

# AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED  
(Reclassify when filled out)

14376

CONFIDENTIAL

054708

## I. GENERAL

(a) Unit Reporting VC-91 (b) Based on or at USS MAKIN ISLAND (CVE93) (c) Report No. VC-91 #61  
 (d) Take off: Date 14 May 1945 Time (LZT) 0730-I (Zone); Lat. 25° 18' 12" N. Long. 128° 00' E.  
 (e) Mission Ground Support, Okinawa. (f) Time of Return 1130-I (Zone)

## II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
TBM-3	VC-91	3	0	3	2 - 500# G.P.S. AN_M64 8 - 5" HE ARs. Mk1/Mk7	103A1 .025 ball AN-M-101A2. .02 base MK 157.
TBM-3	VC-91	1	0	1	Same except 7 ARs.	



## III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
TBM-3	VC-97b	1	USS SHIPLEY BAY (Coordinator)				

## IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
None			(ZONE)			
			(ZONE)			
			(ZONE)			

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Did Any Part of \_\_\_\_\_  
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? \_\_\_\_\_ If so, Describe Clouds \_\_\_\_\_  
 (YES OR NO) (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)  
 Time of Day and Brilliance \_\_\_\_\_  
 (j) of Sun or Moon \_\_\_\_\_ (k) Visibility \_\_\_\_\_  
 (NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.) (MILES)

## V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:				(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER	GUNS USED		
None						

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RESTRICTED  
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

REPORT No. **VC-91 #81**

## VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only).

(a) TYPE OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	(c) CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	(d) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(e) EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
1 <b>None</b>				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				

## VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
<b>None</b>				

## VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

(a) TYPE A/C	(b) MILES OUT	(c) MILES RETURN	(d) AV. HOURS IN AIR	(e) AV. FUEL LOADED	(f) AV. FUEL CONSUMED	(g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED				(h) NO. OF PLANES RETURNING
						.30	.50	20MM	MM	
<b>TBM-3</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>4.</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>185</b>			<b>60</b>		<b>4</b>

## IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over	<b>X</b>			
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm	<b>X</b>			
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm	<b>X</b>			

## X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

- SPEED, CLIMB,  
at various altitudes

URNS

DIVES

CEILINGS

RANGE

PROTECTION

ARMAMENT

**None.**

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

REPORT No. VC-91 #61

## XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) Jap concentrations, Okinawa. (b) Time Over Target(s) 0855-1 (Zone)  
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)

(c) Clouds Over Target Cumulus 2 to 4000 - 3 to 7/10  
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Clear (e) Visibility 12  
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type Glide Bomb Sight Used \_\_\_\_\_  
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)

Bombs Dropped per Run 1 Spacing --- Altitude of Bomb Release 2500  
(NUMBER) (FEET)

Rockets " " " 2 Slant Range 1800 yds. Angle 40°

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed 0 Probably Destroyed 0 Damaged 0

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 Junction of two ravines (Jap concentrations) TA 7971 LGH.	-----	4 VC 91	8 - 500# G.Ps. 30 - 5" HE ARs.	All in area	Undetermined
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

The junction of two ravines (TA 7971 L,G,H.) reported used as a Jap concentration area, was under artillery shelling when planes dropped their loads, making determination of damage by the pilots impossible. However, the ground observer said they had "done a good job". Two bombs were seen to hit squarely in the junction of the ravines; all others bombs and ~~rockets~~ rockets hit the general ravine area.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? No Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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REPORT No. VC-91 #61

## XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

### ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

#### OWN AIRCRAFT

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

#### ENEMY AIRCRAFT

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

#### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " " Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " " Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

### ATTACK

#### OWN TACTICS

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

#### DEFENSE, ENEMY

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

#### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

### OPERATIONAL

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

The story of VC-91's second Support mission on 14 May is best told in the words of Ensign Stanley Ulmer, the squadron "Stunt Man", whose prose demonstrates the pilots have not lost their sense of humor after nearly two months of the Okinawa operation. (A few comments to cover omissions in his account are added inside parantheses like these.)

"Our flight (of four TBM-3's) took off from the Carrier (MAKIN ISLAND at 0730) and rendezvoused with four VT from PETROF BAY and four VT from SARGENT BAY and proceeded to Point Jig (off the west coast of South Okinawa.) Our flight was separated from the other eight VT and we were placed under the command of Hindu Two, an Air Coordinator (from the SHIPLEY BAY).

"Our target was a ravine (a junction of two ravines, TA 7971 LGH) which was southeast of the razed town of Shuri. (It was described as a Jap concentration point.) The visibility was excellent, the brilliant sun radiated its light rays earthward, and the ceiling was unlimited with the exception of scattered clouds between 2000 and 4000 feet. Our target was clearly visible through the holes in the above-mentioned clouds. (He means they could see the ground. No one could see anything in particular.)

"There was an artillery barrage going on at this time but we were assured by Whiskey (the Army CSA) that it would cease as soon as our strike was started. The Air Coordinator marked the target with smoke rockets, but these were not seen due to the explosions of the artillery shells. Thus thoroughly briefed and our target clearly marked, we were set to instill fear into the hearts of our Asiatic foe.

"Our bombing, rocket and strafing runs were started between 4000 and 5000 feet, depending on the pilot. Glide angles were between 20 and 40 degrees, depending on the pilot. Dropping and firing points were between 1500 and 2750 feet, depending on the pilot. Pullout altitudes were between 500 and 2000 feet, depending on the pilot. All of the above vary greatly due to the human idiosyncrasies of each and every pilot. (What ACI Officer has not wrestled with this problem in trying to fill out an ACA report? Bombs were dropped singly, and rockets fired two per run.)

"Two direct hits were reported but no explosions or fires were observed. (He refers to two 500-pound bomb hits squarely at the junction of the ravines. All eight bombs and all 30 rockets hit the ravine area, although three bombs failed to detonate.) The artillery barrage never ceased, so it was hard to discern our hits from theirs. A truck was seen on a road and was strafed (by one pilot) but it continued merrily on its way. We received a well done from Whiskey and departed for our base.

"Three bombs which had only the tail fuze armed did not explode. We would appreciate better fuzes, because it is heartrending to drop on a target and get no results."

#### Pilots participating were:

- Lt. J. M. Fletcher
- Lt.(jg) B. K. Harmon
- Ens. S. E. Ulmer
- Ens. H. E. Vieau.

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**XIII. MATERIAL DATA.** (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.  
Use additional sheets if necessary).

**ARMAMENT**

Guns, Gunsights  
Turrets  
Ammunition  
Bombs, Torpedoes  
Bomb Sights  
Bomb Releases

**COMMUNICATIONS**

Radio, Radar  
Homing Devices  
Visual Signals  
Codes, Ciphers

**RECOGNITION**

IFF  
Signals  
Battle Lights  
Procedures

**PROTECTION**

Armor; Points and Angles  
of Fire Needing Further  
Protection  
Leak Proofing

**EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT**

Parachutes  
Life Belts, Life Rafts  
Safety Belts  
Emergency Kits  
Rations, First Aid

**NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT**

Compasses  
Driftsights  
Octants  
Automatic Pilots  
Charts  
Field Lighting

**INSTRUMENTS**

Flight  
Power Plant

**OXYGEN SYSTEM**

**CAMOUFLAGE AND  
DECEPTION DEVICES**

**STRUCTURE**

Airframe  
Control Surfaces  
Control System  
Dive Flaps  
Landing Gear  
Heating System  
Flight Characteristics  
At Various Loadings

**POWER PLANT**

Engines  
Engine Accessories  
Propellers  
Lubricating System  
Starters  
Exhaust Dampers

**HYDRAULIC SYSTEM**

**ELECTRICAL SYSTEM**

Auxiliary Plant  
Lights

**FUEL SYSTEM**

**FLIGHT CLOTHING**

**MAINTENANCE**

**BASE FACILITIES**

Plane Servicing Equipment  
Personnel Facilities

1. The first bombs set on .025 delay tail fuze (AN-M-101A2) dropped by three pilots, failed to detonate. Apparent cause: Defective fuze. Nose and tail fuzed were armed on ~~MIN~~ subsequent drops with out failure.

2. One rocket had a defective motor and failed to fire.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

**E. H. SPENCER, LT., A.C.I. OFFICER**

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

**F. M. BLANCHARD, LT., C.O.**

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

**14 May 45**

DATE