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川河宣智サ馬シタ

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口供書

私米内光政八八九三年二月力ライ九三九年八月近海軍大臣デアリ、九四の年一月 力力全年七月也然往大庄了了人又八九四五年四月力了一九四十年十一月也治年大庄于力力全年七月也然

老しは極同人議可視地解以不拡大方針が快度也でです 1川聖トンデ視地が解決し他対は大サセズニが進したモライタイト他の主 张之又这、近衛後睡太庄》初少質屋大城大臣之舍公全阁係之之意動成同 項ましず海軍とシデ非常送送デアで改造属清将事件八少又其場場 後、大体中文方面、伴情して来れ、中文デ事件が起ルト之しい海軍,以係事 ソンテ海軍倒しして八從末人 出失スルツ季がアルト連ママンタ私へ海軍大臣トレテた出兵を及対レマンタ 名」北京東天津駐兵及多数ノ在由日本人ノ安否が気いカワレルカラむき ノコトデアリマング、ソンテ杉山陸軍大臣へ此ノ供放電スレバ日本、五十五百 カラ不法:攻撃也之名名以不得已日本軍像が之二應就しタモノデアルト カラだ街安事件が衛軍ナ報告にはしてしタック報告デハ、支那軍隊 当好八十一次近衛內阁デアリマンダが九日,倒議デ和学校山陸軍大臣 九五年七月七日北文那八個清為テ日文西軍八行安事件が安全してした 何カラ見テル文下事件か起ルトソレカラニケ月位

聖中日郎千十一日ニナッテ杉 安及に兵国民」安全が保証スピート出来すり事徒ニナルヤを知しナイカラ是明は思望の日限千十一日ニナッテ杉山を軍大臣カラ天ニルノ際出兵シセナケレハ我が駐 共ラスルはまかアリトは硬ルルキへしかアリマンタ、ソコデ州就二れてい他ノ全的係 八柱軍及大百氏保護ノタメトウンテモ火車ダーアレバ出共モモラ得ナイが出失し デ之後地解決不扶方針的後少在坚持,從干現地下解决かつ中次升出失了清 電センジュト、然と出失散か多イト日幸西軍一武力衛失か拡大スル危険が アルカラ出矢数八種カ少数が上メルコトンカフ方針で立見一致してンダソコデ

掠奪せうしんナドノニトかアリ又戻三同年八月二八支即側か上海テ日本側可不 王幸能三川中城之下已可得又年初,主恨了几在艾日本,正当权益保護, 法二文はサンネルナドアトカラ 其,後又那側かけ京、向午在方面力清兵之又通州二十十日本人多数力修設 タメノ出失情加二反対元二十か出来十一有様子アリアンス当川質住大藏大臣八 此方針に依すを揮が出失スルコトニ統断かちへうレタノデアリッス、 其,在任中与面心事件费的独力少额二下以此根切壁之好力之一格了之之久 現三事態か上海三雅火レタトキー出紙三北下を留住氏ハナルベリ上海三出失ラナ アトカラ小部幸然が演出して来マスノテ政府小して

サルは根地三田ガラホメマンタが当け、情勢上己り得ストラが三川減二於子出 失二反社やサルコトニナッタコトが私、記念三残った他りでス

血溢清移、日文軍術尖人全り突発事件デアリマレテ後二事件か上海に拡大 ナコトハ勿論アリセセンン又前内倒力ラを様ナコトノーとはう受かり様ナコトを素 ンタ、汁一次近衛内的成立以来支那事件より其他都年,計画準備ラナン又標 シテ文那事変ト你やうしい三至心とい不拡大方針,下二北文都幸要上好心上悟少

五十一次近衛外倒,什川該二於乙報告其他一方法"四八千日本軍一又那二於人 タト河イナオリマス 此,翠沉,竹下八阶零,照债金乡支件,于米回及英国上,沿二田沟解决也已 当け、事情上しいう得ザリレカ又八的失言ルモノデア、ターノ動者デアリマンタ にハネーテスレケーハード子撃北ノコトハ尚誠二報告セラレマレタ、其、報告へ セヌかりろしゃた様けれ就かで、タトラフ報告へ尚続これテナサレテオリマセス 新闻えた様ナコトハ記載セランテたらス当山外国かったまかアッタカトウカ知りで 我居行為方南京居被事件等一件我人問係一何等知方井上外口上大人又当时

大文羽事夷"於子其,你然"了了一小一切倒藏"出城也了一世小勿論幸於一報 光サレシューハナカッタ南京攻撃ニッイテモの漏ソウテアッス

宣哲。

トラ響フ

良心

二從中質質少述べ何率サモ默沿下

ズ叉何事チ

モ附加セザル

* 肉

名捺印



昭和二十二年 九四七年

述 者

八省立會 ٨ 前ニテ宣誓シ 見ツ琴名 捺印 シタ N 7 瞪明

日

同

Def Doc No. 2015.

ARAKI Sadao et all SNORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: YONA/ Miltumina

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

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AFFIDAVIT OF MITSUMASA YONAI

- 1. I, Mitsumasa Yonai, held the following offices: Navy Minister from February 1937 to August 1939. Prime Minister from January to July 1940. Navy Minister from April 1945, to November 1946.
- 2. On July 9, 1957 an armed conflict took place between some Japanese troops and Chinese troops at Lukouchio (Marco Polo Bridge) in North China. At the Cabinet meeting on July 9, War Minister SUGIYAMA made a brief report of the Incident for the first time.

He reported the Japanese troops being attacked without justification by some Chinese troops were forced to respond to the attack and urged that the immediate dispatch of reinforcements was necessary, saying that he felt a grave concern for the safety of the 5500 Japanese troops stationed at Peking and Tientsin as well as the numerous Japanese residents there and that this was necessary for their protection.

As the Navy Minister I expressed objection to the dispatch of reinforcements and strongly advocated that the Incident be handled as a local affair to be settled on the spot and the utmost effort be made to prevent its spreading to other districts in China and that the Navy feared according to past experience that any Incident occurring in North China was liable to spread to Central China in the course of about two months;

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and I further remarked that, in the case of an untoward. Incident taking place in Central China the Navy would inevitably be involved in it to its extreme annoyance. Cabinet members, including Prince KONOYE and Finance Minister KAYA agreed with my opinion and at this Cabinet meeting it was decided to have this affair settled as a local issue not to be extended any further.

tance still more strongly on the immediate dispatch of reinforcements stating that unless an expeditionary force was sent there the situation might develop to such a pass as would imperil the security of the Japanese troops and the Japanese residents in that section of China. The Cabinet thereupon discussed the request of the War Ministry and finally agreed to recognize the despatch of reinforcement was inevitable if the Army felt that such reiforcement was neccessary to safeguard the Japanese

force on the spot and the livesof Japanese nationals living in reinforcement is despetched it mason the condition that the Army should address closely to the Governthe vicinity. However even if policy of "non-expension of mentioned the incident and settlement on the spot" and recall the troops as soon as the incident was settled, and as the despetch of large reinforcement might bring on a head-on clack with the Chinese Army, the despetch of reinforcement should be as small as possible.

Later it developed that the Chinese side gathered its armed forces in and around Peking from various counties.

Further there occurred in Tungchow massacre of numerous Japanese residents and mob plundering. And the situation was worsened when in August, 1937 Chinese troops in Shanghai

wantonly attacked Japanese. Thus fresh developments appeared one after the other in succession until at last the Japanese Government was forced by circumstances to find itselfunable to resist the insistence of the Army on the dispatch of additional forces which the Army deemed necessary to protect the lives of Japanese nationals and legal rights in China.

At that time Finance Minister KAYA throughout his tenure of office wanted to limit to the minimum the military expenditures on account of this Incident and made every effort toward that end. When the trouble spread to Shanghai area Mr.KAYA at a Cabinet Meeting earnestly solicited the Army's re-consideration of its intentions to send troops to Shanghai but the Government was eventually obliged by force of circumstances to yield to the **ITMY-Army's-re-censideration- Army's demand of dispatching troops to Shanghai at its Cabinet Meeting.

Bridge between Japanese and Chinese troops was considered an accidental affair, and was then called the North China Incident as it was the Japanese Government's policy to treat it as a local trouble. However, when a fresh development ensued in Shanghai the whole Incident became to be termed as the China Incident. But since the start of the first Konoye Cabinet nothing in the from of a plan had every been contemplated nor any preparations made for the so called China Incident or any other war. Neither did the said Cabinet have any such plan handed down from its predecessor.

5. Cabinet members were not informed at any Cabinet meeting of the First Konoye Administration, or through any other material, of the atrocities committed in China by Japanese troops nor of the massacre at Nanking. Neither was there any reports concerning them published in the press.

I do not know whether any protest was filed at that time by foreign countries but so far as any Cabinet members were concerned we were not advised of any protests being loaged with the Japanese Government.

The sinking of the Panay and of the Ladybird were reported at a Cabinet meeting. The report stated that the Incidents occurred under unavoidable circumstances or by fault. I was told that compensation was paid for the sinking of these warships, and that the matter had been settled to the satisfaction of the United States and Great Britain.

6. The Cabinet was not informed nor was it consulted about the military plans in China, in connection with the attack on Nanking or any other battle.

	On this of day of Augy, 1947
	At Doleyo
DEPONENT ONA!	Mutsuniara seal)

I, TANAMA Two donereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponet, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

At the same date

At the same public

Witness: (signed) TANAHA Londing

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

10NA 1 Milsumal (Soul)

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Derosition

Deponent: YONAT, Mitsumasa

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country.

I hereby depose as follows.

- 1. I, Mitsumasa Yonai, held the following offices: Navy Minister from February 1937 to August 1939. Prime Minister from January to July 1940.
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3. On July 11 "ar Minister SUGIYAMA renewed his insistance still more strongly on the immediate dispatch of reinforcements stating that unless an expeditionary force was sent there the situation might develop to such a pass as would imperial the security of the Japanese troops and the

Japanese residents in that section of China. The Cabinet thereupon discussed the request of the War Minister and finally agreed to recognize the despatch of reinforcement was inevitable if the Army felt that such reinforcement was necessary to safeguard the Japanese force on the spot and the lives of Japanese nationals living in the vicinity. However even if reinforcement is despatched it was on the condition that the Army should adhere closely to the Government policy of "non-expansion of the incident and settlement on the spot" and recall the troops as soon as the incident was settled, and as the despatch of large reinforcement might bring on a head-on clash with the Chinese Army, the despatch of reinforcement should be as small as possible.

,..

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Later it developed that the Chinese side gathered its armed forces in and around Peking from various counties. Further there occurred in Tungchow a massacre of numerous Japanese residents and mob plundering. And the situation was worsened when in August, 1937 Chinese troops in Shanghai wantonly attacked Japanese. Thus fresh developments appeared one after the other in succession until at last the Japanese Government was forced by circumstances to find itself unable to resist the insistence of the Army on the dispatch of additional forces which the Army deemed necessary to protect the lives of Japanese nationals and legal rights in China.

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 - 5. Cabinet members were not informed at any Cabinet meeting of the First Konoye Administration, or through any other material, of the atrocities committed in China by

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Japanese troops nor of the massacre at Nanking. Neither was there any reports concerning them published in the press. I do not know whether any protest was filed at that time by foreign countries but so far as any Cabinet members were concerned we were not advised of any protests being lodged with the Japanese Government.

The sinking of the Panay and of the Ladybird were reported at a Cabinet meeting. The report stated that the Incidents occurred under unavoidable circumstances or by fault. I was told that compensation was paid for the sinking of these warships, and that the matter had been settled to the satisfaction of the United States and Great Britain.

6. The Cabinet was not informed nor was it consulted about the military plans in China, in connection with the attack on Nanking or any other hattle.

On this 24 day of July, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ YONAI, Mitsumasa (seal)

I, TANAKA, Kodo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place

Witness: /S/ TANAKA Kodo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ YONAI, Mitsumasa (seal)