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on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
S. Con. Res. 27

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Wednesday, January 30, 1946.

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A. M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associated General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

I believe the committee had not finished with Admiral Smith.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, on yesterday I was questioning Admiral Smith. It was the understanding that he would be here this morning at 10:00 o'clock. He is not here.

On yesterday the statement was made by Mr. Richardson of counsel that it would be desirable if possible to hold the testimony to ten minutes, because of the urgency of finishing with the testimony of Captain or Admiral McCollum.

Mr. Kaufman: Captain McCollum.

Mr. Murphy: Captain McCollum.

Now, then I have spent considerable time on the previous testimony of Admiral Smith, and I find, Mr. Chairman, that there is a vast amount of very important material in the previous testimony of Admiral Smith as to why they didn't use the Army planes, as to basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, as to the propriety of it, as to the efficiency of the Fleet at the time of December 7, as well as one more important thing, that when Admiral Kimmel was on the stand I asked at that time if he consulted his air man, Admiral Bellinger, and he said "no," that he consulted Captain Davis.

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1 Mr. Keefe: Admiral Smith is here now.

2 The Chairman: Yes.

3 Mr. Murphy: I want to show by this witness on the
4 stand that Captain Davis was never consulted either.

5 For those reasons, I cannot agree to restricting
6 myself to ten minutes, and if Captain McCollum, I ask that
7 this testimony of Admiral Smith be put over until later.

8 I think the testimony too important not to be developed.

9 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, if I may make this
10 suggestion: There isn't the slightest necessity of the
11 Congressman or any other member of the committee curtailing
12 his examination of Admiral Smith. My suggestion is that
13 the Admiral be permitted to step aside so that we can
14 present the testimony of Captain McCollum and Admiral
15 Bellinger, who are under very imperative orders, and when
16 they are through, there is no reason why Admiral Smith
17 can't be examined to the limit.

18 And I want to make this statement to the committee:

19 There has never been any idea in our minds that Admiral
20 Smith might not be able to give material testimony. The
21 point that we make, and which has been in my mind, is that
22 he has testified two or three times. There will be in the
23 record a very full statement. I have an apprehension that
24 all of the testimony that will be brought from the Admiral
25

h3

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2 The Chairman: Yes.

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22 he has testified two or three times. There will be in the
23 record a very full statement. I have an apprehension that
24 all of the testimony that will be brought from the Admiral
25

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1 here may be just cumulative to that testimony.

2 If, of course, there are new facts to be elicited,
3 not only with Admiral Smith, but with any other witness,
4 there should be further examination.

5 But now I would ask the Chairman to permit the Admiral
6 to pause in his testimony to get rid of these other two,
7 and then take up the testimony. I have been advised too
8 by Captain Zacharias that he desires to offer some further
9 remarks in connection with the matter.

10 The Chairman; Admiral Smith may step aside then,
11 and these other witnesses will be called.

12 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman --

13 The Chairman: The Chair would like to call attention
14 to an article that appears in this morning's Washington Post,
15 with the headline, "Pearl Harbor Report to Hit Army, Navy.
16 Congress to be told High Command, as well as Kimmel and
17 Short, 'Muffed Ball.'" 18

19 The article goes on to say:

20 "The Joint Congressional Committee investigating Pearl
21 Harbor will report to Congress that the War and Navy
22 Departments in Washington share the responsibility for the
23 disaster with Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and Major General
24 Walter C. Short, 1941 Hawaiian Commanders, The Washington
25 Post learned exclusively yesterday.

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1 "The Committee, which is now at work on its report
2 to Congress has tentatively decided, a member disclosed
3 that the High Command here, as well as Kimmel and Short
4 'muffed the ball' and gave the Japs the chance to inflict
5 this nation's greatest naval disaster."

6 And the article goes on further.

7 The Chair wishes to say that the committee has not
8 met, nor discussed its report, even informally, or casually.
9 It has been the Chair's understanding, and I think that of
10 the committee, that the committee will not make up its mind
11 on its report until the evidence is in, and it has met and
12 gone over the situation, and agreed on its report.

13 There isn't any basis for any article in any newspaper
14 that this committee is now writing its report, or that any-
15 body on the committee knows what its report will be.

16 I think it is a distinct disservice to this committee
17 to be predicting and prognosticating a report when the com-
18 mittee has not met or discussed its report.

19 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I want to say as
20 a member of the committee that I certainly have never heard
21 of any member of the committee having an idea as to what
22 the report should be, and that I personally have not com-
23 mented upon the evidence or made up my mind in any way in
24 relation to what the report should be.
25

h6

1 My sole purpose has been and will be during the hearings
2 to get the facts and then I know the committee as a whole
3 will consider those facts and make a report.

4 The Chairman: I appreciate the member's comment. If
5 there is any member of the committee that has any other
6 view or objective, I don't know who it is, but I do feel
7 the committee ought not in advance to be put in the posi-
8 tion of having made up its mind, when we haven't even con-
9 cluded the evidence, and when we will in all likelihood want
10 to take a little time when we have concluded the evidence
11 to consider it, and probably reread some of it in order to
12 get the picture appropriately before the committee before
13 we attempt to write a report.

14 I felt in justice to the committee that that comment
15 ought to be made.

16 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman --

17 The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

18 Mr. Keefe: I want to thank the chairman for making
19 that statement. I had intended to make a similar state-
20 ment when the Chairman very graciously called attention to
21 the article which appeared in this morning's Washington Post.

22 I agree with the Chairman that I think a disservice
23 has been done the committee and the country by the specula-
24 tion that is contained in this article, but perhaps it may
25

h7

1 have been prompted by the fact that it has been suggested
2 that we have been indulging somewhat in clairvoyance in
3 some of the evidence that has been given here. Maybe
4 that is what tended to influence this particular writer.
5 I don't know.

6 The Chairman: I appreciate that.

7 Mr. Keefe: So far as I am concerned, I have never
8 met with the committee to discuss that matter; I don't
9 know of any committee meeting, and if there has been any
10 such agreement by any group on the committee, I know nothing
11 about it.

12 The Chairman: I want to say there has been no meeting
13 so far as the Chair knows of any group and so far as the
14 Chair's intention is concerned, there would be no meeting
15 called of the committee to consider the evidence and con-
16 sider its report until all of the evidence is in; and while
17 it may be that there has been some clairvoyance indulged
18 in here, at least the Chair hopes it will not become con-
19 tagious.

20 That is all.

21 Mr. Kaufman: May we then present Captain McCollum?

22 The Chairman: Yes.

23 Mr. Kaufman: Captain McCollum.
24

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2 that we have been indulging somewhat in clairvoyance in
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18 in here, at least the Chair hopes it will not become con-
19 tagious.

20 That is all.

21 Mr. Kaufman: May we then present Captain McCollum?

22 The Chairman: Yes.

23 Mr. Kaufman: Captain McCollum.
24

1 The Chairman: Captain, will you be sworn?

2 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

3 TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ARTHUR HOWARD MC COLLUM

4 (sworn by the chairman)

5 - - -

6 The Chairman: All right, you may proceed.

7 Mr. Kaufman: Captain, where were you born?

8 Captain McCollum: I was born in Nagasaki, Japan.

9 Mr. Kaufman: And how long have you been in the Navy?

10 Captain McCollum: I have been in the Navy for 28 years
11 continuously.

12 Mr. Kaufman: Will you tell us briefly your experience
13 in the Navy?

14 Captain McCollum: I was appointed to the Naval Academy
15 in 1917 by the late Senator Bankhead of Alabama. I was
16 graduated in 1921, in June.

17 I served for six months on the battleship Arkansas and
18 for two months on the destroyer Argonne en route to the Ori-
19 ent. I arrived in Japan, in Tokyo, in March of 1922 for the
20 purpose of studying the Japanese language. I remained, I
21 think it was, until 1925.

22 During that period for four months I served with the de-
23 stroyers of the Asiatic Fleet who were at that time serving
24 in conjunction with Japanese destroyers assisting in the Army
25 planes flying around the world in 1924. Most of that service

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 was in the Kurile Islands, where I spent nearly six weeks at
3 that time.

4 I returned to the United States in June of 1925, went to
5 submarine school, finished there and in June 1926 I was as-
6 signed to duty on board the USS O7, a submarine operating out
7 of the Canal Zone. I served in that submarine for two and a
8 half years, the last of which I was in command of it. I
9 shifted from the USS O7 to executive officer of a larger sub-
10 marine, the S-11, returned to the United States in that ship
11 in June of 1928 and was ordered to duty as assistant Naval
12 Attache at the American Embassy in Tokyo. I arrived in Tokyo
13 in about October of 1928 and served on that up until June of
14 1930.

15 I returned then to the United States and served for three
16 years on the battleship West Virginia. In 1933 I returned to
17 the Navy Department as head of the Far Eastern Division of the
18 Office of Naval Intelligence. In February of 1935 I was de-
19 tached from that duty and ordered to San Pedro, California to
20 set up a special Intelligence Office to work in conjunction
21 with the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, at that
22 time Admiral Reeves, to make an effort to stop the Japanese
23 espionage attack on the vessels of our Fleet.

24 I completed that duty in 1936 and was assigned as As-
25 sistant Operations Officer and Fleet Intelligence Officer on

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2 the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet,
3 Admiral A. J. Hepburn. I continued in that duty until about
4 1 February of 1938. The last seven months of that duty I
5 was Acting Operations Officer of the Fleet, having no senior
6 in that billing.

7 I spent then two months on temporary duty here in the
8 Navy Department in connection with the installing of a new sys-
9 tem for keeping check of the movements of vessels of the Fleet,
10 was assigned to the command of the destroyer Jacob Jones. In
11 the course of that cruise I was detached from the command of
12 the Jacob Jones in the latter part of September of 1939, re-
13 turned to the United States and was assigned to duty in the
14 Division of Naval Intelligence, where I was detailed as of-
15 ficer in charge of the Far Eastern section.

16 I was relieved from that duty in October of 1942, was
17 ordered as Operations Officer on the staff of the Commander
18 of the Southwest Pacific force, which was later called the
19 Seventh Fleet, which was that part of the Navy serving under
20 General MacArthur's orders overall command. Upon arrival I
21 was directed by the Admiral to assume duty as Intelligence
22 Officer of that Fleet and served and developed an Intelligence
23 organization for him.

24 I served as Intelligence Officer of that Fleet until
25 about 1 May of 1945, when I returned to this country. I am now

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 assigned as commanding officer of the heavy cruiser Helena.

3 Mr. Kaufman: During the months of October and November
4 1941 what was your assignment?

5 Captain McCollum: I was head of the Far Eastern section
6 of the Division of Naval Intelligence. I might add that from
7 the 25th of August until about the 14th of October I was ab-
8 sent from the United States.

9 Mr. Kaufman: You returned here around the 14th of
10 October 1941?

11 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

12 Mr. Kaufman: And you continued as Chief of the Far East-
13 ern section until October of 1942?

14 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

15 Mr. Kaufman: And who was the counterpart of your par-
16 ticular position in the Army?

17 Captain McCollum: Colonel Bratton.

18 Mr. Kaufman: Now, as part of your duties as Chief of the
19 Far Eastern section was it part of your duties to keep track
20 of the fleet movements, of the Japanese fleet movements and
21 will you explain to the committee the manner in which that was
22 done?

23 Captain McCollum: It was. I had a special section in
24 my office who were charged with that particular duty. We had
25 a large chart spread on the wall with the ocean divided up into

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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certain zones to which we had given names. All sorts of information concerning the movements of any Japanese man-of-war were entered on a card and that card index was kept together and daily or more often as necessary pins representing the various ships of the fleet were moved around on this chart and for my own purposes there was a sheet summarizing the situation.

Mr. Kaufman: Did the time come in November 1941 when you determined that the Intelligence Office in Washington had lost track of part of the Japanese fleet?

Captain McCollum: By the time you speak of we were almost wholly dependent on one form of radio intelligence for information concerning the Japanese fleet which was not on the China coast. That form is known as traffic analysis, whereby inferences are drawn from such things as the volume of radio traffic and call signs and so on.

Those inferences were drawn and were made based largely on radio intelligence by that particular section of the Communications Intelligence organization. Their conclusions were then submitted to my office.

Radio intelligence, of course, has very definite limitations. If the man you are trying to find out about does not use the radio, radio falls down. After a fleet has been in port a certain length of time, in the absence of other informa-

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 tion, that is, information other than radio intelligence, such
3 as sight contact or some other report from an observer, unless
4 the call signs of those ships are heard very definitely and
5 plotted in by compass a doubt arises as to whether those ships
6 are where radio intelligence thinks that they are. That situ-
7 ation existed, to my mind, from about the middle of November on.

8 Mr. Kaufman: And as a result of that doubt did you
9 dispatch to the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet a dispatch
10 which is dated November 24, 1941, part of exhibit 37? (Hand-
11 ing document to witness.)

12 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir, I drafted that dispatch and
13 it was released by my chief, Admiral Wilkinson.

14 Mr. Kaufman: And in reply to that dispatch did you get
15 communications from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic
16 Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet which
17 are referred to on page 7610 of the record before this commit-
18 tee, pages 7610 and 7611? (Handing transcript to witness).

19 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Kaufman: On or about December 1st, 1941 did you cause
21 to be prepared a memorandum showing the disposition or location
22 of the Japanese fleet?

23 Captain McCollum: May I just see it, sir? I think I
24 know what you mean, Mr. Counsel, but I would just like to re-
25 fresh my mind, sir.

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 (Whereupon the document referred to was handed to the
3 witness.)

4 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir, this is a routine report on
5 this particular subject and under the office orders that ex-
6 isted at the time, while that is dated 1 December, the in-
7 formation and the time, the dead line for preparing this re-
8 port was about two days before that, sir.

9 Mr. Kaufman: And in that memorandum that you prepared
10 you indicated that part of the Japanese fleet was in Japanese
11 home waters?

12 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

13 Mr. Kaufman: That is exhibit 85 before this committee.

14 On or about December 6th did you prepare another memo-
15 randum as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet? (Handing
16 document to witness.)

17 Captain McCollum: December 6th?

18 Mr. Kaufman: December 1st.

19 Captain McCollum: No, sir. This memorandum that you have
20 shown me here on December the 1st is a memorandum which I
21 personally prepared covering the development of the entire
22 situation, the general location on the idea of the Japanese
23 fleet and it is only one part of it. This summarizes the
24 situation and is an attempt to show what to my mind was the
25 very critical situation that had been brought about step by

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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step.

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Mr. Kaufman: And was that communicated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

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Captain McCollum: So far as I know it was not, sir.

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This thing was actually drafted by me on the Friday and Saturday preceding. If I remember correctly, December the 1st was

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Monday. I polished it up in some aspects and took it to my chief, Admiral Wilkinson, early Monday morning in finished

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11

form. He read this document over, directed me to wait in his

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office and disappeared. He came back in about ten minutes and said, "You be ready to go to the office of Admiral Stark

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with me between 11 and 11:30 this morning and make a number of copies of this thing that you have given me."

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I did that and at the time stated I appeared in Admiral Stark's office. Present in that office at the time were Ad-

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miral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Turner, the

20

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Director of War Plans, of course my chief, Admiral Wilkinson, and one or two other flag officers, I believe Admirals Brain-

ard and Noyes.

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23

At the direction of Admiral Wilkinson copies of this memorandum were passed to each of the flag officers present.

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I then read the memorandum personally and engaged in a discussion at that time and pointed out that in my opinion war or

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 rupture of diplomatic relations was imminent and I requested
3 information as to whether or not the fleets in the Pacific
4 had been adequately alerted.

5 I was given a categorical assurance by both Admiral
6 Stark and Admiral Turner that dispatches fully alerting the
7 fleets and placing them on a war basis had been sent. I had
8 seen no such dispatches at that time.

9 Mr. Kaufman: Were you informed at that time of the war
10 message sent by Admiral Stark to the Commander-in-Chief of
11 the Pacific Fleet under date of November 27th?

12 Captain McCollum: Not except in the form of the assur-
13 ance that adequate information in alerting the fleet had been
14 sent.

15 Mr. Kaufman: In connection with the preparation of the
16 memorandum to which you have just referred did you rely to any
17 extent on the traffic analysis reports received by you from
18 Admiral Kimmel?

19 Captain McCollum: Oh, yes. I might point out that the
20 best stations for traffic analysis were at Corregidor, the
21 radio intelligence center there, and after Hawaii to Oahu.
22 We were dependent on those places for our information here.

23 Mr. Kaufman: Now, Captain, we will go to another sub-
24 ject. You are familiar with the intercepts of the Japanese
25 diplomatic code regarding the setting up of the so-called

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 winds code?

3 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir. I had first
4 heard it called the winds code upon my return to Washington
5 last May, sir.

6 Mr. Kaufman: But you are familiar with the two inter-
7 cepts that are part of exhibit 1?

8 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Kaufman: On pages 154 and 155 of exhibit 1.

10 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir, I am familiar with these.

11 Mr. Kaufman: And they are dated when, sir?

12 Captain McCollum: The first one is dated from Tokyo
13 to Washington 19 November 1941, translated apparently in the
14 Navy Department on November the 28th, 1941. The second one
15 is also dated Tokyo to Washington 19 November 1941, trans-
16 lated in the Navy Department on 26 November 1941.

17 Mr. Kaufman: Now, after those two messages were called
18 to your attention what did you do to insure receipt of any
19 execute message in furtherance of that code?

20 Captain McCollum: At my recommendation my chief, Ad-
21 miral Wilkinson, went to the Director of Communications,
22 Admiral Noyes, and asked him to set up everything he possibly
23 could to intercept the execute of these dispatches and it is
24 my understanding that that was done. That would be done by
25 that technical service.

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Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Mr. Kaufman: And any reports with respect to the execute of the winds code would normally come to you?

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Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir, - should have.

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Mr. Kaufman: Did you up to December 7th get any information that an execute message of the winds code had come through?

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Captain McCollum: About the middle of the week I was told -- I had heard that an execute which would have meant relations with Russia in danger had been received. In checking back on the Japanese original, or in trying to run down the Japanese original of that particular dispatch we checked it very carefully and we came to the conclusion that it was not an execute whatsoever; that it was merely a part of an ordinary weather broadcast.

Mr. Kaufman: And the only one that was called to your attention was that relations with Russia had been broken?

Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: It did not relate to relations with the United States or with Britain?

Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: And it did not relate to war with either one?

Captain McCollum: None of these related to war, sir; that is, being exact about it. The translations all used the euphemism of strained relations, or what have you, sir.

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Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 Mr. Kaufman: Would you explain the Japanese language
3 relating to the setting up of those codes?

4 Captain McCollum: I presume either one of them will
5 do, will it, sir?

6 Mr. Kaufman: I think so.

7 Captain McCollum: In the first one here the dispatch
8 says:

9 "Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an
10 emergency.

11 "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our
12 diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international
13 communications, the following warning will be added in the
14 middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news
15 broadcast.

16 "(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger:
17 HIGASHI NO KAZEAME."

18 That means "east wind rain".

19 "(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI."

20 That is "north wind cloudy".

21 "(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE."

22 That means "west wind clear".

23 "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end
24 as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated
25 twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc.

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

3 "Forward as urgent intelligence."

4 I would like to point out that the value of this thing
5 as a code is wholly dependent upon the use of particular
6 and precise Japanese words, used in a precise position within
7 a broadcast. Any departure from that order must necessarily
8 cause the code to be in doubt.

9 For instance, one might say "east wind rain" in a number
10 of different ways in Japanese. Here it is in the rather
11 emphatic and brief form "Higashi No Kazeame". We might as
12 well say "Kaze Higashi Ame", which means exactly the same
13 thing in another form.

14 So I may point out the translation will not suffice.
15 It must be the particular Japanese words used in a particular
16 sequence in a dispatch. They deal with weather matters here
17 and they could so easily be confused that the value of this
18 thing as a code would be nil.

19 Mr. Kaufman: Exactitude is necessary?

20 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

21 Mr. Kaufman: And if other words were used meaning the
22 same thing then you would not regard that as being an execute
23 of the code?

24 Captain McCollum: No, sir, not in this type of thing.

25 Mr. Kaufman: I asked you just a few moments ago as to

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 when your attention was called to a break in Russian rela-
3 tions. Do you recall when and where that information came
4 to you?

5 Captain McCollum: That came to me from Captain Kramer,
6 who is, I think -- I cannot be certain on this, but I heard
7 later -- excuse me, I am wandering. I heard later that
8 Admiral Noyes, Director of Communications, set up a special
9 system for warning me and the officers in the Naval Plans
10 about the arrival of any of these winds messages, or winds
11 information. That I did not know about at the time.

12 I heard one morning somewhere about the middle of the
13 week of 1 to 7 December that such a dispatch had been re-
14 ceived, and I sent for Kramer and we went over it in detail
15 and came to the conclusion that it was not the real thing,
16 and I am fairly certain that Colonel Bratton of the Far
17 Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Service also
18 worked on it with his experts and came to the same conclusion,
19 and we continued to check back and forward with each other.

20 Mr. Kaufman: Captain McCollum, I direct your attention
21 to a communication from the FCC, Federal Communications Com-
22 mission, which is part of Exhibit 142, and ask you whether
23 that is the information that you got to which you just
24 referred?

25 Captain McCollum: I cannot be certain that it was this

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2 particular one, but it was one of this same general connotation,
3 because we went back, or tried to go back to the original
4 Japanese on this thing.

5 Mr. Kaufman: Will you look at the one on the next
6 page and see whether that refreshes your recollection?

7 Captain McCollum: I am sorry, Mr. Counsellor, I cannot
8 identify any one of these as the exact one I saw. It might
9 have been either one of them.

10 Mr. Kaufman: The two papers to which I just referred
11 are items 3-B and 3-C of Exhibit 142.

12 Aside from the suggestion that there may have been an
13 execute of that portion of the code as related to Russia,
14 you had no other information?

15 Captain McCollum: Not until after the war had started,
16 sir.

17 Mr. Kaufman: I am talking about up to and including
18 December 7.

19 Captain McCollum: No, sir.

20 Mr. Kaufman: After December 7, the day after Pearl
21 Harbor, did a message come in in execution of the winds code?

22 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir, one that we thought was
23 an execute, and that either came in late on the afternoon
24 of the 7th or sometime on the 8th. The code, as translated,
25 if you can use that term, would have indicated strained

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1 relations between England and Japan.

2
3 Mr. Kaufman: You refer now to item 3-B of Exhibit 142?

4 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Kaufman: Captain Safford has testified that a
6 winds execute message was received in the Navy Department on
7 December 3rd or 4th. Did any such information come to you?

8 Captain McCollum: I saw nothing of that sort, sir.

9 Mr. Kaufman: Captain Safford testified in substance
10 that predicated on information that an execute message had
11 been received you prepared a dispatch to go to the various
12 outposts. Did you prepare any such dispatch?

13 Captain McCollum: I did prepare such dispatch, but it
14 was not predicated on the winds execute, sir.

15 Mr. Kaufman: What dispatch are you referring to now?

16 Captain McCollum: After submitting my memorandum to
17 Admiral Wilkinson and through him to the Chief of Naval
18 Operations --

19 Mr. Kaufman: You are referring now to Exhibit what?
20 Exhibit 81?

21 Captain McCollum: The 1 December 1941.

22 (Continuing) -- I was put in the rather difficult posi-
23 tion of not personally knowing what had been sent out to
24 the Fleet. Possibly it was none of my business. As I pointed
25 out to you, the basis of this memorandum, the information it

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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was based on was actually as of about the 28th of November.

As time went on we had sent out dispatches to our Naval Attaches in Tokyo, Pieping, Bangkok and Shanghai to destroy all of their codes, and to report by the use of a code word, and those codes were destroyed.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness McCollum

1 We were getting reports from our observers of the
2 Japanese task force which was moving down the Kra Penin-
3 sula. Our planes were sighting forces moving, our sub-
4 marines were trailing them. We had some little informa-
5 tion in addition. I still did not know what had been sent
6 to the Fleet.
7

8 I drafted a rather brief dispatch, outlining the
9 information pretty much as is in this memorandum, but
10 greatly condensed. I went further and stated that we felt
11 everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of hostilities
12 between Japan and the United States. That dispatch was
13 taken by me to my Chief, Captain Hurd, and together we
14 went in to see Admiral Wilkinson. We did it in view of
15 the fact that the function of evaluation of Intelligence,
16 that is, the drawing of inferences therefrom, had been
17 transferred over to be a function of the War Plans Division.

18 I was directed to take that dispatch and present it
19 for the consideration of Admiral Turner, the Director of
20 the War Plans Division, which I did.

21 Admiral Turner read the dispatch over. He then made
22 a number of corrections in it, striking out all except the
23 information parts of it, more or less, and then showed me
24 for the first time the dispatch which he had sent on the
25 27th, which I believe is referred to as the "war warning"

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness McCollum

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1 dispatch, and the one which was sent, I believe, on the
2 24th -- wasn't it?
3

4 Mr. Kaufman: That is right.

5 Captain McCollum: (continuing) -- which preceded that
6 dispatch, and said did not I think that was enough. I
7 said, "Well, good gosh, you put in the words 'war warning.'
8 I do not know what could be plainer than that, but, never-
9 theless, I would like to see mine go too."

10 He said, "Well, if you want to send it, you either
11 send it the way I corrected it, or take it back to Wilkinson
12 and we will argue about it," or words to that effect.

13 I cannot presume to remember precisely.

14 I took it back to Admiral Wilkinson and discussed it
15 with him, and he said, "Leave it here with me for a while,"
16 and that is all.

17 Now, I would like it understood that merely because
18 this was prepared on a dispatch blank in no sense means
19 it was an official dispatch. It was merely my recommenda-
20 tion to my seniors which they were privileged to throw in
21 the waste basket, I imagine. It was in no sense a part of
22 the official file. It is nothing other than a recommenda-
23 tion for the dispatch officer. I have written dozens of
24 dispatches for the Admiral, and he could either throw them
25 away, or use them. There was no record kept of that sort

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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of thing.

Mr. Kaufman: That dispatch, or that memorandum that you prepared had no relation or no reference at all, to the winds execute message?

Captain McCollum: No, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: And if Captain Safford says that the dispatch or memorandum that you prepared had relation to the winds execute message, what is your version of it?

Captain McCollum: I think Safford would be misinformed in that. He has judged my intentions in what motivated me, sir, and I believe I am a better judge of that than he is, although I do not impugn his motives whatsoever. He may sincerely believe that to be true, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Captain Safford testified at one place that the last paragraph of your memorandum or dispatch had particular reference to the winds execute message, and a suggestion by you that you wanted to avoid another Port Arthur.

Captain McCollum: No, sir, I could not have done anything like that, Mr. Counsellor, when I did not have the winds execute message.

Mr. Keefe: May I inquire, Mr. Chairman? Am I correct in the understanding that this purported message

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Senator Lucas
Mr. Keefe
Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Lucas: As far as the evidence is concerned,
3 there is no evidence in the record that any dispatch of
4 this character was ever sent?

5 Captain McCollum: There is no evidence that any dis-
6 patch of this character was ever sent.

7 Senator Lucas: By the Chief of Naval Operations?

8 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir, no dispatch
9 was ever sent.

10 Mr. Keefe: Does the evidence disclose the date of
11 this alleged conversation, or the writing of this dispatch?

12 Captain McCollum: These things are entirely memory
13 on my part, sir. There is no record of this thing at all.
14 As I explained to you, this was drawn up and written on
15 the dispatch form. When the dispatch does not go, you
16 wind it up, and throw it in the waste basket. That is
17 what happened probably in this case.

18 Mr. Keefe: Do you recall the date that this took place?

19 Captain McCollum: It was either the fourth or fifth,
20 sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: Of December?

22 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: That would be on a Saturday or a
24 Friday?

25 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir. It was about that time.

The Chairman

Witness McCollum

Questions by:

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The Chairman: The 7th was Sunday, the 6th was Saturday, and the 5th would be Friday.

Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: And the 4th would be Thursday.

The Chairman: The 4th would be Thursday.

Captain McCollum: Yes.

The Chairman: And so on, backwards.

Senator Ferguson: Let the record show that I asked the question, thinking it might refresh his memory if he knew what day of the week it was.

I know just as well as the other members of the committee what day these dates fall on.

The Chairman: The Chair recognizes that.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 Mr. Kaufman: We will go now, Captain, to another item.
3 I direct your attention to a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu
4 dated September 24, which is part of Exhibit 2, and being on
5 page 12 of Exhibit 2.

6 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir, I have seen this dispatch
7 since coming to Washington this time, sir.

8 Mr. Kaufman: Did you see it at or about the time it
9 was translated on October 9?

10 Captain McCollum: No, sir, I was not in Washington
11 at that time, sir.

12 Mr. Kaufman: You arrived in Washington about the 16th?

13 Captain McCollum: I arrived in Washington about the
14 11th, sir, but that was Friday and I had certain notes and
15 reports that I made. I had been to Europe and I had to
16 knock some of my notes in shape, and I called in at the
17 office and then went home where I got my notes in shape,
18 and actually went down to the office on Monday, sir, and
19 it was probably two or three days after that before I got
20 myself into the saddle again, sir.

21 Mr. Kaufman: Do you recall whether that particular
22 memorandum, or that particular dispatch, which has been
23 referred to here as plotting a chart of Pearl Harbor, whether
24 that came to your attention at any time after you came
25 back and before December 7th?

1 Witness McCollum

questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 Captain McCollum: Mr. Counsellor, I cannot be certain.
3 If it did not it should have been called to my attention as
4 Chief of that Division, sir. I have heard it in the testimony
5 before this committee, that I have read, sir, I have heard
6 it referred to as the bombing plan. All I can say about
7 that, sir, is if I saw it it did not make much impression
8 on my mind, nor did it make much impression on the minds of
9 any of the considerable number of what were supposed to be
10 quite capable officers who saw this dispatch at that time,
11 sir.

12 The first time I ever heard it referred to as being
13 any definite bombing arrangement was when I believe the
14 former counsel advanced that hypothesis before this committee,
15 sir.

16 Mr. Kaufman: And what interpretation, if you saw it,
17 did you put on it, or what interpretation do you put on
18 that chart now?

19 Captain McCollum: The situation in regard to the
20 Japanese obtaining intelligence in this country was this:

21 Back in 1935 the Japanese Navy was apparently not
22 satisfied with the type of intelligence forwarded to them
23 by their consular agents in this country and undertook
24 the setting up, on the West Coast of the United States, of
25 an observation net of their own. We knew about it in

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 1935 and broke it up by 1936. We purposely let a certain
3 portion of it run along so that we had an insight into the
4 organization on this coast, on the West Coast of the United
5 States.

6 During all of this time it was my feeling then, and
7 it is my feeling now, that the Japanese had been unable to
8 put Naval observers into the consulate general at Honolulu.
9 In 1941 they had them at Seattle, San Francisco, the Los
10 Angeles-San Diego area, and Panama. Panama was serviced
11 from the Japanese Naval Attache's office in Peru. These
12 offices, you will remember -- we were able to run two of
13 them out. One was arrested I think in Los Angeles in about
14 June of 1941. Okada, Lieutenant Commander, and son of the
15 former Premier of Japan, was chased out of the country about
16 the same time. He had been operating in Seattle.

17 As we estimated it, the Consul General at Honolulu
18 was receiving, through the Foreign Office at the instance
19 of the Japanese Naval Department, explicit directions of
20 the type of intelligence that was needed, much more in detail
21 than any of the other key consulates on the West Coast,
22 because he did not have the benefit of the services of
23 a Japanese Naval Intelligence Officer within his consulate.

24 Therefore this thing here, if I saw it, I am quite
25 certain I would have felt it was just another move to get

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2 explicit information, to cut down the frequently voluble
3 type of reports made by consular officials which the Japs
4 Navy did not like.

5 More than that, sir, I cannot say.

6 Mr. Kaufman: You do not now regard it as a bombing
7 plan for Pearl Harbor?

8 Captain McCollum: Not necessarily, sir, not unless
9 I had known that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, and then I
10 could say this certainly looks like it might be such a plan,
11 sir.

12 Mr. Kaufman: Now we will go to the last item, Captain,
13 and that is the 14-part message, part of which arrived
14 on Saturday, December 6.

15 Were you on duty at that time?

16 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Kaufman: When did you first receive the 13 parts
18 of that message?

19 Captain McCollum: I was receiving parts of that message
20 as they came in. I was down in my office until late
21 Saturday night, sir. They called me up at my home in the
22 middle of the night and told me that the rest of it had come
23 in, but they did not have the last part, there was one still
24 to come. I inquired right away what steps had been taken
25 to deliver it and to whom. I was informed it had been

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 delivered by Captain Kramer to the Director of Naval
3 Intelligence. Fortunately the Naval Aide for the President
4 happened to be at his house, as was, I believe, the Director
5 of Military Intelligence, General Miles, who had all seen
6 it at that time, and that steps had been taken to deliver
7 it to other of the high command in the Navy Department and
8 presumably to the White House, because our channel there
9 was with the Aide to the President, Admiral Beardall.

10 Mr. Kaufman: What time, to your recollection, did this
11 message begin to come in on Saturday?

12 Captain McCollum: I cannot say, sir. About 5:00 o'clock
13 in the afternoon was the first time that I heard about it,
14 sir, that it was coming in. It might have come in before that.

15 Mr. Kaufman: Did you stay on duty until that entire
16 message had been received?

17 Captain McCollum: No, sir. My office was on a 24-hour
18 basis by early November, sir. I had a total of six officers,
19 including myself and including Kramer, who was excluded
20 because of his special relationship there. Early in November
21 I take it the three senior officers, that is from experience,
22 either myself, Captain Watts or Colonel Boone were on duty
23 in my office, together with adequate assistants such as we
24 had on a 24-hour basis, sir. I took over the watch on
25 Sunday morning sometime between 7:30 and 8:00, and about 9:00

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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had arrived and desired to see me. I went up to Admiral
Wilkinson's office and we entered into a discussion of the
first 13 parts of this dispatch. I should say that would
be 9:00 o'clock or maybe a little later. While we were
talking an orderly or someone came in and said Admiral
Stark had come into his office, and Admiral Wilkinson said,
"Well, come on, let's go and see the Chief." We went down
the passageway and went into Admiral Stark's office. At
that time there was no one in Admiral Stark's office except
himself. None of his aides were present in the outer office.
We went in and discussed this thing with Admiral Stark
and then came on out. That was the 13 parts.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Hook follows

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman
Mr. Keefe

1 Shortly after that, the 14th part was delivered to
2 me. I took it up with Admiral Wilkinson, and pointed
3 out to him the difference in the tenor of the language
4 of the 14th part from that of the other. We immediately
5 took it to Admiral Stark and pointed out to him the viru-
6 lence, and tenor of the language of the 14th part of it.

7 Mr. Kaufman: What time would you say it was that
8 you and Admiral Stark discussed it?

9 Captain McCollum: Certainly before 10 o'clock, sir.
10 Nine-thirty, or ten. I cannot be exact, Mr. Counselor.
11 I am trying to do the best I can, sir, but I just did not
12 have the time to check the time precisely, sir.

13 At that time, the suggestion was made that it looked
14 right there that that was enough to indicate that we
15 could expect war. That term was used. That was an infer-
16 ence. I mean there was nothing about war in this dispatch
17 at all, and possibly was loose language, unquestionably
18 was loose language, but we were all rather thinking in
19 those terms.

20 The suggestion was then made that an additional warning
21 be sent to Pearl Harbor.

22 Mr. Keefe: By whom? Who made the suggestion?

23 Captain McCollum: Admiral Wilkinson, sir. Some little
24 discussion went on, and, as far as I know nothing was done
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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at that time.

About a half-hour later -- I was still in Admiral Stark's office -- when word was sent in that one of my officers wished to see me, and I stepped out, and Kramer was standing there with the time part of the dispatch; that is, an additional dispatch which directed the Japanese ambassadors in Washington to deliver this note at one o'clock Washington time.

Mr. Kaufman: That was the 14th part of the message, was it not?

Captain McCollum: I am not certain without referring to it. I thought it was a separate message, was my impression, sir, and that the 14th part in it, the last thing, was rather a Philippic thing against the United States. It followed the usual procedure, and this procedure was used as an emphasis. There was nothing unusual about that.

The Chairman: You are either too close or too far from the microphone. Some of the members have difficulty hearing you. Will you raise your voice a little?

Captain McCollum: Is this better, sir?

The Chairman: That is better.

Captain McCollum: The time zone is set up as a routine procedure in my office, and in order to keep track of what

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman
Senator Lucas

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time of day it was there, whether it was sunset or sunrise, or moonset, we had a standard procedure that when any dispatch of which time was an element came in, we immediately converted that time to not only our own time but usually set up Washington time, West Coast time, Honolulu time, Manila time, and Tokyo time. That was all set forth, because the Japanese operate entirely on Tokyo time, that is, all of their time business in the Japanese Navy is run on Tokyo time.

So that a consideration of these times is necessary to get a view as to what is understandable in relation to sunrise and sunset, and other phenomena that have a rather important effect on naval operations.

Senator Lucas: You mean the Navy was run on Tokyo time?

Captain McCollum: The Japanese navy was run on Tokyo time; that is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas: I am sorry I interrupted you.

Captain McCollum: Thank you sir.

As a result of that, Kramer had worked out these times and those times were shown just on a rough sheet of paper as they appeared to Admiral Stark. The suggestion was made at that time that this indicated that if anything was going to occur, it would probably start about that time.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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1 As I remember it, Admiral Stark picked up the
2 receiver of his telephone and attempted to contact someone
3 over the telephone. It was my impression at the time that
4 he had tried to get the Chief of Staff of the Army, and
5 had been unsuccessful in getting through.

6 By this time, a good many of the senior officers of
7 the Division of Operations had come in. They were in and
8 out of Admiral Stark's office. Various times of the morn-
9 ing, Admiral Turner was there, Admiral Ingersoll was there,
10 Admiral Brainard, I am certain Admiral Noyes was there,
11 and of course, my chief, Admiral Wilkinson.

12 Later on, about 11 o'clock or maybe later in the
13 morning, I was given to understand that it had been decided
14 to send a warning to Pearl Harbor -- I wish to stand cor-
15 rected there, to the forces in Hawaii, including the Fleet,
16 and that the warning dispatch was to be handled by the Chief
17 of Staff of the Army and it would be in a form which would
18 be sent to General Short who would be instructed to trans-
19 mit the substance of that dispatch to the Commander in
20 Chief of our Fleet, Admiral Kimmel.

21 Mr. Kaufman: One further question, Captain.

22 An examination of Exhibit 142, and some of the other
23 dispatches, indicates delays in transmission. Will you
24 tell us whether anything was done about that?
25

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Captain McCollum: As to that part of it, there are officers of the technical service that are probably better qualified to answer that than I am. However, I would venture this general explanation:

These dispatches were intercepted at a great many intercept or pick-up stations located in various parts of the world.

Once they were picked up, the pick-up station had no personnel qualified to either decode or translate any of this material. They only had operators who were skilled in taking the Japanese equivalent of our Morse code. Those dispatches, therefore, from any given pick-up station, when received, were sent to a center, depending on who was the control center -- either Washington, Pearl Harbor, or Corregidor.

They might have sent it either by radio, teletype, or by mail.

Radio and teletype facilities were not always available.

When sent by mail to one of the decryption and translational centers, as soon as they arrived, there was an office procedure for taking through the dispatch, and an attempt was made to decrypt the code.

It is my understanding that priorities were first given on the basis of the code classification. In other

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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1 words, the higher the code classification, probably the
2 more important the information was.

3 There was also the precedence of the dispatch, that
4 is the urgency with which it was sent. Those were obtained
5 from the normal procedure signs at the head of the dispatch.
6

7 Then an attempt was made to decrypt them together,
8 if we had the particular code table in which that code
9 was sent.

10 We did not always have it. Sometimes these codes
11 would be received and we did not have the method or means
12 of decrypting them until sometime afterwards.

13 Once it was decrypted, or sufficiently decrypted to
14 indicate some importance, it was handed to one of the
15 translators who took a look at it to determine whether he
16 thought it should be completely broken down for further
17 decryption. That had to be done because of the limited
18 number of people capable of translating the language,
19 and to make the very best use of the people we had.

20 When we were working full blast, the way we were,
21 oh, for the month immediately preceding the attack on our
22 Fleet, great effort was made to get the stuff out on these
23 negotiations right away, just as quickly as we possibly
24 could.

25 Now, that was dependent on the time of arrival at the

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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decoding center, which was not of necessity directly related to the time of transmission from Tokyo, whether the code to decode it was available or not, and dependent upon the relative importance of it as determined prior to reading any of the contents.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1 Now, when you come then to a slack period, that is,
2 when we weren't getting so many messages, they would go
3 back and work on the old ones. The effort was to decode
4 everything but to try to decode the most important ones
5 first.

6 Mr. Kaufman: Captain, you said a moment ago that
7 Pearl Harbor was a central point for decryption. What
8 type messages were decrypted at Pearl Harbor, if you know?
9

10 Captain McCollum: Going back somewhat here, sir,
11 the Navy Communications Intelligence organization was
12 set up first with headquarters in Washington. Then we
13 put an organization out in the Asiatic spheres with head-
14 quarters in Cavite first, and later at Corregidor. We
15 originally had pick-up stations in Peking, Shanghai, Guam,
16 and I think at one time one almost in Japan, some years
17 ago.

18 Until the early 30's very little had been done so far
19 as Honolulu was concerned. We didn't have very many
20 people. The first idea was that they would be a mobile
21 movement, that would move with the Commander in Chief of
22 the Fleet. I had such a movement when I was Fleet Intelli-
23 gence Officer. That was found unworkable. They couldn't
24 get the sets. As a result of that, a route of entry was
25 set up in Honolulu with the hope that that could be built

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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3 Until about early 1941, we had only, it is my under-
4 standing, a very rudimentary organization in Honolulu. At
5 that time we were very fortunate in having become avail-
6 able the services of Captain Rochefort, who is the only
7 officer in our Navy who is a top-flight cryptographer,
8 and radio man, and who also has a thorough knowledge of
9 the Japanese language. He was obtained from the staff
10 of Vice Admiral Andrews, and put in charge at Honolulu
11 with instructions to build up his organization as rapidly
12 as he could.

13 He did not get very much help, I believe, from
14 Washington. We didn't have the people, and he was in the
15 process of building up that organization with the primary
16 job of making an effort to break Japanese naval codes and
17 ciphers when the war occurred.

18 It is my understanding that they did not have the com-
19 plete codes to enable them to read the Japanese diplomatic
20 messages, nor is it my understanding that they were
21 expected to; that their principal effort was to be directed
22 on an attack on Japanese naval codes.

23 Mr. Kaufman: Do you know whether Admiral Turner
24 thought that the organization in Hawaii could decode Japanese
25 diplomatic codes?

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 Captain McCollum: This is hearsay, Mr. Counsellor.
3 I heard him say before this committee that he thought so,
4 sir.

5 I wish to clarify one point. This organization at
6 Honolulu by dropping everything else that they were doing
7 and using some of the standard books that they had, and
8 by exercising cryptographic efforts, in other words, a
9 direct attack with some of the very clever officers they
10 then had out there, were able to read the gist of some of
11 the low-grade stuff in the Japanese diplomatic ciphers.

12 In other words, it was a major cryptographic effort
13 on each code, that was my understanding, but they couldn't
14 read it right straight through.

15 Mr. Kaufman: Now, coming back to the meeting at
16 Admiral Stark's office on Sunday morning after you had the
17 one o'clock delivery date for the message, did any officer
18 at that meeting suggest Pearl Harbor was a possible point
19 of attack?

20 Captain McCollum: Pearl Harbor as such was never men-
21 tioned. The feeling that I had, and I think the feeling that
22 most officers there had, was that at or near the outbreak
23 of war with Japan, we could expect a surprise attack on the
24 Fleet.

25 When I was acting Fleet Operations Officer of the Fleet

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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right in our Standard Fleet Operating Plans of War was the major assumption that upon the outbreak of war with Japan, or the near outbreak of war with Japan, we could expect a surprise attack or an attempted surprise attack on the Fleet.

I recollect, by way of illustration, if I may, at Christmas, 1937, we went on an all-out alert on the battle-ships and fleet based on the West Coast, and that went on for some time.

Mr. Kaufman: If it was the assumption of all of the officers there that there would be an attempted surprise attack on the Fleet, did not that mean Pearl Harbor because the Fleet was at Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCollum: That is correct, but if the Fleet had not been at Pearl Harbor it would mean wherever the Fleet was.

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Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman
The Chairman

Mr. Kaufman: But it was never suggested that Pearl Harbor better go on an all-out alert immediately?

Captain McCollum: I think the thinking was in terms of the Fleet, Mr. Counsellor, that the Fleet should have been alerted all the way through.

Mr. Kaufman: Did the officers there assume that Pearl Harbor was on an all-out alert, both Army and Navy?

Captain McCollum: I had been given to understand that they had been thoroughly alerted, sir, and on their toes.

Mr. Kaufman: No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Just one or two questions, Captain.

Did you state what date it was in December that this message came through that seemed to refer to Russia but which you did not regard as an execute?

Captain McCollum: I think, Senator, that it is right here, sir, if I may refer to it.

The Chairman: Yes.

Captain McCollum: One of them here is on the 5th of December and I think there is one preceding that. Here is one on the 4th of December, sir.

The Chairman: If any execute message, in view of your position, which could have been regarded as an execute message, predicated upon this winds forecast, had come to the Navy Department, would you have seen it?

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Chairman

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Captain McCollum: I should have seen it, yes, sir.

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The Chairman: Was there any reason, if it did come, why you wouldn't have seen it?

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Captain McCollum: Oh, occasionally, I believe it has been testified here before there was a special arrangement made here by the Director of Communications, Admiral Noyes, to get this information promptly higher up in the chain than I was, Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, and so on, under those conditions it would be possible that they would overlook me, but in the normal chain I should have seen that first, sir.

13

14

The Chairman: If such a message or a similar message came through in what office would a record of it be kept?

15

16

Captain McCollum: That should be kept down in the Communications Intelligence Office.

17

18

The Chairman: It would have come there first?

19

20

Captain McCollum: That is correct.

The Chairman: They would have kept a record or a copy of it and sent it up to the next order?

21

22

23

Captain McCollum: They would have gone through their office filing procedure, Senator, on that, and Kramer or one of his assistants would have brought me that instantly.

24

25

The Chairman: When it got to you would there be a record of it in your office?

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Chairman

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Captain McCollum: No, sir.

3

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The Chairman: You passed it on upstairs. You kept no record then?

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Captain McCollum: I took those messages in my office, Senator, and filed them in a file and kept them for a period of about two weeks, when they were then returned to the Communications Intelligence Section, where those messages were destroyed, sir.

10

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The Chairman: In case such a message went up to Admiral Wilkinson and thence up to Admiral Stark, so that all of them saw it, would there be any record in each of those offices that the message had been received?

14

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Captain McCollum: No, sir.

The Chairman: Would not?

Captain McCollum: No, sir. It was carried by an officer by hand to these people and every effort made to get a copy and return it to the Communications Intelligence Center, who then kept the master file.

20

21

22

The Chairman: So that the only office in which there would be a written record of the receipt of this message would be in the office where it was received?

23

24

25

Captain McCollum: That is right.

The Chairman: Who was in charge of that?

Captain McCollum: Captain Safford would be the head

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 of that office.

3 The Chairman: Now, the intercept that was received
4 indicated that if certain things happened, if they got this
5 weather forecast from Tokyo, east wind rain, and so forth,
6 it was based upon an assumption that an emergency came into
7 being, and then they spell out what the emergency is in their
8 mind by saying "breaking off relations".

9 Captain McCollum: That parenthesis is a translator's
10 explanation, Senator. In other words, the translator has
11 given you the exact Japanese translation and then he in
12 parenthesis gives you the full force and meaning of the
13 Japanese, sir, which is not always possible in a direct
14 translation.

15 The Chairman: In other words, what is in the parenthesis
16 is his interpretation.

17 Captain McCollum: Is the translator's interpretation
18 and explanation of his use of the words.

19 The Chairman: And the other part is as to the breaking
20 of communications. They are two separate things.

21 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

22 The Chairman: Diplomatic relations might be broken
23 between the two governments.

24 Captain McCollum: That is correct.

25 The Chairman: But without any breaking of diplomatic

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Chairman

2 relations communications might be cut off?

3 Captain McCollum: That is right.

4 The Chairman: Even private communications, telegraph
5 or radio?

6 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

(3) 7 The Chairman: In case those things happened and they
8 got this broadcast about the weather they would understand.

9 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

10 The Chairman: So that the basis upon which the execute
11 message would be sent was never in existence. There was
12 no diplomatic break of relations and no breaking of communi-
13 cations between Japan and the United States or between the
14 communications systems, public or private, prior to the
15 attack?

16 Captain McCollum: That is right.

17 The Chairman: So the basis upon which they were pre-
18 dicting that such an execute message might come through
19 never transpired?

20 Captain McCollum: That is correct.

21 The Chairman: If such a message had come through it
22 would have been in a sense premature because conditions for
23 forecasting it did not take place?

24 Captain McCollum: That is right; unless they wished
25 to use this and forecast the action which they expected to

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Chairman
The Vice Chairman

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2 occur some hours later, but as you pointed out, that did
3 not occur.

4 The Chairman: That is all.

5 Congressman Cooper.

6 The Vice Chairman: Captain, why was not priority given
7 to the decoding, decrypting and translating of these Japanese
8 messages?

9 In other words, what I am trying to ascertain is this,
10 I got the impression that these intercepted Japanese messages
11 were handled more or less in a routine manner. I was
12 wondering why the highest type of priority was not given
13 for the immediate decoding, decrypting and translating of
14 these messages intercepted from Japanese sources.

15 Captain McCollum: Oh, but they were, sir. If the
16 impression was given that the thing was routine, that is a
17 wrong impression, sir. Everyone was working tooth and nail
18 to get these things out as quickly as they possibly could, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: To the exclusion of others?

20 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir. In other
21 words, the people working on the Japanese, the major effort
22 was put on the Japanese and all other things that had rela-
23 tion to it were dropped completely out of the picture.
24 Every effort of that organization was bent on this thing,
25 the decrypting of these dispatches.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1. The Vice Chairman: My recollection is that the evidence
2 presented here during the appearance of General Miles, who
3 was G-2 of the General Staff of the Army, as you know, it
4 was called to his attention that all the way from 2 to 20-odd
5 days of time elapsed from the time the Japanese message
6 was sent before it was decoded and translated.
7

8 Now, did anything of that kind happen with the Navy?

9 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir; I have tried to explain
10 that, sir. In other words, if I may take a hypothetical
11 case, assume that a Japanese diplomatic dispatch was picked
12 up in one of the pick-up stations in Alaska. I, again, do
13 not know the physical means they had but there were such
14 stations that the only communication they had was by mail.
15 Assume, again, that that was the only station that picked
16 up that particular dispatch. That would come in to us here
17 in Washington we will say by mail. As much as a week might
18 elapse from the time it was actually received at the pick-up
19 station until it was received in the Decoding Center in
20 Washington. The minute that thing then came in it would
21 be looked at to see if we had the code that would permit
22 us to decode it, sir. If we had that code it would be
23 decoded in part, handed to a translator who would translate
24 part of it to ascertain whether, as far as he had gone,
25 whether it merited complete breakdown, particularly if there

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 was more code work to be done on it.

2
3 Then if it didn't look important it would be set aside
4 in favor of things that looked to be more important and
5 pressing, sir.

6 Those things were done first. Then when you came to
7 a slack time everything that you hadn't done before would
8 be decoded. The set-up was to try to decode what appeared
9 to be the most important things first and get them out just
10 as quickly as we could, sir.

11 The Vice Chairman: Now, can you tell by review of these
12 messages that have been presented here in evidence that the
13 most important messages were handled more promptly than the
14 less important messages?

15 Captain McCollum: I think so, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: You think that is the true situation?

17 Captain McCollum: I think that is the true situation
18 looking at it all over, sir. I think the most important
19 ones went out first.

20 The Vice Chairman: Of course, you are an expert in
21 this and I am not.

22 Captain McCollum: No, sir, I am not an expert. As
23 I said before, sir, I am not an expert in that field and I
24 believe there will be an officer here, Captain Safford,
25 and perhaps others, who are much better qualified to explain

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 in detail on those points than I am, sir.

3 The Vice Chairman: Well, at least you have had much
4 more experience with it than I have, that is a fair statement,
5 isn't it?

6 Captain McCollum: Thank you, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: Of course, there is a definite
8 physical problem involved in this type of work.

9 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir. Not only that, I might
10 add, Mr. Congressman, but there is a mental problem involved.

11 Senator Lucas: A what?

12 Captain McCollum: A mental problem. This type of
13 work is one of the most trying mental exercises that you
14 have.

15 The Vice Chairman: I can appreciate that.

(4) 16 Captain McCollum: We have had a number of our officers
17 and a number of our civil people break down rather badly
18 under continual punching on this sort of thing and it is a
19 continual concern of officers who handle those people to
20 keep them from coming to a mental breakdown on this type
21 of work.

22 The Vice Chairman: I can readily appreciate that it
23 is a difficult task. That would certainly be my idea about it.

24 I want to see if you can clear me up on this point.

25 The records presented here, these exhibits of the messages,

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 rather indicate that some relatively unimportant messages
3 were decoded and translated more promptly than some other
4 messages here which were much more important. Now, can you
5 help me some on that?

6 Captain McCollum: That may be because on the more
7 important messages they weren't able to break them at the
8 time they arrived. They might not have arrived until after
9 the unimportant ones were here. On the more important
10 messages we couldn't use all of our translators. We had to
11 use only the few top-flight ones. We only had six or seven.
12 We had increased our number 100 percent, sir, but it was
13 still six or seven when we got through with that in 1941.

14 And, if I may be pardoned for going back to this, the
15 so-called translator in this type of stuff almost has to
16 be a cryptographer himself. You understand that these things
17 come out in the form of syllables, and it is how you group
18 your syllables that you make your words. There is no
19 punctuation.

20 Now, without the Chinese ideograph to read from it
21 is most difficult to group these things together. That is,
22 any two sounds grouped together to make a word may mean
23 a variety of things. For instance, "Ba", may mean horses
24 or fields, old women, or my hand, all depending on the
25 ideographs with which it is written. On the so-called

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 translator is forced the job of taking from unrelated
3 syllables and grouping them into what looks to him to be
4 intelligible words, substituting then such of the Chinese
5 ideographs necessary to pin it down, and then going ahead
6 with the translation, which is a much more difficult job
7 than simple translation, sir.

8 For that reason all of the people, however qualified
9 they might be in the Japanese language, had to have con-
10 siderable experience in this particular field before they
11 could be trusted to come through with a correct interpreta-
12 tion of the dispatch.

13 The Vice Chairman: I can understand those difficulties.
14 Is it true that many words in the Japanese language can be
15 given a variety of meanings, as you have indicated by this
16 one word you have used here?

17 Captain McCollum: It depends on the Chinese ideograph.
18 The reason is this: The Japanese language is an uninflected
19 language. It is straight out. They borrowed and applied
20 to the Japanese the Chinese characters. The Chinamen indi-
21 cate a difference between the characters by a difference
22 of inflection. Therefore the Chinaman, when he talks, sounds
23 like he is singing. The Japanese, not being able to sing,
24 when he says "Ba", we will say, he doesn't know whether it
25 is one of a half a dozen different things that he means. It

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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is not uncommon to see two Japanese in discussion who get out of tune and one of them has to write the character down to show the other what he is talking about.

The Vice Chairman: In ordinary conversation?

Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Well, I might take a second to state that I had the experience one time when I was in school of meeting a Chinese student, and he said "So many words in your language mean such a different thing." He said, "You talk about a horse running fast and then you talk about a man being tied hard and fast." He said, "One is going and the other can't move at all. What do you mean."

I can understand some of the difficulties. Let me ask, if I may, assume that one of our stations somewhere picked up a Japanese message. It is then rushed by the fastest available means of communication to a center where the decoding, decrypting and translating is done. Is that correct?

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Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

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The Vice Chairman: Then there is somebody there who has to make an appraisal on the value of the information contained in that message?

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Captain McCollum: Yes, sir, that is correct, but that appraisal in the first instance is done without the benefit of reading any of it.

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The Vice Chairman: Just by looking at it?

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Captain McCollum: By judging from the -- as I say, I may be contradicted later on because I am not exact on this, but you have at least two methods of judgment of that. One is the urgency of the dispatch, in other words, whether it is priority, triple priority or so on.

The Vice Chairman: The Japanese, do they use terms for that?

Captain McCollum: Not those terms, but I mean they use a similar system. They have to in practically all of these systems.

The Vice Chairman: I see.

Captain McCollum: Then by looking at it they could tell whether it was in one of the highest security codes or a code of less security or what kind of code and the presumption was that the higher the security of the code the more important was the information contained in that, sir.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: And then after that appraisal was made --

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Captain McCollum: Then after that you would look to see where it came from, whether it was the embassy in Washington, the Foreign Office in Tokyo talking, or something that concerned us more directly.

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The Vice Chairman: And after that appraisal was made, why, then --

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Captain McCollum: Yes, sir. We tried to run time after time what we called technically time studies in there;

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 that is, to see how fast we could get them out.

3 The Vice Chairman: As I recall, we also received in-
4 formation that one difficulty was the lack of trained, quali-
5 fied personnel.

6 Captain McCollum: Oh, yes, sir, that was all the way
7 through. I might add on that, sir, that from 1907 until the
8 outbreak of the war in 1941 the Navy had exposed to Japanese
9 language instruction a total of about fifty officers. By
10 1941 about 43 of those were available, either active or re-
11 tired. All but eight of those people were on specialty jobs
12 when the war commenced.

13 In October of 1941 the Navy started schools for the in-
14 struction of college men in the Japanese language and those
15 schools opened on 1 October 1941, I think, with about 40
16 selected students, one at Harvard and the other at the Uni-
17 versity of California out in Berkeley. They were subsequently
18 combined at Boulder in Colorado, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: Well, Captain, to invite your at-
20 tention to what I have been trying to inquire about, on page
21 245 of exhibit 1 in the middle of the page there appears a
22 brief message there from Tokyo to Washington. It apparently
23 was sent December 6, 1941 and is shown to have been trans-
24 lated the same day. That would not be a very important mes-
25 sage, would it?

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 Captain McCollum: No, sir, but on this thing, this might
3 have cleared right away as it came in. In other words, the
4 code might have been immediately available. It was a simple
5 matter to put it into Japanese and it was simple and it was
6 translated almost by looking at it.

7 The Vice Chairman: But you would not regard this as an
8 important message, the opening words there, "There is really
9 no need to tell you this"?

10 Captain McCollum: No, sir; that is correct.

11 The Vice Chairman: But that was translated the same day
12 it was sent.

13 Captain McCollum: That is right, sir.

14 The Vice Chairman: Now, then, I invite your attention to
15 page 29 of exhibit 2. Do you have it there?

16 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: A message from Honolulu to Tokyo
18 sent December 6, 1941, not translated until the 8th, December
19 8, 1941. That was two days later. That would be --

20 Captain McCollum: That is an important message.

21 The Vice Chairman: That would be an important message,
22 wouldn't it?

23 Captain McCollum: That is an important message.

24 The Vice Chairman: What I am trying to get at is, two
25 messages sent on December 6th, one of them of practically no

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 importance translated that day, another message sent on De-
3 cember the 5th that was important not translated for two days
4 later.

5 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir, that is correct. As I have
6 said before, sir, I cannot answer that directly because it
7 would depend so much, sir, on where the pick-up station was
8 located that got this thing and how fast they got it in to
9 Washington, sir. There is nothing in this dispatch to indi-
10 cate when it was received in the decryption center here, sir.

11 The Vice Chairman: But it is an important message --

12 Captain McCollum: It is.

13 The Vice Chairman: (Continuing) -- because they were
14 inquiring about our air reconnaissance.

15 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: And things there in Hawaii.

17 Captain McCollum: That is right, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: Now, Captain, did you state that the
19 best decoding, decrypting and translating officer in the
20 United States Navy was at Pearl Harbor? You gave the name of
21 some man.

22 Captain McCollum: That was my impression, Mr. Cooper.
23 I have known Rochefort a good many years.

24 The Vice Chairman: What is the name?

25 Captain McCollum: Rochefort, sir; R-o-o-h-e-f-o-r-t.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: What was his rank?

Captain McCollum: He was then a Commander, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Commander Rochefort?

Captain McCollum: Yes, sir. As early as 1925, Mr.

Cooper, he was looked on as being one of the outstanding cryptographers and radio officers in the service and because of those special qualifications he was sent to Japan to acquire a knowledge of the Japanese language, which he did, and to my mind he is the only officer in the entire naval service that in this particular field is preeminent because of his training in both the language and the decryption, together with my evaluation of his ability. I rate him as one of the ablest officers in the service, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And he was on duty there in Hawaii on December 7th?

Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And had been for some time prior thereto?

Captain McCollum: In May, I believe it was, of 1941 he took over that job.

The Vice Chairman: He went to Hawaii in May 1941 and continued there until after December 7, 1941?

Captain McCollum: And he stayed there until the Battle of Midway, sir.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman yield for a question
3 on that point?

4 The Vice Chairman: Yes, I yield, Senator.

5 Senator Lucas: What equipment did he have compared with
6 what you had in the center here at Washington for decrypting,
7 decoding and translating?

8 Captain McCollum: As I have indicated, Senator, he was
9 in the process of getting things organized. His job was to
10 make an attack on the naval codes. I am not informed as to
11 the details of the equipment, sir. I believe that Captain
12 Safford, who was the head of that section, can give you that
13 information in detail, sir, and anything I might say might
14 merely becloud the issue, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: Is that all?

16 Senator Lucas: Thank you, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: Then this Commander Rochefort you say
18 had been engaged in this type of work from 1925?

19 Captain McCollum: It was my understanding, sir -- well,
20 Mr. Congressman, the first time I had ever heard of this sort
21 of thing was in 1925, when I worked for a brief period here
22 in the Navy Department, sir. At that time Safford was in that
23 section and I understood that he and Rochefort more or less
24 alternated in that job. Safford I believe was a Lieutenant
25 then and Rocheford was a Lieutenant, Junior Grade, and when I

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 was Assistant Naval Attache in Tokyo this fellow Rochefort was
3 up there with a wife and a child and I sent a dispatch to the
4 Navy Department protesting the sending of a married naval of-
5 ficer out there because living conditions were most difficult
6 and our general rule was that an officer that studied Japan-
7 ese was unmarried largely because of the difficulty of sup-
8 porting a family and keeping his wife and children happy while
9 he buried himself in this language business, and I was told
10 that they had special reasons for overlooking the normal in-
11 cumbrance of a wife and a child, that this fellow was going to
12 stay anyway, so it was only after I got back to Washington
13 and talked to him about it later, in 1930, that I commenced to
14 realize why they had sent this individual out there.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

15 The Vice Chairman: It was because of his ability in that
16 field?

17 Captain McCollum: That is correct.

18 The Vice Chairman: When was that that he arrived in
19 Japan?

20 Captain McCollum: That, I believe, was in 1929, sir.

21 The Vice Chairman: Now, did you state that these inter-
22 cepted Japanese messages we re sent to Pearl Harbor by the
23 stations that picked up the message?

24 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir, they had a pick-up method.
25 Whether Pearl Harbor merely passed them on to the decryption

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 center here or not, I do not know, sir. I think each one of
3 these centers, - the idea was that each one of these centers
4 controlled a certain pick-up station. Those pick-up stations
5 flowed -- the information went from the pick-up station to
6 the center and then anything that center could not do they
7 sent on to another center that could handle it.

8 For instance, these diplomatic messages of the Pearl
9 Harbor net or the Hawaii net might well be flown into the --
10 might well have moved first into the center at Hawaii and
11 then been transmitted by radio or cable direct to Washington
12 because they were not working on this particular type of stuff
13 out there, sir.

14 The Vice Chairman: Well, now, Honolulu was a center --

15 Captain McCollum: That is correct.

16 The Vice Chairman: (Continuing) -- for those intercepted
17 Japanese messages to be sent to?

18 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: And they had the best man in the
20 Navy in Hawaii at the time qualified to do this type of work?

21 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir; that is my opinion as to
22 his ability, sir. Someone else might differ with me on that.

23 The Vice Chairman: You certainly ought to know more
24 about that than I do.

25 Now, on that question, Captain, of this message that you

Witness McCollum

Questionsby: The Vice Chairman

1
2 referred to as the bomb plotting message, dividing up of
3 Pearl Harbor into five sectors.

4 Captain McCollum: Yes.

5 The Vice Chairman: Now, did you ever in all of your wide
6 experience in the Navy know of any request for such detailed
7 information about the location of our Fleet as was called for
8 in that message?

9 Captain McCollum: No, sir. Might I elaborate on it a
10 bit, sir?

11 The Vice Chairman: Yes, I would be glad for you to.

12 Captain McCollum: The anchorage there at Pearl Harbor
13 is chopped up into a number of more or less independent lochs
14 there. When we moved the Fleet in and out of that place where
15 the ships were moored in there, whether they were pointing in
16 or pointing out, whether they were double banked or whether
17 they were in the east loch or west loch or wherever they might
18 be, was indicative of the facility with which the ships could
19 move out. The channel going in is fairly shallow and a ship
20 the size of a battleship has to move at relatively reduced
21 speeds.

22 I am speaking, if I may say so, from my experience as
23 Operations Officer on Admiral Hepburn's flag when we moved
24 the Fleet in and out of that place two or three times.

25 The Vice Chairman: Did you serve at one time as Opera-

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 tions Officer of the Fleet?

3 Captain McCollum: I was Assistant Operations Officer of
4 the Fleet and Acting Operations Officer of the United States
5 Fleet for about seven months, sir. I served as Assistant
6 Operations Officer for about eighteen months.

7 The Vice Chairman: While the Fleet was based at Pearl
8 Harbor?

9 Captain McCollum: Well, sir, we were not based there but
10 we went there.

11 The Vice Chairman: You went there?

12 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: All right, go ahead.

14 Captain McCollum: So that those questions relating to
15 how the ships were anchored and where they were anchored in
16 there might be interpreted to indicate the facility with which
17 that Fleet was prepared to move.

18 To give a general statement of where the ships were, the
19 stuff they are requiring here, would require a rather long
20 winded dispatch, where the same device, such as breaking it
21 up into areas A, B and C, such a simple device could be used.
22 With this area discovered a rather simple and short dispatch
23 would suffice to give the essential information as to the lo-
24 cation of the Fleet and also an indication of their readiness
25 for sortie. I would suggest that that is a reasonable, tenable

Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1

2 hypothesis as to why they wished information, apparently, in
3 this detail.

4 The Vice Chairman: Now, then, one other question, if I
5 may, please, Captain. Did you ever know of a Fleet commander
6 taking the position that all information received by the Navy
7 Department in Washington should be sent to him for his evalu-
8 ation?

9 Captain McCollum: Well, sir, I have not served intimately
10 with any large number of Fleet commanders, but certainly
11 neither the Fleet Commander Admiral Hepburn that I served with,
12 nor the Fleet Commander, Admiral Kincaid, that I recently
13 served with, took that attitude, sir.

14 The Vice Chairman: Hasn't it always been generally re-
15 cognized that the Navy Department is supposed to make certain
16 evaluations and give appropriate information and instructions
17 to Fleet commanders?

18 Captain McCollum: That was the basis on which I under-
19 stood that we were operating here in Washington, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: Well, hasn't that been the traditional
21 policy of the United States Navy?

22 Captain McCollum: So far as I am aware, yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: All right, thank you. Senator George
24 of Georgia may inquire.

25 Senator George: I never heard the direct, Mr. Chairman,

Witness McCollum

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so I will pass. I did not hear his direct.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Clark had to go to a meeting of the Rules Committee. Senator Lucas of Illinois is recognized at this time. It is now about three minutes to 12, Senator. Would you like to start after Lunch?

Senator Lucas: I will start after lunch.

The Vice Chairman: At this point the committee will take a recess until two o'clock, please, Captain, Be back at that time.

(Whereupon, at 11:57 A.M., January 30, 1946, a recess was taken until 2:00 P.M. of the same day.)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness McCollum

9181
Questions by: Senator Lucas

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

3

The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

4

5

Come forward, please, Captain.

6

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ARTHUR HOWARD MC COLLUM, U.S. NAVY

7

(Resumed)

8

The Vice Chairman: Does counsel have anything at this time before examination is resumed?

9

10

Mr. Richardson: No.

11

The Vice Chairman: Captain, do you have anything you want to bring to the attention of the committee before your examination is resumed?

12

13

14

Captain McCollum: No, sir.

15

The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois will now inquire.

16

17

Senator Lucas: Captain, I am not sure just the route that one of these messages takes from the time it is intercepted until it finally gets into the high command. With the hope of avoiding repetition I should like to have you take, for instance, the so-called pilot message -- which, as I understand, you saw and were familiar with?

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Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

24

Senator Lucas: Now, where was that intercepted, if you remember?

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WARD 6 PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Captain McCollum: Senator, I do not know where it was intercepted, sir.

Senator Lucas: I see. Where was it analyzed, decrypted and decoded, or whatever term you use?

Captain McCollum: My impression is that that was done here in Washington.

Senator Lucas: Where is that station located?

Captain McCollum: The center for doing that work was right in the Navy Department at that time.

Senator Lucas: In the Navy Department?

Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Who would be in charge of that work in December 1941?

Captain McCollum: Captain Safford was the officer in charge of that section, sir.

Senator Lucas: Captain Safford was the officer in charge?

Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Did he possess all of the necessary knowledge in order to properly decrypt, translate, decode these messages?

Captain McCollum: Not in his person, but within his organization, yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: He did not have that peculiar information within himself?

Witness McCollum.

questions by: Senator Lucas

1 Captain McCollum: He is one of the best cryptographers
2 and experts on the radio aspects of this thing in the Navy.
3 That is his reputation, sir. He is not a Japanese language
4 man, sir.

5 Senator Lucas: I understand. So you would have to
6 rely upon the Japanese language men for proper translation?

7 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Lucas: And when he would translate it he would
9 then transmit it to -- what is the name, Captain Safford?

10 Captain McCollum: No, sir. When translated that came
11 directly to me, sir.

12 Senator Lucas: Where did Captain Safford get in on it?

13 Captain McCollum: Captain Safford was the administrative
14 head and the director of the whole organization. Then that
15 organization is broken down into certain parts, one of
16 which you might call the translation-distribution center
17 whose people were actually attached to my office but worked
18 under Safford and were headed up by Kramer.

19 Senator Lucas: Do I understand Safford then saw all
20 of the messages?

21 Captain McCollum: Ordinarily he would see them all,
22 either as a check-up or as they went through office procedure,
23 but occasionally, if something hot came in Kramer could
24 come directly with it to me or higher authority.

25 Senator Lucas: After the Japanese language student

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 translated the messages they were presumed to go to
2 Captain Safford?
3

4 Captain McCollum: I didn't quite understand.

5 Senator Lucas: I say, after they were translated by
6 the Japanese language student these messages were presumed
7 at least to go to Safford?

8 Captain McCollum: Captain Safford would see them sooner
9 or later, but not necessarily immediately.

10 Senator Lucas: You saw them all, is that correct?

11 Captain McCollum: That was the idea, yes, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: Is that an answer to your question, Senator?

13 Senator Lucas: He said that was the idea.

14 Captain McCollum: If I haven't answered your question
15 I will try to do so.

16 Senator Lucas: I said was it your duty as a result
17 of the position you held at that time to examine each and
18 every one of the messages that came from the language student?

19 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: After you examined one of these messages
21 what did you do with it?

22 Captain McCollum: I then indicated the distribution
23 within the Navy Department, sir, and made sure that my opposite
24 numbers in the War Department had it, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: That was ordinarily a standard distribution?

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Captain McCollum: If that distribution within the Navy Department needed additional ones I added that for if the ones I considered important had not been so marked I added those marks to them.

Senator Lucas: Who delivered the so-called pilot message, what did you do with it, if you remember?

Captain McCollum: That pilot message was distributed on the standard distribution in the Navy Department.

Senator Lucas: Who did that?

Captain McCollum: Captain Kramer.

Senator Lucas: Captain Kramer was the individual who was held responsible?

Shefner follows

WARD S. PAUL - WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Captain McCollum: He actually carried it around and delivered it to the various officers who should have received it, sir, including mine.

Senator Lucas: That helps me just a little, Captain. One further question. You have repeatedly said that at no time did you ever see an implementing winds message after you had the original pilot message.

Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir. That is prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator Lucas: Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I want to examine you just briefly upon the so-called pilot message with which you are familiar.

I call your attention to that message which is No. 2353 and then I also direct your attention to the message sent from Tokyo to Washington on that same day, November 19, 1941, known as Circular No. 2354:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts."

And at the bottom of that it says:

"The above will be repeated five times and included at the beginning and end."

Will you explain that to me, what that means?

Captain McCollum: This, I take it, sir, is an additional

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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word code to the one we had before. As you notice, the word "HIGASHI" up there means "East" and this is an additional word code to be used in either the voice broadcasts or possibly in the news broadcasts sent out in Morse and would be repeated five times at the start of the message and five times at the end of the message, sir.

Senator Lucas: Do you consider that this message identified as 2354 has anything to do with 2353?

Captain McCollum: It is the same sort of thing, sir. It brings out the same, it is an attempt to convey the same information.

Senator Lucas: Well, that was the way I construed it from my limited knowledge of the type of message that was sent. I admit that I have no particular powers of analyzation of a message of this kind but as a layman in reading these two messages I could not help but read one unless I read the other and then attempt to construe both of them as really one message. Am I correct about that?

Captain McCollum: They are not one message.

Senator Lucas: No, they are not one message.

Captain McCollum: But they are attempting to convey the same information. The Japanese at that time were trying, as I remember, - were most anxious to convey this information and they apparently rigged up an additional word, - two

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 additional word codes, that is, hidden word codes here to
3 accomplish that purpose, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: Counsel seems to think, after giving these
5 two messages some study, that they set up both of these types
6 of message, one to go to the general public and one to go more
7 or less to the diplomatic representatives, but they both mean
8 the same thing.

9 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Lucas: Well, I was just wondering whether or not
11 any message, any purported implementing message was ever re-
12 ceived or it is contended was received whereby they repeated
13 five times the particular word, including it at the beginning
14 and the end? Have you ever heard that discussed?

15 Captain McCollum: I never saw such an information mes-
16 sage.

17 Senator Lucas: Let me ask you this: If an implementing
18 message of any kind came from the result of the information
19 contained in Circular 2353 or Circular 2354 wouldn't it be
20 necessary in order that the people receiving it, the Japs
21 receiving that message in this country would thoroughly under-
22 stand what it means, to have the names repeated five times and
23 included at the beginning and end?

24 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: That is, regardless of what message,

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 whether it was based upon 2353 or 2354?

3 Captain McCollum: I believe, sir, that there are two
4 separate systems; that it could be either this system, 2354,
5 or the system set forth in 2353, sir, not to go in the one
6 message.

7 Senator Lucas: You were testifying this morning upon a
8 question that I want to raise. Do you recall that the Navy
9 Department here in Washington at one time did send to Admiral
10 Kimmel some of these intercepts?

11 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Lucas: Do you know why they discontinued that
13 practice?

14 Captain McCollum: I do not know that it was ever a prac-
15 tice. When the Japanese fleet would start an aggressive move,
16 when the movement was actually going there were times when
17 we were unable to keep up with the evaluation process and at
18 that time certain selected things were sent in a special code
19 system breakable only by the Communication Intelligence organ-
20 ization attached to the staff of the Admiral and was sent for
21 that purpose and it is my recollection that that series of
22 dispatches along, I believe, in July of 1941 will coincide,
23 sir, very closely with Japanese movements into French Indo-
24 China.

25 Senator Lucas: Well, as I understood from the previous

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 testimony there was a while there that they sent these inter-
3 cepts direct to Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific.

4 Captain McCollum: Not all of them by any means, sir.

5 Senator Lucas: Who determined what should be sent at
6 that particular time?

7 Captain McCollum: We had that in my office, sir.

8 Senator Lucas: Well, did you get any orders from the
9 higher command to cease and desist sending those messages to
10 Kimmel?

11 Captain McCollum: No, sir, no such orders, except that
12 there were constant reminders to reduce the sending of these
13 verbatim translations of these dispatches to the ultimate de-
14 gree, sir, and the matter of the security of the information
15 that we were able to break these codes was continually and
16 repeatedly stressed. Where it was possible to draw an evalu-
17 ation from this material and to send the substance of that
18 evaluation out in the form of orders to the Fleet Commander or
19 as an evaluated Intelligence message it was so sent.

20 Senator Lucas: Well, now, returning to the exhibit that
21 contains the message from Tokyo to Honolulu with respect to
22 getting information and dividing the harbor up there in five
23 sectors. You are familiar with that message?

24 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: Whose definite responsibility was it to

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 analyze and evaluate that particular message along with the
3 rest that came in from time to time?

4 Captain McCollum: That would have been the responsibil-
5 ity of the Intelligence Division and then to pass that infor-
6 mation, together with their evaluation, to the Plans Division,
7 who would direct any dissemination to any outfit other than
8 the Plans Division of the Navy Department.

9 Senator Lucas: Well, now, in your Intelligence Division
10 who initiated the original analyzation of a message of that
11 kind?

12 Captain McCollum: My office.

13 Senator Lucas: Your what?

14 Captain McCollum: My office.

15 Senator Lucas: Your office?

16 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: Your office was responsible for analyzing
18 any message from time to time and then whatever evaluation
19 you placed upon that message you sent it on to Admiral Wil-
20 kinson?

21 Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

22 Senator Lucas: Did Admiral Wilkinson have the experience
23 and inside knowledge of the Intelligence work that you and
24 your staff had?

25 Captain McCollum: Admiral Wilkinson had not previous-

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 ly served in Intelligence, sir. He is by reputation one of
3 our most brilliant officers. It is my opinion he has a mag-
4 nificent mind. He accepted my recommendations almost in toto.

5 One of the reasons that Captain Kramer carried these mes-
6 sages around is that Captain Kramer had served in an analy-
7 tical capacity in my office, was completely aware of all of
8 the ramifications and in addition to any written evaluation
9 could in person add a verbal evaluation that might be neces-
10 sary or send for me in case of necessity, sir.

11 Senator Lucas: One other question, Captain. After the
12 so-called pilot winds message was received did you continue to
13 look thereafter for this implementing message that might come
14 in?

15 Captain McCollum: So far as I am aware, sir, we were
16 continuing to look for that after the bombs had started
17 falling on the Fleet, sir.

18 Senator Lucas: Did Captain Safford ever discuss this
19 question with you at any time after the pilot message came in?

20 Captain McCollum: Not that I remember, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: Well, was there any particular reason why
22 in view of your position that you held at that time that you
23 should not have received this implementing winds message if
24 such a one had come in?

25 Captain McCollum: No, sir.

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Do you know of any other message of im-
3 portance whereby you were passed up completely and the Com-
4 munications Officer sent it direct over your head to the high-
5 er command?

6 Captain McCollum: There might have been one or two in-
7 stances in which they did go directly over my head to the
8 higher command but in almost every instance I would know about
9 it shortly thereafter, sir.

10 Senator Lucas: As I understand, Captain Safford says
11 that he took this message direct to you and handed it to you.

12 Captain McCollum: I have no recollection of that, sir.

13 Senator Lucas: Well, an important message of that kind
14 certainly would have made an impression upon you?

15 Captain McCollum: Very definitely, sir. We were all
16 looking for it, Senator, everybody.

17 Senator Lucas: You were all looking for it?

18 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: And you would have remembered it, I take
20 it, if such a message had been brought to you?

21 Captain McCollum: I feel quite certain I would have,
22 sir.

23 Senator Lucas: Did you have an opportunity to look at
24 the message that was prepared by Admiral Turner and finally
25 sent through by Admiral Stark, known as the war warning mes-

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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sage?

Captain McCollum: I first saw that message about the 4th or 5th of December, sir. I saw no messages prepared by Admiral Turner of that nature, either that one or any of the others that preceded it, before they were sent, sir.

Senator Lucas: Well, you are an officer with a wide range of experience in the Intelligence Department and as such you have had an opportunity from time to time to construe messages of all types and character, have you not?

Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: You had an opportunity to analyze and construe the message that was sent by Admiral Stark on November the 27th to Admiral Kimmel, known as the war warning message?

Captain McCollum: Yes, sir, I have read it repeatedly lately.

Senator Lucas: What would that message mean to you if you would have been out in the Pacific and had received it?

Captain McCollum: Well, sir, the outstanding part of that message is that it says, "This is a war warning." It does not come in the life of most naval officers to receive or see a message containing such words and my personal feeling is that a message containing the information, "This is a war warning", indicated clearly that the Department expected a war

1 Witness McCollum

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 to break out there at any moment from then on, sir.

3 Senator Lucas: I think that is all.

4 The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

5 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

6 The Chairman: Congressman Cooper.

7 The Vice Chairman: Captain, I would like to clear up one
8 point in connection with some questions I asked you this morn-
9 ing and just now asked you by Senator Lucas.

10 With respect to the so-called bomb plot message, was that
11 before you assumed your duties or after?

12 Captain McCollum: No, sir. I was on duty there but I
13 left Washington on the 25th of August and I returned to the
14 Navy Department about -- I got back to Washington on the 11th
15 of October and I did not really commence to function in my
16 office down here until about the 15th, sir. The 11th I be-
17 lieve was Friday and it was a week end and I had notes and so
18 on to prepare, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: Well, was that bomb plot message
20 received during that interval when you were away?

21 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir. It has a note here. It
22 says that it was translated on the 9th of October 1941, sir,
23 so it must have been distributed about that time very closely.

24 The Vice Chairman: And that was before you resumed your
25 work after you came back?

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Thank you, sir.

The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: Captain McCollum, as I understand it you stated as an explanation of the bomb plot, so called, on page 12 of exhibit No. 2, the fact that they had no naval men at the consulate in Honolulu and the fact that Pearl Harbor was an unusually complicated condition. Do you know whether or not those two factors were known to others in Naval Intelligence?

Captain McCollum: I think that was the general feeling, sir, of the Intelligence officers who were working there.

Mr. Murphy: And in your judgment would that have minimized the importance of that rather than have it as an outstanding message that would indicate an air raid on Pearl Harbor?

Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, as I understand it, you did testify as to page 154 in exhibit 1. Will you hand that to the Captain, please? Page 154.

Captain McCollum: I have it, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, that message, if it were not sent by way of an implementing message to the winds code, if it were sent by the Japanese, what were the people to do who received it?

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Captain McCollum: It says in this message here, "When this is heard, please destroy all code papers," and so forth, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Right. Now, the fact is that the Navy did receive messages from Japan through the consulates telling them to destroy the codes?

Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And the very reason why the winds code, so-called, was set up was that if they did send an implementing message that way, to destroy the codes, isn't that right?

Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Actually there were messages sent spelling out exactly what to do to destroy the codes, isn't that right?

Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, after that message was received or, rather, intercepted in Washington who was it who prepared the messages to CINCPAC by way of information and by way of authority as to code destruction at Guam and also informing CINCPAC that the codes were being destroyed at different points throughout the world by the Japanese?

I direct your attention to your testimony, Captain, along that line at page 21 of the Hewitt testimony. That reads as follows:

"Subsequent to this the situation further deteriorated

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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and I recommended to Admiral Wilkinson and we did send
dispatches out to our naval attaches and various naval
agencies throughout the Far East directing that they de-
stroy all their codes and ciphers, and so on, and so
forth, and to affirmatively report when these had been
destroyed. That dispatch was sent so that the Fleet
commanders on the chain going out and coming back would
have the information that the order had been issued.
Some time after the first, possibly around the fourth,
I prepared this."

Now, was it you who prepared that message to the Islands
to take steps about destroying their particular codes, our
own naval codes?

Captain McCollum: No, sir.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Who was it?

Captain McCollum: That would be Captain Safford who prepared that sort of thing, and his Division, sir, in our own islands. The instruction that actually had been given was this, sir: The naval attaches, the people whose codes could be seized by the Japanese, were our responsibility. The general destruction of codes in their outlying areas was the responsibility of the Communications Division. I conferred with Captain Safford, and in view of the fact that it involved codes I asked him to draw up the appropriate thing to send to the naval attaches, so there would be no misunderstanding about which ones they were to destroy.

Mr. Murphy: Now why was it sent out?

Captain McCollum: He drafted this dispatch. I had expected that he would bring it to me. I wished to add something more to it at the time. In his hurry he did not and got it released directly, which was quite all right with me. I had some discussion with Admiral Wilkinson as to whether we should send another one direct to these fellows to destroy other things in addition to codes.

Mr. Murphy: What was the purpose of sending the message?

Captain McCollum: The purpose of sending the message was to insure that none of our cryptographic systems should fall into the hands of the enemy should war ensue.

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: And at that time was the reason for sending it the fact that you thought war was imminent?

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Captain McCollum: That is correct, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: You have been in Naval Intelligence for a good many years. What is the significance in the Navy of a message stating that an expected enemy is destroying his codes, all the different systems?

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Captain McCollum: I would interpret that to mean that the enemy expects to be at war with us in the immediate future, sir.

12

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Mr. Murphy: On page 359 of the Hart testimony Captain Safford testified:

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"Q. Was any of the foregoing information, under dates of November and December, 1941, disseminated by the main Washington unit direct to the corresponding unit in 14th Naval District?

18

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"A. (Captain Safford) No, sir. That was not permitted by a written order then in force."

20

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Was there ever any such order by anybody prohibiting that?

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Captain McCollum: Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Did you ever hear of it?

Captain McCollum: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: If there was such an order, don't you think

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 it should have come to your attention?

3 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to page 359,
5 to Captain Safford's testimony. Do you have a copy of it
6 available? If not, I will read it to you.

7 After speaking about the order in question Captain
8 Safford said:

9 " -- but there was one exception. On the 3rd of December,
10 I prepared OPNAV Secret Dispatch 031855, which was released
11 by Captain Redman, the Assistant Director of Naval Communica-
12 tions."

13 Was that the one you spoke of, which he prepared with-
14 out taking it up with you?

15 Captain McCollum: No, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: I will go on then -- we will come back
17 to that.

18 "A similar dispatch was released by Admiral Wilkinson
19 and filed at 031850. Admiral Wilkinson's message is re-
20 ferred to in the Roberts Report. Before drafting my message,
21 I called Commander McCollum on the telephone and asked him
22 'Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing anything to
23 get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet', and McCollum replied,
24 'We are doing everything we can to get the news out to the
25 Fleet.' McCollum emphasized both 'we's'. In sending this

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 information, I was over-stepping the bounds as established
3 by approved war plans and joint agreement between Naval
4 Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I did it because
5 I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released."

6 Do you recall such phone call from Captain Safford?

7 Captain McCollum: I remember talking to Safford on
8 this subject about that time, sir. The specific things
9 that I said I do not remember, sir. I drafted the dispatch
10 which ONI sent out about the same time. That starts out,
11 I think, "Categorical and specific instructions herein".

12 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you remember Safford did
13 call you?

14 Captain McCollum: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: Did you agree with him, that it was your
16 function and his function to send messages out to the Fleet?

17 Captain McCollum: I felt that messages should have
18 gone to the Fleet, sir. The effort was to get it out there.
19 Now you will notice, sir, Safford's message here, or the
20 one that you refer to, is sent in this system to his
21 Communication Intelligence organizations out there. That
22 would probably be in a code only very closely held by his
23 immediate, you might say, subordinates.

24 Mr. Murphy: He speaks in his testimony of sending a
25 message to Hawaii, that only one man in Hawaii would understand

Witness McCollum

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 what was in it. Why would it be sent that way? He
3 says the only man at Hawaii who would understand it was
4 Lieutenant Coleman. Do you have a copy of that message,
5 do you know?

6 Captain McCollum: I do not know, sir, unless he had
7 some private arrangement of wording with Coleman, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: I am referring to the Navy liaison officer,
9 to page 359, in which Captain Safford said, at page 360,
10 "OPNAV 031855 was addressed to CINCAF and COMSIXTEEN for
11 action but was routed to CINCPAC and COMFOURTEEN for informa-
12 tion. It was written in highly technical language and only
13 one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant
14 H. M. Coleman, on CINCPAC's staff, could have explained its
15 significance."

16 I suppose the "late Lieutenant Coleman" means that
17 he is dead, the man who could understand it. There is a
18 message that only a dead man could understand at Hawaii.
19 I wonder if we have somebody here with that message?

20 Captain McCollum: Mr. Congressman, is that the dispatch
21 which says: "Circular 244. From Tokyo. 1 December. Order
22 London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy machine"?
23 Is that what you are referring to?

24 Mr. Murphy: I don't know. All it says is "OPNAV 031855
25 was addressed to CINCAF", and so forth. He says it was in