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Authority: 795006
By: NARA Date: 11-30-11



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Authority 795006

By AR NARA Date 11-30-11

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
G-2
FAR EAST COMMAND

FILE NO. 210
LINE NO. _____ TO _____
DATE JAN 1948 TO DEC 1948

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SECRET*directed
revised
by Col. Balthus
15 Jan 47*APO 500
13 January 1948SUBJECT: Air Force Officer to Serve in Theater Intelligence Div,
G-2 Section, GHQ, Far East CommandTO : Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces,
United States Air Force, APO 925

1. Continued and increasing demands by JSPOG on G-2 for Intelligence Annexes, Estimates, Data for Air Target Studies, etc., require the assistance of Air and Naval officers within Theater Intelligence, on a working level as a corollary to Ground intelligence and for coordination of the latter, with that of Air and Naval intelligence. The present organization of G-2 Theater Intelligence, without representation of the Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces, Far East, causes loss of valuable time and effort in coordinating estimates, getting concurrences, checking data, etc.

2. The present absence of qualified officers of the Air and Naval Forces within the G-2 Section is contrary to the principle of organization of intelligence staffs on a "Joint Basis" -- a common and highly effective wartime practice. The failure to have Air and Naval officers in G-2 Theater Intelligence violates the lessons learned by wartime experience in both the Pacific and the European Theater.

a. Inclosure 1 shows the combat tested organization of G-2, GHQ, SWPA.

b. Inclosure 2, organization chart published in FM 30-5, WD, February 46, to serve as a guide for organizing the G-2 Section of an Army or Task Force for combat, is another indication that War Department intended to have G-2 Sections of higher echelons organized along "Joint" lines. It will be noted that there is a G-2 Air Division within this section charged with the control of the Photo Interpretation Branch and Army Photo Intelligence Center, in addition to handling intelligence of an Air nature. If the Army or Task Force concerned is participating with Naval Forces in an operation, a mutual exchange of Army and Naval officers for purposes of liaison is effected.

c. Inclosure 3 shows the organization involved in the European Theater of Operations from "D" Day to "VE" Day. It should be noted that these organizations include, not only Intelligence officers of the British, but United States Air and Naval officers as well.

d. Inclosure 4 shows the organization chart for a Theater Intelligence Division to serve in an overseas joint operation. The formation of Joint Intelligence Sections is prescribed in the National

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G-2 Admin File

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MAYNARD E. LEE
CWO, USA
28 Jan 48

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Air Force Officer to Serve
in Theater Intell Division

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War College Text "Study of Joint Overseas Operations" transmitted recently to General Headquarters, Far East Command. This document, among other things, provides for a "Joint Intelligence Staff", (Air, Ground and Navy), balanced with respect to numbers, experience, work of the services concerned, with closely integrated organization training and techniques.

3. See War Department Letter "Intelligence Functions and Responsibilities" dated 3 March 1947 - - - "that as our positive power to provide material security, i.e., military strength is decreased, the efficiency of our Intelligence Services must be correspondingly increased in order to insure sufficient advance warning of hostile intent and capabilities to allow mobilization of our national resources". Note also the Joint Committee of Congress of the United States outline of twenty-five principles in their report on the Pearl Harbor attacks, viz:

- " I. Operational and Intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clean cut allocation of responsibilities.
- II. Superior officials cannot safely take anything for granted in alerting of subordinates.
- III. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information.
- XVIII. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality.
- XXIV. In a well balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority."

* * * * *

In connection with these principles G-2 requires a staff organized along Joint Intelligence lines to perpetuate wartime experience.

4. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces, Far East, furnish G-2 with one suitably qualified Air and Naval Intelligence officer, as soon as practicable, to act as the Air and Naval representatives and experts, for the various publications of Theater Intelligence.

5. In the event manpower cuts have reduced the strengths of various Headquarters, G-2 FEC is prepared to put personnel on a mutual

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Air Force Officer to Serve
in Theater Intell Division

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exchange basis by furnishing G-2 representatives to balance the Air
and Navy representation on our A-2 and DNI Staffs.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2.

4 Incls:
4 Organization Charts

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SECRETAir Force Officer to Serve
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Air Force Officer to Serve
in Theater Intell Division

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the Air and Navy representation on out A-2 and Director of Naval
Intelligence Staffs.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2.

4 Incls:
4 Organization Charts

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
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
Air Force Officer to Serve
in Theater Intel Division

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Intelligence Staffs.

G. A. WILLOUGHBY
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Asst Chief of Staff, G-2.



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APO 500

15 January 1948

SUBJECT : Air Force Officer to Serve in Theater Intelligence Division,
G-2 Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, United
States Air Force, APO 925.

1. Continued and increasing demands by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group on G-2 for Intelligence Annexes, Estimates, Data for Air Target Studies, etc., require the assistance of Air and Naval officers within Theater Intelligence, on a working level as a corollary to Ground intelligence and for coordination of the latter, with that of Air and Naval intelligence. The present organization of G-2 Theater Intelligence, without representation of the Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces, Far East, causes loss of valuable time and effort in coordinating estimates, getting concurrences, checking data, etc..

2. The present absence of qualified officers of the Air and Naval Forces within the G-2 Section is contrary to the principle of organization of intelligence staffs on a "Joint Basis" -- a common and highly effective wartime practice. The failure to have Air and Naval officers in G-2 Theater Intelligence violates the lessons learned by wartime experience in both the Pacific and the European Theater.

a. Inclosure 1 shows the combat tested organization of G-2, General Headquarters, SouthWest Pacific Area.

b. Inclosure 2, organization chart published in Field Manual 30-5, War Department, February 1946, to serve as a guide for organizing the G-2 Section of an Army or Task Force for combat, is another indication that War Department intended to have G-2 Sections of higher echelons organized along "Joint" lines. It will be noted that there is a G-2 Air Division within this section charged with the control of the Photo Interpretation Branch and Army Photo Intelligence Center, in addition to handling intelligence of an Air nature. If the Army or Task Force concerned is participating with Naval Forces in an operation, a mutual exchange of Army and Naval officers for purposes of liaison is effected.

c. Inclosure 3 shows the organization evolved in the European Theater of Operations from "D" Day to "VE" Day. It should be noted that these organizations include, not only Intelligence officers of the British, but United States Air and Naval officers as well.

d. Inclosure 4 shows the organization chart for a Theater Intelligence Division to serve in an overseas joint operation. The formation of Joint Intelligence Sections is prescribed in the National

G-2 Admin File

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MAYNARD E. LEE
CWO, USA
17 Jan 48

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26 January 1948SUBJECT: Air Force Officer to Serve in Theater Intelligence Division,
G-2 Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command.TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces,
United States Air Force, APO 925.

1. Continued and increasing demands by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group on G-2 for Intelligence Annexes, Estimates, Data for Air Target Studies, etc., require the assistance of Air and Naval officers within Theater Intelligence, on a working level as a corollary to Ground intelligence and for coordination of the latter, with that of Air and Naval intelligence. The present organization of G-2 Theater Intelligence, without representation of the Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces, Far East, causes loss of valuable time and effort in coordinating estimates, getting concurrences, checking data, etc..

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CWO, USA
28 Jan 48

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Air Force Officer to Serve
in Theater Intell Division

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d. Inclosure 4 shows the organization chart for a Theater Intelligence Division to serve in an overseas joint operation. The formation of Joint Intelligence Sections is prescribed in the National War College Text "Study of Joint Overseas Operations" transmitted recently to General Headquarters, Far East Command. This document, among other things, provides for a "Joint Intelligence Staff", (Air, Ground and Navy), balanced with respect to numbers, experience, work of the services concerned, with closely integrated organization training and techniques.

3. See War Department Letter "Intelligence Functions and Responsibilities" dated 3 March 1947 — "that as our positive power to provide material security, i.e., military strength is decreased, the efficiency of our Intelligence Services must be correspondingly increased in order to insure sufficient advance warning of hostile intent and capabilities to allow mobilization of our national resources". Note also the Joint Committee of Congress of the United States outline of twenty-five principles in their report on the Pearl Harbor attacks, viz:

- I. Operational and Intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clean cut allocation of responsibilities.
- II. Superior officials cannot safely take anything for granted in alerting of subordinates.
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In connection with these principles G-2 requires a staff organized along Joint Intelligence lines to perpetuate wartime experience.

4. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces, Far East, furnish G-2 with one suitably qualified Air and Naval Intelligence officer, as soon as practicable, to act as the Air and Naval representatives and experts, for the various publications of Theater Intelligence.

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Air Force Officer to Serve
in Theater Intell Division

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5. In the event manpower cuts have reduced the strengths of various Headquarters, G-2, Far East Command is prepared to put personnel on a mutual exchange basis by furnishing G-2 representatives to balance the Air and Navy representation on our A-2 and Director of Naval Intelligence Staffs.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Major General, G. S. C.
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2.

4 Incls:
4 Organization Charts

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Demands by JSPOG on G-2 calling for increased work on estimates, maps and other data have shown the need for Air and Naval Intelligence Officers within P&E for such work.

General Willoughby directed preparation of letters to FEAF and COMNAVFE requesting such officers on a mutual exchange basis. He further directed G-1 be queried by check sheet reference desirability of dispatching such letters and the extent G-1 would support them.

G-1 replied and upon submission of Staff Study, which was to be submitted together with command letters to FEAF and COMNAVFE, to the C/S for approval, it was decided by Gen Willoughby that the Staff Study and letters would not be sent to the C/S but that original letters to FEAF and COMNAVFE would be sent.

F.B.D. -- 26-6021

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APO 500

15 January 1948

SUBJECT : Air Force Officer to Serve in Theater Intelligence Division,
G-2 Section General Headquarters, Far East Command.

TO : Intelligence Officer, Commander Naval Forces, Far East,
FPO Navy 3923.

1. Continued and increasing demands by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group on G-2 for Intelligence Annexes, Estimates, Data for Air Target Studies, etc., require the assistance of Air and Naval officers within Theater Intelligence, on a working level as a corollary to Ground intelligence and for coordination of the latter, with that of Air and Naval intelligence. The present organization of G-2 Theater Intelligence, without representation of the Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces, Far East, causes loss of valuable time and effort in coordinating estimates, getting concurrences, checking data, etc..

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a. Inclosure 1 shows the combat tested organization of G-2, General Headquarters, SouthWest Pacific Area.

b. Inclosure 2, organization chart published in Field Manual 30-5, War Department, February 1946, to serve as a guide for organizing the G-2 Section of an Army or Task Force for combat, is another indication that War Department intended to have G-2 Sections of higher echelons organized along "Joint" lines. It will be noted that there is a G-2 Air Division within this section charged with the control of the Photo Interpretation Branch and Army Photo Intelligence Center, in addition to handling intelligence of an Air nature. If the Army or Task Force concerned is participating with Naval Forces in an operation, a mutual exchange of Army and Naval officers for purposes of liaison is effected.

c. Inclosure 3 shows the organization evolved in the European Theater of Operations from "D" Day to "VE" Day. It should be noted that these organizations include, not only Intelligence officers of the British, but United States Air and Naval officers as well.

d. Inclosure 4 shows the organization chart for a Theater Intelligence Division to serve in an overseas joint operation. The formation of Joint Intelligence Sections is prescribed in the National

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Air Force Officer to Serve
in Theater Intelligence Division

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Air Force Officer to Serve
in Theater Intelligence Division

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on a mutual exchange basis by furnishing G-2 representatives to balance
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Staffs.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2.

4 Incls:
4 Organization Charts

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APO 500
26 January 1948

SUBJECT: Naval Officer to Serve in Theater Intelligence Division,
G-2 Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command.

TO : Flag Intelligence Officer, Commander Naval Forces Far East,
FPO 1165.

1. Continued and increasing demands by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group on G-2 for Intelligence Annexes, Estimates, Data for Air Target Studies, etc., require the assistance of Air and Naval officers within Theater Intelligence, on a working level as a corollary to Ground Intelligence and for coordination of the latter, with that of Air and Naval Intelligence. The present organization of G-2 Theater Intelligence, without representation of the Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces, Far East, causes loss of valuable time and effort in coordinating estimates, getting concurrences, checking data, etc..

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d. Inclosure 4 shows the organization chart for a Theater Intelligence Division to serve in an overseas joint operation. The formation of Joint Intelligence Sections is prescribed in the National War College Text "Study of Joint Overseas Operations" transmitted recently to General Headquarters, Far East Command. This document, among other things, provides for a "Joint Intelligence Staff", (Air, Ground and Navy), balanced with respect to numbers, experience, work of the services concerned, with closely integrated organization training and techniques.

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Naval Officer to Serve
in Theater Intel Division

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4. Inclosure B shows the organization chart for a Theater Intelligence Division to serve in an overseas joint operation. The formation of Joint Intelligence Sections is prescribed in the National War College text "Study of Joint Overseas Operations" transmitted recently to General Headquarters, Far East Command. This document, among other things, provides for a "Joint Intelligence Staff" (Air, Ground and Navy), balanced with respect to numbers, experience, work of the services concerned, with closely integrated organization training and techniques.

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Naval Officer to Serve
in Theater Intell Division

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C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Major General, G. S. C.
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2.

4 Incls:
4 Organization Charts

MEMO FOR RECORD:

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F.B.D. -- 26-6021

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directed rev
15 Jan -*APO 500
13 January 1948SUBJECT: Air Force Officer to Serve in Theater Intelligence Div,
G-2 Section GHQ, Far East CommandTO : Intelligence Officer, Commander Naval Forces, Far East,
APO 3923

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a. Inclosure 1 shows the combat tested organization of G-2, GHQ, SWPA.

b. Inclosure 2, organization chart published in FM 30-5, WD, February 46, to serve as a guide for organizing the G-2 Section of an Army or Task Force for combat, is another indication that War Department intended to have G-2 Sections of higher echelons organized along "Joint" lines. It will be noted that there is a G-2 Air Division within this section charged with the control of the Photo Interpretation Branch and Army Photo Intelligence Center, in addition to handling intelligence of an Air nature. If the Army or Task Force concerned is participating with Naval Forces in an operation, a mutual exchange of Army and Naval officers for purposes of liaison is effected.

c. Inclosure 3 shows the organization involved in the European Theater of Operations from "D" Day to "VE" Day. It should be noted that these organizations include, not only Intelligence officers of the British, but United States Air and Naval officers as well.

d. Inclosure 4 shows the organization chart for a Theater Intelligence Division to serve in an overseas joint operation. The formation of Joint Intelligence Sections is prescribed in the National

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Air Force Officer to Serve
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War College Text "Study of Joint Overseas Operations" transmitted recently to General Headquarters, Far East Command. This document, among other things, provides for a "Joint Intelligence Staff", (Air, Ground and Navy), balanced with respect to numbers, experience, work of the services concerned, with closely integrated organization training and techniques.

3. See War Department Letter "Intelligence Functions and Responsibilities" dated 3 March 1947 - - - "that as our positive power to provide material security, i.e., military strength is decreased, the efficiency of our Intelligence Services must be correspondingly increased in order to insure sufficient advance warning of hostile intent and capabilities to allow mobilization of our national resources". Note also the Joint Committee of Congress of the United States outline of twenty-five principles in their report on the Pearl Harbor attacks, viz:

- " I. Operational and Intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clean cut allocation of responsibilities.
- II. Superior officials cannot safely take anything for granted in alerting of subordinates.
- III. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information.
- XVIII. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality.
- XXV. In a well balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority."

* * * *

In connection with these principles G-2 requires a staff organized along Joint Intelligence lines to perpetuate wartime experience.

4. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces, Far East, furnish G-2 with one suitably qualified Air and Naval Intelligence officer, as soon as practicable, to act as the Air and Naval representatives and experts, for the various publications of Theater Intelligence.

5. In the event manpower cuts have reduced the strengths of various Headquarters, G-2 FEC is prepared to put personnel on a mutual

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
Air Force Officer to Serve
in Theater Intell Division

- 3 -

exchange basis by furnishing G-2 representatives to balance the Air
and Navy representation on our A-2 and DMI Staffs.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2.

4 Incls:
4 Organization Charts



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
Air Force Officer to serve
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- 3 -


exchange basis by furnishing G-2 representatives to balance the Air
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C. A. WILSON
Major General, U.S.A.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2

Organization Charts
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