

**Name:** OKADA, Keisuke  
**Date of Birth:** January 21, 1868  
**Birth Place:** No. 19 Hinode-cho, Fukui, Fukui Prefecture.  
**Former Clan:** The Fukui Clan.  
**Permanent Domicile:** No. 875 Tsuhokazu, Yodobashi-cho, Toyotama-gun, /Shinjuku-ku/, Tokyo.  
**Social Status:** The "Samurai" Rank.  
**Family Members:**

Grand Mother	Shizu, born in July 1818
Father	Kitada, born in January 1832
Elder Sister	Toyoko, born in November 1864
Younger Brother	Kimatsu, born in November 1874
Younger Sister	Toshiho, born in March 1877
Youngest Sister	Tomiko, born in February 1887
Eldest son	Sadatomo, born in March 4th 1908
Third Daughter	Kimiko, born on Aug. 30th 1914
Second Son	Sadahiro, born on Jan. 15th 1917

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1885 Nov. 21                      Ordered to be a student of the Naval Academy.  
Naval Academy

1889 April 20                    Awarded a certificate of the completion of the  
whole course of the Naval Academy.

"                    "                    Commissioned naval cadet.                    Navy Ministry

"                    "                    Ordered to board the Kongo for the purpose of  
practice.

"                    Aug. 14                    Started for Hawaii on ocean navigation. "  
Returned home on Feb. 22nd, 1890.

1890 March 14                    Transferred from the Kongo to the Naniwa  
for the purpose of practice.

"                    June 8                    Ordered to sail to Korea. Came back to  
Mihara on July 6th.

"                    July 9                    Appointed Ensign.                    Cabinet

"                    "                    Assigned to Assistant Division Officer of  
the Naniwa.                    Navy Ministry



1891 Aug. 22	Sailed to the various posts of the neighbouring countries. Came back to Maizuru on 29th.	
" Aug. 28	Relieved of the current post and appointed Assistant Navigating Officer on the Naniwa.	
" Nov. 16	It was decided that Ensign be treated with the ninth grade of the "Sonin" Rank by Imperial Ordinance No. 215 regarding the official ranks.	
" Dec. 14	Conferred the Senior Grade of the Eighth Court Rank.	Imperial Household Department Navy Ministry
1892 Jan. 19	Granted the first pay grade.	Navy Ministry
" Feb. 2	Was ordered to sail to various posts of the neighbouring countries. Returned home on March 11th.	
" May 23	Relieved of the Current Post.	"
" "	Ordered to board the Jingei for the purpose of training.	"
" Oct. 20	Conferred a certificate of finishing the junior officers course on the torpedo training ship of the Japanese Empire, the certificate being with the first prize.	Captain of the Jingei
" "	Relieved as member of the crew of the Jingei though once had been ordered to board to practice torpedo-operations.	Navy Ministry
" "	Placed on the Waiting list.	"
" Nov. 12	It was decided on that Ensigns let placed at the eighth rank of the higher civil service by Imperial Ordinance No. 96 Enforced on and after the 20th.	"
" Dec. 21	Ordered to be C-class student of the Naval Staff College.	"
1893 Dec. 19	Finished the regular course for C-class students of the Naval Staff College. The first class.	Naval Staff College
" "	Awarded a binocular for excellent scholarship.	
" "	Relieved as C-Class student of the Naval Staff College.	Naval Ministry



1893 Dec. 19 Appointed assistant division officer of the  
Itsukushima. Naval Ministry

1894 Mar. 1 Relieved of the current post and appointed  
acting-division officer the Marine Corps  
of the Yokosuka Naval Station.

" Mar. 22 Appointed member of the Yokosuka Naval Station  
Court-Martial. Yokosuka Naval Station

" June 8 Relieved of acting-division officer of the  
Marine Corps of the Yokosuka Naval Station and  
appointed acting-division officer of the Naniwa,  
the ship awaiting commission. Naval Ministry

" June 13 /The ship/ became a guard-ship.

" June 24 Set sail from Moji for Korea, arrived at Sasebo  
on July 1.  
Left Sasebo on July 25 and engaged in battle from  
that day on.

" July 25 The war was opened with China.

" Oct. 5 Relieved as acting-division officer of the Naniwa  
and appointed acting-division officer of the Takachiho.  
At the front. Military Internal  
Affairs Bureau

" Dec. 9 Appointed Lieutenant. Cabinet

" " Raised to the 7th Rank of the higher civil  
service.

" " Appointed division officer of the Takachiho.  
At the front. Military Internal  
Affairs Bureau

" Dec. 28 Raised to the Junior Grade of the 7th Court  
Rank. The Imperial House-  
hold Ministry

1895 Feb. 20 Relieved of the current post and appointed division  
officer of the Tsushima Mine-layer Section.  
Military Administrative  
Bureau

" Nov. 18 Decorated with the 5th class Order of the  
Golden Kite. Bureau of Decorations



1895 Nov. 18	Decorated with the 6th Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.	Bureau of Decorations
" "	Decorated with the 5th class Order of the Golden Kite with the amnity of 300 yen and the 6th Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure in recognition of services in the 1894-95 War.	"
" "	Decorated with the 1894-95 War Medal.	"
1896 Jan. 20	Imperial Ordinance No. 2, the Torpedo Station Law was enacted. To be enforced on and after April 1.	
" Apr. 1	Appointed division officer of the Nagasaki Minelayer Section of the Sasebo Torpedo Station.	Navy Ministry
" July 2	Entered the 3rd pay grade.	"
" Jun. 15	Appointed Judge of the SASEBO Naval Station Court-Martial.	SASEBO Naval Station
" Dec. 26	Relieved of the current post. Appointed division officer of the HIEI.	Navy Ministry
" "	Relieved as Judge of the SASEBO Naval Station Court-Martial.	SASEBO Naval District
1897 April. 13	For the purpose of practical training of the students of the Naval Academy left YOKOSUKA for HAWAII, U.S.A. etc. and returned to YOKOSUKA on Sep. 20.	
" Oct. 26	Appointed concurrently Navigating Officer of the HIEI.	Navy Ministry
" Nov. 5	Relieved of current and concurrent posts. Appointed division officer of the FUJI.	"
" Dec. 1	Appointed Lieutenant again in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 310 re of the Naval Officers' official ranks.	
1898 Jan. 6	Entered the 2nd pay grade.	Navy Ministry
" Mar. 8	Promoted to the senior grade of the 7th Court Rank.	Imperial Household Ministry



1898 Apr. 29	Relieved of the current post.	Navy Ministry
" "	Ordered to be B-class student of the officers' course of the Naval Staff College.	
" Jul. 4	Entered the 1st pay grade.	Navy Ministry
" Oct. 10	Confined to bed for 3 weeks because of pleurisy.	
" Oct. 31	Confined to bed for 3 weeks more.	
" Nov. 21	Confined to bed for a week more.	
" Nov. 28	Completely recovered and attended the office.	
" Dec. 19	of Given a certificate/the completion of the special course of Torpedoes, the Naval Staff College. (Awarded a silver watch for excellence in scholarship)	
" Dec. 19	Relieved as B-class student of the officers' course of the Naval Staff College.	Navy Ministry
" "	Appointed instructor of the Naval Torpedo Training School.	
" 24	Appointed Judge of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station Court-Martial.	YOKOSUKA Naval Station
1899 Mar. 22	Relieved of the current post.	Navy Ministry
" "	Ordered to be A-class student of the officers' course of the Naval Staff College.	
" 25	Relieved as Judge of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station Court-Martial.	YOKOSUKA Naval District
" Sep. 29	Promoted to Lieutenant Commander.	Cabinet
" Nov. 2	Promoted to the junior grade of the 6th Court Rank.	Imperial Household Ministry
1900 Mar 16	Ordered to attend on the Judge of the grand Naval manoeuvre. (Left the ship at KOBE on May 2.)	Navy Ministry
" Jun. 20	Relieved as A-class student of the officers' course of the Naval Staff College.	
" "	Appointed division officer of the FUJI in the standing fleet. (Special addition being made to the real term	



of service in JAPAN proper an account of  
the Empire of China Incident of 1900/T.N.  
Boxer Uprising/.

Navy Ministry

- 1900 Sep. 1 Relieved of the current post and appointed  
torpedo officer and concurrently division officer  
of the SHIKISHIMA in the standing fleet.  
(Special addition being made the real term of  
service in JAPAN proper on account of the Empire  
of China Incident of 1900 /T.N. Boxer uprising/.  
Navy Ministry
- " Dec. 6 Relieved of the current and the concurrent post.  
Navy Ministry
- " " Ordered to be A-class student of the officers'  
course of the Naval Staff College. "
- " Dec. 22 Entered the 1st pay grade. "
- 1901 May 24 Conferred the certificate for finishing the A-class  
course for officers of the Naval Staff College.  
President of the Naval  
Staff College
- " " Relieved as A-class student of the Officers'  
course of the Naval Staff College. Navy Ministry
- " " Placed on the waiting list. "
- " May 31 Decorated with the Fifth Order of Merit with the  
Order of the Sacred Treasure. Decorations Bureau
- " June 7 Appointed Member of the Third Bureau of the  
Naval General Staff with the additional post  
of Instructor in the Naval Staff College. Navy Ministry  
Decorations Bureau
- " July 16 Ordered to make a trip of inspection while the  
standing Fleet was cruising along the coasts of  
China and Korea. Navy Ministry
- 1902 March 4 Appointed special inspector of the Standing Fleet.  
"
- " April 10 Appointed Investigator of the Documents on Works.
- " May 10 Conferred the War Medal, Boxer Uprising, 1900.  
Decoration Bureau
- 1903 Feb. 18 Ordered to act as Staff Officer of the First  
Squadron while the fleet was specially organized  
for the Naval Grand Manoeuvre. Navy Ministry



- 1903 March 23      Granted a sum of eighty yen in recognition  
of the special exertion rendered as instructor.  
Navy Ministry
- "      May 15      Appointed investigator of the Documents  
on Works.      "
- "      July 7      Relieved of the current and the concurrent post,  
and appointed Acting commander of the Chitose;  
the ship being enlisted in the Standing Squadron.
- "      Aug. 16      The ship was ordered to sail from Sasebo to Korea.  
It came back to Takeshiki on 23rd.
- "      Sept. 19      Permitted, because of orchitis, to go to Takeo  
for recuperation for three weeks, excluding two  
day for a round trip, Started on the 22nd.
- "      Oct. 5      Relieved as acting commander of the Chitose.  
Navy Ministry  
Placed on the waiting list and ordered to  
stay at Sasebo.      "
- "      Oct. 12      Permitted to keep bed for further three weeks;  
Nov. 2., for further three weeks; Nov. 29, for  
further three weeks; Dec. 14, still keeping in  
bed (nervous prostration)
- 1904 Jan. 3      Permitted to keep in bed for further three weeks  
(pleurisy in the right)
- "      Jan. 24      Permitted to go to Kino Hot Springs for recuperation  
for three weeks, excluding two days for a round trip.
- "      Feb. 15      Permitted to stay there further, and completely  
recovered on Feb. 28.
- "      March 7      Attached to the Sasebo Naval Station (At war  
against Russia)      Navy Ministry
- "      March 8      Appointed councillor of the Naval Prize Court  
at Sasebo.      Cabinet
- "      "      Granted a sum of fifty yen in recognition  
of the special exertion rendered as instructor.  
Navy Ministry
- "      March 24      Appointed chief judge of the Court-martial  
in the Sasebo Naval Station. Sasebo Naval Station



1904 March 31	Appointed Acting Staff Officer of the Sasebo Naval Station while the post was vacant. Sasebo Naval Station
" April 11	Relieved as Attached officer to the Sasebo Naval Station. Navy Ministry
" April 12	Relieved as counselor of the Sasebo Prize Court. Cabinet
" "	Appointed equipment officer of the Sasebo Naval yard. Navy Ministry
" April 21	Appointed commander of the Yaoyama. The ship being made a First reserve ship on the same day. Navy Ministry
" April 26	Relieved as chief judge of the Court-Martial in the Sasebo Naval Station. Sasebo Naval Station
" May 11	Appointed chief judge of the Court-Martial in the Yokosuka Naval Station. Yokosuka Naval Station
" May 24	Relieved as chief-judge of the Court-Martial of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station.
" May 28	Started. (At the front)
" July 13	Appointed commander of the YAHYAMA in accordance with Article 10 of the Complement Ordinance. Navy Ministry
" "	Promoted to Commander. Cabinet
" Aug. 30	Raised to the Senior Grade of the 6th Court Rank. Imperial Household Ministry
1905 Jan. 12	Relieved of the current post and appointed commander of the CHITOSE, First Fleet. At the front.
" Apr. 5	Relieved of the current post and appointed commander of the KASUGA, First Fleet. At the front.
" May 30	Decorated with the 4th Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure. Bureau of Decorations
" Dec. 20	Relieved of the current post and appointed commander of the ASAHI, First Fleet. Navy Ministry



1905 Dec. 29 Entered the 1st pay grade. Navy Ministry

1906 Jan. 9 Appointed chief-judge of the Court-Martial of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station. YOKOSUKA Naval Station

" May 11 Relieved of the current post and appointed instructor of the Torpedo Training School and concurrently instructor of the Naval Staff College.

" May 21 Appointed member of the Committee for investigating and accepting special automatic torpedos. Navy Ministry

" May 17 Relieved as chief-judge of the Court Martial of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station. YOKOSUKA Naval Station

" Apr. 1 Decorated with the 4th Order of Merit with the Order of the Golden Kite, with an annuity of 500 yen and with the 3rd Order of Merit with the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun in recognition of distinguished service during the 1904-1905 War. Bureau of Decorations

" " Decorated with the War Medal, 1904-1905.

1907 Mar. 4 Appointed member of the Committee to Investigate a Various Regulations on Torpedoes. Navy Ministry

" Apr. 20 /The Naval Torpedo Training School/ became the Naval Torpedo School in accordance Imperial Ordinance No. 136.

1908 Sept. 25 Promoted to Captain. Cabinet

" " Appointed head of the Naval Torpedo School Navy Ministry

" Dec. 25 Appointed chairman of the Committee for Improving Wireless Telephones.

" Dec. 11 Promoted to the Junior Grade of the Court Rank. Imperial Household Ministry

1909 Jan. 13 Appointed member of the Wireless Investigation Committee. Navy Ministry

1910 July 5 Appointed chairman of the Investigation Committee for the Improvement of Creeping Machinery. Navy Ministry



1910 July 25	Relieved of the current post and appointed Captain of the KASUGA, Second Reserve. Navy Ministry
" Dec. 1	The KASUGA, Second Fleet. "
" Dec. 31	Request for three weeks' return trip since Jan. 4 to KAMAKURA Mechi in order to adjust household affairs as a result of the death of wife Fusa was approved on Jan. 1
1911 Jan. 4	Relieved of the current post and assigned to the YOKOSUKA Naval Station. Navy Ministry
" Jan. 16	Relieved as attached officer to the YOKOSUKA Naval Station and appointed member of the Personnel Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry. Navy Ministry
" Jan. 19	Appointed member of the Ordinary Disciplinary Committee of Civil Officials. Navy Ministry
" "	Appointed member of the nomination committee of Students for the Naval Staff College. Navy Ministry
" "	Appointed member of the Naval Reserve personnel Authorization Committee. "
" Mar. 18	Reported transfer of the permanent domicile to Tokyo Prefecture. "
" May 30	Appointed chairman of the Investigation Committee for the Dismissal of Midshipmen ASADA, Junichi and YUMOTO, Ruzo. "
1912 Feb. 23	Appointed chairman of the Investigation Committee for the Dismissal of Midshipman WATABE, Kiyoshige. "
" Mar. 13	Requested permission for marriage. Permitted on the same day. "
" June 17	Appointed chairman of the Investigation Committee for the Dismissal of Midshipman UMEIDA, Yoshio. "
" Dec. 1	Relieved of the current post and appointed captain of the Kashima, the First Fleet.
1913 Feb. 10	Left Daku, to cruise to China.



1913 Feb. 10 Arrived at Mako on the 17th.

" Apr. 28 Permitted to travel to Tokyo for 8 days, excluding 2 days for both ways, to adjust household affairs. Started on May 5, and returned on the 15th.

" Dec. 1 Appointed Rear-Admiral

" " Appointed Chief of the Ordnance. Cabinet  
Department of the Sasebo Naval Dockyard. "

1914 Jan. 30 Raised to the Senior Grade of the 5th Court Rank.

" Aug. 18 Relieved of the current post and appointed  
Commander of the Second Fleet. Cabinet

" Aug. 23 The War Against Germany was opened.

" Aug. 24 Started from Sasebo for the front.

" Aug. 27 Got on board (the flagship TONE) and returned to Sasebo on board the Tone.

" Aug. 28 Left Hakkoho, engaged in battle.

" Dec. 1 Relieved of the current post and appointed  
Commander of the 1st Flotilla Destroyers.

1915 Mar. 7 Permitted to travel to Tokyo for 7 days, excluding 2 days for both ways, to adjust household affairs. Started on March 9, returned on the 17th.

" Apr. 1 Relieved of the current post and appointed  
Commander of the Third Flotilla of Destroyers.  
Retired from the Flotilla on October 6. Cabinet

" Oct. 1 Relieved of the current post and appointed Chief of the 2nd Department, and concurrently chief of the 3rd Department, of the Naval Technical Headquarters.

" " Appointed Naval Merits Investigation Committee.  
Navy Ministry

" Oct. 9 Appointed member of the nomination Committee of Students for the Naval Staff College. "

" Nov. 20 Appointed Commander of the 8th SENTAI /Squadron/ while the fleet was organized for the special Naval review.



- 1915 Nov. 1 Decorated with 2nd Order of Merit with the  
Order of Sacred Treasure. Bureau of Decorations
- " Nov. 7 Decorated with the 3rd class Order of the  
Golden Kite with the annuity of 700 yen and  
the Order of the Double Rays of the Rising Sun  
in recognition of the services in the 1914-15 War.
- " " Decorated with the 1914-15 War Medal.
- " Nov. 10 In accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 154,  
awarded the coronation commemoration medal.
- " Dec. 13 Relieved of the principal and concurrent post and  
appointed chief of the personnel Affairs Bureau  
of the Navy Ministry. Cabinet
- " " Appointed member of the Nomination Committee of  
Students for the Naval Staff College.  
The Naval Department
- " Dec. 13 Appointed member of the Joint Investigation  
Committee for Rivising the Army and the Naval  
Code of Criminal Procedure.
- " " Appointed special committee for the agreement  
regarding the official recognition of distinguished  
services of the Army and the Navy.
- " " Appointed member of the Naval Merits Investigation  
Committee.  
The Naval Department
- 1916 Jan. 22 Appointed investigation committee for awarding war  
medals to those who served in the 1914-1915 War/.
- " May 26 Appointed member of the Naval Merits Investigation  
Committee.
- 1917 Dec. 1 Promoted to vice-admiral. The Cabinet
- " Dec. 1 Appointed Chief of the Sasebo Naval Dock Yard.  
Arrived at the post on the 10th Dec. and retired on  
the 17th Sept. 1918.
- " " Appointed councillor of the prize court at SASEBO.
- " " Promoted to the Junior Grade of the 4th Court Rank.  
The Depart. of the  
Imperial Household



- 1918 Jan. 26 During the absence of SASERO Naval Station Commandant YATSUSHIRO Rokuro, on account of journey to investigate the conditions of enrolling volunteers, took charge of his post temporarily.
- " Feb. 1 Relieved of the temporary post.
- " Aug. 10 Special addition was made to the real term of service in accordance with Minister's Secretariate Order No. 2978.
- " Sept. 4 Relieved of the current post and appointed member of the flag officers' conference. The Cabinet
- " " 9 Request for seven days' leave excluding two days round trip for a journey to TOKYO from this day in order to attend on a sick child was granted.
- " Sept. 16 Relieved as councillor of the Prize court at SASERO. The Cabinet
- " Oct. 18 Relieved of the current post and appointed chief of the Bureau of the Naval Construction, Navy Ministry. Arrived at the post on Oct. 22.
- " Oct. 22 Appointed councillor to the Munitions Bureau. 1920, by Imperial Ordinance No. 139.
- " " 24 Appointed Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Naval Powder Depot. The business ended on the 4th of April 1919. Naval Department
- " " Appointed chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Branch Depot of the KURE Naval Powder Depot.
- 1919 March 1 Relieved as chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Hiroshima Branch Depot of the KURE Naval Powder Depot.
- " April 1 Appointed member of the Naval Merits Investigation Committee.
- " June 25 Appointed member of the Investigation Committee for the Standardization of Weights and Measures and Industrial Goods. Became lapsed on March 31, 1921.
- " Nov. 7 Appointed temporary member of the Temporary Investigation Committee of Finance and Economy. The Cabinet



1919 Nov. 18 Appointed chairman of the Investigation Committee of Iron Manufacturing and Ship-building. The Navy Ministry

1920 Sept. 30 The principal post became void in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 440. came to effect on and after the 1st of October.

" Oct. 1 Appointed chief of the Naval Construction Bureau. The Cabinet

" " 11 Appointed member of the flag officer's conference.

" " 14 Appointed member of the Munitions Conference. Became lapsed by Imperial Ordinance No. 474 of the 30th of Oct. 1922

1921 May 30 Granted a set of silver cups in recognition of distinguished services regarding the revision of the Army and Naval Code of Criminal Procedure. The Bureau of Decorations

1920 Nov. 1 Decorated with the 1st Order of Merit with the Order of the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun in recognition of services in the 1915-1920 Battle, and granted Yen 2,800.

" Nov. 1 Decorated with the War Medal 1914-20.

1922 Jan. 23 Appointed Government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Navy Ministry. Cabinet

1922 Jan. 25 Appointed Acting Vice-Minister of the Navy while IRE, Kenji, Vice Minister of the Navy was confined to sick-bed. Navy Ministry

1920 Nov. 1 Decorated with the War Victory Medal in accordance with the War Victory Medal Ordinance. Bureau of Decorations

1922 Nov. 18 Relieved as temporary member of the Temporary Investigation Committee of Finance and Economy. Cabinet

1923 Feb. 10 Promoted to the Senior Grade of the 4th Court Rank. Imperial Household Ministry



- 1923 Apr. 18 Appointed chairman of the Special Aviation Inquiry Committee. Navy Ministry
- " May 25 Relieved of the current post and appointed full-time member of the Flag-Officers' Council. "
- " " Appointed Vice-Minister of the Navy. Cabinet
- " " Promoted to the 1st Rank of the higher civil service.
- " " Appointed member of the Naval Merits Investigation Committee. Navy Ministry
- " " Appointed chairman of the Inquiry Committee on the Conferment of the 1914-1920 War Medal. "
- " " Appointed chairman of the Inquiry Committee on the Conferment of the Victory-Medal.
- " " 30 Appointed member of the Central Statistics Committee, membership becoming lapsed on June 11, 1924. Cabinet
- " " Appointed member of the State Property Inquiry Committee, membership becoming lapsed on June 11, 1924. "
- " June 5 Appointed member of the Harbor Inquiry Committee, the membership June 11, 1924.
- " " Appointed member of the Road Council. Abolished on Apr. 17, 1924 in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 90. Cabinet
- " " Appointed member of the Central City Planning Committee.
- " " 7 Appointed member of the Board of Trustees of Peers' School. Imperial Household Ministry
- " " 4 Appointed member of the Railway Conference, the membership becoming lapsed on June 11, 1924. Cabinet
- " " 13 Appointed member of the Maritime Affairs Committee. Abolished on Apr. 17, 1924, in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 90
- " July 25 Appointed chairman of the Inquiry Committee on the Naval Educational System. Navy Ministry



1923	Sept. 5	Appointed chairman of the Naval Committee on the Earthquake Relief Work.	Navy Ministry
"	Oct. 1	The Naval Committee on the Earthquake Relief Work was abolished in accordance with Paragraph 4 of Secretariat No. 3055.	
"	Oct. 18	Appointed councillor to the Metropolitan Reconstruction Board. Abolished on Feb. 23, 1924, in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 25	Cabinet
"	Dec. 10	Appointed Government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Navy Ministry.	"
"	Dec. 22	Ordered to proceed to CHINA and SIBERIA.	Navy Ministry
"	Dec. 25	Appointed government commissioner of matters under the jurisdiction of the Navy Ministry.	Cabinet
1924	Feb. 2	Appointed member of the Committee on Special City, membership becoming lapsed on June 11, 1924.	"
"	Apr. 19	Reported the transfer of the permanent domicile to the urban Prefecture of TOKYO.	
"	Jun. 10	The Inquiry Committee on Naval Educational System was abolished.	
"	Jun. 11	Promoted to Admiral.	Cabinet
"	"	Relieved of the current post at own request.	"
"	"	Relieved of the current post.	The Navy Ministry
"	"	Appointed Supreme War Councillor.	Direct Imperial Appointment
"	" 27	Relieved as member of the Board of Trustees of Peers' School.	Imperial Household Ministry
"	Sept. 1	Appointed Judge of the grand naval manoeuvre of 1924.	
"	Oct. 1	The form of commission was revised by Navy, Personnel Affairs No. 79.	



1924 Dec 1	Relieved of the current post.	Navy Ministry
"	Appointed Commander in Chief of the 1st Fleet and concurrently Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.	
1925 Jan 31	Transferred to the MUTSU because of the change of the flag-ship.	1st Fleet.
Feb 28	Promoted to the Junior grade of the 3rd Court Rank.	Imp. Household Ministry
Apr 28	Transferred to the YAMASHIRO because of the change of the flag-ship.	1st Fleet
Jul 2	Transferred to the MUTSU because of the change of the Flag-ship.	"
Oct 15	Transferred to the YAMASHIRO because of the change of the Flag-ship.	"
Mar 1	Granted a sum of 1,200 yen for the services rendered in the affairs concerning the despatch of troops to Russian Territory.	Navy Ministry
1925 Dec 1	Transferred to the NEGATO because of the change of the Flag-ship.	1st Fleet.
1926 Dec 10	Relieved of the current and the concurrent post.	Navy Ministry
"	Appointed Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station.	Direct Imp. Appointment
"	Appointed concurrently member of the Board of Admirals.	Navy Ministry
1927 Apr 20	Relieved of the current and the concurrent post.	"
"	Appointed Navy Minister. Arrived at the post on Apr 21.	Cabinet
1927 Dec 15	Promoted to the Senior grade of the 3rd Court Rank.	Imp. Household Ministry
1927 Dec 15	Promoted to the Senior Grade of the 3rd Court Rank.	



1928 May 29	Got Imperial sanction of receiving and wearing of the Order of the "Chevalier, Virtuti Militari" given by the Polish Government.	
Oct 29	Ordered to attend on the Emperor in His tour for the Coronation.	Cabinet
Nov 5	Ordered to appear at office after mourning.	
Nov 10	Decorated with the Medal in Commemoration of the Imperial Enthronement in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No.188 of 1928.	Bureau of Decorations
1929 July 2	Relieved of the current post at own request.	Cabinet
"	Appointed Supreme War Councillor.	"
Dec 11	Appointed Councillor.	"
1930 Jan 28	Got the Imperial sanction of receiving and wearing the Order of "Knight Grand Cross Victoria" given by the King of Great Britain.	Bureau of Decorations
Mar 4	Got Imperial sanction of receiving and wearing the 4th Grade of White Order of Naval Merit given by the King of Spain.	
1930 Jun 20	Appointed Special Inspector.	Navy Ministry
Dec 5	Decorated with the Medal in Commemoration of the Reconstruction of the Metropolis in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No.148 of 1930.	Bureau of Decorations
1932 Mar 28	Appointed chairman of the Committee for the Specially Grand Festival of the Yasukuni Shrine of Apr. 1932.	Navy Ministry
May 26	Appointed Navy Minister. Arrived at the post on May 26. Relieved of the current post.	Cabinet Navy Ministry
Jun 1	Promoted to the Junior Grade of the 2nd Court Rank.	Imp. Household Ministry
1932 Aug 4	Appointed member of the Committee for the Compilation of Historical Materials of the Meiji Restoration.	Cabinet



1932 Aug 18	Appointed chairman of the Inquiry Committee on Naval Merits.	Navy Ministry
1933 Jan 9	Relieved of the current post at own request.	Cabinet
	Placed on the waiting list.	Navy Ministry
Jan 21	Decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun with the Paulownia Flowers.	Bureau of Decorations
.	Transferred to the second reserve.	Navy Ministry
1933 Jan 26	Specially granted the sum of 11,000 yen because of diligence in duties.	"
May 30	Got the Imperial Sanction of receiving and wearing the Grand Officer d'Ordre National de la Legion d'Honneur given by the French Government.	
1934 Jul 8	Appointed Prime Minister and concurrently Minister of Overseas Affairs.	Cabinet
Oct 25	Relieved of the concurrent post.	
Mar 1	Got the Imperial Sanction of receiving and wearing the Empire Foundation Service Medal given by the Emperor of Manchoukuo.	Bureau of Decorations
1935 Sep 9	Concurrently appointed Minister of Communications.	Cabinet
Sep 12	Relieved of the concurrent post.	"
1934 Apr 29	Decorated with the War Medal in accordance with the 1931-34 War Medal Ordinance.	Bureau of Decorations
1935 Sep 21	Got the Imperial Sanction of receiving and wearing the Medal in commemoration of the Emperor of Manchoukuo's visit to Japan given by Him.	
1936 Mar 9	Relieved of the current post at own request.	Cabinet
1934 May 9	Got the Imperial Sanction of receiving and wearing the 1st Order of the Grand Cordon of the Dragon Ray given by the Emperor of Manchoukuo.	Bureau of Decorations



1937 Apr 29

Specially granted the privileges of former  
post.

1938 Jan 21

Placed on the retired list.

Navy Ministry



Checked by KUROSAWA

Social Status: <sup>9th</sup> "Samurai" Rank

~~Curriculum Vitae (1) J.M.~~

Name: OKADA, Keisuke

Date of Birth: January 21, 1868

Birth Place: No. 19, <sup>Chō</sup> Hinode-machi, Fukui ~~City~~, Fukui Prefecture.

Former clan ~~in the Shogunate~~: The Fukui clan

~~Godobashi-chō, Toyotama-gun,~~

Permanent Residence: No. 875, Isunobazu, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.

Family Members:

Grand Mother: Shizu, born in July 1818

Father: Kitada, born in January 1832

Elder Sister: Toyoko, born in November 1864

Younger brother: Kimata, born in November 1874

Younger sister: Toshiko, born in March 1877

Youngest sister: Tomiko, born in February 1887

Elderest son: Sadatomo, born on March 4th 1908

Third daughter: Kimiko, born on Aug. 30th 1914



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 4126

August 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

Naval Preparations

MIYO - Cross

Page

Asked whether it was a coincidence that the place of reconnaissance was the precise spot of invasion on December 8, 1941, he stated that there were not many appropriate points for landing operations, and if an aerial reconnaissance was conducted over the east coast of Malaya then there would be in that place an appropriate place for landing.

26924

\* He did not mean to state that they had the reconnaissance because they thought it an appropriate place for landing. The purpose of the reconnaissance was to find out if there were any appropriate places, and it so happened that in the particular area over which the reconnaissance was conducted an appropriate landing place was found, and that could occur as a natural matter. He did not know whether after the reconnaissance, the hydrographic office set to work to make a complete map that was completed in July 1941, because he was not connected with such matters.

26925

Asked whether if the results did not come to him in the Staff and thus enable him to issue a detailed map in October, 1941, he stated that they in their operational studies would ask for necessary data from the Third Division, Naval General Staff, handling intelligence. \* Any such demand or order might have been issued, but he did not know how the Third Division placed its orders or requests.

He stated that with respect to naval personnel in the invasion of the Philippines, the personnel did not come from Manchuria. He did not know whether the navy convoyed the troops from Manchuria, because he was not in direct association with the matter. He did not know the training for the operation took place in Manchuria since July 27, 1941.

26926

\* He stated his recollection was very faint with regard to the war games in July and August, 1941. He stated he knew nothing about them. He had not participated in the War Games at Saiki and Kagoshima. He stated that war games were not held in the Naval War College after transfer from Tokyo. During the month of August, chart maneuvers were conducted at the Naval War College, and the witness did participate in those games.

26927

\* Asked whether these included a complete rehearsal of the Pearl Harbor Operation, he stated whether it could be called complete would be difficult to say, but a private draft plan of such operations was incorporated. He denied that the maneuvers took place in August and the final stage began on September 2. It was conducted in the middle of September. It was attended by umpires from the Staff and Navy Ministry. He thought the commander of the games was the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet. He had no recollection that one team was called the "N" team. He had the feeling that it might have been called the "Blue".



Second son Sadahiro, born on Jan. 15th 1917.

year	Month & Day	Particulars	Government office
		<del>RECORD</del>	<del>school</del>
1885	Nov. 21	<del>was</del> a student of the Naval Academy. <del>Ordered to become midshipman</del>	Naval Academy
	April 20	Awarded a <sup>the completion</sup> certificate of finishing <del>the</del> <del>course</del>	"
		<del>of</del> <sup>whole</sup> the complete course of the Naval Academy.	
	"	Commissioned naval cadet <del>was appointed Officer Cad Candidate</del>	Navy Ministry
	"	Ordered to board <del>was assigned to</del> the Kongo for the	"
		purpose of practice.	
	Aug. 14	Started for Hawaii on <del>was ordered to set out on</del> ocean	"
		navigation to Hawaii. Returned <sup>home</sup>	
		on Feb. 22nd, 1890.	
1890	March 14	<del>was</del> Transferred from the Kongo to	"
		the Naniwa for the purpose of practice	



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
 August 27, 1947  
 DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
 Naval Preparations  
 MIYO - Cross

Page

26928 \* Generally, he thought there was another team supposed to represent the British Commonwealth. He did not know who commanded this force. He thought there was a third team representing the U. S. He stated he did not believe there was any elaborate plans in the games for the invasion, with carefully worked out schedules, for occupying Malaya, Burma, NEI, Philippines, Solomons, the Central Pacific Islands and Hawaii. The purpose was generally to study fleet movements. There was nothing included in them about landing operations or ground fighting.

The fleet does play an important part in landing operations. It was difficult to umpire anything pertaining to ground fighting. Landing operations is considered to be unnecessary in the study. They were only concerned with operations at the time up to the point of landing operations and where they would take place. After that the navy officers were not familiar with the matter, and they did not consider it necessary to go into details. He did not recollect ever stating that they went into detail on the naval part of the operations. At that time the witness was one of the umpires for aerial operations, and there were two or three besides himself. He definitely umpired the Pearl Harbor Operations. He was asked to umpire certain phases of other operations, \* but did not remember ever serving as umpire for over-all operations.

26930 He thought he was connected with the Philippine Area Operation. He did not know how long before the games the preparations had been going on. He did not think it was for a long time. The plans for the games were drawn up by the Combined Fleet, and he was unable to give a clear answer. He had no particular basis for making his statement that the Tokyo games began in the middle of September instead of the 2nd of September. He spoke only from memory.

26931 \* He denied that in the middle of September the staff officers went to Iwakuni to report results to the army staff. It is a fact that they went to Iwakuni, but they did not report results of the games. They met the army staff officers, but he had no recollection who headed them. The Pearl Harbor Operations were not discussed at that time.

26932 He decided to make a correction by stating that they met at Iwakuni on November 15, \* and not in the middle of September.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BLEWETT.

26933 \* The witness stated he acted as umpire in the naval maneuvers after September 6.



1890 June 8	<del>1890</del>	Was ordered to sail to Korea. Came back to Mihara on July 6th.	"
July 9	✓	<del>Was</del> Appointed Ensign assigned to	Cabinet
"	✓	<del>was ordered to assume the post of Assistant Division Officer of the Naniwa.</del>	Navy Ministry
<del>1891</del> <del>Aug 22</del>	<del>1891</del>	Relieved of the current post and was appointed Assistant Navigation Officer on the Naniwa.	"
1891 Aug. 22	✓	<del>was ordered to sail to the various</del> ports of the neighbouring countries. Came back to Maizuru on 29th.	"
Aug. 28 Nov. 16	✓	It was decided that Ensign be treated	



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
 August 27, 1947  
 DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
 Naval Preparations  
 HIGASA - Direct

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF HIGASA, KEN.

26936 \* The witness stated he lived in Tokyo. He identified exhibit  
 26937 No. 3021 as his affidavit, and verified it. \* The witness stated that  
 in the summer of 1941, he was a staff officer of Imperial General  
 Headquarters. At the conclusion of the pact with FIC, he was sent to  
 aid the spot negotiations which were carried out by General SUMITA at  
 Hanoi. SUMITA was informed from General Headquarters that the negotia-  
 tions on the co-defense of FIC was concluded in France on July 21, between  
 Darlan and Ambassador KATO, and that the exchange of official statements  
 was made on July 22. At the same time he was informed of the arrangement  
 of military expansion and cooperation, exhibit No. 651. He was informed  
 of its contents before July 29, when it was executed.

26938 SUMITA immediately opened negotiations. \* At that time,  
 relations between the Japanese and the FIC government office was very  
 friendly and close, and the spot agreement proceeded smoothly and  
 speedily. The witness, with the Navy and Foreign Office representatives,  
 witnessed the signing between SUMITA and the Governor-General. In  
 addition to the Governor-General, there were present the Chief Secretary  
 and other persons. SUMITA, at the signing, asked the French whether the  
 notice from France contained the same contents as exhibit 651, and  
 received an affirmative answer. The date of the agreement was July 23,  
 1941.

26939 The contents of the agreement was for enforcing details in  
 compliance with the official statement. It is composed of detailed,  
 concrete measures, such as \* movement of Japanese forces, their landing  
 point and date, their course, occupation regions, billeting and supply  
 facilities for the forces, removal of breach mechanisms from the French  
 guns to avoid collisions between the two forces, the gist and region of  
 withdrawal of the FIC forces from the beach where the Japanese planned  
 to land, and the establishment of land marks visible from the air at the  
 stationed areas of FIC forces. The telegram sent from headquarters and  
 the agreement cannot be found.

26940 He flew by air to Hainan Island the day after the conclusion  
 of the agreement, and informed the supreme commanders of the Japanese  
 Army and Navy of the course up to the conclusion, and the contents of  
 the agreement. They talked about minute arrangements for preventing  
 \* accidental collision.



(4)

		With the ninth grade of the <del>higher</del> <sup>"Sonin"</sup>	
		Rank <del>Civil Service</del> by Imperial Ordinance	
		No. 215 regarding the official ranks.	
Dec. 14	✓	Was conferred the Senior Grade of the <del>Imperial</del>	Imperial
		<del>eighth class of the Court Rank.</del>	Household
			Department
Jan. 19	1892	Was granted the first pay grade	Navy Ministry
Feb. 2	✓	Was ordered to sail to <sup>various</sup> <del>ports</del> of the	
		neighbouring countries. Returned	
		home on March 11th.	
May 23	✓	Was relieved of the Courant Post	"
"	✓	Ordered to board <del>was assigned to join the Jingei</del>	"
		for <sup>the</sup> purpose of torpedo <del>service</del> <sup>training</sup> .	



Page

On July 25, he went to Saigon with SUMITA and others. Detailed arrangements were made with the FIC forces there. The arrangements were carried out in a friendly atmosphere, and scrupulous care and preparations were made against any accidental collision in the several days prior to the landing of Japanese. It was planned in advance that the SUMITA mission should certify the withdrawal of the FIC forces, and they were to report it to the Japanese forces, and the landing would begin. This was carried out in this manner. A part of the Japanese forces landed on the 28th, and the greater part on the 29th.

26941 He later learned that the date of the formal signing of the protocol for co-defense of FIC was July 29, 1941. However, the official statements \* were reported on July 22 to each respective agency, by Japan and France. Based on this, the pact was concluded harmoniously and the occupation began.

THERE WAS NO CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS.

26942 Exhibit No. 3022, excerpt from the interrogation of TOJO, February 13, 1946, stated \* that he thought they would send troops into Southern FIC, and that was all. He thought this was to be in connection with increasing close relations with that country. On May 9, 1941, Japan had arbitrated the \* border dispute between Thai and FIC. It was not planned to occupy FIC. Japan concluded a joint defense treaty to stabilize FIC on July 29, 1941. Prior to that time, the Japanese had not entered South FIC.

26944 They were sent in accord with the treaty signed on July 29, 1941. The troops were sent to Southern FIC the same day they entered on the basis of the agreement. He denied that they had decided on July 1941 to send troops whether FIC agreed or not. There was a military agreement of September 22, 1940, under which troops were stationed in northern FIC. However, military pressure from Singapore, the Philippines, and others, had continued. On July 25, the U. S. freezing of assets had gone into effect, and it was very difficult \* to carry on peaceful commerce with the NEI. The China Incident was continuing, and the stabilization of FIC was very important. On July 29, troops were sent to south FIC in accordance with the agreement. The Imperial Conference had foreseen changes and decided to carry on negotiations with France.

26945 \* The main reason why Japan decided to advance south in July 1941 was not that she needed raw materials. The main reason was the necessity for maintaining stability there while fighting with China. However, Japan needed peaceful trade to support production at home and maintain the China struggle. Japan needed oil, iron ore, bauxite, tin, and food, to be gained by peaceful trade.



Oct. 20	✓	<p>was conferred <sup>R</sup> certificate of finishing Captain  <del>torpedo training course for the junior</del> of the jin-  <del>officer</del> the junior officers' course on <del>zei</del> <sup>zei</sup>.  the torpedo training ship of the Japanese  Empire, <del>the</del> <sup>the</sup> certificate with <del>honors</del> <sup>being the first prize.</sup></p>
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NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
 August 27, 1947  
 DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
 Naval Preparations

Page

When asked why FIC needed stabilizing, he stated that Japan was making every effort to successfully conclude the China Incident. Any disturbance in the south would have an unfavorable effect on that solution. It was Japan's idea for a long time before to maintain the stability of East Asia. Thirdly, rice and other foodstuffs imported from FIC, would be unavailable if conditions were unsettled there.

26946

\* These were very necessary for Japan.

As War Minister, he did think that FIC would be militarily useful in connection with the China Incident, but from the military point of view, there was a practical relation so far as north FIC was concerned. The supply route from north FIC was of aid to the Chinese, and Japan wanted militarily to establish air bases in north FIC so as to cut off the route from Burma. However, since French power had declined, there was required the stationing of troops not only in north FIC but also in the central and southern parts for maintaining stability.

26947

Asked whether troops in FIC would not have been of assistance in case of war between England, U.S., or Holland, TOJO stated that economic and military pressure from those countries was increasing. \* The stationing of troops was chiefly to maintain stability, but it did assist the China operations and help make peaceful commerce possible. He believed that the stationing of troops was an appropriate measure of national defense.

From exhibit 809, it was stated that available references documenting Japanese preparations were yet fragmentary, especially on specialized training operations in tropical warfare, which were reported to have taken place in the summer and fall of 1941. As the day of opening hostilities approached, pertinent references grow plentiful, until in November 1941 it is possible to piece together a fairly comprehensive picture of the military preparations.

26948

It was pointed out that according to the same exhibit, no general mobilization took place until October 1941.

With respect to the land operation practice, this document stated that little, if any, military advantage resulted, and it would appear that they had been intended solely for training.



1892	"	Relieved as member of the crew of the Jingei though once had been appointed <sup>ordered to board</sup> to practise torpedo-operations	Navy Ministry
	"	Placed on the waiting list. It was decided on that	"
Nov. 12		Ensigns. <del>were</del> <sup>let</sup> placed at the eighth rank of the higher civil service by Imperial Ordinance No. 96. Enforced on and after the 20th.	
Dec. 21		Ordered to be C-class student of the Naval Staff College.	"
1893 Dec. 19		Finished the regular course for C-class students of the Naval Staff College. The first class.	Naval Staff College



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

August 28, 1947

Page 4157

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

Naval Preparations

IIMURA - Direct

Page

27070

The use of the results of this study in actual policies was out of the question because of the lack of time needed for scrutiny and because of the aims. Students, who were first selected by Ministers and other organizations and examined by the Institute, were selected and formally appointed by the Cabinet as students. All were young men of an average age of 32, and no one held any responsible position. There was one judge of low grade.

The budget was ¥160,000 a year, of which half was for personnel expenses and the other half for office expenses. It was too small for making any activity possible. The Institute would seem to be of considerable importance from its name and stipulations as to its organization, but it was nothing but an Institute for educating junior officials, and they could not be educated successfully. Not a single result of their studies was used in drawing up practical policies or war plans.

27071

\* In order to obtain assistance from various quarters, a councillor system was adopted in May or June 1941, but they were registered only as members. They received no suggestion or direction from KIMURA, SUZUKI, or HOSHINO in connection with business of the Institute.

CROSS EXAMINATION BY BRIGADIER QUILLIAM.

27072

The witness stated that he was the first director of the Institute, but before his appointment HOSHINO acted as director. Before the witness' appointment, he had been Chief of Staff of the Quantung Army, and for a short time had been attached \* to the General Staff. He relinquished his appointment to take up the directorship, and at that time he was a Lieutenant-General. When he gave up his directorship he was appointed to command the Fifth Army in Manchuria. He held that appointment for two years, and was then appointed director of the Military War College.

27073

The Cabinet felt primarily responsible for establishing the Institute. The students were trained by the Institute, using as the background the international and domestic situation then facing Japan of which it expected to face. They discussed and examined the national \* problems which would arise if Japan moved into the Southwest Pacific.



1893 " Awarded a binocular for  
excellent scholarship.

C-Class

" Relieved as student of the Naval  
Staff College.

Naval  
Ministry

" Appointed assistant division  
officer of the Itenkushima "

1894 Mar. 1 Relieved of the current post and  
appointed)  
ordered to ~~assume temporarily~~  
acting-

~~the duties of a~~ division officer  
the Marine Corps  
of the Yokosuka Naval Station ?

~~Barracks.~~ "

Mar. 22 Appointed member of the Yoko-  
suka Naval Station Court -

Martial. Yokosuka  
Naval  
Station



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
August 28, 1947  
DEFENSE - Div V - Pacific  
MILITARY PREPARATIONS

page 4159

page

In fact only purely naval matters were outside his authority. As Premier he had full responsibility for civil affairs, as War Minister he had the additional military function of military administration and as Chief of Staff he had the High Command functions of operations and tactics. This must be understood to explain the China Incident and the matters in southern FIC. At first the government policy on the China Incident was localization. But due to the independence of the High Command, the fighting spread. KONOYE had a terrible time.

27088

\*In addition, the Emperor was assisted by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Lord Chamberlain and the Imperial Household Minister and a Chief Aide-de-Camp. The Lord Keeper was the adviser on civil affairs. The Grand Chamberlain and the Imperial Household Minister had no direct connection with the civil government or the Supreme Command. The Chamberlain was adjutant to the Emperor. He was a civil official and not a military man. The Aide-de-Camp being a full general had unofficial access to the Supreme Command but had no authority for direct liaison.

27089

The Emperor conferred directly with the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. This was not a very active body since most of the members were old. In practice, the Emperor was in a difficult position. He had no one to help him on High Command matters. \* When the Premier and various cabinet members reported to the Emperor on civil matters he could consult the Lord Keeper. When the Chiefs of Staff reported to him on command problems, he had nobody to consult except the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals.

The responsibility of the various ministers and the President of the Planning Board, and chiefs of staff for advice to the Emperor through Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences was of tremendous importance. For example in the China Incident the Government policy was not enlargement but because the civil government had no authority over the Supreme Command, the fighting was enlarged and the civil government was powerless.

With respect to Exhibit 3032, it was read that TOJO stated \* as an answer to the question whether a large number of army officers were pro-axis, he stated that a majority of officers' opinion was pro-Axis for a number of reasons; that one of the reasons



June 8 Relieved of <sup>acting - division</sup> ~~the duties of a division~~  
of the Marine Corps.

~~officer~~ officer of the Yokosuka  
Naval Station ~~Baracks~~, ~~ordered~~

to assume temporarily the duties  
acting-  
~~of a~~ division officer of the

Naniwa, the ship awaiting commission. Navy  
Ministry

June 13 <sup>The ship</sup>  
~~she~~ became a guard-ship.

Set sail from Moji for  
June 24 sailed to Korea, leaving Moji.

On July 1<sup>st</sup> arrived at Sasebo.

On July 25<sup>th</sup> left Sasebo, and

engaged in ~~the~~ battle from  
that day on.

July 25 The war was opened with  
China.



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

August 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

TANAKA - Direct

Page 4141

Page

26,997 because the southern operations for defense were left out of consideration and the areas were untouched or without defense. Even the study of the defense of the south was incomplete as to organization, equipment, materials and training of forces for landing and tropical operation. Although the most urgent need was to reform the organization and equipment of part of the forces and give them special training for use in the south \* against the U.S. and Britain as provided in the plan, it could not be expected that they would be finished even crudely by the Summer of 1941.

26,998 In the 1941 mobilization plan, emphasis was laid on completing defense in Manchuria against the Soviet, by reorganizing each division to adapt it to continental operations, especially in North Manchuria. The organization and equipment was opposite in nature to those for the south. Transport goods for each division was of a great amount and a majority of horses for transport and communication were to be Manchurian ponies. This makes clear that Japan laid greater stress on defense operations against the Soviet than on those against the U.S. and Britain even in April 1941. As for Army airplanes, only 60 or 70% out of the original mobilization plan was expected to be reached before August 1941. Heavy bombers originally designed \* for the Manchurian-Soviet frontier had only a small flying range and were not well fitted for the south. On the whole, aviation facilities were not available for the south.

26,999 Only a small amount of ammunition was piled up for the south during the spring and summer of 1941 and an additional amount was accumulated in September and October until December, and at that time it reached in total barely to the amount available for ten divisions. This accumulation was not calculated into preparations based on the 1941 plan, but was carried out chiefly after determining national policy. The preparations in the 1941 plan meant reorganization and training of divisions to fit them for defense in the south, study of tropical tactics, landing tactics and the collection of information and strategic materials. They were essential matters of study for planning a peacetime national defense and were not the prerequisites \* for war against the U.S., Britain and Holland. It was too late in beginning and not rapid in progress. In addition, information about the south was incomplete and no bases were prepared for aviation, sea transport and communications.

Even passive and defensive operations were hard to put into effect, and more difficult than this was the plan to make a responsive attack after defensive actions or an instant counterattack. They tried



as acting-

Oct. 5

Relieved the duties of a division officer of the Naniwa, ~~ordered to~~ and appointed

~~assume temporarily the duties of acting-~~

division officer of the Takachiko.

~~while~~ At the front.

Internal Affairs

Military Administrative Bureau

The Cabinet

Dec. 9

Appointed Lieutenant.

"

Raised to the 7th rank of the

higher civil service.

"

Appointed division officer of

the Takachiko. ~~while~~ At the front.

Military Administrative Bureau

Internal Affairs

Dec. 28

Raised to the Junior Grade of the

17th Court Rank.

The Imperial Household Ministry

1895

Feb. 20

Relieved of the current post and

appointed division officer of



## NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

August 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

TANAKA - Direct

Page

26,997

because the southern operations for defense were left out of consideration and the areas were untouched or without defense. Even the study of the defense of the south was incomplete as to organization, equipment, materials and training of forces for landing and tropical operation. Although the most urgent need was to reform the organization and equipment of part of the forces and give them special training for use in the south \* against the U.S. and Britain as provided in the plan, it could not be expected that they would be finished even crudely by the Summer of 1941.

26,998

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Even passive and defensive operations were hard to put into effect, and more difficult than this was the plan to make a responsive attack after defensive actions or an instant counterattack. They tried



" Decorated with the 1894-95 War Medal. "

1896 Jan. 20 Imperial Ordinance No 2, the Station Law was Torpedo ~~Group~~ Regulations were To be enacted. Enforced on and after April 1.

Apr. 1 Appointed division officer of the Nagasaki <sup>er</sup> ~~ing~~ <sup>Section</sup> ~~Force~~ of the Sasebo Torpedo ~~Group~~ Station

Navy Ministry



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

August 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

TANAKA - Direct

Page 4141

Page

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Even passive and defensive operations were hard to put into effect, and more difficult than this was the plan to make a responsive attack after defensive actions or an instant counterattack. They tried



Tsushima,

the Minelayer Section.

~~the Tsushima Torpedo Unit~~

Military Administrative Bureau

~~minelaying force~~

1895 Nov. 18 Decorated with the 5th class Order of the Golden Kite.

Bureau of Decorations

" Decorated with the 6th Order of

Merit with the Order of the Sacred

Treasure.

"

" Decorated with the 5th class Order

of the Golden Kite with the

annuity of 300 yen and the

6th Order of Merit with the Order

of the Sacred Treasure in recogni-

tion of services in the 1894-95

War.

"



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 4141

August 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

TANAKA - Direct

Page

26,997

because the southern operations for defense were left out of consideration and the areas were untouched or without defense. Even the study of the defense of the south was incomplete as to organization, equipment, materials and training of forces for landing and tropical operation. Although the most urgent need was to reform the organization and equipment of part of the forces and give them special training for use in the south \* against the U.S. and Britain as provided in the plan, it could not be expected that they would be finished even crudely by the Summer of 1941.

26,998

In the 1941 mobilization plan, emphasis was laid on completing defense in Manchuria against the Soviet, by reorganizing each division to adapt it to continental operations, especially in North Manchuria. The organization and equipment was opposite in nature to those for the south. Transport goods for each division was of a great amount and a majority of horses for transport and communication were to be Manchurian ponies. This makes clear that Japan laid greater stress on defense operations against the Soviet than on those against the U.S. and Britain even in April 1941. As for Army airplanes, only 60 or 70% out of the original mobilization plan was expected to be reached before August 1941. Heavy bombers originally designed \* for the Manchurian-Soviet frontier had only a small flying range and were not well fitted for the south. On the whole, aviation facilities were not available for the south.

26,999

Only a small amount of ammunition was piled up for the south during the spring and summer of 1941 and an additional amount was accumulated in September and October until December, and at that time it reached in total barely to the amount available for ten divisions. This accumulation was not calculated into preparations based on the 1941 plan, but was carried out chiefly after determining national policy. The preparations in the 1941 plan meant reorganization and training of divisions to fit them for defense in the south, study of tropical tactics, landing tactics and the collection of information and strategic materials. They were essential matters of study for planning a peacetime national defense and were not the prerequisites \* for war against the U.S., Britain and Holland. It was too late in beginning and not rapid in progress. In addition, information about the south was incomplete and no bases were prepared for aviation, sea transport and communications.

Even passive and defensive operations were hard to put into effect, and more difficult than this was the plan to make a responsive attack after defensive actions or an instant counterattack. They tried



OKADA, KEISUKE - 3

51  
1

Translated by AZUMA

12

1896 Jul. 2	Entered <del>Raised</del> to the 3rd pay grade	Navy Ministry
Jun. 15	Appointed Judge of the SASEHO Station Naval District Court - Martial.	SASEHO Naval District Station
Dec. 26	Relieved of <sup>the</sup> current post.	Navy Ministry
	division officer of the warship HIEI.	
" "	Relieved as Judge of the SASEHO Station Naval District Court - Martial.	SASEHO Naval District
1897 Apr. 13	For the purpose of <sup>practical</sup> training <sup>of the students</sup> <del>for practice</del> <del>cadets</del>	
	As the Naval Academy Officer Candidates	
	left YOKOSUKA for HAWAII, U.S.A.	
	etc. and returned to YOKOSUKA	
	on Sep. 20.	
Oct. 26	Appointed concurrently Navigating	



Page

27169 Exhibit No. 3014-A, a Report of the Red Cross Inspection of POW Camps, stated \* that on a visit to camp Sumiro Jogakuin in Tokyo on May 16, 50 Allied citizens were found, two-thirds of whom were local missionaries, who arrived at the camp, which was established on December 8. The telegraphic message described the very salubrious camp situation and the excellent lodging and food conditions. All the internees were made to have a medical examination monthly, and in case of need were sent to public hospitals. Catholic and Protestant religious services were held, and the internees had a library with newspapers, and other amusements. None was indigent among them.

27170 \* The commander of the service of the foreigners of the Metropolitan Police gave good treatment to the internees, who were represented by four men, who maintained excellent discipline and morale. The camp was exemplary, and the sole desire expressed by the internees was about calls to the outside world, which they wished more frequently.

From the delegation in Shanghai, it was reported that 67 nurses from Corregidor were safe and sound and interned in the University of Manila, where they were treated well. Also, about 13,000 civilians were interned in St. Thomas's, and 200 letters from them showed treatment and conditions of life excellent.

27171 From the delegation in Japan, it was reported that Camp No. 2 of Yokohama, visited May 30, was on the seashore on artificial ground. \* It was well-drained, sunny, well-ventilated, and comprised 27 Allied citizens. It was opened on December 19, 1941. The building was two-storied. Treatment, discipline, and morale were good. The delegate received few complaints from internees, suffering from depression. The same day the delegate visited Camp No. 1, in southern Yokohama, which sheltered 52 Allied citizens. Treatment, discipline, and morale there were good.

27172 On June 11 the camp of Shiroyama, Nagasaki, was visited, where 25 Allied citizens were found. The camp was on top of a hill, drained well, with an excellent climate, and enjoyed the fertility of the country. Treatment, morale, and discipline were good, and no complaints were heard. \* It was pointed out that they desired to have books, cards, and play-things, and the Japanese Red Cross was trying to get them. The delegate concluded that the camp was excellent.

On June 13, Camp Miyoshi, Hiroshima Prefecture, was visited. The camp was opened December 13, 1941. There were 18 women and three men interned there. It is situated in a town where in 1935 an American mission established a sanatorium. The climate was salubrious, the buildings solid, sunny, and well-ventilated. Good morale reigned, and no complaint was made to the delegate. The commander, a sympathetic man, was satisfied with the discipline and their spirit of comradeship.



Officer of the warship HIEI.

Navy Ministry

1897 Nov. 5 Relieved of current and concurrent

posts. Appointed division officer

of the warship FUJI.

Dec. 1 Appointed Lieutenant <sup>(again)</sup> in accordance

~~with~~ with Imperial Ordinance No.

310 re Revision of the Naval

Officers' official ranks.

1898 Jan. 6 <sup>Entered</sup> Raised to the 2nd pay grade.

Imperial Household Ministry

Mar. 8 Promoted to the senior grade of

the 7th Court rank.

Apr. 29 Relieved of <sup>the</sup> current post.

Navy Ministry

" " Appointed <sup>B-class student</sup> officer trainee of the  
(Ordered to be)



Page

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Staff  
the Naval War College. Commissioned

officers' course of

1898 Jul. 4 Entered the 1st pay grade. Navy Ministry

" Oct. 10 Confined to his bed because of

pleurisy (for 3 weeks)

Confined to bed

Oct 31 For 3 weeks more.

Confined to bed

Nov 21 For a week more.

Nov. 28 Completely recovered and attended

the office.

Dec. 19 Given Presented a certificate of the completion of the Naval War College Torpedo Art <sup>that he finished</sup> President of the Staff College

Special course of Torpedoes

Staff of the Naval War College

Awarded Given a silver watch for



page

In fact only purely naval matters were outside his authority. As Premier he had full responsibility for civil affairs, as War Minister he had the additional military function of military administration and as Chief of Staff he had the High Command functions of operations and tactics. This must be understood to explain the China Incident and the matters in southern FIC. At first the government policy on the China Incident was localization. But due to the independence of the High Command, the fighting spread. KONOYE had a terrible time.

27088

\*In addition, the Emperor was assisted by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Lord Chamberlain and the Imperial Household Minister and a Chief Aide-de-Camp. The Lord Keeper was the adviser on civil affairs. The Grand Chamberlain and the Imperial Household Minister had no direct connection with the civil government or the Supreme Command. The Chamberlain was adjutant to the Emperor. He was a civil official and not a military man. The Aide-de-Camp being a full general had unofficial access to the Supreme Command but had no authority for direct liaison.

27089

The Emperor conferred directly with the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. This was not a very active body since most of the members were old. In practice, the Emperor was in a difficult position. He had no one to help him on High Command matters. \* When the Premier and various cabinet members reported to the Emperor on civil matters he could consult the Lord Keeper. When the Chiefs of Staff reported to him on command problems, he had nobody to consult except the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals.

The responsibility of the various ministers and the President of the Planning Board, and chiefs of staff for advice to the Emperor through Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences was of tremendous importance. For example in the China Incident the Government policy was not enlargement but because the civil government had no authority over the Supreme Command, the fighting was enlarged and the civil government was powerless.

With respect to Exhibit 3032, it was read that TOJO stated \* as an answer to the question whether a large number of army officers were pro-axis, he stated that a majority of officers' opinion was pro-axis for a number of reasons; that one of the reasons



		excellence in scholarship.)	
1898	Dec 19	Relieved as B-class <sup>student</sup> trainee of the <sup>Navy</sup> Staff <sup>Ministry</sup>	
		officers' course of the Naval <del>War</del>	
		College.	
"	"	Appointed instructor of the Naval <sup>War</sup>	
		torpedo <del>War</del> Training School.	
"	24	Appointed Judge of the YOKOSUKA <sup>YOYOSUKA</sup> Naval <sup>Naval</sup> District <sup>Station</sup> Court-Martial.	
			Navy Ministry
1899	Mar 22	Relieved of <sup>the</sup> concurrent post.	
"	"	Ordered to be <sup>student of</sup> <del>Appointed A-class trainee of the</del> Staff	
		officers' course of the Naval <del>War</del>	
		College.	
"	25	Relieved as Judge of the YOKOSUKA <sup>YOKOSUKA</sup> Naval <sup>Naval</sup> District <sup>District</sup> Court-Martial.	



Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF SATO, TAKEGORO.

26893 The witness stated he lived in Tokyo, and was secretary to  
the Archives Section, Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry. He identified  
exhibit No. 3019 as his affidavit and verified it. The affidavit stated  
26894 \* that on October 2, 1946, the witness issued a certificate concerning  
the authenticity and source of the document entitled "Outline of the  
Foreign Policies of the Japanese Empire" dated September 28, 1940, being  
exhibit No. 837-A. This document is in a file with three other documents  
under a cover entitled "Foreign Policies of the Japanese Empire. His  
certificate does not cover the other three documents.

One of the three documents entitled "Tentative Draft of  
Japan's policies toward the southern regions", dated October 4, 1940, has  
no name of its compiler and bears no seal or signatures of the persons  
concerned or who examined the documents. It is not clear whether the  
original was prepared by the Foreign Ministry.

26896 \* The witness stated that the original exhibit which he had  
examined contained four separate documents. The certificate he made on  
October 2 covers the document entitled "Outline of Foreign policies of  
26897 the Japanese Empire". \* The document mentioned in his affidavit is the  
one called "Tentative Draft of Japanese Policies Toward the Southern  
Regions", October 4, 1940. He did not think there was any difference  
between documents No. 1 and 2.

26898 \* In the Foreign Office, official documents are documents filed  
in the Foreign Office, and any documents whose contents have something to  
do with the activities of the Foreign Office as a government organ are  
called official. Document No. 1 bears the seal "Very Secret" but has no  
signatures, although there are interlineations. Document No. 2 has no  
signatures or marking, and has only the seal "Secret".

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TAVENNER.

26901 \* The witness stated that he had shown beforehand the three  
certificates introduced into evidence the day before. They were signed  
26902 by his superior, HAYASHI, whom he assisted. \* He thought them accurate.  
All four documents are documents of the Foreign Office. The other three  
documents also bear the seal "Very Secret". Each page of the document  
is on Foreign Office stationery, and each page contains the Japanese  
equivalent of the words "Foreign Office". There is an index which  
contains the topic and refers to the documents by numbers. The documents  
26903 themselves do not bear numbers, but each separating sheet contains the  
number of the respective documents.



1899 Sep. 29 Promoted to Lieutenant Commander | Cabinet  
of the Navy.

Nov. 2 Promoted to the junior grade of the Imperial Household  
6th Court Rank. Ministry

1900 Mar. 16 Ordered to attend on the Judge of Navy  
the grand naval manœuvre. Ministry

(Left the ~~vessel~~ <sup>ship</sup> at KōBE on May 2.)

June 20 Relieved as A-class <sup>student</sup> ~~trainee~~ of the  
officers' course of the Naval ~~War~~ <sup>Staff</sup>  
College.

" " Appointed division officer of the  
~~warship~~ FUJI in the standing  
Special addition being made  
fleet. (Added <sup>next</sup> to the term of  
~~his~~ service in JAPAN proper <sup>on account of</sup> ~~for his~~



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 4122

August 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

Naval Relations

SATO -- Cross

Page

- 26904 On document No. 2 there is a piece of paper affixed bearing blue pencil writing. \* This paper states that if the moves against Chiang Kai-shek could be carried out without using his army, this would be the best way. He had investigated about these notes on the documents, but was unable to find out who put them on. On document No. 3, outside the border of it, there is a signature YAMAMOTO, and there is a mark signifying that it is finished. The same seal and name
- 26905 YAMAMOTO appears on the fourth document. \* It appears that he was Chief of the East Asia Bureau.

His affidavits related only to documents 1 and 2, and not to 3 and 4. It also appears that a name like KITA is on the document, and he could not recall the name, and the seal is somewhat smeared. He believed that the YAMAMOTO referred to is YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi, who testified a few days before.

- 26907 The attention of the Tribunal was called to exhibit No. \* 2344, 2753, 2754, 2755, 2756, 2757, 2830, and 651.



T.N. Boxer Uprising/

~~service in~~

~~the Boxer Trouble~~ ~~the Empire~~

of China Incident of 1900/

Navy Ministry  
division officer

1900 Sep. 1 Relieved of <sup>the</sup> current post and

Appointed torpedo officer of

concurrently

the ~~warship~~ SHIKISHIMA in the

Special addition being made

standing fleet. (Added to

the <sup>real</sup> term of ~~his~~ service in JAPAN

on account of

proper for ~~his service in~~ the  
the Empire of China Incident

~~Boxer Trouble~~ of 1900 / T.N. Boxer Uprising/

Dec. 6 Relieved of <sup>the</sup> current and <sup>the</sup> concurrent

posts.

Ordered to be

Appointed <sup>student</sup> / A class trainee of the

officers' course of the Naval ~~War~~

Staff

College.



August 27, 1947  
 DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
 Naval Relations  
 MIYO - Direct

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MIYO, TATSUKICHI.

26908 \* The witness identified exhibit No. 3020 as his affidavit,  
 and after making certain corrections verified it. The affidavit stated  
 26910 \* that from November 1939 to December 1942, the witness was in the  
 Operations Section, Navy General Staff, in charge of affairs relating  
 to aerial operation, and he learned the following information about the  
 advance of Japanese forces to South FIC.

At the time he took office, it was the consistent policy of  
 the Navy and the nation to try to affect the speediest possible settlement  
 of the China Affair. Japan's deadlocked land operations in China required  
 enforcement of an economic blockade as an important factor in solving the  
 Incident.

26911 The advance to South FIC was prompted by economic and political  
 necessity. To those concerned with military operations, the most  
 \* imperative reason was to avert a collapse of Japan's national defense  
 and to bring the China Affair to an early end by an over-all economic  
 blockade.

In June, 1941, the First Department Chief of the Staff, while  
 ordering them to prepare for the proposed move, told them the reason  
 why the step was inevitable. He stated that Anglo-American aid to Chiang  
 Kai-shek in southwest China was growing. The U. S., Britain, China, and  
 Holland had formed the so-called A B C D Line, and were pushing on with  
 steady war preparations and hardening economic pressure. The failure of  
 the NEI negotiations was one of the outstanding cases.

26912 \* He further stated that this evil influence was now reaching  
 FIC and Thailand, and that there were signs that DeGaulist and other  
 Anti-Japanese elements in FIC, together with the British, were inducing  
 all FIC to go over to the U. S.-British camp. This might become another  
 Syria, and it was ten to one that Thailand would be won over to that  
 group, in view of her domestic and foreign relations. If this happens  
 the A B C D front would be invincibly fortified, completely isolating  
 Japan and shattering the blockade of China. If this happened, with  
 Japan excluded from U. S. and British trade and the negotiations having  
 failed, Japan would suffer an economic collapse and be forced to fall  
 on her knees before this pressure, to say nothing of settling the China  
 Affair.

26913 \* If the British and others move into FIC, the DeGaulist and  
 other anti-Japanese would likely work together and provoke Japanese  
 forces in North FIC to a clash which would lead to serious consequences.



1900 Dec. 22	Entered <del>Raised to the</del> 1st pay grade	Navy Ministry
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Page

To prevent this, the only possible, although not desirable way, is to get ahead of the other powers by sending troops to South FIC. There is no alternative. France will surely welcome the idea of defending her possession in East Asia jointly with Japan, to prevent it from becoming a second Syria.

26914

When the witness took office, he found that the Navy was on guard against Japan being involved in World War II. It was consistently opposed to the German-Italian Alliance, \* lest it would cause friction with the U. S. and Britain and imply danger of being embroiled in war. After the conclusion of the pact, the Navy took special care so it would not unnecessarily impose fighting obligations. It refrained from referring to any idea of joint military operations with Germany and Italy, for it dreaded that if it talked about such a possible agreement with Germany and Italy would take the Navy to be disposed to join in the war, and would try to compel them to fight Germany's battle.

26915

This precautionous attitude was kept up to the time immediately before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Before the opening of the war, there was no joint operational agreement between Germany, Japan, and Italy. \* When the military move to south FIC was launched, the responsible staff officers had no mention for war in the Pacific, or any plans or operations prepared for it. It can thus be seen that the Japanese advance was not a preliminary step for the Pacific War.

When the witness first made arrangements for the advance, he was annoyed to find there was no adequate military information about the place. There was no data about the airfield other than that collected by civilian interests, and it was from such data that he got general ideas. The subsequent fact-finding survey on the spot revealed numerous errors.

26916

Immediately before the advance to South FIC, U. S., Britain, and Holland, almost simultaneously, \* cut off economic relations and banned oil exports. Japan tried to ease the situation, but there was no prospect of success. Things went from bad to worse. The outcome was the September 6 decision of national policy.

Following this decision, his Section Chief ordered that the government had decided to prepare for war that might break out any moment with the A B C D front, and that the operation officers should without delay begin study to formulate plans of campaign. This appeared a sheer absurdity to the witness, to try to fight against the four powers when the single China Affair was too much. He told his Section Chief that with the poorly equipped air force they could not wage war on the four powers with confidence of success.



J.M. (1)

May 24	1901	<del>Was</del> conferred the certificate of <sup>for</sup> finishing <del>the</del> A-class course for officers of the Naval <del>War</del> <sup>Staff</sup> College.	President of the Naval Staff <del>War</del> College.
"	"	<del>Was</del> Relieved of <del>the</del> <sup>as</sup> 1st class <del>Traineeship</del> <sup>student</sup> of the <del>for</del> Officers' <sup>course</sup> of the Naval <del>War</del> <sup>Staff</sup> College.	Navy Ministry
"	"	Placed on the waiting list. <del>Was ordered to await orders</del>	"
May 31	"	Decorated with <del>Was</del> conferred the Fifth Order of <sup>Merit</sup> <del>the</del> Sacred Treasure.	Decorations Bureau
June 7	"	<del>Was</del> <del>conferred</del> appointed Member of the Third Bureau of the Naval General Staff with the additional post of Instructor in the <del>Navy</del> <sup>Naval Staff</sup> <del>War</del> College	Navy Ministry
July 16	"	Was ordered to make a trip of	"



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
August 27, 1947  
DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
YOSHIDA - Direct

Page

the document was kept in the Treasury Section. The issuance of military notes meant the crediting by the Bank of Japan to the other government deposit at the bank of the amount of the military notes received by the bank and the cabinet printing office.

Exhibit No. 3026, an instrument referring to the issuance of military currency for use in the southern areas was admitted into evidence.

26,980 There was no cross-examination \* but the attention of the Tribunal was called to Exhibit No. 852, communications 9 and 10.

Exhibit No. 3026 stated that in view of present international situation and if in case when war plans in the south are made for an unexpected eventuality in the future and considering the necessity which may arise, the issuing of military notes in foreign denomination shall be made as preparatory measure to provide for paying military expenditures. There was a note that issuing of military notes in the past was decided by cabinet conference because they were issued at the time of actual use. Since the present issue is only a preparatory measure for an unexpected event in the future, it was decided \* by the ministries concerned only, pending report to the cabinet if an emergency happened requiring their use.

The note shall be issued against an eventuality of military operation in the South Seas to be used by the armed forces concerned in paying military expenditures. When necessary they shall be converted into Japanese currency. The handling procedures will be established by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the War and Navy Ministers.



		inspection observation while the Standing Fleet was cruising along the coasts of China and Korea.	
March 4 1902	✓	<del>Was specially Appointed Inspector</del> special inspector of Officers by the <sup>Imperial Order</sup> <del>Imperial Order</del> of the Standing Fleet.	"
April 10	✓	<del>Was ordered to act as Investigator</del> Appointed of the documents on works.	
May 10	✓	Was conferred the War Medal, Boxer Uprising, Trouble 1900.	Accommodation Bureau
Feb. 18 1903	✓	Was ordered to act as Staff Officer Squadron while of the First Fleet during the orga- nization of the fleet for the naval	



Page DIRECT EXAMINATION OF YOSHIDA, Tosuke  
by MR. BLEWETT

26,971

The witness stated he lived in Osaka. He identified Exhibit No. 3025 as his affidavit and after making a correction, verified it. The witness stated that he was Chief of the Treasury Section, Finance Bureau, Finance Ministry, from January 1941 to October 1942. He stated \* that military notes were for use of armed forces while in operations and did not belong to ordinary currency but in view of their bearing on the obligations of the treasury, their handling was under the treasury section of the Finance Ministry, so far as the matters concerned were internal and except when handled by the military itself.

26,972

In January 1941, the Army requested the Ministry to print and manufacture military notes in foreign currencies of the southern regions. \* In the same month, the Finance Ministry decision was made, and printing and manufacturing order sent to the printing office, a government organization. In May, a certain number of such notes had been printed and manufactured and continued thereafter. About the middle of October, the Army asked the Finance Ministry to take measures for dealing with the military notes. The Finance Ministry was working on draft measures when the Cabinet change took place on 18 October 1941, and KAYA became Finance Minister.

26,973

On October 22, they completed the draft entitled "The Issuance of Military Notes with Foreign Currency Denominations" to be submitted for approval to the Ministers concerned. The draft was sent to Mr. KAYA. KAYA showed deep concern \* over matters relative to the issuing of military notes, particularly to the part that provided that such notes should be issued preparing for the eventuality of taking military operation in the South Seas when they will be used by the armed forces in payment of military expenditures. He warned that this passage, while not erroneous was inadequate to fully express what was intended. The Army requests the notes to be prepared beforehand because it feared the exigencies when hostilities had begun. But Japan had by no means decided to wage any war. The draft should, therefore, say that they want to be provided with measures relating to military notes in advance as a sort of general preparedness to cope with an unexpected event.

26,974

26,975

The document should make this clear. The Ministry on October 29 decided on a document which included the import \* of KAYA's remark and annexed it as a reference to the end of the first document. This was approved by the respective ministries concerned. After approval



21

(3)

		Grand Manoeuvre.	Navy
March 23	↘	Was granted a sum of eighty years in recognition of the special exertions rendered as instructor.	(Ministry)
May 15	↘	Was appointed <del>ordered to act as</del> Investigator of the documents on works.	"
July 7	↘	Was relieved <del>both</del> of the <sup>current</sup> principal and <sup>concurrent</sup> of the additional posts, and was appointed Acting Executive Commander Officer of the Chitose; during the time the ship being enlisted in the Standing Squadron.	"
Aug. 16	↘	The ship was ordered to sail from	"



15  
10  
NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
August 27, 1947  
DEFENSE # Division V - Pacific  
YOSHINAGA - Direct

Page 4135

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF YOSHINAGA, Yoshitaka  
by MR. BLEWETT

26,967

The witness stated he lived in Tokyo. He identified Exhibit 3024 as his affidavit and verified it. The witness was in the Army in ordnance research work. The study of ordnance technique was made exclusively with consideration for cold region operations in line with anti-Soviet operations. Only after troops were stationed in southern FIC was the tropical zone operation considered.

26,968

In 1937, the ordnance research work was directed by the War Minister and the policy did not change until 1943. There was nothing in this policy considering southern operation. The important thing was the adaptability of weapons in the cold zone and the principal weapons were tried in North Manchuria since 1932. \* Weapons which did not pass the test were not adopted. They never considered the adaptability in the tropical zone. After troops were stationed in southern FIC they emphasized consideration of the tropical zone and research work and ordnance technicians were sent to Formosa in August 1941. A tropical zone test room was completed for the first time at the end of August 1941 and when the war broke out the research work was in an early stage and incomplete. Defects of various weapons were apparent in the southern theater.

26,969

There was a lot of unusable ammunition due to insufficient damp-proof device and local units preferred to use captured weapons. Tanks had no cooling system and research for this was only made after the war broke out. \* Railroad research was made as to gauges in the Continent, but nothing was done as to the south. In May 1932 the study of railroads in the south was initiated.

From November 1941, the units were given short unit-to-unit training in handling weapons in the tropics.

There was no cross-examination.

The attention of the Tribunal was called to Exhibit No. 2767.

1947  
1868  
79



Sasebo to Korea. It came back to

Takeshiki on 23rd.

Sept 19 ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> permitted, because of orchitis, <sup>in Nigan Province,</sup> to go to Takeo Hot Springs for recuperation for three weeks, two

~~days~~ excluding two days for a round

trip, <sup>started</sup> ~~Left Sasebo~~ on 22nd.

Oct. 5 ~~was~~ Relieved of the post of Acting Executive <sup>navy</sup> as acting commander <sup>ministry</sup> of the Chitose.

~~was~~ Placed on the waiting list and "

ordered to ~~remain~~ stay at Sasebo.

Oct. 12 ~~was~~ permitted to keep <sup>was</sup> kept in bed for further three weeks;

Nov. 2, ~~kept in bed~~ for further three

weeks; Nov. 23, ~~kept in bed~~ for further



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
 August 27, 1947  
 DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
 NISHIURA - Direct

Page

26,960 need of materials. The aid from the U.S. and Britain considered absolutely necessary in war with the Soviet became much more vital. The Army went ahead to draft a three year plan. As the China affair progressed, it gradually brought about the anti-Japanese economic oppression of the U.S., Britain and others and the situation became critical after the Summer of 1940. However, if relations with the U.S. and Britain were broken, the Army \* could not carry out the affair and it would upset completing military preparation for defending Manchuria in view of the frequent armed conflicts with the Soviet.

They had never thought of warring with the U.S. and Britain and they believed they would come through the crisis. They could not change their view and prepare for war against the U.S. and Britain, which would have been natural in view of public opinion. There was a set tradition of defense against the Soviet and no one who knew anything about the material situation in the event of war with the U.S. and Britain was aware of the difficulties that would confront Japan. This prevented making whole hearted preparation. The solving of the China affair and preparing for defense against the Soviet was more than the Japanese Army could handle.

26,961

Even if full preparation for war with the U.S. and Britain was ordered, they could not do so due to lack of materials and the budget. From the middle of 1941, the situation grew worse daily and the consensus of Army opinion was to hurry and reach an agreement diplomatically and avoid a dangerous situation.

There was no cross-examination.



		three weeks; Dec. 14, still keeping in bed (nervous prostration)	
		was permitted to keep	
Jan. 3	1904	Kept in bed for further three weeks (right plucking in the right)	
Jan. 24	"	was permitted to go to Kins Hot Springs for recuperation, for three weeks, excluding two days for a round trip.	
Feb. 15	"	was permitted to stay there further, and completely recovered on Feb. 28.	
March 7	"	was attached to the Sasebo Naval Station (at the war against Russia) <del>opening</del>	Navy Ministry
March 8	"	was appointed <sup>(Councillor)</sup> Assessor of the	Cabinet



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
 August 27, 1947  
 DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
 NISHIURA - Direct

Page

26,954 squadrons. However, material was badly wanting and the allotted ammunition was insufficient. Though it was decided to produce these munitions by mobilizing all industrial power, it was only a paper plan and many parts could not be taken seriously. Having no remedy, they did nothing about it. Productive power of airplanes and storage of aviation gas were almost non-existent and the real substance of the Army, acknowledged to be the \* strongest in East Asia, was only superficial armament without content. The Army only consumed 20,000 tons of steel a year and its total budget was 200,000,000 ¥. Despite anxiety of the authorities, Japan's preparations were inferior compared to those of other powers which after being in the first World War showed a marked advance in their armament.

26,955 Japan was also substantially getting poorer and poorer. Munitions were merely sufficient to supply peacetime consumption. With this condition, the Manchurian affair broke out. Japan had promised cooperative defense and she had to consider the defense of the part of Manchuria bordering on the Soviet. She was faced with the advancement of industries of the Soviet and the numerical increase in the eastern part of Siberia. All required Japan to increase her military power in Manchuria to feel secure in the north. The economic restriction \* was still strict and military power in Manchuria increased only slightly annually.

As to aviation, the annual production was about 100,000,000 yen and the air unit was barely increased from 26 to 50 odd companies in 1936. The makeup of the companies was so poor that it was not possible to carry out offensive operation. The General Staff deemed that if an incident arose between Japan and the Soviet, the defense of Japan and Manchuria would be impossible unless Japan had two-thirds of the military strength which the Soviet might use in East Asia. Such strength could never be provided. No one ever thought of preparing for an all-out war with China. Up to the Marco Polo incident in 1937 there was never any request from the staff for filling up of armaments with a view to such an incident. The idea of completing armaments in those days was to be prepared for counter measures if and when the Soviet attacked.

26,956 It was planned that war materials lacking in Japan and Manchuria would be obtained from the U.S., Britain and China. Fighting with them was never contemplated. In the Spring of 1937, the Army was just beginning to realize the plan to complete armaments for defense against the Soviet. They were discussing the plan of expanding Japan and Manchurian productive power to develop industrial economy. When



		Naval Prize Court at Sasebo.	Cabinet
"	"	Was granted a sum of fifty yen in recognition of the special exertion rendered as instructor	Navy ministry
March 24	"	Was appointed <sup>chief judge</sup> President of the Court = Sasebo <sup>trial</sup> Marshal in the Sasebo Naval Station	Naval station
March 31	"	Was appointed Acting Staff Officer during the <del>vacancy</del> of the Sasebo Naval Station during the time of while the post <del>is</del> was vacant.	"
April 11	"	Was Relieved as attached officer to the Sasebo Naval Station	Navy ministry
April 12	"	Was Relieved as <sup>councillor</sup> <del>Assistant</del> of the	Cabinet



Page DIRECT EXAMINATION OF NISHIURA, Susumu  
BY MR. BLEWETT

26,949 The witness stated he lived in Tokyo. He identified Exhibit No. 3023 as his affidavit and verified it. The witness served in the Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, from October 1931 to August 1941, except for  
26,950 the period from April 1934 to February 1937. In \* October of 1941 he became private secretary to the War Minister. He became Chief of the Military Affairs Section in April 1942 and served until December 1944.

26,951 Most of the armaments used in the Pacific war were supplied from provisions originally prepared for use in Manchuria against the Soviet or had been prepared for emergency during the China incident. It was not originally prepared for use in the Pacific war. The mobilization plans of March 1941 provided for a large Baggage Transportation Section in the rear against fighting in severely cold or barren regions. The brigade was so equipped as to be a mobile unit in Manchurian operations, but not to be used \* in the southern islands. All horses in the Supply and Baggage Department were to be Manchurian except those for headquarters.

26,952 Immediately before using these units in the south, they had to change the organization completely, and it could not help but be unadjusted, inadequate and incomplete. One could guess the operation plan by the distribution of the supplies. For example, ammunition in the spring of 1941 was to be divided 20% for Manchuria, 30% in China, 50% in Japan and none for Formosa and FIC. Aviation gas was 16% for Manchuria, 4% for China, 80% for Japan, and none for Formosa and FIC. In the Kwantung Army special \* maneuvers which aimed at strengthening the USSR Manchuria boundaries, they sent a considerable portion of supplies preserved in Japan to Manchuria during July and August. 27% of all ammunition and 14% of aviation gas was sent there.

26,953 On the basis of the decision of early September 1941, it was scheduled to prepare for war by the end of October, although they were working for success in diplomacy and to avoid a war with the U.S. and Britain. In the field of supplies, Japan was blocked entirely by the U.S. and Britain and there was no room for increase in output, and what is referred to as completion of military preparation was in reality a mere change of distribution of supplies already owned or the preparation of personnel and materials for developing resources in the south in case of an outbreak there. \* From September 1941 to December, 10% of ammunition and 12% aviation gas was for the first time transferred to Formosa and FIC. Completing military preparation for ten years preceding the Pacific war, the Manchurian affair broke out in September 1931 and the Army at that time had seventeen divisions and twenty-six air



		the Sasebo Prize Court	Cabinet
"	"	equipment officer <del>was appointed member of the Fitting out</del>	Navy Ministry
		<del>Chief</del> of the Sasebo Naval Block Yard.	
April 21	"	commander of <del>was appointed Executive Officer on the</del>	"
		Yaeyama. the ship <sup>being</sup> <del>was</del> made to a first	
		<del>new reserve ship on the same day.</del>	
April 26	"	<del>was relieved</del> <sup>as chief judge</sup> <del>of the post of the President</del>	Sasebo naval Sub station
		of the Court-Martial in the Sasebo Naval	
		Station.	
May 11	"	<del>was appointed President</del> <sup>chief judge</sup> <del>of the Court</del>	Yokosuka naval station
		of the Court-Martial in the Yokosuka Naval	
		Station	



August 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

TANAKA - Direct

PageDIRECT EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, Shinichi  
BY MR. BLEWETT

26,982 The witness identified Exhibit No. 3027 as his affidavit and  
26,984 verified it. \* The affidavit stated that the witness was Chief of  
Operational Planning in the General Staff from October 12, 1940 to  
December 7, 1942. In the conference for the 1941 peacetime operations  
plan held in 1940 \* the Chief of Staff adopted a draft for southern  
operations almost identical with the previous year. It was purely a  
technical provision for defense, an annual program being part of the  
general peacetime national defense plan. This draft has been burned.  
Under that plan, a major part of Japan's peacetime operations plan  
for defensive operation plans against the Soviet consisted of defensive  
preparations, in point of quantity as well as quality.

26,986 The first thing to be done in each year's plan was to define  
an outline of anti-Soviet defense plan. Only when this was finished  
was the operational plan for the south considered. It was deemed  
secondary and supplementary. There was no stress on it. It was some-  
times nothing more than a paper plan. \* There was nothing concrete in  
operational preparations for the south. The plan for 1941 was of the  
26,987 same nature. \* According to this program, if a war broke out with the  
U.S., measures were to be limited to occupying the Philippines and  
Guam and the capture of U.S. military bases in the Far East. It never  
had any detailed plan or preparation against possible attack from the  
mainland of the U.S. which might be expected to follow. An anti-  
American operational plan would have included a possible overall  
attack by main U.S. forces and with the extended scope of the plan,  
would have been wider and more complicated.

26,988 The question when and where the war would end would have been  
the key point to be decided beforehand. The Japanese plan never  
referred to this essential point and touched only on operations against  
U.S. bases in the Far East. Even offensive actions against Hawaii were  
not taken into account. This was due to the fact that priority was given  
to the defensive plan and Japan's \* national power could not stand such  
operations. Also Japan's sole aim was to drive away imminent threats.  
It was unnecessary further to wage war with the U.S. As to Britain,  
while it was true that Japan had the idea in case of war to capture the  
military bases such as Singapore or Hong Kong, there were no concrete  
plans prepared for this. Burma, India, Australia, etc., were never  
contemplated. The same was true as to the NEI. Actual conditions did  
not allow for the planning of simultaneous operations against more than  
two countries including the U.S., Britain, and Netherlands. She did



" May 24	Relieved as chief-judge	
	of the Court-Martial of	
" May 28	the YOKOSUKA Naval Station	"
	started (at the front).	
July 13	Appointed Executive Officer	
	commanding in accordance with	
	of the YAEYAMA by Article 10	
	of the Complement Ordinance	Navy Ministry
" "	Promoted to Commander	Cabinet
Aug. 30	Raised to Senior	
	grade of the 6th	
	Court Rank, Senior Grade	Imperial Household Ministry
1905 Jan. 12	Relieved of current post and	
	appointed Executive Officer of	Navy Ministry
	the CHITOSE, First Fleet at the	
	Front.	
Apr 5	Relieved of current post and	



WOOLWORTH, Colonel Gilbert S.	14,265-66
Assurance of Japan to abide by Geneva POW Convention . . . . .	14,295-303
Attitude of Japanese Government toward POW and correspondence concerning same . . . . .	14,263-65
Lists official positions of defendants at time, Class B offenses were committed . . . . .	14,262-910
Presentation relating to individual re- sponsibility of accused . . . . .	14,191-2; 14,194
WOOJUNG CAMP	
Atrocities committed in . . . . .	2604-5
WU, Chang-Teh	
Direct examination . . . . .	2605
Execution of 1500 civilians by machine guns at Nanking . . . . .	2607
No cross-examination . . . . .	
YAMAMOTO PLAN See also Pearl Harbor attack Japan's naval plan for attack on Pearl Harbor . . . . .	10,209-10; 10,187-96; 10,210-12
YAMANI CAMP	
Tortures at . . . . .	14,225-26
YAMAZAKI, Shigeru	
Served in the POW Information Bureau and POW Control Bureau in War Ministry, Tokyo . . . . .	14,839 14,839-90
Testimony . . . . .	
Under regulations POW Information Bureau is directly under Director of Military Affairs and War Minister . . . . .	14,847
War Control Bureau and War Management Bureau controlled policy regarding treatment of POW . . . . .	14,340
YATSUGI, Kazuo	
Affidavit of . . . . .	7359-67
Contributions to National Policy Association by Cabinet members . . . . .	7361 7359
Explains National Policy Investigation Assn . . . . .	7374
National Policy Assn, purely research body . . . . .	7363
Policies of National Policy Assn, aggressive . . . . .	
YOCHOW, CHINA	
Atrocities committed on prisoners . . . . .	14,184
YOKKAICHI, CAMP	
Violent punishment inflicted on men until they begged to be killed . . . . .	14,240



		appointed <sup>Commander</sup> Executive Officer of the KASUGA, First Fleet. At the front	
May	30	Decorated with the <sup>4th</sup> Imperial Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure, <del>4th Class</del>	Bureau of Decorations
Dec	20	Relieved of <sup>its</sup> current post and appointed <del>Executive Officer</del> <sup>Commander</sup> of the ASAHI, First Fleet	Navy Ministry
"	29	Entered <sup>pay</sup> <del>from</del> the 1st <del>pay</del> grade	"
1906 Jan.	9	Appointed <del>Officer</del> Chief-judge of the Court-Martial of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station	Y.N.S. Yokosuka Naval Station
May	11	Relieved of <sup>the</sup> current post and appointed instructor of the Naval Torpedo <del>Training</del> Training School and concurrently instructor of the Naval Staff College	Navy Ministry
"	21	Appointed <del>Officer</del> member of the Committee for investigating and accepting <del>the</del> special automatic torpedo	"



WILD, Cyril E.D. (cont'd)

Burma-Siam Railway (cont'd)

Deaths of prisoners tabulated . . . . .	5568
Epidemics . . . . .	5552
Journey to Burma. Mistreatment of men . . . . .	5445-63
Medical supplies . . . . .	5581-2
Preparation for invasion of India . . . . .	5434
Prisoners of war worked on construction . . . . .	5434
Sick forced to work . . . . .	5472
Changi Prison conditions . . . . .	5359-60; 5373
Atrocities . . . . .	5384
Construction of military airdrome . . . . .	5390
Mistreatment of sick . . . . .	5385
Received prisoners who were dying . . . . .	5430
Parit Sulong Bridge massacre . . . . .	5403-7
POW Investigation Committee on atrocities . . . . .	5625-65
Reports from field officers . . . . .	5671-81
River Valley Road accommodations . . . . .	5374
Atrocities on prisoners . . . . .	5381
Dysentery . . . . .	5376
Overcrowded conditions . . . . .	5376
Shooting of Chinese . . . . .	5366-7; 5370
Singapore massacre in hospital . . . . .	5398-5401
Singapore atrocities . . . . .	5414
Suggestion of death on record . . . . .	6695
Testimony . . . . .	5351-5846

WILLIAMS, John M.

Conditions in Batevia Jail, Singapore, . . . . .	12,997-13,007
Rangoon described . . . . .	13,006
Many deaths from cholera, other diseases, . . . . .	12,996-13,012
overwork and lack of medical care . . . . .	
Testimony . . . . .	

WILSON, Robert O.

Bayoneting . . . . .	2538
Cause of wounds of patients . . . . .	2553
Continuance of incidents for 6 or 7 weeks . . . . .	2538
Cross examination . . . . .	2551-5
Direct examination . . . . .	2527-51
Doctor in University Hospital, Nanking in 1937 . . . . .	2531-2
No resistance to Japanese entry . . . . .	2533
Opium sales . . . . .	2547; 2648-59;
	2668-95
Rape . . . . .	2536-7
Shooting of group of men at Yangtze River . . . . .	2536
Testimony as to injured persons . . . . .	2534-6

Dysentery . . . . .	5376
Overcrowded conditions . . . . .	5376
Shooting of Chinese . . . . .	5366-7; 5370
Singapore massacre in hospital . . . . .	5398-5401
Singapore atrocities . . . . .	5414
Suggestion of death on record . . . . .	6695
Testimony . . . . .	5351-5846

Conditions in Batevia Jail, Singapore, . . . . .	12,997-13,007
Rangoon described . . . . .	13,006
Many deaths from cholera, other diseases, . . . . .	12,996-13,012
overwork and lack of medical care . . . . .	
Testimony . . . . .	



May 17 Relieved <sup>as</sup> chief-judge of the

Court Martial of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station

Station ~~the 4th Order of Merit with~~

Apr. 1 Decorated with the Order of the

Golden Kite, ~~4th Class~~ with

an annuity of 500 yen and with the 3rd Order of Merit with

the Middle Cordon of the Rising

Bureau of Decorations

Sun, ~~1st Class~~ in recognition

of distinguished service during

the 1904-1905 War

Decorated with the War Medals

1904-1905

Appointed ~~Ordinary~~ member of the

1907 Mar 1



TANAKA, Ryukichi (cont'd)

Kwantung Army role in Inner Mongolia and North China . . . . .	2026-44
Memorial . . . . .	2516
MINAMI's activities as Commander in Chief, Kwantung Army . . . . .	2112-39
Opium Control Board was set up to prevent bootlegging and black market activities in narcotics and to eliminate addicts . . . . .	15,939
Plans for independence of Manchuria . . . . .	2012
Plans in China . . . . .	2370-1; 2463-4
Policy in Manchuria while ITAGAKI was Chief of Staff . . . . .	2100-1
Prisoners of War, testimony relating to Army organization for handling, policies relating thereto and responsibilities therefor (See breakdown under POW)	
Reason for Japanese intervention in North China . . . . .	2136-7
Recognition of Manchukuo by USSR . . . . .	2074
Relations with Manchuria after 1928 was equivalent to undeclared war . . . . .	2066; 2156-8
Resignation because military situation was hopeless . . . . .	2053
Student military maneuvers in 1941 . . . . .	2051
Succession of CHANG Hsueh-liang . . . . .	1958
Testimony . . . . .	1945; 2049-2177; 14,285-422; 15,853-951
Uncertainty as to who blew up Ry at Mukden . . . . .	2086- $\frac{1}{2}$

TANGKU TRUCE

Alleged violation of . . . . .	2708-12
COMTE testimony re . . . . .	3745
Text Ech 193 . . . . .	2272-4; 2693

TARAWA, GILBERT AND ELLICE ISLANDS

Murder and atrocities committed on . . . . .	14,141
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TAVENNER, Frank S.

Japanese officials involved in aggression . . . . .	5900-6
Opening statement on phase of case involving wars of aggression and violations of treaties, etc . . . . .	5848-93

TERESHKIN, Peter F.

Border incidents . . . . .	7771; 7791-4
Effort to identify frontier line between USSR, Manchukuo and Lake Khasin area . . . . .	7768-71; 7788-9
Incident at Zaozernaya Hill . . . . .	7774-7



		Committee to Investigate the	
		Various Regulations on	
		Torpedos	Navy Ministry
Apr. 20		Naval / The <del>Naval</del> Torpedo- <del>Training</del>	
		Training School / became	
		Naval the <del>Naval</del> Torpedo School in	
		accordance with Imperial	
		Ordinance No. 136	
1908 Sept. 25		Promoted to Captain	Cabinet
		Appointed <del>President</del> head	
		Naval <del>Training</del> School	Navy Ministry
		Appointed chairman	
Dec. 25		<del>Ordered</del> chief of the	
		Committee for Improving	



WILD, Cyril E.D. (cont'd)

Burma-Siam Railway (cont'd)

Deaths of prisoners tabulated . . . . .	5568
Epidemics . . . . .	5552
Journey to Burma. Mistreatment of men . . . . .	5445-63
Medical supplies . . . . .	5581-2
Preparation for invasion of India . . . . .	5434
Prisoners of war worked on construction . . . . .	5434
Sick forced to work . . . . .	5472
Changi Prison conditions . . . . .	5359-60; 5373
Atrocities . . . . .	5384
Construction of military airdrome . . . . .	5390
Mistreatment of sick . . . . .	5385
Received prisoners who were dying . . . . .	5430
Parit Sulong Bridge massacre . . . . .	5403-7
POW Investigation Committee on atrocities . . . . .	5625-65
Reports from field officers . . . . .	5671-81
River Valley Road accommodations . . . . .	5374
Atrocities on prisoners . . . . .	5381
Dysentery . . . . .	5376
Overcrowded conditions . . . . .	5376
Shooting of Chinese . . . . .	5366-7; 5370
Singapore massacre in hospital . . . . .	5398-5401
Singapore atrocities . . . . .	5414
Suggestion of death on record . . . . .	6695
Testimony . . . . .	5351-5846

WILLIAMS, John M.

Conditions in Batevia Jail, Singapore, Rangoon described . . . . .	12,997-13,007
Many deaths from cholera, other diseases, overwork and lack of medical care . . . . .	13,006
Testimony . . . . .	12,996-13,012

WILSON, Robert O.

Bayoneting . . . . .	2538
Cause of wounds of patients . . . . .	2553
Continuance of incidents for 6 or 7 weeks . . . . .	2538
Cross examination . . . . .	2551-5
Direct examination . . . . .	2527-51
Doctor in University Hospital, Nanking in 1937 . . . . .	2531-2
No resistance to Japanese entry . . . . .	2533
Opium sales . . . . .	2547; 2648-59; 2668-95
Rape . . . . .	2536-7
Shooting of group of men at Yangtze River . . . . .	2536
Testimony as to injured persons . . . . .	2534-6



			Wireless Telephones	
			Promoted to the	
			Conferred with the 5th Court	
			Rank (Junior Grade of the	Imperial Household Ministry
1909	Jan. 13		Appointed	
			Ordered member of the	
			Wireless Investigation Committee	Navy Ministry
1910	July 5		Appointed chairman	
			Ordered chief of the	
			Investigation Committee for	
			the Improvement of Creeping	
			Sea Searching Machinery	
			Improvements	Navy Ministry
	July 25		Relieved of current post	
			and appointed Captain	
			of the KASUGA,	
			Second Reserve	"
1900	1		The KASUGA,	
			Second Fleet	"



WILD, Cyril E.D. (cont'd)

Burma-Siam Railway (cont'd)

Deaths of prisoners tabulated . . . . .	5568
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Shooting of Chinese . . . . .	5366-7; 5370
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Testimony . . . . .	12,996-13,012

WILSON, Robert O.

Bayoneting . . . . .	2538
Cause of wounds of patients . . . . .	2553
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Doctor in University Hospital, Nanking in 1937 . . . . .	2531-2
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Opium sales . . . . .	2547; 2648-59; 2668-95
Rape . . . . .	2536-7
Shooting of group of men at Yangtze River . . . . .	2536
Testimony as to injured persons . . . . .	2534-6



	"	31	<p>Request for three weeks' return <sup>trip</sup> since  Jan. 4 to KAMAKURA Machi in order to  adjust household affairs as a result  of the death of wife <sup>was</sup> Fusa approved  on Jan. 1</p>
1911	Jan.	4	<p>Relieved of <sup>the</sup> current post and  assigned to the YOKOSUKA Naval Station</p>
	Jan.	16	<p>Relieved <sup>as attached Officer</sup> of assignment to the  YOKOSUKA Naval Station and appointed  member of the Personnel Affairs Bureau  of the Navy Ministry</p>

Navy Ministry

Navy Ministry



PROCESSING CONTROL SLIP NO. 3

TO MR. WAGNER, Room 363 (By 9 A.M. Daily)

Doc. No. \_\_\_\_\_ for Attorney \_\_\_\_\_

SENT TO ATTORNEY ON \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Central Check

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TO MR. WAGNER, Room 363 (By 9 A.M. Daily)

Doc. No. \_\_\_\_\_ for Attorney \_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_  
Translation

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This document is approximately \_\_\_\_\_ pages

Is Certificate Attached? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Work Order Desk



by J. Kusago 32

member of the

Jan. 19 Appointed, (Civil Officials) Ordina-

Navy  
Ministry

ry Disciplinary Committee of a  
member of the

" Appointed, Naval Higher Officers

Appointing Committee,  
member of the

" Appointed ~~students~~ nomination  
of Students for  
Committee for the Naval Staff

College.

member of the

" Appointed, Naval Reserve

personnel Authorization Committee

Mar. 18 Reported transfer of <sup>the permanent</sup> domicile

to Tokyo Prefecture.

May 30 Appointed chairman of <sup>the</sup> Investi-

gation Committee for the Dis-

missal of Midshipmen ASADA,



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
August 27, 1947  
DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
TANAKA - Direct

Page 4141

Page

26,997

because the southern operations for defense were left out of consideration and the areas were untouched or without defense. Even the study of the defense of the south was incomplete as to organization, equipment, materials and training of forces for landing and tropical operation. Although the most urgent need was to reform the organization and equipment of part of the forces and give them special training for use in the south \* against the U.S. and Britain as provided in the plan, it could not be expected that they would be finished even crudely by the Summer of 1941.

26,998

In the 1941 mobilization plan, emphasis was laid on completing defense in Manchuria against the Soviet, by reorganizing each division to adapt it to continental operations, especially in North Manchuria. The organization and equipment was opposite in nature to those for the south. Transport goods for each division was of a great amount and a majority of horses for transport and communication were to be Manchurian ponies. This makes clear that Japan laid greater stress on defense operations against the Soviet than on those against the U.S. and Britain even in April 1941. As for Army airplanes, only 60 or 70% out of the original mobilization plan was expected to be reached before August 1941. Heavy bombers originally designed \* for the Manchurian-Soviet frontier had only a small flying range and were not well fitted for the south. On the whole, aviation facilities were not available for the south.

26,999

Only a small amount of ammunition was piled up for the south during the spring and summer of 1941 and an additional amount was accumulated in September and October until December, and at that time it reached in total barely to the amount available for ten divisions. This accumulation was not calculated into preparations based on the 1941 plan, but was carried out chiefly after determining national policy. The preparations in the 1941 plan meant reorganization and training of divisions to fit them for defense in the south, study of tropical tactics, landing tactics and the collection of information and strategic materials. They were essential matters of study for planning a peacetime national defense and were not the prerequisites \* for war against the U.S., Britain and Holland. It was too late in beginning and not rapid in progress. In addition, information about the south was incomplete and no bases were prepared for aviation, sea transport and communications.

Even passive and defensive operations were hard to put into effect, and more difficult than this was the plan to make a responsive attack after defensive actions or an instant counterattack. They tried



Junichi and YUMOTO, Enzo. "

1912 Feb. 23 Appointed chairman of <sup>the</sup> Investigation Committee for the Dismissal of Midshipman WATABE, Kiyoshige. "

Mar. 13 Requested permission for marriage.

Permitted on the same day.

June 17 Appointed chairman of the Investigation Committee for the Dismissal of Midshipman UMEIDA, Yoshio. "

Dec. 1 Relieved of the current post and

appointed captain of the Kashi-

ma, the First Fleet.

1913 Feb. 10 Left Daker, to cruise to China.

Arrived at <sup>Mako</sup> ~~Pakō~~ on the 17th.



August 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

TANAKA - Direct

Page

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- Apr. 28 Permitted to travel to Tokyo  
for 8 days, <sup>excluding</sup> ~~besides~~ 2 days for  
both ways, to adjust household  
affairs. Started on May 5, and  
returned on the 15th.
- Dec. 1 Appointed Rear-Admiral.
- " Appointed Chief of the Ordnance Cabinet  
Manufacturing Department of the  
Naval Dockyard.  
Sasebo (Navy Yard) "
- 1914 Jan. 30 Raised to the Senior Grade of the  
5th Court Rank.
- Aug. 18 Relieved of the current post and  
appointed Commander of the  
Second Fleet. Cabinet



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

August 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

TANAKA - Direct

Page 4141

Page

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Aug. 24 Started from Sasebo for the front.  
Aug. 27 Got on board (the flagship TONE) and returned to Sasebo on board the TONE.

35

Aug. 23 The war against Germany was opened

Aug. 28 Left Hakkohe, engaged in ~~the~~ battle.

Dec. 1 Relieved of the current post appointed  
Commander of the 1st <sup>Flotilla of</sup> Destroyers

~~Squadron.~~

1915 Mar. 7 Permitted to travel to Tokyo for  
7 days, <sup>excluding</sup> besides 2 days for both

ways, to adjust household affairs.

Started on March 9, returned  
on the 17th.

Apr. 1 Relieved of the current post and  
appointed Commander of the Third  
Flotilla B,

~~Destroyers Squadron.~~ Retired from

the <sup>Flotilla</sup> ~~squadron~~ on October 6.

"



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
AUGUST 28, 1947  
DEFENSE, DIV V Pacific  
MILITARY PREPARATIONS

page 4161

page

27094

To overcome resistance of the German Foreign Office, the witness deemed it necessary to word the arguments for German decorations upon Japanese officials in exaggerated terms. The class of the decoration \* to be recommended depended first and foremost on the rank of the officer to be honored and not on his merits. This created a paradox because it was impossible to decorate a Lt. Colonel because the German and Japanese Foreign Office had not been able to agree how to classify them, whether as colonels or as majors.

As to the German Embassy's telegram of May 17, 1942, the wording of the telegram was not made by the affiant. He had handed Amb. Ott his proposals for orders to be conferred upon Gen. SUGIYAMA, Lt. Gen. KIMURA, Lt. Gen. MUTO, Maj. Gen. SATO and others. He had proposed them because of their position in the Japanese Army rather than because of special accomplishment in favor of the German Army. Gen. OKAMOTO and others were not recommended since they had already received the German decoration.

27095

He did not recall that he had asked \* for an order for Gen. KASIMARA. He did not remember the exact wording of his proposals but must have been close to the wording used in the telegram. In order to overcome the German Foreign Office's reluctance, he regarded the superlative to be necessary where the positive would have been more correct. The Ambassador added superlatives in his additional explanations.

27096

Exhibit 3035, agreement between Thailand and Japan \* stated that to cope with the urgent situation in the Far East Thailand would give Japan permission for passage of Japanese forces through the Thai territory and would give all necessary facilities for the passage and would execute measures to avoid every possible conflict which might arise between the Japanese and Thai forces.

The particulars were to be agreed on between the military authorities of the two countries. Japan would guarantee Thailand's independence, sovereignty and honor.



Oct. 1 Relieved of the current <sup>and</sup> appointed chief of the 2nd Department, <sup>and</sup> concurrently chief of the 3rd Department, of the Naval Technical

Headquarters

" Appointed <sup>Naval</sup> Navy Military Merits Investigation Committee.

Navy Ministry

Oct. 9 Appointed <sup>member of the</sup> Students Nomination of Students Committee for the Naval Staff

College.

Nov. 20 Appointed Commander of the Squadron

8th SENTA / ~~during the organi-~~ while <sup>was organized</sup> zation of the fleet for the special

naval review.



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AUGUST 28, 1947  
DEFENSE, DIV V Pacific  
MILITARY PREPARATIONS

page 4161

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Nov. 1	Decorated with 2nd <del>Order of</del>	Bureau of Decorations
--------	--	-----------------------------

	Merit with the Order of Sacred	
--	--------------------------------	--

	Treasure.	
--	-----------	--

Nov. 7	Decorated with the 3rd class Order	
--------	------------------------------------	--

	of the Golden Kite with the	
--	-----------------------------	--

	annuity of 700 yen and the	
--	----------------------------	--

	Order of the Double Rays of the	
--	---------------------------------	--

	Rising Sun in recognition of	
--	------------------------------	--

	the services in the 1914-15 War.	
--	----------------------------------	--

"	Decorated with the 1914-15 War	
---	--------------------------------	--

	Medal.	
--	--------	--

		"
--	--	---



page

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WAKABAYASHI Yoshio

1915 Nov. 10 In accordance with ~~the~~ Imperial  
 Ordinance No. 154, ~~was given~~ <sup>awarded</sup>  
~~with~~ the coronation commemoration  
 medal.

" Dec. 13 ~~Was~~ Relieved of the principal and  
 concurrent posts, and ~~was~~

appointed ~~the~~ Chief of the personnel  
 Affairs

Bureau of the Navy Ministry

The Cabinet.

member of the Nomination

" " ~~Was~~ Appointed a ~~selecting~~ Committee

of Students to be permitted to



			Staff for the Naval college.	The Naval Department.
1915	Dec.	13	was appointed a member of the Joint Investigation Committee for the Revision of the Army Code of Criminal Procedure.	-190-
"	"	"	was appointed a special committee for the <sup>agreement</sup> <del>negotiation</del> regarding the official recognition of distinguished services of the Army and the Navy.	-50-
"	"	"	was appointed a <sup>member of</sup> <del>investigating</del>	



~~100~~

		<del>committee of the Naval Board</del> Committee of Merits Investigation	The Naval Department
1916	Jan. 23	<del>was</del> Appointed an investigation Committee for awarding war medals to those who served in the 1914-1915 <del>war</del> .	- do -
"	May 28	<del>was</del> Appointed <del>an investigation</del> member committee of the Naval Board Investigation Committee of Merits.	- do -
1917	Dec. 1	<del>was</del> <sup>P</sup> promoted <sup>to</sup> a vice-admiral.	The Cabinet



Sasebo

1917	Dec.	1	Was appointed the Chief of the Naval Dockyard, Arrived at <sup>the</sup> post on the 10th of Dec. and retired on the 17th Sept. 1918.	The Cabinet
"	"	12	Was appointed a councillor of the prize court at SASEBO	"
"	"	28	Was promoted to the <sup>Junior's</sup> 4th grade of the Court Rank.	The Depart. of the Imperial Household.
1918	Sept	4	Was Relieved of the <sup>current</sup> principal post. and appointed a member of the flag officers' conference	The Cabinet.
"	"	9	Applied for seven days' leave <sup>Request</sup> (excluding two days' round trip)	

SASEBO Station

1918 Jan. 26. During the absence of Naval <sup>Station</sup> ~~Assistant~~ <sup>Accountant</sup> Commandant YATSUSHIRO Rokuro, on his ~~inspection~~ <sup>inspection</sup> journey to investigate <sup>the</sup> conditions of enrolling volunteers, took charge of his post temporarily.

" Feb. 1. Relieved of the temporary post.

" Aug. 10. Special addition was made to the real term <sup>of service</sup> ~~of service~~ in accordance with the Ministers' Secretariate Order NO. 2978.



for a journey to TOKYO <sup>(from this day)</sup> in

order to attend on <sup>a</sup> sick child,

~~excluding both travelling~~

~~days in going and coming,~~

~~and~~ was granted.

1918 Sept. 16 ~~was~~ Relieved as a councillor

of the prize court at SASEBO,

The  
Cabinet.

" Oct. 18 ~~was~~ Relieved <sup>of current</sup> the ~~principal~~ post

<sup>Bureau of</sup>  
and appointed ~~the~~ chief of the  
the Naval Construction, Navy Ministry.

~~Navy Technical Department.~~

Arrived at the post on Oct. 22.  
~~took charge of the post.~~

-80-



1918	Oct 22	<p>Was appointed <sup>to</sup> councillor of <del>the</del> Munitions <del>the</del> Cabinet  <del>Bureau</del> Board. <del>was</del> abolished on the 15th of May, 1920, by <del>the</del> Imperial Ordinance NO. 139.</p>
"	" 24	<p>Was appointed <del>the</del> chairman of the Preparatory Committee of <del>arrangement</del> for the Establishment of the Naval Powder Depot. The business ended on the 4th of April, 1919.</p>
"	" "	<p>Was appointed <del>the</del> chairman of the Preparatory Committee of <del>arrangement</del> for the Establishment of the <sup>Hiroshima</sup> Branch Depot of the KURE Naval Powder Depot.</p>