I. GENERAL

|) Mission | Bomb A/0 | ; at Mamu | rogawa A | /F, Honshi | 1 | | (f) Time of | Return. | 1816(-9) | $_{\rm L}$ (Zone |
|--|---|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------|------------------|
| 41. OV | NN AIRCRA | FT OFFICI | ALLY COV | ERED BY TH | IIS REPORT | • | 1 | | | |
| TYPE | SQUADRON | TAKING | NUMBER ENGAGING ENEMY A/C | ATTACKING TARGET | | MBS AND TORPEDOE | | | FUZE, SETTING | |
| (a) | (b) | OFF (c) | (d) | (e) | | (*) | | T4 | (g) | |
| 3-3 | 7149 | 9 | 0 | 9 | 4-500# | G.P. | | | Nose | |
| 4 | | | | | | DEDATION | | | | |
| TYPE | SQUADRON | OR ALLIEI NUMBER | O AIRCRAF | T EMPLOYED BASE | | PE SQUADRON | NUMBER | | BASE | |
| enning | ton (AG-) | | ton (AG- |), Hanco | ock (AG-6 | each 12 V | , 15 VT. | 255.0 | | aciani wadine |
| | | | | J | F61 | 7-5 VF-49 | 2 | PROPERTY. | SAN JACI | E-11 VIII 70 |
| 157 8 | NIELAN AIDO | TRAFT OPS | EDVED OP | ENGAGED (| Ry Own Airc | raft Listed in I | (Only) | | | |
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | | (e) TION OF OUNTER | | (f) EDOES CARRIED OBSERVED | ; | (g) CAMOUFLAG MARKIN | E AND |
| TYPE | OBSERVED | NO. ENGAGIN | G TIME ENCOUNTED | RED ENC | OUNTER | GUNS | ORZEKAED | | MAKKIN | |
| ione of | served | | (Z(| ONE) | | | | | | |
| | | | (Z | ONE) | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | (Z | ONE) | | | | | | |
| | | | | ONE) | | | | | | |
| Did A | rent Enemy A | | | | | | | | | |
| Did A Encou | iny Part of unter(s) Occ | ur in Cloud | | one) If so, Desc | ribe Clouds | (BASE | IN FEET, TYPE | AND TENT | HS OF COVER) | |
| Did A Encou Time | ny Part of | ur in Cloud | S? (YES OR NO | | | | IN FEET, TYPE (k) Vis | | HS OF COVER) |) |
| Did A Encou Time i) of Sur | inter(s) Occ of Day and B n or Moon | ur in Cloud rilliance | (YES OR NO | o) If so, Desc | Y, OVERCAST; ET | | (k) Vis | ibility | | |
| Did A Encou Time of Sur V. E TYPE | ny Part of Inter(s) Occording Day and Bon or Moon | ur in Cloud rilliance CRAFT DEST | (NIGHT, BRANCE OR NOTED OR NAGED BY: | o) If so, Desc | IN AIR (By | C.) | (k) Vis | ibility | (MILES | DAMA CLAIN |
| Did A Encou Time i) of Sur | ny Part of Inter(s) Occording Day and Bon or Moon | ur in Cloud rilliance CRAFT DEST | (NIGHT, BRANCE OR NOTED OR NAGED BY: | If so, Descons DAY | IN AIR (By | Own Aircraft L | (k) Vis | only). | (MILES | |
| Did A Encou Time of Sur V. E | ny Part of Inter(s) Occording Day and Bon or Moon | ur in Cloud rilliance CRAFT DEST | (NIGHT, BRANCE OR NOTED OR NAGED BY: | If so, Descons DAY | IN AIR (By | Own Aircraft L | (k) Vis | only). | (MILES | |
| Did A Encou Time of Sur V. E | ny Part of Inter(s) Occording Day and Bon or Moon | ur in Cloud rilliance CRAFT DEST | (NIGHT, BRANCE OR NOTED OR NAGED BY: | If so, Descons DAY | IN AIR (By | Own Aircraft L | (k) Vis | only). | (MILES | |
| Did A Encou Time of Sur V. E TYPE | ny Part of Inter(s) Occording Day and Bon or Moon | ur in Cloud rilliance CRAFT DEST | (NIGHT, BRANCE OR NOTED OR NAGED BY: | If so, Descons DAY | IN AIR (By | Own Aircraft L | (k) Vis | only). | (MILES | |
| Did A Encou Time of Sur V. E | ny Part of Inter(s) Occording Day and Bon or Moon | ur in Cloud rilliance CRAFT DEST | (NIGHT, BRANCE OR NOTED OR NAGED BY: | If so, Descons DAY | IN AIR (By | Own Aircraft L | (k) Vis | only). | (MILES | |
| Did A Encourting Time j) of Sur V. E TYPE | ny Part of Inter(s) Occording Day and Bon or Moon | ur in Cloud rilliance CRAFT DEST | (NIGHT, BRANCE OR NOTED OR NAGED BY: | If so, Descons DAY | IN AIR (By | Own Aircraft L | (k) Vis | only). | (MILES | |
| Did A Encourting Time j) of Sur V. E TYPE | ny Part of Inter(s) Occording Day and Bon or Moon | ur in Cloud rilliance CRAFT DEST | (NIGHT, BRANCE OR NOTED OR NAGED BY: | If so, Descons DAY | IN AIR (By | Own Aircraft L | (k) Vis | only). | (MILES | |
| Did A Encou Time j) of Sur V. E TYPE | ny Part of Inter(s) Occording Day and Bon or Moon | ur in Cloud rilliance CRAFT DEST | (NIGHT, BRANCE OR NOTED OR NAGED BY: | If so, Descons DAY | IN AIR (By | Own Aircraft L | (k) Vis | only). | (MILES | |

RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out)

VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only). (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit) CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C,
TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE (b) SQUADRON TYPE OWN A/C 1 THERE Did not affect flight Leading edge of port .50 calibre or VI-49 TH -3 wing from 6 O'clock characteristics. Easily .30 Calibre repaired. below. 5 inch hole on exit at leading 5 edge. 6 8 9 10 11 13 14

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

(a) (b) (c) (c) (d) (CAUSE CONDITION OR STATUS

NONE

NONE

(a) (c) (d) (CAUSE CONDITION OR STATUS

(b) (c) (CAUSE CONDITION OR STATUS

(c) (d) (CAUSE CONDITION OR STATUS

| VIII. | RANGE, | FUEL, AN | D AMMUNI | TION DAT | A FOR PLAN | IES RET | URNING TOTAL AMM | UNITION EXPEN | NDED | (h) |
|--------------------|--------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------|---------------------|---------------|------|-------------------------|
| (a) TYPE A/C | MILES OUT | (c) MILES RETURN | AV. HOURS IN AIR | AV. FUEL LOADED | AV. FUEL CONSUMED | .30 | .50 | 20MM | MM | NO. OF PLANES RETURNING |
| TBM-3 | 182 | 182 | 4.8 | 401 | 31.5 | | 3210 | | | 9 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |

| IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Che | NONE | MEAGER | MODERATE | INTENSE |
|--|------|--------|----------|---------|
| HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over | X | | | |
| MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm | X | | | |
| IGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm | | Y | | |

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

| SPEED, CLIMB, | |
|----------------------|--|
| at various altitudes | |
| TUDNIC | |
| TURNS . | |
| DIVES | |
| CEILINGS. | |
| RANGE | |
| PROTECTION | |
| ARMAMENT | |
| | |

DECEDICATED

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

| KESTRICTE | U |
|-------------|------|
| (Reclassify | wher |
| filled out) | |

| - | VI ATTACK ON EN | ENAV CHIDE OR | GROUND OBJECT | IVES (By Own Aircraft Listed | in II Only) | REPORT No. |
|------------|--|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|---|
| (a) | The state of the s | | | IONSIN (b) Time Ove | | |
| The second | | | | T. TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER) | | |
| | Visibility of Target | ue- | | | Visibility | 15 (MILES) |
| | Bombing Tactics: Type | | | Bomb Sight Us | | |
| 10 | Bombs Dropped per Run | Usually 2 | Spacing_ | Select Altitude | of Bomb Rel | ease 2500-1000 (FEET) |
| (g) | Number of Enemy Airc | raft Hit on Gro | ound: Destroyed | Probably Destroyed | 0 | _ Damaged No ostina |
| | (h) AIMING POINT | DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE | (j) NO A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON | BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED EACH AIMING POINT | NO. HITS On Aiming Point | (n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk) |
| | Dispersal planes on & around field | | 8 VT-49 | 32-500# G.P. | About 5 | l plane seen to burn. |
| | Railroad yards | | VT-49 | 4-500# G.P. | Not | Serious damage to tracks. |
| 3 | Aircraft, chiefly | | 7T-49 | 3200 rounds of .50 cal. strafing. | | 3 burned. |
| | and an | | | | | |
| 4 | | | | | | |
| 5 | | | | | | |
| 5 | | | | | | |

RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both as approxi-

of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify

than morning strike because other groups sent in first burned many of the less difficult to find planes not destroyed before. Our flight had time for fewer runs to search out those still hidden.

Other photos and pilot reports substantiate presence of seven planes besides burning one in this photo, away from field.



S-E-C-R-E-T

Photographs of Damage, WhenTaken, Should Be Attached By Staple. (p) Were Photographs Taken?

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment: Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
", Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
", Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

After fruitful hunting and success at finding camouflaged aircraft at Mamurogawa in the morning strike by this Air Group, the Task Group Commander ordered the afternoon Masy strike to return to the hills of North Central Honshu, with SAN JACINTO coordinating. Lieut. Peters was

chosen to lead, and nine Avengers were catapulted at 1330 for another

One flight preceded this one and in departure from the Task Group, the others joined up on the VT-49 planes as a heading was taken toward the Honshu coast. In view of the weather observed en route, and the knowledge that no high altitude, high speed runs could be made at the target, the coordinator took his flight only to 10,000 feet. On account of the size and nature of the target, with planes to be found and destroyed only by scooting along the deck and continual strafing runs, it was planned to have only one Air Group at a time on the target for approximately ten minutes each.

Billowy cumulus en route made it difficult to keep the flights together, and one flight lost contact and never reached the target. Lieut. Peters, with two other flights, following his lead, lost sight of the Lexington flight ahead, and ten minutes before Mamurogawa was located, he was informed that this flight was over the field and ready to make runs. Permission was granted, although planes were not easily located by the first group to go in. Lieut. Peters next sent in another big flight, who scouted out a number of camouflaged and widely dispersed planes. Because of the inadvisability of keeping too many planes orbiting, with not much time remaining, he early sent one of the big flights to join some of the VF-49 planes, which had successfully located another "gold mine" on a nearby field and were able to point them out to the newly arrived planes.

With two groups having made many runs over Mamurogawa, while SAN JACINTO planes orbited with the coordinator-leader, the FORTY NINER'S had about fifteen minutes over the target. The hunting by this time was more difficult. Planes could not be spotted from altitudes at which it was safe to drop a 500 pounder. Lt. Livingston flushed a Betty or Sally in some trees with his bombs. Lts(jg) Pruitt and Bartlett each collected another strafing trophy, the first a single engine in a clump of trees Northeast of the irregularly shaped field, the latter a twin. Ensign Milburn smoked a single engine which did not fire until his next time around.

Lieut. Peters had instructed each flight to return separately, and although this squadron was the last to return to the Task Group, it was a disappointment to the pilots and gunners (who had extra turret "rations" along) that they could not stay overtime to seek out the planes they knew could be found.

One plane was hit by .50 calibre which may have been ricochet from another plane. Otherwise no planes were damaged, no A/A tracer fire observed.

Pictures taken by the radiomen revealed more planes untouched in this backwoods plane stockpile. The accompanying picture illustrates how difficult the job of finding them was from the air. Vertical photos failed to uncover what obliques revealed.

RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out)

(Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights Turrets Ammunition Bombs, Torpedoes Bomb Sights Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar Homing Devices Visual Signals Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF Signals Battle Lights Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles of Fire Needing Further Protection Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes Life Belts, Life Rafts Safety Belts Emergency Kits Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses Driftsights Octants Automatic Pilots Charts Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe Control Surfaces Control System Dive Flaps Landing Gear Heating System Flight Characteristics At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines Engine Accessories Propellers Lubricating System Starters Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

SIGNATURE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

(Page 4 continued)

In commenting as the coordinator, Lieut. Peters stated that he felt it much more satisfactory for a small flight, say one or two Air Groups, to work over this type of target. Conventional glide bombing could not be done, not only because of the weather but because of the difficulty in finding the planes. There was room for about 20 planes at a time at in that field. Fortunately the flights diverted to nearby fields were able to get planes by careful looking and continual strafing.

More so than in previous aircraft strikes, HVAR and 100 pounders would be more suitable ordnance.

APPROVED BY:

SIGNATURE

Charles N. Fuller, Lt(JE)USNR, ACIO

RANK AND DUTY

RANK AND DUTY

DATE