

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

h13

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

about chopping up Pearl Harbor, you are talking about the message on page 12 of Exhibit 2; is that correct?

Colonel Phillips: I guess that is it.

Mr. Kaufman: That is it?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Well, now you heard the testimony of various officers with respect to that message, didn't you?

Colonel Phillips: I have heard some testimony, yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Most of them have testified that this has no relation to an air attack. You have heard most of them testify to that?

Colonel Phillips: I don't know about that, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Most of them have testified that this was a convenient way of charting the harbor so as to avoid extra words in messages; you heard that?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, I have heard that.

Mr. Kaufman: But you say notwithstanding that testimony and all of the facts with relation to the intercepts, that if you had had this particular piece of evidence on or about the date that it was translated, namely October 9, 1941, that it would have changed your entire course?

Colonel Phillips: It would have affected us, I am sure.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

h14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Kaufman: Affected you?

Colonel Phillips: Affected us very much in our decision.

Mr. Kaufman: Now, coming back again to the Joint Coastal Defense, Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, did you not regard the war warning of November 26 and 27 as a sufficient basis for invoking the provisions of that agreement?

Colonel Phillips: I did not have that in my power. That was General Short's, and I was his Chief of Staff.

AL
fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

LaCharity (3) am
follows
Hook
AL-1

Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1 Mr. Kaufman: Did you discuss it?
2

3 Colonel Phillips: The matter was discussed.
4

5 Mr. Kaufman: Did you discuss it with General Short?
6

7 Colonel Phillips: It was discussed at the time.
8

9 Mr. Kaufman: You and General Short discussed it?
10

11 Colonel Phillips: It was discussed, I think, in the
12 staff meetings.
13

14 Mr. Kaufman: When was it discussed in the staff
15 meetings?
16

17 Colonel Phillips: Well, we had many staff meetings
18 after the 27th, sometimes two or three a day. The heads of
19 the General Staff.
20

21 Mr. Kaufman: And you want us to understand that the
22 question of invoking the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
23 Plan was discussed?
24

25 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

26 Mr. Kaufman: And that it was determined by General
27 Short and his staff that it was unnecessary to invoke the
28 provisions of that plan?
29

30 Colonel Phillips: There was no decision ever made in
31 the staff meeting; the matter was brought up to the General's
32 attention and it was thoroughly discussed at the time.
33

34 Mr. Kaufman: Then do you want the committee to under-
35 stand that it was suggested to General Short and that he just

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 took no action with respect to the suggestions that were made?

3 Colonel Phillips: Not at all, no, sir. The matter
4 was discussed in staff meetings and there was no specific
5 suggestion one way or the other, as I recall. I have no
6 notes of those meetings and it has been four years ago.

7 Mr. Kaufman: What action was taken on the subject,
8 Colonel?

9 Colonel Phillips: There was no action so far as I know.

10 Mr. Kaufman: Well, the message of November 27 called
11 for reconnaissance, and reconnaissance could only be had
12 under the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

13 Colonel Phillips: General Short felt that the re-
14 connaissance that the Navy was making at that time with
15 their task forces and our inshore reconnaissance was fulfilling
16 that directive.

17 Mr. Kaufman: Well, the directive was to the Army to
18 make reconnaissance, was it not?

19 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

20 Mr. Kaufman: And you didn't think that it was your duty
21 to advise the War Department that you were just making the
22 inshore patrols 20 miles out?

23 Colonel Phillips: The War Department had approved the
24 plan of distant reconnaissance under the Joint Hawaiian
25 Defense Plan.

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 Mr. Kaufman: The War Department?

3 Colonel Phillips: And the Navy Department.

4 Mr. Kaufman: The War Department and the Navy Department
5 both approved the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan that
6 we have been talking about?

7 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Kaufman: And that, as I indicated to you, and read
9 from paragraph 2, contemplated that it would be put into
10 effect on the agreement of the Commander in Chief Hawaiian
11 Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
12 Now, under those circumstances, I ask you again whether
13 Washington was not justified by reason of your statement of
14 liaison with the Navy, your telegram of November 27, to assume
15 that you had invoked the provisions of this Coastal Frontier
16 Defense Plan?

17 Colonel Phillips: I do not think so.

18 Mr. Kaufman: What information do you want this committee
19 to understand you would have needed before you would have
20 invoked the Defense Plan?

21 Colonel Phillips: That is very difficult to say. That
22 was General Short's problem, and I am not capable of answering
23 that question.

24 Mr. Kaufman: Now, Colonel, you testified a little while
25 ago that by reason of this telegram of November 27 and parti-

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 cularly that portion of it that directed you not to alarm
3 the civilian population that you conceived that the only
4 requirement was the one to alert for sabotage?

5 Colonel Phillips: That seemed at the time to meet the
6 situation.

7 Mr. Kaufman: And meet the situation because you didn't
8 want to alarm the civilian population?

9 Colonel Phillips: That was only part of the requirements.
10 We were to restrict the information in this message to the
11 fewest possible number. If we had alerted to Alert No. 2,
12 which was against sub-surface, surface and air attack, we
13 would have put everybody out all over the island, not just
14 running around with a helmet on as in training, but going
15 to actual war with ammunition. If we had gone to Alert No. 3,
16 the worst that the enemy could do, we would have put troops
17 in position all over the island, around the perimeter, digging
18 positions, and, of course, the information to the entire
19 command.

20 Mr. Kaufman: Now, you say you wanted to do this thing
21 very quietly because of the requirement not to -- the
22 requirement to avoid notifying except a limited number of
23 officers?

24 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Kaufman: And also to avoid alarming the civil

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2 population?

3 Colonel Phillips: That is right; not to disclose intent.

4 Mr. Kaufman: Not to disclose intent.

5 Now, I read to you from Admiral Smith's testimony. It
6 is at page 9,087 of this record. Admiral Smith testified:

7 "I saw the Army go on the alert on the late afternoon
8 of the 27th, the streets were full of them, going in all
9 directions, manning the bridges, public utilities, but I
10 did not know how far their alert went."

11 Then at a later point he testified that the roads were
12 all blocked up with your men taking their positions.

13 So that the civil population did know that there was
14 something going on, did it not?

15 Colonel Phillips: They perhaps knew that there was
16 something going on. We were moving into radio stations,
17 we were moving to bridges, as a drill. That is very simple.
18 You have a very small proportion of your command. But I
19 do not believe that the streets were blocked by troops
20 moving at that time. I believe the Admiral perhaps is
21 mistaken.

22 Mr. Kaufman: What is that?

23 Colonel Phillips: I believe the Admiral perhaps was
24 mistaken. We didn't have that number of troops out, there
25 weren't that number required on the sabotage alert.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Kaufman: Well, now, were you here yesterday when Captain Layton testified?

Colonel Phillips: I was here a part of the time only.

Mr. Kaufman: He testified yesterday, as I understand it, I was not here, that he understood your alert was the highest type of alert that the Army could have. Can you explain that testimony?

Colonel Phillips: I cannot explain Captain Layton's testimony, no, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: You knew Captain Layton, did you not?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: He was the Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Colonel Phillips: That is true.

Mr. Kaufman: And did you have any contact with him at all?

Colonel Phillips: I did not personally.

Mr. Kaufman: During the week preceding December 7 was your attention called to the fact that the Japanese Consul in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers?

Colonel Phillips: During the week preceding December 7, as a matter of fact on the morning of December 6th, it was reported to my staff meeting that the Japanese Consul was burning papers. Not codes, codes were never mentioned,

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D C

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 but burning papers at that time, or had shortly before that.
3 That was reported by the Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell,
4 and that fact was reported by me as well as Colonel Fielder,
5 the G-2, to General Short, that the Japanese consulate were
6 burning papers.

7 Mr. Kaufman: Was that a suspicious circumstance in
8 your mind?

9 Colonel Phillips: Not particularly. We did the same
10 thing. It is customary on foreign stations to burn many.

11 Mr. Kaufman: Did you make any inquiry as to the extent
12 of the burning?

13 Colonel Phillips: No more than the report from Colonel
14 Bicknell; Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell at that time.

15 Mr. Kaufman: Did you know during the weeks preceding
16 December 7 that the Navy was concentrating on training?

17 Colonel Phillips: I don't know that I knew that
18 specifically. We were all training. All services.

19 Mr. Kaufman: Did you know that they were getting ready
20 to carry out the orders under WPL-46?

21 Colonel Phillips: I did not know that specifically.

22 Mr. Kaufman: Didn't you read that in the message of
23 November 27 to the Navy when it was shown to you?

24 Colonel Phillips: That message of November 27 of
25 the Navy, I was only informed of that message. I saw the

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 but burning papers at that time, or had shortly before that.
3 That was reported by the Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell,
4 and that fact was reported by me as well as Colonel Fielder,
5 the G-2, to General Short, that the Japanese consulate were
6 burning papers.

7 Mr. Kaufman: Was that a suspicious circumstance in
8 your mind?

9 Colonel Phillips: Not particularly. We did the same
10 thing. It is customary on foreign stations to burn many.

11 Mr. Kaufman: Did you make any inquiry as to the extent
12 of the burning?

13 Colonel Phillips: No more than the report from Colonel
14 Bicknell; Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell at that time.

15 Mr. Kaufman: Did you know during the weeks preceding
16 December 7 that the Navy was concentrating on training?

17 Colonel Phillips: I don't know that I knew that
18 specifically. We were all training. All services.

19 Mr. Kaufman: Did you know that they were getting ready
20 to carry out the orders under WPL-46?

21 Colonel Phillips: I did not know that specifically.

22 Mr. Kaufman: Didn't you read that in the message of
23 November 27 to the Navy when it was shown to you?

24 Colonel Phillips: That message of November 27 of
25 the Navy, I was only informed of that message. I saw the

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 24th message that I have testified about.

3 Mr. Kaufman: Didn't you know that the message of
4 November 27th to the Navy directed them to take defensive
5 deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks provided for
6 in War Plan 46?

7 Colonel Phillips: I may have been acquainted with that
8 at the time. I don't recall just now. General Short told
9 me the contents, informed me of the contents of that message.

10 Mr. Kaufman: But you didn't have it in mind at that
11 time, apparently?

12 Colonel Phillips: I believe that is correct.

13 Mr. Kaufman: If you had that in mind would that not
14 have imposed a greater obligation on the Army to protect
15 the Fleet while it was in the harbor?

16 Colonel Phillips: I don't know that it would.

17 Mr. Kaufman: I have no further questions.

18 The Chairman: It is practically 12:30. We will
19 recess until 1:30.

20 (Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p.m., the committee
21 recessed until 1:30 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

22
23 - - -
24
25

Witness Phillips

questions by: The Vice Chairman

h2

1 having seen the message of November 27, without more
2
3 ado, the Navy could have started their distant reconnaissance?"

4 "General Marshall: That is right. That is my view."

5 Now that was the view of General Short and General
6 Short showed the message of the 27th to Admiral Kimmel.

7 That is all I have.

8 The Vice Chairman: Well, Colonel, what is your purpose
9 in reading General Marshall's testimony before another in-
10 quiry to this committee?

11 Colonel Phillips: The purpose was to complete my
12 answer this morning, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: Do you want General Marshall's
14 testimony to stand as your testimony?

15 Colonel Phillips: This was the testimony before the
16 Pearl Harbor, Army Pearl Harbor Board, yes, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: Why are you reading the testimony
18 of General Marshall before the Army Pearl Harbor Board?

19 Colonel Phillips: That is part of my answer.

20 The Vice Chairman: You are taking General Marshall's
21 testimony as your testimony?

22 Colonel Phillips: It is part of my answer, sir, yes,
23 sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: You want it understood, then, that
25 you are taking part of General Marshall's testimony before

Witness Phillips

Shack
hl

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this point?

Mr. Kaufman: No further questions at this time, sir.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS

(Resumed)

The Vice Chairman: Do you have any statement you desire to make, Colonel, before your examination is resumed?

Colonel Phillips: I would like to amplify and finish a reply to a question that I was making this morning, by reading from the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Volume 1, page 26:

"General Marshall: Distant reconnaissance was a naval function, and the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the planes suitable for that purpose that could be provided."

Army Pearl Harbor Board, Volume 1, page 43:

"General Marshall: As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance, would have been in detaching the units to serve under the Navy."

Army Pearl Harbor Board, Volume 1, page 47 :

"General Russell: Well, is it your view that both

Witness Phillips

questions by: The Vice Chairman

h2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

having seen the message of November 27, without more
ado, the Navy could have started their distant reconnaissance?"

"General Marshall: That is right. That is my view."

Now that was the view of General Short and General
Short showed the message of the 27th to Admiral Kimmel.

That is all I have.

The Vice Chairman: Well, Colonel, what is your purpose
in reading General Marshall's testimony before another in-
quiry to this committee?

Colonel Phillips: The purpose was to complete my
answer this morning, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Do you want General Marshall's
testimony to stand as your testimony?

Colonel Phillips: This was the testimony before the
Pearl Harbor, Army Pearl Harbor Board, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Why are you reading the testimony
of General Marshall before the Army Pearl Harbor Board?

Colonel Phillips: That is part of my answer.

The Vice Chairman: You are taking General Marshall's
testimony as your testimony?

Colonel Phillips: It is part of my answer, sir, yes,
sir.

The Vice Chairman: You want it understood, then, that
you are taking part of General Marshall's testimony before

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 another inquiry as your answer to questions presented to
3 you here?

4 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: And you adopt that as your answer?

6 Colonel Phillips: Yes, as part of my answer, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: Did that have anything to do with
8 your knowledge of the facts as they existed out at Pearl
9 Harbor at the time of the attack?

10 Colonel Phillips: Not at all. I know General Short's
11 opinion. General Short's opinion was that he showed the
12 message to Admiral Kimmel in regard to long distance re-
13 connaissance, and that was quite sufficient.

14 The Vice Chairman: So you know then what General
15 Marshall said before the Army Pearl Harbor Board was exactly
16 what General Short thought?

17 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: How do you know that?

19 Colonel Phillips: Because I know what General Short
20 thought, and I have just read you what General Marshall
21 testified, sir.

22 The Vice Chairman: Why did you not just tell us what
23 General Short thought out there at that time, and not what
24 General Marshall might have thought?

25 Colonel Phillips: This was merely part of my reply

h3

Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

this morning, sir.

The Vice Chairman: If you knew what General Short thought out there at Hawaii at the time the thing happened, why did not you just tell us that?

Colonel Phillips: I tried to tell you that this morning, sir. That is merely added emphasis to it.

The Vice Chairman: You think by referring to General Marshall's testimony you can better tell us what General Short thought?

Colonel Phillips: Not necessarily, sir. I merely thought it added emphasis to my reply.

The Vice Chairman: Well, as I indicated this morning, I do not think there could be any doubt from this record that it was the duty of the Navy to conduct long range reconnaissance.

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: But that was not done, was it?

Colonel Phillips: Long range reconnaissance was being conducted as the Navy Commander, Admiral Kimmel, judged necessary, as far as we thought at the time.

The Vice Chairman: Did you know that long range reconnaissance was not be conducted by the Navy at that time?

Witness Phillips

questions by: The Vice Chairman

h5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Colonel Phillips: They had task forces at sea --

The Vice Chairman: I am not talking about task forces.

I am talking about long-range reconnaissance from
Oahu.

Did you know the Navy was not conducting that type of
long-range reconnaissance back in December 1941?

Now, you would know now what you knew then.

Colonel Phillips: We knew they had task forces at sea,
and that those reconnaissance that the task forces
conducted were certainly long-range.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

AL
ls

Shack (2) pm
follows
Hook
AL-1

13,190

1 Witness Phillips questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: Did you know the Navy was not
3 sending any long-range reconnaissance planes out from Oahu
4 in December 1941?

5 Colonel Phillips: Personally I did not know that, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman: You did not know that?

7 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: All right. Now you stated that
9 you arrived in Hawaii March 1, 1941.

10 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

11 The Vice Chairman: And became Chief of Staff, or
12 rather took over the duties of Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian
13 Department on November 5, 1941.

14 Colonel Phillips: That is correct, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: So you spent about 8 months out
16 there in Hawaii becoming familiar with your new duties as
17 Chief of Staff?

18 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

19 The Vice Chairman: Now most of your experience had
20 been as a training officer, had it, Colonel?

21 Colonel Phillips: Not entirely, by any means. I
22 spent nine years in General Staff duty out of my service
23 that I gave you this morning.

24 The Vice Chairman: As I understood General Short's
25 testimony, he indicated very clearly that one of the main

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 reasons that he wanted you out there was because of your
3 special qualifications for training purposes. That is true,
4 isn't it?

5 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

6 The Vice Chairman: All right. Had you served as Chief
7 of Staff of a Division or Department before?

8 Colonel Phillips: Only temporarily as Chief of Staff
9 of the First Division.

10 The Vice Chairman: How long?

11 Colonel Phillips: Just a short period.

12 The Vice Chairman: How long?

13 Colonel Phillips: I believe about two weeks.

14 The Vice Chairman: Two weeks. But you had had a
15 great deal of experience as a training officer?

16 Colonel Phillips: I had had much experience as a
17 training officer, and also in a staff capacity, and much
18 command.

19 The Vice Chairman: You were recognized in the Army as
20 a man with special qualifications for training purposes,
21 weren't you?

22 Colonel Phillips: That is very flattering, sir. I
23 do not believe I was particularly. I had done a fair job
24 with the First Division.

25 The Vice Chairman: Well, when General Short states

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 that to this committee you accept the compliment, don't you?

3 Colonel Phillips: Thank you.

4 The Vice Chairman: Well, you know that is in substance
5 what he stated here, don't you?

6 Colonel Phillips: I do not know that, no sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: Is not that about the effect of
8 what he stated here, that he especially wanted you because
9 of your ability as a training officer?

10 Colonel Phillips: I do not know his testimony on that
11 at all.

12 The Vice Chairman: He rather emphasized the training
13 feature of it in discussing you before this committee, as
14 I recall.

15 Now you state that you saw the Navy message of November
16 24 to Admiral Kimmel.

17 Colonel Phillips: That is correct, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: You read that?

19 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, to the best of my re-
20 collection, I did.

21 The Vice Chairman: You, of course, bore the contents
22 of that message very definitely in mind?

23 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: In your work out there?

25 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: Now this message states:

3 "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan
4 very doubtful."

5 You understood that, did you not?

6 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: "This situation coupled with statement
8 of Japanese Government and movements their Naval and Military
9 forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
10 movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or
11 Guam is a possibility."

12 You considered what that message said in that respect,
13 did you not?

14 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: "The Chief of Staff has seen this
16 dispatch concurs and requests action addressee to inform
17 senior Army officers their areas."

18 And it goes on about the necessity of secrecy, and so
19 forth.

20 Now just what did that message mean to you, Colonel?

21 Colonel Phillips: That message meant to me Guam or
22 the Philippines were in an attack in any direction, but it
23 did not say any distance. Hawaii is thousands of miles
24 from that locale.

25 The Vice Chairman: You make a distinction between the

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 use of the word "direction" and the word "distance"?

3 Colonel Phillips: Much distinction, yes, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: All right, then tell me about it.
5 I am interested to know.

6 Colonel Phillips: Simply because you can attack Guam
7 and the Philippines and that is not so very far, or you can
8 attack the China Coast, or you can go down to Borneo and the
9 Kra Peninsula and still you haven't gone very far, but that
10 is in most every direction.

11 The Vice Chairman: And because the word "distance"
12 was not used in this message it did not mean much to you?

13 Colonel Phillips: Yes, it meant a great deal, but it
14 did not mean as much as it certainly would have meant if
15 they had mentioned Hawaii.

16 The Vice Chairman: I can understand that. But why
17 would it have meant more to you if the word "distance" had
18 appeared in it?

19 Colonel Phillips: Because distance has a great deal to
20 do with the sailing of a ship, that is an amphibious attack.

21 The Vice Chairman: Well, the Army was not so much
22 concerned with the distance that ships had to sail, was it?

23 Colonel Phillips: Well, we were concerned with how
24 an air attack was going to get there.

25 The Vice Chairman: I see. Did you ever consider that.

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 war was inevitable with Japan?

3 Colonel Phillips: Yes, I think we all did. We thought
4 it was imminent.

5 The Vice Chairman: When did you reach that conclusion?

6 Mr. Mucphy: What was that last?

7 The Vice Chairman: He said he thought it was inevitable
8 and he thought it was imminent.

9 When did you reach that decision, please, Colonel?

10 Colonel Phillips: Well, I should say about that time,
11 November 24 to 27, in that general period.

12 The Vice Chairman: And that was your definite conviction
13 that from about November 24 to November 27 war was inevitable
14 and imminent?

15 Colonel Phillips: We felt so, yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: And that was your personal view
17 about it?

18 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: All right. Now, then, let us
20 look for a moment to the message of November 27. You stated
21 that you did not see that message but General Short told
22 you about it. That is the Navy message.

23 Colonel Phillips: The Navy message, yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: The Navy message of November 27.

25 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: From the Chief of Naval Operations
3 to Admiral Kimmel, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific
4 Fleet. You say you did not see it yourself but General
5 Short told you about it, is that correct?

6 Colonel Phillips: That is correct, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: Did he undertake to tell you in
8 detail what the message contained?

9 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: And gave you full information about
11 it?

12 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: Had you known or heard of any Army
14 or Navy message before in your experience beginning with the
15 expression "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning"?

16 Colonel Phillips: I have never heard that expression
17 before, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: And General Short told you that
19 that was in this message?

20 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

21 The Vice Chairman: And what did that mean to you then,
22 by those words being used in this message?

23 Colonel Phillips: Just as I have stated, sir, it meant
(4) 24 war was imminent.

25 The Vice Chairman: War was imminent between Japan and

Witness Phillips
the United States?

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1

2

Colonel Phillips: We already felt that.

3

The Vice Chairman: You already felt that?

4

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

5

The Vice Chairman: You then accepted this?

6

Colonel Phillips: This is additional evidence.

7

The Vice Chairman: As additional evidence?

8

Colonel Phillips: Yes.

9

The Vice Chairman: And after you knew of these words
in this message there was not any doubt in your mind at all
that war was inevitable and imminent between Japan and the
United States?

10

11

Colonel Phillips: I would not say there was not a
doubt, sir, at all. I felt that --

12

13

The Vice Chairman: You felt it was coming?

14

Colonel Phillips: I felt that it was coming, yes, sir.

15

The Vice Chairman: Now the message goes on to say:

16

"Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization
of conditions in the Pacific have ceased."

17

18

You understood that?

19

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

20

The Vice Chairman: "Aggressive move by Japan is expected
within the next few days."

21

22

You understood that?

23

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

AL-9

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: That aggressive action by Japan
3 was expected within the next few days?

4 Colonel Phillips: Correct.

5 The Vice Chairman: That was within a few days from
6 November 27, wasn't it?

7 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: All right. Now that is a period.
9 Down at that point there was not any doubt in your mind as
10 to what this meant, was there?

11 Colonel Phillips: That is right.

12 The Vice Chairman: "The number and equipment of Japanese
13 troops and the organization of Naval task forces indicates
14 an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines,
15 Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo."

16 That was additional information that was given you,
17 wasn't it?

18 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

19 Larry
20 follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

21

22

23

24

25

26

Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

Lac
fls
Shack
hl

1
2
3
4
5
6
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The Vice Chairman (reading):

"EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL-46."

That was a definite direction, a positive order, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, wasn't it?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And then the message followed with about three or four more lines:

Now, Colonel, you have told us that you saw and studied, with General Short, the message from General Marshall to General Short?

Colonel Phillips: That is right.

The Vice Chairman: On November 27, 1941, the same date, as this last Navy message we have been talking about?

Colonel Phillips: That is right.

The Vice Chairman: Now, that message starts out:

"NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE."

That was a direct, definite statement of information, wasn't it?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. I don't believe I have that, sir.

Witness Phillips

questions by: The Vice Chairman

h2

1 The Vice Chairman: Can counsel supply the Colonel
2 with a copy of the message of the 27th from General Marshall?

3 (A copy of the above-mentioned message was handed to
4 Colonel Phillips.)

5 The Vice Chairman: You have it before you now?

6 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: It begins:

8 "NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO
9 ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES
10 THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO
11 CONTINUE."

12 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: That is a direct, definite state-
14 ment of information?

15 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: You understood that?

17 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman (reading):

19 "JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION
20 POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT."

21 That is another sentence. You understood that?

22 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman (reading):

24 "JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION
25

Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT."

3 Colonel Phillips: Right.

4 The Vice Chairman: You understood that?

5 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman (reading):

7 "IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED
8 STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT."

9 That is a statement for information, isn't it?

10 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

11 The Vice Chairman (reading):

12 "THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS RE-
13 STRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE
14 YOUR DEFENSE."

15 That is definite instruction to General Short?

16 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman (reading):

18 "PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO
19 UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM
20 NECESSARY."

21 That is direct order from General Marshall to General
22 Short, isn't it?

23 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

24 The Vice Chairman: And you so understood it?

25 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

h3

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Phillips

questions by: The Vice Chairman

h4

2 The Vice Chairman: Now, then, you say that after you
3 and General Short received and studied that message for
4 about a half an hour, then you sent a reply, General Short
5 sent a reply to General Marshall that he was alerted to
6 sabotage and had liaison with the Navy?

7 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

8 The Vice Chairman: Now, Colonel, point out to me where
9 the word "sabotage" appears in this message of November
10 27th from General Marshall to General Short.

11 Colonel Phillips: It is not in the message. It does
12 not appear, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: All right.

14 You stated this morning that you did not personally
15 notify anybody in the Navy that the Army in Hawaii was alerted
16 only to sabotage?

17 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, that was my statement
18 this morning. That was not my -- I might amplify that, sir,
19 by stating that liaison with the Navy was not part of my
20 job. I was carrying out at General Short's directives, as
21 he directed, how he desired his Chief of Staff to function.
22 I was functioning strictly according to his directions.

23 The Vice Chairman: Well, it has been a good many
24 years since I served in the Army during the first World
25 War, but the Chief of Staff to any Commanding Officer is

Witness Phillips

questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
h5
just his right arm, isn't he?

Colonel Phillips: The duties of the Chief of Staff are prescribed, sir, but how the Commanding General employs his Chief of Staff, or any other member, is entirely a matter up to him.

The Vice Chairman: That is right. It is up to the Commanding Officer?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, the Commanding Officer.

The Vice Chairman: One commanding officer or commanding general has a definite outline of duties for his Chief of Staff that sometimes are quite different from those of another commanding officer or commanding general; that is true, isn't it?

Colonel Phillips: Always different. I have never seen two alike.

The Vice Chairman: I think I agree with you on that.

In other words, it depends to a great extent on the personality of the commanding officer or commanding general, doesn't it?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, entirely.

The Vice Chairman: Some of them rely more largely upon their Chief of Staff than others, don't they?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Some of them require much more of

Witness Phillips

questions by: The Vice Chairman

h5

1
2 just his right arm, isn't he?

3 Colonel Phillips: The duties of the Chief of Staff
4 are prescribed, sir, but how the Commanding General employs
5 his Chief of Staff, or any other member, is entirely a
6 matter up to him.

7 The Vice Chairman: That is right. It is up to the
8 Commanding Officer?

9 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, the Commanding Officer.

10 The Vice Chairman: One commanding officer or commanding
11 general has a definite outline of duties for his Chief of
12 Staff that sometimes are quite different from those of another
13 commanding officer or commanding general; that is true,
14 isn't it?

15 Colonel Phillips: Always different. I have never
16 seen two alike.

17 The Vice Chairman: I think I agree with you on that.

18 In other words, it depends to a great extent on the
19 personality of the commanding officer or commanding general,
20 doesn't it?

21 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, entirely.

22 The Vice Chairman: Some of them rely more largely
23 upon their Chief of Staff than others, don't they?

24 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

25 The Vice Chairman: Some of them require much more of

1 Witness Phillips

questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: Did you have any conferences with
3 the members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff before December 7,
4 1941, while you were serving as Chief of Staff of the Army
5 there?

6 Colonel Phillips: I do not believe I did, sir.

7 General Short handled that entirely himself, and he had Naval
8 liaison, a Naval liaison officer, Major Fleming. He would --

9 The Vice Chairman: Well, you have answered by question.
10 You said you didn't have.

11 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. I did not personally.

12 The Vice Chairman: Now, you read this morning a memoran-
13 dum or a statement to the committee that you stated that you
14 showed to General Short's counsel about two weeks ago?

15 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: When did you write that statement?

17 Colonel Phillips: About that time; a little before
18 that, I should say, maybe two weeks ago.

19 The Vice Chairman: About two weeks ago?

20 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, maybe three.

21 The Vice Chairman: Maybe three weeks ago?

22 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: About three weeks ago you wrote
24 this statement and showed it to Short's counsel?

25 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Phillips

questions by: The Vice Chairman

h9

2 The Vice Chairman: That was Captain Ford?

3 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: Have you revised it or changed
5 it any since you wrote it?

6 Colonel Phillips: Somewhat.

7 The Vice Chairman: In what respect did you change it
8 after you conferred with Captain Ford about it?

9 Colonel Phillips: I don't think I changed it in any
10 material way at all. I just had the one copy here, and I
11 gave it --

12 The Vice Chairman: The reporter took it away from you.

13 Colonel Phillips: Yes.

14 The Vice Chairman: Do you remember any changes that
15 you made in your statement that you wrote two weeks ago
16 after you conferred with Captain Ford, General Short's
17 counsel?

18 Colonel Phillips: I do not.

19 The only thing I think I put in was -- I had "seize
20 Marshall Islands," instead of "raid Marshall Islands." That
21 is the only change I made.

22 The Vice Chairman: Did you write this statement from
23 your own personal knowledge?

24 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

25 The Vice Chairman: You didn't confer with anybody or

Charity (3) pm
 follows
 Hook
 AL-1

Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 It is provided in the manual that -- I am a book man,
 2 I am an Army School man of quite some experience, and in
 3 making an estimate we have a certain form of mental process
 4 that you go through and I merely drew this up to conform
 5 to that regular form of the estimate of the situation which
 6 we made at that time.
 7

8 The Vice Chairman: Now, Colonel, in writing this
 9 statement three weeks ago did you write it as you would
 10 have written it on December 7, 1941?

11 Colonel Phillips: I put some facts in there that I
 12 couldn't possibly put in on December 7, 1941.

13 The Vice Chairman: I see. So in some respects it is
 14 your present knowledge?

15 Colonel Phillips: That is right.

16 The Vice Chairman: Your present knowledge up to date?

17 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: Four years after the attack?

19 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: Now, there wasn't any written
 21 estimate made by you back there the first part of December 1941?

22 Colonel Phillips: There was not.

23 The Vice Chairman: And was any written estimate made
 24 by you at any time after you assumed the duties of Chief of
 25 Staff?

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 Colonel Phillips: There was not. I wrote a series
3 of notes, just scratch notes, that I kept for a year or so
4 and lost them in the shuffle somewhere. There was no
5 written estimate at that time.

6 The Vice Chairman: Now, Colonel, you mentioned three
7 messages that would have enabled you to make a definite de-
8 cision had you known about those messages at that time;
9 that is true, isn't it?

10 Colonel Phillips: Mr. Cooper, I hadn't made a study
11 of this magic at all. I haven't read the entire -- anything
12 like all that have been submitted, but I have heard here
13 in testimony certain things that I can state now I am sure
14 would have had a definite effect on our thinking had we
15 known them at the time.

16 The Vice Chairman: All right. Now, you mentioned three.

17 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: The message dividing up Pearl
19 Harbor?

20 Colonel Phillips: That is right.

21 The Vice Chairman: That is the first one you mentioned?

22 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: At least that is one of the three.

24 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

25 The Vice Chairman: Now, what was the date of that

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 message dividing up Pearl Harbor?

3 Colonel Phillips: Well, I -- I have no idea.

4 The Vice Chairman: Well, it was some time before the
5 attack, wasn't it? Several months, wasn't it?

6 Colonel Phillips: I do not know.

7 Senator Ferguson: the 24th of September.

8 The Vice Chairman: Let me examine the witness.

9 Do you have any idea of what the date was?

10 Colonel Phillips: I had it here this morning, sir.

11 I have heard it was the 24th of September.

12 The Vice Chairman: You heard that just recently?

13 Colonel Phillips: I heard it just now.

14 The Vice Chairman: I was hoping to find out when
15 you knew about it.

16 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: But you think that if you had
18 known of that message on September 24, the date of it, why,
19 you would have been able to take definite action then?

20 Colonel Phillips: September 27, it would have affected
21 our decision -- I don't mean September 27, November 27,
22 it would have affected our decision much had we known that.

23 The Vice Chairman: In what way? What would you have
24 done that you didn't do?

25 Colonel Phillips: It would have given us more of a

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 background than we had.

3 The Vice Chairman: Just what would you have done on
4 November 27 if you had had this message of September 24 that
5 you didn't do on November 27?

6 Colonel Phillips: We at least would have thought that
7 the Japanese were making a plan for the bombing of Pearl
8 Harbor. I would say that that was a bomb plot, so far as I
9 was concerned.

10 The Vice Chairman: When did you first hear the expression
11 "bombplot" used?

12 Colonel Phillips: Years ago. That is a normal thing
13 in aviation.

14 The Vice Chairman: When did you first hear the
15 expression "bombplot"?

16 Colonel Phillips: I can't say, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: But you know it was years ago?

18 Colonel Phillips: I think so.

19 The Vice Chairman: You know that it wasn't since this
20 hearing started when Mr. Mitchell started using the term?

21 Colonel Phillips: Oh, no.

22 The Vice Chairman: You heard it years ago?

23 Colonel Phillips: I had never heard "bombplot of Pearl
24 Harbor", but I had heard "bombplot" used. You put a "bombplot"
25 out for bombing practice.

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: When did you first consider this
3 message of September 24, 1941 as a bombplot message for
4 Pearl Harbor?

5 Colonel Phillips: I heard it here in testimony.

6 The Vice Chairman: Here in this testimony?

7 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: And you had never considered that
9 term before, had you?

10 Colonel Phillips: I had never heard of the message
11 before.

12 The Vice Chairman: I see. Now, did you know that Japan
13 had requested somewhat similar information for other places?

14 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: The Panama Canal or the West Coast
16 or other places?

17 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: And it is your considered opinion
19 then that this message of September 24, 1941 couldn't mean
20 anything but a bombplot for Pearl Harbor?

21 Colonel Phillips: I didn't say that, sir. I think
22 that is what it could mean. It might have meant something
23 else but to me that is what it meant, yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: That is what it means?

25 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: You do not agree with all the
3 other witnesses here who have testified that it might simply
4 mean the Japanese desired to get information of this type
5 about this and various other installations?

6 Colonel Phillips: What evidence is that, sir?

7 The Vice Chairman: Well, I say, you don't agree then,
8 if evidence has been given to this committee that the
9 Japanese desired to get this information, that that was
10 rather in line with their desire to get detailed information
11 about many other places and harbors and ports throughout
12 the world?

13 Colonel Phillips: I cannot testify to what the Japanese
14 desired.

15 The Vice Chairman: I see. Now, the other two messages
16 mentioned by you were the deadline message of November 25
17 and the one of November 29.

18 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: Now, what would you have done on
20 November 27 that you didn't do if you had known about this
21 message on November 29th?

22 Colonel Phillips: In making our estimate on November
23 27 we were influenced greatly by the small amount of informa-
24 tion that we actually had and any additional information that
25 we could have gotten or that we might have had at that time

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 would have its effect on our decision due to the fact that
3 we must consider it.

4 The Vice Chairman: I understand, but you told me that
5 on November 27, when this war warning message came, that
6 you were definitely of the opinion that war was inevitable
7 and imminent.

8 Colonel Phillips: That is right; that is correct.

9 The Vice Chairman: All right. How much could have
10 been added to that conviction that you already had by the
11 messages of November 25 and 29th?

12 Colonel Phillips: Additional information. You cannot
13 have too much intelligence in making a decision and we
14 considered on the 27th that we had actually very little
15 enemy information.

16 The Vice Chairman: But you had a direct war warning
17 message in front of you, didn't you?

18 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, we had a war warning
19 message.

20 The Vice Chairman: And you had direct orders from the
21 War Department to do certain things, didn't you?

22 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

23 The Vice Chairman: And you had the conviction at that
24 time that war was inevitable and was imminent, didn't you?

25 Colonel Phillips: We thought war was imminent but not

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 war in Hawaii.

3 The Vice Chairman: You thought it was imminent between
4 the United States and Japan?

5 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman: What you really wanted then was for
7 the War Department to tell you when and where the attack
8 would be made by Japan, was that it?

9 Colonel Phillips: It would have been very nice, but
10 we hardly expected that.

11 The Vice Chairman: What did you expect?

12 Colonel Phillips: We expected, of course, some indi-
13 cation, some indication from the War Department that at least
14 Hawaii was in the battle zone.

15 The Vice Chairman: Didn't you consider the message
16 that hostile action might be expected in any direction,
17 didn't that cause you to think that Hawaii might be in the
18 battle zone?

19 Colonel Phillips: "In any direction". That is, again,
20 the distance there, sir. We considered that.

21 The Vice Chairman: What is there in the message --

22 Colonel Phillips: Hawaii is a long way from Japan.

23 The Vice Chairman: What is there in the message of
24 November 25 and November 29 that refers to Hawaii?

25 Colonel Phillips: I haven't made a definite study of

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 those. I don't think there is anything that definitely
3 says anything about pointing directly to Hawaii. However,
4 it would have given us more information of additional enemy
5 information.

6 The Vice Chairman: All right. You say Hawaii, or
7 Pearl Harbor, is not mentioned, referred to even remotely,
8 in the message of November 25 and November 29, the two
9 deadline messages?

10 Colonel Phillips: That is true.

11 The Vice Chairman: Then what additional information
12 would that have given you about an attack on Pearl Harbor?

13 Colonel Phillips: The deadline message would have
14 given us the idea that war is coming at that particular
15 time. We would have had the time, anyway.

16 The Vice Chairman: If you had had the time you would
17 have been expecting the attack on Pearl Harbor, wouldn't you?

18 Colonel Phillips: I can't say that, no, sir, but that
19 would be additional information.

20 The Vice Chairman: What, in either one of those messages,
21 would have caused you to think it applied to Pearl Harbor?

22 Colonel Phillips: We at least would have had one
23 element. The time and place. The place wasn't supplied but
24 the time was, and it would have been given due consideration
25 by General Short in arriving at the decision as to what form
of alert he would take.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness phillips

questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: Now, what was the time that that
3 message would have given you?

4 Colonel Phillips: Of course, the 25th, we would have
5 had the 25th; the 29th we would have had the 29th.

6 The Vice Chairman: And the attack didn't occur on
7 either date?

8 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

9 The Vice Chairman: Didn't come for over a week later?

10 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

11 The Vice Chairman: So it wouldn't have been worth
12 anything as far as time is concerned?

13 Colonel Phillips: Just for consideration.

14 The Vice Chairman: Just for consideration?

15 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: It couldn't have been worth any-
17 thing as a place because there wasn't anyplace indicated,
18 was there?

19 Colonel Phillips: Not so far as I know, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: I think that is all.

21 Senator George.

22 Senator George: Colonel, you say you did see the Naval
23 message of November 24?

24 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

25 Senator George: In which it was stated that Japan might

nl
fls
AL

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Phillips Questions by; Senator George

h2 2 strike in any direction?

3 Colonel Phillips: That is correct, sir.

4 Senator George: That was the effect of it?

5 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

6 Senator George: With an enumeration as to certain
7 places it was believed that the strike would come. I be-
8 lieve that is in this message of the 24th.

9 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. Guam and the Philippines.

10 Senator George: In any direction, including an attack
11 on the Philippines and Guam as a possibility. And General
12 Marshall's message of November 27, of course came directly
13 to the Army in Hawaii. That is, the message of General
14 Marshall to General Short.

15 Colonel Phillips: Yes.

16 Senator George: That same message, of course, was
17 sent to General MacArthur, and to the commanders everywhere
18 in all of the areas. That was received and it was on that
19 message that you immediately acted?

20 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

21 Senator George: And Alert No. 1 was put into effect.
22 I believe it was Alert No. 1. That is, the alert against
23 sabotage?

24 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

25 Senator George: And there was immediate notice given

h3
1 Witness phillips questions by: Senator George
2 to General Marshall by General Short that he had so
3 interpreted his message of the 27th. Did you have any
4 information at all that the sabotage alert was not adequate,
5 in the light of the message of the 27th?

6 Colonel Phillips: We had no information on that, sir.
7 As a matter of fact, that afternoon we got a message from
8 General Miles, the G-2 in the War Department, which definite-
9 ly directed sabotage, as I recall. I haven't the message
10 here. We got one from General Adams on the 28th to which
11 we replied at great length also on sabotage, and we received
12 one also on the 28th from General Arnold also on sabotage.

13 Senator George: In other words, following the message
14 of November 27, you had three messages, all dealing with
15 sabotage from Washington?

16 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

17 Senator George: But you had no message that what General
18 Short had done there was inadequate? That is, no direct
19 reply asking that anything else be done by him?

20 Colonel Phillips: . No, sir.

21 Senator George: Now, did you receive the December 3
22 message relating to the destruction of codes or machines
23 by Japan?

24 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

25 Senator George: You didn't have any message of that kind?

Witness Phillips

Questions by: senator George

h4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

Senator George: Did you have any message from Washington indicating that the Japanese were destroying their codes from the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th of December?

Colonel Phillips: No, sir. We received no messages other than the three sabotage messages from Washington until the message from General Marshall which came in about 3:30 on December 7.

Senator George: After the attack.

Colonel Phillips: After the attack.

Senator George: I have the impression, Colonel, that the December 3 message was received by General Short. It is from OPNAV for action CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14 and COM 16:

"HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG, SINGAPORE BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS."

You say you didn't receive this message?

Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

Senator George: Well, did you have any information from the Navy in Hawaii that they had received this message, that the Navy had received it?

Witness Phillips questions by: senator George

Colonel Phillips: Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator George: Well, when you say that you didn't get this message, do you mean that you didn't get it as Chief of Staff, or that General Short didn't get it, so far as you know.

Colonel Phillips: It didn't come in to our headquarters.

Senator George: It didn't come to your headquarters?

Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

Senator George: And you had no notice from the Navy of the receipt of it?

Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

Senator George: It would have been the duty of the Navy to have furnished you with this information, would it not?

Colonel Phillips: I don't know, sir. We expected to get everything that pertained to us from the Navy that they had.

Senator George: And then there was another message of December 3, which possibly does contain the same information.

In that message you are not mentioned as an action addressee, that is the Army, but you are mentioned as an information addressee, and you had no information about that message?

Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

h5

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator George

h6

1
2 Senator George: That didn't come to the headquarters?

3 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

4 Senator George: Did you learn of a message from
5 Washington relating to the burning of codes on the Hawaiian
6 Islands?

7 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

8 Senator George: All you had was information that the
9 Japanese consul was destroying certain official papers
10 or important papers?

11 Colonel Phillips: We had information on the 6th, it
12 was brought to our attention by the Assistant G-2, Lieutenant
13 Colonel Bicknell, at the Staff meeting at 8 o'clock on the
14 6th, that the Japanese consulate was burning papers. We
15 had no information in regard to the codes.

16 Senator George: You had no information regarding the
17 burning of codes, and destruction of code machines, no such
18 information was received in your headquarters?

19 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

20 Senator George: And you have already testified that
21 you did not see nor know of the existence of the contents
22 of the September 24, message, the one dividing Pearl Harbor
23 up into areas?

24 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

25 Senator George: Did you have notice or any information

1 Witness phillips

questions by: Mr. Clark

h8

2 before the committee shortly.

3 Mr. Clark: Do you mean that you, as Chief of Staff
4 didn't know whether they had a system of spies on the
5 Islands?

6 Colonel Phillips: Not positively. They had consular
7 agents, and there were a number of them. That is what they
8 called them. We assumed that they were conducting espionage.
9 There was no particular necessity for it because there was
10 nothing concealed. It was all open, anybody could go anywhere.

11 Mr. Clark: I think it was perhaps Admiral Ingersoll
12 who testified here that they could stand on the hills around
13 Pearl Harbor and see everything that went on there; is
14 that right?

15 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

16 Mr. Clark: There is considerable elevation around Pearl
17 Harbor, as I understand it?

18 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Clark: Did you know of the instance of wire
20 tapping down there?

21 Colonel Phillips: I did not, sir, not at the time. I
22 learned of it much later.

23 Mr. Clark: The Japs did have direct wire communications
24 with Honolulu, I mean Tokyo, did they not?

25 Colonel Phillips: I think so. I think they could use

Witness Phillips

questions by: Mr. Clark

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

hg
our commercial lines, and our radio, and whatever they pleased. There was no restriction so far as I know.

Mr. Clark: Of course, any alert that the Army would go on would be immediately known to the Japs on the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel Phillips: I can't say that it would, sir. I don't know that that would be the case. Incidentally, we were very careful in alert No. 1 when we went on that and attempted to carry out the restrictions as to the number of people who knew what we were doing; we attempted to carry out that to the letter.

It is very simple on a sabotage alert to put sentries here and there and say that you will keep everybody out. That doesn't restrict you to the Japanese.

In Hawaii you have Puerto Ricans, you have all manners of peoples.

Mr. Clark: Colonel, was it your opinion that the Japanese on the Hawaiian Islands were reporting to Japan practically everything that was being done there by the Army and the Navy?

Colonel Phillips: They certainly could, I believe.

Mr. Clark: I say, wasn't that your opinion as Chief of Staff of General Short that they were doing that every day?

1 Witness phillips questions by: Mr. Clark

h10

2 Colonel Phillips: Yes, I agree with that. There
3 was nothing to stop them.

4 Mr. Clark: That was pretty well known in Army and
5 Navy circles, was it not that they were doing that?

6 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. Everybody knew that,
7 I think everybody knew that they could do it. We didn't know
8 that they were doing it, but there was nothing to prevent
9 them from doing it.

S .

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 Witness phillips questions by: Mr. Clark

h10

2 Colonel Phillips: Yes, I agree with that. There
3 was nothing to stop them.

4 Mr. Clark: That was pretty well known in Army and
5 Navy circles, was it not that they were doing that?

6 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. Everybody knew that,
7 I think everybody knew that they could do it. We didn't know
8 that they were doing it, but there was nothing to prevent
9 them from doing it.

S

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Shefner
fls
LaChar

13,228

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Clark: Did none of these intercepts that were made there indicate that they were doing that?

Colonel Phillips: I did not see those intercepts, sir. I don't know what you refer to.

Mr. Clark: You didn't know much about what was going on around there, did you?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark: Well, wasn't it a matter of highest concern to the safety of both the Army and the Navy that you should have information on that subject?

Colonel Phillips: Excuse me, I did not get that. I wish you would repeat it.

Mr. Clark: I say wasn't it a matter of highest concern to both the Army and the Navy as to what the Japs were doing in that respect?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, that was of great interest, of course. Again I believe that General Fielder is a better witness on that than I, simply because he devoted much of his time to that work. He is to appear later before the committee.

Mr. Clark: Yes. Well, you have laid some stress here upon the fact that you did not receive from Washington the so-called bomb plot information. Now, what comes into my mind is why steps were not taken either by you or by General

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. PHOTOGRAPHY - JUAN S. ORAZ

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1
2 Short or by the Navy to ascertain what the Japs were report-
3 ing to Tokyo right from Pearl Harbor?

4 Colonel Phillips: I do not think we had any authority
5 for interrupting traffic of that kind at that time, or traffic
6 of any kind.

7 Mr. Clark: But you knew that the detail of the movement
8 of every ship and of all the troops on those islands was be-
9 ing observed and likely being reported to Tokyo?

10 Colonel Phillips: No, we did not know that positively.
11 It was open and anybody could see it and, of course, it is a
12 likelihood that that is what was going on.

13 Mr. Clark: Well, I will put it this way: You knew that
14 the Japanese spies on the island could see every movement of
15 either the Army or the Navy, a company of soldiers or a
16 battleship or a cruiser and you knew that the means of commun-
17 icating that to Tokyo were available?

18 Colonel Phillips: That is right. There were approximate-
19 ly 160,000 Japanese on the islands, about forty per cent of
20 the entire population, and they were most everywhere.

21 Mr. Clark: Now, you say you did not hear of the wire
22 tapping prior to Pearl Harbor?

23 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

24 Mr. Clark: All right. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

25 The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Colonel, I want to discuss briefly with
3 you the November 27th message of General Marshall.

4 As I understand from your testimony, you were completely
5 familiar with that message that came to General Short on the
6 day it was sent.

7 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Lucas: You have also given to counsel a prepared
9 memoranda that you recall discussing with General Short as
10 to what should be done in view of the receipt of this message.
11 I direct your attention to the first statement in that mes-
12 sage, which says:

13 "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated
14 to all practical purposes with only the barest possi-
15 bilities that the Japanese government might come back and
16 offer to continue."

17 Now, what was your interpretation of that when you dis-
18 cussed that part of the message with General Short? What did
19 that mean to you out there in this outpost in the Pacific?

20 Colonel Phillips: Well, that was information on Japan,
21 which would normally come in a combat order, under information
22 on the enemy and that is where we put it. Negotiations --

23 Senator Lucas: Now, isn't it a fact that that is the
24 first command that your post had ever received from General
25 Marshall?

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Colonel Phillips: I believe that is correct, sir.

3 Senator Lucas: He was Chief of Staff of the Army?

4 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. There had been a command
5 the year before which I was acquainted with.

6 Senator Lucas: Yes.

7 Colonel Phillips: But that was not during my time.

8 Senator Lucas: Since you were there as G-2 on General
9 Short's staff--

10 The Vice Chairman: Chief of Staff.

11 Senator Lucas: I mean as Chief of Staff of General Short's
12 staff, this is the first message in all that had been received
13 out there that was signed by General Marshall?

14 Colonel Phillips: I am not sure. That is the first to
15 my knowledge, yes, sir.

16 Senator Lucas: Well, at least you do not recall any
17 other messages coming from the Chief of Staff in Washington,
18 D.C., directing General Short and his group out there to do
19 certain things?

20 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: Well, now, did the fact of General Mar-
22 shall directing General Short in the Pacific to do certain
23 things have any different effect upon the manner in which you
24 interpreted a message of this kind than if it had come from
25 G-2 or some other official in Washington?

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Lucas: It did make a tremendous impress upon you,
4 didn't it?

5 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Lucas: The mere fact that the Chief of Staff of
7 the United States Army had seen fit in this particular crisis
8 to send direct to General Short a message of this character?

9 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

10 Senator Lucas: As I understand it, this type of a mes-
11 sage is a command message and there is a distinction between
12 an operational order and an order which is really mere infor-
13 mation that is sent out. Am I right on that?

14 Colonel Phillips: That is quite correct. I might say
15 that there is a command directive and a combat order and a
16 combat order is our normal form for a command directive. A
17 combat order is an order that we teach in our schools in the
18 alert form and we start from our lowest and teach it right
19 straight through till we finish at Leavenworth.

20 Senator Lucas: Well, a combat order is one that is used
21 when you are in war, is it not?

22 Colonel Phillips: That is right.

23 Senator Lucas: And he was not giving you a combat order
24 because we were at peace at that time.

25 Colonel Phillips: He was directing that we take up a

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

formation here.

Senator Lucas: Yes, he was directing you to prepare for any eventuality that might happen.

Colonel Phillips: Exactly.

Senator Lucas: As a result of what he says in the first paragraph: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue."

Now, he said following that:

"Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

Colonel Phillips: That is right.

Senator Lucas: Now, what did you understand that meant from this message:

"Hostile action possible at any moment."

Colonel Phillips: "Hostile action possible at any moment?" Why, we had, of course, the Navy message here of the 24th which we had gone through very carefully and --

Senator Lucas: I am not talking about the Navy message. I am talking about the first message that you received from General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: And the first time you had received a

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 message of this character he told you definitely that hostil-
3 ities, - or, rather that negotiations were about to cease and
4 he said further, "Future action unpredictable but hostile ac-
5 tion possible at any moment."

6 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: Now, where did you think hostile action
8 was going to take place?

9 Colonel Phillips: We did not anticipate an attack by air
10 on Hawaii. Possibly action -- a form of possible action is
11 sabotage. With 160,000 Japanese sitting right on our islands
12 that is a form of hostile action. We divided our standing
13 operating procedure into three forms of defense.

14 Senator Lucas: Did General Marshall know at any time--

15 Senator Ferguson: I don't think he was through.

16 Senator Lucas: I am very sorry, sir.

17 Colonel Phillips: Our first or safety alert was the first
18 firm of hostile action that I could visualize.

19 Senator Lucas: Yes.

20 Colonel Phillips: That is hostile action right there.

21 Senator Lucas: All right.

22 Colonel Phillips: We took definite measures against that
23 form of hostile action.

24 Senator Lucas: All right, Colonel. When did you or
25 General Short send to the War Department your 1, 2 and 3 alert?

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Colonel Phillips: Those alerts I have heard since I
3 have been here, some testimony that they got there in March.
4 I am not sure. It is a normal routine procedure that every,-
5 that a copy of every order, or perhaps six copies, - I am not
6 sure what the procedure is in the Adjutant General's office,
7 but six copies of every order; I say six but I am not sure of
8 that. At least one copy of every order is mailed as a routine
9 matter to the War Department, every order that is issued in
10 the Department and the normal thing was on November the 5th,
11 when that was published and mailed, the normal thing would
12 have been for the Adjutant General, Colonel Dunlop, to have
13 put the number, - as he mimeographed them to put the number
14 on just as a routine matter, just as a mail clerk would have
15 put them in the bag and they would have gone to the War De-
16 partment.

17 Senator Lucas: Well, the number 1, 2 and 3 alert pro-
18 cedures were prepared by General Short under your advice and
19 assistance?

20 Colonel Phillips: I don't understand the question.

21 Senator Lucas: Well, the 1, 2 and 3 alert, Colonel
22 Phillips, you and General Short and the staff had prepared
23 those?

24 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: And you prepared those without first tak-

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1

2 ing it up with the Army here in Washington, D.C.?

3 Colonel Phillips: No, sir, we prepared a tentative alert
4 or a tentative standing operating procedure almost identical
5 to the one that was adopted and a copy was sent to Washington
6 in June and I think returned approved in September.

7 Senator Lucas: Well, I would like to see that. If that
8 is correct, I would like to see it.

9 Colonel Phillips: It is the letter to General Marshall.

10 Senator Lucas: Do we have a copy of that operating
11 procedure that was sent in on July the 14th?

12 (No response.)

13 Senator Lucas: Well, now, this is the message that came
14 back from General Marshall. (Reading)

15 "The mimeographed standard operating procedure for
16 the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to
17 my attention and I am particularly concerned with mis-
18 sions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian
19 Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission
20 of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on
21 Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with
22 providing a provisional battalion of five hundred men
23 for military police duty.

24 "This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are
25 placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance
3 personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we
4 are now in process of testing the organization of air-
5 base defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a
6 rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed
7 for the specific purpose of relieving the air mainten-
8 ance people from ground missions of this kind at loca-
9 tions where there are no large garrisons for ground de-
10 fense, as there are in Hawaii.

11 "I wish you would give this your personal consider-
12 ation."

13 Now, did you see that letter that was addressed to Gen-
14 eral Short dated October 10, 1941?

15 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. The standing operating
16 procedure was taken and those changes made following or sub-
17 sequent to this letter and the revised copy conforming to the
18 recommendations not only of the War Department, as stated
19 there, was published on November the 5th and distributed.

20 Senator Lucas: Well, whatever information you may have
21 thought was sent, I think the record is very clear in this
22 hearing before the committee that your orders, your operation-
23 al orders of these three alerts never reached the War Depart-
24 ment here until some time in March after the attack of De-
25 cember.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1

2

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

3

4

5

6

Senator Lucas: So the Army, as far as this hearing is concerned, had no notice of the fact that General Short had placed sabotage on Number 1 alert and then the Number 2 and Number 3 alerts.

7

8

9

10

11

12

Colonel Phillips: Yes. For that reason, sir, you will find that in the tentative standing operating procedure the numbers of the alerts were just the reverse, in the tentative one. In this one, - they were, in that one adopted on November 5, 1941, the Number 1 alert was the sabotage alert. Number 2 and Number 3 was all-out.

13

14

Senator Lucas: But in the tentative they were just reversed?

15

16

17

18

Colonel Phillips: Just reverse.

Senator Lucas: Number 1 was the all-out alert for defensive actions, where the troops would be stationed in different batteries?

19

20

21

22

23

Colonel Phillips: That is right and for that reason in General Short's reply to this message of the 27th the numbers were not used. It was called defensive, a sabotage alert, and not a number. The number was left out of the message in order not to be confusing.

24

25

Senator Lucas: You have stated that in that connection a copy of it was sent or should have been sent, at least, to

Witness P hillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1

2

the Army here in Washington, D.C.?

3

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

4

5

6

Senator Lucas: Do you recall now whether or not the Army ever answered acknowledging receipt of the so-called alert where sabotage became the number 1?

7

8

Colonel Phillips: I don't know whether that would have been necessary. I don't believe they ever did.

9

10

11

12

13

Senator Lucas: Well, it may not have been necessary but in view of what happened it would have been a good thing to have followed that up after it was sent in, would it not, Colonel, to ascertain whether or not the Army agreed with that kind of an alert?

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. That is hindsight.

Senator Lucas: Of course it is hindsight.

Colonel Phillips: We did not number them for that very reason in General Short's reply to this, so that the sabotage could not be mistaken, could not be confused with a number.

Senator Lucas: Well, in other words, your position is insofar as this message is concerned that when Marshall was talking about hostile action and when he says in the latter part of the message, "Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan", you contend that you thought that he was talking about sabotage?

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1

2

Colonel Phillips: I thought he was talking about hostilities.

3

4

Senator Lucas: Well, he was talking about hostilities, but sabotage --

5

6

Colonel Phillips: But sabotage is one form of hostilities.

7

8

Senator Lucas: Sabotage is one form of hostilities?

9

10

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. That seemed to be our most imminent danger right there at the time.

11

12

Senator Lucas: Well, when you take that part of the message, when it says further:

13

14

15

16

"You are not restricted to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary."

17

18

Did you think that that would apply to sabotage activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii?

19

20

21

22

23

24

Colonel Phillips: We considered that at the time, sir, and the reconnaissance, of course, we were doing. The other measures that we thought should be carried out was, "Do not, repeat not, alarm the civil population or disclose intent" and "Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

25

It was deemed that the sabotage alert, which happened to

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 be the number 1, was adequate.

3 Senator Lucas: Well, you were not carrying out any re-
4 connaissance there, were you, Colonel?

5 Colonel Phillips: We had inshore reconaissance from
6 Bellows Field.

7 Senator Lucas: Yes, and you thought that that was what
8 he was talking about?

9 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Lucas: "Such reconaissance and other measures
11 as you deem necessary." You thought that he was talking about
12 the short range reconaissance?

13 Colonel Phillips: Short range reconaissance at that time
14 and the fact that he knew that the long range reconaissance
15 was a mission and duty of the Navy.

16 Senator Lucas: So from that November the 27th message
17 you and General Short concluded that all that General Marshall
18 was talking about in that dynamic message was the question
19 of sabotage in Hawaii?

20 Colonel Phillips: That afternoon we received a message
21 from General Miles, the next day we received two other mes-
22 sages which seemed to confirm us in our decision.

23 Senator Lucas: Yes, I appreciate that fact that General
24 Miles sent a message the following day, or the same day, and
25 General Arnold sent a message the following day, but the point

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 I am attempting to make is that you and General Short made up
3 your minds with respect to what this message ment before either
4 one of the other messages came in.

5 Colonel Phillips: That is correct, yes, sir.

6 Senator Lucas: And the only thing that those other mes-
7 sages did was to confirm --

8 Colonel Phillips: To confirm our decision.

9 Senator Lucas: (Continuing) -- your decision that you
10 reached?

11 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

12 Senator Lucas: Colonel, I have been unable to understand
13 just how you could construe that message in that manner. I am
14 only a lay man. I have examined it rather carefully. I have
15 examined the reply of the Commanding General of the Western
16 Defense Command in San Francisco.

17 Have you seen his reply to this same message that General
18 Marshall sent out to you?

19 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: Well, here is what he says and, mind you,
21 the words are identical now in this message that was sent to
22 DeWitt of the Western Command, of the Western Defense Command
23 as in the one that was sent to General Short. Here is what he
24 said on November the 28th: (Reading)

25 "Report following measures taken as per your radio

28176

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 November Twenty Seven: Your radio paraphrase^d to Command-
3 ing Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force,
4 Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps
5 Area and Commandants Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval
6 Districts. All harbor entrance control posts continuously
7 manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously
8 alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive
9 activities intensified. Six infantry battalions and ne-
10 cessary motor transportation alerted so as to be instantly
11 available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under Rainbow
12 Five. Constant contact being maintained with Corps Area
13 and Naval District Commanders and full cooperation assured.
14 PCF, Sector and Subsector plans Rainbow Five practically
15 completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry
16 out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furn-
17 ished CG SFP of E for guard duty and one company furnished
18 to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in
19 connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov Twenty
20 fifth which recommended that WPL Five Two be extended to
21 include Pacific Coast and Japanese vessels and which out-
22 lined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As air
23 forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the
24 execution of WLP Five Two or the preparatory stage of
25 Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 direct operations of Air forces in defense of the PCF or
3 that instructions be issued specifying air action and that
4 I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should hostilities
5 occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned
6 in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for
7 woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment
8 planes which should be made available without delay."
9 Now, was there anything in Rainbow 5 that talked about sabot-
10 age on the island, or do you recall?

11 Colonel Phillips: I do not recall, sir.

12 Senator Lucas: Do you know why DeWitt would construe that
13 message any different than General Short himself did?

14 Colonel Phillips: For one reason he does not have a stand-
15 ing operating procedure.

16 Senator Lucas: He does not have what?

17 Colonel Phillips: He does not have a standing operating
18 procedure. If I may, sir, I will read you what a standing
19 operating procedure is and why we were directed in the Staff
20 Officers' Field Manual which was in effect at that time to
21 place in effect a standing operating procedure. It is FM-
22 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual, The Staff and Combat
23 Orders. (Reading)

24 "Section VI

25 "STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

1
2 "a.-- Standing operating procedure covers those fea-
3 tures of operations which lend themselves to a definite or
4 standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. It
5 should be provided that the procedure is applicable unless
6 prescribed otherwise in a particular case; thus the flexi-
7 bility necessary in special situations is retained.

8 "b. -- The purposes of standing operating procedure
9 are:

10 "(1) To simplify and abbreviate combat orders, ex-
11 pedite their transmission, and permit their being under-
12 stood easily and certainly.

13 "(2) To simplify and perfect the training of the
14 troops.

15 "(3) To promote understanding and teamwork between
16 the commander, staff, and troops.

17 "(4) In general, to facilitate and expedite opera-
18 tions and minimize confusion and errors.

19 "c.-- Standing operating procedure should not hamper
20 the effective tactical employment of the troops."

21 Senator Lucas: Well, you were working under that sort of a
22 procedure, were you?

23 Colonel Phillips: We were working under that under this
24 directive. That is what the standing operating procedure was
25 drawn up for, simply because the situation in Hawaii was simp-

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 ly a limited perimeter defense.

3 Senator Lucas: And you don't think that the --

4 Colonel Phillips: I don't think the Western Command had
5 anything of that kind in existence and he had to go into great
6 detail in order to tell what he was doing.

7 Senator Lucas: Well, the Western Command had no more in-
8 formation with respect to magic or in respect to what was
9 going on in the Pacific than you did?

10 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Lucas: In fact, they did not have as much.

12 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Lucas: And, yet, notwithstanding that fact they
14 interpreted this order entirely different than what you or
15 General Short interpreted it?

16 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: Now I take you over to the Panama Canal
18 Zone. Do you see any reason why the commander in Panama
19 should interpret it any different than what you did, or the
20 same as you did?

21 Colonel Phillips: I don't know about that, sir.

22 Senator Lucas: Well, just briefly here is what he said.
23 He sent a long telegram back and then he said that he was
24 sending an air letter, which he did on November 29th. He
25 says:

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 "In compliance with radiogram No. 461 from the Chief
3 of Staff, dated November 27, 1941, report that the follow-
4 ing measures are in effect for the protection of the Carib-
5 bean Area.

6 "a. Naval Measures."

7 He goes into it at great length.

8 "At the present time, it is believed that the de-
9 fensive measures for the Caribbean Defense Command center
10 largely around the Panama Canal," and so forth.

11 "b. Measures for the Defense of the Panama Canal.

12 "(1) Harbor Defense. Troops are on a continuous
13 alert. Harbor defense is coordinated with the naval de-
14 fense."

15 Here is a fellow town in Panama who has got his troops all
16 alerted. Here is this fellow on the West Coast who has got his
17 troops all alerted and here you fellows that are two thousand
18 miles or more away all you have got your troops alerted to is
19 sabotage.

20 "Harbor defense is coordinated with the naval de-
21 fense.

22 "(3) Antiaircraft Artillery. All available anti-
23 aircraft equipment is installed and on a 24-hour alert."

24 "(2) Aircraft Warning Service. The two detectors
25 installed are on a 24-hour alert."

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Would it have been possible for the aircraft warning ser-
3 vice in Hawaii to be on a twenty-four hour alert?

4 Colonel Phillips: I think we could with the limited per-
5 sonnel we had. I don't know how long that could have lasted,
6 I am not sure about that. General Powell is here and he will
7 make a better witness on that than myself.

8 Senator Lucas: (Reading)

9 "Seven observation posts have been established at
10 various places in Panama with direct radio communication
11 to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center."

12 Did you have an information center there in Hawaii?

13 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Lucas: Did you have a liaison man between the
15 Navy and the Army?

16 Colonel Phillips: The Navy had supplied us a liaison of-
17 ficer, I believe; Lieutenant Taylor, I believe.

18 Senator Lucas: The Navy testified here that they never
19 received any information from the Information Center with re-
20 spect to what was going on, at least on December the 7th.

21 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. It was purely a training mat-
22 ter at that time.

23 Senator Lucas: Well, I appreciate the handicaps that you
24 were operating under at the time, Colonel, with respect to
25 radar and a number of other things.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Lucas: All I am wondering is whether or not you
4 did the best you could with what you had and were really alert
5 to the situation.

6 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: Now, antiaircraft artillery. Now, here is
8 another one from the Panama Canal. Certainly, it seems to me
9 that if Panama is going to do these things under the same
10 instructions, practically under the same message, that Hawaii
11 should have done them, too. (Reading)

12 "All available antiaircraft equipment is installed
13 and on a 24-hour alert."

14 Now, that was not true in Hawaii at all.

15 Colonel Phillips: No, sir. We had small care-taking crews
16 in permanent anti-aircraft installations.

17 Senator Lucas: Did you have any anti-aircraft equipment
18 that was on any kind of an alert on the morning of December the
19 7th?

20 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. There were care-taking
21 establishments in the permanent installations. There were
22 care-taking troops in the permanent establishments on a sabo-
23 tage alert. Of course, they were on twenty-four hours. They
24 opened fire. I should say we had about six or seven, probably
25 more, batteries. I have the report of Colonel Wing who has

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
made a report. I think it is an exhibit.

Senator Lucas: Of only those that were on a sabotage alert?

Colonel Phillips: That is right, that got into the action.

I think eight or ten batteries.

Senator Lucas: How many batteries did you have in all?

Colonel Phillips: That is a matter of record, sir. I do not recall.

Senator Lucas: You cannot give a guess? I have forgotten it myself.

Mr. Kaufman: 32 the record shows.

Senator Lucas: What?

Mr. Kaufman: 32 the record shows.

Colonel Phillips: That is about right.

Senator Lucas: (Reading)

"(4) Anti-Sabotage."

I am still reading from the report of General Andrews in the Panama Canal Zone.

"Looks and other sensitive areas are continuously guarded, and all approaches to the sensitive areas are covered by mound bunkers. Approaches to bunkers and between bunkers where practicable, are covered by patrols. Transit guards are placed on all vessels transiting the Canal.

"(5) Counter-espionage. Active counter-espionage measures are being taken continuously.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 "(6) Counter-subversive activities.

3 "(7) Air Force. A portion of the pursuit is on a
4 continuous 24-hour alert. The Bomber Command headquarters
5 maintains a 24-hour alert. This latter applies to the
6 whole Caribbean Area."

7 Was there any more reason why the Caribbean area should be
8 on a twenty-four bombing command alert than there was at Hawaii?

9 Colonel Phillips: I do not know, sir.

10 Senator Lucas: What is your opinion about it as an ex-
11 pert, Colonel, and a man who has had a lot of experience in the
12 Army?

13 Colonel Phillips: I would have to know the conditions in
14 Panama. I don't think the conditions in any two of those
15 spots you have mentioned are similar at all.

16 Senator Lucas: No, but the mere fact that you fellows
17 were two thousand miles closer to Japan, closer to the attack
18 than either Panama or the West Coast, would indicate that at
19 least the Army command and the Navy command should have been
20 equally on the same type of alert as either Panama or the West
21 Coast.

22 Colonel Phillips: Well, that is a matter of opinion. We
23 were taking the facts as we found them in Hawaii and working
24 on that basis alone.

25 Senator Lucas: The point that I am making is that Panama

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Canal and the West Coast had no more facts than in Hawaii. In
3 fact, they did not have as many.

4 Colonel Phillips: They had different circumstances to
5 handle in a situation right there.

6 Senator Lucas: They did and they were on the alert, Col-
7 onel.

8 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Lucas: Now, it goes into the Caribbean Theater,
10 other than Panama Canal Department.

11 It sets out about the Air Corps there, as to what they
12 were doing.

13 "Harbor Defenses: Less than one complete manning
14 detail available for the harbor defense armament."

15 Signed, "F. M. Andrews, Lieutenant General, United States
16 Army, Commanding."

17 In other words, it has always given me some concern as to
18 why these two commanders on the West Coast and the Panama
19 command interpreted this entirely different than what General
20 Short and his staff interpreted it, and in this message of
21 November the 27th there is not a single word in there about
22 where the Japs are expected to attack; that is true, isn't it?

23 Colonel Phillips: That is correct, yes, sir.

24 Senator Lucas: On page 105 of the Pearl Harbor inquiry
25 carried on by Justice Roberts as Chairman and others, General

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 McNarney asked you this question:

3 "What is your idea of the function of the Local Joint
4 Planning Committee?

5 "Colonel Phillips: My idea is, of course, controlled
6 more or less to conform to what we have as a joint plan,
7 and I should say that whenever changes are necessary, why,
8 that joint committee should meet and modify the joint plan
9 that we have.

10 "General McNarney: You did not consider that the
11 situation as known to you on November 27 and 28 required
12 any revision of the existing plans or any examination into
13 the propriety of making a new plan?

14 "Colonel Phillips: We were all familiar with the
15 plan thoroughly, sir, and a change was not deemed ne-
16 cessary at that time.

17 "General McNarney: What is the normal routine method
18 by which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
19 ment, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and the Com-
20 mander of the 14th Naval District maintained close liaison
21 and contact with reference to the existing situation?

22 "Colonel Phillips: By personal conferences at one
23 or the other headquarters.

24 "General McNarney: Did you, as Chief of Staff of the
25 Department, confer with any Navy officers during the period

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 November 27 to December 7?

3 "Colonel Phillips: I did not. I was occupied with
4 the duties of my office here at headquarters practically
5 the entire period."

6 You probably have answered that question before in testi-
7 fying here today, but can you give me again the reason why,
8 Colonel you, as Chief of Staff, failed to confer with a single
9 Navy officer from November the 27th until December the 7th?

10 Colonel Phillips: Senator, I was carrying out my duties
11 as Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department in conformity
12 with the directions of General Short. I ran the headquarters
13 and the staff. General Short attended personally conferences
14 with the Navy, taking along his Navy liaison officer, as he
15 called him, Major Fleming usually, General Martin and perhaps
16 maybe somebody from the coast artillery. I remained at his
17 headquarters to free him of all the routine administrative
18 work. That was his direction and that was what I was carrying
19 out to the letter.

20 Senator Lucas: Well, now, in view of what you know about
21 the testimony that has been adduced before this hearing do you
22 believe that the liaison between the Navy and the Army is what
23 it should have been?

24 Colonel Phillips: That is a matter of opinion, Senator.
25 I think that we had liaison. Whether it could have been im-

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 proved upon is another thing. The Commanding General was a very
3 active man, he was taking part in every conference, he was al-
4 ways present, he had all the facts at his fingers tips and,
5 after all, he is the man concerned, he is the commander, and if
6 he has the facts in hand that is quite sufficient. We had,
7 however, a liaison officer from the Navy, from Admiral Bloch's
8 staff, Lieutenant Burr, who sat in and had a desk in G-3 and
9 was always there.

10 Senator Lucas: Don't you believe as Chief of Staff of
11 General Short's army down there in Hawaii that you should have
12 known practically everything that General Short knew?

13 Colonel Phillips: He told me, he acquainted me with the
14 results of every staff meeting and what messages, if any, he
15 had seen. I was thoroughly conversant with all those facts.

16 Senator Lucas: But you never sat in on a single conference
17 after the war warning message was received through the Navy
18 and after you received this message from Marshall, with a
19 single Navy man. That was all done by General Short, was it,
20 and his aide?

21 Colonel Phillips: General Short and our naval liaison
22 officer. However, I believe that we did have -- well, I am
23 not sure of it. My memory is not good on that.

24 Senator Lucas: What were your chief duties following this
25 November the 27th message as Chief of Staff of that army out

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 there?

3 Colonel Phillips: My chief duties following the 27th were,
4 of course, first to initiate all orders, get them out to the
5 troops concerned, right down through the staff, see that the
6 staff sections, particularly the G-3, was out inspecting the
7 positions and his entire office was out. I did some inspect-
8 ing myself, although not required under my duties.

9 I went out to see if our message center was functioning at
10 all times and as far as the sabotage alert was concerned that
11 it was functioning fully.

12 Senator Lucas: Had you ever had any previous experience
13 on a joint command of this character?

14 Colonel Phillips: Yes, with the First Division in amphi-
15 bious operations down in the Caribbean in 1937 and again in
16 1939 I believe, at the time we had joint operations off Puerto
17 Rico. We defended there the southern coast of Puerto Rico
18 for a strip of thirty-five miles and an amphibious operation
19 landing under the Navy was made from the Arkansas and the New
20 York by the Fifth Marines.

21 Senator Lucas: Did you know on December the 6th the num-
22 ber of ships that were in Pearl Harbor?

23 Colonel Phillips: I cannot say that I did, no, sir.

24 Senator Lucas: Well, if it was your duty to defend the
25 Navy, it was the duty of the Army to defend the Navy, why

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 wouldn't it be your duty to ascertain on December the 6th and
3 every other day the amount of those ships in and out of that
4 harbor?

5 Colonel Phillips: That did not modify our defense in the
6 least. Our defenses was a static proposition. We had so many
7 guns and so many positions and whether there had been one ship
8 in the harbor or fifty our defense would have gone into oper-
9 ation just the same.

10 Senator Lucas: It would have been just the same?

11 Colonel Phillips: It would have been just the same, yes,
12 sir.

13 Senator Lucas: In other words, the fact that there were
14 two task forces out at sea and you did not know anything about
15 that did not make any difference as far as the defense was con-
16 cerned?

17 Colonel Phillips: It made a difference as far as the re-
18 connaissance was concerned, yes, sir. We knew of that, yes,
19 sir.

20 Senator Lucas: Did you know that the task forces were out?

21 Colonel Phillips: We knew of that, yes, sir. General
22 Short had been informed and so informed me.

23 Senator Lucas: General McCoy asked a couple of questions
24 which I want to interrogate you a little further on, on page
25 109 of these proceedings. (Reading)

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 "The Chairman: What was the objection to putting in
3 two or three, if any?

4 "Colonel Phillips: There was no particular objection,
5 sir. It was considered that I was what we desired and re-
6 quired.

7 "The Chairman: Are there further questions?

8 "Admiral Stanley: I have one; I am not quite ready
9 yet.

10 "General McCoy: I have one: Colonel Phillips, under
11 Alert No. 1, the very first line, the very first sentence,
12 14, page 3, it states. 'This alert is a defense against
13 acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands, with no
14 threat from without.'

15 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

16 "General McCoy: Now, here was a warning telegram
17 that did mention hostile action and unpredictable action
18 from without, from the War Department.

19 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

20 "General McCoy: So that that line is absolutely in-
21 consistent, then, with the instructions from the War De-
22 partment, is it not?

23 "Colonel Phillips: It says, 'with no threat from
24 without,' sir.

25 "General McCoy: So that Alert No. 1 is not consistent,

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 8 I take it, with these instructions from the War Department.
3 Had that inconsistency in the very first paragraph of
4 Alert No. 1 occurred to you?

5 "Colonel Phillips: It had not, sir. At the time
6 I saw no inconsistency, sir."

7 Do you care to comment any further upon that?

8 Colonel Phillips: No, sir, other than I have already tes-
9 tified in regard to the fact that we thought that form of hos-
10 tility right in our very midst was what should be guarded
11 against and we had no information from the War Department or
12 from the Navy, our only sources, that an attack was expected
13 in Hawaii.

14 Senator Lucas: I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

15 The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

16 Mr. Murphy: Colonel, as I understand it you testified
17 before the Roberts Commission first; thereafter you testified
18 before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, as well as before the
19 Naval Court of Inquiry.

20 Colonel Phillips: That is correct, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Before the Naval Court of Inquiry, as I
22 recollect it, you made the answer "I don't remember" at least
23 forty times. What have you done to refresh your memory since
24 that time?

25 Colonel Phillips: I have attended some of the sessions

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 here, sir.

3 Mr. Murphy: Well, the testimony you are giving us now is
4 what you have heard then during the hearings, is that it, and
5 that has refreshed your memory, as it?

6 Colonel Phillips: No, sir. I at that time had had no op-
7 portunity to read the reports of the Robert committee. I have
8 read that and I have also read the report of the Army Pearl
9 Harbor Board. At that time I was testifying there before the
10 Navy Committee I had just flown in from Burma and had no time
11 to refresh my memory on anything.

12 Mr. Murphy: Did I understand you to say to Senator Lucas
13 that you made the rounds to see whether or not the message
14 center was operating? Did I understand you on that correctly?

15 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: You mean now by that the air warning service?

17 Colonel Phillips: No, sir, I mean the message center.

18 Mr. Murphy: That is a different thing than the air warn-
19 ing service?

20 Colonel Phillips: Quite.

21 Mr. Murphy: You did not know whether the air warning ser-
22 vice was functioning or not, did you?

23 Colonel Phillips: It was a training matter. It was a new
24 thing.

25 Mr. Murphy: Do you know whether it was functioning or not?

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

3 Mr. Murphy: On the morning of December 7th?

4 Colonel Phillips: No, sir, I ~~if~~ not personally.

5 Mr. Murphy: You felt that that was under the Signal Corps?

6 Colonel Phillips: It was under the Signal Corps for in-
7 stallation and the Air Corps for operation. It was a joint
8 control, a training problem.

9 Mr. Murphy: Up to the time of the attack you had no in-
10 formation whatsoever as to whether there had been a warning
11 order given as to the radar, did you?

12 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you say now that you knew the task
14 forces were out and what they were.

15 Colonel Phillips: General Short had told me, yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: And you say you knew that on December 7th.
17 You knew on December 7th what task forces were out?

18 Colonel Phillips: Oh, no. The testimony -- we are speak-
19 ing of the 27th, I am speaking of that.

20 Mr. Murphy: I am speaking on the day of the attack.

21 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

22 Mr. Murphy: Did you know immediately before the 7th
23 where the task forces were, whether they were in or out of
24 the harbor? I don't want hindsight? Do you know?

25 Colonel Phillips: I don't recall just now.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Mr. Murphy: Well, now, I would like too so that we may
3 have it in one place in the record, I am going to hurriedly
4 run over that testimony before the three Boards.

5 You never saw the Navy message, did you, "This is a war
6 warning?"

7 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you testified on page 213 of the
9 Roberts Board, page 1010 in the committee's transcript, that
10 you did have some record or receipts of these different mes-
11 sages at Pearl Harbor. Did you or didn't you?

12 Colonel Phillips: We could not find those in the records.

13 Mr. Murphy: When the Roberts Board asked you the question,
14 asked you to get the records you could not find them, could you?

15 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

16 Mr. Murphy: Now, the night of December 6th you were at a
17 dance at Schofield Barracks, weren't you?

18 Colonel Phillips: A charity ball.

19 Mr. Murphy: Yes, with your wife. Was that at Isadore's
20 night club or wasn't there some place called Eleazar's or
21 Isadore?

22 Colonel Phillips: It is the Schofield Barracks Officers'
23 Club.

24 Mr. Murphy: That is the only thing?

25 Colonel Phillips: That is all there is, yes, sir.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Mr. Murphy: All right. Now, the message of the 27th came
3 in at 1:16 P.M. and you saw two messages that afternoon and
4 you made answer at 5:40 P.M., isn't that right?

5 Colonel Phillips: I did not understand that question.

6 Mr. Murphy: I say the message of the 27th, the one that
7 you received from General Marshall, came in at 1:16 P.M. of
8 that afternoon and that afternoon you saw a second message,
9 did you not, and sent the reply called the short reply as of
10 5:40 P.M. that day?

11 Colonel Phillips: I am not sure as to the time. It was
12 shortly thereafter.

13 Mr. Murphy: Well, you testified on page 220 and at page
14 104 before the Roberts Board:

15 "Yes, sir. This was 1:16 P.M. the 27th, and this went
16 out at 5:40 P.M. the 27th."

17 Was your recollection pretty clear at that time as to
18 when it came in and when it went out?

19 Colonel Phillips: Apparently I checked that from the mes-
20 sage. I did not have the message.

21 Mr. Murphy: All right. You were head of the local joint
22 planning committee, were you not?

23 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: And there never was a meeting of the local
25 joint planning committee called at any time between November

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 27th and after the attack, was there?

3 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

4 Mr. Murphy: Now, the question was asked you by General
5 McCoy at page 229 of the Roberts Board, page 108 of our hear-
6 ing:

7 "Were you informed that such distant reconnaissance
8 was being carried out?

9 "Colonel Phillips: I do not know that we were in so
10 many words. We assumed that we were carrying our part of
11 the plan, and I don't know that there was even any thought
12 of anything else."

13 Was that the knowledge you had of what the Navy was doing
14 on distant reconnaissance?

15 Colonel Phillips: That was my estimate at that time, at
16 least, in reply to that question. I also assumed that they
17 were carrying out and were doing their job all the time.

18 Mr. Murphy: On the same page General McCoy said:

19 "Were you informed by the Naval District of the
20 arrival of the battleships in the harbor?

21 "Colonel Phillips: I was not, sir. I can't say
22 whether the Department Commander was or not. I was not,
23 sir. I never knew whether the ships were in or out."

24 Was that a correct answer?

25 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

3 "General McCoy: Wouldn't that affect any plan for
4 defense that you might have, whatever?"

5 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, it should have affected
6 that, sir, but as Chief of Staff I never knew."

7 Was that a correct answer?

8 Colonel Phillips: I have just answered that --

9 Mr. Murphy: Yes, but not in this manner.

10 Colonel Phillips: (Continuing) -- for Senator Lucas.

11 Mr. Murphy: Is what you said --

12 Colonel Phillips: Our defense setup in the standing oper-
13 ating procedure was a static defense.

14 Mr. Murphy: Well, that is what you said before the Rob-
15 erts Board back in January 1942:

16 "Wouldn't that affect any plan for defense that you
17 might have, whatsoever?"

18 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir, it should have affected
19 that, sir, but as Chief of Staff I never knew."

20 Were you incorrect when you testified that way before the
21 Roberts Board?

22 Colonel Phillips: That is not a very good reply, "As
23 Chief of Staff I never knew." I was never able to correct
24 this or go over that. That does not make sense.

25 Mr. Murphy: Well, the fact is that General Short was

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Murphy
2 with his own liaison officer principally with the Navy, wasn't
3 he?

4 Colonel Phillips: No, he was the Commanding General and
5 he attended Navy meetings personally himself. He knew all the
6 facts in the case. He had a liaison officer, Major Fleming,
7 who also attended.

8 Mr. Murphy: Both you and General Short in testifying here
9 have talked about Major Fleming being your liaison officer.
10 Was that really your liaison officer?

11 Colonel Phillips: He was the Army liaison, yes, sir.

12 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

13 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Murphy: Before the Roberts Board he said it was
15 Captain Truman.

16 Colonel Phillips: No, Captain Truman was the aide who
17 accompanied General Short.

18 Mr. Murphy: Well, we never heard his name in this record
19 now after twelve thousand pages until this minute.

20 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Why is that?

22 Colonel Phillips: He was merely the aide who accompan-
23 ied him. I don't know what the question was or what it
24 was about. I have only heard that since I have been here,
25 sir.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Mr. Murphy: The question was:

3 "Were not you usually with him at these conferences
4 with the Commander of the Fleet?

5 "Colonel Phillips: No, sir, I was not.

6 "General McCoy: Were you with him when he had any
7 conferences with the Navy during that period of November
8 27 to December 7?

9 "Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

10 "General McCoy: Who was with him on those confer-
11 ences? Are you informed as to that?

12 "Colonel Phillips: I believe his aide, sir.

13 "The Chairman: Who is his aide?

14 "Colonel Phillips: Captain Truman."

15 That was your answer to the Roberts Board, wasn't it?

16 Colonel Phillips: That should have been amplified.

17 Mr. Murphy: That is the answer you gave the Roberts
18 Board in January 1942?

19 Colonel Phillips: His aide was with him. That is all
20 incorrect.

21 Mr. Murphy: What?

22 Colonel Phillips: His aide was with him. That is all
23 incorrect.

24 Mr. Murphy: Now, that is who you said was with him and
25 that is the only one you said was with him.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Colonel Phillips: That should have been amplified. That
3 was incorrect. I knew that also.

4 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

5 "General McCoy: At any time during the period of
6 the alert from the 27th of November to December 7 did you
7 have any conference with your vis-a-vis in the Navy or
8 with any officer in the Navy?"

9 That is on page 108 of the Roberts record, page 230 of
10 our record. Your answer was:

11 "No, sir, I did not.

12 "General McCoy: Did anybody of your staff?

13 "Colonel Phillips: None of my staff, no, sir."

14 Now, when I asked General Short this question he kind
15 of laughed out. I asked whether or not there was any time
16 when the Navy staff, Kimmel's staff and your staff sat down
17 together? Did they at any time sit down that you knew of
18 up to the time the war started?

19 Colonel Phillips: They never had a joint staff meeting
20 of that kind. That would have been a very unusual procedure.

21 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you were asked this question by
22 Justice Roberts at page 231, page 109 our number:

23 "The Chairman: Why was it that that had not been
24 activated prior to December 7, Colonel?"

25 Referring to your radar.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

2

Colonel Phillips: Yes.

3

Mr. Murphy: You made the answer:

4

"We did not have the Radars. They are still not installed. Making every effort that we can to get them in, sir, and that was the basis of the interceptor command, we felt: Aircraft Warning Service."

5

6

7

8

9

You were speaking there, I take it, about the permanent sets, were you?

10

Colonel Phillips: That is right, yes, sir.

11

12

13

14

Mr. Murphy: You were asked whether or not you had an aerial warning service with sirens in the tower downtown, and so forth. Your answer was: That you did not have them until after December 7th. Was that correct?

15

Colonel Phillips: I think that is correct, sir.

16

17

Mr. Murphy: Now, you were asked this question by the Chairman at page 234, our number 110:

18

19

20

"Was there any discussion, in view of the possible outbreak of hostilities, of the necessity for working those Radar units 24 hours a day?"

21

22

"Colonel Phillips: No discussion of that so far as I know, sir."

23

Was that a correct answer?

24

25

Colonel Phillips: That was not entirely correct. We had discussed that.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Mr. Murphy: Well, the Chairman then said to you:

3 "Then in spite of the availability of those units your
4 Department depended simply upon the scouting forces of the
5 Navy and such intelligence information as the Navy might
6 otherwise obtain to warn you of any hostile attacks?

7 "Colonel Phillips: I would say so, sir."

8 That is the answer you made in January of 1942, wasn't it?

9 Colonel Phillips: That is correct. Our radar was working
10 only on a training basis.

11 Mr. Murphy: You said then on that same page, our page 111:

12 "We had no trained operators. We were exerting every
13 effort we could to train these men. They were all rank
14 amateurs; nobody was a professional on the Radar. We were
15 devoting--"

16 Colonel Phillips: Yes.

17 Mr. Murphy: Was that a correct answer?

18 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

19 Mr. Murphy: You considered everybody on radar then as
20 rank amateurs, is that it?

21 Colonel Phillips: Perhaps that is the wrong adjective,
22 but they were all learning. They were merely going to school.
23 We only had two officers in the Department at that time prior
24 to the return of General Davidson and Colonel Powell from the
25 States, who we had sent here to observe, - we only had two