

Doc. 2188 Evid.

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. ~~2188~~, 2189, 2190
2191, 2192, 2193

22 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Official Transcripts of IMT,
at Nurnberg

Date: 1946 Original () Copy (x) Language:
English

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
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Nurnberg

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PERSONS IMPLICATED:

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SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Doc. No. 2188 - 10 Dec - M-WMM-1

IMT - Transcript of 10 December 1945, 1000-1245.
Presentation of evidence by Mr. S. Alderman, attempting
to prove Germany planned to attack Russia.

Doc. No. 2189 - 20 Mar - A-GH-13-1

IMT - Transcript of 28 March 1946, 1425-1700.
Direct examination of Paul Schmidt, German Foreign Office
interpreter by Dr. Horn, concerning the von RIBBENTROP-
Neville Henderson meeting on 30 Aug 1939.

Doc. No. 2190

IMT - Transcript of 29 March 1946, 1400-1700

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Doc. No. 2191

IMT - Transcript of 29 March 1946, 1000-1300

Doc. No. 2192

IMT - Transcript of 3 April 1946, 1125-1300

Doc. No. 2193

IMT - Transcript of 3 April 1946, 1400-1700

Analyst: 2d Lt Goldstein

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#2188

Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of: The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 10 December 1945, 1000-1245, Lord-Justice Lawrence, presiding.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received a letter from Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht. In answer to that, the Tribunal wishes the Defendants' Counsel to know that they will be permitted to make one speech only in accordance with Article 24 (h) of the Charter, and this speech will be at the conclusion of all the evidence.

At the conclusion of the case for the Prosecution, the Defendants' Counsel will be invited to submit to the Tribunal the evidence they propose to call, but they will be strictly confined to the names of the witnesses, and the matters to which their evidence will be relevant, and this submission must not be in the nature of a speech. Is that clear? In case there should be any misunderstanding, what I have just said will be posted up on the board in the Defendants' Counsel room so that you can study it there.

MR. SIDNEY ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose Friday, I had just reached the point in my discussion of the aggression against the USSR where, with the campaign in the west at an end, the Nazi conspirators had begun the development of their plans to attack the Soviet Union. Preliminary high level planning and action was in progress. Hitler had indicated earlier in November that more detailed and definite instructions would be issued. These would be issued to him as soon as the general outline of the Army's operational plans had been submitted to him and approved by him. We had thus reached the point in the story indicated on the outline submitted last Friday as Part 3 of the Plan Barbarossa.

By the 18th of December, 1940, the general outline of the Army's operational plan, having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the high command of the Army, Navy, and the Airforce, for Barbarossa, directive No. 21, was issued. This directive marks the first time the plan to invade the Soviet Union was specifically referred to in an order, although the order was classified Top Secret. It also marked the first use of the code word "Barbarossa" to denote this operation.

The Directive is No. 446-PS, and was offered in evidence in the course of my opening statement, as USA Exhibit No. 31. Since it was fully discussed at that time, it is, I believe, sufficient now merely to recall to the Tribunal two or three of the most significant sentences in that document. Most of these sentences appear on Page 1 of the English translation. One of the most significant, I believe, is this sentence with which the order begins, "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England."

On the same page it is stated, "Preparations requiring more time to start are - if this has not yet been done - to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.

"Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of the attack will not be recognized."

The directive then outlines the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed, and the parts that the various services (Army, Navy and Air Force) were to play therein, and called for oral reports to Hitler by the Commanders-in-Chief, closing as follows: "V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-Chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.

"The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time."

"Signed by Hitler, and initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible."

It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself, as well as from its history, which I have outlined, that this directive was no mere planning exercise by the Staff. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression, which was intended to occur, and which actually did occur.

The various services, which received the order, certainly understood it as a order to prepare for action, and did not view it as any hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning, and operation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in this basic directive.

So we come to the military planning and preparation for the implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 13 January, 1941, indicated the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21, which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary is Document C-35 in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 132.

This document contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy's part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play that part. I feel, however, that it will be sufficient for the establishment of our point, that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date, to read only a small portion of the entry into the record, beginning on Page 1 of the English translation, which is Page 401 of the Diary itself. The entry reads:

"30 January 1941, Page 401 of the Diary.

"7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the "Barbarossa" case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces."

I should note that "Ia" is in this case the abbreviation for a deputy chief of naval operations. Then follows a list of the Navy's objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many tasks for the Navy are listed, but I think one is

sufficiently typical to give the Tribunal an idea of all. I quote from the top of page 2 of the English translation:

"II. Objectives of War Against Russia.

* * * *

"d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:

"1) Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea."

The purpose of the offer of this document is merely that it indicates the detailed thinking and planning, which was being carried out to implement Barbarossa, almost six months before the operation actually got under way. It is but another peice in the mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union was one of the most cold-bloodedly premeditated attacks on a neighbouring power in the history of the world. Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign. Extracts of such references are contained in Document C-33, whihc I am now offering in evidence as Exhibit USA 133.

I think it will be sufficient to quote for the record as typical the entry for 19 February 1941, which appears at Page 3 of the English translation, and at Page 248 of the Diary itself,

"In regard to the impending operation 'Barbarossa' for which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations."

On the third of February 1941, the Fuehrer held a conference to assess the progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa. The conference also discussed the plans for Sonnenblume, which was the code name for the North African operation - Sunflower. Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Defendant Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Defendant Johl; the Commander in Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder, as well as several others, including Colonel Schmudt, Hitler's

Adjutant:

A report of this conference is contained in our Document No. 872-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 134.

During the course of this conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with their own strength, and the general overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer.

At Page 4 of the English translation of the conference plan, which is at Page 5 of the German original, there is an interesting extract, which although written in semi-shorthand, is at least sufficiently clear to inform us that elaborate time-tables had already been set up for the deployment of troops as well as for industrial operations. I quote:

"The intended time period was discussed with a plan: 1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) transfer now, Front Germany - East; 2nd Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila"-- I might state here parenthetically that this was the code word for the operation for the occupation of unoccupied France, "can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained." "Felix" was the name for the proposed operation against Gibraltar.

"In industry the full capacity timetable is in force. No more camouflage.

"From 25.IV - 15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seelowe, or Sea Lion,--was a code word for the planned operation against England and Marita, which we shall see a little later in the quotation, was the code word for the action against Greece.) Seelowe can no longer be carried out. The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognisable.

"The full capacity time-table remains. 8 Marita divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.

"C-in-C Army requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.

"Fuehrer: 'When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and made no comment.'"

This much, I believe, when read with the conference conclusions, which I shall read in a moment, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far along with their preparations even as early as February of 1941 - almost five months prior to 22 June, the date the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected Barbarossa, as follows. I am now reading from Page 6 of the English translation, which is on Page 8 of the German:

"Conclusions:

"1). Barbarossa.

- "a). The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.
- "b). The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.
- "c). Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldau.
- "d). It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila.
- "e). The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seelowe and the subsidiary measure Marita."

On 13th March 1941, the Defendant Keitel signed an operational supplement to Fuehrer Order #21, which was issued in the form of "Directives for Special Areas". This detailed operational order is No. 447-PS in our numbered series, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA No. 135.

This order which was issued more than three months in advance of the attack, indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed "Area of Operations and Executive Power," and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. It states that while the campaign is in progress in territory through which the army is advancing, the Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power. During this period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is entrusted with "special tasks". This assignment is discussed in paragraph 2b, which appears on page 1 of the English transla-

tion, and reads as follows:

"b) In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks, military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS".

The order then states that in time political administration will be set up under Commissioners of the Reich, and discusses the relationship of these officials to the army. This is contained in paragraph 2c and paragraph 3, parts of which I should like to read:

"c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

"3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

"The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:

- "a) Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political tasks.
- "b) Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry."

The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of economy in the conquered territory, a subject I will develop more fully later in my presentation. This provision is also in Section I, paragraph 4, which I shall read:

"4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal, who has delegated the Chief of the 'Wi Rue Amt' with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt."

The second section deals with matters of personnel -

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you tell us at sometime who these people are? Who is the Reich Marshal?

MR. ALDERMAN: The Reich Marshal is the Defendant Goering.

THE PRESIDENT: And who was the Reichsfuehrer SS at that time?

MR. ALDERMAN: Himmler.

THE PRESIDENT: Himmler?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply and communication traffic, and I shall not read it here.

Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain other countries, and states in part as follows -- I am reading from page 3 of

the English translation:

"III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.

"9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW."

The document closes with a section regarding Sweden, which is also on page 3 of the English translation.

"IV. Directives regarding Sweden.

"12) Since Sweden can only become a transient area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.

"The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.

signed: KEITEL"

As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive No. 21 which I discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans, and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a document, which bears our Number C-170. This document has been identified by the Defendant Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files, and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry.

I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 136.

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Although I shall refer to this document again, I should like at present to read only an item which appears in the 2nd paragraph of item 142, on page 19 of the English translation, and which is in the text and in a footnote on page 26 in the German original. This item is dated 3 April 1941, and reads as follows:

"Balkan Operations delayed 'Barbarossa' at first for about five weeks. All measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order."

By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out to permit the Fuehrer to definitely set "D" Day as the 22nd of June - more than seven weeks away. Document No. 873-PS, in our series, is a "Top Secret" report of a conference with the Chief of the Section Landsverteidigung of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab on 30 April, 1941.

I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA No. 137.

I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of this report:

"1) Timetable Barbarossa:

The Fuehrer has decided:

Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May, maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations, the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.

"2) Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa:

Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength.

Sector Middle: Great German superiority

Sector South Russian superiority"

Early in June, practically three weeks before D-Day, preparations for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate timetable, showing in great detail the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

This timetable is Document No. C-39 in our series, and I offer it now as Exhibit USA 138.

This document was prepared in 21 copies, and the one offered here was the third copy which was given to the High Command of the Navy. Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as follows:

"Top Military Secret

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/abt.L (I op)

Fuehrer's Headquarters.
(no date)

Top Secret (Chef Sache) 21 copies
Only through officer 1 op.00845/41
Received 6 June
Enclosures: --

The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a foundation for further preparations for 'Barbarossa'. If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.

Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: Keitel"

I shall not bother to read you the distribution list which indicates where the 21 copies went.

The next two pages of the document are in the form of text, outlining the state of preparations as of the 1st of June, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal does not think it necessary that you should read all these preliminary matters ahead of these documents, "Top Secret," "Only through officer," and then the various reference numbers and file information, when you give identification of a document.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

The next two pages of the document are in the form of text, outlining the state of preparations as of the 1st of June, 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: General, Negotiations with Friendly States, Army, Navy, Air Force and Camouflage.

I think it unnecessary to read into the record any of this textual material. The remainder of the paper is in tabular form with six columns headed from left to right at the top of each page - Date, Serial Number, Army, Navy, OKW, Remarks. Most interesting among the items appearing on this Chart --

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you read the first paragraph, for that seems to be important. There are two lines there.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The heading "General" on page 2.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

"1. General.

"The time table for the maximum massing of troops in the East was put into operation on the 22nd of May."

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ALDERMAN: (Continuing) Most interesting among the items appearing on this Chart, in my opinion, are those appearing on pages 9 and 10. These are at Page 8 of the German version. At the bottom of Page 9, it is provided in the columns for Army, Navy and Air Force that, and I quote:

"Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled."

Under the column headed OKW appears the note that, and again I quote:

"Cancelled by code word 'Altona' or further confirmation of start of attack by code word: 'Dortmund.'"

In the Remarks column appears the statement that:

"Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort, concentration of armor and artillery must be reckoned with."

The second entry on page 10 of the chart for the 22nd of June, under serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Navy and OKW, and provides as follows, under the heading:

"Invasion Day

"H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330 hours."

In the Remarks column, it states that:

"Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to weather on the part of the Air Force."

The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted, and give, as I have said, great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.

On 9 June, 1941, the order of the Fuehrer went out for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June, 1941, which was just 8 days before "D-Day". This order is signed by Hitler's Adjutant, Schmundt, and is C-78 in our numbered series of documents.

I offer it in evidence now as Exhibit USA 139.

I read from page one the matter under the heading "Conference 'Barbarossa.'"

- "1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have ordered reports on 'Barbarossa' by the Commanders of Army Groups, Armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.
- "2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June, 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.

"3. Time Table.

- a) 11.00 hrs "Silver Fox"
- b) 12.00 hrs - 14 hrs Army Group South
- c) 14.00 hrs. - 15.30 hrs. Lunch party for
all participants in
conference
- d) From 15.30 hrs. Baltic, Army Group
North, Army Group
"Center" in this order."

It is signed by Schmudt.

There is attached a list of participants, and the order in which they will report, which I shall not read. The list includes, however, a large number of the members of the Defendant High Command and General Staff Group, as of that date. Among those to participate were, of course, the Defendants, Goering, Keitel, Jodl and Raeder.

I believe that the documents which I have introduced and quoted from are more than sufficient to establish conclusively the premeditation and cold-blooded calculation which marked the military preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Starting almost a full year before the commission of the crime, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union with all of that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the German character. Although several of these defendants played specific parts in this military phase of the planning and preparation for the attack, it is natural enough that the leading roles were performed, as we have seen, by the military figures - the Defendants Goering, Keitel, Jodl and Raeder.

Next, preparation for plunder - plans for the economic exploitation and spoliation of the Soviet Union.

Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning and preparation was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to insure that their aggression would prove economically profitable.

A little later in my presentation, I will discuss with the Tribunal the motives which led these conspirators to attack, with provocation, a neighboring power. I shall, at that time, show that the crime was motivated by both political and economic considerations. The economic basis, however, may be simply summarized at this point as the greed of the Nazi conspirators for the raw material, food and other supplies which their neighbor possessed, and which they conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of their war machine. To these defendants, a need was translated as a right, and they early began planning and preparing with typical care and detail to insure that every bit of the plunder, which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression, would be exploited to their utmost benefit.

I have already put into the record evidence showing that as early as August of 1940, General Thomas, the Chief of the B Group Army, received a hint from the Defendant Goering about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R. which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. I also said at that time that I would later introduce evidence that in November 1940 - 8 months before the attack - Thomas was categorically informed by Goering of the planned operation in the East, and preliminary preparations were commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to be occupied in the course of such operation. Goering, of course, played the overall leading role in this activity, by virtue of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan.

Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning at page 369 of his draft, which is our Document 2353-PS, introduced earlier as USA Exhibit No. 35; the part I will read is at pages 10 and 11 of the English translation.

"In November 1940, the Chief of Wi. Rue, together with Secretaries of State Korner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.

"By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi. Rue at the end of 1940.

"The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first of all the following tasks:

"1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian armament industry, its location, its capacity and its associate industries.

"2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers and their dependency one on the other.

"3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the Soviet Union.

"4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum (crude oil).

"5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in the Soviet Union.

"These points were concentrated in one big compilation 'War Economy of the Soviet Union' and illustrated with detailed maps, etc."

I am still quoting: "Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important factories in Soviet Russia and a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of the German war economy organization.

"For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was created, first in charge of Lt. Col. Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier General Schuberth. The work was carried out according to the directives from

10 Dec-M-JH-1.

the chief of the office, respectively" -- I suppose -- "the group of departments for foreign territories (Ausland) with the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any other persons possessing information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the territories." That ends the quotation.

By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a point where a broader plan of organization was needed, and so General Thomas held a conference with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for such a plan. A memorandum of this conference, classified "Top Secret" and dated 1 March 1941 was captured, and is our Document 1317-PS. I now offer it in evidence as US Exhibit 140. The text of this memorandum reads as follows:

"The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be drafted for the Reich Marshal.

"Essential Points:

"1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the four-year plan.

"2. The organization must include everything concerning war economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already a special mission of State Secretary Backe.

"3. Clear statement that the organization is to be independent of the military or civil administration. Close coordination, but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.

"4. Scope of activities to be divided in two steps:

a) Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to secure the removal of important goods.

b) Administration of the occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically complementary districts."

And then, on the bottom of page 1:

"5. In view of the extended field of activity, the term 'war economy inspection' is to be used preferably, instead of armament inspection.

"6. In view of the great field of activity, the organization must be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly numerous. The main mission of the organization will consist of seizing raw materials and taking over all important concerns. For the latter mission reliable persons from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can only be performed by the aid of their experience. (For example, lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum).

"After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization within a week.

"Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building is essential. An officer must still be appointed for the Wi. and Ra, with whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.

"Major General Senubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the second half of next week. Also, the 4 officers who are ordered to draw up the individual armaments inspection are to report to the office chief at the end of the week.

"Signed,

"Hamann."

Hamann, who signed the report, is listed among those attending as a Captain and apparently the junior officer present, so presumably it fell naturally enough to Hamann to prepare the notes on the conference.

The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was organizing at the direction of Goering was clearly recognized by Keitel in his operational order of 13 March 1941. This order is No. 447-PS, and I have already offered it in evidence earlier as

10 Dec-M-JH-3.

Exhibit USA 135. At that time I quoted the paragraph in the order in which it was stated that the Fuehrer had entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operation and political administration to the Reich Marshal who, in turn, had delegated his authority to the Chief of the Wi. Rue. Amt.

The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on 28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a conference was held with various branches of the armed forces to explain the organizational setup of the economic staff Oldenburg. Oldenburg was the code name given to this economic counterpart of plan Barbarossa. A report of this conference is captured Document No. 1157-PS, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 141.

Section 1 of this memorandum deals with the general organization of Economic Staff Oldenburg as it had developed by this time, and I should like to read most of that section into the record. The report begins:

"Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours on 29th April 1941.

I.

Welcome

"Purpose of meeting: Introduction to the organizational structure of the economic sector of this action.

Barbarossa - Oldenburg.

"As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand of all economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the overall direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas under political administration.

"The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic general staff working under the director of the industrial armament office (Chief Wi Rue Amt.)

"Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is the" --

and then a heading --

"Economic Staff Oldenburg for special duties
under the command of Major General Schubert.

"His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided, are:

5 economic inspectorates

23 economic commands and

12 sub-offices, which are distributed among important
places within the area of the economic command.

"These offices are used in the military rear area. The idea
is that in the territory of each army group an economic inspectorate
is to be established at the seat of the commander of the military
rear area, and that this inspectorate will supervise the economic
exploitation of the territory.

"A distinction must be made between the military rear area
on the one hand, and the battle area proper and the rear area of the
army on the other hand. In the last economic matters are dealt
with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the army headquarters command, that is,
the Liaison officer of the industrial armament office within the
supreme command of the armed forces at the army headquarters command.
For the battle area, he has attached to him technical battalions,
reconnaissance and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil,
agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and means of production.

"In the territory between the battle and the military rear area, the rear area of the army, group IV Econs at the various field commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of the industrial armaments office in order to support the army headquarters commands specialists responsible for supplying the troops from the country's resources and preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation.

"While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the locality.

"The new feature inherent in the organization under the command of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal with military industry, but comprises the entire economic field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, etc.

"This also corresponds with the internal organization of the individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down to the economic commands, requires a standard sub-division into three large groups, i.e.

"Group M, dealing with troop requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization;

"Group L, which concerns itself with all questions of feeding and agriculture, and

"Group W, which is in charge of the entire field of trade and industry, including raw materials and supplies; further, questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, commerce and exchange of commodities, and manpower allocation.

"Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General von Hanneken."

The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions,

personnel and planning problems, and similar details, which I think it unnecessary to put into the record.

These documents portray vividly the coldly calculated method with which these Nazis prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage a wanton attack on a neighbor they had pledged to security, but that they also intended to strip that neighbor of its food, its factories, and all its means of livelihood.

As I shall point out more fully later, when I discuss the question of motivation, these men made their plans for plunder being fully aware that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and starvation for millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union.

THE PRESIDENT: This would be a good time to adjourn.

(A recess was taken from 1120 to 1130 hours.)

DR. DIX: I beg your pardon. We ask the Court to be excused. Through some error, we couldn't come in here.

MR. ALDERMAN: May the Tribunal please, I have been informed by the interpreters that I have been speaking at a great speed this morning, so I shall try to temper the speed.

Next, the politics of destruction, preparation for the political phase of the aggression. As I have already indicated and as I shall develop more fully later in this discussion, there were both economic and political reasons motivating the action of the conspirators in invading the Soviet Union. I have already discussed the extent of the planning and preparations for the economic side of the aggression. Equally elaborate planning and preparation was engaged in by the conspirators to ensure the effectuation of the political aims of their aggression. It is, I believe, sufficient at this point to describe that political aim as the elimination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a powerful political factor in Europe and the acquisition of lebensraum.

For accomplishing this purpose, the Nazi conspirators selected as their agent the defendant Rosenberg. As early as the second of April 1941 Rosenberg or a member of his staff prepared a memorandum on the USSR. This memorandum considers what the political goal of such occupation should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal.

The memorandum is No. 1017 PS in our series, and I offer it in evidence now as Exhibit No. 142 USA.

Beginning with the second paragraph, it reads, under the subject, "The USSR":

"A military conflict with the USSR, will result in an extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large section of the USSR. It is very probable that military action on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse of the USSR. The occupation of these areas would then present not so many military as administrative and economic difficulties. Thus arises the first question:

"Is the occupation to be determined by purely military and/or economic needs, or is the laying of political foundations for a future organization of the area also a factor in determining how far the occupation shall be extended? If so, it is a matter of urgency to fix the political goal which is to be attained, for it will, without doubt, also have an effect on military operations.

"If the political overthrow of the Eastern Empire, in the weak condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of military operations, one may conclude that:

"1) The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions;
"2) From the very beginning, the treatment of individual sections of territory should, as regards administration, as well as economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are striving to attain.

"3) Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast

areas, such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for the continuation of the war against England, the maintenance of production which this necessitates and the great directives for the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with all together in one place.

"It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the arguments which follow of course only hold good once the supplies from the area to be occupied, which are essential to Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been assured.

"Anyone who knows the East, sees in a map of Russia's population the following national or geographical units:

- "(a) Greater Russia with Moscow as its center.
- "(b) White Russia with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital.
- "(c) Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
- "(d) The Ukraine, Latvia, and Lithuania.
- "(e) The Don area with Rostov as its capital.
- "(f) The area of the Caucasus.
- "(g) Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan."

The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or geographical units lists in some detail, and I shall not read those pages.

At the end of the paper, however, the writer sums up those and briefly outlines his plan. I should like to read that portion into the record. It is at the bottom of Page 4

of the English translation under the heading "Summary":

"The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from the points briefly outlined here:

"(1) the creation of a central department for the occupied areas of the USSR, to be confined more or less to war time.

"Working in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it would be the task of this department--

"(a) to issue binding political instructions to the separate administration areas, having in mind the situation existing at the time and the goal which is to be achieved.

"(b) to secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from all the occupied areas.

"(c) to make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out, in main outline, of the primarily important questions for all areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds, transport, and the production of oil, coal and food:

"(2) the carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the separate administration areas, grouped together by race or by reason of political economy, for the carrying out of the totally dissimilar tasks assigned to them.

"As against this, an administrative department, regulating matters in principle, and to be set up on a purely economic basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be inadequate, and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas, dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its being run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent it.

"The question therefore arises, whether the opinions which have been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be taken into consideration from the very beginning when organizing the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy. In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of the living

conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of the USSR would require different treatment from that which has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe."

JUSTICE BIDDLE: Is that signed?

MR. ALDERMAN: No, sir, it is not signed.

JUSTICE BIDDLE: Is it in the defendant Rosenberg's handwriting?

MR. ALDERMAN: It was in the Rosenberg file.

JUSTICE BIDDLE: Is there anything to indicate that he wrote it?

MR. ALDERMAN: No. I said it was evidently prepared by Rosenberg or under his authority. We captured the whole Rosenberg file, which constitutes really, a large library.

It is evident that the "presently envisaged administration operating on a purely economic basis" to which the memorandum objects was the Economic Staff Oldenburg, which I have already described as having been set up under Goering and General Thomas.

Rosenberg's statement, if this be his statement, of the political purpose of the invasion and his analysis of the achieving of it, apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Fuehrer order, dated 20 April 1941, Rosenberg was named Commissioner for the Central Control of Questions Connected with the East European Region. This order is part of the correspondence file regarding Rosenberg's appointment, which has been given the Number 865 PS in our series, I ask that this file, all relating to the same subject, and consisting of four letters, all of which I shall read or refer to, be admitted in evidence as Exhibit USA 143.

The order itself reads as follows: It is the first item on the English translation of 865 PS:

"I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East - European Region.

"An office, which is to be established in accordance with his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the carrying out of the duties there by entrusted to him.

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"The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich
Chancellory Treasury in a lump sum.

"Fuehrer's Headquarters, 20th April 1941. The Fuehrer /signed/ Adolf Hitler. Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellory /signed/ Dr. Lammers."

This particular copy of the Fuehrer's order was enclosed in a letter which Dr. Lammers wrote to the defendant Keitel requesting his cooperation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a deputy to work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows: It is on the stationery of The Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellory, Berlin, 21 April, 1941. I omit the salutation.

"Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree by which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control connected with the East European Region. In this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for the probable emergency with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest cooperation of the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them, and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities to conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being only those of the highest Reich Authorities should be informed on whose cooperation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. These are: The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan--that is Goering--"the Reichs Minister of Economics and you yourself--" that is Keitel.

"Therefore, may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer's wishes, to place your cooperation at the disposal of the Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the carrying out of the task imposed upon him.

"It is recommended in the interests of secrecy that you name a representative in your office with whom the office of the Reichsleiter can communicate and who in addition to your usual deputy should be the only one to whom you should communicate the contents of this letter.

"I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of this letter.

"Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely, /signed/ Dr. Lammers.

In the next letters Keitel writes Lammers acknowledging receipt of his letter and telling of his compliance with the request. Keitel also writes Rosenberg telling him of the action he has taken. Now, the letter to Dr. Lammers I shall read the text of:

"Dear Reich Minister:

"I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer's Decree in which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East European Region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, as my permanent deputy, and Major General Warlimont as his Deputy."

And the letter to Reichsleiter Rosenberg on the same date:

"Dear Reichsleiter:

"The Head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East European Region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff and his Deputy, Major General Warlimont, with the solving of these questions, as far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your office is concerned, to deal with him only."

Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler, Rosenberg began building his organization, conferring with the various ministries, issuing his instructions and generally making the detailed plans and preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission. Although Rosenberg's files, which were captured intact, were crowded with documents evidencing both the extent of the preparation and its purpose, I believe that the citation of a small number which are typical should be sufficient for the Tribunal and the record. All of those I shall now discuss were found in the Defendant Rosenberg's files.

Our document numbered 1030-PS is a memorandum, dated 8 May 1941,

entitled "General Instructions for all Reichkommissars in the occupied Eastern Territories." I offer that in evidence as Exhibit USA 144.

In these instructions to his chief henchmen, Rosenberg outlines clearly the political aims and purposes of the attack. In the second two paragraphs of the English translation, which appear on Page 2 of the German, the following remarks appear:

"The only political goal of war can be the aim to free the German Reich from the 'grossrussisch' pressure for centuries to come. This does not only correspond with German interests, but also with historical justice, for Russian Imperialism was in a position to accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression almost unopposed, whilst it threatened Germany again and again. Therefore, the German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign against Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a Great Russian Empire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow and Petersburg have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today. This has been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to correspond to the Leader's political testament as laid down in his book, that now the military and political threat from the East shall be eliminated forever.

'Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its historical and racial conditions into Reichskommissariats, each of which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reich Kommissariat Eastland (Ostland), including White Ruthenia, will have the task to prepare, by way of development into a Germanized Protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in alliance with Germany and Caucasia with the contiguous Northern Territories a Federal State with a German plenipotentiary. Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future. These general viewpoints are explained in

the following instructions for each Reich Kommissar. . Beyond that there are still a few general considerations which possess validity for all Reich Kommissars."

The fifth paragraph of the English translation, Page 7 of the German, presents a fascinating rationalization of a contemplated robbery. It reads:

"The German people has achieved, in the course of centuries, tremendous accomplishments in the Eastern European area. Nearly its entire real estate property was confiscated without indemnification; hundreds of thousands (in the South, on the Volga) starved or were deported, or, like in the Baltic territories, were cheated out of the fruits of their cultural work during the past 700 years. The German Reich will now have to proclaim the principle, that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories, the former German assets have become property of the people of Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former individual proprietors where the German Reich may reserve the right (assuming that it has not already been done during resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner

of compensation and restitution of this national property, will be subject to different treatment by each Reich Kommissariat."

Document No. 1029-PS in our series is an "Instruction for a Reich Kommissar in the Baltic Countries and White Russia." It is typical of the type of instructions which was issued to each of the appointed commissioners or Kommissars, and is amazingly frank in outlining the intentions of the Nazi conspirators toward the country they intended to occupy in the course of their aggression. I offer this document in evidence as Exhibit USA 145. I should like to read into the record the first three paragraphs.

It begins: "All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have constantly been in close relationship with the German people. A 700-year-old history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the races living there in a European direction, and has added this region to the living space of Greater Germany.

"The aim of a Reich Kommissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and White Russia"--last words added in pencil--"must be to strive to achieve the form of a German Protectorate, and then transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic races and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater Germany.

"For certain cattle-raising products the Baltic region was a land of surplus, and the Reich Kommissar must endeavour to make this surplus once more available to the German people, and, if possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of germanizing or resettling, the Esthonian people are strongly germanized to the extent of 50 per cent by Danish, German and Swedish blood, and can be considered as a kindred nation. In Latvia the section capable of being assimilated is considerably smaller than in Esthonia. In this country stronger resistance will have to be reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too

the emigration of racial Germans is called for in order to promote very intensive germanization (on the East Prussian border)."

Skipping a paragraph, the next paragraph is also interesting and reads as follows.

"The task of a Reich Kommissar with his seat of office in Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one. A country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights, built up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant influx of German blood, together with Swedish elements, was a predominantly germanized land, is to be established as a mighty German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are available everywhere, and the German Reich will be able to guarantee the right to a later emigration to all those who have distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who fought in the Baltic campaign, never once lost courage, fought on in the hour of despair and delivered Baltic civilization from Bolshevism. For the rest, the solution of the colonization problem is not a Baltic question, but one which concerns Greater Germany, and it must be settled on these lines."

These two directives are, I think, sufficiently typical of the lot to show the Tribunal the extent of the planning and preparation for this phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it was hoped would be achieved thereby. However, on 28th June, 1941, less than a week after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full report of his activities since his appointment on the 20th of April. One might almost think he had so meticulously recorded his activities in order to be of assistance to

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this prosecution.

This report is numbered 1039-PS, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 146. To me the most interesting things about this report are its disclosures concerning the number of these defendants who worked with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and preparation for this phase of the aggression and the extent to which practically all of the ministries and offices of both the State and the Party are shown to have been involved in this operation. The report was found in the Defendant Rosenberg's files and, although it is rather long, it is of sufficient importance in implicating persons, groups and organizations that it must, I believe, be read in full in order that it may be made part of the record. It is headed "Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Questions."

"Immediately after the notification of individual Supreme Reich offices regarding the Fuehrer's decree of 20.4.41 a conference with the Chief of the OKW (Armed Forces High Command) took place" -- that is the defendant Keitel. "After presentation of the various political aims in the proposed Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of the OKW explained that a deferment (OK-stellung) would be too complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried out best by direct cancellation (Abkommandierung) by command of the Chief of the OKW. Generalfeldmarschall Keitel then issued an appropriate command which established the basis for the coming requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer General Jodl and Major General Warlimont. The negotiations which then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern Territory" -- relative to, I suppose it is-- "were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in collaboration with officials of my office.

"A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no way deal with any representatives of the people of the East -

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European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the Military Intelligence required it, and then to name persons to me who could count as political personalities over and above the military intelligence in order to arrange for their eventual commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants, would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed in accordance with my indications.

"Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conference we agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme Commander of the Army, respectively to the Chief Quartermaster and to the Army groups for questions relative to political configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has been done.

"Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of Economy (Reichswirtschaftsminister) Funk" -- the Defendant Funk-- "who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic intentions of the Economic Operational Staff East. In this connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State Secretary Koerner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert, and others.

"Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few problems regarding the relationship of the proposed Reich ministry toward the four-year plan are still open and will be subject, after submission, to the decision of the Fuehrer. In principle I declared that I in no way intended to found an economic department in my office, economics would rather be handled substantially and practically by the Reichsmarschall" -- that is the defendant Goering --" and the persons appointed by him. However, the two responsible department heads, namely Ministerial Director, Dr. Schlotterer, for industrial economies

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and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economies, would be placed in my office as permanent liaison men, to coordinate here political aims with the economic necessities in a department which would have to unite yet with other persons for such coordinating work, depending on later" -- that must be a mistranslation -- "depending on later and for work (political leadership of labor unions, construction, et cetera).

"After notification of the Reich Foreign Minister, the latter appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my office. For the requested representation in the political department of my office (headed by Reichsamtseleiter Dr. Seibbrandt) the foreign ministry released General Counsel Dr. Braeutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian, and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations which if necessary will be placed before the Fuehrer are under way with the foreign office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its representatives to the future Reich commissioners," or Kommissars.

"The Propaganda Ministry" -- that is Goebbels --

appointed State Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, et cetera, would be made in my office; a great number of substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the papers prepared by the Propaganda Ministry would be modified here, if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda will undisputedly be subject to the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. For the sake of closer cooperation the Propaganda Ministry assigns yet another person directly to my department, 'Enlightenment and Press', and in addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these activities have been going on for some time, and without attracting attention to my office in any way, this agreement on contents and terminology takes place continually every day.

"Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister Ohnesorge concerning future transmission of communication and setting up of all technical necessities in future occupied territories; with Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with Reichsminister Frick" -- that is the defendant Frick--" (State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of numerous necessary officials for the Kommissariats. According to the present estimate there will be four Reich Kommissariats, as approved by the Fuehrer. I shall propose to the Fuehrer for political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of General Kommissariats (24), Main Kommissariats (about 80), and Regional Kommissariats (over 900). A General Kommissariat would correspond to a former General government; a Main Kommissariat to a Main government.

"A Regional Kommissariat contains three or four Districts (Kreise). In view of the huge spaces that is the minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil government and/or administration. A portion of the officials has already been requested on the basis of the above-named command of the Chief of the OKW."

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, I don't understand why it is necessary to read this document in full. You have already shown that there was a plan for dividing Russia up into a number of Kommissariats.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: This is merely a detailed report on that.

MR. ALDERMAN: Quite true. I should like merely to point out two or three other individual defendants who are referred to in this document and as to whom the document shows that they were in immediate complicity with this whole scheme. The first of those, about three paragraphs further down, the Reich Youth Leadership. That is the Defendant Baldur von Schirach. Then of course Gruppenfuehrer SS Heydrich, about the next paragraph --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he is not a defendant.

MR. ALDERMAN: No, sir. His organization is, however, if the Tribunal please, charged as a criminal organization.

In the next paragraph, the Defendant Ministerial Director Fritsche, to work under Goebbels.

Without a long discussion of further propaganda material, I might summarize the individual implication in this fashion. Those of the individual defendants now on trial which this report personally involves are Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Goering, Ribbentrop, Frick, Schirach, and Fritsche. The organizations involved by this report include the following: OKW, OKH, OKM, Ministry of Economy, Reich Foreign Ministry, Propaganda Ministry, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Communications, Reich Physicians Leader, Ministry of Munitions and Armaments, Reich Youth Leadership, Reich Organizational Leader, German Labor Front, the SS, the SA, and the Reich Press Chief.

At a later stage in the trial and in other connections I should like to ask the Tribunal to consider that that document with which I have just been dealing be considered a part of the record to the extent that it involves these individuals.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you can treat it as all being in evidence.

MR. ALDERMAN: At a later stage in the trial and in other connections evidence will be introduced concerning the manner in which all of this planning and preparation for the elimination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a political factor was actually carried out. The planned execution of intelligentsia and other Russian leaders was, for example,

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but a part of the actual operation of the program to destroy the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early resurrection as a European Power.

Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans, and on 22 June, 1941, hurled their armies across the borders of the U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the world, Hitler issued a proclamation on the day of the attack. The text of this statement has already been called to the Tribunal's attention by my British colleagues, and I should like merely to refer to it in passing here by quoting therefrom this one sentence.

"I have therefore today decided to give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers".

This announcement told the world that the die had been cast -- the plans darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and continuously developed since then, had now been brought to fruition. These conspirators, having carefully and completely prepared this war of aggression now proceeded to initiate and wage it.

That brings us to the consideration of the motives for the attack. Before going into the positive reasons, I should like first to point out that not only was Germany bound by a solemn covenant not to attack the USSR, but throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union was faithful to its agreements with Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions toward territories of the Reich. General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of "Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy," which is our Document 2353 PS and which I put in evidence earlier as Exhibit USA No35, that insofar as the German-Soviet trade agreement of 11 August 1939, was concerned, the Soviets carried out their deliveries thereunder up to the very end.

Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually made quickly and well, and since the food and raw materials being thus delivered was considered essential to the German economy, efforts were made to keep up their side too. However, as preparations for the campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about complying with their obligations under that agreement. At page 315 of his book, Thomas says, and I read from page 9 of the English translation:

"Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as preparations for the campaign in the East were already under way." By that, clearly he speaks of German deliveries to Russia, not as to what the Russians delivered.

"The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the start of the attack; even during the last few days, transports of India-rubber from the Far East were completed by Express transit trains."

Again at page 404, this author brings this point out even more forcefully when he states, and I shall read the first paragraph on page 14 of the English translation:

"In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June, 1941, the negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage -

THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading now from a document?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Where is that?

MR. ALDERMAN: It is page 14 of the English translation of these notes.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

MR. ALDERMAN: "The Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it was necessary for the W1 R4 office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them, within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack."

Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to the treaty obligations with Germany but the evidence shows that she had no aggressive intentions toward German territory. Our Document No. C-170, which is in evidence

as Exhibit USA No. 136, is, as I have previously stated, a file on Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High Command covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack. The entries in this file demonstrate conclusively the point I have just stated. It will, I think, be sufficient to read to the Tribunal a few entries which include reports from the German ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941. I shall read the first entry 165 on page 21 of the English translation. That is 4 June.

"Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia, Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian government is endeavouring to do everything to prevent a conflict with Germany".

In entry 167, on page 22 of the English translation, it says:

"6 June. Ambassador in Moscow reports ...Russia will only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made quietly - as far as can be recognized only defensive. Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best possible relationship to Germany as good."

The next one is entry 169, also on page 22, the date, 7 June.

"From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow...All observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the Government, as well as the attitude of the press, which reports all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with Germany proves the same thing". Now, that is the German ambassador talking to you.

The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. In truth, no doubt as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on

planning and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the USSR. All of them, however, appear to blend into one grand motif of Nazi policy. The pattern into which these varied reasons impelling the decision to attack may be said to fall, is the traditional Nazi ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the USSR. This Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative "Drang Nach Osten" or the drive to the East had been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost since its birth and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic aggrandizement. Politically such action meant elimination of the powerful country to the East, which might constitute a threat to German ambitions, and acquisitions of Lebensraum, while on the economic side magnificent opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies, going far beyond any legitimate exploitation under the Geneva Convention principles for military purposes. Undoubtedly the demands of the German War economy for food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness of the economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent.

As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in *Mein Kampf*, where he stated: I quote from page 641 of the Houghton Mifflin, English edition, as follows:

"There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special examination the relation of Germany to Russia:

"1. Here perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German foreign affairs; and

"2. This question is also the touchstone for the political capacity of the young National Socialist movements to think clearly and to act correctly."

Again at page 654 of the same edition:

"And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south and west,

and turn our gaze toward the land in the east. At long last we break off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil policy of the future.

"If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states."

The political poison of this economy or purpose is clearly reflected in the stated purposes of the organization which the defendant Rosenberg set up to administer the occupied Eastern Territories. I have already discussed this material and need repeat it now. In a speech, however, which he delivered, two days before the attack, to the people most interested in the problem of the East, Rosenberg restated in his usual somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its interrelationship with the economic goal. I should like to read a short extract from that speech, which is Document number 1058-PS and which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA No. 147. The part I read is from page 9 of the German text:

"The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to which extent industries can still be maintained there (Wagon Factories, etc.). The consideration and execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest characters. Perhaps, this decision will also be approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years."

As I have indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat Britain had served to further strengthen them in their belief of the political

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necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of Europe.

The economic motive for the aggression was to be brought out clearly in our discussion of the organization set-up under Goering and General Thomas to carry out the economic exploitation of the territory they occupied. The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable and if any doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion was to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine regardless of the horrible consequences such robbery would entail, that doubt is dispelled by a memorandum which bears our No. 2718-PS and which I introduced earlier during my opening statement as Exhibit USA No. 32, showing clear and conscious recognition that these Nazi plans would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people by robbing them of their food.

Along a similar line, on 20 June 1941, General Thomas wrote a memorandum in which he stated that General Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler's present conception of the German Economic policy concerning raw material. This policy expressed the almost unbelievable heartless theory that less manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such raw materials. This is our Document No. 1456PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 148. I should like to read the first two paragraphs.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we better do that after the adjournment.

(Whereupon, at 1255 hours the hearing of the Tribunal recessed to reconvene at 1400 hours.)