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TOJO

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Interrogation by Mr. Besson and Lt. Dorr, USNR.

Taken from USSB

Analyst: C.W.J. Phelps

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1803

Translated by S. Nakajima
Checked by
J. Washida

Q II ヒソン氏ノ復向
A II 星野直樹氏ノ答

Q II 満洲ニ於テ採用

~~サレタ~~ 計画

コノ企画院

テ 変へん事があるか?

A II 郵船 権限 執り 承る 事あり

寧ろ、甲満

我々ノ見積り時ハ、
我々ノ見物キリノハ、我々ノ見物キリノハ、
満洲カウ

何れノ見物キリノハ、
何れノ見物キリノハ、
他方満洲ハ、日本ノ備品ヲ

輸入スル 針 糸 共同テ 我々ハ 計画ヲ

製作 働 事 あり 我々ハ 計画ヲ

ニ修正ヲ施ス 必要 あり 我々ハ 計画ヲ

計画ヲ 樹テ 我々ハ 計画ヲ

~~修正~~

各項目に付、何し程ト云フ事ヲ決メル最終ノ権限ハ

Q 其ノ程度ハ何カニ定ムル最終ノ権限者

ニ在リタカ

誰ノ事カ? 滿洲ノ送ラウト思フテオル

ノ數スル量ガ甚シキ上テア

日本ノモトニ 銑鉄ヲ何カニ定ムルト假定

覽ナシ、ソノ向ノ紛糾ハドウニ変理サレマシカ:

協定

A 日滿經濟研習會ニ定ムラレル様ナ問題ハ

滿洲ノ指導者ト日本カラ來ル者トノ責任ノ立場ニ

飛局者トヨクテ取定メラレテオマレタ

議ヲ指スルニナリヌカ。

Q 滿洲ノ指導者トハ

A 大藏大臣ト商工大臣又ハソノ様ト人達デス

Q ソレデハ日本側ハ誰デスカ?

2.

A 日本大使館ノ顧問ト満洲總務局ノ局長
デス。

Q 商工大臣ハコノ事ニ関係シテオマシタカ?

A 否 関係シテオマセン。

Q コノ企画院ハ大東亜省ガ出来タ時、無クナリ

マシタカ?

A 多分 最後ノ時マデ、續イテオタト思ヒマス。

ソレハ此處テシタノ

Q 企画院アリマシタカ又ハ満洲デシタカ?

A 満洲デシタ。之ハ新京デ組織サレ其変テ

仕テオラオテオタト私ノ知ル限リデハ、思ヒマス。

Q 貴方ハ貴方ノ企画院

計画ヲ立テタル事

二国間ニトシテ協定が出来上
ツテ居タカラ豫メ
貴方ハ

知ツテ斗^ルニ^ハ必^ズ西^ノカ^ノア^リシ^ニタ^カカ^ニ

A 〓 ハイ 私ハ知ツテ斗ニシタ

Q 〓 貴方ノ全般ニ互ル方針ヲ貴方が作成スルニ

前ニ問題ハ先ヅ決定^シナケレバナリマセンデシタ^カ

A 〓 ハイ 又之等協定ハ必要ニ^基キ^キ作^レシ^タ

Q 〓 必要^ナトシテトシテ意味^デスカ^ラ?

A 〓 一寸剛ニ貴方が云ハレタ如キ事^ハ付^キバ

カ^ニ成^シシ^タケ^レバ^ナラ^ズカ^ツタ^ト云^フ
協定^ハ決^シテ^ハ金^ノ意^味デ^ス輸^入等^ノ

問題ヲ片付ケル為^デス。

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 505

PLACE: TOKYO, JAPAN
DATE: 19, 22, 28, NOV. 1945

Division of Origin: Overall Economic Effects.
Subject: Personal Views on Social and Economic Developments during the War.
Personnel Interrogated: Mr. HOSHINO, Naoki
Where interviewed: Meiji Bldg., Room 712, USSBS Main Conference Room.
Interpreter: Mr. Millard
Interrogators: Mr. Bisson
Lt. Dorr, USNR
Lt. (jg) Cohen, USNR
Allied Officers Present: Brig. General Gardner
Captain Logan
Lt. Cdr. Spinks, USNR
Mr. Truman
Ch.Sh.Clk. Ordell, USNR

Summary:

The first section of this interview covers such issues as the obtaining of capital for investment in Manchuria, difficulties confronting Mr. Aikawa in operating the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation, the reasons attained in the development programs. Hoshino set the peak year of Manchurian production at 1943, then qualified it by saying "1942 or 1943."

Later, as head of the Cabinet Planning Board, Hoshino could not schedule the Manchuria program except as the result of special agreements negotiated between Japanese and "Manchoukuo" representatives. The Planning Board dealt with production and imports, but had no data on strategic reserves (as of oil). He was concerned over the low oil output (300,000 tons as against needs of 2,000,000 tons), but gained the impression that enough stocks were in reserve to cover operations until the southern areas were secured. At the beginning of 1941, the higher priority given shipbuilding threw cut allocations in the Materials Mobilization Plan all along the line.

2nd session under prodding, Hoshino indicated quite clearly that Aikawa had great difficulty in overcoming the opposition of entrenched "Manchoukuo" bureaucrats and Kwantung Army middle-rank officers to his attempt at integrating Manchurian production. (At a separate interview, Mr. Aikawa also confirmed this fact. Both men, however, tended to stress the failure to get foreign capital as the main reason for Aikawa's withdrawal from Manchuria in December 1942).

Hoshino confirmed the Zaibatsu opposition to the Planning Board's control program in Nov-Dec. 1940. He denied, however, that the arrests in the Planning Board in April 1941 were connected with this issue, though he accepted responsibility for these arrests by resigning.

Hoshino believed that Germany's pressure, plus Japan's ability to occupy the southern areas, would enable Japan to gain a negotiated peace with the U.S.

1892 Born. Kanagawa-ken; eldest son of:
Father: HOSHINO, Michita (Mitsuta)
Wife: Misao, b. 1897; e.d. of MICHIKAZU, Sugano.
Sons: Tadashi, b. 1920; studied at Kenkoku University
Ryo, b. 1921; studied at Tohoku University
Daughter: Makiko, b. 1923; wife of MURAKAMI, Joichi.
Religion Christianity.
Hobby: Baseball
Address: 1 of No. 8, Niban-cho, Kojimachi-Ku, Tokyo.

1917 Graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, Political
science.
1917 Entered Finance Ministry on graduation, serving
in the Banking Bureau.
Promoted to Superintendent, Northern Revenue Office
of Osaka.
Chief, Customs Department of Kumamoto Revenue
Superintendence Office.
Chief, Customs Department of Osaka Revenue Super-
intendence Office.
Chief, Indirect Taxation Section of the Tokyo Revenue
Superintendence Office.
Bank Inspector.
Secretary, Building and Repair Fund Control Associ-
ation, Bureau of the Finance Ministry.

These above posts covered period from 1917 to 1932,
all in Japan Proper.

1932 - 1936 Vice-Minister, Finance Department of "Manchoukuo".
1936 Vice-Chief, General Affairs Board of "Manchoukuo".
1937 - 1940 Chief, General Affairs Board of "Manchoukuo".
Chief, Manchurian Special Products Central Associ-
ation (Manchou Tokusan Chuo-kai).
Councillor, "Manchoukuo" Concordia Society (Man-
choukuo Kyowa-kai).

July 1940 - Minister of State without Portfolio; Chief, Cab-
Apr. 1941. inet Planning Board, in 2nd Konoye Cabinet.
Apr. 1941. Dropped in Cabinet reshuffle; probably due to
opposition of conservatives to his Army-backed
control plans for Japanese industry.
Arrests reported among employees of the Planning
Board.
Oct 18, 1941-Chief Cabinet Secretary through entire period of
the Tojo Cabinet.

COMMENTS:

- (1) Long Manchurian career (1932-40) covered whole period of
its early development, including first-year plan.
- (2) His last post in Manchuria was the highest a Japanese could
occupy in the "Manchoukuo" government - actually, the cen-
ter of power. Only the Kwantung Army commander outranked
him. Worked closely for eight years with the Kwantung Army.

- (3) His position well indicated by the "Corunna", first class, conferred on him by Italy for his services to the rapprochement of "Manchoukuo" and Italy. A leading figure in working out the German - Manchurian economic pacts (exchange of soy beans, etc. for machinery, etc.) and for the Otto Wolff loan to "Manchoukuo".
- (4) Thus, very intimate knowledge of Manchurian economic affairs, as well as political, for nearly ten year period.
- (5) As head of Cabinet Planning Board in 2nd Konoye Cabinet from July 1940 to April 1941, he had chief planning role in war mobilization preparations. Thus, a detailed knowledge of Japan's economic potential.
- (6) The "Hoshino Plan" of economic control (proposed autumn, 1940) looked toward strict overall government (Army) control of industry. It was bitterly fought by the Zaibatsu and defeated. In its place, the Zaibatsu - sponsored Control Association plan was adopted.
- (7) The April 1941 episode, when Hoshino was dropped and arrests made in his Planning Board, might reveal interesting details on the Army - Zaibatsu conflict.
- (8) As Tojo's Cabinet Secretary, played a leading role in wartime planning. His influence was significant in formation of the Greater East Asia Ministry (Nov. 1, 1942) and the Munitions Ministry (Nov. 1, 1943).

TRANSCRIPT

MR. BISSON

19 November 1945

- Q. We are primarily interested in broad, general trends in the development of strategic and economic policy rather than in details.
- A. I understand.
- Q. During the early period in Manchuria - roughly 1931 to 1936 there was no great change in Manchurian production, especially industrial production. What would you give as the main reasons for the lack of industrial development during those early years?
- A. There might be a number of reasons for this; perhaps, the greatest one is that during that period a large amount of preparation was under way, so that there was no large amount of production.
- Q. In what specific fields were these general preparations?
- A. I don't have the exact figures at hand here, and cannot explore the minute reasons for all of this, but these preparations involved the setting-up of industries such as the Showa Steel Mills, and also involved the location and prospecting of gold fields. Since Japan does not advance as fast as America along those lines, it took considerable time to play the foundation for industrial production.
- Q. Was there a shortage of capital during this period for development work?
- A. If you think of capital not only in terms of money but also in terms of necessary goods and materials, then surely we can attribute part of the difficulties to a lack of capital in Manchuria.
- Q. Where did you look to for the necessary capital?
- A. We looked first of all to Japan for capital, but there were not sufficient sources from which to draw in Japan itself, and so we looked to foreign countries for the necessary capital. When the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation was established, we expected to get some capital from America, but due to various circumstances, that did not work out according to our plans and so we were forced to make out with what capital we could develop within Japan itself.
- Q. You have forged over to the period after 1937. I was still talking about the period before 1937. There have been statements that Japanese industrialists did not want to invest in Manchuria, especially before 1937. What were the reasons for the industrialists not wanting to invest during that early period?
- A. The reluctance on the part of the Japanese capitalists may be attributed to two reasons. The first, is perhaps the matter of whether or not enterprises in Manchuria should become monopolies controlled by the Zaibatsu. There was considerable argument and discussion on this point. Another reason is that the investors were not too sure of whether the venture would be profitable or not, and they considered it somewhat of a risk and, therefore, hesitated.
- Q. Was the original point that he made on monopolies that the capitalists were loath to invest because the enterprises were likely to develop, not under their control, but under the Kwantung Army's control?
- A. The thing that I thought of was more the suspicious or fears we had that the interests which were monopolizing much of the business in Japan would likewise try to monopolize the industries in Manchuria.

- Q. Were you supported by the Kwantung Army in that respect?
A. I suppose so. I think the Kwantung Army shared in that sentiment.

LT. DORR

- Q. How would that prevent them from getting capital? Do you mean unwilling to accept capital on Zaibatsu terms?
A. The interests in Manchuria were not clamoring for capital from Japan. Perhaps part of the reluctance was on the part of the industries which needed the capital.

MR. BISSON

- Q. In the early period - in the first period we are referring to before '37 - who invested the capital; where did it come from; was it local capital, or did it come from Japan?
A. It came practically all from Japan; during the period in question the investment from Manchuria was negligible.
- Q. What sources in Japan supplied it?
A. As I said, while the capital did not flow the Manchuria in a great stream, there was some, of course, and this came from various sources - from various industrial associations, from connections with Zaibatsu, and from private capitalists and small investors - it was collected from quite a number of sources. In the early period, a great deal of this, of course, was invested through the South Manchuria Railway.
- Q. Beginning 1937, you have a much sharper growth in industrial production in Manchuria - what were the reasons for this greater expansion in output?
A. The first explanation for such an increase in production could be attributed to the fact that the various enterprises such as the Showa Steel Works, had been completed, the coal mines had become fully operable, and the period of production had arrived. At the same time, the plans for increased expansion had also been developed, so that from then on we can witness this sharp increase in production.
- Q. To what extent was this development based on the bringing in of Aikawa with his industrial experience and equipment?
A. For one thing, the Manchurian Government desired that a more realistic and positive attitude be taken toward the whole matter. That is, they wanted the Japanese capitalists to forget their suspicion and reluctance and really get some capital in and put things on a strong basis.
- Q. Aikawa was a very special type of Japanese capitalist - why did they choose him?
A. I am coming to that - I have just started in with the first step. Then, the Manchurians took an attitude of welcoming help and the Japanese capitalists began to take more of a definite interest in Manchuria and that led to an inflow of capital. Up to this time, the South Manchuria Railway had been to some extent carrying on various enterprises, but as the enterprises grew, it became too much for the Railway Company and a need was felt to push the whole development to a higher level. At the same time, Manchuria needed more than capital. Administrative ability was also needed. These reasons were for bringing in Aikawa at that time. Another reason for calling Aikawa was the feeling that to develop these enterprises in Manchuria to the utmost, the thing should be put somewhat on an international basis so that financial aid could be brought in from outside Japan.

- Q. The international angle of it included Germany, as well as Japan I suppose. What was the major contribution that the economic agreements with Germany supplied over and above what Japan was making?
- A. We had no special thought of leaving Germany out of anything when we were planning this. However, as a matter of fact, we did not think much of Germany as a possibility for bringing in capital. Of course, it is true that Germany would consume products from Manchuria, particularly soy beans, but at that time it was Germany's policy to invest or pass out funds as little as possible, so there was little prospect of any investment from Germany. In the purchase of soy beans even, Germany traded as far as possible without the outlay of any funds so the thought of getting any capital beyond that was something out of question.
- Q. How important in Manchuria's economic development was German machinery?
- A. As I mentioned before, Germany, in buying soy beans from Manchuria, tried to arrange it so that she paid out no money, but her account gradually grew with Manchuria, and she attempted to get Manchuria to settle the account by purchasing German equipment in large quantities. This situation might be attributed to the fact that the investment which we had hoped to get from America did not materialize.
- Q. What were the largest items of machinery? What specific types of industry?
- A. I don't have any specific figure here - I will have to depend on my memory - but as I recall it, that machinery was along the following lines: In the development of the Showa Steel Company, blast furnances and other steel making equipment came from Germany. The hydro-electric equipment for the Shungar dam - half of that was also furnished by Germany, while half came from Japan. I was not connected directly with that so don't remember in detail, but I do know a large amount of German equipment was involved.
- Q. Your first period of service in Manchuria ended in 1940. That was about the end of the first Five-Year plan in Manchuria. In what lines was that plan most successful?
- A. Nothing went according to plan exactly and it is difficult for me to say that we made any great success. However, possibly in the field of coal production and steel works, we made some relatively good progress. In the field of hydro-electric development, while we did not accomplish what we had outlined for the period, still dams were completed and the basis laid for future development so that in that field also it might be said we achieved some success. And, I might as well say that as far as aircraft production or automobile manufacturing was concerned, we did not succeed at all.
- Q. Where could we get, from you the past record of this development? Do you have individual sources of your own on these materials? You have mentioned once or twice that you have specific data?
- A. The most exact figures are probably in Manchria. However, it seems to me that these figures should be found in the Greater East Asia Ministry or in the Foreign Office. Formerly there was the Manchurian Affairs Bureau and also the Greater East Asia Ministry, which are now combined with the Foreign Office, so this material should be found there.
- Q. Was the Manchurian Affairs Bureau taken over by the Greater East Asia Ministry. Did the records go to the Greater East Asia Ministry?
- A. Yes, of course.

- Q. What private records do you maintain yourself?
A. I have not a single thing left. My residence was completely destroyed by fire on 25 May. Some of these might be in the Manchurian Embassy but it would seem to me more likely that they should be found in the Manchurian section of Foreign Office.
- Q. Can you tell us whether the Kwantung Army had a documentary record of economic development in Manchuria?
A. I think that they probably did.
- Q. Where would those records be?
A. These are probably in the Commander's Office in Manchuria, I would suppose.
- Q. Would a copy of those documents be sent to Army Headquarters in this country?
A. While it is true that certain reports were probably sent to the Army authorities, all the statistics and the lesser detail would go to the Manchurian Affairs Bureau.
- Q. When you became Chief of the Cabinet Planning Board, did you have in the Planning Board detailed statistics on Manchurian economic development?
A. I had no personal data of my own but I did have access to such materials.
- Q. And, they were in the Planning Board?
A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. How closely did you, when you were head of the "Manchoukuo" General Affairs Board, keep contact with the Kwantung Army?
A. I kept a very close connection with that Army.
- Q. How often did you meet with the Commander of the Kwantung Army?
A. There were no regular meetings, although we did meet together often. I suppose I met the Commander of the Kwantung Army once or twice a month, but I met oftener than that with other officials.
- Q. What was the normal range of subjects that you discussed with the Commander of the Kwantung Army? Were they strategic subjects or were they largely economic?
A. There were no discussions along strategic lines at all. We took up certain economic affairs and civil administrative affairs largely.
- Q. What problems did you normally discuss?
A. We took up practically all types of economic questions, particularly some of those involving development, i.e., the economic development of Manchuria.
- Q. Did that include careful discussion of the progress of such a thing as the Five Year Plan?
A. Yes, of course.
- Q. What did you think, in the period when you were there in 1932-1940, were the major obstacles to economic development - what were the limitations?
A. One of the biggest reasons for the lack of development possibly was the lack of good equipment.
- Q. Which is machinery and machine tools?
A. Yes.

LT. DORR

- X Q. Can Mr. Hoshino give us a statement in his own words, as to what his conception is as to what Japan went into Manchuria for and what it expected to get out of it?

- A. Well, in a word, I would say that after Japan occupied the country, then our policy was to try to build it up, first as a source of raw materials for our industries and second, as a place for our expanding population to go to.
- Q. How successful does he feel the taking of Manchuria was for securing a source of raw materials up to the outbreak of the war?
- A. Well, I can say I think it was a profitable thing as far as raw materials are concerned; but, it is rather difficult to answer your question.
- Q. Well take iron ore specifically?
- A. Even the Manchurian iron ore was not enough to satisfy Japan's industrial needs. Perhaps, she could provide up to one-third, however.
- Q. That is, assuming they fulfilled their plans, they would still not get more than one-third of what they had planned as a national requirement for iron ore? Is that what you mean?
- A. Again, I say it is a little bit difficult to be accurate on that. However, I do feel that even had our plans succeeded; at best we could not have looked for more than one-third of our requirements from that source.
- Q. How about coal?
- A. As far as coal is concerned, we could probably get all we wanted. In getting coal from Manchuria, the question of whether it would be most advantageous, is another question.
- Q. How about food.
- A. If our plans were carried out we could get ample food supplies from that source.
- Q. Enough to take care of Japan's import needs?
- A. I think probably we could have.
- Q. Are there any raw materials which they felt they needed which they discovered they could not get in sufficient quantities in Manchuria except iron ore? Any they felt were essential to their national development?
- A. There are many - first of all, there is oil and aluminum.
- A. There are many - first of all, there is oil and aluminum.
- Q. Didn't they have shale in Manchuria which could produce both oil and aluminum?
- A. There are deposits of shale and aluminum producing shale which if exploited, might supply our needs. Of course, it would be possible to produce synthetic oil from the coal, but development of its sources would depend upon a great outlay of effort and expense and could not be realized immediately.
- Q. Why did they decide not to make that outlay?
- A. Well, they did develop them somewhat but that did not fit the needs. I think at the very last they did produce something like 100,000 tons of shale oil but the plan called for 500,000. It was a very difficult proposition. And, as far as synthetic fuel is concerned, probably altogether they did not produce more than 100,000 tons. In another 10 or 20 years, they might be developed into something, but at the present state it is negligible.
- Q. When was the peak year in which they produced the most?
- A. Our plans called for a continued increase in production, but it did not go according to plan. This was done after I left Manchuria, so I do not know the details, but I rather think the year before last (1943) was probably the best year.

MR. BISSON

- Q. Would that year be the year, in your opinion, in which the total Manchurian output for war potential was the highest?
- A. In general, I should think the peak of output was in 1942 or 1943.

- Q. Why did it fall off after 1942-43?
- A. It fell off there, because Japan's productive power also fell off. And, since Manchurian industry depends altogether on Japan's industry, it was influenced by the falling-off of Japan's industry.

LT. DORR

- X Q. You say that one of the reasons Japan wanted to take over Manchuria was to get raw materials to use in her own industries?
- A. Yes, that is right.

- Q. However, instead of that, Manchuria proceeded to set up an industry to process the raw materials on the spot - the raw materials were not sent back to Japan were they?

- A. Perhaps I used Japan in a rather limited sense a while ago, and instead, I should have said within the Japanese sphere because I was thinking of Japan and Manchuria together.

- Q. Although you had an economy where you had to bring in large quantities of raw materials into Japan and you had processing facilities there, you chose to build up new processing facilities on the continent? Why was that?

- A. As I said before, our purpose was to develop the whole Japanese sphere. Therefore, we were not limiting our development to Japan proper. From that standpoint, it was advantageous to us to develop industry where it could make the best use of local raw materials, and for that reason, these industries were developed near the source of the raw materials in Manchuria.

- Q. Actually, although the plan for food production would have taken care of Japan's needs, Japan in fact continued to import food from other areas, did it not, prior to Pearl Harbor?

- A. Yes, there was considerable of that.

- Q. Well, if the purpose in taking Manchuria was to make Japan independent, then it was a failure as far as food was concerned?
- A. Under ordinary circumstances and conditions, Japan with Korea and Manchuria, should have been able, by helping each other, to produce all their own required foods. However, crops do not always come up to expectations and for that reason it becomes necessary to import foods. Crops fluctuate a great deal - for instance, I recall in 1934 that Manchuria produced so many soy beans she did not know what to do with them. In fact, they even gave study to the use of soy beans instead of coal for firing locomotives. At that time, there was also some thought of imposing a customs duty on the importing of soy beans into Japan and this became quite a problem to Manchuria.

- Q. Was there ever a year when Japan did not import large quantities of food from areas other than Manchuria and Korea?

- A. Yes, there were. For instance, 1943-4-5. Then, there were years when we brought in a great deal, for instance in 1941.

- Q. How about prior to 1941?

- A. There were some years when Japan even had excesses. In fact, we had excesses in rice to the point of not knowing what to do with it. For instance, in 1932 and 1933, we had such excesses.

- Q. That had nothing to do with Manchuria - it was just the local crop in Japan?

- A. That includes, of course, the things we ordinarily get from

Manchuria such as beans and oil.

- Q. Is it fair to sum it up this way -that the acquisition of Manchuria had virtually solved any food problems that Japan had before Pearl Harbor?
- A. No, there were emergency periods, as I said before. In regular years it was all right, but it did not solve all our problems at all times.
- Q. But, in the main, it attained what they hoped?
- A. Yes. Of course, the war situation changed that quite a bit.
- Q. Now you said that one of the reasons Japan went into Manchuria was to secure additional living space for its people- To what extent did the acquisition of Manchuria accomplish what had been hoped in that respect?
- A. I cannot say that any great help has come so far. In fact, just a beginning has been made.
- Q. But, as of 1941 it had not accomplished what Japan had hoped and expected?
- A. No, it had not proceeded as well as we had hoped.

Colonel COLE

- Q. We have heard two reasons for going into Manchuria. I would like to inquire if there were not one or two other reasons - perhaps the Army?
- A. I do not know that the military had any other great reason beyond those mentioned.
- Q. Well, the Army was very strong at that time in Japan, politically. It was able to implement its wishes. Why did the Army wish to go into Manchuria?
- A. Well, it would seem to me, as near as I can analyze it, that their purposes were largely the two that I have mentioned.

MR. BISSON

- Q. You mean there were no strategic objectives in going into Manchuria?
- A. Wouldn't these things themselves be considered somewhat as having strategic significance? Outside of that, I do not know of any other specific objectives.

COLONEL COLE

- Q. We have seen a document called the "TANAKA MEMORIAL". The Japanese Government has frequently denied that it was genuine, but nevertheless, every move that has been made by the Japanese government since that time has been in line with it. I would like to have Mr. Hoshino say whether or not it was a genuine document.
- A. I cannot tell you whether that is genuine or not. I have no way of knowing, myself. At the time of this so-called Tanaka Memorial, I was just a young man and just a minor clerk, so it is very difficult for me to say very much about it. This is something the government has denied and I do not know much about and if I were put under pressure in the matter, I do not know what I could say about it. As far as I know, I have never heard any discussion or argument concerning such a declaration here in Japan.

MR. BISSON

- Q. Previously we were discussing the Kwantung Army and the Zaibats - is this a fair summary: That during the earlier period up to 1937, there seemed to be reluctance on the part of the Zaibatsu to participate fully in the development of Manchuria. Would you say that after 1937 the industrialists in Japan proper became more willing to participate in the development?
- A. That is right - it would be difficult, of course, to put one's finger on the exact date when the change took place, but in general that was so.
- Q. Well, what would you think were the main reasons that led to this change - what caused this change in the attitude of the industrialists?
- A. For one thing, the Manchurians expressed a definite desire for such a thing, and in the second place, the situation cleared up considerably.
- Q. Cleared up in what way?
- A. That is, the Japanese industrialists began to realize that Manchuria was a safe place after all.
- Q. Did that mean the Kwantung Army gave them more control over their investments in Manchuria?
- A. What I meant by "safe" was from an economic standpoint - i.e., they realized it would be profitable. It was no longer a risk.
- Q. Yes, but was there a modification of the exclusive control by the Kwantung Army of Manchurian development?
- A. Yes, they somewhat relaxed their controls - eased up on them.

LT. (JG) COHEN

- Q. When he speaks of "Manchuria wanting things" and "Manchuria's so-and-so" you mean, of course, the Kwantung Army?
- A. When I said the Manchurians, I meant the Manchurian government. Of course, there is a very close connection between the Kwantung Army and the Manchurian Government and usually it represented pretty much the opinion of the army.

MR. BISSON

- Q. You were Chief of the Planning Board from July 1940 to April 1941. In your administration of the Planning Board during that period, what were the major tasks - major activities - as you see them now?
- A. At that time, perhaps, the outstanding problem was that of a planned economy for Japan.
- Q. What was the necessity for a planned economy then?
- A. The situation both in Japan itself and in the world at large was such at that time that Japan found it necessary to develop her own economy against the possibility and danger of being cut off from both materials and capital from abroad.
- Q. In these mobilization plans that the Planning Board drew up, our understanding is that they scheduled Manchurian production to fit in with Japanese production. Is that correct?
- A. Plans were drawn up for Japan itself of course, but since there was such a close connection between the two countries, the plans usually took in the whole sphere.
- Q. Could the Planning Board here change the program adopted in Manchuria?
- A. Rather than any idea of a limitation of authority, the plan was to work jointly so that in planning for our needs, we made allotments from Manchuria and, on the other hand, Manchuria planned for the importing of Japanese equipment and thus it was necessary always for us to make the plans together, so there was not any modification of each other's plans.

- Q. Who was the final authority who decided how much of each item? Suppose Japan wanted more pig iron than Manchuria wanted to ser - how would that conflict be worked out?
- A. Such problems as that were decided in a Japanese-Manchurian Economic Association, made up of leaders in Manchuria and responsible authorities from Japan.
- Q. Who would be the leaders in Manchuria?
- A. The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Commerce and Industry and such men.
- Q. And, on the Japanese side?
- A. The Counselor to the Japanese Embassy and the head of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau.
- Q. Was the Commerce and Industry Minister on it?
- A. No, he was not on it.
- Q. Did this Board disappear when the Greater East Asia Ministry was formed?
- A. It probably continued right up to the very last.
- Q. Did it meet here or in Manchuria?
- A. In Manchuria. This was organized in Hsinking and operated there, as far as I knew.
- Q. When you drew up your Planning Board Program, did you have to know beforehand what agreements had been reached between the two countries.
- A. Yes, I knew them.
- Q. Those had to be decided first before you could draw up your over-all program?
- A. Yes, and those agreements were drawn up on the basis of necessity.
- Q. Necessity, in what sense?
- A. In the sense of coming to agreement on such matters as you mentioned a while ago. In order to settle questions over imports and exports, etc.
- Q. How would you learn of these agreements - did they come to in the form of written documents?
- A. I knew of them from the time I was head of the General Affairs Board in Manchuria when documents were also presented to me.
- Q. Yes, but after you came to Japan, were there documents presented to you?
- A. Yes, those were provided by the Foreign Office and, if necessary they can be produced now for examination.
- Q. They are in the Foreign Office and Planning Board Archives also?
- A. Such documents were kept in the Foreign Office and were brought to the Planning Board by the Foreign Office representative who presented them to us.

LT. (JG) COHEN

- Q. Who was the Foreign Office representative?
- A. That would be one of the Foreign Office Secretaries and not the Minister - probably the Manchurian Affairs Bureau representative or secretary.

MR. BISSON

- Q. You do not have those documents yourself?

A. No.

Q. You cannot produce them?

A. No. I would be unable to do that. It would have to be gotten from the Foreign Office.

Q. In this period, during 1940-41, what were the major gaps in Japan's economic potential that you were concerned with?

A. The shortage in oil was a big problem.

Q. Were you achieving, during this period, satisfactory results from the iron and steel industry?

A. Well, I could hardly say they were up to expectations.

Q. In the late autumn of 1941, or toward the end of the year, would you say to what extent economic preparations were adequate for the strategic plan that Japan envisaged at that time?

A. This is a very difficult problem. You certainly was not in a very favorable position economically. Certainly there were plenty of difficulties.

Q. Let's make it specific - on the oil problem - how much did you calculate you had in reserve to cover needs?

A. The Navy, of course, had secret reserves, and probably the military did as well, but we of the Cabinet Planning Board did not know how much, except that they ultimately felt that there was a supply ample enough to take care of their needs until they could obtain oil from other areas. There were evidently ample prospects at that time, as far as oil was concerned.

Q. Did you not have these figures in the mobilization program that your Board was working on?

A. No, this was kept in absolute secrecy by the Army and Navy and I knew nothing of it. Of course, in planning, I did have the figures on imports and on production.

LT. DORR

Q. But, nothing on consumption or possible consumption?

A. Of course, we did have some figures on production for the various years, but we could not tell how much the military had stored up in reserve. That was a secret. They gave us figures on what the demands would be. I was only on the Planning Board until April and I don't know what went on after that, but as I said before, it is my belief that there was enough oil on hand for operations until the military should get their hands on supplies of oil in the south.

Q. How long did you figure that would be?

A. I haven't any idea. The Army and Navy both felt confident that they would get those supplies and there was no need to worry about the length of time it would take.

Q. Were there any other items which were given special consideration in lieu of this strong possibility of being cut off?

A. Well, we were worried considerably over the lack of aluminum and also of iron ore.

LT. (JG) COHEN

Q. I understand your's connection with the Planning Board ceased in April 1941. At that time, before your connection ceased, had the Cabinet Planning Board's plans for 1944 already been completed?

A. Yes, we had some plans well in advance for several years.

- Q. Was the so-called Materials Mobilization Plan for 1942 drawn up while you were still a member of the Planning Board?
- A. Yes, this was drawn up during my period in the Planning Board although it was not definitely decided upon until a later period.

LT. DORR

- Q. If you had a plan for 1942, that must have reflected what you thought were going to be the needs for that coming year. Were not those needs higher than they had been in the past?
- A. I do not recall that there was any great difference between the plans for 1942 and those of 1941 - the big increase came before that when the so-called Four-Year Plan was set in operation.
- Q. You did not expect that if you got into a war that you would have to greatly increase their industrial production?
- A. At that time we did not take anything like that into consideration.
- Q. When you became a member of the Cabinet Planning Board in 1940, you said that the chief problem consisted of converting Japan to a planned economy because you were afraid she might be cut off from raw materials, didn't you?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. You said that during that period oil was one of the things Japan was most worried about.
- A. Yes, that is right.
- Q. The question of oil was discussed with the Army and the Navy and although they did not state how much they had on hand, they did state that they were not worried and that they would be able to take over new sources of oil before they ran out of what they had?
- A. I must have mis-understood, or else you misunderstood me. In regard to one of the first questions you asked me as to the shortages or problems in our economics, I mentioned the fact that oil was the big problem and we were having to do something to prepare against being cut off from outside sources. At that time our own production of oil was a mere 300,000 tons while our needs were two million tons, and that was something that gave us great concern, and figured large in the work of the Planning Board. Now, this oil question came up from another standpoint and was not in connection with my work as Chairman of the Planning Board. You asked me my opinion as to whether or not the Japanese military thought they had sufficient supplies of oil for the war they might be planning in the fall of 1941, and I told you that it seemed to be the understanding that they had ample supplies to last them until they could get their hands on the oil in the south. This had no connection whatsoever with my Planning Board.
- Q. What did the Planning Board do in the question of oil, in working out a planned economy?
- A. One thing we did to ease the oil situation was to increase imports.
- Q. Were there any other commodities of which you tried to increase the imports?
- A. We also planned to increase the import of food.
- Q. Were the plans merely to balance existing consumption and production by imports - to make up the deficit in production?
- A. Yes.
- Q. There was no attempt to build up stocks in anticipation that later they might be cut off from imports?

- A. We did plan to import food then, because of the fact that the previous year's crops had been poor - this however was not specifically connected with our Four Year Plan. It was merely an emergency plan. However, basically food was a big problem.

MR. BISSON

- Q. At what point did you, as Chief of the Planning Board, become aware of the fact that war with the U. S. might break out soon and take it into consideration?
- A. Our plan was a Four Year Plan and therefore rather an overall affair and we directed ourselves largely to that plan. If I were to try to decide on a time when it became evident that the situation called for immediate planning, I might say it was around the end of 1940.
- Q. In considering the Four Year Plan, was there any discussion of the adequacy of the merchant fleet to handle traffic which had to be moved?
- A. First of all, I want to make it clear that the Four Year Plan was started before my time and I simply tried to develop it. The question of shipping did not come up much until the beginning of 1941 when it was discovered that we would have to include shipbuilding in the carrying out of the plans.
- Q. Did that throw out the allocations which had been made for other industries - did that mean they were going to be short on other materials for other planned production?
- A. Yes, that is true.
- Q. What were the other industries which would be affected?
- A. There was hardly a field that did not feel the influence of that change of plan.
- Q. What priority was given to shipbuilding at that time?
- A. Up to that time, there seems to have been little worry about shipping, but from that time on, shipping was given high priority.
- Q. Was there anything given a higher priority?
- A. It is a little difficult to say just what order of priority to assign to the various things - a plan was developed of course - an overall plan - and shipbuilding would come in for strong consideration.
- Q. They did decide to reduce the amount of materials to other industries - did they not?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. What industries did they reduce?
- A. Quite a large number; in fact, it was very general. Of course, the greatest influences were on civilian industries.
- Q. What ones did they not reduce?
- A. The heavy industries and munitions were virtually on a par with shipbuilding.

(At this point, it was decided to adjourn the meeting until 1400 on Thursday, 22 November.)

- Q.. It might be interesting to get Mr. Hoshino's views on why Aikawa resigned at the end of 1942, and left the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation.
- A. It is a little difficult to explain, but I would imagine Mr. Aikawa's term of service (5 years, ed.) was ended, for one thing and that, as I told you the other day, Aikawa went to Manchuria with the hope of attracting international investments, but things did not go as was expected; the situation changed; things were somewhat modified in Manchuria, and he was not in as great demand as he had been before, and he seems to have dropped out therefore, and the work was turned over to Takasaki.
- Q. What were the specific difficulties that developed in Manchuria which may have prevented Aikawa from accomplishing his objective?
- A. As I have mentioned a number of times, Aikawa's mission in Manchuria was connected with a plan to bring in capital and all his ideas were centered around a long period of development. However, at about this time, the China-Japanese incident occurred, and it became more and more evident that the situation would not permit of a long period development but would have to be speeded up. Aikawa could not see his way clear, apparently, to try to make such a change in the program; he did not think it was possible to speed it up as was demanded, and since it was evident that tasks more close at hand would have to be taken up first rather than the development of this long-term program, he felt he was not the man for the job and dropped out.
- Q. I don't think that really answers my question. My question was - What were the specific difficulties inside Manchuria which made it difficult for him to operate?
- A. I don't know of any special situations which involved Aikawa personally. The thing, as I see it, was one of a world situation which militated against any long-term development.
- Q. We have understood that in some of the activities that Aikawa was carrying on in Manchuria - some of the businesses he was concerned with in Manchuria - there were serious difficulties in getting the cooperation - especially of middle-rank officials - in carrying through the program he was trying to initiate.
- A. There is undoubtedly some truth to such a report and it was opposed by the middle-rank officials, but I don't believe it was of such a nature as to greatly impede the work or to cause Aikawa to return to Japan.
- Q. What was the reason for the opposition among these middle-rank people?
- A. One thing which they opposed was the idea of giving Aikawa too much of a free hand.
- Q. Why?
- A. I don't know any particular reason except that such middle rank officials usually do oppose the giving of a free hand. The same is true in Japan - what they want is to make sure the thing is under more control.
- Q. We understand Mr. Hoshino was in general control of this official group. Why wouldn't he be able to insist that they cooperate with Aikawa in attempting to do his job?
- A. I was in Japan in 1942 and did not have much connection with Manchuria.

- Q. How about the earlier period - 1938 and 1939?
- A. At that time, there was not so much opposition to giving a free hand.
- Q. What does Mr. Hoshino think the real reasons were for this opposition? I have not heard any reasons specific enough to sound reasonable.
- A. Again, I repeat that this opposition, while it probably existed, never came to the surface to such an extent as to amount to a great deal, and as far as a reason for it, I might say that there was not a great likelihood that the Five Year Plan (for Manchuria, ed.) would succeed anyway.
- Q. Was there opposition to Aikawa because he was a Zaibatsu?
- A. I don't think there was.
- Q. Aikawa was friendly to the Kwantung Army - presumably his relation with you were also good - and still there was considerable difficulty in putting his program into effect?
- A. The opposition to Aikawa could probably be divided into two periods - in the early period the opposition was mainly on the part of those who felt that international capital should not be brought into Manchuria. In the second place, when the capital did not come, then they began to criticize him severely. This opposition arose on the part of the South Manchuria Railway, since the plan was that much of their work would pass into hands of the Manchurian Industrial Development Co. Then, in the latter part of the period, the opposition arose in the middle ranks of officialdom.
- Q. Was that purely the civil officials or was it also the Kwantung Army officials?
- A. These middle-rank officials, mostly civilian although possibly some in the Kwantung Army, opposed the giving of a free hand - they felt direct control would be more efficient.
- Q. What it amounted to was that each of them had a vested interest and they did not want Aikawa to come in and interfere with their vested interests. Isn't that what it amounted to?
- A. I would not think so. These people did not really have any vested interest since they were just officials.
- Q. I mean vested interest in the administrative sense - it was their power in which he was interfering?
- A. Yes, from that viewpoint, undoubtedly it was so.
- Q. The last time when we were speaking of your period of service during the second Konoye Cabinet, you indicated that one of the major problems the Board had to deal with then was measures of economic control. What specific issues arose in this field?
- A. At that time one of our biggest problems was in getting the industrialists in certain lines such as coal or iron together and organizing them for the greatest efficiency and greatest advantage for national production.
- Q. What were the Cabinet Planning Board's recommendations?
- A. The recommendation was that, in each field, the industrialists be organized and that they form a group unifying the industry so as to place administration of the whole field under a control association.
- Q. To what extent did the industrialists object to this?
- A. I don't believe there was any great opposition on the part of the industrialists, themselves. Just as in the case of the vested interests in Manchuria, the opposition was raised on the part of

bureaucrats who were opposed to giving the control association the free hand which it was our mind to give them. They were reluctant to give up their controls and really never did. That gave rise the considerable confusion because of the dual control that, in my own opinion, is one of the reasons why economic affairs developed so poorly during the war.

- Q. My information, gathered partly from leading Japanese papers at the time, indicates that there was very strong opposition to the Cabinet Planning Board's idea - they called it Communist - they said it would separate ownership of industries from their management, so the business men would not be running their businesses any more and this opposition was all centered against the Cabinet Planning Board's program. It would seem that the Cabinet Planning Board's program was one that was disliked by the Zaibatsu.
- A. I must admit there was opposition on the part of the industrialists but it was probably directed against their great fear of bureaucratic control. The control associations were set up to handle this directly, with only indirect control from the various government bureaus. However, as I said before, the industrial world was very, very much afraid of this control. They had examples of it in various ways, and the Zaibatsu, did not want to have too much authority over them pass into these government hands. However, we did set up the control associations, but unfortunately, the bureaucrats did not relinquish their hold but increased it, and their resulted in considerable confusion in the industrial field.
- Q. That is the latter period - I am now interested in November and December 1940 - in this period, did the Planning Board call for control by the direct appointment of the officials of the control associations by the government?
- A. Yes, these leaders were to be appointed by the various government offices.
- Q. So, their objection was that the control associations would be dominated by officials appointed directly by the government?
- A. Yes. Of course, there was talk of the danger of Communist control, but the thing you mentioned was a fact, I think.
- Q. This issue, that I understand was fought out very bitterly, of the Planning Board's plan for direct control by the government was defeated - To what extent think that issue affected your resignation in April 1941?
- A. There was a great deal of heated debate over this question, but I don't recall that the question of the appointment of the leaders was the greatest issue - surely not as great as the problem of the separation of capital and management. This was a real issue. As far as my own withdrawal is concerned, that took place after this plan was set up and was not concerned specifically with those issues. At the time of Cabinet meetings (in which the Planning Board's plan was revised, Ed), I felt that perhaps it was time for someone abler than I to take over and I withdrew.
- Q. Was Mr. Hoshino dismissed or did he resign?
- A. I voluntarily withdrew.
- Q. How many members of the Planning Board were arrested at the time when he withdrew?
- A. About four, I think.

- Q. Why were they arrested?
- A. Perhaps it is because two or three years prior to the time when I joined this Board, there was a certain study group organized and that was thought to have been Communistic. That is a long time prior to my time.
- Q. Was this study group only among officials of the Planning Board or did it include other officials?
- A. Yes, there were others in the group besides members of the Planning Board. As I recall a man in the Agriculture Ministry (named Wada?) and a man in War Ministry was arrested. These men were in the study group a long time before this, but they, too, were arrested.
- Q. Well, why were these particular men in the Planning Board arrested at this time?
- A. Because these men had belonged to this particular study group.
- Q. Were they not engaged in the activities of the Planning Board at that time?
- A. These men, while they were on the Planning Board, were minor officials and they had not taken part in these more important plans.
- Q. These arrests had no connection whatsoever with your resignation?
- A. They had no direct connections with my resignation, but perhaps I should say they had some psychological influence on my decision.
- Q. Was there a general feeling that the Cabinet Planning Board had gone Communistic at that time?
- A. There were possibly some who thought that, but I don't think it was a general feeling.

LT. DORR

- Q. Can you tell a little bit more about it - what it had to do with him?
- A. I had been in Manchuria for eight years and came back and was put in this post but as you can readily see, this was a time of considerable problems and difficult issues and as I got into those things I felt I was not equal to it and I had better withdraw and let someone handle it who understood the issues better.
- Q. I am not sure I understand yet what the arrests of these men, whom you have described as "small-fry" on the Cabinet Planning Board staff, had to do with his resignation. Do you imply it was some group or interest which brought about this series of arrests as a warning to him not to persevere with his advocacy of this plan?
- A. This proposition is a little difficult to explain, but I felt responsibility for the whole thing since it took place under my administration. Acknowledging the responsibility perhaps would be a way to explain what I meant by the psychological influence, but aside from that there was no other pressure on me that I knew of.
- Q. These men had been members of this study group for a long time previous to the time you became connected with the Cabinet planning Board. Therefore, why was this particular time chosen for their arrests and why, if they had been carrying on these activities for so long, did you feel responsible?

- A. With regard to the first - I don't know, of course, what goes on in the minds of the police and why it took them so long to come to their conclusion. Perhaps it could be explained by the fact that even below these men - down in the clerical official group - similar problems had arisen and in investigating that situation, the police learned of the problem on the higher level and their investigations finally led to the arrests - all of which took considerable time. Now, on the second point, I did not resign simply because of any responsibility for what had taken place - there was no legal responsibility as far as the law was concerned, but it simply led me to believe that the job could be handled better by someone other than myself.

MR. BISSON

- Q. In one case, it was reported that the total number of arrests came to 432 instead of four or six. What would your comments be on that?
- A. I don't know of any such figure as that. The members of the Cabinet Planning Board arrested were four; in addition to that there was this man from the Agricultural Ministry and the other from the War Ministry.
- Q. Then, this other report is false?
- A. There were only six that I knew in connection with the Planning Board. There were other groups - there was an educational group and then a group in the railway employees and such groups as this were involved and, therefore, the number may be rather large.
- Q. And they were all arrested at this time?
- A. About that same time. I think that the members of the Cabinet Planning Board were among the last arrested.

LT. DORR

- Q. I wonder whether you could tell us very briefly and generally what your relationship was with Tojo when you were both in Manchuria?
- A. I went to Manchuria in 1932, and at first was Vice-Minister of the Financial Dept. At that time, Tojo was Commander of the Kwantung Army's military police. He was located in Hsinking where I was, and I first met him there. However, we had practically no official contacts. Later, in 1936, I was made Chief of the General Affairs Board, and the next year, 1937, Tojo was made Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. In that capacity, we did have a number of contacts and did work together.
- Q. And, in 1941, when Tojo became Premier, you became his Chief Cabinet Secretary?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And, presumably, that implied that you enjoyed the respect and confidence of the new Premier?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In October 1941, when the Tojo Cabinet took office, there was, was there not, at least a very grave danger of war with the U. S. and it was recognized on all sides?
- A. Yes, it was recognized that there was danger of war.

- Q. What was the appraisal of the Japanese Cabinet at that time as to their ability to bring a war with the U. S. to a successful conclusion?
- A. At the beginning, the big question was trying to avoid war and trying to carry on negotiations with America. However, it was realized that war might take place and preparation had to be made and, of course, attention was given to the question of such preparations.
- Q. My question is - did you believe that if a war came with the United States, you could win such a war?
- A. Rather than the thought of whether we would win or not, the big thing was that we would try to settle the issues with America and there was considerable feeling that the thing could be settled. Of course, I suppose we thought if we did go to war we could probably win.
- Q. Did you have any exact plan as to how you expected to win?
- A. Of course, about those specific things, you would have to talk with the War and Navy Ministers because I was not in on the details or plans they had. However, from my own viewpoint and perhaps others, I felt that in the early stages of the war, Japan would be able to occupy a great deal of the Far East and with the materials such as oil and other things which we would thus acquire, it was felt we would be able to carry the war on for a long time and hold on to the countries we had occupied. There was never any thought of course of gaining a decisive victory over America, i.e., of landing on the American continent and bringing America to her knees - we felt that America, for her part, would be unable to subdue the Far East and that eventually we would work out some sort of an understanding in a sort of negotiated peace.
- Q. Would you have felt that such a termination would be possible had you known that Germany would be defeated by Russia and the rest of the Allies?
- A. No, I don't think we would have held the same opinions.
- Q. Why didn't Japan wait until it saw whether or not the Germans would actually capture Moscow and defeat Russia before attacking the U. S.?
- A. I don't think that at that time Japan was relying too much on Germany and while it is true that plans might have been different had Germany's defeat been foreseen, the question seemed to center around the issues between Japan and America, and it was accelerated by the American attitude toward China.
- Q. But you did say, as I understand it, that had you believed that Germany would be defeated, you would not have believed it possible to bring the war to a successful conclusion through a negotiated peace. If that is so, I will have to repeat my question - Why did not you wait and make sure?
- A. While it was not felt necessarily that Germany would gain an immediate victory over Russia, neither did anyone think that Germany would be knocked-out so easily.
- Q. Is it a fact then that you expected there would be a long continued European war which would tend to keep the U. S. worried about the situation in Europe, as well as the situation in the Far East, and thus prevent the U. S. from bringing its full weight to bear against Japan?
- A. There was undoubtedly more or less that kind of thinking.

- Q. Was there any other kind of thinking in regard to it also? I don't want you to say "Yes" because I put the question in that form if you do not really mean that. If you have something else in mind, that is what I would like.
- A. Yes, there was undoubtedly that feeling.
- Q. Was that an important factor?
- A. Yes, it probably was an important factor.
- Q. Was it a determining factor? Would they have been willing to go to war had they felt the situation would have been different?
- A. I don't think this was a decisive factor. It is true that in any discussions or thought of winning the war, such a proposition would be taken into consideration. I think the question of primary importance was that Japan felt that she was fighting for her own existence and if that were threatened, she would fight regardless of other factors.
- Q. That is, whether she thought she would win or lose, she would fight rather than retire from China?
- A. Yes, that is the situation.

MR. TRUMAN

- Q. I am interested in some of the broader political questions rather than the more specific economic questions; particularly during the period when you were attached to General Tojo's government in the capacity of Chief Cabinet Secretary. Specifically, I wonder what devices were available to the Cabinet, of which Mr. Hoshino was aware, for ascertaining what popular feeling was about the war and about the government?
- A. There was no special set-up whereby the popular feeling could be ascertained, with the exception of perhaps of learning of it in the Diet itself.
- Q. Then, the Diet was the only channel - organized or unorganized - in which any attempt was made to find out the popular feeling?
- A. Effort was made to get reports from various part of the country but there was no special organization set up for such a work.

LT DORR

- Q. Did the thought police not make reports as to the general popular attitude?
- A. The police do make general reports to the Home Ministry and these would be forwarded on in some way to the Cabinet, I suppose.
- Q. Didn't they have a rather elaborate organization, with a man in every block, who was supposed to lead and guide the thought of the people?
- A. They were set up, but they did not have very much power or influence.
- Q. Didn't they make any reports back to higher headquarters from which a national picture could finally be assembled?
- A. They didn't do anything like that. Perhaps that is another one of the weaknesses of the government.

MR. TRUMAN

- Q. I wonder if you would give us, in your own words, what you did regard as the important to the Cabinet of knowing such

- information?
- A. Then I spoke the other day of Japan's relations with Manchuria, I meant to say that Japan would be independent as far as food supplies were concerned, but I did not mean to convey the thought that in other lines she would not still be dependent on overseas sources. With regard to this other question, there are a number of factors concerned in the international situation-but when Japan was being shut off from various parts of the world, it was definitely important that she maintain close relations and keep an understanding with China in order to guarantee her own national existence.
- Q. Was China thought of primarily as a potential market for Japan's manufactured goods or primarily as a source of raw materials?
- A. Both.
- Q. And, what would prevent Japan from buying and selling in China, even though she did not have her army there?
- A. At that time, a virtual state of hostility existed between the two countries and with the situation as it was, Japan was loath to withdraw from China unconditionally.
- Q. Could we get a copy of the Planning Board's plan of November and December 1940 which you prepared?
- A. I don't have it at present myself, but if you want it, I can look it up and give it to you.
- Q. That will help.
- A. We would like to have one more session with you to complete the story of the operations and problems which faced the Japanese during the period from the start of the war until the fall of the Tojo Cabinet. We are sure we can finish it up in one more session and we propose Tuesday - either morning or afternoon - if that is satisfactory.
I live quite a long distance away and am coming up here on the 28th and would like to make it the afternoon of the 28th.
- Q. That will be fine - at 1400 on Wednesday, the 28th.

(Remark by Mr. Hoshino): You said before, you would like to have this copy of the original plan that I proposed, as Chairman of the Cabinet Planning Board in 1940, as drawn up at the Cabinet Meeting?

Q. This is the plan that caused so much controversy but finally was not adopted?

A. As I recall, most of the discussion on this proposal was made prior to the time of the Cabinet Meeting. At that time, it was passed.

Q. This is not the original plan, then?

A. It would be hard to say what the original plan was from your standpoint because it was worked over in the various departments many times, but this is the form in which it was finally presented to the Cabinet and was adopted.

Q. As I recall the discussion the other day, you proposed a plan for industrial control which was very unpalatable to certain people and that plan was changed so as to give the industrialists control of industrial mobilization. As I right in my recollection of that?

A. The question was raised the other day as to the attitude of the industrialists on this proposal and after reading the thing over to refresh my memory, it does seem that at that time there was considerable opposition on the part of various business enterprises to the government's appointment of the leaders for such enterprise. The fear was raised, as was suggested before, that government appointment would separate capital from its administration. The business leaders were willing to let the government have a sort of power of veto over the appointment of leaders who might be considered unsatisfactory and to impose control or restrictions when absolutely necessary. However, they did not approve of letting the government appoint the actual leaders for the various enterprises.

Q. Did you consider appointment by the government an important feature of your plan?

A. No, at the beginning I did not consider this a vital point.

Q. That implied that at some later time he did think it important? When and why?

A. No, I would not say that even later I considered this of such vital importance.

Q. Was there ever any question of position or lack of cooperation by the industrialists to the plan of increasing Japan's military strength by industrial mobilization?

A. I don't think there was any great opposition on the part of industrialists toward the mobilization of materials for national defense or for the development of munitions. There was some question as to the methods of control in this mobilization.

Q. Then, it was really a question of whether the industrialists would continue to control their own businesses either as a group or individually?

A. This point on which there was considerable misunderstanding involved the question of whether the government should run the business or whether it should be left in the hands of business men.

Q. Was there ever a time prior to the outbreak of the war, when any important industrialist expressed to Mr. Hoshino a fear that a war with America might break out and a reluctance to see Japan engaged in such a war?

A. I don't think now of any such conversation of anyone talking to me along those lines.

Q. Does he know of any attempt by any important industrialists to get together to bring pressure to bear upon the Tojo Cabinet in the fall of 1941 to prevent the outbreak of war?

(Ed. Note - Ishida former senior managing director of Mitsui states that there was such an attempt by a group of 7 headed by himself and participated in by Mitsubishi Asano Japan Chamber of Commerce and others. Ishida states he was there after forced to resign his position as a result of Army pressure.)

A. I think I can say definitely there was no such attempt.

Q. In October 1941, when it began to appear that war with the U. S. might be imminent, was there any discussion with the War Minister and Navy Minister as to the ability of Japan to carry on such a war successfully? We have been told by two individuals that such opinions were expressed within the Army and Navy Depts.

A. I believe that there were talks with the Navy and War Ministers on the part of the Ministries concerned, with the economic questions.

Q. Talks indicating that from an economic point of view, Japan was not prepared to engage in such a war?

A. I don't know that there were any specific talks of that nature. There were undoubtedly discussions on various economic matters and also on the question of whether Japan had sufficient economic strength or not, but I don't know of any specific instance where anyone urged that Japan's strength was such that it would not permit her to undertake such a war.

Q. I think you told us the other day that you did not think Japanese economic strength was sufficient?

A. I don't think it was I, alone, but others also who felt we did not have sufficient strength but as I did explain the other day, we thought it was a matter of time and we could carry on for some time until the situation could be improved.

Q. You were Cabinet Secretary from the beginning of the Tojo Cabinet until its fall, as I understand it?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. I wonder if you could give us for each year beginning with 1942, the major problems of the Japanese war economy? In detail - not merely saying shipping or something like that, but what particular thing worried them the most?

A. 1942 was a period of positive advance in the war and our biggest problem during that year was the question as to how we would make the most effective use of the resources that we acquired in the territories that we occupied. The mobilization of these materials progressed very smoothly in the early stages of that program but after the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal, the mobilization did not progress as smoothly as we would like.

- Q. Were the plans which had been prepared in advance found to be appropriate for the development of those areas - Did you find it was necessary to bring in more resources from Japan or less than you had figured?
- A. Up until August 1942 the mobilization of these newly acquired resources exceeded expectations.
- Q. Did the battle of Midway, which took place in June really did not seriously interfere?
- A. The cause of the pinch that took place is found in the battle of Midway and Guadalcanal, but the actual appearance of the effect of Midway did not show until August. Another development was the fact that the war increased to such an extent that huge battles had to be fought at a great distance and therefore greater demands for materials than we had anticipated were presented to us and that was one place where our plan fell down.
- Q. That is; the actual consumption of materials was higher than you anticipated?
- A. Yes.
- Q. If everything had gone better than you expected in taking over the N.E.I. and Malaya and the Philippines, why wasn't your consumption of military products less rather than you had figured it would be?
- A. We did get along very nicely at first and our plans worked our famously but particularly after the battle of Guadalcanal the interference with our holding of these newly captured resources to Japan was interfered with by submarines and other means, and that is one reason why our plans did not develop as nicely as we had expected. There is another reason and that was this: The battles of Guadalcanal and other battles at that time consumed a great deal more in the line of ammunition and ships, etc. than we had planned.
- Q. Was the expenditure of military products in the early campaigns, during which they captured the Philippines, Malaya and the N.E.I., greater or less than anticipated?
- A. The only thing that exceeded our expectations was the importation of raw materials from newly acquired territory - otherwise, there was no improvement in the war situation over what we had planned.
- Q. We still have not received a responsive answer - When they started into the campaign they must have figured that they would use up a certain amount of finished military goods - now, did they use up more or less than expected?
- A. The Army and Navy did not keep us posted on the details of their consumption but I believe that the consumption figure approximated the planned figure.
- Q. The mere fact that things had gone easier than they expected did not give them a surplus against the later consumption which was greater than they had figured?
- A. We do not have the figures as to the amount that was used and amount on hand, but the fact that our operations were on a wider scale than anticipated offset any surplus that we might possible have had.
- Q. When Guadalcanal came along, Mr. Hoshino says that the use of end products was greater than expected?
- A. Yes.

- Q. Didn't you expect to defend this perimeter of island against American attack when you formulated defense plans?
- A. They certainly must have done that, but I had nothing to do with planning the military campaign.
- Q. Yes, but you had a great deal to do with planning the economic preparations to support the military plan and, to plan such an economic base you must have known whether they would have to fight or not?
- A. We were not preparing specifically in our economic planning for a Japanese-American war - we were simply planning for war needs without any specific information as to how the military affairs would develop.
- Q. The other day, Mr. Hoshino told us that as early as the end of 1940, he considered that war with the U. S. was inevitable. We have had a number of people tell us that that was a major concern. He has told us himself that it was expected that Japan, if war broke out would be able to seize the raw materials and then fight a holding action to keep those materials. Surely, Japan's industrial mobilization must have anticipated that war materials were going to be used?
- A. I no doubt gave the wrong impression in my previous statement. As a matter of fact, I quit my position as head of the Planning Board in April 1941. Before that time, of course, we all realized there was more or less danger and there was some discussions of our requirements. In regard to the time as to when the military requirements were increased, my recollection tells me that that was about the end of '40.
- Q. I am not trying to catch him up on this, but am interested to see why, as early as the fall of 1942 when everything had gone even better than expected, he still says that the consumption of military end products - the Guadalcanal campaign - was an unexpected and bothersome problem. It seems that if they expected to do any fighting at all, they should have been able to take the Guadalcanal campaign in stride.
- A. The only thing that I can say I know is the results. I know that after the Guadalcanal campaign we were short - our consumption had exceeded expectations, but as for the reasons for it, I cannot say. One thing that I recall is the sudden demand for increased shipping and that, to me, is proof that we were short of materials about that time.
- Q. In 1942, did Japan continue to expand her industrial plant?
- A. Yes, we were expanding in that year.
- Q. And, what were the relative priorities given to different industries in that year?
- A. I think of no particular order, but the three things that come to my mind as being in the greatest demand were aircraft, shipping and oil. The expansion of those industries was uppermost. When we get into 1943, then I have a very clear recollection as to where the shortages were and how we lined up our plants. 1942 was not a year that is marked by any particularly great shortages but I do recall that shipping was quite short after the battle of Guadalcanal.
- Q. Was the industrial mobilization and expansion plan which had been prepared prior to the outbreak of the war modified in 1942 or was it merely carried out as originally planned?
- A. As I recall it, we were not able to hold to our original plan for the expansion of industry, and made some changes.

- Q. What were the changes why were they made, and when?
- A. The biggest shortage was shipping. I don't recall just exactly when we got under way with our new progress but the shortage of shipping in the latter part of 1942 was the big problem and a problem which engaged our very careful attention in '43.
- Q. What I am trying to get at is this: Prior to the outbreak of the war, a plan had been set up whereby so much as going to be done with the steel industry for each year; so much, for aluminum, aircraft, etc. There, you had a clear-out plan. We would like to know whether that plan was changed in any major respect and if so, in what respects was it changed?
- A. I was not connected with the detailed solution of that problem and I don't recall when those changes were made. As I recall it, rather than making any sudden changes in the expansion of industries, we were always making changes as the situations developed.
- Q. Prior to the war, isn't it a fact that a large part of the carrying trade of Japan was done in foreign-owned ships - didn't foreign-owned ships bring necessary materials into Japan and move material between, say, China and Japan, etc.?
- A. No, that was our own ships. We used some foreign ships.
- Q. What was the situation after war broke out - were they still able to use these foreign ships?
- A. No, we couldn't use them.
- Q. Had that been taken into account in the economic planning before the war started?
- A. After the war broke out, I wasn't particularly connected with these problems, but as far as my own feeling was concerned, I know that if a Japanese-American war broke out, of course, we would not have the use of foreign shipping.
- Q. Was the percentage of cargo needed by Japan, carried in these foreign bottoms, sufficiently large so that this would constitute a serious problem?
- A. I do not know just what the percentage of foreign shipping was but, of course, we expected the loss of whatever it was and knew we would have to depend upon our own shipping.
- Q. Would he think it was as much as 30% or 40%?
- A. I just don't know the percentage but it was a considerable figure. Of course, it was not the larger part. I might be that the figure of 30% is pretty close. (Ed. note - The 30% figure was selected arbitrarily by the interrogator)
- Q. Was the problem considered to be an important one in connection with Japan's industrial mobilization for war?
- A. We, of course, realized we would have to be on our own and would have to plan to build more ships.
- Q. It was expected that an increased building program would take care of the situation?
- A. Yes.
- Q. After the war broke out, was there an immediate shipping difficulty because of this withdrawal of foreign shipping?
- A. As I recall it, we had enough shipping to take care of the immediate shock of that loss of foreign shipping.

Q. In considering Japan's ability to carry on a war, what study was made of the British experience in the first World War when submarine losses of merchant shipping were extremely heavy?

A. We took that into consideration.

Q. Do you think now they made an adequate estimate of the situation?

A. It is a fact that our losses far exceeded our expectations. In 1942, our shipping losses were less than expected.

Q. Including Guadalcanal?

A. At Guadalcanal was the time when we lost a lot of shipping attached to the Army and Navy.

Q. He told us that after that, they were short of shipping?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. That doesn't make sense if you say that your shipping losses, as a whole were less than expected?

A. I would say if you considered the year 1942, from beginning to end, our losses were about what were anticipated for that year.

Q. Does that imply that up to the end of 1942, Japanese mobilization plans were not interfered with by shipping difficulties?

A. In 1942, while the situation at the end of the year was very rapidly changing, yet as far as the year as a whole was concerned, we were carrying on our work pretty much as we had planned. I would add this point too, also, and that is, that our shipbuilding program, i.e., the program of building new ships, was behind schedule.

Q. Why was it behind schedule?

A. The only thing I can say is we were not too good at building ships.

MR. BISSON

Q. Was there any conversion that Mr. Hoshino remembers from other sections of industry - in other words, did aircraft and ship building increase as a result of conversion of any other industry. Was there any diversion of materials and plant capacity to shipbuilding and aircraft before 1942 ended?

A. I wouldn't say we didn't do that to some extent, but the conversion program in favor of those industries was primarily carried out in 1943.

LT DORR

Q. Let's come to 1943 now and get the major schemes for the mobilization plans for that year?

A. As a result of the battle of Guadalcanal and other developments by 1943, a very serious shortage of shipping had developed. That was our largest problem and was adversely affected.

Q. Is he speaking here of the fiscal year?

A. Calendar year. As far as I am concerned, rather than talking about calendar year, I would rather have my calendar begin at Guadalcanal.

Q. As I understand it, however, at the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, you had just about as much shipping on hand as you expected to have?

- A. No, our shortage in shipping developed immediately after the Guadalcanal campaign. As I remember it, the Guadalcanal campaign was from August to February and during that period, our shipping shortages developed very rapidly.
- Q. How did that affect the general economic war planning?
- A. In handling the shipbuilding problem, the first thing we decided was to change our methods. We gave priorities to materials needed for shipbuilding. More careful inspection of shipbuilding yards was inaugurated and we employed Mr. Fujihara in this inspection. At the same time, in connection with the inspection of the shipping program, we also inspected our coal production, and steel programs. In changing our shipbuilding methods, we first gave attention to eliminating various types and sizes of ships - deciding on simplified forms. Another change we made was to take the responsibility for the direction of the shipbuilding program from the Department of Communications, giving it to the Navy. In other words, we turned over the shipbuilding program for both battleships and commercial ships, to the Navy.

MR. BISSON

- Q. Wasn't that earlier - my recollection was that was in '42?
- A. It may be was 1942 but if it was, it was pretty late in the year.

LT DORR

- Q. Was the bottleneck in shipbuilding in materials or in the ability of the yards to produce ships?
- A. I would say that our biggest shortcoming was in the matter of methods and the rest was materials. I would say that our shipyards, while not perfect, were pretty good, but we were not using them to their fullest capacity.
- Q. Does he remember whether or not the steel plants were being used to capacity in 1943?
- A. I do not feel they were put to the best possible use.
- Q. Isn't it a fact that they were only operated at a fraction of capacity because of the lack of raw materials?
- A. Not at that time.
- Q. That doesn't agree with what the steel industry tells us?
- A. Of course, the statistics would settle that question, but as far as my recollection is concerned, it seems to me we were producing very well at that time.
- Q. The steel statistics show that steel plant capacity was still being expended in 1943, although there was not enough material to employ all the capacity already available. We should like to know whether that fact was known to the Japanese economic planners?
- A. We knew we were not using them to the fullest extent. Yes, plants were being expanded in spite of the fact that raw materials
- Q. Why was that?
- A. We were counting on getting larger supplies of raw materials and it was our policy to get ready for a larger production of steel in the near future.
- Q. Even though shipping losses were mounting and Japanese shipbuilding was unable to keep up with the losses, you were

- still hoping that sometime in the future you would be able to increase the amount of raw materials you shipped to Japan?
- A. At that time, we were planning on making larger vessels so we could haul more. We were also hoping to be able to take certain anti-submarine measures so as to be able to increase the amount of raw materials we could bring in with our ships.
- Q. Can you fix the date when you considered this problem and thought it was worthwhile going on expanding the steel plant even though the shipping losses were very serious?
- A. It is a little difficult to say just when we gave consideration to these problems, but we always drew up our annual plan about March and changed it from time to time as conditions varied.
- Q. Does that imply that you think this was considered in March 1943?
- A. I do not recollect exactly but think so.
- Q. Was any consideration given to increasing imports of Manchurian aluminous shale with the thought that bauxite imports might be cut off at some time in the future?
- A. We were planning on using Manchurian supplies in Manchuria rather than bringing them over to Japan. We did have a plan to bring in this ore from probably Choten, which is in Shantung.
- Q. When?
- A. I don't recall exactly but it was a plan for 1943-44.
- Q. I think the difference between 1943 and 1944 is important. When did they first realize there was a danger that the bauxite might be cut off?
- A. We realized that in 1943.
- Q. What month?
- A. I could not say the exact month, but that was the result of the Guadalcanal campaign and, therefore, it must have been early in 1943.
- Q. The expected shortage of bauxite did develop after the fall of Kwajalein?
- A. The first plan we laid was to speed up our imports of bauxite from all possible places in the South Pacific to get ahead in supplies and the second plan was to make use of supplies of shale in North China. And, the third plan was to make use of certain low-quantity aluminous shale available in Japan proper.
- Q. Was the Cabinet advised by the Japanese aluminum industry that the North China shale could be processed by them?
- A. I think the opinion was in general that it could be used.
- Q. That is not quite responsive - was there some official consideration of the matter and an affirmative decision that it would be possible to operate on that basis?
- A. Yes, there was such a decision.
- Q. When?
- A. I don't know exactly when this was - it is very difficult to say just when certain of these things developed. I just don't know, but would say it was sometime in 1942. From the beginning, there was talk of using such supplies but the actual decision to definitely make use of it was at this later time.

- Q. You don't think it was in 1942 that they began to use it?
- A. The quality of the material from Choten was very good but the decision was to bring in the alumina which was sometime in 1944.
- Q. When did oil first become a problem considered by the Cabinet planners as a major difficulty?
- A. Production of oil was a very important problem for the planners from the very beginning of the war and even before the war.
- Q. But, with the capture of the N.E.I., wasn't the oil situation during 1942 comparatively easy?
- A. The petroleum situation was relatively eased by that, of course.
- Q. When did it begin to bother them seriously again?
- A. That, too, was following Guadalcanal.
- Q. And, what did they propose doing about that difficulty?
- A. Since it was almost out of the question to develop substitutes, the only thing left to do was to speed up shipments, to construct more ships, and oil tankers, and to endeavor to increase protection for the shipping.
- Q. What consideration was given to further development of Manchurian shale oil?
- A. Previously, a study had been given to this, and while it could not be speeded up overnight, still an increased production was planned through the giving of high priorities to supplies for these developments.
- Q. Was the priority given to supplies for Manchurian shale oil changed during the war?
- A. This was high on the priority list even before the war but it was further increased at this time.
- Q. Meaning when?
- A. That is, following Guadalcanal.
- Q. How about synthetic oil in Japan and on the mainland?
- A. Big plans were laid first for a development of synthetic fuel, but such plans called for huge amounts of materials and, due to the shipping problem and shipping construction, it was not possible to put much into this program. Study was given to the substitution of alcohol for aviation fuel but not a great deal of effort was put into this.
- Q. Was it felt that Japan had the technical know-how to develop a large-scale synthetic industry if you had the materials with which to build the plants?
- A. There was, of course, some knowledge of these technics, but there were insufficient.
- Q. Well, then, is it your judgement that even if the materials had been available, you would not have been able to do very much more on synthetic oil?
- A. It would have taken at least five years before anything could have been realized.
- Q. Did you have access to German technical development and know-how in this field?
- A. We had access to German technical developments to a certain extent, but certainly we did not have all their knowledge -

we received blueprints, etc.

Q. But, no German technical men to assist in the practical operation?

A. Not very many.

Q. Just to go back for a moment, I am not clear whether you say it was primarily lack of technical knowledge which was the main factor in preventing substitution of synthetic oil, or rather the lack of raw material was the main difficulty.

A. It was the technical skills.

Q. Could you tell us whether you feel that Japan's military strength was impaired by lack of raw materials?

A. Yes, particularly from an internal standpoint.

Q. And, how do you rate the various shortages in importance?

A. Number one would be oil; then aluminum; and iron; then, there were also serious shortages in the precious metals.

Q. Now, let's take them, one at a time. Why do you consider oil was the most important and in what respect do you feel it limited Japan's military activity?

A. Without oil, ships don't move, airplanes don't fly, and automobiles don't move, so the shortage of fuel would inevitably effect the war effort and while alcohol was developed as a substitute, it would not meet the demands and it was inefficient. Since we were cut off from our oil supplies in the south, we were forced to depend on production within Japan proper, which did not exceed 500,000 tons a year.

Q. We understand what the oil is used for, but which of the various uses which they were forced to forego does he think were the important ones - does he think it was due to the fact they could not move ships and motor trucks, or does he think it was the denial of fuel to planes; what does he think was most important?

A. It is hard to say just which of these was affected the most by a shortage of fuel but I would say that it was aircraft first of all, and then shipping, but really, all of them were effected.

Q. I realize that all were effected but I was wondering which the Cabinet thought was the most important.

A. Looking at it primarily from carrying on war activities, the lack of aviation fuel had the most direct result, but looking at it more broadly from the standpoint of production, then influence on transportation must be considered of greatest importance.

Q. Why do you consider that the shortage of aluminum was a major problem? As I understand it, the aircraft industry was never forced to curtail operations because of lack of aluminum.

A. That would have perhaps developed had the war continued.

Q. Then, it never became an actual problem?

A. That is right, it probably did not reach the stage of being an actual problem.

Q. But it was something they were very much concerned about?

A. Yes.

- Q. Starting clear back in 1940 would the program for aircraft construction have been higher in any year had more aluminum production been available?
- A. There was no actual curtailment of aircraft production due to such shortages in aluminum. However, the plans for expansion of the aircraft industry raised a serious problem of supply of aluminum.
- Q. Was there ever a time when the planners sat down and said, "We would like to plan to make many more aircraft than we are making, but we know we cannot increase our aluminum production beyond a certain point and, therefore, we will only plan to make a smaller amount of aircraft."
- A. Undoubtedly such technical planning was somewhat curtailed or influenced by the aluminum situation, but in actual practice it never influenced the production of planes.
- Q. When was it that the program for the construction of aircraft was lower because it was realized only a limited amount of aluminum would be available?
- A. Perhaps we could best clear this up by actually saying that at no time was aircraft planning limited by aluminum production since the expansion programs of 1942 and 1943, which were very large by the way, were based on the aluminum supplies already in sight.
- Q. That implies that before the war, when the aluminum plants were comparatively limited in capacity, the appraisal for Japan's needs for aircraft was also low. Wasn't that correct, i.e., they would not have tried to build more aircraft before the war, regardless of whether they had more aluminum?
- A. I think at that time what you say is probably true.
- Q. That is, more aircraft would have been planned had there been the aluminum to build them?
- A. I don't know of any special limitations on aircraft due to shortages. Of course, though, any expansion of aircraft would call for expansion of aluminum and undoubtedly consideration was given to the overall program from that standpoint.
- Q. Before the war started, would they have planned to build more aircraft had they had more aluminum production?
- A. Undoubtedly it was somewhat affected although it would be impossible for me to say to what extent.
- Q. You said that iron and steel was the third most important shortage. What was the most important effect of the iron and steel shortage, in your judgement?
- A. Probably the most direct result of this shortage was that all steel and iron was used for munitions with the result that none went to industry and without iron and steel, industry fell down in its production and, therefore, could not keep step with the war effort.
- Q. That is, you feel that lack of steel to maintain capital equipment - plant equipment - was the most important result of this shortage?
- A. That is right.
- Q. What industries were particularly affected by lack of maintenance?
- A. As I see it, the fact that iron and steel went into the factories directly connected with the war effort, left many other industries without steel so that all non-war industries were affected and this, in turn, was bound to affect war production, itself.

- Q. Do you mean then that there was no direct affect on war production through shortage of steel?
- A. Yes, of course there was, but I think the most important was this influence on the indirect industries.
- Q. I think these more important than a direct shortage of steel for war industries?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What specific indirect effects resulted?
- A. For instance, I think the overall economic situation was enfeebled through the shortages brought about in these indirect industries. For instance, the shortage of farm tools greatly hampered the farmers; the lack of tools for the carpenter affected his work, and in the same manner, shortage on which the military effort depended were seriously affected.
- Q. I understand that these were important, but don't see how they compare with not having steel to build tanks and artillery. Isn't it a fact that because of a shortage of steel, you had to cut back the production of heavy artillery, reduce the manufacturing of tanks, et.
- A. Yes, of course, and that is the thing on which I was about to speak. It is true, of course, that there were shortages which affected the manufacture of these items you mention. However, looking at the picture from the overall aspect, it was the weakening of the economic situation over a long period of time through the cut-off of these commodities essential to national production which affected the war effort so much. In the beginning, plenty of iron and steel were turned into the manufacture of munitions and the effect was not felt immediately on civilian production but in the long run it was this other shortage that really brought on a serious situation.
- Q. This is very interesting - you mean that in bringing about the Japanese decision to surrender, the general overall weakening of the economy was a more important factor than the lack of ability to turn out important weapons?
- A. The militarists themselves would probably attribute their failure to a lack of munitions, but I persist in my own personal opinion that the real weakness lay in the overall loss of economic power through the results which I have been tracing.
- Q. Why do you consider that that was a more important factor in bringing about a decision not to continue the struggle?
- A. I don't know on what the Army and Navy based all their decisions in ending the war, but even in the question of munitions, such as tanks and guns, the industries upon which these depend had lost their elasticity, their ability arise to the occasion, and manufacture the needed munitions of war. And, thus, the proposition of munitions was concerned in this general weakening of the economic strength of the country.
- Q. Obviously, the indirect effect could not be more important than the direct cutting-off of the raw material supplies?
- A. What I have been saying applies also to this question of raw materials. Perhaps I have been making too much reference to farming and carpentry - take for instance the coal mines - the cutting-off of the supplies for civilian production greatly affected the mining of coal, since the tools and equipment were also cut off and since that was cut, it was

impossible to step up production suddenly, since such deficiencies had already arisen. Now, as regarding the decision to end the war, the actual thinking of the leaders, i.e., what line of psychology led them to make their decision, is something to be debated just what went into it - a shortage of munitions or was their thinking also influenced by these broader aspects - it is impossible for anyone to pin that down, but it does seem to me that the overall picture does explain all these points that have been brought up.

- Q. Was there any discussion while you were Cabinet Secretary of whether Japan could continue the war?
- A. I don't remember any special discussion on that point.
- Q. After the fall of Saipan, was there no discussion on the subject? We have been told by many people that there was.
- A. I don't know of any such discussion in the Cabinet, itself.
- Q. What was the occasion for the falling of the Cabinet, of which he was Secretary?
- A. As I explained the other day, the Cabinet fell because it was unable to carry out the recommendation for a strengthening of the Cabinet by making more use of the elder statesmen.
- Q. Was there a difference of opinion between the Cabinet and elder statesmen as to the advisability of carrying on the war?
- A. I don't know that there was any great difference of opinion whether to carry the war on or not, but the elder statesmen felt that another Cabinet would be able to carry on the war more effectively.
- Q. What was your own feeling after the fall of Saipan as to the ability of Japan to carry on?
- A. Rather than whether or not to carry it on, I was perhaps more impressed with the fact that the difficulty of carrying on the war had been greatly increased as a result of the fall of Saipan.
- Q. Did you feel it increased to the point of whether it became a question of whether Japan could go on at all?
- A. I did not feel right at that time, for instance, that it was time to quit, but I did think that the time might come when the difficulties would be so great as to make the continuance of war a question.
- Q. What were the increased difficulties which you anticipated?
- A. The biggest problems that I saw were the cutting off of our connections with resources in the south, as perhaps the greatest; then, the possibility that Saipan would become a base for bombing of Japanese industry; and finally, I was made uneasy over the fact that since the Navy had not been able to save Saipan, where would the Navy be able to stop the advances of the enemy.
- Q. I would like to go back to steel for a minute or two. We have been told that the most important effect of the fact that Japan would not have more steel was felt before the war ever started was because Japan did not have sufficient steel to build all aircraft she wanted. (Ed note - Statement of Col Sato to Lt Richard Galland - Basic Materials) Would you comment on that suggestion?

- A. It may be that Japan was somewhat hampered in the building of plants she desired, but as I mentioned a while ago in regard to aluminum I don't think that Japanese aircraft production was seriously hampered through the shortage of steel.
- Q. I understand there was no difficulty in employing the existing facilities on the program already set up. But, again, we have the question of whether the plans were affected at any time?
- A. There was no effect on aircraft production. There was no shortage due to iron although it is true that most of the plans of the military were limited by the overall economic situation.
- Q. But nobody ever said, "Let's build five or six new aircraft plants" and somebody else said, "Sorry, but we haven't the steel to build them"?
- A. I would not go so far as to say there was never any such talk, but as far as I know, no special problem of that nature developed.
- Q. Then, it was not a controlling factor?
- A. That is what I think.
- Q. During 1944, about 40% of Manchurian-produced pig iron and steel went into the building of new plants and commercial and civilian uses in Manchuria at a time when the Japanese war industries had already been forced to cut down on the production of guns and ammunition. What efforts were made to secure for Japan proper a larger share of Manchurian iron and steel?
- A. I don't know about this 40% of which you speak. The use of Manchurian production was generally determined through talks between the two countries and most of Manchurian production would go into the war effort, so I wonder if this 40% to civilian production was not used indirectly also in the war effort so that actually what went into Manchuria was negligible.
- Q. Is it your opinion that that is a fact?
- A. I think that is the situation.
- Q. So far as you knew, the Manchurian economy was completely integrated with the Japanese war economy and the distribution of scarce materials was controlled completely from Japan?
- A. As the war developed, the integration between Japanese and Manchurian economies became more and more definite, but I would not say that decisions were made arbitrarily in Japan, for these decisions were always reached in conversations between the two countries, but as Japan became more and more pressed, Manchuria would make a greater effort to bear a greater share of war demands.
- Q. Did any differences of opinion arise as to the use of Manchurian resources?
- A. Yes, there were discussions on this matter, particularly within Japan.
- Q. Where a difference of opinion could not be settled by discussion, who had the final word?
- A. As I explained the other day, such differences of opinion were settled by the Joint Japanese-Manchurian Economic Conference.

- Q. How many votes did each of the parties on the Committee have?
A. Four each.
- Q. Were there never times when the vote was 50-50?
A. No, there was not.
- Q. Was the vote always unanimous?
A. Generally, the discussions were carried to the point where the final agreement was unanimous.
- Q. In other words, there were no issues which arose over the use of Manchurian resources in the war effort which could not be settled by complete agreement of all parties?
A. That is right as far as these deliberations went.
- Q. What does the qualification mean?
A. Well, there were, of course, many discussions which led up to these final decisions.
- Q. And, you were always satisfied that Japan was getting everything out of Manchuria which could be got?
A. Yes, I was satisfied. I think that Manchuria rendered full help. Of course, Japan was actually in the fighting but Manchuria did what she could from her standpoint.
- Q. And, the Manchurian civilian economy was cut down as much as the Japanese?
A. Manchuria probably was not cut down as much as Japan but inasmuch as she was not directly engaged in the fighting, perhaps the extent in which she engaged was all that could be expected. But, it is true, that either directly or indirectly, Manchuria, too, suffered considerably cut-down in her economy.
- Q. But, she was not expected to make the same kind of contribution as Japan proper made?
A. Yes, that is right.
- Q. We talked about the major developments in the economic plan for war during 1943, but we did not say anything about 1944. Could you just review very briefly what the high-points in 1944 were?
A. Early in 1944 the American forces progressed from Kwajalein to the Marshalls and finally through Saipan, itself. This brought them near to Japan proper and plans for that year were concentrated on mobilizing the national forces in a final war effort. This included a strict control of communications and a general lowering of the living standards of the people. Another big problem was the protection of cities and industry against air raids.
- Q. That is, it was anticipated that the U. S. had long-range bombers which would attack and destroy Japanese cities?
A. Yes, we felt sure that such planes were being developed.
- Q. What do you think were the main factors leading to Japan's defeat?
A. I think one of the big reasons lies in the fact that Japanese Navy was unable to check the American Navy, which might possibly direct air raids on Japan itself. This destroyed Japan's industrial power.
- Q. What do you think would have been the effect of an air attack on Japan's railroads in April, 1945?
A. I think it would have had a very serious influence.

Q. In the event that the main railroad lines had been completely blocked and the Kanmon Tunnel traffic had been stopped and it had become impossible to move coal from Hokkaido and the Joban fields, how long do you think Japan could have continued to resist?

A. Such a condition as you describe would, it appears to me, have immediately proceeded landing operations, or would certainly have brought a point where landing operations would have been easy. If landing operations had not been carried out, then it would simply have been a question as to how long it would have taken the Japanese people to starve.

Q. Was railroad transportation considered to be a serious economic and war production problem during the time you were Cabinet Secretary?

A. Yes, this was a very great problem.

Q. Could he just, in a couple of words, tell us what the main angles of the problem were and what they did about it?

A. Prior to the war, Japanese railroads made short hauls only. However, as a result of the loss of shipping and the risks involved in marine transportation, more and more of the burden for supplying Japanese industry had to be taken over by the railroads, a task for which they were not well prepared. Toward the end of the war - 1944 - practically all passenger traffic had to be cut down to give way to the transportation of freight. This shortage of transportation had paralyzing effect upon industry which, prior to the war, had depended so largely upon sea transportation.

Q. And, when you say "sea transportation" you refer to coast-wise transportation as well as imports from foreign countries?

A. Yes, this includes both, although overseas transportation is always limited to ships, but much of Japan's transportation was limited to coastal shipping.

Q. And, how important was this coastal shipping as compared with overseas shipping?

A. It would be difficult to make a comparison between coast-wise and overseas shipping, but it might be explained by saying that practically all of the transportation of coal in Japan was done by ship.

Q. And, was coal a serious problem during the war, aside from coking coal?

A. Yes, it was a problem.

Q. How did it rate in importance with iron and aluminum and others he has mentioned?

A. In comparison with iron and aluminum, which must be brought in from overseas, the falling off in coal was not as pronounced, since almost all of Japan's coal needs are spread within the country. That is, theoretically, coal should not be as big a problem as these other commodities which must be brought in from overseas, since Japan should by some means or other have met her needs with locally produced materials. However, coal was actually a serious problem during the war.

Q. How decisive do you feel it would have been to cut off from Honshu the movement of coal from Kyushu, Hokkaido, Joban and Ube?

A. Sufficient to bring about a situation wherein the war could not have been continued.

- Q. Does he feel it would have been as decisive a situation as existed at the time of the end of this war?
- A. I think probably it would have. Of course, fighting might have continued, but it would have been meaningless.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234 c/o PM San Francisco

INTERROGATION NO. 507

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 28 November 1945

Division of Origin: Military Studies

Subject: The Emperor's position in respect to political and military developments, 1936-1945

Person interrogated and background:

Admiral HYAKUTAKE; born 1878; graduated Naval College 1892; graduate of Naval Staff College; Captain E.I.M.S. IJN; Cmdr., 3rd Fleet; CINC, Sasebo Naval Station; Member Supreme Military Council; Grand Chamberlain to the Emperor 1936 - August 1944; Appointed Member of Privy Council September 1944 to fill vacancy left when Admiral Suzuki; became President of the Council.

Where interrogated: Home of Admiral Hyakutake.

Interrogator: Colonel Ramsay D POTTS, AC

Interpreter: W T H SHIMANOUCHI, a Japanese National

Allied Officers Present: Lt Cmdr NICHOLS, USNR
Lt Cmdr WILDS, USNR

SUMMARY

At the opening of the interview Admiral Hyakutake was presented with the enclosed summary of the subjects to be covered. Having considered the topics, he expressed doubt as to his ability to give satisfactory answers, explaining that since the incident of February 26th, 1936 the Emperor had required his Grand Chamberlains to remain inactive in politics for reasons of their personal safety. He stated that the chief function of the Grand Chamberlain was personal attendance to the Emperor and that the Grand Chamberlain was rarely involved in affairs of the state, being present only at interviews granted by the Emperor to premiers designate and to plenipotentiaries leaving for or returning from diplomatic posts abroad. He pointed out that Grand Chamberlains were appointed as civilians and that therefore no significance should be attached to the fact that several were selected as Grand Chamberlains had been admirals. Insisting that this was a matter of coincidence and did not indicate any predominant naval influence. It was therefore agreed that replies made by the Admiral would be considered as merely personal opinions based on observations made during his tenure of office.

The Admiral was unable to give any information concerning pressure groups which sought access to the Emperor nor was he able to suggest any considerations which might have induced the Emperor to approve war plans against the United States. He stated, however, that it was customary on the basis of the Japanese Constitution for the Emperor to approve plans and policies submitted to him through the proper channels or by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy as the product of agreed opinion. He could not provide any information based on facts regarding the Emperor's feelings in connection with the Manchurian Incident, but was certain that "the Emperor was gravely concerned over the situation."

The Admiral was not in a position to discuss the extent of the Army's influence over the Navy, but said that at the time of Tojo's appointment as Premier he wondered if at last the Army had become as powerful in politics as it had been in feudal times, indicating that he considered Tojo's appointment significant since in any case the Army had been politically dominant since the beginning of the Meiji era. He recalled that the audience granted by the Emperor other than the customary assignment of discharging his responsibilities in accordance with the Constitution.

SUMMARY
(Contd)

In connection with pressure brought to bear upon the Navy by the Army, the Admiral observed that the Navy might have been able to prevent war against the United States by stubbornly opposing such a plan, thereby causing the collapse of the government. He personally had disapproved of the Navy's policy of concurring with the Army since what he himself had read and observed had convinced him that a war against an enemy so superior in resources and industrial capacity would be a superhuman undertaking. When pressed for an opinion of the Emperor's feelings in the matter he stated that the Emperor had always been profoundly interested in the nation's foreign relations and had continually exercised extreme care in the pursuit of a policy of peace and that he believed the Emperor was deeply concerned over the prevailing situation, but the Admiral would not say whether the Emperor was opposed to Japan's drift towards the European aggressor nations.

Regarding the sudden end of the war, Admiral Hyakutake indicated that he himself had experienced no strong feelings in the matter other than sympathy for the Emperor and sorrow over the state into which the Japanese nation had fallen.

Nichols

- Q. I want to make it quite clear that I am not trying to fix any responsibility as such for starting the war, or for the MANCHURIAN incident, or for any of these things. I am simply trying to find out what forces were at work. What we are trying to do is to try to write an analysis of the effect of air in the war, and we desire to understand the background of events.
- A. The points listed on this memorandum impress me as being rather outside of the province of the post which I held as Grand Chamberlain, and so, before proceeding into the interrogations, if you will permit me I would like to explain, the place and function of the Grand Chamberlain:

The Grand Chamberlain is one who serves the Emperor at his side. However the Grand Chamberlain at no time interferes with or touches upon questions relating to military or political affairs; political and military matters are entirely outside the province of the Grand Chamberlain's work. Perhaps the only time in which the Grand Chamberlain had any contact with the Nation's political affairs is when he attends the audience given by the Emperor to a Premier Designate; which means, a man who has been designated as a Premier and commanded to form a cabinet but who, until the conclusion of the formation of the cabinet, is not in a responsible position.

There have been, although very rarely, cases which, by virtue of general misunderstanding, involved the Grand Chamberlain in affairs of the State. When I became Grand Chamberlain, the atmosphere among the fighting services, the Government, and the civilian public in general, was in a state of unrest. His majesty, having great concern over the matter, made it very clear that those serving him should not be involved in politics. For one thing, because of a very strong desire and concern to protect these close advisers from any possible harm. This being the case, I as Grand Chamberlain instructed my personal staff that at no time should they be involved in political affairs.

Q. I understand, however, that the Grand Chamberlain--and especially in your case--is in a position not to participate in, but to know about the influences that were working in this period that we've been speaking of. What groups were seeking access to the Emperor, what groups were exerting direct pressures? It is mainly in this that I am interested--not in your actual participation but in your position--what you observed in your position as confidant to the Emperor.

A. I do not recognize any specific pressure groups working directly. However I do believe that there were groups within the services or even within the Government whose ideas and actions served as a pressure on those sponsors above them which made the situation difficult and not in accordance with the Emperor's wishes.

Q. In clarification I would like to say this: You have a reputation for being dispassionate and completely disassociated from the storm of politics. Most of the people we've interrogated have some particular interest which colors their point of view, and I had hoped that, because of your peculiar position and because of your reputation for objectivity, that you would be able to comment upon some of these things--perhaps not from first-hand knowledge or actual association with the actual event itself, but from your peculiar position relative to the Throne.

Suppose I go ahead and ask some specific questions, and so far as possible you can give me your opinion or point of view on them, and if you are not in a position to know about those subjects, we can pass on to other questions:

Were you present at the interview which the Emperor granted to General UMEZU upon the appointment of General UMEZU to command the Manchurian Army?

A. No. At audiences granted to military or naval officers, the Grand Chamberlain is never in attendance except when a general or admiral is to retire. On such occasions when they are granted audiences, the Grand Chamberlain and the Aide-de-Camp are in attendance; otherwise, not.

Q. Do you know what the feeling of the Emperor was on the Manchurian Incident there--the month-and-a-half of fighting with Russia on the AMUR River?

A. As I said before, I have had no opportunities to hear His Majesty's opinions on such matters directly, but when I personally view the situation and the atmosphere which prevailed at that time, I can categorically say that His Majesty must have been extremely concerned over the incident.

Q. I think perhaps we'd better pass on to the persons and factors which induced the Emperor to approve the war plans against the United States. Leave out the persons; but can you give me an opinion on the considerations that induced the Emperor to approve the war plans against the United States?

A. That I don't know at all.

Q. Do you know, during this year previous to the outbreak of war with the United States, whether the Army was in such a dominant position that it could force the Naval Staff to concur in any such plan?

A. I don't know anything about it.

Q. I think we should perhaps pass on to the relative political influence of the Army and Navy. During the war we know that, because of General TOJO'S peculiar position politically, the Army was dominant. Would you give me an expression of your opinion as to whether the Army had more influence with the Emperor than the Navy at any time, or was the influence approximately equal? Was there an impartial unjaundiced view of the whole matter on the part of the Emperor in showing favor to the two services all the way through?

A. In my personal opinion, from as early as the MEIJI era, the Army had a more dominant influence than the Navy.

Q. In looking over the lists of the Emperor's close advisors, there seems to be a predominance of Naval personnel. Why, then, was the influence of the Army stronger than the influence of the Navy?

A. As I said before, in explaining the position and function of the Grand Chamberlain, we are in the service of His Majesty not as Admirals but as civilians, and it so happened that we retired Admirals were selected because the selection of the appointee was sought from a rather wide circle of persons; and so, I did not serve as Grand Chamberlain as an Admiral but as a civilian. In my personal observation there are no specific individuals or pressure groups working to influence the Emperor, but any one or any group formulating plans and pursuing those plans would advance those plans through the proper channels--via, the senior official in charge of the particular branch of politics or military affairs concerned.

In case political or military plans are advanced through such channels and they represent agreed opinion below, or if any plan is submitted by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy or are advanced to the Emperor by previous agreement between the two branches, then, on the basis of the Japanese Constitution, it is the custom in Japan for the Emperor to approve them and not to veto them, and that these responsible officials are permitted to proceed on their responsibility.

Q. Then, any plan that would be of such a magnitude as to involve war with Britain and America, let's say, would have to be approved by the Army and the Navy both?

A. Of course, and by the Government, naturally.

Q. In the case of a decision of this magnitude, would the Emperor take any direct act in modifying the plan or in trying to have it reconsidered before he took action to approve it?

A. I am not acquainted at all with such details.

Q. I'd like you to express a personal opinion, as an observer on the scene, of what the considerations were which led the Navy to concur with the Army in planning the war against the United States. Could you give me an expression of personal opinion on this, the background of events which led up to war?

A. I am not acquainted at all with this matter, but I personally viewed with disfavor the policy pursued by the Navy at that time; nor did my position permit me to make inquiries on the position of the Navy in the matter.

Q. When you say you viewed with disfavor the policy of the Navy, what particular policy of the Navy are you speaking of, at what particular time?

A. Having been long retired at the time, I was not acquainted at all with the contents of the matter, but on the basis of my personal readings and observation of the American productive power, her resources, etc, it was my opinion that war against such an industrial power was a gigantic task. That the Navy should approve of a policy of war against her made me wonder from where the Navy obtained such confidence as she appeared to have, but I was not at all familiar with the details.

Q. If the Navy had disapproved of a war with the United States, could they have stood out and prevented this war by refusing to cooperate in such a plan as proposed by the Government and by the Army?

A. I couldn't say very definitely, but I would presume that, if the Navy should stubbornly oppose such a plan, it would lead to the collapse of the Government and prevent the execution of such a plan; or, by the efforts of the Navy and change of Government as the result of its opposition, it might be able to influence the opposition to concur with the Navy's view.

Q. Or to modify their plan in some way? Do you know any of the general factors connected with the resignation of Prince KONOYE just before the war with the United States?

A. I do not know.

- Q. Can you tell us the background of events that led up to the acceptance of the Potsdam terms, the general feeling of the civilian population, what you heard at that time, and what you observed?
- A. Having been retired at the time, I was not familiar at all with the situation previous to the acceptance of the Potsdam terms. Having been bombed out, I was more or less preoccupied about moving hither and thither, trying to find a home.
- Q. Well, I think we should go back to the period before you retired. Previously you stated that you were present at audiences granted to the Premiers Designate. When General TOJO was appointed as Premier and came and had an audience with the Emperor, what commission, what objective did the Emperor assign to Premier TOJO before he assumed office?
- A. There having been about seven changes in the cabinet during my tenure of office, and having no records of those audiences, I cannot say; but as I recall, His Majesty usually urged the Premiers Designate to proceed with their work in accordance with the Constitution and his commands on those occasions concerned general and not specific matters.
- Q. The appointment of TOJO came at such a dramatic moment in world history that I wonder if you could recall any particular matter that the Emperor might have touched on at this time?
- A. It was such a brief audience that the Emperor did not go into any detail regarding specific subjects.
- Q. It was limited then to mere formalities of receiving the Premier Designate?
- A. Yes. If you wish to have some observations of mine relative to the Emperor's feelings and attitudes, I should be glad to make one or two remarks.
- Q. About what specific period?
- A. During my tenure of office.
- Q. Yes, I would like to have just personal opinions as to his feelings about the subjects we have covered.
- A. When a Japanese plenipotentiary leaves for a foreign post or returns to Japan from a foreign post, it is customary for the Emperor to receive him in audience. His Majesty's remarks to a plenipotentiary leaving for a post would be "Gokuro" which is an expression of "Godspeed" as well as encouragement for the task he is undertaking, and the same remarks would be made to a plenipotentiary returning from a post, this time with a feeling of gratitude for the service that he had rendered in a foreign country. His Majesty has been very profoundly interested in the nation's foreign relations, and he has proceeded with his diplomatic interests with extreme care in pursuit of the policy of peace. This sentiment was very strongly expressed on the occasion of the new year when Japan greeted the 2,600th year of the nation's founding. The poem composed by His Majesty at the opening of the year on this occasion was:

"West, East,
Let there be intercourse
In spirit of amity;
This is my prayer
At the dawn of the new year."

As one who has served close to the Emperor for a number of years, I was very profoundly impressed by this spirit expressed by the Emperor in the very midst of the hostilities with China. I have brought this matter to your attention in the hope that, by giving you some glimpse into that aspect of His Majesty's character and attitude, it might help you to understand some of the problems you are trying to probe.

- Q. Did you notice at any time any concern on the part of the Emperor as to the course of events tying Japan in more closely with what we had termed and designated the European Agressor Nations: Italy and Germany?
- A. In my observations there were a number of things--or I might even say, a great number of things--over which the Emperor was very deeply concerned at this time, so I cannot say whether he was particularly concerned at all with the drift of Japan toward what you call the European Agressor Nations, but observing from the sidelines, it is my impression that His Majesty was very anxious over the situation prevailing at the time.

Questions by Commander Wilds:

- Q. Admiral, when did you first learn of the moves for peace?
- A. After the Government's decision had already been passed.
- Q. At what time was that?
- A. August 14.
- Q. Were you surprised?
- A. I was not shocked nor surprised nor overjoyed. My emotions were confused.
- Q. Were you shocked, Admiral, that the decision had been made?
- A. Having gleaned items from the press, I was more or less prepared for such an eventuality, but as to the fate into which the country had fallen, I was taken with a feeling of sadness, and having served his Majesty up to the year previous, I immediately felt a very strong sense of sympathy toward His Majesty.
- Q. When you say that you were rather shocked by the state of the nation, do you mean that you did not realize the extent to which Japan's military forces in the field had been attrited--the extent of the losses that had been incurred? Is this what you meant? Prior to the surrender, did you know the extent to which various military forces had been defeated in the field?
- A. Yes, by the reports appearing in the newspapers.
- Q. Now, to go back just briefly to the beginning of the war: Why was TOJO named Premier?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. Did you expect that he would be named Premier, or were you surprised?
- A. I neither expected it nor was I surprised; but I only thought this: Has the Army at last become secured in a dominance similar to that held by the SHOGUN? Such was the feeling that I had at the time.
- Q. Admiral, would a more determined effort, a stronger effort on the part of the Emperor to avoid war have been effective?
- A. I made a few remarks purely in my capacity as private citizen expressing impressions which I had obtained during my years of service. Before you, Commander Wilds, came into this room, I had explained to the other gentlemen about the position and function of the Grand Chamberlain, which would enable you to understand why I am in no position whatsoever to reply to your question. The Grand Chamberlain has a very fixed function. He does not involve himself or participate in political or military matters whatsoever, and in this respect the Grand Chamberlain is very strictly and specifically instructed by His Majesty. This being the case, His Majesty does not disclose one iota of any matter pertaining to politics or military affairs to the Grand Chamberlain which makes it impossible for me to reply to questions of such a nature.

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Those instructions were very strict. To give you a bit of a background: You are familiar with the incident of May 15, and later of February 26, 1936, at which time close advisors of the Emperor were attacked. The social unrest was very strong at the time. Should persons close to the Emperor involve themselves or participate in political or military affairs, it meant that it would endanger the personal lives of these men, and thereby make it impossible to serve the Throne well, and for this reason the Emperor instructed those close to him to keep out of politics and military affairs, and those in service made a determined effort to keep themselves out so that they might serve the Emperor properly and well.

The fact that three Grand Chamberlains were successively Admirals in the Navy may have given rise to the impression that the Grand Chamberlain has had something to do with politics or military affairs, but the general rule in selecting a Grand Chamberlain is, that he is not a member of the political parties or that he has not been engaged in politics, and it is out of more or less coincidence that Admirals have been appointed to this post--they were appointed purely as civilians. When I, as a retired Admiral, entered the service as Grand Chamberlain, it was with the determination that I should serve as a civilian with no Naval connections whatsoever.

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Appendix A to Interrogation No. 507

27 November 1945

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Admr HYAKUTAKE, Grand Chamberlain during the period 1936 to August 1944.

1. Admiral HYAKUTAKE is in position to know the background of unofficial pressures and influences that swayed the EMPEROR during this period and will be interrogated on these sources. Special emphasis will be placed upon
 - a. The various pressure groups at work during the war seeking access to the EMPEROR.
 - b. The persons and factors which induced the EMPEROR to approve the war plans against the United States.
 - c. The reasons why the MANCHURIAN incident with Russia in 1939 was concluded and the reasons why General UMEZU was charged with maintaining peace on the Manchurian border throughout the period of war with the United States.
 - d. The relative influence of the Army and Navy in the National political life.
 - e. The background of events that led up to a consideration of seeking a method of concluding the war.

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USSBS 503)
NAV NO. 115

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 9 December 1945

Division of Origin: Naval Analysis Division.

Subject: The Naval War in the PACIFIC.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Vice Admiral Shigeru FUKUDOME, IJN; Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet from 1940 to April 1941. Chief First Section, N.G.S., TOKYO, April 1941 to May 1943. Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet from May 1943 to March 1944. On sick leave in TOKYO from April 1944 to June 1944. Commander, Second Air Fleet from July 1944 to January 15, 1945. Commander, 10th Area Fleet from January 15th, 1945 to present date.

Where interviewed: Meiji Building, Room 719.

Interrogator: Rear Admiral R. A. Ofstie, USN.

Interpreters: Mr. Mizota.
Mr. F. C. Woodrough, jr.

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

Admiral FUKUDOME offers high level comment on important plans and operations throughout the PACIFIC War. He discusses the employment of shore-based naval air forces throughout the PHILIPPINE Campaign and action in the SINGAPORE Area for the last seven months of the war, the planning and decision of the Combined Fleet under Admiral KOGA, and the planning of the Naval General Staff from the beginning of the war to the spring of 1943.

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503-1-

TRANSCRIPT

Part One

- Q. What was the reason for your being ordered to command of the Second Air Fleet, and what were the movements of your headquarters?
- A. The only reason I can think of for my appointment to that position, since I was not an air expert, was the fact I had just recovered from a sick spell when the new air force was organized, and it was a matter of convenience that I was assigned to that position. At the time I took it, the Second Air Fleet really had not reached the stage of a unit; it was more in the training stage. I received the appointment in TOKYO and took over command at KATORI, in CHIBA Prefecture, on 15 June. Toward the end of July I received orders from Central Headquarters to move headquarters to KANOYA, in KYUSHU. The areas of operation assigned to me was KYUSHU and OKINAWA district. In the opinion of the Imperial General Staff at that time the American offensive was expected to be at one of three possibilities; first, against the PHILIPPINES; second, against TAIWAN - KYUSHU Area; third, against HONSHU; and as I already had headquarters in KYUSHU I was ordered to take charge of the TAIWAN - KYUSHU district. It was as a result of that order that my command became operational. At the time, the First Air Fleet was stationed in the PHILIPPINES Area and the Third Air Fleet, based at KISARAZU, was responsible for the KANTO District. Toward the end of August it appeared that the weight of the American offensive was directed southward, namely the PHILIPPINES, and I was therefore ordered to change my headquarters to TAIWAN which I did on 10 September. There was, however, no change in the area for which I was responsible KYUSHU, OKINAWA, TAIWAN district - it was simply a change in headquarters. At the time that I took over the Second Air Fleet the pilots were still inadequately trained, so that the period when I was in KANOYA was spent in further training. Four days after I had established my headquarters, on September 14th, I received first attack from your Task Force.
- Q. On arrival in FORMOSA on the 10th, what was the status of your aircraft?
- A. My fleet had approximately 100 planes, but simultaneous with my advance into TAIWAN about 200 Army planes were placed under my command; so from that time on I had a total of about 300 planes. As already stated you made your first air attack on the 14th, and I undertook a counter-attack with a part of my air force on the night of the 15th and 16th with some success. The greater part of my air force was used in day counter-attack, but I believe that they obtained very little result with that counter-attack. The 300 planes used in this counter-attack were those stationed in KYUSHU, and after attack flew down to TAIWAN. These were in addition to the other 300.
- Q. What were those 300 counter-attack planes; were they Army, Navy or both?
- A. All Navy planes which I had trained from the beginning.
- Q. What was the organization in KYUSHU on your arrival; what flotillas did you have, and what types?
- A. There were many changes in reorganization during the time I was there. I cannot recall the exact system, but there were three principal divisions; the fighter corps, reconnaissance corps, and attack planes. Each division was further divided into two groups ranging in strength from 30 to 40 planes each. In addition to those three divisions there were the land service forces divided between TAIWAN, OKINAWA and KYUSHU. These latter might be called maintenance units.
- Q. You took command of the Second Air Fleet plus the Army aircraft on your arrival. Were those all the Army planes in TAIWAN, and did you have direct command of these Army planes?
- A. I had command of the Army planes through the Commandant of the Army Air Division which was already there, and the 200 Army planes I mentioned were all of the Army planes there.
- Q. What advance intelligence did you have of the approach of the Carrier Task Force on 12 - 14 September?
- A. As I had just established my headquarters in TAIWAN only a few days earlier my intelligence had not been well organized yet, and I was therefore forced to rely on information from Central Headquarters. However, since your Task Force had attacked OKINAWA on about the 11th or 12th, I conjectured that the Task Force on its way southeast might undertake an attack against TAIWAN.

TRANSCRIPT of Interrogation (Vice Admiral Shigeru FUKUDOME, IJN).

- Q. What reports did you have on the strike on OKINAWA, which was within your area of command as I understand it?
- A. Just prior to your attack on OKINAWA a very small number of scouts which I had in OKINAWA, as a result of daytime reconnaissance, brought the report that the Task Force was not a very large one. Its nucleus was probably two or three carriers, and not certain whether or not there was a battleship included. As a result of the first attack all of those scouting planes were lost so that no further reports of scouting were received.
- Q. About how many Japanese planes were reported lost at OKINAWA?
- A. Around ten, all scouting planes. The following attack on TAIWAN was made jointly by your Task Forces moving up from the PHILIPPINES; that was the report we got from our reconnaissance planes in TAIWAN.
- Q. What losses did you sustain in the Task Forces attack on TAIWAN?
- A. The Navy lost between 170 or 180 planes, which included about 120 fighters, 30 attack planes, and 10 reconnaissance planes. Of the Army planes only about one-half of the total of 200 were really fit for actual fighting, and I believe that practically all of those were lost. Consequently the total aircraft loss was somewhat less than 300. (Note: This apparently refers to the attack in October, as mentioned later).
- Q. What results by way of damage to the American Third Fleet, did you report to TOKYO?
- A. As already stated, our daytime counter-attack proved practically of no value, we got very little results. The night attacks undertaken on two successive nights were considerably better. Of course, the reports made by commanders of the units actually participating in the raids are inclined to be exaggerated. As reported by them, however, three carriers and several other vessels were reported either sunk or damaged. These counter-attacks were made by medium type land-based attack planes with torpedoes. The day attack was made from TAIWAN, but that did not prove effective; the two night attacks were made from KYUSHU bases (Aside from Mr. Mizota, the Japanese interpreter, - I might add at this time, as there had been no reports of successful engagements for some time, the newspapers played this up quite prominently).
- Q. Was the report believed by the General Staff; did you send in a qualifying statement to TOKYO, or was it a positive statement?
- A. As the two night attacks were made by the planes based in KYUSHU, the results were reported in by a Captain in command there. Of course, the only thing I could do was get those reports together for transmittal to the Imperial General Staff. As a general practice I believe that these reports from the operating units were not taken at their full value by the Imperial General Staff; just what attitude they took toward this particular report I do not know.
- Q. After the action was over, what reinforcements did you then receive from the Homeland; Army, Navy, carrier planes, etc.?
- A. In September it became more and more apparent that your counter-thrust would be directed further southward, namely the PHILIPPINES; and as the First Air Fleet assigned to the PHILIPPINES Area had lost the greater part of their planes it was decided that the Second Air Fleet should be sent into the PHILIPPINES Area to reinforce the First Air Fleet. With that end in view the Second Air Fleet received by way of reinforcement perhaps a slightly larger number of planes than I had lost in the TAIWAN engagement. These reinforcements were planes which had been gotten together from all parts of JAPAN and sent to TAIWAN.
- Q. What was the actual date of movement of headquarters to the PHILIPPINES?
- A. I myself went to MANILA on the 22nd, and the 450 planes of the Second Air Fleet reached CLARK Field the next day, on the 23rd.
- Q. What were the results of the Carrier Task Force attack on TAIWAN 12 - 14 October?
- A. I am afraid that I had the September and October attacks somewhat confused, and that the results of the September attack were probably the figures for the October attack. The statement I made before for September should be confined to the OKINAWA attack, and all I said with regard to your Task Force attack on TAIWAN for September should be for October instead. In any case, the replace-

- A. At the period that you mention, namely, immediately after our Task Forces had withdrawn, there had not been any serious depletion in air force because it was still the early part of the LEYTE Operation, and the continuing bad weather made the number of air combats relatively few.
- Q. Did you have definite plans for air support of the reinforcing convoys going into ORMOC, and was it in conjunction with the Army?
- A. I am not at all certain on this, but I do not believe that any definite air support was planned for that reinforcement. However; I think that that job was assigned to the Army Air Force based near MENADO.

(To Be Continued)

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 501

PLACE: Tokyo
DATE: 1300, 5 Dec. 1944

Division of Origin: Military Analysis.

Subject: General Supply Problems, New Guinea, Solomons.

Personnel interrogated and background:

Lt. Col. Shirai, Fumitaba, who in 1940 to November of 1941 in Manchuria served as Supply Officer of the 4th Army. From November 1941 to 1945, he was on the general staff in supply. From March 1945 until the termination of the war he was chief of supply section of the 12th Area Army.

Where interviewed: Room 806 Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Col. Rhine.

Interpreter: Lt. Col. Swift.

Allied Officers Present: Lt. Pinkstaff.

- Q. Do you have any figures on plans as to how you were to supply troops in New Guinea and Solomons?
- A. In general they are as follows: The expeditionary units left Japan with 30 days supply. Advance troops usually carried various amounts mostly 1 week supply. From then on stocks would be supplied as they advanced. In general this was the case.
- Q. On a Division level was such the case?
- A. Divisions departed with 1 Kaisenbun or 4 months supply of ammunition (3,000 tons).
- Q. Take one area for example, New Guinea, can you tell me how your dumps were set up and the method of distribution of supplies to the troops?
- A. I have prepared an explanation here in Japanese for you. With in the homeland there has always been a depot system used. They have shipping and air depots. (See attached chart)
- Q. Will you explain the operation of overseas depots?
- A. Ordnance stores took care of guns, trucks, small arms, tanks, and repair parts. The Air Depots handled all the requirements of the Air Forces except vehicles. Field shipping Depots took care of all food, provisions and fuel. Field Freight Depots handled all the remaining items and had the job of collecting, assembling, storing and issuing of these items. These depots were responsible to supply up to 4 divisions, however this also varied according to the amount of troops in the area.
- Q. Suppose you had a division on each of 3 islands, would you have depots set up on each?
- A. Main depots would be set up on the principle island along with the Army Headquarters.
- Q. At this point Col. Rhine shows on the map area that he wishes to talk about their methods of supplying and indicates New Guinea, and New Britain.

- A. The 8th Army Area was set up in Rabaul to control New Guinea, New Britain, and Bougainville. At that time main or head depots were all set up in Rabaul. The branch field depots were located at Wewak, Buin (Bougainville). Under the Wewak depot other depots were located at Hansa Bay, Madang, and Finchhafen. I am not certain but believe that the forces at Buin did not have any particular supply unit. An agency was established later. Hollandia became the site of this agency. The 17th Area Army was in Guadalcanal out to the west of the 8th Area Army and the 18th Army further to the west. The 4th Air Army originally at Rabaul then moved to Wewak and from there to the Mindanaos. In Lonrenngo in the Admiralty Islands was an agency that worked under direct control with Rabaul. This finished the supply system of the 8th Area Army. Hollandia actually is in the Dutch New Guineas but was the dividing line and under control of Rabaul.
- Q. What stock levels were required in these depots?
- A. I Kaisenbun of ammunition (Approximately 4 months); fuel and food for 3 months. Later with difficulties arising of supplying the area (August to October 1943), The stock level was increased to 1 year.
- Q. What was the method of distribution of this equipment to combat troops?
- A. Almost entirely by small boat. The only exception was that we decided to build a road in the Madang to Lae area but abandoned this after completion of about 70 kilometers of the road.
- Q. Were there any critical shortages of combat materials in these depots?
- A. Yes. Stocks were in these depots but along the New Guinea coast the shortage was mostly of food. In Guadalcanal there was a critical shortage of all items of supply.
- Q. Why was this?
- A. Due to air attacks. Later on this situation became even more acute due to the fact that we were denied use of what supplies were there because our troops abandoned these supplies.
- Q. Were any of these depots destroyed or the material damaged done by air action?
- A. No, for the reason that there were no warehouses, rather the goods were stored in Nipa huts. Later in Rabaul during severe raids some damage was done but by this time most of the stocks were underground. There was a lot of loss of stock in transit due to bombing of supplies landed on the beaches. Provisions suffered heavy loss later from bombing and we were unable to put them underground.
- Q. What was the percentage of loss in transit?
- A. Air attacks and P. T. boats, in my opinion the greater percentage was air.
- Q. Was there any changes in plans to try to overcome these losses?
- A. Some thought was given to airplanes and submarines to move our supplies but due to lack of planes this plan was never developed. The only material change was that fleets of small boats were used to transport supplies with orders to hug the shore lines. This made a longer trip but they were not so susceptible to PT attack. Another step taken was the arming of these supply boats.
- Q. Was there any vital shortage of combat equipment?
- A. At the times when the 18th Army withdrew to the area between the Sepic River and Hollandia there was an extreme shortage of combat material caused by the troops abandoning their equipment. Another case was in the Torokina area. There was sufficient stock at Bougainville but it could not be delivered to Torokina because of air action.

- Q. What general effect did these lack of supplies have on the combat efficiency of your troops?
- A. You know the situation at Guadalcanal, that was lost because of our inability to furnish them supplies. In New Guinea itself the denial of supplies stopped our advance and eventually resulted in our gradual withdrawal.
- Q. What method was used to get these supplies to the troops after the small boats had got them ashore?
- A. In the Madang area there were a certain number of roads and they were utilized for car transportation. In other areas there was nothing but jungle so supplies had to be man handled.
- Q. Did these combat troops here have any service troops to take care of these supply problems?
- A. No, the combat troops had to do their own work. The only exception was in the depot areas like Rabaul where there were some troops attached to handle supply problems.
- Q. Were there many casualties while working with supplies on beaches?
- A. I am not able to say for sure, but since there was a heavy loss of supplies, I presume that the loss of men was heavy too.
- Q. We have been told that in some of your landings on these islands ships were sunk and the troops got ashore without equipment. How were these troops re-equipped?
- A. They were not re-equipped.
- Q. In February of 1943 at Guadalcanal what percent of field guns, etc., was left of the original 100%?
- A. I cannot answer officially. Personally my guess is they did not have over 5% of their original equipment and I believe they had lost all their cannon.
- Q. Back to the New Guinea area-were plans of future operations ever changed due to lack of supplies?
- A. Yes, in the 18th Army area previously mentioned there was such a situation-all plans had to be changed because of the supply shortage.
- Q. Was the plan of defense based on the supply situation?
- A. I believe the major element was air attack-a specific instance was the Wau area which should have been an advance defense post, but due to the failure of supply we were forced to place our defenses in the Salamania Area. We would definitely have been able to hold Wau had our supply lines not failed.
- Q. Were replacements sent in fully equipped or were they equipped after they came in?
- A. Yes, they came in fully equipped.
- Q. When did they first feel they were losing the battle of the supply lines?
- A. That would differ by areas. In the New Guinea, New Britain area, my opinion would be that it occurred in December 1943. Solomons, in July 1942 or immediately after your landings at Guadalcanal.
- Q. Were the supply officials ever consulted as to their ability to supply these intended operations before decision of an operation was made?
- A. Yes, that was always done.
- Q. How much weight did this carry?
- A. It is very difficult to say as it depended on the personnel and situation, however there were frequent instances when operations were planned in spite of the fact that supply was unable to function properly.

Q. Generally, does this discussion apply to the Solomons, New Guinea, New Georgia, Makin, Tarawa, and Saigon?

A. Yes.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco

Place: Tokyo
Date : 4 December 1945

INTERROGATION: 500

Division of Origin: Military Analysis Division

Subject: General Information-Supplies, Stock Levels, and Requirements.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Lt. Colonel IWAKOSHI, Shinroku, Graduated from Military Staff College in 1938, was staff officer of the 9th Division in China from Feb. to Aug. 1939; was staff officer attached to the 6th Army in Manchuria from 1939 to July 1940, and took part in the border incident with Russia during this time. Since July 1940, he has been in GHQ as a staff officer on communications (supply).

Where interviewed: War Ministry Building.

Interrogator: Lt. T. Pinkstaff.

Interpreter: Mr. Kerr.

Allied Officers present: None.

- Q. It was requested that you have a chart prepared showing names, locations and strength of units being supplied; also on the chart, he gave us Nov. 17, I would like to know the names or numbers of these units moving from one area to another.
- A. I have prepared the chart and will try to supply the number of the divisions on these other charts by to-morrow. Also, one showing the channels supplies go through from the beginning until it arrives to the troops.
- Q. Explain what basis was used for shipments of supplies to these army bases in the Islands.
- A. It was desired by GHQ to maintain stock levels as follows: Ammunition enough for one campaign, Fuel and provisions-four months supply and then build this up to a six month's supply. In the early days, usually 90% of this amount was on hand.
- Q. Talking of smaller units, say a division, how many days supply did GHQ desire they carry with them.
- A. Each soldier carries two days' provisions and ammunition, and three days provisions carried within the unit; then an additional two days provisions carried by the division, making it a total of seven days in all. However, for infantry troops fighting in the hills they, sometimes, carry as much as twenty days supply. This is carried by the soldier, himself, usually consisting of ammunition, rice, and bread. This was especially true on Guadalcanal.
- Q. On Guadalcanal, did you have large supply depots?
- A. No, because there were not many troops there.

- Q. Prior to Aug. 1943, or before the United States started attacking Guadalcanal, were the troops short many supplies?
- A. No, but as time went on and air attacks became worse, we could get very little through. When ships did arrive, the units were usually on hand at the beaches to receive it from the shipping officers.
- Q. Then you did not establish large depots with reserves of supplies in these places?
- A. No.
- Q. Now getting back to Base Ordnance, do your base depots operate maintenance shops or work shops for say vehicles?
- A. No, this is done in the division.
- Q. How are small or minor parts replaced?
- A. The base depot are supposed to maintain a three months supply of small parts; usually they had only half that much. Usually the division had most of the small parts and the base depots had none. Fuel also was scarce.
- Q. On what basis were divisions issued fuel?
- A. Based on strength, if a division had trucks, the usual number was about 100 per division, fuel was issued for seven days supply, 36 liters per day average.
- Q. Are you familiar with any certain campaign, so that I could get some facts and figures about the operations of the division: in combat?
- A. No.

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- A. No.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C'O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 499.

PLACE: Tokyo.
DATE: 4 December 1945.

Division of Origin: Military Analysis Division.

Subject: Shipping Supply - Philippines.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Lt. Colonel YAHEI, Toyama - 1933 was in officers school and in 1941 graduated from the War College. From 1941 to 1945, connected with the Shipping, attached to Shipping Headquarters, Hiroshima until April 1944; at this time, Colonel YAHEI was transferred to Manila and remained there until 2 January 1945.

Where interviewed: Room 805, Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Colonel Em. M. SHINE.

Interpreter: Mr. Harvey Colton.

Allied Officers present: Lt. T.T. Pinkstaff.

Summary: None

INTERROGATION

- Q. In the Philippines, was your job still connected with Shipping?
A. Yes.
- Q. Was the original plan to use the Philippines to supply troops farther South?
A. Up to May 1944, it was to be used to supply Halmahera and down to New Guinea, but in June 1944, it was impossible; so from this time on all supplies were used in the Philippines.
- Q. Were you able to get the supplies you needed in the Philippines up to June 1944?
A. Up to August 1944, we were able to, but from September 1944 on, air and sea blockade prevented our getting through.
- Q. As of June 1944, what percentage of supplies needs in the Philippines arrived?
A. About 60%.
- Q. What plan of distribution did you have for getting supplies into the hands of troops after they reached the Philippines?
A. Manila received goods from Japan and Saigon, this was shipped in smaller boats to Mindanao, Leyte, and Cebu. On the island of Luzon, it was delivered by trucks. Trains were used to a certain extent but due to the lack of coal, mostly vehicles were used. As a result of this, the supplying so large an area, Manila contained considerable store of supplies.
- Q. Did these trucks used in transporting supplies belong to supply units or the divisions receiving the supplies?
A. They belonged to transportation units.
- Q. Did you transport supplies direct to the divisions or establish dumps and have the divisions send back for them?
A. From the main depots, like Manila, supplies were taken to division dumps and from there moved by small hand carts to the troops.
- Q. Was 100% supplies delivered to the division dumps by truck?
A. Up to the time of the American landings in Leyte, Yes; but fearing the next step would be Luzon, all available means were used and considerable amounts were moved around the Luzon coast in small boats.
- Q. Were supplies piling up on beach due to lack of transportation to move them or our air action?
A. Originally there was enough trucks to move supplies but after the Leyte landings, the supplies coming into Luzon caused a definite shortage, but no additional trucks were received.
- Q. How many days supply did you issue a division at one time?
A. We concentrated principally on fuel, ammunition, food and clothing. The plan was to maintain one months supply of these items.
- Q. Were you able to maintain a one months supply on hand at all times?
A. Prior to the time of the blockade we were able to do this, but from June 1944 on, we were not able to have this amount on hand.
- Q. Was the Army able to fill all your requirements, if not, why and what items were critical?
A. Food and fuel were the most critical items, the reason being the increased personnel and the supply ships being sunk.
- Q. What effect did bombing have on your supply dumps?
A. Soon after supplies were brought in they were disbursed but there was considerable loss at the docks from air attacks.

INTERROGATION NO. 499 (Cont'd)

- Q. In over-all losses from the time goods left Japan until they arrived in Luzon, what % do you estimate you lost by bombing?
- A. 50%.
- Q. Then after the supplies were received in army dumps, what % did you lose by bombing?
- A. About 50% - In other words supplies that were coming from the main land suffered heavy losses and even after they arrived bombing destroyed more, so that nearly a 100% loss was considered in getting to the base, but once supplies were received in dumps and disbursed the loss from air action was practically nil.
- Q. What effect did air action have on your truck convoys supplying small units?
- A. Practically none, because they moved at night in groups of 2 and 3.
- Q. Did this slow down your supply line and to what extent?
- A. It definitely slowed up the supply but due to bombing on larger installations they got through with only time lost.
- Q. What effect did air action have on personnel working in supply depots?
- A. It didn't bother morale any but caused loss of working hours to a great extent.
- Q. On troops who lost their equipment by air action prior to landing and joined units already in combat, how were they then reequiped?
- A. They were re-supplied only with small arms from army dumps but toward the end they were unable to supply them even with small arms.
- Q. Were your plans of operations ever changed due to lack of certain supplies?
- A. The original plan was to supply Leyte with the present stock of supplies on Luzon, but around the middle of December after heavy losses at Leyte we quit supplying the island realizing it was lost. We figured the dwindling supplies that were on Luzon then would be needed to supply Manila, but after being bombed in Manila, the supplies were moved to San Fernando and later when troops landed all possible supplies were moved to the hills and we carried on as best we could.
- Q. Due to all these supply losses, how did this affect the combat efficiency of troops?
- A. Shortage of materials, especially food, reduced the morale of troops about 50%.
- Q. Did all troops that left from other areas to go to Luzon leave with full equipment, field pieces, etc.?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How many tons of supplies a day were required to maintain a division in fighting (15,000 men)?
- A. About 300 metric tons for 15,000 men.
- Q. How far, as a rule, does a division place their dumps from the front line?
- A. About 24 Kilos (15 miles).
- Q. What type of transportation was used to move supplies to troops in combat?
- A. Trucks were used from main dumps to temporary dumps and from temporary dumps to troops, horse carts were used.

INTERROGATION NO. 499 (Cont'd)

Q. Did strafing cause much loss from dumps to troops?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the supply department consulted on an operation before a decision was made?

A. In any of the larger operations, yes.

Q. If after talking with the supply departments, and finding that they could not always meet the requirements necessary, were tactical plans changed?

A. They were told of plans and upon advice that tactical plans could not be carried out due to lack of transportation, they would be told that they would have to carry thru anyway.

Q. In your own opinion what do you think caused the most loss of supplies?

A. Air action.

Q. Do you know of any supply people who we could talk to who might give us more information along these lines?

A. No. As far as I know they are still in the Philippines.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234 c/o PM San Francisco

INTERROGATION NO. 497

PLACE: Tokyo
DATE: 3 December 1945

Division of Origin: Military Analysis Division.

Subject: Effect of Allied air activity on Japanese planning of the Solomons, Rabaul and New Guinea operations and on Japan's ability to carry out those plans; planning and objectives of the Burma campaign.

Personnel Interrogated and Background: Lt General MIYAZAKI Shuichi

Understands but does not speak English. Graduate of Military Academy and Army War College. 1938-39, Staff Officer with Army in CHINA (Hankow). Regimental commander with KWANTUNG ARMY, MANCHURIA (Chichibar) from 1939-1940. Instructor at War College 1934 and for 1½ years 1940-41. From 1942-43, SOLOMONS Area, finally assuming position of Chief of Staff, 17th Army, GUADALCANAL. 1943-44, Chief Secretary, War College. Sept-Dec 1944, with the KWANGTSE ARMY, South China. Since 14 Dec 44, Chief 1st Section (Operations) SAMBO HONBU.

Where Interrogated: WAR MINISTRY

Interrogator: Col Ramsay D POTTS, AC

Interpreter: Lt Cmdr Walter NICHOLS, USNR

Allied Officers Present: Col Philip COLE, GSC

SUMMARY

General MIYAZAKI stated that notes of staff meetings on operational plans were not available since they were all burned on August 16th. He could not give a detailed account of the manner in which allied air activity forced the Japanese to alter their basic plans. However, he gave a brief history of the Guadalcanal operation, describing the effect of bombing on the Japanese attempt to retake the island. Destruction of supply lines as a result of the sinking of transports was the biggest problem. Four engine bombers caused the principal damage to ships in Rabaul Harbor and "small-type" planes caused most of the damage to ships along the sea route to Guadalcanal. The General promised to provide the Survey with a record of his personal experiences in the Rabaul-Solomons campaign and an analysis of why the Japanese failed to hold in that area. He also contracted to have a similar document written about the New Guinea campaign by someone who knew of the operations in that area from the Tokyo point of view. He explained that detailed information about actual operations in New Guinea was not available in Tokyo, since due to the interdiction of shipping routes there had been virtually no communication with New Guinea for almost three years. He stated that the Solomons, Rabaul and New Guinea were considered one theatre of operations by the Japanese High Command. The original purpose of the Burma Campaign, he said, was to cut the Burma Road, but little is known in Tokyo about the situation because it was planned by the field commanders in Saigon. He does not believe the Japanese even intended to capture Ceylon or invade India.

- Q. We expected that General MIYAZAKI would have notes on the IMPERIAL STAFF conferences.
- A. Operational plans?
- Q. Yes, operational plans throughout the war.
- A. All the detailed records of the staff meetings and plans of operation were destroyed by burning at the end of the war so that we have on hand no records. However, I received information that the subject would be Staff Planning, so I have prepared some notes on the subject which I would like to discuss.
- Q. First of all can you give us a biographical sketch of your career, going back as far as 1926?
- A. From 1929 to 1933 I was with SAMBO HOMBU as a Captain and Major. My chief duties were in connection with Military History. After that I became an instructor in the War College, in 1934. In 1938 I went to CHINA as a Staff Officer with the Army, operating around HANKOW. I stayed in CHINA until 1939. Then I became the Commander of a Regiment for one year in MANCHURIA, at Chichi-har. That would bring me up to 1940. For a year and a half, from 1940 to 1941, I was an instructor in the War College.
- Q. What subjects did you teach?
- A. I was teaching both tactics and military history.
- Q. What sort of tactics: ground tactics, ground air tactics, infantry?
- A. Ground tactics. From Sept 1942 to May 1943 I was in action down in the Southern Area on GUADALCANAL. I was the Chief of Staff of the 17th Army which was operating in the SOLOMONS; I became Chief of Staff just at the time of the withdrawal from GUADALCANAL. I had some harrowing experiences down there.
- Q. In what way--because of air bombardment or surface action or what?
- A. The chief difficulty was lack of food.
- Q. You couldn't get your transports through?
- A. No, no transportation, no supplies. For four months, from May to August 1943 I was attached to SAMBO HOMBU. Two of those four months I spent in a hospital due to stomach trouble from malnutrition. For one year after that I acted as the Chief Secretary of the WAR COLLEGE. From September 1944 to December 1944 I was in SOUTH CHINA with the KWANGSI Army operating chiefly with the purpose of capturing your airfields in that theatre.
- Q. September to December of '44?
- A. Yes. Then on December 14 I was recalled to SAMBO HOMBU to become the Chief of the First Section, which is concerned with Operations.
- Q. Did you hold that on through the war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In the matter of records, notes, etc, we were told when we interrogated General UMEZU that you would try to get for us personal records that were kept as to the proceedings in these planning conferences, not just from December '44 on but all the way back to the beginning of the war, and I wondered if you have had any success in that?
- A. These are not official records.

- Q. No, just memoirs, records that we could microfilm then return the original documents to the owner.
- A. General UMEZU had a talk with me about it, but I do not recall his having said anything specific about trying to collect records. I was asked to get opinions and information, if possible, from people who were in SAMBO HOMBU before my time. The specific assignment given me was to reconstruct from memory and any available source, the history of the planning from December 1944 to the end of the war.
- Q. Only from '44 on?
- A. Yes, I understood that it only covered my period, and I have therefore attempted to reconstruct such information.
- Q. We are more interested in the planning in the early stages of the war because we have a fairly good record of the planning from 1944 on; we know pretty well what you were trying to do. It is in the early part that we have some doubts as to why you did this, and why you did that; was it the lack of shipping, was it lack of appreciation of the speed with which we would move into NEW GUINEA, or other outposts, etc? Can you secure for us not only the opinions which would be valuable, of course, but also records which would be useful in reconstructing the plans of operations which were going on in NEW GUINEA, the SOLOMONS, BURMA, etc., particularly those three areas I have just named?
- A. At the present moment there are no really important people in Tokyo who were on the planning staffs at that time, but there are some members who know quite a few things about those campaigns and the planning phases of the campaigns. From now on if you will give me more or less of an outline of the kind of thing you would like to know, I will see that an attempt is made to reconstruct those three campaigns.
- Q. We have already submitted questionnaires on the activities of the Japanese Air Force and what effect our operations had on that. What we want is a reconstruction from the Japanese point of view of what our air--accomplished in bombing you, in strafing you, in knocking down your airplanes in the air, in bringing up supplies for our own troops, and in sinking your transports--or, in other words, the Japanese estimate of what our air power did to stop your advance and then to push you back in those three areas?
- A. This is mainly from the point of view of the ground forces?
- Q. Yes, from the overall standpoint, the Supreme Commander of any given area, the group forces particularly: How did it modify his planning?
- A. I myself can give you a general discussion of the subject, i.e., regarding the effects of your air attack upon our forces in relation to the changes made in our original plans as a result of these air attacks. Some plans were changed as a result of air attacks, and though it would be difficult to enter into it in detail, I can give you a rough outline of the way our major plans were changed.
- May I start out by saying that the biggest problem of all was destruction of our supply lines as a result of air attack upon shipping.
- Q. That is one of the things we want. What changes did you make in your plans, not just as the result of our immediate attacks upon troops or strong points or supply dumps, but also as a result of the attacks against airfields, attacks against your airplanes in the air, attacks against your shipping in bringing up supplies, the whole picture?
- A. In August 1942, the Navy was constructing an airfield on GUADALCANAL; it was at that time that AMERICAN forces landed to take the airfield. In order to retake the airfield, one battalion was sent down from MILBARRAO to reinforce GUADALCANAL; the entire battalion was wiped out during August, in the fighting on GUADALCANAL. In September three more battalions were sent down to reinforce those. By October two divisions were sent down; the 2nd Division and the 38th Division.

Q. From where?

A. The 2nd Division was sent from JAVA; the 38th Division, I believe, was stationed at HONGKONG--it was the division which had captured HONGKONG, and it was intact there, and the most mobile force we had. We brought it down as fast as possible because this was an extremely important operation. I myself arrived in October, landing at GUADALCANAL from a destroyer.

Q. Now, both of these were top-notch fighting divisions, weren't they, among the best you had?

A. Yes, they were both top-notch divisions. On October 23 and 24 the Japanese concentrated around MT AUSTIN (which is slightly inland from the coast) were attacking HENDERSON FIELD from the rear through the jungle. We were on the very point of success in pushing the American troops back into the sea when we had to give up the attack because trench mortar fire was so severe and we had so many casualties that we were decimated. In addition to losing two crack divisions in the GUADALCANAL operations, we lost in that operation about 20,000 tons of shipping.

Despite these losses on GUADALCANAL we planned to retake the island in a second attempt. For this purpose we planned to send two more divisions which were both crack divisions: The 6th Division and the 20th Division, which happened to be available and mobile. An attempt was made to carry out this plan, but as the result of bombing we could not carry out the attack.

Col. Where were the attacks made, at the staging area or where?

COLE:

A. The 20th Division was staged in RABAUL, and the 6th Division was landed on BOUGANVILLE. By this time both the RABAUL area and the area between BOUGANVILLE and GUADALCANAL had become almost impassable due to air attacks; also by the time we had moved the divisions this far, we had to give up the plan because we had lost any hope of retaking GUADALCANAL.

Q. Where did the bombing attacks interdict the movements of these divisions? Was it by destroying supplies, or by sinking some of the vessels carrying troops, or did attacks destroy some of the men themselves in barracks areas? What types of planes, in addition, caused this interdiction, caused this trouble?

A. The biggest problem was the loss of ships. Actually the bombing of troops and troop concentrations on the ground were not much of a hindrance because, although the bombing scared everybody and made lots of noise and had an effect on morale, the actual destruction was not very great. The biggest problem was the loss of our capacity to move these troops to the fighting areas. (I myself was bombed and I still have a fragment of the bomb in my back). However in the case of ground forces, you can disperse your forces to guard against heavy destruction in one raid, and also you can dig in and prevent losses, which cannot be done aboard ship.

Col. I still want to know where were these particular ships sunk? Can you give COLE: me some idea? And what types of planes sank these ships that were going to be used for these two divisions?

A. The types of planes which gave us the most trouble were B-17s. We were affected by bombing; we thought your accuracy was accountable to your good bombsight.

Q. Are you sure they were B-17s?

A. May I qualify that by saying that that is what I thought they were. They were four-engine bombers.

Q. Were they attacking at night or in the daytime?

A. Mostly daylight attacks, although there were some at night.

- Q. In the harbor or in the approaches to the harbor--?
- A. The greatest number of ships were sunk in RABOUL Harbor. However there were also a great number sunk on the way down.
- Q. In the approaches to the harbor?
- A. Yes. The ships that were sunk while under way were sunk most frequently by small type planes rather than by B-17s or four-engine bombers.
- Q. The ships that were sunk in the harbor were sunk by planes attacking from what altitude--low, medium--?
- A. I think that most of the ships sunk in the harbor were sunk by large-type planes, namely four-engine bombers operating at high altitudes estimated to be about 7,000 or 8,000 metres.
- Q. I didn't intend to get into, at this time, a full discussion of these various campaigns. I think you are in a very good position to write for us personally a description of the GUADALCANAL Campaign and what effect our bombing of ships in RABOUL Harbor and in the approaches to RABOUL had on your efforts to reinforce your forces in the SOLOMONS area. If you could personally prepare that as a paper, we are very much interested in your personal experiences there, and we'd like an eye-witness account, a first-hand account, of the difficulties your units ran into, of the hardships you suffered there, of the hardships your men suffered, and especially what effect air attack had on preventing supplies of food, reinforcement of these divisions, reinforcement of arms, etc., coming into the GUADALCANAL-TOUGAIVILLE-SOLOMONS area. Could you prepare for us a personal account of that campaign, especially dwelling on your own personal experiences, in which we are very much interested?
- A. I will try to write up for you what I can of it. I'd like to know about when you want this done.
- Q. If you will try to do it within your power, we'd like to have that by the 12th of this month?
- A. I'll do my best.
- Q. We'd like to have your analysis of why you failed down there and why you failed to hold that area?
- A. There is no longer any secrecy about anything as far as we are concerned, so I will be glad to write everything I can remember on the matter.
- Q. Now I wonder if you would attempt to have someone who knows about this business in NEW GUINEA make a similar evaluation--write a similar paper--on the NEW GUINEA campaign up as far as HOLLANDIA?
- A. That would be very difficult because there is hardly any one left in Japan now who took part in the NEW GUINEA campaign. As you are aware it's been almost three years since we have been able to supply them. Our communications have been entirely cut off from them for three years.
- Q. Why couldn't you get in? Was it because of the air attacks which interdicted the area, that kept you from communicating?
- A. Definitely because of your air superiority in that area; we couldn't even send supplies in by plane. Therefore our communications were entirely cut off; our supplies were cut off; we couldn't send personnel, military stores, or food. The reason we haven't had much communication from that area is that as you advanced up the coast, taking one place after another, our forces just went into the jungle with whatever they could carry with them. Naturally they ran out of batteries, and their communication equipment was too heavy.
- Q. Do you mean that our air superiority was so great that you couldn't even bring ships along there, hugging the coast and sneaking in?
- A. At first we were able to slip small ships through by moving them only at night and hiding them during the day, but towards the end it got to the point where we couldn't even do that.

- Q. About what time was this, when the air blockade became so intense that you couldn't even get small ships through?
- A. Practically from the end of 1943.
- Q. Did you lose many ships in trying to reinforce NEW GUINEA?
- A. Yes. We tried to reinforce but our ships were sunk.
- Q. Did the loss of this shipping and the attempts to reinforce this area weaken the attempt to fight this campaign (Col POTTS indicated on a map the RABAUL - SOLOMONS - NEW GUINEA area), and this one (indicating MALAYA area)?
- A. You would have to consider the RABAUL operations as part of the NEW GUINEA operations; therefore I could hardly say that one influenced the other because it was all one theatre of operations.
- Q. In other words as far as you were concerned, the SOLOMONS-RABAUL-NEW GUINEA area was all considered one campaign?
- A. Yes, we considered it as one theatre of operations (I mean by that that your air superiority in this area, in the SOLOMONS and Southern NEW GUINEA area, made the circumstances of operations in the whole area exactly the same), but I'm not quite certain what you mean by "one campaign."
- Q. What I mean is, the operations here were loosely tied up with operations here (indicating the two areas on the map). If you brought in supplies from RABAUL and had to ship them down to the SOLOMONS, then obviously you couldn't ship them to Southern NEW GUINEA. The campaigns were related in that any action in one area would affect the available strength in the other area.
- A. Originally it was extended out to here (indicating area east of SOLOMONS) but it was viewed as a campaign in this area overall.
- Q. Then you will attempt to have someone, if not from the NEW GUINEA point of view, from the TOKYO point of view, explain what was the meaning of these operations down here, the meaning of this air blockade in trying to get in supplies and reinforcements? Also what was the significance of what we were doing over here (BURMA) as it stopped you from pushing further into the area? Did it stop you from supplying forces or from going on and conquering INDIA?
- A. Just to go back a second about what I said of the operations in NEW GUINEA: I said, that was all sea transport; therefore once the shipping was cut off we were entirely cut off. Although it had some effect on our ability to ship overseas, we were able to make up the difference by shipments into BURMA over land which we could not do down in NEW GUINEA because there was the water barrier.
- I think, as a matter of opinion, somebody could write on the subject from TOKYO, somebody who was here in TOKYO at the time.
- Q. Well, if they can't do it circumstantially, then, we'd like a document which would be an informed opinion of the effect that our operations were having on your ability to carry on operations in these areas?
- A. I am the only person in TOKYO who was present and knows anything much about the operations in RABAUL and SOLOMONS area. There isn't anyone like myself in TOKYO who participated in the NEW GUINEA campaign.
- Q. Not a single person?
- A. Not a single person who would be in my position in regard to the other campaign, and therefore anything that was written would merely have to be looked on as a matter of opinion.

Q. We will regard it as such, but we'd still like to have it.

Col COLE: Weren't there people in TOKYO on the Staff who had as their immediate and direct responsibility the knowledge of and handling of affairs in the NEW GUINEA area who are still around and who could supply this information?

A. There are people in TOKYO whose responsibility was the operation in NEW GUINEA campaign from the TOKYO standpoint, but as I said before, were they to write about the campaign it would not be any more accurate than anything I could write about the RABAUL-SOLOMONS campaign.

Q. We'd very much like to have that as their estimate of the significance of the various operations.

A. I will handle it.

Q. And those will be ready by the 12th?

A. I will try and do it. I want to make certain that you understand that whatever is written here will be merely an opinion on what happened, the accuracy of which cannot be guaranteed. Of course when eventually these people come back from NEW GUINEA they will be able to write a complete and documentary history of it, but anything turned out between now and the 12th would have to be merely opinion.

Q. Can this same report be done on the BURMA campaign?

A. A report could be written in the same manner on the BURMA campaign. However I want to point out that the BURMA campaign was planned locally, and no orders were given by TOKYO as to how the operations in the BURMA theatre should be carried out.

Q. Where did those come from: SINGAPORE?

A. SAIGON--I think the headquarters were at SAIGON.

Q. Who were the generals or the commanders who directed those BURMA operations, in 1942, '43, '44, and '45; in other words, the man who was in supreme command and could originate policy?

A. I can look that up for you.

Q. I'd like to have that at the same time. As a matter of fact I'd like to have that as soon as possible for we may find it necessary to go through SINGAPORE and SAIGON and RANGOON to talk to them.

A. The man to see when you get down there would be General KIMURA.

Q. Why weren't operations in this area directed by TOKYO?

A. The situation was that the elements involved in campaigns in those areas, the obstacles to be overcome in the way of natural obstacles and the forces involved, were very little known in TOKYO, and I'm afraid that if orders were given to carry out certain operations, it would be impossible to carry out those operations for reasons not known in TOKYO; therefore, it was left entirely up to the local commander to decide where he could utilize his troops best, strategically and otherwise; then he would report his plan to TOKYO and TOKYO would give him the go-ahead signal, provided he stated this plan could be carried out.

Q. What was the objective in that area? Didn't TOKYO issue some directive as to policy?

A. I don't really know about that, but as far as I know the entire operation was carried out from almost the beginning under the direct command of the local commander.

Q. Was it handled that way from the very beginning?

A. I don't think so.

I am not certain of the facts, but I know from what I have heard that, even in the field there, in the BURMA area, there was a great difference of opinion, some officers insisting that it was impossible to advance as far as IMPHAL and others insisting, they could do it right away, and things like that; so it was certainly a matter that TOKYO couldn't decide on. The purpose was to secure BURMA and capture all points strategically necessary for the defense of BURMA, IMPHAL being considered an essential defensive position.

Col COLE: The purpose of the campaign was to interdict the BURMA ROAD, wasn't it?

A. Well, naturally.

Col COLE: This was the main strategic mission, wasn't it?

A. The primary objective of the BURMA campaign was originally the cutting of the BURMA ROAD. Therefore the Army that had that task assigned to it went in there and managed to cut the road. However they no sooner cut the road than the Allies developed an air route from Northern India to KUNMING and flew supplies in to CHINA. Therefore the next objective was to cut their air route. We believed that if we advanced as far as IMPHAL that we would be in a fair position to cut that supply route. However we knew that even if we advanced that far we were still slightly out of range of the main bases from which your planes were operating, and therefore we still could not be certain of achieving this object of cutting the air supply route.

Q. Did you ever at any time intend to invade INDIA'S western area?

A. I don't think we ever had a plan for invading INDIA because it would have been impossible.

Q. Did you ever plan to take CEYLON at any time? After taking the ANDAMANS did you ever think of taking CEYLON as a means through air of controlling the shipping in this (Southern) area?

A. I don't believe there was ever any plan for invading CEYLON because, in the first place it was beyond the power of the forces which the Japanese could assemble, and also because we had decided on a line through JAVA, through SUMATRA and up through the ANDAMANS and then up through BURMA as the first line of defense in this area. I don't believe that CEYLON could have been taken with the forces we had available.

END OF INTERROGATION

(Note: Another interview was, at this time, scheduled for 0930 hours the following day, to be conducted by Cols. COLE and ROSENHAUSER).

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO. 496

PLACE: Tokyo
DATE: 3 Dec 1945

DIVISION OF ORIGIN: Military Analysis

SUBJECT: Japanese Naval Air Combat Aircraft & Tactics.

PERSONNEL INTERROGATED AND BACKGROUND OF EACH: Lt IWASHITA, Kunio - JIN

Entered Navy College in 1938. Graduated in 1941. Duty on the cruiser AOBA, November 1941 entered the Navy Officers' Air School. Became a pilot at the end of August 1942. Went to OITA for fighter plane combat training. Became a JG Lt in February of 1943. Instructor at OITA until November 1943. Member of 301st Kokutai attached to YOKOSUKA Naval Base until June of 1944. Flew a Raiden interceptor. Went to IWO JIMA in May of 1944 where unit was destroyed in June of 1944 by U.S. carrier task force. Returned to YOKOSUKA in June. Became squadron leader of 701st KOKOTAI (Shiden) at YOKOSUKA and then went to the Philippines (Clark Field) the first of December 1944. January 1945 went to field south of APPARI. Unit at Clark Field was destroyed and then he returned to YOKOSUKA where he joined the Kokutai and became a test pilot.

WHERE INTERVIEWED: Room 238, Meiji Bldg.

INTERROGATOR: Maj John J. Driscoll

INTERPRETER: Lt. Richard Sneider

SUMMARY

Lt IWASHITA has 1500 hours of flying time. He gives a relative evaluation of Jap and American aircraft based on his combat experience. He also presented his notes on pending Japanese Navy developments, and future combat requirements re aircraft and special equipment.

RESTRICTED

- Q. How many combat hours do you have?
- A. About 100 hours.
- Q. How many encounters?
- A. About 20 encounters. I shot down one Gruman and one B-29. During encounters my fighter was always damaged. I had no aerial combat in the Philippines.
- Q. What types of planes did you engage?
- A. I had two encounters with P-38's in the Philippines. I was on the defensive both times as I was attacking a B-29 formation.
- Q. What did you think of the P-38?
- A. It is a very good plane, strong and maneuverable. I think the P-38 the very best American fighter.
- Q. What encounters did you have with the P-51's?
- A. I never really fought the P-51 as I was going after the B-29's with a rocket plane. The P-51 has a fast rate of climb, but its maneuverability is not too good. If I did a half roll, I could easily avoid a P-51 when it was diving on me. However, its speed is very high. The big point of the P-38 is that it is much more maneuverable than the P-51.
- Q. What engagements did you have with the F6F?
- A. I met the F6F three times. I think it is a very good plane. Its maneuverability is fine. But I think the Shiden was a better plane in combat when it used the combat flaps (wing flaps). These flaps were smaller than landing flaps and were used only in combat. The Shiden was most effective when in operation at heights up to 6,000 meters. At higher altitudes the F6F is better than Japanese planes. It has a longer firing range.
- Q. What about the F4U?
- A. I met the F4U once.
- Q. The B-32?
- A. I engaged a B-32 toward the end of the war and my machine guns jammed.
- Q. The B-24?
- A. Four or five times.
- Q. Any other bombers?
- A. None.
- Q. The P-47?
- A. I engaged P-47's twice in the Philippines.
- Q. The P-40?
- A. None.
- Q. Any others?
- A. No, no others. Against the B-29's I flew the Shiden, the Raiden, the Zero 52 and 62, the Gkko and the Tenrai.

- Q. What was the best one, of the group which you flew against B-29's?
- A. The modification of the Shiden Kai (Judy).
- Q. Which did you use against B-24's?
- A. The Zero 52 and the Shiden #11.
- Q. What did you fly when engaging the P-38's?
- A. The same planes.
- Q. When engaging the P-47's?
- A. The same. The Zero 52 was the best. The Shiden engine was bad.
- Q. Which planes did you use against the P-51?
- A. The Raiden and Zero 52, Shiden 21 and I think the Shiden was the best. However, I flew the Raiden the most. I never feared the P-51.
- Q. What did you fly when engaging the F6F?
- A. The Shiden 21, the Zero 52 and 62. I think the Shiden 21 the best.
- Q. What did you use against the F4U?
- A. The Zero 52.
- Q. Name the three U.S. planes you think the best - in the order you rank them.
- A. I think the P-38 the best, F6F second, and the P-51 third. The P-47 is fourth in my estimation.
- Q. What was the best anti-bomber armament you ever carried?
- A. The Fireball.
- Q. What was the official name of that? Did you call it the Fireball?
- A. It was the MARK 3 Bomb (SANGO: not a rocket shell). It weighed 60 KG; length was 30 centimeters and diameter 10 centimeters. The rocket shell was different from the Fireball.
- Q. How does it differ from the rocket?
- A. The rocket has a flat trajectory and the sighting is much simpler. Effectiveness of the two is about the same.
- Q. Why was it called the Fireball?
- A. That was what the Americans called it.
- Q. How did you know that?
- A. We learned it from the newspapers before the surrender. We used it in B-29 attacks and at Rabaul.
- Q. How was it launched?
- A. It drops from the wing of the plane.
- Q. How many did you carry on one plane?
- A. The Zero carried two at the beginning, and at the end of the war carried four.

RESTRICTED

- Q. Did you have a special sight?
- A. No.
- Q. How did you aim? How did you estimate the elevation?
- A. Guessed - 150 meters height - had a three second fuse.
- Q. How many attacks did you make?
- A. I used the rockets against the B-29's.
- Q. How many of these Fireball attacks did you make?
- A. Ten times at Kyushu, and I used the SANGO in fighting the B-29 I shot down in April of this year.
- Q. When did the Navy first use rockets?
- A. Against B-29's, we first used rockets at the beginning of June 1945.
- Q. Did you use rockets for anything else?
- A. At OKINAWA we used rockets against ground targets and against torpedo boats.
- Q. What model rocket was that?
- A. The MARK 27 (Kayaku) rocket, the same one used against B-29's.
- Q. What were the tactics for the rocket against bombers?
- A. We used two - one was the same as for the SANGO - the other was a rear attack.
- Q. What's the fuse setting?
- A. The right one is a 4.5 second fuse and the left is 4 seconds. We used them this way because they would cover a bigger area. Firing from behind the B-29 was very dangerous. The 29 was very fast at high altitudes and we would dive at the tail.
- Q. How high did you start your dive?
- A. At about 500-1000 meters above the 29.
- Q. At what range did you release the shell?
- A. About 750 meters for a tail attack. 1750 meters for a nose attack.
- Q. How did you sight from the tail?
- A. One and a half degrees above the target from the tail and also one and a half degrees from the front. The speed of the bomb was the same. (Draws image of 3-ring gunsight & B-29's)
- Q. But at 1750 meters the 29 looks less than half the size it appears to be at 75 meters. How do you explain the same sighting process?
- A. We used 1.7 degrees for this sighting.
- Q. Was it difficult with the ordinary sight to estimate .7 ?
- A. Yes, very difficult.
- Q. Was the sight modified?
- A. Yes, we had a new reticle.

Q. Did it have special size rings?

A. Yes, it was a variable sight.

Q. What was the number of the sight?

A. Type #4 shooting and bombing sight - modification #1.

Q. Was it only used for rockets?

A. Also for regular firing.

Q. Did you use it for the SANGO also?

A. Yes.

Q. How many rings were there in the sight?

A. One ring.

Q. Did you use this for ordinary machine guns? Was this the only sight used in combat?

A. Yes, we used it for machine guns. We used it in the Philippines. Used this and the modifications of it.

Q. Did the basic model have variable rings?

A. No variable sight in the basic model. We used a radio range finder.

Q. What was the model number?

A. It was just an experimental model. It was only ground tested and never used in the air.

Q. Did you use any radio models in combat?

A. No.

Q. How successful was this - what percentage of attacks were successful?

A. It wasn't very successful.

Q. Out of 10 attacks, how many B-29's were shot down?

A. Three out of ten.

Q. Were these nose or tail attacks?

A. One by nose attack; two by tail attack. (These were my own attacks.)

Q. How many would you say was the average?

A. There were two bombs on one plane, and when shooting, both bombs went at the same time.

Q. In the entire Navy Air Force, what was the percentage of 29's destroyed (out of 100)?

A. I do not know the number.

Q. How did your score compare with the others?

A. Most had three out of ten.

Q. What percentage of the B-29's were kills and what percentage damaged?

- A. One destroyed to seven damaged was the average.
- Q. Would you rather use these or rockets?
- A. I would rather use rockets. They were the best. There were less chances of getting hits with rockets, but they were the best.
- Q. What were the best guns you ever carried?
- A. 20 mm.
- Q. Which do you think would have been better - which would you have preferred?
- A. I think a 20 mm is the best in general use. I think that the rate of fire should be increased to 850.
- Q. Which 20 mm did you use?
- A. Type #2 - MARK 2.
- Q. What about 30 mm?
- A. Yes, we used them, but only a little. We used 70 rounds in the 30 mm and I think the 30 mm is the best.
- Q. How many rounds in each gun?
- A. 150.
- Q. What type of magazine - belt or drum?
- A. 150 rounds in a belt.
- Q. Which type of ammunition did you use, long or short?
- A. Long.
- Q. What armament did the F6F have, do you think?
- A. I think it carried 13 mm cannon. I think it also carried a 20 mm cannon.
- Q. Did you have armor plate?
- A. Yes, however, in normal use, we took it off as it was too heavy.
- Q. You never flew with it into combat - you always took it off?
- A. Yes, it was too heavy.
- Q. When did you first have self-sealing gasoline tanks?
- A. From the beginning of the war.
- Q. What type? Were they all rubber or rubber-covered aluminum?
- A. The cover had CO/2.
- Q. Do you mean that the air space in the tank was CO/2?
- A. No, there was a tank of it carried in the fuselage. When a fire was started in the tank, a line fed it into the tank cover and the fire was extinguished. This tank was only capable of being used one time; however, it must be repaired after each use. The gum covering of our tanks wasn't good; it leaked.

- Q. What did you use after that, all metal?
- A. The outside was covered with gun. We only tested the inside covering.
- Q. Did bombers ever hit you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When, where, and what kind of bomber?
- A. It was a B-29. I was making a tail attack.
- Q. How far were you when you were hit?
- A. About 800 meters. The bomber didn't fire often enough to shoot me down.
- Q. The B-29 should have shot more times?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How many guns were firing at you?
- A. Only the tail guns.
- Q. 13 or 20 mm?
- A. Probably 20 mm.
- Q. How large holes did they make in your aircraft?
- A. They hit the engine - 20 mm, I think - the shell went through the engine and out through the wing leaving a large hole.
- Q. Only one shell hit you?
- A. Yes. They did not fire often enough. They only fired at me for a few seconds.
- Q. Were there no other B-29's firing at you?
- A. I attacked a formation of five and they all fired at me.
- Q. Did you ever attack a bomber and not be fired upon?
- A. They always fired at me.
- Q. What was the most successful method of attacking B-29's?
- A. The nose attack, coming in from a dive. It was best to come in a little low and off a little to the side. Another way was to come down at about 80 degrees from above - half roll and shoot when on back. The tail attack was no good - there was too much firing from that section.
- Q. Did you ever hit a B-24?
- A. No.
- Q. Why not?
- A. Our early warning radar was not good enough to warn us of the attacking bombers. Also, the escorting P-38's were very strong.
- Q. Did you ever carry any bombs other than the two mentioned?
- A. No, only those two.

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Q. Ever hear of such a thing as a parachute bomb being in use?

A. No.

Q. Did you know of the Cable Bomb?

A. We heard of it, but did not use it.

Q. What did you think of it?

A. I should think that the air resistance would be very great and that it would cut down the maneuverability of the aircraft. The chief defect of it, though, is that it would enable the enemy to find the fighter's range too easily. I think that bombing and radar bombs were the best way to down B-29's.

Q. What do you think the next best method?

A. A rocket bomb with a radio range finder. We also investigated the "death ray" which would stop the engines. I have these notes I have made as to how to combat planes in the future.

- (1) Electrical range finder in plane.
- (2) Radio bomb from plane.
- (3) Chemical substance (powder) which would stop engine.
Powder would be dropped on it.

Q. What were the proposed aircraft developments?

- A.
- (1) To increase the performance of fighters.
 - (2) To increase the high altitude performance of the engine.
 - (3) To substitute pure alcohol for gasoline.
 - (4) To supercharge the engine in two stages.
 - (5) To increase the maneuverability and to use combat flaps (on Reppu). (I think the Reppu is the best Japanese Navy airplane and I think it is the best combat airplane in the world.)
 - (6) To increase the rate of climb of fighters.
 - (7) To increase the high altitude performance of bombers.
 - (8) To increase the use of radar on fighters.
 - (9) Improve special bombing against bombers.
 - (10) Rocket development (this was in a rough stage and personnel were not sufficiently trained to develop this program.)
 - (11) Protect the pilot against gravity, (I used a G-Suit, but it wasn't good.)
 - (12) Install mirrors in order to see behind.
 - (13) De-icing mechanisms for wings. (I consider this very important.)
 - (14) Testing of Shindan (the push prop). (This was a very difficult thing to develop as prop hits the pilot if he bails out.)
 - (15) Development of the Reppu fighter.
 - (16) Development of a rocket fighter for the future which would employ a rocket for an engine.
 - (17) Development of a night fighter. (We used off-set guns for night fighting; guns were fired at a 45 degree angle, but we tested them for 70 degrees.)

Q. Did you use 45 degrees?

A. No, but I knew some pilots who did.

Q. At what range were the guns fired?

A. About 800 meters - shooting from under was very effective as the bomber burns very easily from underneath. (Continues listing points)

- (18) To protect parked planes from enemy bombing. (The carpet bombing was very effective and we had no way to protect planes on the ground.)

(19) Development of a long range, high altitude fighter such as the P-51 (which we admired very much.) We needed such as this for use in bad weather. (I think the P-38 was very good as it shot down Japanese fighters very easily.)

Q. Did you ever fly an American plane?

A. No, but I think the F6F is the second best type. I admire the strong wings of the American planes. (Continues listing points)

(20) Mounting of machine guns. (I think we should spread the angle of fire out instead of building a concentration of fire, especially for young pilots.

Q. At how many meters would you expect hits this way?

A. At 100-200 meters for veteran pilots a concentration of fire is good, but for young pilots, a spread of fire would be better.

(21) Education of pilots. The use of aerial cameras in aerial fights would have been good as it would have enabled us to have moving pictures to use in training. We used bicycles for ground training in some cases as this helped in the development of formation flying.

(22) Development of fighter flying formation practices. We admired the American fighter flying formations very much, but our young pilots could not fly these formations. How to train these pilots for this type of flying is an important question.

(23) The HOMARE engine. In theory it was very good - light and compact and the air resistance was small. But there were many difficulties to solve. It was not a durable engine, and we also had difficulty with the proper mixture of fuel. Also, leaks caused by vibration (due to oscillation) affected the sparking of the engine as the oil got on the sparkplugs. Another difficulty was that the oil temperature ran too high and the engine could not go more than 800 meters at full power.