

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

/PRQ/

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

- Instruction: 1. Write clearly.
 2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable"
 3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name Andrejs APSITIS
 First Middle Last
2. Name in native script _____
3. Name at birth (if different from 1.) _____
4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.) ANNA
5. a. Date of birth 1919 b. Place of birth Riga, Latvia
6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate Latvian (USSR)
7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) Latvian
8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) Riga, Latvia
 (present street address unknown)
9. Permanent address (if different from 8.) same
10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.) Employee in building administration.
11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States.
 (Give date and name in which certificate granted.) _____
12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship) Friend - Freds LAUNAGS, 415 E. Clifton Terrace, N.W., Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2003 2005

FORM NO. 51-95A
 MAY 1950

13. Father - full name occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

Hermanis APSITIS, born 19 Nov. 1893, in Latvia. Former Latvian Minister of Justice. Deported from Latvia in 1941.

14. Mother - same information as 13.

Milda Marija APSITIS nee CIRULIS. Present residence Goeteborg, Sweden.

(OA granted 3 October 1956, Case No. C-51496).

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

Guna APSITIS nee DAMBITE, daughter of former General Roberts DAMBITIS. Born abt. 1922, in Latvia. Physician - eye specialist. Residing with husband.

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

2 children (1 boy, 1 girl), residing with parents.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

None.

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

-

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

not known

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

not known

21. Present and past political affiliations

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited

Visited Sweden illegally - ~~from~~ May-June 1955.

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

High school in Riga, Latvia; studied law at University of Latvia (did not graduate).

24. Languages and dialects (indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language Latvian Speak good Read good Understand good

Language Russian Speak _____ Read _____ Understand _____

Language German ~~Speak~~ _____ Read _____ Understand _____
(probably)

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war

Latvian Army - 1938-1941
Latvian Legion - 1943-1945 (2nd Lt.) Captured by Soviets 1945.
POW in Far East - 1945-1946

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

not known

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

not known

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

not known

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Worked for short periods as electrician, farmer, teacher at elementary school. Last known employment - building administration in Riga, Latvia (details not known).

29. (Continued)

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

Wife and children.

32. List five character references.

1. see 12.
2. Gen. TEPFERS, Stockholm, Tunnländsvägen 16 III.

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

not known

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age <u>37</u>	Posture _____
Apparent age _____	Weight _____
Height _____	Teeth _____
Eyes _____	Hair _____
Face - shape _____	Scars _____
Complexion _____	Build _____
Sex <u>male</u>	
General appearance _____	
Prominent features _____	
Other identifying features _____	

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

/PRQ/

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to Items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym AECOB/10

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?

Contacted by in Stockholm 17 October 1956. Meeting set up by TILBURY. C/O bonafides established by handwritten personal letter from to AECOB/10.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? **Yes** To whom? **To a mature Russian or Latvian speaking case officer who could satisfactorily establish his bonafides.**

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation

Subject is a patriotic Latvian nationalist and anti-Communist who believes in doing everything within his capabilities toward the eventual liberation of Latvia. He is also motivated to some extent by an urge for adventure and fondness for clandestine activity.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

- 7 -
SECRET

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.
Duties are intelligence gathering including photography.
46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.
Has been briefed on fundamentals of trade-craft, use of S/W inks and developers, use of one-time pads.
47. How and from whom does he obtain information?
From personal observation and unwitting friends and acquaintances.
48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.
Subject was given a one-time payment of 10,000 Swedish kronor. Agreement was made to pay subject's mother \$60.00 per month for an indefinite period. Should subject succeed in exfiltrating again it will probably be advisable to make another similar lump sum payment.
49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.
Commitment made that in event subject escapes with his family, we will arrange for their resettlement.
50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.
Possibly as a Russian.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

From subject.

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

(Continuation of 41. on page 8)

concerned regarding her welfare. A certain amount of control also exists in that subject is dissatisfied with his operational activity to date and desires to do more and on a larger scale. The contact with us affords him that opportunity. Control can be increased by promising resettlement for subject's family in the event they manage to escape.

Case officer

SECRET

AECOB/10

(TILBURY/1) - AECOB/10
Swedish IS born 1919

his father was former Minister of Justice. Subject
A Latvian who lives in Riga; ~~formerly a member of the Ministry of Justice~~. Subject
was recruited by [] via mail and is a regular report source. He is a part of
the [] organization, working with Swedish Intelligence. We are in ~~xxxx~~
the process of "recruiting" or developing him. Tilbury (Swedish) helped him develop
S/W. Both AECOB/10 and () intend to return to Sweden. Married and has 2 children;
wife is daughter of a former Latvian General accused of being Communist (General
Roberts DAMBITIS.)

Exfiltrated to Sweden in 1955 and again in 1956. Debriefed and recruited by
[] in Oct.-Nov. 1956.

AECOB - SR/2

S/W - (over)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Attachment "H"

RYBAT

SECRET

DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST

PASPORT XI-U Yu No. 704432

1. Serial numbers and prefixes:

- a. XI-U Yu appears correct for a Riga issuance in January 1953. No comparative exemplars or reports are available from the Third Okolnive Militari for this month. However, other reports from nearby O.M. show the numeral, digraph, and serial number to be probably correct.
- b. V-U Yu No. 500394 issued 16 January 1948 is entered in Item # 8 of Subject's PASPORT. This serial number and prefixes appear correct on the basis of an exemplar from the 3rd O.M. in Riga issued 14 February 1948.
- c. SVIDETEL'SIVO O ROZHDENII L A No. 415734 was issued to Subject on 17 December 1946 according to the Item # 8 entry. A comparative Birth Certificate shows the letter prefix and serial number to be plausible for issuance in Riga in December 1946.

2. Validity:

Subject document issued in 1953 and the previous PASPORT issued in 1948 listed under Item # 8 are both valid for 5 years. A five-year PASPORT would normally be issued during these years to a Soviet citizen born in 1919.

3. Item # 2:

The date of birth entry in Subject's PASPORT is expressed as: "1919 g. 24. VIII". This entry is more often written with the day and month preceding the year in other Latvian PASPORTA. However, another PASPORT issued in Riga in February 1948 shows the date of birth expressed in the same manner as subject document. This inconformity is not considered significant.

4. Item # 6:

Subject is shown as liable for military service. This entry indicates fitness for such service.

5. Item # 8:

- a. Comments on the prefixes and numbers of listed documents are shown above.

RYBAT

2/ b. The issuance/

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T

- 2 -

- b. The issuance of a five-year PASSPORT to a Latvian citizen is not unusual in 1948, particularly in a city the size of Riga.
- c. The issuance of a Birth Certificate in 1946 to a Latvian citizen born in 1919 is not unusual. Many Baltic sources report the issuance of Russian-Latvian type SVIDETEL'STVO O ROZHDENII on the basis of old Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian METRIKI or church records, for the purpose of establishing identity following the war. Subject may have obtained this document to serve as a basis of issue of temporary identity documentation preceding the issue of his 1948 PASSPORT.

6. Language indicator:

- a. "78" is correct for the Latvian language.
- b. No exemplars of 1952 printings of the Latvian PASSPORT are available for comparison regarding the placement of these numbers. Exemplars of the 1949 edition do not show any language indicators. Exemplars of the 1941 edition issued after the war reveal variations. Some do not have any indicators while others show the indicator on the first page of the second language. Because of these variations found in previous editions, the indicator pattern on Subject document cannot be evaluated.

7. Militia Validating Cachet:

Languages, emblem, and general design of subject cachet are similar to other Latvian MGB exemplars in our files. The validating office is indicated on the cachet as the "3rd Otdeleniye Militsii". This agrees with the issuing authority cited in Item # 7. No exemplars of MGB type validating cachets issued by this office in Riga are available for exact text or format comparison.

8. Propiska:

- a. No exemplars of propiska cachets issued by the 3rd O.M. in Riga for 1953 are available. An exemplar from this office issued in 1948 has a different text arrangement and is more square than subject cachet. Propiska cachets issued prior to 1952 in Liepaya are also squarer and have

~~SECRET~~

3/ text arrangements/

S E C R E T

RYBAT
S E C R E T

- 3 -

text arrangements similar to the 1948 exemplar. The more oblong shape and text layout similar to that found in the propisjan cachet in subject document may be found on a propisjan vransung cachet issued by the 1st O.M. in Riga in July 1953, indicating a possible change to this shape propiska cachet for the city.

9. Printing data:

Document is a 1952 edition. No comparative exemplars of this edition are available for comment.

10. Technical inspection:

Technical inspection of the photographs of subject document revealed no significant irregularities.

UDOSTOVERENIYE YAKETS MENA No. 208; SUDOVOY BILET 12 July 1956; BILET CHITATELYA No. D 201:

1. No comparative exemplars of these documents are available for comment.

2. Technical inspection of the photographs of these documents revealed no evidence of unusual characteristics indicating that they are other than authentic documents.

COMMENTS:

1. There is no evidence to indicate that the documents of APSITIS are other than authentic.

2. Comparison of information taken from the documents with available biographic data presented no significant conflicts with the exception of the following:

a. The documents indicate that APSITIS is a Latvian citizen in good standing with the authorities. This is indicated by the issue of the Boat Registration (SUDOVOY BILET) permitting Subject to operate a motor boat on the Gulf of Riga. It may be assumed that these permits are given only to citizens considered reliable due to the wide access to the open sea that exists at the mouth of the gulf.

b. The issuance of a privilege document of this type to a man of APSITIS's stated background must be considered unusual. His father was a Minister of Justice in the former Latvian government and was purged by the Soviets.

RYBAT
S E C R E T

AP SITIS fought/

RYBAT

S E C R E T

- 4 -

AFSITIS fought against the Soviets as a member of the Latvian Legion during the war and was imprisoned in the Far East for this crime.

c. It is known that the Russian Intelligence Service recruits some of their agents from former anti-Soviet partisans, prisoners of war, and other persons in trouble with the regime. The RIS uses threats of imprisonment for those persons not in prison at the time of recruitment, and offers of release for those persons recruited during their confinement as inducements to service. AFSITIS was released in 1946 for a crime which resulted in 10 year sentences for many of those Latvians convicted.

~~RYBAT~~

S E C R E T

SECRET

KURIOT COMMENTS ON THE DOCUMENT DEBRIEFING OF AESTIIS

- 1. Subject's statements on forbidden zone controls:

We have no evidence from other sources indicating that travel in the forbidden zone areas of the Baltics and the Ukraine is possible without a PROFUSK. Subject implies that this travel is possible, although illegal. Specific locations where this type of illegal travel is easily performed would be of interest to KURIOT if mentioned.

Subject's answers regarding access to the beaches in the vicinity of Riga are probably correct. Other Latvian sources report that the shores of the Gulf of Riga are not patrolled or considered as a zakaznaya zona. Security is provided by sea patrols at the mouth of the gulf.

- 2. Release of troops from service:

We have no reports of the retention of troops on active duty that are "due" for release this year.

- 3. In his debriefing Subject stated that he was released from prison "sometime in 1947". Item # 8 of his PASSPORT reveals that he was issued SVIDETEL'STVO O ROZHDENII I A No. 15724 on 17 December 1946. This appears to be the only inconsistency between the admitted biography and information taken from the photographs of his documents.

- 4. Regarding your recommendations contained in paragraph 5, [] has informed us that Subject has been dispatched and that we will be informed when and if communications are established. He has no document information prepared by Subject in answer to your requirements described in paragraph 6.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

~~RYBAT~~ **DESENSITIZED**
per CSN 43-26

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 214
02 JUNE 55

SECRET

ROUTING	
1/2	4 Board
2	5
3 Chomox	6

TO : DIRECTOR
 FROM : []
 ACTION: SR (1-2)
 INFO : COP (3), EE (4-5), WE (6-7), S/C (8-9)

JA

[] 450 (IN 49532) 1544Z 2 JUN 55

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: PRITY SFRAN INFO: DIR

CITE: []

~~RYBAT~~ MKTOPAZ REDSOX TIEBAR

REF: A. OSSA 3709

B. DIR 06306 (OUT 93710)

TILBURY

1. TIEBAR COURIER RECENTLY EXFILTRATED FROM LATVIA. PASSPORT AND SPRANKA ONLY DOCUMENTS IN POSSESSION. REF CONTAINING PHOTOGRAPHIC COPIES POUCHED (PORTION GARBLED-BEING SVCD) 2 JUNE.
2. II PREFIX. CYRILLIC PREFIX U (20) (PORTION GARBLED) 704439. PASSPORT ISSUED 24 JAN 53, IN RIGA. EXPIRES 24 JAN 58. DATE OF PRINTING 52.
3. AS T AGENT ALREADY UNDER LCIMPROVE SUSPICION REQUEST MKTOPAZ EXAMINE DOCUMENTS FOR LCIMPROVE INDICATION (PORTION GARBLED) AS COURIER MAY RETURN WEEKEND 4 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2005

DESENSITIZED
 per CSN 43-26

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 050
2 JUN 55

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	2
2	4
3	5
	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : E J

A

SERVICE

ACTION: SR (1-2)

INFO : COP (3), EE (4-5), WE (6-7), S/C (8-9)

E J 450 (IN 49532A) CORR: 0605Z 3 JUN 55

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

RYBAT MKTOPAZ REDSOX TIEBAR

CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT:

COMPLETE PARAGRAPH 1, LINE 3, TO READ:

"...CONTAINING PHOTOGRAPHIC COPIES POUCHED MKTOPAZ 2 JUNE."

COMPLETE PARAGRAPH 2, LINE 1, TO READ:

"2. II PREFIX. CYRILLIC PREFIX U (20), YU (31). SERIAL..."

COMPLETE PARAGRAPH 3, LINES 2 AND 3 TO READ:

"...MKTOPAZ EXAMINE DOCUMENTS FOR LCIMPROVE INDICATIONS. CABLE
ANY SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS PRITY AS COURIER MAY RETURN WEEKEND
4 JUNE."

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

673
ORIG : []
UNIT : SR/2
EXT : 3582
DATE : 2 JUNE 1955

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING		
1	2	4
2	2	5
3		6

TO : []
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SR (1-4)
INFO : COP (5), CI (6), CI/OPS (7), CI/OA (8), FI (9), FI/OPS (10), WE (11-12), S/C (13-14)

DIR 06631 (OUT 94218) 2211Z 2 JUN 55

PRIORITY
PRECEDENCE

TO []

CITE DIR

~~SECRET~~ REDSOX AECOB

RE [] 445 (IN 48776) ✓

1. FOLLOWING [] INFO RE IDEN A: BORN 1919 ONLY SON IDEN B, WHO ARRESTED, DEPORTED 41. IDEN A SERVED LATVIAN ARMY UNTIL SPRING 41. AFTER GERMAN OCCUPATION JULY 41 PARTICIPATED IN PROVISIONAL MILITARY FORCES LATVIAN SELF DEFENSE (AIZSARGI) UNDER LATE COL VEISS. LEFT RIGA FOR FATHERS FARM AT OMULI NORTH VIDZEME FOR SHORT TIME, ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHER ALSO. RETURNED SPRING 43, JOINED LATVIAN LEGION. HAD RANK SECOND LT. FOUGHT KURZEME BATTLES IN 44/45 UP TO CAPITULATION ON 8 MAY 45. CAPTURED, SENT POW CAMP FAR EAST (SOVETSKAYA GAVAN). ALMOST DIED FROM TYPHOID. RELEASED TO LATVIA 46. HAD REMOVED OFFICERS INSIGNIA PRIOR CAPTURE, POSED AS CPL AND ATTEMPTED CONCEAL FAMILY BACKGROUND, YET PRIOR TO RELEASE FOUND SOVIETS FULLY WITTING. MARRIED IDEN C IN RIGA. FIRST CHILD BORN 47 OR 48. WIFE IS PHYSICIAN, EYE SPECIALIST, WORKED AT FIRST RIGA CITY HOSPITAL. MENTIONED IN CINA 19 FEB 55. NOW SAID TO HAVE TWO CHILDREN, BOY AND GIRL, BOYS NAME JURIS. THEIR ADDRESS SAID TO BE IDEN D.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 12006 NG OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

RETIRED FILE
DECLASSIFIED

per CSN 43-26

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :
FROM :
CONF :
INFO :

D/R 06631 (OUT 94218)

PRECEDENCE

PAGE 2

2. IDEN A HIGHLY RECOMMENDED BY AS PROSPECTIVE RECRUIT IN 48.
 LONG TIME CLOSE FRIEND COMPLETELY RELIABLE POLITICAL
 BACKGROUND, HOWEVER VIEW FAMILY STILL LATVIA NEGATIVE CONTROL FACTOR EXISTS.
 WISH POINT OUT IN USUAL LCIMPROVE CASES RIS DISPATCHES COURIERS WHO UNWITTING
 ANY CONTROL.

*Q designed?
Lu*

3. MOTHER IDEN A LATELY HAS BEEN CORRESPONDING WITH SEEKING
 ADDRESS, NEWS OF SON.

4. OKAY GIVE TIEBARS DATA PARA ONE ABOVE
 EXCEPT LAST TWO SENTENCES.

AP

END OF MESSAGE

for WE SR/COP/CE AMS SR/COP/PI ES WE SR/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

674
ORIG : C
UNIT : SR/2
EXT : 3592
DATE : 2 JUNE 1955

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1	2	4	
2	2	5	
3		6	

TO : C

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SR (1-4)

INFO : COP (5), CI (6), CI/OPS (7), CI/OA (8), FI (9), FI/OPS (10),
WE (11-12), S/C (13-14)

DIR 06632 (OUT 94219) 2211Z 2 JUN 55

PRIORITY
PRECEDENCE

TO C

CITE DIR

~~TAPOK~~ REDSOX AECOB

RE * DIR 06631 (OUT 94218) ✓

IDEN A: ANDREJS APSITIS

IDEN B: HERMANIS APSITIS, MINISTER OF JUSTICE DURING ULMANIS' TIME.

IDEN C: GUNA DAMBITE, DAUGHTER FORMER GEN ROBERTS DAMBITIS.

IDEN D: VALDEMARA (NOW MAKSIMA GORKIYA) IELA NO 37, APT 20 RIGA.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

* NOTE TO SIGNAL CENTER: PLS GIVE NUMBER ATTACHED

CABLE AS REF THIS CABLE.

RETIRED FILE
DESENSITIZED

[Handwritten signature]

SR/COP/CE AMS SR/COP/FI ES WE/A

SR/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

245

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 9 JUN 55

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	2 <i>at</i>
2	
3	<i>Chomox</i>
4	<i>Board</i>
5	
6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: TSS (1-2)

INFO : COP (3), FI/OPS (4), EE (5-6), SR (7-8), WE (9-10), S/C (11-12)

FRAN 0310 (IN 12224)

1708Z 9 JUN 55

ROUTINE

TO: (PRIORITY)

INFO: DIR

PRECEDENCE

CITE: SFRAN

~~RYBAT~~ TECHS REDSOX LCIMPROVE TIEBAR

RE: A. 450 (IN 49532)

B. OSSA 3709

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

1. FROM MKTOPAZ ANALYSIS PHOTO SUBJ PASSPORT NO REASON
SUSPECT PASSPORT NOT VALID ISSUE FOR FF REASONS:

- A. ROMAN NUMERAL, SERIES INDICATOR, NUMBER APPEAR CORRECT FOR PLACE AND DATE OF ISSUE;
- B. ENTRIES APPEAR NORMAL. ITEM 8 INFO RE 1948 PASSPORT AND 1946 BIRTH CERT CHECKS OUT;
- C. VALIDATING AND PROVISAN CACHETS APPEAR NORMAL FOR PLACE AND DATE OF ISSUE;
- D. DRY SEAL OVER PHOTO APPEARS TO BE MGB WHICH NORMAL FOR DATE ISSUE.

2. SUBJ PASSPORT FIRST 1952 PTG LATV PP AVAIL KUBARK. REQUEST KURIOT COMMENT ON ABOVE MKTOPAZ ANALYSIS AND FF DOUBTFUL POINTS:

- A. BOTH SUBJ PP AND 1949 PTG LATV PP HAVE ROMAN NUMERAL XI ONLY OTHER POSTWAR INSTANCE THIS TYPE NOTED 1948-1949 PTGS KARELO

DESENSITIZED

S-E-C-R-E-T

per CSN 43-26 IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No. 7

9 JUN 55

FRAN 0310 (IN 12224)

PAGE -2-

FINN PP BOTH IV;

B. LANG INDICATOR SUBJ PP DOES NOT FOLLOW PATTERN
1949 LATV OR 1952 PTSG EST OR LITH PP;

C. SUBJ PP HAS SIGNATURES DIFF THAN SIGS ISSUING OFFICIALS
PP ISSUED SAME RIGA OTD MIL 1948;

D. NO EMPL CACHET IN SUBJ PP.

3. PHOTO SUBJ SPRAVKA APPEARS NORMAL BUT NO OTHER EXEMPLAR
AVAIL FROM THIS PLACE EMPL FOR COMPARISON.

4. THOROUGH ANALYSIS SUBJ DOCS REQUIRES ORIGINALS FOR ANALYSIS
PAPER, PTG, INKS SINCE IN PAST RIS DECEPTION ATTEMPTS INDICATE
RIS WILLING GIVE AIS APPARENTLY VALID DOCS WHICH THOROUGH ANALYSIS
ORIGINALS REVEALED CONCEALED CONTROLS NOT APPARENT PHOTOS.

5. MKTOPAZ ANALYSIS PHOTOS SUBJ DOCS PRELIM SUBJ TO RECEIPT
KURIOT ANALYSIS.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

269

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 9 JUN 55

S-E-C-R-E-T

		ROUTING	
1	2/6	4	Boer
2		5	
3	Ch...	6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: TSS 4

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, EE 4, SR 3, S/C 2

FRAN 0311 (IN 12243)

1757Z 9 JUN 55

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: SFRAN

TECHS

RE: FRAN 0310 (IN 12244)

REF REQUESTED KURIOT-SOVIET COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No.

580

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : []
UNIT : TSS/ID/FB-1
EXT : 8347
DATE : 15 JUNE 1955

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : []
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : TSS (1-2)
INFO : COP (3), FI/OPS (4), EE (5-6), SR (7-8), WE (9-10), S/C (11-12)
SPECIAL: FRAN (1-5)

DIR 08730 (OUT 97620)

1831Z 15 JUN 55

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO []

INFO FRAN (BY POUCH)

CITE: DIR

~~RYBAT~~ TECHS REDSOX LCIMPROVE TIEBAR

REF FRAN 0310 (IN 12224)

1. WITHOUT ORIGINAL PASPORT KURIOT UNABLE GIVE DEFINITE OPINION AUTHENTICITY THIS CASE. CONCUR PARA 1 REF. POINTS LISTED PARA 2 IRREGULAR BUT NO GROUNDS DEFINITE SUSPICION.

2. SINCE SOURCE NOT LEAVING ON OTHER MISSION FOR 6-8 WEEKS SUGGEST ONE MKTOPAZ AUTHENTICATION SPECIALIST AND TECHNICIAN TDY STOC EXAMINE ORIGINAL. SINCE KURIOT/MKTOPAZ ASSISTANCE PROFITABLE PREVIOUS BONA FIDES CASES SUGGEST POSSIBILITY MKTOPAZ INTERROGATION OF SOURCE. IF DIRECT CONTACT IMPOSSIBLE MIGHT POSSIBLY WORK THROUGH TIEBAR CASE OFFICER. ALSO, SINCE SOVS APPARENTLY INTRODUCING MAJOR CHANGES THEIR BASIC DCC, CONTROL MEASURES (10 YEAR PASPORT, 1952 PRINTING VOYENNY BILET, ETC), EXTREMELY IMPORTANT BRIEF TIEBAR AGENT ON PRESSING KURIOT NEED LATEST INFO. SUGGEST STOC, MKTOPAZ TRY MAKE ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS SOONEST.

- END OF MESSAGE -

WE []

co-ord by phone
ART 15/VI

SR/2 []

co-ord by phone
ART 15/VI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DC/TSS

ASSTC/TSS/AUTH

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DESENSITIZED

REF GSN 43-26

SECRET

AIR FOUCH

K A P O K

OSBA-3758

Chief, WE

20 June 1955

Chief of Station,

Operational/LOIMPROVE/TILBURY

TILBURY's Debriefing of TILBURY/1

REFS: 473

1. The enclosed debriefings (Enclosures A and B) of TILBURY/1 (Iden A of 446) were conducted by TILBURY at the request of KUBARK and presumably without the knowledge of the TIEBARS. A copy of the questions prepared by the Station and submitted to TILBURY is transmitted as enclosure C.
2. The questions were originally designed for use as a preliminary debriefing that could be used as a basis for a more detailed interrogation either through TILBURY or by a KUBARK interrogator, if access to TILBURY/1 could be obtained. The change of plans reported in 462 make it impossible to follow up the leads turned up in the enclosed debriefing, unless the operation aborts and TILBURY/1 returns to Sweden. To date we have received no indications from either TILBURY or the TIEBARS that the TIEBARS attempted to carry out a similar CE debriefing to establish the bona fides of TILBURY/1 and the organization.

Enclosure A represents TILBURY's first effort to fulfill the requirements of the questionnaire. It is not a debriefing in the strict sense, because TILBURY has interlarded his own comments on the organization. The answers contained in Enclosure A were accompanied by a note from TILBURY in which he explained that the clandestine organization who sent TILBURY/1 was based on the policy of secrecy of identities and that he, TILBURY, had always respected this policy and had never asked for names. In addition, he reported that TILBURY/1 had been sworn to secrecy not to reveal names of contacts. However, after the receipt of 2500 rones support TILBURY informed us that he had been able to persuade TILBURY/1 to provide the requested details, by explaining to him that if his task was to attempt to get support from the AIS via TILBURY, he must provide TILBURY with enough facts about the organization and the exfiltration to enable TILBURY

K A P O K

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

UNCLASSIFIED
Per CSN 48-26

28

OSMA-3758
page 2
20 June 1959

to make a convincing case when he attempted to interest the AIS. TILBURY states that the organization does not know that he already is in contact with AIS. Although TILBURY does not specifically say so it must be assumed that TILBURY/1 knows that some group other than the TIEBARS is involved. This point will be clarified. According to TILBURY, TILBURY/1 bought the argument and the answers in Enclosure B were the result. It is suspected that the 2500 roses also played their part.

4. The inconsistencies and peculiar statements in the debriefing increase tremendously - almost to the point of confirmation - the suspicion that that TIEBAR assets in LATVIA (centered around the w/t station VALDENAR) are RIS controlled on some level. (This suspicion also exists in relation to the TIEBAR assets in Estonia.) The following are some of the facts and inconsistencies that seem to indicate a KGB operation:
 - a. TILBURY/1 has been unable to hold a permanent job because when his past (membership in the Latvian Legion and presumably his father's anti-communist record) comes to light he must move to another job. A low financial status is also indicated by the facts that he is currently unemployed. Despite his financial status he owns a Mercedes automobile. According to our knowledge of Soviet reality, private ownership of any automobile is not the rule, let alone a Mercedes.
 - b. TILBURY/1 is a member of the MVD sponsored Dynamo sports club.
 - c. The primary aim of his exfiltration was to contact the AIS and obtain its support. In return the clandestine organization voluntarily offers support and shelter for AIS agents in Latvia, as well as the collection of intelligence.
 - d. Details of the exfiltration leave many unanswered questions. For example, if Ventspils is in a restricted zone - Headquarters can confirm this - TILBURY/1 had no restricted area permits in his passport. Why was it necessary for him to meet a cutout in Ventspils instead of travelling direct to Roja and contacting KLAVLAPA directly. The rubber boat was issued to him by his contact in Riga, instead of being provided by the fisherman. If the TIEBARS are able to recover the boat, we will attempt to obtain it for KUBARK examination.
 - e. The casual way in which he requested readmission into the clandestine organization in 1947.

SECRET 29

20 June 1955

5. The above are but a few of the questions raised by TILBURY/1's answers. Unfortunately, they will not be answered by him, barring his return to Sweden. However, there would appear to be enough information to enable Headquarters to analyze this operation in light of known KGB operations of this type that have been doubled in other parts of the world. Therefore, Headquarters' support is requested in trying to determine the status of this operation. Specifically the following support is requested.
- a. Complete name traces of all personalities mentioned by TILBURY/1, including information from and Please note that we have promised TILBURY that personality information will be given strict security protection.
 - b. Make a comparative analysis of the information in the debriefing in light of known KGB operations, including If further specific information is needed, it can perhaps be obtained from TILBURY.
 - c. Analyze the information in this debriefing in relation to known Soviet reality.
 - d. Inform the Station of the factual basis for suspicions of VALDENAR that have already been voiced by Headquarters.
6. It is believed that the Headquarters support requested above is justified because the entire TIEBAR/TILBURY, complex inside the Baltic States is currently producing very little as positive intelligence operation in relation to the case officer time involved. However, the operation cannot get off the present dead center without the support requested from Headquarters. The indications are that it is an RIS operation. However, the Station does not have sufficient information on previous DA operations to make a qualified conclusion. If in the opinion of a qualified COMPROVE expert the operation is RIS, it should be run as an aggressive COMPROVE case. (The s/w link to TILBURY/1 can be used as the initial opening.) In its present indeterminate state the operation is too shaky to use for KUBARK operational support or for positive intelligence. Of even more importance is the relationship to liaison. According to their own admission the TIEBARS depend on their Baltic operations for early warning of hostile Soviet action. However, judging from what is known of their handling of TILBURY/1, the TIEBARS have made little effort to establish the bona fides of TILBURY/1 or of the organization that he represents. Furthermore, they could not do a thorough OE job without KUBARK experience and assistance. If the KUBARK analysis of

SECRET

OSMA-3758
page 4
20 June 1955

the operation justifies the conclusion that the TIEBAR Latvian
[] and TILBURY/1 should be run as double agents, ways of
presenting this conclusion to TIEDARS (without hurting TILBURY)
will be explored.

7. Through the debriefing, TILBURY uses the alias OGLINS for TILBURY/1.

Enclosures:

- A. - Debriefing, 5cos.
- B. - Debriefing, 5cos.
- C. - questions to TILBURY, 3cos.

Distribution:

- 1-HEADQUARTERS w/encls. as noted
2. [] w/3 encls.

SECRET 51

1. Organization which your friend represents:

A. Its name.

The organization has no name; when someone speaks of it the designation "FULKVEDIS" can be employed (FULKVEDIS in Latvian means Colonel).

B. Number of active members.

The number of active members is approximately 150.

C. Specific Locality (town names) in which the organization is active.

RIGA, LIEPAJA, VENTSPILS, LIMBAZI, SIGULDA and out in the country in the provinces, VIBZEME and KURZEME.

D. What are the specific aims of the organization and how is it attempting to accomplish these aims?

The organization is not engaged in sabotage or propaganda activities because at this time this would serve no purpose and is too dangerous. The aim of the organization is to prepare for the liberation of Latvia by supporting, observing and registering possible future members who would be drawn into an active organization in the future. The organization also collects various data and information regarding current conditions in Latvia, economic conditions and military as well as political occurrences. It also attempts to continue and further contact with abroad.

E. When and how was it organized?

The organization is a nucleus of that organization which had originally been created in 1943 and which had been considerably reduced (the number of members and activities) in 1951 to its present structure. The reason for this reduction and curtailment of activities was the fact that an extensive organization served no purpose and became dangerous, it was also not possible to support it any longer financially (the program incorporating the farms KOLKHOZES; inadequate aid from abroad).

F. Names of the persons in the organization with whom your friend is in contact. Give details including their addresses, occupations, how active they are, and what are their tasks for the organization.

-2-

F. (cont'd) I [Tilbury] was present when the organization was founded in 1943 and was acquainted with most of the leading personalities at that time. The organization recruited persons of various professional backgrounds and from various walks of life - professors, former officers, government officials, landowners, college students and workers. The persons recruited were considered completely reliable and had been under observation for a number of years. At the time of the aforementioned re-organization, I was here [in Sweden] as the representative of this organization and as a result do not know who the leading personalities are. I have remained true to the basic principles of the organization and have consequently not attempted to collect the names of members because that is too dangerous and at present completely unnecessary. Identification can be effected by various signals and passwords. OZOLINS receives his assignments in most cases anonymously (PULVEDIS) and does not know his superiors. Moreover, he is also sworn not to reveal to anyone - no matter who it may be - anything regarding members of the organization. In case it became absolutely necessary to know who the members of the organization are; it has been planned that this information be transmitted by the organization.

G. Name as many as you can of the individuals you have heard are connected with the organization, especially the names and details about the leaders.

NA.

H. What specific task was your friend sent out to accomplish for the organization?

No one in the organization has any definite and particular assignments. Everyone is utilized as best as can be possible by taking advantage of all existing conditions. OZOLINS has been utilized in observation, transportation, collection of information, and presently as a courier.

I. Why and how was he chosen by the organization?

OZOLINS has been a member of the organization ever since its creation and was in active status during the period of his captivity as a Soviet POW in SOVJETSKJA GAVANJ (1945-46).

2. Biography of your friend. (Tilbury/1)

A. Name, birthdate, birthplace, father and mother, brothers and sisters.

^XPeters OZOLINS (alias) born 2 April 1919 in Riga. Father - Hermans OZOLINS (alias). Mother - Milda. He was an only child.

SECRET

33

-3-

B. Education: where, what dates, subjects he studied.

Completed high school in Riga. Studied electrical engineering at the University of Riga.

C. Military service, branch of service, to what units was he attached, was he a prisoner of war?

Served in the Latvian Army (obligatory military service) 1939-40, branch of service artillery. In 1944-45 he served in the Latvian Legion and fought against the Communists. In May 1945 he was captured by the Russians and held as a POW for 1 1/2 years in SOVJETSKJA GAVANJ. He was then released and permitted to return to Riga.

D. Has he ever or does he now travel? Inside or outside his country? Where? When?

NA.

E. Work history since 1940.

1. Jobs held, where, when, reason for changing.

He worked as a farm hand on farms in VIDZEME because he could get no other job during the Communist occupation of Latvia as he is a son of a high government official.

2. Present job. What is his salary? Name and address of his superior and the chief of the cadre section.

He has worked in various jobs and had always been forced to leave his job when his past family history became known. At present he is unemployed.

3. Future prospects.

He has no definite future prospects but he is certain that at least for some limited period of time he will find some sort of a job. He is still studying electrical engineering.

F. Has he or any of his relatives been deported? When, where, why?

His father was deported in 1940. There is no information as to where he had been sent. The reason for having been deported is not known but it is assumed that it was because of his previous nationalistic activities and tendencies.

SECRET

RH A 055A-3752

-4-

G. What organizations, clubs, parties, does your friend belong to?

He belonged to no political parties. He is a member of the Union of Farm Workers. Belongs to the sport club "Dynamo".

H. Marital Status.

1. Is he married? Yes.

2. If so, name (maiden), birthdate, and birthplace of wife.

Regina nee KRUZE, date of birth, 16 January 1921, place of birth - RUJIANA, LATVIA

3. Place and date of marriage.

Riga - 16 January 1947.

4. Names, birthdate and birthplace of children.

Marate (daughter) - 22 April 1949.

35

1021

1. Organization which your friend represents:

- F. Names of the persons in the organization with whom your friend is in contact. Give details including their addresses, occupations, how active they are, and what are their tasks for the organization.

The people with whom O. works together, whom he knows, and who assigned him his mission, and who will accept the report of what was carried out by him:

a. Dr. Harrijs BERGMANIS surgeon in II Municipal Hospital in Riga. The one from whom he most often receives instructions. He also made arrangements with him for the trip here and made preliminary preparations for the trip. O. does not know with whom H.B. is in contact on his side.

b. Bookkeeper Izolde VITOLS, lives in Riga, Dzirnau iela 27.

c. Construction engineer (Bautekniker) Hermans BERG residence in a new row house (blockhaus) on the park of the year 1905 (formerly Grizinkalus) ~~etc.~~ has not noticed the number of the house, because he knows it too well to confuse it with another house.

d. Electrician (Elektro-Feinmechaniker) Tugolfs ZILE - lives in Riga, Amatu street 7.

O has significantly less to do with these three latter than with H.B., who is his principal task giver. O. knows all these people personally and is summoned by them in writing or orally to meet. The word "Pulkvedis" is used as a sign that it deals with business of the organization. O. does not know exactly what other sort of tasks these people have. He knows only that on their side they have contacts with other members of the organization and that they themselves also carry out missions. In general they are assigned to various tasks, usually such as they are able to do the easiest on account of their positions, and other circumstances, acquaintanceships, etc. Thus my friend O. is often used to gather information on the condition of roads and bridges, because he owns a Mercedes (TILBURY originally wrote Moskvich, but crossed it out) and makes rather frequent drives and the like.

- G. Name as many as you can of the individuals you have heard are connected with the organization, especially the names and details about the leaders.

Among the people that he has heard or found out that belong to the organization, O. can name the following:

-2-

- a. DINVIETIS /or DINVICTIS/ fnu, who is employed in the Artel "Somdaris" and whose mother should now be in the USA.
RIGA, LATVIA
- b. Dentist Oskars LEIMANIS, whose address he does not know.
IN LATVIA
- c. Dr. Med. Alfreds VITOLS (no relation of the above named Izolde VITOLS), who, in O's opinion is in a position of leadership. He works in the Peoples Health Department in Riga. I can confirm the latter. Dr. A. VITOLS was a fellow student of mine [i.e. TILBURY]. When I was still in Latvia he had a leading position in the organization. It is therefore certain that he now still has it. It is also certain that the professor of law at the University of Latvia, Ed. SCHIRONS, is still active as a leader in the organization. I Tilbury cannot assert with certainty whether any of the other persons are actively engaged.

1. I. Why and how was he chosen by the organization?

O. became a member of the organization in 1943 when he was recruited by an active member, J. CERINS (CERINS disappeared in 1945 without a trace.) O. was then used particularly for contact with the Latvian Legion, in which he had served.

3. Your friend's position in the organization.

A. What does he do for the organization?

The tasks vary, but mostly they deal with the collection of information, observation, and the purchase of necessary objects, either directly or through his acquaintances (who naturally are not allowed to know for whom and for what purpose the objects were needed.)

B. From whom does he receive instructions?

From the four persons named above, but mostly from H. BERGMANIS. []

C. How does he receive instructions?

He is ordered by one of these persons to a meeting, where he receives the assignment orally from them.

D. How does he report to his superiors?

With the completion of the task, he makes an appointment for a meeting with the person - at a different place - where he then reports orally on the completion of the task. (The person who assigned tasks sometimes takes notes on loose leafs.) The small objects are delivered and it is agreed where the larger ones shall be handed over.

SECRET

37

-3-

- F. Give a summary of his past activities for the organization.
- After his work as the organization's contact man with the Legion, which by 1945 was no longer practical there was an interruption, when he was imprisoned by the Russians in 1945 and interned in the labor camp SOVETSKAYA GAVAN. When he was released at the end of 1946 and was allowed to return to Riga, he could not immediately resume the connection on account of general enfeeblement and because he had to be sure of recovery. He had met Dr. H. BERGMANIS. However, neither of them mentioned the organization; B. certainly because he still wanted to observe O. Not until after his marriage [16 Jan 1947] did O. begin to make inquiries again to Dr. H.B. about the organization. When he learned that it was still in existence, he offered his cooperation, which was accepted after a short time. Then began his activity as it is sketched above.
- G. What are his specific instructions for reporting to the organization on his return?

The courier was sent on my [TILBURY's] suggestion which was made a year and a half ago. The purpose was to learn the details about the conditions and the state of mind in Latvia, to orient the organization about the situation in the world, to bring into conformity the prospect for suitable tactics and the setting of the next objectives of the organization, etc. After O's arrival it became apparent that the organization is, moreover, very interested in establishing closer contact with the Intelligence organization of the USA; partly, because in general it considers a contact with the USA to be very important and partly it hopes to get better financial support (and principally regular support) for its work. On its side the organization could, besides collecting intelligence, promise all possible help and shelter for possible American agents there. But for practical reasons the hitherto existing contact with Sweden must be maintained undiminished. I would very much like to hear your views on the possibility of such an arrangement, in connection with which the technical details could be discussed.

As it now stands, O's return trip will very probably be postponed for about 10 days, or at least one week, because the original project cannot be carried out immediately. According to the original project, O. is to be picked up by the fisherman KLAVLAPA, who was to sail his boat about 45 nautical miles toward Gotland in the Baltic where he was to expect O. O. will be taken there by a customs cutter, while two two-engined fighters [Zertorer von der Luft] direct the rendezvous. It cannot be carried out because at the moment KLAVLAPA is not in a position to go to sea according to a radiogram that was received here yesterday. [11 or 12 June 55] The preparations are now made to enable O. to sail through the Kolka Straits into the Gulf of Riga in a specially built motor boat. The boat is very low and develops a speed of 27 knots, (cruising speed, 22 knots) and is powered by a rather soundless Ford motor.

CLASSIFIED 38

-4-

The boat is ready to start, but navigational instruction for O. is still needed. (He has had 8 years of sailing experience and an acquaintance with motors.) A trail run is also still necessary. This will take several days to get the results. O. himself is interested in this project and thinks that while the delay will make it more difficult to explain his absence at home, it will not be impossible by any means. But thereby we will have more time here and that makes it possible to think through the above sketched suggestion quietly and with no undue haste shown.

Concerning the question of currency, my friend O., who is extremely grateful for the 2500 rubles already received, believes that he has very secure possibilities in Riga to sell foreign currency - dollars or pounds at a very advantageous rate to people known to him, who would like nothing better than to invest their savings in foreign currencies. He would therefore very much like to take back dollars or pounds (in larger denominations) in place of rubles. If you have the possibility and the aim to support the organization to a further extent, he would love to have dollar and pound notes.

4. Details of your friend's trip.

A. Write a detailed chronological description of the recent trip from the moment he left his home until he arrived here. This should include:

1. A map giving the exact route he followed.

See sketch No. 1.

2. Hours of the day that he passed through various towns enroute.

The trip from Riga took place in midweek on 25 May at about 1500 hours by means of a truck from the fishing kolkhoz "Sarkana Baka" in Ventpils. O. made an agreement with the driver to drive him to Ventpils for 400 rubles. At about 1800 they passed through Saldus, 1930 through Kuldiga, and arrived in Ventpils at about 2100. In Ventpils he met his contact man between 2100 and 2200 in the municipal park at the Statue of the Maiden of Physical Culture as had been previously agreed on. After he had identified the contact man from a description given by his task assigner, he spoke to him with the agreed upon recognition phrase. He did not know the contact-man personally, knowing only that he is a harbor employee in Ventpils, a man of middle age, and that he was to be addressed by the name ANSIS. This man took him to Roja via Kolka on his motorcycle, arriving in Roja at about 0100 hours on 26 May. Here he had to wait in the woods for a time, while ANSIS looked for the fisherman KLAVALAPA, and brought him back to O. KLAVALAPA took O. immediately to his boat, which was lying completely unguarded in the harbor, and O. had to wait in the cabin for further instructions.

19

4. A. (cont'd)

3. The times of departure and arrival of any busses, trains, etc. that he used in travelling.

Neither railroad nor bus were used.

4. How was the trip arranged? When was it first planned at home? By whom? How many people knew about the trip? Give their names.

First the organization's orders to travel to Sweden as a courier were delivered to him in January 1955 by J. BERGMANIS. He agreed in principle, but his work situation at that time did not permit him an inconspicuous disappearance. When he quit his job in April and was permitted a couple of weeks' absence from his technical studies, he informed H.B. and his departure was arranged by the organization. Beforehand, he knew only the way that he was to go, otherwise no details. He did not get to know the fisherman KLAVLAPA until the departure at Roja. On the morning of 25 May he was made aware of the date of departure, and the contact man "ANSIS", as well as being informed the password. He had to organize the trip to Ventspils himself. Whereupon he hired the truck of the fishing kolchoz (he made the agreement with the driver.) Later he got from H.B. travel money, a rubber boat, and a tin can that was soldered shut. He was to give the can to me [TILBURY] here. (This he did. The can contained a report on Latvia, which had suffered somewhat from the water and which you will get from me after it has been deciphered. It also contained a number of blanks and forms, which I had to give to the [TIEBARS].)

5. Give the full names of the captain and crew of the boat.

The captain of the boat is Eduards KLAVLAPA (born 1909) and besides him was his somewhat younger brother, whose name O. did not know. Usually four men are on this boat, but this trip was to Ventspils for repair, which was to take about a week and not a fishing trip on which there was only a two man crew. This condition had caused the suddenness of the departure.

6. Draw a map of the port where the trip boat was tied up.

O. cannot draw a plan of the harbor, because he travelled in the darkness of the boat and had never earlier been in Roja. He knows only that he had to walk over several boats in order to get to K's boat. The fishing harbor and the boats in Roja were completely unguarded.

4. A. (cont'd)

7. Describe how and when your friend went on board the boat.

About an hour after his arrival he was led onto the boat and remained in the cabin there until the time of departure.

8. Where was he hidden? Draw a sketch of the boat.

From the beginning he was not at all hidden, but sat openly in the cabin. The sketch of the boat is in attachment 2.

9. How long was he on board before the boat left?

The boat put to sea at 0500.

10. Was there an inspection of the boat? Describe.

No inspection of the boat took place in Roja.

11. How did he get from the boat to here?

At the point marked on sketch No. 1 the boat was stopped by three Soviet patrol boats that ordered them to anchor. There were two "S" boats and one larger ship. K. immediately hid O. under an empty case in the cargo hold and put a large pile of nets over this. O. himself was not able to observe the search, but K. later told him that the search had been quite thorough, and that the searchers had poked in the heap of nets several times. But O. himself did not hear that the case under which he was lying was struck by the probing instrument. The search lasted about a half hour, but O. was let out much later (It seemed to him that it was after a couple of hours.) They then sailed to a point off Ovizi where they headed for Gotland. By evening they were off the island, but the high seas did not permit a trip with the rubber boat that had been brought along, for which reason they turned back out to sea and anchored. On Friday 27 May they tried again, had motor trouble, which took a very long time, and in the evening saw a light which they took for Gotland. But this was false and he does not know yet what sort of light this really was. After that at about 12 o'clock he got into the rubber boat and rowed to the island. At 9 o'clock in the morning (of 28 May) the sea was again high and the boat filled up with water. At 10:30 he noticed the ship HERNODIA on a course north and hailed it. He was taken on the ship, where the rubber boat remained. (The Swedish ship HERNODIA was steaming to Helsinki. The Swedish authorities have asked for the rubber boat back from the ship, but have not yet received it.) On the ship O. passed

4. 11. (Cont'd) himself off as a refugee Klaipeda, Lithuania and kept his name secret. HERNODIA called the Swedish authorities on Gotland, and O. was picked up by a customs cruiser off Slite and handed over to the Landfiskal of Slite B. BONDE, Tom Paul Berthil BONDE, born 1903/who took him to his cottage in the woods. His arrival went rather unnoticed on Gotland. On the evening of the same day I and a friend TIEBAR picked him up and we flew on a scheduled flight to Stockholm on 29 May.

B. What reasons did he give to his wife and friends and fellow workers to explain his absence?

His wife knew nothing about the trip and believes that he got temporary work in Latvia outside of Riga. He wrote several letters to his wife, which he gave to H.B., who will have them sent to his wife at certain intervals of time. Such absences have been frequent in the past. He is convinced that his wife does not suspect anything. Since he is now out of a job, there is nothing that needs to be done to protect him at his work place.

C. How will he explain any purchases he made here upon his return?

Objects of foreign origin - clothing, watches, and in general everything from abroad - are no longer dangerous, for they come into the country in large quantities by a variety of ways. Partly they are available from time to time in the shops, but for the greater part they are imported as contraband by sailors and are sent to individual persons by relatives who are located abroad. In Liepaja there are even shops that deal secretly in contraband articles. Foreign articles are now openly carried about and no one asks where they came from. O. recently saw a woman on the streets in Riga wearing a kerchief on which the USA flag was printed. No one cares about it. So now it is possible to take everything to Latvia and sell it there without running any risk.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

24 JUNE 1955

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	2
2	3
3	4
	5
	6

: DIRECTOR

FROM : [] []

ACTION: TSS (1-2)

INFO : COP (3), FI/OPS (4), EE (5-6), SR (7-8), WE (9-10), S/C (11-12)

[] 485 (IN 17432)

1616Z 24 JUN 55

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SFRAN

INFO: DIR

CITE: [] []

~~RYBAT~~ REDSOX TECH

RE: A. FRAN 0762 (IN *)
B. [] 482 (IN 15310) (NOT SENT FRAN)

1. DOCS AND SUBJ NOT AVAILABLE PENDING OUTCOME CURRENT
TIEBAR INFILTRATION ATTEMPT.

2. CANCEL [] [] TRIP UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

END OF MESSAGE

*CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT: APPARENTLY WRONG REFENCE SEE
FRAN 0762 (IN 17099)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-26

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

K A P O K

Air Fouch

OSSA-3783

: Chief, WE

30 June 1955

: Chief of Station, []

REDSOX/TILBURY/AECOB
S/W Briefing of TILBURY/1

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

- REFERENCES:
- A. DIR-07273
 - B. OSSA-3758, 20 June 1955

1. In accordance with the suggestion in reference A, TILBURY was instructed to give TILBURY/1 briefing in the use of the scorch method of development and a set of control indicators. A copy of the instructions are transmitted as an enclosure to this dispatch. The control indicators were devised by [] whose help on this case was very much appreciated by the [] Station. As soon as an English translation of the Latvian instructions are received from [] they will be transmitted to Headquarters.

RECORDED/FORMERLY
2. TILBURY/1 provided the following addresses for receiving letters in Latvia:

X
a. Frigis BUMBIERS
Sauldrastes rajons
Garkalnes cilvina padome
Venou nājas
LATVIA

BUMBIERS is about 65 years old, a farmer and has an elementary school education. Although he does not belong to the resistance organization which TILBURY/1 represents, he is considered to be absolutely reliable by TILBURY/1.

X
b. Auguste BRIEDIS
Riga
Artilerijas iela 22 dz. 16
LATVIA

BRIEDIS is about 60 years old and is a widow. She has an elementary school education and now is employed as a part time worker as a charwoman, doing knitting, and receives pay for standing in queues for other people who do not want to take the time.

SENSITIZED

K A P O K

FILE IN []

REF ID: A63280

22 ✓

30 June 1955

Both of these persons were chosen because they are rather aged. According to TILBURY/1 only old people can receive mail from abroad without fear of reprisal. Because of this it should be possible to mail letters from outside the USSR to both of these addresses. There are no traces in the Stockholm Station files on either of these persons.

3. Both TILBURY and TILBURY/1 were very enthusiastic about setting up an independent s/w channel. However, they stated that if the system was one that the Soviet censorship could develop merely by warning it would be too dangerous to use and that they would prefer to have no s/w at all. TILBURY was not informed that it would be possible to instruct TILBURY/1 in a more secure system in the first scorch letter mailed from inside the USSR. TILBURY had expected to receive the s/w material before TILBURY/1's departure. He therefore believes that it is no longer possible to set up the s/w commo. TILBURY explained to TILBURY/1 that he could get the ingredients for the s/w ink from a local friend who is a chemist.
4. The following procedure for establishing the s/w link is suggested:
 - a. The first letter containing s/w that can be developed by the scorch method should be mailed from inside the USSR. This letter should contain instructions for a s/w writing and development system chosen by Headquarters. It is suggested that something like white carbon would be most easily learned.
 - b. In the first letter TILBURY/1 should be instructed to write a test message (possibly containing details of his infiltration and return home) to one of the addresses provided by TILBURY. These addresses will be sent to Headquarters as soon as obtained from TILBURY.
 - c. As soon as it is demonstrated that the s/w link is working, the operation will be run either as ICDIMPROVE or as a positive operation depending on Headquarters' comments on the TILBURY/1 debriefing transmitted in reference B.
5. Since TILBURY/1 at present does not believe that the s/w link will be set up, it is imperative that the initial letter be sent as soon as possible before he forgets his s/w briefing. Therefore, Headquarters' comments, suggestions in regard to s/w material, and name traces, are requested as soon as possible.

Enclosures:

1. Letter
2. Instructions

29 June 1955

Distribution:

- 5 - Headquarters, w/2 encls. 5 copies each
 2 - [] w/2 encls. 1 copy each

K A P O K

DESENSITIZED

REF ID: A6-93

23

SECRET

AIR POUCH

K A P O K

OSSA-3810

Chief, WE

14 July 1955

Chief of Station,

Operational/REDSOX/TILBURY

TILBURY/1 Operation - Transmittal of Operational Papers

REFS: A. OSSA, 3758, 20 June 1955

B. OSSA-3753, 30 June 1955

1. Transmitted herewith are pertinent portions of the Station's working file on the TILBURY/1 operation. It consists of rough translations of TILBURY's reports in German and copies of our instructions to him with the exception of those already transmitted in the references.
2. On the profit side of the operation we obtained considerably more data on the complex than we have had heretofore. In addition to the GE debriefing transmitted with reference A, we have received four lengthy positive reports from TILBURY with more to come. The first four were transmitted in OSSA-3805, 11 July 1955. TILBURY/1 was given a briefing that should enable us to set up a s/w link with him. Perhaps not least of all TILBURY has been indoctrinated to a certain extent in what is wanted in the way of GE and operational debriefing. Throughout the whole operation TILBURY did everything that was asked of him but did not show any initiative in establishing TILBURY/1's bona fides.
3. On the debit side we were not able to determine the bona fides of TILBURY/1 or of the resistance organization which he represented, because TILBURY's GE debriefing, which was done at our instigation, was received and translated too late to permit follow-up questioning. In retrospect the situation could probably have been improved by pushing TILBURY faster from the beginning. However, at the time it was decided to concentrate on obtaining TIERBAR cooperation, while taking into account the difficulties of TILBURY's position in serving two masters, the TIERBARS and KUBARK. As we now reconstruct it, once returned to work the TIERBARS did not cut us into the operation to the extent hoped for and by the time this was clear the infiltration was about to start. At one point we considered attempting to put in contact with TILBURY/1 via TILBURY without the

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: METHOD USE EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-28

K A P O K

SECRET

FREE IN

SECRET

KAPOK

OSSA-3810
page two
14 July 1955

knowledge of the TIEBARS, but this idea was abandoned when the TIEBARS informed us that the operation was being postponed until fall. The reasoning here was that we would have sufficient time to continue the GE debriefing either through TILBURY or the TIEBARS, or that KUBARK would be given TILBURY/1 for interrogation and future utilization. It is an interesting sidelight that TILBURY's positive reports, were received in carbon copy, the original going to the TIEBARS, while the GE debriefing was almost a single original. The details of the liaison relationship during this operation will be filled ⁱⁿ by [] in a later dispatch.

4. In his 22 June report TILBURY speaks of the possibility of another courier coming out next year. In preparation for such an eventuality it is considered highly desirable that the analysis requested in reference A be used as a basis for deciding what sort of support should be given to TILBURY for the TIEBAR/TILBURY complex inside Latvia. As in the case of support for [] discussed in OSSA-3795, 7 July 55, we will inform TILBURY that his assets inside Latvia are being examined in the GE light and will solicit his help in the task.
- attached
6, 51/2*

Encls:

10 reports in dup.

13 July 1955

Distribution:

5-Headquarters w/10 encls.
2 [] w/10 encls.

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-26

~~KAPOK~~

2
SECRET

APR 1955

107-2-007
TranslationLaiks, 27 July 1955, p.1 :

Mysterious Refugee in the Baltic Sea
Claims to have escaped from Latvia but has disappeared in Sweden without leaving a trace.

L o n d o n

" On Saturday ^{before} of the Whitesunday (Vasarsvētki - in Latv.; i.e. on 28 May -
Transl.) I took up ^{from a small rubber boat} ~~to~~ my ship in the Baltic Sea a refugee from Latvia
and five hours later the Swedish authorities took him over but afterwards
I did ^{not} hear ^{anything} ~~nothing~~ about his fate ", asserted a captain of a Scandinavian
steamer, interviewed by the correspondent of Laiks in London, thus presenting
a riddle which up to now has got no answer.

The docks of the harbor of London are wide. Here is the meeting place for
ships from the ^{entire} ~~whole~~ world. Here are also seamen from all the corners of the
world. Look, one of them, a captain of a Scandinavian ship, who is known
also to the Latvian seamen. And here is his story: " It occurred on Saturday
of the Whitesunday. It was ten minutes past ten o'clock in the morning.
The air was clear, the sea sunny, only the white tops of waves and the ~~the~~
barometer were announcing that a storm is approaching. The ^{seaman} ~~man~~-on-duty
ran into my cabin and reported that somebody out in the sea is shouting for
help... My vessel, having a course to the south, was in the vicinity of
the Swedish coast and, when stepping out to the deck, I discovered by the
binoculars a rather small rubber boat in the waves and a man in it who
shouted and waved to us. I ordered the steersman to reduce speed and to
approach the boat. Actually it was not a boat but a rubber raft of the kind
which was used in wartime by the ~~the~~ airmen and ^{sailors} instead of the life-boats.
The raft was filled with water up to its edge and the man was sitting up to
his waist in water.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

100000002012

We lowered the ladder and the rescued skillfully climbed up to the deck but his rubber sailing vessel remained in the waves of the Baltic Sea.

The rescued was a man of about 35 years, had oblong, energetic face, was of ~~nixix~~ medium height. He had a grey homespun suit, working boots and a cap with a peak. He spoke fluently German and was in command of some English too. He told that he is coming from Latvia, from Almenstrags (5650 2103 on Latvian Army Map 1: 200.000 - Transl.). Told that he had set off for the sea in the rubber boat two days ago. Really, he was unshaved, had a beard of about two days. He told that he had been threatened by danger, arrest or deportations. But here I caught doubts because when I offered him a meal, he refused and accepted only a cup of coffee. He had an identity card (personas aplieciba - in Latv.), issued by the Soviet authorities, in his pocket."

When asked by the correspondent of Laiks about the name of the escapee, the captain replies that he has forgotten it but there was a definite feeling that he does not want to mention this name since it is known that the ship's log book contains all happenings, thus ~~nixx~~ this reception of the refugee on the ship too, and the log book thus should contain also this name all the same whether it is a true one or assumed. The captain continued:

" The refugee had not rough hands, and he had the appearance of a technician, mechanic or auto mechanic. He had no weapons and he told that he had wanted to escape from Latvia and now he has accomplished it. The radio operator of the ship meanwhile got in contact with the ^{Swedish} frontier guards, we stopped at the ^{set} harbor and in the afternoon of the same day we handed over the escapee to the Swedish authorities. I have ^{not} heard ^{anything} ~~nixix~~ about him since then. I have found nothing about the escapee either in the Swedish or European newspapers. Maybe the Latvian newspapers have ~~xxxx~~ by chance any information about this man ?" asked the captain. " No ? ", he repeated my answer and continued then: " Well, this matter is not so

simple as you might believe. After having rescued him we gave him dry clothes. These clothes I received recently back in a parcel which was ~~xxxxxxx~~ mailed from the post office in Stockholm. A person with a Swedish surname was given as the sender there and it was addressed to my shipping company. If he were only a refugee then the Swedish police, after the lapse of the quarantine time, would let him go free by ^{granting} ~~xxxxxx~~ him the rights of a political refugee or expell him but nobody of us ~~do~~ knows what happened to ~~with~~ this man. He seemed to be intelligent, was talkative and he had something important.

What was this "something important", the captain did not want to reveal. Why? It is understandable that the captain asked not to mention his and his ship's name, because the steamer is sometimes sailing to harbors behind the Iron Curtain, Danzig and Gdynia and Stettin, but what was that which prohibited the captain to mention the name of the rescued and this "something important".

J. Jaunbērzis

File: COMMO
Doc.: 22

TRANSLATION FROM LATVIAN NEWSPAPER "LATVIJA" (IN GERMANY)
(July 30th.1955 Nr.28, front page.)

A NEW ESCAPEE FROM LATVIA- (AE C 13/10)

A Poor Escapee or a Russian sent Spy?

LEAFLETS IN LATVIA.

Stockholm/AE./.- In these days Gotland was reached by a young Latvian man, who crossed the Baltic Sea in a small boat. The name of the escapee is not known yet. Respective Swedish Authorities have interned the lad and do not disclose anything about this person.

Judging by some circumstances of escape, there is a possibility that the escapee could be a Soviet sent agent with a special task. Although, untill the end of the investigation the contrary might be proved.

As it is well known, only 21 persons have succeeded to escape from Baltic States in the postwar years, 8 of them from Latvia. However from Russia itself 989 persons have reached the the freedom in the last 6 months of 1954. From Bulgaria - 141 persons, from Czechoslovakia - 1231, from Hungary - 721, from Poland - 842, from Roumania - 245, to say nothing about the hundreds of thousands od escapees from Eastern Germany.

These are figures which show the fact in what oppression the

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Soviet rulers keep their victims at the shores of the Baltic Sea.

During the Geneva Conference special leaflets reached Latvia and the other Baltic States, to remind the Latvians in their homeland that they are not abandoned. Similar action took place already before to strengthen the moral. Of course, the reading of leaflets is as dangerous as listening to the Voice of America broadcasts.

- - -

P.S. /AE/ probably means Andrejs Eglitis, who is the author of this article.

- - -

In the same newspaper "LATVIJA" on August 6th, 1955 (page 2) is an article "MISTERIOUS ESCAPEE FROM LATVIA" that quotes the newspaper "LAIKS" (July 27th, 1955) article with the same title. (See File COMMO.Doc.22)

Only the lead-in is different - It states that the escapee is put ashore in Gotland Sweden. It further states that as far as it is known the Latvian escapee whom we mentioned before should not be considered as a communist agent. He is still isolated by Swedish authorities, which might ~~XXXXXX~~ have reasonable motives, remembering the ~~XXXXXXXX~~ huge uproar which aroused the press and public in the previous years

regarding Latvians who escaped from Soviet Latvia.
At the end of the article it states: However the usual time
of quarantine has expired, the escapee is still in the hands
of Swedish authorities. Either they should grant him the
rights of asylum, or if the authorities should consider him
as undesirable, they should expell him and return him
to Latvia.

- - -

(A)

AIR POUCH

OSSA-3907

Chief, ME

11 August 1955

Chief of Station, []

Operational/REDSOX/AECOB

TILBURY/1 Leak

REF: DIR 18204

1. The information transmitted in the reference about the leak to the press of TILBURY/1's arrival was appreciated. The Station had previously learned of the leak, but was not in a position of discussing it with TILBURY for fear of identifying the source. It will now be possible to try to get to the bottom of the leak.
2. [] reported to [] that he had heard about a courier whose time of arrival corresponded with TILBURY/1. [] had been told this information confidentially by Identity A, who in turn had received it from TILBURY. [] did not know TILBURY/1's name, but he did know that he had been successfully infiltrated. The information in the reference indicates that news of TILBURY/1's exfiltration is very wide spread in the emigration. [] was informed of TIKOLAD's story during his visit to Stockholm.

[]

11 August 1955

Identity A., U.S.C.

Distribution:

5-Headquarters

2. []

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

COPY

~~44-6-34-2-1722~~

3

0 - Ebury/1 to

Separate cover attachment to
OSMA-3907

Identity A - Mintauts GARSTE

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. OSSW-3924

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

APR 24 1956
20 APR 1956

TO Chief of Station, C

DATE _____

FROM Chief, SR thru Chief, WE

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/REDWOOD/AECOB/TILBURY
 SPECIFIC Inquiries Regarding TILBURY/1

REFERENCE: C 445, 31 May 1955

NR

1. Information has recently been received at Headquarters from TILBURY/1's mother, via one of our covert sources, to the effect that Identity 1, who is known as a former SMOTH agent, has shown unusual interest in TILBURY/1 by questioning friends of TILBURY/1's mother.

2. Headquarters is bringing this report to your attention and suggests that you may wish to notify the TIEBARS accordingly.

Attachment (Under Separate Cover)
Identity

Distribution

C 2 (w/att. usc)
REG.....1 (w/ att.)
WE/1.....2 (w/o att.)
SR/2.....2 (w/o att.)

WLAPIN:rdv
13 April 1956

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SR/COP/FI [Signature]

WE/FI _____
(Releasing officer)

WE/1 [Signature]

SR/2 [Signature]
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

NO COPY

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

OSSW-3924

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 31 May 1956
FROM C J	ROOM NO. 2607 J TELEPHONE 8545

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name, and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym if assigned. If true name is sensitive, fill in the 201 number and Section II only. If true name is non-sensitive, both Sections I and II must be completed.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I					
201 NO. C J	1. NAME (Last) Apsitis	(First) Andrejs	(Middle)	(Title)	3.
NAME VARIANT					
TYPE 2. NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)	

PHOTO YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	4. BIRTH DATE 07/06/19	5. COUNTRY OF BIRTH LATV	6. CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH	7. OTHER IDENTIFICATION	8.
OCCUPATION/POSITION				OCC/POS. CODE	9.

SECTION II	
CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM TILBURY/1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SENSITIVE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NON-SENSITIVE

SECTION III				
COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE LATV	10. ACTION DESK SR/2	11. 2ND CITY INTEREST	12. 3RD CITY INTEREST	12A.

COMMENTS:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

OPEN FILE YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RESTRICTED FILE YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE C J
--	--	------------------

FORM NO. 831 TEST
1 NOV 55

SECRET COPY
PUNCHED
(38)

DB 24477

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. OSSW-4080

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

JUN 29 1956

TO Chief of Station, [] [] DATE _____

FROM Chief, SR thru Chief, WE

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/REDWOOD
SPECIFIC TILBURY/1 Exfiltration

ACTION REQUIRED: Deliver Enclosure A or B to TILBURY/1's Mother and Notify Headquarters by Cable

1. Information has recently been received at Headquarters from TILBURY/1's mother, via [] [] to the effect that:

- a. TILBURY/1's mother has been, and at present still is, in contact with TILBURY/1 (she mentions three different methods or channels but does not identify).
- b. TILBURY/1 has reported that he and [] [] intend to make a black exfiltration to Sweden for a short stay and then return.
- c. TILBURY/1's mother expects them momentarily and urges [] [] to transmit a questionnaire to her without delay. This questionnaire would concern internal prospects and persons of operational interest to [] [] and [] []

2. In the event the above mentioned visit by TILBURY/1 and [] [] actually materializes, it is intended to exploit this opportunity to the fullest possible degree. In view of the apparent lack of control over the movements of TILBURY/1 exercised by the TIEBARS during his 1955 visit to Sweden, no great difficulty is anticipated in establishing a secure private contact with him. Once such a contact is established it is intended to subject TILBURY/1 and [] [] to an extensive debriefing regarding their network, contacts and activities. Upon the completion of the above examination and a determination that they are not either wittingly or unwittingly under RIS control they will be:

- a. Issued an S/W system and trained in its use.
- b. Given a means for developing S/W and trained in its use.

(Relating officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
E/TE 2009

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RIS CONTROL

SECRET

OSSW-4080

Page 2

- c. Issued letter-drops for operational correspondence.
- d. Issued a KUBARK signal-plan and crystals for W/T communications.
- e. Issued one-time pads for encipherment and decipherment.
- f. Provided with operational funds.
- g. Principals of trade-craft will be reviewed and they will be briefed on general reporting requirements.

3. A Latvian-speaking case officer will be made available from Headquarters in order to implement the action in the foregoing paragraph.

4. Inasmuch as TILBURY/1's mother has indicated TILBURY/1's visit is to be a short one, the period during which KUBARK can gain access to him will probably be quite limited. It is therefore considered important that Headquarters be notified of TILBURY/1's arrival as soon as possible. Although TILBURY could normally be expected to notify the Station of such an event, it could be possible that he may be unable or unwilling to do so on this occasion. It would be preferable, in any case, to keep him out of the picture insofar as is possible and not make him witting to any greater degree than he now already is.

5. Judging from the pattern of TILBURY/1's 1955 visit, he will almost certainly be permitted to contact his mother. She is aware of her son's desire to establish contact with [] and is apparently anxious to assist in any way. It is therefore considered desirable that she be provided with a means for reporting her son's arrival to KUBARK quickly and securely. For this purpose enclosure A and B are attached together with translations of [] handwritten texts. As can be seen from the translation of enclosure A, TILBURY/1's mother is directed to send an innocuous text cablegram to a KUBARK drop thus indicating TILBURY/1's arrival. Enclosure B directs her to call a name and number (to be filled in by []) so that she can alert [] directly. It is felt that [] may not prefer to use the latter variant because of possible compromise of the installation, therefore, the two choices.

6. It is requested that one or the other of the enclosures be delivered to TILBURY/1's mother and that Headquarters be notified by cable when this is accomplished and which enclosure was utilized. TILBURY/1's mother reportedly knows only broken German and practically no Swedish.

IN COPY

SECRET

Secret

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

OSSA-5209

A I R

Chief, WE

12 October 1956

Chief of Station,

INFO: Chief, SR

Operational/TILBURY

Contact Report of Meeting with TILBURY on
26 September 1956

COPY	ROUTING
#1	2/CE w/att.
#2	B/S
#3	
#4	
#5	

ACTION REQUIRED: Headquarters evaluation of report as requested in para 2a.

1. Meeting: Subject was seen by prearrangement upon his return from leave, at the VAGABOND safehouse from 1430 to 1600 on 26 September. The next meeting is scheduled to take place at the same location on 16 October at 1330.
2. Operational: The following items of operational significance were covered:
 - a. The two Latvians who landed on Gotland in July via rubber boat were discussed and it developed that Subject has not yet been in direct contact with either one of this pair. TILBURY was able to elaborate slightly on their arrival in that he is now definite on the fact that the Swedes consider them to have been sent to Sweden by the RIS and further, that they did not arrive simultaneously. As Enclosure 1 to this report is a copy of an information report which the Swedes turned over to TILBURY for translation from the Latvian. This report is submitted untranslated and we would appreciate a Headquarters evaluation of same at such time as it becomes available.
 - b. The above mentioned report originates with the individual who appears to be the more dominant of the two Latvians, Viktor MIKELSSON. TILBURY knows nothing more than has already been reported about (fm) KIMKANS. TILBURY states that a second report should soon be forthcoming from Mikelsson which will be taken from a diary covering a trip which Mikelsson took on the Volga. Mikelsson claims to be a member of a Latvian resistance group which sent him to Sweden in order to make contact with a certain ZARINS in London. It was the intention of Mikelsson's resistance organization to have Mikelsson remain in London as Zarins' assistant (assuming that the Swedes are correct in their

Secret

5

2005-2008

Secret

OSSA-5209, 12 Oct 56
page 2

evaluation of Mikelsson as an RIS agent, this scheme would certainly afford the RIS a maximum penetration of Latvian emigration activity abroad.) Mikelsson is reported to have brought a formal protocol along with him as evidence of his bona fides. He reports that there are currently five or six resistance groups in Latvia, one of which is known as the MAKSIS (the group to which Mikelsson belongs). Another group is named the IMANTA. According to TILBURY, SMOTH advised the Swedes that they were certain that the MAKSIS group in Latvia is under control and that they (SMOTH) were certain that Mikelsson and Kinkans were on an RIS mission. We are awaiting Headquarters traces on Mikelsson and Kinkans. We have no Stockholm traces.

- a. [] inquired into the current status of ^{Jawis} Yamus KRAMENS, the fairly recent Latvian architect refugee to Sweden. TILBURY reports that he has not been in direct contact with this individual, that Kramens is currently living outside of Stockholm and is engaged in fruit orchard work. TILBURY further reported that Kramens had recently written a letter to Bulgaria in the Soviet Union stating that he (Kramens) had given the matter considerable thought and decided that his friends and relatives in Latvia would suffer from his escape and that he now wanted to return to Latvia. Subject reports that Kramens has had little contact with local Latvians, has done a few VOA broadcasts and that he is now probably in a hospital suffering from a severe nervous disorder resulting from his experiences. The Swedes want TILBURY to debrief Kramens but not before he at least has had a partial recovery from his current disorder.
- d. In response to [] inquiry concerning GRINEBERG whom you will recall had been closely associated with the now-convicted Soviet spy, Anatole ERICSSON, TILBURY reported that Grinberg was a neighbor and fairly close acquaintance of Ericsson's but that no one with whom he has spoken has intimated that there is anything definite with regard to Grinberg's having helped Ericsson in his work with the Soviets. Subject will continue to keep an ear to the ground for Grinberg's activities.
- e. During a discussion about recent tourist visits to Sweden, [] steered the conversation around to the group of which [] was a member. TILBURY reports that, to his knowledge, this group did not return to Latvia by boat but rather by airplane. Subject repeated his impression that all of the ^{NATIVE} negative Latvian members of this group were very much in favor of Soviet reprisals for any

Secret

OSMA-5209

12 Oct 56

page 3

unwarranted action they might take during their stay in Stockholm. As far as Subject has been able to determine, all of the Latvian members of this group were considered to be honest, straightforward and in Sweden without a Soviet mission. Subject described their principal trait as a strong desire to buy up commodities on the local market at lower prices. TILBURY states that he has spoken with "many people" about the [] group.

- f. TILBURY is certain that no Latvian boat operation will be laid on for the balance of this year. There has been a minimum of radio contact for the last few months and he described the Swedish attitude as extremely cautious and desirous of waiting for some time.
- g. In connection with the conversation about boat operations, [] brought up the subject of TILBURY/1. TILBURY responded to numerous questions on subject but stated that he was certain that TILBURY/1 was not under control during his last visit and when asked why, simply replied that he, TILBURY, spent two solid weeks with TILBURY/1 last year and that TILBURY/1 could not have been under control at that time. As a by-product of this conversation bearing on TILBURY/1's cleanliness, Subject stated that the Swedes had sent money to some of their Latvian agents in the spring of 1953 via SMOTH assets. The SMOTH assets buried the money in Latvia and the Swedish agents were then told where the money was located. TILBURY speculated that if these funds were made available to Swedish agents in Latvia through such a resistance organization as NIKHS or any group which fall under RIS control then it would be perfectly reasonable to assume that TILBURY/1 is controlled; despite this speculation, TILBURY along to his belief throughout that TILBURY/1 has not been doubled by the RIS.
- h. The subject of RIS activity within the Latvian emigres in Stockholm was taken up once again in detail and TILBURY has promised to ^{Search For} a good prospect carefully. He has no candidates to offer as possibilities at present.

3. Personal: Subject reported that he had spent part of his leave in Italy attending a Latvian organization conference and that the remainder of his leave had been spent in the Stockholm area.
4. Communications: The communications plan for contact between TILBURY and [] was gone over in full and it appears that Subject now has it firmly in mind.

10 Oct 56

Encl: Untranslated report

Distribution:

3-Headquarters w/1 encl.

2-SR w/1 encl.

Secret

~~SECRET~~

WZ

15 October 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Request for Waiver of Clearance

1. A waiver of clearance is requested for our prospective agent, AECOB/10. This agent is a legal resident of the USSR and is temporarily in Sweden, where he is to be interviewed and possibly recruited by our Case Officer. AECOB/10's freedom from RIS control cannot be definitely established at this time. Inasmuch as AECOB/10's stay in Sweden is of a very short duration, the standard clearance procedure cannot be applied in this case. In the event the recruitment is successful, it will be necessary for the Case Officer to turn over to AECOB/10 one-time code pads, S/W ink, funds and other operational equipment.

2. Due to the time limit involved, your expeditious handling of this waiver will be greatly appreciated.

3. For any further information, please contact []
or [] Room 2607 J Building, extension 8545. []

[] []
Chief, SR/2

[] [] /ejb

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

~~SECRET~~

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

No. C-54903

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ^{1 NOV 1956}
SR2/Lapin

Provisional Operational Approval is granted for AECOB 10

as requested in your memorandum dated 16 Oct 1956.

Limitations:

For use as requested in your memorandum dated 15 Oct 1956.

Operational use under the POA is granted on the basis of an operational priority need as expressed in the above mentioned memorandum.

Please furnish complete PRQ Part I and PRQ Part III.

If derogatory information develops from outstanding investigative checks you will be notified.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
E.O. 13526

A Provisional Operational Approval is temporary in nature and expires in ninety days unless it is cancelled, extended or superseded by a full Operational Approval.

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 22 Oct 1956
smh

SECRET

FORM NO. 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JUN 55

7067

AIR POUCH

K A P O K

CSSA-5246

Secret

Chief of Station, Germany
ATTN: MKTOPAZ
Chief of Station, []

26 October 1956

INFO: Chief, WE

Operational/REDSOX/TILBURY/1
Transmittal of Document Photographs for analysis

ACTION REQUIRED: Request cable reply to paras 1a,b,c,d,e.

1. Transmitted under separate cover are 14 photographs of the personal identity documents of TILBURY/1. Inasmuch as there is a possibility that there may be an LCIMPROVE ramifications in this case it is requested that you examine the photographs and attempt to determine the authenticity of the documents.

a. Please note that line 4, photograph 8 does not have the bearers' signature entered. Does MKTOPAZ possess similar exemplars or have any information regarding the usual procedure encountered when this document is issued?

b. The passport photo in photograph 7 is black and white single weight glossy without any cachet on the reverse and was supplied by bearer himself by means of his home laboratory. Bearer stated he was not aware of any requirement for a special pose i.e. left or right profile, one or two ears showing. Is the photographic paper and the pose consistent with known Soviet document procedures?

c. Is the passport serial number consistent with date and place of issue?

d. Note photograph 11 bears a single "PIERAKSTITS" residence cachet which has been bearers residence since 1948 and appeared in his previous passport. Is it the usual Soviet procedure to enter this cachet into a new passport using the same date of registration (1948) as in the previous passport? Note also that by 1953 the street had been renamed; however, the cachet bears the 1948 version.

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-20

K A P O K

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

COPY ROUTING	
1	2 w/alt
2	B.12 w/alt
3	
4	
5	

K A P O K

e. The absence of employment cachets was explained by bearer to the effect that he used a work book wherein these cachets were entered. Is this consistent with known Soviet procedure?

2. A cable reply to the foregoing questions would be appreciated as well as any comments you may have on the presence or absence of any special indicators or controls in the documents. It is realized that without the originals of the documents it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to make a thorough analysis; however, because of the limited access to TILBURY/1 it was not possible to do more than photograph them.

Enclosures:

1. COS, Germany; One copy each of photo numbers 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11, 12,13, 15 and 17. Hand carried by Identity of FRAN 3253.
2. Hqs; Negative strip of photos 1-19 inclusive.
3. One copy each of photo numbers 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 15 and 17.

24 October 1956

Distributions:

- 3 - COS, Germany (Enclosures above-named hand carried; index h/w)
- 5 - G/WE (Enclosures u.s.c; index h/w)
- 2 - (Enclosures above-named with index)

K A P O K

~~КАРОА~~
Secret

Index to Negatives and Photographs

- 1-2. Inside pages of Yachtsman identity card issued by the Committee of Culture and Sport (Same subject, negatives at different exposure settings)
3. Front and back cover of Yachtsman identity card, above.
4. Front and back page of Library identification card, in Russian and Latvian
5. Inside pages of Library identification card, above.
6. Front and back pages of passport.
7. Pages 1 and 2 of passport; page 1 carrying photo of owner, and page 2 bearing number 704439 at bottom.
8. Pages 3 and 4 of passport.
9. Pages 5 and 6 of passport, devoid of entries.
10. Pages 7 and 8 of passport, devoid of entries.
11. Pages 9 and 10 of passport; page 10 bearing 1948 cachet.
12. Pages 11 and 12 of passport, devoid of entries.
13. Pages 13 and 14 of passport, devoid of entries.
- 14-16 Front side of ship registration sheet. (Same subject, negatives at different exposure settings).
- 17-19 Reverse side of ship registration sheet. (Same subject, negatives at different exposure settings).

~~КАРОА~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

162

Oct 29 NG 15 35 56

OB/WS
DATE : 29 OCT 56

SECRET

1	2	4
2		5
3	Chrono	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [] []

SA a

IN43981

ACTION: TSS 4

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/R&A, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, EE 4, SR 3, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: PRITY FRAN

INFO: DIR

CITE: [] 323

AECOB TECHS

REF: DIR 35330 (OUT 92895)

1. REQUEST SEND MKTOPAZ REP [] SOONEST TO TRAIN TILBURY 1 SW. WILL REQUIRE 2 SEPARATE SYSTEMS OUT AND 1 SYSTEM IN.
2. HAVE REP CONTACT [] AT EMBASSY.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 315 MG/RFL
29 OCT 56

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	2	4	beard
2		5	
3	Chromo	6	

TO : DIRECTOR

OCT 29 2058Z 56

FROM : FRANKFURT

IN 44178

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, TSS 4, SR 3, WE 4, S/C 2

Q

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO (PRIORITY) *EU*

INFO DIR

CITE FRAN 3518

TECHS AECOB TILBURY

RE A. OSSA 5246 NR

B. DIR 08930* NR

C. FRAN 0310 (IN 36041) NR

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

1. BASIS REF A AND DISCUSSION WITH NAST MKTOPAZ OPINION PASSPORT SAME AS REF B AND C. COMPARISON WITH PASSPORT PHOTO MADE IN 55 INDICATES PROBABLY SAME DOCUMENT BUT HAS BEEN WET AND THAT WRITTEN NOTES LAST PAGE HAVE BEEN CHANGED.

2. REF A QUESTIONS NOT ANSWERED ABOVE:

A. PARA 1A B AND D NOT SUSPICIOUS

B. PARA 1E UNSATISFACTORY AS TILBURY 1 EXPLANATION INSUFFICIENTLY

DETAILED TO MAKE MEANING CLEAR.

3. UNABLE COMMENT ON OTHER DOCS SINCE NO OTHER EXEMPLARS MKTOPAZ.

4. IF ORIGS ABSOLUTELY UNAVAILABLE ONE DAY LOAN ADVISE RE FEASIBILITY MKTOPAZ SOVMAN TDY STOC FOR EXAMINATION ORIGS AND INTERROGATION THRU *EU*

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT: CABLE REFERRED TO PRE-DATES CURRENT CABLE SECRETARIAT FILES, A COPY MAY BE EXAMINED IN SIGNAL CENTER ARCHIVES.

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No.

RFL/WS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : C
UNIT : SR/2
EXT : 8545
DATE : 30 OCTOBER 1956

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	

Oct 30 21 48 56

TO : []
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SR 6
INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, WE 4, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OUT 97041

TILBURY 1

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO [] ATTN []
REDWOOD AECOB TILBURY

114861

CITE DIR 37586

[] RECD LETTER FROM TILBURY 1 DATED 25 OCTOBER EXPRESSING SOME
DISCOURAGEMENT ABOUT PROGRESS OF TALKS WITH [] TILBURY 1 VITALLY
INTERESTED OBTAINING PROMISE FINANCIAL HELP FOR MOTHER AMOUNTING \$60 PER
MONTH FOR PERIOD ONE YEAR. HAS ASKED [] TO INTERVENE HIS BEHALF.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

LC []
NOV 20 1956

CWE []
for

[] R/GOP/FI [] WE/1 [] '2 []

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No:

201 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ED/JM

ROUTING

1	8	4	board
2	15 40 56	5	
3	Chreno	6	

DATE : 30 OCTOBER 1956

SECRET OCT 30

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [] []

IN 44511

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, TSS 4, SR 3, WE 4, S/C 2

JFA

ROUTINE PRECEDENCE

TO: PRITY FRAN

INFO: DIR

CITE: [] [] 328

TECHS AECOB TILBURY

RE: A. FRAN 3518 (IN 44178) ✓

B. [] [] 323 (IN 43981) ✓

1. IF MKTOPAZ REP REQUESTED BY REF B CANNOT ACCOMPLISH PARA 4 REF A ANALYSIS, RECOMMEND SEND SECOND REP SOONEST. DOCS AVAILABLE 31 OCT FOR 24 HOURS.

2. HAVE CONTACT [] [] AT EMBASSY WHERE HOME PHONE NUMBER AVAILABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT: AT THE DIRECTION OF THE CABLE SECRETARIAT DUTY OFFICER, THE ACTION UNIT WAS DETERMINED AS THOUGH THE INDICATOR NYXIS HAD BEEN USED.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
EATE 2005

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 243 JB/JM
30 OCT 56

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	2
2	5
3	Chrono 6

TO : DIRECTOR

OCT 30 1550Z 56

FROM : FRANKFURT

SA

IN 44572

ACTION: TSS 4

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, EE 4, SR 3, WE 4, S/C 2

Q

TO (PRIORITY) <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	INFO DIR	ROUTINE PRECEDENCE
AECOB TECHS		CITE FRAN 3544

RE 323 (IN 43981) ✓

S/W TECH ARR 31 ^{Oct} NOV SK 626. PLS MEET AND MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No.

VIA AIR POUCH
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. OSSA-5295

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 5 November 1956

FROM Chief of Station, C ⇒ OJP

SUBJECT { GENERAL REDWOOD/AECOB
SPECIFIC Transmittal of TILBURY/1 File

ACTION REQUIRED: Processing of appropriate items.

1. Transmitted herewith are the following materials obtained from TILBURY/1 by C ⇒ during the past few weeks:

- ✓ a. Atlas and Gazetteer of Latvia - marked with positive intelligence data.
- ✓ b. Map, "Estland-Lettland, Valmiera (Volmar) 1940" with positive intelligence notations.
- ✓ c. Map, "Slokan scale 1:75000", undated with positive intelligence notations.
- ✓ d. Map, "Ostland, 1:100000, Deutsche Heereskarte, sheet 0-35-136", 1944, with positive intelligence notations.
- ✓ e. Map, "39-Riga, scale 1:75000", undated, with positive intelligence notations.
- ✓ f. 84 assorted photo prints taken in Latvia 1956. (Some identification data furnished on backsides).

2. It is noted for the record that Mauger agreed to furnish the Station with a replacement for item a, above.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Enclosures: h/w encls. a/s as indicated above

5 November 1956

Distribution:
3 - Hqs. (w. encl.)
2 - C ⇒ (w/o encl.)

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

COPY ROUTING
2/6/56 att

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DI: CH NO. EGTA-9489

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, KURIOT
Attn: []
FROM : Chief, MKTOPAZ

DATE: NOV 8 - 1956

INFO: EE

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/AQUATIC/AECOB

SPECIFIC— S/W Training and Supplies for TILBURY-1 [] []

REFERENCE: [] 323

1. In response to reference cable the undersigned arrived in Stockholm on the evening of 31 October. That evening and the following morning the S/W needs of TILBURY-1 were discussed with the case officer, [] [] Due to the operational requirements, two, two-way S/W systems were required.

2. TILBURY-1 was trained in the use of carbon #30107 and development #20600. These systems are for TILBURY's use between the target and PBPRIME. In addition TILBURY-1 was given instruction in the use of #10104 and development #40601-C. It is intended that the latter two systems will be given to VALDEMAR, who is considered to be under control.

3. [] [] was given four #31417 (SF) carbons and fifty #21810 which were to be turned over to TILBURY-1 just prior to his leaving Stockholm.

APPROVED: [] []

5 November 1956

Distribution:

3 - KURIOT (Direct)
1 - EE (Direct)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

VIA AIR POUCH
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. OSSA-5300

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 9 November 1956

FROM Chief of Station, C *Wif*

SUBJECT { GENERAL REDWOOD/AECOB
SPECIFIC TILBURY/1 Microfilm *114801*

REF: OSSA-5295, 5 November 1956

ACTION REQUIRED: *M* Processing of appropriate items.

1. Transmitted under separate cover are three rolls of developed 35 mm film, totaling 77 negatives. The document photographs were made by TILBURY/1 during the early part of November C W in Stockholm with a Leica camera loaned by the Station on a Boo-Woo copying device purchased by C W. Although most of the negatives are over-exposed, it is thought by the Station that with careful processing satisfactory prints of them can be made. Unfortunately, TILBURY/1 had no exposure meter or proper artificial lighting. The ten negatives of TILBURY/1 on Roll 2 were taken by C W.

2. It is requested that the station be furnished with a print from the best negative of TILBURY/1.

Enclosures: u.s.c. *Encl s/c* C W
Three rolls developed 35 mm film

7 November 1956

Distribution:
5 - Hqrs. (w. enclosures u.s.c.)
2 - C W (w/o enclosures)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

216
2
B12

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

VIA A I R
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. CSA-5301

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 9 November 1956

FROM Chief of Station, C → W

INFO: Chief, SR

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/AECOB/TILBURY
 SPECIFIC C →
 TILBURY/1 Recruitment and Dispatch

REF: STOC-336

ACTION REQUESTED: Turn over the attached notes to C →

1. In accordance with Reference, C → departed Stockholm for Frankfurt on 7 November. Attached to this dispatch are C → notes from which C → intends to write his report covering the C/E phase, debriefing, recruitment and briefing of TILBURY/1 between 17 October and 5 November 1956. It is requested that the attached notes be held for C → pending his return.
2. The Station would like to commend C → for the manner in which he has cooperated in the handling of this case. We are all aware that TILBURY/1 can hardly be considered completely without RIS taint, principally by virtue of his associations inside and the peculiar success of his 1955 infiltration and 1956 exfiltration; on the other side of the ledger, however, we must consider C → favorable assessment of TILBURY/1, TILBURY/1's obvious inclination to speak openly and with no apparent reluctance or reservation on any subject on which he is knowledgeable, and TILBURY's assessment as offsetting to a considerable degree the evidence which condemns Subject as an RIS agent. We feel that C → did all he could to either expose TILBURY/1 and get an admittance of his RIS complicity or to establish his bona fides. Unfortunately, no clear-cut case can be made at either extreme.
3. If we accept that the best possible situation with which KUBARK comes away from the TILBURY/1 encounter is one whereby we have recruited a double agent under our control for a singleton positive intelligence mission, we would like to call to Headquarters attention what we consider to be at least one very significant reason for TILBURY/1 to remain under our control to the extent that he accomplishes his mission within physical and security limitations - i.e. TILBURY/1's mother. As C → will indicate in his overall report, an agreement was reached

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

NO COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Secret

OSSA-5301

9 Nov 56

page 2

to provide TILBURY/1's mother with continuing nominal financial support in Sweden in return for his services inside. Even if we had had our choice, it would have been difficult for us to provide a more effective means of giving us some assurance that TILBURY/1 will accomplish his mission in our behalf despite his RIS involvement.

4. [] has agreed to furnish [] with his complete operational report of this case; [] has also indicated to [] that, if the TILBURY contact is to continue to yield results and remain within security requirements, and if the other AEMARSH or AEGOB operations of this Station are to continue to bear fruit, it is essential that Stockholm be completely aware of all information which Headquarters collects from sources outside of Sweden which bears in any way on the conduct of Baltic operations with which this Station is directly or indirectly concerned. It is considered manifestly insecure for Headquarters not to observe this principle.
5. We would like to convey our thanks to Headquarters for the prompt handling our requests received in this case and repeat our awareness of [] personal efforts throughout.

7 November 1956

Encl:

[] notes

Distribution:

3-Headquarters w/encl.

2-Chief, SR w/o encl.

2 [] w/o encl.

[] has followed this case very closely with both [] and [] and completely concurs
OSP

1 Encl

Secret

Secret

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
 UNIT : SR/2
 EXT : 4122
 DATE : 10 NOVEMBER 1956

579

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

Nov 10 18 30 56

TO : FROB, FRANKFURT
 FROM : DIRECTOR, CIA
 CONF : SR 6
 INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, EE 4, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OUT50986

Tilbury 1

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO FROB

INFO: FRAN

CITE DIR

39397

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REDWOOD AECOB

Subj - [signature]

REQUEST CABLE SUMMARY DEVELOPMENTS AND DATE DEPARTURE

TILBURY ONE ALSO ADVISE WHEN RETURNING HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

rcw

DATE NOV 21 1956

[signature]

SR/COP/FI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CSR/?

RELEASING OFFICER

[Signature]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 386
13 NOV 56

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

NOV 13 2157Z 56

FROM : FRANKFURT

IN 11183

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, EE 4, S/C 2

Tilbury 1

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

CITE FROB 5429

TO DIR

INFO FRAN

REDWOOD AECOB

RE DIR 39397 (OUT 50996)

Subject

1. TILBURY 1 DENIED ANY RIS CONTROL HOWEVER ACCEPTED TWO SEPARATE COMMO CHANNELS AND THEORY VALDEMAR CONTROLLED. 2000 U.S. ISSUED, THIRD FINAL BRIEFING COMPLETED 6 NOV. SCHEDULED FOR DEPARTURE 7 NOV. [] WILL CABLE ACTUAL DATE.

2. [] ETA WASH 16 NOV.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

DATE NOV 21 1956

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No.

VIA A I R
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. OSSA-5456

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 18 December 1956

FROM Chief of Station,

INFO: Chief, SR

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/REDWOOD/AEGOB
 SPECIFIC TILBURY/1 Positive Information

COPY ROUTING

#1	2 <i>Walt</i>
#2	2
#3	B/2
#4	
#5	

REFERENCE: STOC-407

ACTION REQUESTED: A. Headquarters evaluation of the enclosed information.
B. comparison of this information with that derived from debriefing of TILBURY/1.
C. Technical analysis of the Chief, SR copy of Enclosure 1 as per paragraph 3 below.

- On 17 December 1956, a communication was received from TILBURY which apprised us of TILBURY/1's safe arrival and Reference was dispatched. anticipates having one meeting with TILBURY prior to Christmas and any amplifying information in re TILBURY/1's dispatch and arrival will be transmitted. Reference notes that paragraph 5 of OSSA-5374 of 30 November should be corrected; by this we meant that TILBURY/1's dispatch date is shown in paragraph 5 as 21 November and his arrival date in the communication received today is 20 November. We assume that TILBURY was misinformed on the original date by the TIEBARS but will check.
- The message concerning TILBURY/1's arrival also contained the positive information herewith forwarded as Enclosure 1 to this dispatch. This information supplements that forwarded via OSSA-5374 and TILBURY states in his covering note that this is all of it. Once again, we would appreciate Headquarters' overall evaluation of this information at such time as it becomes available as well as assessment of how this information compares with that he extracted from TILBURY/1 through his own debriefing.
- You will note that the only copy of this information which we received on this occasion, and on the occasion of OSSA-5374, is a carbon copy. Our assumption is that the original is given to the TIEBARS. Would it be possible for KURIOT to analyze the carbon copy which we received in this case (forwarded herewith as the Chief, SR copy) and that of OSSA-5374 to determine if this copy has also had a carbon under it in order to make

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

RI COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

Secret

OSSA-5456

18 Dec 56

page 2

a second copy? With the TILBURY/1 case as complicated as it is, we would be interested to know if TILBURY makes a second copy for himself (as he would probably claim) or for still another party (as the case may be).

17 December 1956

Enclosure:

TILBURY notes

Distribution:

3-Headquarters w/1 encl.

2-SR w/1 encl.

2- [] w/1 encl.

Secret

SECRET

3 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

SUBJECT : Engagement of AECOB/10 as Independent Contractor

1. In accordance with the terms of AECOB project, the individual named above has been engaged by me for an indefinite period. The effective date of oral contract is 1 November 1956.

2. In consideration of the mission subject has agreed to perform in our behalf in a denied area, he has been given a one-time payment of 10,000 Swedish Kroner. In addition, until further notice, the sum of 60.00 U.S. dollars, or its equivalent, is to be paid to subject's dependent mother each month.

3. In accordance with oral contract, subject is not entitled to annual or sick leave benefits, disability compensation, nor will his dependents be entitled to death benefits.

4. Subject has been promised assistance in event of his escape from the denied area.

5. Termination of oral contract may be made at any time upon oral notice by either party.

6. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to subject.

AECOB Project Case Officer

APPROVED:

REVIEWED:

Special Contracting Officer

DATE

H-000

29 Jan '57

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

VIA AIR POUCH
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. OSSA-5504

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 4 January 1957

FROM Chief of Station, C 11P

SUBJECT { GENERAL Intel/REDWOOD/TIEBARS/TILBURY
SPECIFIC Transmittal of TIEBAR Debriefings of TILBURY/1

REFERENCE: OSSA-5374, 30 November 1956

COPY	ROUTING
#1	2 / RP/6 <i>initials</i>
#2	2
#3	B/S
#4	
#5	

ACTION REQUESTED: See paragraph 2

1. Forwarded herewith are four intelligence reports (untranslated) received from C 11P on 20 December. From a comparison with TILBURY/1 debriefings, forwarded headquarters under reference, it appears almost certain that the TIEBAR reports are primarily rewrites of TILBURY/1 reports in German.

2. As time permits, we would like to have headquarters comments on:

A. Comparison of these reports with those forwarded under reference, to highlight any editing, corrections or omissions in the TIEBAR reports.

B. The same service as above on the information C 11P obtained verbally - for the same purpose.

3. In an attempt to smoke out an admission of the TIEBAR source on these reports we intend to query C 11P along the following lines:

"With reference to [these reports] we note that your source appears to have more detailed knowledge than would be the case were he either a legal traveller, or a short term inhabitant of the area [i.e. the C 11P representative]. Could the source be the Latvian who recently repatriated? [see paragraph 1 C 11P -161]. Would it be possible to submit questions to this source now, or in the future?"

This approach provides for a turndown without embarrassment, but gives C 11P a chance to expose his source.

JOB # 61-948767
Box: SR/2
Restr to: SR/2

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

Addendum -
Distribution-

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

OSSA-5504
4 January 1957
page two

ADDENDUM: Since writing this dispatch, [] has received additional TILBURY/1 reports, and the history of the TILBURY/1 operation in detail from [] Therefore paragraph 3 above is no longer valid.

[]

Attachments:

4 reports

4 January 1957

Distribution:

- 3 - Chief, WE, w/4 attachments, single copies *Encl. A/S*
- 2 - Chief, SE, w/o attachments
- 2 - [] w/o attachments

FEB 1 1957

J-1505

USSR

11 December 1956

Airfields in the Riga Area (251)
Summer 1955 - October 1956
C 2

During the year, aircraft activity in the Riga area has been heavy and steady without specially noticeable peaks. Single and twin-engine jet planes have been observed almost exclusively. Because of the danger of collision with civilian planes, military aircraft are prohibited from flying over the city of Riga itself.

It continues to happen quite often that jet planes crash or have other accidents. Such occurrences are never mentioned in the press. Nor is it published when catastrophe strikes civilian planes either. For example last year a jet plane ran into a two-storey house in Liepaja; both the pilot and some of the occupants of the house ^{were killed and the house} burned to the ground. Despite the fact that the accident was witnessed by many people, it was not mentioned in the local press. Most of the accidents have taken place on landing.

The military portion (northeastern) of Spilva^e airfield still is being used by jets, although this happens only occasionally. There are no indications that it is intended to close down the military part of the airfield. Brand new planes have been observed on the field a number of times. Most recently, in July 1956, three new planes covered with tarpaulins were observed. All openings on the planes were covered with painted wooden covers. They were of the MIG-17 type. There is no assembly plant for aircraft on or in the vicinity of Spilva^e airfield.

- 1 -

JOB # ~~67-984/67~~
Box: 27 Folder: 7
Restr to: SR/2

The airfield at the "Kvadrats" factory, on both sides of the Riga-Ogre highway, is about $4\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers in length and its greatest width is about 1 kilometer. Work has commenced, however, to widen the field to the shore of Daugava. The actual airfield is situated west of the highway. On the easterly side are the officers' quarters, the club, a radio station, a cement factory which provides material for the continued expansion of the field, fuel cisterns, and a number of new structures. This year they have begun to erect an approximately 2 meter high board fence around the airfield. About 3 kilometers of the fence is finished. At present the runway which goes parallel with the highway is being widened. Its width heretofore was 40 to 50 meters; the length is about 3,000 meters. It is a concrete runway. The fuel supply has been enlarged considerably this year too. A series of 2 and 3 storey structures have also been erected on both sides of the road. New construction is continuing. There are no hangars on the field nor is there any airplane repair shop. It is possible that the plane motors are repaired in an automobile shop which is located near the barracks in the northwest portion of the field. The planes sit in the open along the runway. The number of planes never is below fifty; they are of the MIG-17 type. There were no twin-engine jets on the field at the beginning of October of this year. During darkness the field is kept lighted with neon lights and searchlights. No orientation lights have been observed in the vicinity of the field. The field is used solely by army air units. A sketch of the field is appended.

The airfield at Kalnciems belongs to the navy. It is about 4 kilometers long and 3 kilometers wide. Expansion is in progress. During this year a double barbed wire fence has been erected around the area. The buildings which belong to the actual airfield are situated within the woods. Only some work shops and officers quarters are visible at the edge of the woods. The construction of housing and installation of fuel cisterns on the east side of the Riga-Kalnciems road has been commenced

recently. Both single and twin-engine planes use the field. The single engine planes are of the MIG-17 type and the twin-engines are of the YAK-25 type. A few Il-28's have been observed also this summer. Last winter they kept the permanent runways clear of snow by means of modern blower units.

The Sleperi airfield which is located north of Kalnciems ~~was~~ used to be used occasionally. For about a year now it has been completely closed down.

The Tukums airfield is 6 to 7 kilometers long. The width is up to about 4 kilometers. The area is not enclosed. Single-engine jet planes are stationed at the field. Types and number not established. Detailed observation of the field has not been possible.

The airfield south of Cesis continues to be used but only to a small extent and by civilian planes. A number of ambulance planes are station^{ed} on the field, which also has radar installations.

Since the seaplane station at Kisezers in Riga was closed down in 1954, no seaplanes have been observed in the Riga area.

A new airfield is being constructed northeast of Cesis in the Startu area. According to the inhabitants of the area a number of ^farms are to be evacuated shortly. Excavating machinery was already at work in certain parts of the area in the spring of 1956. In June a number of carloads of runway plates arrived at the Cesis railway station. The plates were perforated and were about 1.5 meters in length and 0.5 meter wide. Civilian vehicles also were used to transport the plates to the Startu area. In October the local inhabitants observed radar antennas in the area. Aircraft have not yet been observed.

The photos of the airfield at Kalnciems (2) and the barracks construction and fuel ^{tanks} cisterns at "Kvadrats" are appended.

USSR

11 December 1956

Air Training Institutions in Riga (651)
October 1956
C 2

The K. E. Voroshilov Military Air School is housed in the former 5th Latvian Infantry Regiment barracks at Lomonosova iela (street) No. 1 (formerly Samarina iela) in Riga. There are two old planes standing on the barracks grounds, probably for demonstration purposes. The ~~air school~~ ^{air school} is visited almost daily by personnel from a building on Gorskiy Street (formerly Valdemar Street No. 7). An air staff is likely housed in this building. (Two photos of radar on the air school are appended).

A civilian air training institute is located in some buildings in the Transduna sector of the city between Nometan Slokas and Dartas Streets (photo appended).

Civilian aircraft have a special air route to and from the city of Riga. It follows the railroad from Riga to Incukalns, at which the planes veer onto the course desired. Planes coming in for landing also fly via Incukalns.

The USSR is now making a plane similar to the Storch type. A number of these are being used in ambulance service. This type plane was first observed in Riga during spring 1956.

There are now airfields for civilian traffic in all rayon capitals in Latvia.

11 December 1956

Helicopter Unit in Lithuania (3404)
October 1956
C 3

A fairly large air unit is stationed on one of the airfields near Kaunas in Lithuania. The unit is said to have been transferred to Lithuania early in 1955. It has not been possible to determine the size of the unit. It is equipped exclusively with helicopters of the MI-A type.

USSR

13 December 1956

Radio and antenna installation in
the Riga area (261,343)
October 1956
C 2

The wire radio network is now well developed in Riga. Loudspeakers are set up on most of the streets. The entire program of the Riga transmitter is carried. The broadcasts are also carried to factories and other places where there are large numbers of listeners. Recently, private subscription to the wire radio system has been permitted; in such cases a loudspeaker is installed in the residence. Most of the subscribers are Russians.

A new radio transmitter has recently been completed north of Riga on the northwest shore of Baltezers. According to rumors the transmitter will serve primarily for direct contact with Moscow.

In Pleskodale, in the northwestern outskirts of Riga, there is a radio station consisting of several high masts grouped around a building (photo of the installation is appended).

X { The large radar installation on Spilve airfield has been dismantled since this summer. From summer to October 1956, only one large radar installation has been observed. It is situated on Zolitudes iela in the western outskirts of Riga (photo of the installation appended).

Small antenna installations have been observed at a number of places. Whether these are for radar, navigational ~~purposes~~^{purposes}, or ultra shortwave stations, it has not been possible to judge. Sketches of the four different types of antennas observed have been appended.

X [A number of these small installations are placed around Spilve airfield. Most of them, five or six, are situated along the north shore of Hapaka Gravis.

X { The same kind of antennas are placed around the airfield at the "Kvadrats" factory on the road to Ogre and at the Kalⁿciems airfield.

In the Moscow suburb of Riga, formerly the Lettgallie suburb, a couple of blocks are now blocked off by a high wooden fence. The blocked off area is bounded by the streets, Odzianas, Paides, Strautu, Sesku, and Rezeknes iela. The street which used to pass through the area, Piedrujas Street, is closed off. Several airplanes and antenna installations of the same kind as at the airfields outside of Riga have been observed inside the enclosure. Spur tracks lead into the area; it has not been used as an airfield. (Photo is appended).

Types of this smaller antenna have also been observed at an anti-aircraft battery in the southern portion of Bolderaja, at another anti-aircraft battery east of Velnezers and (only one) in Transduna on an open area bounded by Kandavas, Zolitudes, Sampetera, and Kalnciema Streets.

VIA AIR POUCH
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. OSSA-5551

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 11 January 1957

FROM Chief of Station, [] []

INFO: Chief, SR

SUBJECT { GENERAL REDWOOD/TILBURY/TIGERCAT
SPECIFIC TILBURY/1 Positive Information

REFERENCE: A. OSSA-5456, 18 December 1956
B. OSSA-5374, 30 November 1956

COPY ROUTING	
#1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
#2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
#3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
#4	<input type="checkbox"/>
#5	<input type="checkbox"/>

ACTION REQUIRED: For Information and action per paragraph 4

1. At a meeting with [] [] on 4 January, [] [] brought along a selection of recent reports prepared by the TPFEELING local office on subjects he felt might be of interest. Included was the attached report titled: Lativa, Review of General Situation. This report is a typed duplicate of the TILBURY/1 debriefings, obtained from TILBURY, and forwarded headquarters under references.

2. [] [] is quite adamant that he won't disclose sources. In this case [] [] attempted to elicit a source description by saying that this report looked as if it might have come from the man who had been sent back to the USSR this fall. [] [] had Mikkelsson in mind since this information had been in the newspapers, and [] [] and [] [] had previously discussed the "Case of the 14 Latvians on Gotland".) [] [] originally seemed to agree half-heartedly to this source description, until [] [] mentioned the name Mikkelsson, at which point [] [] said he was not the source; that he had thought [] [] was referring to someone from the Latvian colony in Stockholm.

3. From the above account, we assume that [] [] misinterpreted [] [] reference to "the man who was sent back" and thought the reference was meant to be TILBURY/1. Conjecture on how this report reached TPFEELING leads to two suppositions: either TILBURY gave or sold it directly to [] [] or he gave it to, say, his brother, who passed it on to TPFEELING. To have this report reach the station via three separate channels, all leading back to the same source, TILBURY, raises various questions, and confirms other suppositions. Unfortunately, we don't know precisely how the report reached TPFEELING. Given TILBURY's known channels to two services, KUBARK and TIEBARS, we can assume he would not hesitate to add the head of the Latvian emigration in Sweden as a third customer, even though the report could only have come

CLASSIFICATION

from a recent

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

[] []

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET

OSSA-5551
11 January 1957
page two

from a recent arrival from Latvia, and theoretically TILBURY is aware of the security problem of giving such a report to the emigration. Further and more detailed comments on this aspect of the problem will be forwarded after TILBURY, C [] meeting.

4. [] [] proposes to sound out TILBURY on just who did receive the TILBURY/1 reports. [] [] in his turn, will raise the subject of source with [] [] at his next meeting. [] [] requests an early headquarters reply to the request contained in paragraph 3 of OSSA-5456 of 18 December, i.e. whether or not a worthwhile check can be made of the TILBURY copies of the TILBURY/1 reports to determine that more than one copy has been made.

[] []

Attachment
Report - u.s.c.

11 January 1957

- Distribution:
- 3 - Headquarters, w/1 attachment u.s.c.
 - 2 - C. SR, w/o attachment
 - 2 - [] [] w/o attachment

SECRET