is further amended as follows:

(a) By inserting after the first sentence in paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation" the following sentence, "You shall be entitled to authorized overtime in excess of forty (40) working hours per week, in accordance with rates prescribed for Government employees earning equivalent compensation, for not to exceed twenty-six (26) hours of overtime per calendar week."

(b) By deleting from sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph three (3), entitled "Benefits" the words "ten (10) calendar days leave" and substituting in lieu thereof "fifteen (15) calendar days leave".

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY _____

APPROVED:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

SECRET

1 March 1954

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB

SUBJECT : Liquidation of Overtime Accounts of Indigenous
Contract Employees, Case [] and
Mr. Mario K. Giardano (p), for period 11 May 1953 -
19 February 1954

1. During the subject period, according to progress reports
submitted weekly, the following hours of overtime were reported:

a. By []

WEEK OF:	TOTAL HOURS WORKED	OVERTIME
11 May 53	40.00	0.00
18 May 53	42.00	2.00
25 May 53	54.50	14.50
2 June 53	77.00	37.00
8 June 53	53.00	13.00
13 June 53		
20 June 53	120.00	40.00
31 June 53	34.50	- 2.50
6 Jul 53	67.50	27.50
13 Jul 53	52.00	12.00
20 Jul 53	67.00	27.00
8 Sep 53	32.75	- 3.40
14 Sep 53	49.25	9.25
28 Sep 53	59.25	19.25
5 Oct 53	37.00	- 4.00
12 Oct 53	36.25	- 4.75
19 Oct 53	51.00	11.00
26 Oct 53	52.00	12.00
2 Nov 53	51.25	11.25
9 Nov 53	51.50	11.50
16 Nov 53	42.50	2.50
23 Nov 53	40.50	.50
30 Nov 53	42.00	2.00
7 Dec 53	46.25	6.25
14 Dec 53	43.00	3.00
21 Dec 53 (3 holidays)	26.50	-
29 Dec 53 (1 holiday)	39.25	-
4 Jan 54	49.00	9.00
11 Jan 54	47.00	7.00
18 Jan 54	46.75	6.75
25 Jan 54	55.25	15.25
1 Feb 54	46.50	6.50
8 Feb 54	55.00	15.00
15 Feb 54	40.75	.75
Total Hrs Worked	1,648.00	Total Overtime 321.75
		Amount Paid 261.00
		Total Overtime Due 380.75

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b. By Mr. Mario K. Giordano:

WEEK OF	TOTAL HOURS WORKED	OVERTIME
11 May 53	37.50	- 4.45
18 May 53	42.00	2.00
25 May 53	61.50	41.50
1 Jun 53	61.00	41.00
8 Jun 53	70.00	30.00
15 Jun 53	68.25	28.25
22 Jun 53	47.50	7.50
29 Jun 53	63.50	43.50
27 Jul 53	53.50	13.50
3 Aug 53	59.50	19.50
10 Aug 53	93.75	53.75
17 Aug 53	74.75	44.75
24 Aug 53	72.00	32.00
31 Aug 53	82.50	42.50
8 Sep 53	64.00	26.00
14 Sep 53	48.50	8.50
21 Sep 53	67.50	47.50
28 Sep 53	52.50	12.50
5 Oct 53	41.75	4.75
12 Oct 53	36.50	- 2.45
19 Oct 53	44.75	4.75
26 Oct 53	40.25	.25
2 Nov 53	57.50	17.50
9 Nov 53	60.75	20.75
16 Nov 53	62.75	22.75
23 Nov 53	51.50	11.50
30 Nov 53	65.25	25.25
7 Dec 53	57.50	17.50
14 Dec 53	59.00	19.00
21 Dec 53 (Holiday)	35.00	-
28 Dec - 30 Dec 53 (Holidays)		- 44.00 (24.00)
4 Jan 54	53.50	13.50
11 Jan 54	51.00	11.00
18 Jan 54	52.00	12.00
25 Jan 54	48.50	8.50
1 Feb 54	49.25	9.25
8 Feb 54	97.75	57.75
15 Feb 54	38.75	- 1.25
Total Hrs Worked 2,161.00		Total O/T 693.25
		31.25
		<u>662.00</u>

SECRET

SECRET

2. Should these overtime accounts be liquidated by authorizing the use of compensatory time, [] would be entitled to 38 days leave and Mr. Giordano to 83 days. Based on the appropriate pay scales for each of these employees the loss of [] services for 38 days (salary-wise) would cost this Base approximately \$467.40; Mr. Giordano's approximately \$1,020.90.

3. Should these overtime accounts be liquidated by authorizing a lump sum payment at \$1.77 per overtime hour, [] would be entitled to approximately \$535.00 less taxes; Mr. Giordano to approximately \$1,182.74 less taxes.

4. The following factors have a bearing on the cases

a. Both [] and Mr. Giordano have expressed a preference to be paid for overtime rather than receive compensatory time leave. Neither wishes protracted inactive periods. This wish was first expressed in July, 1953, when I worked as a case officer in TU #105 with both employees. This wish has been reiterated in subsequent conversations.

b. Contracts for indigenous contract employees are based on the presumption of a 40 hour work week. It is further presumed any work in excess of this is considered as "overtime".

c. Since it is contemplated both [] and Mr. Giordano will remain active in TU #105 until approximately mid-April, the total number of working and overtime hours used as a basis of this report are incomplete.

d. Although not applicable to subject case, there are two precedences for overtime payments as such to indigenous contract employees -- [] on an hourly basis and [] on a "per script" basis (for SR/FP work performed on [] duties, the amounts of which were reimbursed to ARACRE by [] Therefore, in a strict interpretation, they should not be used as a precedence to subject case.

e. Should it be decided to liquidate overtime accounts in subject cases by lump-sum cash settlements, contracts of both Newsens and Giordano would have to be amended to allow for overtime cash payments.

f. No promises or commitments have been made to either [] or Giordano regarding the liquidation of accumulated overtime hours.

g. It is contemplated both Giordano and [] will be given an assignment in preparing training materials and Soviet Estonian reality immediately after completion of their participation in the training of TU #105. Such utilization is in the best interests of the Tradecraft Section of the Training Staff of this Base.

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h. At the present time, there is no DOB policy by which large amounts of overtime (in excess of 30 hours) worked by indigenous contract employees can be liquidated.

5. Based upon factors enumerated in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above, it is recommended:

a. That a thorough review be made of the problems which arise when indigenous contract employees are required to work from fifty to ninety hours a week in implementing operational training, and

b. That a policy consistent with the maintenance of high morale and sustenance of incentives, be formulated for guidance of staff personnel administering indigenous contract employees defining:

(1) Maximum hours of overtime allowed, and

(2) Method(s) by which overtime will be liquidated.

[]
Assistant Operations Officer, T/C

SR/DOB/Stanbsdg

Distribution:

0 - Addressee

1 - DOB Finance

✓ 2 - T/C (1 - [] file, 1 - Giordano's file)

1 - Chrono

SECRET

URGENT

TO: Sam
FROM: Alex
SUBJECT: Filing of Income Tax Return for 1953,
Request for Advise.

March 6, 1954

- A. The case is not quite usual, as I came to the States on Feb. 26, 1953 and started working here on March 8, 1953.
- Have I to pay incometax off the money paid to me, or on my request to other persons, for the services rendered by me before my arrival here, when I was not a Resident, nor a Citizen of the United States?
 - The amount of money involved consists of:
 - Paid to my family in New York in Jan. and Feb., together \$ 500.00
 - " to me in Germany for the same time period, DM 800.00, the equivalent of \$ 200.00
 - Sum: \$ 700.00
- B. My income as a Resident of the U.S. in 1953:
- According to the Contract signed on 8 March, 1953 I was supposed to receive \$ 4800 per annum. March to October 1, (for 7 months) \$ 2800.00
There might be a small discrepancy as I do not remember whether this contract was effective of March 1, 1953 or as of another date.
 - According to the Contract effective of Oct. 1, 1953, I was supposed to receive \$ 5000.00 per annum. October to Dec. 31, 1953 (3 months) \$ 1250.00
 - My total income since my arrival in the States and up to Dec. 31, 1953 should thus be: \$ 4050.00 (or less, in case that the Contract of 8 March, 1953 was effective of the date when it was signed.)
- C. All together I have been paid during 1953, as mentioned under A.b) and B.c), the equivalent of \$ 4750.00 or less.
- Was there a mistake in the figure of \$ 4800.00 I was advised to file my return, (advise given on 5 March) or
 - am I wrong with my above computation?
- D. The difference in tax off the above mentioned sums, taking into consideration two exemptions, is:
- income as shown under C.a) -\$ 4800.00, Tax \$ 725.-
 - " " " " C, -less t \$ 4750.00 " \$ 703.-
 - " " " " A.b)1) and B.c), " than 4550.00 " \$ 659.-
 - " as under B.c) " " \$ 4050.00 " \$ 548.-

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

I surely like to do my duty and pay what is foreseen by the law, but I can not afford any overpay and the difference in taxes (up to \$ 155.00) counts much in my budget.

130c-2(2)

- 2 -

- E. Any objections against my filing a joint return together with my wife? (Joint income over \$ 5000.0). Her Form W-2 shows the income of \$ 2008.xx and there was no other income. As I was not in the States on the beginning of the year and it was not clear whether our elder son would earn himself over \$ 600.0, so my wife claimed exemptions for 3 persons and therefore there was not much withheld of her wages for the Income Tax (all together about \$ 36.0)
- F. In case ^{that} You do not advise to file a joint return:
- can my wife change her number of exemptions from 3 to ~~one~~, me taking one son on my return and we dropping the other son who has earned over \$ 600.0?
 - will she have to file the Form 1040 like I shall do in this case and pay the difference in taxes when filing the report or -
 - may she still file the Form 1040A, paying the balance due later according to the computation done by the District Director?
- G. We intend to claim standard deductions of 10%.
- Could some more deduction be made before fixing the "adjusted gross income"?
 - I am thinking of extra expenses I had because of the separate working places of me and my wife, a situation not caused by any whim but by the circumstances: the family had settled in New York before I arrived and my job brought me to Washington. It was impossible or at least very difficult for the family to move at once to Washington, as it was in interest of ~~my~~ work that the family were not to close to my working place.
 - My expenses in connection with this separate life during 10 month (March to Dec, 1953) were approximately:
 - Biweekly ~~return~~ trips between Washington D.C. and New York, N.Y. - 20 trips, each \$ 20.0, total \$ 400.00
 - Rent for one room in Washington, D.C. " 211.00 in addition to the rent paid by the family and not shown here. Sum of these expenses: \$ 611.00
 - Unfortunately I have preserved no records to prove these expenses.
- H. Having to coordinate my return with this of my wife, or even to file a joint return, I must ask for one free day, the Friday, 12 March, 1953, so we could prepare our return or returns, take the money from the bank and pay the tax before the 15th of March.
- I. For being able to do this I must ask that your advise would be given to me at least in the evening of Thursday, March 11, 1954.
Thank you for competent advise.
- Alba*

SECRET.

TO: []
FROM: Mario K. Giordano

March 7, 1954

Subject: Contract effective as of 1 Oct, 1953, not yet signed.

Having in mind the stipulation of point 7 of this contract and the experiences which I have made during the last year of my employment with the U.S. Government, I should like the following points of the Contract precised or the sense of the present wording explained to me:

A.
1. In the preamble of the contract. What is the sense and reason of changing the Employer's name from the C.I.A., as I think was used in the old contract, to the U.S. Government? Is it a step "down" my employment ladder?

2. ... "as a Covert Associate". When starting working with this Authority, in September, 1952, I declared that I am doing this out of my sense of duty as an Officer of my Homeland. I am glad to go on working with this Authority for the benefit of the U.S.A. and of my Homeland sofar the interests of both Countries in fighting the Communism remain accordant. It would help the cause if now, me being a resident of the States, I would be enlisted as an officer of my homeland in the U.S. Forces, and if so deemed necessary, delegated to this Authority for the service and duties of confidential nature as mentioned in the preamble of the contract.

This would satisfy me much better than my present status. This would also be a very good cover for my real work with this Authority. This would automatically settle many inconveniences of administrative and social character now having been reason for worries.

I think that a possibility to settle this question is given by the "Treaty between the United States of America and N (my homeland) - Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights" the § 6 of which treats the drafting of the citizens of the both contractors during the war time. The Treaty is still in vigor, the States are in war, as is my homeland, and I, as a commissioned officer of my country, would respond such a call without delay. This treaty does not bear any limitations as to "cold" or "warm" war or to the ~~act~~ act of "declaration of war". The enemy is the Communism, with the battlefronts everywhere in the World.

I think that if this change in my legal status could be effected, this surely would bring better conditions of my working and better results of it with your Authority. Till now, although trying to do my best for the States, I have the feeling that I and my family are in the cross-draughts: from one side submitted to all the dangers emerging from such secret work to a political refugee who can not use an innocent cover of an ordinary laborer, and from the other side in fear of being fired not because of my own fault, but of some one man's whim. But I am making no issue of these two questions for signing a contract.

-2-

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-2-

B. Point 1. Compensation.

1. During the last year (March 1953 to March 1954) I had to do approximately 800 overhours, not counting the time lost for driving to and from the working place outside the D.C.

There was nothing said in the old contract of the overtime pay, although the weekly working hours were limited to 40. I do not grumble because of this, as I am not working for money only and I understand that the task needed overhours.

But it is clear by now to me, that I can not go on working on similar or worse terms, the weekly limit of working hours being left out of the contract and the wording being "in full consideration for \$ 5000 per annum". In my advanced age and my family-responsibilities I need more income than this. If this Authority does not find my full- and overtime work worth of better compensation, then I must ask for strict limitation of my working time, so I could earn some additional income by working during the time left over. I feel that I am able to do this. I do not find this being my fault that this Authority or at least some of my supervisors of the last year have on some occasions not liked to use my qualifications and hardy work to which I am used.

2. Be it pointed out, that I was practically in better financial conditions when working with this Authority in Germany, with \$ 4200 per annum than I am now here, with \$ 5000 per annum.

3. There was a support up to \$ 300.00 allowed with the last contract for the case that I would have moved my family to Washington, D.C.. I did not move the family mostly on reasons depending of the actual conditions of my work:

a) in the beginning I was advised not to bring the family over too early, before getting fully acquainted with the work and the living conditions in Washington.

b) then I was asked to live in the Safe House, and it would have been against any security regulations to bring the family over to Washington in a time when I had myself to stay permanently outside.

c) later, since Oct. 1953, I have been thinking that I was sitting on a too "shaky chair" myself for daring to pull the family out of the little comfort my wife had established in New York with so much effort.

In case that I will have a two-year contract and that I can be sure that this will not be terminated earlier without a grave reason but with one month notice, I surely will bring my family to Washington, and therefore I am asking that this support be maintained in the new contract.

C. Point 8. Term.

1. The ~~xxxxxxx~~ right of termination should be bipartite. In present wording there is no possibility for me for termination before 1 Oct, 1955. The experience of the last year showed me that this possibility should exist. I do not like

-3-

mcg

to "hang around" when I see that there is no work for me or that my supervisor is not satisfied with my work. When coming to the States, not knowing the habits and the capacity of my new superiors and of the other people to work with, I could not know whether I am able to get along with the American requirements. Now, after one year of work, under guidance of different supervisors, I feel myself able to render even better and more valuable work to this Authority than I was able to perform during this year, the first in the States, in quite peculiar working conditions. My time is costly to me, not only for earning the living but for doing things, too. Therefore, for such cases that I should feel that my stay with this Authority would mean but loss of my time and of the money of the U.S. Government, I like have the right of termination, too.

2. Work under the conditions of this or ^A similar contract can not be compared with work on any other field, where one can be fired without special reason and without causing any special harm to the fired person. In my case of an aged newcomer working with this Authority means continuation of my learned professional work. It surely is clear to everybody concerned that such work keeps one far from other fields of activity and of the experiences in these other fields which the person could use when his contract would be terminated. I know how such workers were dealt with in my country and in some European countries. I think that this is likeable here, too. But this is not expressed in this contract and I do not know who, the direct supervisor, the Contracting Officer or who else, is having the right to terminate this contract, be this on month's notice or without any notice. In my homeland I worked on a post from where but the Commander in Chief of the Army could release me, when advancing me to a higher post. I was glad never having deserved any admonishment during the many years I was working on this post. This was the case during the W.W.II, when I had to work together with the Germans, although the Nazi-German Government did not recognize my Country as a State any longer. But in the States, my Country still recognized by the States, and me working conscientiously, as to my own estimation, and with full pull and responsibility, I already got admonished for things in which I felt and feel being absolutely pure.

- This here is not a rising a complaint, but I should like to explain the difficulties I have had to fight with, so the person who drafts the contracts and those who have to care for the "joy of working" of the personnel could take the measures they find appropriate. I should like have the wording of this point a little more clear, so to be sure that I would not be fired but because somebody happens not to like me, or my habit of working too much and saying so if finding that something is going wrong.

Respectfully yours

Maria K. Gordenno

~~SECRET~~
P
Y

22 MAR 54

Date: 3-22-54

Mr. Mario K. Giordano

Dear Mr. Giordano:

Reference is made to your contract effective 24 February 1953 with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature.

Effective 1 November 1953, said contract is amended by deleting the figure \$4,800 in the first sentence of paragraph one, entitled "Compensation" and substituting in lieu thereof the figure \$5,000.00.

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

United States of America

By _____
Contracting Officer

Approved:

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DATE 2006

~~SECRET~~

1303-40

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**TO : Chief, Soviet Russia Division
Attn: Chief, SR/DOB

DATE: 27 April 1954


FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT: Aleksei KURGVEL

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 24 February 1954 in which we requested a progress report on the subject, who entered the United States under the provisions of Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949. As was pointed out in the referenced memorandum, this office has the responsibility of maintaining current information on all recipients of Section 8 benefits.

2. As we have received no reply to the above request, it would be appreciated if we may have current information concerning the subject. If your office is no longer the custodial component in control of the subject, it would be appreciated if you would inform us as to the identity of the present custodial office.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA:


Alien Affairs Officer

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DATE 2006

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2/10/54
SECRET

27 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB
SUBJECT : Evaluation of AELUNG

1. AELUNG served as an indigenous instructor under the undersigned for Project AEROT from 16 October 1953 until 18 April 1954. It is to be noted that he had been on duty with the same project since its inception, however, not under the supervision of the undersigned. Consequently, this evaluation would only cover the period 16 October 1953--18 April 1954.

2. Basically, AELUNG is a research type of individual who would prefer a desk to a compass, entrenching tool and lock-picking kit. As such, obviously, he has his definite value within a training unit. This capability and preference should, however, be known to the officer in charge so that the utmost benefit may be gained from it. AELUNG is very meticulous in keeping all sorts of records such as schedules, training progress, and writing reports; he is also a good instructor in the more academic subjects such as current reality (but not operational arrangements within current reality), communism, Estonian history, etc. As such, it is best to utilize him as a supporting researcher (and instructor) to a more operationally minded indigenous instructor (as, for example, []

*to be assigned to this unit
in T/I to this
unit
to handle
matters in this
unit.*

3. Should AELUNG be involved in another Estonian training unit, he should be made to understand from the outset that he is a specialized instructor and analyst and that he has no additional responsibilities or obligations (moral or otherwise) than those definitely assigned him. The reason for this is the fact that, being an Estonian (and a former General Staff officer who served in Estonian Intelligence), he feels an inherent sense of responsibility and moral obligation to his native country and people. As a result, he tends to interfere in matters which are beyond his field of responsibility (and competence) to a point where he actually begins to question our authority to deal freely in matters so vitally pertinent to his country. This, obviously, is not derogatory as far as the interests of Estonia are concerned; however, it does complicate our attempts in mounting an unencumbered FI operation. []

4. Other than that, AELUNG has been found to be very conscientious, reasonably professional, and very secure. His biggest drawback is probably the fact that he becomes overly emotional at times which results in a loss of objectivity and even borders on a lack of self control. (?)

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[]
SR/DOB/Project AEROT Case Officer

SECRET

E J C O B

2 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Officer, SR/DOB
SUBJECT: Aleksei KURGVEL; Change of Address.

1. This is to inform you that the address of Mr. Aleksei Kurgvel has been changed as reported this date:

c/o Mr. and Mrs. Montgomery
1700 T Street, S.E.
Washington 20, D.C.
Phone LU 1-1020

2. Because Mr. Kurgvel entered this country under Section 8, this change of address will be included in the semi-annual report to the Alien Affairs Officer [] .

[]
Assistant Operations Officer, T/I

SR/DOB/TI:ST:ese
Distribution:
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1 - SR/DOB/TI ✓

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12-1-53

Mario K. Giordano

Confidential.

Washington, D.C.
18 August, 1954

To C J, in House.

In conformity with the obligations towards the Organization taken upon myself by signing my contract, I hereby forward a draft of a writ "Selling an Idea" of the same date, with the request that I be allowed to file such a writ in my real name to some of the leading American industrial concerns or the Patent Office, if advised accordingly.

I would have nothing against being introduced to one of such solid concerns by this Organization, if such a procedure will be found necessary or preferable to my going another, normal public way.

Urgent decision upon the case is much appreciated.

ENCLOSURE: on 2 sheets.

Mario K. Giordano.
Mario K. Giordano.

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DATE 2006

CONFIDENTIAL. A DRAFT.
18 Aug, 1954

SELLING AN IDEA:

1. The Nation, and especially the responsible people, are so concerned about the horrors which will be caused by the first sounded real A- or H-bomb alarm, that nobody likes to think of them.
2. But everybody likes to save himself and his family from those horrors. Is it possible? They all are waiting for hints and help.
3. Mass-evacuation of millions of people during a few hours of warning time is hopeless, panic-bound, and extremely dangerous undertaking to be mixed in. This will cost the life to many people even in the case that the Air Defense will be able to prevent the threatening enemy attack.
4. Efficient help for such cases can be provided to millions of people by building, in due time, of expertly designed SHELTERS. The idea is not utopian, it is practically feasible. There ought to be shelters of two kinds, in general:
 - a) big public ones, to board the masses fleeing from their working or living places in the most populated and most endangered central areas of big cities or big industrial developments. These must be far enough from the probable Z-point of the exploding bomb to resist the tremendous destructive powers involved, and near enough for the people to reach them during the warning time in reasonably safe way, and -
 - b) small private ones, close to the living places of the people in the suburbs, for the inhabitants of one house or of a small group of neighboring houses.
5. The COSTS of building and fitting out of these shelters will be great. But the Nation, the State, the Municipality CAN, MUST, and WILL provide for the big ones, and they will have to subsidize building of the small private ones.
6. These costs can be held in reasonable limits only then, when well designated and developed standardized constructional items and necessary devices and equipment, and even specialized constructional machines will be used.
7. A big and honest CONCERN which FIRST and in DUE TIME starts MASS-PRODUCTION of manifold STANDARDIZED BUILDING MATERIALS, SPECIAL DEFENSIVE AND OTHER NECESSARY DEVICES FOR THE SMALL, PRIVATE-TYPE A- AND H-BOOMB SHELTERS, will earn the THANK of MILLIONS, and HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF HONEST DOLLARS from BIG SALES of well designed, well manufactured, well advertised and DEADLY NEEDED articles, sold on LOW PRICES.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Page 2.

"SELLING AN IDEA"

SOME ITEMS OF BUILDING MATERIALS, DEVICES AND EQUIPMENT WHICH CAN BE PREFABRICATED AND SOLD IN STANDARDIZED PACKAGES FOR SMALL TYPE PRIVATE SHELTERS, OR BY SINGLE ITEMS:

1. Heat, blast, and soaking-resistant, and gas-tight multiple entrance doors, forming degazing and washing off of the radioactivity. rooms for
2. Construction details supporting the ceiling of the long entrances and of the shelters.
3. Installations for foraging of food.
4. Sanitary and Rest installations.
5. Built-in furniture.
6. Electric Power Station in Shelter, for the case that the usual supply lines will be destroyed.
7. A well to supply water, built into the shelter.
8. Installation for purification of air, and supply of fresh air.
9. Installation to provide overpressure in the shelter for getting rid of bad air and gases in case that the built-in electric power station will have to work.
10. Wireless T/R set for communication between the shelter and the survived rescue organizations after a blast.
11. Devices for detecting and fighting radioactivity and war gases in shelter.
12. Packages of tools and first aid materials necessary during the stay in the shelter or an emergency outbreak out of the shelter before the arrival of the rescue teams.
13. Food sufficient for the maximal number of persons to be boarded, in weekly packages (e.g.: One Week Package for 4 Persons).

SECRET

8 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, STG/SPB

SUBJECT: Report of Current Status of Covert Security Clearance of SR/DOB Contract Personnel; Case of Mario K. GIORDANO.

REFERENCE: CSC- JG 3721, #50562.

1. It is requested that the subject's referenced CSC be amended to read "subject to be utilized on a contract basis as a translator and agent trainer in training operations for DOB under Project AFACRE with access to classified information up to and including that of Secret. The cover story provided for him is that he is employed by the Department of the Army, G-3, Language and Area Evaluation Section as a consultant/translator".

2. The subject has shown himself to be conscientious in the performance of his assigned duties and observant of the security regulations placed upon him.

SR/DOB:CO:ese
Distribution:

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1 - SR/DOB/TIV
1 - Vit.Doc.
1 - G, Chrono

Chief, SR/DOB
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130A-132

~~VITAL DOCUMENTS FILE~~

17 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: IAS, Alien Affairs Officer
Attns: [] []

SUBJECT: Status Report of Covert Associates Admitted to U.S. Under
100 Persons Act, for Period 30 April 1954 to 30 September
1954.

REFERENCE: (A) Verbal Request of [] to [], SR/DOB, dtd
15 September 1953, for semi-annual report including sub-
ject information.

1. In accordance with provisions of reference (A) the following infor-
mation is hereby submitted:

a. [] [] presently residing at [] []
[] with his wife, [] [] infant
son, [] [] and mother-in-law, [] []

b. [] [] presently residing at [] []
[] with his
two minor children, [] [] and his
wife, [] []

c. [] [] (at [] [] address).

d. Mr. Alaband KROVIL, presently residing at a temporary add-
ress 1700 T Street, S.E., Washington 20, D.C. (No telephone at present).
His wife, Selma KROVIL and a minor son, Reta KROVIL (16 years of age)
live in Astoria, Long Island, New York. An older son, (24 years of age)
Joan, is a student taking post-graduate work at the Agricultural College
in Clemson, South Carolina.

2. Further inquiries may be directed to [] [] extension
3806.

SR/DOB:ST:ess
Distribution:

[] []
Chief, SR/DOB

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- 4 - SR/DOB/TI Subject files. ✓
- 4 - Vital Documents
- 1 - C, Group

~~VITAL DOCUMENTS FILE~~

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130A-106

SECRET

TO: FI/STC/SPB
ATTENTION:
FROM: Chief, Special Security Division
SUBJECT: JU-3721
#50562

6 OCT 1954

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 17 September 1954 requesting that the covert security clearance issued 12 January 1953 be amended to permit utilization of Subject on a contract basis as a translator and agent trainer in training operations for DOB under Project ARABER, with access to classified information up to and include that of Secret. The cover story provided for him is that he is employed by the Department of the Army, GS-3, Language and Area Evaluation Section as a consultant/translator.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949, entitled, "Security and Operational Clearances", a covert security clearance is granted for the covert use of the Subject as described in your request set forth in paragraph 1 above.

3. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-9. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

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SECURITY INFORMATION

TO : SR/DOB

7 Oct. 1954

FROM : FI/STC/SPB *mt*

SUBJECT: GIORDANO, Mario K.

1. Your request for clearance to use Subject dated 6 Sept. 1954 was processed and transmitted to the Chief, Special Security Division, for final action.

2. The results of this action are attached.

Attachment:

Memo dated 7 Oct. 1954

mcc

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DATE 2008

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SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 59-46
FEB 1953

(47)

130A-135(2)

SECRET

COVER: ASSOCIATE EVALUATION REPORT

12 Oct 54

1. ADMINISTRATIVE

- a. Name: Aleksei Kurgvel
- b. Position title: Consultant/Instructor
- c. Station and office: Guam Hall
Oklahoma Ave. & C Street, N.E.
- d. Salary per annum: \$5000.00
- e. Date of current contract: 21 February 1954
- f. Duration of contract: 2 years
- g. Current citizenship status: Alien
- h. Naturalization eligibility: 1963
- i. Organizational employment background: Agent trainer
- j. Period covered by report: 2 July - 22 September 1954
- k. Type of report: Initial Reassignment of Supervisor
 Reassignment Special
 Semi-annual

1. Special qualifications. (Foreign languages, avocations or trade specialities, typist, etc.)

Estonian, Russian, German and English

2. DUTY STATUS

a. List major duties in order of importance:

Agent-trainer

Research analysis

Translator

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- b. List courses of instruction completed during report period.

<u>Name of Course</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Length of Course</u>	<u>Date Completed</u>
<u>None</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>
<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>
<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>

- c. Type work in which covert associate is primarily interested.

Project-type assignments associated with the training of agents.

If different from present job, explain qualifications. (Aptitude, knowledge, skills.)

Individual's assignment is commensurate with his background and qualifications as a former Captain of the Estonian General Staff.

3. DUTY PERFORMANCE

- a. Briefly describe this covert associate's performance of major duties listed under Item 2.a above.

The undersigned has not had the opportunity for observing this individual on actual training assignments although it is believed that his performance has been between that of a rating of Very Good and Excellent. As a research analyst: Very Good, Translator: Good.

- b. In what respect is this person's performance on present job most noticeably good or outstanding?

Individual is very conscientious in the performance of his required training tasks.

- c. On what aspect of performance should this covert associate concentrate effort for self improvement?

English self-improvement.

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d. Are there other duties which better suit this covert associate's qualifications?

No

e. What training is recommended for this covert associate?

Refresher courses on American Clandestine Operational techniques.

f. Has any portion of this covert associate's duty performance during the reporting period been unsatisfactory? (If yes, explain circumstances and what corrective action has been taken.)

No

g. Indicate estimate of this covert associate's general value to this organization. Using ratings specified in paragraph 4 of cover instructions.

Very Good

h. Is a salary increase recommended for this covert associate at this time? No If so, to what salary? _____

4. REMARKS (To be used for additional pertinent information or comment, if any, not covered elsewhere in this report.)

Individual appears to be quiet and well mannered and inspired to a high sense of dedication in fighting the Communist conspiracy.

5. 22 Sept 1954
DATE

[Signature]
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

6. 12 Oct 54
DATE OF REVIEW

[Signature]
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

SECRET

SECRET

1 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Officer, SR/DOB

SUBJECT: Request for Technical Interview for Indigenous Contract Employee.

1. It is hereby requested arrangements be made for a Carriage test of Mario E. GIORDANO (p), indigenous contract employee, presently assigned to this section for duty.
2. According to our records, the individual listed in paragraph 1 above has never received a Technical Interview after his arrival in the United States.
3. The undersigned would like to be consulted prior to subject's technical interview.

[]
Chief, Covert Associates Section

SR/DOB/CAS:VS:ese

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee
1 - Subject file ✓

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

130A-134

SECRET

TO : [redacted] DATE: 4 Nov, 1954

FROM : Mr. Clayton

SUBJECT : My Call to the FBI on 3 Nov, 1954

Mr. ^{by} ~~Eric~~ H. King ^{of the FBI} asked me about [redacted] who has applied for a government job.

As I know [redacted] but since my arrival in Washington, D.C., thus for a short time, there was not much I could report about him.

All I had to say was positive.

A. Clayton
A. Clayton.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SECRET

130E-5

5 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Security Division
SUBJECT : Request for Technical Interview for
Aleksel Kurgvel.

1. It is requested that the subject be given a technical interview sometime during the second week of December. Although the subject is an Estonian and speaks that language most fluently, the interview can be given in English.

2. It is further requested that your office contact Mr. [] staff employee of SR/DOB in order to have him assist in preparing the proper questions to be used in the interview with the representative from your office.

3. According to [] files the subject was last interviewed while in Europe but has not received such an interview since his arrival in the United States on 26 February 1953. It is recommended that the conference between [] and your representative be held sometime between 15 and 19 November 1954, and that any further arrangements between the two be conducted on an oral basis. [] can be reached on Extension 3808, Room 1701 J Building.

[]
Chief, SR/DOB

SR/DOB/Sec.RHW:mlw (4 November 1954)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
✓ 1 - DOB/Training
1 - DOB/Security
2 - Chrono

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

130A-138

Vit. doc. copy
made

10 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CAS
SUBJECT : Technical Interview for Aleksei Kurgvel.
REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, SSD, from Chief, SR/DOB
Dated 5 November 1954, Subject; Request for
Technical Interview for Aleksei Kurgvel.

1. The interview requested in Paragraph 1 of referenced memorandum will be on Tuesday, 7 December 1954, at 0930 hours.
2. The meeting requested in Paragraph 3 of same memorandum will be Monday, 15 November 1954, at 1400 hours.
3. C } was informed of these dates by
C } on the morning of 10 November 1954.

C }
C }
SR/DOB Security Officer

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DATE 2006

130A-139

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TO : SR/DOP

10 January 1955

FROM : FI/SIC *WMD*

SUBJECT: GICRD NO, Mario E.

1. Your request for ~~clearance to use Subject dated~~ technical interrogation was processed and transmitted to the Chief, Special Security Division, for final action.

2. The results of this action are attached.

Attachment:

Memo dated: 5 January 1955

MP

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DATE 2008

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 59-46
FEB 1953

[]
130A-140 (2 pg)

SECRET

FI/STC/SPB

5 JAN 1955

Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

JG-3721
#50562

1. In compliance with a request from the Chief, SR/DOB, Subject was afforded a technical re-interrogation and interview on 7 December 1954, at a covert site in Washington, D.C.
2. Questions were asked concerning Communism, falsification of PHS, security indiscretions, and vulnerability to blackmail. Results thereof were considered favorable and were classified as fairly accurate.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

[]

SECRET

4/13/55

TO : ()

Date: Jan. 10, 1955

FROM : Mr. Clayton

No: 2 - 55

SUBJECT: Mr. Oskar TOMJALLA, Estonian, wireless operator and monitor

*How did
Tomjalla
contact
Clayton?*

On 27 Dec, 1954 Mr. Elmo PAJUSI, Estonian, residing at 83 35, 116 St. Kew Gardens, L.I., N.Y., phone: Virginia 90753, N.Y., called at my residence in Astoria, L.I., N.Y. on behalf of Mr. Tomjalla.

Mr. Tomjalla had asked Mr. Pajusi to contact me for getting some information about how to get employed by some American Authority dealing with monitoring of Soviet wireless communications.

Mr. Tomjalla, approximately 33, single, working as technical dra-
wer somewhere in Manhattan, N.Y., had worked during W.W.II for 3
years with a German military monitoring unit, being in charge of
interception and transcription of wireless traffic of Soviet
high-level army Head-Quarters and special NKVD stations. Before
1941 he had worked on a similar assignment in the Estonian Army,
being a non-commissioned officer. He had been a passionate wor-
ker, taking the job like "hunting". He had obtained good skill and
very good results. He would like continue working against the
communists in the same branch, finding his present job, ^{of} a drafts-
man not exciting enough.

*and
in Wash.*

He had the intention to go to Washington, D.C. during the days
off he had in the beginning of January and wanted some hints as
to whom he could contact here in this matter personally. He had
been to the Civil Employment Service at New York and, ^{was} advised
to write a letter to the State Department, but he thought that
I, working in Washington, could know of some better ways where

130 A-140 a

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

he could go for a personal interview.

I gave the following advice:

- 1) No sense to go to Washington personally.
- 2) Follow advice given by the competent agency of Civ.Empl.
- 3) I can not do more than report his wish to my supervisor by whom the information could be forwarded to the appropriate authority. Mr.Pajusi mentioned this being the wish of Mr. Tomjalla and I promised to do that. But the "Army" was mentioned as my employer, without any further details added.

Mr. Pajusi said to know Mr. Tomjalla as a reliable person. He was not quite sure but he thought him belonging to the old Swedish minority of Western Estonia, him having some relatives in Sweden and him speaking some Swedish. He has studied agriculture in the University of the Baltic Displaced Persons at Pinneberg (near Hamburg), Germany. He lived at 128 (or 28) Remsen St, Brooklyn, N.Y, but this address being not quite sure, he could be contacted through Mr. Pajusi.

To the Person of Elmo PAJUSI: Mr. P. was introduced to me by my wife about one year ago. She knows him since 1945 when both lived in D.P. Camp Alt Garge, Germany, British Zone. Pajusi, knowing some generalities of my work during WW II, had asked my wife on some occasions to report his name to me for the case that some real work could be done for the benefit of our Fatherland, Estonia. He said having learned wireless, too, but married now, and having a good job, he personally is not interested in similar employment in today's situation. Mr. Pajusi made a good impression.

I personally did not have anything to do with Mr. Tomjalla before or during W W II, but I remember having heard good remarks about an Estonian wireless operator with the same or very similar name (Tomalla?) from an Estonian officer who was in charge of the units which worked on the assignment here mentioned. It is possible that I made a mistake when taking notes during the visit of Mr. Pajusi (I saw no documents, nor did I ask for the spelling of the name). But it is possible, too, that Tomjalla was pronounced "Tomalla" by the very busy officer, the later name being easier to pronounce.

A. Clayton
A. Clayton.

SECRET

10 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Contracting Officer
THROUGH: FI Plans/Projects
SUBJECT: Mario K. Giordano (p), Request for Amendment of Contract.
REFERENCE: Contract in the name of Mario K. GIORDANO, dtd 24 February 1954.

1. Mario K. GIORDANO is a covert associate under contract to SR/DOB.
2. Under the terms of subject's contract, GIORDANO has been receiving a \$5000 yearly salary. This salary has been paid to him since 1 November 1953.
3. During the period subject has worked for this office he has executed his duties in a highly professional and excellent manner.
4. His vast experience in intelligence work had been used in agent training projects. It is anticipated that we will have to draw on his experience again in the near future.
5. This office requests that paragraph 1 of subject's contract be amended to read "you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of \$5,200 per annum".

C Chief, SR/DOB

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

130 B - H

TO : C J
FROM : Mr. Carlson

Feb. 18, 1955

NO: 9-55

SUBJ: Informing of the new trainee of the "15 Jan. news".

Ref: Briefing received on Feb. 16, 1955.

I am wondering whether the decision, not to inform the new trainee of the special information dated 15 Jan, is the very best one.

The new trainee knew one or both of the men mentioned in the 15 Jan. news. He knew what they were going for. He might like to build some of his own planning on the knowledge that his friends are there or were there. Therefore it would be but normal that he once will ask somebody about the two men.

It is not impossible that he has learned of the news already, although this seems not to be so.

it is well possible that he will learn of it from the second man when this ^{one} will arrive.

The situation would be the worst if he will learn of the tragedy from his contacts in field. This could easily break even a good man, because he will learn then that he or his detention was not trusted by the authorities here, and this bad news might influence his state of mind which will be under great strain already by the mere fact of being in the enemy's sphere of reach.

The earlier he would be informed of what has happened, the more time he would have to overcome the shock of this knowledge,

136 A-143

*Follow up memo to Chay, 1/4/55
filed in 136 C*

SECRET

23 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/2

SUBJECT : Party Line to be Followed Regarding
Roll-up of AEROOT Project.

1. The covert associate selected by DOB to teach the AERROOTS "reality" had been briefed 16 February 1955, not to bring up the issue of the roll-up of the last AERROOT operation with the newcomers, and that if the subject were brought up by the agents he was to profess complete ignorance of the case.

2. As a result of this briefing, the consultant came up with the attached memorandum addressed to his case officer.

3. Much of what he says has validity and should be taken under advisement.

4. It is felt that the decision and the party line to be taken are SR/2 prerogatives.

5. DOB will pass on to the case officers and covert associates, in contact with the agents, the line decided on by your branch.

Chief, SR/DOB

Attachment -
Memo to case officer

SR/DOB/Training HIF:mlw

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee
✓ 1 - CAS
1 - Vital Documents
1 - DOB/Security
1 - Chrono

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130 C - 6

SECRET

28 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP/FI

SUBJECT: Soviet Defectors and Former Soviet Agents in our
Employ.

REFERENCE: (a) SR/COP/FI Sec Memo to All Branches, dtd
24 February 1955.

1. In accordance with the request contained in Reference (a) the following information is hereby submitted:

a. [] a pseudonym which was accepted by this individual on 17 December 1952. He was never assigned a cryptonym. [] was contracted by this Division on 5 January 1953. He is engaged in translating, as a general consultant and language instructor. [] has been a problem as he has adjusted (during the past year) to the fact that gaining U. S. citizenship has not opened the magic door to staff status.

b. [] a pseudonym which was accepted by this individual on 6 October 1952. According to the records of this office he was never assigned a cryptonym. [] was contracted by this Division on 7 March 1953. He is engaged as a research analyst, general consultant, agent trainer and language instructor. There have been no problems in handling []

c. [] who accepted her pseudonym on 11 June 1953 and was contracted by the SR Division on the same date. No cryptonym was never assigned to her. [] is engaged in translating, drawing (diagrams and sketches) and typing English, Russian, German and Lithuanian materials. There have been no problems in handling []

d. [] accepted his pseudonym on 26 September 1951 and was contracted by the SR Division on the same date. [] is engaged as a general consultant, agent trainer, research analyst, translator and language instructor. [] has not been a problem in handling.

e. [] accepted this pseudonym and was contracted by the SR Division on 12 July 1951. [] is engaged as a research analyst, agent trainer, general consultant and translator. [] was a problem during the past year as he was removed from spotting and assessing activities and confined to "grey" activities only. Once this was accepted [] presented no further problems in handling.

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130 A 141 (2/5)

f. Mario K. GIORDANO accepted this pseudonym and was contracted by the SR Division on 5 September 1951. GIORDANO is engaged in agent training, as a general consultant, translator and language instructor. GIORDANO presents a problem in handling only during those times he is training agents. He cannot accept the role of a trainer only, but insists on wanting an operational responsibility, too. Even though he may outwardly accept it, GIORDANO will never feel deep inside that his responsibility for operational matters can or should be denied him.

2. It should be understood that the six subjects of paragraph 1 above are not truly either Soviet defectors or former Soviet agents in the strict sense of the word. None of them have ever served in the Soviet armed forces or in any part of the Soviet intelligence apparatus. However, all of them were born and raised in countries which are now either a part of the USSR or behind the Iron Curtain.

[3]
Chief, SR/DOB

SR/DOB/Trng Str DC: []
Distribution:

- Orig. - Addressee
- 1 - Subject file
- 1 - Vit Doc
- 1 - Security DOB
- 1 - Chrono

(2)

SECRET

28 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP/FI

SUBJECT : Soviet Defectors and Former Soviet Agents in our Employ.

REFERENCE: (a) CSR/DOB Sec Memo for SR/COP/FI, dtd 28 February 1955, same subject.

1. True identities of personalities identified by pseudonyms in Reference (a) are as follows (same paragraphing):

- a. [redacted], born [redacted] in [redacted]
- b. [redacted], born [redacted] in [redacted]
- c. [redacted] was born on [redacted] in [redacted]
- d. [redacted] was born on [redacted] in [redacted]
- e. [redacted] was born on [redacted] in [redacted]
- f. Aleksei Kurgvel was born on 13 September 1904 in Kuresaare, Estonia.

([redacted])
Chief, SR/DOB

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

~~SECRET~~
130 A-142

SECRET

10 March 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: I&S, Alien Affairs Officer
Attn: [] []

SUBJECT: Status Report of Covert Associates Admitted to U. S. Under
100 Persons Act, for period 1 October 1954 to 31 March 1955.

REFERENCE: Ltr dtd 17 September 1954, from Chief, SR/DOB to I&S,
Alien Affairs Officer.

1. In accordance with provisions of reference (A) as contained in the
above reference, the following information is hereby submitted:

a. [] [] presently residing at [] []
[] with his wife, [] [] infant
[] son [] and mother-in-law, []

In December 1954, [] [] was transferred operationally,
to SR/2. It is anticipated that administrative transfer will take place
before the next semi-annual report.

b. [] [] presently residing at [] []
[] with his
[] wife, [] [] and two minor children,

[] contract was terminated in October 1954
by mutual consent. She is now employed by the [] [] Restaurant

c. Mr. Alexander KURGVEL, presently residing at 1700 T Street, S. E.,
Washington 20, D. C. (telephone LE4leW 1-1080). His wife, Salma KURGVEL
and a minor son, Ben KURGVEL (who will be 16 in May 1955) reside at
3070 34th Street, Astoria, Long Island City 3, New York, (no telephone at
present). An elder son Jean (2 1/2 years of age) is a student taking post-
graduate work (MA degree) at the Agricultural College in Clemson, South
Carolina.

2. Further inquiries may be directed to [] [] , extension
3808.

SECRET

[] [] -
Chief, SR/DOB

Distribution:

- Orig. - Addressee
- 1 - Chrono
- 4 - SR/DOB/TI Subject files.
- 4 - Vital Documents

130 H-144

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DATE 2006

SECRET

28 March 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COF/YI

SUBJECT : Citizenship status of - Soviet Defectors and Former Soviet Agents in our Employ.

REFERENCES : (a) CHR/DOB Sec Memo for SR/COF/YI, dtd 28 Feb. 55.
(b) CHR/DOB Sec Memo for SR/COF/YI, dtd 26 Feb. 55.
(c) CHR/DOB Sec Memo for SR/COF/YI, dtd 25 Feb. 55.
(d) Telephonic request received at this office on 28 March 55 for additional information.

1. In accordance with the telephonic request of Reference (d) the following additional information is hereby submitted:

- a.] - Naturalized citizen -
- b.] - Alien - Naturalization eligibility -
- c.] - Naturalized citizen -
- d.] - Naturalized citizen -
- e.] - Naturalized citizen -
- ✓ f. Marie K. GICHARD - Alien - Naturalization eligibility - 1963
- g.] - Alien - Naturalization eligibility -
- h.] - Alien - Naturalization eligibility -

Chief, SR/DOB

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
8 - Subject File
8 - Vital Rec.
1 - Sec. DOB
1 - Chrono

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DATE 2006

13011-145

SECRET

TO : []
FROM : Mr. Carlson

No: 20 - 55
DATE: Apr. 6, 1955

SUBJECT: Area knowledge, reported as requested.

In Estonia:

- A. Good knowledge, acquired through special study at the Military College, and the Staff College, and during professional work, and long stay:
- the towns of TALLINN, KURESSAARE (now KINGISSEPP), NARVA, TARTU, RAKVERE and PÄRNU;
 - rural areas: the islands SAAREMAA and MUHU.
- B. Fair knowledge, acquired as described above, except longer stays, - all the territory of Estonia, with repeated visits to many places.

In Germany:

- fair knowledge, acquired through longer stay:
- Berlin (the vicinity of "Bayrischer Platz", "Mollendorf Platz" and Kaiserallee in Charlottenburg.) - From 1940/1941, partly up to 1945.
 - Hamburg (Bergedorf and Wentorf) from 1949-1951.
 - Munich from 1951-1953.
 - Kühlungsborn (Soviet Zone, near Rostock), from 1944/1945.

In Finland:

- Helsinki, from 1941.

W. Carlson
w. Carlson.

*Standardized original
given to []
on 21 April 1955*

SECRET

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

130 A-146

TO C J
FROM : Mr. Carlson
SUBJECT: Former agent-trainee of TU 105, "KARL"
DATE DELIVERED: 24 May, 1955

1. Enclosed is a clipping from the Soviet Estonian newspaper "RAHVA HÄÄL", copy of 5 June, 1955. It carries an article about the kolkhoz "Kings-sepa-nimeline" at RUDINA, SE part of Estonia. The article is accompanied by one photograph, showing three men. The man on the right, with a book in his hand, is indicated to be the leader of this kolkhoz, R. METUS. The article as such is of no interest, it tells of the experiences and merits of the left-standing man, P. VOOLÄRV in cultivation of flax. The leader of the kolkhoz is not mentioned in it at all.
2. The image of R. Metus recalls most vividly the above mentioned trainee, KARL: his big nose, large ears, half-apologizing sully face, a guessing look, posture - leaned forward like having some pain in stomach.
3. The name of this man, as given in the text below the photograph, "Metus" was very common in the SW part of Estonia wherefrom Karl originated. It was used in different variations: MÖTUS, METUS, MÖTTUS, METTUS, the meaning of the word being the PARTRIDGE or the BOBWHITE.
4. It is unknown to me who has drawn the cross above the head of that man. Most probably this was done by Karl himself or his buddy, ARTHUR. Both had the copy at their disposal among hundreds of other Soviet newspapers. Either Arthur nor Karl told anything of it to me or to Mr. Victor, the co-instructor with TU 105.
5. Victor thinks that the ink used for drawing this cross could have belonged to his fountain-pen, which Arthur had asked once for a short time.
6. One more peculiarity: this man in the photo is wearing a cap of the special design Karl was very fond of and liked to have one in his equipment.

W. Carlson
W. Carlson.

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DATE 2006

130 A-147

Confidential

TO []
FROM : Mario K. Giordano
DATE DELIVERED: 24 May, 1955
SUBJECT: FORWARDING A LETTER.

Sir,

I kindly request your co-operation in forwarding the enclosed envelope, through official channels, to the Director of the Agency.

The envelope contains a proposal concerning collection of information from the Countries behind the Iron Curtain.

I enclosed the proposal in an envelope in order to have the Director or his Deputy make the decision to whom it should be given for further consideration.

Mario K. Giordano

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

*Transmitted to
Wesley Day,*

*SRIPP (E) 0
1 June, 1955*

*130A-148
J - (4pp)
J. T. G.*

TO : The Director of the Agency (TWO Copies)

FROM : Mario K.Giordano

DATE SUBMITTED: 24 May, 1955

SUBJECT: ONE WAY TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS FROM BEHIND
THE IRON CURTAIN.

1. So long there still are people longing for freedom behind the Iron Curtain, there will be thousands of courageous men and women among them ready to inform the Free World of the real proceedings at their living places and about other items interesting the Leadership here, provided that usable means will be supplied for sending the information over the Curtain.
2. The following WAY could be used, if not yet done:

A / Send together with the millions of leaflets carried by balloons over the Iron Curtain thousands or tens of thousands of RETURN-BALLOONS, packed together with chemicals necessary to make these balloons volatile and able to carry light bundles of information materials.

Add to the packages short instructions concerning:

- a) Manipulation of a Return-Balloon so this will be able to fly, carried by favorable winds, far enough for being collected by us or by the people friendly to us.
- b) What kind of information could be sent or is specially wanted.
- c) How such information could be collected on spot / ted. in a way safest for the persons involved.
- d) Which basic precautions the special helpers shall take for their own safety for the case that a return-balloon would fall into enemy hands, together with the information.

B / Organize the COLLECTION of the to be expected arriving Return-Balloons, in countries neighboring the Iron Curtain.

This last job will require a rather big mass-organization in case that but simple wind-carried return-balloons will be used. It could be done by the members of different voluntary

/ Mario K. Giordano, 24 May, 1955 /

"Organizations for Freedom", organized (or to be organized additionally) by the refugees from the countries involved, or/and by the help of the Policy Forces of the friendly countries this side the Curtain.

In case that the Return-Balloons can be fitted out with some kind of distant-controlled propulsion and guiding means or devices, then the collection could be done by a few appropriately equipped Collecting Centers of our own, not too far from the Iron Curtain. Such specially equipped return-balloons would be started by help of favorable winds like simple return-balloons. Their special apparatus, which will later have to respond to the radio-signals of our Collecting Center, would be put in action automatically, after a period of time necessary for the balloon to be carried by the winds out of the enemy-controlled area (and out of the zone of effective influence of the possible jamming or interception stations of the enemy) into the area where the radiation-field of our own guiding station will be strong enough to control the remaining flight of the balloon by the intermediary of the tiny receiver-relays on the balloon.

3. Knowing the immense difficulties and costs involved in work with the sent-in agents, and the rather often failures of the missions, it looks to be worth-while to try this way. Although the enemy will collect most of our return-balloons unused, and some after these will be on their way with valuable loads, the percentage of possible positive results could be higher than that of the sent-in agents. Besides, such an activity would strengthen the hope of the suffering people behind the Curtain, that they really will be helped to free themselves.

Mario K. Giordano

SECRET

9 June 1955

TO : []
FROM : []
SUBJECT: Mr. A. Kurgvel, Request for Clearance of Article for
Publication.
ENCLOSURE: Ltr, dtd 9 June 1955 Mr. Kurgvel to []; Carbon Copy
of article to be published.

1. Forwarded.

[]
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DATE 2008

SECRET

130-A-149
(2 pp)

SECRET

9 June, 1955

TO : WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, c/o []
FROM : Mr.A.Kurgvel

SUBJECT: Request for Clearance of Publication of an Article.

I was asked by Estonian Ex-Colonel R.MAASING, former 1-st Assistant to the Chief of Estonian General Staff, to write something for being printed in the History of the Estonian People and State in World War II, being published by an Estonian Publishing House in Sweden.

To comply with this request I have written a part of the story of my service with the G 2, of which Colonel Maasing was the Chief then, and of my later activity. The story carries the title "Viisteist aastat üle normi" (15 years over the rate). I chose that title because 15 years will be over in this July from the date when the Soviet occupational authorities in Estonia, in July 1940, ordered my displacement from G 2 because I was found unacceptable for them to cooperate with. As they most likely intended to liquidate me soon after that, like they did with all my fellow-officers who did not surrender to them but could not escape their hold, and as I am still alive, then I find that the 15 last years of my life have been over the rate foreseen by the Communists for me to live.

Up to now I have written 40 pages (1 to 41, with # 19 missing) starting with my entering the service with G 2, in 1934, and finishing with my escape from Estonia, in 1940.

I shall mail one copy of this writing to Colonel Maasing, so that he could read it . I will inform him that I have to receive the authority from my Employer to publish this writing. I do not expect that it will be printed in full, it is too long for that in frame of the volumes of this history book, but some parts of it, which are of some general interest, could be, if the authority for this will be given.

There is NO mentioning of the United States of America in this writing, except the names of two Military Attaches of the U.S. in Estonia, Major G.B.GUENTHER and Major W.E.SHIPP, and the note that Major Guenther fell during World War II in grade of General and Colonel Shipp represented the U.S.Army in many other countries later, at last in Spain, from where he returned in autumn, 1954 and retired in sight of the nearing limits of age.

Forwarding (here enclosed) one copy of this writing I herewith ask for Clearance of Publication of it, provided that the Publishing House, represented by Col. Maasing, will like to use it.

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A. Maasing

Foreign Documents Division

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Fifteen Years Over the Norm

Author

The events which began in Estonia in 1939 indicated that the Communist general staff in Moscow had decided upon the destruction of the Estonian armed forces prior even to the beginning of the overt Communist measures against the Estonian government and people. But they did not begin the execution of these plans at once with the immediate seizure of everything by force. They were sufficiently well concealed and conceived, and began with the elimination of individuals from among the many, so that it would not be apparent to those who were to be liquidated when the great seizure was to begin.

On 2 July 1955 it will be exactly 15 years from the day that the writer of these lines himself heard about the measures the Communists had taken. That he heard of them is probably owing to the foresight of the new officials. The Communists had already placed, or had forced the President of the Republic [of Estonia] to appoint, Major General G. Jonson as Commander of the Armed Forces in place of Supreme Armed Forces Commander General J. Laidoner, who had similarly been discharged through their pressure. When General Jonson received an order from the Red leaders, the first phase of which involved the liquidation of two Estonian officers, the originators of the order once again apparently made the mistake of forgetting to specifically forbid him from reporting, thinking that he would not dare to inform the authorities as to the source of the order. General Jonson, as an honorable Estonian officer, though considered a proper tool by the Reds, informed the authorities of the true situation.

The preliminaries prior to the order were so clear to both of the officers concerned that they were able to draw the proper

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conclusions. Thanks to that, and thanks to their assistants, they are still alive -- 15 years above the "norm" which the Communists had decreed for their existence. (1)

(1) Colonel V. Saarsen, a War College [of Estonia] graduate, and Captain (Author), a War College graduate.

How did it come about that the Red leaders gave their attention to mere captain among the generals and colonels in their plans?

What did that man, as a captain and as a civilian, experience and do during those fateful days and during the ensuing 15 years?

The present document attempts to answer those questions as accurately as recollection permits. The writer will rely upon written notations made during the occurrence of the events, or shortly thereafter while the impressions were still fresh, to the extent that they are available, so that gross errors of memory will be eliminated.

The writer will not recount or tell of any personal "heroic feats," for there were none; he begs merely to tell his own account, as an Estonian soldier, as he sees it and is able to, of a situation quite unusual for a soldier.

In order to avoid the first person singular recounting, the writer begs refer~~ence~~ to himself in the third person as the author, and when this is inconvenient, simply as "the captain," without mention of the name.

Since some small details of this article may ^{be} in variance with the premature or belated writings of other authors, it is urged that it be taken as a free interpretation with the assurance that it makes

no pretense at infallibility. The retentive capacity of the human mind is limited. Various incidents can with the passage of time assume significance, in the minds of those who have experienced them, that is not in keeping with the true situation, and individual wishful thinking may preclude an objective picture, and there are few authoritative opinions written on the subject. But writers can control the accuracy of their minds by a comparison of the divergent writings, as well as the influence of memory, and researchers can come closer to the truth by the use of such documents than would be possible by the study of only one document.

Where the writer may use material from the works of earlier writers or researchers, that fact is indicated by the use of appropriate notes.

Peacetime Service in Division II of the General Staff

Division II of the [Estonian] General Staff was called variously the foreign and the information division, but most frequently the espionage division. In the eyes of those who were not familiar with the operations of the Division, it was given some kind of a secret, clandestine mission. So it happened that the captain, then still a lieutenant, rejected the offer of an assignment in Division II when it was made to him in 1931,⁽²⁾

(2) By Col K. Laurits, a War College graduate, then chief of the division.

as he had just completed the course at the War College. When the same offer was repeated two years later, he accepted it and went on duty in Section A of the Division in January 1934.

At the time Lt (Author) entered on duty, Col K. Laurits was chief of the Division. But Col Laurits ~~was chief of the Division.~~ But ~~Col Laurits~~ soon left, going to France as a military attache and to the French Supreme War College. Lt Col R. Ma^aising, a War College graduate, who had been a former chief of Section A, and more recently a military attache in Riga, then became chief of the Division.

The Division was at that time organized into three sections, later four, known as Sections A, B, C, and D, and into corresponding offices (kantsel) under direction of the Division secretary. ^{in 1934 the chiefs were:} Section A, Maj A. Sinka, a War College graduate; Section B, Major Ernits; Section C, Maj R. Tonurist, a War College graduate; and K. Kreiman, ^{an army} ~~an army~~ official, was Division secretary (later replaced by Reimere). There was yet no Section D; when it became established, Capt A. Kalmus was its chief.

The author was originally assigned to Section A and Capt A. Kristian, a War College graduate, was transferred from Section A to Section C. The departure of the author, who had been promoted to captain, to attend a code ciphering course in Poland was soon ordered. But the unexpected illness of Major Tornist^{up}, and the approaching departure of Major Sinka as military attache to Moscow disrupted these plans. Captain Kristian was brought back to Section A so that he could take over the section upon Major Sinka's departure to Moscow. The former had to return, therefore, as military attache to Finland. The captain (author) had to remain temporarily in Section C, where he worked under directions given him from time to time by Major Tonurist, who was expected to go on sick leave. But Major Tonurist became seriously ill before Major Sinka's departure for Moscow. One of Major Tonurist's legs was amputated, which would necessarily keep him away from the Division for an extended period. After that Captain Kristian was ordered permanently into Section C, and when Major Tonurist's other leg was amputated, which necessitated his separation from the army, Captain Kristian was appointed chief of Section C. In order to effect Major Sinka's appointment to Moscow, Captain Kristian, already earmarked for this duty, was ordered as military attache to Finland (concurrently as senior officer of Section C), and the captain (author) was appointed temporary director of Section A.

This appointment placed a great responsibility and workload upon the still inexperienced captain (author), especially since at first he was not able to have an assistant and had to do alone the work of two. But he believed that he could assume the responsibility for a short time, until a new section chief would be appointed, since there were suitable candidates who claimed the proper experience; that point was already assured by the planned appointment of a lieutenant colonel, since an officer of the rank of captain could not be appointed acting chief until he had had two

years of experience as a "temporary appointee." But -- time passed and no new section chief was appointed, but in time the captain was assigned a Junior Lieutenant Didvig (subsequently ^{changed his name to} Raia) as assistant, and later a Capt A. Reinlo (former name Freimann), a War College graduate. After two years the captain was made acting chief, and later chief of the section.

The work in Section A was diversified, involving the authorization of all actions delegated to the section. The standard staff duty day of seven hours was not long enough. It was necessary to work in the evenings and at night, so that the family complaints that "we do not see you for days on end; you frequently appear just long enough to change your clothes and disappear again; you seldom get home before midnight, only to disappear early next morning, constantly day after day," were all entirely justified.

The captain's work involved all of the foreign military attaches accredited to the Estonian army and also the Estonian military attaches abroad. There were 16 countries (3) which had military attaches in Estonia. Many countries did not limit themselves

(3) The custom then was to list the names of the countries in their French-language alphabetical order. But since the French language has practically lost its value as a diplomatic language, the countries will here be listed in their Estonian-language alphabetical order, as follows: England, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Soviet Union, Poland, France, United States of North America, Sweden, Rumania, Germany, Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

For the record, let it be noted here that Estonia had military attaches at the following localities: Latvia and Lithuania, Riga; Soviet Union, Moscow; Poland and Rumania, Warsaw; France and Belgium, Paris; Germany and Hungary, Berlin; Finland, at Talinn until 1939, subsequently in Helsinki. Estonia had no military attaches in England or the Scandinavian countries. There was a naval attache for a short time in England following establishment of the [Estonian]

Republic. Estonia had no military representatives outside of Europe.

to a single attache, but had special ground, naval, and air forces representatives, frequently with assistants.

The Soviet Union, Latvia, and Poland had their resident attaches in Tallin, while the other attaches came as needed from their residences in Riga, Warsaw, Berlin, Helsinki, or Stockholm, just as the Estonian attaches did in representing their forces in the various countries.

It was a beautiful sight to behold and sweet music to the ears when the attaches and their assistants gathered in Tallin for the observation of Estonian Independence Day. They presented a beautiful picture in their parade uniforms, flanked by the flag-bedecked streets, but even more festive and colorful was the ensuing official reception, with everyone in dress uniform and bedecked with all their medals. The languages of discourse would then be mostly French, Russian, German, and English, depending on the fluency and wishes of each representative. Since the representatives of the countries neighboring Estonia ~~were~~ frequently ^{spoke only} their native tongues, the Estonian officer corps included linguists in those languages. The Finnish representatives were so accomplished, in fact, that they conversed with the Estonian officers in faultless Estonian. Though perhaps it was a bit of a burden for the Estonian officers to orientate themselves among all these languages and to shift frequently from one to another, there was no real difficulty; small wonder then that the memory of such receptions frequently returns to mind.

The foreign representatives from both the nearby and furthest countries traveled extensively in Estonia in the course of each year,

and they were regularly reassigned every two or three years. We will mention by name several of them who remained longest in Estonia or otherwise made themselves more noteworthy.

It is the popular custom that the military attache who has been longest at a post, or who was first appointed to that country, should be considered the senior attache in that country. In 1934 there was one such, the Lithuanian military attache, a Col B. Jakutis, a solid senior gentleman, talkative, and equipped with an inexhaustible stock of anecdotes. After he left, the Finnish attache, Maj. R. Ingelius, became the senior attache until 1939. Later, when the Communists were driven out of Tallinn in autumn 1941, Ingelius returned to Tallinn as a lieutenant colonel, this time as the Finnish liaison officer with the German forces in Estonia. He was known as a cordial and serious person, respected and beloved by many Estonians, especially after the dreary events of 1940-41, when his presence brought back the joyous times when he represented his army in the free Estonian Republic.

Since each country strives to use its most capable officers as its representatives, it is no wonder that many of the military attaches who were stationed in Estonia have subsequently risen to high rank and to high office. They cannot all be listed here, but we will mention several: Major Geneval, the French military attache later became a general and assistant to the chief of the French General Staff, and more recently, chief of the President's cabinet of the French Republic; Major Onodera, the Japanese attache, as a general during World War II represented his forces in Sweden; Capt Tangen Hansteer, the Norwegian attache, was a general in charge of Norwegian occupation forces in Germany, and later became commander of the entire Norwegian army; Maj G.B. Guenther, the USA attache, came out of World War II as a general, and Maj W.E. Shipp, as a

colonel, has represented his armed forces in a number of countries, most recently in Spain, going into the reserves in autumn 1954 after that assignment since he is approaching retirement age; Lieutenant Colonel Veiss, the last Latvian attache in Estonia, was decorated with the German Iron Cross for exceptional bravery and service in the war against the Communists. He was later killed in that same war.

The Estonians paid more attention to Soviet Union attaches than they did to the attaches of any of the other countries. That was natural since it involved their largest and most mysterious neighbor against whom they had fought for their independence and whose political objectives differed so much from their own and from that of their neighbors. They were the select from tens of thousands of Red Army commanders, intelligent and capable in all fields. There were three of them regularly in Estonia during the period 1934-1940 and they presented quite an interesting picture of the Red commanders. We will deal with them at greater length.

The Red Army forces were represented in Estonia during 1934 by a commander Mazalov [Estonian transliteration from the Russian]. Rank was therefore not then yet employed in the Red Army. Mazalov carried service appointment credentials from which it could be assumed that his attache rank corresponded to that of a brigade commander, which would correspond to a major general ^{or} a senior colonel in the Estonian army.

Mazalov did not reveal to others the extent of his knowledge. He was not adept socially. He concealed his knowledge of the Estonian language, apparently on orders, which is natural since an individual who is appointed as a "representative" to a neighbor country should properly know the language of that country. The Estonians, however, did not believe in this inability of his to know

their language and the Estonian ladies constantly created situations aimed at bringing about a "confession" from him. It so happened one warm summer day in the Officer Association casino in Tallinn that the "comrade military attache" was seated at a table between two Estonian ladies and across from one Estonian man. He appeared to feel uneasy in such civilian company. He became hot and the sweat began to roll down his face. One of his Estonian table companions, whose appetite no doubt was affected by this sight, remarked in Estonian during an appropriate moment to another Estonian words to the effect "he could at least wipe his nose so that it wouldn't add to the sweat." The representative in uniform heard and understood, and was so influenced that he forgot his pretense of not knowing the language that he reached for his handkerchief and began wiping himself, all the while reddening and sweating all the more.

The following Soviet Union military attache was Tupikov. He was plain, but freer and more accomplished in his department than his predecessor. Tupikov was well read; he dared and liked to converse and play chess, even with civilians. The use of military ranks for Red Army commanders was adopted during his stay in Estonia. Tupikov received the rank of "polkovnik," which corresponded to that of a colonel in Estonia. Epaulets were not yet then authorized, only the insignia corresponding to rank were issued for the collar and the coat. During a reception given by the Polish military attache in the extraterritorial area, two of the guests, N. Reek, the Estonian Chief of Staff (who was then a major general), and Soviet Polkovnik Tupikov, played a game of chess, the latter already having won against many opponents. We have forgotten how the game turned out, but we remember the conversation that went on during the game. The conversation touched on the new ranks adopted by the Red Army. General Reek predicted that the Red Army officers would soon begin to wear bright epaulets, as they had during czarist times. Tupikov maintained that this would never happen. General Reek offered to make a wager that they would not only adopt gold epaulets, but would

begin to attend church and to kneel to icons. A part of General Reek's prediction has come true, and the realization of the second part has come nearer rather than farther, for the control by the Communist Party of all high and low church officials is officially and publicly admitted, though the attitude of the Communists toward religion has not changed.

Polkovnik Tupikov knew how to handle situations. When any of the other attaches became "over-fatigued" at the frequent receptions, he did not make this known to the guests. He felt completely at home in the Soviet embassy. Once, upon the departure from Estonia of Captain Radomsky, the assistant to the Polish military attache, he gave a small farewell reception. When Captain Radomsky had already departed, for he was in a hurry, and the guests were drinking their coffee, Polkovnik Tupikov, as the host, said that he had been in the company of Captains at numerous receptions where there was no lack of good liquor, but that he had never yet seen a captain intoxicated. Now he wished to see how much an Estonian captain could take. The captain was unable to talk himself out of this "examination," especially when the Polish attache was pushing the host on, as well as the chief of Division II, who was the captain's chief.⁽⁴⁾ The umpires

(4) The two officers involved were Lieutenant Colonel Szczekowski, the Polish attache, and Colonel Maasing.

were selected and they duly determined the conditions for the honorable combat. The liquor was to be Kremlin cognac, the typical Soviet drink, of which the host seemed to have an inexhaustible supply. The Red Army lost that encounter. Tupikov became so "fatigued" that the guests ended as the victors. Both of the umpires and the captain remained relatively sober, but it was not easy for them to be sociable the following evening, nor were they able to do much work during the day, for the Kremlin cognac was much more potent even than Estonian bootleg liquor.

Polkovnik Tupikov's knowledge of Estonia, and especially the extent of his information resources, are illustrated by the following incident. The foreign attache corps had been invited by the Estonian General Staff to an excursion somewhere between Tapa and Rakvere. An attache of a western country inquired as to how far from Tallinn they were. Before the Estonian escort could give an answer Polkovnik Tupikov gave the accurate distance from the nearest crossroads to Tallinn. It was not an important crossroads whose distance from Tallinn might be readily known, but one among many small ones. The distance he quoted has been forgotten, but this first-class instance of map control showed that Tupikov's information was accurate.

Tupikov was apparently considered such an efficient attache that he was later, probably in early 1940, sent as the Red Army attache to Berlin in the rank of major general. There he again became involved in Estonian affairs for, with the Soviet occupation of Estonia in 1940, the Estonian embassy in Berlin was liquidated upon the demand of the German Foreign Office and the embassy building and its equipment were given over to the use of the Soviet officials. The Red Army attache office was then located in it, with Major General Tupikov as chief.

The last Soviet military attache in Estonia was Polkovnik Tsukanov [Estonian transliteration from Russian]. Although he came to Estonia prior to the beginning of the bad events of 1939, he was not able to create that human atmosphere around himself that Tupikov had been able to create. Polkovnik Tsukanov also had social contacts with the officials, but he did not create a humane impression, remaining a coldly calculating aloof official, as if he were afraid of someone or something. The Estonians had nothing

against that, however, for it was clear to the officers who had observed the Soviet military attaches that the backward Mazalov, the adroit and precise Tupikov, and the timid Tsukanov all represented the one great menacing power which they had seen attempting the invasion of their country on 1 December 1924 and again in 1939, and finally in the dreary days of 1940.

Polkovnik Tsukanov's timidity may be ascribed to the watchful glances of his "wife," regarding whom it was rumored that she was not his real wife but a high Communist surveillance official. As respects Mazalov, there is no impression that he had any members of his family with him in Estonia. Tupikov's wife was in Estonia only a short time with her child, explaining that she was studying chemistry in a university and could visit her husband only during the university vacation period. Whether that was actually so, or whether it was a cover for the harsh Soviet regulation which demands that the members of the families of representatives going abroad must remain as hostages in the Soviet Union, is not essential here. Tupikov's wife had the appearance of an ordinary domestic Russian woman, who seemed quite suitable to Tupikov, who was also plain. In the case of the Tsukanovs it was impossible to say whether they had merely been sent out together; both were quite well educated; the man fearfully reticent, gray, and level-tempered; the woman small, superbly dressed, and with manners befitting a high-ranking woman during the entire stay in Tallinn. Perhaps they had an agreement as to who should be considered the surveillance officer.

A Captain Markov appeared as Tsukanov's assistant in 1939. He was not appointed as an assistant military attache and was not entered in the diplomatic register. He did not visit the Estonian General Staff in connection with his duties, but there was frequent telephone contact with him since he would answer the attache's telephone, especially after the beginning of the irregular events of 1939.

The management of official affairs with all of the foreign military attaches proceeded smoothly and projurly. Only the excessive love of alcohol of several attaches produced some difficulty socially. The cognac contest given by Polkovnik Tsukanov was not merely a small and gay affair, but brought with it affairs known as "alcohol poisoning," which were to be avoided whenever one had the ability to talk himself out of them. Besides, Tupikov could control himself even when "fatigued." The unexpected inebriation of Maj T. Shimanuko, the friendly assistant Japanese military attache at a small affair he gave in the green room of the Estonia building created at first an uneasy feeling among the guests, especially since his superior was present, but the latter caused no disturbance of it; in fact, a self-appointed expert asserted that this was quite proper, since under Japanese custom the host must be in a "gay" mood so that the guests would feel free to enjoy themselves. Whether that is so we cannot question, but it is known that Japanese customs vary greatly from those of the Estonians. But in addition to those who were of natural high spirits, or to those whose "fatigue" was merely feigned, there were also individuals whose fatigue was authentic, and whose presence at such functions became a burden to the entire social corps, especially to hosts. On one occasion the matter went so far that the report of the inebriation of one representative came back from abroad through official channels to Estonia.

Owing to his great workload, the chief of Division II was not able to attend personally to everything. The section chiefs therefore had to handle independently many subjects of a general nature. Thus it fell upon the chief of Section A to prepare and execute an excursion for the foreign attache corps to visit the troop units at Rakvere, Tapa, and Tartu, of which mention has already been made in connection with Polkovnik Tsukanov's knowledge of Estonia.

The trip began quite normally. Since the trip was during a cold and snowy winter, part of the trip by automobile between Tapa and Rakvere was quite cold, since the Estonian automobiles then were not yet equipped with heaters. The high-quality Estonian wine used to ward off colds, and later the French cognac at the supper table, tasted so good to many of the guests that they were not able to endure them. The escorts had some difficulty with one representative, (5) who did not participate in the pleasant sessions

(5) Lieutenant Colonel Veckalnins, the Latvian military attache. As it became clear later, during World War II, that officer who had appeared so decrepid and weak by nature in 1940, changed overnight into a Red and into one that sealed the fate of many of his Latvian fellow-officers.

of the company, while the majority of the participants remained quite sober.

Many weeks after that excursion there came a report from the Estonian military attache in Riga to the General Staff concerning a rumor among the attache corps in Riga to the effect that the excursion had been one big drinking bout. The Chief of Staff demanded an explanation from the chief of Division II. The Division chief, who was not familiar with that phase of the excursion, though he had been briefed on the excursion prior to the arrival of the ill report, then gave, with an amused appearance, a mischievous order to the captain that the situation must be rectified. It was then necessary to write a report stating that the liquor and the claimed debauchery were not forced on anyone; that none of the Estonians were inebriated; that the majority of the guests had been completely sober; that most had only taken a single drink, while there was^s only one who was actually inebriated; and that when the Estonian army invites guests it must also provide them with food and drink; that the Estonians, as the hosts could

not say to any guest that he could have no more, since each person is the best judge of the quantity sufficient for himself; that the hosts could not end a function until all of the sober guests had departed; that a re-examination of the events of the excursion indicated that there had not been an over-abundance of liquor, but that the fault lay with the one who became "over-fatigued". The event was closed for the captain with the submission of this report, but the over-fatigued person of that event became fatigued again later.

The reader of such a report might infer that there was much drinking going on in Division II. Such a picture would be erroneous. It is true that during peacetime there was considerable drinking, for the custom in Estonia and her neighboring countries was still such that the taking of one of three appetizers before dinner was considered normal; those who could not adhere to that, or who spoke against it in principle, found it somewhat difficult to get along with those guests who liked to drink. Naturally the Estonians as hosts did not dare, least of all in the course of social functions, to make comparisons between individual representatives which of them did or did not slumber from the effect of drinks. There was an unwritten rule in the Division that no drink would be forced on either the guests or our own people, and also the fact that the Estonian officers did not dare to lose their alertness and remain drinking with those who wished to do so. Frequently it was necessary to guard discretely against the attempts of foreigners to examine one under influence of liquor, and to assist one's companions in avoiding such involvements. It was frequently necessary to return to one's work at headquarters after such "wet" functions in order to finish work needed the next morning. It was not a light or gay responsibility, but an inevitable aspect of a diverse job. It was not for the light-minded or irresponsible, but for one who could practice self-control under pressure. The small Estonian army staff was not large enough to permit the use

of different personnel for attending unavoidable social functions and others to do the work, as in common in the headquarters of large armies. The same personnel had to perform both functions without thought of over-fatigue. Fortunately there were some, though not many, experienced military attaché officers in Estonia, who, with few exceptions, were socially accomplished in the western cultural sense, to whom the social diversion was frequently a good change from the tension of staff work.

Thus far in this document the presentation of the captain's work has been involved with the foreign representation because -- as will later become clarified -- it was one of the prerequisites which later permitted him to escape the Red tentacles in 1940.

The captain's duties required that he have contact with the highest foreign military leaders visiting Estonia, since he had been charged with the technical preparations necessary for their reception. There were so many of these visits during the period under consideration that it is no longer possible to arrange them in the proper chronological order. The daily notes regarding them were burned as a precaution in autumn 1939 when the Soviet Union pressed an assistance pact upon Estonia and brought her forces into Estonia. Thus a great quantity of secret documents were destroyed, not only in the War Ministry, but in many other ministries and offices. The furnaces were not able to burn this great quantity of paper fast enough for complete destruction and a heavy smog hung over many parts of Tallinn with charred and undestroyed parts of book pages floating in the air. It was a necessary measure, but we now lack accurate data for the writing of history. And the undestroyed data are not now available to us, but to our enemies.

It can be generally observed that the chiefs of staff of all near and far countries neighboring Estonia visited in Estonia; these included Marshall Yegorov [Estonian transliteration from Russian], the Soviet Union chief of staff, and General Halder, chief

of the German ground forces staff. Even higher officials visited from several other countries -- ministers of war and armed forces chiefs. The visits to Estonia of the highest military leaders resulted in the visits of corresponding foreign division staff chiefs, or of special representatives, such as that of Admiral ^{Canis} _A, chief of the German general staff foreign division, and that of General Kanave, the senior Japanese military attache in Europe. The official visits of foreign naval units in Tallinn and other Estonian ports, are also worth noting.

The ^{writer} ~~writer~~ is reminded of one of the earliest of such visits, that of the special attache from Hungary on the eve of the Estonian independence day in 1934. Hungary did not yet then have a regular military attache in Estonia. They despatched one officer⁽⁶⁾ of the

(6) Only an oral impression remains of the visitor's name, which might be approximated as Uishiashi.

rank of major as a special representative to the celebration wondering at the patience of Major Sinka, then chief of Section A. The visitor's first greeting was polite and so complimentary and flowery that it lasted several minutes. All the while the visitor held the section chief's hand, cordially squeezing and shaking it, and Major Sinka somehow managing to smile energetically and to squeeze in return the visitor's hand during what appeared to be an interminable time. It was not a common situation among us Nordics. But, customs vary and it is natural that each representative behaves according to his own customs, and we have no right to criticize that which appears strange to us. The visitor fulfilled his function well, erring only on one point when he mentioned the 15-year existence of the Estonian Republic, when actually the sixteenth anniversary was being observed.

A. Oksala, the Finnish minister of war, visited in about 1935 and toured through Estonia. That visit has remained in the

captain's memory because he was ordered to be at the visitor's service during his stay in Tallinn, and no doubt it was in this connection that the Order of the White Rose of Finland was subsequently conferred upon the captain. It was the first foreign decoration on the captain's uniform, which led the section chief to remark that this decoration had only begun the series of crosses that would be conferred on him until after a while he would not know which ones to wear. The chief was right, for during the course of years such a large number of them accumulated that he had to be careful what decorations to wear at the receptions and anniversaries, for the attache concerned would consider the wrong decoration an offense to his country. Fortunately, this occurred only one time to the captain and he believes that the foreign representative with whom he was dealing took it quite sensibly.

As regards the visit of Marshall Jegorov, the impression remaining is that of the exaggerated wariness of the visitors. On such visits the insuring of the safety of the visitors is naturally the responsibility and duty of the host country. Rooms had been prepared for the Marshall and his party in the Palace Hotel (the former Peterburg) just then completed. There were no other guests in the hotel as yet. The Estonian army and police took all the necessary and possible measures to ensure the security of the Communist visitors. But one member of the Marshall's party thoroughly searched under the bed and dressers of the rooms assigned to the Marshall, in the Marshall, in the presence of the Estonian escorts, as if he expected to find many infernal machines there and much more. It was unthinkable to the Estonians who accompanied their own commander or chief of staff, even when in Moscow, to throw themselves on the floor in the presence of their hosts to inspect under the bed in the room assigned to their general. But the officials of any country or department act as if their own procedures were being applied against them, thus betraying their own fear and distrust.

The Marshall's party included 5 or 6 officers, which was twice the number usually accompanying the army commanders of other countries on their visits to Estonia. We later again encountered Major Kalmokov [the Estonian transliteration from Russian is Kalmokov], a member of this party, in the rank of brigadier general, as a member of the commission for establishing military bases. We recall one bearded polkovnik [of that party] who explained that he has worn a full beard since the time when, in the war between Poland and the Soviet Union following World War I, he had to retreat from Warsaw because of Marshall Pilsudski's advance. He swore that he would not shave off the beard until Red Army units again march into Warsaw. The members of Marshall Jegorov's party were generally similar in conduct to the later Red commanders of bases in Estonia, who in every instance, no matter what the topic of conversation, would say "we have the same, but much bigger, much better, and much more developed." That type of answer put one of the polkovniks in an awkward position when the conversation turned to the natural increase of population. It is well known that the rate is small in Estonia, and we made no effort to conceal it, so the polkovnik found a suitable topic for proving the unusual virility of his people. He quoted, apparently automatically and without thinking, such a large annual birth rate for Moscow that the absurdity of it occurred even to him and he quickly changed the subject of conversation.

Col J. Rempel, a War College graduate, then chief of the Training Division of the Estonian general staff, once put all of the Marshall's party into something of a dilemma. He asked the visitors a question concerning the grammar of their own language. The visitors pondered and deliberated for some time for the correct answer when colonel Rempel, an old schoolmaster from the times of

Russian rule, stated that all of the answers were incorrect. He did this with such assurance that the visitors were dumbfounded.(7)

(7) Years later, when Colonel Remmel was in Petseri, deceitfully entrapped and doomed with many other Estonian officers as a result of the compatriotes of these visitors, the captain discovered while doing research on the Soviet language that both sides had been right on that linguistic question. Many expressions which were prohibited as incorrect in the Russian literary language in czarist times have now been accepted with the growth of officialdom into the Soviet Russian language. The question put forth by Colonel Remmel chanced to involve just such an expression: "ya shumlyu." Apparently he had not yet chanced to obtain any special Soviet glossaries, of which there were very few generally available at the time, but which would have show the adoption of the term into the official Soviet terminology from the spoken language.

During General Halder's visit, when the president of Estonia entertained the general at Oru castle, it was necessary for the president to retain Colonel Grabb, the senior command officer, to see that the general in his haste would not step into the water. There was a natural pit in the rack on the grounds of Oru castle, which contained a body of water so clear and smooth on the surface that the guest did not perceive it -- only the clean chalk bottom of the pit was visible.

During the same visit Maj Gen H. Kauler, inspector of the Estonian heavy artillery, invited the guest, who was also a heavy artillery man, to test the accuracy of the Estonian artillery while at the Jagala heavy artillery firing range. The commander of the battery that was to deliver the fire chanced to be one Capt E. Anari (former name was Amberg), one of the best Estonian heavy artillery officers and battery commanders. The guest selected a target on the terrain and designated it himself to the battery

commander. The latter prepared his range calculations with amazing speed, delivered them to the battery, gave the order to fire, and the shots resounded, accurately on the target which was completely destroyed. The Estonian heavy artillery inspector, who had also heard the guest's target designation, was overjoyed at Captain Anari's achievement, since it was necessary to leave a good impression with the guest, but -- the looks of the latter indicated that something had gone awry. It then became clear that target designation and its comprehension are not dependent merely on language ability. The guest had selected and designated quite another target, but both General Kauler and Captain Anari had interpreted incorrectly, yet both exactly the same way. The guest could not understand why the Estonian officers were so pleased with the result. It was later explained that neither side was at fault: the guest had designated the target according to the method used in the German artillery, while the Estonian artillerymen had interpreted it by the method used in the Estonian heavy artillery, and the fault lay in the fact that the German and Estonian methods differed. The honor of the Estonian heavy artillery salvaged; the guest had seen that the Estonians could fire quickly and accurately.

The captain had less occasion for contact with the foreign diplomatic representation in Estonia than he did with the military representatives, who were daily visitors at the Division. Visits to the embassies were mainly in connection with the visits of the highest military men, with the celebrations of the various countries, or with the receptions given in the embassies by the military attaches with whom one had dealings. There was also frequent contact through the exchange of courtesy calls.

In these times of the cold or political war the leaders of many countries frequently give special attention to the tone

of the courtesy letters or telegrams received from other countries, attempting to discover from them whether international political relations are improving or becoming worse, or to discover a change of direction in policy. Only in very few cases can this be assumed possible, but we dare not minimize this possibility. The captain speaks only on the basis of his own experience. For many years he had the responsibility of composing the greetings, telegrams, and numerous types of expressions of appreciation sent by the highest Estonian military officials to the corresponding foreign officials, himself dictating the text. Only in very few instances when exceptional matters were involved did the undersigning high officials give instruction as to the special content of the document, but the work of actual composition was always delegated to the technician. The captain was naturally responsible to the extent that the letters would be appropriate to the occasion and properly phrased, without receiving special instructions. There is no reason to suppose that the methods developed in other countries in this respect differ much from the course developed in Estonia. There must certainly be captains, polkovniks, and first secretaries in the foreign offices and security offices of the countries involved in the cold war who write these courtesy notes sent through official channels to the very top, without even a complete reading by the purported originator. It is a normal occurrence in the modern bureaucratic flood of paperwork, for high officials would not get much of their work done if they had to read every document bearing their signatures; they must have confidence in their subordinates and trust their safety to their own choice of expert advisors. It may therefore be entirely inappropriate to attempt to seek special indicators of political direction from such documents. They may merely give an indication of whether the "little wheel" who composed the letter was tired or

clear mind that day, or whether he was in a good or bad frame of mind. If many highly placed individuals now detect signs of changing political direction in such documents, it can therefore at best give reason only for the independent smirks of the "little wheels," or at the worst, what the cold war adversary may observe from such naiveties may therefore give him another weapon, namely, that he may purposely undertake the development of "lenient" or of "stringent" relations at the next round, in order to lead the opposition more astray or into greater confusion.

The captain had contact also with high Estonian military leaders in the performance of his duties. He was still a lieutenant and a newcomer to Division II when he was sent as a representative of the General Staff to General Laidoner to hear his wishes in respect to the observation of his fiftieth birthday, then approaching. Years later, when General Reek observed his fiftieth birthday, he also called on the captain to assist in the arrangements for the reception. The captain found such tasks more demanding than the discharge of those in the headquarters of the foreign military attaches or at the social functions, because at the former type of function the captain was either alone, or one of very few others, of junior rank among the ministers, generals, and colonels.

Though the captain, or more properly the lieutenant, had received an excellent background in dealing with colonels when he took the course at the War College, he found that the work in Division II gave him an even higher education in this respect. For two years he worked in the War College side-by-side with experienced majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. There the lieutenant saw on many occasions that a lieutenant could be as intelligent, or even more intelligent, than any of a number of colonels. During his six years in Division II the captain had frequent and close contact with so many high foreign and domestic officials, office holders, and military personalities that he soon lost his fear of them, which was not

quite natural for many a line captain who in ordinary conditions seldom come eye-to-eye with many generals. The captain learned to see not only the official person in the colonels, generals, and ministers, but also the inner man and to gauge their strengths and values, as well as their weakness. It was a useful experience in the school of life for him.

The Autumn of 1939

The captain had then been five years in Division II. That was an excessive length of time under the regulations in one type of duty. There was mentioned on many occasions of sending him into some troop unit, but it never materialized. Lieutenant Raia, who had been his assistant, had long since been reassigned to a unit. Capt F. Brede, a War College graduate, had also been reassigned after a tour of duty of about a year in Section A, having been promoted to the rank of major he was sent as military attache to Latvia; the section chief then was left with but one officer assistant. Then came a turn of affairs for the section chief, for it was decided in summer 1939 that he would be sent to Germany for three years to attend the War Academy.

The captain had already put his affairs into order in preparation for his departure, which had been ordered for 3 September, when the war between Germany and Poland broke out on 1 September, which cut these plans short since the War Academy does not train foreign officers during wartime; even those who were studying there at the time were sent home.

The captain therefore had to remain in Section A of Division II, although a Captain-major B. Linneberg had already been ordered there, as the new section chief replacing the captain, to familiarize him with the duties before taking over the office.

But because of the rapidly changing situation, Captain-major Linneberg never did officially take over the function. For a short time the new and old section chiefs worked side-by-side, until Captain-major Linneberg was appointed chief of staff of the [Estonia] naval forces following the escape of the Polish submarine Orzel from the Estonian naval forces.

Thus the captain had to remain as chief of Section A, but because of the pressure of events this was not confirmed by official order.

The outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland, and the demands made of Estonia by the Soviet Union, resulted in a considerable change in the nature of work in Section A of Division II. The workload became even greater. The social functions at the foreign legations and attache offices decreased, but the operational liaison with the representatives increased, since they were naturally interested in the special events developing in Estonia. The situation became extremely involved in that now the attaches of two important nations, Germany and Poland, who were at war with one another, both made visits to Division II, in addition to the attaches of many other countries which were in war readiness but not yet actually at war with one another. Precautions therefore had to be taken so that none of these attaches would ever be put together into the same room since they were not supposed to "see" one another or engage in any kind of conversation. During the Estonian independence day parade in 1940 there was a serious problem of how to avoid placing the attaches of warring nations into ranks so as not to be abreast of one another. Ordinarily at those parades the chief of Division II would take the position at the right flank of the rank of attaches and the attaches would take positions at his left in the sequence of their accreditation, beginning with the one having greatest seniority, followed by the assistant attaches in similar sequences, with the chief of Section A as the last man in the rank. This time it happened that one of the attaches most recently accredited in Estonia had to be placed abreast of Capt Koerner, the assistant German attache, who had seniority of accreditation in Estonia. The problem was resolved by placing the chief of Section A into the middle of the rank between the attaches and the assistant attaches; he therefore separated the two "warring factions."

There was a phenomenal increase in the dealings with the Soviet military attaches. During peacetime the Soviet attaches did not molest Division II with excessive visits to the Estonian staff. They visited only occasionally, as if out of courtesy or custom, and asked few

questions. This may have been owing to the fact that they usually made their wishes known at the Estonian staff after they had expressed similar wishes to the Estonian attache in Moscow. Since they did not wish to reveal anything special to the Estonian attaches, the expression of their desires in Tallinn were apparently limited -- until the situation changed in September 1939 with the presentation of Moscow's criminal demands. Then the telephones between Division II and the Soviet attache began to ring frequently and Polkovnik Tsukanov was frequently seen in Division II. The conversations at first concerned the appearance of Red Army aircraft over Estonian territory and of Red naval vessels in Estonian territorial waters. After that the discussions concerned the ordering of Red Army bases in Estonia, and after the arrival of the commission on bases, the details of their production. Later they concerned the technical execution of marching Red Army units to the bases, inquiries concerning tanks that ran into holes or got stuck along the way, flights of aircraft over Estonian territory between the bases and the Soviet Union, forced landings, and inquiries concerning other mishaps. That work increased to such proportions that the personnel of Section A could no longer cope with it. It became necessary to establish a continuous watch service on duty 24 hours a day. The entire staff of Division II was used for it, together with many other general staff officers who had sufficient proficiency in the Russian language. The workload at the Soviet embassy also grew to such proportions that the attache and Markov, his assistant were not able to handle it. New voices and names appeared there until these exchanges were finally performed without the use of the military attache exchange service directly from the Red Army base at Paldiski and the staff of the Red Army corps stationed in Tallinn. The workload increased even more when the Soviet invasion of Finland began, since the Red aircraft frequently dropped bombs on Estonian territory. Also, many more Soviet aircraft then made forced landings in Estonian territory than they did during their flights

between the Soviet Union and the bases. The grounded fliers were often panic-stricken, thinking that they were in hostile Finland. It was sad and even repugnant to have to assist the invaders of a kindred nation -- but everyone had to do their part.

Dating from the time that Major Sinka was chief of Section A, the section had been charged with the responsibility of producing press releases concerning the Estonian armed forces. They were confined for the most part to events which in one way or another had some connection with the foreign military attache corps. Later, when the emphasis of the releases shifted to domestic affairs, that responsibility was transferred to Section B, especially in view of the fact that Maj P. Villemi, a War College graduate, then chief of Section B, had had previous experience with newspaper work. (9)

(9) Following the entry of Section B chief Maj Ernits into the reserves, Maj J. Toonsar, a War College graduate, became chief of that section and after he had completed his tour of duty, Maj Villemi took over command. Capt K. Tamm, a War College graduate, was the last chief of Section B. That reorganization considerably alleviated the workload of Section A. although the reporters, following the accustomed procedure, continued to make telephone calls to Section A. After having been released from the responsibility of furnishing information to the press, the captain had to rush back with all haste from lunch one September day, when the Leningrad radio began to broadcast a report that the Soviet ship Metallist had torpedoed and sunk the Polish submarine Orzel, near Narva, after it had escaped from Estonia. It did not take long to establish the falseness of that report, for the Estonians were still the masters in their country. The Estonian naval observation posts were still operating without interference and their reports indicated that nothing of the kind reported by the Leningrad radio had occurred at Narva or thereabouts. The other factors were also so evident that the summary of data

refuting the report was soon prepared and submitted to the division chief for the consideration of higher officials and for release to the public. The peacetime operations of the intelligence divisions of the general staffs of all countries are very similar to their wartime operations. Beginning in early September the Estonian Division II operated under extreme pressure. A number of radio receivers had been installed in the section and in the officers' quarters because the officers were required to remain on watch even during their off-duty hours, since the staff was still undermanned to peacetime strength, and because many wished to keep abreast of so that they could properly advise the top level command. But Estonia was not yet engaged in actual war preparations and was therefore not abreast of the surrounding countries that were. The release of that accusing radio report marked the beginning of her eastern neighbor's open activities against her. It was a war in which the weapons still remained silent. Under such conditions it was the self-assumed responsibility of Division II to deliver accurate information with the greatest possible speed to chief of staff so that the president and the commander of the armed forces could make the correct decisions on important matters. There was a sign of relief in the division when the information, so quickly obtained, showed that the Leningrad accusation was entirely without basis and so poorly based that it could be refuted with ease. If all of her neighbor's measures could have been dealt with such despatch, Estonia's position would not have been at all hopeless. But in the meantime a report arrived from Moscow to the effect that demands, very onerous and degrading to Estonia, had been made there to the Estonian minister of economy [or state finance]. During such a critical situation no one would dare to take a chance on creating an even worse situation by attempting a public refutation as in Leningrad accusation. The press therefore remained temporarily uninformed.

In addition to the other work it was necessary to work also in the social sphere, but under conditions quite different than those of peacetime. The performance of such operations is now known as the waging of cold war. A commission for the determination of the details of the bases, which the Soviet Union forced on Estonia under the assistance pack, soon arrived in Tallinn from Leningrad; the commission was composed of high-ranking Red generals and commissars. The members of the commission were extremely reticent. The Estonians tried to relieve the dejection of the commission sessions by establishing more human relations with their counterparts by intermingling with them at the dinner table. But their neighbors were so reserved that they could not enjoy either the food or the drink the Estonians offered them. The captain naturally was not a member of the corresponding Estonian commission, but he had official contact with the latter and he had to participate in the attempts to create human relations. But he knew that the official discussions were so trying that General Reek, the Estonian chief of staff, had to be discharged as chairman of the corresponding Estonian commission and that this heavy responsibility was then placed on K. Selter, the Estonian foreign minister. The captain chanced to be a witness on one occasion to the diplomatic tranquility with which Minister Reek reacted to an extremely sharp demand. He did not respond with a quick retort, but slowly rose from the table, walked calmly to a table in a corner of the room, poured beverage into a glass, drank some, returned just as calmly, and took his place at the table. The opposition remained under tension during this time, but the tension on the Estonian side was reduced by that brief and peaceful delay. After that it was easy for Minister Selter to give the Reds a quick answer, which showed that their "bomb" had missed its mark. The captain was also aware that the quiet overnight departure from Estonia of Colonel Maasing, first assistant to the chief of staff, came about as a result of the bitter remarks he made to the opposition when he was a member of the commission on several occasions and had put the opposition to silence with the logic of his arguments.

The captain knew that the commander in chief inwardly condoned Colonel Maasing's procedure, but knew that he could not at that time reveal his true opinions or feelings. It was clear that Estonia must attempt a peaceful reconciliation with her neighbor. But Estonia could not agree to all of the demands. Colonel Maasing's courageous and forthright presentation aided in the alleviation of the demands made by the Red generals, as well as the situation for Estonia. But it was also clear that Colonel Maasing could not personally live any longer under the power of those Red officials, and that it would have been extremely difficult for the Estonian government to protect him from them if he had remained there.

The Red generals and commissars made a miserable impression socially. But the Red commanders who came "to visit" in Estonia in uninvited naval units appeared even more pitiful. The Estonians had to remain polite; when a new arrival says that he is coming to visit, then the host must treat him appropriately, since the situation did not permit slamming the door in the face of even an uninvited guest. The Estonians found themselves in just such a situation; they had to give at least one official reception, no matter how simple.

The preparations for such a reception would not have caused the Estonians any difficulty if the "visitors" could only have provided information on the number of guests, their names, and ranks that they would send to the reception. Polkovnik Tsukanov was asked to provide the needed information as soon as possible, which he agreed to do. The importance of the seemingly trifling matter, namely, that the highest ranking and most important individuals had to be seated at the table ~~placed~~ in proper sequence from the host, was nevertheless well known, for the guests were known to be quite sensitive in that respect. But this time Polkovnik Tsukanov had even more trouble in providing the required information than his predecessor had on the occasion of the reception given ^{for} ~~to~~ the commander of the Red battleship "Marat" upon the visit of the latter in Tallinn during its return from the coronation of the king of England. The information was received barely an hour before the reception. When the guests began to arrive it immediately became apparent that the proper seating plan that had been hastily prepared could not be used because a great number of individuals had been substituted on the list of guests previously submitted to the Estonians. The only thing that could then be done was to estimate the importance of each Red commander and to seat him accordingly. Polkovnik Tsukanov himself was uneasy since he knew from previous experience at Estonian receptions that the hosts were not accustomed to that kind of situations.

The memory of one Red commander at that table who apparently went to great lengths to exhibit cultural refinement still lingers. His hands were not especially clean, but perhaps it was not his fault that he had had no time to wash his hands since his name did not appear on the list of guests submitted to the hosts. But apparently he had ~~xxxxxx~~ been coached in some kind of manners. He would take a slice of bread from the tray with one hand and shove it on the end of a fork held upright in the other, and would then eat the bread from the end of the fork. No doubt his eating manners were those he had become accustomed to at home.

There were two aspects to the situation; on the one hand there ~~was~~ were the utterly haughty and blunt demands of the high-ranking Red generals in the sessions of the commission, as well as the social inaffability of their

officials, all of which contributed to an uneasy premonition, and on the other, there was the feeling that everything had ended and that the monster would swallow Estonia, yet, when one observed their unrefined and uneducated manners and the superiority of the Estonians in this respect, there was a rekindling of hope, though there was no real possibility of physical or political opposition. It was indeed a strange feeling; the captain experienced it himself and struggled against it. The fact that many Estonian officers remained in Estonia until suitable avenues of escape had been closed, no doubt resulted from this feeling.

But the problem of escaping from a perishing country cannot be dealt with as simply as that. There were many other factors in addition to the two-fold feeling described above, which influenced the people to remain, such as the desire to continue ones work, to ~~remain~~ retain ones position, ~~and~~ the hope that time would resolve the situation, and that kind destiny would bring its just desserts to the Estonian people.

When
^ the work of the commission dealing with the establishing of the bases had been completed and the Red members had departed from the dinner given after the signing of the papers, the Estonian members present, notably General Laidoner, the ^{commander in} chief, ~~of staff~~, and Foreign Minister Selter remained ^{with heavy hearts} in the Officer Association casino to exchange thoughts. Everyone supported the idea of sending certain leading government officials abroad as a precautionary measure. The discussion then turned to the question of how great an advantage it would be for Estonia if President Pats and General Laidoner were to go to the free world and work from there for the good of the country. General Laidoner remarked that the decision regarding the president is a foregone conclusion: He must remain with the people to share their destiny, for he who has worn the purple cannot flee. As respects himself, the general said that though he has not worn the purple, his position as commander of the armed forces was such a high office that he could not flee either and would therefore remain. The general seemed to support the idea that many officials ought to be sent abroad. The commander in chief considered the situation

purely from the military, the realistic, point of view. Captain-major J. Santpank, the recently-appointed commander of Estonian naval forces, brought up the question of what the Estonians should do in the event war should break out between Germany and the Soviet Union and German naval units should come into the Gulf of Finland and into the range of Estonian shore batteries. The Estonians would be required to open fire on them under the terms of the assistance pact, but they would not want to do so. The general answered in the affirmative, that certainly fire would be opened, for the Estonians always observe the terms of their treaties. He added further that when the Estonian shore batteries would encounter German ships under such conditions the German unit commanders would certainly become aware of the situation and would remark, "Clever fellows, those Estonians."

The remarks and opinions of an experienced government official and military leader cannot be lightly set aside. These aged men knew the realities and did not permit themselves be influenced by their individual considerations nor by wishful thinking. They foresaw the difficult times in store for the Estonian people and knew that the entire population could not flee, and that therefore they would also have to remain. The question is, what were those powers that ~~planned~~ upset the correct plan designating the positions from which ^{the} individuals ~~would~~ ~~be~~ sent abroad under official order; these individuals were those whose fates would have been sealed by remaining there during the coming developments, because of their former ~~actions~~ official actions in opposing the Soviet Union, either during the War of Independence or during later times. The plan to send such officials abroad who could speak for the rights of the Republic of Estonia until such times as the principles of justice would be restored in the world also failed. The preparatory measures were under way, even the lists of names were being compiled, though the papers of only a few officials had been put into readiness for action by the foreign minister. From the military side, Col H. Kurg was sent as military attache to France, replacing Col J. Soodla, a War College graduate, who had been recalled when the situation began to become critical in 1939.

In contrast to the foregoing plan, official action was taken to ~~limit~~ place a limit on indiscriminate transfers abroad by establishing a strict control for the issuance and application of official foreign passports. As formerly, the responsibility for the passports of military officers rested with chief of Division II, who sent them to the director of the administrative division of the foreign ministry, but now such papers had to be prepared by the chief of staff. Even more stringent measures were taken. The ^{External} ~~Border~~ Police (Välispolitsei) and the ^{Border} ~~District~~ Guardposts (Piirivalve) were issued an order ~~marking~~ with a list of names of individuals who were not to be ~~given official~~ ~~passports~~ allowed to depart from each district ~~on~~ upon presentation of their official passports unless they could also present ~~special~~ papers issued specially for that purpose. The captain's name was also on such a list, as he discovered in 1941 upon his return to Estonia, though he had been able to leave despite the order in 1940. But that account ~~will~~ would precede the events.

The changed situation brought additional tasks in the maintaining of liaison with Estonian military attaches abroad. Formerly the military attache for Finland ordinarily resided in Tallinn, traveling from there to Helsinki only as the need arose. In the new conditions he resided permanently in Helsinki and utilized the submarine cable across the Gulf of Finland with the friendly permission of Division II of the Finnish general staff, using telegraph as the mode of communication with Tallinn. The situation was similar with Lt Col K. Mollini, a War College graduate, who was the Estonian attache for Latvia. The Estonian general staff had direct telegraph communication with Riga during certain hours, and the chiefs of Division II and Section A frequently received long reports through that channel. The same telegraph line was utilized also by the Latvian general staff for maintaining communication with their attache in Tallinn; for that reason the Latvian military attache was frequently seen in Division II, waiting for a time when the line would be free. The captain chanced to be on tour of duty attending that line when the Latvian commander of armed forces reported

to the Estonian commander of armed forces that he would not go to the pre-arranged meeting place in Valga because there were too many watchful eyes in Riga -- that being the approximate reason he gave -- which report arrived barely two hours before the Estonian chief of armed forces was to depart from Tallinn to ~~the~~ exchange opinions regarding the situation, with the neighbor country ~~the~~ commander of armed forces.

There were fundamental changes also in the staffs of the foreign military attache offices in Tallinn. Lieutenant Colonel Szczekowski, the Polish attache, protested vociferously when the Estonian naval forces interned the submarine "Orzel," which had come into Estonian territorial waters. The Estonians could not hold that against him, for that was ~~his~~ his duty as well as it would have been the duty of the Estonian attache in a similar situation, but the Estonians could not grant his wishes, for that would ^{not} have been in the interests of the Estonian government and would have violated the national law. The escape of the Orzel may have been some consolation to him, but he certainly did not display any joy, for the fateful ending of the Polish Republic was rapidly approaching. He quietly disappeared from Estonia without even a farewell. The Estonian chief of staff had presented a two-volume ^{the Estonian} copy of Vabadussõja Ajaloo (History of the War of ~~its~~ Independence), each individually dedicated, to each of the foreign military attaches accredited in Estonia. The volumes dedicated to Colonel Szczekowski were later found in the Tallinn flea market. That was not a pleasant piece of news for the Estonians, but when one considers the number of precious books and other valuables that we ourselves had to abandon in order to escape with our life, we can find it to forgive him, since he no longer even had a homeland to which he could return; the concern for the future causes an effacement of the rules of courtesy and decency.

With the development of war conditions in Warsaw, the French naval attache, Commandant Gruillot, established himself in Tallinn. He used to remark that he likes Estonia very much and wants to settle down in Tallinn in private life. He, however, was able later to return to his homeland.

Captain-lieutenant Cellarius, the German assistant naval attache, and Captain Koerner, the German assistant ground forces attache, were frequently seen in Tallinn during those times. They were both superb officers, very cordial and sincere. Fate brought them back to Estonia in 1941, both in higher rank. They each had their parts to play in the liberation of Estonia.

Captain Hallakorpi, who was appointed Finnish military attache in Estonia after the departure of Major Ingelius, did not remain long in Estonia because the Winter War, which had just begun, took him back to his homeland.

But life and work continued onward although all joy and radiance had departed, leaving ^{behind} only the dismal workaday life, ~~and~~ the sight of the prosaic Red Army men, and the constant threat of even worse to come, for there was a strange premonition prevailing throughout, following the recalling of German personalities from the Baltic countries. And so the worse times soon followed.

June 1940

The operations of Division II did not permit the ~~division~~ ^{division} chief to be much in his office even during peacetime. The responsibility of the section chiefs to perform their operations independently thereafter increased, for the work had to go on, whether the division was there or not to give orders. Colonel Maasing, who was division chief when the captain took over the leadership of Section A from Major Sinka, gave the captain orders to that effect, remarking in his own joking manner that it does not pay to wait for praise, and that when the work is well done everything is quiet, but when something goes wrong, then "hell lets loose." The praise was not forthcoming even when Colonel Maasing became first assistant to the chief of staff and Colonel Saarsen, a War College graduate, who until then was the military attache in Latvia and Lithuania, became chief of Division II. But "hell" never did "break loose" and the work inside the division progressed quietly and smoothly, with ~~no~~ the need for independent operation never even questioned.

The workload increased to such a point during the period ~~that~~ the bases were maintained in Estonia that it was possible to be with ones family only very few hours ~~of~~ during any 24-hour period. And the recognition for the independent work still remained forthcoming. The captain had to substitute for the division chief during the latter's absence for, during the course of time, the captain had become the senior section chief. The ~~independent~~ independent action which had become ingrained during the course of the years became far more necessary under the new conditions. An example of that follows. One Sunday in June 1940, the captain was in the division, as usual. The division chief was out of Tallinn. The telephone central reports that there is a long-distance call from one of the border posts on the Estonian-Latvian boundary. The caller is Captain-lieutenant Cellarius, the German assistant naval attache. He is having difficulty crossing the border with his automobile because he does not have a permit for it which he should have obtained from the ministry of economy in Tallinn. The attache states further that his trip is urgent and ~~xxx~~ he cannot return to Tallinn, and that he is asking for assistance from the Estonian general staff. The border post

chief, a noncommissioned officer, states that he cannot permit the vehicle to pass without the required papers (the automobile had been purchased in Estonia) or without a direct order from his chief, the border guard section chief in Valga. The captain assures the attache that he will do what he can, and the attache remains waiting. The captain is certain that it is proper for the vehicle to pass, but Division II has no right to give orders to the border guardpost service. Neither the border service chief nor his assistant can be reached by telephone. But small wonder, for it was a beautiful Sunday morning and those who could still do so, after becoming accustomed to the situation, were out enjoying the peace of nature. Nor did anyone answer the telephones at the homes of the chief of staff or of the commander of armed forces. The captain put through an emergency call to the Valga border service division, hoping that he could straighten the matter out with the chief there. Fortunately, the latter knew of the captain, at least in respect to his name and place of duty, (1) but stated

(1) Possibly because the captain's name was on the list of those who were to be detained at the borders! And ~~was~~ certainly the Valga border post had one of those lists.

that he could not give such an order to the border post chief without an authorization from the ~~border~~ chief of the border guardpost service, or someone higher. The captain had to make a quick decision. It occurred to him that the Estonians dare not, under the conditions prevailing, put any obstacles in the way of attaches friendly to Estonia purely on the basis of minor peacetime economic regulations. The captain knew ~~that~~ personally that the attache waiting at the guardpost was an efficient officer who had not concealed his anti-Communist views even after the friendship pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. But he did not dwell long on these thoughts; they went through his mind as he was talking with the chief of the border service division. The result was that the captain gave an order in the name of the commander of armed forces to the chief of the border service division to permit the automobile to pass. No minor official in the ministry

of war or in the armed forces would not have been authorized to issue such an order, but the commander of armed forces was authorized to issue orders to the ministry of interior and the border service subordinate to it. The order was honored. The following day a report on the incident was submitted to the officials concerned. That incident ~~was~~ should not be justified by the fact that the alternates of the highest military leaders were not available. They could certainly have been reached, but in the captain's opinion there was no need to refer to them in regard to such a specialized and urgent matter, for there was no reason to suppose that they, unfamiliar with the details, could have made a better decision for the commander of the armed forces than was possible for the responsible section chief in Division II.

During the events of June 1940 the captain had his residence on Paldiski Highway, just across from the police precinct station. When the Estonian supporters and Communist~~s~~ presented their demands, the internal enemies were expected to become more active, the captain rented a cottage in Nõmme, where it would be more peaceful for his family than in Tallinn.

On the morning of ~~30~~²¹ June, the passage from Paldiski Highway to Pagari Street was quite difficult, for the usual route along Pikk Street at the Raekojaplats had been closed by Red Army sentries. There was an atmosphere of tension at staff headquarters owing to the reports of an impending rebellion or sedition, which had begun to arrive during the previous day and were still coming. The telephones in Division II were ringing frequently with the arrival of new reports and with news of the situation. The division chief ~~was~~ frequently ^{delivered} ~~reports~~ reports to the chief of staff, the minister of war, or the commander of the armed forces. The captain ~~was~~ also had to hasten frequently ~~there~~ there to deliver new reports to the division chief. While there, the commander of armed forces ordered the captain to put through a telephone call on a special line to Kadrioru Castle so that the commander could talk with the president of Estonia. It was necessary for the captain to remain in the room, so he overheard the conversation between the commander and the president. They spoke of the appointment of the Vares-Barbarus cabinet, which Zhdanov had urged [upon Estonia], and to which the president

had not yet agreed. The commander recommended yielding to that demand because, he said, that Estonia had no other alternative and must avoid any encounters with Red Army units for that would give them cause to start a battle which would be catastrophic for the Estonian nation -- but that the authority should not be handed over to the mob; that would be delivering them the ~~power~~^{weapons} of the army.

The commander of the armed forces was quite calm during the entire discussion, but his expression showed that he was under great internal tension. One time when the milling about of the generals and colonels around his office became too distracting, he raised his voice somewhat, apparently unintentionally, and said that those who cannot control themselves and those who have nothing to do should go into their offices and sit there so that they will not be in the way of those who are still able to work.

What the captain overheard the commander of the armed forces saying to the president was of use later to the captain when he had to answer requests for information, which were directed to Division II. Colonel Soodla, chief of the War College, soon telephoned from the ^{former} Saksa Gümnaasium (German Gymnasium) quarters on Luise Street. The War College had been transferred there from the Tond, and now two kinds of persons were gathering in front of the building to demand arms. There were among them also two persons in Red Army uniforms. Colonel Soodla wished to know what operational orders there were for the event the mob should become violent. It was not the function of Division II, and much less that of the chief of Section A, to transmit orders to troop units. They should be issued by operations, possibly through Division I. The captain did not know whether Colonel Soodla, himself a former chief of Division I, had tried to contact that division. The captain informed Colonel Soodla regarding the commander's standpoint on that question and as to the source of the information.

The captain gave the same information to Captain Meripuu, the duty officer at the Communications Battalion, who also telephoned with the same inquiry; he was calling from the Rauatänav school building into which the battalion had been moved ^{from its own barracks,} also in accordance with the order to disperse. It may be

that because of that information and exchange of fire, which would have brought forth Red Army armored vehicles, was avoided when later that day private persons attempted to enter the quarters of the Communications battalion.

The captain had occasion to make use of that information for the third time. It was on the ~~xxxx~~ day when the building located on Pagari Street jointly occupied by the ministry of war and the general staff was to ~~xxx~~ have been "taken over." A group of civilians gathered at the building and demanded admittance. The captain does not remember how it happened that Major General A. Kasekamp, first assistant to the chief of staff, Colonel Searsen, chief of Division II, Lieutenant Colonel Luts, chief of Division I, Major Valme, staff commandant, and many other officers with Captain Reinlo, ~~xxxxxxx~~ the assistant to the section chief were all together at one time in his office. (2) Nor does the captain remember whether he had been ordered to

(2) No doubt the commandant had turned to the general staff to inquire about the orders in respect to the entry attempted entry of mobs, and then probably ~~xxx~~ it had been decided to turn to Tsukanov, which contact had to be made by Division II.

contact ~~xxx~~ Polkovnik Tsukanov or whether Tsukanov himself chanced to be calling the division chief at that moment, but before long the captain was saying to Tsukanov words to the effect that the Soviet influence had "called forth the ghosts" and that now they were threatening to take over staff headquarters, but that the Estonians could nohand over the authority "to the street", and that he, as the representative of the Red Army which had caused them to come forth, should also see to it that the ghosts are called off. Tsukanov said that he would come personally to the Estonian staff headquarters. In the meantime the captain ~~xxx xxxxxxx~~ ^{made certain} that if it was understood that Tsukanov was not to be endangered by the fire that might be opened on the "revolutionists" ~~xxxx~~ ^{who} might try to force their way in with him

The staff commandant was greatly relieved, as he had later remarked, upon hearing that talk, and hurried from the fourth floor, where the talk

had taken place, down to the men and gave the order to open fire if the throng should attempt enter with the polkovnik. He was relieved because no one had told him earlier whether to fire or what to do, but what he had now heard made it clear to him what he should do.

The situation ~~was~~^{appeared} so critical that the officers who had been assembled in the captain's office carried their personal weapons, for the invasion ~~of~~ the building⁷ could have taken place at any moment. But some of them did not own pistols, so the captain distributed the pistols kept in reserve in a steel cabinet in Section A. No one expected any assistance from the Red forces since the entire "popular uprising" had been staged and premeditated by their officials.

~~The captain~~ It occurred to the captain that he should contact his family. He telephoned to Nomme and asked for his wife. He spoke a few words regarding the state of affairs, stating that there was probably no escape from the situation, and said goodbye to his forever. She later told him that the conversation was so brief and in such an ordinary tone and coming so unexpectedly in the peaceful sunshine at Nomme that the full import of it had not occurred to her until she had said "farewell" and hung up the receiver. Then it occurred to her that this was the end! But that, however, was not yet the case. Polkovnik Tsukanov did not come personally to staff headquarters and he had no real intention of doing so since he had plenty of high subordinates at his disposal; but after three o'clock a major was sent from the ~~Red~~^{Red} corps staff headquarters who then remained as a "protector" ~~with~~ in the same room with the Estonian duty officer. The danger of forced entry abated some time later when Maj Gen T. Rotberg, the former assistant to the retiring minister of war and now newly appointed minister of war in the Vares cabinet, announced from the building that they should go to the Soviet embassy on Pikk Street. The throng immediately accepted him when they heard that they were dealing with a "people's cabinet" ~~x~~ minister of war who deals with Soviet embassy and their special urge to enter the building soon disappeared and they quietly dispersed.

On the following day, which was 22 June, Major General Jonson called a

meeting of all the people working in the general staff to be held in the Council of War conference room. The old esteemed cavalryman was a stricken man. Having been coerced by Soviet authorities into accepting the post of commander of armed forces he urged that everyone honorably fulfill Estonia's military obligations. It was quite apparent to everyone present that the "red inclinations" of this old and tired warrior were limited to the red coloring in his cavalry trousers.

On St. John's Day [24 June] there was a gathering of people, resembling some kind of a meeting, at the Piiritakanõts. Though many people were outdoors in the beautiful weather, that meeting did not seem to interest many of them.

In the forenoon of that day Polkovnik Tsukanov had called by telephone to inquire for Captain Tamm and that they wished to discuss something important. When Captain Tamm could not be reached, they asked for the chief of Section A. As soon as the latter heard of this he called the polkovnik's office. Polkovnik Tsukanov wanted ~~to meet with~~ ^{the} captain to meet with him at ten o'clock that evening; the meeting was not to be in the embassy, but at the consulate, whose entrance was on Laialt Street. Neither the time nor the place were quite usual, but then, neither were the conditions any longer what they had been, so the captain agreed to go to the place at the time requested. The captain informed the division ~~superintendent~~ ^{chief} of the invitation. It was agreed that the captain would stop at Division II before going to the consulate. The deliberation there concerned the kind of questions Polkovnik Tsukanov might bring forth. It was apparent that ~~the~~ it did not concern any ordinary discussion which could have been conducted by telephone or ~~at~~ ~~another~~ at another time. Because of the unknown factors in the case, the captain was instructed to act according to his own best judgement and within the framework of the "Mutual Assistance Pact." After leaving the consulate, he was to report directly at Division II, regardless of the hour. In order to avoid the possibility of any kind of misunderstandings or provocation, the captain went unarmed to the consulate, leaving his pistol in the division. The captain was allowed to wait for 15 minutes after reaching the consulate. Then Polkovnik Tsukanov made his appearance, apologizing

for his tardiness, saying that he had been called away on an urgent matter; then he asked that the captain speak with his two companions, to whom he then presented the captain. Both were in the uniforms of brigade commissars; one of them was tall and blond and spoke fluent Estonian, the other was short and dark, typically Russian. The captain does not remember whether Polkovnik Tsukanov mentioned their names or not during the introduction. The captain recognized the blond as the individual who had attracted his attention at the Ulemiste airport on 5 June when Colonel Saarsen and the captain were waiting there for the arrival of Loktionov, assistant to the Soviet commissar of war. That man in uniform remained in the captain's memory because he was wearing inappropriate, checkered socks with his uniform.

The captain was offered a chair at a small table and the commissars took places across the table from him. There were writing materials on the table, and no doubt a pistol which the blond commissar may later have placed before him on the table, though the captain cannot recall the precise details. The captain was asked to choose which language he wished to converse in, Russian or Estonian; if in Estonian, the blond one would have acted as interpreter. The captain chose Russian, knowing that language well enough. He was asked to recount his personal history, ^{and} what he really does, in the conviction that it was quite important to know precisely concerning both. This observation led to his purely proletarian origin, and they asked whether he wished to work with them, that it would be quite profitable for him; as an Estonian officer he would forever remain a captain, though he had long been ^{quite} outstanding; ~~amongst them~~ that if he worked with them he would soon attain the rank of polkovnik. The captain answered that he was already working with them, as was the entire Estonian army, under the framework of the Mutual Assistance Pact that existed between the two countries. Then the blond interrupted, saying that the captain should not talk in such a naive manner, that he knows very well what they mean and that there is no need to engage in empty words. The captain continued to maintain that the entire Estonian army is prepared to fulfill the terms of the pact honorably.

The captain was next asked to furnish ~~in~~ data concerning the Estonian espionage network in the Soviet Union. The captain answered that he knows nothing about it, that his relations with the military attache to the Soviet Union have had nothing to do with the Soviet Union. Then he was asked what Major Kristian did in the division and where he now was. The answer was that the major was chief of Section C, studied Soviet military literature, Red Army regulations and instructions, and was now the military attache in Finland. The blond still remained dissatisfied, asking why the captain the captain tries evade the question, namely, what kind of an espionage network Major Kristian had in the Soviet Union. The captain reiterated that he does not know, whereupon the blond attempted to intimidate him by asking what kind of a general staff officer ~~he~~ was he anyway when he, despite his long service in Division II, knows nothing about the espionage network. The captain parried with a thrust of his own, alluding ~~him~~ to the fact that the generals, especially since they were in the political field and therefore among the elite of the Red Army, should know that excessive talk is forbidden in espionage work, and ^{therefore,} because ~~of the fact that he works~~ the captain works in Section A, he naturally does not know the details of the work in Section C. To this the generals replied that of course they knew that and then turned the conversation to the person of Capt A. Nomm ⁽³⁾, the new chief of

(3) Capt Arnold Nomm, a War College graduate, was appointed chief of Section C following the permanent residence in Helsinki of Major Kristian as military attache. Capt Nomm had been prior to that in the island defense staff in Kuressaare.

Section C, inquiring about his personal history, his family, and his family difficulties. The answer was brief, that the captain does not know details of the personal histories of his companions, though in regard to the family difficulties the captain said that their information must be incorrect, since to his knowledge there were none. Again they asked about the espionage network, especially in regard to a new network which was also in Estonia in the military bases. The captain replied with conviction that he did not know

under
what there had been previously, but that he was certain that now, ~~the~~ the
assistance pact, there was no network either in the Soviet Union or in the
bases, that the appointment of Captain Nomm as chief of Section C was a
natural result of circumstances, and that he previously had not been in any
way connected with anti-Soviet activities, having served in the western part
of Estonia.

The questioning then turned to the captain's own activities in Section
A. They were not satisfied with generalities concerning it, but wanted
details concerning: (1) What did Captain Hallakorpi, the Finnish military
attache, speak about on his last trip to Tallinn; (2) what did the British
military attache talk about on his recent trip to Tallinn, and especially,
what did he talk about with the Estonian commander of armed forces; and (3)
why did the former Turkish legation attache, whose name the captain has for-
gotten, possibly Iksel, make a trip recently to Tallinn, and what did he
talk about with his companions on the train while traveling from Riga to
Tallinn. The captain answered that he could not answer those questions
because he did not know the answers, not having been a party to any of the
conversations. Now he was told that he must know all that, or if he did
not, he must find out and and let them know. The captain asked them to look
up the many public reports in Tallinn concerning those persons, but that
was not considered sufficient; they wanted him to get the accurate reports,
adding that they already knew the answers but wished that the captain would
show them, by obtaining the ~~xxx~~ accurate answers, that he was truly prepared
to cooperate. This the captain categorically refused to do, saying that it
would be spying, and that spying is contrary to his honor as an officer and
has nothing to do with working together. The dark one, who appeared to be
a good-natured conciliator and pacifier, then took the lead in the interro-
gation and asked to explain that such work is necessary, and that all these
were small, inconsequential matters; that the captain need only to think
the matter through and he would come to the same conclusion.

When the captain again refused, the blond one asked, while toying with
the pistol on the table, whether the captain understood what that refusal

would signify whether he knew that he was endangering his position. The captain answered that he was fully aware of the situation and that he was ready for anything. He stated cynically that he was unarmed, and asked the threatener whether he wanted the captain to remain sitting in the chair or to stand in a corner (the question was so phrased and directed that the hearer could not fail to understand that the captain was speaking of the position he should assume for his execution). The dark one again hastened to make amends, saying that the matter was ~~xxxxxx~~ not as bizarre or as pressing as all that; just let the captain think about the matter and he will himself see how inconsequential the matters are that he is asked about. The captain again refused, saying that he has no need for reconsideration. The dark one had then resumed the lead, suggesting to the captain that he go home, think the matter through in peace, and then notify Polkovnik Tsukanov when he is ready to give the answers. He admonished the captain not to tell anyone what they had actually talked about and indicated that ~~he~~ the captain should explain that he had discussed the movement of Red Army units with Polkovnik Tsukanov, as the captain had done previously. It was about one o'clock, as the captain later verified. He does not remember how he came out of the consulate. From Laia Street all the way to Pagari Street he felt that he was being followed, since he had so categorically refused to cooperate. "It was a strange feeling; one did not ~~xxx~~ want to die, yet one did not want to run away from death." He was under such great tension that he walked as though on parade march until he reached Pagari Street and out of possible line of fire, ^{while} on Laia Street, around a corner where a rifle bullet would no longer reach him. (4) The captain's nerves were

(4) The essential parts of the abstract and the account here presented have drawn from the summary which the captain wrote in Germany during April 1950, and which he had wished to present at the time of the incident to Col V. Saarsen, chief of Division II, who is the only witness to the fact that the captain immediately reported the incident. Colonel Saarse's notation on the original draft of the summary states among other things ... "On 24 June

Captain (Author) informed me that Polkovnik Tsukanov, the Soviet Union military attache, had invited him to a conference at 2200 hours at the Russian consulate on Laia Street. I instructed the captain that he should act during the conference in accordance to his position as an Estonian officer and in keeping with his oath of allegiance to the Republic. We agreed that I would wait for the captain's return in my office on Pagari Street. At about midnight I became concerned about Captain (Author)'s extended absence and attempted to make contact with the Soviet Embassy and consulate. There were no answers to telephone calls to Polkovnik Tsukanov's office and the consulate. I then took up the matter by telephone with General Jaakson, the chief of staff, who ordered not to wait for developments. Soon after one o'clock at night Captain Kurgvel reported to me in person . . . and . . . and told me all the details as they are recounted in this book . . . "

exhausted, and he wished then for a drink of cognac before he began his account of the developments to the chief of Division II. The captain assured the division chief that he would never execute the mission asked of him and would take no steps toward that end.

During the week following that talk, either Polkovnik Tsukanov or Captain Markov, his office manager, made telephone calls more frequently than usual to Section A. There was the impression many times that they really had nothing to ~~ask~~ inquire about and that they were merely checking whether the captain was there, or perhaps because they wanted to keep the captain under strain. This continued for a week, until 3 July, when General Jonson received orders to make new ~~assignments~~ appointments to the positions held by the chief of Division II and by the captain, because, as General Jonson had said to Colonel Saarsen, "You and Kurgvel are not suitable for cooperating with the Russians." Whether those orders had any connection with the captain's nocturnal talk and his refusals is not known, but it can be assumed that there is.

Captain Koerner, assistant to the German military attache, chanced to be

in Division II when Colonel Saarsen came from General Jonson's office with the above news. Captain Koerner had just made the proposal for assisting the captain to leave Estonia and the captain had just turned it down, since it would have ~~xxx~~ seemed ^{to him} like running away from the field of combat. But upon arrival of the news it was clear to him that he could no longer fight on that field of combat and that perhaps it be also done from abroad, so the captain then accepted the friendly offer in the presense of the division chief. He demanded that the matter be kept absolutely secret, except for the necessary instructions he would have to give his wife. The captain officially applied for, and was granted, a leave of absense of one month for the purpose of resting his nerves and in connection with a change of assignment. The leave papers had to be signed by Major General Kasekamp, the assistant chief of staff, for the ^{signature of the} chief of Division II was no longer sufficiently firm, since he himself was "unsuitable for cooperation." While appending his signature General Kasekamp asked the captain what assignment he might wish after his leave, since it would also ~~xxx~~ require an order. The captain remarked that perhaps the position of communications lecturer at the Öppeasutus might be most suitable. He promised to keep that in mind, but the general added that while he was still assistant chief of staff today, no one knows who will ~~become the~~ assistant chief of staff a month from that day.

Maj F. Brede, a War College graduate, who was recalled about that time from Lithuania, and Maj H. Onni, a War College graduate, who was removed from staff Divison I, were both later murdered at the Öppeasutus (Armed Forces Combined Training Institute) merely because they were conscientious Estonian officers. But the captain's time was not yet up.

He had to perform one other task that evening at Section A, in line with its ~~xxx~~ duties with attaches: he must go to Balti station in Tallinn and politely escort two western military attaches from there. ⁽⁵⁾ A Red Army

(5) If the recollection is correct, one of them was the British military attache, Major Firebrace, who previously had been an attache in the Baltic

countries and after an absence of many years was now enroute to his new post in Moscow. The other was probably the British military attache for the Baltic countries, a Lieutenant Colonel Vale. Since the captain had so many personal worries at the time, he is not quite certain whether these were the officers concerned.

armored train was standing in the station and the soldiers were singing one of their army songs "Katyusha." The western attaches noted the captain's sad looks and cheered him in a paternal manner, saying that everything will go all right, that after a month's time everything will be fine again. The captain felt sorry for these gentlemen, either they were so naive that they believed it themselves, or considered the captain so stupid that he would believe so. Or perhaps those gentlemen were soothsayers and knew that the captain would be freed from earthly life in a month's time, and that thus everything would be alright.

It was about midnight when the captain returned to Division II and heard there that he must at once make one more telephone call. He made the call but there was no answer. Soon he learned that either he or the division chief must be ready to leave the country ~~on~~ that morning, and that who was to leave first was just then being considered; it appeared, however, that the captain should leave first because the too sudden disappearance of a division chief might cause difficulties, but a captain could go on leave anytime. It was finally agreed to leave that decision to the division chief. He then had to reach the division chief at once. The result was that the captain was to leave first.

It was between two and three o'clock at night when the captain arrived at ~~Nomms~~ and reached his family. There were a number of things he had to tell of to his wife, and the packing had to be done so quietly in the night-time that the neighbors on the other side of the thin dividing wall would not be disturbed. The existing wealth had to be left behind, for one did not dare take anything but the most urgently needed, only as much as would be necessary during a leave of one month . . .

When the departure from the protected place was about to begin in the afternoon, one of the assistants noticed that there were still too many possessions and that the amount of them would be apparent. But one of them was more accustomed to family life and observed that a year-old child must always travel with a bottle of milk. . .

How the escape was actually executed cannot yet be set in writing because it is not impossible that many of those assistants may still be living somewhere behind the iron curtain and may suffer danger of new persecution as a result, for under Communist conditions nothing is forgotten or forgiven and nothing becomes time-worn.

The captain still asks himself occasionally why he was given a week of reprieve after he had refused to become a henchman ~~of the~~ for the Communists. He thinks that they were not yet quite ready to arrest the division chief and the captain because there were still foreign military attaches in Tallinn and reports of the arrests would soon have reached Helsinki and Major Kristian, the Estonian military attache there, whom the Red authorities were anxious to seize, would have heard of them. The Red authorities despatched a regular order to Major Kristian for his recall to Tallinn, and persons who have followed developments in that situation say that every ship arriving from Helsinki is met at the harbor by a black car with its windows blacked out, but has always had to return empty. Those who were expecting his return did not of course know that both those who transmitted the recall order and the one who received it knew at once that that order would not be fulfilled. Apparently the arrest orders ~~of~~ for both of the unsuitable officers would have been issued after they had been removed from Division II and from view of the foreign military attaches there; otherwise they too could have shared in the honor of being sent to the Soviet "academy" along with those many Estonian generals, colonels, and other officers for whom there is no return.

- End -

SECRET

6 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director Plans
THROUGH : Chief, SR/Division
SUBJECT : Request for Approval for Publication
of an Article
REFERENCE : R-10-250, 3 May 1955

1. It is requested that Aleksei Kurgvel be granted approval to publish an article titled, "Fifteen Years Over the Norm," forwarded herewith as an attachment.

2. Aleksei Kurgvel, a covert associate, under Agency contract, currently assigned to duties with SR/DOB, compiled the article at the request of Mr. R. Maasing, a publishing house representative, currently residing in San Francisco, California. Mr. Maasing, a former Colonel, Chief of G-2, and 1st assistant to the Chief of Estonian General Staff was, at that time, Mr. Kurgvel's supervisor.

3. The article relating to Mr. Kurgvel's service with the Estonian G-2, is to become a part of a publication titled, "The History of the Estonian People and State in World War II," which is to be published by an Estonian Publishing House in Sweden.

4. According to Mr. Kurgvel, the article will have to be made available within the next few weeks in order that the publishers dead

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

line can be met. Therefore, it is further requested that this office be advised at the earliest opportunity regarding approval or disapproval of the requested action.

[]
Chief, SR/DOB

Attachment:
Original and 1 of article as stated

SECRET

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29 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI/ Plans/Projects

SUBJECT: Salary Increase - Marie K. GIOGDANO (P)

1. It is requested that subject be granted a \$1000 salary increase, effective 16 August 1955. In reviewing Mr. GIOGDANO's pay history we have noted that:

a. Subject's current contract, which expires on 23 February 1956, provides for a salary of \$5200 per annum.

b. There were reasonable increases in subject's early service. These were due to a complete changeover in usage, assignments and responsibilities and a change from one operational area (overseas) to another; his earlier salary was commensurate with overseas rates.

2. Mr. GIOGDANO's past assignments actually have been worthy of greater financial consideration. Recent expanded activity within SR/DCS has necessitated use of his background and experience to an even greater degree.

3. There is also a generally recognized need to consider the rise in cost of living in current salary standards. His noteworthy performance and above-considered factors prompt this request for action on the part of your office to increase this contract employee's salary to \$5600 per annum. It is requested that subject employee's current contract be amended to include the requested raise in salary.

[]
Acting Chief, SR/DCS

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DATE 2006

SECRET

130-B-43

SECRET

29 AUG 1955

Attention : Chief, SR/DOB
Room 300, 2210 "E" Street
Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

KURGVEL, Alekse
#50562

1. Reference is made to your request for security approval for publication of an article written by Subject entitled, "Fifteen Years Over the Horn."

2. This is to advise that this office interposes no objections, from a security standpoint only, to the proposed publication of this article. However, you should insure that all action taken in regard to the publication of this article is supervised so as to protect the author's relationship with this Agency and to prevent any cover compromise. It is assumed that you have had the article carefully analyzed from an operational point of view.

3. It is noted that Subject's article is to be part of a book published by R. Maasing. This office is possessed of no information relative to this individual.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Attachment:
Manuscript

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET


130 A-151

~~SECRET~~

30 August 1955

Memorandum For: Chief Training SR/DOB
Subject : Security Approval for Publication of an Article
by Aleksei Kurgvel
Reference : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and
Support) Memo. Dtd. 29 August 1955

1. The referenced memorandum provides the necessary security approval for the release of "Fifteen Years Over The Norm" by Mr. Kurgvel of SR/DOB.
2. Your office must make certain that all actions taken by Kurgvel in connection with the publication of his article do not in anyway compromise the fact that the author is employed by the Agency. Kurgvel should attempt to prevent his name from appearing as author of the article but must prevent showing his present address and employment.
3. A copy of the publication, in final form should be furnished this office when it becomes available.


SR/DOB Security Officer

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

~~SECRET~~

130 A-152 (47)

SECRET

100 A

7 September 1955

TO : The Security Officer, SR/DCB
FROM : Chief, Covert Associates Section, SR/DCB
SUBJECT: Identity cards, official government

1. The below named personnel of the Covert Associates Section have been issued Building Passes, the numbers of which follow their names.

[]	[]	[]	[]
[]	[]	[]	[]
✓ Ahmed KHRQVXL		B 127185	
[]	[]	[]	[]
[]	[]	[]	[]
[]	[]	[]	[]
[]	[]	[]	[]
[]	[]	[]	[]

~~[]~~
Chief, CAS, SR/DCB

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

130 A- 153

SECRET

13 October 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: I&S, Alien Affairs Officer

ATTENTION []

SUBJECT : Status Report of Covert Associates admitted to U.S. under 100 Persons Act, for period 1 April 1955 to 30 September 1955.

REFERENCE : Letter dated 10 March 1955, from Chief, SR/DOB to I&S, Alien Affairs Officer

1. In accordance with provisions of reference (A) as contained in the above reference, the following information is hereby submitted:

a. [] has been transferred to SR/2 as of April 1955.

b. [] presently residing at [] with his wife, [] and two minor children, [] terminated her employment with the [] Restaurant in [] in April of 1955.

c. Mr. Alexsei KURGVEL is at present employed in the field and has given up his apartment in Washington, D. C. It is anticipated that he will return to Washington, D. C. by the end of November, but he is not certain whether he will reside at the same address. His wife, Salme KURGVEL and a minor son, Rein KURGVEL (who was 16 in May 1955) reside at 3070 34th Street, Astoria, Long Island City 3, New York, (no telephone at present). An older son Jaan KURGVEL (24 years of age) is a student taking post-graduate work (MA degree) at the Agricultural College in Clemson, South Carolina.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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130 AF-154 []

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2. Further inquiries may be directed []
extension 3808.

[]
Chief, SR/7/DOB

SR/DOB/CAS [] (13 Oct 55)

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - DOB/CAS
- 1 - Vital Documents
- 1 - Chrono

SECRET

file
CHRISON

18 November 1955

Mr. Kay:

Here are copies of the next five weeks of training. This is a somewhat tentative schedule because the survival instructor is from another shop and is presently not in the Washington area. Therefore, I cannot determine exactly what aspects he will cover in survival.

I understand that you would like to spend Thanksgiving with your family, therefore, you are given authority to depart when it is convenient on Wednesday 23 November 1955. It is desired that you return sometime Friday 25 November 1955 so that you and [] may prepare a report on the results of the exam. Unfortunately, I cannot authorize the entire weekend at this time.

[] will be leaving the project on Sunday, 27 November or Monday 28 November; however, I will come to the safe-house on either Monday or Tuesday 21 - 22 November 1955 to discuss future plans and schedules.

As you will note, exams are scheduled for Friday 25 November 1955. I think the type exam required in the morning is obvious. For the exams for the tradecraft aspects we would like to have the agents put in theoretical situations so that they must write down their solution to the problem. An example of such a portion of this test could be as follows:

"You have been operating in the target country for several months and have established a small net. By chance you learn that your principle agent has been seen in the company of a known MVD informant. What action would you take and why?"

The object of this exam is to determine how each agent thinks or how each agent would think in a tight spot. If you remember, Peter did not give much evidence of prior thought in the latter portion of the Fort Bragg exercise. It is suggested that several such situations be presented to Peter and Eric.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

X
130A-155 (172)

R. H. Carlson

25 Nov, 1955

TO : []
FROM : Mr. Kay
SUBJECT : Overtime from 15 Oct. to 24 Nov, 1955, encl.

Reported according to your request received through Roger on 23 Nov, 1955.

Total time present in Offices in D.C. or on Training Sites (including Traveltime from D.C. to the sites) 357 hours.

Normal working time (40hrs weekly, minus legal holidays) 216 hours.

Difference = Overtime: 141 hours.

NOTE: Of the reported overtime 31.25 hours fell on Sundays and Legal Holidays.



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SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. CAREER DESIGNATION
Giordano	Mario		13 Sept. 1904	M	
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO	7. SALARY PER ANNUM			
24 Feb. 1952		5,600.00			
8. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)				
	1 July - 31 December 1955				

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
---------------------	---

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

During the period of this report he was assigned to a training unit for tradecraft and fieldcraft instructions. He continued working, when time permitted, on Estonian Reality files.

Case officers assigned to the same project had this to say:

"This employee was assigned to work with the undersigned during December as a language interpreter. He did an excellent job. During this training, in demolition and sabotage, and his personal interest in the men's problems, both personal and trainingwise, merit high praise. I would greatly desire to have this man work with me during any future training programs." -- []

"During my association with this employee, I found him to be very industrious, honest, cooperative, quite thorough in his classroom work and very patient with the trainees. He would consistently work until 2200 or 2300 during the week, preparing the next day's work or in checking previous work or field problems. I consider him to be an excellent instructor and would appreciate having him work for me on future projects." -- []

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

THIS DATE	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor)
1 January 1956	[]
I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT	(Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)
THIS DATE	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority)

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
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(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual, and may be considered the lowest possible rating.

STATEMENTS	NOT OB- SERVED	CATEGORIES				
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE	APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.	SAMPLES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
B. PRACTICAL.					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.					X	
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.					X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.					X	
4. HAS INITIATIVE.					X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.					X	
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.					X	
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.					X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.					X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.					X	
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.					X	
11. CALM.					X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.					X	
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.					X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.					X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.					X	
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.					X	
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.					X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.					X	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.					X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.					X	
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.					X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.					X	
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.					X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.				Y		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.				X		

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

None

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? NO YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL? **REFRESHER**
Because of his vast experience any training and reference courses requested by him should be given serious consideration.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, special skills, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on the effective utilization of this person). **He is a strong Estonian patriot and, on occasions, is distrustful that, in his opinion, USA is not doing enough to check Communism.**

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A, B, C, & D

A. DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.

1. DOES NOT PERFORM HIS DUTIES ADEQUATELY, HE IS INCOMPETENT.

2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.

3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY, OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.

4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.

5. A FINE PERFORMANCE: CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.

6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? NO YES. IF YES, WHAT?

Because of his extensive intelligence background he could be assigned tasks which are on higher level than that of an instructor.

C. DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.

1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION...WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.

3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION...BOthered BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS... WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.

4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE... WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.

5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION...THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.

6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION, BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.

7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION...WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

B. DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's level and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.

1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.

2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME AT PRESENT LEVEL BEFORE HE CAN ASSUME HIGHER LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY.

3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.

4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES.

5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT A LEVEL OF HIGH RESPONSIBILITY.

6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

D. DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating...skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.

1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.

2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.

3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.

4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE...HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.

5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.

6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.

7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECTION VII

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ THE ABOVE FINISHED REPORT.

Walter J. Gindler
Signature of Employee

SECRET

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Finance Division
FROM: Contract Personnel Division
SUBJECT: Contract Extension for Maria E. GORIANO

1. Effective 24 February 1954, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual effective 24 February 1953 is extended for a period of two (2) years.
2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY: Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

A.KURGVEL: Note to: PERSONAL HISTORY STATE-
MENT, 9 March, 1956:

Some data are incomplete due to the fact
that my personal notes and files are in
New York and thus not immediately avail-
able. Nor do I know at present time whether
my sisters in Sweden have applied for Swe-
dish citizenship or not yet.
I shall have the missing information when
coming back from the leave.

AKC.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

9 MAR 56

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES
(Yes or No)

Sec. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME: Miss KURGVEL NMN Aleksee
(Use No Initials) (First) (Middle) (Last) Telephone: Office _____
Mrs. _____ Ext. _____
Home LI 62802

PRESENT ADDRESS 1528 East Capitol St, Washington, D.C.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 30-70, 34th, L.I.C. 3 N.Y. (Teleph. AS 49341)
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME _____ WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? KURBEL and

KUSEL, Alexander. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE
NAMES? In service of the German Mil. Intelligence: KURBEL for 2 months
for hiding from Sov. Mil. Mission in Germany after flight from
Estonia in 1940. KUSEL was used with unwitting Germans and
agent-trainees, from 1940 to 1945.

HOW LONG? _____ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS NO

C. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sep. 04 PLACE OF BIRTH KURESSAARE, Estonia
(Where?) (By what authority) (City) (State) (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP ESTONIA BY BIRTH? _____ BY MARRIAGE? _____
(Country) By creation of Republic of Estonia.

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. _____ ISSUED _____ BY _____
(Date) (Court)

AT _____ (City) _____ (State) _____ (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? YES RUSSIA
(Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? 1904 to 1918 ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? NO
(Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS _____

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? YES GIVE PARTICULARS:
Automatic, pertinent to Displaced Persons Act.

(2)

26 Feb, 1953

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? _____

PORT OF ENTRY: New York ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? Estonia

LAST U. S. VISA _____
(Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 51 SEX Male HEIGHT 5'10" WEIGHT appr. 150 lbs.
EYES Gray-blue HAIR Blond COMPLEXION Fair SCARS None
BUILD Average OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES None.

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE _____ MARRIED X DIVORCED _____ WIDOWED _____

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS _____

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Salme MM KURGVEL, born EPLER
(First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE NARVA, Estonia, 25/27 Oct, 1928

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE Kalda tm. NARVA, Estonia.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE _____ CAUSE _____

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 30-70, 34th L.I.C.3 N.Y. U.S.A.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 23 Jan. '09 PLACE OF BIRTH NARVA, Estonia
(City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY 31 Jan. '52, New York.

CITIZENSHIP ESTONIA WHEN ACQUIRED? When Estonian indep. Republic was created, 1918 WHERE? _____
(City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Clerk LAST EMPLOYER Globe & Rutgers Insurance Co

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS 59 John St. Manhattan, N.Y.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM _____ TO _____ BRANCH OF SERVICE _____
(Date) (Date)

COUNTRY _____ DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN _____

16-62855-1

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME KURGVEL Jaan RELATIONSHIP Son AGE 25
 CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS 30-70, 34th, L.I.C.3, N.Y.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME KURGVEL Rein RELATIONSHIP Son AGE 16
 CITIZENSHIP ESTONIA ADDRESS 30-70, 34th, L.I.C.3, N.Y.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME _____ RELATIONSHIP _____ AGE _____
 CITIZENSHIP _____ ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Johann NMN KURGVEL
(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Dec. DATE OF DECEASE 1926 CAUSE Natural.

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Kitzbergi tän. 4, KURESSAARE, Estonia.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 14 Feb. '71 PLACE OF BIRTH Island SAARENAA, Estonia.
(City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY _____

CITIZENSHIP Estonian WHEN ACQUIRED? _____ WHERE? _____
(City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Gardener & Baker LAST EMPLOYER Self-empl.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM _____ TO _____ BRANCH OF SERVICE _____
(Date) (Date)

COUNTRY _____ DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN _____

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Marja nnn KURGVEL, born TOOLPUU
(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED accord to records DATE OF DECEASE 1945 CAUSE Natural

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Kitzbergi tän. 4, KURESSAARE, Estonia, in 1944.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 29 July '68 PLACE OF BIRTH Island SAARENAA, Estonia

CITIZENSHIP Estonia WHEN ACQUIRED? _____ WHERE? _____
(City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY _____

(4)

OCCUPATION _____ LAST EMPLOYER _____
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
MILITARY SERVICE FROM _____ TO _____ BRANCH OF SERVICE _____
COUNTRY _____ DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN _____

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME Olga nnn KURVEL AGE 58
(First) (Middle) (Last)
PRESENT ADDRESS unknown, remained in Estonia, KURESSAARE.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

2. FULL NAME Ksenia nnn KURVEL AGE 57
(First) (Middle) (Last)
PRESENT ADDRESS Stockholm Sweden
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

3. FULL NAME Nadežda nnn MARIPUU, b. KURVEL AGE 47
(First) (Middle) (Last)
PRESENT ADDRESS Bergsgatan 32 Enköping, Sweden
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

4. FULL NAME _____ AGE _____
(First) (Middle) (Last)
PRESENT ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

5. FULL NAME _____ AGE _____
(First) (Middle) (Last)
PRESENT ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Karl nnn EPLER
(First) (Middle) (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED unknown DATE OF DECEASE _____ CAUSE _____
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS unknown, remained 1944 in Estonia, evacuated
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
from (Kõrva) Parish ELISTVERE, Estonia
DATE OF BIRTH 6 Feb. 78 PLACE OF BIRTH _____
IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY _____
CITIZENSHIP Estonian WHEN ACQUIRED? _____ WHERE? _____
(City) (State) (Country)
OCCUPATION Merchant LAST EMPLOYER Self-empl.

16-62856-1

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Ida mm DPLER, born LIBLIK
(First) (Middle) (Last)
 LIVING OR DECEASED unknown DATE OF DECEASED _____ CAUSE _____
 PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Same as reported for Father-in-law.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
 DATE OF BIRTH 25 Mar '32 PLACE OF BIRTH Parish KUDINA, Estonia.
 IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY _____
 CITIZENSHIP Estonia WHEN ACQUIRED? _____ WHERE? _____
(City) (State) (Country)
 OCCUPATION housewife. LAST EMPLOYER _____

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME Ulo MARIPUU RELATIONSHIP Nephew AGE 27
 CITIZENSHIP _____ ADDRESS Bergsgatan 32, ENKÖPING, Sweden
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
 2. NAME Maie MARIPUU RELATIONSHIP Niece AGE 24
 CITIZENSHIP _____ ADDRESS Bergsgatan 32, ENKÖPING, Sweden
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
 3. NAME Öie USSISCO, b. MARIPUU RELATIONSHIP Niece AGE 26
 CITIZENSHIP _____ ADDRESS _____ Sweden
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT: NO information concerning those who remained in Estonia. NONE elsewhere.

1. NAME _____ RELATIONSHIP _____ AGE _____
 CITIZENSHIP _____ ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
 TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) _____
 2. NAME _____ RELATIONSHIP _____ AGE _____
 CITIZENSHIP _____ ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
 TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) _____
 3. NAME _____ RELATIONSHIP _____ AGE _____
 CITIZENSHIP _____ ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
 TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) _____

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR _____

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? \$ _____
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY _____
FREQUENTLY _____, CONSTANTLY _____

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. _____
ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES _____, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES _____

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL "Ministerial" ADDRESS KURESSAARE, Estonia
and a private one (City) (State) (Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1911-1914 GRADUATE? YES

HIGH SCHOOL "Gümnaasium" ADDRESS KURESSAARE, Estonia
(City) (State) (Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1914-1923 GRADUATE? YES

COLLEGE University of Tartu ADDRESS TARTU, Estonia
(City) (State) (Country)
MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Economics YEARS COMPLETED -
DATES ATTENDED 1943-1944, in war conditions DEGREE -

COLLEGE Military College ADDRESS TALLINN, Estonia
Technical Branch (City) (State) (Country)
MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Electr. Eng. YEARS COMPLETED 2.5
DATES ATTENDED Oct. 1920 - Feb. 1926 DEGREE Jun. Lieutenant, Techn. Troops

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS Electrical Engineering in general
Wire- and Wireless Communications, Powersupply. Surveying.
Civil Engineering: Roads, Bridges, Buildings.
Mechanical Engineering: Maintenance of diff. machines.
CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS _____

(See Page 15).

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

ESTONIA General Staff Captain, Mil. Serv. entered 1923.
(Country) (Service) (Rank) (Date of Service)

TALLINN, Estonia
(Last Station) (Serial Number) (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: NOT discharged, left the Country in 1940, to fight the Communists.

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER _____ ADDRESS _____

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON _____

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS _____

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM 5 Sep. 1951 to today CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) _____

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY _____

ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS _____ NAME OF SUPERVISOR _____

TITLE OF JOB _____ SALARY \$ _____ PER _____

YOUR DUTIES _____

REASONS FOR LEAVING _____

FROM Oct. 1949 to Aug. 1951 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) "TOA 7" (German)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY International Refugee Organization, U.S. Resettlement and Immigration Center.

ADDRESS Wentorf Germany
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Resettlement NAME OF SUPERVISOR Herr Lehmann

TITLE OF JOB Clerk SALARY DM 320 approx PER month.

YOUR DUTIES Registering of incoming and outgoing mail.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Engaged by the new employer, in my proper field of work.

(8)

FROM Aug 1946 TO Sep. 1949 CLASSIFICATION GRADE TCA 8 to 6
(IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)
EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Successively: Displaced Persons' Camps
"OXFORD", "EAGLE" and "ROSEA"
ADDRESS correspondingly: DRACAM, STOLZERAU, LINGEN, all Germany British
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
KIND OF BUSINESS Public Service NAME OF SUPERVISOR Different, mostly
British.
TITLE OF JOB From Clerk-Interior. SALARY DM 270-420 PER month.
to Office Manager and Ass. Camp leader.
YOUR DUTIES The titles of jobs are self explanatory, -
everything concerning the life of a refugee-camp.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Transfer to U.S. Resettlement Center for
immigration to U.S.A.

FROM 5 May, 1945 TO July, 1946 CLASSIFICATION GRADE
(IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)
EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY PoW, held by the British in W. Germany.
ADDRESS in 7 different PoW and special interrogation camps.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
KIND OF BUSINESS _____ NAME OF SUPERVISOR _____
TITLE OF JOB _____ SALARY \$ _____ PER _____
YOUR DUTIES _____

REASONS FOR LEAVING Rehabilitated, sent to D.P. Camp.

FROM July 1940 TO 5 May, 1945 CLASSIFICATION GRADE Captain.
(IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)
EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY German Mil. Intelligence, diff. units, and on
loan to "I.G. FARBEN, Volkswirtschaft. Abt."
ADDRESS Successively: Berlin, Germany; Helsinki, Finland; Tallinn, Esto-
nia, and German East Coast.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
KIND OF BUSINESS Intelligence NAME OF SUPERVISOR Different
TITLE OF JOB Captain-Consulter SALARY DM 600-700 PER month
YOUR DUTIES With I.G. Farben: Economic Intell. Research - USSR
With Mil. Intellig. in charge of agent-training,
clandestine W/T training- and operational communications and
assisting the chief of operations. In between, Sep/Aug, 1944
Estonian Chief Liaison Officer to the German Mil. H.Q. in Estonia.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Reported to Western Powers for continuation
of the Estonian Intelligence Work, started when working with the
Germans; because the Germans could not go on fighting the Com-
unist; I thought that the Western Powers will.

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

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SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	Estonian	SPEAK	Fluent	READ	fluent	WRITE	fluent
	Russian		fluent		fluent		fluent
LANGUAGE	German	SPEAK	fluent	READ	fluent	WRITE	fluent
	French		fair		fluent		fair
LANGUAGE	Finnish	SPEAK	fair	READ	fair	WRITE	fair
	Polish		slight		fair		slight

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Have never had time for hobbies. Interested in light sportive games for physical restoration of body after long hours of office work. Preference: long walks, skating.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

- 1) Intelligence Research Work (experiences: 1934-1956)
- 2) " Training (experiences: 1941-1944, and 1953-1956)
- 3) Clandestine Communications (W/T, ciphres). (Experiences: 1941-45)
- 4) Interrogation of PoW and of Escapees. (Experiences: 1941-1943 and 1950.)
- 5) Officer of Gen. Staff. (Training and experiences: 1929-1940.)
- 6) Wireless Mechanician (Training and experiences: 1923-1929 and 1941-1945)
- 7) Translating, general and techn.; Estonian, Russian, German.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

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APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 40 SHORTHAND _____

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC. 1) Officer of Technical Services (Signals, Engineering)
YES: 2) "K.S. diploma" Officer (it means: of General Staff),
IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE both Estonian Army.

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) 1) 1926 LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) 2) 1932.

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

- (1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
- (2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
- (3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
- (4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

To (3): As Chief, Section "A", G2, Estonian Gen. Staff, I was in charge of (besides diff. other duties):

- a) Mil. Press-Officer;
- b) Informations pertinent to the Estonian Armed Forces given to the foreign Military Attaches accredited in Estonia.

To (4): Honors: Military College, Technical Branch, First in Graduating Class of 1926. Golden watch with pertinent engravings.

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

NO.

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

NO.

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Street and Number	City	State
1. ✓	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____
2.	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____
3.	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____
4.	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____
5.	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Street and Number	City	State
1. ✓	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____
2.	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____
3.	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____
4.	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____
5.	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Street and Number	City	State
1. ✓	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____
2.	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____
3.	BUS. ADD. _____ RES. ADD. _____	_____	_____

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME _____

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS.
Long Island City Bank, 30th Avenue, L.I.C.3, N.Y.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? NO.
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: _____

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.

1. NAME _____ ADDRESS Have not used any, yet.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME _____ ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME _____ ADDRESS _____
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM 26.02.53 TO Present 30-70, 34th L. I. C. 3, N.Y.
(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM Fall '51 TO 25.02.53 Montsalvat St. 13, Munich, Germany
(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 16.09.49 TO Fall '51 U.S. Resettlement Center, Wentorf, Germany.
(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM Spring '48 TO 15.09.49 D.P. Camp "ESSEX", Lingen, Germany
(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM Spring '47 TO Spring '48 D.P. Camp "KUNGLA", Stolzenau, Germany
(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM Summer '46 TO Spring '47 D.P. Camp "OXFORD", Dragahn, Germany
(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 5 May, 45 TO Summer '46 PoW, British Zone, W. Germany.
(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 7 July, 40 TO 5 May, 45 With German, German-Estonian and Finnish
Army in Berlin facing East. (State) (Country)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

FROM _____ TO _____ (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM _____ TO _____ (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM _____ TO _____ (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM _____ TO _____ (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM _____ TO _____ (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

- Estonian Independence-War Veterans Association in New York
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
Estonian House, 236 E. 34 Street, N.Y.
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: since 1953.
- Estonian Educational Society, Estonian House, 236 E. 34 St. N.Y.
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: since January, 1955.
- Association of Friends of Estonian Boy Scouts of New York.
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
Estonian House, 236 E. 34 St. N.Y.
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: Since 1954.

4. Estonian Litterary Association, Estonian House, 236 E 34th, N.Y.C.
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
 DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1955.
5. Y.M.C.A. Stolzenau Germany
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
 DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1947/1948 (No contact any longer)
6. Association of Officers Graduated from the Estonian Military Academy in Tallin, Estonia
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
 DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1933 or 1934 (No activity since 1940).
7. _____
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
 DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: _____

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? NO.

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: _____

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? NO, except IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? alcohol in very limited and controlled extent.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: NO.

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW: NO.

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940: NONE.

(14)

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

NO.

Sec. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. Salme KURGUEL RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS 30-70, 34th Str. L.I.C.3, N.Y.
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

Sec. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO.

Sec. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Washington, D.C.
(City and State)

DATE 9 March, 1956

(Witness)

(Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

TO: Sec.13: The "Gimnaasium" at Kuressaare, was a Russian one when I was admitted, in 1914. Practically I did not attend any lessons there, because the institution was evacuated from Kuressaare to VOLOGDA (World War I), me remaining in Kuressaare. I had to take examinations for 3 years from the Examination Board which returned every Spring from Vologda to Kuressaare. During the German occupation of Kuressaare the Russian "Gymnaziä" was substituted by a German one, 1917-1918, from which I shifted over to the Estonian one as soon as such one was opened, in January, 1919. As to the views of educators an Estonian Gimnaasium, by its standards, could be compared with an American Highschool plus two years of a College.

Besides the Military College (1923-1926) I attended the Military Academy (1929-1932), graduating with the degree of K.S. DIPLOM-officer. The letters "K.S.", written behind ones rank, indicate that the officer has graduated from this Academy of General Staff, whereas the word "DIPLOM" adds that he has graduated, ~~and~~ written and defended an assigned disertation.

My dissertation carried the topic: "Development of the Public Communication Net to Satisfy the Requirements of the Air-Observation Service".

TO: Sec.15.: When PoW I got in contact with the British Mil. Intelligence. This contact lasted for about one year after I was released from PoW. This being put "on ice" did not satisfy me and I interrupted the contact. This was renewed in 1951 by the British, and lasted for a few month, me doing some interrogation work, until I quit after getting in contact ~~with~~ the representative of this Agency.

From July, 1941 to July, 1944 I worked simultaneously with the Finnish and the German Mil. Intelligence Services, on mutual projects, and I was taken over as a volunteer-captain into the Finnish Army. I left the Finnish Army before Finland made armistice with the USSR, after that I worked as an Estonian Captain, and as such ~~was~~ accepted to the Western Powers.

Alexander K...

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

SR/7/DOB Memo No. _____

8 August 1956

BAC
Kate
Kung

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/CE

ATTENTION : []

SUBJECT : Information Obtained from AEPIONEER 6

1. Pursuant to a verbal request from your office, AEPIONEER 6 was asked the following questions:

a. While he was working for this organization in Sweden in 1951-52, did he contact a person named KALA?

b. While in Sweden did he, AEPIONEER 6, use the name "Thompson"?

c. If he did not use this name, is he aware of anyone who did, or does he know anyone named "Thompson"?

2. AEPIONEER 6's answers were as follows:

a. He believes he met a man named KALA in Germany. This man, now about sixty years old, was an Estonian Major. He was attached to an Estonian Labor (Guard) Company working for the Americans near Nürnberg. AEPIONEER 6 does not recall ever meeting anyone named KALA in Sweden.

b. AEPIONEER 6 has never used the name "Thompson".

c. AEPIONEER 6 has a good friend in Estonia named "Thompson"; however, he has not seen this friend since 1940 and can recall no one by that name in Sweden.

3. AEPIONEER 6 was told that this information was needed in order to clarify our records. He gave this information readily.

h. Should the above information have any bearing on the present use of AEPIONEER 6, this office would appreciate notification as soon as possible.

[] Additional information on this matter, please contact []
a, extension 3808.

SR/7/DOB Tmg [] (8 Aug 56) []

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - DOB/Security
- 1 - Carlson File ✓
- 2 - Chronos

Chief, SR/7/DOB []

SECRET

130A-159

September 1956

ALEXANDER KURGVEL - AEPIONEER 6 Date of Birth: 13 September 1904
Safe Office Name: William Carlson Place of Birth: Estonia
Contract Name: Mario K. Giordano EOD with DOB: 24 February 1952
Aliases: Alex Kay, Clayton (at S/O) Citizenship: Estonian
Eligible: 1963

Subject was educated in Tallin war schools and graduated from the military academy there.

Subject has a vast amount of military and intelligence experience having worked in the Estonian Intelligence Service, Finnish and German Military Intelligence Service, British Intelligence from 1929 to 1949 and with the U.S. Intelligence since 1950. Subject received highest rank of Captain in 1934 while working for the Estonian Intelligence Service. His 28 years of intelligence experience has included analysis and compilation, intelligence liaison, CE instruction, W/T, training and recruiting, assessment, and handling of Russian, Baltic, German and U.S. Agents. He also assisted in the dispatch of agents into the USSR. From 1951 to 1953 he was utilized by CSOB as an operational assistant.

Subject was brought to the U.S. by CIA under PI-110. So far Subject has been assigned to two DOB projects instructing in Tradecraft and Fieldcraft subjects. Subject has many favorable efficiency reports in his files. He is said to have a highly developed sense of duty and responsibility.

Subject is married and has two sons, one of whom is attending college in South Carolina and the other attends high school.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

130A-162