

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DOC NO. 1814

6 June, 1946.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: File pertaining to WANG CHING-WEI and NANKING Puppets Government.

Date: 1939-40 Original (x) Copy ( ) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable): Document Division.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: WANG, Ching-Wei; KITA; OTA: (latter two from Japan Foreign Office) NOMURA, Kichisaburo.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Violation Nine Power Treaty; Relations with China.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Most significant reports are:

1. Report re Japan's guiding principles of the Chinese Central Political Conference to be convened in spring of 1940. (These principles decided upon at KO-A-IN Conference, 1 November '39). Object of conference was to organize Central Govt., considering following points:

a. Before opening of conference, principal members of new govt. must understand thoroughly, Japan's claims and make arrangements so that no contradictions will exist.

b. Central Political Conference must adopt Japanese plans as basis for establishment of Central Govt.

c. Important points of China's arrangements will be:

1) Organizing its political sphere

2) Deciding policy against CHUNGKING Govt.

3) Regulating army

4) Raising money

5) Luring influential members from CHUNGKING to undermine that govt., chief members being WANG CHIN WEI (as centre) WU PEI FU and others.

d. Time of establishment of new govt. must be decided by Sino-Japanese conference

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e. Felicies and political programs must not be contradictory to Japanese demands which include:

1) Adjustment of relations between federal autonomous govt's of MONGOLIA: between provisional govt and New Central Govt; between Restoration Govt and New Central Govt.

2) Recognition of MONGOLIA as highly autonomous area.

3) North China to be administered by North China Political Commission and Military Affairs Transaction Organization.

4) In Central China, New Central Govt. to take over Restoration Govt and realize closer economic collaboration with Japan.

5) Recognition of AMOY as special administrative district.

6) HAINAN to be governed by local administrative organization directly under Central Govt. with Military Affairs Transaction Organization attached.

2. Telegram from Consul-general OKAZAKI at HONG KONG to Foreign Minister NOMURA, 19 Dec. '39, re Japanese special service man wanting to buy 1,000 pistols and 60 machine guns from HONG KONG Govt. to send to TAIWAN and to prevent CHUNGKING Govt from obtaining them.

3. Telegram from KATO at SHANGHAI, 29 Dec. '39, to Foreign Minister ARITA stating that 3 Japanese Lt. Generals, DOHASHI, FUJITA, HIRONO met an influential delegate of WANG CHIN WEI and said that Japan would not be able to put an end to war unless peace be made with CHUNGKING, and that if WANG cooperates with CHIANG KAI SHEK toward peace, Japan will have no objection.

4. Report of conversations between WANG KO-MIN and OTA and KITA, 17-19 Jan. '40, at SHANGHAI, re establishment of New Central Govt and North China Political Affairs Council. Meeting was held to give WANG KO-MIN preparatory understanding before his attendance at CHINTAO Conference to be held about 23 January. Information revealed as follows:

a) North China Political Affairs Commission to have its seat of activity in PEKING.

b) SUI-CHING Corps to be under control of this commission to maintain public order in North China.

c) HONAN Province to eventually be placed under direct control of Central Govt.

d) WANG states preference for CHI HSIEH YUAN as head of post of Chief of Central Military Headquarters or as head of organization in charge of public order in North China.

e) Since Inner MONGOLIA is still far from an independent state, it should be under jurisdiction of North China Political Affairs Commission.

5. Report re basic measures in dealing with problem of establishing Central Govt, approved by KO-A-IN Conference, 6 Jan. '40, in connection with secret understanding made on 30 December between WANG CHING WEI and "UME" or Plum Organization.

6. Report from Consul-general MIURA in SHANGHAI, 22 Jan. '40, to Foreign Minister ARITA stating that British and Chinese newspapers report as headline news REUTER's dispatch from HONG KONG that two Chinese, TAO CHU SHING

and KAO TSUNG WU (presumably CHUNGKING) had sent letter to TAI KUNG PAO in attempt to gain disclosure of terms of agreement signed by WANG on 30 December. State that agreement is more aggressive than "21 Demands" and would reduce China to virtual dependency of Japan. Expose of the major points of agreement follow:

- a. Recognition of MANCHUKUO by China.
  - b. Sino-Japanese economic cooperation.
  - c. Organization of joint-Anti-Comintern front.
  - d. Designation of North China and Inner Mongolia as special district for Japan's defense and economic development.
  - e. Recognition of Japan's economic superiority in lower YANGTSE and of her paramount position in designated islands along South China coast including AMOY and HAINAN.
7. Japanese counter measure to commotion aroused by newspaper article in which deny identification and have WANG make counter announcement. ARITA says it was only a draft drawn up by unofficial personnel and that actual agreement was concluded on revised version quite different from expose.
  8. Draft of main points of plans for newly adjusting Japanese-Chinese relations, issued by Cabinet Information Section and discussed at secretaries' conference, 24 January '40. This is the agreement in question exposed by aforementioned KAO and TAO.
  9. Telegrams re KAO and TAO affair and attitude of foreign countries toward WANG's new regime.
  10. Draft of answers to be made to cover possible inquiries by foreign military attaches re movement to establish new regime. Drawn up by War Ministry 26 January. Pictures desire of friendly collaboration as doctrine of SUN YAT SEN and promulgated by WANG; portrays CHIANG KAI SHEK as pro-Comintern and anti-Japanese.
  11. Report from Vice-consul ICHIAWA at SUCHOW to ARITA, 31 Jan. '40, re views of representative people of China concerning establishment of new regime.
  12. Main points of explanation re Central Govt. to be given at meeting with leaders of political parties. Drawn up 31 Jan. '40, probably by KO-A-IN.
  13. Report from TSINGTAO consulate 5 Feb. re people's comment upon TSINGTAO Conference and upon loan given WANG.
  14. Outline of Premier's explanation re Central Govt. problem to be given at secret conference of Diet 5 Feb. '40.
  15. Essential points of plans of propaganda in connection with Central Political Council, drawn up by Information Division of Japanese Expeditionary Force in China, 13 Feb. '40.
    - a. To be drawn up on basis of TSINGTAO Parley.
    - b. Actual publicity to be handled by WANG's Govt. with Army Press Section keeping background control.
  16. Secret telegram from Chief of Staff of Expeditionary Force in to Vice-Minister of War re withholding Wang's announcement re central political conference.
  17. Telegram from KATO at SHANGHAI to Foreign Minister accompanied by copy of documents exchanged between WANG and MONGOLIANS.
  18. Record of SHANGHAI Conference held on 12 February '40 under WANG CHING WEI sponsorship, and letter from Consul SAHO to TAJIRI, 19 Feb. '40 regarding simultaneous declaration of Japanese and WANG's Govt.

19. Chinese draft of this declaration.
20. Telegrams concerning recognition by Italy and Spain of Central Govt.
21. "KO-A-IN's" decision regarding the loan to WANG's government made on 19 February '30. Draft of the Premier YONAI's speech concerning Wang's declaration which is to be made before the central political conference is opened. Draft of the guiding principles regarding the new central government's treatment of the national flag, Kuomintang and Sun Yat Sen's three principles on democracy.
22. Telegram from Tsintao to Tokyo regarding the organization of special corps belonging to the new central regime, and a telegram from Chang Chiakow regarding the background of the Mongolian delegates to the central conference.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Blumhagen

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X Deputy Consul-General in Hongkong, Koda's cable #48  
of Jan. 23, 1940 on press reports concerning the  
agreement between Wang Ching-wei and Japan.

XVIII Summary of the Publicity Program  
in relation to the Central Political  
Council — Feb. 13, 1940

XXII Consul-General in Tsingtao; Kato's letter of  
Feb. 23, 1940 on a Special Military Corps.

IPS DOCUMENT 1814-A

1939 No. 44596 (Code)

Sent from Hongkong, in the afternoon, 19 Dec., 1939  
Received by Foreign Ministry, in the evening, 19 Dec. 1939

To : Foreign Minister, NOMURA

From: Consul-General OKAZAKI

No. 1441 Diplomatic Agency Code

TAKEUCHI's /T.N. written in ink, WANG/ party here begged for our assistance, saying that the Government Office of Hongkong will shortly put on sale arms (1000 revolvers and 60 machine guns) confiscated from German merchants; that under a Chinese name it will be difficult to transport them out of the territory without a permit from the Chungching Government; and that TAKEUCHI /T.N. written in ink, WANG/ ordered them to ask Japan to nominate a Japanese as the titular purchaser and to buy the said arms and send them to Formosa. We have, however, been asking the Government Office to maintain neutrality and to prohibit the sale and transportation of arms to the Chungching Government; we now don't think it wise that we should buy arms in Hongkong (except for revolvers for policemen), and we said so to Mrs. TAKEUCHI, who, maintaining that they will be in greater need of arms, that it will be difficult to purchase such a large quantity as this and that CHIANG will probably want to buy them and that this must be prevented, entreats us again and again for our assistance. My own opinion is that we need not give up our previous position in order to buy this quantity of arms and that it will also have a bad effect upon our negotiations with French Indo-China, but on account of repeated entreaties, I ask for your instructions. Please wire your instructions to me. If you disapprove of it, I beg you to wire to TAKEUCHI to that effect and to have him wire to his wife.

(The end)

TOP SECRET

Management Policy for the Establishment of the New Central Government of China.  
(Decided at Cabinet Meeting, January 8, 1940)

1. Various schemes in connection with the establishment of the New Central Government of China have been carried out according to the decision of the China Affairs Board meeting on November 1, 1939. However, as an agreement of opinions has been reached on December 30, 1939 between Japanese and Chinese members engaged in the schemes, the Imperial Government has decided to approve the agreement and to have the New Central Government established promptly.

The gist of the agreement of opinion reached by the above members is as per separate volume, "Outline for the Adjustment of New Relations Between Japan and China."

2. The time for starting formal negotiations for the regulation of diplomatic relations with the New Central Government and the conditions for the regulation of diplomatic relations shall be decided later, after ascertaining the growth of that government and grasping the situations at home and abroad.

IPS DOCUMENT 1814-C

The Director of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs: HORIUCHI /signed/.  
The Chief of the 1st Section of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs: /signed/.  
The Chief of the 2nd Section of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs: /signed/.

The matter regarding WANG.

Draft by the Chief of the Political Affairs Department /T.N. written in pencil/.  
At the Secretary Meeting on January 24, 1940 /T.N. written in India ink/.

If any opinion, please /refer/ to Commander YOSHINO /T.N. written in pencil/.  
The Chief of the Political Affairs Department, SUZUKI's explanation  
to the political parties and others /T.N. written in India ink/.

#### Explanation

Recently two men KAO Tsim-wu and TAO Hsi-sheng, who were among the attendants of WANG Ching-wei and engaged in the movement to establish the Central Government, escaped to Hongkong in the course of the movement, and made public the so-called Peace Terms between Japan and China. This was nothing but a rough draft made at the beginning of the movement and differs from the final one which was studied by the Japanese and Chinese members of this movement for about a month afterwards.

I am going to explain the outline regarding an adjustment of the relations between Japan and China, which was mutually agreed upon, on Dec. 30, last year by the Japanese and Chinese members of the movement, which was approved by the Imperial Government with a view to establish a new Central Government. Prior to my explanation, I want you to understand the nature of this confidential agreement, which is as follows:-

1. To strengthen our defense power and consequently the defense power of East Asia.
2. To establish Japanese continental expansion and especially its basic power (in consideration of the relations with third Powers).
3. To be able to strengthen the political power of the Central figures in order to establish, to bring up and to develop a new Central Government.
4. To be useful for weakening and making surrender the Chungking Government in connection with the preceding item.
5. To bring about no sudden change or oscillation in the activities of our people, who are now active on the Continent:



IPS DOCUMENT 1814-C

These were the basic ideas of this confidential agreement, the purpose of which is to establish the Central Government.

The confidential agreement, therefore, will not necessarily be the final treaty for the restoration of the diplomatic relations between Japan and China.

I believe that the real conditions for the restoration of the diplomatic relations between Japan and China should be decided in conformity with the said basic ideas so as to be able to achieve the outline which was decided by the Imperial sanction at the end of 1938, when we have ascertained the future development of the new government, the movements of the Chungking Government and other internal and external situations.

Please allow me to repeat that as this confidential agreement is of the said nature, so the enterprises and other activities of the Japanese nationals on the Continent need not have any immediate change as a result of this confidential agreement.

Even such matters as have to be revised will be gradually changed in accordance with the future development of the government and other situations and can, I believe, remain the same as they are for the time being.

However, it goes without saying that any deed, such as to disturb the harmonious cooperation between Japan and China by ignoring the existence of the Chinese people in taking advantage of our victory, should be strictly suppressed in any case.

Please listen while bearing in mind what I have explained.

(Here the secretary was ordered to read)

/T.N. Document ends here/

IPS DOCUMENT 1814-C

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Please listen while bearing in mind what I have explained.

(Here the secretary was ordered to read)

/T.N. Document ends here/

IPS DOCUMENT 1814-D

/SECRET/

/Copy of Telegram/            A     B     WANG  
1940            51441            (Code)

Sent from Shanghai on Feb. 19, P.M. Asia.  
Received by the Foreign Ministry on 19th, night.

To : ARITA, Foreign Minister

From: KATO, Minister

No. 68 (Top Secret)

As the Central Government will shortly be established, we are now arranging the matters which the Renovation Government will hand over to the new Government.

The Liaison Office of the China Affairs Board claims that the advisers be included in the items to be handed over in accordance with the previous agreement on advisers between Japan and the Renovation Government, while the Ume /Intelligence Service/Agency is of the opinion that as the question of the advisers is regarded as a matter of great importance by WANG and his surroundings, and has been repeatedly discussed since last year, therefore, the Agency cannot bring itself to make the new Government take over the present advisers as they are. The Agency is now negotiating with the Liaison Office which is said, however, to have wired directly to the China Affairs Board for instructions.

Moreover, the number of advisers recommended by the China Affairs Board to the new Government is not large (together with assistants, a little more than 30 in total). It is a fact that among them are quite a large number of advisers and directors of the Renovation Government, and the Provincial Governments and Town Governments, who were recommended by the Army.

(Relayed to Nanking and Peking)

DOCUMENT 1814-E

The First Section of the East Asia Bureau

Received on the 30th January, 1940

Confidential No. 29

January 22, 1940

MIURA Yoshiaki  
Councillor to the Embassy  
Shanghai

SEAL/ The Imperial Japanese  
Envoy Extraordinary and  
Ambassador Plenipotentiary in China/

To: ARITA Hachiro, the Minister of Foreign Affairs

The matter in regard to the suppression of the movements against  
the establishment of a new government.

I beg to inform you that as to the matter mentioned above I  
have already had the Chief of the Police Department give instructions  
to all chiefs of official institutions under the control of this  
office as mentioned in the copy attached.

(copy) The Minister of Foreign Affairs;  
Central China, Police II;  
Confidential GO 10;  
January 17, 1940;  
MIURA Yoshiaki,  
Chief of the Police Department in Central China, Shanghai.

/Addresses are given at the end of this paper/

The matter in regard to the suppression of the movements against  
the establishment of a new government.

The activity to establish a new Central Government with WANG  
Ching-wei as its central figure is accompanied, it seems, by the  
efforts of the Chungking Government at counter-measures to  
prevent it. CHEN CHENG, the Chief of the Political Department of  
the Military Affairs Committee, recently carried out the most  
effective anti-WANG propaganda in the shortest period for the  
purpose of invalidating the undertakings of WANG's parties, and  
sent his instructions to all local officials in charge to win  
the hearts of the people. Besides this, YO YUEH-TSU, the Chief  
of the Statistical Bureau of International Investigation of the  
same Committee (Special Service Office) gave strict orders to

all local Special Service Execution Organs under his control to carry out terroristic acts in order to crush the movements of WANG's parties, and secretly sent responsible leaders to reorganize quickly the Special Service Execution Organ in the Shanghai area which is now on the verge of complete collapse because of our general arrests, for which he was very sorry. In view of these reports, and of the increase of anti-WANG and anti-Japanese propaganda and of a tendency toward frequent terroristic acts against pro-Japanese Chinese, I beg you to instruct the police under your control to give heed to any even trifling matters regarding movements which will hinder the establishment of a new government, to keep in close touch with all the local authorities concerned, and to be always alert and ready to suppress any such matters.

This despatch was sent to the Chiefs of our Official Institutions in Central China.

Copies of the despatch were sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry /of Foreign Affairs/ the East Asia Bureau, the Intelligence Department, the Investigation Department, the Chief of the Police Department in North China, the Chiefs of all police-stations under the control of the above, the Chiefs of all branch /police/stations, the Chiefs of all detached /police/ stations.

*Proc. not used*  
Page 1.

TOP SECRET

The terms of a loan of forty million yuan from the Yokohama Specie Bank to the New Central Government. (The decision of the China Affairs Board Conference)

February 19, 1940

In accordance with Article 2 of "A loan to WANG with the surplus (funds) of the Shanghai Maritime Customs as collateral security", the China Affairs Board Conference, on Feb. 19, 1940, decided the terms of the loan as follows:

1. Simultaneously with the establishment of the new Central Government, the Yokohama Specie Bank shall grant a loan of forty million yuan to the new Central Government; and the new Central Government shall deposit the said money in the same bank and shall draw it in case of necessity.

2. The above loan shall be without interest and unsecured, and the above deposit shall have no interest either.

(Remarks\*)

(1) As a preliminary measure on the Japanese side, the Yokohama Specie Bank is to be ordered to prepare for the drawing of the said deposit as follows:-

March 10th, (the day of the establishment of the new Central Government)	Y15,000,000
April 10th	Y10,000,000
May 10th	Y10,000,000
June 10th	Y 5,000,000

(2) The dates and sums of payment will be pre-arranged as mentioned in (1) but the Chinese side is to be guided so as to curtail its expenses as much as possible and to use the money, as a rule, for special expenses, but not for working expenses.

(3) Though preparations will be made so as to make payments in FAPI /Chinese currency/ the Chinese side is to be guided to receive (Japanese) military notes or HUA HSING (Bank) notes instead of FAPI as much as possible.

(4) In connection with the above two items, further details of dates of payment, sums and kinds of money within the limits of the above (1) shall be hereafter communicated beforehand to the Yokohama Specie Bank by the Ume Agency (which will direct the new Central Government when it is established.)

C E R T I F I C A T EStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, URABE, Katsuma hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief Archives Section, Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of two pages, dated 19, February, 1940, and described as follows: THE TERMS OF A LOAN OF FORTY MILLION YUAN FROM THE YOKOHAMA SPECIE BANK TO THE NEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. (The decision of the China Affairs Board Conference) I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section, Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of September 1947.

/sgd/ K. Urabe (seal)  
Signature of Official

Witness: /sgd/  
T. Sato (seal)

Asst. Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. Dolan, Jr. hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of September 1947

/sgd/ Henry A. Dolan, Jr.  
NAME

Witness: J. F. Munroe /sgd/

IPS, INV. DIV., Investigator  
Official Capacity



1814 - 4

in the keeping of the  
General Linnæus, 175

1814-F

1. Original and certificate in La Vergie's office.
2. Certificate O. K. and processed.
3. Fully processed. Copies in files.

C E R T I F I C A T EStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, URABE, Katsuma hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief Archives Section, Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of two pages, dated 19, February, 1940, and described as follows: THE TERMS OF A LOAN OF FORTY MILLION YUAN FROM THE YOKOHAMA SPECIE BANK TO THE NEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. (The decision of the China Affairs Board Conference) I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section, Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of September 1947.

/sgd/ K. Urabe (seal)  
Signature of Official

Witness: /sgd/  
T. Sato (seal)

Asst. Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

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I, Henry A. Dolan, Jr. hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of September 1947

/sgd/ Henry A. Dolan, Jr.  
NAME

Witness: J. F. Munroe /sgd/

IPS, INV. DIV., Investigator  
Official Capacity

TOP SECRET

The terms of a loan of forty million yuan from the Yokohama Specie Bank to the New Central Government. (The decision of the China Affairs Board Conference)

February 19, 1940

In accordance with Article 2 of "A loan to WANG with the surplus (funds) of the Shanghai Maritime Customs as collateral security", the China Affairs Board Conference, on Feb. 19, 1940, decided the terms of the loan as follows:

1. Simultaneously with the establishment of the new Central Government, the Yokohama Specie Bank shall grant a loan of forty million yuan to the new Central Government; and the new Central Government shall deposit the said money in the same bank and shall draw it in case of necessity.
2. The above loan shall be without interest and unsecured, and the above deposit shall have no interest either.

(Remarks\*)

(1) As a preliminary measure on the Japanese side, the Yokohama Specie Bank is to be ordered to prepare for the drawing of the said deposit as follows:-

March 10th, (the day of the establishment of the new Central Government)	Y15,000,000
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(2) The dates and sums of payment will be pre-arranged as mentioned in (1) but the Chinese side is to be guided so as to curtail its expenses as much as possible and to use the money, as a rule, for special expenses, but not for working expenses.

(3) Though preparations will be made so as to make payments in FAPI /Chinese currency/ the Chinese side is to be guided to receive (Japanese) military notes or HUA HSING (Bank) notes instead of FAPI as much as possible.

(4) In connection with the above two items, further details of dates of payment, sums and kinds of money within the limits of the above (1) shall be hereafter communicated beforehand to the Yokohama Specie Bank by the Ume Agency (which will direct the new Central Government when it is established.)

極秘

Proc. Not used

Doc. 1814-F

橫濱正金銀行ヨリ新中央政府ニ対スル四  
千萬元貸付ノ條件(興亞院會議決定案)

昭和十五年二月十九日

昭和十五年二月十九日興亞院會議決定「汪ニ對シ上海海關剩餘  
金ヲ見返トシテ貸付ヲ為スル」等二項ニ依リ貸付ノ條件ヲ左ノ  
如ク定ムルモノトス

一 新中央政府成立ト同時ニ之ニ對シ橫濱正金銀行ヨリ四千萬元  
ヲ貸付ク新中央政府ハ之ヲ其ノ儘同銀行ニ預金ニシテ要ノ都  
度引出スニト

二 右貸付金ハ無利子無擔保トシ且右預金ハ無利子トスニト

〔備考〕

(一) 本件預金引出ニ備ルル為日本側含ミトシテ橫濱正金銀  
行ヲレテ左記ニ依リ支拂準備ヲ為サシムルコト

三月十日(新中央政府成立日) 千五百万円

四月十日 十万円

五月十日 十万円

六月十日 五百万円

(二) 支拂準備期日及金額ハ右(一)ノ如ク豫定スルモ去來得  
ル限リ節約ヲ圖リ且原則トシテ之ヲ臨時的經費ニ充テ經  
常的經費ニハ充テシムル様支那側ヲ指導スルコト

(三) 一應法幣ニテ支拂ヲ準備スルモ去來得ル限リ法幣  
ニ代ヘ軍票又ハ華興券ヲ受領セシムル様支那側ヲ指  
導スルコト

(四) 前二項ニ關聯シ右(一)ノ範圍内ニ於テ更ニ具體的支拂期日金  
額及金種ハ今後梅棧園(新中央政府成立後ハ其ノ指導ヲ  
園)ニ於テ事前ニ橫濱正金銀行ニ連絡スルコト

證明書

ワシントン文書局 才 号

國際検査部 才一八〇F号

典據及び公正な證明

1814 F

余、浦部勝馬ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書課長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモ、且ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル武員ヨリ成ル、千九百零七年、昭和十五年、三月十九日附、下記題名、即チ横濱正金銀行ヨリ新中央政府訂立四十萬元貸付ノ條件(興亞院會議決定案)ノ文書、保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及び文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱者又ハ郵局ノ公式書類及び綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテ左ノ綴者又ハ引用、其他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於テ該又書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

千九百零七年、昭和二十二年、九月十日

東京ニ於テ署名

当該官吏署名欄 浦部 勝馬 (印)

右者、公的資格外並有文書課長代理

證人 佐藤武五郎 (印)

公式入りノ圖シ證明

余、ハ余ガ聯屬國最高指揮官總司令部關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百零七年、昭和二十二年、九月十日

氏名欄 Henry A. Rankin

右者、公的資格 Inspecteur, I.P.S. 國際検査部調査官

證人 R. H. Rank

Cable dated Hongkong, Jan. 21, 1940.

The contents of a letter with joint signatures by Kao Tung-wu and Tiao Chu-shang.

According to an information obtained from a certain important Chinese source, Kao Tung-wu and Tiao Chu-shang will make public in the Chinese paper of Hongkong, "Tai Kung Pao" of tomorrow's issue (the 22nd) a letter with joint signatures by them, and disclose the whole contents of the Agreement signed on December 30 last by Wang Ching-wei and the delegates of the Japanese Government in Shanghai. Together with the above letter, the said agreement and the notes annexed thereto are said to be simultaneously disclosed. The above agreement, entitled "Fundamental Principles for adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations" is said to contain some concession made by Wang Ching-wei to meet the demand put forth by the Japanese side. As is claimed by these men, the Japanese

demands are far more aggressive and monstrous than the 21-point Demand of 1915, and widely divergent from the Konoye statement of December, 1938; and when this were put into effect, China would be degraded almost to a status of being Japan's dependency.

~~The foregoing is followed by a whole text of the agreement signed on December 31, 1939 in Shanghai between Wang Ching-wei and the delegates of the Japanese Government. If such is of interest to you and in case you are still not provided with a summary or a translation I shall be only too glad to turn out details thereof on your instruction. — K. Arita /~~



Consul-General in Shanghai, Miura's Cable No. 127 (urgent), dated Shanghai, Jan. 22, 1940, addressed to the Foreign Minister Arida, reads in substance as follows:

British as well as Chinese newspapers in this place report as headline news the Reuters despatch from Hongkong of the 21st that Tiao-Chu-sheng and Kao Tsung-wa under joint signatures sent a letter to the "Fai King Pao" with an attempt to make disclosure of the contents of the agreement signed on December 30th last between our government and the Wang group, quoting the contents of this letter in the main to the following effect. This naturally had an effect to attract a serious attention of the public:

The terms of the agreement are far more aggressive than the 21-point Demand, and would virtually reduce China to a dependency of Japan. This agreement, as a matter of fact, contains the following terms:

China's recognition to be accorded to Manchoukuo.  
Wholesale collaboration between Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

Economic collaboration.

Anti-Comintern collaboration.

North China shall be made a special zone for national defense and economic exploitation.

Japan shall be permitted to secure an economic supremacy in the lower stream of the Yangtze river and also to hold a dominating position in the seaboard of the South China, including Amoy, Hainan island and others.

In addition, Japan shall retain the right to keep its troops in North China, in Inner Mongolia, in the Yangtze Valley and also in a number of islands in South China, which shall be designated. Furthermore, Japan shall be permitted to acquire the railroads, the air-ways, the postal and telegraphic communication services, the principal ports and the water ways which are located in the zone where Japan will keep its troops, and also the right to supervise these interests; <sup>while</sup> China shall keep down its military force in such area to a minimum.

Further, the new Central government shall be bound itself to pay indemnities so as to make good

of the damages suffered by the Japanese residents since the outbreak of the China Affair.

The New Central Government is requested to make the necessary preparations for lowering the duty revenue on the international trade between Japan, Manchuria and China, for developing the air routes, the postal service, the telephone installations, and also for the investigations in astronomy and <sup>and</sup> other branches of scientific pursuits.

China shall grant to Japan a privilege <sup>+ facilities</sup> for exploitation of natural resources in China, Inner Mongolia and others. Japan shall name advisers to the Chinese administrative machines in special zones.

China shall put into effect <sup>a new</sup> import tariff that would fit to the purpose for encouraging her trade with Japan. Japan and China shall cooperate with each other for rehabilitation of Shanghai.

The above draft agreement was <sup>on Dec. 12 last</sup> handed over to Chou Fu-hai, Mei Shi-ping and Tao-Chu-sheng by Major General Kagesa at Rokusanzen, Shanghai. Wang Chin-wei subsequently conferred with other leaders of his block about this. Kao, <sup>who</sup> was frightened at the vigorous terms, got

photo-static copy of this draft agreement. Wang, on the other hand, on account of the tricky entanglement and the pressure influenced by the Japanese side had on December 30 finally signed it.

Further, according to a Central Press despatch from Hongkong of the 22nd, Tao and Kao jointly forwarded cables to the men in their group to the effect: "although we feel a moral obligation to keep this matter in secret since we had joined our negotiation with Japan, we for the cause of independence for our fellow countrymen and our descendants dare disclose it as we find that this agreement would drive China to a disintegration and collapse, and we in earnest hope that this movement which is futile and harmful for the interest of our country will promptly be overthrown."

✓

/AKITA/

The Basic Measure to deal with the question of establishing a Central Government in China — approved at the Conference of the "KO-A-IN" or the Asia Development Board, of Jan. 6, 1940.

In consideration of the present development of the steps taken by the "Ume" or "Plum" organ, a special military service corps, in the way to tackle up the Wang problem, the following items shall be adhered to in taking up all the necessary measures.

1. With regard to the proposition unofficially arranged on December 30, 1939 between the "Ume" organ and Wang Ching-wei (i.e. the items which are to be indicated in the records on the discussions concerning the matter of adjusting the relations newly developed between Japan and China), we approve this on the basis of the idea developed out of the <sup>agreement</sup> discussions had on the measure for establishing a central government" decided at the Conference of the Asia Development Board of December 8, 1939, and also the proposed establishment of a

V

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Central government.

2. As to the time when we start officially our negotiation with the new central government for adjustment of the relations between Japan and China and also as to the terms, on the basis of which rapprochement is to be arranged, we would decide these points later on when we could see with certainty how would the said government develop and also how would the trend of the situation, domestic as well as external, turn out.

3. With regard to the constructive measure in the economic field for building up our wartime economy efforts shall be exerted to speed up the economic construction mainly in line with our current policy until the moment when the relations between us are officially adjusted. However, with regard to the measures which are remote from the wartime economy, especially those items which oppose to the basic program for adjusting the new relations between Japan and China, efforts are to be made to adjust them adequately.

4. Measures which are to be put into action to have

The Wang Group, in cooperation with Japanese side, endeavor to promptly get rid of the Chiang Kai-shek group.

5. In making announcement of the items, of which the "Unre" organ reached an unofficial agreement with Wang Ching-wei (that is "the proceedings of the conference on the question of adjusting the new relations between Japan and China"), some adequate measure shall be taken with a prior consultation with the Chinese side in consideration of its possible effect upon the public, domestic as well as external.

6. As regards the machine which is to function as a guiding factor for the new central government, the method of building up such structure shall be studied separately.

7. As to the method to handle secretly the proposition unofficially agreed to between the "Unre" organ and Wang Ching-wei (the proceedings of the conference concerning adjustment of the new Sino-Japanese relations), the proposition shall be handled in accordance with the Paragraph 1 of the annexed note.

Note: The Chief of the Asia Development Board

will explain to the Cabinet the main points of the proceedings referred to above, thus to obtain an understanding from the cabinet thereof.

Annexed Note:

Re: Treatment in secrecy of the "proceedings of the conference concerning adjustment of the new Sino-Japanese Relations".

With regard to "the proceedings of the conference concerning adjustment of the new Sino-Japanese Relations" we, from the view points, military, foreign relations as well as economic, have to handle this document confidentially, and to some part of which "the special secret treatment" is to be applied. Further, in handling this document, the following items shall be strictly adhered to:

1. No duplicate of all the documents concerning the proceedings of the conference referred to above shall be produced.

2. The annexed sheets of the aforementioned documents (covering the secret understanding) as well as those listed below, shall be treated as "the special secret documents" and the special secret treatment shall be applied.



- (1) Item 2:2 of the concrete principle concerning the adjustment of the new Sino-Japanese relations (The item which specifies the area in which Japanese troops will garrison as an anti-Comintern measure).
- (2) Item #4:1 of the said concrete principle (concerning withdrawal of our troops).
- (3) Item concerning Secret Understanding (#2) (The item pertaining to the finance and banking)
- (4) Item concerning Secret Understanding (#4) (The item pertaining to traffic)
- (5) Item #3:3 concerning Secret Understanding (#7) (re Ratio of Investment to joint Sino-Japanese enterprises)

3. Later when happen to be in need, we can get a minimum number of printed copies of the foregoing items except those which are subject to "the special secret treatment."

4. Memo of explanation to be furnished to the Cabinet shall be produced at an opportune moment later.

/AKITA/

Deputy Consul-General in Hongkong, Koda's cable # 48, dated Hongkong, January 23, 1940, addressed to Foreign Minister Arita reads in substance as follows:

The Tai-kung-pao's special despatch from Chungking of the 23rd disclosed as an unofficial utterance by a certain prominent person that Japan had been contriving to make Wang a second Pu-yi, that the terms contained in the agreement in question were far more hard and aggressive than that proposed through German Ambassador two years before, and that the peace in Wang's works was nothing other than a surrender as condemned by Chungking. This despatch went on to say that Chungking found it unworthy of doing even to take a trouble to denounce the agreement since Chungking looks upon Wang as no more than an agent of Japan and as having no authority to sign the agreement, and further that the turn-back of both Kao and Tao from the Wang bloc, following Chen Kung-po, disclosed its wholesale collapse being possible at no distant date. Tao Chu-sheng, on the other hand, making disclosure in the same paper of the 23rd, as to the situation that had prevailed around the agreement prior to its signing, revealed the fact

that Chen Kung-po, reluctant to join the last parley on the agreement negotiation, fled to Shanghai, that Kao, though he was in a position that permits him to indulge in outspocentals with Wang, left with me discerning that he could possibly do nothing under the prevailing circumstances, and repeating disclosure of the contents of the agreement, added that Wang and his wife, both of whom were at the beginning disappointed at the agreement, conferred with Kao and set to drop the plan of creating a new government, and urged that there should be no alternative other than nullify the agreement altogether.

Besides, the Nanka Nippo or the South China Daily, quoting a Shanghai despatch of the Chu-Ka-sha or the Central China Press of the 22nd, pointed out in its editorial note that the announcement made by Kao and some other people in his group carries no truth.

/AKITA/

Lt. Colonel Ishii of the War Ministry, Military Affairs Section, under date of January 26th, 1940, wrote to Foreign Office official Okumura, mainly to the following effect:

Re: Draft explanation to <sup>meet</sup> possible queries which may be raised by foreign military attaché concerning the movement for creating a new Central regime.

With regard to the above subject I should like to have an expression of your view tomorrow, Saturday, at the office of the Asia Development Board, and am sending you herewith a copy of the draft.

Draft explanation to cover possible queries which may be raised by foreign military attaché concerning the movement for creating a central regime — by the War Ministry.

Whenever you happen to be in contact officially or otherwise with any foreign military attaché and involved in a query on the movement for founding a new Central regime in China you are requested to explain the matter to him mainly in line with the specimen herewith. Such explanation may, however, be to some extent modified according to the degree in which stand the relations, favorable or unfavorable, between Japan and the state to which he belongs.

The framework of Wang's movement for creating peace and reconstruction (enunciation of the fundamentals).

1. It was unequivocal that Sun Yat-sen held invariably a strong belief even in those days when the Sino-Japanese relations were not smooth that China could possibly bring about a peace, a renaissance and a social growth only through its collaboration with Japan as axis.

Wang Ching-wei is an enthusiastic patriot, who succeeding Sun's posthumous aspiration stood and valiantly faced the Manchurian Incident and a series of other unfortunate crises that ensued between Japan and China. He opened the road towards a peace and built up the rapprochement between the two countries. He thus continued his strenuous efforts to bring about a perpetual peace in East Asia, thereby also to contribute to the world peace at large. On his way in pursuance of his aspiration Wang lost his righthand man: Tang Yu-jen, who fell a victim by the attack of an assassin. Wang himself too had a narrow escape <sup>from</sup> assassins, suffering a few-shot injury. He is a man who yet unflinchingly rose with the creed he succeeded from Sun Yat-sen.

2. Chiang Kai-shek, on the contrary, chose the way to alienate from Sun's doctrine, adopted an anti-Japanese policy, and with the outbreak of the Sian affair led his country to a woeful calamity by adopting a pro-Comintern attitude and by intensifying the anti-Japanese move. Wang and other leaders

Conferring with those who were deeply concerned about the future of their country secretly started their efforts to improve the relations between Japan and China, and consulting with a group of Japanese collaborators formulated in November, 1938 a fundamental principle for restoration of peace on the basis of good-neighborly spirit, and also of anti-Comintern and economic collaboration with the ideal to establish a New Order in East Asia. Wang repeatedly advised and proposed to Chiang Kai-shek the effort for restoration of a Sino-Japanese peace, but meeting Chiang's opposition fled to Hanoi, with a determination to reveal his peaceful appeal.

Wang seems to have been prevailed especially by Premier Konoye's statement of December 22, 1938, through which he appears to have discerned the sincerity of Japan, and thus all the more solidified his determination. While engaged in his work in Hanoi, Wang lost one of his colleagues, Tseng Chung-ning by assassins. Wang himself too felt an impending danger; thus he moved the seat of his activities over to Shanghai. Since then, Wang frequently travelled back and forth between those key-points as Tokyo, Peking, Nanking and Canton, and struggled for accomplishment of his "great mission" to restore peace and to bring about a renaissance. Many of the politicians, war lords, industrialists and

leaders in all branches of activities, whether partisans to the old regime or non-partisans, and in all streams of divergent factions now appear to rise, not to speak of the mass of the Chinese population. On top of this, Wang succeeded in reaching an understanding with Japan in regard to the basic rule for adjusting the relations between the two countries, and thus he has been convinced that the prospect of attaining his aim out of the movement for restoration of peace as well as for renaissance is quite bright.



Present Status and Prospect of future progress  
of the Peace and State-founding movement.

1. As stated before, the current movement has just reached a stage to complete the basic jobs in working upon Japan and also in dealing with the Chinese internal affairs, thanks to Japan's broadminded collaboration and also to the exhaustive efforts on the part of Wang and his colleagues who rose for a common cause. A Big-Three conference, to which Wang and other two prominent figures, viz. Wang Ko-min, the Chief Executive of the Provisional Government and Liang Hung-chih, the Chief of the Supreme Administrative Council of the "Reformed Government" are expected to join, is scheduled to be held in Tsingtao, starting from the 24th, with the object to chiefly discuss major problems concerning the internal affairs. Another conference, which will be met in Shanghai at the end of this month, to which the members of all different political parties and factions and those who are non-partisans, are expected to join, is scheduled to complete all the necessary preparations for the Central Political Council which will discuss about the establishment of a Central Government.

And as all those who share the idea of Wang are

enthusiastically backing this movement with a fervent hope for its success, we feel confident that the forthcoming session of the Council will reap a satisfactory fruit.

## 2. Status of contact and liaison between Wang's group and various parties, factions and non-partisans.

The relation between the Wang's group and the Chinese Youngmen's Party and the National Socialist Party is quite close, not to speak of its bondage with the existing regime. Impartial politicians, industrialists, educationalists and others are in number going to join this movement. Also among the leaders and war lords who are connected with Chungking there are, inspired by the great cause of peace and the state-founding proposed by Wang Ching-wei, not few who are communicating with the Wang group.

As to who are they, we, to our regret, cannot disclose it at this moment.

## 3. Under these circumstances, this movement making a smooth and rapid progress would shortly develop to a stage of accomplishing the establishment of a central government through a decision of the Central Political Council scheduled to convene within short.

## 4. Judging from the present development, the current peace and state-founding movement, when once a central

government were established, would make a progress far more extensive than is generally expected, and is believed to make a material contribution to expedite the establishment of a lasting peace in the Far East.

This movement is expected to assume a marked progress especially when the truth becomes known in and out of Japan as to the motive with which this self-sacrificing and self-asserting movement was started by the senior Chinese Statesmen of progressive mind and wide perspective with a burning love of their homeland, and also as to the fact that it is absolutely not one designed to play a puppet role for Japan, and when Japan's all-embracing attitude which points to nothing other than the independence of China and its prosperity becomes clearly understood.

On what basis will Japan and China adjust the relations between them?

This point can be made clear if anyone goes over thoroughly the Konoze statement of our Empire and that of Wang Ching-wei in Hanoi on his proposed Peace and Salvation. In other words, Japan, Manchuria and China will collaborate with one another with a view to contributing to the world peace, - will unite

with one another as a good neighbor with the ideal to create a New Order, and will make it a common aspiration first of all to bring about a peace in the Far East.

For attainment of this end, these three states will, based on the mutual reciprocity, formulate three principles, namely, good neighborly amity, anti-Comintern collaboration and economic cooperation.

To accomplish an embodiment of the aforementioned principles, Japan and China will in North China and Inner Mongolia establish a zone where these two can work together in a close cooperation in the matter of national defense and economic activities, while in Central China as well as in South China we also expect maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and China for co-existence of the two nations.

Further, China will recognize Manchoukuo, while Japan will assure China her territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Japan and China will mutually respect their respective characteristic features, and both will take measures for promoting mutual assistance and friendship based on the spirit of reciprocity, equality and good-neighborly amity.

As to the details we are confident that we shall arrive

at a conclusion blessing for the two nations through negotiations based on the sincerity of both sides.

Adjustment which seeks its basis to the foregoing principles ruling the relations between both countries does absolutely not contemplate to defy the interests of the Third Countries who are friendly to us. We expect to touch upon this point once again elsewhere. The above claim will be self-evident when reference is made to the program of the new Central Government, to the repeatedly enunciated statements of our Empire and to the sincere steps which are now being taken by our Empire.

What program will the new Central Government adopt?

This is a matter which China itself has to decide and fix, and is not an aspect upon which our Empire is to intervene. Summing up, however, the whole plane of the proposed peace movement and what the Wang block claims, we may say that the new Central Government will go ahead along the following policy in alignment to what had been pronounced in the Kenoye statement.

#### I. Foreign Policy.

1. Through a wholehearted cooperation based on

the principle of good neighborly amity, China will endeavor to adjust its relations with Japan, to promote the common weal of the two nations, and to create a permanent peace in East Asia.

2. The New Government will not only respect the interests of those nations who are friendly to it but also take steps so as to adjust the existing relations and to promote the mutual amity.

Further, through a peaceful diplomatic measure the new government will demand the sovereignty of China and its administrative independence.

It would, however, be unavoidable for the new government to admit, in dealing with the third party countries, the existence of the extraordinary circumstances which are prevailing as the result of the current warfare.

## II. Internal Policy.

1. The new government will adopt as its capital policy anti-Comintern measures, the peace-making and the state-founding.
2. The new government will repudiate military dictatorship, will open the door to governmental posts for the men of ability, and will handle the politics on the basis of universal public opinion. For this purpose, the new

central government will on its inauguration prepare for putting into effect a constitutional administration.

3. It will also promptly take measures for relief of the war sufferers as well as for rehabilitation of the war devastated area, and it will endeavor to further the national economic and industrial development, thereby to stabilize the thought among the people.

For this purpose, the new government will welcome foreign capitals and technical assistance from bona-fide third countries.

Set-up of the Central Government and its relation with Chungking.

1. Members of the Nationalist Party, personnel of the existing government, members of the legally organized political parties and persons of influence and of high social standing will be adopted by the new government as the pivot of its formation.

2. It was made clear by a cable which Wang Chung-wei recently sent to Chungking that Wang would make the Chungking regime a major element for the structure of the central government if the structure of the Chungking regime were drastically modified.

As to the condition for a radical change in the structure

of the Chungking regime, we believe that this comprises the repudiation by the latter of the anti-Japanese and pro-Comintern policy, consent by Chungking to the aforementioned set-up and also Chungking's collaboration in the direction of a formal adjustment of relations between Japan and China for a peace of the two nations.

To negotiate with Chungking direct for a peace is not our policy, while Japan will admit and assist any peace efforts on the part of the Wang group based on the foregoing idea.



XIX

Secret Telegram

17 Feb 1940

To the Vice Minister of War and the Vice Chief of the General Staff.

From the Chief of the General Staff of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China.

There are several drafts of the Japanese and the Chinese declarations to be made at the same time in Japan and China.

Inspecting WANG's draft, I have found that it contains problems of occupation, traffic and other secret understandings. Therefore it is not proper to make the declaration before the Central Political Conference, for it may produce troubles in Japan and China. After frequent negotiations with <sup>the persons of</sup> WANG's side, I have been able to persuade them to declare that both Japan and China will act on the basis of the Kasei Statement, even before the conference is opened. It is necessary to have a <sup>negotiation</sup> on the Japanese and Chinese drafts. I ask you to take our opinion into the Japanese Statement.

TOP SECRET

Re. WANG.

Cabinet Information Board  
January, 1940.

Outline of the Policy for the Adjustment of ~~the~~  
new Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China.

— Appendix: Principles for the  
Guidance of the Public  
Opinion on the Establish-  
ment of the new Central  
Government of China.

Doc. No.: Foreign Ministry # 27.

I Outline of the Policy for the Adjustment of  
~~the new~~ Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China.

(Reproduction prohibited)

Regarding the policy for the adjustment of ~~the new~~ <sup>new</sup> relations between Japan and China in relation to the establishment of the new Central Government of China, an agreement of opinion has been reached as follows between the Japanese and Chinese officials concerned at Shanghai on December 30, in accordance with the spirit of the decision made at the Council of the China Affairs Board on November 1, last year. Accordingly, the Japanese Government for the time being gave its approval to the above-mentioned agreement

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at the Cabinet Council on January 8. But it has also been decided that the Japanese Government will wait and see the development of the internal and external situations as well as the growth of the new Central Government after its establishment, and will thereafter decide the terms and the time of the restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.

Principles for the Adjustment of the new Relations between Japan and China.

1. The Governments of Japan and China shall adjust the new diplomatic relations between them in accordance with "the Fundamental Principles for the Adjustment of the

new Relations between Japan and China", which is stated elsewhere.

2. The affairs which had been administered by the existing government prior to the restoration of the new diplomatic relations shall be taken over for the time being, and shall be adjusted in accordance with the principle mentioned in Item 1, as circumstance permits.

3. It shall be understood that an emergency state exists during the Incident.

The above-mentioned emergency state shall be adjusted in accordance with the principles mentioned in Item 1, with the development of situation and the settlement of the Incident.

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Nagasakiya ✓  
checked by R. Hori

II

Concrete fundamental Principles concerning the Adjustment of the new Relations between JAPAN and CHINA.

Chapter I ~~of~~ Neighbourly Friendships

The three countries, Japan, Manchuria, and China shall respect <sup>the natural characteristics of</sup> ~~the natural characteristics of~~ each other, and shall ensure ~~the~~ peace <sup>in</sup> of the Far East <sup>by</sup> ~~it~~ closely cooperating; they shall also ~~co-operate~~ with each other closely; and shall take measures of mutual help and friendship in ~~the~~ every field <sup>so as</sup> in order to realize good neighbourly friendship.

- China shall recognize <sup>the Manchurian</sup> ~~Manchurian~~ Empire; and Japan shall respect <sup>the territorial and the administrative</sup> ~~the territorial and the administrative~~ integrity of ~~China~~ of CHINA, ~~Territory and administration and shall~~

and also her ~~respect~~ independence of sovereignty; ~~she~~

three countries, Japan, Manchukuo, and

China shall restore ~~national~~ <sup>new diplomatic relations,</sup> friendships.

2. ~~the~~ Three countries, Japan, Manchukuo, and China

shall remove ~~actions and measures~~ such measures or causes which would

~~be destroying~~ mutual friendship in ~~any~~ <sup>the various</sup>

fields of ~~polity~~ <sup>politics,</sup> diplomacy, education,

propaganda, ~~and~~ <sup>etc,</sup> trade, and shall <sup>also</sup> prohibit

and interminate all such actions in <sup>the</sup> ~~the above matters in~~ future.

3. ~~the~~ Three countries, Japan, Manchukuo, and China

shall ~~hold~~ <sup>follow</sup> the foreign policy based on ~~the~~ coalition

with each other.

~~mutual harmony~~

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4. <sup>the</sup> three countries, Japan, Manchukuo, and China  
shall cooperate <sup>in the union,</sup> ~~for fusion,~~ creation and  
development of culture.

5. ~~In proportion to the impermanence of~~  
~~friendly relations~~ <sup>between</sup> ~~among~~ Japan, Manchukuo,  
~~and China,~~ <sup>gradually,</sup> ~~by and by~~ Japan shall consider ~~the~~  
return of ~~the~~ settlements, extraterritoriality,  
~~and etc.~~, with the realization of friendly relations  
between JAPAN, MANCHUKUO and CHINA.



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Translated by: WAKABAYASHI Y.

## Chapter II. JOINT OPERATIONS

### AGAINST COMMUNISM.

The three countries, JAPAN, MANCHUKUO and the Republic of CHINA, will <sup>co-operate and</sup> ~~in cooperation~~, defend their countries from being put in communistic influences.

1. JAPAN, MANCHUKUO and the Republic of CHINA, <sup>will</sup> ~~as well as~~ drive out all communists and ~~their organizations~~ <sup>ics elements</sup>

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from ~~the~~ their <sup>respective</sup> ~~own~~ territories, and will cooperate and work hand in hand ~~each other~~ in regard to the informations, propagandas and other matters concerning anti-communism.

~~measures.~~

2. JAPAN and the Republic of CHINA will, <sup>co-operate and</sup> ~~in cooperation~~, carry out anti-communism measures.

and for this purpose, JAPAN will station <sup>a necessary</sup> ~~certain~~ numbers of soldiers

10 B

at the ~~necessary~~ <sup>in</sup> places decided as <sup>necessary</sup>.

3. JAPAN and the Republic of CHINA

will cooperate in <sup>the</sup> maintenance of

common peace.

4. The Republic of CHINA will comply

with <sup>Japan's</sup> ~~the~~ requests of ~~JAPAN~~ ~~on~~ ~~its~~  
on matters necessary from the military point of view,  
~~military necessary subjects,~~

in accordance with the agreements

<sup>concluded</sup>  
~~settled in the separately documents,~~

that is, requests concerning aviation,  
for the Railroads, ~~the~~ air route

communications, the principal  
harbours and ~~the~~ waterways, in  
~~the~~ areas where <sup>the</sup> Japanese troops <sup>are</sup> stationed  
<sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ areas <sup>having</sup> <sup>with the troops.</sup> some connections

However, in <sup>peace</sup> ~~ordinary~~ time, Japan

will respect their rights of administration <sup>and control.</sup>  
~~the right~~  
~~and of control in the area.~~

(NOTE). In regard to ~~the~~ items 2, 3 and  
special care is necessary in execution, as  
4, they ~~touch to the~~ Military  
<sup>involve</sup>

secrets and also affect the internal

✓ 5

policies of the Chinese side,

~~special case is to be taken in~~

~~dealing with.~~

Chapter III. ~~AN~~ ECONOMIC ~~IS~~

CO-OPERATION.

In order to realize mutual aid and

joint <sup>defence</sup> operations against communism, JAPAN,

MANCHUKUO and the Republic of CHINA will ~~make~~ follow

the spirit of balancing the merits and demerits and ~~equality and reciprocity as their principle~~

ministering each others wants in industry and ~~in connection with their industries~~

17th

and ~~economical policies~~, in accordance  
with the ~~idea of merits and demerits~~ its  
~~counterbalance each other and of supplying~~  
~~each other's needs.~~

1. ~~As to the~~ <sup>The specific resources</sup> ~~underground~~

~~materials~~ <sup>of</sup> North CHINA, <sup>and</sup> MONGOLIA,  
especially the underground resources  
~~and HSIANKANG~~, especially those

which are necessary <sup>national</sup> ~~for~~ for the defence,  
shall be developed through the cooperation  
~~of CHINA~~, in view of joint operations  
of China and Japan ~~from the~~  
~~against communism~~ ~~and of an~~  
point of joint defense against communism

14 8

and economic ~~cooperation~~ <sup>coalition</sup> JAPAN

~~and CHINA will exploit in co-~~

~~operation~~ and As to <sup>their</sup> utilization, China's demands shall be considered and special benefit shall be given to

JAPAN, being the demand ~~by CHINA~~

~~taken into consideration.~~ In other

~~cases~~ As to the <sup>development</sup> ~~exploitation~~ and

utilization of the <sup>specific resources</sup> ~~special materials~~ in other areas necessary

~~necessitated~~ for the national

defence, <sup>necessary</sup> ~~feasible~~ benefit

15

shall ~~not~~ be given to JAPAN <sup>from the point</sup> ~~in view of an~~  
of economical ~~cooperation~~ <sup>coalition</sup>. In the  
utilization, however, China's demands  
~~case, however, the demand of CHINA~~  
shall be  
~~is to be~~ taken into consideration.

2. As to ~~the~~ general production,

JAPAN will give necessary

support to CHINA according to ~~the~~

arrangements <sup>between</sup> of both countries.

3. As to the <sup>establishment of China's</sup> financial, ~~the~~

<sup>(banking)</sup>  
~~monetary situation~~ (especially



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~~regarding~~ the establishment of the

New Central Bank, ~~and~~ the issuance

of new currency, etc.) and ~~the~~

~~establishment~~ of economic policies,

of ~~CHINA~~, JAPAN shall give

necessary support to CHINA

according to ~~the~~ arrangements

between ~~of~~ both countries.

4. As to ~~the~~ trade, ~~the~~ <sup>general</sup> commerce among Japan, China, ~~and~~ ~~Manchukuo~~ and Manchukuo shall be promoted.

~~and the rights of both countries~~  
 by respecting the independence  
~~will be respected, and as well as~~  
 and mutual rights of custom duties,  
~~the general trade between Japan~~  
 and by adopting appropriate  
~~MANCHUKUO and CHINA will be~~  
 procedures for custom duties  
~~developed by adopting fair~~  
 and clearance.

~~duty rates and systems~~  
~~in regard to the~~  
~~products, supply and~~  
 The supply and  
 demand of materials ~~to~~

in JAPAN, MANCHUKUO and CHINA,  
 especially in North and Central China,  
~~will be brought into more~~

18 W

shall be facilitated and rationalized ~~conditions~~

within the limit of not disturbing

the self-supply of ~~each~~ each material.

5. As to the development of  
transportation,

Communication, ~~correspondence,~~

meteorology and surveying in

CHINA, JAPAN ~~to~~ <sup>shall</sup> give necessary

support to ~~CHINA~~ or cooperate with

CHINA according to ~~the~~ arrangements

~~between~~  
~~of~~ both countries.

19 12

6. As to the establishment of  
New SHANG HAI, JAPAN ~~shall~~  
give necessary support to ~~CHINA~~  
and cooperate with CHINA according  
to ~~the~~ arrangements <sup>between</sup> both countries.

Chapter IV ~~Other~~ Miscellaneous,

1. CHINA, <sup>as designated</sup> ~~in accordance with the~~  
~~separateness~~, shall  
~~separate agreement~~, ~~with~~ invite  
and ~~employ~~ <sup>engage</sup> Japanese advisers  
and officials in connection with

matters of cooperation between  
~~the cooperated business of~~ JAPAN

and CHINA.

2. JAPAN ~~will~~ <sup>shall</sup> cooperate ~~with~~

~~the~~ CHINA in relief of Chinese

sufferers from the incident.

3. CHINA ~~will~~ <sup>shall pay</sup> (indemnity for

~~the~~ damages ~~done to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~the~~ rights and

<sup>suffered by</sup> subjects  
 the interests of Japanese since the

outbreak of the incident.

The end.

Chungking  
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P. 9

REGARDING THE NAME) 3. Wang

DESIGNATION OF <sup>the</sup> NEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT,  
AND ADOPTION OF <sup>the</sup> NATIONAL FLAG, etc.

The organization, name and capital of the  
new central government <sup>are to</sup> ~~will~~ be decided at  
the conference of the Central Political Assembly.

However, ~~but~~ it is desirable that the government  
be established by the proper cooperation of the  
should include the rightful Kuomintang Party,

the existing regimes, influential men  
of all parties and <sup>factions and</sup> ~~those~~ <sup>who do</sup> not belong to  
parties <sup>(and factions)</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>also if possible</sup> by taking in members of the  
Chunking <sup>who</sup> ~~have~~ <sup>changed</sup> their  
Regime

mirrors.)

~~ideas (note) will be organized by~~

~~the united cooperation of these persons.~~

(that the new central government

In order to make mighty development, claim-  
will advocate)

~~ing to be pro-japanese and anti-communist~~  
and yet make great developments by completely  
~~and gaining the hearts of the people, there is~~  
it is important that,

Central Government should <sup>it</sup> ~~be called~~ <sup>assume the name</sup>

~~of the~~ National Government <sup>as the successor to the laws and traditions of China</sup> ~~and have~~ <sup>with</sup> the right-

ful Kuomintang Party <sup>as its leading constituent</sup> ~~its chief element;~~

~~as the true government successor to the~~

~~true Chinese tradition,~~ that its capital

should be ~~not~~ <sup>established</sup> in Nanking; and <sup>that</sup> its flag

should be the Sun-in-Blue-Sky Flag. We ~~think~~ <sup>consider</sup>

these ~~steps~~ <sup>inevitable</sup> are ~~quite necessary~~ to China

(The Government has already informally

and ~~they have already been~~ approved

~~of~~ them beforehand.

~~within our government~~ Regarding the

national flag, <sup>however,</sup> a large triangular piece of

yellow cloth ~~on which are written~~

with characters like

~~at~~ meaning "Anti-Communism and Peace," must

be <sup>attached on</sup> ~~affixed to~~ the top of the flag ~~in order to~~

distinguish it from the flag of the Com-



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Government during the required term  
in order to distinguish it from the flag of  
the Chungking Government

(note) By members of the

Chungking ~~Regime~~ who have ~~changed~~ <sup>changed</sup> their ~~views~~ <sup>views</sup>,

we mean

~~persons~~ <sup>persons</sup> who have ~~abandoned~~ <sup>abandoned</sup> ~~the principles~~ <sup>(the principles)</sup>

anti-Japanese and pro-communists and accepted

to adjust ~~the regulation of~~ Sino-Japanese relations

in accordance with the <sup>("Outline for the")</sup> ~~Principles of Regulation~~  
Adjustment of New Relations Between Japan and  
of ~~the Sino-Japanese New Relations, China~~ "China"

Material on Wang Ching-wei's Nanking government

Item 1 is the guiding principles of the central political conference which is to take place in the spring of 1940. And the fact that these principles are decided upon at the Ko-a-in conference on 1 Nov 39 shows clearly that Japan is handling the political affairs in China. Wang Ching-wei's Nanking government is the outcome of this political conference and other secret agreements between Wang and the Japanese government.

Item 2 is a telegram from Consul-general OKAZAKI at <sup>Hongkong</sup> to Foreign Minister NOMURA on 19 Dec 39 about the Japanese special service man wanting to buy 1000 pistols and 60 machine guns from the Hongkong government.

Item 3 is a telegram from Minister KATO at Shanghai to Foreign Minister ARITA on 29 Dec. concerning the suggestion by three Japanese Lt. generals of having peace negotiation with Chang Kai-shek.

Item 4 deals with the conversation of Maj. General KITA and Wang Ho-ming on 17-19 Jan. 40

2 /  
at Shanghai regarding the establishment of the new central government and the north China political affairs council. This conversation was held to make preparatory understanding with Wang Komin before he attends the Chintao conference held around 23rd of January.

Item 5 Basic measures in dealing with the problem of establishing the central government in China which are approved by the Komin conference on Jan 6. 40. in connection with the secret understanding made on 30 Dec between Wang Ching wei and the "plum" organ.

Item 6 Wang Ching wei's new government is well on its way and the Chungking government is trying very hard to disturb it. Report from Shanghai <sup>on 22 Jan</sup> to the Foreign Minister ARITA says that the (Japanese) police affairs bureau in central China will suppress the anti-Wang movement.

Item 7 Kao Tsung-wu and Tao Hsi-sion, who fled from Wang <sup>to Hong Kong</sup>, exposed in the newspaper <sup>on 22 Jan 40</sup> the content of the secret agreement between Wang and Japan concluded on 30 Dec. 39. Item 7 is a collection of DOMEI telegrams on this matter.

Item 8 Telegrams, reports and newspaper clippings regarding the above mentioned affair. Kao Tsung-wu and Tao Hsi-sion wrote a letter to the Chinese paper, Dai-ko-ho, in which the secret agreement was exposed as follows:

1. Recognition of Manchukuo by China
2. Sino-Japanese economic cooperation
3. Organization of joint anti-Comintern front
4. Designation of North China and Inner Mongolia as the special district for Japan's defence and economic development.
5. Recognition of Japan's <sup>economic</sup> superiority in the lower Yangtze valleys and of her paramount position in some designated islands along the South China coast including Amoy and Hainan Island.

The Japanese government's counter-measure to the commotion <sup>arising by the paper</sup> is to deny the identification and to have Wang make counter-announcement. ARITA says that it was only a draft drawn by unofficial personnel and the agreement was concluded ~~with~~ <sup>on</sup> a revised version, which was quite different from the one disclosed.

- Item 14 Duplicate of item 8. and telegrams regarding the Wang's new government.
- Item 15 Report from Tsintao consulate on 5 Feb. regarding the people's comments upon the Tsingtao conference, and some other telegrams in connection with the Wang's government, and the loan given to him.
- Item 16 The gist of the Premier's explanation concerning the central government problem, to be given at a secret conference of the Diet. / the draft drawn by the "Ko-a-in" 5 Feb 40  
The telegram from Consul-general OKAZAKI at Hongkong to the Foreign Minister expressing his opinion of the situations in China.
- Item 17 Report from Shanghai to the Foreign Minister on 9 Feb. concerning the present status of the outer organization of Wang's group.  
Report from the Consul-general HORI at Nanking to the Foreign Minister concerning the <sup>recent</sup> political trend of the Nanking citizens.  
A few other telegraphic reports regarding the Chinese attitude toward the central government.

Item 18 The essential points of the plans of propaganda accompanying the central governmental conference drawn by the information division of the Japanese expeditionary force in China.

Item 19 Some telegrams from China to Tokyo concerning the central political conference.

Item 19 Secret telegram from the chief of the staff of the expeditionary force to the vice-minister of war and the vice-chief of the general staff office about withholding the Wang's announcement regarding the central political conference.

Item 20 Telegram from plenipotentiary minister KATO at Shanghai to the Foreign minister accompanied by a copy of the documents exchanged between Wang Chingwei and the Mongolians.

Item 20 Record of the Shanghai conference held on 12 Feb 40 under the sponsorship of Wang Chingwei a letter from YANO (consul) to TAJIRI (chief of a section) on 19 Feb. regarding the simultaneous declaration of the Japanese and Wang's governments.

Item 21 Chinese draft of the declaration.

Item 22 Telegrams concerning the recognition by Italy and Spain of the central government.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

6 June, 1946.

DOC NO. 1814

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: File pertaining to WANG CHING-WEI and NANKING  
Puppet Government.

Date: 1939-40 Original  Copy  Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes  No   
Has it been photostated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable): Document Division.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: WANG, Ching-Wei; KITA: OTA: (latter two from Japan  
Foreign Office) NOMURA, Kichisaburo.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Violation Nine Power Treaty;  
Relations with China.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Most significant reports are:

1. Report re Japan's guiding principles of the Chinese Central Political Conference to be convened in spring of 1940. (These principles decided upon at KO-A-IN Conference, 1 November '39). Object of conference was to organize Central Govt., considering following points:
  - a. Before opening of conference, principal members of new govt. must understand thoroughly, Japan's claims and make arrangements so that no contradictions will exist.
  - b. Central Political Conference must adopt Japanese plans as basis for establishment of Central Govt.
  - c. Important points of China's arrangements will be:
    - 1) Organizing its political sphere
    - 2) Deciding policy against CHUNGKING Govt.
    - 3) Regulating army
    - 4) Raising money
    - 5) Luring influential members from CHUNGKING to undermine that govt., chief members being WANG CHIN WEI (as centre) WU PEI FU and others.
  - d. Time of establishment of new govt. must be decided by Sino-Japanese conference

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Page 1

e. Policies and political programs must not be contradictory to Japanese demands which include:

1) Adjustment of relations between federal autonomous gov't's of MONGOLIA: between provisional gov't and New Central Gov't; between Restoration Gov't and New Central Gov't.

2) Recognition of MONGOLIA as highly autonomous area.

3) North China to be administered by North China Political Commission and Military Affairs Transaction Organization.

4) In Central China, New Central Gov't. to take over Restoration Gov't and realize closer economic collaboration with Japan.

5) Recognition of AMOY as special administrative district.

6) HAINAN to be governed by local administrative organization directly under Central Gov't. with Military Affairs Transaction Organization attached.

2. Telegram from Consul-general OKAZAKI at HONG KONG to Foreign Minister NOMURA, 19 Dec. '39, re Japanese special service man wanting to buy 1,000 pistols and 60 machine guns from HONG KONG Gov't. to send to TAIWAN and to prevent CHUNGKING Gov't from obtaining them.

3. Telegram from KATO at SHANGHAI, 29 Dec. '39, to Foreign Minister ARITA stating that 3 Japanese Lt. Generals, DOHASHI, FUJITA, HIRONO met an influential delegate of WANG CHIN WEI and said that Japan would not be able to put an end to war unless peace be made with CHUNGKING, and that if WANG cooperates with CHIANG KAI SHEK toward peace, Japan will have no objection.

4. Report of conversations between WANG KO-MIN and OTA and KITA, 17-19 Jan. '40, at SHANGHAI, re establishment of New Central Gov't and North China Political Affairs Council. Meeting was held to give WANG KO-MIN preparatory understanding before his attendance at CHINTAO Conference to be held about 23 January. Information revealed as follows:

a) North China Political Affairs Commission to have its seat of activity in PEKING.

b) SUI-CHING Corps to be under control of this commission to maintain public order in North China.

c) HONAN Province to eventually be placed under direct control of Central Gov't.

d) WANG states preference for CHI HSIEH YUAN as head of post of Chief of Central Military Headquarters or as head of organization in charge of public order in North China.

e) Since Inner MONGOLIA is still far from an independent state, it should be under jurisdiction of North China Political Affairs Commission.

5. Report re basic measures in dealing with problem of establishing Central Gov't, approved by KO-A-IN Conference, 6 Jan. '40, in connection with secret understanding made on 30 December between WANG CHING WEI and "UME" or Plum Organization.

6. Report from Consul-general MIURA in SHANGHAI, 22 Jan. '40, to Foreign Minister ARITA stating that British and Chinese newspapers report as headline news REUTER's dispatch from HONG KONG that two Chinese, TAO CHU SHING



and KAO TSUNG WU (presumably CHUNGKING) had sent letter to TAI KUNG PAO in attempt to gain disclosure of terms of agreement signed by WANG on 30 December. State that agreement is more aggressive than "21 Demands" and would reduce China to virtual dependency of Japan. Expose of the major points of agreement follow:

- a. Recognition of MANCHURUO by China.
  - b. Sino-Japanese economic cooperation.
  - c. Organization of joint-Anti-Comintern front.
  - d. Designation of North China and Inner Mongolia as special district for Japan's defense and economic development.
  - e. Recognition of Japan's economic superiority in lower YANGTSE and of her paramount position in designated islands along South China coast including AMOY and HAINAN.
7. Japanese counter measure to commotion aroused by newspaper article in which deny identification and have WANG make counter announcement. ARITA says it was only a draft drawn up by unofficial personnel and that actual agreement was concluded on revised version quite different from expose.
8. Draft of main points of plans for newly adjusting Japanese-Chinese relations, issued by Cabinet Information Section and discussed at secretaries' conference, 24 January '40. This is the agreement in question exposed by afore mentioned KAO and TAO.
9. Telegrams re KAO and TAO affair and attitude of foreign countries toward WANG's new regime.
10. Draft of answers to be made to cover possible inquiries by foreign military attaches re movement to establish new regime. Drawn up by War Ministry 26 January. Pictures desire of friendly collaboration as doctrine of SUN YAT SEN and promulgated by WANG; portrays CHIANG KAI SHEK as pro-Comintern and anti-Japanese.
11. Report from Vice-consul ICHINAWA at SUCHOW to ARITA, 31 Jan. '40, re views of representative people of China concerning establishment of new regime.
12. Main points of explanation re Central Govt. to be given at meeting with leaders of political parties. Drawn up 31 Jan. '40, probably by KO-A-IN.
13. Report from TSINGTAO consulate 5 Feb. re people's comment upon TSINGTAO Conference and upon loan given WANG.
14. Outline of Premier's explanation re Central Govt. problem to be given at secret conference of Diet 5 Feb. '40.
15. Essential points of plans of propaganda in connection with Central Political Council, drawn up by Information Division of Japanese Expeditionary Force in China, 13 Feb. '40.
- a. To be drawn up on basis of TSINGTAO Parley.
  - b. Actual publicity to be handled by WANG's Govt. with Army Press Section keeping background control.
16. Secret telegram from Chief of Staff of Expeditionary Force in to Vice-Minister of War re withholding Wang's announcement re central political conference.
17. Telegram from KATO at SHANGHAI to Foreign Minister accompanied by copy of documents exchanged between WANG and MONGOLIANS.
18. Record of SHANGHAI Conference held on 12 February '40 under WANG CHING WEI sponsorship, and letter from Consul YANO to TAJIRI, 19 Feb. '40 regarding simultaneous declaration of Japanese and WANG's Govt.

19. Chinese draft of this declaration.
20. Telegrams concerning recognition by Italy and Spain of Central Govt.
21. "KO-A-IN's" decision regarding the loan to WANG's government made on 19 February '30. Draft of the Premier YONAI's speech concerning Wang's declaration which is to be made before the central political conference is opened. Draft of the guiding principles regarding the new central government's treatment of the national flag, Kuomintang and Sun Yat Sen's three principles on democracy.
22. Telegram from Tsintao to Tokyo regarding the organization of special corps belonging to the new central regime, and a telegram from Chang Chiakov regarding the background of the Mongolian delegates to the central conference.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Blumhagen

Doc. No. 1814.

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No.

Date 1 June 46

1814

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: *File pertaining to WANG CHING-WEI and NANKING Puppet Gov't*

Date: 1939-40

Original (x) Copy ( ) Language: Jap.

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

*Document Division*

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *Foreign Ministry*

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

*WANG Ching-wei; KITA; OTA; (latter two from Japan Foreign Office); NOMURA, Kichisaburo.*

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

*Violation Nine Power Treaty;  
Relations with CHINA*

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    - 2) Deciding policy against CHUNGKING Gov't.
    - 3) Regulating army

Analyst: *2d Lt. Blumberg*

*MBW*

*(over).*

Doc. No.

- 4) Raising money.
  - 5) Luring influential members from CHUNKING to undermine that govt.; chief members being WANG CHIN WEI (as centre) WH PEI FH and others.
- d. Time of establishment of new govt must be decided by Sino-Japanese conference
- e. Policies and political programs must not be contradictory to Japanese <sup>demands</sup> ~~claims~~ which include:
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c. HONAN Province to eventually be placed under direct control of Central Gov't.

d. WANG states preference for CHI HSIEN YUAN as head of post of Chief of Central Military Headquarters or as head of organization in charge of public order in North China.

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dependency of Japan. Exposure of the major points  
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d. Designation of North China and Inner Mongolia  
 as special district for Japan's defense and economic  
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e. Recognition of Japan's economic superiority in  
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 designated islands along South China coast  
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7. Japanese counter measure to commotion aroused by  
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 it was only a draft drawn up by unofficial  
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8. Draft of main points of plans for newly  
 adjusting Japanese-Chinese relations, issued by  
 Cabinet Information Section and discussed at

secretaries' conference, 24 Jan. 40. This is the agreement in question exposed by aforementioned KAO and TAO.

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10. Draft of answers to be made to cover possible inquiries by foreign military attaches re movement to establish new regime: Drawn up by War Ministry 26 Jan. Pictures desire of friendly collaboration as doctrine of SUN YAT SEN and promulgated by WANG; portrays CHIANG KAI SHEK as pro-Comintern and anti-Japanese.

11. Report from Vice-consul ICHIKAWA at SUCHOW to ARITA, 31 Jan. 40, re views of representative people of China concerning establishment of new regime.

12. Main points of explanation re Central Gov't to be given at meeting with leaders of political parties.

~~12.~~ Drawn up 31 Jan 40, probably by KOA-1N.

13. Report from TSINGTAO consulate 5 Feb. re people's comment upon TSINGTAO Conference and upon loan given WANG.

14. Outline of Premier's explanation re Central Gov't problem to be given at secret conference of Diet 5 Feb 40.

15. Essential points of the plans of propaganda in connection with Central Political Council, drawn up by Information Division of Japanese Expeditionary Force in China, 13 Feb. 40.

- a. To be drawn up on basis of TSINGTAO Parley
- b. Actual publicity to be handled by WANG's Govt. with Army Press Section keeping background control.

16. Secret telegram from Chief of Staff of Expeditionary Force to Vice-Minister of War re withholding WANG's announcement re central political conference.

17. Telegram from KATO at SHANGHAI to Foreign Minister accompanied by copy of documents exchanged between WANG and MONGOLIANS.

18. Record of SHANGHAI Conference held on 12 Feb 40 under WANG CHING WEI sponsorship, and letter from Consul YANO to TAJIRI, 19 Feb. 40 regarding simultaneous declaration of Japanese and WANG's Govt.

19. Chinese draft of this declaration.

20. Telegrams concerning recognition by Italy and Spain of ~~the~~ Central Govt



Consular-General in Tsingtao, D. Kato's letter #Ki-Mitsun-224 of Feb. 23, 1940, addressed to Foreign Minister Arita reads mainly as follows:

Re: Formation of a Special Military Corps  
for the new Central Government.

For your information I am sending you enclosed herewith copy of the report which I have received from one of our consular police chiefs concerning the above subject.

Police Chief of the Japanese Consulate-General in Tsingtao, S. Takahashi's letter # Sei-Kei-Ko-Hi-583:2 of Feb. 22, 1940, addressed to Y. Myeda, deputy chief of the Police Section of the Japanese Embassy in Peking and to D. Kato, the Consular-General in Tsingtao.

Re: Formation of a Special Military Corps  
for the new Central Government.

Regarding the above subject, I, for your information, append below a summary of what one of our personnel gathered from a Y. Tsuji, 38, member of the Ansei League, resident in Shanghai, who for about one and half a month travelled round Chinan, Suchow and various outlying points as well, following a secret order by Chief of Staff to the Expeditionary

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Force in China, taking up his duty relative to the headed proposition, on his return to Shanghai by Ss Tsingtao Maru sailed from this place on Feb. 14.

Incidentally, the project in view is at the present moment being carried out in scrupulous secrecy, and I wish that all the concerned authorities handle this information absolutely confidential.

#### Summary of Tsuji's story:

During my recent journey round various outlying points with the object of working upon those who are associated with the "Tsingpan" faction, I have found that among the bandits who are active in various sectors there are many who awakened at the present developments have a desire to surrender. The fact, however, remains in this connection that those rings of bandit, who know the fact that when some of the bandits previously surrendered to the Japanese Army they, after being disarmed, had been subjected to a wholesale slaughter by shot, hesitate to listen to our advice extended over to them to induce them toward allegiance.

Parallel with the Peace and State-founding Army contemplated by the Wang block, our Army has lately been trying to organized a special

military corps picking up those of bandits, who though formerly associated with the "Tsingpan" faction, are now showing allegiance to our side.

The personnel of this special military corps number 11,500 men, headed by Hsu Tieh-shan, the chief of the "Ko-Do-Kai" Association, living in Tsingtan, now nominated as the chief of the proposed corps. This special corps, designed professedly to collaborate with the Peace and State-founding Army as a special military unit of the Wang block, will at the moment of emergency play a role to watch the action of the Wang block. The formation of this special corps is now making a headway, backed by General Itagaki, the Chief of Staff of the Expeditionary Force Headquarters.

/ AKITA /

Summary of the Publicity Program in  
connection with the Central Political Council  
— by the Press Section of the Japanese  
Expeditionary Force, Feb. 13, 1940.

The Key-points of Publicity concerning the Central Political Council.

1. The Press Section of the Headquarters of the Expeditionary Force will study and draw up a scheme of publicity concerning the Central Political Council on the basis of the Tsingtao Parley, and will then turn it over to the Wang side for a further study towards an eventual decision.
  2. We will have Lin Jung-shie, the Chief of the Publicity Dept. of the Wang block handle the matter of press reports while the Central Political Council is in session; our Army Press Section, on the other hand, will mainly work in the background so as to assist the Wang's side in conducting their publicity jobs. We will at the same time keep control over the press correspondents, Japanese as well as foreign.
2. Expansion of the facilities for publicity and press news in relation to the Central Political Council.
- As regards the publicity jobs in relation to the Central

Political Council in Nanking, there are no equipment nor facilities at all, which belong to the Wang's side, for correspondence, publicity and news. We are therefore planning to make an expansion of the present installations and equipment of the Army Press Section by the time when the Council is convened, and to permit the Wang's side to make use of these, so that we can satisfy and meet the need and the activities of the Publicity Section of the Wang's side as well as of the foreign correspondents. Details of the methods we propose for accomplishment of this end can be summarized as follows:

1. Expansion of the equipment which is in the hands of "Chu-Ren-Sha" or the Central United Press.
2. We will request the Central China Electric & Communication Company to increase its capacity of press news service so that it can cover the requirements of the press agencies, Japanese as well as foreign. We will also have the above company to arrange the set-up of its personnel so that it can amply cover the correspondence in alien languages, in particular.
3. With regard to the radio broadcast facilities, we will permit the Wang's side to avail of the installations of our Army Press Section. We will allocate to the Wang's side

ample broadcast hours. At the moment when the Wang side starts its broadcast we will permit them to choose itself a name for its own broadcast station.

4. For the press correspondents of the Third Countries, the Chinese press reporters, and the persons in the journalistic circles, who are coming from the territories other than Central China, we will take steps so as to provide them with all possible facilities as to hotel accommodations, traffic &c.

For foreigners, in particular, we will take special care in order to avoid misunderstandings and troubles whatsoever that may arise from the difference in custom and usage and also from the language barrier. In this connection, we intend to keep a close liaison and cooperation with the Headquarters of Patrol Corps, the Gendarmerie and various other authorities so as to ensure best possible arrangement.

3. Preparation for Transfer of the Publicity Facilities in conjunction with the Central Political Council.

It appears that the opening of the Central Political Council in Nanking affords the best opportunity for the new Central Government to take over the publicity facilities which belong to the "Reformed Government". The new Central Government is now badly in need of publicity equipment. Thus, if some adequate steps are now taken, it may be possible to enable the new government to

take over the equipment from the "Reformed Government" in its present shape, and check sinister attempts such as to create a publicity organ sided with the Kuomintang dictatorship. It is therefore desirable that, taking advantage of this opportunity we take steps to create a better understanding as regards Japan's policy on press news and radio broadcast, which we are planning to carry out in the Chinese territory in future, thereby to ease the job of adjusting the relations between the two nations.

From the above viewpoint, Colonel Mabuchi, the chief of the Expeditionary Force Press Section had a conference with Lin Tung-shieh, the Director of the Publicity Section of the Wang block on Feb. 10, which starting at 3 p.m. lasted for about 4 hours at the latter's official residence in Shanghai, the gist of which being as given in the appendix herewith. These two are expected to have a couple of conferences still.

4. Campaign in exaltation of the new regime after the forthcoming session of the Central Political Council.

It is imperative that mass movements to welcome and to pay tribute to the new government are encouraged when the session of the Central Political Council is over. It is desirable that we right now start action to positively help and guide such a campaign, and to spread an atmosphere

that would be conducive to our purpose.

In conjunction with this, we are now taking measures to bring an incentive to the Chinese people towards an extensive mass movement in cooperation with the Dai-Min-Kai or the "Great Peoples Association" as its centre, in combination with the Koa-Kengoku-Undo or the "Movement for Development of Asia and State-founding."

#### 5. Publicity Organ in Shanghai after the inauguration of the Central Government.

It is the intention of the group of men who sponsored the project to create a central government to open a pivotal publicity organ in Shanghai even after the capital is moved over to Nanking on inauguration of the new government. It is thus all the more important to maintain a closer contact between the Publicity Section of the Central Government and that of the Japanese side in Shanghai. It is advisable that already at this moment we start our study, and thus considerations are now being made by both sides.

#### 6. Scheme for regulating the publicity of Japan and China after the establishment of the Central Government.

It is a matter of capital importance that we take some appropriate measure to regulate the publicity and news matters of Japanese and Chinese sources after the establishment



of the Central Government in order to permit no room of inconsistency and alienation between the two, thereby to ensure smooth collaboration between us.

To attain this end, it is desirable that the governmental authorities, Japanese as well as Chinese, will organize a machinery which can be termed "Sino-Japanese Publicity Liaison Commission (temporary appellation), and a coordinated organ by the non-governmental circle, which may be called "Sino-Japanese Press Reporters Association". The Army Press Section is now studying such aspects:

Summary of the proceedings of the Parley  
between the Japanese side and the Wang side  
on the question of Publicity and Press news,  
occasioned on Feb. 10, at the official residence  
of Lin Tung-shih.

The persons who were present:

Japanese side: Colonel Mabuchi, the Chief of the  
Expeditionary Force Press Section.

Lt. Colonel Miyawaki (Staff of the Press Section)

Secretary Shimizu (of "Wue" or "Plum" organ)

Chinese side:

Lin Tung-shih, the Chief of the Propaganda Dept.

Chou, the assistant Chief " "

Tang Liang-li, the Assistant Chief of the Propaganda  
Dept., concurrently taking charge of the Overseas Propaganda.

Kuo Hsin-feng (Central China Daily)

Liang, the Chief Secretary of the Propaganda Dept.

I. Scheme of the Publicity Weeks:

The First Series:

Publicity shall be effected for a period ranging from the  
middle of February to the latter part of May; each series  
of the publicity campaigns shall be continued for

about 1 to 2 weeks, and be carried out successively one by one. This scheme can be outlined as follows:

- (1) All-China Publicity Conference (Feb. 15): Inviting the persons who are connected with the Wang block and who are interested in the Press business, we will discuss the question of publicity and news. The Army Press Section will take no part in such a conference. On the other hand, the Chief of the Army Press Section should expect Lin to give him reports on its proceedings; while the former will cooperate with Lin by mobilizing the whole personnel of the Army Press Section.
- (2) Peace Bill Propaganda Week (in the latter part of February). Around the central themes, viz. the declaration by Wang Ching-wei and those by all the parties and factions, publicity shall be conducted on the Peace Bill, and efforts be made to ensure an extensive diffusion thereof.
- (3) Propaganda Week on the Kuomintang Government's return to the capital (in the early part of March): Propaganda on the Nationalist Government's return to the Capital as a central theme and a coordinated publicity on various subjects which will be debated and declared by the Central Political Council.
- (4) Propaganda Week on Peace and Unity (in the middle of March): Publicity on the inauguration of the new government.

- (5) Propaganda Week on Constitutional Government.
- (6) Propaganda Week on the Chinese overseas and their contribution to the founding of a new China.
- (7) Propaganda Week on the founding of a new China (in the early part of May).
- (8) Propaganda Week on Planned Economy (in the latter part of May).

We will concentrate on the items (2), (3) and (4); as to the item (5) and the rest we will select among them one or other for our propaganda, according to the development of the situation. As regards the prosecution of the first series of the Propaganda, we would rely on the cooperation and assistance of the Army Press Section in conducting the major part of the propaganda upon the mass population by means of press news, radio broadcast and films and the propaganda upon Chungking and the Third Countries as nobody else than the Nationalist Party is provided with publicity machinery yet. The Army Press Section will by mobilizing its whole personnel and equipment do all possible to assist the Wang side in their propaganda operation.

## 2. Problem of how to deal with foreign press agencies.

The Wang side will not approve the supply of news whatsoever to the foreign press agencies until the Central Press is inaugurated. The Army Press Section too will not authorize such