


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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 491



1945

Division of Origin: Military Analysis

Subject: Army Ground Radar: Operations and Tactics

Personnel Interrogated: Lt Col Masuda

Where interviewed: Meiji Building

Interrogator: Lt B. W. Carey

Interpreter: Mr. Dennis Kildoyle

Allied Officers Present: None

SUMMARY

Lt. Col. Masuda describes the allocation of ground radar in the various Japanese Air Forces. He claimed that the Japanese lower ranking personnel were not mechanically inclined and broke the radar that was sent to the field. He also claimed that Japanese research was at fault for lagging far behind the American development.

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- Q. What was your assignment Col. before you left the service:
- A. I was Ordnance Officer at War Ministry Headquarters. My duties involved my allocating radar to the various theaters of operation.
- Q. What was the first type of radar in the field?
- A. There were two types, fixed and mobile.
- Q. Did you not have a type that had a transmitter and a receiver, employing the Doppler method?
- A. Yes, Type A, that was sent into the field in 1940. After 1943, however, they were used only to a limited extent. They were for the most part replaced with Type B impulse echo sets.
- Q. Where did you employ Type A?
- A. We lined the coasts of Japan with Type A. Some were used in China around Hankow, some in Sumatra, and a few were employed in Burma.
- Q. Where did you set these up?
- A. We put these up immediately after those places were captured.
- Q. Why did you change the Type A Equipment?
- A. They were not good for ascertaining position of a plane.
- Q. What was your first piece of radar, Type B That was put into operation?
- A. Tachi 6, an early warning detector, was sent out first.
- Q. Did it give satisfactory performance?
- A. Yes !
- Q. Where were they sent?
- A. They were distributed about Japan in late 1942 and at the same time, two were sent to an important airfield in Sumatra.
- Q. Where else and when were other Tachi 6 sent out?
- A. Five or six went to Burma in 1943, 20 to Palembang, Sumatra between Dec. 1942 to Spring 1944, 3 or 4 to Rabaul in the Spring of 1943, 4 to Java, and several to Korea, and Manchuria in 1943.
- Q. Where and when did you send Tachi 7, the modification of Tachi 6?
- A. We sent 3 or 4 to Burma in 1943, 7 to Rabaul, some to Saigon in the Spring of 1944, 2 to the Bonin Islands in 1944 and about twenty to the Philippines in October 1944.
- Q. Did you not have any radar in the Philippines before 1944?
- A. No. Everything in defense lagged. The situation in the Philippines was so critical that it was necessary to correct the shortage.
- Q. Did you use any Tase 2 and 10?
- A. Yes, we used some on transports but the transports could be picked up easier by your radar so the installation of Tase 2 was discontinued. Tase 10 never was used operationally because its performance was unsatisfactory.

- Q. How did you distribute gunlaying equipment?
- A. Tachi one and two were used mostly in the homeland of Japan. They were concentrated for the most part around Tokyo and southern Kyushu. One Tachi two was sent to Palambang.
- Q. How was the performance of each?
- A. Tachi one was unsuccessful but Tachi two gave a satisfactory performance.
- Q. Did you have any other gunlaying sets?
- A. Yes, Tachi three ! One was sent to Palambang in the Spring of 1943 and few were sent to China in the Spring of 1945. The performance was satisfactory but production difficulties made it impossible to obtain sets for use in other theaters of operations.
- Q. Did you use any other sets?
- A. We used two Tachi 35 around Tokyo for measuring the altitude of enemy planes. Tachi 35 gave a satisfactory performance but it came out late in 1945.
- Q. Was there any other equipment employed?
- A. Army airborne equipment was employed, but I have nothing to do with that. I suggest that you contact Major Iwamiya at the Air Headquarters.
- Q. Would you describe the shortcomings of Japanese radar?
- A. We lacked engineers. Research was far behind the Allied powers. That seemed to me the main trouble. Our people did not have any mechanical inclination. Our privates who fixed radars were of too low intelligence to learn the fundamental necessities of repair work. Instead of repairing, they broke the delicate radar instruments.
- Q. Did you send these privates to school?
- A. There was no time for sending them to school. Headquarters demanded personnel immediately.
- Q. Did you cooperate with the Navy?
- A. We had a separate organization.
- Q. Can you think of any other shortcomings in Operation and tactics?
- A. No, research was really main trouble. It lagged far behind the Americans.