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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1916

17 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Details concerning the Negotiations for Adjusting Diplomatic Relations between Japan and U.S. in 1941

Date: Jan 1945 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA, Hiroshi; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; TOJO, Hideki; YOSHIDA, Zengo

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: U.S. - Japanese Relations; Japanese-German relations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Details concerning negotiations for adjusting diplomatic relations between Japan and U.S. in 1941, prepared by the Historical Materials Investigation Committee for War Time Diplomacy of the Foreign Ministry in January, 1945.

Chapter I. Conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact.
Chapter II. Gist of the Second Japanese-American Negotiations.

Chronological summary of events from 25 July, 1940 to 8 December, 1940.

Analyst: 2d Lt Goldstein

Doc. No. 1916

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Date 6/17/46

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Title and Nature: *Details Concerning the Negotiations for Adjusting Diplomatic Relations between Japan and U.S. in 1941*

Date: *Jan 1945* Original Copy Language: *Jap*

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LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

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SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *Foreign Ministry*

PERSONS IMPLICATED: *OSAKIMA, Hiroshi; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; TOJO, Hideki; YOSHIDA, Zengo.*

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*U.S.-Japanese Relations;
Japanese-German Relations.*

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Chapter I Conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.

Chapter II First of the Second Japanese-American Negotiations

See Chronological Chronological Summary of events from 25 July, 1940 to 9 December, 1940

Analyst: *H. Goldstein*

Doc. No.

Draft

Measures for strengthening the National Government of China

Prepared by: China Committee

Dated: December 4, 1939

Preface: This Draft is the report of the Foreign Minister's question and meeting held on Dec. 4th. It is a summary of the draft measures to transfer the definite details of investigation organs. The first measures by Chinese side on section deals with measures by

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Section 1 - Political

- 1) Stability of the leading personnel of the Chinese Government. (Page 2)
- 2) It is not necessary to alter the policy and attitude towards anti-communism, but the National Government ^{have to be induced to} would negotiate and arrange the measures for strengthening the anti-communistic movement with the Japanese Ambassador to NANKING. (Page 2)
- 3) For grasping the public sentiments in the field of pure internal administration, it is deemed appropriate to make or establish a policy or a slogan. (Page 2)

Draft
Measures for strengthening the National Government of China

Prepared by: China Committee, Foreign Ministry

Dated: December 4, 1944

Preface: This Draft is the reply by the China Committee to the Foreign Minister's question and was agreed unanimously at its meeting held on Dec. 4th. It confines only in showing the summary of the draft measures and it was deemed appropriate to transfer the definite details of the economic problems to other investigation organs. The first section of the Draft mainly deals with measures by Chinese side on political matters and the second section deals with measures by JAPAN on economical problems.
(Page 1)

Section 1 - Political

- 1) Stability of the leading personnels of the Chinese Government. (Page 2)
- 2) It is not necessary to alter the policy and attitude towards anti-communism, but the National Government ^{have to be induced to} would negotiate and arrange the measures for strengthening the anti-communistic movement with the Japanese Ambassador to NANKING. (Page 2)
- 3) For grasping the public sentiments in the field of pure internal administration, it is deemed appropriate to make or establish a policy or a slogan. (Page 2)

- 4). It is deemed appropriate to adopt definite measures, ^{for} facilitating a constitutional government at least to the standard reached by the CHUNGKING Regime. On adopting an epoch-making measures like taking initiative steps, may be said as another suggestion. (Page 3)
- 5). Liberation of political power and appointment of talented personels to the central political circle as well as to the government offices in important cities. (Page 3)
- 6). Accordance of better treatment to Government officials. (Page 4)

Section 2 - Economical

- 1). It is found essential to make plans for unified management of various organs of the Army and Greater East Asia Ministrie and economical advising bodies in NANKING and provinces
- 2). The method of controlling economy in CHINA must be planned by conforming to the condition in CHINA and should make the most of CHINA's originality and responsibility as much as possible
- 3). The measures to be adopted, for the time being, for inflation of currency and the appreciation of prices. (Page 5-6)

極秘

國民政府強化ニ關スル措置案

十九、十二、四支那委員會

序言

本案ハ外務大臣ノ諮問ニ對スル支那委員會ノ答申ニシテ委員會ハ十月四日開催討議ノ結果大体本案ニ意見一致ヲ見タリ

本案ニ於テハ措置案ノ要綱ヲ示スニ止マリ特ニ經濟問題ニ付テハ具體的詳細ハ他ノ審議機關ノ研究ニ讓ルヲ適當ト認メタリ

尙本案ニ於テハ日本側ノ行フヘキ施策ト中國側ノ夫レトヲ特ニ區別シ居ラスシテ何レノ場合ニ於テモ日本側ノ決意ト斷行トヲ原動力トスルハ勿論ナルカ第一政治關係事項ハ主トシテ中國側ノ措置ニシテ第二經濟關係事項ハ主トシテ日本側ノ執ルヘキ措置ナリ

一 國民政府現首腦者ノ安定
 既定方針ニ從ヒ陳公博、周佛海合作ノ最高首腦部ノ陣容ヲ支持シ
 之ヲ中心トシテ現政府ヲ結束安定セシムルコトヲ目標トシテ施策
 スルヲ要ス
 二 反共問題ノ取扱
 國民政府トシテハ反共ノ建前ヲ變更スルノ要ナキモ反共ヲ強調ス
 ルコトニ付テハ在華日本大使ト打合せサシム
 三 内政上ノ新局面ノ打開
 國民政府トシテハ最近國民ノ輿論ヲ日本トノ關係ノ調整ニ向ヘシ
 ムルヨリモ對日協力、治安、官規ノ肅正、食糧増産ヲ標語トシ居
 ルモ更ニ進ンテ純内政方面ニ於テ民心ヲ捉フル如キ政綱、政策乃
 至ハ標語ヲ作案構立スルコト適當ト認メラルル
 右具体案トシテハ後述ノ如キ憲政ノ促進、政權ノ解放、人材ノ登

外務

外務

用等ヲ考慮シ得ヘキモ更ニ一采トシテハ國民革命ノ推進經濟復興
 建設ノ抱負、計畫等ニ關シテモ對日戰爭協力上ノ可能ノ限界ヲ勘
 案シツツ研究ノ要アルヘシ

四 憲政ノ促進

少クトモ重慶政權程度ノ憲政促進ニ關スル具體的措置ヲ講スルコ
 ト適當ト認メラルルモ寧ロ之ニ先行スル如キ劃期的施措ヲ爲スコ
 ト一采ナルヘシ

具體案ハ支那側ノ副意ニ俟ツヘキモ中央及地方ニ於ケル民意暢達
 ノ機關ノ設定並地方自治ノ實施ヲ眼目トスヘキハ勿論ナリ
 尙舊租界行政ノ結果或程度ノ自治行政ニ習熟シ居タル上海、天津
 等ニ於テハ特ニ本件ヲ急進的ニ實施ヲ可トスベシ

五 政權ノ解放及人材ノ登用

前記三、四、ト相俟テ中央及重要都市ニ於ケル政權ノ解放、人材
 ノ登用ヲ試ムヘキモノト思惟セララル

外務省

外務

本件ニ關聯シ左記二點ヲ注意ノ要アリ

一ハ在野要人ノ國民政府参加ハ急激ニハ困難多キヲ以テ先ツ前記
ノ如ク地方自治ノ線ニ副ヒテ民意ヲ代表スル形式ト名目トノ下ニ
實現ヲ圖ルコトヲ要スルヘキコトニシテ二ハ政權ノ解放ハ決シテ國
民黨ノ革新強化ト背馳スルヘキモノニ非スルヲ事ヲ兩者ハ併行シテ
行ハルル要アルコト之ナリ
尙經濟統制團體及中央儲備銀行ノ人事、設備乃至ハ運営ニ當リテ
モ從來ニ増シテ民間トノ連繫ヲ強化スル如キ配意ヲ適當ト認ム
六官公吏ノ待遇改善、生活安定ニ關シ徹底的措
置ヲ講スルコト肝要ナリ
之カ爲我方ノ協力ニ依リ財源ヲ捻出スルト共ニ必需物資ノ實物給
與制度ヲ擴張スルコト可然シ

外務省

外務

第二 經濟調停事項

一 日本經濟政策適當機關ノ一元の運営

待ニ車、大東亞省圖先機關及經濟顧問系統ノ三者ヲ中央（南京）及地方ニ於テ夫々一元的ニ協力運営ヲ圖ラシムルコト肝要ナリ之カ爲車、政一元化ノ如キ根本的方法ヲ避クルト共ニ經濟參謀本部ノ如キ協力運営機構ヲ採用スル如ク考慮スル要アリ尙右參謀本部ニハ氏官經濟連ヲモ協揚スルコト可然シ

二 中國經濟統制ノ方法兼適當區分

中國ニ於ケル經濟統制ハ中國ノ事情ニ適合セル方式ニ依リ努メテ中國側ノ副官、責任ヲ活用スヘキハ勿論ナルト共ニ中國國民ノ適當區分ニ付テハ官ハ大綱ノ監督ニ止マリ業務ノ運営ハ努メテ民間ニ委ヌルコト其効ヲ求クル所以ナルト共ニ他國政府ニ對スル民心離反ヲ避クル方途タルヘシ

三 通貨・物價對策トシテ差富リ感ル可キ恒情

外務

外務

以多

Memo. of Telephone Exchanges.

Written on a copy-paper of the Foreign Ministry

Telephone messages exchanged between:-

May 8, 1941 7 a.m. - MATSUOKA and NOMURA

8 p.m. - NOMURA and MATSUOKA

Sept. 24, 1941 - TOYODA and NOMURA

Oct. 14, 1941 noon (Japanese time)

Chief of the American Bureau TERASAKI and

Minister to Washington WAKASUGI

by international telephone.

Note: The records of phone-messages of the above are not to be found in Private Secretary's Office and others, but may be available from TERASAKI who was the Chief of the American Bureau.

昭和十六年五月八日
前七時 杉園
八時 野村
野村 杉園
野村 杉園
電話連絡内容

昭和十六年九月二十日

豊田大臣 野村大使 電話内容

昭和十六年十月十四日 正午 (日本時間)

寺崎アメリカ局長ト在米若杉公使ト口際電話ニテ通知

内容

右電話内容、記録秘書官室基、他、見書田ラズ

此寺崎公使(書田時)アメリカ局長ト尋ねられた何利明スルモノト野村省

1916

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Item No 46-D.

MASAKICHI ICHINOMIYA

Details concerning the negotiations
of adjustment of the relation between Japan
and U. S. A. in 1941

prepared by the Committee of the ^{war time} Historical Investigation

date - January 1940.

Section 1. Enactment of the Tripartite Pact
^{between} Japan, Germany and Italy and its
relationship with ^{the} U.S.A.

(1) The development of the Tripartite Pact ^{between}
Japan, Germany and Italy.

The problem of strengthening the Axis of Japan, Germany and
Italy has been a long standing one since the HIRANUMA

Cabinet in 1939, and ^{an important} a great diplomatic problem.

In July of 1940,

~~But~~ when Prince KONOE received the Emperor's order to

form a new Cabinet after the ^{abdication} retirement of the YONAI

Cabinet, ~~in July 1940~~, he ^{invited} ~~the~~ the three men, YOSUKE

MATSUOKA, HIDEKI TOJO, and ZENGO YOSHIDA, prospective ministers

for Foreign, War, and Navy Departments to his private residence
on July 19th, prior to the formation of the cabinet,

and conferred with them for three and half
hours ^{on} ~~about~~ the diplomatic policy of the new Cabinet,
and came to the conclusion that the strengthening of the
Axis of Japan, Germany and Italy should be the
fundamental policy of the Cabinet. ^{Therefore,} ~~So~~ when the new Cabinet
was formed on the 22nd July, that policy became the
main policy of the Cabinet.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, thinking that the time was ripe for
(with the arrival of German Envoy Stammer to Japan)
consolidating the Axis of Japan, Germany and Italy, made
basic plan of his own
~~fundamental outlines~~ for strengthening the Axis which
outlines were much stronger than the ones made at
the executive offices of
the Foreign, War and Navy Departments. ~~concurrently~~

Matsuoka

~~And~~ he presented this to the 4 ministers' conference

of ~~the~~ (Premier KONOE, War Minister TOJO, Navy Minister YOSHIDA and

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) on the 2nd Sept. for discussion.

But ^{no} the Navy Minister ~~not~~ did not approve ~~consenting~~ to the whole of the

plan, the project of strengthening the Axis seemed to be at a temporary standstill.

~~standing still for a time,~~ ~~But~~ the Navy Minister YOSHIDA

resigned his ~~resigning~~ ~~the~~ post, for reason of sickness, on the 5th September, ~~and was~~ ~~succeeded by~~ ^{succeeding}

Admiral OIKAWA. ~~became~~ ~~the~~ Navy Minister. ~~and~~ ~~after~~ ~~the~~ ~~general~~

after the Cabinet's general meeting, ~~Conference of ministers,~~ ~~they~~ had the four Ministers Conference was ^{held}

and ^{on} that occasion Foreign Minister MATSUOKA emphasized and explained that the only way to break the deadlock was the ~~the~~ ~~point~~ ~~that~~ ~~there~~ ~~was~~ ~~no~~ ~~other~~ ~~way~~ ~~but~~ ~~the~~ enactment

~~be~~ ~~able~~ ~~to~~ of the tripartite Pact ~~that~~ ~~would~~ ~~break~~ ~~down~~ ~~the~~

~~difficult situation in Japan~~ ^{at the present} ~~was in.~~

Naval Minister OIKAWA, after listening, ^{gave his approval and} ~~consented~~, thus the

proposed plan of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA passed the four Ministers

Conference,

But ^{Since this was closely connected to the rights of} ~~as this had much to do with the Supreme Command,~~

~~they held~~ a joint meeting of the Cabinet and the Imperial

Headquarters ^{was held} before the Emperor, and there decided to

proceed ~~to~~ negotiation with Germany on the lines settled

at the four Ministers Conference.

Interpretation held by

(2) ~~Outlook of~~ the Japanese Government on
the Tripartite Pact and its' relation with ^{the} U.S.A.

Prince KONOE in his opening speech at the meeting before the

Emperor made the following remarks:-

" ~~where~~ As you all know, the China incident has not ~~yet come~~ ^{yet been}

~~its~~ ^{solved and} ~~to~~ ^{resent} ~~submission,~~ the attitude of America toward us has

~~recently~~ ^{quite adamant.} become ~~pretty~~ strong. As the attitude of America

becomes strong, those ^{possessing} of other nations who ~~have~~ hostile

intentions toward us, such as ^{the} ~~the~~ Chungking Government, etc,

will be influenced, and ~~we~~ ^{our international position will become} have to stand in a very
much aggravated, which will have deep bearings in our future.

critical position among the nations. In order to break

through ~~down~~ this critical situation, ^{it is necessary that we} ~~we~~ must strengthen

our international position

~~our~~ stand among nations, and there is no other way to bring this about ~~but~~ ^{than} to form a strong alliance

with ~~the~~ nations that have the common interests similar to ours

under the present circumstances. ~~Since~~ ^{Since} Germany and Italy

wish to prevent America's entry into the war

~~are wanting America not to enter into the war~~, and Japan

desires

~~is desiring~~ to avoid ~~the~~ crisis with America, ~~too~~,

both possess the

~~so we have here~~ a common interest.

(Fundamentally,

-- (omit) -- ~~of course~~, this draft has

~~the~~ purpose as ^{its} objective ~~in view~~, yet, ^{it is necessary that} we must ~~not~~

we must also be prepared for the worst ^{possible occurrences, and therefore, it could} case possible, ~~to this end~~

that this ^{has direct bearing on the future of our nation.} will be said ~~an~~ unprecedented important proposal. ---

MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister, in explaining the bill said,

" The ^{basic} ~~foundation~~ principle of the present negotiation

with Germany is ^{totally} ~~altogether~~ different from that ~~of~~ ^{of}

the HIRANUMA cabinet. Germany ^(has made clear) ~~says~~ that is not necessary for Japan

to participate in the European War. ^{Germany does not want} She is wanting America to

~~not~~ enter into the War, and Japan ^{desires to} is wanting to avoid

which are the common objectives of both nations.

~~The~~ collision with America; ~~there are~~ ^{not also} ~~we have the common interest~~

--- (omit) --- I think that it is almost hopeless to amend Japanese-American relationship by resorting to

courtesy or goodwill, and ~~moreover~~, ^{but also} I fear that it would on the contrary aggravate matters.

~~but~~ it will become worse by such gestures. ~~And the~~

The ^{only measure now left for} ~~only hope for the~~ amendment, ^(or the prevention of further aggravation) if there is any left, is

to ^{take} ~~show~~ a ^{firm} ~~strong~~ attitude. Furthermore, in order to

strengthen our firm attitude, we must bind ourselves with

~~some~~ ~~by~~ ~~getting~~ ~~together~~ as many countries as possible

~~into our hands~~ and ~~show~~ ^{by propagating} this fact to the ^{immediately} world, ~~and this is our strong stand against~~ ~~firm attitude~~, we can meet
I believe that it is, from the point of diplomacy, an urgent matter
~~This I believe is the most urgent diplomatic course~~
in retaliating against America.

But I, as the Foreign Minister, ^(always) and will be ready to grasp any
will pay minute attention to the responses of such measures
opportunity I can lay hold of, in diverting our ^{strained} relationship
with America, ~~paying minute attention to the responses and effects~~

~~of the above measures.~~ At any rate, we must clearly show
to the outside world as well as to our people, our firm attitude of
retaliation with ^{the} resolute determinations void of a single
point of doubt. "

Thus we ^{can} see that the 2nd KONOE Cabinet had faith, that in
forming this Tripartite Military Pact between Japan, Germany
and Italy, ^{and that although America was their common objective, they} did not want America as her enemy and that
by forming this pact can they only avert war with America.
~~only by this means.~~ Although this ^{Pact} ~~Attitude~~ led

~~a common objective, namely America, yet it did~~

~~not want to fight with America.~~

After several ^{conferring} ~~negotiations~~ with Ambassador OTTO and

Envoy Stammer, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA completed all

^{of the negotiations} the details concerning the pact on September 24th, at

7:25 P.M.

Interpretations held by

(3) ~~Outlook~~ of Japan and Germany regarding the Tripartite Pact and its relationship with America and Soviet Russia

Concerning the ^{relationship} ~~relation~~ of the Triple Military Pact

and America, the following might be said to be ^(from records made at that time) responsible an approximate summary of views of those who

~~took part~~ for the negotiations between Jap

(Very secret)

The following are ^{the} important points of the informal conversations ~~that had been~~ exchanged between MATSUOKA, ^{the} German Ambassador and his assistant, Stammer.

(1.) Germany does not want the present war to develop into a World War; ^{she} desires to put an end to it as quickly as possible; ^{she} specially desires ^{that the} U.S.A. will ^{stay} stand outside the limits of war.
~~of the war.~~

(2.) Germany is not expecting any military aid from Japan at the present stage of the War against England.

(3.) What Germany expects of Japan is that Japan (^{utilize every means available to}) and prevent will restrain and check ^{the} U.S.A. ^{from} entering into the War, ~~by putting all the means available~~

Although Germany believes that ^{the} U.S.A. will not enter into the war, ~~but~~ she ~~does not like to~~ ^{can not} tread on dangerous ground.

4. Germany does not think that Germany and America will collide in the near future, but thinks that ~~the~~ collision and war between Japan and America may be unavoidable.

(5) Consequently, Germany ^{believes} ~~thinks~~ that it is profitable for both ~~the~~ Japan and Germany that, they should enact ^{Italy will join} ~~(Italy joining)~~ an agreement ^(and that the three nations should) ~~and~~ ^{and be always effective} ~~be~~ thoroughly prepared ^{any urgent crisis that occurs.} ~~for the worst case at any time,~~ by which ^{the} U.S.A. entry into this present war

This is the only means, ~~if there is left any means~~ could be checked (if there is a way of checking) and, at the same ~~at all, whereby we could check U.S.A.~~

to prevent armed warfare with Japan
~~entering in the present war, and at the same time~~
~~to avoid~~

the war between Japan and U.S. ^{if it be} ~~at all possible,~~

6. A strong, decided, ^(and yet a) clear and immovable attitude
^{(and the conception of this attitude by the U.S.A and the world at large, is}
on the side of Japan, Germany and Italy ^{the only strong}
and effective preventive a brake to check
a barricade against Americas ~~entry into the war.~~

^(shown at this present stage)
A weak and lukewarm attitude ^{may only} ~~invite~~ ^{invite}
ridicule and danger.

7. Germany wants Japan to be cognizant of the situation and to
realize the danger that is ~~at hand~~ ^{approaching}
^{(therefore wants Japan) speedily and}
from the Western Hemisphere, and ^{to act clearly by}
enacting a pact between Germany and Italy, so that it will
check America and ~~any~~ other ^{countries of the world} ~~country to entertain~~

from harbouring the) (and speculations
the least doubts of our actions

8. Germany and Italy will do their utmost to check

America in the Atlantic, (if it is necessary, to send

Japan ^{armaments} ~~advances~~ such as planes, tanks and other weapons
including man power) and immediately ^{supply Japan with armaments} and offer her all possible assistance.

9. Germany recognizes the ^{political} leadership of Japan

in greater East Asia of which she will respect, and what
Germany expects ~~she expects~~ in these areas is of the ^{economical} ~~financial~~ nature;

and to accomplish ^{this aim Germany} ~~the same~~, she is prepared to work

with Japan. ~~And~~ Germany expects that ^{Japan} ~~she~~ should do
her utmost and supply her with the necessary materials of these
~~to given opportunities to get in these areas, or that~~
she should be given access to these materials Germany needs at the present
~~what materials she wants now or she may want in future~~

or in the future.

10. Firstly, ~~to~~ ^{to conclude the pact} ~~to come to agreement~~ between Japan,

Germany and Italy, and ~~then take up the relation with~~ ^{then immediately negotiate}

~~the~~ Soviet Russia, Germany is willing ^{to serve as a} ~~to be the~~

Japan and Russia on the 'closer relationship' ^{go-between} ~~the~~ ^{problems of coming nearer of Japan and Russia} ~~problem~~

and she does not think there is any insurmountable obstruction.

In fact the problems will be rather easily solved, because

The relation ^{ship} between Germany and Russia is favourable

in spite of the counter propaganda of England, Russia is truly fulfilling the promises made to Germany and Germany is satisfied.

(11) → (12) Germany wants Japan to join ~~in~~ the Tripartite Pact

in the perfect sense of the word, and that before

[Although, not mentioning America in the term of 'Anglo-Saxon' ^{it bore that far reaching view of carrying out a great war against Britain} ~~war~~ the end of the war with England. The present

will cease before long, yet the greater and bigger

11

It is necessary that the axis inclusive of Japan, should prepare thoroughly to meet any urgent situation, but Germany will do her utmost to prevent Japanese-American collision, and furthermore, if it is possible, to find means of improving the relationship of both nations.

fight ~~against so called Anglo-Saxon nations including~~
(will continue for some length of time) ^{say}
~~U. S. A. will have to be waged for long,~~ perhaps, several decades.

(MATSUOKA emphasized this point) Japan, Germany and Italy
must be closely ~~united~~ ^{unite themselves} until this great object
~~is accomplished~~ ^{is accomplished}
~~of this great object, at last.~~

Remarks.

The tripartite pact was formed in anticipation that Russia
would be drawn into the pact soon. We did not expect
at all that in less than a year Germany will attack
Russia without referring the matter to Japan.

Section II.

Synopsis of the Negotiations of Japan and U.S.A.,

(1) Adjustment of relationship^{ship} between Japan and ^{the} U.S.A. under the YONAI Cabinet.

The recent A-J

The relationship^{ship} between Japan and ^{the} U.S.A. in recent years

(brought about a new ^{Stimson} epoch when the Secretary of State, declared ~~seemed to have made an~~ non-recognition ~~the~~ disapproval of Manchukuo in connection with the Manchurian

On July 7, 1937

Incident of Feb, 1932, ~~But~~ when the Marco Polo Bridge incident

and the military operation of Japan in China began to spread broke out, ~~7th July 1937 and it began to spread, naturally~~

it naturally influenced the interests of the signatories of the Nine Nations pact and ~~interests~~ of America in

China. ~~not a little was influenced.~~ And The American

(frequent)

Government made protests against the Japanese Government and the relationship between both countries became tense.

~~time after time, and the tension began to become tight.~~

Finally,

~~and~~ in July 1939, the commercial treaty between Japan
and ^{the} U.S.A. was ~~denounced~~ ^{abolished}, and the two nations were placed
in a state of non-treaty relationship.
~~in no treaty relation.~~ On September 3, 1939,

the second European War broke out which brought a great change ~~some~~

~~over~~ ⁱⁿ the world situation. America seemed to have ^{had} the

intention of ~~checking~~ ^{preventing} Japan to enter the Axis Camp,

and in June of 1940, ^{Ambassador Grew in Tokyo} ~~she~~ began to negotiate with Foreign Minister

ARITA ~~through her Ambassador Grew in Tokyo,~~ ^{regarding the} ~~concerning the~~
question of general

All-inclusive adjustment of relations ^{with} between Japan and ^{the} U.S.A.
(on the proposal by the U.S.A.)

Since that time there were several negotiations concerning

maintenance of the status quo of the territories and
in the whole Pacific area

the dependencies of the Nations ~~the~~ fighting in Europe,

~~that were~~ proposed from the ~~American side~~. ~~But these but~~ with the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet on July 16th, the ~~negotiations did not see any tangible result for Yonai cabinet~~ parley came to a standstill. Further negotiations were ~~resigned 16th July the same year~~. The second KONOE cabinet opened under new conditions by the succeeding 2nd ~~succeeded and negotiations were handed over to this cabinet~~ Kono cabinet.

(2) International situation and ^{the American Japanese Negotiation} ~~negotiation of Japan and~~ ^{during} U.S.A. in the second and the third KONOE cabinet.

The second KONOE cabinet signed the Tripartite Pact ^{on the 27th Sept, 1940} ~~Sept, 1940~~,

thinking that the only way of breaking ~~up~~ ^{deadlock} the ~~difficult~~ ^{difficult}

~~situation~~ between Japan and ^{the} U.S.A. ^{was by showing} ~~is to show frank~~ ^{based upon this conception,} a firm ^{towards the} ~~attitude~~ ^{U.S.A., and that could} for Japan ~~a strong~~ attitude ^{made it an important cabinet policy of} ~~be brought about only by~~ consolidating the relationship

of Japan, Germany and Italy.

Although the KONOE cabinet ^{hoped for American-Japanese} ~~wished the~~ adjustment, ~~of~~
~~the relationship between~~ ^{she} ~~of Japan and U.S.~~ ^{refrained to} ~~she avoided to~~
enter into immediate negotiations ^{because, as a preparatory} ~~right away~~ ^{movement} she must first conclude the signing of
~~on the one hand was busy in preparatory proceedings~~
~~and nextly,~~
~~in signing the tri-partite pact, the Neutral Treaty between~~
and nextly the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on
~~Japan and Russia~~ 22nd April, 1941, and by such measures

to strengthen her international position. On the other
hand, ^(who had many friends in America) ^{Japanese} ^{the}
Japan ~~not~~ appointed Admiral NOMURA as ^{the} Ambassador to U.S.A.

^{the} on 27th of Nov. 1940 ~~who had many friends there.~~

During the ^{American-Japanese} ^{shift}
One year of the KONOE cabinet, ~~the~~ ^{the} relationship ~~between~~

~~Japan and U.S.~~ ^{went} ~~going~~ from bad to worse,
and thus the hopes of American-Japanese adjustments produced
contradicting results

~~American-Japanese Adjustments~~
~~and hopes.~~

In stating the brief outlines

of the above situation, ^{the} on ~~25th~~ ^{of} July 1940, ^{the} U.S. Government

effected the ~~put into action an~~ Export Permit System for petroleum,

petrolie manufactures, and scrap irons; ~~on 31st of the~~ and announced embargo

~~for exports on~~ ~~put in embargo on~~ gasoline used for planes, ~~on the 31st of the same month,~~

and on ^{the} 13th of September ~~on~~ plane motors, accessories, fuels, their

methods of manufacture and their machines; and

on the 26th ^{of the} ~~same month~~ ^{September} on scrap iron and iron ore.

~~And thus~~ ^{the} U.S. government began to ~~put~~ ^{effecting economic pressure} financial oppression

and on September 20th, Hull, ~~the Secretary of state, announced~~
on Japan, ~~more and more,~~

the united defence measures of England, U.S.A. and Australia ~~and~~
and of the negotiations regarding utilization of Singapore, which showed the
~~the agreement of utilizing Singapore.~~ All this proved

~~intensification~~ ^{intensified} of the Attitude of U.S. Government,

Whereas in the East ~~A~~ ^a military agreement between the French and the Japanese Armies was formed on the 22nd of September, ~~French India~~ ^{French India} ~~was formed~~ ^{was formed} 22 Sept, and on the 23rd, our Army ~~occupied~~ ^{occupied} carried on a relatively peaceful occupational operation into French-Indochina. ~~French India~~ ^{French India} ~~peacefully~~ ^{peacefully} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~formed~~ ^{formed}, and on the 27th ^{of the} same month,

the tri-partite ~~belligerent~~ ^{military} pact ^{between} of Japan, Germany and Italy was

signed. ^{which} ~~It~~ caused a great shock to the American public.

On the other hand, on the 12th of October, Roosevelt declared ~~the~~ continuation of help to England and Chungking, which was a retaliation.

~~12th Oct~~ ~~in opposition~~ to the Tripartite pact, and on ^{the} 13th of November, England newly established ~~the Eastern HQ~~ ^{her Far Eastern General Headquarters} at Singapore.

On the 30th of November, ^{the} Japan-China ^(Basic) ~~fundamental~~ Treaty and Japan-China-Manchukuo Joint Declaration.

~~the Common declaration of Japan, China and Manchukuo.~~

Japan rejected the Chungking Government and formally ^{recognized} ~~recognized~~ the

Nanking Government as the legitimate Chinese Government ~~to which~~

On the other hand, the United States Government supporting

^{her} ^{new} granted a loan of \$100,000,000 ^{U.S.} to the Chungking Government.

The attitudes of Japan's supporting the Nanking Government and the United States support of the Chungking Government became conspicuous more and more, and on January 26th, 1941, during the Diet's Budget meeting, MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister said ~~that~~ that

improvement in ^{between} Japan and the U.S. was hopeless ^{ship}

as long as the U.S. ~~will~~ ^{maintain} China as ^{her} the first line of

national defence and utilize ^{her} as an instrument of curbing

the policy of Japan,

on February 19th,

Ambassador NOMURA ^{the American Newspapermen} told ~~on the 19th Feb.~~ that Japan

will ~~not~~ go into war ^{as long as the United States of America challenges} ~~unless she be challenged to it~~ ^{her.}

by the U.S.

Churchill the English Premier lashed to SHIGEMITSU
in his answer to the anti-English message of
Japanese Embassy to England a memorandum, 24th Feb. [MATSUOKA]

remarking strongly to avoid the crisis of the relation between
England and Japan.

On the 11th March an agreement was formed of solution of problems
between Tai and French-India and Tai promised not to form
any political, financial, and military agreement with 3rd Nation
that was contrary to the interest of Japan,

MATSUOKA on his way back from Germany and Italy
called on Stalin at Moscow and enacted a Neutral
Treaty, by which the both countries promised to maintain
the peace in Manchuria and outer Mongolia and not to violate

each other. Thus the relations of Japan with the Eastern Nations had become more and more intimate. But the Chungking Government manifested its disapproval of Russo-Japanese Neutral Treaty.

On the 4th May the President Roosevelt manifested an open challenge against the Axis nations declaring that U. S. was ready to fight for the maintenance and existence of democracy.

On the 27th May Colonel HIRAIDE of the Intelligence Bureau of the Navy showed the attitude of the Navy by declaring that she would fight anyone who challenged her.

On the 30th May MATSUOKA the Foreign Minister said, in

opposing some article in American paper, that Japan did not avoid to take the responsibilities of the tri-partite Pact of Japan, Germany, and Italy, and her Southern Policy is peaceful, but in case of peaceful policy be made impossible other consideration must be taken.

On the 6th June Fankook the delegate of Dutch-Indies handed to YOSHIZAWA Envoy a strong and decided answer to the negotiations between Japan and Holland. So we closed negotiations and decided to call back our delegates.

Hull the Secretary of State showed his anti-Japan and also anti-Russo attitude by restricting or prohibiting the export of ordnance to Japan and Russia before,

but when Germany suddenly opened fire against Russia 22nd June and declared war, America changed her attitude toward Russia and began to help her.

On the 2nd Oct. ⁽¹⁹⁴¹⁾ a Conference was held before the Emperor and an important policy was decided as regard the International Situation, and MATSUOKA said that Japan would be looking over the situation of the world in connection with the war between Germany and Russia. At the same time the Chief of Intelligence Bureau of Soviet Russia said that her attitude toward Japan was not changed.

On the 16th July the 2nd KONOE Cabinet resigned and the 3rd KONOE Cabinet was formed 18th and SADAJIRO TOYOTA admiral

became the Foreign Minister.

(Note:- It is now impossible to ascertain the cause of the downfall of the 2nd KONOE Cabinet through documents, yet it seems most probable that it was because she wanted to make MATSUOKA to resign who is not favourable with U.S, and thus pacify the feelings of America.)

(3) International Situation and negotiations between Japan and U.S: in the time of 3rd KONOE Cabinet,

Thus we see that one year of 2nd KONOE cabinet was spent in seeing the relation between Japan and America going from bad to worst. But the true intention of the Japanese Government was not for war, but ^{was} by showing a strong

attitude to avoid the War with America,

At the latter part of the 2nd KONOË and all through the 3rd KONOË

Cabinets there continued negotiations between Japan and America

but it became worse and worse.

On 19th July Premier KONOË sent a message to Wan the Chief

stating that Japanese attitude toward foreign nations and

China herself had not seen any change.

On 25th July U.S. froze the funds of Japan in America,

and England too did the same in her country and besides

she notified Japan that she would ~~make~~ ^{nullify} the Commercial

Treaties between England and Japan, India and Japan,

Burma and Japan, and New Zealand and Japan.

On the 27th Dutch Indies Government notified to annul
the Financial Treaty between Japan and Dutch-Indies and
on the 28th the Petroleum Treaty. Kuo Tai-chi

On 29th a French-Japan Treaty was signed for the common defense.

4th August Chungking Government declared the formation of

Allied Nations of England, U.S., Russia and China.

24th Aug, the English Premier censured the China incident and

broad cast the alliance of England and U.S. in the East.

Dutch Indies and New Zealand declared ^{their intention} to fight together with

England and U.S.

Thus the situation in the South became serious.

Premier LONNOU sent a message to President Roosevelt

suggesting a talk between the top men of both countries.

And this mitigated the tension for a time.

During the time NOMURA the Ambassador to the States had been
President
negotiating with Roosevelt ~~the~~ and Hall the Secretary of state, but

did not come into any compromising point.

The proposal of KONOE was to stand still because America
wanted a preliminary arrangement to be made before they meet
together and have a talk.

Internal situations had become very serious and on the 12th.

KONOE the Prime Minister, TOJO the War Minister, OIKAWA the Navy Minister, TOYOTA the
Foreign Minister, SUZUKI the Chief of the Planning Department met at
the official residence of the Premier and decided

the following as the
Japan's attitude in negotiating with U.S.

(A) No change in policies pertaining to the retention of the Army
in China.

(B) Give no occasion of vicissitude to the results of
the China incident.

The Foreign Minister in investigating ^{the possibility of} the above attitude
in the negotiations with U.S. had come to the conclusion
that that attitude would not go, proposed several amendments
and not consenting to appeal to arms unless for self
protection, the opinions of the Cabinet dissented and
thus the 3rd KONOE cabinet resigned 16th Oct.

On the 18th Oct. TOJO Cabinet was formed and

SHIGE TOKU TOGO became the Foreign Minister,

To assist NOMURA the Envoy KURUSU was sent to Washington
15th and he immediately took part in the negotiations.

On the 18th U.S. amended Neutral Law and armed merchant
ships with armament and blockaded the belligerent area.

On the 22nd and 24th Hull the Secretary of State had
an important talk with ^{the} Ambassadors of England, Australia,
Holland and Chungking concerning the negotiation with
Japan.

On the 25th ^(Treaty) the Lengthening of the
Anti-Red pact 5 years more was signed
at Berlin by Japan, Germany, China, Rumania, Bulgaria,
Slovakia, Finland, Denmark.

On the 26th Hull the Secretary of State handed
to NOMURA and KURUSU ambassadors the U.S. government
claims in writing, and next day Roosevelt explained

the same ~~to~~ accompanied by Hull the Secretary
Secretary

On the 3rd, Hull gave out the proceedings of
Japan-American negotiations.

England called back of all ^{English} ships in China and great
number of her countrymen who were in Shanghai.

On the 8th Dec, Japan handed the answer to U.S.
and finally went into war.