Maja Snow: changes made are as per Memorandum of 4 Aug 47 (attached) and your comments.

Is it satisfactory?

O.K. Snow

HUB

D. Civilian Administrator General (SHISEIHOKAN) in Occupied Territories who were Civil Officials of CHOKUNIN rank or higher in Ministries other than the War or Navy who were ordered to serve with the War or Navy Ministry in Japanese Occupied Territory.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 11 August 1947

These criteria were submitted as a result of Memorandum for Chief, Public Service Qualifications Division: "CHOKUNIN rank officials with the War and Navy Ministries: Their Status Under SCAPIN 550", dated 24 June 1947.

HHB

PUBLIC SERVICE QUAL. DIV.
Buck Slip

	Initial	Remarks
Baerwald		
Brady		
Carson		
Chick		
Drivdahl		
Earle		
Gilbert		
Grahamslaw		
Jones		
Kozlowski		
McGandy		
McCrath		
Melvin		
Mueller		
Napier		
Neff		
Ogino		
Schweitzer		
Snow		
Tsukahara		
Tyson		
Whitney, Jr.		
Wiggins		

Hans, I don't like their 1A. I think a provision should be made for those officials from other Ministries who received treatment of CHOKUNIN, on or subsequent to their transfer, ~~which~~ as a result of the duty performed, but not in the line of promotion. Snow See me.

DATE 8 Aug

D
R
A
F
T

Memorandum for: Chief, Public Service
Qualifications Division

8 August 1947

Subject : Record of Conference re Criteria to be Applied to CHOKUNIN Rank Officials with the War and Navy Ministries.

1. On 7 August 1947 between 1430 and 1545 a conference was held in the office of the Secretariat of the Central Screening Committee in order to consider the recommendations, which representatives of the SCAP stated that they had, with regard to Criteria to be applied to CHOKUNIN rank officials with the War or Navy Ministry, as established 11 July 1947. Present at the conference were Mr. OTA, Mr. KURIYAMA, Mr. HIRAMATSU, Mr. HINATA, and Mr. OKADA representing the Secretariat of the Central Screening Committee and Lt. Baerwald representing PSQD.

2. The following recommendations of changes were made by the members of the Central Screening Committee Secretariat with regard to the above-mentioned criteria.

A. Criteria 1A (Under Mandatory Purge Cases) is ambiguous in its present form: "Civil officials of CHOKUNIN rank who had continuous service with the War or Navy Ministry and who, in the course of promotions, became CHOKUNIN rank officials with either of the above-named Ministries." This criteria is ambiguous for reason that the following differentiation which exists among subject officials is not taken into consideration. Namely, that there are some officials in Ministries other than the War or Navy Ministry who were transferred into the War or Navy Ministry while holding a rank below CHOKUNIN and who while in service with these Ministries became CHOKUNIN rank officials for reason of being eligible for it because of length of service. (Promotions in the Japanese civil service could well be compared to existing policy with regard to promotions ~~existing~~ in the U. S. Army), and those officials who were actually career civil officials in the War or Navy Ministry, which officials this criteria was designed to include. It was therefore recommended that the criteria be rewritten in the following manner:

1A: "Career civil officials of the War or Navy Ministry who, in the course of promotions became CHOKUNIN rank officials in the above-named Ministries.", and that the following criteria be added to those listed under 2 (not automatically mandatory purge cases), 2D. "Civil officials of rank below CHOKUNIN in Ministries other than the War or Navy Ministry who were ordered to serve in the War or Navy Ministry and who in the course of their service in these Ministries became CHOKUNIN rank officials." That these latter officials not be deemed mandatory purge cases but be handled as those cases listed under 2 in the criteria is that some of these officials only served for a relatively short time while in service with the War or Navy Ministry and as such to include subject officials in the mandatory class would be unfair in the light of the established criteria.

1B: "Members of the National Diet who were appointed Parliamentary Councillors or Parliamentary Vice Ministers for the War or Navy Ministry and who as such were appointed CHOKUNIN rank officials in the War or Navy Ministry. It was recommended that the underlined phrase be cut for the reason that it is superfluous and can only serve to confuse rather than clarify the criteria.

C. That in all such instances where the term "SHOKUTAKU" is translated as "temporary officials", the translation be changed to non-staff member in order to be in accord with the accepted translation of the term "SHOKUTAKU". It was also considered that the English translation of the term "SHOKUTAKU" might be cut entirely, for reason of there not being a truly accurate translation for the term in the English language.

D. It was recommended that the word "standing" be cut from criteria 1C for reason that the translation of the term into Japanese conveys an ambiguous meaning and is actually superfluous and confusing. Criteria 1C reads as follows: "Temporary officials (non-staff members) (SHOKUTAKU) of full time service as CHOKUNIN rank officials with the War or Navy Ministry or who received CHOKUNIN rank treatment, (standing), or authority."

3. It is recommended that these changes as recommended by the representa-

tives of the Central Screening Committee Secretariat be approved. Comments and/or questions would be appreciated.

Hans H. Baerwald

HANS H. BAERWALD
2nd Lt. INF.
PUBLIC SERVICE QUALIFICATIONS DIVISION

Prime Minister's Office and Home Ministry

Ordinance No. 6 of 1947.

~~[illegible]~~, 2 Aug 1947
~~[illegible]~~

A part of the Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance of 1947 shall be modified as follows:

In "Remarks" attached to Paragraph 7 of the Appendix I the following item shall be added:

10. Persons who held the following offices in the Great Japan Military Virtue Association (to be called Association hereafter) between 22 March 1942 and 2 September 1945, with the exception of those who can give satisfactory proof to the contrary.

(1) Central office-President, Vice-President, Chief of the Board of Directors, Directors and Chiefs of Sections.

(2) Prefectural branch-Chief, Vice-Chief, Chief of the Board of Directors, Directors and Chiefs of Sections.

(3) Local sub-branch (including sub-office (Bun Kai) and others substantially corresponding with sub-branch.)-Chief (including chief of sub-office and others substantially corresponding with chief of sub-branch; ditto hereafter.)

Note: "persons who can give satisfactory proof to the contrary" shall be as follows:

1. Proof to the contrary to be recognized in respect of all officers.

Any person or persons who can give proof that he made positive attempts to obstruct the militarisation of the association.

association.

II. Other proof to the contrary to be recognized in respect to the following officers.

1. In respect to Directors of central office, any person who can give proof to the contrary under the following paragraphs.

(a) That he did not hold the concurrent post of a Section Chief or any other active position, and,

(b) The number of attendance to the directors conference being such as not to exceed 1/4 of the number of conferences held during the period in which he was a director and, proof of non-participation in other activities of the association, and,

(c) That his personal record was such as to show that he did not identify himself with any quasi-militalistic or quasi-ultra-nationalistic activities.

2. Officers of prefectural Branches.

(a) In respect to person who was an officer only before September 22, 1942, any of the above persons who can give proof to the contrary under the following paragraphs.

(i) That the actual activities including the various performances of the said branches were similar to those of the said branches prior to the reorganisation, of the central office and,

(ii)

(ii) That (consequent on the reorganization of the central office) the preparatory measures for the purpose of the reorganization of the said branches did not become active.

(iii) That his personal record was such as to show that he did not identify himself with any quasi-militaristic or quasi-ultra-nationalistic activities.

(b) In respect to officer subsequent to the period as in 2 (a) above, (to include officers even prior to the same date, in cases where the activities of the said branches were in actual fact strengthened or preparatory measures for the purpose of reorganization thereof became active), any person who can give proof to the contrary under the following paragraphs.

(i) That he was not authorized any responsible part in the final coordination or general execution of the funcitions of the branch, such as Chief of Branch or Chief of the Board of Directors; and,

(ii) That he did not take an active part in strengthening the actual activities of the said branches such as various performances etc; and,

(iii) That his personal record was such as to show that he did not indentify himself with any quasi-militalistic or quasi-ultra-nationalistic activities.

3. Chief of Local Sub-branch.

(a) In respect to any person or persons who was chief of

a

a local sub-branch only before September 22, 1942, any person or persons who can give proof to the contrary under the following paragraphs.

(i) That the actual activities of the said local sub-branch including its various performances were similar to those of the said branches prior to reorganization of the central office; and,

(ii) That consequent on the reorganization of the central office no preparatory measures for the purpose of strengthening the actual activities of the said local sub-branch were taken; and,

(iii) That his personal record was such as to show that he did not identify himself with any quasi-militaristic or quasi-ultra-nationalistic activities.

(b) In respect to chief of local sub-branch subsequent to date as in 3 (a) above any person who can give proof to the contrary under following paragraphs.

(i) That the actual activities of the said local sub-branch including the various performances were similar to that of the said sub-branch prior to the reorganization of the central office; and,

(ii) That the period of service as chief of local sub-branch was one year or less; and,

(iii) That during the period of service as chief of local sub-branch the activities of the said branch were in no way militaristic or ultra-nationalistic; and,

(iv)

(iv) That his personal record was such as to show that he did not identify himself with any quasi-militaristic or quasi-ultra-nationalistic activities.

Supplementary Rule.

The present Ordinance shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.

Persons who, prior to enforcement of this Ordinance, have filed, under the provisions of Articles VII and VIII, their questionnaires with the Prime Minister or the prefectural governor , who consider themselves as falling under the revised provisions of the proviso of Item 10 of the "Remarks" attached to the Appendix I, shall submit, within thirty days after the enforcement of this Ordinance, the proof to the contrary to Prime Minister or the prefectural governor with whom their questionnaires have been filed.

Prime Minister's Office and Home Ministry

Ordinance No. 6 of 1947.

~~(Draft)~~

2 August 1947
~~30 July 1947~~

A part of the Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance of 1947 shall be modified as follows:

In "Remarks" attached to Paragraph 7 of the Appendix I the following item shall be added:

10. Persons who held the following offices in the Great Japan Military Virtue Association (to be called Association hereafter) between 22 March 1942 and 2 September 1945, with the exception of those who can give satisfactory proof to the contrary.

(1) Central office-President, Vice-President, Chief of the Board of Directors, Directors and Chiefs of Sections.

(2) Prefectural branch-Chief, Vice-Chief, Chief of the Board of Directors, Directors and Chiefs Sections.

(3) Local sub-branch (including sub-office (Bun Kai) and others substantially corresponding with sub-branch.)-Chief (including chief of sub-office and others s substantially corresponding with chief of sub-branch; ditto hereafter.)

Note: "Persons who can give satisfactory proof to the contrary" shall be as follows:

1. Proof to the contrary to be recognized in respect of all officers.

Any person or persons who can give proof that he made positive attempts to obstruct the militarization of the association.

association.

II. Other proof to the contrary to be recognized in respect to the following officers.

1. In respect to Directors of central office, any person who can give proof to the contrary under the following paragraphs.

(a) That he did not hold the concurrent post of a Section Chief or any other active position, and,

(b) The number of attendance to the directors' conference being such as not to exceed 1/4 of the number of conferences held during the period in which he was a director and, proof of non-participation in other activities of the association, and,

(c) That his personal record was such as to show that he did not identify himself with any quasi-militalistic or quasi-ultra-nationalistic activities.

2. Officers of Prefectural Branches.

(a) In respect to person who was an officer only before September 22, 1942, any of the above persons who can give proof to the contrary under the following paragraphs.

(1) That the actual activities including the various performances of the said branches were similar to those of the said branches prior to the reorganisation, of the central office and,

(11)

(ii) That (consequent on the reorganization of the central office) the preparatory measures for the purpose of the reorganization of the said branches did not become active.

(iii) That his personal record was such as to show that he did not identify himself with any quasi-militaristic or quasi-ultra-nationalistic activities.

(b) In respect to officer sabsequent to the period as in 2 (a) above, (to include officers even prior to the same date, in cases where the activities of the said branches were in actual fact strengthened or preparatory measures for the purpose of reorganization thereof became active), anyperson who can give proof to the contrary under the following paragraphs.

(i) That he was not authorized any responsible part in the final coordination or general execution of the funcitions of the brahch, such as Chief of Branch or Chief of the Board of Directors; and,

(ii) That he did not take an active part in strengthening the actual activities of the said branches such as various performances etc; and,

(iii) That his personal record was such as ~~to~~ show that he did not indentify himself with any quasi-militalistic or quasi-ultra-nationalistic activities.

3. Chief of Local Sub-branch.

(a) In respect to any person or persons who was chief of

a

a local sub-branch only before September 22, 1942, any person or persons who can give proof to the contrary under the following paragraphs.

(i) That the actual activities of the said local sub-branch including its various performances were similar to those of the said branches prior to reorganization of the central office; and,

(ii) That consequent on the reorganization of the central office no preparatory measures for the purpose of strengthening the actual activities of the said local sub-branch were taken; and,

(iii) That his personal record was such as to show that he did not identify himself with any quasi-militaristic or quasi-ultra-nationalistic activities.

(b) In respect to chief of local sub-branch subsequent to date as in 3 (a) above any person who can give proof to the contrary under following paragraphs.

(i) That the actual activities of the said local sub-branch including the various performances were similar to that of the said sub-branch prior to the reorganization of the central office; and,

(ii) That the period of service as chief of local sub-branch was one year or less; and,

(iii) That during the period of service as chief of local sub-branch the activities of the said branch were in no way militaristic or ultra-nationalistic; and,

(iv)

(iv) That his personal record was such as to show that he did not identify himself with any quasi-militaristic or quasi-ultra-nationalistic activities.

Supplementary Rule.

The present Ordinance shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.

Persons who, prior to enforcement of this Ordinance, have filed, under the provisions of Articles VII and VIII, their questionnaires with the Prime Minister or the prefectural governor , who consider themselves as falling under the revised provisions of the proviso of Item 10 of the "Remarks" attached to the Appendix I, shall submit, within thirty days after the enforcement of this Ordinance, the proof to the contrary to Prime Minister or the prefectural governor with whom their questionnaires have been filed.

THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of aggression. This directive was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program has never been either in concept or administration a punitive measure but rather a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and the cause of world peace.

BASIS FOR THE PURGE

Potsdam Declaration

The basis for the purge program is found in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world".

Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society"..... who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, "or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the Occupation".

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in, or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of any persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550, the "4 January Directive", is SCAP's implementation of the instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel: Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career

commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultranationalists.

These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).

2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.

3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.

4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.

5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E), as listed in the original directive, was increased.

6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category E) were defined.

7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "The China Incident" and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicious evidence that these individuals have played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

Initial Operation and Effect of the Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kijuro Shidehara under went extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the Government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel, of whom approximately 183,000 were barred from the public service.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. These extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline. Nevertheless, this document represented an early extension of the purge program into industry and the field of public information, an extension to be perfected and completed the following year.

Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed. This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie and former intelligence agents had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Goverrment to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

The Extension Plan

On 22 October the Government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc., were specifically listed.

Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or antimilitaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc. of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of

strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were listed in the ordinance.

Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a re-organization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were within the screening authority of the local committees.

Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available

for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened and the following report made by the Japanese Government:

Candidates	Filed	Passed	*Provisionally Passed	Barred
House of Representatives	3,426	3,230	59	137
House of Councillors	1,406	1,365	10	31
Prefectural Governors	451	428	3	20
Mayors of 5 Principal Cities	43	42	-	1

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public service. There remained the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

The economic phase of the purge program was completed on 10 May 1948. A total of 6,951 persons holding or having held screenable positions in 245 listed companies had been screened, of whom 6,312 were passed, 186 were barred from public service, and 453 were removed and excluded. In addition 1,298 persons who had held positions subject to the purge either in Japan itself or in former Japanese-occupied areas were purged thru the provisional designation program.

Public Information Media Purge

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of these provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15 motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified office holders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

The Japanese Government conducted a review of allegedly ultranationalistic books published during the decade preceding the war in order to determine whether or not the authors fell under the Memorandum.

As of 10 May 1948, 1,328 persons in the public information media field had been screened; 1,104 of such persons were passed, 71 barred, and 153 removed and excluded from office. In addition 857 persons were purged thru provisional designation, of whom 286 were the authors of objectionable writings.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible",

purgees who engage in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees".

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of the basic ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by July 1947 a total of 99 was listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 36 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 9 recommended for reinstatement, while 54 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal became possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but later a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

The Public Office Qualifications Committee and the Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board concluded their work 10 May and were dissolved in accordance with provisions of Cabinet Order No. 62 of 1948.

In the program which began 4 January 1946, 717,415 persons were screened and 8,781 were barred or removed from public service. The Central Committee screened 66,015 of whom 3,681 were removed from public office and 1,019 were barred. Local committees screened 651,400 of whom 1,907 were removed and 2,174 barred.

Provisional designation of undesirable individuals on the basis of official records and documentary evidence, concluded 10 May, affected 204,304 persons of whom 15,699 submitted petitions for exception accompanied by questionnaires and counter evidence, on the basis of which 11,124 were cleared. The number finally designated in this phase

of the program was 193,180, making a total of 201,9[illegible] persons removed or excluded from public service. Three of these persons, purged in 1946, were reinstated as a result of rescreening in 1947.

The Government reported 20 May that of the 201,958 persons remaining purged 1,070 had submitted appeals and, of these, 14 were reinstated before 10 May when the Appeals Board submitted the names of 248 persons to the Prime Minister with recommendations for their reinstatement. The Prime Minister subsequently requested that SCAP authorize the reinstatement of 129. Approval for this action was granted 21 May and the Government officially announced the reinstatement of these persons 22 May, reducing the number of those purged to 201,815.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF PURGE STATISTICS

Category	Screened	Passed	Barred	Removed	Purged by Prov. Desig.	Reinstated	Total Remain. Purged
Category A (war criminal suspects)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Category B (career military)	2,097	16	39	2,042	113,337	2	115,416
Category C (ultra-nationalistic societies)	0	0	0	0	3,066	4	3,062
Category D (Imperial Rule Assistance Assoc. and affiliates	0	0	0	0	33,573	1	33,572
Category E (Expansionist organizations)	51	8	31	12	391	3	431
Category F (Governors of occupied areas)	0	0	0	0	43	0	43
Category G (Additional militarists and ultranationalists)	715,267	708,610	3,123	3,534	42,770	136	49,291
Economic	6,951	6,312	186	453	914	18	1,535
Public Info Media	1,328	1,104	71	153	857	25	1,056
Ex-Servicemen's Assoc.	0	0	0	0	39,732	0	39,732
Misc. others (including special higher police, recommended candidates, Butokukai, etc.)	706,988	701,194	2,866	2,928	1,267	93	6,968
TOTAL	717,415	708,634	3,193	5,588	193,180	146 a/	201,815

a/ Of these, three were purged in 1946 and were reinstated as a result of rescreening in 1947.

SOURCE: Secretariat of the Central Screening Committee.

PURGE STATISTICS BASED UPON REASON FOR PURGING

Category	Screened	Passed	Barred	Removed	Reinstated	Total Remaining Purged
Category A Suspected war criminals	0	0	0	0	0	0
Category B	2,097	16	39	2,042	0	2,081
Career army officers	1,287	4	22	1,261	0	1,283
Chokunin rank officials--War Ministry	0	0	0	0	0	0
Career navy officers	804	12	17	775	0	792
Chokunin rank officials--Navy Ministry	0	0	0	0	0	0
Members of Kempei-tai	6	0	0	6	0	6
Category C Founders, officers and influential members of secret ultranationalistic societies	0	0	0	0	0	0
Category D Founders, officers and influential members of Imperial Rule Assistance Assoc. and affiliates	0	0	0	0	0	0
Category E	51	8	31	12	1	42
Financial organizations	34	8	14	12	1	25
Development organizations	17	0	17	0	0	17
Category F Governors of occupied territories	0	0	0	0	0	0
Category G	715,267	708,610	3,123	3,534	107	6,550
Economic organizations	6,951	6,312	186	453	13	626
Special companies and special banks in which the Government is largest stockholder	2,855	2,755	5	95	1	99
Companies and organizations designated by Temp. Supply & Demand Adjustment Law	843	802	0	41	0	41
Organizations established and subsidized by the Government	911	848	5	58	3	60

PURGE STATISTICS BASED UPON REASON FOR PURGING

Category	Screened	Passed	Barred	Removed	Reinstated	Total Remaining Purged
Influential companies, financial institutions and other economic institutions (located in Japan)	1,770	1,429	137	204	9	332
Influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations (located outside Japan)	136	63	39	34	0	73
Other influential companies and financial institutions	436	415	0	21	0	21
Public Inf. Media organizations	1,328	1,104	71	153	15	209
Government Info. media control companies	0	0	0	0	0	0
Officials of news companies and news agencies	595	468	42	85	7	120
Book and mag. publishers	640	571	14	55	7	62
Motion picture and theatrical companies	73	50	11	12	1	22
Broadcasting corporations	20	15	4	1	0	5
Writers	0	0	0	0	0	0
Influential members and officials of Butokukai	1,058	625	27	406	0	433
Others	705,930	700,569	2,839	2,522	79	5,282
GRAND TOTAL	717,415	708,634	3,193	5,588	108	8,673

SOURCE: Secretariat of the Central Screening Committee.

PURGE STATISTICS BASED UPON POSITION FOR WHICH SCREENED

Screened by Central Govt.	Screened	Passed	Barred	Removed	Reinstated	Total Remaining Purged
For appointive office	57,388	53,001	753	3,634	54	4,333
Ministries and boards	42,404	40,386	307	1,711	8	2,010
Central Govt. Committees	1,345	1,342	3	0	0	3
Public Office Qualification Committees	1,005	1,004	1	0	0	1
Members of political parties subject to screening	21	15	4	2	0	6
Quasi-governmental control orgns.	434	434	0	0	0	0
Economic orgns.	6,951	6,312	186	453	13	626
Special companies and special banks in which the Govt. is largest stockholder	2,855	2,755	5	95	1	99
Companies and orgns. desig. by Temp. Supply & Demand Adjustment Law	843	802	0	41	0	41
Orgns. established and subsidized by Govt.	911	848	5	58	3	60
Influential companies, financial institutions and other economic orgns. (located in Japan)	1,770	1,429	137	204	9	332
Influential companies, financial institutions and other economic orgns. (located outside Japan)	136	63	39	34	0	73
Other influential companies and financial institutions	436	415	0	21	0	21
Public Info. Media organizations	1,328	1,104	71	153	15	209
Govt. info. media control agencies	0	0	0	0	0	0
Officials of newspaper companies and news agencies	595	468	42	85	7	120
Book and mag. publishers	640	571	14	55	7	62
Motion picture and theater companies	73	50	11	12	1	22
Broadcasting corporations	20	15	4	1	0	5
Writers	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others	3,900	2,404	181	1,315	18	1,478

PURGE STATISTICS BASED UPON POSITION FOR WHICH SCREENED

Screened by Central Govt.	Screened	Passed	Barred	Removed	Reinstated	Total Remaining Purged
For elective office	8,627	8,314	266	47	18	295
House of Representatives	3,931	3,731	178	22	13	187
House of Councillors	1,439	1,381	49	9	3	55
Governors	450	412	37	1	1	37
Mayors of principal cities	43	42	1	0	0	1
Prefectural assemblies	2,499	2,485	1	13	1	13
Others	265	263	0	2	0	2
TOTAL	66,015	61,315	1,019	3,681	72	4,628
Screened by Local Govts.						
For appointive office	351,971	349,736	462	1,773	31	2,204
First-class officials	16	16	0	0	0	0
Second-class officials	4,301	3,380	0	921	0	921
Third-class officials	19,921	19,875	0	46	0	46
Members of political parties	8,034	8,021	6	7	0	13
Others	319,699	318,444	456	799	31	1,224
For elective office	299,429	297,583	1,712	134	5	1,841
Headmen and assistant headmen	44,187	43,947	206	34	0	240
Others	255,242	253,636	1,506	100	5	1,601
Total screened by Local Government	651,400	647,319	2,174	1,907	36	4,045
GRAND TOTAL	717,415	708,634	3,193	5,588	108	8,673

SOURCE: Secretariat of the Central Screening Committee.

PURGE STATISTICS FOR PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

Category	Persons Provisionally Designated	Persons Passed	Persons Finally Designated
Category A			
Suspected war criminals	0	0	0
Category B	122,445	9,108	113,337
Career army officers	54,185	5,238	48,947
Chokunin rank officials--			
War Ministry	48	0	48
Career navy officers	26,982	2,863	24,119
Chokunin rank officials--			
Navy Ministry	105	2	103
Members of Kempei-tai	40,217	999	39,218
Members of Tokumu-bu	43	0	43
Members of Tokumu Kikan	865	6	859
Category C			
Founders, officers and influential members of secret patriotic or ultra-nationalistic societies	3,206	140	3,066
Category D	34,216	643	33,573
Imperial Rule Assistance Association	16,913	207	16,706
Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Association	16,572	408	16,164
Council for Establishing Imperial Rule Assistance			
Political Societies	576	13	563
Political Association of Great Japan	14	0	14
Other affiliates of Imperial Rule Assistance Association	141	15	126
Category E			
Financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion	401	10	391
Category F			
Governors of occupied territories	44	1	43
Category G	43,992	1,222	42,770
Economic organizations	936	22	914
Special companies and special banks in which the Government is largest stockholder	0	0	0
Companies and organizations designated by the Temporary Supply and Demand Adjustment Law	0	0	0
Organizations established and subsidized by the Government	0	0	0

PURGE STATISTICS FOR PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

	Persons Provisionally Designated	Persons Passed	Persons Finally Designated
Influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations (located in Japan)	681	15	666
Influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations (located outside Japan)	255	7	248
Other influential companies and financial institutions	0	0	0
Public Information Media Organizations	967	110	857
Government Information Media Control Agencies	62	3	59
Officials of newspaper companies and news agencies	276	20	256
Book and magazine publishers	255	42	213
Motion picture and theatrical companies	28	0	28
Broadcasting corporations	15	0	15
Writers	331	45	286
Recommended candidates of 1942 elections	353	0	353
Principal officials of Ex-Servicemen's Associations	40,802	1,058	39,744
Officials of Butokukai	823	32	791
Others	111	0	111
GRAND TOTAL	204,304	11,124	193,180

SOURCE: Secretariat of the Central Screening Committee.

As a final action of this phase of the purge program five additional persons were reinstated upon recommendation of the Prime Minister on 19 July. These changes in status are not reflected in the foregoing summaries.

A cabinet pronouncement effective 11 May established an advisory group for Public Office Qualifications Examination within the Prime Minister's Office. It will assist the Prime Minister in the routine checking of the eligibility of applicants and nominees for positions in the public service.

In May the Investigation Bureau of the Attorney General's Office, established by law 15 February and now organizationally complete with local bureaus in the eight regions of Japan, began to function. Action taken in accordance with its mission of observing and investigating compliance with the injunctions against return to public leadership by purgees included the completion of the investigation of violations and referral of the cases to the Public Procurator's Office for prosecution. The Bureau is continuing investigation and surveillance of purged organizations and individuals.

1 August 1947

THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a sweeping directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of aggression.

This directive, issued as SCAPIN 550, was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence and authority in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program has never been either in concept or administration a punitive measure but was and is a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and the cause of world peace.

BASIS FOR THE PURGE

Potsdam Declaration

The international basis for the entire purge program is found in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world".

Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society". . . . . who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, "or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the occupation".

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in, or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of any persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the "4 January Directive" is SCAP's implementation of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel: Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultranationalists.

These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).

2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.

3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.

4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.

5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E), as listed in the original directive, was increased.

6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category E) were defined.

7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "The China Incident" and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicious evidence that these individuals have played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

Initial Operation and Effect Of The Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kijuro Shidehara underwent extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel, of whom approximately 183,000 were barred from the Public Service.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April

elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. These extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline. Nevertheless, this document represented an early extension of the purge program into industry and the field of public information, an extension to be perfected and completed the following year.

Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed. This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie and former intelligence agents had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Government to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

The Extension Plan

On 22 October the government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc., were specifically listed.

Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering

important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or antimilitaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc. of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were listed in the ordinance.

Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were within the screening authority of the local committees.

Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is

also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened and the following report made by the Japanese Government:

Candidates	Filed	Passed	*Provisionally Passed	Barred
House of Representatives	3,426	3,230	59	137
House of Councillors	1,406	1,365	10	31
Prefectural Governors	451	428	3	20
Mayors of 5 Principal Cities	43	42	-	1

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public

service. There remained the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

Public Information Media Purge

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of these provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15 motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified officeholders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who engage in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees".

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of

the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been submitted listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. Of these approximately 800 clearly fell under the provisions of the Memorandum, an additional 200 were deceased, the addresses of some 200 were unknown, and more than 500 will be required to submit questionnaires.

Lists of persons coming within the purview of the categories pertaining to war criminals (Category A) and to career military and naval personnel (Category B) are under preparation.

Preparation commenced on 10 July 1947 of a list of persons who held the policy-making positions in the public information media companies and organizations. It is estimated that this list will be completed as soon after 30 July 1947 as all "evidence to the contrary" can be fully considered.

The collection of documentary evidence insofar as it affects the former officers and persons of authority in secret, patriotic, ultranationalistic and militaristic societies is currently in progress.

APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by July 1947 a total of 99 was listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 36 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 9 recommended for reinstatement, while 54 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but recently a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP, In 27 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 19 July 1947 the Japanese Gove rnment screened 563,099 cases, removing or barring a total of 1,681 individuals. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 16,047 cases, representing persons holding important elective and appointive posts in gove rnment, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Gove rnment was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct the reinstatement of 12 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of mid-July reduce to the following approximate totals:

1.	Barred and removed - Initial phase (4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947).....	1,067
2.	Barred and removed under the Extension (4 Jan 1947 - 15 July 1947).....	1,681
3.	Career officers, gendarmes and intelligence agents barred by original directive.....	183,000
4.	Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation.....	20,000

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October, 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

Purge
(Aug. 47)

APPENDIX II

THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a sweeping directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of aggression.

This directive, issued as SCAPIN 550, was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence and authority in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program has never been either in concept or administration a punitive measure but was and is a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and the cause of world peace.

BASIS FOR THE PURGE

Potsdam Declaration

The international basis for the entire purge program is found in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society". . . . . who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, "or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the occupation."

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of any persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the "4 January Directive" is SCAP's implementation of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

30 C

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel: Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultra-nationalists.

These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).

2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.

3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.

4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.

5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E), as listed in the original directive, was increased.

6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category E) were defined.

7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "The China Incident" and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicious evidence that these individuals had played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

Initial Operation and Effect Of The Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kinjuro Shidehara underwent extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. These extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline. Nevertheless, this document represented an early extension of the purge program into industry and the field of public information, an extension to be perfected and completed the following year.

Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed.

This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie, former intelligence agents, etc., had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Government to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

The Extension Plan

On 22 October the government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter groups were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc., were specifically listed.

Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved

in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Facist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies of the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or anti-militaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc., of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials

were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were listed in the ordinance.

Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of the federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were placed within the screening authority of the local committees.

Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened, and the following report was made by the Japanese Government:

Candidates	Filed	Passed	*Provisionally Passed	Barred
House of Representatives	3,426	3,230	59	137
House of Councillors	1,406	1,365	10	31
Prefectural Governors	451	428	3	20
Mayors of 5 Principal Cities	43	42	-	1

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet. Of cases held pending for further investigation and determination of exact interpretation of the Purge Ordinances, one governor and six additional members of the House of Councillors were barred.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies and associations had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public service. There remained at that time the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

This remaining task was largely completed by early October 1947, by which time a total of 3,488 such persons had been screened in almost 300 companies and associations, and the total number of persons removed and/or excluded increased to 360.

Public Information Media Purge.

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of those provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15

motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified office-holders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

Early in October the Japanese Government reported that 134 information media companies had submitted counter-evidence, on which 95 have been acted, resulting in the request to SCAP for approval to remove 12 companies from the black list.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who engaged in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees."

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been secured, listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. By early September 1947 lists had been compiled of the Governors of Occupied Territories (Category F) and of officials who held certain policy making positions in the Japanese Government between 1937 and 1941 (Category G); and by the end of that month the collection of documentary evidence listing the persons falling under the other various categories and provisions of the Purge Ordinances was rapidly approaching completion.

By early October approximately 1,405 persons, on whom documentary evidence was obtained, had been provisionally designated; this will result in the final designation of over 1,000 persons whose period for submitting protest has expired. Of those provisionally designated 130 individuals submitted letters of protest.

APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly

enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by October 1947 a total of 239 were listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 41 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 16 recommended for reinstatement, while 182 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but in August 1947 a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP. In 27 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 4 October 1947 the Japanese Government screened 611,411 cases. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 25,600 cases, representing persons holding important elective and appointive posts in government, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct or approve reinstatement of 21 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of early October 1947 reduce to the following approximate totals:

1. Barred and removed - Initial phase (4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947). 1,067

2. Barred and removed under the Extension (4 Jan 1947 - Oct. 1947) 1,941

3. Career officers, gendarmes, intelligence agents, etc, barred by original directive 183,000

4. Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation 20,000

5. Provisionally designated (2 July 47 - 9 Oct 47). . 1,405

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of

other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6,000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5,000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

571

Purge Background

History as of August 1947

THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a sweeping directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of conquest and aggression.

This directive, known as SCAPIN 550, was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence and authority in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program was neither in concept or administration a punitive measure but was and is a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to peace and democracy.

BASIS FOR THE PURGE

Potsdam Declaration

The international basis for the entire purge program lies in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC 150/4/A, approved by the President as a statement of U. S. policy) SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society", ...who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, "or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the occupation".

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in, or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the "4 January Directive" was SCAP's implementations of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel: special police and officers of the war ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who have served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who have served as one of the higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading official in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivision, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations Involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultranationalists

A broad provision brought under the terms of the directive:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE.

a. On 27 Befruary 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the legal machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the directive and third, the removal of how undesirables should be accomplished.

1. By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the them first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

2. The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances. While those applying to war criminals and career military and naval personnel remained substantially the same, the provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance

organizations were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion, as listed in the original directive, was increased and the exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories were defined. The broad provisions of Category G ere extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109. It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "the China Incident" and the surrender. It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicious evidence that these individuals had played an important part (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities. The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge (a) those officials who had over a long period of time specialized in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

3. The ordinances probided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

OPERATION OF THE PURGE PROGRAM - INITIAL PHASE

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kijuro Shidehara underwent extensive reorganization. Three ministers and six cabinet officials resigned. Throughout the higher government levels other officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organ zations, and (c) career naval and military personnel, of whom approximately 186,000 were barred from the Public Service.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; give ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candid tes were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred for all reason; of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. While these extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline, nevertheless, this document represented

an early extension of the purge program into industry and the fields of public information, an extension that was to be perfected and completed the following year.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, prefectural governors, all officials of the first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Mini try of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed. This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. Official questionnaires and records of action taken by the Japanese Government had been submitted to SCAP for review. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

A. Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Government to prepare a comprehensive plan for the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; for the application of that directive to

all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet which may be held prior to 1 September 1948; and for the exclusion of all purged personnel from all other influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

The Extension Plan

On 22 October the Government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features were incorporated into highly definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

B. The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No.1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

The scope of positions which would subject applicants and holders to screening was extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments (down to and including town and village associations) and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communications media and other organ zations. These latter were defined to be

positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication, political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations. The specific officers considered to be in policy making positions and approximately 370 such companies, organizations, etc. were specifically listed.

In a manner similar to the way in which definition of screenable position was enlarged, the purge criteria was also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applying to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F) with regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C), the criteria was specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, etc. (CategoryD) was further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the greatest and most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had been positive in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provision of government officials who (1) took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism or advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (3) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (4) furthering important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members who in or outside the Diet had been conspiciously active in writing, speech or action for the purpose of instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitariansim of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artist to be considered as having been positive in activities such as mentioned in this broad category, and thus falling within its purview, were those who in certain

capacities had by their works advocated aggression of militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar mature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who co-operated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or antimilitaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism. This added definition made it possible to measure by some clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc. of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as it applied to the principlal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance, the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised the authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above position of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentation, any other

media of mass communication or other companies which sponsored or controlled the dissemination of information through the above media in or outside Japan during such period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 as those companies were engaged actively, through their business, in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artist. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provision of this broad category, and perhaps in the entire program, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, principal stockholders who owned 10% or more of the stock of the company or who exercised, directly or indirectly, controlling influences in the management of the company or any other official, regardless of title, including certain branch managers, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which were conspicuously influential and manufactured strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic and engaged in the production of basic productive materials or bus ness of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade, holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto, companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded

excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty six such companies were listed specifically in the ordinance.

INJUNCTIONS

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 were four injunctions different in legal content, but all designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organ zations, public or private, from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses were included which made violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

NON-SUCCESSION PROVISIONS

A new feature designed to allow new leadership to come to front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of twons and villages and headmen of federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred frombeing candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1946, these federations were abolished.

ADMINISTRATION

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated b the Government to be between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was

effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committees authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectues and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of sreenable organ zations were within the screening authority of the local committees.

PUBLICITY

In connection with the extended program, the results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program was accomplished in several ways. The government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, released to the press and posted semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who had been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances were made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned.

A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate was available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as at the screening committee's office. News releases and radio braodcasts explained to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

OPERATION OF PURGE EXTENSION

SCHEDULE OF SCREENING

A screening schedule determined the order in which various screenable groups would be screened. Proposed appointees for local committees, estimated to number 2,500 (including temporary members) were scheduled first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screenings of economic organizations, principal public office holders, political party officials and similar groups and public information media followed.

ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO ELECTIONS

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened and the following report made by the Japanese Government:

Candidates	Filed	Passed	*Provisionally Passed	Barred
House of Representatives	3426	3230	59	137
House of Councillors	1406	1365	10	31
Prefectural Governors	451	428	3	20
Mayors of 5 Principal cities	43	42	-	1

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" due to the fact that necessary research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees of cities, towns and villages.

ACTIVITIES SUBSEQUENT TO ELECTIONS

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 for assemblies of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees applied post screening to 158,757 persons elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

ECONOMIC PHASE

This phase started about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approxiamtely 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies had been screened and their cases reviews by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed from public office and/or excluded from public service. There remained the screening of those persons from whom obtaining questionnaire was difficult, the seeking out of those who,

although they had not held mandatorilly purgeable positions, had exercised commensurate influence and authority, and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees. This latter problem will be elaborated in more detail in a succeeding chapter entitled Provisional Designation.

PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA PURGE

Paragraph 5 of the "remarku" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcast ng corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, who espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, who denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of these provisions necessitated extensive research in ev ry field of public information, including not only a sutdy of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This research progfam was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat Sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15 motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, all of which were deemed to have

engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified office holders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent a considerable number of persons who had resigned to escape being purged, from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions for which they were screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which although it provided that the Prime Minister could require persons to submit to screening, was in terminology and intent directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who were engaging in political activity. As such it could not effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees".

On 2 July 1947, Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 was issued by the Government which provided that the Prime Minister could effect the provisional designation of any person whom he deems, based upon sufficient evidence, to fall within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation was to be effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days was allowed from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified could, if he so desired, fiel a letter of

exemption with a questionnaire which would then be examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception were filed within the thirty day period, the designation became effective under the provisions of the basic Ordinance, and was publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been submitted and lists prepared of all the persons who held key positions in designated economic companies during the period 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. Of this number approximately 800 clearly fell under the provisions of the Memorandum. An additional 200 were deceased, the addresses of some 200 were unknown, and over 500 were required to submit questionnaires and to be screened.

Lists were under preparation for the persons coming within the purview of the categories pertaining to war criminals (Categery A) and career military and naval personnel (Category B).

Preparation commenced on 10 July 1947 of a list of persons who held the designated positions in the public information media companies and organizations. It was estimated that this list would be completed shortly after 30 July 1947, or at such time thereafter as all "evidence to the contrary" had been fully considered.

The collection of documentary evidence insofar as it affects the former officers and persons of authority in secret, patriotic, ultranationalistic and militaristic societies is currently in progress.

The implementation of this program will continue for the other purgeable categories in accordance with a schedule currently under

preparation. The categories are to be given priority based upon the extent to which the necessary documentary evidence is readily available, giving consideration to the number of persons therein believed to be evading the intent of the Purge Ordinances.

APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up an appeal organ. Until this time, while there had been no separate organ in the Government to handle such appeals, any person, who deemd that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case, could appeal to the Prime Minister for reconsideration. However, there had been relatively few such appeals: But with the greatly enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by July 1947 a total of 99 was listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 36 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 9 recommended for reinstatement, while 54 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. The initial provisions of the Ordinance as issued b the Government provided that before an appeal could be submitted the appellant must have been removed or barred from the position in question, however, in July 1947, in fairness to the individuals concerned, this particular provision of the Ordinance was revoked. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a secretariat but in July a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

SUMMARY

From its inception the character of the Purge remained preventative. Although SCAP had been authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to war criminals.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memorandums directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program.

SCAP has, however, throughout the entire program reserved the right to review the action taken by the Japanese Government in order to insure that the initial directive is being administered in accordance with SCAP interpretation.

By 4 January 1947 of the 8,899 cases acted upon by the Government 1,770 were reviewed by SCAP, and of these in 27 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 19 July 1947 the Japanese Government screened 563,099 cases, removing or barring a total of 1,681 individuals. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 17,274 cases, representing all persons holding important elective and appointive posts in government, all officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and all the most influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

During the entire period SCAP demonstrated readiness to correct any injustice in individual cases. SCAP reinstated 12 persons, which in view of the care with which cases are initially screened, is a significantly large number.

Prime Minister's Office and Home
Ministry Ordinance No. 5 of 1947

~~(Draft)~~ 31 ~~22~~ July 1947

A part of the Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No.1 of 1947 shall be amended as follows:

In Paragraph 9 of the Appendix II "BUNGEI SHUN JU SHA" (Bungei Shun Ju Publishing Co.) shall read "BUNGEI SHUN JU SHIN SHA" (Bungei Shun Ju New Publishing Co.); "FUZANBO" shall read "KABU-SHIKI KAISHA FUZAN BO" (Fuzan Bo Publishing Co.,Ltd.) and "SANSEI DO"(Sansei Do Publishing Co.) shall read "SANSEI DO SHUPPAN K.K." (Sansei Do Publishing Co., Ltd.); and after "YUHIKAKU" (Yuhikaku Publishing Co.) the following shall be added:

ARS (ARUSU) (Ars Publishing Co.)
CHIKURA SHOBO (Chikura Publishing Co.)
CHIYU NIPPON SHA (Chiyu Nippon ~~Publishing Co.~~ Association)
CHOBUN-KAKU (Chobun Kaku Publishing Co.)
DAI ICHI SHOBO (Dai Ichi Publishing Co.)
DAI NIPPON SHUPPAN K.K. (Great Japan Publishing Co., Ltd.)
DAI TO SHUPPAN SHA (Dai To Publishing Co.)
DAIWA DAIWA HONSHA (Daiwa Daiwa ~~Publishing Co.~~ Association)
DOBUN KAN (Dobun Kan Publishing Co.)
GAIKO JIHO SHA (Diplomatic News Publishing Co.)
HIBON KAKU (Hibon Kaku Publishing Co.)
IKUSEI SHA (Ikusei Publishing Co.)
IWASAKI SHOTEN (Iwasaki Publishing Co.)
ISHIN KAI (Ishin ~~Kai Publishing Co.~~ Association)
JINBUN SHOIN (Jinbun Publishing Co.)
JINSEI SHA (Jinsei Publishing Co.)
JITSUGYO NO SEKAI SHA (Jitsugyo no Sekai Publishing Co.)
KAGAKU SHA (Kagaku Publishing Co.)
KAISEI SHA (Kaisei Publishing Co.)
KASUMIGASEKI SHOBO (Kasumigaseki Publishing Co.)
KEISATSU KYOKAI (Policemens' Association)
KOKON SHOIN (Kokon Publishing Co.)
KOKUMIN HYORON SHA (Kokumin Hyoron Publishing Co.)
KYOTO INSHO KAN (Kyoto Insho Kan Publishing Co.)
MIKASA SHOBO (Mikasa Publishing Co.)
NANYO KYOKAI (South Seas Association)
NIPPON DENPO TSUSHIN SHA (Nippon Denpo News Agency)

NIPPON HOSO SHUPPAN KYOKAI (Japan Broadcasting Publication Association)
NIPPON KYOBUN SHA (Nippon Kyobun Publishing Co.)
OKAKURA SHOBO (Okakura Publishing Co.)
OKURA ZAIMU KYOKAI (Okura Financial Affairs Association)
RISO SHA (Riso Publishing Co.)
SANGA BO (Sanga Bo Publishing Co.)
SAN YU SHA (San Yu Publishing Co.)
SATOMI NIPPON BUNKA KENKYU SHO (Satomi Japan Culture Research Institution)
SEIKATSU SHA (Seikatsu Publishing Co.)
SHIBUN KAI (Shibun ~~Kai Publishing Co.~~ Society)
SHIN TAIYO SHA (Shin Taiyo Publishing Co.)
SHOWA SHOBO (Showa Publishing Co.)
SHUNJYU SHA (Shunjyu Publishing Co.)
SOZO (Sozo Publishing Co.)
TAIHEIYO SHUPPAN SHA (Taiheiyo Publishing Co.)
TEISHIN KYOKAI (Communications Association)
TENSEN SHA (Tensen Publishing Co.)
TOKAI SHUPPAN SHA (Tokai Publishing Co.)
YUZAN KAKU (Yuzan Kaku Publishing Co.)

In the same Paragraph, "GIFU GODO SHINBUN" (Gifu Godo Newspaper) shall be deleted; "CHIBA SHINPO SHA" (Chiba Newspaper Co.) shall read "CHIBA SHINBUN SHA"; (Chiba Newspaper Co.) "DEIRY SHINBUN SHA" (Daily Newspaper Co.) shall read "DAILY TOHOKU SHA"; (Daily Tohoku Co.) "JIJI SHIMPOSHA" (Chronicle News Co.) next to "ISHIKAWA SHIMBUN SHA" (Ishikawa Newspaper Co.) shall be deleted; "NAGASAKI MINYU SHA" (Nagasaki Newspaper Co.) shall read "NAGASAKI MINYU SHINBUN SHA"; (Nagasaki Newspaper Co.) "NAGASAKI NICHINICHI SHA" (Nagasaki Daily News Co.) shall read "NAGASAKI NICHINICHI SHINBUNSHA" (Nagasaki Daily Newspaper Co.) "SHINHOCHI SHA" (New Hochi Co.) shall read "HOCHI SHINBUN SHA"; (Hochi Newspaper Co.) and after "IBARAGI SHINBUN SHA" (Ibaragi Newspaper Co.) the following shall be added:

BUNKA SHINBUN SHA (Culture Newspaper Co.)
CHUBU MINPO SHA (Central Minpo Co.)
FUJIN MINSHU SHINBUNSHA (Women's Democratic Newspaper Co.)
HAKODATE SHINBUN SHA (Hakodate Newspaper Co.)
JIYU SHINBUN SHA (Liberty Newspaper Co.)
Junior Times SHA (Junior Times Co.)
KAGAKU BUNKA SHINBUN SHA (Scientific Culture Newspaper Co.)
NANKAI Times SHA (South Seas Time Co.)
NICHIBEI SHINBUN SHA (Japan-America Newspaper Co.)

NIPPON YORON SHINBUN SHA (Japan Public Opinion Newspaper Co.)
OKINAWA SHIN MINPO SHA (Okinawa New Minpo Co.)
OSAKA Times SHA (Osaka Times Co.)
SEIJI SHINBUN SHA (Political Newspaper Co.)
SEINEN SHINBUN SHA (Youth Newspaper Co.)
SEINEN Times SHA (Youth Times Co.)
SHIN NIPPON SHINBUN SHA (New Japan Newspaper Co.)
SHONEN Times SHA (Boys Times Co.)
SHUKAN JIYU SHA (Weekly Liberty Co.)
SHUKAN KYOIKU SHINBUN SHA (Weekly Educational Newspapers Co.)
YUKAN MIYAKO SHINBUN SHA (Evening Miyako Newspaper Co.)

In Paragraph 11 of the same Appendix "DAIWA SHOKEN K.K." (Daiwa Securities Co., Ltd.) shall be deleted; after "ISHIKAWAJIMA JUKOGYO K.K.", (Ishikawajima Heavy Industry Co., Ltd.), "HAYASHIKANE SHOTEN K.K." (Hayashikane Co., Ltd.) shall be added; "NIKKO SHOKEN K.K." (Nikko Co., Ltd.) and "SANWA GINKO" (Sanwa Bank) shall be deleted; after "TOKYO SHIBAURA SHARYO K.K." (Tokyo Shibaura Wheel Co., Ltd.), "TOYO BEARING SEIZO K.K." (Toyo Bearing Producing Co., Ltd) shall be added and "TOKYO SHOKEN K.K." (Tokyo Securities Co., Ltd.) and "YAMAICHI SHOKEN K.K." (Yamaichi Securities Co., Ltd.) shall be deleted.

In Paragraph 12 of the same Appendix, after "DAIWA BOSEKI K.K." (Daiwa Spinning Co., Ltd) "DAIWA SHOKEN K.K." (Daiwa Securities Co., Ltd.) shall be added, after "NANYO KAIUN K.K." (South Seas Marine Transportation Co., Ltd.), "NIKKO SHOKEN K.K." (Nikko Securities Co., Ltd.) shall be added; after "RIKAGAKU Research Institute" (Physical and Chemical Science Research Institute), "SANWA GINKO" (Sanwa Bank) shall be added; and after "TOKYO SHIBAURA KYODO KOGYO K.K." (Tokyo Shibaura Cooperation Industry Co., Ltd.), "TOKYO SHOKEN K.K." (Tokyo Securities Co., Ltd.) and "YAMAICHI SHOKEN K.K." (Yamaichi Securities Co., Ltd.) shall be added.

Supplementary Rule

The present Ordinance shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.

Prime Minister's Office and Home

Ministtry Ordinance No. 5 of 1947 31 July 1947

~~(Draft)~~

Final ~~22 July 1947~~

A part of the Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No.1 of 1947 shall be amended as follows:

In Paragraph 9 of the Appendix II "BUNGEI SHUN JYU SHA" shall read "BUNGEL SHUN JYU SHIN SHA"; "FUZANBO" shall read "KABUSHIKI KAISHA FUZAN BO" and "SANSEI DO" shall read "SANSEI DO SHUPPAN K.K."; and after "YUHINKAKU" the following shall be added:

ARS (ARUSU)	CHIKURA SHOBO
CHIYU NIPPON SHA	CHOBUN KAKU
DAI ICHI SHOBO	DAI NIPPON SHUPPAN K.K.
DAI TO SHUPPAN SHA	DAIWA DAIWA HONSHA
DOBUN KAN	GAIKO JIHO SHA
HIBON KAKU	IKUSEI SHA
IWASAKI SHOTEN	ISHIN KAI
JINBUN SHOIN	JINSEI SHA
JITSUGYO NO SEKAI SHA	
KAGAKU SHA	KAISET SHA
KASUMIGASEKI SHOBO	KEISATSU KYOKAI
KOKON SHOIN	KOKUMIN HYORON SHA
KYOTO INSHO KAN	MIKASA SHOBO
MANYO KYOKAI	NIPPON DENPO TSUSHIN SHA

NIPPON

NIPPON HOSO SHUPPAN KYOKAI

NIPPON KYOBUN SHA	OKAKURA SHOBO
OKURA ZAIMU KYOKAI	RISO SHA
SAN ~~YAMAGA~~ BO	SAN YU SHA
SATOMI NIPPON BUNKA KENKYU SHO	
SEIKATSU SHA	SHIBUN SHA
SHIN TAIYO SHA	SHOWA SHOBO
SHUNJYU SHA	SOZO SHA
TAIHEIYO SHUPPAN SHA	
TEISHIN KYOKAI	TENSEN SHA
TOKAI SHUPPAN SHA	YUZAN KAKU

In the same Paragraph, "GIFU GODO SHINBUN" shall be deleted; "CHIBA SHINPO SHA" shall read "CHIBA SHINBUN SHA"; "DEIRY SHINBUN SHA" shall read "DAILY TOHOKU SHA"; "JIJI SHIMPOSHA" next to "ISHIKAWA SHIMBUN SHA" shall be deleted; "NAGASAKI MINYU SHA" shall read "NAGASAKI MINYU SHINBUN SHA"; "NAGASAKI NICHI NICHI SHA" shall read "NAGASAKI NICHINICHI SHINBUNSHA"; "SHIN HOCHI SHA" shall read "HOCHI SHINBUN SHA"; and after "IBARAGI SHINBUN SHA" the following shall be added:

BUNKA SHINBUN SHA	CHUBU [illegible] SHA
FUJIN MINSHU SHINBUNSHA	HAKODATE SHINBUN SHA
JIYU SHINBUN SHA	Junior Times SHA
KAGAKU BUNKA SHINBUN SHA	NAN[illegible] Times SHA
NICHIBEI SHINBUN SHA	[illegible]
NIPPON YORON SHINBUN SHA	OKINAWA SHIN MINPO SHA
OSAKA Times SHA	SEIJI SHINBUN SHA
SEINEN SHINBUN SHA	SEINEN Times SHA

SH[illegible]

SHIN NIPPON SHINBUN SHA
~~CHO~~SHU KAN JIYU SHA
YUKAN MIYAKO SHINBUN SHA
SHONEN Times SHA
~~CHO~~SHU KAN KYOIKU SHINBUN SHA

In Paragraph 11 of the same Appendix "DAIWA SHOKEN K.K." shall be deleted; after "ISHIKAWAJIMA JUKOGYO K.K.", "HAYASHIKANE SHOTEN K.K." shall be added; "NIKKO SHOKEN K.K." and "SANWA GINKO" shall be deleted; after "TOKYO SHIBAURA SHARYO K.K.", "TOYO BEARING SEIZO K.K." shall be added and "TOKYO SHOKEN K.K." and "YAMAICHI SHOKEN K.K." shall be deleted.

In Paragraph 12 of the same Appendix, after "~~YAMATO~~ Daiwa BOSEKI K.K.", "DAIWA SHOKEN K.K." shall be added; after "NANYO KAIUN K.K.", "NIKKO SHOKEN K.K." shall be added; after RIKAGAKU Research Institute", "SANWA GINKO" shall be added; and after "TOKYO SHIBAURA KYODO KOGYO K.K.", "TOKYO SHOKEN K.K." and "YAMAICHI SHOKEN K.K." shall be added.

Supplementary Rule

The present Ordinance shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.

10 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Information Media Purge

1. Mr. Sunobe of CLO came in at 1000, 10 July 1947, and reported that he is to take over the duties heretofore assigned to Mr. Tanaka. Mr. Sunobe will be the liaisen for the Japanese Government on all matters pertaining to information media purge during Mr. Tanaka's absence from office.

2. Mr. Sunobe was directed to immediately begin preparing a list of "resignees" from organizations listed in the Information Media Black List. He is to submit an initial list of resignees by 30 July 1947.

3. Mr. Sunobe was also instructed to complete, as soon as possible, the investigation of information media companies to be added on to Paragraph 10, Appendix II of the Ordinance. The list of information media companies is to include all newspaper and magazine publishers having a circulation of 20,000 or more, and all organizations listed in the Information Media Black List which are still in existence. The initial report on this project had already been submitted by Mr. Tanaka on 8 March 1947.

T. Tsukahara

T. TSUKAHARA

CABINET ORDER NO. 136

15 July 1947

A part of the Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 shall be amended as follows:

In Article 1, paragraph 1, "Any person who has been designated as falling under the Memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, and as a consequence thereof removed or barred from appointment or election to a position in the public service may" shall read "Any person who has been designated falling under the Memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 may."

(Draft)

Cabinet Order No.

A part of the Imperial Ordinance No.65 of 1947 shall be amended as follows:

In Article 1, paragraph 1, "Any person who has been designated as falling under the Memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No.1 of 1947, and as a consequence thereof removed or barred from appointment or election to a position in the public service may" shall read "Any person who has been designated as falling under the Memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No.1 of 1947 may."

10 July 47

Approved both for content and form of issuance.

See Memo for Record 10 July 47

Subj: Amendment to Emp Ord No. 65 of 1947.

John H. Snow

37

May 47.

Jack.

This is the draft SHIMA
& SAWADA brought in.
I gave them the
go ahead as a Cabinet
order. They said they
would appreciate your
mentioning to SUZUKI the desirability
of getting it out quickly.

Snow

Mr. Sawada
1100 8 July 47
Simon

(Draft)

Cabinet Order No.

A part of the Imperial Ordinance No.65 of 1947 shall be amended as follows:

In Article 1, paragraph 1, "Any person who has been designated as falling under the Memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No.1 of 1947, and as a consequence thereof removed or barred from appointment or election to a position in the public service may" shall read "Any person who has been designated as falling under the Memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No.1 of 1947 may."

Article III, paragraph 2 shall read as follows:
"Validity of designation as falling under the Memorandum as prescribed by Article III, paragraph 2, and other provisions of Imperial Ordinance No.1 of 1947 shall not be affected by the filing of the appeal prescribed by Article I, paragraph 1 above."

on file
my ord

Policy file

11 July 1947

Criteria to be applied to persons who had been officials of CHOKUNIN rank or above with War or Navy Ministry.

1. The following classes of officials shall be deemed mandatory purge cases under the provisions of Category B of SCAPIN 550:

A. Civil officials of CHOKUNIN rank who had continuous service with the War or Navy Ministry and who, in the course of promotions, became CHOKUNIN rank officials with either of the above-named Ministries.

B. Members of the National Diet who were appointed Parliamentary Councillors or Parliamentary Vice Ministers for the War or Navy Ministry and who as such were appointed CHOKUNIN rank officials in the War or Navy Ministry.

C. Temporary officials (SHOKUTAKU) of full-time service as CHOKUNIN rank officials with the War or Navy Ministry or who received CHOKUNIN rank treatment, standing or authority.

D. All officials included in Paragraph F, Appendix "A", SCAPIN 550.

2. The following classes of officials may be deemed as not falling under the provisions of SCAPIN 550 ONLY in the event that they can produce satisfactory evidence to warrant such action. Determining factors should be that: (a) The Service rendered was of a purely technical nature, (b) The length of Service was relatively short, and (c) The position held was one of relative unimportance. Whenever the Japanese Government passes a person in this category, the evidence upon which such action is taken is to be attached to the questionnaire when it is submitted to GHQ for review.

A. Civil officials of CHOKUNIN rank and above in Ministries other than War or Navy who were ordered to serve with the War or Navy Ministry.

B. Civil officials of CHOKUNIN rank and above of Ministries other than War or Navy, who were assigned as temporary officials (SHOKUTAKU) of the War or Navy Ministry in order to assist in research or administration because of their abilities.

C. Civilian Administrator General (SHIKIKANKAN) in Occupied Territories who were Civil Officials of CHOKUNIN rank or higher in Ministries other than the War or Navy who were ordered to serve with the War or Navy Ministry in Japanese Occupied Territory.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: 11 July 1947

These criteria were submitted as a result of Memorandum for Chief, Public Service Qualifications Division: "CHOKUNIN rank Officials with the War and Navy Ministries: Their Status Under SCAPIN 550", dated 24 June 1947.

(HHB)

Approved 0910
12 July 1947.
To be issued on or about
14 July 47.

Sombe 0910
12 July 47.

Cabinet Order. of 1947 (Draft)

10 July 1947

The following Article shall be added to the Imperial Ordinance No. 66 of 1947:

Article VII. In order to deal with miscellaneous matters, the Public Office Qualification Appeal Board shall have a Secretariat.

The Secretariat shall be composed of the following personnel.

Chief Secretary

Secretariat Member

Prime Minister's Office Secretaries

Second Grade (two out of 6 may be filled with the First Grade Official.)

Third Grade. 5

Chief Secretary shall be appointed or be commissioned under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office from among the first grade officials prescribed in preceding paragraph, or persons of knowledge and experience.

Chief Secretary shall supervise administration of Secretariat's works under the direction of the Chairman of the Board.

Secretariat member shall be filled with the Prime Minister's Office Secretaries mentioned in paragraph 2 above. These Secretaries shall be completely excused from all former duties and shall devote full time to this position.

Besides those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, Secretariat members may be appointed or commissioned under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office from among government

officials

officials of each Ministry concerned or men of knowledge and experience.

Secretariat members shall dispose of Secretariat's works under the direction of their superiors.

The provisions of the "Regulations on Discipline of Government Officials" shall apply mutatis mutandis to persons who are not government officials being commissioned as Secretariat members in their performance of duties.

Supplementary Rule

The present Cabinet Order shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

BASIC POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

PART III - POLITICAL

1. Disarmament and Demilitarization

High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

The restoration, even in a disguised form, of any anti-democratic and militaristic activity shall be prevented, particularly on the part of former Japanese career military and naval officers, Gendarmerie, and former members of dissolved militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and other anti-democratic organizations.

Militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic doctrines and practices, including para-military training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, and all other exponents of militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic doctrines and practices shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions.

PART IV - ECONOMIC

...

2. Promotion of Democratic Forces

...

To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

a. To prohibit the retention in important positions in the economic field of individuals who because of their past associations or for other reasons cannot be trusted to direct Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful and democratic ends;

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

Purge Misc

File No.: (Do not remove from attached sheets) CW/CLK/JPN/ked

Subject: HAYASHIKANE SHOTEN, Inclusion in Paragraph 12, Appendix 2, Cabinet & Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947.

Note No.:	
(1)	From: Govt. Section To: Natural Resources Section Date: 8 July 1947 1. Pursuant to study of HAYASHIKANE SHOTEN by Government Section, it appears that this company falls within the provisions of Paragraph 12, Appendix 2, Cabinet & Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 as a "conspicuously monopolistic company which has engaged in domestic or foreign trade". This determination is based primarily upon the finding as indicated on enclosure (1) hereto that HAYASHIKANE SHOTEN controls Taiyo Fishing Co. which is listed in Paragraph 12, Appendix 2, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947. 2. It is understood that officers of Taiyo Fishing Company plan to move into the HAYASHIKANE SHOTEN offices and continue their control through that organization. It is obvious that this would make a mockery of SCAPIN 550 as applied to the fishing industry. 3. Unless Natural Resources Section has evidence to the contrary concerning control by HAYASHIKANE SHOTEN of Taiyo Fishing Co., HAYASHIKANE SHOTEN will be added to the companies listed in Paragraph 12 above reference. Incl: 1 (Shares Held by Hayashikane Shoten) CW CW
2	From: NR/Fi To: GS HGS/WCH/vs Date: 16 JUL 1947 Natural Resources Section has no evidence to the contrary concerning control by Hayashikane Shoten of Taiyo Fishing Company. 1 Incl n/c for HW H. G. S.

563

2 From: NR/Fi To: GS HGS/WCH/vs
Date: 16 JUL 19[illegible]

Natural Resources Section has no evidence to the contrary concerning control by Hayashikane Shoten of Taiyo Fishing Company.

1 Incl
n/c

- H. G. S. - - - - - - - -

C
O
P
Y

June 14, 1947

SHARES HELD BY HAYASHIKANE SHOTEN

Name of Company	Its Capital	Its Shares	Held by Hayashikane	Percentage
Hokkaido Fishing Co.	600,000	12,000	1,920	12.66
Kanmon Shipbuilding Co.	1, 052,000	21,040	7,000	33.27
Hayashikane Marine Products Industry Co.	2, 345,650	46,913	40,732	86.83
Hayashikane Shipbuilding Co.	12, 930,000	258,600	240,800	93.13
Taiyo Fishing Co.	60, 000,000	1, 200,000	772,300	64.36
Ogawajima Whaling Co.	153,000	3,060	500	16.01
Showa Fishing Co.	195,000	3,900	3,198	82.00
Japan Special Foodstuff Co.	150,000	3,000	900	30.00
Yamaguchi Pref. United Pusseine Fishing Co.	180,000	3,600	980	27.22
Shimonoseki Petroleum Supply Equipment Co.	190,000	3,800	705	18.55
Aomori Pref. Canning Co.	1, 350,000	27,000	7,458	27.52
Nagasaki Pref. United Canning Co.	2, 200,000	44,000	22,295	50.67

Business outlines of the above-mentioned companies.

Hokkaido Fishing Co.	Coastal fishing around Hokkaido Island.
Kanmon Shipbuilding Co.	Building of small crafts.
Hayashikane Marine Products Industry Co.	Drug manufacturing and food processing.
Hayashikane Shipbuilding Co.	Building of fishing boats and other vessels.
Taiyo Fishing Co.	Fishing in general including whaling.
Ogawazima Whaling Co.	Whale fishing off Kyushu Island.

Encl 1

(Continued)

Showa Fishing Co.	Mackerel fishing in Japan Sea.
Japan Special Foodstuff Co.	Processing of marine products.
Yamaguchi Pref. United Purseiner Fishing Co.	Fishing in Yamaguchi Prefecture.
Shimonoseki Petr. Supply Equipment Co.	Storing of Petroleum for fishing.
Aomori Pref. Canning Co.	Canning of fish, meat and vegetables.
Nagasaki Pref. Canning Co.	Canning of fish, meat and vegetables.