

049

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 181 C/O PM SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO. 530

Place: TOKYO

Division of Origin: Military Studies.

SUBJECT: The Battle of MIDWAY.

Personnel Interrogated, Background of Each and Date of Interview:

1. Rear Admr SOJI Akira - Commanding striking force; aboard the cruiser "Mogami". Interviewed 1000 hrs 23 Dec 45 by Gen ANDERSON.
 2. Capt AOKI Taijiro - Commanding Aircraft Carrier AKAGI, flagship of the carrier force. Interviewed 1045 hrs 23 Dec 45 by Gen ANDERSON.
 3. Capt KAWAGUCHI Eki - Flight officer aboard Aircraft Carrier HIRYU. Interviewed 1130 hrs 23 Dec 45 by Gen ANDERSON.
 4. Capt WATANABE Yasuji - on staff of Grand Fleet (Logistics Staff); aboard Battleship "Yamato", flagship of fleet. Interviewed (a) 1400 hrs 23 Dec 45; and (b) 1645 hrs 27 Dec 45, by Gen ANDERSON.
 5. Capt TSUTSUMI Michiso - Executive officer, Battleship "Haruna". Interviewed 1400 hrs 26 Dec 45 by Gen ANDERSON.
 6. Vice Admr KUSAKA Ryunosuke - Executive officer to Admr NAGUMO who commanded carrier force; aboard the "Akagi". Interviewed 1000 hrs 30 Dec 45 by Major HARDWICK.
 7. Commander CHO Masuo - Navigation officer of Aircraft Carrier "Hiryu". Interviewed 1000 hrs 2 Jan 46 by Maj HARDWICK.
 8. Capt AMAGI Takahiza - Flight Officer of Aircraft Carrier KAGA. Interviewed 1000 hrs 11 Jan 46 by Maj HARDWICK.
 9. Capt TOYAMA — - Senior Staff Officer of transport convoy; aboard Cruiser "Jintsu". Interviewed 0900 hrs 14 Jan 45 by Maj HARDWICK.
 10. Capt OHARA — - Executive Officer of Aircraft Carrier "Soryu". Interviewed 1000 hrs 14 Jan 46 by Maj HARDWICK.
- Where Interrogated: Meiji Bldg, Tokyo.

Interrogators: Orvil A ANDERSON, Maj Gen USA
Walter A HARDWICK, Major, AC

Interpreter: Walter NICHOLS, Lt Cmdr USNR

Allied Officers Present: Col Robert TERRILL, AC (first 5 interviews)
Major HARDWICK (interview #5)

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APPENDICES

A.

DAMAGE LIST

Japanese Navy at Midway



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<u>Vessel</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>TOKYO Date & Time</u>
SORYU	Aircraft Carrier	Sunk	Noon, 5 June 42
HIRYU	do	Sunk by Jap torpedo after damage by Allied attack	0215, 6 June 42
AKAGI	do	Sunk	Noon, 5 June 42
KAGA	do	Sunk by Jap torpedo after damage by Allied attack	6 June 42, During night.
MOGAMI	Heavy Cruiser	Severely damaged; returned to TRUK	7 June 42
MIKUMA	do	Sunk	1800, 6 June 42
One Destroyer	Destroyer	Severely damaged	5 June 42

Separate sheets "A" "B"

B.

MIDWAY ACTION SUMMARY

0600 27 May 42 Fleet departed HASHIRA JIMA for MIDWAY

1030 3 June 42 Task force intercepted AMERICAN Naval broadcast

1000 2 June 42)
2300 3 June 42) Proceeded through a heavy fog.

1510 4 June 42 Again intercepted AMERICAN Naval broadcast, not very distant.

2530 4 June 42 AKAGI again intercepted AMERICAN Naval broadcast, but Japanese didn't expect that AMERICAN Naval forces had approached so near.

0130 5 June 42)
0600 ") Thirty-six fighters and 36 bombers sortied to attack MIDWAY. Returned at 0600.

0130-0220, " On defensive search.

0230 " Two or three enemy flying boats discovered Japanese Fleet and continued to follow.

0400-0650 " Received enemy air attack. No damage.

0500 " Sighted one aircraft carrier. Japanese Force changed their aerial weapons from torpedoes to 800 KG bombs.

0628 " Sighted main enemy surface force.

0730 " Enemy planes attacked, causing fires aboard the AKAGI and SORYU.

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Appendix "B" - continued.

0758	5 June 42	Six fighters and 18 bombers took off from the HIRYU to attack an ENTERPRISE-class Carrier. Heavy damage reported. One heavy cruiser reported severely damaged. One heavy cruiser aircraft carrier possibly sunk.
1413	"	Enemy task force turned Eastward leaving one aircraft carrier behind on fire.
1403	"	The HIRYU was damaged.
2355	"	The attack on MIDWAY was cancelled.

Part I

Questions asked by Gen ANDERSON of Admr SOJI, IJN

Q. Admiral, we are trying to add a little bit to the detail of the picture of the MIDWAY Battle back in May of 1942 under the command of Admiral ~~MOGAMI~~ *Magnum*

A. I think it would be better, if it is very detailed, to consider that in the nature of a questionnaire, if it is a matter of research.

Q. I think that the force that the Admiral was with was just the supporting force--it was never actually visually present with the task force that had the carriers in it. Is that right?

A. Yes, that is right; we were an entirely separate force.

Q. I think that--as I recall--the first time that you experienced an air attack was on June 5 our time, June 6 Japanese time?

A. I recall that we had an air attack on the 4th.

Q. Was that the attack on the transports and not on the cruisers?

A. I believe the attack was on the transports.

Col TERRILL: They were in the same force that you were in?

A. The transport force was actually in the same formation, but ~~they~~ ^{the two forces} were out of visual range, operating on different courses. The transport force left SAIPAN and was proceeding north. My force left GUAM and therefore was proceeding towards the South. We ~~just met~~ ^{converged}, but the courses were very far apart actually.

Q. Was a report ever received by the Admiral as to the damage suffered by the transports from that attack?

A. I recall having received a report that they had received no damage.

Q. But that they had been attacked?

A. I recall that they were attacked at the scene. Since I was in ~~this other~~ ^{the task} force, I do not know myself, but that is what I understood. Since the Battle of MIDWAY I have never met any of the people ~~engaged in~~ ^{who were aboard} those transports coming from the South so that my recollection is all that I have to go by and do not know from first-hand information.

Q. On the day that the Admiral's ship was attacked by air on the 5th--on the 6th, your time--what was the type of aircraft first attacking?

A. I'm a little bit confused about the date. I think it may have been the 4th or the 5th. The planes which first attacked my cruiser were Army planes.

Q. The high level?

A. High level bombers.

Q. Where was the Admiral at the time of the high-level attack? What was your position on the ship?

A. I was on the bridge at the time of the attack.

Q. Did you personally observe the approach of the high-level bombers or were you aware--informed--of their approach?

A. There was no warning of their approach, but I myself saw them.

Q. As they were making their approach?

- A. Yes. On the 4th while the cruisers MIKUMA and MOGAMI were taking evasive action to protect themselves from the submarine attack, they collided, and the MOGAMI's bow was somewhat damaged, so ~~they turned~~^{we changed} course and started proceeding West. Early the next morning (which would be the 5th), ~~they~~^{we} were spotted by a PBY. Because of that, ~~they~~^{we} knew ~~they~~^{we} probably would be attacked, but ~~they~~^{we} were not warned directly of the approaching planes.
- Q. That attack was early in the morning?
- A. The attack took place both in the morning and afternoon--several attacks during the day. We were attacked several times by high-level bombers, several times by dive bombers from carriers on the first day. I am still somewhat confused about the date because it was near MIDWAY; the date line made some difference. There was no damage during the first day of attack. I do not recall any hits being scored.
- Q. Is the Admiral, in his memory, quite sure that the first attacking planes were high level?
- A. I am certain as I can be of it.
- Q. Let's carry on with it. Did you observe the pattern of the bombs which came from the high-level bombers?
- A. I don't recall ~~what~~^{the} pattern in which the bombs were dropped, but I recall that there were some near hits, say within 200 or 300 yards, and that some bombs fell all around in the vicinity of the ships. I do not recall anything about the pattern.
- Q. No, I didn't mean that: Just their position of fall with respect to the ships themselves?
- A. Off the stern a bomb was dropped within 200 to 300 yards of the ship.
- Q. They were to the rear of the ships?
- A. Yes, ~~sir~~.
- Q. How many bombing attacks were made by the high altitude bombers?
- A. I am not certain how many separate attacks were made on the ship because both the MOGAMI and MIKUMA were attacked separately. I believe in the first wave there were 20 or more high-altitude bombers, and in the second wave there may have been ten or 15. There were several runs made over each ship so I am not certain as to how many sorties were made altogether.
- Q. How much later did the dive bombers make their attacks after the initial attack by the high-level B-17s? How much later was it that the dive bombers began their attack?
- A. I am not quite certain, but I believe it may have been an hour and a half to two hours later.
- Q. What I am referring to is the attack made that morning: How closely did the dive bombers follow that first attack?
- A. That was right about an hour and a half to two hours. However it is very difficult for me to answer a question like that, because there are no records left, about time and number of planes. There was the ship's log, but of course that went down with the ship. The Navy report has general information about the battle, but does not have specific details such as the planes, method of attack, etc.
- Q. Do you recall the effect of the dive bombers' attacks? Did they get any hits or damage from the dive bombers' attack at all on that first day?

- A. The only damage sustained was from near hits which made small holes in the ship, but there were no direct hits and no damage other than that the first day.
- Q. Did you receive any bombing attacks from high level during the time that dive bombers were attacking, more or less simultaneously?
- A. I don't believe there were any simultaneous attacks.
- Q. About how many dive bombers were in the attack in your ship?
- A. The dive bombers split up and attacked both the MIKUMA and MOGAMI, but I think the greatest number of dive bombers which ~~were~~^{attacked} at my ship at one time ~~was~~^{was} from 12 to 13.
- Q. What would have been the distance between your ship and the ship, the MOGAMI, at the time of the attack?
- A. Since the MOGAMI had received damage to its bow in the collision the day before it couldn't proceed at a very high speed whereas the MIKUMA could, so the MIKUMA was sweeping in front of the MOGAMI. The MOGAMI was following a direct course so that the distance varied considerably; it varied from 15,000 meters to 5,000 meters; it was changing all the time, so it was difficult to say how far apart they were at any given time.
- Q. I'd like to ask the Admiral if, that under the conditions facing him during these different bomber attacks, he feels that high-level attacks would have been detected, or whether or not they might have been able to effect a high-level operation undetected under this condition of intensive attack by the dive bombers?
- A. It is possible that a situation like that could have happened, but I think that if they had come somebody would have known about it. The weather was extremely clear that day, so there were very favorable conditions for spotting planes. On the other hand, if you wait until the planes ^{came} ~~in at a very high altitude~~, the weather was so clear that, once they got directly over you, it was very hard to spot them, so there may have been ~~an interval there~~^{undetected high-level attacks.} ~~at very high altitude~~.
- Q. What I am trying to get from the Admiral is, whether the natural interest attached to a dive bomber attack wouldn't attract all eyes to the dive bombers--whether they would find time to look around for high level bombers at a time when they were being subjected to intensive dive bomber attack?
- A. We had spotters, and it was their responsibility, and they didn't report anything. I think they would have been sighted had there been high level attack at the same time.
- Q. Does the Admiral know from either reports or observation whether or not the MIKUMA (that was the other ship) received any damage during this first attack?
- A. I do not believe it was severely damaged if it was damaged because it continued to operate at high speed, but I am not certain as to whether or not it may have received small damage.
- Q. I'm just wondering if the two ships were in communication--if there was any report being made between them?
- A. They were not ~~in a great deal of~~^{maintaining close} communication--in touch with each other--but when they were near they would use signal lights and flags.
- Q. You were not personally informed or aware of any hit that the sister ship had received?
- A. No, I did not receive any reports, and I was not informed of any damage to the MOGAMI.

Q. Did you observe whether or not the MIKUMA was under attack from horizontal as well as dive bombers in this operation?

A. Yes, it was attacked by both high level and dive bombers.

Q. About when in the morning, to the best of your recollection, on this particular day, did air attacks cease?

A. I don't recall that. In a severe battle like that, time doesn't mean very much. You don't worry about what is going on. Afterwards when you read a report of it, you say, oh yes, that's how it was, but at the time I did not ~~recall~~ notice.

Q. Was your ship damaged at all that day?

A. No ~~it~~ ^{it was}, not damaged.

Q. On the following day what was the nature of air attacks on your ship?

A. On the next day it was principally dive bombing attacks.

Q. What damage did you receive that day, if you recall?

A. There were four or five direct hits amidships on the MOGAMI.

Col TERRILL: Did it sink that day?

A. No ~~it~~, it didn't sink. The other ship was the one that actually sank

Col TERRILL: The other ship was the one that actually sank?

A. Yes, ~~it~~ in the evening the MIKUMA sank.

Q. The ship that the Admiral was sailing; he took that back to TRUK?

A. Yes ~~it~~, the MOGAMI went to TRUK.

Q. When was it placed back in combat? How long did it take to place it back in combat?

A. ~~The Admiral~~ ^I went back to TRUK ^{aboard} with the MOGAMI, and ~~they~~ ^{we} effected temporary repairs at TRUK. On August 5 it ~~had~~ left TRUK for SASEBO where the principal repairs were carried out to make it fit for combat. While it was there in SASEBO refitting, I was transferred. Up to August 5 it was still in temporary repair and laid up for full repair.

Q. I wonder how long it took them to give it a full repair, what length of time?

A. ~~None~~, I don't know that.

Q. Does the Admiral recall whether or not any of these high level attacks were dropped on his ship without effect?

A. We were only informed once that planes had taken off from MIDWAY to attack us. Other than that, all the attacks were more or less surprise attacks because we couldn't see them at all until they got right over the target area.

Q. The point I'm trying to make is, did the bombs fall before you had detected the presence of the enemy? Did the bombs ever get to the target before you were aware of the attack being launched?

A. No, we never had any circumstances like that; we were always aware of the planes' approach.

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Q. I wonder if the Admiral knows whether or not any of the battleships in this MIDWAY force received any damage from air attack?

A. I was not informed of any damage to any of the battleships--as acting captain of my ship, officially I was not informed--and I do not know of any damage; except that I heard from purely unofficial sources, just by way of conversation, that there was one hit on one of the battleships, but that is all I remember--that is all I know about: I wish to stress that point, that that was purely unofficial.

Q. Is there anyone in JAPAN now available, to your knowledge, who was on the cruiser that sank?

A. I don't know of anyone myself offhand who was aboard the MIKUMA, who is here now. The captain was killed in the battle, and the chief navigator is now in CHINA, or was in CHINA, but I haven't heard from him for some time and don't know where he is.

End of Part One

Part I

Questions asked by Gen ANDERSON of Capt AOKI, IJN

- Q. Captain, what we are after is this: We are conducting a little further exploratory research into this MIDWAY Battle. We will proceed at once to the actual attack: On June 4, what was the disposition and distance between the four carriers at the time of the initial air attacks made against the ships?
- A. We were about 200 to 250 miles distant from MIDWAY. (Note: Capt AOKI drew a pencil diagram indicating the position of the ships, showing them to be --with reference to the four carriers--in the form of a rectangle, with the flagship, the AKAGI, at the upper right hand corner; the KAGA astern; the HIRYU abreast to the left; and the SORYU astern of the HIRYU. Ships about 5000 meters apart laterally and 2000 meters in depth.)
- Q. Did they maintain that formation and those intervals up to the time of attack?
- A. Up to the time of attack they maintained this formation.
- Q. At about what time of day did the AKAGI receive its first attack?
- A. At 7 o'clock in the morning.
- Q. What type of aircraft made the initial attack?
- A. ~~They~~^{we} were attacked by torpedo planes and dive bombers. We were able to avoid the torpedoes, but we received hits from the dive bombers.
- Q. Were any of the torpedo planes attacking, twin-engine?
- A. We were carrying out evasive action, and I'm not certain because we were attacked by formations of 12 planes from various angles. There may have been 2-engine planes in the group, but I think probably they were all one-engine.
- Q. About what was your estimate of the number of airplanes--torpedo planes--attacking? I'm trying to limit this to the first attack, just the initial attack?
- A. In the very first attack, only 12 planes attacked, but they came in sequence, one after the other, ~~these~~ⁱⁿ various waves. For instance, in this very first attack there were 12 planes, but at a distance of 4000 to 5000 meters they were attacked by ZERO fighters and enough of them were shot down so that the ship only had to avoid five or six torpedoes dropped by these planes.
- Q. How much time intervened between the first 12 that attacked and the next 12 that attacked? What time?
- A. I think we were attacked by a total of about 60 planes over a two-hour period. In other words, these different waves came more or less consecutively, covering a period of about two hours.
- Q. That is, torpedo planes?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You mean sixty against the AKAGI or sixty against all four?
- A. Just the AKAGI. I was just going to say this, that during this interval--during this attack--of course the ships scattered and carried out (evasive action) following individual courses, so that I am not certain about circumstances of the other ships.

- Q. How widely separated did the carriers get as a result of this scattering procedure?
- A. The HIRYU was lost sight of almost immediately; it went off to the Northwest. The SORYU and the KAGA remained in sight, but whereas they had been 2000 meters originally, now they were 5000 or more.
- Q. But one ship went out of sight?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was the position of the captain on the AKAGI at the time of these attacks?
- A. I was standing on the bridge.
- Q. You were in a position to observe these attacks?
- A. I was in such position to see.
- Q. Was there a cover on the bridge to prevent you from seeing vertically?
- A. There was a roof on the bridge, but on the roof we had any number of spotters so that they could see overhead.
- Q. I'd like to get this picture: About how many torpedo bombers attacked the AKAGI before the dive bombers started their action?
- A. Before the dive bombers came, we had been attacked any number of times by waves of torpedo bombers, but so many of those were shot down by our own fighters that I don't think ~~that~~ more than six planes attacked the AKAGI directly--got in close for that purpose. Of course more planes got through this screen of fighter protection, but since the AKAGI was taking evasive action, if they were coming in from a certain direction and the AKAGI swerved away from the attack, the planes would sometimes go right on and attack the carriers on the other side so that many planes which had started runs on the AKAGI made attacks on the other ships, but only six planes made attacks directly on the AKAGI.
- Q. How many additional planes got in closer so that you could see them from the bridge--how many additional planes were launched that you could see from the bridge?
- A. In addition to what I could see from the bridge, I was getting reports continually from the lookouts above, saying that 12 planes were attacking from such-and-such a quarter, eight planes attacking such-and-such a quarter, saying that so many had been shot down, so many more had been shot down. There ~~was~~ ^{were} probably more than ten planes actually attacking the AKAGI, but I myself saw six which came in very close and attacked direct.
- Q. What was the next type of attack? What I'm getting at is, when did you get your initial attacks from dive bombers, about how much later?
- A. I believe that the first dive bombing attack came an hour and a half or so after the opening of the torpedo attack.
- Q. Had the torpedo attack stopped by the time the dive bombers initiated their attack?
- A. No, the torpedo attack was still in progress, and the dive bombers attacked my ship while we were still taking an evasive action from the torpedo bombing. We were unable to avoid the dive bombers because we were so occupied in avoiding the torpedo attacks.
- Q. Then you were being subjected to simultaneous torpedo and dive bomber attack?

- A. Yes.
- Q. What was the effect of the different bomber attacks? How many hits in this initial attack did the AKAGI receive from the dive bombers?
- A. We received two direct hits in the first attack from dive bombers.
- Q. Now in this attack operation, when did the high-level bombers first put in an attack? How was it associated with the torpedo and dive bomber attacks?
- A. I myself don't know actually if the AKAGI was attacked by high-level bombers but I could see splashes from high-level bombing around the SORYU and the KAGA and the battleship HARUNA which was away off in the distance, but I myself could not see whether the AKAGI was being attacked by high-level bombers.
- Q. Did you ever receive a warning from any of the lookouts that a bombing run was being made on your ship by the high-level bombers?
- A. As far as I know, the AKAGI was not attacked by high-level bombers; I did not receive any report from the lookouts ^{of such an attack} ~~that there was~~. ~~The other ships--~~ At one time there were so many splashes around the SORYU that I couldn't see the ship at all and thought maybe it had been sunk; that was just what I saw with my own eyes, but from the reports I received I do not believe that the AKAGI itself was ever attacked by high level bombers.
- Q. You did observe splashes you say in the vicinity of the SORYU and the KAGA?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What distance were those two ships from the AKAGI at the time of attack?
- A. About 5000 meters.
- Q. How did they determine in this attack whether or not a dive bomber was actually delivering agent when a bomb would hit the AKAGI?
- A. We knew they were dive bomber attacks because our report from the lookout told us so. We were warned of the approach of these planes as they came to drop a bomb so it was fairly definite that it was dive bombers. I am only going on the report from the lookouts.
- Q. The lookouts made the observation?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you at any time ever see any of the horizontal bombing?
- A. No, I did not see any high-level bombing; I was screened by the roof of the bridge.
- Q. Where were the lookouts stationed?
- A. There were more than 20 lookouts stationed on the roof of the bridge.
- Q. About how long did the first series of attacks, including both the dive, torpedo, and horizontal bombers, last? When did it cease? How long a period of time were you under this attack?
- A. I believe that there was a continuous attack for about two hours.
- Q. Was there any period of time during that two hours--any extended period--when there were no attacks being launched?
- A. More or less there was a continuous attack. They would go for maybe 20 to 30 minutes without an attack, then another wave; it was more or less

- continuous but not just a mass attack. There was no stretch of time such as an hour or two hours when there was no attack at all. In other words there were no major breaks in the series of attacks of this period.
- Q. Were you attacked later in the afternoon by horizontal bombers, nearing the evening, when no dive bombers and torpedo bombers were present?
- A. There was no time when the horizontal bombers attacked when other attacks weren't being carried out by the other planes.
- Q. What was the total damage to the AKAGI?
- A. The total during the whole engagement--we only received two hits.
- Q. When did you abandon?
- A. It was sunk by torpedoes from Japanese destroyers early the next morning because, as a result of the two hits, the whole ship was on fire--burning.
- Q. You are confident, however, that it received no additional strikes?
- A. Only two.
- Q. At what part of the attack did you receive those two--early in the attack? When in the sequence of events did you receive those two hits?
- A. The two hits were received in the latter half of the ~~occasion~~ ^{attack}. The attack lasted over a two-hour period; it was toward the end of those two hours.
- Q. That you received those first two hits?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I gather then, for the major portion of the attack the AKAGI went without receiving any hits at all, that it avoided all the fire that was delivered?
- A. Yes, we were able to avoid ~~any~~ ^{all} other ~~hits at all~~ ^{attacks}.
- Q. When, then, would you say you were first hit?
- A. The attacks lasted from 7 ^{til about} ~~towards~~ 10 o'clock. These two hits were received toward the latter half of this two or 2 1/2-hour period, so that would put it some time, say, after 9 o'clock in the morning.
- Q. Did you receive any attack, then, in the afternoon?
- A. No sir, at the time there was no attack.
- Q. Were there any warnings of attack, late that afternoon, from high level bombers?
- A. No, sir, no warnings and no attacks of any kind.
- Q. What was the position of the AKAGI with respect to the other three carriers, we'll say, later in the afternoon--what position did you hold with respect to the other carriers?
- A. We never saw the HIRYU again after the engagement. The SORYU sank very early in the engagement; the KAGA sank in the evening when it was getting dusk, and at the time it sank it was 6000 to 10,000 meters distant from the AKAGI.
- Q. From a compass point of view, was the AKAGI S.W.--N.E.--what was its geographical position from the MIKUMI?

- A. I believe at that time the AKAGI was about Northwest of the MIKUMA. Both ships had been stopped dead in the water so they were just drifting. Their positions changed of course but I believe it was about Northwest of the MIKUMA.
- Q. And the SORYU was in what position?
- A. The SORYU sank very early in the engagement; this was in the evening.
- Col TERRILL: The HIRYU was not in sight at that time?
- A. The HIRYU had gone completely out of sight early in the engagement.
- Q. About what time did the SORYU sink?
- A. I don't know at all when the SORYU sank; I'm not certain at all when it sank. It was hit early in the day but that is about all--I don't remember at all where it sank or how.
- Q. Where were the battleships with respect to the AKAGI in the late afternoon?
- A. The battleships had all turned back with the HIRYU at the same time it turned, so that we couldn't see the battleships at all. The AKAGI was just standing dead in the water, and around it were destroyers--two by the KAGA and two by the AKAGI--four destroyers altogether, two standing by each ship.
- Q. These two that were out here would be the AKAGI and the KAGA?
- A. Yes; those had been burning.
- Q. If the KAGA had been attacked in the afternoon by high-level bombers, would the AKAGI have been informed--would they have been aware of the attack? Were these close enough so that they could have observed such an attack?
- A. I don't believe either of the ships were attacked at all during the afternoon. All afternoon the KAGA was burning fiercely, and we could have spotted splashes from any attacks from high-level bombers, but we didn't see any and I received no report of any attacks.
- Q. When did the crew of the AKAGI leave the ship---abandon ship?
- A. From about 4 to 9 in the evening we were transferring to destroyers. During that time we had no attack.
- Q. It took you five hours?
- A. Yes, we just took our time; we were not under attack so we took our time about it.
- Q. At about what time did the captain leave the ship?
- A. I left last of all, at night.

End of Part 2

PART III

Questions asked by Gen ANDERSON of Capt KAWAGUCHI, IJN:

(Note: It was first determined by the interpreter that Capt KAWAGUCHI was the Flight Officer aboard the CV "HIRYU" during the Battle of MIDWAY.)

- Q. On the morning that the HIRYU received the attack at MIDWAY from our air, what was the first type aircraft and when that launched an assault against the HIRYU?
- A. The very first attack on the HIRYU was made by torpedo bombers, but we received no hits.
- Q. At about what time in the morning?
- A. At about 4 in the morning, TOKYO time.
- Q. Were any two-engine torpedo planes in the attack?
- A. Yes ~~sir~~, there ^{were} ~~was~~ two-engine torpedo planes.
- Q. Where was the Captain during this time--what position did he occupy on the ship?
- A. I was standing on the bridge of the HIRYU.
- Q. Did you personally observe the torpedo attack?
- A. Yes ~~sir~~, I personally observed it.
- Q. How many two-engine torpedo planes got in close enough to launch the torpedoes?
- A. About 30 planes got in close enough to launch torpedoes.
- Q. I meant, the two-engine?
- A. Originally about 150 planes came in to attack; only about 30 came in to attack the HIRYU, and all of those were two-engine bombers.
- Q. About how long did it take for this initial attack--about how much time did it consume prior to the arrival of either dive bombers or level bombers?
- A. We were attacked for about 30 minutes by torpedo planes before receiving other attacks. The whole attack covered a period of about eight hours.
- Q. Did you observe the approximate distances from which the torpedoes were launched?
- A. The torpedoes were dropped at quite a distance, say at 2000 to 3000 meters.
- Q. Did any of the two-engine planes come almost directly over the carrier after launching their torpedoes?
- A. Hardly any came close at all.
- Q. What was their operation? Did they bank away as soon as they had launched their torpedoes?
- A. They came in at about 50-meter altitude, and as soon as they had dropped their torpedoes they flew back.
- Q. About how many torpedoes were launched against the KIRYU in this initial assault?

- A. I believe about ten torpedoes were actually fired ^{at} against the HIRYU. We received no hits from any of them, as I stated before. Those torpedoes were very slow; they seemed to surface, go down again, surface, go down again. For some reason those torpedoes didn't seem to have any speed at all. There was one occasion when a torpedo came towards us on the surface. We hit it with a machine-gun and blew it up.
- Q. What was the next type of attack?
- A. Next we received a dive bomber attack. We were able to avoid the first attack by dive bombers also and received no hits.
- Q. By about how big a force?
- A. Only about twenty dive bombers.
- Q. How long were the dive bombers attacking--over what period of time did the dive bombers continue their attack--this first wave?
- A. The attack only lasted about five minutes.
- Q. And they scored no hits?
- A. No hits; but on the other hand, we suffered some personnel casualties from strafing of the deck.
- Q. What was the relationship of the high-level attack in time with the dive bomber attack?
- A. There was no simultaneous attack. The high-level attack followed the dive-bombing attack.
- Q. By about how much time?
- A. We were attacked for perhaps ten minutes by high-level bombers about an hour after the attack started--that was, an hour after the initial torpedo attack started.
- Q. I thought you stated the dive bombers followed about an hour behind the torpedoes?
- A. I think the high-level bombing followed the dive bombing by about 20 to 30 minutes, although I'm not certain.
- Q. Now neither the torpedo bombing or the dive bombing had scored a hit on this first attempt?
- A. That is right.
- Q. In none of the first three attacks? Where did the bombs fall that came from the high bomber attack with respect to the ship?
- A. About 20 bombs altogether fell astern of the ship during the first attack by high-level bombers, separated into groups ^{with} about ten bombs in each group.
- Q. About what distance would you estimate you saw the actual bomb falls?
- A. About 100 meters astern.
- Q. About how many bombers were in that attack?
- A. I'm not quite certain but I think between 20 and 30 planes.
- Q. High-level bombers?

A. Yes, ~~sir~~.

Q. Were they visual--could you see them?

A. Yes sir, I ~~did~~^{saw} see them.

Q. When did the next attack occur and what was it?

A. About an hour after the high-level attack we received another torpedo attack.

Q. What success did that attack have?

A. Not one hit, from the torpedo attack.

Col TERRILL: How many were in that attack?

A. About 20 or 30 planes.

Col TERRILL: Single-engine or twin-engine?

A. Twin-engine planes.

Q. What was the next attack?

A. After that we had a dive bomber attack consisting of only about 20 planes.

Col TERRILL: What time of day was that?

A. About 1:30 or 2 in the afternoon, TOKYO time, which would make it about 4:30 or 5--just about two hours before sunset.

Q. You didn't get any additional torpedo and dive-bomber attacks after the high-levels had left until late afternoon?

A. I'm not quite certain what the sequence of time was.

Q. But it was late in the afternoon?

A. Yes, we had a torpedo attack after the high-level attack, then the next attack came in the afternoon--late in the afternoon. There may have been other attacks in there; I don't really recall. These attacks were going ~~on~~^{almost continuously} ~~sack and forth~~ and I don't recall the exact number of planes that attacked us.

Q. What were the results of the dive bombing attacks--you said the torpedo attack produced no results?

A. We had six direct hits from ^{the} dive bomber attack. At that time the other aircraft carriers had all been hit, and were in sinking condition or sunk, and the HIRYU was the only one that hadn't been hit.

Q. Did you receive any additional attacks, after you had been hit by the dive bombers, from high level?

A. After the dive-bomber attack in which we received six hits, we were attacked by high-level bombers but received no hits.

Col TERRILL: That was after the dive bombing attack?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was the Captain's position on the ship--still on the bridge--when the high-level attack was made late that afternoon?

A. I was standing on the flight deck at that time because the bridge had been burned up in the previous attack.

Interrogation No. _____

RESTRICTED

- Q. Were you able to observe the position where the bombs fell from the high level attack?
- A. Yes, I saw where the bombs fell: Those bombs also fell astern of the ship but this time only about 50 meters away.
- Q. Was the ship in motion at that time?
- A. Yes, it was still under way--was still travelling at about 30 knots.
- Q. Did it maneuver to avoid this attack?
- A. Yes ~~sir~~, we were taking evasive action.
- Q. Was this a series of attacks or just one attack?
- A. I think we were only attacked once--just one wave of bombers--but I'm not certain.
- Q. You just saw the bombs from one attack?
- A. Yes, I only saw one group of splashes from high level bombing.
- Q. Did you observe the approximate strength of this high-level attack, the number of planes?
- A. I think there were about 20 or 30 planes.
- Q. How bad were the fires on your ship at this time?
- A. Very severe fires on the deck of the ship.
- Q. Any explosions?
- A. Yes, from time to time there were explosions.
- Q. Do you consider it possible that one of these explosions could have been a bomb?
- A. There were no explosions at the time the bombs were dropped--at the time of the attack. Those explosions were explosions in the magazine and not explosions of bombs dropped.
- Q. When did you leave the ship?
- A. About 1:30 in the morning, TOKYO time--the next morning.
- Q. Do you know when the ship sank?
- A. It was sunk at about 2 in the morning, TOKYO time, by torpedoes from a destroyer. I transferred to the destroyer at about 1:30 in the morning. I had already started to leave the scene aboard the destroyer, and another destroyer fired the torpedoes.
- Q. At the time of the high-level attack in the afternoon, were any of the other ships--battleships, or cruisers--in the vicinity of the HURYU?
- A. There were other ships in the vicinity, including battleships, but there were no hits on them either.
- Q. Did you see the attacks?
- A. No, I did not see the attack, but I was transferred from the destroyer to a battleship, and that was when I heard--aboard the battleships--that they had received no hit.

- Q. Did you get a report of attack, that there had been an attack by high-level bombers that afternoon?
- A. Yes, we did.
- Q. You had been attacked the same time?
- A. Yes. ~~sir~~.
- Q. What battleship did you go aboard?
- A. The HARUNA?
- Q. Had that battleship, when you went aboard, had any damage at all from the overall attacks? Had it ever been hit?
- A. It had a slight bit of damage from a bomb hit on the stern, but it had no effect on the ship's efficiency. || ?
- Q. How much physical damage had it sustained?
- A. It had received just one bomb hit which did not do much physical damage. |
- Q. Is that your personal observation?
- A. Yes, my personal observation.
- Q. Was it reported at that time to the members of the HARUNA, whether or not any other battleship had received any direct hits in the battle?
- A. No, they had not heard of any other damage, but that was because we had not had any reports.
- Q. Did those two ships stay together in the withdrawal--those two battleships?
- A. Yes ~~sir~~, they both came back together.
- Q. Did the battleships receive any attacks the following day?
- A. On the day after the battle, I was aboard the destroyer and could not even see the battleships and don't know what happened to them during the day. I went aboard the battleship the second day after the carrier battle so that I do not know anything about what happened to the battleships in the meantime.
- Col TERRILL: After you went aboard the HARUNA, you would have known what the damage was--that would have been on the 6th?
- A. No; no attacks.
- Q. Were there any attacks on the other battleships?
- A. No, there were no attacks on either of the battleships after I went aboard.
- Q. You went aboard the second day. What time of day did you go aboard?
- A. At 2 in the afternoon, TOKYO time. We were quite a distance from the scene of the battle by that time.

End of Part III

PART IV

Questions by Gen ANDERSON asked of Capt Y. WATANABE, IJN:

(Note: Capt WATANABE's knowledge of English was adequate to a point which precluded, for the most part, the intervention of an interpreter.)

Q. What was your position in this operation?

A. I was in the staff of the Grand Fleet. My post was on the Logistics Staff.

Q. What ship were you on?

A. I was on the YAMATO.

Q. That was the flagship?

A. Yes.

Q. Admiral YAMAMOTO was on that?

A. Yes.

Q.6 Was that with the task force or with the support force?

A. Support force.

Q. That was with the support force?

A. Yes.

Q. During the approach it was not with the carrier craft?

A. No.

Q. In the operation--the battle--was it ever within visual distance of the Japanese carriers?

A. No--I'm not quite sure--about a half-day away from the carrier force; from the support force.

Q. Half a day to the East?

A. Yes.

Q. How close did the support force come to MIDWAY?

A. I remember, about 600 miles.

Q. About 600 miles?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you within visual distance of the transports at any time?

A. No, we didn't see any transports. We ~~concentrated~~^{assembled} the task force after the bombing.

Q. You concentrated with the task force?

A. Yes, but not with the transports.

Q. At the time you rendezvoused with the task force, what were the elements then in the task force?

A. I remember two battle cruisers and several cruisers and destroyers; that is all. The carriers did not appear; that is all, I think.

Q. Did you know how much damage the task force had suffered? Had you heard-- the carrier task force?

A. All carriers were bombed. At first two carriers were bombed, and during the night were sunk by torpedoes; and next, the two remaining afloat, so when we met there were no carriers.

Q. Had any of the other ships been sunk--had any of the destroyers been sunk that you know of?

A. Some may have been sunk, but I'm not quite sure. Admiral NAGUMO was taking command of the carrier force--was moved to a destroyer when the destroyer came to our group. Many destroyers were concentrated in our group, so which were sunk I'm not quite sure. Some may have been sunk, I think.

Q. Had any of the cruisers been damaged by bombing?

A. A cruiser named MOGAMI, I think, and the MIKUMA: Those two ships were bombed and sunk, but the other cruisers were not damaged by bombing.

Q. Was the ship that you were on--the battleship--ever bombed?

A. Yes, one or two bombs were dropped near, but didn't hit.

Q. But the ship that you were on actually did receive a bombing attack, did it?

A. One or two, I remember.

Q. What type of bomber?

A. They were heavy bombers at high altitude.

Q. About how many bombers were in that formation that made the attack?

A. In that formation, only one--they didn't come in formation but just attacked by single planes.

Q. About how many planes all told?

A. I think, only about three.

Q. The ship was not hit?

A. Not hit. In our group, none were hit.

Q. Were you ever attacked by either torpedo bombers or dive bombers?

A. Never attacked.

Q. Did the battleships from the task force withdraw with the support force? Did they withdraw with you--the KIRISHIMA and the HARUNA?

A. In the matter of necessity, and in connection with these ships, we put all our battleships into one column--the YAMATO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA and MUSASHI-- and retired in one battle line westward.

Q. How close did the bombs come to the battleships when you were attacked? Where did they fall?

A. About five or six hundred meters ~~off~~ from the battleships. The bombs fell to the south of the ships. They were proceeding eastward from the west.

Q. On what day was this, do you remember--before or after the main battle with the carriers?

A. The next day, I think.

Q. The day after the battle with the carriers?

A. Yes.

Q. What time of day?

A. In the morning.

Q. In the morning?

A. Yes. We wanted to concentrate the carrier group so we ran toward the east coming near to MIDWAY. At daybreak we met the carrier force and then went to the west; that I remember. Then, I remember, we were attacked.

Q. After you had met up with the carrier force?

A. Yes.

Q. That would be about the 6th?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether or not the two battleships HARUNA and KIRISHIMA had received any damage in bombing when they rendezvoused with the other force?

A. After we gathered them together there was no damage incurred.

Q. Had they been hit before that?

A. I'm not quite sure; perhaps serious damage was not received.

Q. But you don't know whether they had been actually hit by bombs?

A. Maybe; I'm not quite sure, but after returning to KURE after this action, we didn't hear of serious damage to the HARUNA and KIRISHIMA--being hit by bombs.

Q. Were they put in repair?

A. After this action we entered ~~in~~ KURE. All ships were repaired--their damages--and some additional equipment ~~was~~ installed, so maybe damage was only incurred by battleships. Serious damage was not recorded.

Q. Did you ever hear, after you got back to JAPAN, what the total losses, the total damage, was to the forces that participated?

A. Yes, I studied this, but do not know the exact number. I had records, when I was here, I studied and have a record in my office of the loss and damage.

Q. Of the loss and damage?

A. Yes; I compiled this.

Q. Can we get a copy of this?

A. Yes.

Q. That includes the number of ships sunk and the number of ships damaged?

A. No; I remember as far as the carriers. There were two cruisers--

Q. Do you remember the names of the cruisers?

Interrogation No. -----

RESTRICTED

A. Yes, the MOGAMI and the MIKUMA, I think. The transports were attacked by torpedoes the evening before the action but were not sunk, only damaged. One more transport was hit by bombs but not sunk. Now I remember--

Q. One transport got hit by bombs?

A. Yes.

Col TERRILL: You have that all written out, of what ships?

Q. Didn't the MOGAMI go to TRUK?

A. Yes. This (MIKUMA) was sunk; this (MOGAMI) was damaged seriously and not sunk, and after that she was ~~transported~~^{taken} to TRUK and there she was repaired.

Q. Was any other cruiser sunk?

A. No, that is all, I think.

Q. I thought you said two cruisers were sunk?

A. That was a mistake. We considered (the MOGAMI) defeated as she could not be used for a long time. In other words, scratched from the Navy Register until she could be repaired.

Q. How many battleships were damaged?

A. No battleships were damaged, I think. Some were hit--I'm not quite sure. HARUNA and KIRISHIMA may have been damaged--I'm not quite sure,--but serious damage, none.

Q. Do you know of anybody who may have a compiled report of damage done to all ships in this MIDWAY operation?

A. There's no chart of the damages sustained but I have a list in the office of various damage sustained because I was studying the subject. Therefore I can bring that over as soon as I get back.

Col TERRILL: We'd like very much to see that?

A. I don't know if the dates are drawn on the chart or not, but I think these are just tables we've made up from memory. When the survey passed the first censored information, we gathered as many people who knew about it as we could and together just compiled this list.

Col TERRILL: The naval yards wouldn't have any places where they went for repair --KURE, for example?

A. You could find out information like that by locating people who used to work in the naval yards down there at that time. They have all been retired--demobilized--so that it would take quite a while to locate them, but they would probably be able to tell you.

Q. The information he's furnished to the Naval Division here: They've gotten all these people together and furnished as complete a list as possible of the damage sustained to all of these vessels?

A. Yes, this table is exactly the same as the one we gave to the Navy.

Q. Do you know whether or not there are persons who were on either the HARUNA or the KIRISHIMA who are now in the area--members of either one of those two crews?

A. No, we have no officers living near TOKYO. It would be very hard to gather these people who were in this action.

Interrogation No. -----

Q. You've already tried to get some witnesses from these two ships?

A. Yes, we have tried before.

Q. Couldn't get any?

A. No, but after I've studied and studied I found it impossible--there was nothing existing.

Col TERRILL: Was Admiral NAGANO in command of the carriers down at MIDWAY?

A. No, Admiral NAGANO was Chief of the Naval General Staff; this was NAGUMO.

Col TERRILL: Where is he?

A. He is dead; killed at SAIPAN.

Q. Who was his Chief of Staff?

A. I know just a little bit of the name. He is now living near OSAKA: Admiral KUSAKA.

Q. He is down near OSAKA?

A. Near OSAKA

Q. You said that one of the transports was damaged by bombs?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know when that was?

A. In the evening before the day of action.

Q. June 3?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know what the nature of that damage was?

A. Just that we had fire on board, but soon it had ceased--had then stopped becoming bigger and bigger.

Q. Did you see that?

A. No, the transports were going southward to our support force. They came from SAIPAN so we could not see.

Q. That was a report to you, that there was a fire?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the type of aircraft that made the attack on the transport?

A. I do not recall this so I'm not quite sure.

Q. When did the attack take place--what time of day?

A. In the evening.

Q. That was during the daytime, during daylight?

A. I think probably after dark. There was also a torpedo attack.

Q. Yes, but was this ship damaged from a bomb attack or a torpedo attack?

Interrogation No. -----

A. We ~~have~~ ^{had} two damaged, I remember--two transports were attacked by torpedo and dive bomb. Both vessels were damaged by aircraft, I remember. I just returned from my business so I do not carry the records which I studied. I will get it from my file and then will have it again.

Col TERRILL: You have never been able to locate anybody who was in this transport force?

A. It was very difficult. We tried, but we couldn't get anyone who was on board. After this action these soldiers were transported to SAIPAN and there were used to defend GUADALCANAL, and all of them are dead. It would be very difficult to gather--

Q. Did you get any report that a cruiser was hit at the same time that the transport was hit?

A. We had some cruisers with them, escorting the transports. I remember two were attacked, but they were not damaged.

Q. Then at the time that this transport was hit, you don't remember any report that a cruiser got hit at the same time in that same attack?

A. No, I'm not quite sure. I will study and will ask some man who took part in this operation.

Q. Do you have anybody that was with the transports available to your knowledge?

A. It will be difficult to get a survivor who took part in this operation aboard the transport. All these are dead or not living here; almost all of them dead. After this battle the sailors and soldiers which had ^{been} expected to run MIDWAY, ~~they~~ were transported to GUADALCANAL action and they almost all are dead in the GUADALCANAL action, so it is very difficult to get them.

Q. How about some one who was aboard one of the destroyers escorting?

A. There were destroyers escorting the transports. The destroyers were mostly sunk in the same action, down in GUADALCANAL. Most of the forces in this action were committed to that theater. However I will see if I can find someone who may be surviving.

Q. The high-class officers who took part in this transport group, all dead now? Some junior officers may be alive now?

A. I will study.

Q. I'd like to get a confirmation, if we can do it, about the time that each of these two attacks on the transports--you say two of them were damaged-- I'd like to get the time when that action took place, whether or not the attack on one of the transports was made before sunset?

A. The bombing attack took place about 6 o'clock. The torpedo attack took place in the middle of the night.

Q. I want to know whether the bombing attack resulted in one of these transports being set on fire?

A. Yes, it was set on fire after the bombing attack. I recall that the cruiser was attacked at the time, but no damage resulted.

Q. Do you know the name of someone who was on either the KIRISHIMA or the HARUNA.

A. Just now I do not remember, I am sorry, but afterwards I will tell you.

Col TERRILL: In other words they talked over the damage and some people thought other ships were damaged but could only get together on this official list?

A. Yes.

Q. Now did you have in this damage report--in this agreement--did you report any damage to battleships?

A. Battleships, even though attacked, had no hits. *Our investigation showed that it is cleared by our study--*
~~have no hits--HARUNA and KIRISHIMA were not hit.~~

Q. No damage?

A. No. The attack on the 5th--TOKYO date--was concentrated to the carriers so some may have attacked battleships, but it was not successful. The greater part of your airplanes attacked carriers so ~~they~~ ^{the battleships} had no damage.

Q. Is there any record kept of, say down at the naval base, ~~the damage to~~ these ships? Most of these ships came back to KURE?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there any record down there of the repairs that were made to these ships after the attack on MIDWAY?

A. I am sorry; all the records we have been keeping were burned by air raid so we gathered ^{men} who took part in this action and discussed ^{it} last night--~~the day~~ ^{yesterday} before last night. Even KURE Dockyard doesn't have any records, ~~and officers who have been on board HIRYU--~~ We found three officers ^{who served aboard the HIRYU} one of them living near TOKYO, named Commander CHO, who is now living in YOKOSUKA--that is about one hour's drive from TOKYO.

Q. Do we know where to find him?

A. I think this man can be reached by telephone, and our Navy Dept knows his number. He was navigating officer, so if you want to clear the point of question, I will bring him.

Q. Yes, get him in here. Now do you have any others?

A. Next we found two--one is a commander, but I'm not sure of his address; another is a leader of airplane but of address I am not quite sure.

Col TERRILL: What vessel were they on?

A. HIRYU.

Q. All on the HIRYU?

A. Yes. ~~The SORYU:~~ We found two officers ^{who served aboard the SORYU.}

Q. Are they living in TOKYO?

A. No, not living in TOKYO; all returned to home. It would take several days to send dispatch to have them come to TOKYO.

Q. You say you've got two others there that were on the SORYU?

A. Yes.

Q. Who are they?

A. Commander OBATA--~~these are both men you have on call--~~ and Capt OBARA, and I will see Cmdr CHO of the HIRYU tomorrow. (These other two we are looking for ourselves.)

Interpreter's comment

Q. Did any dive bombers attack the battleship force you were in?

A. No sir, only high-level bombers. I think probably it is possible they might have dropped the bombs while they were on reconnaissance mission. We reported every drop. I will bring the report in Wednesday.

Q. I wonder if you could give us any more information on this Admiral KUSAKA-- his first name? There might be another man by that name?

A. Admiral KUSAKA Ryunosuke. He was Chief of Staff ~~on it~~ ^{Captain}. OISHI ~~he was~~ ~~Captain~~ he was Chief Assistant to Admiral KUSAKA and assistant of airplane. Also ~~Admiral~~ ^{Captain} GENDA, Chief of Staff of airplanes. He had been planning this action.

Q. About how far were you from MIDWAY when the B-17 made the attack on your battleships?

A. About 600 miles.

Q. That would be the day after we made the attack on the carriers?

A. Yes.

Col TERRILL: They were joined up with the other forces at that time?

Q. At that time, the MOGAMI and the MIKUMA--they had not joined you yet?

A. These two boats ~~were~~ ordered to ~~concentrate~~ ^{return} to JAPAN, but the evening before they sailed toward MIDWAY, the commander wanted to bombard MIDWAY.

Q. So they were going to the east of you on the morning of the 5th? These were the two targets for B-17s then?

A. But while they ~~were proceeding~~ ^{were proceeding} toward MIDWAY they ~~were~~ attacked and ~~ordered~~ ^{an order was given} to place the four cruisers in one line. Then MOGAMI and MIKUMA ~~made~~ collision and they ~~delayed~~ ^{were}. The other two ships ~~were~~ ordered to come soon to JAPAN but these two ~~were~~ left. Then your airplanes came--lots of airplanes--and attacked them. I remember thrice they ~~were~~ attacked, and then the MIKUMA was sunk; the MOGAMI almost sunk, but she did come back to TRUK.

Q. She came back to TRUK?

A. Yes.

(Note: The further interrogation of Capt WATANABE was continued at 1645 hours 27 December 45 at which time Charts--attached hereto as Appendices "A" & "B"--were introduced. The following is transcript of later interrogation of 27 Dec 45.)

Capt WATANABE (after presenting Appendix "A"): That is all which ~~reported~~ ^{were reported} previously to your naval investigation, but I remember some were maybe damaged ships. At first I remember two transports which were attacked by airplanes in the night, the day before the battle.

Col TERRILL: In other words that was on the night of June 4-5, TOKYO date?

A. Yes. They were attacked one by bombs and one by torpedoes and slightly damaged. I remember one transport had a fire after it was hit but afterwards it was put out. The cruiser--flagship of transport group--~~was~~ ^{was not hit} attacked by airplane but ~~hit nothing~~ ^{was not hit}--no damage. One more I remember when the day after the battle, in the morning ~~we concentrate~~ ^{we} carrier force ~~to~~ ^{redeployed} support force. I remember one destroyer was attacked by airplane and greatly damaged, I think. I remember one destroyer failed to ~~concentrate~~ ^{concentrate}, but that is in my memory. That is all damage I know, but it was not reported to previous investigation, so we discussed many times and failed to agree, and since we had already submitted an official report, were rather opposed to submitting a further list of damage.

(Note: Appendix "B" was now introduced, and later translated, listing the major movements and actions of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle of MIDWAY.)

Q. What ship were you on in this action?

A. On board the YAMATO

Col Terrill: Admiral YAMAMOTO's flagship--the Admiral's flagship?

A. That was the flagship of the fleet, yes.

Q. That was not close to the action?

A. No. I took part in the GUADALCANAL action but didn't go on GUADALCANAL. I went on RABAU. This is from memory; with several of my friends we discussed. The minutes were not clear, but we managed to put exact time--this is almost correct, I think--but to make order and sequence we put the minutes like this.

Q. I'd like to ask one question: You said there was one destroyer damaged. Do you know what the type of attack was on that destroyer?

A. I don't know what type of plane damaged the destroyer, but I do know that it was a plane which did it.

End of Part IV

Part I

Questions asked by Gen ANDERSON of Capt TSUTSUMI Nichiso, IJN

Q. We are conducting an investigation of the MIDWAY Battle, June 3 through June 6, 1942. What was your assignment in 1942--your military or naval assignment?

A. Up to March of 1942 I was the Chief of Staff of the 4th Destroyer Division, and in March I became the Executive Officer of the Battleship HARUNA and stayed on it as Executive Officer through 1942.

Q. Were you present in that position as Executive Officer to the HARUNA in the Battle of MIDWAY?

A. Yes, I was Executive Officer of the HARUNA.

Q. I want you to give me the position of the HARUNA with respect to the four carriers as you recall it on the first day of the battle the day that the aircraft carriers were attacked?

(Note: Capt TSUTSUMI submitted a pencil chart showing the positions of the various ships.)

A. Generally speaking ~~they~~^{we} were proceeding Northeast, the four carriers 4000 meters East Southeast of the HARUNA with many destroyers between ~~them~~. Although the distance varied, ~~they~~^{we} were roughly 4000 meters apart, with the KIRISHIMA almost due Southwest and astern of the HARUNA, approximately 2000 meters away. The distances were variable as ~~they~~^{we} were maneuvering.

Q. When were you first aware that enemy aircraft were in the area?

A. I believe it was about 4:30 in the morning, TOKYO time on the 5th of June that ~~they~~^{we} were first aware of the presence of enemy aircraft. I am not certain about the date. That would make it about 7:30 or 8 in the morning.

Q. What was the type of the first aircraft that the Captain personally observed?

A. The first I saw were torpedo planes.

Q. About how many?

A. About fifteen.

Q. What type--were they single engine or twin engine?

A. I am not certain; I think twin-engine. I know that they were torpedo planes because we were torpedo-attacked.

Q. What was your position at the time you observed these planes?

A. Standing on the bridge.

Q. You were standing on the bridge? What cover, if any, did you have for looking straight into the air from that bridge?

A. ~~On the tower of the battleship,~~ The executive officer was the only one during the action who remained on the bridge itself. The commander of the ship, the navigators, and duty officers went above ~~the commander~~ to the battle bridge, a secondary bridge higher on the mast than the bridge itself, and they conducted operations there. The executive officer remained to control damage or anything like that down below.

- Q. And he stayed down below?
- A. Yes, I stayed down below, and aside from what I could see from the windows, I could see nothing else. From inside the bridge I couldn't see above, but we had signal platforms on each side of the bridge, and I could go out and look up from them.
- Q. These torpedo planes that you observed: What did they attack? What was (1) their method of attack and (2) what did they direct their attack against?
- A. The planes attacked coming in from about 4 to 5 thousand meters out at an altitude of only 200 meters, and they attacked the HARUNA. The HARUNA took evasive action. That is the only ~~ship~~ ^{ship} I know specifically about. ~~Other~~ carriers were attacked by other planes. I think that quite a few of these attacking torpedo planes were shot down by A.A. fire from our own vessels.
- Q. Do you mean, though, that about 15 airplanes attacked the HARUNA?
- A. I'm not certain, but I think the HARUNA was the main target. On the run into the target, because of heavy A.A. fire, some of them turned off and turned into the center of the formation.
- Q. That's over towards the destroyers and carriers--toward the carriers?
- A. Towards the destroyers and carriers.
- Q. This was the first element of attacking planes that came into the formation?
- A. The very first attack.)
- Q. I'm not certain if the carriers were attacked before my ship because I was too busy with my duties aboard the HARUNA to follow very closely the action of the rest of the fleet.
- Q. What I mean by that was: Were they attacked minutes before or were they attacked a lengthy time before--an hour or an hour-and-a-half, or two hours before--or was this all taking place at about the same time?
- A. The carriers were attacked before the HARUNA was; in fact about 20 minutes before the HARUNA had received any attacks. The carriers were the principal target. The HARUNA received some attention because it was so close, but the KIRISHIMA was so far away that it hardly was attacked at all.
- Q. Was there an air alarm issued on the HARUNA at the time the carriers were attacked?
- A. Yes ~~is~~, there was an alarm.
- Q. Did you see any attacks delivered against the carriers--personally see them?
- A. Yes, I saw myself what was going on.
- Q. Are the torpedo planes that attacked the carriers included in this 15 or are they in addition?
- A. They were not included in the 15 which attacked the HARUNA.
- Q. From your observation, could you make an estimate of about how many planes were attacking the four carriers?

- A. I can't say how many planes attacked the carriers. Principally it was the carriers--and the HARUNA off and on--was attacked by hundreds of planes.
- Q. I wanted to get just this first wave, in the first attack?
- A. I think they may have been attacked by about 50 planes.
- Q. All torpedo attacks?
- A. I think that torpedo planes and carrier-based dive bombers attacked the carriers at about the same time. The carrier-based dive bombers were continually circling the fleet and came in from time to time.
- Q. Which type of airplane launched the assault--made the initial attack?
- A. I think it was just about simultaneous, by carrier-based dive bombers and torpedo planes.
- Q. Were any torpedoes launched against the HARUNA?
- A. Yes, torpedoes were fired against the HARUNA; only one or two torpedoes.
- Q. At what time--was it early in the attack or later in the attack?
- A. That was only at the very beginning of the attack. Toward the end we were attacked only by dive bombers.
- Q. But the HARUNA was attacked first by torpedoes before it was attacked by the dive bombers?
- A. Yes, ~~sir~~.
- Q. Was the HARUNA ever hit by a torpedo?
- A. The HARUNA did receive some damage from a near miss by attack by dive bombers.
- Q. From dive bombers but not by torpedo?
- A. It had no effect. The bomb which wrought the damage had no effect on the ship's battle efficiency or the ship's speed. The only effect was a slight buckling ^{of the plates} ~~effect~~ astern.
- Q. The torpedo bombers did not hit?
- A. No, no hits at all. The ship which was hit the most was the KAGA.
- Q. The KAGA?
- A. Yes, a carrier.
- Q. Do you know from reports or from observation whether or not any of the carriers were hit by torpedoes?
- A. I understand that no hits were scored by the torpedoes. However I do think that some of the damage incurred from dive bombers was as a result of the preoccupation of avoiding the torpedoes fired at them.
- Q. From the HARUNA were you able to observe fires as the result of dive bomber attacks on the carriers?
- A. We could see the fires very clearly from the bridge of the HARUNA?

- Q. How many carriers were set afire in the morning attack--this first attack?
- A. I believe that three carriers were set afire in the morning attacks, that the HIRYU was not severely damaged until late in the afternoon, around 2 o'clock.
- Q. How much damage do you remember that the HARUNA received during the attack?
- A. It never suffered a direct hit and only suffered near misses. We were zigzagging all the time.
- Q. Did a fire ever break out on the HARUNA?
- A. There were no fires.
- Q. Do you know whether or not the KIRISHIMA was hit by bombs?
- A. ~~They~~^{It} had no direct hits--in fact no hit at all.
- Q. What do you base that statement on--what knowledge?
- A. I not only saw the KIRISHIMA in action during the entire engagement, but after I returned to TOKYO I went aboard the KIRISHIMA later.
- Q. How much later?
- A. This is absolutely certain because I went aboard the KIRISHIMA myself on the 12th of June. However, the KIRISHIMA, in the harbor, was operating in Battleship Division 3. The Commanding Officer of the HARUNA was sent, with the Commanding Officer of the KIRISHIMA, aboard her, and so ~~she~~^{the Haruna} was acting in the nature of the flagship of the division. Therefore reports were received continually from the KIRISHIMA
- Q. Did you see attacks on any cruisers or destroyers at this time?
- A. In my group no cruisers received any damage at all. During the whole battle, not one cruise was severely damaged, and the cruisers which were damaged were in the 7th, which was an entirely separate division.
- Q. How about destroyers?
- A. No damage to destroyers of my group.
- Q. Do you give these answers from observation of the ships or was it from later confirmation?
- A. What I heard afterwards. I can't confirm this from actual observation myself, but that is what I heard when the battle was over.
- Q. Were the cruisers and destroyers generally within range of your vision during this battle?
- A. There were times when the cruisers and destroyers were out of visual range. As soon as the enemy airplanes attacked, we dispersed so that ~~they~~ wouldn't be in such a tight battle formation. Because of the dispersal, there were some ships that were entirely out of visual range. In addition to that, due to near

misses and gunfire and various other conditions, the visual conditions for observation were not very good. Other ships weren't in sight, and it was pretty hard to see.

- Q. What was the weather condition at this time?
- A. A very clear day.
- Q. During this morning attack, did you ever observe any high-level bombers--four-engine bombers?
- A. Yes, I myself saw high-level bombers attacking during the morning.
- Q. Did you make an estimate about the strength of that force?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Do you know whether or not any of them bombed the HARUNA?
- a. I don't believe it was attacked by high-level bombers.
- Q. Did you observe the attacks at all of the high-level bombers against the Carriers?
- A. I didn't observe the attacks on the carriers of the high-level bombers.
- Q. Did you know that there was an attack made by the high-level bombers?
- A. Yes, I understand that from what I've heard.
- Q. Did you receive any such report or did you get that report during the battle?
- A. The Executive Officer didn't receive any reports where he was standing because the reports were received up in the battle station above the bridge where the Commanding Officer was, but I learned what I hadn't seen at the battle from the Chief Navigator and the Navigating Officer and the Chief Engineer--people like that who were there at the time and saw what I missed--didn't see.
- Q. You mean that you saw reports that were submitted of the battle?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What were those reports as regards the high-level bombers?
- A. I believe that they could have received a report that they were being attacked.
- Q. Did they report any results--were any results recorded?
- A. They did not report any damage.
- Q. At what time were these high-level attacks, these bombers--observed? Was that while the torpedo planes and the dive bombers were attacking the force?
- A. I would say generally that the high-level bombers attacked about the same time as the torpedo and dive bombers.
- Q. About what time--about how long, would you estimate, that this morning attack extended in time--over what period of time did the morning attack cover?

- A. The attacks on the group as a whole were more or less continuous for about three hours, then there may have been a 30-minute interval without attacks, after which perhaps another two hours of attack. These attacks were so continuous that we didn't even have time to eat lunch.
- Q. You are quite sure that no destroyer was sunk in that attack-- during that attack?
- A. I am positive as I can be that no destroyers were sunk. I think that is correct, but I'm not absolutely confident.
- Q. Did the HARUNA and the KIRISHIMA stay with the fleet--with the burning carriers--or what action did they take after those three carriers caught on fire?
- A. The battleships operated in the vicinity of the three carriers even after they were attacked, and at one time they drew as close as 2000 meters to the KAGA.
- Q. Did the undamaged carrier stay in the vicinity of the three damaged carriers?
- A. The HIRYU was standing by in the same vicinity.
- Q. At about what time of day did they attack the 4th carrier? Did they hit the 4th carrier?
- A. I don't think the HIRYU was hit until about 2:30 or 3 in the afternoon, TOKYO time. Of that I'm not certain.
- Q. What was it hit by?
- A. It was hit by dive bombers.
- Q. Were any of the four carriers hit by torpedoes from a submarine?
- A. We had a report that submarines were in the vicinity, but I do not believe that any of the carriers were hit by submarine attacks.
- Q. During this day?
- A. During this day.
- Q. Do you remember whether or not high-level bombers made another attack later on, during the day?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. Which was the carrier that was not hit initially?
- A. The HIRYU.
- Q. How close was the HIRYU to the other three carriers at the time it was hit?
- A. At the time the HIRYU was hit, the three burning carriers were almost out of sight because ~~the Japanese~~^{we} had taken the HIRYU and incorporated it into ~~their~~^{our} battle formation and were advancing to attack the American carriers, so that at the time it received its damage, the three burning carriers were barely visible on the horizon--just the smoke from them.

- Very abbreviated*
- Q. You don't remember whether high-level bombers were in there, whether they made an attack at about the same time that the HIRYU was hit by dive bombers?
- A. I don't believe it was attacked by high-level bombers because we were standing by at the time the HIRYU was hit by the dive bombers.
- Q. Was the KIRISHIMA with the HARUNA?
- A. Yes, the KIRISHIMA was standing close in.
- Q. There were no battleships or cruisers in the presence of the three burning ships at that time?
- A. Only destroyers were with them to rescue personnel.
- Q. The HARUNA did not pick up any survivors that day from the carriers?
- A. At that time the HARUNA did not rescue any survivors, but the next day and the day after that all the survivors of the HIRYU were brought aboard the HARUNA.
- Q. In the early torpedo attacks, did you either observe or get a report to the effect that one of the torpedo bombers collided with one of the carriers--ricocheted off a carrier?
- A. I didn't see it and have never heard of it.
- Q. At the time the HIRYU was attacked, did the dive bombers attack the HARUNA? Were you subjected to another attack?
- A. Only the HIRYU was attacked at that time by the dive bombers.
- Q. Neither of the battleships received an attack?
- A. No, that was the last attack delivered by American planes. After that it became dark.
- Q. In that afternoon, neither battleship received an attack from any type of planes--dive bombers or horizontal?
- A. I'm not positive--I don't think they were attacked, but--
- Q. The HARUNA, that you were on: Do you recall that it received an attack?
- A. I think it might have received an attack.
- Q. By what--dive bombers?
- A. By dive bombers.
- (Note by the interpreter: I think a lot of the confusion is caused by the use of TOKYO time in his answers. According to TOKYO time, the sun would set on the battle scene at about 4:30.)
- A. I remember the attacks very clearly to a certain degree ^{because} frequently dive bombers came in as low as masthead height, and I could see the face of the pilot very clearly. One plane attacked so low that its trailing antennae tangled with that of the HARUNA, and the antennae was cut off.
- Q. Do you recall at the time the HARUNA was attacked, whether or not any cruisers were attacked by dive bombers?

A. I think that the NAGARA, which was the flagship of the cruiser division, was attacked at the same time.

Q. Do you know whether or not there were any hits scored on any other ships? Did any other ships get hit or burned except the HIRYU?

A. I believe there was no damage to any ships except the HIRYU during the afternoon.

Q. Did this force--this task force that was with the carriers--did they all come into a common port or did they separate after the withdrawal?

A. The task force came back as a unit?

Q. As a unit? Did all of the destroyers and cruisers return to port with that force?

A. Yes, all of them came back. *Wrong*

Q. How many of them, if any, were put in for repairs--battleships, cruisers or destroyers?

A. Of course the carriers were sunk, but of the others I don't think any ship except for the HARUNA itself had to go in for repair.

Q. Was this force attacked, the day following the loss of the carriers, by air?

A. It was not attacked the next day. *Wrong*

Besides the NAGARA, the cruiser which was the flagship of the destroyer division, there were two or three other cruisers: the MOGAMI, MIKUMA, CHITOSE, of this group of cruisers which were not in my task force. Two of them, the MOGAMI and MIKUMA, and two others which I have forgotten, were ordered to attack the island. Of these--this group--the MIKUMA was sunk and the MOGAMI was heavily damaged. We had a warning that planes were approaching the day after the battle--which was after the four carriers were sunk--but ~~we~~ didn't know whether they were going out to attack the MOGAMI, the MIKUMA, or ~~their~~ own formation.

Q. What was the weather the next day over the force?

A. It was clear weather.

Q. When did you get back into cloudy weather?

A. I'm not certain, but I think the weather remained clear for at least three days. On the day following the battle in which the carriers were sunk, the sky cover was about 3/10ths. *?*

Q. How far away was the KERISHIMA from the HARUNA at the time the HIRYU was attacked?

A. I think about 3000 meters.

Q. Could you see it from the HARUNA bridge?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you observe it under attack at or about the same time the HIRYU was being attacked?

- A. The HARUNA was in the center of the column lead by the NAGARA and was followed immediately by the KIRISHIMA. The HIRYU was off it's flank so that the HIRYU and the KIRISHIMA were within good visibility of the HARUNA. I could see the KIRISHIMA the whole time, but did not observe any attacks.
- Q. When did the HIRYU sink?
- A. The commander of the HIRYU, Vice Admiral YAMAGUCHI, stayed aboard the ship to the last, and his Executive Officer stayed with him. This Vice Admiral YAMAGUCHI stayed aboard the ship to the end because he wanted to stay with her, although there was no necessity. The ship sank in the night after all personnel were withdrawn, except the Admiral, so that there is no one left alive today who knows exactly what time the ship sank.
- Q. The force, however, left it at what time?
- A. The force didn't wait for the carrier to sink; it left it at about 4:30 in the afternoon. It stood by for about two hours after the attack.
- Q. Was that the length of time it took for them to get the crew off the HIRYU?
- A. Yes, that was the length of time.
- Q. From your memory, you don't remember or recall high-altitude bombers participating in this afternoon's attack?
- A. I'm not certain whether there was a high-level bombing attack during the afternoon, but I'm certain that there were no high-level bombing attacks at the time the HIRYU was hit in the afternoon. I understood from the Captain of the HIRYU that it was attacked by dive bombers while it was taking evasive action from the torpedo attacks. I have not heard of any attacks of any high-level bombing during this attack, but I think it was because of this pre-occupation with evasion from torpedo attack that the HIRYU was struck by dive bombers. There was one case in which machine-gun fire from the HIRYU was able to explode a torpedo approaching the ship.
- Q. That was in this afternoon's attack?
- A. Yes.
- Amurray*

End of Part V

Part VI

Questions by Maj HARDWICK asked of Vice Admr KUSAKA (30 Dec 45)

Q. Have you been interviewed previously by Admr OPSTIE?

A. No, this is the first time I have been interviewed.

Q. What has been your position during this war?

A. At the very beginning of the war I was acting as Chief of Staff to Admr NAGUMO, and as Chief of Staff to Admr NAGUMO I participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR. After PEARL HARBOR I continued as Chief of Staff and took part in the Battle of MIDWAY. Prior to that I had taken part in various attacks on the SOUTHERN SEA AREA including the attack on into the INDIAN OCEAN as far as ceylon. I also took part as Chief of Staff to Admr NAGUMO in the Second Battle of the SOLOMONS in October 1943, and then I was recalled to TOKYO and became the Command of the YOKUSAKA Air Group. After a short tour of duty as Commander of the YOKOSUKA Air Group, I was sent down in November 1943 to Rabaul because the situation was very deperate down there. Then Admr KOGA was killed, and Admr TOYODA became CinC of the Combined Fleet, so I was recalled from Rabaul to act as Chief of Staff to Admr TOYODA. I remained as Chief of Staff to Admr TOYODA until after July of this year, and then was attached to the Naval General Staff and given a vacation after which, on August 14, I was ordered to take command of the 5th Air Fleet down in KYUSHU. I got aboard a train and went down to OITA where, on the 16th, I heard of the EMPEROR's order regarding the cessation of hostilities. The Headquarters of the 5th Air Fleet was OITA and I was ordered to take over as commander as the previous commander was dead. At OITA I had a great deal of difficulty because the men under his command and the younger trainees wanted to continue the war, and it was my responsibility to prevent them from taking off on suicide missions. I was in a very difficult situation because I was afraid that, due to their patriotism, they wouldn't listen to me, and that I myself might be killed if I ordered them not to continue this operation, but nevertheless I sent out directives ordering them to stop all hostilities, and I managed to bring them under control. I was then sent to KANOYA by Prince MIYASHIKUNI who was, at that time, the Premier; therefore I went to KANOYA to act as a liaison officer with the Allied Forces which were scheduled to land there. I acted as liaison officer for about one month, after which, in October, I returned to Tokyo and became demobilized. That is my history during the war; I returned to my home as a farmer.

Q. Are you a pilot - an air officer?

A. No, I am not a pilot.

Q. How long have you been in the Navy?

A. I have been in the Navy since MEIJI 43 (Note: A.D. 1908)

(Note: Vice Admr KUSAKA had an adequate knowledge of English but preferred to answer through an interpreter.)

Q. I'd like to know what ship you were on in the Battle of MIDWAY?

A. I was aboard the AKAGI during the Battle of MIDWAY.

- Q. That is the flagship carrier AKAGI? Do suppose we could find out from you the position of the AKAGI with reference to the other carriers in your division?
- A. I am not factually certain what formation the battle fleet maintained during the battle, but the AKAGI itself was in the battle force--the attacking force--and the relative position of the ship remained generally the same throughout.
- Q. Could you see the other carriers of the carrier division at all times?
- A. Generally speaking, the other carriers were always within visible range. However since they were launching planes and receiving planes, they had to turn into the wind and maneuver to take aboard and launch planes so that at times they became separated and certain carriers were out of visible range, but generally speaking they remained within visible range.
- Q. Prior to June 3, what day did the four carriers join together as a carrier mission? In other words, had they come into position four together or had they joined previously and what day?
- A. I believe that all carriers sortied together as a force on about May 26. The carrier force proceeded from HIROSHIMA BAY out through Bungo Channel and followed a course generally Southeast after which it turned to the North, and after proceeding to a position Northwest of MIDWAY, came in to attack MIDWAY from the Northwest.
- Q. What time did the carrier force join the battleship divisions?
- A. The carriers rendezvoused with the battleship division after it had received its damage--after the attack.
- Q. In other words, the four carriers were operating alone? With what protection?
- A. The carrier force was escorted by the small cruiser NAGARA, about 16 destroyers, and two battle cruisers, the HARUNA and the KIRISHIMA, and the TONE and CHITOSE, both Heavy Cruisers.
- Q. Did you have any submarines escorting your force?
- A. This force had no submarines under my command. The submarine forces were directly under the command of Admiral YAMAMOTO. At the time the force was changing course to Southeast in order to attack MIDWAY, it was supposed to assemble and form at the point at which they were to change course, but there was a very heavy fog all around the assembly area, and we couldn't see visual signals and were afraid to use wireless; therefore we had a very difficult time forming our battle line. Although Admiral YAMAMOTO thought that we should use our wireless, the other officers said, well, let's wait because it may clear up any minute. Therefore, we waited a little while, but there didn't seem to be any sign of clearing, so we finally communicated by using medium wave length. No sooner had we used that, however, than the weather cleared up, and we thought that it was unfortunate that we had used it because, if we had waited a little bit longer, perhaps we wouldn't have been discovered by the AMERICAN fleet.

On or about the day before the battle took place, which I believe was June 4, TOKYO time, we could hear AMERICAN planes flying over us. We believed that we were being shadowed by the AMERICAN planes

AMERICAN reconnaissance planes. That was a most extremely critical time for us because we had done everything possible to keep our presence unknown and believed that we had been spotted.

Q. To the best of the Admiral's memory, what is the first time that he is positive that he was observed by AMERICAN planes?

A. I believe the first time we really knew we were being shadowed by AMERICAN planes was early on the 4th, TOKYO time, because we could hear planes circling over us but couldn't see them. By listening and communications intelligence, it seemed to us that there were indications of this.

Q. What means did you employ on the ships for locating and spotting our aircraft?

A. The only way we had of detecting enemy movements was by trying to listen in on AMERICAN broadcasts.

Q. What I had in mind was: What facilities did you employ to be able to locate Allied Airplanes--whether it was visual--did you have spotters on the ships with certain areas to observe and what kind of report did the commanders of the ships receive when a plane was spotted or heard?

A. The only warnings we had of planes approaching were visual warnings unless we could detect planes when they were near or far by listening in to their broadcast from the planes and could hear them sending out Morse Code. We could tell by the signal strength whether a plane was near, approaching, or distant.

All during the 4th we were certain we could hear planes over us and thought, although we couldn't see them, the planes were searching for us by radar. Towards the evening of the 4th, somebody spotted some AMERICAN planes so we launched some fighters, but couldn't find them, so believed that maybe we had mistaken a cloud for an AMERICAN plane, and our planes returned.

During the 4th, we did not see any AMERICAN planes but were very worried because we thought we had been spotted by AMERICANS. The first time we actually saw AMERICAN planes was on the day of attack which was the next day.

Q. What was the weather like on the 4th, and did you take advantage of any cloud cover and try to hide your force? on the 4th?

A. On the 4th the weather was very clear, but there was a certain amount of cloud in the sky, and we purposely maneuvered to try and hide ourselves under the clouds.

Q. When was the first time that the force was actually attacked by any aircraft?

A. On the 5th (that would be the 4th, your time) we were attacked some time about 7 in the morning (your time)--about a half-hour before sunrise. We had launched planes to attack MIDWAY, and I only recall that the first AMERICAN attack took place shortly after our planes had been launched to attack MIDWAY which I know was about 7 in the morning.

Q. Does the Admiral know what kind of aircraft attacked him?

- A. I believe that the first planes which attacked us attacked by both torpedoes and bombs. I remember the Japanese believed that the planes attacking were land-based planes, and I recall at the time saying how odd it was that land-based planes were using torpedoes because as far as I knew the only planes which carried torpedoes operated from carriers. Also we were convinced that the planes which attacked us in the first place were from land bases because bombs and torpedoes fell at about the same time.
- Q. I'm ^{very} interested in the bombs: Does the Admiral mean by this that they were dropped from horizontal bombers?
- A. It was a high-level bombing attack.
- Q. Did anyone on any of the ships send in a message or did anyone communicate with the ship telling how many horizontal bombers there were or did anybody see them?
- A. I not only saw the bombs fall but I myself saw the high-level bombers.
- Q. Where was the Admiral at the time he saw these bombers and saw the bombs fall?
- A. I was on the bridge.
- Q. In other words it was possible for the Admiral to have a clear vision above him?
- A. It wasn't possible for me to see directly above because of the roof, but I could see from the windows a certain arc and could see them from the windows.
- Q. Were these aircraft that he observed four-engine?
- A. I am not positive, but I think they might have been twin-engine bombers.
- Q. At what altitude would you estimate the bombers were flying?
- A. I think they would probably be flying above an altitude of 3000 meters - about ten to twelve thousand feet.
- Q. Approximately how many horizontal bombers were in the formation?
- A. I think there were quite a number of high-level bombers in ~~the~~ formations of five to six, to ten or more planes--I don't remember exactly--but it was a sizeable force. Due to the high splashes from the bombs falling from the high-level bombers there were several times when I thought that one of our other carriers must have been hit because they were operating at high speed trying to escape--taking evasive action trying to escape direct hits, so that the formation which had originally been a solid formation became more or less scattered. Toward the end of the attack we were also attacked by torpedo planes which distracted our attention, which made it much more difficult for us to escape hits. I recall that most of the planes in the torpedo attack were single-engine planes; there were some twin-engine planes. One of the twin-engine planes came right toward the bridge, and it looked to me as though there were no way in which it could avoid striking the bridge. Just at the moment when I thought it was going to strike the bridge, it veered off--did not hit--missed the ship and crashed in the sea out of my visual range, but I was informed that the plane had crashed just the other side of the ship.

- Q. This was a twin-engine bomber? You are sure of that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did that twin-engine bomber drop its torpedo?
- A. It seems that it didn't drop its torpedo and crashed with it. I was very busy on the bridge taking evasive action from the torpedo tracks approaching the ship itself from other planes when it was suddenly brought to my attention, this one ~~plane~~ torpedo plane was approaching very close without having dropped its torpedo. I watched it and, as I said before, it appeared to me that it couldn't avoid hitting the bridge, and all those standing on the bridge thought they were done for. I am not certain why the plane missed the bridge; it may have been the movement of the ship or it may have been change of course of the plane, but in any case it went by very close to the bridge and very low, and I thought that it had probably flown on past the ship, but the lookout said that it had crashed on the other side.
- Q. This I want to get clear in my mind? Did the horizontal bombers drop their bombs on the formation before the formation was attacked by torpedo or low-level aircraft?
- A. To the best of my knowledge we were attacked first by high-level bombers. Due to our evasive action, the formation of the battle fleet became very loose, and it became very difficult to keep it under control. We had just finished taking evasive action from the high level bombers and torpedo planes which we believed came from the land, and were just thinking, well we were lucky to get out of that scrape, when we were attacked from between the clouds by dive bombers which hit the ship.
- Q. No hits by the high-level bombers? You are sure--no hits on any of the ships
- A. Yes; although we thought occasionally we had been hit because of near misses, we were not hit by the high level bombers.
- Q. How did you get the information - by communication between the ships?
- A. I did not have actual contact with other carriers in the group so that I am not certain about the details concerning other carriers, but at times when, during near misses, I thought they had been hit on the carriers, it was reported to me by the lookouts that it was all right, there had been no damage, but that was only just a report from my own ship.
- Q. And the Admiral feels in the first attack by high-level bombers none of the carriers were struck?
- A. I believe that there were no hits by high-level bombers. Of course it is pretty difficult to bomb a ship by high-level bombing.
- Q. How many twin-engine aircraft does the Admiral think attacked the formation?
- A. I am not certain--I have forgotten most of the details--but I believe probably about one-third of the planes attacking in the first attack were twin-engine bombers.
- Q. One-third? In numbers, approximately how many?

A. I am not certain about the numbers, but I think there might have been as many as 30 twin-engine planes. The Japanese Army planes were very poor at attacking surface craft, and so I more-or-less believed that the AMERICAN Army would be the same way, that they wouldn't be very good at attacking surface ships, but ~~possibly~~ AMERICAN ~~ships~~ would be better than Japanese Army ~~ships~~ at attacking ships. When I saw these twin-engine planes carrying torpedoes, I was surprised and thought it was very odd--the first time I ever heard of this sort of thing, the American Army planes evidently using Naval tactics.

Q. Did you receive any information from any of the ships of the force being hit by the 2-engine bombers?

A. I did not hear of any hits. I do not recall receiving any reports of damage to other ships from twin-engine bombers, but in reference to high-level attacks, due to the extreme degree to which we had to maneuver in order to avoid these attacks, it naturally had an effect on the battle efficiency of the ship. Towards the end of the attacks, it became more and more difficult for us to avoid attacks, and our movements became more complicated in trying to avoid bombing attacks. Therefore it was an extremely difficult situation for us, created by Army attacks.

I will explain what I said before by stating that when a fleet, with carriers as the main ships, is attacked by bombing, each carrier has to operate in order to avoid its own individual attack. ~~so that~~ It would be ideal if the formation could move together, ~~with, so that~~ the carriers, about 3000 meters apart, could all turn in the same direction when they turned in order to avoid attack. However due to the attack, we have to meet our own problems.

Occasionally, however, we were very far apart and again, occasionally we found ourselves very close together so that ~~when~~ in order to avoid attack a carrier should turn in to avoid ~~an~~ attack--it was so close to another carrier that it was dangerous to do that and we were forced to turn out; we didn't have any choice in the matter. During the air attack the operations, the movements of the fleet, became very complicated.

Q. On this first morning attack, the carriers were not hit by high-level bombers. Who does the Admiral accredit the hits on the carriers to--what type of aircraft?

A. Dive Bombers.

Q. Which ships were struck by these dive bombers?

A. The dive bombers scored hits--at least three hits--on the AKAGI just at a time when it was about to launch its planes for an attack on MIDWAY. The principal object of the Japanese attack would have been the destruction of the airfield on MIDWAY, and we had considered secondarily the problem of interference from AMERICAN aircraft carriers, so our planes had all been prepared to attack the airfield at MIDWAY and were equipped with bombs and not torpedoes. We had already carried out one attack, and in order to search for AMERICAN carriers we had launched reconnaissance ships from the TONE and CHITOSE. These planes unfortunately did not find the AMERICAN carriers at once, but only found them on the way back after having searched quite a distance, so their warning came a little bit late.

Because we were attacking MIDWAY all planes were loaded with bombs and on the flight deck ready to take off when we received these three hits from AMERICAN carrier-based dive-bombers. Although those three hits would not have been sufficient to sink the ship, because of the destruction to the airplanes loaded with bombs on the decks and the torpedoes in the store-rooms below, there was a terrific fire aboard ship which was just like Hell!

- Q. In other words, your ship was put out of action by the first attack--three hits--
- A. Not by the first attacks, but by the first attack of dive bombers.--The first attack was the high-level attack--but the first general attack, in that morning.
- Q. All right; how about the other carriers of that task force, the other three? What damage did they receive?
- A. I don't know what sort of hits the other carriers received because the ships had become somewhat separated. The first I knew of hits on the other carriers was when I saw the fires.

I might describe the situation on the bridge of the AKAGI after this attack? Admiral NAGUMO thought the situation was under control and refused to come down from the bridge, but the Captain of the ship advised him that the ship was out of control and that it should be abandoned and wanted him to abandon ship, but he refused; Admiral NAGUMO was an extremely hot-tempered person and ~~of a~~ consequently insisted on remaining on the bridge. I myself, as Chief of Staff, tried to convince him that it was his duty as CinC to abandon ship and transfer to some other ship where he could control the actions of the fleet because it was no longer possible to communicate with other ships by wireless from the AKAGI, and the signal flags and semaphores weren't sufficient to direct the battle.

Although Admiral NAGUMO refused to come down, I finally had the others drag him by the hand and talk him into leaving the ship but couldn't find a way down; everything was so covered with smoke and flame, there was no way of getting down from the bridge except by a rope which we hung from the bridge. I was second in line coming down the rope, and as a result I still have one finger badly damaged by climbing down this rope. When I got down, the deck was on fire, and AA and machine-guns were firing automatically, having been fired by the fire aboard ship. Bodies were all over the place, and it wasn't possible to tell what would be shot up next. I lost one shoe, and finally got over the side after walking over the burning deck in my stocking feet. I had my hands and feet burned--a pretty serious burn on one foot. That is eventually the way we abandoned the AKAGI --helter-skelter--no order of any kind.

- Q. Did the ship sink from the effects of this attack or a later attack?
- A. Rather than being sunk by a ~~subsequent~~ ^{subsequent} attack, I think it was the extreme damage done by exploding bombs and torpedoes inside the ship and the gradual gutting of the ship by fire which contributed to its eventual sinking, although it remained afloat for some time.

I don't know if this has much to do with anything you are investigating but in reference to my command "it remained afloat a long time"; eventually when the fires got so bad, the captain of the ship, Capt AOKI, collected what he could of the crew and ordered them to abandon ship, including the executive officer. (I have only heard this from the executive officer, I myself having abandoned ship previously) Everyone abandoned ship except Capt OAKI who insisted on going down with the ship. He and the executive officer had a long discussion about it, and the executive officer tried to persuade him not to go down with the ship, but his reply was that it was the EMPEROR's order that he do so.

Everyone left except Capt AOKI and they all transferred to destroyers. The general opinion was that it was dangerous for them to remain in the vicinity of the AKAGI because they would be subject to further attack by enemy planes; therefore we wanted to sink the AKAGI with torpedoes. While they were considering that, we got a message from Admiral YAMAMOTO who was very tied up emotionally with the AKAGI because he had formerly been the Commanding Officer and had served on it a long time, and he ordered us not to sink it and to do everything possible to save it and take it back--tow it back. Therefore the executive officer went back aboard the AKAGI and argued with the captain for a long time, saying that the thing to do was to abandon ship and try to tow it back, until he finally got him (the captain) off that way.

Some time after he finally abandoned ship under persuasion of that reasoning, the AKAGI sank, but after having stayed afloat for a long time.

Q. In other words, the AKAGI was the first one of the four carriers to be put out of action and sunk?

A. I am not certain what carrier sank first. The HIRYU was the last to sink, but it is very difficult to say which sank when because all three carriers were burning very heavily for a long time.

Q. Let's get on here then: This is the initial attack we have been discussing. Later in the day, after the Admiral had left his ship and boarded a destroyer, when was the next attack and what was the next attack received by aircraft--how much later?

A. By the time I had transferred from the AKAGI, all three of the carriers were burning, and the HIRYU was the only carrier left sound. I transferred to the NAGARA with Admiral NAGUMO AND That became the flagship of the column. We reformed the battle line and Admiral NAGUMO wanted to proceed due East and attack the American fleet in a night engagement. However our reports were very confused, and we didn't know exactly where the AMERICAN fleet was, and so didn't know whether to proceed in one direction or another. Then the last report we received said that the American fleet had been observed proceeding Eastward, so we thought perhaps the best thing to do was to withdraw a little to the West and wait and fight a dawn battle the next morning, so we started withdrawing slightly to the west with that intention.

In the meantime we got an order from Admiral YAMAMOTO, telling us to withdraw to the Northwest and rendezvous with the battle fleet so, although all of us had already made up our minds to fight to the finish and we all wanted to go ahead and fight it

out with the AMERICAN fleet whether we came back or not, we had to obey this order, so we proceeded north to rendezvous with the other fleet.

During this time there were frequent air attacks; it was hard to say in what sequence they came, but there were frequent AMERICAN air attacks, and the HIRYU was sunk by air attack, and in addition to the HIRYU a battleship had some damage although it wasn't very serious damage.

Q. Which battleship?

A. The HARUNA was the battleship struck, and although you wouldn't say it was very little damage, it had no bad effects on the ship's operational control or its battle efficiency.

Q. About what time was it?

A. I'm not certain exactly when the HARUNA was attacked, but it was probably, from what I have heard, in the afternoon. The distance was so great from the AMERICAN force at that time that we didn't believe we could be attacked by carrier-based planes. I think that the attack on the HARUNA which caused damage to it was carried out by high-level bombers, and I think possibly from 20 to 30 planes.

Q. Can the Admiral recall possibly who he got that information from, that the HARUNA was struck by high-level bombers?

A. I don't recall.

Q. But he is quite certain of his information that the battleship HARUNA was first struck by high-level bombers?

A. I am not absolutely certain, but I feel that the HARUNA was hit by high-level bombers because I heard a destroyer captain talking about an attack on his ship while he was in the same formation. Although the destroyer captain perhaps wasn't too familiar with air attack tactics or air warfare, he reported that he was attacked by high-level bombers which dropped a pattern of bombs on his ship. This was in the same attack as on the HARUNA so I feel very certain that it was high-level bombers.

Q. Not to influence the Admiral, but to try to clear this point: Would he say that this attack from high-level bombers came approximately at about the time from 6 o'clock to say 6:30 or earlier or later in the day of June 4?

A. I think it is probable that the attack took place about 1:00 to 1:30 in the afternoon which, by your time, would be 5:30 or 6:00.

Q. In other words it was getting dark?

A. We were so scattered that I couldn't see, myself, clearly but I think that is probably about when it was. It is very difficult to remember because there were so many things happening all along, but it was probably before dusk.

Q. Can you recall how many hits the HARUNA received from high-level bombers?

A. I think it might have been two or three hits. That is only what I believe, and you will probably get more information if you ask somebody who was on the HARUNA.

- Q. Can the Admiral suggest someone, who can give us that information, who is still alive?
- A. I think that Rear Admiral ^{Takara} ~~TAKAMA~~ was the captain of the HARUNA and I don't know where he can be located now, but he was retired fairly early because of ~~Syphilis~~. I hardly believe this is correct, but cannot recall what I said that made the stenog hear the word "syphilis".
- Q. The Admiral was aboard the ship at the time it was struck?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were any other ships adjacent to the HARUNA struck simultaneously or about the same time that the Battleship HARUNA was hit?
- A. No very serious damage was sustained by any ships in the vicinity although possibly a destroyer suffered some damage.
- Q. How about that CV (aircraft carrier) off to the West?
- A. The HIRYU, you mean--how about the attack on it?
- Q. Yes; was it struck at the same time?
- A. When the HIRYU was struck, it was struck by dive bombers, and fires were started aboard. They were very anxious about the condition of the ship, but Rear Admr YAMAGUCHI, a very famous Japanese admiral, who was in command, reported that the fires would be controlled and the ship would be all right, so we assigned several destroyers to try to help put out the fires and the NAGARA went off to join the other battle formation because it couldn't operate--it was just standing by watching the HIRYU. It's uncertain how the HIRYU went down eventually, but evidently they were unable to control the fires and they got worse. Although it had been reported that all personnel were safe and the fires could be controlled, later we went back to search for the HIRYU when we got a wire saying that the situation was getting more serious, but we couldn't find her, so we presumed it had sunk but didn't know exactly where and how.
- Q. It wasn't attacked again by high-level bombers that evening?
- A. It is difficult to say if it was attacked again by high-level bombers because when it was ascertained that the ship was in a sinking condition, Admiral YAMAGUCHI and Capt KAGU decided that they would go down with the ship. Therefore we ordered their staff officers and the crew to abandon ship. They all shared some naval biscuits and drank a glass of water in a last ceremony. Admiral YAMAGUCHI gave his hat to one of his staff officers and asked him to give it to his family; then there was some joking among them--the captain and the Admiral--that their duties were finished when the ship sank. Therefore the ship was abandoned by everybody except the captain and the admiral so that, after it was abandoned, it is difficult to say if it was attacked again by high-level bombers, but in any case we searched for it the next morning and found traces of the ship but couldn't find the ship so she must have gone down, but it is difficult to say how or where exactly.
- Q. Now, we have covered pretty well the first day--the first big day of the battle, June 4--June 5 TOKYO time. I'd like to resume this with the Admiral:

You were attacked in the early morning by high-level bombers and twin-engine bombers carrying torpedoes, and again late in the

evening of that day you were attacked by high-level bombers. The morning attack by the bombers showed no hits, but in the evening attack it is quite certain that the battleship HARUNA--

A. I can't say that there were absolutely no hits in the morning attack by high-level bombers because they were dropped in great numbers and made near misses, and there were other attacks. Therefore what I said is what I remember myself from my own observation, but I couldn't say that it was impossible for hits to have been scored by high-level bombers.

Q. I just want to clear this up: On that first day you had observed or had reported to you the presence of high-level bombers which made attacks on your ships, and particularly in the late afternoon attack that he is certain that the battleship HARUNA was struck by high-level bombers that attacked that formation?

A. That is correct.

Q. Has the Admiral anything else to add so far as completion of the first day's attack?

A. I would like to point out that technically speaking I myself observed the attacking dive bombers, and I could see for instance three or four planes coming, and I could see them release their bombs, could see the results, see the bomb hits, so that I can speak definitely about dive bombing attacks, whereas in a high-level bombing attack a great number of bombs are dropped, and particularly if you are viewing an attack on another ship you only view it from a side and all you see are a lot of splashes from the bombs, so that it is very difficult to say exactly and convincingly that there were no hits scored when you just view it from an observer's position on the side.

I would also like to say that one of my lasting impressions in the battle of MIDWAY was that, although it is extremely difficult to make a direct hit with high-level bombing on a fleet, it has the effect of breaking up the formation and scattering the ships and making their movements in their joint operations very difficult. If you first break up the formation with high-level attacks and then attack with dive bombers, it increases the probability of hits from the dive bombers because of the confusion created by the high-level bombings. That was one of my lasting impressions in the battle, that it was largely the result of the confusion created by the high-level bombing that the whole fleet became so scattered and became individual targets.

Q. All right, let's take up the battle as it started on the morning of the 5th? I'd like to get from the Admiral anything he can recall from memory or any records that he got of high-level bombers operating against the fleet throughout the day of 5 June 1945?

A. The only reports received about the second-day attacks by high-level bombers were what was reported by the captain of a destroyer who reported by signal on the second day of the battle about the various attacks by high-level bombers, but they weren't very accurate and were only flash reports. Later, after we got back into port, the Captain made a full report, but since he was only a destroyer captain it was more or less what he had seen and just his impressions which he reported.

Q. Does he recall the name of the captain or the name of the destroyer?

A. I don't remember the name of the destroyer.

Q. Was the destroyer hit by falling bombs?

A. It was hit by high-level bombing. Several destroyer captains came back and made reports, and although it is difficult to say exactly what the report had consisted of, most of the reports contained damage affected by high level bombers.

As I recall, the force with which I was operating was proceeding Northwest, and another force including the MIKUMA and other ships was operating separately. I seem to remember that my force was attacked mostly by land-based planes, and the other force was attacked mainly by dive bombers and other ship-based planes.

Q. Can the Admiral give me any specific information on damage to any specific ships by high-level bombing on this day?

A. I don't recall the names of the ships, and there was no very heavy damage. Generally speaking, it could be regarded as slight damage.

Q. How about in the transport division--the troop transports? Can you give me any information of any hits or damage from high-level attack?

A. I was not well-informed of the movement and operations of the transport convoy, but Admiral YAMAMOTO's headquarters were informed.

Q. Well, I realize that after the close of the first day's operation that the Admiral's possibility of observation on the following two days' battle are limited, but I am most interested in any information he can give regarding any damage from attacks of horizontal bombers or any information that he collected when he got back to JAPAN?

A. As you say, I wasn't kept up on the small events after the first day, but what I have heard regarding damage sustained afterwards was only reports such as, such-and-such a ship was damaged here and such-and-such a ship was damaged in this position during this engagement, but the reports didn't specify whether they were damaged by high-level attacks or what type of attacks; it was just the general situation of the ship, the situation reported.

Q. Can the Admiral give me the names of any officers of the fleet whom I might be able to talk with regarding any battle damage that you are sure was caused by high-level bombers?

A. The only people I can suggest would be the Commanding Officers of the ships, of which I mentioned Capt AOKI, who was in command of the AKAGI, and Admiral TAKARA, who was in command of the HARUNA. People like that would be about the only ones who could give you specific information.

Q. Does the Admiral know of any records--any logs of the ships that still exist that we might be able to study?

A. The complete report on the battle was sent to the headquarters of the Combined Fleet, to the Navy Department, and to the War College for study, but I believe that the Navy Department's records were mostly burned up in the bombing raids. The Combined Fleets' records were destroyed for the most part when the plane, in which Admiral KAGA was killed, was shot down, so that I myself, when I went to take over the post of Chief of

Staff of the Combined Fleet, in the main had to reconstruct the records because very few were left over. Although the War College was very much put out because of lack of records left at the present time, it would be the best source of information, because I heard that they got information from all sources so that the best place to locate information would perhaps be through the War College where they studied the problem. I believe there has been a lot of contact work done by the War College. The best place to get accurate information would be the actual History and Investigation Department, the SHICHI.

Q. Do you have any information you can add as of 6 June, realizing that you are clearing this scene of action?

A. On the 6th we didn't have any large-scale attacks of any kind. I would like to explain that after my injuries from the AKAGI when I transferred to the NAGARA, I felt very poorly; my wounds were hurting me, so we put a couch right into the bridge, and I lay on that, and my staff officers would tell me what was going on, and I lay on the couch and told them what action to take in regard to the various developments. Then, by the second day the action seemed to have quieted down, somewhat, so I went and lay down in the bunk room right off the bridge and tried to sleep there. I don't recall that there were any large-scale attacks of any kind, but occasionally the bugle sounded the alert and "all-hands-on-deck", etc., so I would get up and go out to the bridge to see what was going on, but nothing much developed. Therefore on the 3d day I finally went to the hospital and became a patient in the hospital.

Cmdr NICHOLS

Q. Do you know of any damage to any heavy cruisers other than the MOGAMI and the MIKUMA?

A. The MIKUMA and the MOGAMI were the only cruisers heavily damaged, of course of which the MIKUMA sank. Aside from that, some destroyers may have received severe damage, but I am not certain of that. I am certain that the two cruisers mentioned were the only ones hit, but I'm not very familiar with the facts of it because that was an entirely separate force operating in a different area and proceeding to the southwest.

Maj HARDWICK

Q. Was the destruction of the four carriers the pertinent point affecting the decision to leave MIDWAY--to abandon the MIDWAY attack?

A. Due to the loss of the carriers, it became impossible to continue the attack on MIDWAY, and the main target then became the AMERICAN fleet. We intended, as I said before, to carry out a night attack on the AMERICAN fleet with destroyers. We were all determined to fight it out to the finish until we received the order from Admr YAMAMOTO to withdraw to the Northwest.

The effect the (loss of) carriers had on the battle was; since carriers were the principal offensive weapon, we were deprived of that weapon in regards to our attack on MIDWAY, and our projected attack on the AMERICAN fleet was more or less one of duty to carry out our assignment. It wasn't necessary because of any strategic situation.

End of Part VI

Part VII

Questions asked by Maj HARDWICK of Cmdr CHOO Masuo:

(Note: History - at the beginning of war was Navigation Officer aboard the HIRYU and remained with the HIRYU until it sank after which he was transferred to cruiser SUZUYA in July 42 and remained aboard SUZUYA until Dec 43 then was transferred to Heavy Cruiser TAKAO and remained with that until Feb 45. Returned to Japan in Feb 45 and worked until end of war in Hydrographic Dept.)

Q. What ship were you on during the battle of MIDWAY?

A. I was on the HIRYU.

Q. What force did it operate with?

A. The carrier force. The force was operating with four carriers, two abreast separated by about 7000 meters and two carriers directly astern separated by 7000 meters, and the distance between the forward line and the after line was approximately 7000 meters. That was at the opening of the attack. The carrier on the right forward position of the square was the AKAGI, on the left forward position was the HIRYU, and on the left rear position was the SORYU, and the right rear position, the KAGA.

Q. When were you first attacked?

A. We were first attacked at 7:30 AM Japanese time.

Q. What type of planes were in the first attack?

A. High level bombers.

Q. How many high level bombers were in that first attack?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did you personally see the attacking planes?

A. No, I did not see them; I only saw the splashes.

Q. What was your position on the ship?

A. I was standing on the bridge in the navigating officer's room, just left of center.

Q. Did you have a full field of visibility?

A. No, the visibility was poor, and there was a roof over my office.

Q. Did you receive reports from lookouts?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What damage resulted from the first attack?

A. There was no damage.

Q. What sort of attacks followed?

A. The second attack was also from high level bombers, I think. I didn't see any planes but saw splashes fall astern of the ship.

- Q. This is in regard to the pattern of the bombs, in regard to the way in which the bombs fell around the ship: What kind of pattern did they fall in--how many meters away?
- A. I'm not very positive about the splashes I saw, but I believe they were strung out in a long line and fell approximately 300 meters astern of the ship.
- Q. How many bombing attacks do you recall were made from high altitude bombers in the morning?
- A. I believe we received about three high-level bombing attacks.
- Q. Besides the HIRYU, which ships can the commander tell us were attacked by high-level bombers and the effect that he saw or which was transmitted to him?
- A. I was very much pre-occupied by my duties as navigating officer and so I didn't see much of the action around me. However I did happen to see the KAGA when it was hit.
- Q. At what time was the KAGA hit?
- A. About 7:30 in the morning.
- Q. Does the Commander know what struck the KAGA, whether it was high-level bombs or what?
- A. Dive bombers hit the KAGA in that first attack.
- Q. Did the Commander observe any twin-engine bombers at the time that the KAGA was hit by dive bombers?
- A. I am unable to say whether or not there were twin-engine planes because I just had a glimpse.
- Q. Commander, we received some reports of twin-engine bombers carrying torpedoes?
- A. Yes, I myself saw twin-engine planes carrying torpedoes because they attacked the HIRYU also.
- Q. How many twin-engine (planes)?
- A. I would say about 15 twin-engine planes.
- Q. How many twin engine planes attacked the HIRYU?
- A. Although I'm not certain at all, I believe that about four twin-engine planes attacked the HIRYU.
- Q. When did you observe these twin-engine planes coming in for attack? By that I mean, how many of them were able to get into the ship to be able to drop their torpedoes, or what effect did he see actually himself?
- A. I really can't remember very well, but I know that the HIRYU received at least six direct torpedo attacks. I saw at least six wakes from torpedoes, but I couldn't say who dropped them.
- Q. Was the HIRYU struck by any of them?
- A. No, the HIRYU was not struck by any of them.
- Q. What were the weather conditions at the time of attack?
- A. The weather was clear except for a slight cloud cover at about

2000 meters, and the high-level bombers operated just above the cloud level.

Q. Was the force taking advantage of the cloud cover?

A. Since there was a pretty general cloud cover we weren't necessarily operating to take advantage of the cloud cover but were just operating as we would ordinarily, because we felt we had enough cloud protection.

Q. On that initial attack by high-level bombers and by twin-engine bombers, how far was the task force from MIDWAY?

A. I believe it was about 230 sea miles (knots) from MIDWAY.

Q. Was the Commander informed or aware that his force may have been seen by enemy aircraft? If so, when, and what time of day?

A. I believe we were spotted by enemy reconnaissance planes just at about dawn on the day of the first attack, and I don't believe we were spotted before that.

Q. Did any of the ships of that force have any means of detecting enemy aircraft? Did they use visual or radar--

A. Actual sighting of enemy planes--detection of enemy planes--was by visual only, and a secondary means was a fighter plane patrol which covered the convoy as an escort--covered the vicinity of the force.

Q. What was the name of the first ship in this formation that was hit?

A. I'm not certain which was hit first, the KAGA or the SORYU, but those were the first two hit. As I said before, the KAGA was hit by dive bombers, but I'm not certain what hit the SORYU because all I recall is seeing it burning.

Q. After the initial attack, when does the Commander recall the next attack by high-level bombers?

A. I believe the third high-level bombing attack came about 2-1/2 or three hours after the first attack.

Q. What time would that be, approximately?

A. I would say about 10 o'clock (TOKYO time).

Q. Did you observe any of these high-level bombers?

A. No, I didn't see any of those high-level bombers.

Q. How do you then know you were attacked by high-level bombers? What information did you get?

A. I have no way of really knowing whether it was high-level attack or not, but judging by the splashes which I saw falling all around, I presumed they were high-level attacks.

Q. At the time you received this third high-level bombing attack, was the force being attacked by any other enemy aircraft?

A. I believe the force was being attacked by other type planes at the same time, but I'm not certain of that because I was thinking only of the HIRYU and my duties.

Q. Were any of the ships of the force hit by falling bombs from these horizontal bombers?

A. I don't know specifically of any hits being scored by high-level bombers, but I know that during the morning the KAGA, the SORYU and the AKAGI were all hit and damaged by bombing attacks.

Q. To what extent did these high-level bombing attacks affect the formation of your task force, and did the evasive action, because of high-level attacks render you more vulnerable to other types of attack?

A. In answer to the first part of that question, we took evasive action from all types of attack so that it is difficult to say to what extent high-level bombing caused confusion to our formation. However, due to our evasive action, the formation itself became very scattered and loose, and there were times when various ships got so close that, although I don't know specifically about the other ships in the formation, as navigational officer on the HIRYU I know that in order to avoid a torpedo attack, for example, because of our close proximity to another ship in the formation, we were forced to turn in a less ideal direction for evasive action. I would say, on the whole, that high-level bombing had a great influence on our movements because we were more afraid of high-level attacks than any other because we couldn't see where they were coming from or see the bombers attacking so that we had to take evasive action all the time, whereas we could see the specific attacking planes in other types of attack and could take evasive action depending on the circumstances.

The evasive action we took because of high-level bombing, in answer to the second part of the question, made us easier targets for other types of attack.

Q. During this third attack then, is it conceivable that some of the carriers could have been hit by high-level bombing without the commander's seeing or receiving a communication from those ships?

A. All I can say is, that I never heard of any specific hits ~~caused~~ by high-level bombers, and I didn't see any myself.

Q. Is it possible that you might have received any high-level attacks without any warning from the lookouts?

A. We were very frequently subjected to bombing attacks when we had received no notice whatsoever of approaching planes, and those were generally level bombing attacks.

Q. Was the HIRYU ever hit by high-level bombs?

A. No, the HIRYU was never hit by high-level bombers, but we were forced to take extreme evasive action to avoid the threat from high-level bombers.

Q. Any close misses?

A. Yes, we had some near misses.

Q. Do you know how many?

A. In the third attack by high-level bombers we received several near misses. Since the bombs were dropped in a pattern it was very difficult for me to tell how many bombs were dropped and

exactly how close they were to the ship, and I don't remember too clearly, but the first group of splashes, which may have been either one large bomb or several small bombs, fell about 30 to 50 meters to the starboard side of the ship amidships. The second group which consisted, I am certain of about 6 or 8 bombs, fell about 80 to 100 meters off the port side of the ship amidships. The third group fell slightly off the port bow, and I don't think included more than one or two bombs; I think that that group of splashes was about 30 meters distant from the ship, but since this is only my recollection, I can't be too sure about it.

- Q. Did the damage control officer ever hear or report any damage to the ship from these near misses?
- A. As far as I know there was no damage from these near misses, although there may have been some slight damage near the water line. We didn't have time to investigate, but I know that the battle efficiency of the ship was not impaired.
- Q. Were the high-level bombers that made these near misses observed?
- A. I myself did not see the planes nor, do I believe, did the look-outs, though I do know that after the attack was over the look-out sighted high level bombers departing through gaps in the clouds.
- Q. Is it possible to give me the approximate altitude of these bombers?
- A. Since they were operating above the clouds it is difficult to say, but they may have been 2500 meters up.
- Q. After the departure of the high-level bombers, can the Commander tell us what action followed, what type of aircraft he was being attacked by?
- A. After the high-level attack, we ourselves launched an attack, and 15 shipboard bombers, six torpedo planes, and 9 fighters took off from the HIRYU--although I am not sure of the specific number of planes, it was about that number. That was sometime between 10:30 and 11:00, during which time we received no attack. I believe that the next attack on the HIRYU took place at about 2:00 in the afternoon.
- Q. What was the target of these aircraft that had just departed from the HIRYU?
- A. The planes took off to attack ^{two} enemy aircraft carriers.
- q. What were the results of this attack.
- A. We couldn't find one of the carriers, and I believe from the reports we received that the planes scored some hits on the other of the carriers.
- Q. Up until now had you received or observed any results by high-level bombers on the two battleships, the HARUNA and KIRISHIMA?
- A. I didn't know of any damage to the battleships.
- Q. You don't know whether or not they were attacked by high-level bombers?

- A. There may have been high-level attacks, but I didn't hear ^{of} them or see them.
- Q. ~~I concern~~ ^{Concerning} this, approximately, two-o'clock attack: What type aircraft attacked?
- A. The planes which attacked us at 2 o'clock were single-engine dive bombers, and there may have been 13 to 15 planes in the attack.
- Q. What effect did they have?
- A. The HIRYU received, I think, three direct hits and a few near misses.
- Q. What kind of hits--torpedo, dive bomber--
- A. Bomb hits.
- Q. These were from dive bombers?
- A. Yes, they were from dive bombers.
- Q. These were the first hits that the HIRYU had sustained so far in the battle?
- A. That is correct; that's the first time that I remember.
- Q. How much damage did those three hits make?
- A. As a result of the three direct hits, all the planes on the flight deck were damaged, large fires were started aboard ship, the elevator was put out of commission, and a large hole was opened in the flight deck.
- Q. Where were the other three carriers? Do you recall whether they were on fire--had been damaged?
- A. By that time all the carriers had become so separated that the HIRYU was not within visible range of the others.
- Q. After these three hits, was the HIRYU attacked by high-level bombers later on in the day?
- A. We were attacked by high-level bombers after the dive bombers had scored hits, and I know that at least two or three high-level bombers--large type planes--attacked the HIRYU after the other damage had been inflicted.
- Q. Approximately what time were you attacked by these high-level bombers?
- A. Probably about 20 or 30 minutes later.
- Q. Was the HIRYU hit by any of the falling bombs?
- A. There were no direct hits, from this high-level bombing attack, but the planes strafed our ship and we returned fire with our anti-aircraft equipment.
- Q. Does the commander know how many horizontal bombers attacked the ship?
- A. They came at different times, one after another, but there may have been four or five planes.

- Q. Is it quite possible that some hits were scored on the HIRYU by horizontal bombers?
- A. I believe that there were no hits scored by high-level bombers.
- Q. Was the HIRYU attacked by any other type bombers after the initial three hits?
- A. No, it was not attacked by any other planes, other than the planes which scored the three hits and the high-level bombers which followed.
- Q. The Commander mentioned that he had been strafed by these high-level bombers. How many strafed him?
- A. Only one plane strafed the ship.
- Q. How many engines did these bombers have?
- A. I don't remember, but I know they were large-type planes--they weren't single-engine planes. They may have been twin-engine or they may have been four-engine, but I don't remember; all I remember is, they were large type planes.
- Q. Has the Commander ever seen the Boeing B-17?
- A. Yes, I've seen the B-17.
- Q. Did this strafing aircraft look like a B-17?
- A. Yes, it looked like the B-17.
- Q. Did the Commander actually see the strafing aircraft?
- A. Because of the smoke aboard ship, I couldn't see myself and did not see the plane, but my information is based on what I heard afterwards and the report I received at the time of the attack.
- Q. What effect did the strafing have on the HIRYU?
- A. As a result of the strafing attack, one of our anti-aircraft batteries was put out of commission, and several of the personnel operating the battery were killed.
- Q. Was the HIRYU in a sinking condition at this time?
- A. No, it was not in a sinking condition; it was only on fire, and at that time we were still able to control the motion of the ship.
- Q. When did the HIRYU sink?
- A. It sank at about 2:00 the next morning as a result of our own attempt to sink the ship.
- Q. This attempt to sink the ship: Explain what this attempt was-- what did you do?
- A. One of our own destroyers torpedoed the ship.
- Q. To sum this up, then: The only hits that the HIRYU had were the three hits made by dive bombers?
- A. Yes, that is correct; we only received three hits.
- Q. After the sinking of the HIRYU, what ship was the Commander transferred to?

A. I transferred to the destroyer MAKAGUMO.

Q. It is now the morning of the 5th--6 June, TOKYO time. Can the Commander give us a resume of his actions from there on?

A. Since the HIRYU was gutted by fire, we abandoned ship--transferred to the MAKAGUMO which in turn, itself, torpedoed the HIRYU but we didn't stay in the vicinity to watch the ship sink and left almost immediately, so that I'm not certain how long it took the ship to sink, and it may have burned for some time.

We proceeded Northwest at high speed all during the next day, and in the evening transferred again to the HARUNA.

Q. Has the Commander any information of any damage sustained aboard the HARUNA from these two days' battle previous?

A. The HARUNA had received some damage from a near miss near the stern where, along the water line, the plates had buckled.

Q. Does the Commander know what type of aircraft caused this damage to the stern of the HARUNA?

A. I couldn't say.

Q. Where did the HARUNA proceed to?

A. The HARUNA proceeded direct to KURE.

Q. Why to KURE?

A. The whole fleet returned to KURE.

Q. Did the HARUNA go into dock for battle repairs at KURE?

A. I left the HARUNA at KURE so I'm not certain, but I believe it went into the dock for major repairs.

Q. Does the Commander know how long the HARUNA was in the dock for repairs to the point where it was operational?

A. I'm afraid I can't remember.

Q. With reference to the transports: Can the commander give any information of any damage to any of them?

A. I only heard of one ship damaged in the transport convoy, and that was a tanker which was damaged slightly on the night of the 3d by a torpedo fired from a large-type plane; I heard it was a torpedo.

Q. Did you hear of any destroyer being hit? Can you give us any information on destroyers?

A. I'm afraid I'm not well informed on damage to any destroyers.

Q. Besides the four carriers that were sunk, does the commander know the names of any other ships that failed to return to KURE?

A. I heard that the heavy cruiser MIKUMA, which was operating with the Second Fleet, was sunk, but I haven't heard of any other ships sunk.

- Q. Do you know what sank the MIKUMA?
- A. I'm afraid I don't really know.
- Q. Throughout the 6th, the following day, was the retreating force attacked by any enemy aircraft?
- A. No, we received no attacks.
- Q. How many knots was the HARUNA able to make on the return to KURE?
- A. The HARUNA was proceeding at about 16 knots.
- Q. What were her capabilities of high speed?
- A. I wouldn't really know about how much speed it could have ~~pulled~~ ^{turned} out.
- Q. Do you feel that the near miss--buckling the plates in the stern --stopped the HARUNA from being able to accomplish high speed?
- A. I do believe that the near miss had some effect on reducing the speed.
- Q. What were the weather conditions from the time the HARUNA broke off action and proceeded toward KURE?
- A. There was some cloud cover but no wind.
- Q. Has the commander any information regarding a twin-engine torpedo bomber striking the island of any one of the carriers of the task force?
- A. No, I haven't heard of any such incident.
- Q. How many carriers did the Japanese Navy now have available after the loss of the four carriers at MIDWAY?
- A. We had two large carriers left and perhaps four or five small carriers.
- Q. Has the Commander any information of any carriers that were sunk by submarines?
- A. I have only heard that the AKAGI was torpedoed by a submarine after it had already been burning for some time.
- Q. Are you certain that it was the AKAGI?
- A. I heard that it was the AKAGI.
- Q. From whom did you get that information?
- A. I'm afraid I can't remember who told me.
- Q. Is there a possibility that there were explosions aboard ship other than from dive bombers?
- A. The only explosions aboard ship after the dive bombing attack was the exploding of the anti-aircraft battery magazines. There were no very large explosions aboardship but I really don't know the exact cause of all the explosions, and it may have been possible that one of them was the result of a hit from a second bombing attack.

- Q. Do you recall any bombing from high-level attack while the ship was burning?
- A. I remember that there weren't any high-level attacks.
- Q. What became of the aircraft that were launched from the HIRYU to attack the AMERICAN carriers?
- A. All the planes were lost, but some of the crews of planes which returned to the scene and made crash landings in the water were rescued by destroyers.
- Q. What were your duties after you arrived at KURE, after you went aboard the SUZUYA?
- A. I was Navigating Officer aboard the SUZUYA; all my duties aboard ships were as Navigating Officer.
- Q. Do you know of any survivors from the MIKUMA whom we might interview?
- A. The only person I knew on the MIKUMA who might be now available is Commander AKIBA Hajime. He was the Navigating Officer on the MIKUMA but I don't know where he is now or how he can be reached.
- Q. Do you know of anybody who was on the transport convoy who could be reached?
- A. I don't know of anyone from the transport convoy.
- Q. Do you know of any damage to any other battleship besides the HARUNA?
- A. As far as I know there was no other damage to any battleship in the battle of MIDWAY.
- Q. Do you know of any other cruisers besides the MIKUMA and MOGAMI that were in your force?
- A. I haven't heard ~~any~~ of any damage to any other cruisers.
- Q. Do you know the names of the other cruisers?
- A. The only cruisers in our force were the NAGARA and in the force operating with the MIKUMA and the MOGAMI there were also the two cruisers SUZUYA and the KUMANO. I also believe that in another group the cruisers TAKAO, TONE, SHIKUMA and ATAGO and the light cruisers JINTSU were operating in that group, but I don't know where they were operating.
- Q. The cruisers ^{SUZUYA} SUZUMI and ^{KUMANO} KIMONO were in the support force?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. Were there any carriers in the support force?
- A. I don't believe any carriers were in that force. The only other carriers I know of that were operating at that time were away to ~~the North, up near KISKA~~
the North, up near KISKA, and that force perhaps included two or three carriers.
- Q. Would the loss of the four carriers be the main reason for the change in the striking force's plans against MIDWAY?

- A. Yes, that's correct; it was the loss of the four carriers which forced us to change our plans for the attack on MIDWAY.
- Q. What influence did high-level bombing, in the Battle of MIDWAY, have on Japanese defensive tactics against high-level bombers?
- A. As a result of our experiences in the Battle of MIDWAY, in regard to high-level bombing, we were very greatly troubled because of our inability to detect the enemy planes until they actually came in to sight or dropped their bombs, so that after the Battle of MIDWAY we laid emphasis on more accurate lookout information. We also revised our evasive tactics and also decided to increase our firepower of our anti-aircraft batteries by using larger anti-aircraft guns which could be used against high-level bombers.
- Q. I'd like to ask one more question: What provision, if any, was made so that the officers on the bridge of the Japanese ships could observe high-level attacks?
- A. As a result of our experiences in the Battle of MIDWAY, we made every effort to revise the construction of the bridges so that full field of visibility could be given to a man standing on the bridge.
- Q. Do you know of any survivors who were aboard the KAGA with whom we might be able to talk?
- A. Capt AMAGI, who was the flight officer on the KAGA.
- Q. I understand that the Captain is sick. Do you have any idea when we'll be able to see him?
- A. No, I don't even know where he is.

End of Part VII

Part VIII

Questions by Maj HARDWICK asked of Capt AMAGI Takahiza IJN

(History: Graduate of Naval Academy. Beginning of war, Flight Officer on "Hiryu" remaining until April 1942 when he became Flight Officer of "Kaga" and remained with "Kaga" until Battle of MIDWAY. After MIDWAY, served almost two years as member of 4th Sec'n of KOKU HONBU. Oct 43, became Commander of Air Group #634 serving until PHILIPPINES and in FORMOSA until Apr 44. May 44 became attached to Training Divn of KOKU HONBU, remaining with that div'n until end of war.) (Some knowledge of English.)

Q. Are you a pilot?

A. Yes, I am a pilot.

Q. How many hours do you have?

A. About 2,500 hours. I want to point out that the Flight Officer on a carrier did very little actual flying. I was in charge of controlling the planes, but I myself did very little flying aboard carriers.

Q. First of all I'd like to know, are there any other survivors that you know of, of the KAGA?

A. Most of the men from the KAGA have been killed in battle, and I imagine that I'm one of the very few survivors. In other words I don't know of any others.

Q. I'd like to know how far away from MIDWAY was your force the first time that it was attacked by enemy aircraft?

A. I believe we were about 200 miles from MIDWAY.

Q. What day was that, that you were attacked?

A. I believe we were attacked the first time at about 4 o'clock in the morning, TOKYO time, on the 5th. I remember that it was about an hour or two hours after daylight.

Q. What ships composed the division that you were a part of?

A. With our force were four carriers: The AKAGI, the HIRYU, SORYU, and the KAGA; two battleships of the KONGO class, the names of which I don't remember except that I think one was the HARUNA; about four cruisers, and perhaps six destroyers.

Q. To the best of your recollection, ^{what} was the first time that your division was aware that they were being observed by enemy aircraft?

A. I recall that the evening before we were attacked we were discovered by an American patrol plane.

Q. Do you know the type of aircraft--do you recall the type?

A. Since it was after sundown, I don't believe it was ascertained what type of plane it was.

Q. On the opening day of the battle: I'd like to know the information regarding the first attack by enemy aircraft. About what time was that--on the first day of the battle?

A. As I said before, I believe the first attack took place about four in the morning--at any rate about one or two hours after sunrise.

Q. Approximately 7:30 in the morning, our time?

A. Yes.

Q. What kind of aircraft made this attack?

A. I believe they were torpedo planes. Most of them were small-type torpedo planes, and I recall that there were some larger-type torpedo planes. I recall at the same time, large type bombers were attacking the battleships.

Q. Let's take these up one by one so we'll get this absolutely straightened out in our minds: In reference to the first statements made, on the torpedo planes, were there any two-engine torpedo planes in this attack?

A. The greater number of torpedo planes ^{which} were attacked us were single-engine planes, and since the attack was very fierce, I don't recall if there were any twin-engine torpedo planes attacking us, but I recall that there was a small number of larger-type torpedo planes in the attack. As I recall, the fuselage of these planes was very large.

(Note: At this point a photograph of the American B-26 was shown to Capt AMAGR.)

Since we were attacked from all sides, I really wouldn't recognize the pictures of the plane.

Q. What position was the Captain occupying at the time of these attacks? Where was he on this carrier?

A. I was standing on the bridge during the attack. I was standing on the after part of the bridge where the Flight Officer has his station from which position he controls take-offs and landings of planes.

Q. I'd like to get the visibility from that bridge with reference to horizontal view and that above?

A. I could see the whole area astern of the ship and the upper area astern of the ship, but I couldn't see the sky ~~in front~~ of the ship at all.

Q. Did it have a covering?

A. There was no roof.

Q. Of these torpedo attacks, was your ship struck by any of the torpedoes?

(Note: Capt AMAGR drew a pencil chart showing the position of the four carriers and the results obtained from the torpedo attack.)

A. At the time we were attacked, we were proceeding on a zigzag course with the four carriers in the center of the formation in a square. The AKAGI was on the left upper point of the square; the SORYU was on the right-hand upper point; the KAGA was on the lower left-hand point and the HIRYU on the lower right point of the square. Two battleships in the formation were, one on each side abeam. We were proceeding at 22 knots on this

diagram which I have drawn--the AKAGI and KAGA side of the formation was proceeding at 22 knots, the SORYU and HIRYU side of the formation was proceeding at 34 knots. Twenty to thirty small planes--torpedo planes--attacked from astern of the HIRYU and a second wave of small planes attacked from the right, astern of the KAGA, and at the same time, 20 or 30 small torpedo planes attacked from the left astern of the KAGA. At the same time high-level bombers were attacking the battleships on the AKAGI-KAGA side of the formation, but I'm not certain if those were high-level bombers because there was so much Anti-aircraft fire that explosions in the sky made visibility very poor, and I didn't know. In addition to the 20 or 30 small planes which attacked from left astern of the KAGA, about five large type torpedo planes attacked from left astern of the KAGA.

- Q. Now that we have the formation pretty well set, ^{and} were these torpedo planes, both small and large--any of those planes--drop their torpedoes so that the KAGA was struck?
- A. In that first attack we were not struck, by any torpedoes. Several torpedoes, the number of which I can't recall, approached the ship from right astern in view of which we used left rudder and proceeded in the same direction as the torpedoes, whereupon we were attacked by other torpedoes from left astern of the ship so we changed over to right rudder. No hits were scored, but there were torpedoes which came extremely close to the ship--very nearly hit us. At that time we were maneuvering at 27 knots.
- Q. The Captain has already stated that the battleship to his left was supposedly attacked by high-level bombers. Could he elaborate on this--give us any effects that he saw or give us anything that was reported to him regarding hits or near misses?
- A. Although, because of near misses, huge water columns shot up into the air all around the battleship, "I thought it might have been struck, when the water columns subsided, the battleship was not emitting any smoke and didn't seem to have incurred any damage.
- Q. When communication system was set up between ships and aboard ship? How did you get any information of hits?
- A. We had both radio communication and signal communication.
- Q. Aboard the ship how was communication transmitted in regard to aircraft attacking?
- A. Communications to warn of attack was as follows: If the formation was attacked from the right rear, the HIRYU would send out signals, "Enemy sighted--enemy sighted"; if the formation were attacked from the left rear, the KAGA would send out signals, "Enemy sighted--enemy sighted."
- Q. Were there any devices on board the ship or ships to give you warning of high-level bombers?
- A. Although we had some sort of detection device, it was not working very properly and wasn't very efficient so that we had to rely mainly on lookouts for warnings of high-level attacks.
- Q. Did the Captain ever receive any signals from these lookouts prior to high-level attacks so that any evasive action could be taken?

- A. I'm afraid I don't know what the circumstances were in regard to high-level attacks, because I was standing on the rear of the bridge and all warnings and communications came to the bridge itself, and we were busy trying to avoid the torpedo attacks so that I don't know what the situation was in regard to high-level attacks.
- Q. Since the Captain was the air officer aboard the KAGA, and the planes of the KAGA had left the ship previous to the attack, was was the Captain's responsibility during the attack?
- A. When we received warnings of approaching planes, we launched defensive fighters, and during attacks, my duty was merely to direct the launching of defensive fighters and direct their landing on the carrier.
- Q. During the attack, the Captain then did have ample time to observe what was going on about him?
- A. Yes, I could see generally what was going on.
- Q. Out of this initial attack by torpedo and high-level bombers, was any damage to either carriers or battleships reported to the KAGA?
- A. I don't recall any damage being sustained in the first attacks and, as I recall, the hits scored were scored by the bombers which took part in the attack which followed the torpedo attack.
- Q. In other words, the Captain is quite sure, then, that in the initial engagement, the first attack he got, there was no damage to any of the ships of your division?
- A. I do not remember seeing any damage inflicted by the first attack or seeing any ships which appeared to have sustained damage such as visual evidence like emitting smoke--on fire.
- Q. The Captain states, then, the second attack, the division did receive damage. How much later did this attack come?
- A. I recall that the second attack came about five minutes after the torpedo attack, and the planes in that attack were dive bombers.
- Q. Approximately how many dive bombers were in this formation?
- A. The KAGA was attacked by about 30 dive bombers which approached the ship from the port side. Four hits were scored: The first one landing just forward of the island--and that caused so much damage to the island itself, and there was so much debris flying around that I didn't see clearly where the other hits fell, but I believe the second hit fell near the stern on the flight deck, and two more hits were scored along the port side of the flight deck about amidships.
- (Note: The above was graphically illustrated by a pencil chart drawn by Capt AMAGI.)
- Q. Did the Captain observe or receive reports on any other ship in the formation being hit by these dive bombers at this time?
- A. When the KAGA was hit, large fires were started on the flight deck and in the hangar so that it became impossible to see other ships in the formation. For about 20 minutes we tried to put

out the fire but it became impossible so I abandoned ship, and once I was in the water, it seemed to me that I could see all four carriers burning, although I can't be sure about the HIRYU because it was almost out of sight, but I'm certain that the AKAGI was burning.

While I was swimming in the water, very near the burning KAGA, I saw a submarine periscope come up above the surface, and I saw a torpedo fired at the KAGA. The torpedo struck the KAGA but it was such a glancing blow fired at such an angle that the torpedo bounced off the side of the ship and circled slightly, after which the head of the torpedo dropped off and sank, although the body of the torpedo remained floating near me. If that had exploded, I wouldn't be here now. After the war head dropped off the torpedo, several of our sailors clung to the floating after-part of the torpedo. Probably you haven't heard of this before, but I recall it because I was swimming right nearby.

- Q. How long was the Captain in the water before he was picked up?
- A. I was in the water from two to three hours before I was picked up.
- Q. Can the Captain give us his description of what he observed while he was in the water, of what was happening to the KAGA-- just his own picture?
- A. While I was swimming in the water, the KAGA was burning fiercely from stem to stern, and the anti-aircraft batteries were firing from induced explosion of their magazines. Even the paint on the side of the hull was burning. I had my face down and was swimming breast-stroke so that I couldn't see much above me, but I know that the American planes attacked the KAGA while I was swimming near it, and I recall hearing several loud explosions as a result of these attacks, but I don't know what damage or what sort of planes were attacking because I had my head down.
- Q. How much later was it before the KAGA sunk?
- A. I recall it sank in the evening after sundown.
- Q. Was the Captain's carrier attacked again between then and sundown? Does he know?
- A. I was so exhausted from my ordeal in the water that when I was picked up I rested in the officers' quarters aboard the ship, and I didn't see any of the action going on.
- Q. What ship was the Captain picked up by?
- A. I was picked up by a destroyer.~~after-abandoning-ship,~~
- Q. After abandoning ship and trying to save himself, I realize that the Captain's observation of the rest of the battle on June 4 was not from direct observation. Can the Captain give me any information received by communications or from conversation regarding future attacks?
- A. The evening when I came up on deck after resting, I could see the KAGA burning, and as I was watching there was a tremendous explosion with a great deal of flame aboard ship, probably from the gasoline tanks or the magazine. Although up to that time the KAGA had been floating level in the water, shortly thereafter it sank.

I also recall hearing that the HIRYU, having been able to avoid the previous attacks, had launched a torpedo plane attack against the AMERICAN fleet. I also heard later that the HIRYU sank as a result of a near miss by a large-type bomb. It had naturally been hit previously and was aflame, but this large-type bomb which struck about amidships opened a large hole beneath the waterline which caused enough leakage to sink the ship.

- Q. Do you know approximately when this large-type bomb hit the HIRYU--at what time?
- A. I didn't hear what time it was; I believe there's a Captain KAWAGUCHI at KOKU HONBU who was aboard the HIRYU and should know a great deal about it. He was the Flight Officer on the HIRYU.
- Q. Does the Captain know what kind of bomber dropped this large-type bomb?
- A. I'm afraid I didn't hear what type of plane dropped the bomb, but Capt KAWAGUCHI could probably tell you.
- Q. During any time on June 4 did the Captain observe any high-level bombers?
- A. I saw high-level bombers once or twice, and I know that the formations were attacked by high-level bombers several times, but I'm afraid I don't remember when or where.
- Q. Except for this one instance we've been discussing, of the HIRYU being struck possibly by a bomb from a high-level bomber, does the Captain know specifically of any ships that were hit by bombs from this type aircraft?
- A. Communications between ships became very difficult during that first day of attack, and so I was not informed of the circumstances aboard the other ships, especially after I had been transferred to the destroyer, but I do not believe that the KAGA was struck by high-level bombers because I remember it was attacked principally by the small-type planes, and the destroyer was not attacked.
- Q. How about the AKAGI--what do you know about that?
- A. All I know about the AKAGI is that a large fire was started in the hangar, and we were unable to put the fire out.
- Q. You do not know what type aircraft caused that fire?
- A. I'm afraid I don't know.
- Q. How about the other CV, the SORYU?
- A. I'm afraid I don't know anything about the SORYU except that a bomb hit on the SORYU folded the front elevator back against the bridge.
- Q. You don't know what kind of a bomb this was or from what kind of airplane?
- A. I'm afraid I don't know what type of planes participated in that attack.
- Q. How about the battleship HARUNA--what can you give us? When was she struck?

- A. I'm afraid I don't know anything about the damage to the HARUNA.
- Q. How about the other battleship, the KIRISHIMA?
- A. I seem to recall that the carriers were the principal target of the attack and that not much attention was given to the battleships, and I don't recall any damage.
- Q. Was the KIRISHIMA the name of the other battleship?
- A. I seem to recall that the battleships were the HARUNA and the KONGO.
- Q. Were any of the destroyers hit in this first day's battle by any aircraft?
- A. I only know that four carriers were damaged, and I don't know of any other damage. Perhaps Capt KAWAGUCHI will be able to give you fuller information on that.
- Q. What was the action of the destroyer that the Captain was picked up by following the sinking of the KAGA?
- A. The destroyer by which I was rescued spent the whole first day rescuing survivors. It completed that task at about nightfall just about the time when the KAGA finally sank. Thereafter it withdrew as fast as possible away from the scene of action toward the INLAND SEA.
- Q. What port did the destroyer come back to in JAPAN?
- A. We put in at HASHIRAJIMA right near MIEJIMA.
- Q. Does the Captain know of any surviving ships that came back to JAPAN that went in for repairs?
- A. I'm afraid I don't know about repairs to ships.
- Q. Does the Captain know of any survivor from the transport division?
- A. Since the transport force was operating on an entirely different course and in a different area, I'm afraid I don't know anything about it.
- Q. How many ships were in the force on the second day of attack, which would be 5 June--6 June, TOKYO time?
- A. The day after I was picked up by the destroyer I transferred to the battleship NAGATO, and as I recall, there was no attack upon the NAGATO while I was aboard. I was with the carrier force, and we were operating about 200 miles away from a battleship force which was standing by so that when I was rescued, I was later transferred to the NAGATO which was in that battleship force. Of the crew--total complement of 1800--men aboard the KAGA, only 1000 were rescued; 800 were killed.
- Q. That was the NAGATO that came into HASHIRAJIMA and not the destroyer?
- A. It was the Battleship NAGATO which put into HASHIRAJIMA, and since I was transferred at night I don't know where the destroyer went after that.
- Q. Did the NAGATO receive any damage from enemy air attack?

- A. No, there was no damage at all; it was never attacked.
- Q. After leaving the scene of the MIDWAY action, was your force ever under AMERICAN attack?
- A. I believe that there was a report that reconnaissance planes or patrol planes were over us the evening of the 4th when the KAGA sank, but after that I don't know if any attacks at all on my force.
- Q. What was the weather throughout that first day's action?
- A. The weather was clear all through the day. There was a cloud cover of about 4/10ths, and the clouds were cumulus clouds. The ceiling was about 500 meters. It was quite calm, and the wind speed was from one to two meters.
- Q. Therefore the attacks of high-level bombers would have been above this cloud cover? That is so?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. Did your force take advantage of the cloud cover by trying to take concealment from the high-level attacks?
- A. I don't believe we had any specific plan to use cloud cover for protection.
- Q. But it was advantageous?
- A. Yes, I think it was to our advantage that there were clouds.
- Q. Has the Captain anything he can recall that he wants to add to his information?
- A. I would like to add that after the four carriers had been destroyed, I heard that Vice Admr NAGUMO ordered a night attack upon the enemy fleet and assembled ships for that purpose, but the attack was not carried out because we could not find the enemy.
- Q. Does the Captain recall of an instance where a twin-engine bomber struck the island of one of the carriers?
- A. Although we were attacked by twin-engine torpedo planes, I didn't see any such plane crash on any ship, and I haven't heard of any crashing on any ship.
- Q. What effect did high-level attacks have on the operations of your division?
- A. I would say that the simultaneous use of high-level bombers and torpedo attack planes made our problem difficult in three ways: (1) It made it very difficult for our fighters--our defensive fighters--to maneuver since they were charged with responsibility against defending against both low-level and high-level attacks; (2) it made our anti-aircraft fire problem a difficult one since we had to have divided attention for both low-level and high-level attacks; and (3) I would say that the combination of high-level and low-level attacks greatly hindered our attempts to ~~evade receiving hits.~~ take evasive action.
- Q. What tactical defense did the Japanese Navy set up thereafter against high-level attacks?

A. As a result of the Battle of MIDWAY, we found it necessary to do everything possible to increase our fire-fighting equipment aboard ship, since we believed that all the four carriers which sank, sank as the result of fires which could not be controlled and from induced explosions, and not necessarily from bomb hits themselves. We did not necessarily increase the armament, but we did everything we could to protect gasoline storage and ammunition magazines, and we also learned that it was absolutely essential to do what we could towards the development of radar since we operated under difficult conditions without advance notice of attacking planes, and so radar factories were established for the study and development of warning equipment.

Q. Do you know of any survivors available from the MIKUMA?

A. I knew of the damage and the sinking of the MIKUMA, but it was only by hearsay, and I'm afraid I didn't hear of any particular person who was rescued from it.

Q. In regard to the Japanese cruiser MOGAMI: What does the Captain know about that?

A. I'm afraid I received no reports about the MOGAMI in the carrier force. I believe a Capt GENDA might know quite a bit about that; he was a staff officer; he is now in KYUSHU.

(Note: It was determined that Capt GENDA had been previously interviewed--see USSBS Interrogation No. ____.)

Q. Do you know of any instances of high-level attacks on your force when no other planes were attacking?

A. I'm afraid I can't remember anything about that.

Q. Do you know of anybody who has a complete report on damage done to all ships during the battle of MIDWAY?

A. I think there were records kept, but they were probably burned. On the other hand there should be a man named YAMAMOTO who was a Naval engineer concerned with aircraft carrier construction, and he would be in Naval Construction Headquarters (KANSEI HONBU), and though he may not be there, he might be available, although I don't know where he is living, and he might be able to tell you something about the battle.

End of Part VIII

PART IX

Questions asked of Capt TOYAMA by Maj HARNWICK:

(Note: History - Not a pilot. Dec 41 participated in occupation of DAVAO and JOLLO. Early months 1942 took part in occupation of MENADO, AMBON, KOUPANG. Late Feb & early Mar 1942, participated in JAVA SEA battle. After short period at home, participated in MIDWAY battle. Returned home again, then went to GUADALCANAL. Up to Jan 43, in all operations, attached to 2d Destroyer Div'n. Jan 43 ret'd JAPAN & became attached to KANSEI HOMBUR remaining with that dept until Apr 45 at which time he became attached to Bureau of Military Affairs. Aug 45, became commander KASUMI GAURA air base.) (Some knowledge of English.)

Q. I'd like to know the name of the transport vessel--the troopship--that you were on?

A. The transport convoy was divided into the transport vessels and the escort force, and I was in the escort force aboard the cruiser JINTSU which was the flagship of the destroyer division escorting force. I was the senior staff officer under the command of the escort force commander.

Q. What were your duties as senior staff officer?

A. I was covering all operations.

Q. How close were you to MIDWAY--or, your force to MIDWAY--when first observed by enemy aircraft?

A. About 200 miles, I think. The first plane we saw was a Consolidated

Q. What do you mean by "a Consolidated?"

A. A PBV Consolidated.

Q. What time of day was that?

A. I'm not certain exactly what time we were sighted, by this plane, but it was during the morning, and I'm not certain of the day, but it was the day on which we approached within 600 miles of MIDWAY, and I think that might have been the 5th, your time. Perhaps to straighten this out, I could say that this was on the day before we were attacked by 9 of your B-17s.

Q. I'd like to know how many transport ships there were by division?

A. There were 9 or 11 transports in the group. One was operating astern of the formation.

Q. How many cargo ships?

A. The figures I just gave you include all the transport and cargo vessels we were escorting. The escorting force was made up of the cruiser JINTSU and destroyer Division No. 2 which was made up of DESRON 15 with 3 destroyers, DESRON 16 with 4 destroyers and DESRON 18 with four destroyers. There were also three patrol /vessels.

Q. What air support did you have?

A. There were no air units in our particular force, but other forces operating supplied us with air cover.

Q. Other forces--what do you mean by other forces?

A.

- A. In addition to the escort force there was another force composed of two ships under a separate command entirely which was support force to our escort force. It was composed of the CHITOSE and the KAMIKAWA MARU which carried Seaplanes and which together made up the 11th Air Flot. The CHITOSA and the KAMIKAWA MARU were supposed to break off the day we were to arrive at MIDWAY and were to go to KURE ISLAND.
- Q. What was the main mission of the air support that you had--what was their main job?
- A. Its main mission was merely to cover the convoy with air patrol.
- Q. Air patrol against what--against our fighters or against observation?
- A. Their main duty was to patrol since there wasn't very great strength there and because they were seaplanes, but they were also supposed to do some interception if necessary. These seaplanes were operationally efficient against planes like the PB Y but they were never much use against planes like the B-17 and fighter planes.
- Q. Did your force contemplate attack by heavy bombers from MIDWAY?
- A. Yes, we thought we might be attacked by heavy bombers.
- Q. What was the time of day of the first attack your group received from heavy bombers or enemy aircraft?
- A. I would like to revise my statement about the time, as I believe that the PB Y sighted us on the 3d, TOKYO time and that the heavy bombers attacked us on the 4th, TOKYO time.
- Q. You were attacked by heavy bombers on the 4th: What time on the 4th?
- A. I'm afraid I don't know the exact time.
- Q. The Captain has already said that his air cover was not adequate against heavy bombardment aircraft. What means then did the force have for protection? Where could they get assistance if necessary?
- A. We had no very detailed plan for interception of attacking planes. We only expected to avoid receiving direct hits by evasive action and by anti-aircraft fire. I believe, in view of this, the anti-aircraft fire was very insufficient.
- Q. What means of detection did your force have for spotting bombers?
- A. Our only means of detection was visual detection.
- Q. Was this first attack by high-level bombers a surprise to your force or were they warned?
- A. We first sighted the heavy bombers through field glasses.
- Q. At what altitude were these bombers flying?
- A. I think they were probably flying at from six to seven thousand meters.
- Q. How many bombers were in this formation?
- A. I'm not certain, but I think perhaps nine planes.

- Q. The Captain has stated that these were Boeings. How is he certain that these were Boeings?
- A. Because I had seen B-17s in the Dutch East Indies Area.
- Q. What ships were attacked by these high-level bombers?
- A. Not one ship was struck--no damage.
- Q. What types of ships were they trying to hit?
- A. The bomb splashes fell, I think, astern of the JINTSU, between the JINTSU and the first line of destroyers following, and another pattern of bombs fell to the left side of the column, straddling the left column of the transports and the escorting destroyers.
- Q. About how many bomb patterns did you observe--approximately how many bombs were dropped?
- A. I'm afraid I don't recall how many bombs were dropped, but I recall they were divided into two main groups.
- The night before this attack by B-17s, an enemy plane carried out a torpedo attack on a tanker named AKEBONO MARU which was at the very end position of the left column of the transport convoy, and scored a hit. I don't know what type of plane it was, but I think it might have been a PBY; I was only judging by the sound--I couldn't tell because I couldn't see the plane.
- Q. And the Captain is sure, on the high-level attack, that none of the ships of the convoy were struck by high-level bombing?
- A. Yes, I'm positive there was no damage.
- Q. No hits. On this attack the previous evening by this unknown type aircraft, what were the results of that torpedo?
- A. The torpedo struck the AKEBONO MARU on the starboard bow above the water line--I think the torpedo must have jumped out of the water ~~line~~ because it struck above the waterline--and opened a hole there but it didn't affect the efficiency of the ship other than by reducing the speed to 12 or 14 knots and killing and wounding a few men.
- Q. No fires resulted--just an explosion?
- A. Just an explosion.
- Q. After this initial attack by the high-altitude bombers, what was the next, chronologically, attack your division received?
- A. We received no further attacks--that was the last attack we received.
- Q. Was the force under surveillance by enemy aircraft after that?
- A. I don't believe we were shadowed by any planes after that--at least I know we didn't see any, although there may have been some planes shadowing the CHITOSE and KAMIKAZE MARU in the Air Flot #11 because they were operating a little bit separately.
- Q. Was this support unit ever attacked by aircraft?
- A. I'm afraid I don't know of any attacks--at any rate I haven't heard of any attacks on them.

- Q. Did the Captain receive any information about enemy aircraft attacking the CV's to the North?
- A. The only report we received were reports of damage inflicted so that the reports came in after the action.
- Q. What was the first time you knew that the four carriers of the task force were sunk?
- A. The first time we knew the four carriers had been sunk was on the 5th, TOKYO Time.
- Q. What effect did the loss of their carriers have on the operations of your unit?
- A. The loss of the four carriers of itself did not have any effect on our operations because we were still proceeding towards MIDWAY, but we only reversed course when ordered to.
- Q. When was that?
- A. It was about the same time, about noone.
- Q. How far away from MIDWAY was your unit when you reversed course?
- A. I think about 300 miles.
- Q. After you reversed course away from MIDWAY, was any enemy air attack made by any aircraft on your unit?
- A. After we reversed course, the 11th Air Flot became a direct escort for the transport convoy, and the cruiser JINTSU and part of the Second DESRON joined the main body so that I don't know what happened to the escort convoy after we reversed course.
- Q. To sum this up then, your unit had received the following attacks: (1) You had been observed by the PBY; presumably that evening you were attacked by an unknown type torpedo plane which struck the tanker; (2) on the following day you were attacked by high-level bombers. Were you ever attacked by dive bombers?
- A. No, we were never attacked by dive bombers, and I would like to say that your summary of the events is correct.
- Q. Also I'd like to make certain in my own mind that no ships that you were convoying were lost due to air action?
- A. There were no ships sunk by air attack in the group of ships I was escorting.
- Q. Does the Captain know where the unit went to--where the occupation force went to after they changed course?
- A. Part of the force went to TRUK and part of the force went back to JAPAN via GUAM.
- Q. What was the weather like during this action and when they broke off?
- A. Generally speaking it was fine weather throughout the action.
- Q. What was the Captain's reaction that the force was not attacked again by high-level bombers?
- A. I believed that probably your forces had received damage and were ordered not to attack us.

Q. We were searching for you; it is fortunate for you that we did not find you.

A. I think the reason the transport convoy wasn't found was because the main body went Northwest and we went due West.

Q. What action if any took place after the Captain's ship joined the main fleet--left the occupation forces?

A. After my force joined the main body, we were not attacked.

Q. Where did the main body proceed to?

A. At first the main force proceeded Northwest, then it changed course to Southwest, and after fueling, changed course directly for JAPAN again.

Q. Were any reports of battle damage received from any of the ships of the main force damaged?

A. The only damage I heard of was that already reported regarding the aircraft carriers of the striking force.

Q. What do you know about the MOGAMI?

A. I'm not certain, but I had also heard that a cruiser was sunk. It may have been the MOGAMI or it may have been the MIKUMA.

Q. Does the Captain know of any damage to any of the ships in the force directly accountable to high-level bombers?

A. I heard of no damage to ships by high-level bombers.

Q. Has the Captain got anything to add to the information already given that we haven't covered?

A. I'm afraid I don't have anything to add because I've told you practically everything I know about the battle.

(Note: At this point a chronological record was recorded showing the wartime activities of Capt TOYAMA which chronology is given on the first page of Part IX, this interview.)

Q. One last question here I'd like to ask: The ship that was torpedoed--does the Captain have any recollection of any strafing of the ship by enemy aircraft?

A. The ship was strafed at the same time, but I only heard the sound of the strafing so I don't know what damage was caused by the strafing, but I don't think it was very heavy.

End of Part IX

Part X

Questions asked of Capt OBARA by Maj Hardwick:

(Note: History - Before hostilities, was in Tokyo Hydrographic Headquarters. On 25 Dec 41, boarded the SORYU as Executive Officer. Served on the SORYU thru MIDWAY; was wounded and hospitalized. 15 Feb 43, became District Officer, SOURABAYA Hydrographic Office. 25 Mar 45, returned to JAPAN as instructor; head teacher at Navigation School. 15 July 45, went to OMINARO Coast Defense Corps. Limited knowledge of English.)

- Q. What were the specific duties of the Captain aboard the SORYU?
- A. My chief duty was being assistant to the Captain of the ship, principally involving matters connected with the internal duties aboard ship.
- Q. What was the day and time that the SORYU was first attacked by enemy air at the Battle of MIDWAY?
- A. The first attack came at 0430 on the morning of the 5th of June, TOKYO time. We were first attacked by torpedo planes and then by high-level bombers.
- Q. Were these attacks simultaneous--at the same time?
- A. Almost simultaneous attacks.
- Q. Which type of aircraft attacked first?
- A. The torpedo planes attacked first.
- Q. How many torpedo planes?
- A. The SORYU was attacked from the starboard bow by three or four torpedo planes and off the starboard quarter by three or four torpedo planes.
- Q. Were these single-engine torpedo planes or twin-engine?
- A. They were all single-engine planes.
- Q. Does the Captain remember seeing any twin-engine torpedo planes?
- A. I'm afraid I don't remember seeing any twin-engine, but I don't remember very clearly at this particular time. The situation was very confused because our own planes were returning, taking off and landing, so that it was very difficult to concentrate on any one thing.
- Q. Where was the Captain during this attack?
- A. Standing on the bridge.
- Q. From the bridge how much view did the Captain have in regard to seeing the planes attacking, both torpedo and high altitude?
- A. I could see everything from the bridge.
- Q. What were the results of these torpedo attacks?
- A. We were not struck by a single torpedo.
- Q. How many of the torpedo planes were shot down?

- A. About four torpedo planes fell in the vicinity of the SORYU. The SORYU was able to avoid the torpedoes by evasive action. From my own observation I know that about three torpedoes just missed the ship.
- Q. How far away from the ship were the torpedoes launched by the airplanes?
- A. The nearest torpedo launching was at least a thousand meters distant from the ship, and others were further away than that. The torpedo planes approached from a long way out at exceedingly low altitude, and so it was very easy to hit them.
- Q. How much later after the torpedo attack was your ship under attack by high-level bombers?
- A. I can't be certain of the exact time of the high-level attack because everything was so confused aboard ship, but I do know that immediately after the torpedo planes launched their first attack we were attacked by high-level bombers and then almost immediately after by torpedo planes again.
- Q. Approximately how many high-level bombers attacked your ship?
- A. I can't say about the other carriers, but the SORYU was attacked by three waves of high-level bombers, the smallest group being composed of perhaps three or four planes, and the largest group being composed of perhaps nine planes.
- Q. Could you see these attacking high-level bombers?
- A. I only saw them clearly once, and that was when we were being attacked by formations which had about nine planes in them.
- Q. What were the results of this attack?
- A. Not one bomb dropped by the high-level bombers struck our ship. Bombs fell astern of the SORYU between the SORYU and a destroyer which was following astern perhaps about 600 meters back.
- Q. In the subsequent action, was the SORYU ever struck by high-level bombers?
- A. I don't believe the SORYU was hit by high-level bombers.
- Q. What type of aircraft did hit the SORYU?
- A. They were dive bombers. The dive-bombing attack took place at about 0735.
- Q. Was that previous to the high-level attack or after it?
- A. It was after the high-level attack.
- Q. What was the damage sustained by the SORYU from the dive bombers?
- A. The SORYU was attacked first from the starboard bow by three dive bombers and by a second wave of four dive bombers off the starboard quarter and by a third wave of perhaps five dive bombers off the port bow. These waves came at intervals of 30 seconds to one minute, and three hits were scored. The first hit was scored amidships; the second hit came just forward of the bridge on the starboard side; and the third hit was on the stern part of the flight deck--after section of the flight deck.

- Q. Can the Captain tell us what the results of these three hits were on the SORYU?
- A. Our planes were being made ready for a second sortie and were all lined up on the flight deck ready to take off. The planes in the hangar below decks were loaded with bombs and fuel, ready to be brought to the flight deck, so that the first bomb started all these planes burning. The bombs loaded aboard the planes went off one by one by induced explosion.
- Q. Was the SORYU attacked after this?
- A. I do not believe it was attacked after that, but I'm not sure because I was wounded in the first attack and was being cared for by members of the crew.
- Q. The Captain has no knowledge then of high-level attack following this initial three hits by dive bombers?
- A. Afterwards, when I was in the hospital, I heard that it was not attacked after that first attack--after being struck.
- Q. How much later was it before the SORYU was abandoned?
- A. I believe we abandoned ship at about 1000 or 1030 in the morning.
- Q. Due to the severe wounds that the Captain received, was it at all possible for him to know what was happening to the rest of the carrier force?
- A. Unfortunately, because of my wounds, I do not know what took place in the rest of the battle, and moreover the wounded were separated so that I didn't get a chance to talk to them.
- Q. Did the Captain ever hear of any of the other three carriers being struck by high-level bombs?
- A. I have never heard of any direct hits by high-level bombers.
- Q. Particularly the HIRYU--are you sure?
- A. At the time the SORYU was hit, the HIRYU and the AKAGI were still undamaged, but after that the SORYU was covered with clouds of smoke and flame so that I couldn't see anything outside of the SORYU.
- Q. Does the Captain know of any hits aboard the accompanying battleships?
- A. I have heard that the battleships were not attacked at all--that the carriers were made the main target of the attack--that the two battleships that were escorting the carriers, the HARUNA and the KIRISHIMA.
- Q. After being wounded, can the Captain add anything at all to what he heard or may have observed during the remainder of the battle?
- A. I might say that from my own point of view I believe we approached too close to MIDWAY with our carriers, that we underestimated the air strength of the enemy's defense at MIDWAY, and that we did not carry out sufficient search for enemy aircraft carriers in the vicinity.

Q. What effect did high-altitude bombers have on Japanese tactics thereafter?

A. I believe that we thought we could avoid high-altitude attacks by merely taking evasive action.

Q. Was any warning system set up after this to let them know of high altitude attacks?

A. I believe we did make efforts to develop warning apparatus. At that time we did have ships with warning devices on them, but they went with the ALEUTIAN force and were not at the Battle of MIDWAY.

Cmdr NICHOLS.

Q. How did the SORYU sink: Did it burn down?

A. Due to the large fires aboard ship, the large gasoline storage area in the stern of the ship exploded leaving only the bow afloat, after which the gasoline storage tanks in the forward part of the ship exploded and sank the ship. I think it sank at about 1600.

Q. Regarding these bombs which you mentioned went off in the hangar? Do you think that any of these explosions might have been the result of bombs dropped by high-level bombers?

A. I'm afraid there couldn't have been any ~~hights~~ by high-level attacks at that time because the explosions were all about the same, and there were no large explosions or small explosions, and so it would appear that they were merely all the bombs aboard the planes exploding by induced explosion from the fire, and furthermore there were those who were swimming in the water beside the ship, and according to their stories, there were no further high-level attacks on the SORYU.

Maj HARDWICK.

Q. Of the original complement aboard the SORYU, how many survivors did you have?

A. Of a total complement of 1200 men, 300 to 400 were not wounded; 200 to 250 were hospitalized, and about 700 died in the battle.

Q. What type ship was the Captain removed to?

A. At first I was transferred to a destroyer, and about three days later I was transferred again to the CHIOTA, a Seaplane Tender.

Q. During his return, away from the scene of the battle, does the Captain know of any attacks by enemy aircraft carried out?

A. I did not hear of any further attacks.

Q. Does the Captain have anything to add to the interrogation as far as we've gone--any personal thing he wants to say?

A. I don't have anything special I can think of offhand.

Cmdr NICHOLS.

Have you heard of any incident of an enemy plane--torpedo aircraft--that crashed into any of the carriers?

A. There were none which crashed into any of the carriers, but there were plenty which came almost to the carriers and fell very close to them.

- Q. Did bombs ever fall without previous warning? Does the Captain know of any high-level attacks which came to any of the carriers without warning?
- A. There were no attacks where bombs fell without previous warning because on this particular day the weather was very clear, and we could see everything that was going on.
- Q. Was it possible to see those high-level bombers?
- A. Yes, we could see them very clearly.
- Q. Throughout the action, until the Captain was wounded, he can't recall of any hits made by high-level bombers on any of the carriers of his force or the accompanying ships?
- A. No, I heard of no hits by high-level bombers.
- Q. Were there any near misses which impeded the efficiency of the carriers?
- A. If you review the circumstances, I don't think there would be any evidence to that effect.
- Q. Does the Captain know of any ships that had to return to JAPAN for repairs due to bombing?
- A. Aside from the four carriers which sank, I don't believe that any ships had to go into dock for repairs.

Cmdr NICHOLS.

Q. How about the MIKUMA?

A. The MIKUMA was operating in an entirely different force, but it was sunk. Aside from that I know of no cruisers that were sunk although I think it was the MOGAMI which was heavily damaged.

Maj HARDWICK.

Q. Do you know of any transports?

A. I heard of no transports which were hit.

End of Part X

END OF INTERROGATION