

Doc. 3106 (36) - (45)

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Dec 3106 (36) R

Identical with

"Pearl Harbor"

#842 (3 parts - complete)

pp 31.

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in 32

Dec. No. 3106 (36) to (45). Page 2 (Summary continued)

Dec. 3106 (39) Telegram from TOYODA to NOMURA, 30 September 1941. Identical with Telegram No. 614, IPS Dec. 15, pp. 42.

Dec. 3106 (40) Telegram No. 618 from TOYODA to NOMURA, 1 October 1941. Identical with Telegram No. 618, IPS Dec. 15, pp. 45.

Dec. 3106 (41) U.S. Memorandum of October 2. English original. Identical with "Foreign Relations of U.S. (1931-41) Vol. II", pp. 656.

Dec. 3106 (42) Japanese translation of Dec. 3106 (41).

Dec. 3106 (43) Report of the conversation between Premier KONOYE and Ambassador GREW, dated 6 October 1941. Premier KONOYE asked Ambassador GREW to use his influence to have the U.S. agree to Japanese conditions for the withdrawal of Japanese forces from occupied territories. He also told GREW to inform the U.S. not to lose the opportunity for a settlement.

Dec. 3106 (44) Telegram from TOYODA to NOMURA regarding the interview with Ambassador GREW on October 7. Identical with Telegram No. 643, IPS Dec. 15, pp. 54.

Dec. 3106 (45) Item A. Telegram from NOMURA to TOYODA, 9 October 1941. Identical with Telegram No. 915, IPS Dec. 15, pp. 61.

Item B. Telegram from NOMURA to TOYODA, 10 October 1941. Identical with Telegram No. 917, IPS Dec. 15, pp. 61.

Item C. Telegram from NOMURA to TOYODA, 11 October 1941. Identical with Telegram No. 923, IPS 15, pp. 63.

Analyst:
1st Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa

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Page 2.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Dec. No. 3106 (36) to (45)

Date 12 September 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Various Telegrams and Memorandums
Relative to Japanese-American Negotiations.

Date: September
and October 1941 Original (X) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TOYODA Teijiro; NOMURA Kichisaburo

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Japanese American
Negotiations.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Dec. 3106 (36) Item A. Telegram from TOYODA to NOMURA, 13 Sept.
1941, answering the questions asked in Telegram No. 804. It
states that Japan is still expecting the "good offices" of the
U.S. as heretofore in the China War and that is reserving a
special intimate position for herself in the economy of China.

Item B. Telegram from TOYODA to NOMURA, 15 September 1941, answer-
ing questions asked by the latter in Telegram No. 557, stating that
Japan has no intention of practicing discrimination in international
trade and that further clarification will be made in the negotiation
of the heads of both governments.

Item C. Telegram from NOMURA to TOYODA, 24 September 1941. Iden-
tical with Telegram No. 842, IPS Dec. 15, pp. 31.

Dec. 3106 (37) Telegram from NOMURA to TOYODA, 28 September 1941
Identical with Telegram No. 865, IPS Dec. 15, pp. 36.

Dec. 3106 (38) Telegram from NOMURA to TOYODA, 30 September 1941
Identical with Telegram No. 867, IPS Dec. 15, pp. 40.

Oct. 6, 1941. (Make only a very short summary
of what this is about, and that's all)
Doc 3106-(43)
As the Imperial Government had sent
telegrams repeatedly to Washington Government
and informed them frankly about what the
Imperial Japanese Government believed
in regard to maintain peace in the
Pacific Ocean, and furthermore to uphold
the peace of the world.

• △ Conversation between the premier (Kono) and American Ambassador (Crew).

• The proposal that I (Foreign Minister Toyoda) made on Sept. 4th and an explanatory note I had given after that time were only for the convenience's sake of American side for speeding up realization of conference of heads of the both Governments. Therefore, the assurance given by the Imperial Government cannot be limited or valueless. It was given only to avoid misunderstanding in the future.

It is very regrettable that America herself talks about the trend of

her own national opinions and yet disregards the trend of the public opinion in our country. As you know, Japan had been fighting at big scales for past 4 years (as every one knows the opinions appeared in the news-papers are very firm but yet calm) and the conditions of our country (American Ambassador in Tokyo is said to have sent telegrams to Washington about his own observation regarding the Japanese public opinion) please, make your best effort to enlighten American side regarding points that Japan's true intention is to adjust peacefully the relation between America and Japan from wide standpoint of the general view.

2 - As our answer to America's note is as shown below, please be good

enough to make your best effort for removing misunderstanding by informing about our true intention to your Secretary of States or the President.

The main points of America's proposals are (a) re-investigation of the four principles proposed by America (b) We acknowledge that America wished to have an definite expression of our intention regarding withdrawal of Japanese forces from China and French Indo-China.

We want to know whether above two points (a and b) are all what America wished to know. And we also want to know the reaction of the American Side.

(1) It might be a tactics of American Side that America mentioned in her note of Oct. 2nd, as if we had unconditionally accepted America's 4 principles).

for instance, the opinion that the premier expressed on the 6th of September was that he mentioned that he had no objection only as a matter of principle. Therefore, he agreed only on principle, but he did not agree about carrying ^{out} the principle actually and practically. Regarding the application of the principle the premier wished to reserve. The premier said that such actual matters can be settled at the conference of heads (leaders) of both nations.

2 — If the gist of Japan's clear intention regarding withdrawal of forces from China and French Indo-China is like the one given below, there would be a room for the Imperial Government to take the matter into consideration.

The general withdrawal of Japan's military forces from China shall be done within...
..... years after peace has been established between Japan and China. But, in case of necessity for upholding peace in East Asia and maintain order in China, the said withdrawal shall be postponed for a certain necessary period for specified places provided that such a postponement should be done under a mutual agreement between Japan and China.

The withdrawal from French Indo-China shall be done immediately after the joint defence is ~~de~~ deemed unnecessary in said areas (districts), but the time of withdrawal shall be after the termination of the present China Emergency at the latest.

3 - A proposal regarding the right of self-protection should have been arrived at us already, but it has not yet, so please press your government for the answer. And our further explanation will be given after the arrival of America's proposal.

4 - The assertion about the close relation caused by the geographical neighborhood does not affect or control the fundamental principles. The application of the principle which is now adopted to all over the world to the Japanese-Chinese relation shows clearly that it is absolutely necessary to Japan's economic existence.

5 - That the principle of indiscriminate of international commerce has been limited only to South-West Pacific Ocean, because I (Foreign minister Toyoda)

had mentioned in my proposal of Sept. 4th. That's why I did not mention about China. It was my intention to make clear that America was interested in the resources in the South-west Pacific Ocean as well as Japan was.

In a word, we have no objection to your interpretation that the abovesaid areas and China are included in [the areas of the whole Pacific Ocean?]

6 - We did not refer to the neighbouring places of French Indo-China, Thailand, Soviet Russia, because there was a question of neutralization of French Indo-China and Thailand. Regarding Soviet Russia, America had made an inquiry before about our intention. Any way we wished to display our sincerity. It is misunderstanding

or distortion on the side of America
 of America judges our intention as
 a limit to Security. According by if
 covered all by the interpretation of
 self-protection, we have no objection to
 strike out the qualification.

The sum of the matter is so that we have
 stated already our standpoint frankly
 even neglecting diplomatic technique!

We have made our utmost effort
 to state our frank opinion in order
 to obtain the general settlement. please
 emphasize this point to your government
 and inform them not lose the ~~opportunities~~
 opportunity for the settlement.

Without regard to success or
 unsuccess of the Japanese-American
 negotiation, we believe that America

have no objection as to fixing
time and contents of the public
announcement to be made by
both governments.

RECEIVED
1945
MAY 15 11 30 AM
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

十月十日乃至

十日野村大使

来電云

一掃宛

Dr. 3106 = (45)

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十月十四

米側覚書

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尊文

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內容明細

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外務省

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Doc 3106 (44)

会谈

知
悉
大
使
上

十月七日

内容明細

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						十月廿
						豊田外務大臣 野村大使宛電報 野村大使宛電報 野村大使宛電報