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Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

February 15, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

Vol. 63

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Friday, February 15, 1946

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1
2 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in
3 order.

4 Does counsel have anything at this time before the
5 examination of the witnesses?

6 Mr. Richardson: Nothing, Mr. Chairman.

7 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I have some questions that
8 I want to ask from Colonel Bratton.

9 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, last night the Senator from
10 Michigan, in questioning the witness on the stand, read
11 from paragraphs on page 1, under the heading of "Lieutenant
12 O'Dell", about a certain dispatch from Australia.

13 On page 2 there is testimony to the effect that that
14 telegram or dispatch had been sent to Hawaii, and that there
15 was no mention of Pearl Harbor whatsoever in the telegram,
16 that they expected an attack on the Philippines and the
17 Indies.

18 I think, in view of part of the statement of the witness
19 having gone into the record, that the rest of the statement
20 of the witness should be incorporated at this point.

21 Senator Ferguson: I have no objection.

22 The Vice Chairman: Without objection, so ordered.

23 (The matter referred to is as follows:)
24
25

1 Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Colonel E. W. Gibson, and Lt. O'Dell.

2 6 October 1944, 9 A.M.

3 CWC: All right, now tell me your story. We got the story
4 that you wrote to Kemper and said you knew who did
5 Pearl Harbor, or something to that effect; so you can
6 start telling us what you know.

7 O'D: Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I
8 thought might not have come out through other sources.
9 There was a cable that was sent on the fifth of December
10 to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian and Philippine
11 Departments concerning the movement of a Japanese Task
12 Force in the South China Sea. The information had come
13 to the Military Attache through the Australian Govern-
14 ment, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, who called
15 Colonel Merle Smith and myself to his office.

16 CWC: You were then Merle Smith's assistant?

17 O'D: That's right. There were the two of us, and he is
18 now dead. That's the reason I stuck my nose in this.
19 We were called over on Thursday afternoon about 5 o'clock.
20 Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, myself, and
21 Colonel Merle Smith and Commander Saom, who is the
22 Naval Liaison Officer from the Dutch East Indies.
23 The information was primarily in regard to the
24 Netherlands, to the Indies, and, as I say, principally
25 concerned itself with the movement of a Jap Task Force

1 in the South China Sea. However, within an hour
2 after we had gotten there some additional information
3 came in, the exact nature of which I wasn't told at the
4 time, but when we went out, Colonel Merle Smith had me
5 prepare a cable which he revised to send out and the
6 principal part of that other than the movement of this
7 convoy was that the Dutch had ordered the execution of
8 the Rainbow Plan, A-2. I remember, it's been almost
9 three years now, and I can distinctly remember that
10 particular part of the cable where it said A-2, repeat
11 A-2, which was a part of the joint Abducan plan only to
12 be taken in the event of war. It provided for specific
13 occurrences they would counteract by certain other
14 action. In other words, A-1 would have been some other
15 direction expected attack, A-2 was from a particular
16 direction, and they ordered the execution of this A-2.
17 That was significant because the plan called for joint
18 operations for the Australians and the Dutch and to
19 the best of my knowledge our Navy if nothing else.
20 That was to go into effect only in case of war and
21 here the Dutch had ordered it. That was the definite
22 information that it had gone into effect. There was
23 a bit of flurried excitement with that, and Sir Charles
24 Burnett asked us not to send that cable and Colonel
25 Merle Smith, although impatient to send it, said that he

1 would wait twelve hours at Sir Charles Burnett's
2 specific request. In other words, they didn't say
3 they wouldn't let that cable go out, but I dare say
4 they probably would have stopped it had we tried to
5 launch it.

6 CWC: Let me ask you -- now that was on December 5?

7 O'D: Sir, that was Thursday, the 4th, and we held it.

8 CWC: In other words that's the 3rd our time.

9 O'D: That's right, sir.

10 CWC: And you didn't send it actually until the 5th?

11 O'D: Well, the reason for the delay was that there was a
12 War Cabinet Meeting at which Sir Charles Burnett was
13 to report this information to the Australian War Cabinet
14 which was meeting in Melbourne that evening, and he
15 went from his office to the War Cabinet meeting. We,
16 on our part, held the cable twelve hours, and I coded
17 it and had it ready for dispatch and held on to it.
18 In the cable (it was extremely urgent) this convoy,
19 they had it doped out, could get to somewhere, either
20 the Philippines or the Indies within, I believe it was,
21 60 hours, and that is the way that we had figured it.
22 So we sent the cable one copy to General MacArthur
23 in his code that we had then and another copy in a
24 different code to Hawaii with a repeat to the Commanding
25 General, Hawaiian Department, the request to repeat it
to Washington. In other words, we sent none direct to

1 MILID as we would have done if time hadn't been such
2 a factor. But, we were extremely laborious in writing --

3 CWC: In other words, you fellows instead of having a drop
4 copy for Hawaii, you have it to Hawaii and told them --

5 O'D: And told them to repeat it here, sir, and then send
6 another copy to the Philippines. There was no hint
7 of Pearl Harbor in this whatsoever. It wholly concerned
8 itself with the Philippines and the Indies, and it
9 looked like the Indies at that precise moment would
10 be the first to get it. Now, we sent that cable, that
11 would be the morning of the 5th their time, and I see
12 in the papers where Dixon denied that his country had
13 any information of an attack on Pearl Harbor, and it
14 was reported to the press in that way, which is so. But
15 they did have a warning of action in the Philippines
16 or in the South Pacific Area. I would say it is
17 inescapable that they did. I don't know -- we never
18 had any acknowledgment of the cable from either Hawaii
19 or the Philippines, and we never heard anything from
20 MILID to let us know whether or not it had reached
21 them. Of course, the subsequent events were such that
22 it might have been overlooked. The file copy was
23 destroyed -- ah, this looks like it. That's it, sir,
24 Netherlands Far East Command on Execution of Plan A-2.
25 Naval moves in Mindanao -- (interrupted)

1 CWC: General Osmun, this is Lieutenant O'Dell.

2 RAO: O'Dell.

3 O'D: How do you do, sir.

4 RAO: Mighty glad to know you.

5 O'D: Pleased to meet you, sir.

6 CWC: He's giving us some information here in connection
7 with this Pearl Harbor business.

8 RAO: I've heard about it.

9 CWC: You've heard about Pearl Harbor?

10 RAO: Ha! Ha! I'll tell you sometime about a year from now
11 at Christmas we'll all get together and celebrate that.
12 I'm glad to have met you.

13 O'D: Thank you, sir.

14 O'D: What made us particularly angry about this was that
15 the next morning the newspaper came out in the early
16 edition with a certain part of this information about
17 the Indies. And, after we had held the cable up at
18 their request, Colonel Merle-Smith naturally raised a
19 great deal of trouble over why we had had to hold our
20 cable and the press had gotten an inkling of it; they
21 hadn't gotten the works, sir, but they had an inkling.
22 That is the message in particular, sir. That is the one.

23 CWC: Notice the footnote down there.

24 O'D: "And relayed to War Department message center" (reading
25 from message).

1 (Interrupted by telephone. CWC talked for some time
2 with General Strong)

3 O'D: We expected action to take place on Sunday our time,
4 and we all went down to the office on Sunday and waited
5 with bated breath, and nothing happened Sunday. That
6 led us to believe that, well, this was another of those
7 scares. As you can probably guess, sir, we had had
8 several previous warnings of impending action in time
9 to reflect that in the reports and cables that we had
10 sent. One other positive action was that Kopang -- two
11 days before this happened -- received fifty (the
12 Japanese Consul received) cases which he wished to
13 have in under Diplomatic privilege and it was refused
14 by the Dutch and opened by the Dutch before he could get
15 them back on this Japanese ship. I think that was the
16 trouble, there wasn't a Japanese ship that he could put
17 it on. And, when they opened it, they found a complete,
18 well not radar because radar wasn't in the state that
19 we now know it, but it was a sending and receiving
20 radio set, and we had had information about that.
21 Also, of course, all the Japanese shipping had been
22 pulled back into Japanese waters for at least sixty
23 days before. And, then on the afternoon that this
24 was sent, we sent that in the morning, the Japanese
25 consul in Melbourne, who was under surveillance, was

1 seen to burn all of his codes in the backyard. Nobody,
2 of course, was able to make a move to stop him, but
3 they saw that.

4 CWC: You're sure this was sent out from Singapore, or where
5 was it sent from?

6 O'D: From Melbourne, sir.

7 CWC: Melbourne on the fifth.

8 O'D: The fifth, in the morning, sir.

9 EWG: According to this copy, Colonel, this was received by
10 Signals Hawaii, don't know when, but it was relayed to
11 the War Department, arriving here at the night of Pearl
12 Harbor day, December 7, with a memo on it that this
13 was addressed to CG, Hawaii and relayed here with
14 request for decipherment and repeat back to them.

15 CWC: Well, we got that in there with old man Smith's note.

16 EWG: Yes, we have that. The only thing is, it is curious
17 why Signals Hawaii held that so long. They couldn't
18 decipher it; maybe they thought they could, I don't know.

19 O'D: It was sent positively in a code which Hawaii had.

20 CWC: What did you use?

21 O'D: The information that was on the code and cipher. We
22 used the secret book with the cipher table.

23 CWC: Did you use the black book, or the red book? Do you
24 remember?

25 O'D: If I saw it, of course, I could identify it. As I

1 remember it, it was gray. I don't remember. There
2 was a thick confidential and a thin secret and then
3 there were the cipher tables that were changed every
4 thirty days, and we were very careful to pick one.
5 That's why we had to code it twice, once in a code that
6 we knew Hawaii had and once in one the Philippines had
7 because the Philippines had different codes entirely
8 from Hawaii, and we had to -- well, you can imagine,
9 that is a rather laborious job, a message like that.

10 CWC: The message we got in said it was held 17 hours.

11 O'D: That was 17 hours, sir, from one afternoon until the
12 next morning. I see they have a question mark under
13 what government. It was the Australian government.
14 We put that in the message.

15 EWG: Did you ever in Australia hear of any information
16 indicating that there was a task force sailing toward
17 Pearl Harbor?

18 O'D: Not toward Pearl Harbor, sir. We never had any informa-
19 tion or anything in that direction. We knew of a task
20 force in the South China Sea, and whether it was headed
21 for the Philippines or whether it was headed for any
22 part of the Indies, the reconnaissance information
23 that was available to us did not specify.

24 CWC: Did you know about the build up of a task force in the
25 Marshalls?

1 O'D: Yes, sir.

2 CWC: You did know about that.

3 O'D: Yes, sir, through the Australian Government again.

4 Mostly the RAAF. They were the ones rather than the
5 Army or the Navy, it was the RAAF that was feeding us
6 what information of value --

7 CWC: How far in advance of Pearl Harbor did you know that,
8 do you recall?

9 O'D: I should say it was in that same week. Probably early
10 in that week. That was toward the latter part of the
11 week. I should say in the early part of that week, sir.
12 We had been following the Japanese disposition of
13 troops and had sent a report, a regular M/A report
14 on the disposition of all Japanese divisions about a
15 month before all this came up, which was used merely
16 to confirm what other reports were here. It was
17 just how the Australians had the disposition of
18 the Japanese Army and which we sent in confirming
19 the other information here. Shipping, as I say, we
20 knew that all the Japanese shipping had been moved back
21 into its own territorial waters. Most of our informa-
22 tion led us to the definite and inescapable conclusion
23 that war was going to break here, nothing about Pearl
24 Harbor, sir.

25 CWC: Well, of course, that is a typical Jap stunt. Now, who

is this Sir Charles Burnett again?

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O'D: He was Chief of Staff of the RAAF. He has been sent back to England now. He is an RAF officer who was on loan, and it was through him and Air Commodore Hewett, he was an intelligence officer, that we had disposal of whatever information they had, and they did, of course, cooperate a great deal with us. But the message that you have there, sir, which is the same one exactly as we sent it out, and a pretty good decipherment as well, Colonel Merle Smith was exceedingly careful, and he was the opposite of an alarmist. He would not put anything in a cable that he didn't have absolutely down under his thumb perfectly.

CWC: Yes, I knew Merle Smith. I knew him very well.

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Hook follows

1 O'D: And you can see from that cable, sir, that he put
2 nothing that would tend to alarm that wasn't definite
3 fact that he could attribute to something precise.

4 EWG: Do you know whether or not Hawaii knew what this plan
5 A-2 was?

6 O'D: We believed that they did. That point came up because
7 of the Naval, because of Pearl Harbor being the Naval
8 Headquarters and the Plan A-2 being for U. S. parti-
9 cipitation mostly in a naval manner. We certainly
10 assumed that if anybody knew A-2, Pearl Harbor did
11 know it. Now, whether the Army would show that to the
12 Navy and that sort of thing, we naturally left up to
13 them. But this Naval Plan, you see there was a Naval
14 Attache in Melbourne, Captain Coursey, and we informed
15 him of that and curiously enough Captain Coursey did
16 not sent any message like that. I do not believe he
17 did. I'm not qualified to say for certain, but he was
18 not in the same state that we were about it. What I
19 am trying to say is that what we sent back might not
20 have seemed such a positive indication, but that every-
21 thing where we were definitely led to the assumption
22 that war was going to break out. This was about the
23 third or fourth time it had happened, but this time
24 it really seemd in a state where in 60 hours that task
25 force was going to be somewhere and with all this code

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1 burning and various other indications from all sorts
2 that I knew about and no doubt they knew more than I
3 did, it looked like this time it was going to be the
4 end, and, as I say, we expected it on our Sunday and
5 that Sunday came and went and nothing happened, and we
6 had a let down, and then of course it was Monday, our
7 time, that it happened. He put nothing in that cable
8 that wouldn't be ---

9 EWG: Well, this cable says the Netherlands Command at 8 A.M.
10 on 7 December reported planes to have reached Kopang.
11 Could you have sent it before?

12 O'D: That was added, sir, on the morning as was the fact
13 that it was delayed. In other words we had to re-write
14 it because the situation was changing momentarily.

15 EWG: Then you don't think that it was ---

16 O'D: No, sir, that went out on Friday.

17 EWG: Do you think that might have been a mistake in deciphering?

18 O'D: Yes, sir. You see the meat of the thing: the sug-
19 gestion that the RAAF likewise take reciprocal action.
20 In other words "we're going to live up to our obliga-
21 tion----".

22 EWG: This date bothered me. That's all.

23 O'D: Well, it bothers me a bit, sir. That is the only copy
24 that I know of in existence. The file copy was destroyed by
25 the present Military Attache with all old papers, about two

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24 that I know of in existence. The file copy was destroyed by
25 the present Military Attache with all old papers, about two

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years ago.

1 CWC: Do you think that the Australians notified their people
2 here? Do you have any way of knowing that, or any
3 opinion?

4 O'D: I know that our own Minister was not informed of the
5 situation. You see, of course, the capitol, sir is in
6 Canberra, and we were stationed in Melbourne because
7 that was the scene of activity. The War Cabinet met
8 the previous night. That's when Sir Charles Burnett
9 had told them this information. Whether the War Cabinet,
10 who would be the body then who would have instructed
11 them to let Washington know---. Sir Owen Dixon wasn't
12 here then. He was a shipping man in Australia, and
13 Mr. Casey was here.

14 CWC: Casey was the guy that was here then.

15 O'D: That's right, sir. Mr. Casey.

16 CWC: I know there was a roar about it when they pulled him
17 out of here.

18 O'D: Yes, sir, that's right, sir, jealousy I think. Whether
19 or not they sent a cable to---I rather doubt that they
20 did, sir, because, as I say, the Australian Government
21 wasn't too happy about our s ending this out even after
22 the delay. I mean they realized that it was inescap-
23 able, and we had to keep our government informed, but---.

24 CWC: Well, there is one thing I'd like to get straight in my
25

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1 own mind. Now, when Burnett gave Merle Smith this
2 information, he gave it to you with the understanding
3 that you not transmit it.

4 O'D: No, sir, when he told it to us we were getting ready to
5 send it out. It was only after we had the cable--
6 you see, we were there over an hour, over two hours,
7 that afternoon, and the information was dribbling in in
8 spurts, and we had that and it was only when we were
9 getting ready to go, which was around seven o'clock,
10 that the War Cabinet meeting was called. I shouldn't
11 say before six thirty, at the time we came out there,
12 it wasn't scheduled. They called this emergency meet-
13 ing and at that time when we had prepared the cable and
14 were getting ready to go code it, Sir Charles Burnett
15 requested very specifically that it not be sent, that we
16 hold it up until he had informed the War Cabinet. I
17 rather thing that that is why he didn't want the in-
18 formation to leave Melbourne. In other words, he
19 hadn't told his own government yet.

20 CWC: In other words, he wanted to spring it on his people
21 first.

22 O'D: Before there was any chance of our sending anything out,
23 sir.

24 CWC: That's logical.

25 O'D: I might say, sir, that because there were only two of

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1 us and because everything was happening day and night
2 then, that was one of the last messages that we sent
3 out in our own code. From then on we used the Australian
4 cipher section back and forth.

5 CWC: Why?

6 O'D: Well, sir, we weren't too sure of our codes to the
7 Philippines. We knew they had the cipher device, but
8 we weren't sure of the security afforded by the cipher
9 device.

10 CWC: You mean the cylindrical?

11 O'D: That's right. After the outbreak of war, you see, sir.

12 CWC: But it was secure before the outbreak of war?

13 O'D: Once the show broke and we were going back and forth
14 between General MacArthur's headquarters and Australia,
15 we were given the use of the Australian code and it was
16 mostly of a liaison nature, anyway, as to whether
17 General MacArthur could send a plane here on recon-
18 naissance or a plane there or what could be expected in
19 one way or another. There were so many messages coming
20 and going. General MacArthur would send us messages.
21 Sir Charles Burnett would ask us for certain information
22 from the Philippines. You see Washington was pretty
23 far removed from us at that time. We didn't know what
24 delays would be encountered in the cables going through
25 Hawaii to Washington, which was the only means of sending
any message here, and there were matters which would

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come up which we would want answered in 5 or 6 hours, which we knew we'd never get to Washington and back in that time, and it concerned what General MacArthur would be able to tell us and which Washington would only have to ask someone else for. So, we had quite a bit of correspondence back and forth by cable and wireless from the Philippines to Australia, as soon as the war broke out. We simply didn't have the means, I mean it would take at least three hours to do a job like that message there. By that time the information was not even wanted. So, we had this coming and going. We moved our office right into the RAAF Headquarters.

CWC: They had the machines then, too, didn't they?

O'D: No, sir, they did not. They had---I can assure you that Colonel Merle Smith went into it to the last detail, no violations of any security.

CWC: Oh, no, I wasn't thinking about that. Mine was just a question of the time factor. There is one question I want to ask you. This has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. Were you aware of that convoy which was at sea when Pearl Harbor hit?

O'D: Yes, sir.

CWC: Were you aware of the correspondence when they sent it all over the whole damned South Pacific?

O'D: Then, sir, we started getting messages from General

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1 Marshall in a code that was, at first one message came
2 and we didn't have the code. They repeated the message
3 in a different code, and we had that code, and curious-
4 ly went through that and got that, it was a double
5 transposition which, of course, didn't use the book.
6 We got that, and, of course, that was a long one there
7 again. We were having our troubles. We got that
8 deciphered, and it was from General Marshall, and we
9 called that the Pensacola, sir, that was under escort
10 by one cruiser, which was the Pensacola. We would do
11 about ten of those in one message, sir. One little error
12 in the first, and you go back and do the whole thing
13 over again, and you can't tell until after you've
14 finished that you've made an error, when you start to
15 get your word groups. But we had heard, we got several
16 cables about the arrival of the Pensacola convoy, in-
17 cluding what was on it. As I remember, there were
18 A-24's and P-40's. There were, I think, 26 P-40's and
19 18 A-24's. Immediately Sir Charles Burnett wanted to
20 know what was the A-24. Well, sir, frankly the means
21 at our disposal there, the Air Force manuals on what the
22 A-24's were, we didn't get far, and that was a little
23 annoying.

24 CWC: That was that Mitchell dive bomber?

25 O'D: That's right, sir, single engine and, of course, the

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1 A-20 was a twin engine, and the question in Sir
2 Charles Burnett's mind was, is it a single engine or
3 is it a twin engine. They wanted those planes and they
4 had to make arrangements for staging areas for them and
5 discharge and so forth, and it was rather difficult to
6 do without that information. Still, by the time we
7 wired to Washington to ask them (we didn't, of course,
8 because, with everything happening all over) they
9 were going to land. They were due on the 23rd of December,
10 sir. They arrived in Brisbane and we went up to Brisbane
11 to meet the convoy.

12 CWC: Some of my old gang in the Second Air Force were on that.
13 That interceptor outfit that came out with them.

14 O'D: Yes, sir, they were destined, of course, for the Philip-
15 pines and South Hawaii. General Brereton had sent a
16 mission down. General MacArthur had sent General
17 Brereton with a mission of about eight men, eight
18 officers, from the Philippines in the latter part of
19 November, and General Brereton had arrived at Darwin
20 and Colonel Merle Smith went up to Darwin and flew over
21 to Rabaul with them, and I met them in Brisbane and
22 they went on this mission. They were primarily con-
23 cerned with the fueling facilities for B-17's being
24 flown out from Hawaii via Rabaul, Darwin and then up
25 through the Indies to the Philippines. They were trying

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to arrange for petrol from the Shell Oil Company and airports, airports principally. That was where we got about a 60-day start, not quite that, about a 45-day start on building airports around Darwin which were later used when they evacuated the B-17's, these strips through the jungle. General Brereton, of course, had come down in plain clothes. He wouldn't have been allowed in the country in uniform at that time. He had flown down here, and we took them all around looking for airports where we could land them. Then, of course, this Pensacola convoy came in.

CWC: Yes, I remember all those things. Well, I don't think there is anything else unless you have something you want to add to what you have said.

O'D: No, sir, I just wanted you to have---

CWC: All right. Well, I'm awfully glad you came in, and I appreciate your taking the trouble. It's nice to have seen you.

O'D: Thank you very much, sir.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Vice Chairman: The committee finished with Colonel Bratton last evening.

Mr. Keefe, Senator Ferguson said he thought you might want to ask him some questions. I went over and asked Mr. Gearhart, and he said he did not know of any questions you wanted to ask him, and we excused Colonel Bratton.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I think it should appear that I stated to you before that time --

The Vice Chairman: If you allow me to finish my statement, I am covering that, Senator. If you look at last night's record you will see where I said Senator Brewster had suggested to me that Mr. Keefe might want to ask some questions.

Senator Brewster: I said he did want to ask some questions. There is no "might" about it.

The Vice Chairman: Well, I went over to ask Mr. Gearhart.

Senator Ferguson, Mr. Gearhart and I, all three of us made statements that appear in last night's record. There isn't any difficulty about the matter. I excused Colonel Bratton with the understanding that he would come back this morning if Mr. Keefe did want to ask some questions.

Will you please step aside, Colonel Sadtler, and let Colonel Bratton come forward, if he is here.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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TESTIMONY OF COLONEL RUFUS S. BRATTON,
UNITED STATES ARMY

(Resumed)

The Vice Chairman: All right, Colonel, Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire.

Mr. Keefe: I regret, Mr. Chairman, that it was impossible for me to be here last evening, but I think my attendance in previous hearings justifies me being away for a couple of hours last night.

Colonel Bratton, when you testified before the Army Board you were under oath, were you not, to tell the truth?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You understood that oath?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you undertook to tell the truth to that Board?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You knew at that time, did you, that the testimony which you were giving before that Board might affect the lives and welfare of many men?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you knew that that Board might use your testimony that you gave as the basis of assessing responsibility for the tragedy at Pearl Harbor?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And with that full knowledge you went before that Board and testified in answer to specific questions that were propounded to you, did you not?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

LaCharity follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 Mr. Keefe: I understand your explanation to be, and
2 if I am in error, you correct me, that you endeavored to
3 give the impression to this Board that when you testified
4 before the Army Board, you had not had an opportunity to
5 refresh your recollection by examination of documents and
6 consultation with other people, and that you were flown over
7 here from Europe, that you were tired and dirty and dusty
8 and that you went before the Army Board somewhat cold
9 without sufficient preparation; is that correct?

10 Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: Well, granted that all of those things were
12 true, in the face of the realization that what you testified
13 to was supposed to be the truth, I want to call your atten-
14 tion to the examination appearing on page 237 and subsequent
15 pages of the Army Board transcript, and to questions that
16 were asked you by Colonel Toulmin.

17 You understand that as a witness, Colonel Bratton, if
18 you do not recall a fact that you are interrogated about,
19 it is always the privilege of the witness to say, "I do
20 not remember"?

21 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: Or "I have no recollection on the subject"?

23 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: But when a direct question is asked, and
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1 you testify without equivocation and without qualification,
2 under oath, the people who hear that testimony should have
3 a right to rely upon the fact that you have told the truth.
4 Isn't that true?

5 Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: Now, then: (reading)

7 "Colonel Toulmin --"

8 Colonel Bratton: May I ask, sir, what page you are
9 reading from?

10 Mr. Keefe: I am starting at the bottom of page 236.
11 I will ask you if these questions were put to you and did
12 you make these answers:

13 "Colonel Toulmin. I am aware of that, but you don't
14 answer my question. Why we ren't the first thirteen parts,
15 which were considered important enough by the Navy to be
16 delivered to the President and to everyone of the important
17 Admirals in the Navy Department delivered by the War Depart-
18 ment officers to the Chief of Staff, and his attention
19 called to it, so he could have taken some action upon it?
20 That's what puzzles me.

21 "Colonel Bratton. You are referring, now, to the
22 Japanese reply?"

23 "Colonel Toulmin: To the 13 parts.

24 "Colonel Bratton. Yes -- not to the short message?
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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"Colonel Toulmin. Not to the short message. I am talking about the evening of December 6, and they were in English by 9 or 10 o'clock. The President of the United States and the leading Admirals of the Navy Department all had that message before midnight, most of them by ten or eleven o'clock. You had it in the early evening also.

"What I am trying to find out is why it was that the Chief of Staff was not called and advised, as were others, that this important document had been received. In view of the tenor of its contents, it hardly needed the 14th paragraph to be conclusive as to its intent and contents; and why did not the Chief of Staff get that message?

"Colonel Bratton. I am trying to remember, sir, what I did with the copies that went to General Miles and General Marshall and General Gerow. I can't verify it or prove it at this time, but my recollection is that those three officers got their copies the evening of the 6th.

"Colonel Toulmin. By 'the three officers' you mean whom?

"Colonel Bratton. General Marshall, General Miles, and General Gerow. Now, it was my practice to deliver them their copies before I went to the State Department.

"Colonel Toulmin. That was your practice?

"Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1 "Colonel Toulmin: Did you deliver this copy, for
2 instance, to General Marshall personally on the evening
3 of the 6th?

4 "Colonel Bratton. No; I very seldom delivered it to
5 him in person. I gave it to his secretary, in a locked bag.

6 "Colonel Toulmin. And you gave it to General Miles
7 in that way, on the evening of the 6th?

8 "Colonel Bratton. I generally took them into his
9 office and handed them to him, and if he wasn't there, I
10 left it with the Executive Secretary, Major, now Colonel,
11 Smith.

12 "Colonel Toulmin. We are now talking about the evening
13 before, Saturday evening, December 6.

14 "Colonel Bratton. Yes.

15 "Colonel Toulmin. Is it your recollection that you
16 handed this important, long, 13-part message to General
17 Miles on that evening?

18 "Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

19 "Colonel Toulmin. Is it your recollection you handed
20 that long 13-part message on that evening to the Secretary
21 of the Chief of Staff?

22 "Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

23 "Colonel Toulmin. And it is your recollection that you
24 handed it on that evening of December 6 to General Gerow,
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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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or some representative of General Gerow?

"Colonel Bratton. Yes.

"Colonel Toulmin. Did you hand it to General Gerow directly, or to his secretary."

I am reading on page 238.

"Colonel Bratton. To his Executive Secretary.

"Colonel Toulmin. Who was he?

"Colonel Bratton. The Executive?

"Colonel Toulmin. Yes.

"Colonel Bratton. Colonel Gailey.

"Colonel Toulmin. And what is the name of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff?

"Colonel Bratton: Colonel Smith, Bedell Smith, now Lieutenant General.

"Colonel Toulmin. And after this, you then went over and delivered it to the Secretary of State in the locked pouch for and on his behalf, is that right?

"Colonel Bratton. Yes, to the watch officer in the State Department.

"Colonel Toulmin. To the watch officer, about 10 or 10:30 on that Saturday evening, December 6?

"Colonel Bratton: That is correct.

"Colonel Toulmin. Now, having made these deliveries, Colonel, to these four recipients, the Chief of Staff, the

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Chief of G-2, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Secretary of State, did you get any reaction to that message until the following day?

"Colonel Bratton. What do you mean by 'reaction,' Colonel?

"Colonel Toulmin. Did they answer it? Did they act upon it, did they mention it, did they discuss it, did they call you, did they look at it, to your knowledge? Or, put it in the negative -- did they do nothing about it, so far as you know?

"Colonel Bratton. I had some discussions of the message, as I remember now, with General Miles, indicating to him that the final part was yet to come. It did not come in until the following morning. The reaction from General Marshall was a reading and a discussion of the entire communication.

"General Frank: That night?

"Colonel Bratton. No.

"General Frank. Or the following morning?

"Colonel Bratton. The following morning.

"Colonel Toulmin. Let us confine ourselves to the night of December 6, now.

"Colonel Bratton. Sir?

"Colonel Toulmin. Let us confine ourselves to the night

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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of December 6, for the moment, at least.

2

"Now, did you talk to General Miles?

3

"Colonel Bratton. I did not talk to General Marshall the night of the 6th.

5

"Colonel Toulmin. Did you talk to General Miles on the night of the 6th?

7

"Colonel Bratton. My recollection is that I did, sir.

8

"Colonel Toulmin. You talked to him on the phone, or in his office?

10

"Colonel Bratton. No, I believe I talked to him in his office."

11

12

Did you talk to him in his office?

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Colonel Bratton: My memory on that is not clear even today, sir, but I do know that I talked to him over the telephone because I have conferred with General Miles on that subject; we have both refreshed our memories on the point, and I now know that I did talk to him on the telephone that night at about 11:30. I don't believe I talked to him in his office on the night of the 6th. I did talk to him in his office on the afternoon of the 6th in connection with another message, the so-called pilot message.

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Mr. Keefe: Now, I am intrigued somewhat by the fact that Captain Kramer testified that he had no recollection that General Miles was at the home of Admiral Wilkinson

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1 until he was told later. His first testimony was that only
2 Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner were there. Then he
3 was refreshed by someone later to the effect that General
4 Miles was there.

5 Now, you testified before the Army Board that General
6 Miles was at his office, and you talked with him.

7 Colonel Bratton: Well, this was Saturday afternoon.

8 Mr. Keefe: Was it true?

9 Colonel Bratton: Saturday afternoon, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: I am talking about Saturday evening when you
11 delivered this message.

12 Colonel Bratton: I think I have already answered that
13 question. My recollection is now that I did not talk to him
14 in his office on Saturday night, but I did talk to him over
15 the telephone.

16 Mr. Keefe: When do you expect the members of the
17 committee are going to know when the truth is being told
18 in this proceeding?

19 Colonel Bratton: I was telling the truth on all occas-
20 ions in which I testified before any Board in connection
21 with this Pearl Harbor affair to the best of my ability,
22 and I am still doing so.

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, is truth dependent upon a man's
24 ability to say a thing?
25

Witness Bratton

questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1 Colonel Bratton: No, it is dependent upon his ability
2 to recollect details of events.

3 Mr. Keefe: Let me read these questions to you, and
4 ask you if you made these answers. Page 241:

5 "Colonel Toulmin. And how about General Smith? Did
6 you get any reaction from him, or any action, rather?

7 "Colonel Bratton. No. General Smith did not have access
8 to these pouches. You mean General Bedell Smith?

9 "Colonel Toulmin. Yes.

10 "Colonel Bratton. He didn't have a key to the bag.

11 "General Russell. What was his relation?

12 "Colonel Bratton. General Marshall's secretary.

13 "General Russell. Well, he is the man to whom you
14 gave General Marshall's copy, was he not?

15 "Colonel Bratton. Yes; but it was in a locked pouch,
16 to which General Marshall had the key."

17 You didn't qualify your answer and say, "I don't
18 recollect whether I gave it to him or not, but my present
19 recollection is that I did."

20 Colonel Bratton: I beg your pardon, I did.

21 Mr. Keefe: In this answer?

22 Colonel Bratton: On page 307 in the same document you
23 are looking at, the third line:

24 "Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir, to the best of
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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my knowledge and belief. My recollection is that I found Colonel Smith in his office. It may have been one of the other secretaries, but my recollection is that it was Colonel Smith --"

Mr. Keefe: Well, your recollection is that it was Colonel Smith and your recollection is that it might have been somebody else, but your recollection is positive that you delivered that message to the office of the Chief of Staff that night; that is what you testified before this Army Board, wasn't it?

Colonel Bratton: In one sense, yes, sir, but I qualified --

Mr. Keefe: You gave no reservations.

The Vice Chairman: Just a minute. Let the witness finish.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, this witness is entitled to respect.

The Vice Chairman: Let him answer. Complete your answer, Colonel.

Colonel Bratton: I qualified that statement, and a number of other statements throughout this testimony of mine before the Army Board by saying that that was the best of my belief, I thought so; it was the way I recollected it at the time, or that I was not sure, or some other such

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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qualification, someother such qualifying phrase.

Mr. Keefe: What changed your belief?

Colonel Bratton: Sir?

Mr. Keefe: What changed your belief?

Colonel Bratton: A number of facts that were presented to me subsequent to this.

Mr. Keefe: When were they presented to you?

Colonel Bratton: That I had not recollected at the time.

Mr. Keefe: When --

Senator Lucas: Let him answer.

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel Bratton: As I stated to the committee last night, there were a number of facts that were brought to my attention subsequent to this date which materially modified my recollection of the details of events on the night of the 6th, and the morning of the 7th of December, 1941.

In the first place, when I testified before the Army Board I did not at that time remember that Colonel Dusenbury was working with me in the office that night. When I worked over this stuff, this magic, alone, there was one standard operating procedure that was followed with respect to its processing and delivery. When I had help in the person of

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Colonel Dusenbury, or one of my other assistants, we used another method, particularly with respect to the delivery of the pouches.

When I had two assistants, there was still another standard operating procedure.

Now, that is one fact that was brought to my attention.

When Colonel Clausen interviewed me in Europe he invited my attention to a number of affidavits signed by General Gerow, General Bedell Smith, General Ralph Smith, General Geiley, and a number of other officers, to the effect that they did not receive these pouches from G-2 on the night of the 6th.

As I stated to the committee last night, I know all of these officers, they are men of honor, and integrity, and if they say that they didn't receive the pouches from me, or Colonel Dusenbury, or one of my assistants, then my recollection must have been at fault and I so admit.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I want to read these questions to you and ask you whether they were submitted to you, and did you make these answers.

Colonel Bratton: Sir?

Mr. Keefe: I want to ask you if these questions were put to you and did you make these answers.

"General Russell. --"

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Colonel Bratton: What page, may I ask, sir?

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Mr. Keefe: Page 242.

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"General Russell. Well he is the man to whom you gave General Marshall's copy, was he not?

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"Colonel Bratton. Yes; but it was in a locked pouch, to which General Marshall had the key.

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"General Russell. Did you know what Bedell Smith did with it?

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"Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

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"Colonel Toulmin. Did you tell him that it was an important document in the locked pouch?

12

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"Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

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"Colonel Toulmin. And that the Chief of Staff should know about it.

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"Colonel Bratton. Should see it right away.

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"Colonel Toulmin. What was General Smith's response -- that he would get in touch with the Chief of Staff, or would not?

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"Colonel Bratton. It must have been because if it had been otherwise, it would have registered on my memory.

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"Colonel Toulmin. And about what time in the evening was it when General Smith was told there was an important document in that locked pouch for General Marshall, and that his attention should be called to it?

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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"Colonel Bratton. I don't remember that, sir.

"Colonel Toulmin. And that was on the evening of
December 6?

"Colonel Bratton. Yes.

"Colonel Toulmin. 1941?

"Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Were those questions asked you, and did you make
those answers?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, then, the next time that you had any discussion about this matter was when you were interviewed by Colonel Clausen, is that right?

Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: When was the next time?

Colonel Bratton: If you will turn over, sir, to page 279 --

Mr. Keefe: No, I mean the next time after that Army Board report. Do you want to refer to some other evidence in the Army Board?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. If you will turn over to page 279 you will see further reference to this incident in the middle of the page. (Reading)

"Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. When I last appeared before the Board I was somewhat puzzled by what I considered at that time an over-emphasis placed by the Board on two messages. One was the implementation of the windswe ather code. The other was this fourteen part ultimatum. I was considerably puzzled at the time by the insistence of the Board that these were vitally important documents, and I had the feeling that there was something missing, that they had no longer the significance after the 3rd of December, in my mind, that the Board attributed to them. I find, I think I know now

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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why I had this feeling.

"A search of the files in G-2 as of the day before yesterday and yesterday brought to light a carbon copy of a chronologically arranged series of extracts from intercepted Japanese communications which I prepared some time after Pearl Harbor for the Chief of Staff. In glancing through this document I find that there was a message which I had forgotten when I appeared before you last; dispatch from Tokyo on the 2nd of December, to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. It was interpreted, or rather it was translated on the 3rd and presumably placed in my hands on that date."

"General Frank: During what month?

"General Russell: December 3, 1941, Colonel?

"Colonel Bratton: December 1941, sir. And it is listed here on my paper as S.I.S. 25640, and the extract that I have on this paper reads as follows:"
Then the message is quoted.

"After the receipt of this translation any further intercepts that were brought to me would simply contribute toward the climax that I saw coming. This was it."

Then we branched off into a long discussion of this winds code business and I never did get back to an explanation of the thirteen parts of the fourteen part ultimatum. It

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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slipped my mind and that of the Board apparently.

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Mr. Keefe: Are you telling us this to imply that if you had gotten back to the thirteen part you would have changed the testimony that you had given before the Board?

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Colonel Bratton: Exactly that.

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Mr. Keefe: Is that what you want to tell us?

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Colonel Bratton: Exactly that, and as I testified before the committee yesterday, if I had had an opportunity to review or edit this testimony before leaving Washington in the fall of 1944 I would have corrected many of the conflicting and contradictory statements that now appear therein. I did not have that opportunity.

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Mr. Keefe: Well, is it your understanding that witnesses testifying in important matters before boards or commissions or courts have the right to examine their testimony that they have given under oath and correct it from time to time and day to day?

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Colonel Bratton: Certainly. I was told that I had that privilege by the president of the Board.

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Mr. Keefe: When was that?

Colonel Bratton: I don't remember the exact date. It was on the occasion of one of my appearances before the Army Board. I asked that specific question, if I would be given an opportunity to review my testimony and make such correc-

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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tions as were necessary.

Mr. Keefe: Then you knew at the time you had concluded your testimony before the Army Board that your testimony was in error as to the delivery of the first thirteen parts of this Japanese reply, is that right?

Colonel Bratton: No, I did not know that and I did not say that, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I understood you to say that had you had the opportunity to correct your testimony you would have corrected it in that particular. Did I misunderstand you?

Colonel Bratton: I think I would have corrected many of the contradictions and conflicting statements that appear in this record, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, the most conflicting statement that appears in this record in conflict with your affidavit given to Colonel Clausen is with respect to the delivery of this thirteen part message.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I want to ask you the direct question: Do you mean to tell this committee that you were not given the right to correct your testimony before the Army Board and that had you had that opportunity and not gone off on a tangent discussing the winds code and gotten lost in a mirage of discussion relating to the winds code that you would have

Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 corrected your testimony in respect to the delivery or failure
3 of delivery or lack of delivery of the thirteen part message?
4 That is what I would like to get clear.

5 Colonel Bratton: I did not say that I did not have the
6 opportunity to review this testimony. As I testified before
7 the committee yesterday, I was accorded that right. I also
8 testified before the committee that my Commanding General in
9 Europe had instructed me to return as soon as I could be re-
10 leased from temporary duty in Washington. The testimony was
11 not available for my review on the two occasions that I re-
12 turned to the Grunert Board for the purpose of checking over
13 typographical and other errors therein and as time was passing
14 by I left Washington without reviewing this testimony. I was
15 anxious to get back to my command post.

16 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, you did not answer my question at
17 all, Colonel. You are just rambling. I want to ask this
18 question of you now:

19 You have stated to this Board this morning and specifical-
20 ly referred to the testimony which you read at some length
21 into the record, that you got into a discussion before the
22 Board relating to the winds message and that you did not get a
23 chance to talk about the thirteen part message. Did I mis-
24 understand you?

25 Colonel Bratton: You misunderstood me, sir. I did not

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 say that I did not get a chance. I said that my initial re-
3 ference to the second message, which was the Japanese reply,
4 slipped my memory later on in the course of the questioning.
5 I did not get back to it because we had gotten way off the
6 track and I forgot about it. Apparently no member of the
7 Board remembered that that was one of the messages that I
8 wanted to discuss.

9 Mr. Keefe: Well, how many times did you appear before
10 the Army Board?

11 Colonel Bratton: Three times.

12 Mr. Keefe: You had three opportunities to tell your
13 story or make any corrections you wanted to, didn't you?

14 Colonel Bratton: Yes, and I think if you will examine
15 this testimony you will see that I made a number of correc-
16 tions and changes each time I appeared.

17 Mr. Keefe: Yes, I have read it and studied it very
18 carefully and I am very familiar with it, I assure you.

19 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Keefe: Now, you went back to Europe?

21 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: And you were there confronted by or met
23 Major Clausen?

24 Colonel Bratton: About a year later.

25 Mr. Keefe: Yes. And you finally got to Paris where you

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 District Headquarters. We put him up there; he became a part
3 of our mess.

4 It developed that the papers that he had had been left
5 in Paris looked up in a safe at G-2 of the same base sector.
6 He sent a radiogram to G-2 in Paris requesting that these pa-
7 pers be flown up by officer courier to Berlin so that they
8 could be utilized in his questioning of myself. G-2 of the
9 same base sector refused to do this on the ground that they
10 were top secret material and for security reasons could not be
11 flown over enemy territory for fear the plane would crash and
12 the documents would fall into the wrong hands. It then became
13 necessary for Colonel Clausen and myself to go to where the
14 papers were so that I could see what it was he wanted to ques-
15 tion me about, look at the affidavits that he had and make
16 such correction of my previous testimony as might be necessary
17 or make such comment as seemed called for upon the affidavits
18 which were in Paris. That is why the affidavit was given in
19 Paris.

20 The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your evidence on
21 this?

22 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: Is that all you want to say?

24 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

25 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: All right. When you got to Paris, then you had all these affidavits before you?

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: Were you in a hotel room?

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Colonel Bratton: I was in one of the officers' billets of the same base sector. That headquarters had taken over a number of hotels in Paris for that purpose. They were run as billets for officers.

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Mr. Keefe: All right.

11

Colonel Bratton: This happened to be the Hotel Prince of Wales.

12

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Mr. Keefe: Well, I will refer to it as a hotel. You can refer to it as a billet.

14

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Colonel Bratton: Yes.

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Mr. Keefe: It was a hotel, wasn't it?

17

Colonel Bratton: It was a hotel.

18

Mr. Keefe: And you and Clausen sat down in a room in that hotel, did you not?

19

20

Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

21

Mr. Keefe: And discussed the testimony that you had given before the Army Board?

22

23

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

24

Mr. Keefe: Now, do you remember that discussion?

25

Colonel Bratton: Not in any detail, no, sir.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: Do you remember what Colonel Clausen said to you?

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Colonel Bratton: He showed me the statements and affidavits made by various officers that he had reached and run down all over the world, bearing upon the delivery of the thirteen parts of this fourteen part message, among other things.

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He had some notes in his possession, transcribed notes from my testimony before the Grunert Board. He said, "Now, after you have read these affidavits and considered the matter and tried to refresh your memory on the thing, do you wish to make any comment on this point that you covered in your testimony before the Grunert Board?"

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Mr. Keefe: And then he gave you these affidavits, the affidavits of Clyde Dusenbury, Moses Pettigrew, Ralph Smith, Charles Gailey, Tom Betts, Walter B. Smith, Leonard T. Gerow, Robert Schukraft, John F. Stone and George Renchard, is that right?

20

Colonel Bratton: I read them all, sir.

21

Mr. Keefe: You read those affidavits?

22

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

23

Mr. Keefe: And when you got through reading the affidavits, what happened then?

24

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Colonel Bratton: Well, I made some statement to Colonel

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 Clausen to the effect that in the light of the evidence before
3 me now it seems advisable for me to modify some of the state-
4 ments that I gave before the Grunert Board.

5 Mr. Keefe: Anything else?

6 Colonel Bratton: "All right. Suppose we draft up what
7 it is you would like to say now?"

8 Mr. Keefe: That is Colonel Clausen speaking?

9 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: "All right, suppose we draft up what you want
11 to say now."

12 Colonel Bratton: Then he got a pencil and paper and, as
13 I remember it, I dictated what I thought I should say in modi-
14 fication of my original statement and I made corrections as
15 we went along and he made suggestions as to arrangement of the
16 material. Finally we got it all in shape in pencil. Then
17 he put a piece of paper into the typewriter and typed it. I
18 read the thing over and as I recall now I made a number of
19 suggestions and corrections in the typewritten copy. I don't
20 remember now whether it was re-typed or not.

21 After I was satisfied that the document before me rep-
22 resented my best recollection at that time I signed it.

23 Mr. Keefe: Were you sworn?

24 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: And you signed it?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And that is the affidavit that is before us?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, but I want to make it perfectly clear that no pressure was put on me.

Mr. Keefe: Oh, yes.

Colonel Bratton: I was not coerced in any way whatsoever.

Mr. Keefe: Oh, yes.

Colonel Bratton: The statement or affidavit that I gave was given freely, of my own accord.

Mr. Keefe: Yes, I understand that, you said that. It appears quite clear.

Well, now, in your affidavit which has been offered in evidence you say this:

"The intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, started coming in from the Navy the evening of 6 December 1941, when I was on duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the office."

Is that correct, that it was coming in in the evening?

Colonel Bratton: Yes. By "evening" I mean somewhere from five o'clock on.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I find that in some portions of the country they refer to "evening" as any time after twelve o'clock noon. Now, just what did you have in mind when you said it started coming in in the evening?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Richardson: He just told you, Congressman. Five o'clock.

Mr. Keefe: Did I understand you to say some time after five o'clock?

Colonel Bratton: Or thereabouts, sir. I don't remember the exact hour when any one of the parts first reached my desk.

Mr. Keefe: (Reading)

"We assembled and studied the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by ten o'clock P.M."

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, when you made that statement in your affidavit had you read the affidavit of Dusenbury?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. I had read all the affidavits that Colonel Clausen had with him.

Mr. Keefe: Well, Dusenbury's affidavit in that respect says:

"I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 P.M. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being

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1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 the final part of the message, was received about 12
3 that night."

4 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: Did that statement of Dusenbury's refresh
6 your recollection any when you were talking with Colonel Clau-
7 sen?

8 Colonel Bratton: Not at all. Colonel Dusenbury is at
9 present on duty in Washington in G-2, War Department General
10 Staff. He is available as a witness before this committee.
11 If you call him I think he will contradict every statement
12 that he made in that affidavit because his recollection now
13 as to what happened on the evening of Saturday the 6th is
14 even worse than mine.

15 Mr. Keefe: Well, but, Colonel --

16 Colonel Bratton: There are obvious errors in that affi-
17 davit. It has been proved --

18 Mr. Keefe: Did you recognize them as errors when you read
19 his affidavit over there in the hotel in Paris?

20 Colonel Bratton: Sir?

21 Mr. Keefe: Read him the question, please.

22 (Question read.)

23 Colonel Bratton: Yes, I recognized at that time that
24 several of the statements he made in there could not be cor-
25 rect.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Keefe: So his affidavit did not refresh you any as to the events, did it?

Colonel Bratton: Only to the extent of reminding me that he was with me in the office that evening. Up until that moment I had forgotten that Colonel Dusenbury and I were working together that evening.

Mr. Keefe: Now, in your affidavit you say further:

"After receipt of the thirteenth part I called the officer on duty at the SIS, who I believe was either Colonel Schukraft or Colonel Doud, and asked if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth part coming in that night. I was told there was not, as there had been a delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury and I then assembled the thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients."

That was your normal practice, wasn't it?

Colonel Bratton: When the two of us worked together that was our operating procedure, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And when a message of this kind came in it was operating procedure to deliver it to those who were entitled to receive that message?

Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And so your affidavit is as given to Colonel Clausen that you did assemble this information for the pur-

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

pose of making delivery to the authorized recipients.

Colonel Bratton: That is the statement that I made in my affidavit, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, you say in your affidavit:

"I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff to his home in Fort Meyer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. This was about ten o'clock P.M."

Colonel Bratton: That was our --

Mr. Keefe: Did you deliver it to Colonel Dusenbury?

Colonel Bratton: That was our normal practice and procedure, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, did you deliver this pouch to Colonel Dusenbury and instruct him to deliver it to General Marshall's home at Fort Meyer?

Colonel Bratton: That was my recollection when I made that statement. I know now that I did not and I just --

Mr. Keefe: So again we go from one step to the other. So the affidavit that you gave to Colonel Clausen was in error then?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: When did you find that out?

Colonel Bratton: Upon my return to Washington this time, sir.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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6th because at that time General Ralph Smith was on a train headed for Fort Benning, Georgia. I was to have been a member of that same group.

Mr. Keefe: Did you testify that you had delivered it to General Ralph Smith?

Colonel Bratton: I did in the proceedings before the Grunert Board, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: So when General Ralph Smith said he was not there, he was on a train going to Fort Benning, Georgia --

Colonel Bratton: I know that he was.

Mr. Keefe: Well, he says that in his affidavit.

Colonel Bratton: I would have been with him.

Mr. Keefe: He says that in his affidavit.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: When did you find that out?

Colonel Bratton: Find what out?

Mr. Keefe: That he was on a train going to Fort Benning that night? You indicated that you were supposed to be on that same train.

Colonel Bratton: Well, I remembered it when I read his affidavit. I said, "Why, of course this is correct, I remember now."

Mr. Keefe: And that is the refreshing that you got from his affidavit?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Those facts did not come to you when you were testifying before the Army Board?

Colonel Bratton: I did not remember them at that time, no, sir.

Mr. Keefe: What was there in the affidavit of Charles Galley that refreshed your recollection?

Colonel Bratton: I don't remember now what General Galley said.

Mr. Keefe: Well, he says this:

"Specifically with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941 I do not recall having received any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury or from any other person."

He is testifying from his recollection he did not recall it. You did recall it before the Army Board.

Colonel Bratton: Well, I may be able to clear this up a little bit by saying that what I told this Army Board was my best recollection at the time. I was repeating to them a procedure that I had followed over and over and over again. I was remembering the delivery of some other message. I had done it that way countless number of times.

Mr. Keefe: Now, Bedell Smith's affidavit with respect to this incident, Colonel Bratton, reads as follows:

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 "To the best of my recollection I left the office
3 at about the usual time the evening of 6 December 1941,
4 that is about seven P.M., turning over to the night duty
5 officer. I am quite certain I was not at the office
6 after ten P.M."

7 I repeat that: "I am quite certain that I was not at
8 the office after ten P.M. If the intercepted radio mes-
9 sage referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either
10 to me or the night duty officer it would have been de-
11 livered in the locked envelope which I have previously
12 described and unless the officer who received it were
13 so informed by Colonel Bratton he would have had no def-
14 inite knowledge of its contents, as neither I nor any
15 other officer in the secretariat was classified as
16 'Ultra'. If he had been informed of the contents or of
17 the urgent nature it would have been delivered to the
18 Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure,
19 either by the officer on duty or someone other than my-
20 self."

21 Now, just how did that refresh your recollection?

22 Colonel Bratton: I accept that as his best recollection
23 when he made that statement.

24 Mr. Keefe: Well, he says that to the best of his recol-
25 lection he was not there after seven and then he says that he

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 is certain that he was not there after ten P.M. He may have
3 been there up to ten, however, up to ten P.M.

4 Colonel Bratton: All right, he may have been there then,
5 sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: And you may have delivered it to him there
7 then up to ten P.M., isn't that true?

8 Colonel Bratton: I don't think now that I did.

9 Mr. Keefe: Well, at least according to his affidavit
10 he has no clear recollection when he left the office and that
11 the only thing he is certain about in his affidavit is that he
12 was not there after ten P.M.

13 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: So it is possible he may have been there
15 when you, as you testified, delivered it to him about ten P.M.

16 Colonel Bratton: That is what I testified to before the
17 Grunert Board, yes, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: And you want to say that that affidavit re-
19 freshed your recollection so that you now are of the opinion
20 that you did not make any such delivery to him?

21 Colonel Bratton: That was one of the contributing fac-
22 tors, yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, now I refer to the affidavit of G en-
24 eral Gerow and this is what he says:

25 "Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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stated to have been testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect:

"(3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843. My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows." And then he referred to 3:

"I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me."

Now, he says, "I did not receive or see any parts of the message, I did not receive or see the thirteen parts of the message or the fourteenth part until the morning of December 7", and if he had seen it on the evening of the 6th he would have immediately warned the overseas commanders.

Now, is it because General Gerow makes that statement that your recollection was refreshed so that you can now state with certainty that neither Colonel Dusenbury or you delivered the first thirteen parts to him on the evening of the 6th of December 1941?

1 Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Colonel Bratton: Mr. Keefe, the preponderance of evidence
3 indicates that my memory was at fault when I made these state-
4 ments before the Grunert Board. To say that any one state-
5 ment made by any one man got me to change my mind is not
6 correct. If General Gerow said that he did not receive the
7 thirteen parts or the fourteenth part until the morning of
8 the 7th of December 1941, then I probably did not deliver
9 that message to him or to his executive officer on Saturday
10 night. I know General Gerow, I have known him for a long
11 time. He would make no such statement as that unless it rep-
12 resented his best belief at the time.

13 Mr. Keefe: Well, then, when Colonel Clausen showed you
14 these affidavits you became convinced that the preponderance
15 of evidence was that you were in error ?

16 Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: And then you tried to set down meticulously
18 to Colonel Clausen what the facts were, that is correct,
19 isn't it, as you then remembered them?

20 Colonel Bratton: I tried to modify my statement to make
21 it what was my best recollection when I signed that affi-
22 davit.

23 Mr. Keefe: And that is when you made the statement that
24 you directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the pouch to
25 General Marshall at Fort Meyer on his way home to Arlington?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Colonel Bratton: That is so, sir. We had done that on numerous previous occasions and I was simply remembering something that had happened before.

Mr. Keefe: You did deliver them to the State Department, you remember that?

Colonel Bratton: Definitely.

Mr. Keefe: That night?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, what was there in the affidavits that were shown you by Clausen that got you to make this statement in your affidavit that you had directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the thirteen part message to General Marshall?

Colonel Bratton: Well, the fact that it was recalled to my memory that Colonel Dusenbury was with me that evening. When the two of us worked together and it was necessary to make delivery at an unusual hour, because I lived in one direction from my office and he lived in another direction, we divided the work. On several previous occasions I had made deliveries to the State Department late at night and he had made delivery to General Marshall in his quarters at Fort Meyer. I was remembering one of those previous occasions when I made that statement.

Mr. Keefe: Well, you were attempting to just reconstruct in your mind something that may have happened, is that right,

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 when you made that statement?

3 Colonel Bratton: That is correct, and as I have stated
4 to this committee anything beyond what I said to the Grunert
5 Board must necessarily be an attempt on my part to reconstruct
6 the details of events based upon my knowledge of what was my
7 operating procedure at the time under various sets of circum-
8 stances.

9 Mr. Keefe: And then after you got back to Washington and
10 got to digging into the matter you found that the statement
11 which you made to Colonel Clausen was not in accord with the
12 facts?

13 Colonel Bratton: That is true, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: Are you certain that the statements you are
15 making to this committee are in accord with the facts now or
16 might they be refreshed at some later time and be changed?

17 Colonel Bratton: They are true to the best of my know-
18 ledge and belief at this time.

19 Mr. Keefe: That is all.

20 The Chairman: Any further questions?

21 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I have a question.
22 Do I understand that the chair recognizes me?

23 The Chairman: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Yesterday or last evening you indicated
25 that the wind message as a message did not come into your de-

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 partment. You heard the testimony under which the Navy had
3 set it up on cards so that it would be telephoned rather than
4 delivered in the usual manner?

5 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you have a similar system of
7 cards or any memorandums or papers?

8 Colonel Bratton: Not exactly, but --

9 Senator Ferguson: What did you have?

10 Colonel Bratton: At General Miles' request I wrote out
11 for the office on paper either the Japanese phrase or the
12 English translation or both, indicating below the meaning, so
13 that if I had to call him up at any unusual hour in his quart-
14 ers I could repeat one of these phrases to him in a guarded
15 way and he would know what I was talking about. I also car-
16 ried one of those slips of paper around in my pocket, I be-
17 lieve Colonel Dusenbury did, too. I don't know whether I
18 gave one to Colonel Sadtler or not.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you give one to the Secretary of
20 State?

21 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: The Chief of Staff?

23 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Gerow?

25 Colonel Bratton: No, sir. I knew that if the imple-

Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 mentation of the winds code ever came in and came to the at-
3 tention of Colonel Dusenbury, myself or General Miles we would
4 know what to do about it with respect to those other officers.

5 Senator Ferguson: But you did not set up a system then
6 the same as the Navy?

7 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: But you handed it on to two or three
9 officers, you had a system whereby you gave them memorandums
10 that they could refer to if you telephoned them?

11 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

13 Senator Lucas: I would like to ask one question, Mr.

14 Chairman.

15 The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

16 Senator Lucas: There was a good deal of flurry yesterday
17 about this fellow Lieutenant Odell. Who was he, Colonel?

18 Colonel Bratton: As I understand it, sir, he was an
19 assistant to Colonel Merle Smith, who was our Military observ-
20 er out in Australia.

21 Senator Lucas: Well, what authority did Merle Smith have
22 with respect to sending cables to Australia or communicating
23 with any foreign government with respect to tense situations
24 between this country and Japan or any other nation?

25 Colonel Bratton: His position was analogous to that of

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 a Military Attache, sir, and before we sent him down there he
3 was accredited to the Australian Government as a military
4 observer and he was furnished with certain codes and ciphers
5 for use in communicating with G2 or the War Department in
6 Washington.

7 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

8 Senator Lucas: I will yield.

9 Mr. Murphy: In the record this morning I placed the
10 rest of the Smith testimony to the effect that the dispatch
11 from Australia was sent to the Philippines and Hawaii that
12 they anticipated an attack on the Indies, somewhere down in
13 there, and never anticipated any on Pearl Harbor. That is
14 in the record offered this morning.

15 Senator Lucas: What I was trying to get clear in my own
16 mind is with respect to this testimony that Odell gave before
17 someone in connection with one of these investigations.

18 Colonel Bratton: Before the Clarke inquiry, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: Yes. What I want to find out is this?
20 Now, Odell testified as follows:

21 "However, within an hour and a half after we had
22 gotten there some additional things came in, the exact
23 nature of which I was not told at the time, but when we
24 went out Colonel Merle Smith said that he had prepared a
25 cable which he had to send out and the principal part of

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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it was that the movement of this convoy was there and that the Dutch had ordered the execution of Rainbow Plan A-2," and so forth.

What I want to find out is what authority, if any, did Colonel Smith have as a Colonel to send out a cable of this importance? Wasn't that up to somebody else? Wouldn't that have to go through somebody higher than Colonel Smith to send a cable of this kind?

Colonel Bratton: He was the highest ranking American officer in Australia, sir, and was a representative of G-2.

Senator Lucas: Well, do I understand that Smith at the time was serving in Australia, Colonel Smith was serving in Australia?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: And was Odell serving with him out there?

Colonel Bratton: That is my belief, yes, sir, as his assistant.

Senator Lucas: I understand. That is what I wanted to get straightened out in my mind. Now, just wait, Colonel, one thing more.

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1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Senator Lucas: That is all.

3 Mr. Richardson: Colonel, I want to get myself oriented
4 in connection with Congressman Keefe's examination.

5 If either the 13 parts message or the 14th part message
6 was to be delivered to General Marshall on the evening of
7 the 6th of December it would have to be delivered by either
8 you or Dusenbury?

9 Colonel Bratton: Through us, yes, sir; out of my
10 office.

11 Mr. Richardson: And either you or Dusenbury would know
12 how the delivery of that message to Marshall was to be made?

13 Colonel Bratton: We ought to, yes, sir.

14 Mr. Richardson: You did not make any delivery to
15 Marshall that evening of either the 13 parts or the 14th
16 part message?

17 Colonel Bratton: Not in person, no, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: And you now have been convinced, by
19 your contact with Dusenbury, that he did not?

20 Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

21 Mr. Richardson: Then am I to understand that it is
22 your present recollection and belief that no copy of either
23 the 13 parts or the 14th part message went to General Marshall
24 on the evening of December 6th?

25 Colonel Bratton: That is my present belief, yes, sir.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson
Mr. Keefe

1 Mr. Richardson: And that the first time General Marshall
2 saw either the 13 parts message or the 14th part message
3 was when he got to his office sometime between 11:00 and
4 12:00 o'clock on Sunday morning, December 7?

5 Colonel Bratton: I do not think General Marshall saw
6 either the 13 or the 14th part of the 14-part message until
7 sometime in the morning of the 7th of December.

8 Mr. Richardson: And that occasion was when he came,
9 after his horseback ride, to his office, and found the
10 message there then?

11 Colonel Bratton: Presumably so, yes, sir.

12 Mr. Richardson: As far as you know?

13 Colonel Bratton: As far as I know.

14 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, one question on that point,
15 if I may.

16 The Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

17 Mr. Keefe: You did not deliver the message to General
18 Marshall on the morning of the 7th, the 13 parts or the
19 14th part, did you?

20 Colonel Bratton: I did not, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: Do you know whether Colonel Dusenbury did?

22 Colonel Bratton: He has no definite recollection of
23 it, either.

24 Mr. Keefe: Well, could it have been delivered to General
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 Marshall by anybody else other than you and Dusenbury?

2 Colonel Bratton: It could have, but I do not see how
3 at this time.

4 Mr. Keefe: Well, how did General Marshall get that
5 message then? How did it get on his desk when he came there?
6

7 Colonel Bratton: I think it must have been given by
8 Colonel Dusenbury to Colonel Deane, who was the secretary
9 on duty there on the morning of December 7, and I think
10 Colonel Deane must have taken it in and placed it on General
11 Marshall's desk so it would be there when he arrived.

12 Mr. Keefe: Do you know this to be a fact?

13 Colonel Bratton: I do not know it, no, sir. Colonel
14 Deane has no recollection of it and Colonel Dusenbury has
15 none, and I know I did not put it there.

16 Mr. Keefe: He could not have gotten it from General
17 Gerow because there had not been any delivery to General
18 Gerow, as you say.

19 Colonel Bratton: By that time in the morning the
20 pouch had been delivered to the War Plans Division, yes.

21 Mr. Keefe: And had been delivered to General Miles
22 also?

23 Colonel Bratton: And General Miles had seen it and
24 read it in his office.

25 Mr. Keefe: But you are unable to throw any light,
other than what you have said now, on the point as to where

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
Senator Ferguson

1 this magic, which was so highly secret, came from that was
2 found on General Marshall's desk when he came into his
3 office that morning?
4

5 Colonel Bratton: I am unable at this time to throw
6 any additional light on that subject, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: That is all.

8 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

9 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

10 Senator Ferguson: Can you give us the hour that the
11 War Plans received the 13 parts?

12 Colonel Bratton: I do not know when the War Plans
13 Division got their 13 parts or the 14th part. As I testified
14 before, the moment I received the 1:00 p.m. delivery message
15 at about 9:00 o'clock Sunday morning I left all other
16 deliveries in the hands of my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury,
17 and took off with this 1:00 p.m. message and tried to follow
18 it through from that time on.

19 Senator Ferguson: What time did you give the 1:00 p.m.
20 message to the War Plans?

21 Colonel Bratton: I did not give it to them. General
22 Gerow saw it when he came in with us to General Marshall's
23 office.

24 Senator Ferguson: Had you talked to him on the telephone
25 so that you told him the contents of it?

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Colonel Bratton: As I testified, sir, I do not re-
3 member whether I talked to him on the telephone or whether
4 General Miles did. One of us did.

5 Senator Ferguson: At what hour?

6 Colonel Bratton: Oh, sometime about 9:30, after I
7 had made my initial call trying to trace General Marshall.

8 Senator Ferguson: So the War Plans had notice of the
9 1:00 p.m. message at 9:30 either through you or Miles?

10 Colonel Bratton: No, sir, I did not say that.

11 Senator Ferguson: When did that happen?

12 Colonel Bratton: I said I don't think General Gerow
13 knew anything about the 1:00 p.m. delivery message until
14 he came into the office where General Miles and I were
15 with General Marshall at 11:25.

16 Senator Ferguson: 11:25. Now have you any knowledge
17 as to when Gerow or the War Plans got the 13 parts?

18 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: I am not talking about the 14th
20 part.

21 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: You say "no"?

23 Colonel Bratton: That is right.

24 Senator Ferguson: Have you any knowledge as to when
25 they got the 14th part?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Colonel Bratton: Only what I heard him say in testimony
3 before this committee.

4 Senator Ferguson: Of your own knowledge, you haven't
5 any?

6 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: When counsel asked you the question
8 as to when General Marshall first saw the 13 or the 14th
9 part, you have no personal knowledge except that you saw
10 them on his desk that morning when he was reading them?

11 Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: And you haven't any other knowledge
13 that he may have seen them before somewhere else?

14 Colonel Bratton: I have not, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right, that is all.

16 The Chairman: Thank you, Colonel, for your cooperation
17 in trying to elicit the facts in this case. You are now
18 excused.

19 Is there any further statement that you wish to make,
20 or any further information that has not been elicited by
21 the questions?

22 Colonel Bratton: No, sir, I have no other testimony
23 to give.

24 The Chairman: All right. Thank you very much.

25 The committee will go into executive session and our

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guests will depart as rapidly as possible.

The Vice Chairman: The hearing will be resumed at 1:30.

Colonel Sadtler will please be here at 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 o'clock a.m., the committee retired into executive session, the hearing to be resumed at 1:30 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

- - -

WARD R. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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AFTERNOON SESSION

1:30 p.m.

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The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. Richardson: No.

The Vice Chairman: Counsel will proceed with the examination of Colonel Sadtler.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL OTIS K. SADTLER

(Resumed)

Mr. Kaufman: Colonel, what is your full name?

Colonel Sadtler: Sadtler, Otis K., Colonel, Signal Corps.

Mr. Kaufman: How long have you been in the Army, Colonel?

Colonel Sadtler: Thirty-seven years the first day of March.

Mr. Keefe: You will have to speak a little louder, Colonel, so we can hear you.

Colonel Sadtler: Thirty-seven years the first day of March.

Mr. Kaufman: What was your assignment during the months of November and December, 1941?

Colonel Sadtler: I was on duty in the office of the Chief Signal Officer, in charge of the military branch of

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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the Signal Corps, which duties comprised the supervisory operation of the communication services, the signal intelligence service, the Army pictorial work, military training, and the signal schools.

Mr. Kaufman: That included the division that received messages for signal intelligence?

Colonel Sadtler: That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman: Are you familiar with the set-up of the so-called winds codes?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: That are referred to in Exhibit 1, Japanese Circulars 2353 and 2354 ?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: When were they first called to your attention?

Colonel Sadtler: About November 28, 1941.

Mr. Kaufman: And what did you do after that set-up was called to your attention?

Colonel Sadtler: I sent my liaison officer, Colonel Guest, to the Federal Communications Commission, and asked them to make a special watch on that broadcast frequency, and that they make arrangements so that Colonel Bratton, our liaison officer with G-2, could be reached by telephone at any hour of the day or night.

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Mr. Kaufman: Did you get any communication from the Federal Communications Commission of an implement to either one of those two circulars?

Colonel Sadtler: Not to my knowledge, no, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Did you ever receive a call from anybody in the Navy?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Will you tell us when it was that you received a call from the Navy?

Colonel Sadtler : About 9 or shortly thereafter on Friday, December 5, Admiral Noyes telephoned me to the effect that the message was in.

Mr. Kaufman: How do you fix the date of December 5.

Colonel Sadtler: On December 4 I attended, as an alternate to the Chief Signal Officer who was then absent in Panama, the weekly meeting of the Defense Communication Board, which met every Thursday at 10 a.m., and that was December 4th.

Mr. Kaufman: And you know it was after that meeting that you received that call from Admiral Noyes?

Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Will you tell the committee as fully as you can the conversation that you had with Admiral Noyes?

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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1 Colonel Sadtler: Admiral Noyes telephoned to say
2 that the word was in. I asked him which one, and he told
3 me that it was the word that implied a break in relations
4 between Japan and Great Britain.

5 I then went to General Miles' office --

6 Mr. Kaufman: Before you went to General Miles'
7 office, was that the entire conversation you had with
8 Admiral Noyes?

9 Colonel Sadtler: Practically, yes, sir.

10 Mr. Kaufman: Then what did you do?

11 Colonel Sadtler: I went to General Miles' office and
12 informed him that the word was in. He then sent for Colonel
13 Bratton, and when Bratton came in, I told him that the word
14 had been received from Admiral Noyes to the effect that
15 diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain were
16 in danger.

17 He pulled out a little slip of paper from his pocket
18 and asked me which one of those words it was. I told him
19 I did not know any Japanese, but it was the one that
20 indicated Japan and Great Britain.

21 We discussed that to the extent of some few words, as
22 to whether or not it was a false alarm, and he asked me to
23 verify the receipt of that message.

24 I went back to my office, which was several doors down
25

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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1 the hall, where the secret telephone between Admiral Noyes
2 office and the Chief Signal Officer was located.

3 I then called Admiral Noyes again and asked him to
4 verify the Japanese word. He replied that he did not know
5 any Japanese, but it was the one that meant Japan and
6 Great Britain.

7 I asked him if he could verify that for me at that
8 moment, and he said "no," that he had an engagement to go
9 immediately either to the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief
10 of Naval Operation's office for a conference, and **he would**
11 do it at a later time.

12 I then returned immediately to General Miles' office
13 and told him that Admiral Noyes could not verify the word
14 at that moment; that he would do it later, but it was the
15 one definitely meaning Japan and Great Britain.

16 Mr. Kaufman: Did you try to get in touch with Admiral
17 Noyes after that?

18 Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

19 Mr. Kaufman: Did you have any further connection with
20 this winds code execute after that?

21 Colonel Sadtler: Well, in view of the Haruna message
22 which had just come in, the winds message at that time made
23 a great impression on me. In fact, I think it is the most
24 important message I ever received. So I went back to my
25

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

office and decided to go to see General Gerow, who was the head of War Plans, and tell him that the word was in.

I saw General Gerow and told him that the winds implement was in, and we discussed it something to the effect of notifying various people, and he told me, as I recall it, that the various departments had been adequately warned.

I then went over and talked to Colonel Bedell Smith, who was the Secretary of the General Staff, and told him that the winds implement was in. He asked me what I had done, and I told him I had seen General Miles and General Gerow, and he did not wish to discuss it further. That ended the conversation.

Mr. Kaufman: You talked a moment ago about the winds implement, or what you thought was the winds implement, coming on top of the Haruna messages.

Will you tell us what they were?

Colonel Sadtler: About December 2nd -- you will find it on page 215 of this exhibit.

The Vice Chairman: That is Exhibit 1, Colonel, of this hearing?

Colonel Sadtler: Of Exhibit 1, message No. 867.

Mr. Keefe: 8-6-7?

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

Colonel Sadtler: Page 215, message No. 867, "Among the

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped, burn all but those now used with the machine," and so forth. They were to be burned and destroyed, and when that was done, they were to reply by the one word "Haruna," to Tokyo.

That message indicates at the bottom it was translated on the 3rd, corrected on the 4th, and is Army 25640.

Mr. Kaufman: How many messages, to your knowledge were intercepted from various parts of the world to Tokyo, using the word "Haruna"?

Colonel Sadtler: I recall seeing several from New Orleans, San Francisco, Seattle, and I have since seen the record produced showing that there were 16 of these words "Haruna" received up until the 6th of December.

Mr. Kaufman: Colonel, do you know what facilities were available in Hawaii to the Army for the breaking down of Jap codes, or ciphers?

Colonel Sadtler: The Army had no means of breaking down any of the more difficult codes.

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Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman
Senator George

1 Mr. Kaufman: Did they have the means to break down
2 any of the codes in Hawaii?

3 Colonel Sadtler: I do not think so, except some very
4 simple ones they may have had, but I do not recall any
5 real crypt analysis that were in Hawaii at that time.

6 Mr. Kaufman: I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

7 The Vice Chairman: I do not believe I have any questions
8 at the moment.

9 Senator George.

10 Senator George: Did you ever see the message, Colonel,
11 that Admiral Noyes reported to you?

12 Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

13 Senator George: You never examined it?

14 Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

15 Senator George: Was it ever in your immediate office,
16 so far as you know?

17 Colonel Sadtler: As far as I can ascertain, it did
18 not come over.

19 Senator George: It did not come over?

20 Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

21 Senator George: No further questions.

22 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Clark is not here at the moment.

23 Senator Lucas. He is not here at the moment.

24 Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one additional
25

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman
Mr. Murphy

1 question?

2 The Vice Chairman: Yes, Mr. Kaufman.

3 Mr. Kaufman: The fact that a copy of this so-called
4 winds execute failed to come over to the Army was an unusual
5 thing, was it not?

6 Colonel Sadtler: Most unusual, yes, sir, because it
7 was a routine matter that any message would come over in
8 the normal interchange of business between the two services.

9 Mr. Kaufman: You mean any message that came to ONI
10 would go to the Signal Intelligence Service, and correspond-
11 ingly, any message that SIS received would go to ONI?

12 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Kaufman: That is all.

14 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will
15 inquire, Colonel.

16 Mr. Murphy: Colonel, who was your counterpart in the
17 Navy?

18 Colonel Sadtler: Admiral Noyes, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: I notice on page 248 of the Army Pearl
20 Harbor hearing the question by General Russell:

21 "Did you give attention to the substance of those
22 messages at any time, or were you primarily or solely
23 interested in a proper deciphering, interpretation, and
24 delivery?
25

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 "Colonel Sadtler: In general my position was one of
3 operations only. In other words, we were concerned pri-
4 marily with the collection of data that came to our attention
5 through various intercept means, and we were not concerned
6 with the evaluation or the analysis of the content of those
7 messages."

8 Does that describe your duties?

9 Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Now on page 249 you testified that you
11 expected a declaration of war, at the bottom of page 249.
12 Do you have a copy of your testimony, Colonel?

13 Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

14 Mr. Murphy: I do not know that there is an extra
15 copy available.

16 Mr. Kaufman: There is not.

17 Mr. Murphy: I will read it slowly, Colonel. You say
18 on the bottom of the page:

(7) 19 "General Mauborgne, the retired Chief Signal Officer
20 at that time."

21 I will go back a little bit:

22 "General Russell: What was the history as it relates
23 to the number of messages reaching you, or those asso-
24 ciated with you, for processing, late in November and
25 early 'n December, 1941, relating to the Japanese-American

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 negotiations? Did they become more numerous or fewer?
2

3 "Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir; the messages regarding
4 the relations between Japan and the United States did
5 increase materially.

6 "General Frank: On what date? Leading up to what
7 date, about?

8 "Colonel Sadtler: I don't know. It seems to me that
9 when I first came to the office, I was warned that the
10 messages beginning to come, on the relations between Japan
11 and the United States, were getting more tense, the condition.

12 "General Frank: Who warned you of that?

13 "Colonel Sadtler: General Mauborgne, the retired Chief
14 Signal Officer at that time. The information began to
15 assume rather serious proportions regarding the tense and
16 strained relations between the two countries, and the number
17 of messages about warnings of conditions that might obtain
18 in case of hostilities really reached a climax around the
19 middle of November, to such an extent that we were of the
20 opinion that there might be a declaration of war between
21 Japan and the United States on Sunday, November 30. This,
22 as you all know, proved to be a 'dud', and on Monday,
23 December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that
24 morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to
25 destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code

Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 word when they had so complied with their directive. If
3 I recall correctly, that word was 'haruna'. It is the
4 same name as that battleship that Colin Kelly was alleged
5 to have sunk."

6 You made that answer and that is a true statement, as
7 I understand it, of the situation at that time?

8 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Murphy: Was there anything particular which made
10 you feel there might be war on November 30? Was it the
11 deadline message?

12 Colonel Sadtler: It was the message of November 22
13 which stated after the 29th things were going to automatically
14 happen.

15 Mr. Murphy: Then you also stated:

16 "About December 3, Tokyo notified the Embassy pertain-
17 ing to the destruction of their codes, at once.

18 "General Frank: The Embassy in Washington?

19 "Colonel Sadtler: The Japanese Embassy in Washington,
20 regarding the destruction of their codes. Now, those
21 messages were important as showing the trend of conditions."

22 You made that statement at that time?

23 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: Now you testified at page 253:

25 "Some time about -- I don't know whether it was the

1 Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 5th or 6th of December, or at that period, Tokyo notified
3 the Japanese Embassy at Washington to destroy their remain-
4 ing codes, which was done on Saturday afternoon, and duly
5 reported in the Sunday Star on December 7."

6 Was it in the Sunday Star?

7 Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, it was in the Monday Star.

8 Mr. Murphy: The Monday Star?

9 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: You said Sunday Star.

11 Colonel Sadtler: I am sorry to say I looked it up.

12 Mr. Murphy: It was Monday?

13 Colonel Sadtler: It was Monday, yes, sir.

14 Mr. Murphy: In the Monday Star there was word about
15 the Japs destroying their codes?

16 Colonel Sadtler: There was a picture in the paper of
17 their burning their codes on the Embassy grounds up on
18 Massachusetts Avenue.

19 Mr. Murphy: That was on Monday, December 8, 1941,
20 the Washington Star?

21 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Murphy: A good paper, by the way.

23 Now, then, as to the night of the 6th and the morning
24 of the 7th, you have no familiarity with those messages,
25 because you did not work on the night of the 6th or the

1 Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 morning of the 7th? Isn't that right? The 6th of December?

3 Colonel Sadtler: The 6th we worked. The 7th I did
4 not go to work, sir.

5 Mr. Murphy: I refer you to your testimony on page 255.
6 This was by General Russell:

7 "It has come to the attention of the Board that sometime
8 on the evening of December 6, probably around 9:00 or
9 10:00 o'clock, there were received by some Government agency
10 the first 13 of 14 parts of the reply of the Japanese Govern-
11 ment to Mr. Hull's note of November 26, 1941. Did that
12 clear through your agency?

13 "Colonel Sadtler: I don't know, sir.

14 "General Russell: It is also in the record that some-
15 time in the morning, December 7, the last, the 14th part
16 of this reply reached War Department agencies, and the time
17 for delivery of the entire reply was received in a message,
18 as well as some further instructions about the destruction
19 of codes or code machines. Do you have any recollection of
20 those December 7 messages which I have described?

21 "Colonel Sadtler: No, sir; I did not go to work on
22 the morning of December 7.

23 "General Grunert: How about the night of the 6th?
24 Were you there?

25 "Colonel Sadtler: No, sir; I was not. I heard about

1 Witness Sadtler Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 these things after that, on about the 8th or 9th, General.

3 I did not know anything about them at the time."

4 Was that a true reflection of your testimony?

5 Colonel Sadtler: That is correct. I left the office
6 usually on Saturday afternoon, I imagine around 6:00 o'clock.

7 That is when I generally left. I did not stay there until
8 9:00 or 10:00 o'clock.

9 Mr. Murphy: That is all.

10 The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster would be next.
11 He is not present at the moment.

12 Mr. Gearhart would be next, but he is not present at
13 the moment.

14 Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire, Colonel.

15 Mr. Murphy: Senator, may I just ask one question?

16 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

17 Mr. Murphy: At page 252 you describe those present
18 in the office when you discussed the message with Noyes as
19 General Miles, Colonel Bratton, Colonel Sadtler and General
20 Roderick, who is now dead.

21 Colonel Sadtler: I have been told that it was General
22 Roderick, Mr. Murphy. I did not know the man at the time,
23 I did not know who he was.

24 Mr. Murphy: But in the record you said you thought it
25 was "General Roderick, who is now dead".

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Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Colonel Sadtler: I think my memory was refreshed at the time that I made that statement.

Mr. Murphy: On page 252 you said that, did you not?

Colonel Sadtler: I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Let me read the exact words:

Hook follows

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1 Witness Sadtler

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 "I went immediately to General Miles' office and told
3 him that the word was in. He said, 'Wait a minute. I will
4 call Colonel Bratton,' and in a very short while Colonel
5 Bratton came into the office, and we sat down at General
6 Miles' desk. There were General Miles, Colonel Bratton;
7 some officer, I don't know who it was. I think he has
8 since been identified as General Roderick, who is now dead;
9 and myself."

10 Colonel Sadtler: That is correct, yes, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy : No other questions.

12 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

13 Senator Ferguson: Colonel Sadtler, what hours did you
14 work on the 6th? From what time?

15 Colonel Sadtler: From about 8 a.m. to about 6 p.m.

16 Senator Ferguson: Then you left your work?

17 Colonel Sadtler: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: And you went back to work Sunday
19 morning?

20 Colonel Sadtler: No, sir, I did not go back to work
21 Sunday morning.

22 Senator Ferguson: You did not work Sunday?

23 Colonel Sadtler: No, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: So you had nothing to do with the
25 receipt of the 13 parts?