

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2 Admiral Ingersoll: For the destruction of our codes.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

4 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Well, that is what the lawyers call *functus*
6 *officio* if it came in first.

7 Now, the reason why you knew that the destruction of the
8 codes meant war and not merely breaking off of negotiations
9 was the fact that if they were merely breaking off diplomatic
10 negotiations with us they would not have to destroy their
11 codes?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: Not necessarily.

13 Mr. Gearhart: They could pack them up, as you said,
14 with their second suit of clothes and take them home if they
15 were merely breaking off diplomatic relations.

16 Admiral Ingersoll: Correct.

17 Mr. Gearhart: So that it was a lead tip-off, a foregone
18 conclusion in the estimations of the higher ranking military
19 officers that the order for the destruction of their codes
20 within our areas meant nothing but war?

21 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, and the fact that the consulates
22 were included cinched it in my opinion that it was war and
23 not a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic rela-
24 tions.

25 Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, the high ranking naval

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2 and military officers all felt that war was coming sooner than
3 it did come. Wasn't there much talk about that preceding the
4 seventh?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: So far as the Chief of Naval Opera-
6 tions was concerned war could have come at any moment after
7 the 24th or the 27th of November and it would have been no
8 surprise.

9 Mr. Gearhart: You knew about the deadline date of the
10 29th of November?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: I recall that dispatch.

12 Mr. Gearhart: That was a date after which things were go-
13 ing to automatically happen and so when that date passed you
14 began to watch for things and look for things to happen, did
15 you not?

16 Admiral Ingersoll: Well, in all these things, sir, when
17 you consider a particular dispatch you cannot consider that
18 dispatch alone and nothing else. You have to consider all
19 the other things that you can.

20 Well, at this time, that is, at the latter part of Novem-
21 ber, we knew that they were assembling vast forces of ships
22 and men and landing craft in Southeast Asia, in China and
23 Formosa; we knew they were on the move and it would only be a
24 question of a very short time when they would land somewhere.
25 There wasn't any question about it. It was only the exact

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2

spot and when. Admiral Hart was watching them with his planes.

3

We knew they were going down the coast of China and down Indo-

4

China. We did not know until the last moment whether they

5

were headed for the Kra Peninsula or for Thailand, but they

6

were on the move definitely and it was only a question of the

7

hour as to when it would come.

8

Mr. Gearhart: You knew that Secretary Hull had delivered

9

the American note to the Japanese here in Washington on the

10

26th day of November?

11

Admiral Ingersoll: On the 27th of November the dispatch

12

was sent out stating that all -- in effect, I am quoting now

13

from memory -- that all efforts for peaceful solution had

14

failed.

15

Mr. Gearhart: Yes. And when you sent it out on the 27th

16

was it because you felt that the Hull message had been inter-

17

preted by the Japanese as an ultimatum?

18

Admiral Ingersoll: I am sure that Admiral Stark felt

19

that they could not accept it and also, as I say, things were

20

moving in the East, the concentration of troops, did show

21

that war was coming very, very soon.

22

Mr. Gearhart: Well, as it now appears, as it now turns

23

out we find that the Japanese fleet sailed from Takan in

24

the Kurile Islands on the night of the 27th and morning of

25

the 28th, a day ahead of their deadline date, but we did not

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2 know that until later, but the 29th went by and that was their
3 deadline date and we knew what that deadline date was and we
4 had been told by the Japanese that things were going to happen
5 automatically. Then when nothing happened on the 29th, nothing
6 happened on the 30th, nothing happened on the 1st, 2nd,
7 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th of December, did that long delay after
8 their fixed deadline cause any discussions among the higher
9 ranking naval officers with whom you were in daily conversation
10 in a search for an answer to the question?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: Of course, we had no definite information
12 that a task force had sailed from the Kurile Islands
13 for the Hawaiian Islands but the time of the break, that is,
14 the time of hostilities was indicated would come very soon
15 in the movements of the Japanese in the Far East. It could
16 not go on many days longer or many hours longer. They were
17 approaching a place where they were going to land.

18 Mr. Gearhart: That is, we knew about the moves of the
19 Japanese fleet in the China Sea?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

21 Mr. Gearhart: We had received reports on that. We knew
22 the deadline date of the 29th and because of those circumstances
23 and others, perhaps, it was the belief that the Japanese
24 would do something over the week end of December 1st, that
25 was the general supposition?

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Admiral Ingersoll: I cannot say that it was the belief that something would happen over the week end of the -- did you say the 31st?

Mr. Gearhart: The week end of -- no, the 30th was in November. Over the week end of the 1st of December, after the 30th of November.

Admiral Ingersoll: No, I think not. The forces had not yet reached a point in the Far East where actual hostilities were implied over that week end.

Mr. Gearhart: But you expected action to follow the 29th very closely, did you not?

Admiral Ingersoll: We did not know when it would occur.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, they told you in their own message, didn't they, Admiral?

Admiral Ingersoll: We did not know how soon after that they would actually start to move. For example, forces were in Formosa and forces were in the Pescadores. They could have gotten to Manila in twenty-four hours or in forty-hours.

Mr. Gearhart: That is the point. After the 29th they could have gotten there in twenty-four hours if they wanted to make that attack as soon as they could in Luzon?

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

Mr. Gearhart: In your conferences with the other high ranking officers did you not discuss the point that they could

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2

3

4

5

6

Admiral Ingersoll: As a matter of fact the messages received in these codes were usually not discussed at the Secretary's conferences and mentioned as such because there were more officers present there than who knew of the existence of these messages.

7

8

9

10

11

12

Mr. Gearhart: All right. The discussions go on. You had had daily meetings on the 1st, on the 2nd and the 3rd and we find we get further and further away from the deadline date of the 29th. Did anybody in those meetings raise the question that possibly the Japanese were sailing to a distant point of attack?

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Admiral Ingersoll: No, none that I recall.

21

22

23

Mr. Gearhart: Now, you are a naval expert, one of the greatest living of naval experts. Didn't it occur to you when the time began to lengthen out into close to a week after the date the Japanese said things were going to automatically begin to happen, didn't it occur to you as a strategist that the Japanese fleet was sailing to a distant point of attack?

24

Admiral Ingersoll: The question of an attack on Pearl Harbor, of course, was always considered as a possibility.

23

Mr. Gearhart: Remote or close?

24

25

Admiral Ingersoll: It was considered, of course, as a possibility because there was no other reason for putting

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

anti-aircraft guns there or stationing fighting planes on the island or having radar installation or anything of that kind except to keep Japanese planes away. That was the only reason for putting them there, so that is why I call it a possibility.

Mr. Gearhart: Why is that your position?

Admiral Ingersoll: Now, as to a probability as to whether or not they would attack is something else.

Mr. Gearhart: Was that frequently discussed in your conferences, in your morning conferences?

Admiral Ingersoll: I do not recall in the few days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor that they expected the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor in the manner in which they did.

Mr. Gearhart: Were you surprised?

Admiral Ingersoll: I was surprised that Pearl Harbor was attacked but I was more surprised that the attack was not detected, that was my first reaction, and if I express it in the words which I used at the time, it was, "How in the hell did they get in there without somebody finding it out?"

Mr. Gearhart: Then I will ask you if that was in your mind and that was always considered a possibility in your considerations why was Hawaii never mentioned in any of the so-called war warning messages as a place of possible attack? Why were other places in the Far East always stressed as the places of

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

expected attack?

Admiral Ingersoll: Because the places in the Far East were the only places of which we had definite information towards which the Japanese were moving.

Mr. Gearhart: Didn't the fact that the Japanese were constantly pressing their Honolulu confederates for reports on the movement of ships in Pearl Harbor direct your attention to the rather acute possibility of an attack at Hawaii?

Admiral Ingersoll: Now you are referring, I presume, to the dispatch regarding the location of ships in Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Gearhart: Yes, the series of dispatches that reached your desk.

Admiral Ingersoll: Well, as far as I am concerned personally I have no recollection of seeing that dispatch, so it did not occur to me personally.

Mr. Gearhart: Might I say, Admiral, it is not one dispatch?

Admiral Ingersoll: Sir?

Mr. Gearhart: Might I say it is not one dispatch? It is seven of them.

Admiral Ingersoll: I meant that series of dispatches I did not see.

Mr. Gearhart: Didn't they bring you all of them in that

1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 leather case and didn't you open the leather case with the
3 key that was supplied you --

4 Admiral Ingersoll: No.

5 Mr. Gearhart: (Continuing) -- and read all of those mes-
6 sages?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: No.

8 Mr. Gearhart: You don't know anything about this inordin-
9 ate interest on the part of the Japanese in respect to the
10 movement of ships in Pearl Harbor?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: There are two kinds of movements which
12 would afford interest; one which was a movement of departure
13 of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor would excite no interest
14 whatever because we do that all the time and continue to do
15 it in time of peace; that is, to keep track of the strategic
16 location of ships. So dispatches asking for departures and
17 arrivals would excite no interest. I think if I had seen
18 the dispatch which referred specifically to the location of
19 ships in Pearl Harbor, I would have been interested very much.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Did you see the intercept which divided
21 Pearl Harbor into five areas and the dispatch which called
22 upon the Japanese agents at Honolulu to report each shifting
23 and visit of ships from one area to another, as well as the
24 ships coming in and out of the harbor entrance?

25 Admiral Ingersoll: I think I first learned of that dis-

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2

patch when Admiral Hart asked me about it on his investigation.

3

4

Mr. Gearhart: Well, if you had seen those dispatches and they had been called to your attention, what would you have done?

5

6

7

8

9

10

Admiral Ingersoll: Well, in the first place I would have wanted to know why they were interested in the actual location of a ship, within a harbor as distinguished from whether or not the ship just happened to be in port. My suspicion would be aroused if I had seen that dispatch I am certain.

11

12

13

14

15

Mr. Gearhart: Well, there was nobody to ask anything. All you had to do was read these messages and you would have to draw your own conclusions, so if you had seen those seven or eight dispatches, impatient demands from Tokyo that reports be given even if ships did not move --

16

17

18

19

Admiral Ingersoll: I do not recall seeing that dispatch.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, what would you have done as a naval strategist, what would you have thought as a naval expert if you had seen that message?

20

21

22

23

24

Admiral Ingersoll: If I had seen the dispatches which indicated interest in a specific location within Pearl Harbor as distinguished from being within the Hawaiian area, that would have indicated to me that they had an unusual interest in that place.

25

Mr. Gearhart: That would have been out of the ordinary,

Witness Inge rsoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

wouldn't it?

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, it would have been.

Mr. Gearhart: What would you have done if those messages had been called to your attention?

Admiral Ingersoll: I think Admiral Kimmel should have been informed.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, the fact is he was not.

Now, getting back again to this 29th deadline, the passing of the 29th, the passing of the 30th, the passing of the 1st, the 2nd and the 3rd and the 4th and the 5th and the 6th and nothing happened, did that not suggest to your mind, - and this is back to the same question I asked before, - did it ever suggest to your mind as a naval expert that the Japanese fleet was sailing and steaming to a distant target?

Admiral Ingersoll: It did not to me, no.

Mr. Gearhart: Why would it not?

Admiral Ingersoll: Well, in the first place I did not think that the Japanese would risk an air attack on Pearl Harbor. While it was a possibility and while the defenses for Pearl Harbor had been set up for that purpose, the Japanese had very extensive operations under way at the time. Reports indicated, of course, that they were going into the Dutch East Indies, right into the Malay Peninsula, in the Philippines. Guam, of course, we knew would fall like a ripe plum any time they wanted to take it, which meant that the area of their operations was extended over a considerable stretch of territory.

She f--
Shack fls

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Furthermore, if all of the installations at Hawaii
2 had been working, had the planes been on the alert, the
3 attack there, in my opinion, might have been detected,
4 and there might have been very serious damage to the
5 Japanese.

6 It would have deterred them from making an
7 attack of that kind.

8 Furthermore, if our Fleet had not been in Pearl Harbor
9 and it was at sea, in a place where it might have inter-
10 cepted them, they might have incurred a very serious naval
11 loss at that time.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Well, my dear Admiral, if you had read
13 the intercept I referred to, you would have known that
14 the Japanese knew that our Fleet was in Pearl Harbor and
15 the battleships tied up one next to the other in pairs.

16 Admiral Ingersoll: As far as that goes, the Japanese
17 had been reporting our movements of ships all over the
18 world for a good many years. All you had to do was to
19 stand back of the road at Pearl Harbor, and you could see
20 everything that was in Pearl Harbor, where every ship was
21 anchored.

22 I had no doubt when I was there in 1940 that they
23 were reporting everything at that time.

24 Mr. Gearhart: You said a while ago, the high ranking
25

Shack
fls
Shef
hl

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Naval officers and Military officers were of the opinion
2 that the Japanese would not risk an attack against Pearl
3 Harbor in the light of the great obligations that they
4 were assuming in the event of an attack on the Southwest
5 Pacific; is that not correct?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: I think that was the opinion of
7 most of the people in the Office of Naval Operations, that
8 the Japanese would not make an attack on Pearl Harbor,
9 although, of course, it was a possibility.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Did it occur to you, and the high
11 ranking naval and military officers, that they would not
12 make an attack on the Southwest Pacific if the American
13 Fleet was left on their flank?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: I did not understand that question.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Then I will state it again.

16 Did it occur to you that the Japanese would not dare
17 to make the attack we expected them to make in the South-
18 western Pacific if the American Fleet was left on their
19 flank?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: I still did not understand the
21 question, sir.

22 Mr. Gearhart: Did it ever occur to you, or was it
23 ever discussed among the officers you have told us about,
24 the high ranking military and naval officers of the United
25

h2

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 States, that the Japanese would not dare to launch a
2 major offensive in the Southwestern Pacific if the American
3 Fleet was left in fighting shape on their flank at Pearl
4 Harbor?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: They could have made the attack
6 at that time, in December, on the Philippines and Malay
7 Peninsula, even on the northern part of the Dutch East
8 Indies, when our Fleet was in Pearl Harbor, and they could
9 have gotten away with it in time.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Why?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: The question is why they came to
12 attack us. They hoped to cripple us so it never would be
13 a factor in the rest of the war.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Don't you think, as a naval expert,
15 that they came to Pearl Harbor for the purpose of attacking
16 our fleet and immobilizing it for a time, so it would
17 make it possible for them to complete their conquest of
18 the Southwestern Pacific?

19 Admiral Ingersoll: I think what you stated was their
20 line of reasoning.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Did that enter into your conferences
22 with the other high ranking naval and military officers,
23 that the Japanese might be thinking about immobilizing
24 our fleet so that they could accomplish their objectives in
25

h3

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h4

1 the Southwestern Pacific?

2 Admiral Ingersoll: As I stated before, the result
3 of our estimate was that the Japanese would not do that,
4 that they were fully occupied with what they were doing
5 at that time, and that the risks were too great.

6 Mr. Gearhart: In other words, it was the studied
7 and carefully arrived at opinion of the high ranking
8 naval and military officers in Washington that the
9 Japanese would not launch an attack on our fleet in Pearl
10 Harbor?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: I could not answer it and say it
12 was the opinion of all. I think it was the opinion of
13 those with whom I talked.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Did Admiral Stark express that opinion?

15 Admiral Ingersoll: How is that, sir?

16 Mr. Gearhart: Was that the opinion of Admiral Stark?

17 Admiral Ingersoll: I think it was.

18 Mr. Gearhart: And other people that you were in daily
19 association and frequent conversation with?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: I think so.

21 Mr. Gearhart: If you felt there was any possibility
22 of doing that kind of thing, making that sort of attack,
23 you would, of course, have sent special messages to Admiral
24 Kimmel and General Short?
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Admiral Ingersoll: I think there is no question at all, if we had any information, any definite information that the Japanese ships were moving towards Pearl Harbor or if the Chief of Naval Operations felt that there was a distinct probability, as distinguished from a possibility that there was a distinct probability that Hawaii was in danger, I know he would have told them.

9
10
11
12
Mr. Gearhart: But you have told us that the destruction of codes, code machines, secret papers by the United States in the Japanese sphere, and by the Japanese in the American and British sphere, you told us that that meant war.

13
14
Why did not you sent a notice to that effect and relay that information on to Admiral Kimmel?

15
Admiral Ingersoll: We did.

16
Mr. Gearhart: You did?

17
18
19
Admiral Ingersoll: That is, we sent word that they had ordered the destruction of their codes. We had previously told them on the 27th, that war would come at any time.

20
21
22
Mr. Gearhart: Yes, but you did not say anything in the message of the 27th about the destruction of the codes, did you?

23
24
Admiral Ingersoll: We did not know it then.

25
Mr. Gearhart: What other messages did you send

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

h6

about the destruction of the codes before December 7th,
when it got there too late?

Admiral Ingersoll: We sent them the instruction, or
the information that the Japanese had ordered their codes
destroyed, I believe, on the 3rd or 4th of December; I
have forgotten the exact date. It was on the 3rd of
December.

Mr. Gearhart: Is that the only message that was sent
on that subject, the one of the 3rd of December?

Admiral Ingersoll: That was the only message sent
on the 3rd of December informing him that the Japanese
were ordering the destruction of their codes. Here is
the one on December 3rd which reads as follows: It was
sent to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, the Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, the Commanding Officer of the
14th Naval District, which was Hawaii, and the Commanding
Officer of the 16th Naval District, which was Panama.

"HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT
CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO
JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG, SINGA-
PORE, BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO DESTROY
MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE, AND TO BURN ALL
OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS."

There is another one on December 3rd that says:

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h7

1 "CIRCULAR 2444 FROM TOKYO ONE DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON,
2 HONGKONG, SINGAPORE, AND MANILA TO DESTROY MACHINE. BATAVIA
3 MACHINE ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO. DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON
4 ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY ALL BUT ONE CODE OF OTHER SYSTEMS
5 AND ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS. BRITISH ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY
6 REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED."

7 Here is our dispatch to Tokyo, that is, to the Naval
8 Attache at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Shanghai, to destroy
9 their codes. That was sent on the 3rd.

10 Mr. Gearhart: On the 3rd?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

12 And Peiping and the Marine detachment at Tientsin
13 were ordered to destroy on the 4th. Guam was directed
14 on the 4th, and Admiral Kimmel was instructed on the 6th:

15 "IN VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE EXPOSED
16 POSITION OF OUR OUTLYING PACIFIC ISLANDS YOU MAY AUTHORIZE
17 THE DESTRUCTION BY THEM OF SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS
18 NOW OR UNDER LATER CONDITIONS OF GREATER EMERGENCY. MEANS
19 OF COMMUNICATION TO SUPPORT OUR CURRENT OPERATIONS AND
20 SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SHOULD OF COURSE BE MAINTAINED UNTIL
21 THE LAST MOMENT."

22 Mr. Gearhart: That should be interpreted, and should
23 have been interpreted by Admiral Kimmel, as the most con-
24 clusive evidence that war was coming, and coming quickly?
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Admiral Ingersoll: It was the intention to convey that when they were sent.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes. You felt war was coming and coming quickly, and even though you thought that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility, every message in which places were mentioned directed the attention of the Hawaiian Commanders to the fact that war was expected in the Philippines, in Indo-China, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo and Guam; is that not correct?

Admiral Ingersoll: The information that we had of Japanese forces on the move at that time, was in that direction.

Mr. Gearhart: And even though all these days passed after the deadline date of the 29th of November, you and the high ranking officers with whom you were in daily conference, thought that possibly the Japanese were scheming on a distant point as a place of attack?

Admiral Ingersoll: As I stated before we had no definite information that the Japanese were on the move towards Hawaii, and I do not think it was the opinion of the officers in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations that they were moving in that direction.

Mr. Gearhart: You did not know where the Fleet was did you? Was not this Japanese Fleet lost for a week or

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

two?

Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know. The information regarding the location of Japanese ships was the primary responsibility of the Commander of the Pacific Fleet. He was the man who was in charge of the methods of determining the location of the Japanese fleets through radio intelligence, as it was called.

There were very long periods of time, and at various times when we never knew where the Japanese Fleet was. They might go to their mandated islands, and they might just as well have been on the moon, as far as we knew where they were.

Mr. Gearhart: There were times when you did know where the Japanese fleet was?

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

Mr. Gearhart: You got in touch with the Japanese whenever you could, is that not correct?

Admiral Ingersoll: It is like people that talk too much. Whenever they use the radio too much they get in trouble, because then they find where they are, and when you maintain radio silence, you don't know where they are. It was only by means of the radio direction finders and the analysis of the traffic that they could in most cases keep track of where they were.

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
h10 2 There were long periods of time when we did not know
3 where they were, or when we did not know where particular
4 ships were.

5 Mr. Gearhart: And, as a matter of fact, there were
6 days following the 29th day of November, the deadline date,
7 when it was known to you, and the men with whom you were
8 in daily conference, that the Japanese were in a position
9 unknown to American Intelligence; is that correct?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: I believe, although I did not keep
11 track of the position of all Japanese ships, that there were
12 some ships at that time that they did not know where they
13 were, but there were a great many Japanese ships that we
14 did know where they were.

15 We had sighted them off the coast of Indo-China, lots
16 of them.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Did you have to do with the preparation
18 of the war plan WPL-46?

19 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes. As a member of the Joint
20 Board, that war plan was finally approved by the Joint
21 Board, before it was sent to the Secretaries and the Presi-
22 dent for approval.

23 Mr. Gearhart: WPL-46 was a revised plan, was it not?

24 Admiral Ingersoll: It was a result of several revi-
25 sions.

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

hll

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Gearhart: We had plan after plan, and it is the 46th war plan? Does that mean that it is the 46th plan that had been worked out for the defense of the Pacific?

Admiral Ingersoll: No.

Mr. Gearhart: Were there that many plans, or more?

Admiral Ingersoll: No. As I recall, there were numerous plans that had been prepared for different situations, and different enemies over a period of many years, and that simply meant war plans volume No. 46.

In the old Orange war plan, which had been in existence five or six years, there were four volumes, and each one of them had a separate WPL number.

Mr. Gearhart: WPL 46, though had been recently, just a short time before Pearl Harbor on December 7th, revised?

Admiral Ingersoll: I believe WPL-46 was approved in April.

Mr. Gearhart: In April of 1941. Now, that represented the joint opinion of a committee, in reference to the problem which might come on?

Admiral Ingersoll: It is a little more than that, because WPL-46 was based on another plan, ABC-1, which was the American-British-Canadian joint plan, which had been approved on the highest political levels. Once that plan was approved, then the basic Army and Navy joint plan was

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

hl2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

drawn up, and from that the Navy war plan, WFL-46 was evolved.

Mr. Gearhart: Was the high level political plan, the ABC plan, was that the ABC-1 plan?

Admiral Ingersoll: ABC-1 was the plan agreed upon by the conversations with the British and Canadians, prior to No. 46.

Mr. Gearhart: And was it the adoption of that plan that made necessary the making of the general defense plan which became known as WFL-46?

Admiral Ingersoll: The existing plan, the number of which I have forgotten at the moment, was to be brought into agreement with ABC-1, which had been approved on high political levels.

Mr. Gearhart : Generally speaking WFL-46 was an offensive plan, was it not? It contemplated offensive action on the part of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Ingersoll: On the contrary, no.

Mr. Gearhart: Did it not involve the sending of the fleet down into the Marshalls before the Jap attack, and we became involved in this war?

Admiral Ingersoll: I haven't the plan here, but my recollection of the plan was that the offensive movement to the Marshalls did not take place until D plus 180,

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

hl3

1 which was six months, and the reason for that was we did
2 not have the auxiliaries or the transports sufficient for
3 the fleet to make an offensive movement.

4 Mr. Gearhart: But the ultimate purpose of WPL-46
5 was to capture the Marshall Islands?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: No. The principal task in WPL-46
7 which was in agreement with ABC-1, was to defeat Germany
8 and Italy in the Atlantic, and then defeat Japan. That
9 was the basic decision.

10 Mr. Gearhart: WPL-46 did not relate to the Atlantic
11 warfare, did it?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Was it such a wide plan?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: It was a plan for the U. S. Naval
15 forces wherever situation. The Pacific Fleet tasks
16 were only one chapter of it.

17 Mr. Gearhart: What did it provide for the defense of
18 Hawaii?

19 Admiral Ingersoll: Sir?

20 Mr. Gearhart: What did it provide for the defense of
21 Hawaii?

22 Admiral Ingersoll: Is the plan here so I can see?

23 Mr. Gearhart: I was not going to go into details. Do
24 you remember generally, the underlying scheme?
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

hl4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Admiral Ingersoll: One of the tasks of the Pacific Fleet was to defend the West Coast and our possessions in the Western Pacific. That included Hawaii as a part of it.

Of course, the primary responsibility for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands was an Army responsibility and not a Navy responsibility. Under the Joint action of the Army and Navy the Army was supposed to defend Hawaii so that the Fleet could leave it without any naval ships there. But the Fleet was supposed to cover it in its general operations, to prevent the Japanese from sending an Army there to capture it.

Mr. Gearhart: Was not that the underlying theory of WPL-46 that we would defend Hawaii and defend the United States by an offensive action against the Japanese?

Admiral Ingersoll: The basic task, the major task of the Pacific Fleet in WPL-46, for the first six months was largely defensive.

My testimony in the Court of Inquiry has that outlined in particular, where I have enumerated each task, and whether or not it was defensive or offensive. The reason for that was because the instructions which were sent to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel in the war warning dispatch of November 27, directed them to take a defensive deployment

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

cl3

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

Mr. Gearhart: You have heard the old phrase, the best defense is often an attack, have you not?

Admiral Ingersoll: I have heard that.

Mr. Gearhart: Is that not the theory on which WPL-46 was based?

Admiral Ingersoll: Sir?

Mr. Gearhart: Is not that the theory on which WPL-46 was based?

Admiral Ingersoll: No, sir, it was not.

Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Just a moment.

The Chairman: May I ask, while you are getting ready, there is one question that occurred to me with regard to not only the Pacific Fleet, but with regard to all fleets.

Is it or is it not true that the man who has risen to the rank in the Navy that he would be in charge of a fleet of the proportions of the Pacific Fleet, or the Asiatic, or the Atlantic Fleet, is expected to know enough about the situation and keep himself enough informed about the situation to exercise judgment based upon information he gathers on the ground, and it is not necessary for Washington to feed him out of a spoon every little detail

h15

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: The Chairman

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

hl6

of information that he ought to obtain in the field, on the ground where he is expected to have judgment and use it?

Is that a fair statement of the expectation of all officers?

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir, that is a very good statement, sir.

Of course, there is sometimes information which exists in the capital which the Commander in Chief has no means of obtaining.

The Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll: Or perhaps an expression of policy.

The Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll: Then it is the function of the Navy Department to keep him informed along those lines.

For example, in connection with that I said here before, Admiral Kimmel would have had no means of knowing that the Japanese had sent out instructions to burn their codes, except I have heard that they did see the Japanese consul burn stuff in his back yard in Honolulu, but I mean he would have no means of knowing that the Japanese in Washington or London, were to burn their codes.

The Chairman: Would there be information that he would obtain in the field, or in the ocean where he was in command

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: The Chairman

hl7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

that Washington would not have?

You mentioned a while ago that he had to keep up with where the Japanese fleet was.

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, because the coordination of all of the radio direction finder stations in the Pacific was under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and it was his assigned task to make the analysis of radio traffic in order to keep track as best he could with where the Japanese ships were. He was assigned that task because of his physical location and proximity, and nearness to them.

He could do it better than anybody else.

The Chairman: In other words, as I gather your answer, there is information that could be obtained at each end of the line, that the other one could not obtain, and in case Washington obtained information that was important and that the commander in the field could not get, or does not have, it is the duty of the Washington offices in the Navy, and the same in the Army, to apprise the commander in the field of that information, and also it is the duty of the commander in the field to obtain information and act upon it according to his judgment, along the lines, within his discretion that they could not obtain here in Washington; isn't that true?

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: The Chairman

hl8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Admiral Ingersoll: That is true.

I mentioned before that we were obtaining information regarding the movement of the Japanese along the Coast of Asia.

That information was obtained by the planes which Admiral Hart sent out from Manila.

It was also obtained by reports from Chinese agents and I think they were transmitted to him, and he, in turn, transmitted that information to us.

The Chairman: Yes.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

AL
7/18

Shack (14) p.m
follows
Hook
AL-1

11,333

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: The Chairman
Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
Admiral Ingersoll: A Commander in Chief is considered
by the Navy as almost a viceroy out in his own field. They
tell him in broad terms what he is supposed to do and they
do not bother him with asking him how he is going to do it,
or keep bothering him with whether he has done it.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
The Chairman: Would not any Naval officer worthy of
a command of that sort feel that he ought to have discretion
and he ought to be depended upon and may be depended upon
to act within the field of his own information, and to
gather all the information on the ground that it is at all
possible from any source, and would there be many sources
of such information in Hawaii, or in Manila, or anywhere
in the Far East or in the Atlantic on the part of a command-
ing officer of the Navy?

16
17
18
19
20
Admiral Ingersoll: When you put a Commander in Chief
out there you want to leave him, as far as possible, free
to do his job, and you trust that he is going to do it, and
you help him in such ways as you can, where there are things
of which he has no knowledge himself.

21
The Chairman: That is all.

22
23
The Senator from Michigan may inquire. Pardon the
interruption.

24
Senator Ferguson: That is all right.

25
Admiral, is there any question in your mind that the

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 chief source of intelligence of the United States Navy
2 in the fall of 1941 was in Washington? Is there any
3 question about that?

4 Admiral Ingersoll: That the chief what, sir?

5 Senator Ferguson: The chief source of Naval Intelligence
6 was being assembled and evaluated in Washington in 1941.

7 Admiral Ingersoll: I should say the chief source
8 of evaluation was in Washington, but not necessarily the
9 sources from which all of the information was obtained.

10 Senator Ferguson: I appreciate not all of it was in
11 Washington, as far as obtaining information is concerned,
12 but the evaluation of intelligence was centered in Washington?

13 Admiral Ingersoll: Generally speaking, I think that
14 is correct, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And in what particular office
16 was it? Who had authority, and whose duty was it to
17 evaluate intelligence?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: Generally speaking, the evaluation
19 of intelligence was done in the Office of Naval Intelligence.
20 Of course in nearly every case the credibility of the
21 information, or the reliability of the information, was -
22 determined there. But in some cases you had to refer, say,
23 to technical bureaus as to whether or not reports on this
24 or that mechanical device, or plane, and so forth, was worth
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 anything.

2
3 In regard to the evaluation of the combined political
4 and military information, particularly as it might pertain
5 to its effect on operations, or the strategic distribution
6 of our own forces, that sort of evaluation was done in
7 the War Plans Division. We did not call it evaluation there.
8 It was the estimate of the situation which the War Plans
9 Division made in drawing up the war plans.

10 Senator Ferguson: In other words, you have two sources
11 of information, or you have two kinds of information, the
12 military, or Naval in your case, and political information?

13 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct.

14 Senator Ferguson: And the political part of the informa-
15 tion was never given to the Naval Intelligence, so that
16 they had nothing to do with the evaluation of political
17 information or intelligence, as far as it related to or
18 controlled Naval Intelligence?

19 Admiral Ingersoll: I am not sure that that is correct,
20 that the political information was never given to Intelligence.
21 I think that is not correct. I think Naval Intelligence had
22 practically the same information that everybody in Operations
23 had, except possibly the direct contact which Admiral Stark
24 had with Mr. Hull, and of course that was as good political
25 information as you could have.

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(15)

Senator Ferguson: And Admiral Stark also had direct contact with the President?

Admiral Ingersoll: Oh, yes.

Senator Ferguson: Now how did that information that Admiral Stark got from those two men on the political side of our Intelligence get down into Naval Intelligence that was headed by Admiral Wilkinson?

Admiral Ingersoll: Well, as I said before, we used to have these conferences in the morning. Admiral Stark discussed matters at those times. He had a liaison officer, Admiral Schuirmann, or Captain Schuirmann at that time, who saw the State Department officials I think every day, and sometimes more than once a day, and Admiral Schuirmann would not only, when he came back from the State Department, report to Admiral Stark, but he would tell the other officers in Operations, War Plans, Intelligence, I am almost certain, and myself, what he had learned at the State Department that day.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know what the political policy, foreign policy, was in 1941, in December, in the early part, prior to Pearl Harbor, as far as it related to Japan?

Admiral Ingersoll: I am not sure that I know what you mean by the political policy. I was kept informed by Admiral

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Stark as to the more or less general process of our relations
2 with Japan.

3 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then I will ask you
4 this question: Did you know what our policy was prior to
5 Pearl Harbor -- and that was on the 7th -- that if there
6 was an attack on the Malay Peninsula, what the position
7 would be of the United States of America, as far as the
8 Navy or the Army were concerned?

9 Admiral Ingersoll: As far as the Navy and Army were
10 concerned, what we would do was contained in our war plans
11 and had nothing, of course, whatever to do with whether
12 or not there would be war between the United States and
13 Japan if Japan went into the Malay Peninsula.

14 I do not think there was anybody in the Navy Department
15 who knew what would happen if Japan went into the Malay
16 Peninsula, or into Siam, or Thailand.

17 Senator Ferguson: In other words, as far as the
18 United States Navy was concerned -- and I am talking about
19 OPNAV, which was your department -- you had no idea as to
20 what the position of the Navy would be in case there was
21 an attack by the Japanese upon the British and/or the
22 Dutch and no attack upon any American possessions?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: The position of the Navy would
24 have been the position taken by the United States Government,
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 and what the President would have recommended to the
2 Congress about declaring war. The Navy's position would
3 have been exactly the position of the United States.

4 Now the only thing we had to go by was the destruction
5 of codes, which indicated that the Japanese expected to be
6 at war with us soon, and they were moving in the direction
7 of the Malay Peninsula. So the only inference you could
8 draw is that very soon we were all going to be at war and
9 there were going to be hostilities. But the Navy did not
10 know what the President was going to recommend to the Congress.

11 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that there had been
12 war in the Atlantic without any recommendation to the
13 Congress?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: I certainly did.

15 Senator Ferguson: How does that account then for your
16 answer about war in the Pacific?

17 Admiral Ingersoll: Then it was not a legal war, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you, as one of the chief
19 officers in OPNAV, expect the same kind of a war in the
20 Pacific as they had in the Atlantic if there was an attack
21 on the British possessions and not upon America?

22 Admiral Ingersoll: No, because the Germans were still
23 here in Washington and they had not declared war on us for
24 all that we had been doing to them in the Atlantic.

25
D. G. NOTSHINZAW - JUNE 8 DRAW

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand it was because
2 of the burning of the codes that you got definite informa-
3 tion that there was going to be war with America?

4 Admiral Ingersoll: There is no question about it.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now when did you come to the con-
6 clusion that there was going to be war with America? Will
7 you give us the date as nearly as you can?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: You mean when Japan was going to
9 be at war with the United States?

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

11 Admiral Ingersoll: I think everybody in the Navy was
12 convinced that we were going to have war with Japan for the
13 last twenty years.

14 Senator Ferguson: Can we get a little closer than that?

15 Admiral Ingersoll: As the situation got worse during
16 1941 there was not any question about it, that sooner or
17 later we were going to be at war. The resignation of the
18 Cabinet in Japan in October looked as though it was going
19 to be a very, very serious situation, that there was no hope
20 of a peaceful settlement. Again on the 27th of November,
21 when Mr. Hull I believe informed the Secretary of the Navy
22 that there was no hope of a peaceful solution with Japan,
23 there was no question in the mind of Admiral Stark, I know,
24 that war was coming very soon. The destruction of their
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

codes brought it still closer.

The Chairman: The committee will recess until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Admiral, you will be back then.

(Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed until 10:00 o'clock a.m. of the following day, Tuesday, February 12, 1946.)

- - -

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

