- I. GENERAL

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT 4317 0/005 RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out)

(e) Mission				RED BY THIS		vasion	None	of Return - (Z returned - all pl ed in sea about 20	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR
TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		(PER PLAN		FUZE, SETTING (g)	
F6F-5	WF-53		4		TV.	one			
III. O	THER U. S.			EMPLOYED IN	E II				
None	SQUADRON	NUMBER		BASE	TYPE	SQUADRO	N NUMBER	BASE	
								(1) Dull khaki &	olive-
								green splash	camoui
IV. Et	NEMY AIRC	CRAFT OBS	ERVED OR EN	GAGED (By O	wn Aircraft L	isted in	II Only).	age on all.Large red discs on both	stands
(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	NO. ENGAGIN OWN A/C	IG TIME	LOCATION (OF B	OMBS, TOR	(f) PEDOES CARRIED OBSERVED		
) ZEKE	5	3	1650K (ZONE)	142°32' E. 25° 06' N.	in ea	sh win	gaged.	unobserved.	ce
			(ZONE)	7-8 miles	Unobs	erved (m rest.	(2) Dull khaki &	
2) ZEKE	4	0	1653K(ZONE)	SE of abou	(2)Unknow	ole .2	hmsin on	e. green splash de flage on all.	
			icide bomb	ing attack			sed seen		
	Part of	vi	cinity of	Iwo Jima.			IN PEET, TYPE	howing) Insignia for others unknown 5500 9/10ths	nomm.
(i) Encoun Time of (j) of Sun	or Moon	Late aft		MOON: DAY, OVER				bility 12 (hazy)	
(i) Encoun Time of (j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon	Late aft	ROYED OR DA	MOON: DAY, OVER		ircraft L		nly).	1
(i) Encoun Time of (j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon	Late aft	ROYED OR DA					nly).	AGE
(i) Encoun Time of (j) of Sun V. EN TYPE	EMY AIRCI	AFT DEST OYED OR DAMA SQUADRON	ROYED OR DA	MAGED IN A	GUNS US	.50s C	isted in II C	only). (c) HIT, ANGLE Vel, 6 o'clock Tel, 12 o'clock Desired to the control of the control o	AGE MED TO/O
(i) Encoun Time of (j) of Sun V. EN TYPE ENEMY A/C	EMY AIRCI (b) DESTRO TYPE A/C	AFT DEST OYED OR DAMA SQUADRON VI-53	ROYED OR DA	OR GUNNER S(114650)USI OFORD(36825)	GUNS US	.50s C	isted in II C	only). (c) HIT, ANGLE Vel, 6 o'clock Tel, 12 o'clock Desired	AGE MED Toyed

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(a) TYPE OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE-	WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(e) EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)			
F6F-5	VF-53	After engaging enemy.		BU.NO.	72773-Total	loss.	
2 P6F-5	The state of the s	since fuel was running	•		72964-Total		
3 F6F- 5		low, planes had to be			72700-Total		
4 P6P-5		ditched in sea because they were unable to be	Cockpit hood, port wing (angle unknown)	BU.NO.	72939-Total	1038.	
6		landed on damaged SARA-				10 100	
7		TOGA.					
8							
9							
0	3					Contract of	
						.52	
2						7.47	
3						11/19/1	
4							

(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
1	VF-53	Ens. J. P. NELSON (337916) USINR	Unknown (believed to have Landed at sea in darkness	Missing in action.
			and never rescued)	

VIII.	RANGE,	FUEL, AN	D AMMUNI	TION DAT	A FOR PLAN	VES RET	URNING			
(a)	(b) MILES	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED				NO. OF PLANES
TYPE A/C	OUT	RETURN	AV. HOURS	AV. FUEL LOADED	AV. FUEL CONSUMED	.30	.50	20MM	MM	RETURNING
F6F-5	(CAP)	(CAP)	5.8	400	389	69	Unknown	-	-	None

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Che	eck one block on e	each line).		
CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over	X			669
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm	X	•	-	669
LIGHT — Machine oun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm	T.	-		440

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB, at various altitudes

TURNS
DIVES
CEILINGS
RANGE
PROTECTION
ARMAMENT

Since the action was almost "instantaneous" in type, not much opportunity was presented for comparative performances; however, the pilots did note easy manoeverability of the Zeke and its ability to make far tighter turns than the F6F-5. All pilots feel that water injection (which they all used) placed them at a decided advantage since they were able to close quickly and effectively with the enemy. In one case an F6F-5 closed from 3000' to 1000' in 30 seconds.

In regards to armament, SZYMBORSKI made the observation that the first Zeke which he and RADFORD engaged seemed to have heavier armament than the usual 7.7 machine guns. He bases his conclusions on the size of the gun barrels protruding from the wings and the size of the gun flashes. SZYMBORSKI claims to have seen only one gun on each wing. He estimates the barrel of the gun

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stuck out about 18 inches from the wing, and had what might have been an inverted cone-shaped flash shield, about 4 or 5 inches in diameter, on the end of it. The size of the gun flash was figured to be 2 ft in length. SZYMBORSKI made his observations from a distance of 100 yards or less and definitely feels that the armament on this Zeke appeared heavier than the .50 caliber guns he had been so accustomed to seeing on the F6F-5. RADFORD did not observe the armament on this plane, but on the one he shot down and the one he saw in his rear-view mirror, he was of the opinion that each carried 4 machine guns, 2 on each wing. From the 4 flashes that he saw in each case, and that appeared like little red dots, RADFORD believed that the guns were 7.7 caliber and were set flush into the leading edge of the wings. LUKE made no observations as to armament.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
"", Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
"", Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting

Recognition, Aircraft

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

A four-plane combat air patrol was launched by the USS SARATOGA at 1400% in the vicinity of Iwo Jima on 21 February 1945. It was the first CAP of the day and was made up of VF-53 pilots and planes (type F6F5). The division was led by Lt. R.W. LUKE (114650) USNR, and also included: Ens. J.P. NELSON (337916) USNR, LUKE'S wingman; Ens. L.C. RADFORD (368259) USNR, second section leader; and Ens. C. SZYMBORSKI (346821) USNR, RADFORD's Wingman.

Immediately after launching the division was split into sections with RADFORD and SZYMBORSKI furnishing anti-submarine patrol in the form of a surface search about 12-15 miles ahead of the parent carrier, and LUKE and NELSON orbiting the SARATOGA, occasionally being vectored out by the SARATOGA FDO to investigate targets which in every case (where they were

located) turned out to be friendly planes.

At 1630K RADFORD and SZYMBORSKI were ordered back to screen the ship now located at 141° 53° E, 25° 03° N, and were immediately sent out to intercept a large "bogey" which the FDO reported was approaching the ship from the northeast at a distance of approximately 60 miles. The weather was overcast and hazy with 9/10ths cumulus cloud cover and visibility 12 miles. The cloud base was at 3000° and the top at 5500°. Twenty (20) minutes later RADFORD tallyhoed enemy planes at 1650K at 142°32° E 25°06° N, bearing 084° 20 miles from the SARATOGA. LUKE and NELSON arrived on the scene a moment later.

RADFORD, using water injection, broke throught the clouds at 5300' followed by SZYMBORSKI, a mile behind, and spotted five enemy fighters 5 miles ahead, 4 in right echelon formation, and one about 500' above and 300' astern of the others. All were recognized as Zekes and were moving across the friendly planes! line of flight from port to starboard. The single enemy plane, apparently seeing RADFORD first, immediately broke off to starboard and made a run on RADFORD. Both planes fired headon at each other but apparently no hits were scored by either pilot, possibly because they closed so rapidly thus eliminating any decent sighting for a good lead shot. RADFORD only fired a short burst of 10 - 15 rounds from 1500' - 2000' range. SZYMBORSKI, having pulled out to starboard and swung around to port for a 90° full deflection above shot. next engaged this enemy plane, and saw the bullets from his 6 .50s hit the Zeke from the nose to the tail as it passed by in a dive. Because of the speed advantage of the Zeke from its dive it pulled out of range. so SZYMBORSKI kicked left rudder, put on his water injection, and closed to 1000' from 3000' range in 30 seconds. Having reopened fire at 1600' range SZYMBORSKI held his fire until he was forced to break off and throttle back at 100 yard range because of being too close. This firing was level at 6 o'clock and resulted in large pieces of the Zeke's tail section flying off. A thin trail of smoke emerged from its underside. and the Jap began a shallow spiral to port into the clouds. The plane did not burn, but SZYMBORSKI believes that since the pilot did not attempt whatsoever any evasive action after his first run, he must have been killed by the bullets that went into the cockpit at that time. The Jap had every opportunity to do a loop or dive for cloud cover, but didn't.

In the meantime RADFORD continued on ahead to take on the remaining 4 enemy planes. The closest one turned into him, and the other 3, now aware of opposition, fanned out and scattered wildly. RADFORD opened up with his 6.50s from 1500' - 2000' range and watched his tracers go into the Zeke engine on a 50-75 shot burst that was fired at 12 o'clock level. There was a flash, originating from the cowling of the Zeke, which enveloped the whole plane, and then flames were seen covering the starboard wing and the

fuselage as far aft as the cockpit.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness Distance of Opening Fire Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses Enemy Weaknesses Offensive Tactics, Own , Enemy Defensive Tactics, Own Enemy

Flexible Gunnery, Own Escort Tactics Fighter Direction Use of Radar Night Fighting Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target Approach to Target Altitudes, Speeds Approach Dive Pull-Out Dive Angle Strafing Retirement Defensive Tactics Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics Torpedo Tactics Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes Selection of Targets Fuzing Strafing Tactics Defensive Tactics Use of Radar Reconnaissance Photography Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation Homing Rendezvous Recognition, Ships Communications Flight Operations Search and Tracking Base Operations Maintenance

SZYMBORSKI saw the Zeke afire and confirmed a definite kill for RADFORD. The enemy plane pulled up in a wing-over and fell flaming into the clouds. RADFORD's F6F5 was not hit, since the enemy's bullets passed directly below him. Still continuing on, RADFORD turned to port to get into position to engage his third plane which was at the same time turning into him. (Note: RADFORD at this moment, pointed toward SZYMBORSKI, saw SZYMBORSKI on the first Jap's tail shooting the rudder and stabilizer to pieces, and confirms a destroyed plane for SZYMBORSKI, based on the fact that it could not have been controlled with so much of the tail empennage shot off). However, while in the turn to port, bullets began hitting RADFORD's plane from the rear, striking the cockpit hood and the port wing just forward of the aileron. RADFORD saw a Zoke

in his rear-view mirror and immediately showed over into the clouds, ducking away without suffering any further damage. He emerged on top of the clouds to find himself only 500' directly below 3 Jap planes (apparently what was left of the original group), nosed up and gave one a short burst without any visible affects, and dove for cloud cover once again. This time when he emerged he saw 4 Zekes circling 5 miles distant with a lone Hellcat diving into their midst. This turned out to be Lt. LUKE who had just arrived at the scene of the encounter. Up to this point the entire action had covered a period of 2 or 3 minutes at the most.

Lt. LUKE and Ens. NELSON had been circling the SARATOGA at 2500' when they got their vector from the FDO. They proceded north and then turned east at maximum speed. LUKE was in low blower, and showing 2700 RPM and 61 inches manifold pressure. NELSON lagged behind, possibly because he did not go to blower, but did manage to get close on the turn eastward when he was only a mile to starboard of LUKE. After climbing to 7000' LUKE started down through scattered cumulus clouds and tallyhoed 4 Zekes who were orbiting 1000' below 2 - 3 miles ahead at 1130 o'clock. These Zekes had the same olive green - dull khaki splash camouflage as the others, but LUKE is emphatic that the one he engaged had no markings or insignia, as were seen on two planes that RADFORD engaged a moment earlier; however it could have been easy to miss seeing the "rising suns" in the hazy light

and heat of battle. It is not known whether this second group of Zekes included any of the first group or not. However, based on the total number observed in both sightings and the number of planes destroyed in the first encounter, there were more than the five Zekes which were originally spotted at 1650% by RADFORD. In both cases the enemy fighters were definitely recognized as

Zekes by all of the returning pilots.

LUKE had the impression that the Japs were looking for something to come up at them from below and that they were merely playing around and waiting while circling and alternately diving and climbing seemingly unaware of his presence. Picking the nearest Jap, LUKE dove on him as he came around in his circle and opened up from 500' with 6 .50s for a level 6 O'clock shot. Tracers were seen to enter the Zeke's starboard wing about midway from the root to the tip. A second long burst, from the same position, saw a stream of bullets go into the cockpit and cross over the fuselage into the port wing. Fire was observed at the port wing root in the form of 4 or 5 streaks of flame 3 ft long as the bullets hit. LUKE, getting too close, pulled up 400-500' and reversed course, observing the Jap plane roll slowly on its back and disappear into a cloud ahead. LUKE believes that besides being definitely afire, the plane now had a dead pilot since it rolled so long and slow, when a more violent evasive action would have been normal. The time was approximately 1653K.

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REPORT No. 2

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar

ATTACK

Night Fighting

Recognition, Aircraft

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Use of Jamming

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

It was less than a minute later that LUKE saw a Zeke falling out of control in a mass of flames. The location was 7-8 miles from RADFORD's and SZYMBORSKI's encounters, the time 3 minutes later, and the altitude difference 2000 ft. The returning pilots concur that this plane was none they had engaged, based on these facts, and feel sure that it was destroyed by Ens. NELSON who was known to have been in the immediate vicinity at the time, but who is now missing in action. This seems to be the best conclusion since no other friendly planes were in the vicinity at the time. This plane couldn't have been NELSON himself because NELSON joined up a few minutes later with the rest of the division. At any rate a fourth Jap plane was destroyed.

After LUKE's engagement the remaining enemy planes were lost since they had scattered and disappeared in the clouds. The division joined up (including NELSON who showed up seemingly out of newhere) and went below the clouds circling the area at 1000 looking for the enemy. None was found, but RADFORD saw two large circular oil slicks on the water 3 miles apart, and LUKE besides seeing these, saw a third slick nearby, this one having

sinking pieces of tail assembly in the middle of it. Now under SARATOGA FDO control, the division was vectored southeast and told to orbit 12 miles from the carrier. Then, until 1915K, they were sent on a continuous wild goose chase after "bogsys" that invariably turned out to be friendly aircraft. This must have occured about a dozen times, and finally terminated at 1915K when darkness had set in and plans for ditching had to be made since all planes were low on fuel and could not land on the damaged and fouled-up deck of the SARATOGA. They split up at 1945K, with LUKE ditching successfully at 1955K in the darkness near a small minesweeper (#302) which immediately rescued him. SZIMBORSKI, having picked up the SARATOGA's oil slick, followed it southeast and found the carrier. only to have to land in the sea alongside a destroyer because of the damaged flight deck. This destroyer, the USS MELVIN (one of the SARATOGA screen), picked SZYMBORSKI up immediately at 2000K, with much credit for saving SZYMBORSKI's life being given to a boatswain's mate who dove from the ship to assist SZYMBORSKI until the DD could stop and manoever in close. RADFORD set down at 1955% beside the DD, USS HYMAN. just east of Imo Jima, and experienced no difficulty in being rescued.

about 1950K, was told to go to Iwo Jima since he was so low on gas.

Though he was near Iwo Jima and innumerable ships in the area, no further word has been obtained of him. It is presumed that he might have been injured on landing in the darkness in the rough sea and went down with the plane. Daylight search the next day failed to produce any clues as to his whereabouts. He is listed as missing in action.

The SARATOGA radar gear which determines the altitude of approaching targets apparently was non-operational, since the FDO was unable to give the altitude of the enemy. Thus, the division leader, Lt. LUKE, feels the division was lucky to have made any interceptions at all, particularly because of the many clouds which offered such excellent cover. Communications were generally good, with the exception of channel C (guard channel) which the pilots reported as being fuzzy, and difficult to understand transmissions from the ship. This might have been caused by damage to the ship's radio gear.

The first group of Zekes that were intercepted, from their southeasterly direct course and their formation, seemed headed for business, according to RADFORD and SZYMBORSKI. When the enemy encountered opposition they made no use of combat team work, since aside from the two planes that made single rune, most appeared to scatter wildly and fam out for cloud terror.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses

Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

On the other hand, the second group were circling abalacely show encountered and offered the impression that they were morely having a good time not knowing what they were doing. It was for this reason that the team work displayed by his division was largely responsible for its success. Sith the possible exception of MICOM, each pilot was in position to cover another, and the division leader feels that MICOM must have been likewise, since very possibly the fourth plane might have been after him (ICAM) and MICOM got it.

all place concur that the Jap places certainly see not meet in

In several instances, particularly after dark, planes inadvertently approached too near to or actually flow over friendly forces, and were taken under as fire. Fortunately no casualties occured.

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

No difficulties because of material failure were experienced on the

The Life jackets used by SZYMBORSKI and RADFORD developed slow leaks

The Model A Pararaft packages (manufactured by NAS, Barbers Point A & R)

immediately after inflation. A test showed that SZYMBORSKI's jacket Teaked

as a result of a loose hexagonal nut located on the COp flask housing.

were in all cases easily removed from the cockpits of the airplanes.

RADFORD and SZYMBORSKI found it difficult to open the pararaft packages

and discarded them in the water. Both complain that the QAC Connector

U-bolt was too difficult to locate and was fastened too tight for easy

release. LUKE had no difficulty in opening the package, having had plenty

LUKE did complain of difficulty in opening the Kidde type rotary valve

CO, bottle as is often the case; the safety pin mechanism was too complicated

of time to open it before leaving the wing of the plane and getting into

flight covered by this report, with the exception of a rehostat failing

to dim the light on one of the plane's gunsights. However this was of

minor importance. Otherwise, all pilots reported excellent performance

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.

Use additional sheets if necessary).

on the part of the Hellcat.

the water.

RADFORD's jacket was not returned.

for easy release under emergency conditions.

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar Homing Devices Visual Signals Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF Signals Battle Lights Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles of Fire Needing Further Protection Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes Life Belts, Life Rafts Safety Belts Emergency Kits Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment Personnel Facilities

J.R. Branch, Lieut., A, UMR

ACIO. VF-53

RANK AND DUTY

Rollet W. Courad

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

19 March 1945

DATE

ALLSET - MFD. BY THE EGRY REGISTER CO., PATENTED