AMBASSADER CREATS RETURN THAT LAR MIGHT BE "INEVITABLE"

In a telegram of Fovember 3, 19/1 Ambassador Srew reported to the Department of State on the current situation in J pan. He warned against accordance of any theory that the warkening and final exhaustion of Japanese financial and economic rescurses would result shortly in Japanese collapse as a militarist nation. He pointed out that despite severe cuts in industrial output, the loss of most of Japanese commerce, and the depletion of national resources, such a collapse had not occurred; but instead there was being drastically presecuted the integration of Japanese national economy. Events so for, he said, had given no support for the view that we in the Far East could best be averted by imposition of commercial embargoes. He said that considering the temper of the people of Japan it was dangerously uncertain to base United States policy on a view that the imposition of progressive and rigorous economic measures would probably evert wer; that it was the view of the Embassy that war would not be everted by such a course.

States becoming involved in wer with Japan through any misconception of Japanese conseity to plunge into a "suicidal struggle" with us. Although reason, he said, would dictate against such a happening, our own standards of logic could not be used to measure Japanese rationality. While we need not be everly concerned by the "belliesse" utterances of the Japanese press, it would be short-sighted to underestamate the obvious preparations of Japan; it would be short-sighted also if our policy were based on a belief that these preparations amounted merely to saber ratiling. Finally, he warned of the possibility of Japan's adopting measures with dramatic and dangerous suddonness which might make inevitable a war with the United States.

Four days later, on November 7, Secretary Hull stated at a Cabinet meeting that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was "imminent possibility" that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force. It thereupon became

the consensus of the Cobinet that the critical situation might well be caphreized in specches in order that the country would, if possible, be better propared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11, 1941 in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world -- on the far side of the Pacific"; that the Pacific no less then the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense. On the same day Under Secretary of State Colles, carrying out the Cabinet suggestion in an address, stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Turope to abject scriden and that in the Far Fast the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations berdering on the Tacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking high both in the East and in the Tost", he said, and were threatening, more and more with each massing day, "to engulf our own shores". He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that "at any moment war may of forced upon us".

On November 17 sembassador Graw cabled from Tokyo that in calling attention to the necessity for vigilance against sudden Japanese mayal or military attack in regions not then involved in the Chancse-Japanese conflict, he considered it probable that the Japanese would make use of every possible tretical advantage, including surprise and initiative. The Ambassador said that it daran there was an extremely effective control over military information and that as a consequence it was unlikely that the Embassy would be able to give substantial marning.

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