Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

Senator Lucas: All right. Now, what other stations that were operating at that time that you knew about had the opportunity or the possibility of receiving it, at least?

Captain Safford: The British were operating a monitoring station at Halifax, which I was told about by a British officer who spend about two weeks in my section in the spring of 1941. He was a liaison officer.

Senator Lucas: Was that station capable of receiving a message of this character?

Captain Safford: I don't know whether they had any -Senator Lucas: That is all I am interested in, just
the stations that were capable of receiving a message of this
kind throughout the world.

Captain Safford: The capability of any station to receive that message would depend upon whether the operators were capable of copying the Japanese Morse code. That is something that I do not know for any station outside those the U.S. Navy controlled.

Senator Lucas: From your previous experience in this particular department and from your careful investigation of the different messages that have come into these hearings from these various monitoring stations throughout the world do you know of any that were capable of dedphering the Morse code?

Captain Safford: I do not know what the qualifications of

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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the operators at Halifax were or at other stations, outside of

Witness Safford

our own U.S. Navy controlled.

Senator Lucas: So outside of the two stations in the United States you do not know of any others in the world that were capable of receiving this message?

Captain Safford: I cannot specifically name any.

Senator Lucas: I understand. And the records of these two stations show that they did not, as I understand it, intercept a message of this kind on December the 5th?

Captain Safford: The record of those two other stations cannot be located. It is missing even today.

Senator Lucas: Well, are there any records of any kind, or from your investigation, - as I understand it, you have pursued this rather vigorously, - show that these stations ever received a message of that kind?

Captain Safford: There are no records from those stations of any sort which could be located in 1943 or at the present time.

Senator Lucas: What is the practice with respect to those records that come into these stations from time to time, about keeping them or destroying them? "hat do they do at these stations?

Captain Safford: The monthly reports were supposed to be retained for a permanent record in the Navy Department.

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Messages were submitted in duplicate. One set of messages was broken up for immediate use at the time and their identity lost. The other set of messages was supposed to be retained for permanent record.

Senator Lucas: Well, have you examined the various stations throughout the United States with respect to monthly reports?

Captain Safford: I have requested them and I have been informed that those monthly reports for November and December 1941 for those two stations, as well as all their intercepted messages of any nature, could not be located.

Senator Lucas: What about the other stations in the United States? What about their monthly reports?

Captain Safford: The remaining station of Winter Harbor, Maine, the monthly reports were located or at least were made available to me two months ago -- I mean two weeks ago although they could not be located two years ago. However, none of the intercepted messages from Winter Harbor for this period can be located now, or two years ago. We have one more station, which is Bainbridge Island near Bremerton, Washington, and we have both the monthly reports and the complete file of intercepted messages.

Senator Lucas: Would there be any reason why these monthly reports, say, for November should not be sent in here

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#### Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

## to the Department?

Captain Safford: They were sent in and receipt was given by the Department, receipt was acknowledged by the Department and if by any chance it miscarried in the mail a duplicate would be sent in from the station. The station kept a duplicate report and also a third set of messages which they held until after they had heard, after they had received word from the Navy Department that the previous report and previous messages had been received.

Senator Lucas: You have stated that the station at Singapore and the station at Austrlia, the station at Corregidor and the station at Java used both the voice and the Morse method in transmitting messages. Is that right?

Captain Safford: I believe I said I was doubtful as to which series they had listened for and indicated that by a question mark.

Senator Lucas: How about those at Corregidor? You just had Corregidor voice and Morse and the three remaining stations you do not know?

Captain Safford: Corregidor had voice and Morse and Pearl Harbor for voice only and the others I do not know whether they listened for one or the other or both.

Senator Lucas: Well, they could have received the message at Corregidor?

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

Captain Safford: They could have received the message at Corregidor.

Senator Lucas: And we were supposed to have the best men in the Pacific in every branch of the Naval service there, were we nott?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

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Questions by: Senator Lucas

Senator Lucas: On page 12 you said, "Kramer distinctly recalls that the winds message was shown to him by the GY watch officer after 8:30 a.m. on that date."

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Senator Lucas: You are sure that is not the false winds message that you are talking about here?

Captain Safford: Kramer told me that shortly before Christmas of 1945, either in his room or in the rotunda just outside of it.

Senator Lucas: When was that? Just before Christmas? Captain Safford: Just before Christmas, during the early part of this investigation.

Senator Lucas: And you were talking about the winds execute message?

Captain Safford: We were talking about the winds execute message.

Senator Lucas: You are sure he knew what you were talking about?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Senator Lucas: You fellows did not know what you were talking about when you wrote that letter in December, I think it was, did you?

Captain Safford: We certainly knew what we were talking about this time.

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Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Lucas

Senator Lucas: You say this is a tip-off which would prevent the United States Pacific Fleet being surprised at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Well, if it was simply a war message and did not give any place of attack, how did you figure that?

Captain Safford: It gave a tip-off that we could expect war almost immediately.

Senator Lucas: Everybody knew that. It was testified around here that they all knew the war was imminent, as the result of messages received. You make the statement here that this was a tip-off in the event the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor. I would like to know what the basis of that was.

Captain Safford: This was positive to me, it was positive evidence that Japan was going to rejec our terms as presented in the note of November 26 and declare war on the United States.

Senator Lucas: Well, you were very much excited about this message, too, were you not, when you got it?

Captain Safford: My main excitement had been as to the question of --

Senator Lucas: Well --

Captain Safford: Yes, I was.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

Senator Lucas: I mean by that you were highly satisfied that you had received it?

Captain Safford: Highly satisfied that I had received it.

Senator Lucas: You knew war was imminent as the result

of that message?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: You knew war was more imminent following the beginning of the receipt of the 14-part message, did you not?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Senator Lucas: Notwithstanding that you knew war was imminent when you received the winds message, and notwithstanding you knew war was imminent when you received the beginning of the 14-part message, you left on Saturday, December 6, at 4:30, when this message was coming in, and you never knew any more about the 14-part message until after the bombs struck Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: You told Senator George that you knew war was imminent within two or three days after the receipt of this so-called winds message. Did not you believe that it was your duty to stay right around as close as it was possible from that time on, to see just what would happen?

Captain Safford: I had done everything I could do by

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

3:30 p.m. on Saturday, December 6.

Senator Lucas: You were not interested in whether they struck us or did not?

Captain Safford: I was very interested, but there was nothing I could do to help.

Senator Lucas: I only ask this question because under the heading "Distribution" you say:

"I immediately sent the original of the winds message up to the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track him down and not take 'no' for an answer, and if he could not find him in a reasonable time to let me know."

You did not show the same concern about the 14-part message as you tell us you showed about this winds message? Captain Safford: We had orders -- no, sir.

Senator Lucas: In other words, you did not tell those delivering the winds message to track anybody down, that if they could not find the fellow to be sure to report back to you?

Captain Safford: Will you please repeat the question, sir? Senator Lucas: I say you did not show the same concern about this 14-part message, which was a message that brought us closer to the peril than the winds message. That is a

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Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Lucas

nessages were coming in; you knew the significance of the few that you read, and you did not take the same precaution with the 14-part message, with the messengers, your couriers, or whatever it was, as you did with the winds message?

Captain Safford: It was not carrying out a precaution. We had direct orders from Admiral Noyes when the winds message came in to get it to him as soon as possible, to get it to him personally and he was going to attend to the emergency distribution.

Senator Lucas: And you had no such order on the 14-part message?

Captain Safford: I had no such order on the 14-part.

It was handled by Naval Intelligence in the customary manner.

Senator Lucas: All right. You did not testify before the Roberts Commission?

Captain Safford: I did not testify before the Roberts Commission.

Senator Lucas: You heard Justice Roberts testify that there was no winds message delivered to the Commission, did you not?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Do you believe him?

Captain Safford: I will believe him, as far as the

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

statement is concerned.

Senator Lucas: What do you mean by that?

Captain Safford: Well, it is possible that his memory was not of the best on this. That was only one of many top secret matters which were discussed and not made a matter of official record at that time.

Senator Lucas: You contended right along that this was probably the most important message you ever received. Pont you believe it would make an impression on Justice Roberts at that particular time and he would recall it?

Captain Safford: I thought it would.

Senator Lucas: You are not sure whether he saw it or whether he did not?

Captain Safford: I have no idea what was shown to or discussed with Mr. Roberts, or any of the other members of the Roberts Commission.

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Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Lucas

Senator Lucas: The only reason I ask this question, sir, is because you stated flatly that it was presented to the Roberts Commission, that it was being assembled by Admiral Noyes for being presented to the Roberts Commission, and that gives an indication, at least, that you believed this was presented to the Roberts Commission.

Captain Safford: That is what I was informed at the time, that these papers were being assembled to be shown to the Roberts Commission.

Senator Lucas: As far as you are concerned, you are not sure whether Roberts remembers whether it was in there or not?

Captain Safford: I have no idea whether he remembers that or whether he was ever shown it.

Senator Lucas: With respect to Captain McCollum, who was the head of the Intelligence Branch of the Far Eastern Division, and you were working very close to him, as I understand, you did not submit to him a copy of the so-called winds message at the time it came in?

Captain Safford: Not to him personally from me. It was handled through our liaison officer, who was Captain Kramer.

Senator Lucas: Do you now say Captain Kramer talked to McCollum about this so-called winds execute message?

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Questions by: Senator Lucas Witness Safford

Captain Safford: I do not know what Captain Kramer ever said to Captain McCollum on the subject.

Senator Lucas: You sent the message direct to Noyes because he had requested you to do that?

Captain Safford: He had directed that that be done. ' It was an order, not a request.

Senator Lucas: Now, is that the only time that Noyes ever directed you, during the months of November and December, to send a special message of that kind to him?

Captain Safford: That is the only time that I ever recall at any time.

Senator Lucas: At any time? In the regular routine of affairs, McCollum would be the first fellow to get the message, would he not?

Captain Safford: The first man assigned from Kramer who had any responsibility for it. Kramer usually showed me the message on the way up to McCollum as a matter of convenience, to keep me posted, and also to see if he could explain the circumstances and significance clearly, so then they could ask him questions and he would have a clearer story to tell the other officers that he showed the messages to.

Senator Lucas: But you never talked to McCollum about this message at all?

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Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Lucas Mr. Murphy

Captain Safford: I never talked to McCollum about this message at all.

Senator Lucas: And McCollum was the man upon whom the Naval Intelligence depended for his proper evaluation of intelligence, as far as the Far East was concerned?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Senator Lucas: I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, Captain.

Mr. Murphy: Captain Safford, I understand this morning you were shown a photostatic copy of a letter dated January 22, 1944, purporting to be signed by you, and, as I understand it you said you did sign that letter addressed "My dear Kramer-san."

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: That letter was dated January 22, 1944, was it not?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: I wish counsel would hand the witness a copy of the letter so I can go over it with him.

I would like to go over it with you, Captain. The letter which was shown to you this morning had certain omissions, did it not, certain blank spaces for certain numbers?

Captain Safford: I was not shown this letter that

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Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Murphy
I have here. I was shown the letter that was sent, I
believe, December 22 or 23.

Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that during the noon hour, we took the original letter which refers to names by number and prepared a copy of it where we retained the number but added the name of the person, so the letter could be read intelligently. That is the copy handed the witness. We could furnish the original photostat.

Mr. Murphy: I think that is important, in view of the testimony here, I think it is important to be shown the photostat. I would like to have him read the photostat.

Senator Lucas: Is this the copy that I have?

The Vice Chairman: I think the reporter took the photostat with him. It is probably not available at this time.

Mr. Murphy: It is important that we have it. In the meantime I am going to proceed with my examination.

Captain, as I understand it, you wrote a letter to Kramer, and then there was a separate code which you had with him whereby you had certain numbers and those numbers referred to certain individuals, and to certain incidents; that is right, isn't it?

Captain Safford: I sent him such a letter, yes, sir.

Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: Who prepared the secret code? Captain Safford: I did.

Mr. Murphy: You did.

Now, then, that secret code that you supplied to Kramer was to refer to certain incidents by way of intercepts, and also to refer to certain idividuals; that is right, isn't it?

Captain Safford: That is right.

Mr. Murphy: Now, as I understand you, you said that you began preparation in this case because you thought you would be called as a witness for the prosecution against Admiral Kimmel,

Was that an accurate statement?

Captain Safford: Will you please repeat the question?

Mr. Murphy: Read the question, Mr. Reporter, please.

(The question as recorded above, was read by the reporter.)

Captain Safford: That is a correct statement.

Mr. Murphy: Was that before or after you read the Roberts report that you felt you would be a witness for the prosecution?

Captain Safford: That was after I had read the Roberts report.

Mr. Murphy: What was that, please?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Captain Safford: It was after I had read the Roberts report.

Mr. Murphy: You still felt you would be called as a witness for the prosecution? Would that be a correct state-ment?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And you felt you were a prosecution witness?

Captain Safford: I expected to be called as a prosecution witness.

Mr. Murphy: And not a defense witness?

Captain Safford: Not a defense witness.

Mr. Murphy: And then you went about preparing the prosecution as against the defendant, isn't that correct?

Captain Safford: That is correct, yes.

Mr. Murphy: You sent a letter to Kramer and then, under separate enclosure, you sent the secret code, did you not?

Captain Safford: That is right.

Mr. Murphy: On January 22, 1944, you were preparing material as a prosecution witness. I repeat that because I want to emphasize it. Is that right?

Captain Safford: I was not preparing material as a prosecution witness in January, 1944.

Mr. Murphy: When did you shift? I want to be fair with

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Captain Safford: I shifted at the time that I had definitely determined that the war warning message which I saw and read on the afternoon of December 4, 1941, at about 3 p. m., in Admiral Noyes office had not been sent out from the Navy Department.

Mr. Murphy: Will you tell us when you shifted from a prosecution to a defense witness? Give us the date, please. Up to this moment you have held yourself up as preparing yourself as a witness for the prosecution, and now you have just shifted to the defense.

Tell us when you shifted from a prosecution witness to a defense witness.

Captain Safford: About the middle of January, 1944.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: Now where were you on Saturday night the 6th of December, 1941? You were asked that question before and did not answer it, but I feel this committee is entitled to an answer from you, sir. Where were you and what did you do?

Captain Safford: I was out with my wife visiting friends, and I do not recall whom we saw that morning.

Mr. Murphy: Did you do any drinking?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You were still in your pajamas the next afternoon at 2:20, having breakfast, on December 7, is that right?

Captain Safford: That is right.

Mr. Murphy: At 2:20 you were still in your pajamas having breakfast?

Captain Safford: That is right.

Mr. Murphy: Now the fact is that the 1:00 o'clock message was a very important tip-off, was it not?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: And the fact is further, Captain, that the man under you had the 1:00 o'clock message translated At 5:00 o'clock in the morning, did he not? Did not Brotherhood know what was in that message at 5:00 o'clock in the morning of the 7th?

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Captain Safford: He knew what it meant before 7:00 o'clock.

Mr. Murphy: Did not he know at 5:00 o'clock what was it?

Captain Safford: Not to my knowledge that early.

Mr. Murphy: Did not it take about two minutes to translate it?

Captain Safford: It took a little time to break it down into its Japanese.

Mr. Murphy: Is it not a fact that just shortly after 5:00 o'clock, of 7 hours before Pearl Harbor, in your Department, while you were not in your department, they knew that the warning was given that 1:00 o'clock was the deadline? Isn't that right?

Captain Safford: Brotherhood did, that is correct.

M Mr. Murphy: What is that?

Captain Safford: Brotherhood did.

Mr. Murphy: And Brotherhood was directly under you and you were responsible for your subo dinate, weren't you?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Where were you at 5:00 o'clock in the morning?

Captain Safford: I was at home.

Mr. Murphy: At home. The fact is further that the

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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7th was the Navy day for translating, was it not? Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: There was no interpreter who knew Japanese in your Department, was there?

Captain Safford: There was not.

Mr. Murphy: And you are over home at a time when you think war is coming, because you have told this committee that was was coming on Saturday or Sunday, you know that there is going to be a time fixed which will fix the deadline, and you leave on Saturday afternoon at 4:30, and you do not inquire as to anyone under you until after the war has started; that is right?

Captain Safford: That is right.

Mr. Murphy: And if you had followed your subordinates at 5:00 o'clock in the morning we would have known that 1:00 o'clock was the deadline, wouldn't we?

Will you answer that, please?

Captain Safford: My subordinate sent it over to the Army for translation. There had been a local arrangement made whereby the Army would provide a translator for the 7th because we had furnished the translations for the 6th, and that was sent over in accordance with those instructions from Kramer. Also Brotherhood called Kramer to tell him what was in and to be sure Kramer would come down.

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: We are talking about you, in charge of 200 men. You, the witness before the committee, accusing everybody else of having heard. We are now talking about you.

The fact is that in your Department at 5:00 o'clock in the morning of Pearl Harbor Day your subordinate knew that 1:00 o'clock was the time for the delivery of this fatal message, didn't he?

Captain Safford: He thought but he could not be sure. He was not a qualified Japanese translator.

Mr. Murphy: Did he not say that he knew what was in that message but he was not sure; is that right?

Captain Safford: I don't know what he said.

Mr. Murphy: The fact is that you had no interpreter there on the day you expected the war to start, did you? Kramer was a subordinate of yours. You had no interpreter there, did you?

Captain Safford: We had no interpreter there at the time.

Mr. Murphy: The 7th was the Navy's day?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And it was the day that you expected war to start, wasn't it?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

And you are still in pajamas having breakfast Mr. Murphy:

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

at 2:00 o'clock?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Do you have any sense of responsibility for the failure of this 1:00 o'clock message to get to the proper people in time? Do you feel responsible?

Captain Safford: Not in the least.

Mr. Murphy: In other words, you are not responsible for the failure of Brotherhood to do something about it when he knew it was 1:00 o'clock in the day at 5:00 o'clock in the morning and he knew the time of delivery? Why aren't you responsible? You are responsible for your subordinate, aren't you?

Captain Safford: Three official Naval investigations have listened to all the facts and none of them found me responsible.

Mr. Murphy: Not one of them have gone into this, have they? This is the first time you have been confronted with these questions, isn't it?

Captain Safford: I don't believe so.

Mr. Murphy: Who ever asked you about your responsibility and failure to be there on Sunday, whoever asked you that question before?

Captain Safford: That question was not specifically asked.

Mr. Murphy: You believe that the best defense is an

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Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Murphy attack, don't you?

Captain Safford: I believe that the best defense is telling the truth.

Mr. Murphy: Right.

Now, then, the fact is in all these investigations you have been talking about a so-called winds execute and nobody has questioned you as to your responsibility, since this 1:00 o'clock hour was known under you, directly under you, from 5:00 o'clock in the morning, isn't that right?

Captain Safford: Approximately 5:00 o'clock.

Mr. Murphy: Everybody is asking how soon General
Marshall got it and as I understand it it was around 11:30,
and how soon Admiral Stark got it, which was somewhere
after 9:30 to 10:30, and your subordinate knew it at 5:00
o'clock in the morning, didn't he?

Captain Safford: Or maybe 6.

Mr. Murphy: You weren't concerned about your Department then, you were taking some time off on the day the war was to start; isn't that right?

Captain Safford: I was taking time out.

Mr. Murphy: You felt you had done all you could even though you knew that there was a definite time of delivering to be fixed when you left on that Saturday afternoon?

Captain Safford: That is right.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: Do you think if you had followed your Department or watched it closely on that deadline day you wouldn't have seen there was somebody from 5:00 o'clock in the morning for four or five hours to translate it?

What do you say to that?

Captain Safford: If I had seen that message at 5 or 6 a.m. on the 7th all I could have done was put in a telephone call for Kramer to come down.

Mr. Murphy: The fact is you or somebody would have seen that 1:00 o'clock was significant because that was sunrise at Pearl Harbor, wasn't it? You knew that?

Captain Safford: I knew that.

Mr. Murphy: It was your Department that had it from 5:00 o'clock until at least sometime about 9:30 or 10:30 before it got to your people, wasn't it?

Captain Safford: We sent it over to the War Department about 7:00 o'clock for translation. They had from 7:00 o'clock until the translation was returned.

Mr. Murphy: And your Department, when you knew, and you say you knew three days before that warwas coming on Sunday, your Department on the day that war was supposed to start has no interpreter on hand at all to handle the Navy's obligation, which was to translate the messages on Sunday, December 7? That is right, isn't it?

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Captain Safford: On a matter of technicalities Naval Intelligence was entirely responsible for translation. Not Naval Communications.

Mr. Murphy: Will you please answer my question. Your Department knew, did they not, and didn't you know, that there wasn't a translator on hand to translate anything in Japanese on the day that you knew the war was going to start?

You say you are the only one in Washington now that recognizes the -- withdraw that.

You are the one who says that you knew three days before that war would start on Sunday, and you are responsible for the communications, and you said you saw every translation. The fact is that in that Department, sir, there wasn't a person on the day that you expected war to start to translate a word of Japanese, was there?

Captain Safford: Not until Kramer came down about 8 a.m.

Mr. Murphy: From 5:00 o'clock until 8:00 o'clock there was no one in your Department on that day that war was going to start?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: So that is three hours, isn't it?

In other words, you blamed the Americans because you said the Japanese had a certain notice, as I recall, but you didn't say anything about the three hours in your Department,

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

did you?

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Captain Safford: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, Captain, let me go over this letter with you, if you will, please.

## "NAVY DEPARTMENT

# OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

#### WASHINGTON

22 January 1944."

And as soon as we come to anything that you feel is not correct, sir, please stop me.

"My dear Kramer-san:

"Thanks for your very prompt reply. I did not receive your December 28th letter till January 17th, and had almost given up hopes. What a break for you, as well as the cause, to be ordered to Admiral Halsey's staff. I can see the hand of Providence in it."

What cause? My question is, what cause? You say "as well as the cause".

"What a break for you, as well as the cause."

What was the cause?

Captain Safford: I didn't know if Kramer would understand that or not.

Mr. Murphy: Will you please tell us, sir. They are your words. What cause, please?

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Captain Safford: I meant the cause of Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Murphy: In other words, you were bending every effort to have Admiral Kimmel freed, weren't you?

Captain Safford: At that time.

Mr. Murphy: Yes. Now, after December 7, 1941 you did not remain in Washington, did you?

Captain Safford: I was attached to the Navy Department throughout that period.

Mr. Murphy: Weren't you on the NEW MEXICO? Captain Safford: I was on the NEW MEXICO from about 1934 to 1936.

Mr. Murphy: Then you have not left Washington from December 7, 1941 for official assignment until today? Captain Safford: Except on temporary duty.

Mr. Murphy: At any rate, we proceed:

"I am sending by separate cover (airmail) a condensation code to use. If you want to add to it, use Nos. 151-200, inclusive. I would like to hold it down to a single sheet of paper. I am also sending by ordinary mail a copy of #35 --"

which was the Roberts report, was it not? Captain Safford: That is right.

Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: "--and a clipping to give to #42 --"

Which was Admiral Halsey, was it not?

Captain Safford: That is right.

Mr. Murphy: "--at some auspicious occasion. You will understand this letter better when they arrive."

What was the clipping?

Captain Safford: That was a clipping from the Saturday Evening Post.

Mr. Murphy: About what?

Captain Safford: It was an article about Admiral Halsey which had been written by a Reserve officer who I think was on his staff.

Mr. Murphy: In which you learned Admiral Halsey had said, sir, that he would devote his life after retirement to having Kimmel freed; is that right?

Captain Safford: Right.

Mr. Murphy: You wanted to send that clipping to him and have Kramer turn it over; right?

Captein Safford: Right.

Mr. Murphy: Now, the next paragraph:

"With regard to taking #42 (Admiral Halsey) into confidence wait patiently for the proper moment, and then shoot the works. Tell him everything he will listen to, and show him whatever documentary proof you may have. Use

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|                | Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Murphy                |
|----------------|---|
| h4 1           | (Admiral Halsey);                                       |
| 2              | "(j) #42 (Admiral Halsey) visits #6                     |
| 3              | (Admiral Turner)."                                      |
| 4              | The next paragraph:                                     |
| 5              | "Be prudent and be patient. I am just beginning to      |
| 8              |   |
| . 7            | By that you meant what?                                 |
| 8              |   |
| 9              |   |
| C4<br>10       |   |
| *              | evidence?   |
| 4 11           | Captain Safford: Lining up evidence. Not witnesses.     |
| 12             | Mr. Murphy: Not necessarily what happened, but lining   |
| 3 13           | up evidence?  |
| 5 14<br>0      | Captain Safford: Evidence.                              |
| 16<br>16<br>17 | Mr. Murphy: Not necessarily what actually happened, but |
|                | evidence; isn't that right?                             |
|                |   |
|                |   |
|                |   |
| 30             | Captain Safford: Evidence is the answer I want to make. |
|                | Mr. Murphy: What is it?                                 |
| 21             | Captain Safford: Evidence is the answer I want to make. |
| 22             | Mr. Murphy: Do you understand the distinction between   |
| . 23           |   |
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| 25             | stand the question?                                     |

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And you want to make the answer "evidence"? Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: "No one in #15 (Opnav) can be trusted."

Will you give us who you felt was not worthy of trust in the Navy of the United States during the course of the war on January 22, 1944?

Captain Safford: That is a rash statement; I will not expand it.

Mr. Murphy: It is a rash statement, is it? Captain Safford: Yes.

"No one in #15 (Opnav) can be trusted," Mr. Murphy: said you.

Did you mean also Admiral King, at that time? Wasn't he in Opnav?

Captain Safford: No; he was Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and was not in Opnav.

Mr. Murphy: Tell us who was in Opnav who could not be trusted, even though it is a rash statement? You made a lot of statements here, sir. Let's find out who couldn't be trusted.

Please give us some names.

Who do you mean then couldn't be trusted on January 22, 1.944?

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Captain Safford: I will not give any names.

Mr. Murphy: You will not? You refuse? I ask you to tell us. You are now under oath. Please tell us, sir, who you say there cannot be trusted, because, sir, that is an important accusation. It is an accusation against one of the important departments of the U.S. Navy during the war.

You were making assertions. This is going into the papers of the country as well as are your other statements.

You say "they cannot be trusted." Who were you saying could not be trusted?

Names, please.

Who could not be trusted?

Senator Lucas: He says all of them.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to have names.

Here is a man making an accusation in writing. This is going to the papers.

You, sir, a Captain in the U. S. Navy, say:

"No one in #15 (Opnav) can be trusted."

Who did you mean?

I don't want any sweeping statement. We are going to get down to details. Who could not be trusted?

Names, please.

I am still waiting. Waiting. Will you please give

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Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Murphy us the names as to who could not be trusted in Opnav.

Please, sir.

What did you mean by saying no one in No. 15, Opnav, can be trusted?

The Chairman: Do you wish to answer?

Captain Safford: I would prefer not to answer.

The Chairman: Do you want to refresh your recollection about the names?

Captain Safford: I prefer not to answer.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I submit when an officer of the U. S. Navy, a Captain, who has made some statements before the committee over the past three days, says no one in Opnav can be trusted, in view of the statements of this morning, should be obliged to answer.

Senator Lucas: This was made in January, 1944?
Mr. Murphy: 1944, during the course of the war.

The Chairman: The Chair thinks you should answer if you can answer. We are trying to hold these hearings in public without concealing anything, and it occurs to the chair that you have no mere right to conceal anything than any other witness, or the committee itself has a right to conceal anything that is pertinent.

Captain Safford: That was a private letter to Commander Kramer.

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy Witness Safford

It was a private letter, but it per-The Chairman: tained to public business, and a very pertinent inquiry which we are undertaking to go into. It raises the question of whether any letter of that sort can be regarded as privilege.

Mr. Murphy: I think, Mr. Chairman, it is also pertinent, because it shows the state of mind of the witness.

You have made certain accusations against others. here is another one. You say they cannot be trusted.

You refuse to answer?

Captain Safford: I would rather not mention any names.

Mr. Murphy: But sir, a statement is going out to the papers of the country. You said no one in Opnav could be trusted. That would include everybody in it. Do you mean that there wasn't one single person in Opnav? What did you mean by Opnav? What was Opnav?

Captain Sufford: Opnav is Naval Operations.

Mr. Murphy: Now, did you mean -- I will try to help you -- did you mean that there wasn't one person in Navy Operations on January 22, 1944 worthy of trust?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: What did you mean? What did you mean? Captain Safford: I meant that there was no one that I knew of that I desired to confide this information to.

Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: Who would work with you; is that right? Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: The next sentence;

"Premature action would only tip off the people who framed #31 (Admiral Kimmel) and #32 (General Short) and will also get #8 (Safford) and #10 (Kramer) into very serious trouble."

What did you mean by that? How would it get Safford into trouble if he was doing the right thing?

Will you answer that, sir?

Still waiting.

The Chairman: Go ahead. Answer if you can. You must have some sort of an answer to that.

Captain Safford: What I meant was that nothing should be done in the way of making any statement or anything of that sort until the expected court martial, or the expected investigation at that time which had been directed by Congress had taken place, so I could come on the witness stand, or Kramer could come on the witness stand and present the facts.

Mr. Murphy: And spring a surprise; is that right? Captain Safford: Not necessarily.

Mr. Murphy: What is it?

Captain Safford: Not necessarily.

Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Murphy hlo 2 3 4 5 that time. в 7 8 statements. 8 Mr. Murphy: You say: 10 11 12 13 Name names, please. 14 15 Names. 16 17 and lowest crimes? 18 19 20 21 framed them? 22 23

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Mr. Murphy: How would you get into trouble, what trouble could you get into for telling the truth, if you were telling the truth. Who would make trouble for you? Captain Safford: I was standing almost alone at

Mr. Murphy: Who would make trouble for you, sir? Captain Safford: Anyone who doubted the accuracy of

"Premature action would only tip off the people who framed Admiral Kimmel and General Short."

Who did the framing of Admiral Kimmel and General Short?

That also is a serious accusation.

Do you know that to frame anybody is one of the meanest

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then you say some people did frame these two people, Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Who

Captain Safford: I do not know.

Mr. Murphy: Who do you refer to and who are you cautioning Kramer against?

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"Premature action would only tip off the people who framed Admiral Kimmel and General Short."

Who were you referring to?

Captain Safford: I was referring to the War and Navy Departments in general, but not to any specific individual that I can identify.

Mr. Murphy: Captain, you wouldn't accuse the whole War and Navy Departments with the stigma of the vile crime of framing anybody? Can you narrow it down?

Captain Safford: Well, I will narrow it down to the people concerned, the General Staff and officers.

Mr. Murphy: In other words, you felt that the General Staff of the U. S. Army under General Marshall, and the General Staff of the Navy under Admiral Stark had framed Kimmel and Short; is that right?

Captain Safford: I felt that way.

Mr. Murphy: Yes. Would you include anybody else? Captain Safford: No.

Mr. Murphy: Well, what about Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves, both distinguished and able officers of the U.S. Navy with long and honored careers?

This is after you had read the Roberts report. Did you feel that they too were in on the framing?

Captain Safford: No, sir. I had served under both of them.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: What is that?

Captain Safford: No, sir. I had served under both of them.

Mr. Murphy: Well, do you feel the Roberts report was a fair one, and an honest one?

Captain Safford: From the testimony which I have read, and their interpretation as given by Justice Roberts, I do.

Mr. Murphy: In other words --

The Chairman: You do what?

Captain Safford: I feel that the Roberts report was a fair report.

The Chairman: All right.

Mr. Murphy: I go on.

"Yet we must have the backing, the rank, and the prestige afforded by #42 (Admiral Halsey)."

What did you mean by that, "We must have the backing, the rank, and prestige afforded by Admiral Halsey."

Captain Safford: I meant Kramer and I could do nothing by ourselves.

Mr. Murphy: "Tell #42 (Admiral Halsey) that I knew #31 (Admiral Kimmel) was a scapegoat from the start, but I did not suspect that he was the victim of a frame-up until about #114 (November 15, 1941)(plus 2 years)--"

In other words, you have just said you agreed with the

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Roberts report.

You now say, in this sentence, that you knew he was a scapegoat.

Do you think those two are consistent? Captain Safford. Yes.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: You do?

Captain Safford: I do.

Mr. Murphy: And you repeat then that he is the victim of a frame-up of a frame-up and you found out he was a victim of a frame-up on November 15, 1941. What facts lead to that conclusion?

Captain Safford: I said I did not even suspicion him

Captain Safford: I said I did not even suspicion nim

Mr. Murphy: What led to your suspicion?

Pardon me. There was something left out there:

" -- until about #114 November 15, 1941 (plus 2 years),--"

Did I read that?

Captain Safford: I thought you did.

Mr. Murphy: Yes. Will you tell us what led to your suspicion? What led to the suspicion at that time?

Captain Safford: That was the discovery that we could find no copy of the winds message or any intercepted messages from the East Coast intercept stations, and plus the fact that there was no mention in the Roberts Report anywhere about the warning message which I saw on December 4 and described to this committee but did not get sent.

Mr. Murphy: Captain, the Roberts Report apparently approached the proposition from this way, what did Admiral Kimmel and General Short do with the information they had.

You understand?

AND & PAUL. WASHINGTON.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Captain Safford: I do.

Mr. Murphy: And they concluded from what they actually had certain things that followed. You said you thought that was a fair report; is that right?

Captain Safford: That is right.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you feel, I take it, that if certain information had been sent to them, added information, the result would have been different; is that right?

Captain Safford: That is right.

Mr. Murphy: Let me go on with your next sentence. You say you had that suspicion in November 1941 plus 2 years. You say:

" -- could not confirm it until #132 (December 2, 1941) (plus 2 years), and did not have absolute proof until about January 18, 1944. #8 (Safford) has overwhelming proof of the guilt of #15 (Opnav) and #65 (General Staff) plus a list of about 15 reliable witnesses."

Will you give this committee your evidence of the overwhelming proof of the guilt of Opnav and the General Staff?

Captain Safford: I was referring to the winds execute which had been received and no action taken on it.

Mr. Murphy: You said this morning, sir, right before the noon recess, and after this letter had been shown to you,

9997 Questions by: Mr. Murphy Witness Safford as I recall it -- you saw that letter earlier, didn't you? Captain Safford: I did not see this particular letter. This had been introduced as evidence but I had not seen it. Mr. Murphy: All right. You didn't know we had that one, did you? Captain Safford: I saw a letter introduced as evidence. I had not read it. Mr. Murphy: You didn't know the committee had this letter or that it was in existence, did you? Captain Safford: I didn't know you had it before you. Mr. Murphy: You thought it was destroyed, didn't you? This letter? Captain Safford: My copy had been destroyed. Mr. Murphy: You never expected Kramer to produce it, did you? I mean this morning. This morning, when you were testifying in answer to Judge Clark and Senator Lucas you didn't expect this letter would ever turn up, did you? Captain Safford: I did not know anything about this letter. In fact, I never thought about it.

Mr. Murphy: Before the noon recess you said to Senator
Lucas that you wanted to change your testimony, that you
didn't want to say that you had a suspicion directed to
Admiral Stark and General Marshall, and here you say you have

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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absolute proof, overwhelming proof, you say "and did not have absolute proof until about January 18, 1944."

Then you have "overwhelming proof of the guilt of Opnav and the General Staff."

What do you want to do with your statement just before the noon recess in view of that?

Which one do you stand on, your answer to Judge Clark or your answer to Senator Lucas?

Captain Safford: I will stand on the answer to Senator Lucas.

Mr. Murphy: Will you outline to this committee all of the evidence you have in the way of absolute proof and overwhelming proof of the guilt of Opnav and the General Staff in addition to what you say is the failure to find a winds execute in the files?

Is that what you call absolute proof and overwhelming proof of the guilt of all of the members of the staff of the Army and the Navy?

Captain Safford: That plus the disappearance of official documents.

Mr. Murphy: Which documents, outline them, please. Captain Safford: Which I have referred to.

Mr. Murphy: In connection with this examination I would like to have you outline them, because I want to go to them.

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Mr. Murphy: What else?

Captain Safford: And at that time there were no reports

from any of the four East Coast intercept stations which

could be located. Two are still missing. Two have subse-

Captain Safford: There was the document JD-1 No. 7001.

message files from those four stations were missing then

quently made their appearance. And all the intercepted

and are still missing.

Mr. Murphy: What does "S" mean? What station? Captain Safford: S, Bainbridge Island, Washington.

Mr. Murphy: What?

Captain Safford: "S" stands for Bainbridge Island, Washington.

Mr. Murphy: Let me go on a little bit and then I will come back:

"Please answer the following questions by Item No.: --"
Senator Lucas: Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Senator Lucas: Did the witness name the 15 witnesses?

Mr. Murphy: I beg pardon. I want to go to that.

You say:

"-- plus a list of about 15 reliable witnesses."

Will you let the committee have what you are referring to there, that you told Kramer you had, so we might look them

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

over.

Captain Safford: These were all witnesses or people who had told me at this time, by that time, that they knew of the receipt of the winds execute message.

Mr. Murphy: Will you please give us the names?

Captain Safford: I cannot give them to you from memory but I did give them, I believe, in my testimony to Admiral Hart.

Mr. Murphy: You gave Admiral Hart a list of 15 reliable witnesses; is that right? And the same ones who were referred to when you wrote Kramer?

Captain Safford: I believe so.

Mr. Murphy: Do you know of one witness now who will corroborate you, one reliable witness?

Captain Safford: I do not know what any other witness will say.

Mr. Murphy: Well, do you have the name of any single witness now, who is a reliable witness, who can give anything in the way of absolute proof or overwhelming proof of the guilt of Opnav and the General Staff, one witness?

You said you had 15 of them. Give us one now.

Captain Safford: I can't give you any specific name

Mr. Murphy: Do you still say those 15 will corroborate

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Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Murphy you and give proof of the guilt of Opnav and the General Staff in the light of the evidence as of today, do you say they will corroborate you?

Captain Safford: Some of them won't very definitely.

Mr. Murphy: Well, will any of them, a single one of
them?

Captain Safford: I would rather not attempt to estimate what any other witness is going to say on the stand.

Mr. Murphy: You say this is extremely important and you want the truth. You said you hoped this would be the last investigation. We want the truth. Why won't you give us the name of one witness that you say will corroborate you, if you know of one? All we are looking for is the truth. Let the chips fall where they may.

Do you understand my question now? You have been shown the Hart testimony and reference is made to page -- Captain Safford: 362.

Mr. Murphy: And my question is now: Can you give to the committee the name of a single witness out of the 15 whom you said were reliable on January 22, 1944 to furnish absolute proof or overwhelming proof or any proof of the guilt of Opnav and the General Staff of the United States Army?

Have you some names?

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# Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Captain Safford: I have names from the people who were listed in the testimony before Admiral Hart who I believe will give me some support if not complete support.

Mr. Murphy: All right; those names.

Captain Safford: Kramer, A.D. Kramer, U.S. Navy.

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Captain Safford: Colonel Moses Pettigrew.

Mr. Murphy: Pettigrew.

Captain Safford: Colonel R. K. Sadtler.

Mr. Murphy: Sadtler.

Captain Safford: Colonel R. S. Bratton.

Mr. Murphy: Anybody else?

These are witnesses who have proof of the guilt of Opnav and the General Staff of the Army. Does that conclude the list?

Captain Safford: That concludes all the list I can give you.

Mr. Murphy: What happened to the other 11? Are they no longer reliable?

Captain Safford: They no longer make the same statements they did two years ago.

Mr. Murphy: Well, does Sadtler make the same statement that he -- did he ever make a statement about the guilt of say General Marshall? Did Sadtler ever say anything to you

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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that he felt General Marshall had violated the criminal

laws of the United States?

Captain Safford: Colonel Sadtler did not directly.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: What did he say thatwould make you think that he believed General Marshall, General Gerow, and the other generals would commit crime by ordering the destruction of -- withdraw that.

What did he say that would lead you to believe that those men were guilty of what you were referring to in this letter to Kramer? I am speaking of Sadtler.

Captain Safford: I cannot estimate anything that Colonel Sadtler will say specifically.

Mr. Murphy: Well, what do you have to offer to the committee by way of generalization as to what he might say that will prove the guilt of the General Staff of the Army? Have you any lead? Have you any suggestion? Have you any idea, that led you to believe that they will testify and support you and corroborate you as to the guilt of the General Staff of the Army?

Upon what do you base your statement heretoday that these men would corroborate you? This is going into the papers, the statement that you made that four men will corroborate you in these charges.

Captain Safford: Colonel Sadtler knew of the winds execute.

Mr. Murphy: What else? You say he would give us some evidence of guilt of the General Staff.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

That is part of the picture. You say he knew of the execute.

Captain Safford: That there had been an execute of the winds message in the middle of the week, that is, on the 4th or 5th of December, 1941, and prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy: What will he say about the guilt of General Marshall or anybody on the staff, if you know?

Captain Safford: I believe that Colonel Sadtler knows about the destruction of the official documents in the War Department.

Mr. Murphy: Did you ever discuss that subject with him? Captain Safford: I never discussed it.

Mr. Murphy: You are just imagining that, are you, that he knows that?

Have you any basis for it?

You say you believe he knows. What is the basis for your belief? He knows about the destruction of the records in the War Department.

Captain Safford: Only what Mr. Friedman told me.
Mr. Murphy: You are basing it all on Friedman?
Captain Safford: What Friedman told me.
Mr. Murphy: Have you seen the Clark report?
Captain Safford: No.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Have we Clark report?

I would like to call your attention to the testimony of Mr. Friedman, do whom you refer.

Haven't you learned that the Clark report went into that whole matter and came to the conclusion that there was absolutely no foundation for that charge?

Captain Safford: I never heard of the Clark report until this present investigation. I have never known there was such a thing.

Mr. Murphy: Well, there has been a lot of testimony about it -- a lot of questions asked about it.

Captain Safford: I heard something about it here in this room.

Mr. Murphy: Iask counsel to get that. I will come back to it, about Mr. Friedman, and show you exactly what he said.

What about Colonel Pettigrew, what evidence can he give, do you believe, as to the guilt of the General Staff?

Captain Safford: Colonel Pettigrew I believe made an affidavit to Colonel Clausen that he saw a written copy of the winds execute which had come over from the Navy. This was about the 4th or 5th of December 1941.

Mr. Murphy: What evidence can he give as to the guilt of the General Staff?

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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You see, there is quite a difference between the alleged or actual existence of a winds execute and the violation of the criminal laws of the country in destruction or pilfery, stealing from the files.

What evidence can he give on that subject? You say he is a reliable witness as to the guilt of the General Staff of the Army.

Mn Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I don't want to object, but aren't Colonel Sadtler and Colonel Pettigrew and these other people going to be witnesses, and won't their testimony be the best that this committee can get as to what they are going to testify to, instead of speculating as to what this witness may think they will say?

Mr. Murphy: This man has made statements in the record.

The Vice Chairman: The Chair is of the opinion that
the inquiry of Mr. Murphy is entirely proper.

Mr. Murphy: Will you tell us?

Captain Safford: What Colonel Pettigrew knows beyond the winds message, I do not know.

Mr. Murphy: What does Colonel Bratton know about the guilt of the General Staff?

Captain Safford: Colonel Bratton knows about the receipt of the winds execute and about his attempts to get a warning sent out to General Short.

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: You say he knew about the execute,

about the winds execute?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: On what day?

Captain Safford: About the 4th or 5th of December, 1941.

Mr. Murphy: How do you explain the fact that General Miles sent a message, which we have before us, out to Hawaii to the G-2, on the 5th of December, asking them to inquire of Rochefort of the Navy if he knows anything about the weather business?

And may we have that exactly so we can put it before the witness?

I am speaking about the message of December 5 from General Miles to G-2 in Hawaii, asking him to look into the questions of the winds execute with reference to weather.

The Vice Chairman: It is not in Exhibit 1.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Masten, do you have the dispatch from Miles to G-2 in Hawaii on the 5th of December, the Rochefort message?

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#### Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Richardson: He has it.

Mr. Murphy: I am referring new to -- mexhibit 32, is it?

Mr. Richardson: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Exhibit 32, page 20. (Reading)

"SENT NO. 51, 12/5

December 5, 1941.

"Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters G2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT HONOLULU TERRITORY HAWAII

CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THRU COMMANDANT FOURTEEN NAVAL DISTRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKYO REFERENCE WEATHER

### MILES. "

If there had been an execute on the 4th, as you say, and if Bratton knew about it, - and this was certainly long before any destruction of papers, this was before anybody could possibly have slipped up, how to you account for this ressage?

Captain Safford: Colonel Bratton indicated in his testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board investigation when questioned upon that point by General Grunert that that was the only way he could get word out to General Short that the winds exe cute had been sent.

Mr. Murphy: Do you know of any page where he said anything that would suggest that? You say he was sending

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

this out to inform Hawaii that there had been a winds exeoute?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Is there anything that would lead you as a communications expert to even slightly indicate that or suggest it? How in heaven's name could anybody get that out of that message, will you tell us?

Captain Safford: It is not in the message. He said he thought that Rochefort had it and that his man would get the news as soon as he contacted Rochefort.

Mr. Mumphy: Do you have any 1 lea where anything like that can be found, in what evidence, before what Board? Captain Safford: The Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Mr. Murphy: Do you have Bratton's testimony? I have part of it here. I have just a part of it here. Will you give me page --

Senator Ferguson: I have 1t.

Mr. Murphy: You hove 1t?

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Here it 18.

Mr. Murphy: Do you have any ilea where anything like that can be found in that record? I have read quite a few pages. out of it and I haven't found it. Have you found it, or do you know where it is?

Captain Safford: I believe it is the last time Colonel

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Bratton testified. He appeared two or three times.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Masten, will you look through it in the meantime and I will go on?

Senator Lucas: Before the Congressman goes on to the next question will you yield?

Mr. Murphy: Yes, surely.

Senator Lucas: As I recall, the Captain this worning told me that when he wrote the letter to Captain Kramer on December the 28th, 1943 that at that time you had not considered the winds message at all because it was not in contro versy.

Captain Safford: We expected that it would turn up. I merely asked him did he know what happened to it.

Senator Lucas: Yes. The point I am making is you did not at any time discuss the winds message with anyone because it was not in controversy at that time. That is what you told re this roming, - outside of the one at that tire when you saw it in the files and it was being prepared by someone for the Roberts Corrission; I think that is what you said.

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Senator Lucas: That is your testimony. Now, you say here that you did not have absolute proof of it until about January 18th and I think you told Congressman Murphy that was the winds execute message that you were talking about.

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### Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Captain Safford: No, that was referring to this warning message, to this other warning message which I had seen and which was not sent; which I had seen and thought was sent but that had not been sent.

Senator Lucas: Well, you were talking then, when you said you had no absolute proof of it about January 18th, you were talking there about the memorandum that McCollum prepared for Admiral Wilkinson?

Captain Safford: This was not a memorandum. This was a regular message on a regular message blank and only required the signature of someone in authority to be sent.

Senator Lucas: That is, the McCollum me ssage is what you were talking about?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Yes.

Senator Lucas: I misunderstood you, sir. I thought you were talking about the winds execute.

Mr. Murphy: Have you finished, Senator?

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murp hy

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, this is a little irregular but I wondered if anyone would have any objection? I refer to page 62 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Colonel Bratton testifying:

"There were several codes sent out by the Japanese foreign office at about this time, to their diplomatic officials abroad, which they hoped to use in the case or in the event of a sudden rupture of communications. There were several versions of this wind and weather code sent out. I discussed these codes with my opposite number in the O.N.I., Commander McCullom, on a number of occasions. Learning from him that they were monitoring the Japanese communication system in Honolulu as a function of naval communications, and learning also from him that their expert there was a Commander Rochefort, who was thoroughly familiar with the whole matter, I deemed it advisable, on or about the 5th of December, to have our G-2 in Honolulu contact Commander Rochefort, with the end in view that the latter could explain to G-2 what it was we were waiting for, and could explain to him orally, with complete security, the significance of the message. G-2 did send a message."

Now, then, I am going to page 284, Top Secret Army Pearl Harbor Board, Volume "D".

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

"I discovered from Commander McCullom that their S.I.S. man in Honolulu, a Commander Rochefort, knew everything that we did about this, had all the information that we had, and was listening for this Japanese winds-weather broadcast. He suggested that as a way out of our difficulty I instruct our G2 in Hawaii to go to Rochefort at once and have a talk with him, as in a short period of time Rochefort could tell Colonel Fielder, our G-2, exactly what was going on and what we knew."

Do you take it from that that Bratton felt there was a winds execute and that was his indirect way of telling Hawaii? Captain Safford: There is more than that in the record.

Mr. Murphy: Well, what do you refer to, I mean anything in particular?

Captain Safford: General Grunert, I believe, asked him why he sent the second Miles' message and there was about a half a page of testimeny from that point.

Mr. Murphy: Well, will counsel look for that? The Vice Chairman: He said about a half a page further on.

Mr. Murphy: Oh, half a page from this point. I thought 1t was somewhere else.

Captain Safford: About a half a page of testimony trying to get the second Mile message.

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### Witness Safford

Questions by:Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: Let me read on:

"I managed to get General Miles to O.K. this message to G-2 in Hawaii because he and I both thought that
we could get that message out without violating any of
the policies that were then in effect about getting conourrences from OPD.

"I also had a message sent to the Canal Zone on the night of the 5th, to the G-2 out there. I had forgotten about this message until I found it in the file this morning. The document that I lay before you now is in the files of G-2. It is a paraphrase of an outgoing message, No. 512, sent December 5, 1941, to G-2, Panama Canal Department. It reads as follows:

PANAMA CANAL DEPARTMENT, IS AS FOLLOWS:)

"In the event severance of diplomatic relations
is near, this office will notify you. Japanese-U.S.
relations are now very difficult.

## Signed, 'Miles'

Would that make you think thaton the 5th he knew there was a winds execute in view of that dispatch to Panama?

Captain Safford: That is not what I was referring to.

There is more beyond that.

Mr. Murphy: Well, let me ask you about that. Here is a

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

message on the 5th of December to Panama, which says:

"In the event severance of diplomatic relations is near, this office will notify you. Japanese-U.S. relations are now very difficult." Signed "Miles".

Would you think that General Miles or Colonel Bra tton had any information about there being an execute when they sent that out on the 5th?

Captain Safford: That message is not consistent with what he had told me.

Mr. Murphy: Well, would you think that a man who was in his sound senses, - and I assume you felt General Miles and Colonel Bratton were in their sound senses, do you?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Yes. Would you think that if there had been an execute they would send a message like that on the 5th to Panama?

Captain Safford: I do not know anything about it. Mr. Murphy: Reading from page 286:

"General Russell: Colonel, this action on the 5th, the message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, and the message to the Panama Canal Zone, resulted from the code des truction message of December 3, and the conversations about the 'wind' implementing mess age of December 5, is that true?

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## Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

"Colonel Bratton: To the best of my recollection and belief they were the redults of my receipt of this order to the Japanese ambass ador to destroy his code and his machine.

"Gener al Russell: In your message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department you make a reference to a 'weather' reference -- broadcast reference weather ?

"Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

"General Russell: So apparently, when you said that, you had in mind not only the destruction of the machines in Washington but also the possibility of the implementing 'weather' messages, is that true?

"Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. As you see, I had been told by Commander McCullum that Commander Rochefort had the same intercepts that we had, and this was just a device on my part to bring Fielder and Rochefort together.

"General Frank: After you had been prevented from sending a warning message, by Gerow?

"Colonel Bratton: I couldn't get it out any other way,

"General Russell: Colonel, I want to clarify another message of his."

Now, would that be the part you mean?

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Captain Safford: That, I believe, is the part I refer to.

Mr. Murphy: Well, don't you know that Colonel Bratton also stestified that he called Admiral Noyes on the phone and Admiral Noyes would not give him the kind of information he wanted, that Admiral Noyes hung up rather briefly and that it was only trying to find out what Hawaii might know when he could not get it from Noyes that prompted him to telegraph? Didn't you hear that kind of testimony? Captain Safford: I did not hear that testimonia.

Mr. Murphy: Well, I will go into that later. I think you will find it directly. Now, let me go on with your letter. (Reading)

"Please answerthe following questions by Iter No." I am reading from page 2.

"No. 20. Re your Item #2, 18 Col. B. #59?" Bratton.

"21: What or whose job in the Nawy 111 Col. B. 's job correspond to0

Do you know what Army officers were notified or shown the papers by Col. Bo, and when?

"In amplification of my Items #15 and #168

"I recall your telling me that you saw #3 about 0900 (EST) on #137. December 7, 1941.

"We looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God:

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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This means War. "

Captain Safford: That should be "He" not "We".

Mr. Murphy: What 1s 1t?

Captain Safford: That should be "H", not "We".

Mr. Murphy: It should be "He".

"He looked at the papers and exclaimed, 'My God:

This means War. ""

Now, you are talking to Kramer?

Captain Safford: No. 1t 1s Kramer.

Mr. Murphy: This is you talking about Kramer, repeating his words that he heard Stark say, is that i ght?

Captain Safford: Correct.

Mr. Murphy: Now, how to you reconcile the fact that if he saw that on December 7th and he said, "My God, this means war", how to you reconcile that with having seen the winds execute on the 4th of December when you said that "it was warn?

Captain Safford: I cannot explain that .

Mr. Murphy: They are a little inconsistent, aren't they, if he said, "My God, this means war" on the 7th?

Captain Safford: Yes, it seemed very strange.

Mr. Murphy: Yes, at least that. Now, then, I will go on further?

"He looked at the papers and exclaimed, 'My God, this

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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means war.

"You said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months."

This is Kramer talking. How would Kramer say that if he knew of a winds execute on the 4th? That is inconsistent, too, 1sn't it?

Captain Safford: I do not try to explain why Kramer said anything. This is what he had told me in a previous conversation and I was trying to check up to see was it true, would he stand behind it or not.

Mr. Murphy: Yes, you wanted to know if he would stand behind this that you had typed up here?

Captain Safford: Correct.

Mr. Murphy: This was going to be his testimony when you went in before some court martial, isn't that right?

Captain Safford: Correct.

Mr. Murphy: Now, let me read the next sentence:

"#3 continued: "I must get word to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) and picked up a message blank.

"Then another idea entered his mind and he said, Does #53 (General Marshall) know of this?

"You replied, 'Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (#77) (Serial 902 (14) (The Finale) was sent over ten minutes ago and

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Witness Saffort

Questions by; Mr. Murphy

should be on the General's lesk by now.

"#3 (Admiral Stark) dropped the message blank and reached for the telephone."

And then you say, "End of your tale". What did you mean by that?

Captain Safford: I meant that was the end of what he had told me on this previous occasion.

Mr. Murphy: In other words, you were preparing a brief then and that would be the tale he would tell, is that right, - Kramer?

Captain Safford: No, that was the end of what he told me.

Mr. Murphy: You say the "end of your tale". You were
referring to the part you recalled him telling you, is that
right?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Murphy: All right. (Reading)

"23. Can you verify or correct the foregoing?

"24. Did #3 (Admiral Stark) get #53 (General

Marshall) on the telephone and what did he say?"

By the way, you were away from the winds execute then.

You were counsel for the defense at this time, weren't you, the advocate preparing a defense for Kimmel, isn't that right?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And going beyond the scope of anything dreamt

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of in Navy regulations whatsoever for your office down there, isn't that right?

Captain Safford: For my office?

Mr. Murphy: Yes, - beyond.

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

"25. Were there any other witnesses? If so, who?

"26. Did you tell #9 (McCollum) or #5 (Admiral Wilkinson), or anyone else? (Be sure to tell Admiral Halsey -- when the time comes.)

Now, then, I wish you would notice closely Number 27 be-

"27. Re your Item #15 and #16. What do you mean by general security" (1.e. lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Milway?"

Is that what you were referring about, to the leak you told us about two days ago?

Captain Safford: No, that was another one. That was within the State Department.

Mr. Murphy: What 111 you mean by that?

Captain Safford: That was a lost magic translation that was lost in the State Department. The Army had sent it to them and it never came back.

Mr. Murphy: What is it? Will you read to the witness

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exactly what he said and see if he means it?

(Answer read.)

Mr. Murphy: Is that what you mean? Are you referring now to the Chicago Tribune incident or referring to another leak?

Captain Safford: I thought I was answering your question.
May I have the question over again to be certain?

Mr. Murphy: Well, let us not get it mixed. There were two leaks then, as I understand it. There was one of something that was lost in the State Department?

Captain Saffori: In 1941.

Mr. Murphy: In 1941. And then you speak of another. What do you mean by "General security (1.e. lack) late in spring?

Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway?"

Well, that Chicago Tribune incident was some time after Pearl Harbor, wasn't it?

Captain Safford: That was 1942.

Mr. Murphy: Yes. Was the Chicago Tribune business late in the spring or was that the State Department one that you are referring to here?

Captain Safford: The State Department I think occurred in March and the Chicago Tribune in June.

Mr. Murphy: That was a case of a story in the Chicago Tribune as to the number and the names of the Japanese vessels

AND & PAUL WASHINGTON. I

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### Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

that were at Milway at the time we took them by surprise, wasn't it?

Captain Saffords Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Murphy: And there was quite some disturbance about publishing in Chicago or in any paper in America the names of the Japanese ships be cause that might have shown to the Japanese that we had broken their code, isn't that right?

Captain Safford: There was a possibility of that.

Mr. Murphy: Well, there was a very definite possibility, wasn't there? If they had in a Chicago paper the names of all of the Japanese ships taking part in the Battle of Midway woulin't it be a pretty good indication to the Japanese that somebody had broken their code or that we had advance knowleige, since that story care out immediately after the Battle of Midway?

Captain Safford: Mr. Murphy, I do not want to dodge that question but my orders, which are in accordance with the Presidential directive, forbid any reference to things of that kind.

Mr. Murphy: All right, we will pass that one and we will come to the leak you are talking about. You say to him, "What to you mean by 'general security' (1.e.lack) late in spring?" What did he mean?

Captain Safford: I did not know which he was referring

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to. I was trying to find out.

Mr. Murphy: What Presidential directive are you referring to that stops you from giving answers to questions in this inquiry? Is there any Presidential directive that stops you from manswering this inquiry? What do you understand it to be?

Captain Safford: I understood that I was not permitted to discuss any magic messages or anything of that nature after December 7, 1941.

The Chairman: May I inject there. You haven't any information or knowledge concerning any Presidential directive looking toward the testimony before this committee that limits you in any way, have you?

Captain Safford: Sir?

The Chairman: I say, the President has issued no exeoutive order limiting you in your testimony before this committee?

Captain Safford: That may have been an interpretation which I received in writing from Commander Baecher, who is here -- or through Commander Baecher. It was not his signature.

The Chairman: Well, if any Commander or any other officer has advised you to that effect I think that they are The President has issued no order of any sort afin error.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

feoting the nature of any of the testimony here or restricting any witness in answering questions that may be asked of hir by this cormittee.

Mr. Murphy: In addition to that --

The Chairman: If you have been informed to that effect, whyp whoever gave you that opinion is in error.

Mr. Murphy: Well, the fact is we have been talking about magic after December 7th, haven't we? Haven't we had some messages after December 7th?

Captain Safford: I believe that they were all transmitted prior to December 7th.

Mr. Murphy: You think then that the reason you cannot discuss that is because of your interpretation of something that you got about magic after December 7th, is that right?

Captain Safford: It is not my interpretation and I will abile by the instructions of the chairman of this investigating corrittee.

Mr. Murphy: May I ask this question; You say:

"What lo you mean by general security" (i, e. lack) late in spring? Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Milway?"

Now, what were you speaking about and what answer did Kramer make to the question? What leak was it?

Captain Safford: Kramer never answered the question.

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Witness Saffort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: Well, what did you think it was?

Captain Safford: I was referring not only to the Chicago Tribune story but to the subsequent Grand Jury investigation which had great publicaty.

Mr. Murphy: Had you had much publicity before this report of it?

Captain Safford: None whatsoever before this report.

Mr. Murphy: No. And you say the Chicago Tribune item did have great publicity?

Captain Safford: It 414.

Mr. Murphy: Well, now, why did you mention it here? "hat were you talking about? What were you referming to it for? You asked him: "Was it the Chicago Tribune leak after Midway?" What were you talking about in connection with the Pearl Harbor investigation?

Captain Safford: He made a statement relative to the general security and I did not know at the time what he was talking about.

Mr. Murphy: Well, you say there:

"Incidentally, tell the full story of this to #42 (Admiral Halsey) and explain that #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) tried to stop the prosecution and attending publicity but #24 (Big JRR) insisted (to give publicity to himself" --

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Who was giving publicity to himself? Who did you mean there, somebody looking for headlines and, if so, who was Whom 111 you mean? it?

Captain Safford: J. R. R. stood for Joseph R. Redmond.

Mr. Murphy: Who?

Captain Safford: Joseph R. Redmond, Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. Murphy: Was he your superior?

Captain Safford: He was my superior.

Mr. Murphy: Well, now, let me read the whole sentence:

"Incidentally, tell the full story of this to Admiral Halsey."

What did you mean by that, "Tell the full story to Admiral Halsey? About the leak or what?

Captain Safford: About the attempts to keep that out of the newspapers and not let the Japanese know that we had solved their ode.

Mr. Murphy: In other words, you were planning your attack in onse there was a hearing and you were wondering about the publicity they got in Chicago and were wondering what publicity you would get, or what?

Captain Safford: I was not thinking about publicity. Mr. Murphy: Well, what were you thinking about? That is what Isr puzzled on. I arnot clear on it yet. You

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

wanted Admiral Halsey to know about all the publicity they got in Chicago about that inclient, is that right?

Captain Safford: It may not be clear.

Mr. Murphy: Well, now, you explain it. I do not want to confuse you. What ili you mean by that sentence, - it is your sentence, - in that paragraph?

Captain Safford: The Japanese had taken the precaution of changing their code about a week before Midway and putting a new one in. The Chicago Tribune's story was promptly noticed by the Navy Department censors and killed.

Mr. Murphy: What was that?

Captain Safford: And killed. It was not repeated, that Stanley Johnston story.

Mr. Murphy: What story again?

Captain Safford: The story made out by Stanley Johnston.

Mr. Murphy: Stanley Johnston?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Oh, he was the managing editor or assistant editor of the Chicago Tribune, was he, or a reporter?

Captain Safford: He was a reporter.

Mr. Murphy: A reporter, I should say.

Captain Safford: When the question of a prosecution care up both Adriral Wilkinson and Captain McCollur did their best to stop it because they knew that would have great pub-

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for stopping it and wasn't it because they did not want to let the Japs know that we had cracked their code? Wasn't that their reason?

Captain Safford: The publicity did tell the Japs that we had cracked their codes and a few days after the Grand Jury they did change their code again. It set us back.

Mr. Murphy: Well, 414n't they have a very proper nurpose

Mr. Murphy: Well, the fact is that Admiral Wilkinson, you say, tried to stop the prosecution and publicity and wasn't his reason and don't you know that his reason for not wanting to go through with the trial was that we would have to spread on the court records at Chicago the fact that we had broken the code and the mechanics of it in order to have any jury convict? Isn't that so, or do you know that?

Captain Safford: I do not know. I was not in on all the details.

Mr. Murphy: You had been writing a --

Captain Safford: I do know he had been trying to stop it.

Mr. Murphy: You had been writing a history, you said, of that period and as one who was writing a history you would know some details on it, wouldn't you? Do you know why it was stopped?

Captain Safford: It was not stopped. They went on with it.

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Mr. Murphy: Well, they went on with it but they iii

Captain Safford: But the Japs changed their codes just the same.

Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, to go on with your letter. You say:

"Admiral Wilkinson tried to stop the prosecution and attending publicity but #24 (Big JRR) insisted (to give publicity to himself and to #25 (Little JRR) and was backed up by #29 (Admiral Horne) and #28 (Admiral King)."

In other words, do you think those four were all trying to get publicity out of it?

Captain Safford: Not Admiral Horne and Admiral King.
Mr. Murphy: Well, who is "Little JRR"?

Captain Safford: That was Admiral Redword's younger brother.

Mr. Murphy: Who?

Captain Safford: Admiral Redmond's younger brother.

Mr. Murphy: And you felt then that your superior, Admiral Redword, and his younger brother were trying to have this trial in Chicago so that they would get publicity, is that right?

Captain Safford: I 414.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

"28. Do you know if any of the following were called as witnesses by #36 (Roberts Corrission)?

- "(a) #5 (Aimiral Wilkinson)
- "(b) #9 (MoCollum)
- "(o) #10 (Kramer)
- "(1) [6 (Admiral Turner)

"29. Were the JD files in GZ custody or any mesmages from these files ever submitted to #36 (Roberts Commission)?"

What answer did he make to that?

Captain Safford: Kramer never replied to that letter at all.

Mr. Murphy: Well, 414 you ever talk to him about that?

Captain Safford: I have never talked to him.

Senator Lucase: Will the Congressman yiel?

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Senator Lucas: Do I understand you to say, sir, that Captain Kramer never replied to this letter?

Captain Safford: I have never received a reply of any sort from Captain Kramer.

Senator Lucas: Thank you. That is all.

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"30. Were #5, (Admiral Wilkinson), #9 (McCollum), #10 (Kramer), or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of #136 (December 6, 1941) and #137 (December 7, 1941) or the investigations conducted by #36 (Roberts Commission)? In this connection, I am sending you #35 (Roberts Report) by ordinary ship's mail. I will comment on it in further correspondence." What did you mean by that? Were they instructed not

Captain Safford: I was just asking for information.

Mr. Murphy: Did you suppose they had been stopped discussing the events of December 6 and 7?

Captain Safford: I was wondering if they had the facts.

Mr. Murphy: What is that?

to mention the events of December 6 and 7?

Captain Safford: I was wondering if they had the facts and was asking for information.

Mr. Murphy: Well, sir, McCollum was under Admiral Noyes, was he not?

Captain Safford: McCollum was under Admiral Wilkinson and so was Kramer.

Mr. Murphy: And you told us here that you remembered distinctly that meeting of January 14 and 15 at which Wilkinson and McCollum were present. Did not you tell us about a meeting on January 15? I beg your pardon. I withdraw that.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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There was Redmond, Noyes, you and some others.

Captain Safford: This was in Naval Communications.

Mr. Murphy: Yes. Wilkinson and McCollum were not there, is that correct?

Captain Safford: Wilkinson and McCollum were not there.

Mr. Murphy: You did say the order came down from Admiral Stark, did you not?

Captain Safford: As I understood, or from Admiral Ingersoll, I do not know which.

Mr. Murphy: When you made that statement did you mean to imply or to infer that there was anything improper about what you were told to do at that meeting?

Captain Safford: Which do you mean, sir?

Mr. Murphy: I am speaking of the meeting where you said you were told to destroy certain notes and you were told to stop the whispering campaign against Kimmel, and you were told to stop rumors. You have been asked questions about that.

At one time you said you did not see anything wrong with it or you would not have done it, and at another time you said you did not see anything wrong with it at the time.

The papers in the country carrying that story had drawn something sinister from it. Did you mean to imply that these were the men that had to destroy official papers? Did you mean anything like that?

Captain Serrore: Not official papers.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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What I was trying to find out --

I did not mean anything wrong, I thought it meant it would all be done openly.

I was trying to check it.

The Chairman: The time for recess has arrived.

The Chair would like the committee to remain for a few minutes in executive session.

We will recess until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:00 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed to 10:00 o'clock of the following day, Tuesday, February 5, 1945.)

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl fls 2 What I was trying to find out --

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