

a letter ^{stating that} that the social ~~circumstances~~ ^{condition} was changing
 as I had said in my address of instructions, and that
~~his~~ my words which was indelibly impressed upon him.
 he was ~~deeply~~ ^{all the more} touched by that address of instructions

During my staying in Formosa the Manchurian

~~Incident~~ ^{Incident} and ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~October~~ ^{October} ~~Affair~~ ^{Affair} occurred. ^{in succession} The

latter ^{incident} was ~~an~~ ^{an} undreamed-of event, ^{to me.} It was
~~not until~~ ^{not until} I attended the
~~base~~ ^{base} of seeing with my superior a grand maneuver

~~held~~ ^{held} at Kumamoto on November ^{that} I ^{obtained the} ~~could get its~~
 outline of the ^{incident},
~~general story~~ from ARAKI ~~and~~ YANAGAWA. As its

result I explained ^{in detail} ~~particulars~~ to H. I. H. Prince

KAN-IN that ARAKI had no hand in this affair.

The Shanghai ~~Affair~~ ^{Incident} occurred ^{immediately after} ~~at once~~ when

I took up the ~~post~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{Chief} ~~of~~ ^{General} Staff in

Being unaccustomed to my new duties, January, 1932. ~~In the occasion when I had~~

~~cut adrift from the world affairs because I was~~
~~so busily occupied with~~ ~~that I had no time~~
~~too busily with my principal work to care for others~~

without sleeping and resting, ~~by my unaccustomed~~ to
to think of others. It was at this juncture that
work, the 5:15 Affair what is called happened
(May 15th incident occurred).

Upon receipt of the dispatch, ~~to occur.~~ Receiving the information, I went

~~war minister's~~
at once to the official residence of ~~minister.~~

All the top ranking officers, ~~and other top officers~~ were already
~~through the chief members in this ministry there,~~
the

~~was almost in the residence~~ but ARAKI ^{alone} was not

there. I strove not to excite the ^{staff members} officers by

supervising their general attitude

~~my direct to their general attitude~~

As I had a sudden ~~notion of their~~ ^{desire to go to 'the toilet'} ~~bowls~~, I passed through the front-door of ~~near hall in~~ the official residence. ^{Just} I observed ~~then~~ ^{five} armed

glaring with anger and officers surrounded by about 10 journalists. ~~looked~~

It was very unsightly. daggers and ~~seemed to me~~ like a bad form.

When

I asked them, ~~What~~ ^{for} what ~~sort~~ business ~~did~~ ^{they had} you

come, ^{They} ~~however~~ replied ^{that they} ~~they~~ we wanted to see the

minister. ^{Telling them that since} I said ^{the minister is not here, so} ~~the minister is not here, so~~ ^{was not in,}

I ~~would~~ ^{would} talk with you, I led them to the ~~minister's room~~ ^{come on this way,}

minister's room. Despite my request ~~led to the residence of minister, and I told them~~

to sit down, ^{they declined to do so} ~~but they seemed to have nothing for~~ to the last, showing an attitude that

~~an~~ argument was unnecessary. First 35
~~me without sitting down till last.~~ At first I
of all I asked for their purpose for coming. They
asked for their intention, then they desired to rouse
replied that they came to arouse
ARAKI to action. When I ~~replied that it could~~
~~not be done,~~ ~~impossible,~~ they ~~urged me~~ ~~urged me~~ ~~to~~ ~~rise up~~ ~~to~~ ~~rise up~~ to action.

Though I ~~can't~~ ~~remember~~ ~~now~~ ~~its~~ ~~questions~~ and answers
exchanged between us for ^{each one of the,}
~~took~~ about two hours, ^{in brief} their insistence was that
was that they wanted us to grasp this
most people will follow the lead of the ^{if}
chance to reform the national government,
they ~~rose~~ ~~at once~~ ~~themselves~~ ~~to~~ ~~action~~ so
inasmuch as the majority of the people
they ~~must~~ ~~reform~~ ~~the~~ ~~politics~~ ~~of~~ ~~stat~~ without
would follow us if we should rise up to
missing the best opportunity. I explained that
action just then. [↑] the people ~~are~~ ~~not~~ ~~so~~ ~~pure~~ ~~as~~ ~~they~~ ~~thought~~ ~~but~~

Translator Note:

X ~~Here in the Meiji Era. (1875)~~,

* ~~2 Knight opposed to the Emperor in about 1300 ~ 1400.~~

They were readily bought off by money; 36
~~we can not look light of the political party, for~~
~~as was the ^{recent} case of)~~
~~example, as Ogura. was corrupted by money power~~

~~letting, and that in our country we can not~~
~~parties could not be belittled. Furthermore,~~
~~complete anything unless we make clear the relation~~

I told them that, unless the relation
between the Emperor and his subjects that is, we
were clarified, ~~nothing could be successfully~~
~~accomplished under the Emperor, for instance, as SAIGO~~
we have the His Majesty the Emperor over us,
nothing could be successfully carried out.

Takamori and ^{*}ASHIKAGA Takanji. In the case
I cited the case of ~~SAIJO~~ SAIBO → just when

~~when~~ I was striving to persuade them, some
(convince

officers, ~~and the others~~ ^{feeling anxious for my safety,} ~~by sending a messenger, because~~

called for me under a pretext.
~~they were anxious about me.~~ I assigned NAGATA

and others to each ^{of the cited officers to} ~~person~~ and made them strive

to talk them over. A little after
 to persuade in compliance. About past one o'clock
 p.m. the officers were handed over to and
~~therefore~~ ~~relieved~~ and kept to the 1st Division
 placed under the protection of the
 I know nobody ^{only} KURIHARA among ^{the} five persons
 was known to me.

~~At a point that in the night the SEIYU party existed~~
 That night ^{members of} the Seiyukai Party was ^{so} greatly
 also much and may conflict with the Army I
 indignant over the incident that it was feared
 they might clash with the military. It was
~~not surprising however that MORI Kaku and me that~~
 Kaku MORI and I who were most responsible
~~that there was no conflict under such difficulties.~~
 for preventing any trouble from arising.

I prevailed upon Vice War Minister KOTSU
~~ordered KOTSU the Under Secretary and his subordinates~~
 to exercise prudence
 to use prudence in their speech and action, and

On the other hand I had let Mori ^{quiet down} to persuade the
 Seiyukai Party. ^{now that} However, MORI is no longer
 had gone to death.

living, there is no one who)
~~so no one~~ knows my efforts ~~at~~ that time. Though

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I had no special friendship with him and had ~~only~~
met him ^{only} twice ~~by then~~, before that time, I attended his ^{heartly} funeral.
~~At his death I went~~ to
the lying in state service with ~~my whole heart~~ ^{Sincere Regret}.

Many people ^{have} propagandized and believed that
there were ARAKI and MASAKI ^{were} in back of the 5.15
May 15th Incident. Some of them have criticized
Affairs, ~~are~~ condemned that the relative persons to
the punishment meted out to the persons involved
in the May 15th Incident ~~as~~ were dealt too leniently with. But
~~Such~~ ~~both of these~~ judgments are not right.
I think these people have ~~no true~~ ^{no true} idea.

In the first place, the accusation that
~~At first I say they accuse too falsely that~~
there were ARAKI and MASAKI ~~in~~ ^{were behind} the back.

it is going too far.

Though ARAKI's name ^{often} appeared in the ^{interrogatory} ~~answer~~ of

the defendants in court, ~~he has~~ I had ^{connection whatever} no ~~hand~~ with me.

It was rather ~~being due~~ ^{due} ~~On the contrary it owes to~~ ARAKI's ~~efforts~~ ^{efforts} that the Army

officers ~~has not taken~~ ^{did not take} part in ~~the~~ the incident.

Afterwards I ~~was told that~~ ^{was told that} ~~discovered afterwards as follows:~~ ^{discovered afterwards as follows:}

~~On the last day of~~ ^{on new year's eve of} (1930) ~~some~~ ^{a group of} army and naval

officers ~~gave~~ ^{held} a year-end party at a certain place ~~in the suburbs~~ ^{in the suburbs} to conspire together. When the ~~when they deliberated on the plan~~ ^{when they deliberated on the plan}, the

army officers showed little interest, the ~~navy officers looked the army officers as unfaithful men~~ ^{navy officers looked the army officers as unfaithful men} naval officers looked upon them as "degenerate ^{officers}" and ~~has~~ ^{has} broken off relations with them ever since.

~~because they had no inclination for the plan~~
(Army officers)

Army

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Cadets, too, looked ^{upon} the Army officers as ^{un}faithful "degenerate officers" and as they were treated like ~~executive~~ and resulted in their approach to the gentlemen ~~begin~~ in their contacts with the naval officers, ~~who treated them as gentlemen~~. They naturally come to be closely associated with the latter. It appeared that ~~it seemed to be~~ Captain SUGANAMI who

took ~~command of~~ the Army officers ^{then}. He ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~connected~~ with the Kagoshima Regiment ~~under the division~~ when

It appears that ARAKI was the 6th Division Commander. ARAKI racked his brain in guiding this officer ~~seemed to be much annoyed to instruct him~~.

When ARAKI ~~took his post to the Minister~~ ^{became War}, he ~~carefully~~ selected ^a the commander who ~~had~~ ^{was} ~~ability~~ capable of ~~instructing~~ ^{properly guiding} SUGANAMI, and ~~made~~ ^{assigned} SUGANAMI

changed to the 3rd Regiment. Though Suganami

could not understand fully ARAKI's "Kōdō spirit" ~~and~~

T.N. "imperial way spirit" and was imbued with state ~~mentioned before~~ ~~was influenced by the National~~

Socialism, he washed reluctantly his hands off

from the Naval officers, because he ~~couldn't~~ ^{could not very well} ~~opposite~~

turn against ARAKI, his benefactor.

~~against the benefactor ARAKI~~, that is, it ~~was~~

due to ARAKI's ^{power} that the army officers ~~didn't take~~ ^{did not take} part in the incident. And yet,

~~However~~ the world used this fact for ^{counter-} ~~anti-~~propaganda.

Thereafter,

Afterwards, owing to various circumstances, the

right and wrong ^{intentionally} ~~was~~ ~~turned~~ ~~upside~~ ~~down~~, with ~~advised~~ ~~intentionally~~, and such a

The ~~fact~~ results that the present state of ~~is~~ ~~in~~ ~~present~~ conditions

affairs has been brought about.

The next problem ^{which should be taken up is the} ~~is as to the disposition for~~ ⁴²
~~the~~ matter of punishment
~~relative to the 5.15~~ ~~Affair.~~ For this purpose, ~~at first~~

~~first of all clarify the essence~~
I must ~~be clear the truth~~ of the March ~~and~~ October
incidents. ~~The~~ ~~March~~ ~~Affair~~ ~~the~~ ~~brains~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Army~~ ~~planned~~
heads of the Army in order to take control of
~~you~~ ~~acquiring~~ ~~the~~ ~~political~~ ~~right~~, ~~and~~ ~~then~~ ~~a~~ ~~youthful~~
the government. Up to that time the so-called
~~officers~~ ~~did~~ ~~not~~ ~~take~~ ~~part~~ ~~in~~ ~~such~~ ~~a~~ ~~movement~~.
Young officers attached to field units did not
~~take~~ ~~part~~ ~~in~~ ~~such~~ ~~a~~ ~~movement~~. On the other
~~On~~ ~~the~~ ~~contrary~~, in the October ~~Affair~~ ~~the~~ ~~Army~~ ~~brains~~
hands, ~~the~~ ~~heads~~
of the Army had no part
~~did~~ ~~not~~ ~~play~~ ~~their~~ ~~part~~ ~~→~~ ~~(to~~ ~~tell~~ ~~the~~ ~~truth~~, ~~they~~ ~~did~~

~~not~~ ~~know~~ ~~formally~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~least~~ ~~→~~ ~~It~~ ~~was~~ ~~planned~~ ~~by~~,
it, at least ~~but~~ ~~the~~ ~~middle-aged~~
~~and~~

This was the beginning of the
young aged officers, ~~planned~~ ~~it~~. ~~These~~ ~~middle~~ ~~and~~
~~union~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~middle-aged~~ ~~and~~
young aged officers. began to cooperate with each

Other. (I will not ~~write~~ ^{give} here, because there are ^{the accounts of these incidents 43} other documents giving ^{their} details.)
Certificate written particularly about the matter concerned.)

Judging from this fact, we find that abuses, ^{had} steadily ~~found~~ the October Affair in ~~cept~~ ^{cept} into the ~~and~~ ~~into~~ ~~the~~ lower-class officers in the case of the October Incident.

This matter suggested the revolutionary ~~in~~ Army, ^{that is} ~~unconfident~~ ^{loss of the} By then their plan included ~~it meant~~ ^{loss of} non-confidence in the heads of the Army against the Army brass, but in the 2.26 Affair this thought became distinctly manifest in thought clearly appeared the February 26th Incident.

In view of the nature of the March Incident, ~~On account of such a~~ ^{in it} ~~natured~~ affair as mentioned above, the ~~relative~~ ^{persons involved} to the March Affair were not disposed and the case has been left to this day in ~~but~~ ~~undistinctly~~ ~~have~~ ~~been~~ ~~laid~~ ~~aside~~ ~~till~~ ~~to~~ ~~day~~ an ambiguous state. This is due to the fact ~~Because~~ ^{that} it is difficult for ~~them~~ ^{one's own self} to dispose of ~~themselves~~ ^{themselves}.

I don't know ~~partially~~ ^{detailed} the reasons why the October
Affair ~~resulted in success~~ ^{proved abortive, but} I hear that there

HASHIMOTO ^{and} ~~fell~~ ^{was} ~~working~~ with SUGANAMI ^{and} ~~there~~
~~already~~ quarrelled with each other. This was the
~~the separation~~ ^{the} ~~between~~ middle-aged ^{officers} and ~~the~~ young officers,
beginning of the alienation

~~it is said~~ ^{it is said} ~~that~~ ^{the} ~~quarrel~~ ^{quarrel}, ~~it is said~~ ^{it is said}, ~~was~~
~~has occurred~~ ^{has occurred}: ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~due~~ ^{due} to ~~the~~ ^a difference ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ

~~between~~ ^{between} thought ~~of~~ HASHIMOTO and others, ^{who were} ~~im~~ ^{im} ~~per~~ ^{per} ~~fect~~ ^{fect} with ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Russian~~ ^{Soviet}
~~pattern~~, ~~and~~ ^{who} ~~argued~~ ^{argued} that ~~such~~ ^{such} ~~thought~~ ^{thought} will
~~such~~ ^{such} a system would ~~destroy~~ ^{destroy} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state}
~~our~~ ^{our} ~~national~~ ^{national} ~~policy~~ ^{policy}. I was told that CHAYU ~~uttered~~
~~words~~ ^{words} which I cannot ~~repeat~~ ^{repeat} ~~here~~ ^{here}
~~under~~ ^{under} ~~any~~ ^{any} ~~circumstances~~ ^{circumstances} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~prohibited~~ ^{prohibited} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~utter~~ ^{utter}.

The October ~~incident~~ ^{incident} occurred during the administration
of War Minister Minami. In view of the precedent
was ~~under~~ ^{under} the ~~circumstances~~ ^{circumstances} such as they could not

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set in the case of the March Incident, there
~~dispose of only this matter severely compared with the~~
~~were circumstances which rendered it difficult~~
~~to punish the offenders in the October Incident.~~
~~March Affairs. And though the Manchurian ~~Incident~~ ^{already}~~
Moreover, since ~~Incident had~~
had occurred, ~~so it was not easy to disclose a bad~~
expose the evil practices within the Army. And so
affairs in Army, and by the policy of amending their
I understand that administrative punishment
way the Army took administrative ~~measures~~ which
was meted out in accordance with the policy
was petitioned to the Emperor by MINAMI Minister
of correcting past mistakes and turning to good,
and that War Minister Minami has already reported
today I consider that such disposition ~~is~~ ^{is} obliged to
the matter to the Throne. ~~As I see it you,~~
~~the administrative punishment~~ ^{As I see it you,} was
~~to be taken and never important~~
unavoidable and quite fair.

When ARAKI ~~took his post~~ ^{assumed the} ~~of War~~ Minister, still
he, too, was unable to effect any reforms in punishment,
he, ~~could not reform the disposition,~~ ^{adopted the same}
pursuing the same policy as his predecessors.
policy That is, ~~the policy that the relatives closely to~~
~~those officers who were~~

closely connected with the two incidents were
for the time being transferred to posts ~~of~~ ^{away} 46
posts remote from the central army office
~~these two affairs take the post far from the center for~~
and later returned to the central posts provided

~~some time and~~ ^{will} ~~return~~ to the central post if they will
they were,

~~so~~ well-qualified in ~~action~~ ^{business}. Of course, I, too,
~~endorsed~~
~~supported~~ the policy.

Thus, though ~~about~~ ^{or so} a year had passed away

uneventfully, I heard that many murmurs ^{had been} ~~uttered~~

(but following) personnel shifts,
in all districts since the next military appointment, that is,
grievances from various districts came to our ears.

They said ARAKI and ~~ARAKI~~ ^{I were accused of} forming a party, ~~possess themselves~~
handling personnel affairs in ^{an} ~~such~~ arbitrary manner
in the personnel affair. Although we had never ~~handled~~ ^{possessed}

~~in a~~ ^a selfish manner
myself in the personnel affairs, and I have no any other
we ~~thought~~ it not unreasonable for grievances
measure, though I think it is reasonable that a great

to arise. However, there was no way to remove the 47
grievances
~~many disaffection were uttered among them.~~ I have

~~was~~ pressed by NARA, the Chief Aide-de-Camp to His

whether it was all right to leave
Majesty, for that TATEKAWA, NINOMIYA ~~must be disposed~~
(and) at their posts.

Though ~~he is~~ ^{only} a captain, SUGANAMI ~~had been~~
owing to his connection with Prince Chichibu.
well known ~~in~~ the Imperial Palace. As ARAKI ~~was~~ ^{had been} unable

to transfer SUGANAMI, I ~~did it~~ ^{had done it} ~~by the~~ ^{under pressure from} ~~pressing~~ NARA,

We could not return ~~even~~
~~and we can not return~~ him to his former post.

~~As you see above,~~ The matter ~~was~~ beyond our power,
and yet we could not

for all that, I can not explain the reason, ~~and~~ ^{Thus}
we had to allow matters to pass as propagandized.
~~leave the matter as it is propagandized.~~

It ~~was~~ ^{was} UGAKI ~~and~~ MINAMI ~~that made use of~~ ^{who took advantage}

of the discontent of the officers.)
~~the officers feel discontented.~~ UGAKI, ~~a political~~ lazy,
 who was very anxious to gain political power,
 says that ~~the army is disturbing the advances of the~~
 used financial ^{power} and man-power to overthrow
 political parties. He insisted it is good for the
 Araki and me, whom he regarded as
 political parties to down with ARAKI and MASAKI, and
 obstacles in the way of his acquisition of
 for this purpose he concentrated money and mass
 political power. On account of this,
 powers. Therefore, the people in political circles, too,
~~and political parties~~
 believed that it ~~was~~ due to ARAKI and MASAKI
 that ~~the~~ political ^{power} right ~~does~~ not ^{come} transfer to the
 political parties. The plutocrats, what is called,
 the ZANBATSU also ^{regarded that} ~~believed~~ ARAKI ~~and MASAKI~~ as a
 Fascist bosses
 boss of the Fascists, and hoped ^{for our downfall} to down with them.

This accounted for the prevalence of
These fact is the reason that in the world
sinister propoganda
are popularizing a bad probaganda against me

Thus the strife ^{within the} ~~occurred in~~ Army, ^{occurred}, but
external influences were added to it. The
further added by outside circumstances, that is,
~~influence~~ outsiders were

OKAWA & KITA. ~~At first they seemed to act~~
(and) I understand that at first
these two acted in concert,
essentially with each other, but, ~~they changed to~~
turned into
enemies later on.

~~opposite at some opportunity~~ I did know. According

to ARAKI, ^{became opponents} ~~in~~ words they were likely to change its
in connection with the
attitude at the occasion of reorganization of the

YASUDA BANK. ^{Since Okawa was admired by}
The graduates of the Military General
Army)

Staff College, ~~have followed after~~ OKAWA, and

together and as they had declared that 57
these officers. Only because I uttered my words
depending on the circumstances I, too, would
that if it is necessary I may help them, what we call
use my good offices, the so-called
"Shikan" / ^{"cadet} / ~~the officers~~ / ~~incident~~ occurred. As this matter

has been ~~was~~ recorded ^{in detail} particularly in other documents,

I shall omit here its details, in brief it is a plot
I will here describe in brief. The plan was
was plotted,

made by NAGATA, KATAKURA and others (I ^{am} think

quite sure that ~~many~~ MINAMI ^{was behind} ~~is in the back of~~ them) ^{with the} to make

object of effecting

a wholesale ^{oppression} ~~oppression~~ of me and ^{the young} youthful officers.

Thoughtless young ~~inconsiderate~~ officers of youth were ^{used} attracted

as decoys to lure others.

~~by their~~ decoy. When I met Major Imada at

Kōfu ⁱⁿ ~~on~~ April ^{of that} ~~this~~ year, I sensed from his ^{judging from his}

manner of speaking that a great ^{Agony} plot was being 52
stung I felt the great plot was being attempted,
hatched against me, although I could not tell
though I did not know clearly, however, about
exactly what it was.

by August the plot ^{gradually} became to be clear gradually.

Owing to the Military Academy ^{Incident} ~~Affair~~ & ~~Shikan~~
/ T.N: presumably the "Shikan" ^{Incident} ~~Affair~~ mentioned in the preceding
~~paragraph~~ ~~Affair~~, the relation between the young officers
and the staff ^{seems} ~~was~~ ^{so} extremely aggravated,
that it looked as if the situation would not be
settled peacefully. Sure enough,
As I feared, the AIZAWA ^{Incident} ~~Affair~~ occurred. The

Aizawa ^{Incident} ~~Affair~~, of course,
was not caused by ~~only~~ this
~~matter~~ ^{affair} / "Shikan" (Affair) ^{alone}, but it is a fact
that ~~matter~~ AIZAWA ^{was} greatly excited by it.
~~matter~~ ^{matrix} ~~factor~~ ~~was~~ ~~excited~~.

With respect to the AIZAWA
~~Requesting a public trial, of AIZAWA~~, the staff officers

clique party regarded AIZAWA as a ^{lunatic} crazy and attempted to cover up the matter of the infringement of the supreme command, ~~the fact of encroachment upon the supreme power~~. On the other hand, the clique tried ^{its} best to call ^{the other side} them contrary, AIZAWA ~~party~~ try to ~~pass~~ ^{pass} the responsibility to account for this infringement, ~~with~~ The result at their best, ~~so further severe conflict broke out~~ was that the strife between them was intensified among them.

Though the authorities concerned ~~attempt to connect~~ ~~strive to combine~~
~~February 26th Incident~~
 the ~~2-26~~ ~~Affair~~ with the AIZAWA ~~Incident~~ ~~Affair~~, I ~~do not~~ ~~cannot~~ judge it in that manner.
 judge like this. Of course, though I ~~cannot~~ say that these two incidents are entirely unrelated, ~~these affair entirely are unrelated with each other~~, but my judgment is I can judge that the ~~February 26th Incident~~ ~~is~~ ~~rather~~ ~~different~~ differs

Incident) ~~as in the case of the Military~~ 54
from the AIZAWA ~~Affair~~, and that, ~~the Affairs of youth~~
as in the case of the Military Academy Incident, the
~~were manoeuvred by the opposition party owing to~~
young officers were ^{so} lacking in ~~an~~ intellectual
~~the backing of their judgement such as the Military~~
discernment ~~and~~ that they were ensnared
~~Academy Affair by the opposition's intrigues.~~

Unfinished. (I shall make up the defects at
some other time in the future). ~~In future I will supply a deficiency.~~

Explanatory Notes by the copier, Iwabuchi Tatsuo. :

The ~~original notes~~ ^{manuscript ends} was discontinued here in an
unfinished ~~condition~~ ^{state}. It seems that

likely to be written as ~~special~~ ^{a memoir} memorandums on
other man's advice after the ~~2.26~~ ^{February 26th} Incident
at the suggestion of ~~other~~ ^{some} people.

The essential point of speech on July 12.

The present situation of the Imperial
~~The whole thing as the Imperial Army is to-day~~
~~Army ~~dates back~~ to the March Incident. The~~
~~started, because of the March Affair. Its origin~~
~~root of the cause lies in the~~
~~depends upon the matter of~~ Thought of the Imperial.
~~officers. The March Affair~~ ^{joint} ~~was a scheme of~~
~~in the central posts,~~ ~~of center~~ who were inspired by the political situation
~~of the~~ ~~in~~ country, ~~in~~ hand with outside party of reform elements
~~military circles, to effect reformistic~~
~~provoked the political change, and they attempted to rule~~
~~government by causing a political change and~~
~~revolutionarily by recommending the war minister at that~~
~~placing UGAKI, then War Minister, in the post of,~~
~~since UGAKI was premier. It was absolutely inadmissible~~
~~an act absolutely unpardonable,~~
~~condone~~ for the Imperial Army. Though, fortunately, it

was not ^{carried out, thanks} ~~put in action~~ due to the august virtue of His Majesty, this ^{intrigue seriously affected the} ~~attempts~~ gave a ~~important influence~~ on

the ideology of the Imperial Army and ^{later} resulted in the ~~attempt of the October~~ ^{Incident. Since at} ~~that time~~ a part of

the Imperial Army ^{was engaged} ~~were engaging~~ in Manchurian battle ^{to enhance} ~~field to extend~~ the Imperial prestige ^{with full} ~~under the~~ support

^{of the people, it was thought ill-advised} ~~of whole nation, so by considering it is uninterest for~~ for the Imperial Army to lose the confidence ~~us to lose the confidence to the Imperial Army on this~~ of the people on this

account, ~~we took the way to lead their thought~~ Accordingly, instead of resorting to ~~properly without waiting the decision of Divine punishment,~~ a policy of ^{in thought} ~~correcting the past mistakes and~~ ~~turning to the good~~ was adopted. ~~However, the relation between these officers and~~

However, it was not easily possible to liquidate the connection between these officers and outsiders.

By mutual reaction 57
~~outside people did not wind up easily, and they~~

~~act with each other, at last~~ some officers of the

Imperial Army ~~became embroiled~~ ^{the subject of} criticisms ~~because to take part on the side of~~

~~by outsiders~~
~~outside criticism.~~

In order ^{that the Imperial Army} ~~to discharge the duty~~ shall discharge its duties as the keystone of the Imperial Army which is to be central power overcoming the crisis,

~~saving the present situation,~~ the only way is ~~that~~ ^{to} strengthen the solidarity

~~we must intensify combination of the Imperial Army~~ through the concentration of all its efforts into ~~concentrating to public service with heart and soul.~~ sincere public service. And ^{only} ~~the way~~ ~~is~~ ~~to~~

~~There is nothing but a just personal administration~~ to strengthen this solidarity is to effect

~~as the way to intensify the combination of army.~~ a just and fair personnel administration

However, the War Minister told me the day

before yesterday as follows:

The present situation of the Army ^{is due to the} ~~was attempted~~ intrigues of General MINAMI and ^{Major} General ~~Major~~ NAGATA. It seems to have been somewhat intensified following ~~and after~~ ^{returning} his arrival from Manchuria. It seemed to be intensified more or less. General MINAMI is ^{making} likely to ~~make~~ the War Minister gather chestnuts in the ^{fire} ~~flames~~.

^{too, suspect} ~~there is a ground for suspecting~~ ^{that the fact} ~~is quite right~~ for ^{present} that such is the case, because the ~~present~~ ^{personnel reshuffle} tallies ^{well} this alteration ~~plan~~ ^{corresponds} miraculously with ^{prevalent} the rumours ~~which~~ ^{has} been frequently reported from among the higher civil ^{service} officials since ^{several} a few months ago,

and with the words which were uttered by ~~some~~ certain
 officers ^{of the} major ~~or~~ captain ^{ranked during my} class while I stay at
 Kumamoto in May. I can not help fearing the
 future of

The Imperial Army in future, if the war minister
 should effect such a personnel administration
 himself ~~is able to decide on the personal changes by~~
 in spite of the fact that he knows about such intrigues
~~preventing such an attempt.~~ I think this personal
 The present personnel reshuffle ~~also~~ requires
~~changes must be taken~~ more consideration ^{than ever,} judging

from ~~the~~ various circumstances. However, I have
 not yet completed ^{such}
~~my~~ preparations ~~yet to state a concrete opinion~~
~~as well~~ ^{as well} enable me to give
 accurate opinion on this matter. Though
~~though of course, we should to decide a personnel~~
~~should be decided~~
 affairs as soon as possible, I think such an important

60
problem need not ~~to take~~ be speedily decided in ~~a speedy solution~~ because of delaying
one or two days.)

the business. Therefore, I ~~hope~~ ^{ask for} a sufficient time
to enable me to prepare my opinion on this matter.
~~will be given for my statement of opinion to this plan.~~

Explanatory Notes by the copyist:

It seems that this speech was made
This speech ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~seemed~~ to be stated (at the first

meeting on the occasion of ^{the transfer} ~~a change~~ of the

Inspector-general of Military ^{Training} ~~Education~~ ⁱⁿ ~~one~~ July,

1935. Since it looks like a secret document,
I have omitted the rest herefrom.

~~THE~~ ~~END~~



Appendix

(Translator's note: This appendix, ~~which is~~ written on the last page of the foregoing manuscript, does not bear the name of its writer, but ~~it is presumed~~ ~~that~~ ~~it is~~ ~~presumably~~ ~~by~~ ~~Prince~~ ~~Fuminaro~~ ~~Konoe~~ ~~who~~ ~~added~~ ~~this~~ ~~notation~~)

The ~~the~~ MASAKI clique was completely swept away in the name of the purge of the Army following the February 26th Incident. The "Genro" and the senior statesmen believed that the Army would thereby return to its proper path. I, however, believed that the situation would become ~~more~~ further complicated after the downfall of the ~~the~~ MASAKI clique, since I knew something about the true circumstances surrounding the case. This was one of the big reasons why I declined to become Premier when I received the Imperial mandate

to form the Cabinet immediately
after the February 26th Incident,
notwithstanding two hours of
persuasion ~~from~~ by Prince SAIONJI.
Sure enough, the Army, contrary
to the wishes of Prince SAIONJI,
proceeded thereafter with the
China Affair and the War of Greater
East Asia.

checked by N. Salazar

1. Report on the Interview
of the subject which ~~talked~~ with the
General Kawai concerning ^{the incident of 26th} 2.26 Incident

March 25, 1936 (Shōwa 11th year)

Lieutenant - Colonel of Military Police
Katsuhichi Kamisuna

To The Commander of ^{the} Tokyo Military Police
Toshima Sakamoto, Esq.,
Dear Sir:

I report ~~about~~ ^{on} the ^{above} subject, ~~the subject is~~
as per annexed paper report

2.

Question Lieutenant-colonel Kamisuna.
Answer General Kawai.

Q. I heard that ~~that~~ ^{you} your Excellency was the first to arrive at ~~who went firstly to~~ the Imperial Palace on February 26th, immediately after the Incident happened, and I should like to ask you to tell me the circumstances at that time.

A. In account of ~~that~~ ^{as} February 26th ^{happened to be} the day in which the ^{regular meeting of the} ordinary Privy Council ^{was to} should be held, I was getting ready to go out at 9.00 AM, ~~the~~ when ~~the telephone from the~~ ^{Ministry} Department of the Imperial Household ^{rang} called me up and asked me to come ~~there~~ immediately, ~~and so I went to~~ ^{got into my motor car and tried to pass} Sakashita Gate ~~(Sakashita Gate)~~ as usually, ~~by the motor car~~ but ~~as~~ I was checked by the guard, ^{thereupon I} I came ~~to the Court through the~~ ^{entered} "Inui Gate", ^{announcing up the} saying that way that I was a Privy Councillor.

As I was waiting in the accustomed room, Oshizuka Privy Councillor came in, ~~but~~ ^{since he} the circumstances was still not clear, so I thought I would say little about the situation,

I might get the news from the Chief Aide-de-Camp to his Majesty, and went to his room, and ^{where} ~~then~~ I found General Masaki ~~who was~~ talking with Honjo, the Chief Aide-de-Camp to his Majesty, and General Masaki ~~just~~ insisted that, ^{since it would be of no} ~~the active corps was rather~~ ^{avail for any to persuade the troops in action in view of their firm} ~~stand, and~~ ^{positive and} no one could possibly persuade, ^{therefore} the issue of the Imperial rescript should be promulgated ^{mostly preferable} and ~~the enforcement of the~~ martial law should be enforced without delay, showing the prospectus of ^{rising} and the scheme of the action,

As The War Minister ^{also came} happened to come in, I asked him ^{why he had come} "Did you come here?" and he answered ^{that he} "I was asked to come together here" and I, Kawai, left the room, saying that something must be done about it. I caught sight of Admiral Kanji Kato ~~was seen~~ in the corridor, but, of course, I did not talk to ^{never talked with him, I am sure} him, I am sure.

Other Privy Councillors ^{barely succeeded in} came ^{early at} showing ^{up at} about 10:30 A.M. Every ^{one of them entered} councillor came to the Court ^{through the} of Inui Gate, ^{the conference}

4
Concerning the issue ^{of} the martial law was held and ~~it concluded~~ ^{adjourned} at about 11:15 A.M.

The conference of the Supreme War Councilors had been held since ^{from} at about 11:00 A.M., but I could not ^{learn at all the substance of the discussions} get that content in the least and I, Kawai, came home ^{little past} after 1:00 P.M.

Q. ^{It is rumored} They say that Muranaka and Osobe ^{also} participated in the conference of the Supreme War Councilors, but is it true? Is that true?

A. That's absolutely not the case. However, I denied ~~there was such a fact~~, but as the War Minister and ^{the various} Supreme War Councilors were there, ^{it was arranged to have} ~~it happened that~~ the business of the War Ministry ^{conducted} was managed in the Court, and ^{some} staff officers were seen there.

Q. Was there ^{really} any clique in the army, ^{really?} ~~really?~~ ^(so-called)

A. It is called ~~the~~ "Tosui-ha" (control faction) or "Kodo-ha" (Imperial Way faction), ~~and this group means -~~ ^{the one which was connected by Kagawa and Hata} Its doctrine is a combination of socialism.

and enviousness, which Kazutaru Kita conceived
in Shanghai, where he went after he had
5 become a socialist. ~~at Shanghai~~

~~with the Emperor (Tenno) and Socialism~~
~~by Kazutaru Kita, who was a socialist at~~
~~first and after went to China, and Nishida, too,~~
belongs to ~~that party, too,~~ ^{this faction} and young officers, who
sympathized with this principle ^{and gradually}
~~increased their power~~ ^{grew} ~~gradually~~ ^{and they came}
~~under the General whom they admired.~~ There is
~~probably no one among the~~ ^{generals} ~~that~~ ^{who} ~~thinks this is a good spirit, and it~~
~~was sincerely desired~~ ^{that} ~~if the young officers then~~
~~time "Your spirit is wrong."~~ ^{he} ~~But as he could~~
~~not control them~~ ^{and} ~~he~~ ^{some} ~~treated them with~~ ^{of the} ~~vague attitude,~~ ^{officers} ~~thought that~~
~~the General would agree with their principle~~
~~and they felt respected~~ ^{him} ~~more.~~ ^{is so depended upon by others, he}
~~When a man, should be~~ ^{is} ~~is touched with pity, and he is apt to protect~~
~~he protects them~~ ^{and} ~~it comes to this, I guess, the party~~
~~came out~~ ^{with the result that a faction is created}
~~In addition to the foregoing matters,~~
~~General Kawas talked about~~ ^{concerning}
Kamekawa as follows, ^{explaining} ~~that he had already~~
told Major Fukumoto about this; ^{When he met General}
Hayashi at the Court banquet, on February 11th, at the

7

it was probably the following day,

Afterwards, General Nara came to see ^{General Kawai} ~~me~~ on the following day perhaps and said that (a) Kamekawa ^{had} come to see him with the introduction of General Hayashi, ^{saying} ~~and~~ ^{that} he wanted to ~~withdraw~~ ^{have} the ~~case~~ ^{arrangement} against ~~the case~~ ^{Siigawa} ~~concerning~~ ^{withdrawn} Siigawa.

~~And~~ because Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa was mentally ~~deranged~~ ^{unsound} ~~in mind~~ ^{Kamekawa} ~~and~~ ^{he} ~~he~~ ^{wanted to} ~~ask~~ ^{ask} General Kawai and General Nara to ^{make} ~~make~~ ^{efforts} toward this end.

At that time ^{Kamekawa} ~~he~~ ^{had already} ~~said~~ ^{talked} ~~that~~ ^{General Kawai} ~~he~~ ^{about it} ~~on~~ ^{the} ~~telephone~~. As General Nara ^{asked} ~~for~~ ^{General Kawai's} ~~opinion~~, ^{the} ~~latter~~ ^{related} ~~the~~ ^{case} ~~with me~~ ^{about} ~~my~~ ^{opinion}. ~~I~~ ~~told~~ ~~him~~ ~~the~~ ~~matter~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~telephone~~ ~~and~~ ~~not~~ ~~to~~ ~~bother~~ ~~with~~ ~~it~~.

(Advised General Nara)

Prior to this, ^{General Kawai heard that} ~~Dr. Uzawa~~ ^{had} ~~stated~~ ~~in~~ ~~his~~ ~~statement~~ ~~regarding~~ ~~this~~ ~~withdrawal~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~Seiyukai~~ ~~Political~~ ~~Party~~ ~~that~~ ~~he~~ ~~would~~ ~~thoroughly~~ ~~purge~~ ~~the~~ ~~Party~~ ~~of~~ ~~its~~ ~~members~~ ~~who~~ ~~were~~ ~~members~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Army~~ ~~General Kawai~~ ~~felt~~ ~~it~~ ~~was~~ ~~rather~~ ~~strange~~ ~~when~~ ~~he~~ ~~heard~~ ~~of~~ ~~this~~ ~~and~~ ~~he~~ ~~did~~ ~~not~~ ~~know~~ ~~either~~ ~~Dr. Hanai~~ ~~or~~ ~~Dr. Uzawa~~ ~~as~~ ~~the~~ ~~members~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Party~~ ~~who~~ ~~were~~ ~~the~~ ~~original~~ ~~members~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Committee~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~Revision~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Constitution~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Court~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~War~~ ~~Ministry~~ ~~whereas~~ ~~Dr. Hanai~~ ~~was~~ ~~rather~~ ~~strange~~ ~~and~~ ~~Dr. Uzawa~~ ~~was~~ ~~rather~~ ~~gentle~~ ~~and~~ ~~diligent~~ ~~and~~ ~~I~~ ~~felt~~ ~~it~~ ~~was~~ ~~rather~~ ~~strange~~ ~~and~~ ~~so~~ ~~General~~ ~~Kawai~~ ~~thought~~ ~~it~~ ~~very~~ ~~strange~~.

General Kawai thought it very strange

8 when he ~~read~~ ^{heard} the statement
~~seeing this statement~~ General Kawai learned that
Afterwards (~~I believe in fact~~) ~~that there was~~
was behind
Kamekawa ~~at~~ ~~back~~ of this statement
When ~~he subsequently~~ ^{he subsequently} met Dr. Uzawa ~~of~~ ^{the latter} told him
that he did not ~~know~~ ^{think} Kamekawa was such a wicked
man.

General Kawai's opinion regarding
Concerning the time for abolishing the martial
law:

General Kawai ~~thought that~~ The martial
law should be ~~enforced~~ ^{enforced} as long as ~~it is~~ ^{possible} it should not be
withdrawn ~~until the end of the incident~~ ^{until the incident has settled down} and if it should
~~be~~ ^{be} withdrawn now, the search would be hindered and
the object of the ~~extra~~ ^{special} court-martial would ~~be~~ ^{not} be
attained.

~~If therefore, it should~~ ^{whenever the Partial Law is to be}
~~withdrawn~~ ^{withdrawn} you are requested to inform me ^{Kawai} without fail, then
I will make ~~effort to the utmost of my ability~~ ^{effort}.

General Kawai ~~asked~~ ^{asked} me to let him know
without fail when the Partial Law is to be withdrawn,
for he would do the best he can.

↓

Page 9.

Reference matters

1. The question of giving large sums of condolence money to the (bereaved family of) policemen who died in the pursuit of their duties should be carefully considered. It is not fair to the soldiers who died in the plains of Manchuria.

Such a propagandistic handling of the case is ill-advised.

2. The reporting without reserve of the dishonest and illegal acts of the troops in the outline of the troops in action pronounced ^{recently} by the Martial Law Headquarters was inappropriate, because it ~~will~~ ^{will} have ^{an} evil influence on the Army in the future.

3. If the subsequent disposition of the case is inappropriate, it will cause more ~~and~~ confusion in the future. Once they (the officers?) get out of the Army, they will have freedom of action and engage in more and more active movements. Hence, ~~great~~ caution is urged on this point.

Detailed
~~the~~ account

As February 26th was the day ^{regular meeting of the} which the February Privy Council ^{was to} ~~would~~ be held, I was ~~ready~~ ^{preparing to} go out at 9:00 A.M. as usual. ^a telephone ^{message from the} Council ~~called me up~~ (At about 8:30 A.M.) and informed ~~me~~ ^{me} about ~~the fact~~ ^{the} occurrence of the incident. I, therefore, started ^{out in} the motor-car at 9:00 A.M., but, ^{thinking that} ~~it~~ might be difficult to go to the court by the Sakashita-gate, ~~and~~ ordered ~~the~~ ^{on the way} the chauffeur to go ^{to} the Hanjomon ~~gate~~ ^{since} many motor cars ~~stopped~~ ^{were held up and congested} in the neighbourhood ~~in front~~ of the residence of Prince Kan-in ~~and~~ ^{as} it was very crowded, as we drove up Akasaka-Kitenkei, we turned to the left, ~~and~~ ⁱⁿ passed ~~in~~ front of the residence of Prince ~~Li~~ ^{Li} and came out ~~at Hanjomon~~. ^{We were} ~~we~~ were challenged twice by the guard ^{before we passed through} ~~at~~ the gate, ~~from~~ ^{but I} got through by ~~saying that~~ ^{saying that} I was a Privy Councillor. Thus I succeeded in arriving at the Imperial Palace.

There was ~~no~~ ^{no} one ~~could be found~~ in the waiting rooms of Privy Councillors ^{Meanwhile} ~~and~~ ^{Privy Councillor} ~~Shizuka~~ came in ^a little while ~~ago~~ ^{ago} Vice-President Hiranuma

(By 10:00 A.M. ↗)

and other councillors had arrived.
~~10:00 A.M.~~ But as the circumstances were not

clear, I proposed to go to the Chief Aide-de-camp
to his Majesty, to ask him about the situation. Thereupon
Hiranuma asked me to do so. When I went into the

room of the Chief Aide-de-camp to his Majesty, I met
common ~~council~~. And when I found General Nagai

~~was~~ talking with Honjo, the Chief Aide-de-camp, I
his Majesty, War Minister, and Kawashima, ~~the War Minister~~,
entered the room soon after I had greeted the Chief Aide-de-

camp to his Majesty and others, and I heard from
The War Minister reported on the circumstances which

he met several ^{of the aroused} officers that morning and said
that fourteen to fifteen hundred troops of

~~marched out from the Third Cavalry Infantry Regiment~~
of the Imperial Guards Division and ~~the~~ Third Infantry Regiment

had killed the ^{senior} officials and the ^{senior} ~~senior~~ ^{senior} ~~senior~~ whom
they had selected as their victims. He also stated that a proposal

had been made ~~not to make~~ the Imperial Army ~~might not~~ fight each other. The
War Minister further showed us the prospectus for taking action and
the plan of movements, etc. ~~And~~ the War Minister ~~declared~~

that, ~~in~~ ~~order~~ ~~to~~ ~~prevent~~ ~~the~~ ~~spread~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~epidemic~~
since in his opinion ~~of~~ ~~Martha~~ Law, he would submit it to the Cabinet
should be enforced

12. However, ^{he continued,} ~~as much as~~ the Cabinet Ministers,

~~Council~~ ^{some day} ~~would ask to issue it, but only~~
except Kawasaki, the Minister of Education and Tsami
the Minister of the Navy, ~~was present and other~~ ^{had not yet assembled, some}
~~time would be required to~~ ^{time would be required to}
~~have did not come together yet, it took therefore~~
~~a little while to hold the Cabinet Conference, so~~
he asked the Privy Councillors ^{and he begged to make effort} not to withdraw till that
time, because if they ^{should} withdraw once it would be difficult
to gather again.

At that time, I heard
~~General Masaki~~ ^{telling War Minister} ~~to~~ Kawashima, the War
Minister ^{about such a} ~~to the effect~~ ^{since} ~~that~~ the ^{aroused}
troops ~~would consent to disband themselves, the~~
~~situation was hopeless unless an~~ ^{order} ~~was issued. As~~
Rescript, ~~that~~ ^{some one} came to the War Minister
at this moment ^{to} tell him that it was convenient
~~for~~ the Emperor ~~to~~ the War Minister ^{did not reply to}
what General Masaki had suggested. ^{Since} the War Minister
~~showed signs of leaving~~ ^{looked to} ~~leave the room immediately,~~ I left the
room of the chief Aide-de-camp to his Majesty ^{at}
~~the same time.~~ I remember it was about
ten ^{odd} minutes that I stayed in that room. When
I went out to the corridor I met General Nara, but
~~and parted~~ ^{after exchanging} ~~just greetings only.~~ ^{upon} ~~and~~ returning
to the room of the Councillors, ~~and I~~ ^{to the}
Privy

reported to them

~~the Councilors about~~ the circumstances which I had heard from the War Minister. There after I stayed in the Court ~~staying~~ ~~cessing to return~~ and I ~~was waiting~~ to await imperial consultation concerning the enforcement of Martial Law. ~~The inquiry concerning the granting against danger,~~ Some minutes ~~a Privy Council was held~~ just after eleven at night the Privy Council held a meeting and reached a decision before twelve o'clock. It was past ~~over~~ one o'clock when I ~~was back,~~ withdrawing the ~~Council~~

I reached home from the Imperial Palace. The above is a detailed account of the circumstances which I found at the Court on February 26th.

2 ————— April 23rd '1936 (Showa 11th year)

~~No. 45 1-chome Horinouchi,
Suginami-ku, Tokyo.~~

Misao Kawai
45 Horinouchi 1-chome
Suginami-ku, Tokyo

Translated by T. Ogino
Checked by Toshiyuki

This document shows well
~~these lines~~ successfully
express the condition of
young officers at the time
of about ^{the} 7th year (1932) of
Showa, to which I agree ^{with it.} so well.

I believe ^{this has} ~~these have~~ been
drawn up by lieutenant-general
Teiichi Suzuki (then,
lieutenant-colonel), but can not
say for certain.

112
34 38
20

②
Confidential

How can we direct the current
thought of young officers rightly?

(May 25, 1932)

Of late the current thought of young officers
~~has become~~ ^{highly} ~~have grown~~ intensified, tolerably. We feel it
has become quite acute, observing from various
points of view. Judging from the fact that the
supreme command question had become a subject of
much discussion when ^{the} London Conference was
taking place the year before last, we are obliged
to notice an obvious aggravation in ~~some~~ ^{certain currents} ~~sense~~
of thought* through the so-called March Incident,
October Incident, the ^{recent} ~~present~~ May Incident and
~~the~~ various meetings being held by soldiers.

Why ^{has the} atmosphere ^{among} of soldiers, especially of
officers, ~~has~~ become serious now-a-days? - - - -

- - - - There are causes and motives of course, ^{but} ~~still~~
we think it quite necessary to find these causes
at our leisure, and prepare to ^{understand exactly the} ~~recognize~~ a

3.

mental state of young officers in the present time as well. This is why I want to state my humble opinion and ask for your instruction.

First: Grievous social condition

This ~~now~~ is certainly an emergent ^a times ^{of emergency} a very eventful one both at home and abroad. Upon careful observation of the general appearance in our country, I find a variety of grievous phenomena developing. Above all the questions ^{talked of and the subjects of anxiety} ~~brought into topics and worried over~~ among the officers and worried over by them are the following:

1. Abuses of party politics and degeneration of education.
2. Politicians' unpatriotic attitude
3. Sympathy with lower-class people in their hard living.
4. Uneasiness ^{over} ~~for~~ diplomatic failures.
5. Fears for those close to the Imperial Court.
6. Reaction toward suppression ^{and} ~~upon~~ the contempt of soldiers.

(9)

And others, but especially ^{especially have been} abuses of party politics, are deeply impressed upon the officers.

Concerning instances of these serious problems I have not enough time to spare in describing them particularly at present, but I think it an indisputable fact that we may find matters ^{for} to be worried over and ^{which} required to improvement in our present social condition.

Whereas ^{was it that} what compelled the soldiers to resolutely spring to their feet in the interest of the social condition with which they had ^{no} direct relation? ----- There are, I think, respective causes and reasons in this connection.

Needless to say a soldier ^{should stick to his} ought to dash forward their own duty solely ~~in spite of politics~~ without concerning ^{himself} ~~themselves~~ ^{with} in the politics. However it may be impossible for ^{him} ~~them~~ to entirely sever his connections with society, at all. ^{This is} Because the heart devoted to the throne is the same ^{one} ~~to~~ anxious about the country. It is naturally permissible for ^{him} ~~them~~ to talk over national affairs when the state of the nation is

in some quarters

(5)

at a low ebb, and to be concerned about the nation's future.

Every ^{citizen} ~~one~~ of the nation will probably ^{since childhood} admit that the officer, who has received a special moral education and ^{has} been trained constantly ⁱⁿ ~~with~~ the spirit of loyalty and patriotism, ^{must have} has the most intense loyalty and the strongest patriotism throughout the whole classes and professions in ^{our} the present society. I should like to think it inevitable that these loyal soldiers ^{should} express deep resentment at the sight of the ~~present~~ social grievances ^{of present society} and ^{the} attitude of politicians, ^{and others} in ^{certain} ~~some~~ quarters, ^{and} ^{and} ^{and} evils of political parties, ^{even more than} ~~more~~ than those people who belong to other classes and professions.

A ~~certain~~ soldier ^{wept} ~~wept~~ in silence at a certain meeting saying, that "Unemployed ^{numbering} ~~counting~~ as much as 400,000 are His Majesty's children. The Relation of Sovereign and Subject in our country is quite different from that of foreign countries". Indeed I find this mental condition has gradually ^{become internal} ~~thickened~~ in some quarters

(6)

among the soldiers of to-day, and ~~farther~~
the soldiers' feeling has ^{been} increasingly aggravated ~~and intensified~~
at the sight of the administrators and those
persons close to the Throne, whose actions
are ^{showing} too much hankering after self-interest and
desire, and ~~go over to one party and side.~~ ^{the tendency toward rigid sectionalism.}

The above is the greatest cause of the
indignation of the officers and others nowadays.
^{But} ~~how~~ why must they take a direct action?
This is a problem ^{for} ~~to~~ study.

Second: What led ~~to~~ ^{to} direct action?

As already stated, the resentment ~~increasingly~~
~~has~~ increased step by step in its course. ~~of~~
~~program~~, but here ^{we must note a} ~~is a~~ ^{fact} remarkable, i.e.

"Soldiers have no freedom of speeches"

They are not allowed to talk over politics, ^{or} ~~neither~~
^{write about} ~~can they~~ describe it. ^{This} ~~The fact~~ that "no
freedom of speeches" ^{forbids} ~~does not~~ give soldiers

②

the chances to talk over the national affairs, and it blocks ^{the} passage for them to divert themselves in expressing their own opinions. — namely,

Could ^{be, for instance,} this not, one of the causes by which a direct action bursts out? ~~At a certain time,~~ ^{Once, at} upon

the graduation ceremony of a certain school the following instruction was delivered before young officers by a certain ex-minister who is now ^{occupying} ~~occupied~~ an important post abroad.

" A soldier should be ~~It may be well that soldiers are indifferent~~ to the social appearances. ~~They~~ ^{He} had better go one step behind the society. ~~And~~ ^{he should} ~~then~~ ^{make} the best use of ^{his} ~~your~~ energy ^(in his capacity to fight) ~~to fighting ability.~~

That is to say, ^{a soldier should carry out his} ~~work your~~ duty as a soldier faithfully. ^{At that time} ~~then~~ all of them prudently kept the purport of this instruction to themselves.

~~Afterwards~~ ^{Later,} ~~at the time of the London Conference,~~ when the government and political ^{parties} ~~party~~ were ~~to be~~ about to take part in the prerogative of ^{the} supreme command, the same minister ^(entirely showed an) indifferent attitude towards it, notwithstanding the fact ^{that it was} a great critical situation ~~for the~~ military circles.

Several ^{young} ~~part~~ of these officers ~~was~~ were greatly indignant about him.

Later there was another officer who is said to have stated: ~~We thought it a nuisance to hear of an officer who was said to have spoken~~ ^{afterwards} ~~each~~ words ~~as~~ as " We are ^{not} different from machine-guns or cannons. We are not to be ~~men~~ employed mechanically and kept in silence. Men have spirit. We have no patience with those who intend to destroy the national army using ^{us like machines} ~~us as a~~ ~~mechanic~~ ~~al way~~." When we heard this we sensed that this would be a very distressing problem.

It is said that those soldiers who have no freedom of speech have only gnashed their teeth ⁱⁿ ~~with~~ vexation, being able neither ^{write or} ~~to~~ ~~discuss~~ ~~criticism~~ nor to ~~express~~ ~~slanders~~ of their seniors.

~~Do~~ ^{Do} not these aspects give an account of something about the mental condition of the soldiers who have no freedom of speech?

In connection with the ^{recent} ~~present~~ incident, the soldiers, who are not in a position to select ways to ^{criticize} ~~discuss~~ and purify the abuses of the

Present ^{-day} society ⁱⁿ by speeches and ^{writing,} literary pursuits, ~~had~~ determined ^{to put their thoughts} ~~these~~ ^{into} practice ^{in one} at ~~a leap.~~ ^{mighty found.}

Above all, among soldiers such principles as "action [&] before words" or "Be deliberate in council, prompt in action" are esteemed in a sort of moral culture, and they are educated with the idea of "Knowing what is right without practising it, betrays one's cowardice"

It cannot be said, therefore, ^{that it was merely} ~~of~~ a casual result ~~entirely~~ that such ^{welcomed} ~~direct~~ action is ~~delighted~~ by them under the present social circumstances, because they have the "spirit of sacrifice" ~~and the~~ ^{and the} "chivalrous ~~heart~~ ^{spirit}" in mind more strongly than ordinary people.

The above fact is obviously ~~evinced~~ ^{evinced} even at a glance ^{at the} of wills of each of ^{the cadet} ~~probationary~~ officers concerned ⁱⁿ the present incident.

One cadet officer wrote the following poem: ~~for a certain probationary officer's song,~~

"Were the world
Full of peace, I would
~~have liked~~ ^{have liked} to become old
With flowers to nurse"

and:

" I know what the result will be
If I follow up this step
yet I can't help stirring up
the ^{Gamato} ~~Japanese~~ spirit within me "

Another cadet
~~A certain probational officer~~ ^{wrote:} describes as
" Thank you very much for your kind hospitality.
We must die in the hope of a new and righteous
birth of Japan..... "

And in the wills of ^{another cadet} ~~a certain probational~~
officer and ~~the others eleven~~, addressed to their
classmates, ^{in which they} ~~are written~~ as follows, denoting
themselves as " We are ^{but pebbles to be thrown away in order} ~~dead~~ ^{to help}
^{to save} the world "

" It is ^{only} because we ^{only} love our fatherland
that we ^{look to} ~~long for~~ you, ^{brothers} all of to-morrow. Certainly
the day of ^{the} soul has at last come. ~~which~~ which we
~~seek~~ On the top of ^{the} rocky-precipice of destiny of
Japan, your fatherland, ^{we ask you to build your hopes, using} ~~by~~ our iron spirit.
Alas! The country is about to die out, yet
Heaven does not abandon us..... "

The above can be understood ^(taken) ~~that~~ ^{as the} ~~a~~ virtue of soldiers ^{having} ~~has~~ turned out into a direct action as vice under misgovernment, or ^{as the} ~~a~~ departed souls of the brave ^{helping} ~~help~~ Japan ^(activities of) in the shape of this action of ^{the} "soldiers" as described in Japanese newspapers recently. ^{Thus it may be} ~~on the interpretation~~ ^{either} of good ^{and} evil. Certainly this direct action is wrong, for it has been done without deliberation on ^{the} right and wrong of the matters, and ^{without} ~~a~~ sufficient thought ^{the ethics of} over ^{rights and wrongs} of the public way. We can not agree to ~~this~~ ^{it}, of course, as to an insufficient deliberation. We only think it an emergent necessity to appreciate the feeling of these ^{past} ~~forced~~ soldiers so as to make it ^{reference} ~~material~~ for a social reconstruction in future, and also we find ^{here} ~~out~~ a great lesson on the maintenance of orders in the military circles.

Third: Discrepancy and differences ⁱⁿ ~~of~~ thoughts between ^{the} upper and lower.

To find many young persons among the ^{perpetrators} ~~actual~~ actors may be due to the fact that they had been stimulated by the above mentioned cause; and also due to ^{shallow} ~~a slight~~ consideration in a certain sense, but the fact that he has no ties in his family and ^{no one to} ~~no one to~~ ^{give him} ~~he holds~~ that he is ^{only} ~~not~~ given counsel but ^{is} ~~is~~ scolded upon asking advice of his superiors or of parents and brothers have a ^{good} ~~a~~ deal ^{to do} with it. It seems to me that a considerable difference in thought has lately been taking place between the aged (^{elders} ~~older people~~) and the young. Namely, on the part of young men;

- (1.) There ~~are~~ uneasy prospects caused by the recent social condition, and many of young men ^{begin} ~~have~~ a kind of "prejudiced ^{bitterness}". Therefore young men are more ^{energetic} ~~pre-occupied~~ in the study ^{of} ~~for~~ social conditions, and an extreme social uneasiness ^{excites} ~~stimulates~~ the ^{sensitive} ~~of some~~ minds of some. ~~Part of some quarters sensitively.~~
- (2.) Keeping pace with the general condition of society, studies ^{various} ~~on~~ ideas, theories, reasons

and ideology have recently prevailed ^(to a) considerable ^{extent} among young officers, and in this respect they have more progressive ^{minds} brains than the aged.

When ^{the seniors are} questioned, for instance, ^{to} "explain Marx's principle" ~~to the seniors~~, many of them would give answers stating "entirely unable to answer," with a slight exception. On the contrary, ^{among} ~~those~~ lieutenant, sub-lieutenant or cadets ^{almost} ~~would~~

^{everyone would} ~~write down~~ something about it ^{although} ~~however~~ few had perfect comprehension of it. (3) The Feudalism is scarcely seen among to-day's young officers.

They have no obedient feeling toward ~~the stupid~~ or ~~and~~ incapable superiors, ^{but} ~~yet~~ they admire those of ability as a matter of course. ^{Because of} ~~Accordingly~~ this feeling ^{many of them are not in} ~~leads them to~~ ^{gives} them the mood to take ~~no~~ notice of their ^{superiors} ~~seniors~~.

On the contrary, on the part of the aged, (1) Not a few, ^{still} ~~has~~ lack of understanding of the new-era's society information. Some of them still neglect noticing ^{the} young men's mental condition too.

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In short, such an idea has obviously grown among young persons ~~so~~ to respect people of ability, but not to esteem ^{persons only} ~~those~~ because of their ^{seniority, but not going so far as to forget} ~~old age~~, if not ~~corrupt~~ ^{courtesy}.

On the contrary the aged ^{have the tendency to} ~~has~~ a feeling to regard the young ~~that they~~ as all ignorant and very ^{im} prudent.

These facts are inevitable in the ^{changing} ~~development~~ ^{eras} ~~ment~~ of age, but these are phenomena to be noted carefully ~~remarkable~~ in order to promote an understanding between the senior and the junior. And I think these are ^{good} reference materials in leading the young in future.

Fourth: Educational defects

Judging from the ^{recent} ~~view on the present~~ incident ^{from the} and thoughts of young officers and cadets, I feel that there are many educational defects in the army and navy that require a fair consideration. The points are as follows.

1. Is education, ^{being} conducted for ^{army} military and naval officers and students ⁱⁿ ^{timely} accordance ^{with} the ~~best~~ social conditions, ^{of the times or} with ^{due} consideration for ~~the~~ ^{psychology} ~~structure~~ with social ~~structure~~?

2. Should not some thought be given ^{as} regarding about ~~to these~~ ~~not~~ ~~anything~~ ~~to~~ ~~consider~~ about the education on the closed door principle in the ~~military~~ ^{and} army and navy?

3. Does it not seem ~~Don't you think~~ that they make little of the culture of sentiments and ^{place} too much value on ^{alone,} pure intellectual training?

4. ~~Have they not~~ ~~Do not~~ ~~they~~ ~~fallen~~ ~~into~~ ~~a~~ ~~mistaken~~ ~~form~~ ~~of~~ ~~guidance~~ ~~of~~ ~~misled~~ ~~conception~~ ~~of~~ ~~beliefs~~? ^{convinced} ~~idea~~

5. Is there ^{nothing} ~~no~~ ~~margin~~ ~~in~~ the education ^{concerning} for the national character?

The present ^{is} ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~the~~ ~~time~~ ~~of~~ "Let them ^{people} know nothing; ^{let} ^{them} ^{only} ^{depend} upon." ^{However, is it not} ~~still~~ ~~true~~ at the ^{army} ~~military~~ ^{and} ~~academy~~ or the naval academy, ^{is,} that there ^{still} remains a tendency of such ^a nature in the education?

Is it not because they ^{fail to} ~~do not~~ give a ^{correct} ~~any~~ exact recognition ^{of} for the society and ^{to teach} ~~show~~ the most proper right way to meet it, that they bring forth those persons who lack moderation ^{in their thinking} ~~consideration~~ and the ^{evaluation of} right and wrong in thoughts?

In the last item of Article 12 of ^{the} general rules ^{for in the} of the military training act it is ^{indicated:} ~~signified~~ as "It shall be ^{absolutely necessary that} ~~convenient~~ to clearly observe ^{or} tendencies in thought ^{among} of the students ^{and} ^{should be clearly observed} ~~to~~ guide them ^{that they should be guided} rightly, so as not to let them ^{be} misled.

In order to ^{gain this end,} ~~meet the object,~~ the educators should ^{keep} have a close observation on the actual social condition and ~~the~~ current thoughts, so that they ^{may} ~~might~~ not fail to give the students a suitable instruction ^{born of a} ~~by the~~ firm conviction produced through their constant self-culture."

I wonder what is ^{the} ~~in days,~~ actual condition today, especially in view of the fact that ^{the higher their ranks are,} ~~the more~~ the more ^{first called upon that such} educators must cultivate their discrimination in order to observe the actual condition of ~~the~~ society and the ^{flow of} ~~current~~ thought, ~~the higher their ranks are.~~

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Again in the 2nd item of the general principles it is provided: thus,

"----- To ^{make} ~~let~~ the juniors sincerely follow its each word and act should be just as if the shadow follows the form or ^{as} an echo responds to a sound"

I wonder, however, whether or not the military training has progressively developed just as the shadow follows the form or ^{as} an echo responds to a sound. I fear lest the shadow ^{is apt to} ~~should~~ keep away from the form and a sound should not always tally with its echo.

~~The feeling of~~ ~~Hon. Iddo on the~~ loyalty has intensified more firmly keeping pace with the progression of the times, but of late ~~the~~ ^{have} ~~the~~ ~~country~~ ~~between~~ the seniors and the juniors seems to ^{have} become lax. We regret it very much particularly ^{in view of the} ~~at the~~ ~~inter~~ ~~pretation~~ of an Imperial rescript which provides: ~~for~~ the following

" ^{It is} ~~The seniors~~ ~~are~~ not permissible, ^{that seniors} ~~to~~ ^{superiors} ~~behave~~ themselves disdainfully and haughtily ^{toward} ~~to~~ their

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^{inferiors.}
~~formors.~~ Excepting on occasions when the dignity
^{must be}
~~as~~ maintained chiefly ⁱⁿ public business, the ^{superiors}
~~seniors~~ should always be kind and affectionate ⁱⁿ their
behavior ^{toward inferiors.} Superiors should
~~to the juniors, and~~ exert themselves to the
utmost ^{diligence in} ^{state affairs} ~~for~~ the ^{loyalty} in perfect harmony with
the ^{inferiors.} ~~juniors.~~ If ^a soldier should corrupt the
courtesy and not respect ^{his} superior, ^{or fail to}
love ^{his} inferior, so that ^{harmony in equity should be lost,}
to act harmoniously, ^{he} ~~they~~ would not only be
^{an} ~~an~~ evil in the army, but ^{an} unpardonable transgressor
^{against} ~~for~~ the ^{welfare} ~~of~~ the country."

The seniors would say, "Recent young
officers ^{of today} do not respect their superiors," while the
juniors, ^{are saying,} say "They do not love their inferiors."

In short, it must be said that the seniors
who undertake the task of teaching, lack enthusiasm
and faith ⁱⁿ ~~for~~ the guidance of their juniors.
And ^{at} the same time, the juniors also lack ^{the} faith
with which ^{to} they impress ^{and move} their ^{superiors.}
~~seniors.~~ "Faith will move a mountain." An harmonious
practice with "sincerity" will ^{surely} ~~certainly~~ bring forth
a mutual understanding.

In this connection I regret very much to find an attitude ^{which shows that they} ~~amongst~~ ^{of} senior officers, ^{who are} trying ~~to~~ ^{to} compel a mere formal obedience, wanting in kindness and sincerity. — ~~Some sort of~~ ^{such a}

cause will explain ^{why} the inferiors prefer to ~~rely~~ ^{rely} on others ^{rather than on} ~~that of~~ their direct superiors

Next, ^{as a result of the education along misguided} ~~the~~ ^{men of strong} ~~misled~~ ^{has brought} beliefs, education ~~has brought~~ ^{will have been produced, but we note that this} ~~whose~~ ^{strong} will, ~~however,~~ ^{has} failed to entertain right order, as ~~will~~ ^{is} obviously

to be seen in ^{the} ~~an~~ instance of the cadets. ^{I believe} This is

because I think, that the idea of the ^{cadets} ~~students~~ of the military academy to carry out ~~with~~ such a strong belief ~~can~~ ^{be} ~~interpreted~~ ^{has probably} to have followed ^{and the feelings of} the idea of somebody like a section chief, ~~who~~ ^{the} section chief were very likely gained at some time from the ~~mind~~ ^{mind} of the ~~head~~ ^{head} of a cadet company. ~~company~~ ^{at a certain} period of time.

Once when several section ^{chiefs} ~~chieves~~ of the military academy saw the War Minister at his official residence, I happened ~~there~~ ^{to} be there. I could scarcely ^{see a single one} ~~find~~ ~~among~~ ~~them~~ ^{those} among them, who ^{could be} ~~were~~ thought worthy of ^{being} ~~a~~ ^{gentle} ~~oppression~~, so that may

and ^{thoughtful} ~~good~~ section ^{chief} ~~chieves~~. All of them were extremely insolent, giving themselves ^{the} airs of a great man.

It seems ^{that} such ^{an} attitude and mood of a great man was ^{implanted in} ~~superposed on~~ the students. What would

~~have~~ become of the ^{cadets} ~~students~~ if ~~these~~ ^{such} instructors ^{as these} were not truly affectionate to their students and dared to recognize themselves as "forceful", "strong in conviction" and "great man", while ^{spending} ~~passing~~ all their time in ^{the} preparation ^{for the} entrance examination ~~at~~ the Military Staff College?

^{Next} ~~Now~~ I would like to touch upon ~~the~~ a little of the education ^{as regards} the national character. In respect to ~~the~~ education on the national character, ^{the necessity for thoroughness} ~~its thoroughness~~ ^{as regards it} is strongly ^{stressed} ~~pressed~~ in the military training ordinance (Army) and the naval training regulations (Navy) respectively. But ^{is it true that} ~~are~~ all the ^{army} ~~military~~ and naval officers ^{certainly} possess ^{an} the exact understanding of our national character? ~~as a matter of fact?~~

Lieutenant-general Shinji Hata, who was one of my superiors, used to advise us, that "just as one ^{ruins} ~~spoils~~ a radio-set when he tries to repair it without any knowledge of ^{the} radio, so ~~that~~ ^{they} may

demolish the national character ^{who} instead ^{of furthering it} when they participate in a reconstruction movement without full understanding ^{of it} ~~on~~ the national character. Above all, we must provide ourselves with a profound study and recognition concerning the Imperial national character." It is truly a wise saying. I myself have ^{much} ~~many~~ to study yet, ^{and} there is ^{the} necessity for a ~~of~~ thorough-going education on the national character in all ^{branches of the} army and navy ^{in the} future.

Fifth: Influence of ^{the} Bearing, Speech and Behavior of the senior officer

In ^{the} traces of ^{the} radical change in thoughts ^{among} of the young officers and cadets, we find a ^{sort} of idea-currents. It seems that the young ^{are approaching people both} ~~approach~~ those either outside ^{and} or inside the military circles to be taught and ^{to} discuss ^{their} opinions, ^{often standing up stoutly for his} ~~sometimes explains his own~~ convictions. ~~insistence~~ at each gate. ~~The superior~~ Being ^{but} human, the superior ^{officer} may well worry about difficulties of the times, but he must be prudent in

his attitude to avoid vagueness and agitation ^{in talking} ~~by~~ with his juniors. ~~words.~~ Some of the superiors seem to be little rather indifferent ~~attention~~, and ^{are} liable to stir up the young ~~by saying~~ "Go on!" half in joke. ^{When he does this, however, he should} ~~But that must be dependant~~ be careful to observe his listener. ^{upon the disparity of men.} Consequently young officers and cadets are apt to believe that "A certain general has already sympathized with my ideas. He understands me", for they take what is said ^{of course.} ~~to be~~ his true idea, under a misunderstanding. ^{It is,} [^] Even if it does not go so far as to stir up agitation, it is therefore necessary for the senior ^{officer} ~~to~~ ^{(at least} make his men or the inferiors satisfactorily understand the purpose of his opinions, ~~if it is not tried with~~ ~~agitation.~~

Sometimes ^{we hear it publicized} ~~we~~ encounter a sort of big propaganda prevailing at a meetings of the Cherry Party ^{and} others that they ^{are} holding the meeting with so-and-so's understanding or with so-and-so's approval, or they have obtained so-and-so's ^{tacit} ~~silent~~ consent ^{to put on} a certain kind of events. It seems to me, ^{that} such misunderstandings are due to lack of distinct expression of the superior's ^N intention.

There are many instances ~~are experienced~~ where the speech and acts of those who enjoy a great admiration ^{among} of young officers particularly, or of those whose opinions are regarded similar to their own ^{by such officers,} are intensified and reported misunderstandingly, ^{the period that such opinions} during ~~they~~ ^{being} are conveyed gradually to the juniors. This is, I think, one of the matters ^{requiring much} ~~that~~ attention in future.

Sixth: Agitation ^{against} ~~made~~ for soldiers ^{from} by the outside.

As stated already, we find ^{that} the ~~recent~~ young soldiers ^{of today} have a vigorous intellectual desire ^{knowledge of} for society, and they are in ^a mental condition ^{in which} where they are inclined to try a practical social movement ^{themselves.} But ^{however strong} whatever their intellectual desire ^{knowledge of} for society may be, they have no intention to venture on a movement ^{the so-called} belonging to Leftist, ^{because} besides they know that the Leftist movement is ^{so incompatible with} ~~improper~~ in the ^{interests} sake of the country. ^{For this reason} that they are ^{attracted only} ~~attracted only~~ ^{exceptionally}

concerned about ^{to the} so-called Rightist movement.

The fact ~~is~~

~~It seems all are expressions of their mind that~~
 these young officers and cadets ^{often} call on Shumei
 Okawa, Kazuteru Kita, Seitoku Yasuoka,
 Tomoshiro Endo, Mitsuru Toyama, Kametaro
 Mitsukawa and Inshin Kurokogi, and

~~sometimes on the other men of thoughts, or~~
 scholars. ^{is an expression of their mental state.}

On the other hand ^{the} people ^{on the} outside
^{in number,} have increased by degrees, who ^{desire} ~~want~~ to avail
 themselves of ^{this} ~~these~~ mental conditions of ^{the} soldiers have
 increased.

I dare to say that I find not a few among
 those outside who want to exploit soldiers with ~~a~~ patriotic
 utterances in the mouth, ^{with} ~~but~~ ^{and} an activity of self-desire
 in the mind. I think such an intercourse with
 those outside is very dangerous but avoidable.

~~The~~ young officers with simple thoughts are liable
 to ^{be} exploited by those outside, without ^{such officers} being able to
 acknowledge ^{the} true nature of the other party.

Excepting special cases, ^a ~~an~~ ^{great} ~~enormous~~ danger
 is accompanied by such instances, ^{as} when the soldiers try
 to avail themselves of local people in rural districts.

" One who ^{tries} ~~wants~~ to ^{(the other,} surround ~~it~~ is surrounded by him "

" One who wants to exploit ^{(the other,} it is exploited by him "

----- It is ^{extremely} ~~quite~~ important ^{that we} to be careful ^{in future,} about this. ^{Mr. ~~Saichiro~~ says,} "It is ^{with} ^{for instance,} ^{the non-} ^{propertyless} people and ^{the} soldiers ^{who will} that carry out ^{the} reformation of Showa " ^(name not mentioned) Mr. ~~Saichiro~~ has drawn a draft on the reconstruction of Japan and seeks ^{the} ^{the} sympathy of ^{the} soldiers.

The ^{Staff} members ^{of groups advocating} ~~who hold~~ the national socialism, especially those of ^{the} Kokumin Nihontō (National Japan Party), Seisantō (Production Party), Yūshōkin Kōmeitō (Patriotic Labor Party) and Jimmū-kai (Brave-God Party) which ^{are} ^{of late} ^{drawing} ^{the} ^{public} ~~have~~ ~~people's~~ attention of late ~~respectively~~ for their Fascistic movements, are frequently casting ~~about~~ ~~eyes~~ ~~at~~ ^{for the cooperation} ^{of} the military circles. -----

We think it necessary to ^{observe} ~~see~~ ~~through~~ this tendency closely.

Seventh: Disposition of bygone incidents and the responsibility of the senior officers.

The writer is aware of at least five or six instances of disturbances among ^{army} military and naval officers, have experienced several times so far as the writer is aware of. I think I am one of those who remember the situations under each circumstance then extremely well, perhaps owing to the office I occupied at the time. ~~I was engaged in them~~ (although it is hardly deserving of praise, ~~to say the least~~ ^{praised too much}). A calm consideration, however, over the disposition of each ^{of these} bygone incidents in question will give us several lessons ^{which are worthy} ~~to be regarded~~ of thought.

The bygone incidents are as follows:—

- (1) Disturbance in the navy between April and about October 1930; Indignation of the naval officers at the prerogative of ^{the} supreme command issue at the London Conference. (No direct action; was seen, but ^{many} mysterious documents ^{distributed} got abroad recklessly.)
- (2) On about March 20, 1931; A certain ^{part} ~~part~~ of plan. (A certain plan ^{against} ~~for~~ the Diet, based on mischief-making by soldiers and a certain party)
- (3) Between June and September ^{thereabouts,} ~~or about~~ 1931;

A Resentment ^{among} of young officers caused by the Manchurian Incident. (Several kinds of handbills with inflammatory literature were despatched in all quarters.)

- (4) On about October 17, 1931; A certain incident, (Several kinds of attack plans by ^{the} army and navy combined, which were prevented before ^{they} happened)
- (5) In March 1932; Ketsumeidan (Blood-brotherhood) incident. Assassinations ~~practiced~~ chiefly by local people ^{of rural districts, but participated in by a} ~~combined with a~~ ^{few} ~~part of military and naval~~ ^{army} ~~soldiers.~~ ^{personnel.}
- (6) On about May 15, 1932; An ^{assault} ~~attack~~ incident outside the Premier's official residence. (Assault committed ~~attack was practiced~~ by naval officers and ^{army} ~~soldiers~~ cadets.)

The recent incident ^{therefore} ~~this~~ is not ^{the} first instance ^{of} such movements ~~has taken place~~ by young officers. The extent of each movement has increased by degrees. But I am very anxious whether or not the remedial disposition of these incidents ~~has~~ ^{has} been properly ^{handled.} ~~made.~~

The March Incident was entirely laid aside. The disposition of the October Incident was quite lukewarm. ~~Then~~ ^{And} ^{about} what is the present incident? We have no information about it, for the case is pending in the court now. However, it is as plain as day that a similar incident may ^{arise} ~~be had~~ again at ~~a~~ regular intervals, ^{should} ~~provided~~ ^{there be} ~~that~~ a single mis-step ~~is taken~~ in the disposition. We think it is most regrettable that their direct superior lacks ^{the} ~~an~~ idea of self-reproach, — ~~does not look~~ ^{without looking} well to his want of virtue, ^{not realizing that} ~~that is to say~~ "the sin of the child ~~is also the~~ ^{is also the} parents' ~~one~~" or "evil among ~~his men~~ ^{his men} ~~is his responsibility~~" — although the men are to blame certainly, who have brought about ~~the~~ ^{an} incident. If the superior ^{would} ~~be~~ ^{is indifferent} ~~himself~~ ^{and does not} ~~calmly~~ without feeling responsible at all, ^{one cannot expect} ~~the inferior~~ his men to ~~might not~~ be thankful for their superior, even though hundred of lectures were given to them. In other words, is there not a tendency like "to be severe in criticising others, but ^{lay to give} ~~look~~ ^{himself} self-reflection" ^{quite leniently}?"

(^{Note.} See ~~some~~ instances including that of the Army General Staff after the October Incident.)

One of the military officers who paid a visit to the grave of Shoin Yoshida and others at the Ekoin Temple of Kotenakahara, was eagerly speaking as follows;

"Officers of late have become exceedingly egotistic and ~~egotistic~~ ^{mercenary}. In former times, ~~every~~ ^{one} of the officers would discuss various subjects on the country and the world, and he would work ~~at~~ ^{on} ~~the~~ ^{state} ~~public~~ ^{affairs} without sparing himself.

He ~~used to~~ ^{has} worked for his men. Usually he lived in a ^{rented} house for rent. He ~~did not want to keep~~ ^{did} ~~such~~ ^{not} ~~things~~ ^{keep} as furnitures in his possession. ^{In contrast, the}

a recent officer ^{of today} has an extremely ^{active} ~~gross~~ idea of egoism in his mind such as to "wish to ^{maintain} ~~remain~~ in his ^{position} ~~post~~ ^{somehow}", "want to ^{build up a splendid} ~~have his own~~ house" ^{or} "wish to live a life of ease." ^{These things} Such are a matter for regret

for the sake of the country. Such an officer ^{for instance,} would get indignant, out of ~~such~~ anxiety to maintain his position, at ~~an~~ ^{the} information that his

men have committed a crime or ^{stirred up} a trouble. And
 He would call his men to task. The aim of the
 reproof, however, ^{does} ~~has~~ not ^{been} ~~was~~ originated in his
 sincerity to lead his men better, but arises from
 his anxiety for his ^{own} post. Why ^{should his men} ~~do they~~ obey
 such a man?"

To a certain extent.

We agree with the above, to some extent.

I should think the above-mentioned egoism ~~has~~
 arises ^{much} from ~~an~~ economical ^{considerations} ~~idea~~ rather than from
 love of fame ^{and the desire for prestige} ~~to get a rank~~. There is some-
 thing in it that ^{indicates they} ~~is regarded~~ to have ^{somewhat} ~~misunderstood~~ the
 spirit of the Imperial rescript in which ^{mentions} ~~states~~
 "Simplicity", ^{probably to mean} ~~but mistake~~ as "cultivation of
 the spirit of saving." ^{It is impossible} ~~Certainly it cannot be possible~~
 for a field-officer or a ^{on the active list} company officer ^{to possess} ~~to possess~~
^{home of his own} ~~own house~~ newly built. ^{We should, therefore,} ~~however,~~ ^{that is something}
 to call ~~our~~ attention to the recent fashion among them
 to build a residences with money borrowed at low
 interest ^{and other money} ~~or something~~.

According to ^{certain} ~~some~~ information in respect
 to ^{the} present incident, War Minister Araki is

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reported to be firmly determined to send in his resignation, Inspector-General of Military Education Muto is also to retire from active service holding himself responsible for, and the principal of the military academy and others are said to accept heavy responsibility respectively, too. ^{It is indeed regrettable.} ~~Very sorry!~~ In consequence, however, the students of the military academy and the section chiefs will ~~have a sense of~~ ^{probably be mutually more careful in} ~~mutually warn themselves~~ for the future, awfully struck by the feeling that "they should not give their superior trouble." —
I think, ^{that we should hold back our tears and take these measures} ~~such are the measures taken by keeping~~ ~~back our tears~~ for the enforcement of ~~our~~ military discipline. After the fall of Weihaiwei, Ting Jo Chiang ^{pleaded for} ~~solicited~~ Japan "to ^{spare} ~~help~~ the lives of many young useful Chinese naval officers; in their stead, ^{but} let me fall a sacrifice to them all" and died by ~~with~~ taking poison. In a ~~triumphal~~ memorial to the Throne written by Gen. Nogin ^{following his return to Japan} after the Russo-Japanese War, I remember something in it which implied to the effect that he was responsible for great damage ^{and} in the deaths ^{to} of His Majesty's children, and he would atone for his fault with his life.

We cannot help being impressed by his lofty character and the spirit to take ~~it~~ upon himself ~~to bear~~ the whole burden ^{of blame.} I believe it is true that ~~the~~ inferiors would work for their superior at the sacrifice of their lives only when the superior ^{has this love for them.} ~~was thus affectionate.~~

When their direct superior admonishes ^{the army} ~~the military~~ and naval officers under ^{his} protection ^{with true affection} ~~very affectionately~~, his sincerity ^{will} move them without fail, and they will take good care of themselves, sympathizing with their superior. I should say ^{that} it is not a proper disposition for a direct superior ^{to} ~~be asked~~ the gendarme ^{for the} of a protective detention of officers who need ^{such detention,} ~~protection~~, ~~on account~~ simply because of their being "unmanageable".

Eighth: Counter-measures in future

It is only because we want to consider ~~the~~ future counter-measures ^{from the} ~~at~~ ~~search~~ of lessons obtained in the present incident that I have frankly stated

what I ^{have seen} ~~saw~~ often. Then ^{if} ^{then} how do the military circles ^{propose future} ~~consider~~ a counter-measures? ~~hereafter?~~ This is an important problem, ~~to be solved from now.~~

Namely, ^{the steps} ~~these~~ are as follows;

- (1) To make a sufficient investigation on the mental condition of the young officers and their followers who participated in the present incident, and the ~~heads~~ ^{leaders} of the military circles themselves should strive for eliminating the social phenomena that caused the incident.
- (2) To make clear the rights and wrongs of the matters in reference to the disposition after the incident, esteeming what is right and criticizing what is wrong, and to make a fair inquiry so as ^{to leave} ~~leaving~~ no doubt about it, and make it public to the people.
- (3) Punishment must be strict, but the accountability of a responsible person must be ^{made clear} ~~clear up~~ and ^{it should} ~~not~~ ^{be} severe partially to subordinates ^{only.} ~~positively~~
- (4) To search for and improve the educational defects in the present army and navy i.e.,

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- I. To give an education to the officers ^{which will} ~~in order~~ to furnish them with a fair recognition of the social appearances.
 - II. To conduct a more thorough-going education on the national character.
 - III. Not to attach too much importance to ~~an~~ intellectual training, but ^{to institute training in the} ~~conduct of~~ sentiments training.
 - IV. To conduct a thorough-going education on courtesy.
- (5) To stress upon a perfect fulfilment of one's own duty, and strictly prohibit ~~participation in~~ ^{participation in} ~~participation in~~ of social movements. But to make way to enable those who ^{are anxious} ~~have anxiety~~ for the sake of the country to address a memorial to their superior in due ^{form.} ~~course.~~
- (6) To let the direct superior enforce ^{moral} direction and guidance thoroughly on his men, and check ~~labor for interception of an~~ intrigue from outside, ^{and} at the same time ^{strive} laboring for the

cultivation of right thought.

In short, the intrigues ⁱⁿ the past by soldiers have not ~~been~~ arisen out of any self-interest ~~and~~ self-desire. On the ~~contrary~~ ^{other hand}, ~~there is~~ ^{they have} no room ~~to be denounced~~ ^{for denouncing them} by the people as to their idea ^{of} the loyalty. Therefore we cannot agree with such an idea to deal with officers in general as "A burnt child dreads the fire". ^I ^{respectively} believe it is very necessary for those who are engaged in the military administration, military command or education ~~respectively~~ to carry out a properly ^{organized} ~~worked~~ management under which to foster strong troops, ~~all the more~~, and further to work together harmoniously in contriving ^{towards the} ~~extension~~ ^{of the} ~~national~~ ^{strength} ~~conditions~~.

In conclusion I ~~wish~~ ^{hope} that the superiors will ~~consider~~ ^{spend themselves} to make the most of his life and energies effectively for the ^{welfare of the} country, in ^{regard to} ~~favor~~ of the prospects of those young officers and cadets who are concerned in the incident, and of those

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young officers who ^{attempted} ~~are also about to~~ participate
in it with the ^{others.} ~~same~~ intention.
(sympathy)

Dec. 1907

(90)

Translator: Lt. Col. F. H. ...

Notes on the October Incident

January 1932

A. On October 1931, a conference was held by a section of officers of the staff headquarters and Signal Guard Division for the purpose of executing national reconstruction by force. Though this incident was not consummated, it was secretly publicized as the so-called October Incident to the world. It was criticized on the one hand and approved and argued on the other. It has been argued, naturally and with ^{on the other} ~~on~~ the incident was distorted to the favor of the arguer himself, and frequently, the true facts often have been ~~was~~ erroneously circulated.

From any angle of perspective this incident ^{proves} ~~is~~ an incident to be regarded seriously and can be used as a valuable ^{lesson} ~~example~~ that sheds an important light on the third and fourth incidents which were inevitable in the future.

I will write as much as I know of the "October Incident" in the following.

My connection with the "October Incident" ^{is} ~~is~~ to be made clear in the following. The point is its close connection with this incident is very ^{clear} ~~clear~~.

fact that they as leaders of the nation should administer the affairs of the state and bear the heavy responsibilities for the emperor, they, forgetting the source and lacking the courage to carry out our national policy, are nonchalantly disregarding the spiritual aspect, which is an element contributing to the rise of the Yamato race, and are only concerned in the satisfaction of their greed for political power and wealth, and this ^{very} corrupt political situation, wherein the Emperor is being kept in ignorance and the people is being fooled, has now reached the ultimate point.

Although the people are aware of this evil practice, they have been assimilated by the present depressed atmosphere of society into people without any resilience and ^{hence} absolutely cannot be expected to have the courage and determination to sweep away the ominous cloud ^{hovering over} the political circle and clear the root of the nation's evil. Thus, the nation is digging its own grave deeper and deeper and what does this strange phenomena, which ought to

There were to ~~things~~ ^{things} which I was connected with those that had ^{an} extremely close connection with the so called "October Incident," namely (1) the SAKURA KAI and (2) the so called "March Incident."

The SAKURA KAI

General outline Prospective of the SAKURA KAI

This association is organized around the young officers of the War Ministry's ^{General Staff Headquarters}. It was formed ^{with nationalistic intentions as its aim} with the object of national reconstruction. (The name, SAKURA KAI, however, was given only after some time had elapsed since its organization)

Date organized: ^{later} ~~later~~ part of September 1930

Organizers: ^{General Staff Headquarters} - Lt Col (art) HASHIMOTO (graduate of 23rd class)

War Ministry - Lt Col (Inf) SAKATA (graduate of 21st class)

^{Barriers} ~~Headquarters~~ - Lt Col (Inf) HIGUCHI (graduate of 21st class)

and so and some odd persons

There were about twenty odd persons including the above.

I was assigned to the task of drawing up the program, platform, etc, of this organization so my

connection with this organization is very deep from
the very start.

Object: This organization had ^{as its} the ultimate object of the
national reconstruction for which realization, the
exercise of force was not to be refrained from whenever
necessary.

Members: ^{Limited to} Active army officers with rank of lieutenant
colonel and below, ^{Limited to those interested in}
national reconstruction and devoid of self-interest.

Preparation for realizing the objective:

(1) To use every means ^{available and instill} of instilling thoughts among
the ^{officers of the Imperial Army} Japanese officers, ^{of the necessity for} that national reconstruction
is necessary.

(2) To increase and strengthen membership (membership
numbered about 150 around May 1931)

(3) To map concrete plans for national reconstruction.

Upon studying the real nature of the SAKURA KAI
it included ^{from the very beginning} numerous characteristics which ^{would} must be
lead to a by-product. They were:
~~separated~~ from those at the time of the organization.

(1) One faction ^{holding} ~~held~~ destruction as its first requisite, and claiming that reconstruction would naturally follow destruction. (Note: Considerable number of the members responded to this because of its strong statements)

(2) One faction ^{holding} ~~held~~ reconstruction as paramount and insisting, with a concrete plan and theory, that destruction ~~with destruction limited to the extent necessary~~ ^{be limited to within the said scope and to the minimum for reconstruction and kept at the minimum after some degree of necessity.} all theories have been prepared and concrete plans have been made. (Note: They ^{claim} ~~are~~ is logical but conservative, and since no concrete plan was completed at that time, not many persons responded)

(3) One middle-of-the-road faction standing between the ^{above mentioned} other two factions -- ^{the fence-sitters} ~~those with the least and~~ see policy. (Note: They ^{were} are numerous and fluctuating)

Consequently, with cleavage between the three factions there was no end to strife within the organization from the very ^{causing a cleavage among the three factions} start. The action of the faction which emphasized destruction naturally ^{was always} ~~became~~ ^{actively} ~~overwhelming~~ ^{making} and the ^{entire} SAKURA KAI was ^{apt} ~~ready~~ ^{take} to support directly ^{any} ~~any~~ action that it took.

Soon after I was transferred to the War Ministry in August 1928, I was asked to join a research ~~meeting~~ (its object was not clear but it appeared to be a research ^{club} meeting for national reconstruction) headed by Maj. (Inf) SUZUKI (~~whom~~ ^{prison} having connection later) who was then in the operations section of the ^{General} Staff Headquarters, so I made up my mind and joined. The members occasionally assembled at the KAIKOSHA (TN Military Club) ^{and held} where they ~~gathered~~ ^{held} research meetings. However, the ~~said~~ ^{a serious difference} research of opinion developed among the members at the research meetings developed a ~~serious~~ ^{serious} ~~controversy~~ ^{controversy} ~~of opinion~~ ^{of opinion} resulting in a split up and subsequent disbandment. (While Maj. SUZUKI had departed for Europe and America). I, nevertheless, continued ^{to} ~~deep~~ study deeply with Capt WATANABE (graduate of 29th class), Capt IWAKURO (graduate of 30th class), and Capt YAMAOKA (graduate of 30th class).

When the SAKURA KAI was formed, we four men ^{joined} entered into it without any red tape. ^{however,} since the situation within the organization was as previously mentioned, we four made every effort to complete ~~the~~ ^{as} ~~reached~~ ^{soon} ~~the~~ ^{as} ~~completion~~ ^{quickly} of a reform ^{with} ~~with~~ ^{our} ~~best~~ ^{best} effort ^{and} ~~and~~ ^{while} ~~we~~ ^{we} ~~were~~ ^{were} ~~striving~~ ^{striving} to prevent the organization from becoming more and more violent,

the ~~year~~^{Fall} of 1930 arrived. The authorities at that time were generally displeased with the SAKURA KAI.

The Advent of the SAKURA KAI

In accordance with their ^{usual} practice Section 2 (DAINI BU) ^{of the} Staff Headquarter made an "analysis ^{of the situation}". The "analysis ^{of the situation}" of 1930 was of a nature to be noted which merited particular recording. That is, the "analysis ^{of the situation}" by Section 2 (DAINI BU) until now was an ^{analytical} estimate made only for ^{operational} reference in conducting its operations. In another word, it ^{had} ^{in mind only} only with the enemy nation ^{in mind}, but the one ^{at that time} stressed ^{the necessity of} that national reconstruction must inevitably be a prerequisite for the positive solution of the Manchurian and the Mongolian problems and ~~that~~ for that reason, the reconstruction of the nation must be executed ^{first}. This ^{was} a grave item such as that ^{included} was included in the "analysis ^{of the situation}". Although the reasons for Section 2 of the General Staff ~~Headquarter~~ ^{Headquarter} to make such a precedent breaking decision may have been due to the change of time, ~~and thus violate~~ ^{partly} ~~partly~~ ^{practices}, it can be accused ^{there were a great} to the activities of the great number of SAKURA KAI members among the personnel and sub-section chiefs of Section 2 of the ^{and its} ~~General~~ Staff ^{and its} due to the ^{existence and} activities of such influential men as

~~Col. (Inf) Hashimoto (Russia sub-section) and Lt Col (Inf) Nemoto (China sub-section)~~
Headquarters such as Lt Col. (Inf) HASHIMOTO (Russia sub-section) and Lt Col (Inf) NEMOTO (China sub-section), who are powerful figures there.

With the ~~realization~~ ^{recognition} of the situation of ~~one~~ ^a part of ~~that advocated by~~ ^{the claim of} the SAKURA KAI on occasion of this "analysis of the situation" ~~it was understood that the assistant chief of staff~~ ^{it is deemed, decided to use} the SAKURA KAI for the "March Incident".

The advent of the SAKURA KAI ^{outside of the army} beyond the military.

The radical factions of the SAKURA KAI ^{frequently} met and exchanged views frequently with the leaders of the Social Democratic Party (SHAKAI MINSHU TO) and the ^{People's} Party (TAISHU TO) ~~and exchanged views~~ in order to obtain followers outside the military sphere. As a result, ~~the~~ ^{it helped} proletarian parties ~~made~~ ^{realized} the general intentions of the young officers of the military, and ~~understood~~ ^{recognized} the fact that the military was ~~absolutely not~~ ^{absolutely not} a tool in the hand of the capitalists. The proletarian class, however, utilized this intention of the military

for strengthening and furthering ^{their} own party's ^{strengths}. The most conspicuous illustration ~~is~~ is the attitude held by the HIROSHIMA chapter of the Social Democratic Party ^{during the latter} part of January, 1931.

"The leaders of the Social Democratic Party ^{who} met directly with the radical faction of the SAKURA KAI at TOKYO, ~~it~~ was proclaimed at the mass meeting of the HIROSHIMA chapter, ^{that} 'The present military has a marked feeling of conspicuously good will toward our party. The ~~active~~ officers from the general grade down to the company grade are our advocates if not our supporters. Especially the young officers, in the ~~center~~ ^{small groups} have formed a secret organization for the overthrow of the existing ^{politically} government. Etc."

The SAKURA KAI formed a SEIYŌ KAI (an organization of army and navy staff officers with rank of lieutenant colonel or commander and below) in order to ^{maintain a} ~~have~~ closer relationship with the navy officers, and they met together frequently. Practically all of these were planned by the radical faction of the SAKURA KAI.

In this way the SAKURAKAI make a step-by-step
progress toward practical action. However,
advent into action for putting its purpose into effect,
the radical opinion, ^{numerous experiences, capable to realize} ~~though it is~~
though in ^{being absolutely} ~~thought~~
a small degree, that its object cannot possibly be accomplished
without a theory, ^{and} that especially the lack of concrete plan
for reconstruction ^{in particular, may merely lead} ~~is to result in a mere groping~~
^{to acting blindly} ~~in the dark~~. It decided to undertake the drawing
up of a plan for reconstruction immediately from January
1931. For this purpose, ^a committee was selected
as follows:

Lt Col SAKATA (graduate of 21st class)
Lt Col NEMOTO (graduate of 23rd class)
Lt Col HASHIMOTO (graduate of 23rd class)
Capt ^{CHO} ~~HAGA~~ (graduate of 28th class)
Capt TANAKA (Hiroshi) (graduate of 24th class)
myself - totalling six persons.

(My research associates of ^{many years} ~~Longifera~~ Capt
YAMAZAKI ^{was} ~~has~~ been assigned to duty in Russia, ^{some afterwards} and as
away from Japan; Capt WATANABE ^{resigned} ~~had to go~~
^{because he had to go to China} ~~to China~~, ^{therefore} ~~has resigned~~; and Capt
IWAKURO resigned from the committee saying that
it would be better if he ^{could} ~~could~~ observe the reconstruction

plan of the SAKURA KAI as an outsider. ~~Ultimately,~~
The committee, ^{however,} was composed mostly of the radical members,
^{since} and it recognized that a completely satisfactory plan
~~absolutely could not~~ ^{be made,} so that I, ^{together with} four of my past
associates, ^{deemed it necessary to be prepared with a} second and third plan (and did so.)
~~that one when necessary.~~

Though I thought that this committee would not
be able to accomplish anything, I tried to use ~~the~~ it
as a ^{means to check} ~~opportunity to meet~~ the radical faction and make them
understand that ^{the need for a theoretical and concrete} ~~theoretical and concrete~~ plans and the difficulty of executing it
~~and that executing it is difficult.~~ Just at the moment
when the SAKURA KAI finally ~~has~~ attempted to clarify
its course, ^{though somewhat unsatisfactorily,} ~~despite its dissatisfaction,~~ the so-called
"March Incident" broke out.

The "March Incident"

On January 9, General UGAKI decided to go into
politics and organize a cabinet.

On January 13, General UGAKI conferred with
Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA, ^{Deputy} ~~Vice~~ Chief NINOMIYA,
Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs KOISO, Section Chief
TATEKAWA, Chief of sub-section (Operations) YAMAWAKI

However, represented by
(Col SUZUKI, Sadaichi was acting in that capacity that
day), Lt Col HASHIMOTO, and Lt Col NEMOTO
on the measures and methods for internal reconstruction.
(Authentic information).

During the early part of January 1931, ^{Deputy} ~~Chief~~ Chief of staff Lt Gen NINOMIYA, ~~made a remark to~~ ^{made a remark to} Lt Col HASHIMOTO, as follows:
containing the following gist to Lt Col HASHIMOTO:

"As Gen UGAKI finally is entering politics,
+ present the necessary
you must make plans necessary for 'a reform'
and present them."

Lt Col HASHIMOTO, ^{believing} ~~took~~ this remark, into full consideration
immediately accompanied Lt Col SAKATA and me
into the adjoining room of the Inquiry Section of the
War Ministry, and in accordance with the words
of the ^{Deputy} ~~Chief~~ chief, he requested that ~~plans be finally~~ ^{we to draw up a} ~~made for action~~ ^{plan} be finally
made for action. However Lt Col SAKATA,
taking into consideration the character of Gen. Ugaki
thought that it was inadvisable and dangerous
and of Gen. NINOMIYA and the reputation of the SAKURAKAI
to take this remarks totally into belief because of
and realizing the dangerousness and inadvisability
the nature of Gen. UGAKI and Lt Gen. NEMOTO
of believing this remark requested that the seal
and the reputation of the SAKURAKAI, so he

intention of the Deputy Chief
advised that the real meaning of the vice-chief
be ascertained, ^{first} and that two plans be drawn up.
(One plan will be the real plan for reconstruction and
will be derived from the ultimate objective of the
SAKURA KAI. The other plan is, ^{to be} a deceptive
one whereby the SAKURA KAI would not be construed
as dangerous, that is, one that would indicate
that the SAKURAKAI is ^{nothing} less than a very moderate organization.)
With these two plans, the one to be adopted could be
~~decided~~ that either of the two, as determined by the
decided according to the real intention of the Deputy Chief,
real will of the vice-chief, will be taken.

Lt Col HASHIMOTO ^{personally} went to ascertain the real
intention ^{of the Deputy} of the ^{Deputy} Chief. As a result, the following
information was gained:

(1) The military leaders supporting Gen UGAKI's
entry into politics ~~are~~ ^{were the Deputy} vice chief of staff, Maj Gen
TATEKAWA; Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, KOISO.
Chief of Military Affairs Section, NAGATA; Chief of ^{Appointment} ~~Appointment~~
Section, OKAMURA; Chief of ^{Affairs} ~~Affairs~~ Section, SHIGEFUJI;
and Chief of Section 2, YAMAWAKI.

The attitude of vice-minister of war was not
clear
^{In regard to}
(2) With the entry of Gen UGAKI into politics, the real

of troops ^{would} ~~must not be declared~~, ^{restrained from}
(3) There are sufficient understanding ^{was obtained from} among the
army units.

(4) ^{Since the} ~~The~~ kind of society, political program, ~~and~~ measures, etc.,
that must be instituted in the future are
to be determined by the higher officers, ~~and~~ a way
of seizing the government must be drafted.

~~etc.~~ Consequently, we had to draw up ^{these} plans.

However, the directive ^{from} of the higher officers was:
"Captains and below will not be allowed to participate
in this incident. ^{However, in} ~~In~~ case the incident ended in
failure, they will bear all the guilt, ^{In such} ~~whereas~~
^{instances,} the livelihood of their families cannot be guaranteed,
so the participants must be limited at least to
majors and above."

This directive ^{named} Lt Col HASHIMOTO and Lt Col
SAKATA ^{as} ~~on~~ ^{they} ~~are~~ ^{got}. That is, from the
standpoint of the research ^{to date} ~~material~~ ^{now}, my elimination
would make the completion of ^{the} plans difficult, so

they ^{requested} begged the Tiger commander to make my participation a special exception. With the help of the Chief of the China Section, it was decided that I ~~will~~ could, at any rate, participate in it. ^{for example,} ~~more or less,~~ nevertheless, the most absurd thing was to draw up the plans of construction and destruction ~~draw up separate plans to determine clearly between~~ ~~distinctly as separate plans.~~ ~~the plan of construction and destruction.~~ ~~for destruction and seizure of the government.~~ ~~The plan~~ ~~was~~ ~~totally~~ ~~imperceptible~~ beyond the present, and ~~it~~ ~~practically~~ ~~became~~ ~~impossible~~ ~~to~~ ~~carry~~ ~~out~~. Furthermore, ~~the~~ ~~higher~~ ~~ups~~ did not draw up any political program ~~or~~ measures. Any delay, ~~however,~~ ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~permissible~~, so a plan for destruction and a plan for the seizure of the government were decided to be made separately. ~~In~~ ~~making~~ ~~the~~ ~~plan~~ ~~at~~ ~~that~~ ~~time~~, ~~the~~ ~~necessary~~ ~~conditions~~ ~~in~~ ~~making~~ ~~the~~ ~~plan~~ ~~at~~ ~~that~~ ~~time~~, ~~the~~ ~~necessary~~ ~~data~~ ~~that~~ ~~entered~~ ~~into~~ ~~it~~, ~~as~~ ~~far~~ ~~as~~ ~~I~~ ~~know~~ were as follows:

- (1) The spirit of the Army's governing body to enter politics was very strong.
- (2) The troop's preparation for action had been secretly completed.
- (3) The ~~required~~ ^{necessary} funds ~~would~~ ~~be~~ ~~depleted~~, for the ~~would~~ ~~be~~ ~~disturbed~~ ~~immediately~~ for

Further more
the plan for reconstruction, the day was
near at hand, but since everyone lacked any
ideas of the plan and particularly
was lacking especially since there was no control
and everyone was taking independent actions. Especially
Col SHIGEFUSI joined hand with Dr OKAWA and
made connections with the proletarian party in a
haphazard manner and, according to hearsay,
they are devising a plan of destruction.

Some time after
After 3 PM on February 7, we assembled at the
home of Col. SHIGEFUSI in SHINAGAWA. Those
present were
party was composed of Lt Col SAKATA, Lt Col NEMOTO
and myself. Col. SHIGEFUSI told me, "As you have
already been informed by Lt Col HASHIMOTO, the change
below the rank of captain will be permitted to take part
of this time will prohibit participation by captains and
in this reform, those below, but you will be an exception. However,
even in the event of a failure, it is absolutely unnecessary
for you
to worry about the livelihood of your family. Please
don't worry as we will take good care of that
matter. Etc."

After conferring with SHIGEFUSI and others,
we devised
a plan for destruction.

Its general outline is as follows:

To hold a large scale cabinet consuming mass meeting
(1) ~~A large scale mass meeting for consuming the cabinet will~~
~~of the three proletarian factions at 4 p.m. soon and~~
~~soon be held by a combination of these proletarian~~
factions to agitate the sentiment for the overthrow of the
cabinet. ^{also to stage} a demonstration ^{and make reconnaissance preparations} ~~was made~~ against the
Diet as a prelude for the real event. (Though a
minute plan was made on this matter, I will
omit it.)

(2) ^{To carry out} Destruction and seizure of the government will
be executed on the day ~~the~~ Labor bill is
introduced.

(3) ^{To bomb the} Headquarters of the SEIYŪ KAI and the
MINSEI TŌ as well as the official residence of
the prime minister, ^{on the same day} will be bombed. Bombs with
large percussion effect but causing little physical
injury or death will be used.

The bomb-thrower will be designated in accordance
with the plan of Dr. OKAWA. 10,000 persons will
be mobilized and demonstrations will be staged against
the Diet from all sides. A well-known ^{informed} leader will
be placed at the head of each column ^{and} ~~in order~~
^{to take control} to take control. A band with drawn swords will be
^{attached to} placed in each column to eliminate inevitable and

anticipated police opposition.

(4) ^{To execute} There will be an emergency mobilization of troops which will surround ^{the Diet} and cut off all communication both internally & externally with the Diet under the pretense of protecting it. Officers (mostly SAKURA KAI members) will be ^{stationed} placed beforehand ^{along} at each road. (The leaders placed in each column will execute this)

(5) ^{To have} Under this situation, a certain lieutenant general, (His name was concealed until the ^{very} last and even now it is not known. One version says that he was Lt Gen MASAKI) with either Maj Gen KOISO or TATEKAWA will lead under this situation into the cabinet meeting and force them to resign en masse by proceeding to ^{the ministers}. "The people has no confidence in the present cabinet now. Only a cabinet with Gen UGAKI as premier will be trusted". The nation now is ^{confronting} just a grave period. Please act accordingly." and ~~make them resign en masse.~~

(6) ^{To force} Premier pro tempore SHIDEHARA and others will be forced to tender their resignations.

(7) ^{To execute} Moves will be made in accordance with previous preparations so that the Imperial appointment ^{to form a cabinet} will be granted to Gen UGAKI. (Delegation)