

1942 (continued)

- Exh. 688-A (p 7425) 27 January. Plans for establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere - a publication of the Institute of Total War stated that the area including Japan, Manchukuo, North China and the Soviet Maritime Province is to be the central zone for the East Asia Union under Japan's leadership.
- Exh. 689-A (p 7431-34) 18 February. An excerpt from secret publication of the Institute of Total War stated that in the north, Japan must strive to establish an international defense base and to maintain a superior strategic position. Appendix III of the report contains details for waging war against the USSR.

1943

- Exh. 1345 (p 12096) 16 June. TOJO in speech at the Diet stated defense preparations for Greater East Asia have been strengthened, Japan was making all arrangements to launch decisive operations. Relations with Nanking were smooth, independence would be granted to the Philippines within a year. Malay, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and other places are cooperating toward Japan. Japan intends to take measures envisaging participation of the native peoples and government in the course of a year.
- Exh. 1275 (p 11364) 18 August. Meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held to discuss the treaty between Japan and Thailand. TOJO was present. TOJO said Japan would recognize international law as long as the enemy did so, but would interpret it from the viewpoint of war according to her own opinions.
- Exh. 1347-A (p 12103) 5 November. TOJO gave an address at the assembly of the Greater East Asiatic missions in which he stated that a successful conclusion of the war meant the completion of the construction of the New Order. He then gave his views on the conditions necessary for world peace and the ties which bound the nations of Greater East Asia together. While the nations of the sphere mutually recognize their autonomy and independence, there must be mutual trust and cooperation.
- Exh. 1346 (p 12098) 6 November. Joint declaration of assembly of the East Asiatic nations. Basic principle for world peace is that each nation have its proper place. U. S. and Britain have oppressed other nations and peoples. In East Asia they have indulged in aggression and exploitation. This principle cause of war. Japan, China, Thailand, Manchukuo, Philippines and Burma represented. A proposal was made by TOJO which was approved. SHIMADA, HOSHINO, and others attended.

1943 (continued)

- Exh. 429 (p 4908) December. A document resulting from an investigation made by Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the National Military Council of Mei Sze Ping and incorporated in proceedings held by the High Court of Nanking, relative to Mei Sze Ping showed that the opium business in China was systematic policy of high ranking officials of the Japanese government for two reasons: First, Mongolian autonomous government, puppet of Japan, sought to solve financial deficit problems by purchasing opium in inner Mongolia where people used to grow poppy and sell it at a profit. Second, Japan looked to opium as the necessary way out of her own financial difficulties caused by war. Greater part of the proceeds from the opium sold in Shanghai and other Chinese cities was sent to Tokyo, to be allotted as secret subsidiary funds to TOJO's cabinet, as well as to subsidize members of the Diet. This was an open secret and some Japanese people at home were opposed to this notorious policy of TOJO's Cabinet.
- Exh. 1977 (p 14539) 20 December. Revision and adjustment of cautions on censorship from Chief of the Information Bureau, War Ministry, stated that domestic reports on POW's should be made mainly to contribute to raising the fighting spirit of the people and to increase production. Avoid twisted reports - prohibited to say anything that gives impression POW's are too well treated or too cruelly treated.
- Exh. 1978 (p 14543) Outline for disposal of POW's according to the change of situation issued by the Vice War Minister stated that since war situation was very critical, POW commanders not to make any blunders in treating POW's. POW's must be prevented by severe means from falling into enemy hands. POW camps to be frequently changed. Further details concerning POW's.
- Exh. 1980-A (p 14558) (TOJO Interrogation 25 March 1946) As Minister of War, he was responsible for treatment of POW's.
- Exh. 1980-B (p 14558) (TOJO Interrogation 25 March 1946) POW Bureau organized immediately after outbreak of the Greater East Asia War. Necessary to do so according to international law. Not necessary during China Incident so no organization was set up to deal with Chinese prisoners. He issued order forming POW Bureau. At that time he was familiar with the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. In general he said as Prime and War Ministers he felt Japan was bound by two Conventions and by rules and customs of civilized nations with respect to prisoners of war.

1943 (continued)

Exh. 1980-C (p 14561)

(TOJO Interrogation 25 March 1946) Only complaints coming to him about treatment of POW's was in connection with food. Atrocities were not brought to his notice, he said. He is astounded about the atrocities now being shown in the newspapers. He said if the Emperor's instructions had been followed, these atrocities would not have happened. However, as Minister of War during the period they were committed, he said he was the responsible party for their commission. He was aware of the fact that U.S. and Britain had warned Japan that it would be held responsible for violations of the conventions and rules of war. He did not remember details but believed complaints came through the POW Information Bureau. They would first come to the Foreign Office and then be re-routed to the War Ministry. Complaints received were passed on to the various Army commanders. No replies or reports were sent back from the field.

Exh. 1980-D (p 14564)

(TOJO Interrogation 25 March 1946) Matters concerning the protests of U. S. and Britain on mistreatment of POW's were taken up at the bi-weekly meetings of the War Prisoners Bureau.

Exh. 1980-E (p 14565)

(TOJO Interrogation 25 March 1946) He and his assistants had made investigations many times in connection with mistreatment of POW's on the Burma-Thai Railway. He had heard rumors of mistreatment of POW's at Bataan and when in the Philippines he inquired of the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen'l Wachi, who said that the march was due to a lack of transportation. He made this inquiry on 5 March 1943, more than a year after Bataan. He first heard these rumors in late 1942 or early 1943. He did not know how many times he had heard them - rumors were to the effect that POW's from Corregidor and Bataan had been mistreated; many deaths occurred, referred to as caused by sickness. Rumors did not state that troops who were forced to march were in no physical condition to do so. Other details concerning treatment of prisoners of war mentioned in this exhibit.

Exh. 1981-A (p 14575)

(TOJO Interrogation 26 March 1946) Since the war he had read of inhuman acts committed by Japanese Army and Navy. He said such things were not the intention of himself or those in authority, that they did not suspect such things had happened. Treatment of POW's was responsibility of Army Commanders, TOJO relied on them to follow treaties and rules. However, since he was supervisor of Military Administration, he said he was completely responsible. Other details mentioned.

1943 (continued)

- Exh. 1981-B (p 14579) (TOJO Interrogation 26 March 1946) he said it was likely that on or about 30 January 1942 Japan informed the U.S. that she would follow international conventions, law and rules and customs of law as to POW's and civilians. He said it was the intention of the government and himself to follow these conventions and for the things that happened the responsibility was his. When a protest would come in, he would forward it to the responsible Army Commander. He presumed investigations were made.
- Exh. 1981-C (p 14581) (TOJO Interrogation 26 March 1946) Emperor was not informed of any complaints regarding POW's. These were handled on TOJO's responsibility. The Emperor, he said, had no responsibility in connection with the matter.
- Exh. 1982-A (p 14583) (TOJO Interrogation 27 March 1946) He went to the Philippines in July 1943 in connection with the independence of the Islands. Because of rumors, he discussed with Chief of Staff POW treatment. C/S told him it was a fact that men had walked the long distance. He did not talk to C/S about prisoners being beaten and bayoneted. He felt that if responsible Army Commander knew of these things he would take proper action. He relied upon the commanders.
- Exh. 1983-A (p 14591) (TOJO Interrogation 28 March 1946) POW Information Bureau set up month after war started on the basis of treaties. All matters dealing with military prisoners handled by Information Bureau. Actual handling of prisoners in the field was performed by the head of the Prisoners Reception Centers under regulations and orders from the War Department. War Minister issued orders but Army Commanders could issue further orders on the basis of the previous ones provided they were consistent with those issued by the War Minister.
- Exh. 1983-B (p 14597) (TOJO Interrogation 28 March 1946) He had heard rumors that POW's in Thailand had been mistreated, ~~misused~~. A few cases came to his attention. Matter of mistreatment of prisoners was usually brought up twice a week at meetings of the Bureau Chiefs. The Chief of the POW Information Bureau or the Military Affairs Bureau would bring them up. They would then be referred by the Bureau Chiefs to the commander in the field who had the authority to act. He felt that if there was inhumane treatment the commander would take measures accordingly and send a report back to the War Minister.

1943 (continued)

- Exh. 1984-A (p 14599) (TOJO Interrogation 29 March 1946) He was responsible for Army orders and regulations. He did not recall any regulations directed against flyers before October 1942 when Japan was raided by American flyers. Extreme punishment meted out to these first flyers he said was to act as a deterrent to prevent further raids. General Sugiyama demanded severe punishment and as a result TOJO issued the order. The order was an ex-post facto law which was as follows: the raid, capture, issued order, trial, and executions.
- Exh. 1984-B (p 14605) (TOJO Interrogation 29 March 1946) He believed that on the basis of regulations various prison camps made a monthly report to the Military Bureau with respect to POW's. The War Minister received a stack of papers about a foot and a half high each day and he thought these were probably among them. He said he paid particular attention to reports of deaths caused from malnutrition. Responsibility for these matters belong to the commanders in the field. When they couldn't fulfill their responsibility, they made request of the War Ministry through Military Affairs Bureau.
- Exh. 1989 WAKAMATSU (p 14633-36) 3 September. Witness made an inspection and report of the Burma-Siam Area in regard to prison labor. Reports had been received that physical condition of POW's was poor and the death rate high. Feeding of POW's was below the required standard of quality and quantity. Decision to use POW's on the railway was made by SUGIYAMA, TOJO and KIMURA.
- Exh. 1988 (p 14609) 3 September. Monthly report from POW camps commandant in Thailand showed 40,314 POW's of which 15,064 were ill with malaria, malnutrition, gaihi and beri-beri.
- Exh. 690-A (p 7435) Plans to govern Siberia, including outer Mongolia, a publication of the Institute of Total War stated that the object of government is in preparing and adjusting defensive areas in the northern borders, to establish defense for the sphere, and a military administration should be secured.

1944

- Exh. 1276 (p 11367) 6 January. KIDO, in his Diary, discusses the war situation at the time. The fate of Germany is the most important problem. Japan must consider whether she will take measures to bring the war to an end in case Germany is beaten. The TOJO Cabinet will be difficult to continue in the event Japan attempts to bring war to end. He discusses future diplomatic moves in the event the war should come to an end.

1944 (continued)

- Exh. 128 (p 791) 21 February. TOJO appointed as Chief of the Army General Staff.
- Exh. 827-A (p 8063) 16 April. Speech by TOJO stated that Allied Powers had mobilized their full force and are now pressing the Axis in the east and west. Firm conviction of ultimate victory of Japan, Germany and Italy has only been more strengthened. Through complete co-operation in war effort by the countries within the Great East Asia Sphere, Japan's position is strengthened day by day. Japan will fight to the end. Necessary for the Axis to cooperate and concert more closely and to increase the fight against America and Britain.
- Exh. 1278 (p 11377) 18 July. TOJO reported and told KIDO that he had decided on a resignation en bloc. KIDO asked if he had a succeeding Prime Minister in mind. TOJO replied that the senior statesman must have a plan in mind and he did not venture to give his opinion. KIDO was shown the written resignation of TOJO. At the meeting of the senior statesmen a long discussion centered around the reconciliation of differences between the Army and Navy.
- Exh. 1280 (p 11383) 20 July. The senior statesmen met again and KIDO explained the development regarding the coalition. KOISO came to the palace from Korea, called on KIDO and told him about the discussion with TOJO and UMEZU.
- Exh. 128 (p 791) 22 July. TOJO relieved of his command post as Premier and concurrent post at his own request.

MEMORANDUM

18 November 1947

To: Mr. Joseph B. Keenan
From: Mr. L. C. Dunigan
Subject: TOJO - Cross-examination

All of the analysis sheets of the IPS Documents which were not introduced in whole or in part that relate to TOJO, and which it is considered may be used on his cross-examination or in rebuttal, have been studied.

Some of these documents are now in the mill for processing and with respect to some, further scanning has been requested to ascertain if they are of value.

It is expected that a report will be received on this work in the next two or three days, at which time I shall be prepared to discuss TOJO's cross-examination in detail with you.

It is anticipated that by the end of this week, the chronological summary of the defense testimony relating to TOJO and TOGO will be brought up to date.

Lester C. Dunigan

LCD/tw
CC - Mr. D. H. Sutton

Report to Mr. Keenan

PD-3-47

re: DeWigan

1. The work done by him on his two assignments (a) statement of prob. ev. (b) refere ev. is thorough ^{and} substantially accurate, its organization might be improved but the substance is included.
2. His work ~~set up~~ in the examination of Isotars in the early summer was thoroughly prepared & well executed.
3. In preparing reports repts witness his work was satisfactory. There has been some delay in reports during the last 60 or 90 days which is due to (1) test (2) illness.
4. The report on new evidence requested 16 May 1946 has not been filed.

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Keenan, Chief of Counsel 30 Sept. 47
From: D. N. Sutton
Subj: TOJO - Chronological Summary of Defense
Evidence prepared by Mr. Dunigan

I hand you herewith the original of the chronological summary of evidence introduced by the Defense as to the defendant, TOJO. This covers the period from 4 August to and including 15 September 1947.

Mr. Dunigan states that he has handed to you a copy of the following:

1. A chronological summary as to the Prosecution's evidence as to the defendant, TOJO.
2. A chronological summary of the evidence introduced by the Defense as to the defendant, TOJO, covering the period from the beginning of the defense phase to 19 June 1947.

Should you wish additional copies of these two papers, I will furnish them to you.

D. N. Sutton
Assistant Counsel

file in Defendant

9 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. Robinson USN Att: Cmdr. Cole; Mr. Lopez;
Mr. Edwards; Mr. Sutton; Mr. Dunigan
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - MUTO

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by NIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

WITNESS

TOJO, Hideki

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info from MID report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

EPM
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

General Hideki (Eiki) TOJO: Former Premier; former Minister of War.

1884 Dec	Born, Iwate Prefecture; eldest son of late Lt. General Eikyo Tojo, a samurai and "Father" of modern army strategy; m. Katsu, e.d. of Mantaro Ito.
1905	Graduated Military Academy; 2nd Lt., Infantry.
1907	1st Lt., Infantry.
1915	Captain; graduated Army Staff College with highest honor.
1919	Attached to office of Military Attache, Germany.
1920	Major, Infantry.
1924	Lt. Col., Infantry.
1928	Colonel, Infantry; Chief, Mobilization Section, War Department.
1929	Commander of 1st Infantry Regiment.
1931	Section Chief, General Staff Headquarters.
1932	Given additional duty as Chief, Investigation Department, Army Communication School, and on staff of Army Automobile School.
1933	Major General.
1934	Commander of 24th Infantry Brigade.
1935	Attached to 12th Division; Commander, Military Police Headquarters, Kwantung Army.
1936	Lt. General.
1937	Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army.
1938 May-Dec	Vice Minister of War in 1st Konoye Cabinet.
1938 Dec	Inspector General of Military Aviation and Director of General Affairs Bureau of Aviation Headquarters.
1940 July	Minister of War in 2nd Konoye Cabinet.
1941 July	Minister of War in 3rd Konoye Cabinet.
1941 Oct 18	Full General; Premier and concurrently Minister of War.
1943 Nov 1	Concurrently Munitions Minister
1944 Feb 21	Concurrently Chief of Army General Staff.
1944 July 18	Relieved as Chief of Staff.
1944 July 18	Resigned as Premier.

Address: 25, Kitazawa 2-chome, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo

Early in his career Tojo aligned himself with the "Young Officer" group which demanded new political and economic structure at home. When he became Premier, however, he had been relatively inconspicuous outside of army circles. (20)

Tojo was the first military officer on the active list to become Japanese Premier during the preceding quarter century. His selection was a signal that the militarists were ready to assume active direction of Japan's affairs and Tojo's administration of the Government did not disappoint them. Axis defeats and continued severe reverses in Pacific war caused his Cabinet's downfall.

General Hideki (Eiki) TOJO: (Cont'd)

In "Our Enemy Japan" Wilfrid Fleisher says that Tojo belongs to the humble, simple, fanatic type of visionary in Japan "who would sacrifice everything for the attainment of his ambitions to become a great empire-builder". Fleisher also states that only the most hard-boiled officers attain high rank in Japan's gestapo, i.e., military police or gendarmerie (note 1935 appointment). On 29 November 1938 Tojo warned against the United States, particularly with regard to outmoded treaties and non-recognition of changes in East Asia. When the Tripartite Axis Pact was concluded 27 September 1940, he declared he was "overwhelmed with a mingled feeling of austerity and joy."

Collier's Magazine of 5 February 1944 (The Guilty Series, p. 60) connects Tojo with numerous purges and assassinations during decade preceding outbreak of war, and states he declared for the GEA Co-Prosperity Sphere as early as 1938. An article in New York Times of 6 October 1944 states that Tojo was Toyama's own man. An advisor of Prince Konoye is reported to have stated privately that Tojo used War Ministry post to build up his position in Army, oust rivals and consolidate power for his faction for almost two years before outbreak of war. His army service has been chiefly political with little actual field experience. (72)

Following retirement from the Premiership, Tojo was placed on army's reserve list and granted "privileges of his former post" by the Emperor. The Emperor also elevated Tojo's court rank from Senior Third Grade to Junior Second Grade in recognition of his distinguished services. Last October he went to Manchuria on an official inspection tour, another evidence of respect for his ability. As a former Premier, Tojo is a member of the Jushin.

→ HIDEKI TOJO

ANALYSIS

of the responsibility of the accused arising out of his official position for the facts stated in prosecution's phase " Aggression against the USSR."

Official positions
(directly connected with the said phase)

Responsible
for the following facts;

1 /VIII 1931 - 18/III 1933 -

1. Section Chief of the Army General Staff.

2. 1933 - Chief of the Research Division of the War Ministry

3. 21 Sept. 1935 - 1 March 1937
Commander of the Military Police.

4. 1 March. 1937 - 30 May 1938
Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.

a/ The affidavit of the witness Kita Seiichi stating that in August 1937 the Kwantung Army occupied Inner Mongolia.

/ Prosecution doc. N2467, exb. N 835/

b/ The affidavit of the witness Tominaga Keodzi who testified that the blow dealt upon the Nanking Government by the Japanese troops in 1937 had been ordered by Ueda, commander of the Kwantung Army and Tojo,

4. Plans of a war of aggression against the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1940

C. 17 of the Indictment.

5. The seizure of Manchuria and turning it into a military base for an attack on the Soviet Union. Violation of provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty, and of the Peking Convention of 1925. (1931-1945)

C. 17 of the Indictment.

6. The establishment of the military base for an attack on the USSR in Korea. The violation of the provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty and of the Peking Convention of 1925.

C. 17 of the Indictment.

7. The preparation of the population of Manchuria for the war against the USSR The "Dyo-wa-kai" Society (1932-45)

C. 17 of the Indictment.

Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
/Pros.Dpc. N1984, exh. N 7057

5. May 30, 1938 - June 18, 1938 -
Vice War Minister.

6. 18 June 1938 - Chief of the
Army Air Headquarters.

7. 10 Dec. 1938 up to 1939 -
Inspector General of the Army
Air Forces.

8. 22/July 1940 - 18 Oct. 1941
War Minister and President of
Manchurian Affairs Board.

9. 18 Oct. 1941 + July 1944 -
Premier, War Minister; at the
same time held the posts of
Home Minister, Minister of Fo-
reign Affairs, Munitions Minis-
ter and Chief of the General
Staff.

a/ The affidavit of the
witness Yatsugi Kazuo dated 30 M
March 1946, which stated that
the War Ministry, headed by Tojo
was a juridical member of the
association for the study of
state policy "Kokusaku-Kenkyu-
Kai" and made an annual con-
tribution of 3,000 yen to it.
The secretariate of the Prime
Minister was also a juridical
member of the association
which paid 3,000 yen in fees
annually. Tojo rendered the
association financial support
to enable it to tackle the
various issues connected, with

8. Subversive activities of the
Japanese military against the
USSR and the employment, of
white Russian emigrants for
this purpose the violation of
the Peking convention of
1928-1945.

C. 17 of the Indictment.

11. Undeclared war of aggression
against the USSR in the Lake
Khassan area. (July - August
1938)

Cc. 25, 35, 52 of the Indictment.

12. Undeclared aggressive war
against the USSR and the Mongo-
lian People's Republic in
the Nomonghan area. (May -
September 1939)

Cc. 26, 36, 51 of the Indictment

3. Aggressive intentions of the
imperialistic clique of Japan
in regard to the USSR. (1928-
1945).

Cc. 5, 17 of the Indictment.

2. Propaganda of the ideas of war
of aggression against the Soviet
Union. (1928 -1945)

E. 17 of the Indictment.

the Greater East Asia Construction plans. In 1942, for instance the association received 20,000 yen from the Information Bureau that was directly under Tojo to draw up a draft of a 10 year plan for the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and 20,000 yen from the War Ministry.

/ Pros.Doc. N2233, Exh. N 678.

b/ A symposium of top secret documents of the War Ministry, of the Overseas Ministry "Of the Association "Kokusaku-Kenkyu-Kai" under the title of: "Out line of measures to be taken in future in the South Seas area, occupied as the result of the war in the Greater East Asia". The Document bears witness to the connections established by the Governmental and military bodies with the association "Kokusaku-Kenkyu-Kai" and to the drawing up of Japanese plans of aggression directed against democratic countries and against the Soviet Union in particular

/ Pros. doc. N1987 - a exb.N684/

c/ The affidavit of the witness Yanagita Genzo stating that the activities of the Kwantung Army for the creation of the Manchurian military base were controlled by the General Staff, the War Ministry and the Ministry of Greater Asia Affairs

/ Pros. Doc. N2238, exb. N723/

d/ Testimony of general Kita Seichi written in his own hand stating that the transformation of Manchuria into a military base for the war against the Soviet Union was carried out according to the plans of the government, the First Department of the General Staff and the Bureau of Military Affairs of the War Ministry.

/ Pros. doc. N2467 exb. N 835./

e/ The affidavit of the witness Kusaba Tatsumi who testified that Tojo was one of those who

19. Plans of an aggressive war against the USSR from 1941 to 1944.

C. 17 of the Indictment.

initiated and formed the "Kantokuen" plan and that he and Umezumi prepared the Kwantung Army for its invasion of the Soviet territory. Referring to the creation of a military base in Manchuria, Kusaba pointed out that the construction plans of strategic railways in Manchuria were sent over from the General Staff to the War Ministry for the approval of the cabinet of Ministers.
/ Pros. doc. N 1982, exb. 838/

As one of the leaders of the Japanese ruling clique, which fact is proved by his having held important government posts for a long time, is responsible for the general policy of the Japanese Government, which found its expression in specific aggressive acts against the USSR.

3. Aggressive intentions of the imperialistic clique of Japan in regard to the USSR. (1928-1945).

Cc. 5, 17 of the Indictment.

8 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David N. Sutton
FROM : Mr. Smith N. Crowe, Jr.
SUBJECT : Defendant TOJO

1. I respectfully direct your attention to File No. 3 of the Public Trial of the United States of America vs. Shigeru Sawada, Yusei Wako, Ryuhei Okada and Sotojiro Tatsuta, in which appears a statement of SAWADA, Shigeru, who is a HATA witness. This witness states that the order for the court-martial of the Doolittle flyers was issued by the defendant TOJO from Tokyo.

2. I have directed a memorandum to Mr. Dunigan on the same subject, and a discussion of this is contained in my report on the defendant SAWADA, Shigeru.

Smith N. Crowe Jr.
SMITH N. CROWE, JR.
Assistant Counsel

HS/jen

27 Feb 47

MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. FINELLY, HYDE AND LAVERGE

FROM : DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, CHIEF, INVESTIGATION DIVISION, IPS.

SUBJECT : Defense Witnesses

According to our records defendant TOGO, Zhigenori has not asked for any witnesses to appear on his behalf. In the event that he should do so any data will be forwarded to you without delay as soon as it is received by this office.

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF,
Chief, Investigation Division,
IPS.

EXTRACTS FROM HIDEO'S DIARY

TOJO, Hideki

7.18.40 Recommended for War Minister.
7.22.40 Installation as War Minister.
7.29.40* Political policy and warfare.
8.23.40** Chungking operation.
9.14.40 Relation with Germany and Italy.
9.19.40 Cabinet.
12.20.40 East Asia Confederation.
1.20.41*E Japanese operations in China.
3.17.41
3.27.41 E
3.27.41 Imperial Rule Assistance Association.
5.9.41 U.S.A. and Germany.
6.5.41 Negotiations with Washington; Russia and Germany;
Chungking Government.
6.9.41
6.18.41 * Vichy Government and French Indo-China problem.
6.28.41 E
6.28.41** Kwantung Army attitude re German-Russian war; China
7.4.41 E
7.7.41 Kwantung Army.
7.19.41 Resignation Konoye cabinet.

TOJO - cont'd

8.12.41 E
8.12.41 Diplomatic relations U.S.A. and Soviet; disposal Yen Hsi-shan.
8.20.41 E
8.20.41 Disposal Yen Shi-shan.
8.28.41 E
9.11.41 E War against U.S.A.
10.2.41 Premier's resolution.
10.12.41** Adjustment diplomatic relations U.S.A.
10.14.41 Army's view U.S.A.
10.15.41** Resignation cabinet; new premier; Army, Navy and Emperor.
10.16.41** Higashikuni Cabinet.
10.17.41 E Imperial Order new cabinet; unity opinions Army and Navy.
10.23.41
10.24.41 E Age-limit law Board of Marshals and Admirals of Fleet.
10.29.41 Liaison conference; Anti-Communist treaty; Yen Hsi-shan.
10.31.41 E Liaison conference.
11.2.41*E Conclusion liaison conference.
11.5.41 Formation Southern Army; dispatch Mr. Kurusu to U.S.A.
11.14.41 Administration policy.
11.14.41 E Diet speech.
12.1.41 Imperial proclamation of war.
12.5.41 E
12.8.41 Hawaii attack.

TOJO - cont'd

12.12.41 E

12.15.41

12.18.41 Prince Konoye: peace parlay Soviet and Germany.

12.22.41 E

12.24.41

12.29.41 E

12.29.41

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki Tojo

ROUGH DRAFT

Date and Time: 19 March 1946, 1400-1630 hours.

Place : Sugamã Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Tojo, etc.

Questions by : etc.

- - - - -

Q Yesterday you referred to the "Four-Minister" and "Five-Minister" meetings. What ministers constituted each of these?

A I was not a Cabinet Minister then, but, from what I have heard, the ~~xxx~~ "Four-Minister" conference was composed of the Premier, the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers, and the "Five-Minister" Conference included these, with the addition of the Finance Minister. I think it is important to mention why it was that the "Four" and "Five-Minister" Conferences became or grew into the Liaison Conference.

Q Yes, please explain. We have some information, but we would be glad to have any additional information you can give us.

A The Chiefs of Staff were not represented at the "Four-Minister" or "Five-Minister" Conferences. When problems arose from the overlapping spheres of authority between the cabinet and the Supreme Command, the views of the Supreme Command had to be transmitted to the "Four" or "Five-Minister" Conferences via the War Minister or the Navy Minister and, as time went on, particularly after the China Incident started and after Imperial Headquarters was set up in 1937, the Chiefs of Staff had to have closer relations with the government for carrying on military operations and because of the situation abroad. Therefore, this method of working through the War and Navy Ministers was not so satisfactory and the Liaison Conferences were begun on which the Chiefs of Staff would be directly represented.

The civil sphere of authority, of course, was handled by the cabinet and not by the Chiefs of Staff. This business of the adjustment /chōsei/, as between the Supreme Command and the civil government, was always very difficult. The "Four" and "Five-Minister" Conferences were not too successful and they were replaced by the Liaison Conferences, but even the Liaison Conferences were not wholly without difficulties. When KOISO became Prime Minister, the Liaison

Conferences were replaced by a Conference for the Supreme Direction of the War /Saikō Shidō Kaigi/. This, however, was a change in name rather than in form. When this did not work any too well, the Premier began attending Imperial Headquarters Conferences /Dihon-ei Kaigi/, but without participating in strategic or tactical matters. Even this latter was not too successful since the Premier had nothing to say about strategy or tactics. However, you may say that these four steps, to wit: the "Four" and "Five-Minister" Conferences, the Liaison Conferences, the Conferences for the Supreme Direction of the War, and the Imperial Headquarters Conferences, attended by the Premier, were four steps of the attempt to solve this problem of the over-lapping spheres of authority. With regard to the over-lapping spheres, there was a certain amount of success, but the political forces, that is to say, the political power, of the cabinet, could not control the pure command sphere of authority ~~xxxxxx~~ of the Supreme Command. I am not saying that the independence of the Supreme Command is a bad thing. There are some good points about it too, for example, being able to conduct operations without political interference. It was a good thing in 1890, when the Constitution was established, for the High Command to be untrammled, but in these days where the influence of a single action is felt around the world, a certain

amount of control by the political authority is necessary. However, under the Japanese system, it was impossible. /The preceding portion of this answer was read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness./ There was one important point that I would like to make clear. I have been talking about difficult problems of the Japanese Government system and of the independence of the Supreme Command. However, the foreign problems arising from the actions of the Supreme Command, I am responsible for.

Q So that the independence of the Supreme Command was good from a military standpoint but not good from a political or civil standpoint?

A The independence of the Supreme Command is good from a military point of view only if fighting were the only thing to be considered, but fighting today is also a part of politics. From the political point of view, under modern conditions, the independence of the Supreme Command requires consideration. I believe that under modern conditions, war is a part of politics - they are not separate any more.

Q Do you not realize that the position in which Japan finds herself today was due greatly to the independence of the Supreme Command?

A * To speak plainly, that is a big cause. In fact, it is, but in the trials, I don't want to emphasize that too much. What I do want to plead is that we, as subjects, ~~and~~ I and the ~~Japanese~~ Chiefs of Staff, did not discharge our responsibilities to the Emperor. It is not the Emperor's responsibility. The civil ministers ought to have understood the problems of command and the Chiefs of Staff, the civil problems and to have cooperated to have discharged their responsibilities to the Emperor.

Q In what respects did you and the Chiefs of Staff not fulfill your responsibilities to the Emperor?

A Men use systems; men should not be used by systems /Hito go seido wo tsukau seido ni hito ga tsukawa reruni arazu./ This is an important principle. If I and the other men had fully understood this, the Supreme Command should have taken account of the political aspect of things and adjusted military operations accordingly. We should have risen above the system in which we found ourselves, but we did not. It was the men who were at fault. /Read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness./

Q To whom do you refer when you say "we"?

A I mean myself and the two Chiefs of Staff, especially myself

Q When did you first come to realize the truth of this situation that you have just explained?

A From the time I became Prime Minister I have felt the poignancy, and I imagine that not only I but all Prime Ministers have felt the same.

Q According to information we now have, both MATSUOKA and KONOYE used the phrase "GEA Co-Prosperity Sphere" as early as 1938 to 1940. Are you not aware of this fact?

A They used the words, but the idea was different. Just as I have said. They used it to refer to Japan, Manchuria, and China. The scope was different. The scope was limited to Japan, Manchuria, and China, but, after the GEA War, the scope of the GEA Co-Prosperity Sphere was definitely demarkated. I can't find it here /referring to his little book/. It is a question of what other people said and not what I said, but I dare say, they did say it. However, I think it was with the meaning that I have explained before.

- Q The 2nd KONOYE Cabinet came into power in July 1940. A part of its announced policy was the creation of a New Order in East Asia. Is it not true that shortly thereafter, representatives of Japan and representatives of Germany discussed in detail this New Order in East Asia?
- A You mean in Japan or Germany?
- Q Either or both places.
- A I don't know about the detail, but I dare say they discussed it. It was the Foreign Minister's business. The treaty aspects of it were under consideration, I imagine.
- Q Were not reports made to that effect to the cabinet in which you were War Minister at that time?
- A I dare say, since it is ~~reasonable~~ reasonable to suppose so, but I don't remember such small details as that. I don't remember ~~it~~ definitely whether it was reported or not, but it seems natural enough.
- Q Were there not discussions held here in Tokyo prior to 27 September 1940 with regard to the New Order in East Asia and other provisions of the Pact?
- A The Foreign Minister and STAHRER were talking, but I don't like to say that they were talking about this or that when I was not concerned. This was the Foreign Minister's business.
- Q Do you not remember that the Foreign Minister - wasn't it MATSUOKA - reported to the cabinet on the progress of these negotiations?
- A MATSUOKA was Foreign Minister, but I don't remember that he made a series of reports.

Q MATSUOKA was in Tokyo just prior to ^{the} signing of the Three-Power Pact, was he not?

A I think so.

Q Do you remember that he made any report to the cabinet on this matter?

A I do remember that STAHRER came from Shanghai and that, after a short period of conferences, with MATSUOKA, the Three-Power Pact was signed. The discussions had been going on prior to that as to whether Japan should sign the Pact or not, but the actual putting through of the thing was done in a matter of a few days.

Q STAHRER came to Tokyo as VON RIBBENTROP's representative for that particular purpose, did he not?

A I think so - yes.

Q What ~~was~~ ^{was} the nature of the discussions before this, and where had they been going on?

A I don't remember clearly, but I think that the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers met a number of times on the problem and were informed by the Foreign Minister as to the status of the talks, but I don't remember that the cabinet was so informed.


Q What do you remember that you, as War Minister, learned from these meetings, particularly in regard to Japan's desire for a New Order in East Asia?

A I don't remember.

Q If anything had been said at these meetings to the effect that Japan would not get the cooperation of Germany in setting up a New Order in East Asia, you would have remembered it, would ~~xx~~ you not?


A ~~xx~~ There was no such thing as that, I think.

CHART OF CABINET AND SUPREME COMMAND
RELATIONSHIPS DURING TOJO PERIOD



(See following page for notes)

CHART OF STRUCTURE OF IMPERIAL
HEADQUARTERS SHOWING DIVISION
IN PRACTICE INTO ARMY AND NAVY
SECTIONS.



NOTES: The following notes, compiled by Commander Yale Maxon, USNR, interpreter, and Miss Myrtle B. Mills, stenographer, are based on explanations given by General Hideki Tojo during various interrogations, and are intended to elucidate the above charts.

* * * * *

- (1) Cabinet /Naikaku/ collectively responsible to the Emperor for all purely civil policy decisions (excluding Supreme Command prerogatives - see (2). below.) All decisions the result of unanimous agreement. (See Tojo interrogations of 7 February, p. 3; 6 February, all.) Cabinet-approved measures went to Emperor who referred them to Privy Seal for advice and to Privy Council for final approval. In addition, each Cabinet Minister was individually responsible to the Emperor for matters within his own Ministry.
- (2) Supreme Command. Navy and Army Chiefs of Staff /Tosuibu/ had direct access to the Throne on matters of military command /tosui/. In these matters they were independent of control by the civil government. Military decisions reported to Emperor via Aide-de-Camp and referred by him to Board of Marshals or Supreme War Council. Imperial Headquarters /Dai Hon-ei/ was set up in November 1937 in an effort to secure Army-Navy coordination and to enhance General Staff /tcsuibu/ decisions and policies by the Imperial name and presence. The first of these aims was not fully realized; the second was, although the Emperor did not always attend in person. See Articles 11 and 12 of Japanese Constitution; also Tojo interrogation of 7 February, p. 3. For full description of Imperial Headquarters, see Tojo interrogations of 14 and 15 March, passim.
- (3) Over-lapping Sphere of Responsibility. Due to the independence of the Supreme Command, the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff were not responsible to the Cabinet. Nor was the Cabinet responsible to the Supreme Command. This often resulted in embarrassment to the Cabinet or resentment by the Supreme Command. Beginning with the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet, problems arising from these over-lapping spheres of authority were referred to a bi-weekly Liaison Conference. This Conference was, in practice, weighted on the military side and, though unofficial, in time came to overawe the Cabinet which seldom, if ever, disagreed with these prior unofficial decisions. (See Tojo Interrogation of 13 March, p. 5-6).

- (4) Liaison Conference, /Renraku Kaigi/. (Premier, War, Navy, Foreign, Finance, and sometimes other Ministers, President of Cabinet Planning Board, Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, plus non-voting secretaries) met twice each week and attempted to settle problems arising from over-lapping spheres of responsibility of Cabinet and Supreme Command. (See Tojo interrogations of 19 February, p. 4; 13 February, p. 5; 8 February, p.4-5; 7 February, p. 3-5; 6 February, p. 4-5.)
- (5) Imperial Conference /Gozen Kaigi/. (Premier, all cabinet ministers, President of Privy Council, Chiefs of Staff, plus non-voting but important secretaries) called at suggestion of Liaison Conference on momentous matters of national policy. Met in presence of Emperor. (See Tojo interrogations of 11 February, pp 2; 8 February, all; 6 February, pp 3-5.)
- (6) Privy Council /Sunitsuin/. Cabinet members and key administrative assistants on laws, treaties, etc., plus 20-30 Privy Counsellors appointed for life. (See Tojo Interrogation of 13 March, p. 1-3).
- (7) Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals /Gensuifu/. Aged five-star body. Not active. Members also sat in Supreme War Council.
- (8) The Supreme War Council /Gunji Sangi In/ was an advisory body on inspection, training, etc., but not on operations or tactics. Although theoretically a single body, in practice the Army and Navy Sections met separately. Members of the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals were all members of this body also. (See Tojo Interrogation of 14 March, pp 3.)
- (9) Privy Seal /Nai Daijin/ was Emperor's advisor on political matters. (See Tojo Interrogation of 6 February, pp 2.)
- (10) Imperial Aide-de-Camp /Jijū Bukancho/. The Imperial Aide-de-Camp, as a full general, had unofficial access to the Supreme Command. In theory, he had no connection therewith.

Continued

Interrogation of Hideki Tojo - 13 March 1946

Supplement

(11) The Grand Chamberlain /Jijūchō/ was the Emperor's adjutant. He was a civil official with no connection with civil government or Supreme Command decisions.

(12) The Imperial Household Minister /Kunai Daijin/ managed the Emperor's properties and estates. He had no connection with the civil government or the Supreme Command, and should not be confused with the Lord Privy Seal, despite the similarity of the Japanese titles.

* * * * *

TOJO, Hideki

Premier October, 1941

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
SITTING AT TOKYO, JAPAN

Case No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: et al) ORDER:
) FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
) SUMMONSES FOR WITNESSES
) ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED
- vs -) TOJO, HIDEKI.
ARAKI, Sadao; et al

This matter coming on to be heard on this 11th day of March, 1947, before the Honorable Sir William Webb, President of the Tribunal, upon the application of TOJO, Hideki, one of the defendants herein, for the production of witnesses necessary to the defense of said TOJO, Hideki, in accordance with the provisions of Section III, Article 9, Paragraph (e) of the Charter, the names of said witnesses being fully set forth in said application, which is Paper No. 756; and after hearing the statements and arguments of Counsel for the said TOJO, Hideki, and the Tribunal being fully advised in the premises, it is

ORDERED: That said application as to each of the following named persons be granted, as prayed:

1. YOSHINO, Shinzi
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is No. 888 Marunouchi Building, Kojimachi-Ku, Tokyo;

2. OKADA, Kikusaburo
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is 1203 Setagaya 1-Chome, Setagaya-Ku, Tokyo;
3. OWADA, Teiji
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is 1001 Yoyogi, Ohyama-Cho, Shibuya-Ku, Tokyo;
4. ONO, Takeshi
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is Zushi, City of Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture;

and that a summons be issued by the General Secretary of the Tribunal, commanding each of said persons, to-wit: YOSHINO, Shinzi, OKADA, Kikusaburo, OWADA, Teiji, and ONO, Takeshi, to attend and testify before said Tribunal as a witness for the accused TOJO, Hideki, at a time indicated to the General Secretary of the Tribunal, by Counsel of record for the said accused, as a probable date when the witness will be actually required.

Dated at Tokyo, Japan this 11 March 1947.

BY THE TRIBUNAL:

/s/ W. F. Webb
PRESIDENT

~~Mr. [unclear]~~
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

Paper No. 756

Sitting at Tokyo, Japan

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao; et al

APPLICATION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

NOW COMES TOJO, Hideki by his counsel of record, and respectfully requests an order and process for the production of the following persons as witnesses on his behalf, and more particularly in connection with the presentation of the general phases of the defense case:

1. YOSHINO, Shinzi

- a. This person's address is No. 388 Marunouchi Building, Kojimachi-Ku, Tokyo;
- b. This person will be able to testify generally on the trend of Japanese economy, with particular reference to the testimony given by Prosecution witness LIEBERT;

2. OKADA, Kikusaburo

- a. This person resides at 1203 Setayaga 1-Chome, Setayaga-Ku, Tokyo;
- b. This person is a former Major General, the framer of the "Five-Year Plan", and will testify as to the true meaning and import of said plan;

3. ONADA, Teiji

- a. This person resides at 1071 Yoyogi, Ohyama-Cho, Shibuya-Ku, Tokyo;
- b. This person will testify as to the meaning and operation of electrical control in Japan;

4. ONO, Takeshi

- a. This person resides at Zushi, City of Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture;
- b. This witness will testify to various facts concerning shipping;

WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that an appropriate order be entered herein directing the production of the above-named witnesses.

The exact date upon which such witnesses will be required cannot be stated at this time, but petitioner states that he desires that they be made available for purposes of interview as soon as possible.

TOJO, HIDEKI

By his Counsel

/s/ ICHIRO KIYOSE

/s/ GEORGE F. BLEWETT

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
SITTING AT TOKYO, JAPAN

Case No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al) ORDER:
) FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
) SUMMONSES FOR WITNESSES
) ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED
) TOJO, HIDEKI.
- vs -
ARAKI, Sadao; et al

This matter coming on to be heard on this 26th day of February, 1947, before The Honorable Sir William Webb, President of the Tribunal, upon the application of TOJO, Hideki, one of the defendants herein, for the production of witnesses necessary to the defense of said TOJO, Hideki, in accordance with the provisions of Section III, Article 9, Paragraph (e) of the Charter, the names of said witnesses being fully set forth in said application, which is Paper No. 737; and after hearing the statements and arguments of Counsel for the said TOJO, Hideki, and the Tribunal being fully advised in the premises, it is

ORDERED: That said application as to each of the following named persons be granted, as prayed:

1. FUJITA, Tsuguo
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is Shimizu-Cho,
Suginami-Ku, Tokyo;

2. MITARAI, Tatsuo
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is Ohara-Cho, Chiba Prefecture;

3. OKADA, Tadahiko
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is Naka-Cho, Azabau-Ku, Tokyo;
4. TAMURA, Kosaku
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is No. 1123 Kitazawa, 1 Chome, Setagaya-Ku, Tokyo;
5. WAGATA, Yoshitada
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is No. 3 Kuki Zushi-Cho, City of Kanagawa;
6. MURATA, Shozo
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is Sugamo Prison, Tokyo;
7. YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is No. 7 Shimo-Uma, 3 Chome, Setagaya-Ku, Tokyo;
8. INOUE, Takamaro
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is No. 766 Horino-Uchi, City of Hayama, Kanagawa Prefecture;
9. TSUGITA, Daisabro
 - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
 - (b) His present address is No. 41 Otsuka, Naka-Cho, Koishikawa, Ku, Tokyo;

10. ANDO, Kisaburo

(a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;

(b) His present address is Sugamo Prison, Tokyo;

and that a summons be issued by the General Secretary of the Tribunal, commanding each of said persons, to-wit: FUJITA, Tsuguo, MITARAI, Tatsuo, OKADA, Tadahiko, TAMURA, Kosaku, WAGATA, Yoshitada, MURATA, Shozo, YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi, INOUE, Takamaro, TSUGITA, Daisaburo, and ANDO, Kisaburo, to attend and testify before said Tribunal as a witness for the accused TOJO, Hideki, at a time indicated to the General Secretary of the Tribunal, by Counsel of record for the said accused, as a probable date when the witness will be actually required.

Dated at Tokyo, Japan, this 26 February 1947.

BY THE TRIBUNAL:

(Signed) W. F. Webb
PRESIDENT

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST

Paper No. 737

- 1 -

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

- DEFENDANTS -

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

NOW COMES TOJO, HIDEKI and other defendants, by counsel of record, and respectfully request the Tribunal, in accordance with Section 3, Article 9, Paragraph 3 of the Charter and pursuant to order of the Tribunal, dated at Tokyo, Japan on the 24th day of October, paper bearing No. 492 to order the production of the following witnesses for their joint defense. All these witnesses have furnished affidavits or statements.

1. FUJITA, Tsuguo - Shimizu-Cho, Suginami-Ku, Tokyo.
 - a. The nationality of the witness is Japanese
 - b. This witness will testify to the precise relationships between the Japanese Government under the Constitution and the military organization.

2. MITARAI, Tatsuo - Ohara-Cho, Chiba Prefecture (in front of railroad station)
 - a. The nationality of the witness is Japanese
 - b. He will testify with reference to the composition of 15 Cabinets since 1928 and the cause of the fall of each such Cabinet.

3. OKADA, Tadahiko - Naka-Cho, Azabau-Ku, Tokyo.
 - a. The nationality of the witness is Japanese

- b. He will testify to the operation of the Japanese constitution, the manner of the formation of cabinets, the formation and activities of political organizations and other important internal circumstances.
4. TAMURA, Kosaku, No. 1123 Kitazawa, 1 Chome, Setagaya-Ku, Tokyo.
- a. The nationality of the witness is Japanese
- b. He will testify on the universal aspirations of the Japanese people and the cardinal principles of Japanese diplomacy.
5. WAGATA, Yoshitada - No. 3 Kuki Zushi-Cho, City of Kanagawa.
- a. The nationality of the witness is Japanese
- b. This witness will testify as to the origin and meaning of the moving picture "Japan in Time of Emergency".
6. MURATA, Shozo - Sugamo Prison *see our file*
- a. The nationality of the witness is Japanese
- b. He will be able to testify regarding circumstances preparatory to the "Greater East Asia Conferences of 1943" and the conditions under which the various representatives attended the conferences.
7. YAMAMOTO, Kunichi - No. 7 Shimo-Uma, 3 Chome, Setagaya-Ku, Tokyo.
- a. The nationality of the witness is Japanese
- b. He will be able to testify as to the origin and nature of "Greater East Asia Conferences" and that the speeches delivered were given freely and without compulsion.
8. INOUE, Takamaro - Zushi in the City of Yokosuka, Japan.
- a. The nationality of the witness is Japanese
- b. He will testify as to the true meaning of "Ko-do" and "Hakko-Ichiu" and their application.
9. TSUGITA, Daisaburo - No. 41 Otsuka, Naka-Cho, Koishikawa, Ku, Tokyo.
- a. The nationality of the witness is Japanese
- b. He will testify regarding the Imperial Ordinances relative to the selection of War and Navy ministers.

10. ANDO, Kisaburo - Sugamo Prison

- a. The nationality of the witness is Japanese
- b. He will testify as to the formation and purpose of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

It is respectfully represented that all or most of the above named witnesses were requested under Paper No. 567, and that as they will be called to testify in Division I of the Defense that subpoenas be issued immediately for their production.

Submitted this 24th day of February 1947

TOJO, HIDEKI

By his Counsel

/s/Kiyose, Ichiro
KIYOSE, ICHIRO

/s/George Francis Blewett
GEORGE FRANCIS BLEWETT