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Doc. #2024

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Vol. 24

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

December 14, 1945

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 4195 to 4341

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(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)

OFFICIAL REPORTERS

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

Vol. 24 (5)

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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C O N T E N T S

<u>TESTIMONY OF:</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
GEROW, Lieutenant General Leonard Townsend	
(Resumed)	4215

S. Con. Res. 27

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Friday, December 14, 1945

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,
of counsel, for the joint committee.

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1 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

2 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, before General Gerow's ex-
3 amination continues I have a statement to present to the
4 committee about the situation of the legal staff, if I may
5 do it.

6 The Chairman: Yes, the chair will recognize counsel
7 for that purpose.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, the point we have reached
9 in the hearings makes it evident that a complete replacement
10 of the Committee's legal staff is necessary.

11 The Committee began its hearings November 15th and has
12 been sitting regularly for a month, including all Saturdays
13 but one. During that period only eight witnesses have been
14 completely examined and we estimate that as the field of
15 inquiry by Committee members has widened out and new wit-
16 nesses have been added to the list, there remain at least
17 sixty witnesses to be examined. Many of these witnesses are
18 quite as crucial as those who have testified. At the rate
19 of progress during the past month, it seems certain that
20 several more months of hearings will be required.

21 When I undertook to serve the Committee as chief coun-
22 sel, I believed that my services would not be needed beyond
23 early January. This resulted from several factors:

24 I had and still have a definite conviction that the
25 real purpose of this Committee was to present facts which

1 would permit a final answer to this basic question: Who
2 was responsible for the failure of our forces at Hawaii to
3 be on the alert and for the admitted failure to use to the
4 best advantage such defense facilities as were available at
5 Pearl Harbor?

6 The Joint Resolution of the Congress under which the
7 Committee is acting requires a final report of the Committee
8 to be made not later than January 3, 1946. I assumed that
9 time limit meant what it said.

10 I had every reason to feel that the essential facts
11 bearing on this basic question could be presented thoroughly
12 within the time set. There had already been six inquiries
13 into this question. As a result we had as a starting point
14 the testimony of most of the principal participants and a
15 substantial amount of documentary material previously as-
16 sembled. At the beginning of my employment, as I then in-
17 formed the Committee, I undertook with my staff to spend
18 approximately six weeks in the preparation of evidence and I
19 stated to the Committee that commencing on or about November
20 15th we would be in a position to present in an organized
21 and orderly fashion the evidence which we had assembled.

22 I have never had the idea, nor do I have it today, that
23 counsel should be the sole judge as to what evidence should
24 be presented to the Committee or what avenues of inquiry
25 the Committee should follow. I thought that there are cer-

1 tain essential facts, as to which there could be no doubt
2 as to pertinence or relevance, which counsel should present
3 at the outset in order to lay out the basic groundwork. I
4 thought and so stated to the Committee that at the conclusion
5 of this presentation, which we had every reason to feel could
6 be completed well within the time limit set, the Committee
7 would then be in a position to appraise the case as a whole
8 and determine what additional evidence was required or
9 whether any other witnesses should be called.

10 Since the start of the hearing it has become increasing-
11 ly apparent that some members of the Committee have a dif-
12 ferent view than that entertained by counsel, either as to
13 the scope of the inquiry or as to what is pertinent evidence.
14 This has been reflected in extensive examination by some
15 members of the Committee far beyond what the legal staff
16 anticipated.

17 This unexpected development during the last month has
18 made it clear to me and all of my staff that it is not pos-
19 sible to complete the hearings within anything approximating
20 the time I originally anticipated, and accordingly, I am
21 certain of my own inability, and that of my staff, to see
22 the job through to the end. All of my staff accepted their
23 places on my expectation and assurances that they would not
24 be held for any considerable time after January first. My
25 own obligations and responsibilities put me in the same

1 position.

2 This outcome is a source of deep concern and regret to
3 me, and to the other members of my staff. I did not want the
4 place as counsel, but under the circumstances I felt I could
5 not refuse it. I had hoped to perform a useful public ser-
6 vice in aiding to present publicly all the pertinent facts
7 which would permit the Committee, the Congress, and the
8 public to answer the questions in their minds. Our Entire
9 staff has worked days, nights, and Sundays for two months
10 and a half. We have produced, or prepared for introduction,
11 much pertinent evidence that has never been produced at any
12 previous inquiry about Pearl Harbor. We are all depressed
13 that because of the course of the proceedings we have not
14 been able to present it.

15 It is necessary for me to ask the Committee to arrange
16 for other counsel to carry on. If that is done with reason-
17 able promptness there should be no serious break in the hear-
18 ings. We have already done a large part of the work in
19 digging out and organizing basic material and documents, and
20 arranging for the witnesses.

21 I want to make it clear that there has been no restric-
22 tion placed upon counsel by any member of the Committee or
23 by any agency of the Government as far as presenting perti-
24 nent evidence is concerned. We have had access to all perti-
25 nent records and have received complete cooperation from

1 all Government departments concerned. I feel sure that
 2 this same condition will continue. We will make every ef-
 3 fort to aid the new counsel in preparing for their work and,
 4 during that process, we can, if the Committee desires, con-
 5 tinue, for the rest of December and for a short time in
 6 January, presenting evidence to the Committee so that the
 7 new legal staff can pick up the case and carry on.

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2 The Chairman: The Chair would like to state, in con-
3 nection with that statement of our Chief Counsel, that in his
4 opinion the development as outlined there is, as far as this
5 committee is concerned and the Congress, the country I think,
6 tragic.

7 I would like to say for the record that when this
8 committee was appointed -- I will go back of that, when the
9 reports that were released of the War Inquiry Board and Navy
10 Board of Inquiry, I think in August, there was a general
11 feeling, in which I shared and so stated on the floor of the
12 Senate, that the confusion growing out of the various investi-
13 gations and reports was such that, in my judgment, it required
14 a Congressional investigation. I felt that it was a responsi-
15 bility of the majority party in Congress to make that in-
16 vestigation and accept the responsibility and whatever the
17 consequences might be, and believing that I introduced the
18 resolution under which we have been acting since the 6th of
19 September, I think, or since its adoption by the House.

20 One of the first tasks to be performed was the selection
21 of counsel. That was not an easy task. We had a number of
22 applications for appointment of Chief Counsel by able lawyers.
23 I think the committee felt we would have to draft somebody,
24 some outstanding man whose character and whose record for
25 ability, integrity and experience in legal matters, and

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especially in the Governmental set-ups, would insure a thorough and non-partisan examination into this question.

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The first name suggested, or that occurred to me and to other members of the committee, and I think generally, was Honorable William D. Mitchell, who had been Solicitor General four years in the Coolidge Administration, and had been Attorney General for four years in the Hoover Administration.

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I called Mr. Mitchell over the telephone in New York and told him that I had been authorized to consult him as to the availability of his services, and he said that he had a busy law practice and he was not seeking any additional assignments, but if the committee felt that he was the man desired to conduct this investigation from a legal standpoint, he would accept.

I asked him to come down to Washington to sit with the committee and discuss it, which he did. He was unanimously selected, and the press generally, and the country, reacted most favorably to that selection, and I think both Houses of Congress did also.

The committee authorized him to select his own staff, because if he were to be responsible for the conduct of the investigation from the standpoint of the counsel, obviously it was necessary for him to select men with whom he could work and in whom he had confidence, and so he set about to

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2 make the selection of his assistants. No injunction or
3 suggestion was made to him, as far as I know, certainly not
4 in the committee, and if anybody individually made any such
5 suggestion I am not aware of it, that there should be any
6 politics or any partisanship in the selection of counsel.

7 The Chairman of this committee does not know now and has
8 never inquired whether any member of this legal staff were
9 Democrats or Republicans.

10 Mr. Mitchell came down and began to organize his staff
11 and to look into the mass of records involved in this investi-
12 gation. It was a herculean task, involving the State, War
13 and Navy Departments, and other agencies of the Government,
14 and, as Mr. Mitchell has said, they have worked day and night
15 and Sundays in making available to the committee everything
16 that appeared to be pertinent to the inquiry without re-
17 striction and immediately.

18 I, as Chairman of the committee, asked all the Departments,
19 from the President on down, to make available to the counsel
20 every bit of pertinent record or testimony that might bear
21 upon this investigation.

22 The Chairman of the committee has been, of course, as
23 Chairman, in touch with counsel. It was necessary to confer
24 with him day by day over details that it was unnecessary and
25 impossible for the committee to do as a whole. That is one

W. D. MOTCHINERAW - JUAN S. DRAW

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2 of the functions of the Chairman. The Chairman is able to
3 say, without reservation, that Mr. Mitchell, and his entire
4 staff, have devoted themselves conscientiously, without sparing
5 themselves in any way, in undertaking to develop the evidence
6 that the committee might want or might feel that it needed
7 in order to make an investigation available to the public
8 and held in public, so that the people themselves would know
9 every word of testimony produced here and make up their own
10 minds about the responsibility of anybody in the Government
11 for the disaster at Pearl Harbor, regardless of the opinion
12 of any member of the committee, or of the committee as a whole.

13 The Chairman feels like saying to Mr. Mitchell, and to
14 his entire staff, that in his experience as a legislator
15 covering 33 years, and a longer experience in public life and
16 in the practice of law, he does not recall a more diligent,
17 earnest, painstaking, unselfish effort made by a lawyer or
18 group of lawyers to perform their services as a public duty.

19 When Mr. Mitchell was asked to come down here he insisted
20 that he did not want to consider any question of compensation,
21 that what he did would be a matter of public duty.

22 One or two members of his staff have insisted likewise,
23 that they were not interested in any compensation that the
24 committee or Congress might pay them. They have sacrificed
25 their time and income in order to serve this committee and,

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2 as they felt, serve the country and do a constructive job
3 in presenting this case, in presenting the evidence and in
4 digging it out, which the committee could not do as a committee.

5 Late yesterday afternoon Mr. Mitchell called me, as
6 Chairman of this committee, into the office where he and his
7 staff had been engaged in work and advised me that they would
8 be compelled, under the circumstances, to take the step which
9 they have now taken. I attempted to dissuade them from that
10 decision and asked them to consider it overnight, in the hope
11 that they might reach a different conclusion. They have not
12 reached a different conclusion.

13 Now it is a tragedy that we are to lose the services of
14 these gentlemen. To select new counsel at this time, or
15 within the next week or two, involves a difficulty the result
16 and solution of which I cannot now foresee. I do not know to
17 what extent any lawyer, or any group of lawyers, who are en-
18 gaged in their own practice, who have a reputation and stand-
19 ing as lawyers and as citizens that would justify their
20 selection by this committee, would be possible.

21 The Chairman does not know whether it would be possible
22 at all under the circumstances to substitute counsel who would
23 be in a position to undertake the onerous task which would
24 devolve upon such counsel, notwithstanding the groundwork
25 which has been laid by the counsel and his assistants.

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The Chair expresses his profound regret that the situation, as it has developed up to now, has required the action taken by General Mitchell and his assistant counsel. I cannot make any prediction. I have no idea who might be willing to take over the job. I have no idea how much longer these hearings will last.

When I introduced the resolution and fixed the third of January as the date for making the report I honestly believed that we could, within four months from that date, bring about the development of this evidence publicly and make our report on the third day of January. On account of the mass of detailed information and documents that had to be gone into by the counsel, it took some time to arrange all that and to get it available, and there was a little more delay in the beginning of the hearings than I, at the time of the introduction of the resolution, anticipated.

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On the whole, I think that was a time-saver in this respect; that it gathered and selected and made available the information from the standpoint of the presentation of the case, and that that delay which was necessary as it turned out did not in any way cause any undue postponement of the beginning of the hearing.

It is obvious now to all of us that the hearings cannot be concluded and the report made by the 3rd of January, and that an extension of time must be requested of the Senate and House. How much more time will be required, the Chair would not even prophesy.

We have had, as General Mitchell has said, ten witnesses up to now, only eight of whom have been concluded, as far as the examination is concerned, with two more still on the stand and unconcluded, and at the rate of progress made in the examination of these witnesses, it would be difficult to prophesy how many months it would require to conclude this testimony.

The Chairman wishes to say that he not only did not seek appointment to this committee, notwithstanding the fact that he introduced the resolution, he did not seek appointment to this committee, but protested against his appointment and argued with the President of the Senate for days, seeking to persuade him not to appoint the

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2 Chairman as a member of the committee.

3 As majority leader of the Senate I had all that any
4 ordinary human being could be expected to do, and I realized
5 that in order to give this position the service and to do
6 the justice to which it was entitled, I would have to
7 abandon my duties temporarily as Majority Leader, and
8 almost as a Senator.

9 I must, in my own mind, decide whether I have any fur-
10 ther duty in regard to this investigation, and whether,
11 if I have any duty, it outweighs my duty on the floor of
12 the Senate in the capacity in which I have been chosen by
13 that body, and in which I served for more than eight years.

14 I must say in good conscience, and say it publicly,
15 and I think the committee is entitled to have me say that
16 during the next few days I will weigh my relative obliga-
17 tions as a member of this committee alongside of my obliga-
18 tions as a member of the Senate and as Majority Leader,
19 and if I conclude in my own mind that I must make the
20 decision that my duties in the Senate over the next three
21 or four or six months, whatever the time may be outweigh
22 my duties as a member of this committee I shall thereupon
23 surrender my chairmanship of this committee and resign as
24 a member of the committee.

25 If I conclude in my own mind -- and I must again say

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2 I must reach the decision myself -- that I can render any
3 additional service as a member of this committee over a
4 period of months, and that that service and that obligation
5 may outweigh my obligation on the floor of the Senate,
6 I shall decide accordingly. But I feel that, in view of
7 the whole situation as we all understand it here, I must
8 within the next few days reach a conclusion as to what my
9 course will be.

10 Whatever my course will be, I want chief counsel and
11 all his assistants to know that I have appreciated their
12 contribution to this development in this public hearing,
13 and to the evaluation of the testimony, and the service
14 which all of us have assumed they would and that they have
15 rendered.

16 I have never in so brief a time been associated with
17 men in the legal profession or in legislation for whom I
18 have a more profound respect and in whom I have greater
19 confidence, and I want them to know that as far as I am
20 concerned, and I think I speak for the committee in that
21 respect.

22 That is all I feel like saying. I cannot but feel de-
23 pressed, immeasurably depressed over this development and
24 I don't think I need say anything more at the moment.

25 Senator George: Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to

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2 make a very brief statement?

3 The Chairman: Senator George.

4 Senator George: I think the Chairman of the committee
5 knows, and I know the President of the Senate well under-
6 stands, I have remained on the committee because I felt
7 we were fortunate in securing the assistance and aid of
8 General Mitchell.

9 I have been perfectly willing from the outset to allow
10 General Mitchell and his staff, in whom I have complete
11 confidence, to organize and lay out this inquiry. I have
12 believed that there was not but one way to ascertain the
13 truth and answer the question, which, under the Senate
14 resolution we were called upon to consider, and that was
15 to get a complete view of the pertinent, relevant, and
16 material facts that could be developed only through the
17 conscientious work and skill of counsel.

18 Of course, I recognize the right of all members of
19 the committee to cross-examine witnesses at any length,
20 but I have wondered whether or not we were confusing the
21 issue rather than arriving at any answer in which the
22 public could have any confidence. I still feel that way
23 about it.

24 I deeply regret General Mitchell's decision and the
25 decision of the other members of his staff. I appreciate

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2 the facts stated by General Mitchell to this committee this
3 morning, and I think it is only fair to say that all
4 members of the committee understood that General Mitchell
5 hoped to conclude the inquiry by or very soon after the
6 turn of the year, as he has already stated to us.

7 I merely wish to say that I deeply regret the decision
8 which General Mitchell and his staff have been forced to
9 make in the circumstances, in view of the now clearly indi-
10 cated length of this inquiry, and I know that their separa-
11 tion from service here with this committee is a loss to
12 the committee, to the Congress as a whole, and I think to
13 the country.

14 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may I say just a word?

15 The Chairman: The Senator from Illinois.

16 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I desire to concur in
17 what the able Senator from Georgia, and the able Senator
18 from Kentucky have said with respect to this announcement
19 of General Mitchell this morning. It is a source of deep
20 regret to me that General Mitchell and his staff feel it
21 necessary to leave this extremely important national assign-
22 ment, and I say without fear of contradiction that it is
23 a great loss to the American people, in view of the magnifi-
24 cent job that they have done up to date.

25 I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that General Mitchell

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1 and his staff will continue through this month, and that
2 these hearings may continue from day to day just as we
3 have planned them.

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5 It may be that by January 3, we will have a better
6 opportunity to assess the time necessary to conclude the
7 hearings. Of course, in the meantime we can be arranging
8 for counsel to take over should the contingency arise that
9 it will be necessary to extend this hearing.

10 I want to say in conclusion, as one member of the com-
11 mittee, I had never met any of these gentlemen before begin-
12 ning my service with the committee.

13 I had frequently read and heard about General Mitchell.
14 The first time I ever met him or saw him was when he appeared
15 before our committee for the first time. I was deeply
16 impressed with his frank, opening statement. I concurred
17 in what he wanted to do. That was to bring in every shred
18 of evidence that they could possibly find that would throw
19 any light upon this Pearl Harbor disaster. Counsel selected
20 to aid him in this cause have been more than diligent in the
21 preparation of this case.

22 I again reiterate that it is a tremendous loss to this
23 committee and to the country that these fine men feel it
24 necessary to remove themselves from their assignment.

25 The Chairman: The Chair would like to say that

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General Mitchell and his staff have assured him that they will continue until the committee takes its recess for the Christmas holidays. It has been my thought that we would recess for the Christmas holidays probably Saturday, the 22nd, but it may be more convenient for some members to recess the 21st. Under the circumstances, it doesn't make much difference, apparently. So that we will have the services of General Mitchell and his staff until such time as the committee recesses for the holidays, and in the meantime we may be able to assess the situation more accurately.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Cooper.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I do not want to detain the committee longer than to concur with the Chairman, the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Illinois in the remarks they have made.

It had not been my privilege to know General Mitchell or any of the members of his staff prior to the time they were selected for work with this committee.

I have been most favorably impressed by all of them. I think they have done an outstanding job, and have rendered an outstanding public service. As a member of the committee I regret exceedingly that the situation has developed so

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2 that they feel they must not continue longer than the end
3 of this month in the excellent service that they have ren-
4 dered the committee.

5 It is a matter of very great regret that the situation
6 could not have developed so that we could have gone on
7 with this investigation as was originally planned, outlined,
8 and understood, and under the able guidance of General Mitchell
9 and his staff.

10 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman --

11 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

12 Mr. Murphy: I want to state on the record that in my
13 judgment, Mr. Mitchell has held positions of great honor
14 in this country; he has an outstanding reputation as a
15 lawyer; he and his staff have been able, conscientious,
16 sincere, thorough, and have thus far made a clear presenta-
17 tion of the facts in this inquiry.

18 I regret that it has been necessary for he and his
19 staff, in view of the developments, to come to the conclu-
20 sion they have.

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1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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The Chairman: General Gerow, I believe, is now here and ready to proceed. I have forgotten who was examining.

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The Vice Chairman: Counsel was examining.

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The Chairman: Yes.

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TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW -- Resumed

7

Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, I understand you have in mind asking for some corrections in the transcript of your testimony?

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General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

10

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Mr. Mitchell: Would you like to present them now?

12

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

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14

In reviewing my testimony given before this committee on 5 December 1945, I have found several statements made by me which for purposes of the record should be clarified:

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(a) On page 2643, lines 24 and 25 and page 2644, lines 2 and 3, committee counsel stated as follows:

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"Go to the third item in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5; please look at that and give us the date of that and briefly just what the scope of that plan is, or was?"

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The bound folder which was handed me contained two documents, i.e., Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5 and a revision thereof dated November 19, 1941. I apparently read from the revision rather than the original

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Witness Gerow

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2 document. Since the War Department Operations Plan, Rainbow
3 No. 5 was based on the original joint plan and not on the
4 revision thereof and since it is therefore my belief that I
5 should have identified and quoted from the original plan, my
6 statement as it appears on page 2643, lines 24 and 25 and
7 page 2644, lines 2 and 3 should have been as follows:

8 "There are two plans in this folder: Joint Army and
9 Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5 and a revision thereof.
10 The original plan was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on
11 28 May 1941 and by the Secretary of War on 2 June 1941. It
12 was never approved by the President. The revision of the
13 plan was approved by the Joint Board on 19 November 1941.

14 "I can best describe this plan by quoting the general
15 assumptions as stated in the original Rainbow No. 5 plan.

16 "Section III. General Assumptions. That the
17 Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States,
18 the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East
19 Indies, Greece, Yougoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China,
20 and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis Powers,
21 comprising either:

22 "a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or

23 "b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria,
24 and Thailand.

25 "That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in

1 Witness Gerow

2 accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22.

3 "That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially
4 in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be
5 taken into account.

6 "That United States forces which might base in the Far
7 East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements, other
8 than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from
9 sources in that general region.

10 "That Latin American Republics will take measures to
11 control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-
12 belligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in
13 general, the territorial waters and land bases of these
14 Republics will be available for use by United States forces
15 for purposes of Hemisphere Defense."

16 Again:

17 (b) On page 2646, lines 11, 12 and 13 in commenting on
18 the fact that the War Department Operations Plan which you
19 handed me bore no date, I stated:

20 "I know it was sent to Hawaii in August, 1941, and the
21 receipt was received back from the War Department on September
22 3, 1941."

23 This would have been more accurately stated as follows:

24 "This plan was approved by the Chief of Staff and sent
25 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department in August, 1941.

Witness Gerow

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2 The records of the War Department show that a receipt for
3 this document, dated 3 September 1941, from the Commanding
4 General, Hawaiian Department, was received in the War Depart-
5 ment on 15 September 1941."

6 Again:

7 (c) On page 2646, lines 14, 15 and 16, the committee
8 counsel stated as follows:

9 "The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian Defense
10 Projects, Revision 1940. Will you look at that and tell me
11 the scope and nature of that document and the date."

12 My answer to that should have been as follows:

13 "Yes, sir. This document was prepared in Hawaii. It
14 is a local plan or rather defense project based on Joint
15 Army and Navy War Plan (Orange) 1938."

16 Again:

17 (d) On page 2647, lines 14 to 17, the committee Chairman
18 stated:

19 "May I ask of the General: You say this was in 1940,
20 and based on that previous item which you have just discussed
21 which seems to have been approved in August, 1941. Is not
22 there some divergence as to dates?"

23 I see that my answer to that question was not quite
24 clear. It would have been better answered as follows:

25 "This defense project was not based on War Department

Witness Gerow

1 Operations Plan - Rainbow No. 5 approved in August, 1941.
2
3 This document is a compilation of approved projects for
4 personnel, armament, materiel and funds. It was compiled
5 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as of
6 December 1, 1940.

7 "This document was referred to the War Department where
8 the separate projects contained therein were reviewed to
9 determine that they were in accordance with approved War
10 Department directives. When new separate projects, submitted
11 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, were approved
12 by the War Department the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
13 partment, was notified by letter or radio that these projects
14 were then included in the next compilation of this document.

15 "The 1940 edition of the Hawaiian Defense Project is
16 based on the Army mission as stated in Joint Army and Navy
17 Basic Plan Orange 1938, which is substantially the same as
18 that contained in War Department Operations Plan-Rainbow #5,
19 August 1941."

20 Again:

21 (e) On page 2647, line 25, and page 2648, line 2,
22 committee counsel asked the following question:

23 "The next item is joint coastal defense plan, Hawaii.
24 What is that?"

25 My answer would have been more clearly stated as follows:

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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"This is a joint plan that was prepared by the local Commanders in Hawaii, Army and Navy. It is based on the joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans and the Army and Navy plans furnished by the War and Navy Departments."

(3)

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(f) On page 2650, lines 23 and 24, committee counsel in questioning me regarding the "5 November, 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department," asked:

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"Did you see that document before December 6, 1941?" to which I replied, "I don't recall ever having seen it before December 7. I think the records of the War Department show it came in later in 1942."

13

14

15

I have since had the War Department records checked and find that that document was received in the War Department on March 7, 1942.

16

17

18

The purpose of most of those corrections, sir, is to correct the dates, that I did not have with me at the time, sir.

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Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, I want to direct your attention to the events of December 6 and 7, 1941, and particularly in relation to this so-called 14-part message that was intercepted, the message from the Japanese Government to their Ambassadors in Washington, of which 13 parts were translated before midnight and the 14th part and the 1:00 p.m. part on the morning of the 7th.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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You know that in mind, have you?

2

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

3

4

Mr. Mitchell: Will you tell us, if you remember, what your movements were on the afternoon and the evening of December 6. Have you any recollection of that?

5

6

General Gerow: No, sir, I have no clear recollection of where I was on the afternoon of the 6th.

7

8

Mr. Mitchell: I am more interested in the evening of the 6th, after the dinner hour. Do you remember that?

9

10

General Gerow: No, sir, I do not recall. I believe though, sir, that I was at home.

11

12

Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, if this 13th part of this message had been translated, decoded and translated, by the Signal Corps, SIS, it was their custom to deliver the decoded message, or exhibit the decoded message, to you in your office, was that the practice?

13

14

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General Gerow: Yes, sir, that was the practice.

18

19

Mr. Mitchell: In case of your absence from the office, for instance, on the evening of the 6th, was there anybody there in War Plans Division whose function it was to receive the copy of the decoded message or make any effort to reach you?

20

21

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23

General Gerow: No, sir, there was no one actually in the office. The procedure, sir, was to designate what we

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25

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 call a Duty Officer for each day. The responsibility of
3 that Duty Officer was to remain -- he could go home -- but
4 he remained at his telephone so he could be reached at any
5 time by the Adjutant General or the Office of the Chief of
6 Staff. He could get in touch with me and inform me of any
7 important messages that might be intended for me, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: If the SIS people translated a message
9 of that type on the evening of the 6th, what would be the
10 practice that they would follow in endeavoring to have copies
11 of it delivered to the War Plans Division or to you or to a
12 Duty Officer, how does that work?

13 General Gerow: I think, sir, if they had an important
14 message to deliver to me that Colonel Bratton, who usually
15 delivered those messages, would have telephoned me at my
16 home, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: In other words, the message would go
18 from the Signal Corps, SIS, to G-2, would it, and then to you,
19 or would it come direct to your office?

20 General Gerow: It was delivered to my office by a
21 representative of G-2.

22 Mr. Mitchell: G-2. So that in order to reach you
23 personally a decoded copy of such a message would pass first
24 through G-2 and then to your office or your Duty Officer?

25 General Gerow: Yes, sir, that would be the procedure, sir.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: So that on the evening of the 6th if G-2 wanted to place a copy of such a message in your hands, their arrangement would have been that they would have to call your Duty Officer, locate you through him?

General Gerow: No, sir. My telephone number was on record in the War Department and I believe the representative of G-2 would have called me directly rather than calling the Duty Officer.

Mr. Mitchell: Did you on the night of the 6th receive any copy or learn of any such message as the 13-part message?

General Gerow: To the best of my knowledge and belief I did not, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: There was a pilot message which came in earlier and which was an announcement by the Japs to their Ambassadors to look out for the long message which was to follow. It is found on page 238 of Exhibit 1.

Will you look at it and see whether you ever on the 6th were informed of the receipt of that message, or if you have any recollection about it?

General Gerow: I do not recall having received that message, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: What is your recollection about going to your office or to the War Department on the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941? Do you remember your movements on that

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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morning?

General Gerow: I remember, sir, that I went to the office that morning. I believe I arrived there shortly before 10:00 o'clock. There was some unfinished business that I had to take care of with some of my senior officers and we met there on Sunday morning and were there, I think, prior to 10:00 o'clock, sir.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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2 Mr. Mitchell: Did you see or learn of this 14th part
3 and 1 p. m. decoded series of messages on the morning of
4 the 7th at any time?

5 General Gerow: The first time I saw them, sir, was
6 in the office of the Chief of Staff about 11:30, sir.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Will you state what occurred there?

8 General Gerow: May I refresh my memory? I submitted
9 a memorandum on that shortly after the event.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Will you produce that memorandum? It
11 is in evidence as Exhibit 39, and it has already been read
12 to the committee, but will you please look at it?

13 General Gerow: Shall I read it, sir?

14 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, I think it would be well to do so,
15 and bring out the contents again.

16 General Gerow: It would be much more accurate than
17 my memory, sir, at the present time.

18 This is a "Memorandum for Record," dated December 15,
19 1941:

20 "On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 a.m., E.S.T.,
21 General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles
22 and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall re-
23 ferred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been
24 directed to deliver a note to the State Department at one
25 p. m., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Govern-

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 ment instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour
3 and time might have great significance. The pencilled
4 draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U.S.
5 Army Forces in Far East; CG, Caribbean Defense Command;
6 CG, Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud
7 by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel
8 Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the
9 message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately
10 by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in
11 a few minutes, and informed General Marshall that the message
12 had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach
13 destinations in about 30 minutes. The pencilled draft
14 was typed later during the day and formally made of record."

15 Signed, "L. T. Gerow, Brigadier General, Acting Assis-
16 tant Chief of Staff."

17 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember anything more about that
18 incident than is stated in your memorandum?

19 General Gerow: No, sir, I cannot recall anything that
20 is not stated in this memorandum, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Before you went to General Marshall's
22 office at his request, had you heard from anyone of the
23 receipt and decoding of that message?

24 General Gerow: I had not, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Had you seen or talked with Colonel

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Bratton about it?

3 General Gerow. To the best of my knowledge and belief
4 I had not, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Had General Miles had any conversations
6 with you about it before you went to General Marshall's
7 office?

8 General Gerow: I don't recall having seen General Miles
9 that morning until I saw him in the office of the Chief of
10 Staff at 11:30, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: Referring back to the period from Novem-
12 ber 27 on, after the so-called alert messages were sent
13 out to the commanders of the overseas stations, do you re-
14 call that after that warning of the 27th, which you sent
15 over General Marshall's signature to the Command er at
16 Hawaii, and to others, any discussion took place that you
17 participated in, or knew about as to sending any additional
18 warnings?

19 General Gerow: No, sir. I do not recall any discus-
20 sions on that point.

21 Mr. Mitchell: I think, if the committee please, that
22 that is all I have at the present from General Gerow. I
23 suggest the committee inquire from him.

24 The Vice Chairman: General Gerow, you were head of
25 War Plans Division at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor,

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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as you have testified?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You participated in the drafting of the message of November 27 to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and the other commanders to whom that message was sent?

General Gerow: I did, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Did you regard that message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department as adequate and sufficient as an alert message?

General Gerow: I did, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Senator George.

Senator George: I have no questions at this time.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark: I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that someone else will ask every question that I could possibly think of, so I defer any questioning.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas: I have no questions.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire.

Mr. Murphy: General Gerow, there has been some testimony in the several hearings by Colonel Bratton about some attempt to get in touch with someone in your office, as I

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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h5 2 recall it, to deliver the 13-part message. Have you made
3 any inquiry as to whether or not any attempt was made to
4 deliver that by actually making contact with someone on
5 your staff on the night of December 6, 1941?

6 General Gerow: I have made no such inquiry, sir. I
7 think if any of my officers had been contacted on that im-
8 portant message, they would have informed me, sir.

9 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you did not, as you presently
10 recollect have any notice whatsoever of the 13-part mes-
11 sage until you arrived in General Marshall's office on
12 the morning of the 7th?

13 General Gerow: That is the first time I recall having
14 seen that message.

15 Mr. Murphy: There has been some testimony in the pre-
16 vious hearings about a pouch that was delivered on the night
17 of the 6th. There has been some doubt as to what actual
18 papers were in that pouch, whether it was the 13-part mes-
19 sage or the so-called pilot message, and other papers of
20 the afternoon of the 6th. Do you know whether you ever
21 received the pilot message prior to your going to General
22 Marshall's office?

23 General Gerow: I do not recall having seen this mes-
24 sage, sir.

25 Mr. Murphy: Do you know what the pilot message as

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

referred to here, is?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, do you recall having been in General Marshall's office when Colonel Bratton was sent to the Signal Corps end of the War Department to inquire as to how long it would take to dispatch the message of December 7 to the Pacific theatres?

General Gerow: Yes, sir, I was in his office at the time and I recall that, sir.

Mr. Murphy: After Colonel Bratton was sent, or directed by General Marshall to make that inquiry, do you recall his returning to General Marshall's office?

General Gerow: I can recall that he came back and reported that it would take about 30 minutes.

Mr. Murphy: Was that to send it to all of the Pacific theatres, the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Department, the Philippine Department, and possibly Alaska?

General Gerow: I don't recall that that question came up at the time, sir.

Mr. Murphy: At any rate, the message had been directed to be sent to the several Pacific theatres?

General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, after the message of the 27th was sent, you said the other day that it was your impression

1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 when the Short reply arrived that it was in answer to the
3 other messages sent as to sabotage, rather than in answer
4 to the command for an alert from General Marshall. At that
5 time the gentleman from Wisconsin suggested that you be
6 asked about the fact that it was signed "Marshall," that
7 is, the message going out. And the answer was directed to
8 "Marshall." Do you recall that?

9 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Of course, the Short message did say
11 that it was in reply to 472. You would not know then
12 what 472 was; is that right?

13 General Gerow: I would not know at that time, no, sir,
14 because that is a number put on to the message by the Signal
15 Corps, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: Now, the War Plans, in effect at Hawaii
17 between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, called for coopera-
18 tion and liaison in regard to reconnaissance, and in regard
19 to the use of the equipment there in the event of an emergency,
20 did it not?

21 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Murphy: It was the standing rule over the years
23 for the War Department at Hawaii, and the Navy Department
24 to have liaison, was it not?

25 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: So that when General Short sent the message in reply to General Marshall's message of the 27th, and said "Liaison with Navy," did you think that General Short would send a message in answer to a war direction or an alert message that would merely say they had been doing what they had been doing over the years, having ordinary liaison with the Navy? Do you understand my question?

General Gerow: I don't quite understand it, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Well, for years, and always, as I understand it, there was supposed to be liaison at any outlying theatre between the Army and the Navy. That is a fact, is it not?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, the message of the 27th was a war alert, as I understand it, and then the reply of General Short was to the effect, "Liaison with the Navy."

Would you, as head of the War Plans Division, expect that a lieutenant general at Hawaii would take the time to send a telegram merely saying to General Marshall that he was maintaining the same liaison with the Navy that he had been over the months prior to receiving an alert message?

General Gerow: No, sir. I think in that case, that

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 that phrase would have a different meaning.

3 Mr. Murphy: Would it not be fair to assume that in
4 view of the message of General Marshall, that the reply
5 of General Short, "Liaison with the Navy," meant that
6 there had been an actual conference with the Navy, a dis-
7 cussion of plans to meet the war warning message from the
8 Navy and the war warning message from General Marshall,
9 and that the necessary steps had been taken to put into
10 effect the plan which they had already prepared to have
11 proper liaison, proper cooperation, and an all-out alert,
12 or the necessary alert to meet the impending danger?

13 General Gerow: The message was susceptible of the
14 interpretation that you have outlined, sir.
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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: At any rate Colonel Bundy saw the message,
3 did he not?

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Murphy: And Colonel Bundy was the man on your
6 staff whose duty it was to follow up on messages of that kind
7 and to see whether or not they were responsive to the Marshall
8 message of the 27th; is that right?

9 General Gerow: Yes, sir, that is correct, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Then, as I understand it, Colonel Bundy,
11 unfortunately met his death on the way to Hawaii immediately
12 after Pearl Harbor?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Murphy: Did Colonel Bundy leave any kind of a
15 memorandum in the War Department files which would explain
16 his reaction to the General Short telegram of the 28th?

17 General Gerow: I have had the records searched very
18 carefully and I can find no such record and I don't recall
19 of my own knowledge having talked to Colonel Bundy about that
20 after December 7.

21 Mr. Murphy: I have no other questions.

22 The Chairman: Senator Brewster is still absent. There-
23 fore Congressman Gearhart may inquire.

24 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I just clarify the record
25 on one point.

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Will you give Colonel Bundy's initials, will you furnish them?

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General Gerow: Yes, sir. I know his first initial was "C", but I don't know what his middle initial was.

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Mr. Murphy: There has been reference by General Marshall to a Mr. Bundy who was an assistant, as I understand it, a civilian assistant to Secretary of War Stimson.

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General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Was he a separate and distinctly different person from the Colonel Bundy in the War Plans Division?

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General Gerow: Yes, sir. Mr. Bundy in the Secretary's office was a civilian. Colonel Bundy was an officer of the Regular Army. His first name was Charles. I don't recall his middle initial.

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Mr. Murphy: If there had been liaison with the Navy in accordance with the war plan already drafted and ready for execution at Hawaii in your judgment would we have had the same result on December 7 which we actually had?

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General Gerow: No, sir. I think if the means on hand had been properly alerted and properly used that the damage that the Japs did at Pearl Harbor would have been considerably less.

24

25

Mr. Murphy: Admiral Kimmel had a message commencing with the words, "This is a war warning." General Short had

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 a message putting him on warning that hostilities might
3 commence at any moment. If there had been a conference between
4 Admiral Kimmel and General Short and a discussion of the
5 plans necessary to meet that situation and a putting into
6 effect the kind of plan they already had, you say there would
7 have been a different result on December 7?

8 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I believe the damage would not
9 have been so great.

10 Mr. Murphy: That is all.

11 The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart is now recognized.

12 Mr. Gearhart: General Gerow, you have been present in
13 the hearing room during the examination of General Marshall,
14 have you not?

15 General Gerow: Only one afternoon, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Were you here when I, on two different
17 occasions, referred to the 7 intercepted Japanese messages,
18 messages which either asked for information or supplied in-
19 formation with reference to ship movements in the Hawaiian
20 area?

21 General Gerow: I don't believe, sir, I was present when
22 you asked those questions. May I see the messages, sir?

23 Mr. Gesell: You are referring to the ones in Exhibit 2,
24 are you?

25 The Chairman: May the Chair ask the photographers not
to interfere with the examination of the witness.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.
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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: I am referring to the intercepted messages which appear on page 12, 13, 14 and 15, seven messages in all.

General Gerow: Yes, sir. I have those, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Now, those messages, each one of them, refer specifically, do they not, to the Hawaiian area?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: They are from Tokyo to Honolulu and Honolulu to Tokyo. Now, the first of these messages divides the Hawaiian area, the island with the name of Oahu, they divide this island into seven areas for purposes of subsequent exchanges of intelligence between Honolulu and Tokyo, do they not?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Then the other messages either called for reports of ship movements in that area, or render reports on ship movements in that area, do they not?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: And there is one of the messages which reveals a little impatience on the part of Tokyo in respect to the information they were getting, asking for reports not only when ship movements occur but when they do not occur, is that not correct?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: Now, in your opinion, after reviewing
3 those seven messages will you not say that they reveal an
4 inordinate interest in our Navy's operations in the Hawaiian
5 area on the part of the Japanese?

6 General Gerow: They certainly indicate interest in those
7 movements, yes, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Now, none of those messages were called
9 to the attention of General Short or Admiral Kimmel so far as
10 you know?

11 General Gerow: No, sir, not so far as I know.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Why were they not called to their atten-
13 tion?

14 General Gerow: I believe, sir, that G-2 can testify
15 to that better than I can, sir. They are not messages on
16 which the War Plans Division would normally be called upon
17 to direct special operations.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Now, the War Plans Division of which you
19 were the head makes plans for warfare and for defense, doesn't
20 it?

21 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Gearhart: Then aren't you charged with an interest
23 in plans I have described that are being made --

24 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Gearhart: (Continuing) -- by a nation that might be

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 an enemy of ours?

3 General Gerow: I had a very decided interest in it, yes,
4 sir.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Well, do not these seven messages react
6 on your mind as possible evidence of war plans that were be-
7 ing perfected by Japan?

8 General Gerow: Yes, sir, they do so react but at the
9 moment, sir, these messages were brought to me in a locked
10 despatch case. I cannot recall now whether they all came
11 together or not. I cannot recall whether I saw all of them
12 or not. They were taken out of the despatch case and read
13 by me and handed back to the officer. I did not attempt to
14 evaluate the magic messages that came to me, sir. If there
15 were any that struck me at the moment that they were especial-
16 ly important I would usually contact G-2 and discuss those
17 particular messages with him.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Well, if it is not your precise duty to
19 read the intercepts that are brought to you and very mater-
20 ial, to read, to understand, to evaluate and to recommend ac-
21 tion, what was your function in reading them? Why were they
22 submitted to you?

23 General Gerow: They were submitted to me, sir, as a
24 matter of information, to keep me informed as to the general
25 situation. As I stated before, if there had been a message

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 in the intercepts that conveyed to me the idea that Japan
3 was probably going to attack any place in the globe I would
4 consider that it required action on our part, sir, and to
5 draft a warning message and take it up to the Chief of Staff.
6 I did not so interpret those messages at that time, sir, as
7 I now recall.

8 Mr. Gearhart: You knew that relations with Japan were
9 very rapidly deteriorating, did you not?

10 General Gerow: I did, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: You were being advised of that by other
12 Army and Navy high responsible officers, weren't you, from
13 time to time?

14 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Gearhart: And even though you knew our relations
16 with Japan were rapidly deteriorating, knowing also that,
17 I believe, the American Navy was ship for ship very much in-
18 ferior to the Japanese Navy in the Pacific, the fact that
19 Japan was asking for definite information concerning our
20 Navy over and over again and dividing the Island of Oahu into
21 areas did not impress you as important information?

22 General Gerow: I do not recall, sir, having seen these
23 particular messages. I presume that I did, sir.

24 Mr. Gearhart: It was your duty not only to see them
25 but to read them, to understand them, to evaluate them and

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 recommend action upon them, wasn't it?

2 General Gerow: No, sir, it was not my duty to evaluate
3 all the magic that came to my office, sir.

4 Mr. Gearhart: It ceased to be your duty to evaluate
5 them in August of 1941, did it not?

6 General Gerow: I did not understand the question, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: It was your duty to evaluate them, pre-
8 pare action upon them with recommendations to the Chief of
9 Staff prior to August of 1941, was it?

10 General Gerow: No, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Didn't you receive a directive from Gen-
12 eral Marshall in August of 1941 to thereafter not merely
13 evaluate and send your recommendations in but to send the
14 original material itself to his desk, is that not correct?

15 General Gerow: No, sir, I had no such directive.

16 Mr. Gearhart: That was not issued to you?

17 General Gerow: No, sir.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Did General Miles ever tell you that he
19 had such a message or directive from General Marshall af-
20 fecting his department?

21 General Gerow: Not to my knowledge, sir.

22 Mr. Gearhart: Well, did you not as a matter of practice
23 evaluate intercepts that came to you and to send those inter-
24 cepts to General Marshall?
25

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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General Gerow: No, sir, I had nothing to do with the distribution of intercepts, sir. He received the same intercepts I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, when you read an intercept that struck you as important and calling for action, didn't you take that intercept before you returned it to the courier and discuss it with General Marshall?

General Gerow: No, sir. If I thought that an intercept required action I would prepare a draft of a message, sir, for General Marshall's signature and take it up and suggest that he send it. I did not take the intercepts up to him, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: You did not take it because you knew General Marshall had the same intercepts which you read as he was on the list of persons to whom the intercepts were to be delivered, is that correct?

General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, I will ask you as a military expert, asking you for the moment to put yourself in the position of Admiral Kimmel and General Short, I will ask you if you think that the tragic happening of December 7, 1941 would have occurred just as it did if Admiral Kimmel and General Short had been warned of those seven messages to which I have just called your attention?

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 General Gerow: Sir, I do not believe I can put myself
3 in the position of the commanders in Hawaii. There was so
4 much background, so many things happening. The mental at-
5 titude of those commanders, I cannot translate now, sir, in
6 an expression of opinion.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Well, if you were the commander of either
8 the Army or the Navy over there and you received seven def-
9 inite intercepts called to your attention that the Japanese
10 have divided the area into seven areas and were calling im-
11 patiently for reports upon the ship dispositions there, do
12 you think that in the face of the message of November 27th,
13 in the face of other circular messages that were being sent
14 around the world, one of which was delivered in Hawaii, do
15 you think that eight of our battleships should be lined up
16 like sitting ducks inside of that harbor, with voids open,
17 with ammunition boxed, in a condition in which they could
18 fight very, very inefficiently if they were called upon to
19 fight at all, do you think that would be the situation in
20 the face of those messages being before the eyes and upon
21 the desks and in the minds of those commanders?

22 General Gerow: Again, sir, I do not believe that I
23 can state what I would have done under those circumstances
24 without having been in command over there, sir, at the time.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Well, now, in justice to them don't you

1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 think now as you look back that they should have had that
3 information then?

4 General Gerow: I think when the War Department took
5 the responsibility of sending the message of November the
6 27th and stated that hostile action was possible at any mo-
7 ment, that these messages would not have added anything to
8 the strength of the directive that was contained in the
9 November the 27th message.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Did any of those messages, those circular
11 letters that were sent around, contain any information as to
12 where hostile action was expected?

13 General Gerow: I did not understand that "circular
14 letter", sir.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Well, these messages are circular, aren't
16 they, in nature? They are sent to Hawaii, they are sent to
17 Panama, they are sent to San Francisco, they are sent to
18 San Diego, they are sent to all of the commandants in all
19 of the naval districts. Now, did any of them say where the
20 war was expected to break out?

21 General Gerow: No, sir. The one of November the 27th,
22 as I recall, distinctly stated that Japanese action was un-
23 predictable but hostile action --

24 Mr. Gearhart: There were other messages circulated
25 around that an attack was expected in the Philippines, in the

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Kra Peninsula, in Indo-China and possibly at Guam and Borneo,
3 menacing Singapore. That was what was contained in the mes-
4 sages that were being circulated by the Chief of Staff, is
5 that not correct?

6
7 General Gerow: I should like to look over those mes-
8 sages, sir, to see specifically what they stated.

9 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

10 Mr. Gearhart: Do you know of the memorandum that
11 General Marshall and Admiral Stark sent to the President on
12 the 27th?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Gearhart: They discussed that very subject?

15 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Named those very places that I have
17 picked out?

18 General Gerow: Some of them, yes, sir, I recall.

19 Mr. Gearhart: And in that message there is not even the
20 slightest suggestion or intimation that any trouble is ex-
21 pected in the Hawaiian area.

22 General Gerow: No, sir. I think the reason for that
23 was that that memorandum was directed specifically to the
24 Far Eastern area, to a special area, not to the whole area
25 of the Pacific.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, as a matter of fact all you big

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 ranking Army and Navy officers considered Hawaii as an im-
2 pregnable fortress, did you not?

3
4 General Gerow: No, sir. No fortress is impregnable,
5 sir.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Well, you have seen the characterization
7 of Pearl Harbor that was made by General Herron, didn't you,
8 in his something from memory? It is a French word.

9 Mr. Murphy: Aid de memoir.

10 Mr. Gearhart: I have got to apply to my learned friend
11 Murphy for my French.

12 You have the document in hand, don't you?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Read the first paragraph.

15 General Gerow: "The Island of Oahu, due to its fortifi-
16 cations, its garrison and its physical cha racteristics is
17 believed to be the strongest fortress in the world."

18 Mr. Gearhart: And you know that General Herron when he
19 was commander of the Hawaiian area issued a similar state-
20 ment to the press that was given wide circulation everywhere,
21 don't you?

22 General Gerow: I do not recall that message.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Have you got the volume of that book on
24 Hawaii?

25 The Chairman: Which book is it?

1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: The young lady sitting there has it.

3 Senator Ferguson: Which is it?

4 Mr. Gearhart: It is a novel.

5 The Chairman: A novel?

6 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I don't know. It was a book about
7 Hawaii and it had a large circulation. However, I will pass
8 it.

9 I will ask you do you know of any message of any kind
10 that was ever sent to General Short or Admiral Kimmel in
11 which they were told that Hawaii itself would probably be
12 attacked?

13 General Gerow: I do not recall such a message.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Now, how do you account for the fact that
15 there is a warning in that warning notice of November 27th
16 which was not contained in the one sent to the Philippine
17 Islands, an affirmative direction not to do anything which
18 would alarm the people or reveal intent? Why was that
19 specially put in the Hawaiian and the San Francisco versions
20 and left out of the one sent to Manila?

21 General Gerow: Well, the conditions in Hawaii and in
22 the Philippines were quite different at that time. In Hawaii
23 we had a big Japanese population. We felt that the installa-
24 tions there were very close to the population; that if the
25 civilian population happened to be alarmed there would prob-

2512

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

ably be headlines in the press. Those headlines would be quickly transmitted to Japan and would probably precipitate the very thing we were trying to avoid.

Mr. Gearhart: And everything you have said, every reason that you have given is equally true of the Philippines, isn't it?

General Gerow: No, sir, I do not believe so, sir. The Philippines did not have the large Japanese population. The Philippines at that time had been more or less, I will not say alerted but we were organizing and training a Philippine army at that time and there was a great deal of military activity going on in the Philippines that was not going on in Hawaii, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, as a matter of fact you do not want to stand on the assertion that there wasn't a large Japanese population in the Philippine Islands prior to December 7, 1941? As a matter of fact, the island was full of Japanese and most of them were Japanese agents, were they not?

General Gerow: I do not know that.

Mr. Gearhart: They had probably more observers in percentage to the population of the Philippines than they had in all the rest of the world put together, is that not correct?

General Gerow: I do not know, sir.

1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: And if they only had one Japanese spy
3 there an alert in the Philippines would cause the same alarm
4 to be reported to Japanese headquarters in Tokyo as if there
5 were fifty thousand there, wouldn't it?

6 General Gerow: I do not know, sir, how the Japanese
7 would have reacted to it.

8 I should like to invite the attention, sir, in that mes-
9 sages to which you have just referred, however, that it con-
10 tains this statement: "That this policy should not be con-
11 strued as restricting you to a course of action that might
12 jeopardize your defense."

13 Mr. Gearhart: That is correct, but after a message which
14 from beginning to end warns specifically against doing certain
15 things that was put in the message for the purpose of convey-
16 ing the idea to the commanders in Hawaii, wasn't it?

17 General Gerow: Which sentence now are you referring to,
18 sir?

19 Mr. Gearhart: Directing them to avoid the doing of any-
20 thing which might create alarm among the people or reveal
21 intent.

22 General Gerow: Sir, I do not understand your question.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Well, now, when you put a specific direc-
24 tion in a letter not to do certain things and then say you
25 can do something else if you have to, you are going to expect

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 the recipient of that notice to try to avoid doing the
2 things which you say you do not want done, is that not cor-
3 rect?
4

5 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you would expect the commanders in
7 Hawaii to avoid the doing of anything which would alarm the
8 people or reveal an intent to them, wouldn't you?

9 General Gerow: Yes, sir, so long as it did not jeopar-
10 dize his defense.

11 Mr. Gearhart: I have the book which I designated a
12 novel to the inquiry of the chairman.

13 The Chairman: Did it end all right?

14 Mr. Gearhart: The volume is entitled, "Hawaii -- Rest-
15 less Rampart", and the book was written by Joseph Barber, Jr.
16 I will read you from page 213.

17 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman yield?

18 Mr. Gearhart: What did you say?

19 The Chairman: Will you yield to the Senator from Illi-
20 nois?

21 Senator Lucas: Who did you say wrote this book?

22 Mr. Gearhart: Joseph Barber, Jr. I don't know anything
23 about him, about who he is. It is a book which has had
24 quite a large sale, it is a popular edition, but what I am
25 going to read there is in quotation marks so that it will not

1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 rest on the responsibility of Mr. Barber but, rather, on the
3 responsibility of General Herron. This is the author's in-
4 troduction. (Reading)

5 "Prior to the maneuvers, however, Major General
6 (now Lieutenant General) Charles D. Herron, commanding
7 the Hawaiian Department, issued this statement, intended
8 to reassure nervous residents: 'Oahu will never be ex-
9 posed to a blitzkrieg attack. This is why: We are more
10 than 2,000 miles away from land whichever way you look,
11 which is a long way for an enemy force to steam, and be-
12 sides it would have to smash through our navy.

13 "But we plan for the worst possible situation, which
14 means we assume that the navy might be too busy elsewhere
15 to help us.

16 "So we have developed a potent air defense. Our
17 reconnaissance bombers are going farther and farther to
18 sea. Our air bases here could be reinforced overnight
19 from California bases. The potency of this striking
20 power which would engage an enemy long before he sighted
21 Oahu means that to land on Oahu the enemy must first win
22 mastery of the air above it.

23 "Assuming that happened, enemy transports then
24 would have to anchor offshore, making them fine targets
25 for our coastal artillery. High speed, mobile forces can

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 be rushed within an hour to any point on Oahu. They
3 pack devastating power.

4 "As international tensions increase in the Pacific,
5 the war of nerves comes closer to Hawaii. So we double
6 our vigilance, our intensive training. We don't let
7 up until the future is perfectly safe."

8 "The 1940 war problem assumed that Hawaii was
9 threatened with a sudden thrust by an invading enemy.
10 The enemy fleet had a well-balanced force, with adequate
11 aviation and highly trained personnel. In addition, its
12 merchant marine was capable of transporting an extreme-
13 ly large army for initial overseas operations.

14 "The 'war situation' at this point was outlined
15 by headquarters as follows: 'It is assumed that an out-
16 side enemy has succeeded, by stealth, in landing from
17 boats and dropping by parachutes numerous well-armed
18 nationals at night on the island of Oahu.'"

19 Mr. Clark: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to
20 me?

21 Mr. Gearhart: I would rather wait and yield at the
22 conclusion of this quotation.

23 Mr. Clark: I was wondering when it was going to con-
24 clude. That is what is troubling me.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Don't you find it interesting? Every-

1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 body else does.

3 The Chairman: Go ahead.

4 Mr. Gearhart: You are not very helpful, Mr. Clark.

5 The Chairman: That is not a matter upon which the com-
6 mittee has to pass.

7 Mr. Gearhart: I will proceed. (Reading)

8 "The enemies have mixed with the population as
9 strangers, but are believed to be secretly assembling
10 at various points on the island with the intentions, it
11 is feared, of disrupting both civil and military life
12 by destroying or contaminating water supplies, food,
13 communications, electric power, and other necessities,
14 and democratic institutions with the object of liquidat-
15 ing the present population to eventually make room for
16 their own people.

17 "These activities are believed to be in prepara-
18 tion for reducing our strength and our military resist-
19 ance against a hostile landing force assumed to be ap-
20 proaching the island.

21 "All civil police, national guard, other civil or-
22 ganizations, and the entire civil population, in accord-
23 ance with a proclamation that it is assumed was issued by
24 the governor, are closely working with the military to
25 apprehend the invaders and to protect our families,
homes, and institutions from destruction."

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

The Chairman: Would the Congressman let the Chairman ask him: What does this book show as to where this statement was made, whether it was a newspaper interview or an official statement? What does it say about that?

Mr. Gearhart: That was the document, as I understand, that was issued by General Herron, just prior to the alert of 1940.

The Chairman: I suppose the General can testify about it, if he did it.

Mr. Gearhart: That clearly evidences, does it not, that the highest ranking army officers in the Hawaiian Islands had the same opinion in 1940 that General Marshall had, that he reflected in his paper? You had just read the first paragraph of it. Is that not correct?

General Gerow I think everyone of us in the War Department felt that Oahu was our best prepared outpost.

Mr. Gearhart: And they both, in these two great statements, issued to the people, stated that they considered it in effect an impregnable fortress?

General Gerow: The two statements, sir?

Mr. Gearhart: Yes, in each of them.

General Gerow: I did not understand that this Aide

Memoirs --

Mr. Gearhart: I will read the first paragraph again.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 General Gerow: I did not understand, sir, that that
3 was a public statement to the people, sir. I think that
4 is a paper that I understood he took to the White House
5 with him, or somewhere else, on which he would talk.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Then it is still more important, isn't
7 it? It is a paper circulated for the eyes of military
8 experts only?

9 General Gerow: I am not so sure, sir, that this paper
10 was ever circulated. I do not know what General Marshall's
11 testimony was, as to why it was prepared.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Well, you admit, do you not, that it
13 represents General Marshall's viewpoint at that time? He
14 would not put his signature to something he did not be-
15 lieve, for the purpose of deceiving anyone, would he?

16 General Gerow: No, sir, but he did not sign this paper.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Well, he admitted that he wrote it.

18 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield? That is not
19 so.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Would that make any difference, that
21 he did not sign it?

22 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

23 The Chairman: Will the gentleman yield to his colleague?

24 Mr. Gearhart: I yield.

25 Mr. Murphy: General Marshall said he was called to

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 the White House, he was going over there immediately,
3 and someone in the Department prepared that memorandum.
4 He did not prepare it, and did not sign it.

5 Mr. Gearhart: He read it and presented it, with all
6 of the influence and high position behind it of the Chief
7 of Staff of the Armies of the United States. If he did
8 not believe it, he would not have presented it, would he,
9 in your opinion?

10 General Gerow: General Marshall will have to testify
11 to that, sir. I do not know whether he used this paper
12 or not.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Well, the testimony will speak for it-
14 self.

15 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

16 The Chairman: Will the Congressman yield to Senator
17 Ferguson?

18 Senator Ferguson: Will the Congressman yield?

19 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

20 Senator Ferguson: We would like to find out from
21 counsel where this paper was obtained.

22 Mr. Gesell: The paper was obtained, as we stated when
23 we introduced it, from the files of President Roosevelt.

24 Mr. Gearhart: So it was left with President Roosevelt,
25 the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 States, by the Chief of Staff of the Army of the United
3 States. That is correct, isn't it?

4 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, how could this gentleman
5 know anything of that kind? I do not understand that.

6 The Chairman: If the witness does not know it, he may
7 say so.

8 General Gerow: I am a bit confused.

9 Mr. Gearhart: I have more interruptions than anybody
10 else has had on my line of questions up to now.

11 The Chairman: If the Congressman does not want to
12 yield, he certainly does not have to.

13 Mr. Gearhart: I would like to proceed a little more
14 orderly and with greater continuity of thought, if I am
15 not constantly interrupted. I am developing a condition
16 of mind that was existing in the high ranking military of
17 the United States as an explanation plainly of why no
18 specific warnings were sent to Hawaii.

19 You admit that no specific warnings were sent to Hawaii
20 during this long period, during which our relations with
21 Japan were deteriorating, don't you?

22 General Gerow: No specific warnings were sent to
23 Hawaii, specifically designating that Hawaii was the place
24 that the Japanese were going to attack, no, sir.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Whenever a specific place was discussed,

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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h5 2 it was always an attack on the Kra Peninsula, the Philip-
3 pines, Siam, possibly Guam, and possibly Borneo; is that
4 correct, that permeated all of the military literature to
5 the commanders of the United States?

6 General Gerow: I believe it was a belief at that time,
7 sir, that the Japanese would make their main effort in
8 that area, and I believe the belief was borne out by sub-
9 sequent events that they did, that their attack on Hawaii
10 was in the nature of a diversionary attack, and put on
11 our flank to lay us back on our heels so they could go
12 ahead with their main effort.

13 Mr. Gearhart: I will ask you, General Gerow, if you
14 had thought during those days prior to December 7, 1941,
15 that there was a possibility of attacking Hawaii, and if
16 that were the general opinion of the high ranking military
17 and naval people with whom you were in daily association,
18 would you not have interpreted those seven messages, those
19 seven intercepted Japanese message, were important, would
20 you not have attached to them greater importance than you
21 did?

22 General Gerow: I think we all realized, sir, that there
23 was a possibility of an attack on Hawaii.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Then why did not you send copies of those
25 intercepts to the two commanders that were charged with the

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 defense of those islands?

3 General Gerow: Sir, I cannot answer that question.
4 As I say, these messages came to me maybe one at a time,
5 or maybe in a group of 15 or 20, and I had no opportunity
6 to sit down and analyze them. They came in along with
7 other messages from Panama and the Philippines, and many
8 of the messages from Panama were quite significant. They
9 indicated an intense interest in where our air forces
10 were, where the fields were, which would be the very thing
11 that an enemy would want to do, information that he would
12 want in case he intended to attack Panama, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Did you send any special warning messages
14 to Panama when you saw the Japs were making definite inquiries
15 with reference to the defenses there?

16 General Gerow: I do not know whether G-2 sent any in-
17 formational messages to Panama with regard to those parti-
18 cular intercepts or not, sir.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Will you not say, as the head of War
20 Plans that the commanders of Panama were entitled to that
21 information in the event that any such information had
22 reached Washington authorities?

23 General Gerow: Sir, that is a question of opinion,
24 as to how much information you give commanders in the
25 field.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Isn't it the rule that when high authority in Washington obtains information that is important to any particular commander in the field, that Washington should transmit that information, or if reasons of security do not permit it, that they shall issue directives in the light of that information?

General Gerow: If the intercept is one that the War Department feels is important that the commander have, I think it should send it to him. The War Department, in the case of the November 27 message, interpreted all of the facts it had before it, and decided that the Japanese were going to take some action, hostile action, and assumed responsibility for telling the commander that there was a great possibility of an attack.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Again directing your attention to the somewhat protracted or extended statement of General Herron that I just read, that statement manifestly was issued to allay any fear that might be aroused because of the alert of 1940 by the activities of the Army and Navy, was it not?

General Gerow: Sir, I do not know whether the statement was made prior to or after that alert. I was not present in Washington at the time the alert was put on, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now it would be necessary, if you were going to take steps not to alarm the people, to issue a warning well in advance of the event, is that not correct?

General Gerow: No, sir, that would not be necessary.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you think that it would have been possible to have alerted Hawaii, both its Naval activities and its Army activities, to a No. 3 Army alert and No. 1 Naval Operations alert, overnight without alarming the people?

General Gerow: A lot would depend on how the Commander did it.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, the order that he was to alert his Island was put up instantly upon the receipt of the November 27 notice, wasn't it? If he was to do anything at all under that order it was to do it right then?

General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: And because you could not do it right now

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 without alarming the people and revealing the intent General
3 Short reached the right decision which he reported on the 28th
4 day of November, did he not?

5 General Gerow: That is your conclusion, sir.

6 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

7 Mr. Gearhart: I am not drawing any conclusion at all,
8 I am asking you questions. I want your conclusions; mine are
9 unimportant.

10 General Gerow: May I have the question, sir?

11 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

12 The Chairman: The member asked not to be interrupted
13 and the Chair feels like protecting him in that request. Go
14 ahead.

15 General Gerow: May I have the question again?

16 Mr. Gearhart: Will you read the question, Mr. Reporter?

17 (The question was read by the reporter.)

18 General Gerow: No, sir, I do not think he reached the
19 right conclusion.

20 Mr. Gearhart: In order to reach the conclusion that you
21 have just reached you have to delete then from the November
22 27 message the positive directive not to alarm the people and
23 not to reveal the intent?

24 General Gerow: I believe that is correct, sir. He was
25 told he was authorized to take any course of action he might

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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necessarily have to take to prevent jeopardizing his defense.

Mr. Gearhart: The record speaks for itself. Now yesterday the gentleman from Pennsylvania opened the report of General Hap Arnold and read to us that the Air Forces in the Philippines had been alerted prior to December 7, 1941. Were you here when he read that from his report?

General Gerow: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Has the gentleman from Pennsylvania that report?

Mr. Murphy: Do you have that report from General Arnold?

Senator Lucas: I do not know where it is.

Mr. Gearhart: Assuming that General Arnold's report does contain that information, can you give us any information about the alerting of the Air Force in the Philippines?

General Gerow: At what period of time?

Mr. Gearhart: Just prior to December 7, 1941.

General Gerow: May I refer to the message from General MacArthur, sir?

Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

General Gerow: This is a message from General MacArthur to General Marshall, dated November 28:

"PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR RADIO SIX TWO FOUR AIR RECONNAISSANCE HAS BEEN EXTENDED AND INTENSIFIED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NAVY STOP GROUND SECURITY MEASURES

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 HAVE BEEN TAKEN STOP WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY PRESENT
3 STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THIS THIS THEATRE OF OPERATIONS EVERY-
4 THING IS IN READINESS FOR THE CONDUCT OF A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE
5 STOP INTIMATE LIAISON AND COOPERATION AND CORDIAL RELATIONS
6 EXIST BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY"

7 Signed, "MAC ARTHUR".

8 Mr. Gearhart: Does that report indicate to your mind
9 an all-out air alert?

10 General Gerow: He states, "Reconnaissance has been
11 extended and intensified". I do not know just what he was
12 doing prior to the extending of it.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Were you in the conference that they had
14 with General Arnold just about the time the November 27
15 warning messages were sent out, a conference in which General
16 Arnold said that he had information that there was sabotage
17 going on at certain air stations and he wanted a special
18 warning sent to all of his outlying commands?

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I was present at one conference
20 on a sabotage message of that kind, I think on the 28th of
21 November, sir.

22 Mr. Gearhart: General Arnold wanted to send a special
23 message over his own signature to his commands, did he not?

24 General Gerow: I do not recall that conference, sir.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Was not that one of the main things

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 discussed?

3 General Gerow: I do not remember, sir, whether that
4 was discussed at that particular conference or not. I re-
5 member General Arnold's insistence, or at least the insistence
6 of his G-2, General Scanlon, that warning messages go to all
7 the air stations.

8 Mr. Gearhart: And wasn't it finally decided in that
9 conference that General Arnold should not send it out over
10 his signature, but that it would go out over General Marshall's
11 signature, with a special reference in the notice to the air
12 services?

13 General Gerow: I do not recall such a decision, sir.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Well, you have no special information to
15 convey to the committee now as to why the Air Command in the
16 Philippines went on an all-out alert in the Philippine
17 Islands?

18 General Gerow: The only information I have, sir, as to
19 why they went on the alert is because they received this
20 message from General Marshall directing the alert which was
21 sent out on the 27th of November.

22 Mr. Gearhart: Have you any information as to what the
23 Air Command did in Hawaii, after receipt in Hawaii of the
24 warning message of November 27, 1941?

25 General Gerow: No, sir, I have no such information.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: And if the Air Command in Hawaii went on an all-out alert on December 1st and remained on it until December 6th, you know of no special reason from Washington for their having done it, other than the information that was contained in the warning message of November 27?

General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: I believe that is all.

The Chairman: Twelve o'clock having arrived, the committee will recess to 2:00 o'clock p.m.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

- - - - -

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

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3 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF GENERAL L. T. GEROW (resumed)

4 I believe that Congressman Gearhart had concluded his
5 examination of General Gerow and Senator Ferguson will now
6 be recognized.

7 Senator Ferguson: General Gerow, you were in what is
8 known as the War Plans section. Now, at the time was that
9 the operational section?

10 General Gerow: No, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: I am talking about prior to the 7th
12 of December.

13 General Gerow: No, sir. The G-3 section was normally
14 known as the operational section, but the section that I was
15 in was known as the War Plans Division, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, we had an exhibit here that
17 gave your duties.

18 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: Could I have a copy of that? Does
20 counsel have it? Do you have your copy?

21 Mr. Mitchell: It is the War Department order of the
22 General Staff setup.

23 General Gerow: I think I have it.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Exhibit 42.

25 General Gerow: I think I have a copy of the Army regu-

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 lations here that cover that, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: I have it; it is exhibit 42.

4 Your duties are in paragraph 12?

5 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now, will you give me the specific
7 section in that during peacetime that would have you function
8 in writing messages?

9 General Gerow: I think the first paragraph, sir, para-
10 graph "a" would cover that. I shall read it.

11 Senator Ferguson: Will you read it?

12 General Gerow: (Reading)

13 "The War Plans Division is charged, in general,
14 with those duties of the War Department General Staff
15 which relate to the formulation of plans for the use in
16 the theater of war of the military forces, separately
17 or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national
18 defense."

19 Senator Ferguson: Now, isn't that only the formulation
20 of the plans, the actual drafting of the plans, the war plans?

21 General Gerow: It includes that, sir, but it also states,
22 "is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Depart-
23 ment General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans."

24 The writing of an operational order, the operational
25 orders such as was written on November the 27th I think, sir,

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 would be included in that wording.

2 Senator Ferguson: Prior to that had you ever taken any
3 part in the writing of messages?

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: The writing of alerts?

6 General Gerow: Some of the warning messages that were
7 sent, sir, I participated in their preparation.

8 Senator Ferguson: Did you participate in the one on the
9 24th, the joint one?

10 General Gerow: May I refer to that, sir? Either myself,
11 sir, or some of my officers in War Plans Division I believe
12 did participate in this apparently joint message. We worked
13 with the Navy in the preparation of that message.

14 Senator Ferguson: You knew General Bryden?

15 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: He was Deputy Chief of Staff?

17 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Under this he was to act, was he not,
19 when the Chief of Staff was absent?

20 General Gerow: I believe it so states.

21 Senator Ferguson: "The Deputy Chief of Staff", on page
22 2, "will assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him in the
23 War Department in his absence."

24 Would you say that you had been specifically designated
25

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 to act for the Chief of Staff during his absence in the send-
3 ing of the message of the 27th?

4 General Gerow: No, sir, I had not been specifically
5 designated but as the staff officer concerned with the pre-
6 paration of plans and the issuance of operational orders in
7 connection therewith I believe, sir, I would have assumed that
8 responsibility if necessary in General Marshall's absence.

9 Senator Ferguson: Did General Bryden, who was the duly
10 authorized officer to act in the absence of the General, did
11 he act in relation to that message?

12 General Gerow: I believe he did, sir. If I recall cor-
13 rectly, the message was taken in to him and he O.K.'d it.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, can you show us on the original
15 message that we have here his O.K.?

16 General Gerow: I will try to find it, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Will you try to find that?

18 General Gerow: I have, sir, here a photostatic copy of
19 the message of November the 27th. It shows on the bottom,
20 sir, "Noted: Deputy Chief of Staff," with the initial "B".

21 Senator Ferguson: That was for Bryden?

22 General Gerow: I think it must have been for Bryden,
23 yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now, did he go into this with you and
25 help draft it, or did he just approve it after it was drafted?

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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General Gerow: As I recall, sir, he went in with me to the office of the Secretary of War on my first visit in the Secretary of War's office on the morning of the 27th. I do not believe that he was in there at the second conference and I do not believe, sir, that he actually participated in the drafting of the message.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever attend the Army Staff College?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How long a time did you spend in the college?

General Gerow: I spent the usual nine months as a student, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was there any course or any information as to how to draft plans taken up by you, - or I mean messages?

General Gerow: Yes, sir, but that was normally taught at the Commanding General Staff School at Leavenworth. I thought you had reference, sir, to the War College.

Senator Ferguson: Where was that taught?

General Gerow: That was taught at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, sir, and also at the infantry school.

Senator Ferguson: And did you take that course?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, tell me the elements, the
3 things to be done in the writing of a message as far as the
4 War Department or Army was concerned?

5 General Gerow: We had a system of writing what we
6 called the five paragraph operational order. The first para-
7 graph contained information of the enemy and information re-
8 garding your own forces. The second paragraph contained a
9 general mission.

10 Senator Ferguson: Wait until I get this first one.
11 First was what information? The first was all the informa-
12 tion that you had about the enemy?

13 General Gerow: It contained enemy information and in-
14 formation about our own troops.

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

16 General Gerow: Paragraph 2 contained a general state-
17 ment of the mission, to attack or defend.

18 Senator Ferguson: The mission, yes.

19 General Gerow: The third paragraph was broken down into
20 a number of sub-paragraphs and gave specific missions and the
21 major units involved.

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

23 General Gerow: Paragraph 4 -- I have been away from
24 that school so long I cannot remember definitely paragraph 4.
25 Paragraph 5 I think prescribed the command post and I believe

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 pertained to communications. I have forgotten now definitely
3 what paragraph 4 included, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: You wouldn't say that the first para-
5 graph was your mission?

6 General Gerow: No, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: That the proper way to draft an order
8 was to put the mission in the first paragraph?

9 General Gerow: No, sir. Your first paragraph would con-
10 tain enemy information and the information regarding your
11 own troops.

12 Senator Ferguson: And that the second one was to give
13 full information as to the enemy, its strength, its capacity
14 and its intentions?

15 General Gerow: I am afraid I did not make myself clear,
16 Senator. In the first paragraph it contains the enemy in-
17 formation and information of our own troops. That is ordin-
18 arily broken down into two paragraphs, paragraph A and para-
19 graph B.

20 Paragraph A contains the information concerning the
21 enemy. Paragraph B contains the information concerning our
22 own troops that are pertinent to that particular order.

23 Senator Ferguson: Well, should that information, whether
24 it is one or two, should the information be full as to the
25 enemy, that is, as to its strength, its intention and its

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 capacity?

3 General Gerow: No, sir, that is normally included in an
4 entirely separate document which is known as an estimate of
5 the situation, which is prepared sometimes by G-2 and some-
6 times by G-3.

7 There are two types of estimates: One is a G-2, which
8 arrives at some conclusions as to what the enemy is going to
9 do. There is a second type of estimate of the situation
10 which covers not only what the enemy's capabilities are and
11 his probable intentions but also includes your own capabili-
12 ties and the plans that are open to you and from that you de-
13 cide what the enemy, you think the enemy is going to do and
14 decide what you shall do to counter that action.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, have you got with you any book-
16 let or paper or information that would tell us what should be
17 in an order and how it should be written, or could you get
18 that for us?

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I will be glad to get that for
20 you, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: When I take up the message of the 27th
22 I will refer further to that and you may have it by that time.

23 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Do you have any aide here with you
that could go and get it for you?

25 General Gerow: I think so, sir.

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 ~~Senator Ferguson:~~ Normally in peacetime is the War
3 Plans concerned with the diplomatic messages of the United
4 States?

5 General Gerow: We are interested in them, yes, sir.
6 Anything that might possibly affect military operations we
7 are interested in, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: And how do they come to you? How does
9 that information come to your Department?

10 General Gerow: It comes through various sources, sir.
11 As far as the War Plans Division is concerned, I would get
12 information from the Chief of Staff, very occasionally from
13 the Secretary of War, and also from the Assistant Chief of
14 Staff G-2, and from some of my officers who had contacted
15 their opposite members in the State Department, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Who was your opposite in the State
17 Department that you would get your information from?

18 General Gerow: That depended on the type of information
19 you were after, sir. If it happened to be the Far Eastern
20 situation you would go to the Far Eastern Division. If it
21 was Latin American, you would go to the Latin American section,
22 and if it was European, you would go to the European section.

23 Senator Ferguson: When did you first get the messages
24 that were delivered by the President on the 17th of August,
25 1941?

AL-2

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Gerow: I do not recall, sir, that I ever had copies of those messages, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I will describe them as they were described in 1943 by Peace and War, on page 129. It may refresh your memory:

"During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain the situation in the Far East was discussed, and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression. It was agreed also that the United States should continue its conversations with the Japanese Government and by such means offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which that country was embarked."

Does that refresh your memory?

General Gerow: I do not remember, sir, seeing that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, I will read the part of the message that gave that, or that gave, as far as America was concerned, its parallel action.

On the bottom of page 556, volume II, Foreign Relations, this was handed to the Jap Ambassador, among others:

"Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 of program of military domination by force or threat of force
3 of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States
4 will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which
5 it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights
6 and interests of the United States and American Nationals and
7 toward insuring the safety and security of the United States."

8 Now does that refresh your memory as to whether or not
9 you ever saw that or heard of it?

10 General Gerow: I do not recall having seen it, sir.
11 I believe if the Chief of Staff had known about it he would
12 have informed me, sir, that such a declaration had been made.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now was that of concern to the War
14 Plans Department?

15 General Gerow: Yes, sir, it would have been of concern
16 to the War Plans Division.

17 Senator Ferguson: In fact it was vital information to
18 the War Plans Department, was it not?

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now how do you account for never
21 having heard of that?

22 General Gerow: Sir, I cannot testify at this late date
23 that I never heard of it, sir. I do not believe that I ever
24 actually saw the document. I believe if the Chief of Staff
25 knew about it, sir, that he did inform me of such a declaration.

Hook
follows

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Did you ever know of that before you heard of it here in this Caucus Room?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: When did you hear about it?

General Gerow: Since I have been back here, sir, in Washington, to appear before this committee, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. So since you have been back and after the 7th of December, you heard about it?

General Gerow: I cannot recall, sir, whether I heard it before or not, sir. I definitely remember since I have been here this time to appear before the committee, of reading that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was that kind of information of value to you, and if so, did you act upon it?

General Gerow: It was of value, yes, sir. My instructions to act upon it would probably have come, sir, from the Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever have any information or orders upon which you did act upon that information, and if so what action did you take?

General Gerow: Sir, I cannot recall at this time, my conversations with the Chief of Staff, if I had such conversations on that subject, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you remember receiving word at

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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all that came from Ambassador Winant on the morning of the 6th about the movement of troops that went into the State Department at 10:40 on the 6th of December, 1941?

General Gerow: May I see that message, sir, to refresh my memory?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

(The document was handed to General Gerow.)

General Gerow: I do not believe, sir, that I ever saw that message.

Senator Ferguson: Now, if you had known what I read to you here, what I read from these two books, and you would have seen that message, what would that message have meant to you?

General Gerow: It would have only meant to me, sir, reading this message now that certain troop movements were being made by the Japanese, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Would it have meant anything more than that?

General Gerow: Not that I know of now, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Where is that troop movement to, according to that message?

General Gerow: That states "sailing slowly westward toward Kra."

Senator Ferguson: How many hours distant?

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h3

1 General Gerow: Fourteen hours distant in time.

2 Senator Ferguson: Where would they have struck?

3 General Gerow: The Kra Peninsula, sir.

4
5 Senator Ferguson: That fourteen hours distant, they
6 would have struck in 14 hours, would they not?

7 General Gerow: In 14 hours, yes, sir, if they had con-
8 tinued on that course to Kra.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, would that mean anything in
10 relation to this parallel action that we had taken about
11 any further aggressive movement? Here is what the message
12 said:

13 "The Government now finds it necessary to say to
14 the Government of Japan, that if the Japanese Government
15 takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program
16 of military domination or force or threat of force of
17 neighboring countries, the Government of the United States
18 will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps
19 which it may deem necessary towards safeguarding the
20 legitimate rights and interests of the United States and
21 American nationals towards insuring the safety and security
22 of the United States."

23 Would that not have been a violation of this order,
24 or of this rule?

25 General Gerow: I do not believe, taking this message

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h4

1
2 by itself, it says enough to definitely state what the
3 Japs were planning to do, sir, from my interpretation of
4 the message.

5 Senator Ferguson: So, if you had received that, it
6 would not have meant a thing to you?

7 General Gerow: Well, I would like to plot this on
8 a map, sir, and see. There were, in those staff con-
9 versations in the Singapore --

10 Senator Ferguson: I have got a map here.

11 General Gerow: I think I have got a copy of that same
12 one, Senator.

13 Senator Ferguson: You have got a copy of it?

14 General Gerow: Yes, sir. This map has no scale on
15 it, Senator, so it is rather difficult for me to say exactly
16 where they would be in 14 hours, but it would indicate --

17 Senator Ferguson: It would indicate that they were
18 14 hours from Kra?

19 General Gerow: Yes, but as to where that would place
20 them on the map, I do not know where their position would
21 be actually on this map. It would indicate, sir, that
22 they were proceeding to go south of the line 10 degrees
23 north, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: They would go south of 10 degrees
25 north, and they would also be east of 100 degrees east,

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h5

1
2 wouldn't they?

3 General Gerow: They would be east of 100 degrees east,
4 yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, were you familiar with the
6 fact that on the 2nd of December, the President made a
7 directive in that the President directed three men-of-war
8 to be established in the Pacific. Were you familiar with
9 that?

10 General Gerow: Not at the time, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever hear of that?

12 General Gerow: Not until I heard it brought out before
13 this committee, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now, I have tried to mark on my map
15 with ink there where these ships would be, or the area. It
16 may help you some, because the names are small and hard to
17 see. The first one is between Hainan and Hue. Do you see
18 that one?

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: And the next one is between Camranh
21 Bay and Cape St. Jacques; and the next one is off Pointe de
22 Camau. Do you see those three?

23 General Gerow: I have those located, yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you think those three men-of-
25 war, would be out in a position so they could execute and

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

1
2 see whether or not the Japs were violating what I read
3 to you from the message of the 17th of August -- not the
4 message, but the note?

5 General Gerow: You refer now, sir, to this Admiralty
6 note?

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes, sir, and the note from the
8 President. Will you let him see page 39 of Exhibit 37?

9 (The document was handed to General Gerow)

10 Senator Ferguson: Have you looked at it?

11 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Now, would they not be in a position
13 to execute, to see whether or not there were violations
14 of the note of the 17th of August, 1941?

15 General Gerow: I would say the one, sir, around Camranh
16 Bay and Cape St. Jacques, and the one on Pointe de Camau,
17 yes, sir, they would be in a position.

18 Senator Ferguson: They would be?

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, would not it be material to
21 you, being in the War Plans Division where you were going
22 to give, and it was your duty, as you say, to give orders
23 of action to our troops, if you were going to put the
24 position of the enemy which you said a message should con-
25 tain, would not it be essential to have the information

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h7

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2 in the note of the 17th and also the message of the Presi-
3 dent to the Asiatic Fleet? Would not it be essential for
4 you to have them?

5 General Gerow: It would be helpful to me to have
6 them.

7 Senator Ferguson: Not only helpful; it would be essen-
8 tial, would it not?

9 General Gerow: Only in the failure of G-2 to keep me
10 posted, sir, as to any information.

11 Senator Ferguson: Were you posted as to that informa-
12 tion?

13 General Gerow: I was not, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: How could you have acted on the
15 6th of December, 1941, then, without that information?

16 General Gerow: With regard to these ships?

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes, with regard to these ships.

18 General Gerow: Or with regard to the movements?

19 Senator Ferguson: The movement of the troops, movement
20 of those ships; how could you give orders if you did not
21 have the information?

22 General Gerow: Well, it depended, sir, on whom I wanted
23 to give orders to. There was nothing that the Army could do
24 to stop that movement south. That was a naval matter and only
25 ships or aircraft posted down there could do anything about
that, sir.

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 0 . M O T E N I M B A W . J U A N 6 D R A W

Senator Ferguson: Did it indicate to you, or would it have indicated to you that such a movement meant war with the United States?

General Gerow: Not unless our Government decided to go to war, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What about if they struck the first overt act? Would not it be necessary that you give an order to defend yourself?

General Gerow: Well, sir, if the Japs had attacked some of our positions then they would automatically defend themselves under the existing war plans, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did not I understand you to say, sir, the reason they struck at Hawaii was that that was our strongest fortification and it was on their flank?

General Gerow: I stated, sir, that it was on our flank.

Senator Ferguson: On whose flank?

General Gerow: On the flank of the Japanese, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Gerow: On the advance to the south.

Senator Ferguson: But if they struck and it meant war, because of this message and our stand, and let us say that it was a correct stand, was not it then the duty of your Department to know those things so that you could give orders, so that we could have a defense to any action they may take

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 on their flank?

3 General Gerow: Sir, I believe we would have known
4 very quickly had the Japanese attacked any of our positions.

5 Senator Ferguson: They did on the 7th, so what is the
6 use of knowing afterward. That is why we are here today,
7 because in Washington they did not know and did not anticipate.
8 Isn't that true?

9 General Gerow: No, sir. I think when we sent that
10 message of November 27 out we distinctly stated that we anti-
11 cipated hostile action against each of our possessions that
12 bordered on the Pacific. We did not know which one. The
13 Japanese action was unpredictable, and I saw no information
14 that indicated to me at any time at which particular place
15 they would attack.

16 Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand this, that no
17 matter what information you received after the 27th you would
18 not have sent it to the theater in Hawaii?

19 General Gerow: No, sir, Senator, I do not think I stated
20 that, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Well, isn't that a fair answer?

22 General Gerow: No, sir. I would like to elaborate a
23 bit on that, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Can we get a recess long enough for
25 me to vote?

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 The Vice Chairman: If you desire it, Senator. We will
3 naturally conform to your wishes.

4 Senator Ferguson: I would like, if we could take that
5 long.

6 Mr. Murphy: Why not let Mr. Keefe take it up and then
7 have you continue later?

8 Senator Ferguson: It will only take me five minutes,
9 and then we will not have to break the continuity here.

10 The Vice Chairman: Without objection, we will take a
11 recess --

12 Mr. Clark: I do not object, Senator, but I am calling
13 attention to the fact that the House members do not get an
14 opportunity to vote. I am not objecting --

15 Senator Ferguson: I will continue.

16 General Gerow: Shall I proceed, Senator?

17 Mr. Clark: Mr. Chairman, I would like to finish my
18 statement.

19 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

20 Mr. Clark: I was going on to say if we are going to
21 be here a good long while I thought we would have to have a
22 definite policy in that respect.

23 Senator Ferguson: That is perfectly all right.

24 Mr. Murphy: May I state for the record that there is a
25 resolution that was adopted by both Houses excusing the members

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 of the Pearl Harbor committee from voting during the sessions
3 of the committee.

4 Senator Ferguson: Has the interruption taken you from
5 the question that I have given?

6 General Gerow: No, sir, I do not think so, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: All right.

8 General Gerow: This is an operational message. It
9 contains certain sentences in it that I would like to read:

10 "JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION
11 POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU
12 ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER
13 MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY, BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE
14 CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT TO ALARM THE CIVIL POPULATION OR DIS-
15 CLOSE INTENT. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT
16 THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW 5."

17 Those are all directives. There was nothing that occurred
18 subsequent to the sending of that message, no information that
19 I received, that would have influenced me to change the
20 actions directed in that message.

Larry
follows

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LaCharity (1) pm
 follows
 Chack 2:50
 AL-1

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, as I understand it, as a matter of fact really no information came to you between that date on the 27th and at 11:25 when when you walked into General Marshall's office on the day of the 7th at noon. You had not had the pilot message, you had not had the destruction of the codes message, you had not had the 14-part, or, the 13th part of the message, you had not had the destruction of the Japanese code messages, you did not have the message coming from Winant, you did not have the President's directive to CINCAF which was the Asiatic Fleet; isn't that correct?

General Gerow: The information that came in with regard to magic between the 27th and the 6th and that was distributed by G-2 I did see and that contained certain information.

Senator Ferguson: I will ask you what information you received out of magic between the 27th and the 6th and the 7th?

General Gerow: Sir, I would have to check the documents showing the messages that were received during that time, and I may be able to identify that I saw some of them. I must presume I saw all of these messages that were distributed by G-2, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Let's take the Winant message. You didn't see that?

General Gerow: No, sir.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: The President's message to CINCAF to put out the 3 men of war, you didn't see that?

General Gerow: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The President's message to the High Commissioner, did you see that one?

General Gerow: I believe I saw that one, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: When?

General Gerow: I am reasonably certain, sir, that I saw it on the morning of the 27th. I think my memorandum to the Chief of Staff states that I saw that.

Senator Ferguson: That was on the 26th, so you saw it on the 27th?

General Gerow: I saw it on the 27th.

Senator Ferguson: You didn't see the pilot message?

General Gerow: I don't recall having seen it.

Senator Ferguson: You didn't see the 1:00 o'clock message, that is, giving the day of delivery, and the destruction of the last code?

General Gerow: That is the 1:00 o'clock message that indicated they were going to deliver something at 1:00 o'clock. No, sir, I didn't see that until 11:30 on the morning of the 7th.

Senator Ferguson: You didn't see any part of the 13 part message?