

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY -RESTRICTED-  
(PACIFIC)  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (~~NONE ASSIGNED~~)<sup>608</sup> PLACE: TOKYO  
Japanese Intell. No. 51 DATE: 28 Nov. 45.

Division of Origin: Japanese Intell. Sec., G-2, USSBS

SUBJECT: Intelligence in the Japanese Ground Forces at  
Army Level.

Person Interrogated and background:

Lt. Colonel TOKUNAGA, Hachiro was in the intelligence section (2nd Division) of the General Staff from April 1942 to March 1945, and thereafter until the end of the war was Chief of intelligence for the 57th Army defending the southeast coast of KYUSHU. The principal events in his army career follow:

Commissioned June 1931 and attached 15th Inf. Regt.  
Army Officers School - August 1935.  
Army College - June 1938.  
Graduated 1940.  
Staff 24th Division August - KWANTUNG Army - May 1940.  
Staff of 5th Army in MANCHURIA - 1941-42.  
2nd Division, General Staff - April 1942.  
Chief, Intelligence Section, 57th Army in  
Southern KYUSHU, March 1945 to end of war.

Where interviewed: Heiji Bldg.

Interrogator: Major R. S. Spilman, Jr., AC

Interpreter: Lt. (JG) W. H. Gorham, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.


SUMMARY

1. When the Japanese ground forces defending the Home-land were reorganized in the spring of 1945, the intelligence section in most was given to young officers who had been in the Intelligence Section of the General Staff. These men set up large and well organized sections which, while not prescribed by the General Staff, were approved by it. The Intelligence Section in the 57th Army charged with the defense of the eastern and southern sections of KYUSHU is described.
2. Little change in the intelligence staffs of Division was made at this time although there was some talk of assigning a regular intelligence officer as far down as Regiment.
3. Places for defending southern KYUSHU against our landing, expected in October, are discussed.

TRANSCRIPT


Q. 1. Give the organization of the staff of the 57th Army.

A. See chart.



Q. 2. Break down the Intelligence Section.

A. See chart.



There were only two regular staff officers in the Intelligence Section, but about 20 attached officers and about 20 NCO's and enlisted men were in the section.

Q. 3. Was this a larger section than most Army Intelligence Sections in the beginning of the war?

A. Yes. When I was with the 5th Army in 1941, there were only 11 officers on the staff, and only 2 in intelligence.

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION (Lt. Col. TOKUNAGA, E.) -RESTRICTED-  
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Q. 4. Did most of the armies have as large an intelligence staff as this at the end of the war?

A. I think so, though the location of the army might make some difference. The newer armies in the Homeland had large staffs. My intelligence staff was large but I made it so because none of the men had intelligence training, and I wanted to make them specialists in a narrow field. When I organized the section, I did not have a single man with any intelligence training. In June I got a man who had worked in General Staff Hq. Intelligence.

Q. 5. Did the 57th Army make any intelligence estimates or were they received from the General Staff?

A. Many of the facts on which the estimates were based, such as over-all estimates of fleet units in the area, air strength in the PHILIPPINES and OKINAWA, withdrawal of troops from Europe, etc., came from Headquarters, but we made our own estimates. We added our own information such as submarine activities, analysis of air strikes by your forces, communications activities, etc. We found that after a period of intensive communication activity, when it almost stopped an attack could be expected.

Q. 6. What areas were defended by the 57th Army?

A. East KYUSHU from MIYAZAKI south and the west side of KAGOSHIMA Bay.

Q. 7. Was Headquarters or the 57th Army responsible for making the estimate of our landing date?

A. Headquarters made the general estimate, but the 57th Army would be charged with estimating the exact day. This could not be done more than a few days in advance.

Q. 8. What was the best estimate of the landing date?

A. Any time in October.

Q. 9. Were reconnaissance planes attached to the 57th Army?

A. No. The Navy furnished our reconnaissance. We had formal liaison with the Navy base at KANOYA, but in practice, informal liaison consisting of daily visits by my men produced the best information.

Q. 10. Did Headquarters make any estimate of the force which would land in KYUSHU?

A. The estimate in April was that you would land on the east coast of KYUSHU with 7 or 8 divisions, even before OKINAWA was secured. In June this was revised, and we then thought that you would land 15 or 16 divisions in October in KAGOSHIMA BAY, ARIAKE BAY, possibly near KANOYA, and on the plain south of MIYAZAKI.

Q.11. What was the principal factor which caused the change in your April estimate that we would land in June?

A. We at first thought you would land on KYUSHU before the OKINAWA campaign was over, but when you did not, we concluded that you would assemble a very large force before landing. We thought it would take you until the middle of October to do this. I was afraid you would make several landings in KYUSHU, and we would not know which was the main one. I was also afraid you might bypass KYUSHU and go direct to the KANTO Plain. However, I had no responsibility for estimates as to landings anywhere other than KYUSHU and was prepared to meet you on the plain south of MIYAZAKI, in ARIAKE Bay and in KAGOSHIMA Bay.

Q.12. Do you think our landings would have been successful?

A. We did not plan to resist your landings strenuously, although we did plan to put up more resistance than you found at OKINAWA. We had strong centers of resistance a mile or so inland and mobile reserves back of this line. If enough of your ships were sunk off the coast, we thought we could destroy your army after it got ashore. We expected KAMIKAZE planes to destroy or disorganize at least 1/3 of your attacking force and hoped to raise the figure to 1/2.

Q.13. Did the ground army have any part in planning the KAMIKAZE attacks?

A. We were informed by the Air Force of the plans, but had no part in making them. We knew that the Air Force expected to expend itself against your ships and that we would have no air support after you got ashore.

Q.14. How did you expect to bring your reserves into action with no air support?

A. We did not think you could destroy all our equipment, but we did expect all bridges to be out. We stored ammunition and supplies in many small dumps where they would always be available. We also built prefabricated bridges and hid them at critical stream crossings. We expected to do most of our moving on foot at night.

Q.14. How much growth in the Japanese intelligence system was there during the war?

A. I am not very familiar with this since I was not in intelligence before the war. However, I think there was very great growth in the lower units but not much in Headquarters.

Q.15. At what stage of the war did the increase take place?

A. It began in the southern areas in 1943; in the Homeland not until late 1944 or early 1945. One reason for the growth of the system in Japan was that each Army was afraid it would be cut off from intelligence sources at Headquarters and therefore tried to make itself self-sufficient.

Transcript of Interrogation (Lt. Col. TOKUNAGA, Hachiro)

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Q.16. How satisfactory did you consider your organization?

A. I thought it was good but, of course, it was never tested. My organization was the result of a lot of thought. Prior to 1945, there were a number of officers at General Staff who thought the intelligence system in the Japanese Army was weak. We thought a great deal about a good organization and discussed it among ourselves. When the Homeland defenses were reorganized in the spring of 1945, several of us were assigned to the field, and we had a chance to set up the kind of organization we had so often discussed. I thought mine was the best, but the other men probably thought theirs were.

Q.17. These other intelligence organizations set up by your friends from Headquarters; do you know enough about them to say whether they were much like yours?

A. I know enough to say that they were organized along the same lines. In minor particulars, I am sure there were differences, but I don't know what these differences were.

Q.18. Were these organizations ordered by the General Staff or were they worked out in the field by you and your friends?

A. These organizations were not ordered, but the plans were approved after they were drawn up.

Q.19. Were any orders as to intelligence organizations sent out by the General Staff?

A. While I was with the General Staff, there were none, and I received none after I went to the 57th Army. Occasionally, General Staff would send a representative to the field to advise, but he could not order.

Q.20. Was any effort made to increase the intelligence staff at Division.

A. Yes. In the Homeland intelligence, officers from Division were brought together and given lectures on the need for a better organization. However, this did little good since the Division staff was always small, and Intelligence was the last section to get new men.

Q.21. Was any effort made to assign intelligence officers below Division?

A. There was some talk about it, but nothing was done before the end of the war. It was hoped that a full time intelligence officer might be assigned as far down as Regiment.