

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: MATSUI, Iwane

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. The motive and object of the Japanese Government for the despatch of its troops to the southern part of Chiangsu Province in 1937.

Owing to the discord between Japan and China in North China in July 1937, an anti-Japanese movement among the Chinese army and civilians in Shanghai district grew intense day by day. The Chinese Army, disregarding the Truce Agreement concluded in 1932, persistently concentrated its troops around the Japanese settlement in Shanghai, threatened the Japanese troops and residents there, finally leading to the assassination of Sub-Lt.

Oyama on August 9, and the Japanese troops and residents were exposed to danger. Therefore, the Japanese Government, realizing the necessity of quickly reinforcing its Naval Force there in order to protect the lives and interests of Japanese residents, decided on 15 August to hurriedly dispatch to Shanghai an Expeditionary Force consisting of 3rd and 11th (one brigade less) Divisions. I was appointed the Commander-in-Chief and the troops were sent successively to Shanghai on board warships on and after 20 August of the same year.

The object and mission of the Expeditionary Force was to reinforce our Naval Force and protect the lives and property of our residents in and about Shanghai.

2. The reason why I, a reserve officer, was specially appointed Commander-in-Chief and the state of my mind at that time.

During my forty years' service in the Army; i.e. from 1894, the year in which I entered Military Preparatory School, up to 1935, the year in which I was placed on the Reserve List, I was in the following positions successively: A member of General Staff Headquarters, Chief of 2nd Section, General Staff Headquarters, Commander of 11th Division, Commander-in-Chief of the Taiwan Army, etc. During my military career, I was stationed in

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North and South China for about 12 years all together and not only did I do my best during this time to bring about co-operation between Japan and China, but also, since my younger days all through my life I worked hard so that Japan and China could be on friendly terms and that Asia could be built up again. The greater part of my work in the Army was also in line with these ideals.

In 1937, the Shanghai Incident broke out and the Expeditionary Force was despatched there in haste. The Minister of War himself told me that the reason why I, who had been on the Reserve List, was appointed the Commander was because of my past experience referred to above.

My appointment was due to the fact that at that time the Japanese Government's policy towards China was to settle the Incident locally as soon as possible and to prevent the aimed conflict from spreading.

I was always firm in the belief that the strife between Japan and China was a quarrel between brothers in the so-called "household of Asia" and that it was an unavoidable expedience for Japan to rescue by force the Japanese residents in China and to protect our endangered rights and interests. It was no different from an elder brother thrashing his young and recalcitrant brother after putting up with him for so long. The action was to make China come to her senses, not out of hatred, but out of

love. Therefore, when I assumed the command of the Expeditionary Force I promised myself to settle the trouble between Japan and China on this belief and hoped to make the despatch of the Expeditionary Force not a cause of mutual enmity but something that would help to bring about friendly relations and co-operation between the two nations. So I demanded of my officers that they make every one of their men thoroughly understand the true meaning of the expedition in question. The following points were the gist of my instructions I gave to the troops upon their dispatch:

(1) Fighting in the vicinity of Shanghai is only aimed at the subjugation of the Chinese troops challenging us, therefore, the Chinese officials and people should be pacified and protected as much as possible.

(2) Always bear in mind not to bring troubles upon any foreign residents and troops and keep in close contact with the foreign authorities and armies in order to avoid misunderstanding.

3. The fighting situations in and about Shanghai.

The Shanghai Expeditionary Force arrived one unit after another in Maan Islands at the mouth of the Yangtze River on and after August 22. At this juncture a report was received that the troops and residents in Shanghai were in danger. So at dawn on August 24 I tried hurriedly

to disembark the arriving troops at Woosung and also along the bank farther up the river to establish communications with the Japanese Naval Force, by driving out the Chinese troops who were occupying the position there.

However, according to the reports received the number of the Chinese troops stationed in Shanghai and along the banks of the Yangtze River, west of Shanghai, was approximately estimated at a hundred thousand and they sought our landing troops everywhere and made violent attacks. After 15 or 16 days of bitter fighting and at a great sacrifice, the Expeditionary Force finally succeeded in securing a position along the bank. But the Chinese counter-attacks intensified more and more, and their force, being reinforced from Nanking and Hangchow areas reached more than 30 or 40 divisions. In meeting this, our Expeditionary Force was also reinforced in proportion and on November 5, 10th Army (more than 3 divisions) under Lt.-Gen. Yanagawa was landed on the coast of Chekiang Province to co-operate with the Force. Thus, the Expeditionary Force, after fighting desperately for more than two months, was barely able to drive the Chinese Army out from the vicinity of Shanghai and to occupy the city towards the end of October and the

beginning of November, giving security to the Japanese residents.

During the fighting what attracted my attention especially were as follows: The anti-Japan sentiment of the Chinese officials and people around Shanghai was very strong, and the guard unit of Chiang Kai-shek was most daring in counter attacks.

With their retreat route blocked by their supervising troops, other various units also resisted stubbornly but were finally driven back in confusion. Before their retreat, the Chinese troops adopted the so-called "Clearance Tactics" and either destroyed or burnt main transportation facilities and buildings. Some of them changed their uniforms to plain clothes, and turned guerillas, sniping at our soldiers and threatening our rear. The local people also co-operated with their troops by cutting telegraph wires or arranging signal-fires, jeopardizing our troops to no end. I was also aware of many instances where the troops and nationals of England, America, France etc., in sympathy with the Chinese troops, intentionally gave assistance to them and obstructed our military movements in many ways. Furthermore I felt keenly that the above-mentioned Chinese attitude and the long and bitter fighting had estranged the Chinese army and people in

Central China from the Japanese Army, causing a hostile feeling between the two. Meanwhile, I instructed my officers and men to give protection and be decent to the Chinese people and to have a regard for the foreign rights and interests in China. As one example of the results of this instruction the battle in Nanshi (southern district of Shanghai) ended, as I ordered, without causing any damage to the district.

4. The Organization of the Central China Army and the circumstances that lead to the decision to attack Nanking.

Immediately after the 10th Army's landing at Hangchow Bay on 5 November 1937, what was the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and the 10th Army were organized into the Central China Area Army. I was then appointed the Commander of this new Army. For a while I served as the Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force concurrently.

The Central China Area Army Headquarters was over the Shanghai Expeditionary Force Headquarters and the 10th Army Headquarters, and its mission was to unify the command of these two units. However, since it had only seven staff officers, its duty was limited to giving operational instructions to the two headquarters, and had no authority to dispose the entire intendance and medical matters of the army in general.

Therefore, after I was relieved from my concurrent

post on December 7; i.e. the Commandership of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, my relation with the officers and men in the field in regard to the command and supervision was entirely indirect.

The Central China Area Army, after driving the Chinese Army out of the Shanghai Area, occupied the line between Chiahsing in Chekiang Province, Soochow and Changchow in Kiangsu Province and sought to maintain peace and order in the Shanghai area.

However, the Chinese Army, with Nanking as its base, kept up with the large-scale battles which were then in progress in North China and concentrated a great number of troops from other districts to prepare for attack against Japan in Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces. The situation grew so bad that unless the Chinese base of operation around Nanking was captured, it was impossible to maintain peace and order and to protect our interests in Central China. Consequently, Japan decided to capture Nanking to restore public peace in the southern part of Chingsu province, and the Imperial Headquarters ordered our Central China Area Army to seize Nanking in cooperation with the Navy. Our army thus commenced a quick offensive operation against Nanking in spite of many difficulties.

5. Measures taken at the time of capture of Nanking and the so-called cases of plunder and outrage in Nanking.

In accordance with the standing policy of our government to localize the area of battle as much as possible, and because of my long years of idea to bring about co-operation and prosperity between Japan and China, I took in capturing Nanking every precaution not to make this campaign a cause of struggle for the entire Chinese population. As explained before, my experience in the fighting around Shanghai made me feel the necessity of this more than ever. Regarding the various precautionary measures I took at that time to maintain military discipline and moral, and my other actions to help to enforce discipline, I will not state again since the witness NAKAYAMA, Yasuto already testified thereof in detail.

Notwithstanding my scrupulous care in capturing Nanking, in the busy and unsettled condition at that time, it may have been some excited young officers and men committed unpleasant outrages, and it was to my great regret and sorrow that I, afterward, heard rumors of such misconduct. At the time of capturing Nanking I was sick in bed at Suchow, some 140 miles away, and I was unaware of any such outrages committed contrary to my orders and received no reports thereof. After entering Nanking on 17 December, I heard about it for the first time, from the Commander of the KEMPEI unit, and I, at once, ordered every unit to investigate thoroughly and to punish the guilty men.

However, it is a well known fact that, in war time, the Chinese troops and some outlaws almost always commit acts of violence and looting by taking advantage of the confusion. Not a few of those crimes were committed by the Chinese troops and peoples when Nanking fell, so to hold the Japanese officers and men responsible for all the crimes is to distort the fact.

A ceremony for entering Nanking was held on 17 December, and on the following day a memorial service for the dead was quietly held at the airfield. On the 19th, I inspected through the city accompanied by 15 or 16 officers and men but fires had been already put out and the streets were calm, with many refugees returning to their homes. We saw only about twenty dead Chinese troops lying on the streets and the order within the city was generally being restored. But the water-works, electric facilities and important governmental and municipal buildings had been destroyed by the Chinese troops before the entry of the Japanese army and there were comparatively few fires, the number of fire-destroyed houses being approximately 50 or 60.

In short, during my stay in Shanghai after the fall of Nanking until February 1938, the only thing I heard was a rumour towards the end of December 1937 to the effect

that there were some cases of illegal acts in Nanking but I had received no official report about such fact. I hereby definitely states that the U.S. Army's broadcast in Tokyo after the war's end concerning the alleged large-scale massacre and outrage as has been asserted by the Prosecution in this court was the first time that I ever heard anything about it. After I heard the broadcast I tried to investigate the activities of our army subsequent to our capture of Nanking, however, the responsible persons at that time were already dead or detained and punished overseas, while the documents concerned were destroyed by fire. It is impossible to go back ten years and investigate and study the true situation in detail.

It is possible that a great number of Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded by bombs, artillery shells and rifle bullets during the Nanking campaign, but I do believe that there is not a bit of truth in the Prosecution's charge that there were cases of planned massacre in the fight of Nanking. Nothing can be farther from the truth than the slander that the staff of the Japanese army ordered or tolerated the above deeds.

In view of the situation at that time, it is needless to say that I did everything in my power as commander

of the Central China Area Army to take measures to prevent the occurrence of such unfortunate incidents to give severe punishment to the guilty and to compensate for the damages.

However, it is to my great regret that the result was not perfect due to the hectic condition of wartime. (The contributing factors were that I was sick in bed at Suchow when Nanking was captured; that I stayed only 5 days in Nanking before leaving the city; that as the Commander of the Central China Area Army I had no direct authority over the officers and men in the field, as explained before).

6. My actions after Nanking was Captured:

Staying for five days after entering Nanking on 17th, December, I left on 20th, December for Shanghai by water because of the necessity of commanding the Army in operation in the Chikiang area and after that I stayed in Shanghai. Here I was very busy in disposing the aftermath of war, such as negotiating with the local Chinese officials with regard to the maintenance of general peace and order and taking relief measures for the people; and getting in contact with the commanders of the British and American navies and the other foreign military and civilian officials in the area to look after

whatever incidents that occurred during the campaign. This was because the Central Chinese Area Army, after the complete occupation of Nanking and after my return to Shanghai, was ordered by the central authority to concentrate its efforts in securing the entire areas south of the Yangtze and East of Nanking, especially the neighbourhood of Shanghai.

Incidentally, when I heard the rumour of outrages in Nanking after returning to Shanghai, I issued a warning again to the officers and men then staying in Nanking by despatching especially one of my subordinate staff officers at the end of 1937 and ordered a thorough investigation of the rumour and quick punishment for anybody found to be guilty. However, up to the time of my leaving the post, I received no authentic reports concerning the above matters.

Besides the maintenance of public peace and order in the abovementioned occupied areas, I felt the necessity of negotiations for a general peace movement with the Government of Chiang Kai-shek. I urged the Chinese key officials in the neighbourhood of Shanghai to make efforts in this connection and especially despatched envoys to Foochow and Canton and had them communicate with Chen yi and Sung Tzu-wen. However, simultaneously with the

reorganization of the Central Chinese Area Army in the latter part of February, I was dismissed from the post of the Army Commander and returned to the home. I am still regretting the fact that I had missed the chance of continuing my effort for attaining the above object.

7. The fact that a meeting was held among attaches, in Berlin in 1929:

When I was dismissed from the post of Chief of 2nd Section, General Staff Headquarters in December, 1928, I thought of making a trip to various countries in Asia and in Europe, and in January, 1929 I started on my tour of inspection of French Indo-China, Siam, British Malay, India and other European Countries. Just when I was passing Berlin in April, 1929, military attaches stationed in various nations in Europe, taking the opportunity of my arrival there, got together with the object of renewing friendship. It was not an official conference and there was no particular purpose.

It was presided over by Major General OMURA, Yurin, attache in Berlin, and the meeting was of social nature. It was not a conference called and sponsored by me. Moreover, as I mentioned before, at that time I had already been dismissed from the post of Chief of 2nd Section, General Staff Headquarters and, as a mere Lieutenant General, I had no official power to sponsor a

conference among the attaches of various Embassies. In short, it was only a social meeting and nothing was decided upon with regard to the problems of the time, and no particular items were on the agenda. It was merely an informal, round-table discussion at which the attaches expressed their opinions on the situations in Europe. Accordingly, no minutes were taken and I had made no report thereof to my superior after my return to Japan. At the meeting I was seated in the seat of honour only as a visitor who came to that part of the world from afar. On this point, the contents of the Prosecution Exhibit No. 733 is contradictory to the statement I made to the Prosecution. I find what seem to be mis-translations in the records of investigation prepared by the Prosecution.

8. The relation between my appointment as a member of Supreme War Council or a cabinet advisor and the foreign policies of the Government:

A supreme war councillor is mainly given a temporary mission regarding the education and training within the Army and he is not to meddle in anything at any time, especially in foreign affairs.

A cabinet advisor was appointed mainly as a consultative agency because of the political situations in Japan

and abroad in those days, and had no substantial authority. Such being the case, while I was in these positions, my opinion was never taken up concerning the China and Asiatic problems, etc., and I myself never offered my own opinion.

9. The object of the Greater Asia Association which was established by me and the account of its activities, especially the true picture of the Asia movements for which I negotiated with Mr. Chin Te-chun in Peipin:

For many years, it had been my regret to see Asia invaded by Europeans and Americans, and I had been praying for the reconstruction of Asia by the people of Asia. In view of a marked alienation between Japan and China, since the Manchurian Incident, it was my desire that the peoples of these two nations look at the whole situation instead of being sentimental about small matters and misunderstanding each other. So, in order to give impetus to the movement of the "Greater Asianism" among interested persons in Japan and China, I established the Greater Asia Association together with men of the same views in 1933. This was not a political organization but it was a kind of an organization to study social culture. Its object was to reconstruct Asia by spreading the principle of Wang-Tao -- the idea which has been

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transmitted for thousands of years from generation to generation in China and Japan, by bringing about a state of co-existence and co-prosperity for the entire Asiatic people; and finally by contributing to the humanity as a whole in its peaceful development. (Def. Doc. No. 2234). The number of Japanese members of the Association had reached more than two thousand but, due to the lack of funds, it was unable to do anything special.

In 1935 and 1936 I personally saw China, travelling south and north, and endeavoured for the accomplishment of this movement, planning for a campaign with my old friends in China. But for years in China the "Greater Asianism" had already been widely advocated by Sun Wen, the former President of the Chinese Republic. So, China wanted to propagandize the "Greater Asianism" by herself. Hoping that her movement and ours in Japan would be in line with each other in reaching the common objective, I talked with the interested men in Peipin and Tsentsin in the fall of 1935, and in the Spring of 1936 there was established "the Chinese Greater Asia Association" among the learned in North China. It is true that in this regard I persuaded Mr. Chin Te-chun, then the mayor of Peipin. However, the contents of the affidavit, presented in this court the other day by Mr. China, do not agree with his words and statements at that

time (Def. Doc. No. 2234). Besides, our claim was not necessarily to drive out Europeans and Americans from Asia. What I advocated was that the Europeans and Americans, who were our friends and wanted to cooperate with us in bringing about happiness to the Asiatic people, should join us in our idea of co-prosperity and co-existence. My statements issued in those days will verify this fact. (Def. Doc. No. 2500, No. 2501, No. 2628)

10. The object and activities of the Dai Nippon Asia Development League and the Dai Nippon Asia Development Association.

The Dai Nippon Asia Development League was established at the time of the First Konoe Cabinet, combining then numerous organizations engaged in developing Asia. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was just organized also, and the league was organized into and came under the supervision of this association in order to act in accordance with the Government's foreign policy. However, due to the frequent changes of cabinets caused by the development of our domestic and foreign policies, the Asia Development League was constantly compelled to re-organize itself and change the sphere of activities. All it could do and did was to get in contact with various cultural organizations in China and Manchukuo with a view

to asking their cooperation. Besides that nothing concrete was accomplished. The reason why I was in the position of Vice-President or Adviser of the League from the beginning of its establishment was due to my past relation with the Greater Asia Association ever since it came into existence.

As the result of the frequent changes in the organization of the above-mentioned Asia Development League, it was reorganized and changed its name as Dai Nippon Asia Development Association at the time of Koiso Cabinet in 1944. As to its organization and activities, it was placed under the supervision and guidance of the Government, but the body itself was of cultural nature, composed of interested civilians in the truest sense of the term. With the progress of the Pacific War, however, the inconvenience in communications and the acute situation at home and abroad prevented it from starting any concrete movements, and the result was that it was only able to publish its organ and give some guidance for the Japanese students and citizens in various countries in Asia. Because of my past connection with this association, I took charge of its management, but the war came to an end before long, and I was obliged to dissolve it without making any great contribution to it.

11. The Lady Byrd Incident and other foreign affairs.

About the 12th December, 1937, I received a report that some artillery unit belonging to the 10th Army bombarded a British Gunboat in the neighborhood of Wuhu. I ordered my Chief of Staff to investigate it immediately. According to his report about the 11th of December the Chinese troops were retreating on the Yangtze River by, large and small ships, and many of their ships were deceitfully displaying foreign flags. Hereupon, Lt.-General Yanagawa, Commander of the 10th Army ordered firing upon these ships with the retreating Chinese soldiers on board. So when Colonel Hashimoto located several ships sailing with the Chinese soldiers in the morning of 12th on the fog-covered Yangtze River, he opened fire. The Lady Byrd happened to be among this group of ships.

Accordingly, I immediately ordered the Commander of the 10th Army to tender his apology to the British Naval Commander-in-Chief there. I myself returned to Shanghai from Nanking, called on Admiral Little of the British Navy without delay and apologized to him for the incident. He fully understood my intention and promised me that he would transmit my apology to his Government.

The bombing of the U.S.S. Paney was executed by a Navy plane by mistake, and the plane was not under my

command and I had nothing to do with it at that time. However, since it was an unfortunate incident caused by the Japanese forces, I went to Admiral Kaney, the U.S. Navy Commander without delay upon my return to Shanghai and expressed my regret to him, thus obtaining his understanding about the above event.

I protected peaceful people and respected the rights and interests of foreign powers as mentioned before. After completing somehow the Shanghai and Nanking Battles, I visited Admiral Little of the British Navy and Rear-Admiral Yarnell of the U.S. Navy, and tried to promote a better understanding between them and myself. I expressed my regret to them concerning unfortunate losses suffered by England and America and their Governments and peoples. I also met the French Ambassador and the French Navy Commander-in-Chief and exchanged opinions about what to do with the French Concession and Nanshi and we reached an understanding.

I expressed my profound gratitude to Rev. Jackinough who did a great deal in giving protection to the residents in Nanshi, and contributed ten thousand yen to him for his work. In this way I tried to alleviate the bitter effect of war.

12. Casualties on both sides at the front in the Southern area of the Yangtze River, and the tribute paid to the dead.

The number of the Japanese officers and men who were killed or died from diseases during the time of the fighting at Shanghai, Nanking, etc., reached more than 21,000, and together with the sick and wounded the number of casualties amounted to more than 30,000.

I deny that there were many cases of massacre as maintained by the Chinese witnesses, but I think there were many victims of Chinese soldiers and people during that period and among them there were not a few who suffered from cholera, thyroid fever, dysentery, etc. prevailing at Shanghai and in the Chinese Army at that time. Actually the number of Japanese officers and men contracted these diseases reached several hundred and more than one hundred soldiers died of them.

To my way of thinking, when the two races of Chinese and Japanese ought ^{to} have cooperated with each other as brethren in the nature of things, it was indeed a calamity that they should have struggled against each other at the cost of a tremendous number of lives, and I cannot help but feel profound regret for this sad event.

It was my fervent hope that the incident would give an opportunity for the two races to live in harmony and that those who sacrificed their lives would serve as a corner-stone of new Asia.

After returning home I built a temple near my

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temporary abode at Mt. Izu, Atami, and enshrined the souls of those victims of the two countries and prayed for the repose of their souls. Moreover, I built the statue of Kwannon, the Goddess of Mercy, in the precincts of the temple with the soil brought from the blood-covered fields of battle in the Southern area of the Yangtze River. And with the help of her great virtues, I have been day and night offering, like other people who have faith in this Kwannon, prayers for the repose of all the souls of friends and foes, for the light of East Asia, and finally for the coming of the peace of the world.

On this 14th day of October, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ MATSUI, Iwane (seal)

I, ITO, Kiyoshi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: /s/ ITO, Kiyoshi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ MATSUI, Iwane (seal)