

opens and sets them free. Now we ask in all seriousness, whence has come the entelechy in the gall? Does the plant contain the entelechy to produce adaptive structures whose presence is injurious to the plant, or does the activity of the enclosed insects introduce a new sort of entelechy into the plant? Obviously it would be advantageous to the plant never to set free the gall's contents, for thereby it would rid itself of its parasites forever.

Whether we agree with Driesch or not concerning the nature of the unknown factors of development, his attempt to hold our interpretation to the more difficult epigenetic lines of thought is, we think, deserving of the highest praise. Choosing the more difficult path, we at least keep open the way for further work and thought.

We have selected for comment that portion of Driesch's book that will, we believe, excite the greatest interest. But the book is enriched by excursions into many other fields more or less related to the main theme here discussed. The treatment of such matters as heredity, descent, adaptation, Lamarckism, the logic of history, etc., contains much original and independent thought. The handling of these matters will be found stimulating and suggestive. The second volume, in which a discussion of the more abstruse matters touched on in the present volume is promised, will be awaited with interest.

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*Abriss der Psychologie.*<sup>1</sup> H. EBBINGHAUS. Leipzig: Veit und Comp. 1908. Pp. iv + 196.

This book is the original draft, slightly enlarged, of the contribution of Professor Ebbinghaus to Hinneberg's "Kultur der Gegenwart." It is introduced by an admirable sketch (pp. 1-17) of the history of psychology. "Psychology," Ebbinghaus points out, "has a long past, yet only a short history"; and with much discrimination, he indicates the obstacles in the path of the development of a science of psychology, the conditions of the growth of psychology, and the characteristic contributions of the great makers of modern psychology. His references to Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Herbart, and the physiologists and physicists of the earlier nineteenth century are especially suggestive.

Following upon this historical chapter comes the first division of the book, a discussion of "Allgemeine Anschauungen." This contains a brief but admirable summary of the physiology of the nervous system and a clear restatement of the doctrine, embodied in Ebbinghaus's "Grundzüge," of Spinozistic psychophysical parallelism. "Soul and nervous system," he declares (p. 39), "are not two separated, interacting [realities] . . . they are one and the same real, on the one hand as it immediately knows itself and is for itself, on the other hand as it exhibits itself to other similar reals when it is experienced by them—seen or touched by them, as we say." This familiar doctrine is based upon a very unconvincing argument. Like so many parallelists, Ebbinghaus assumes

<sup>1</sup> A translation by Professor Max Meyer is announced by D. C. Heath, Boston.

that he has proved his theory when he has shown the objections to the conception of the brain as "tool" of the soul. He would make his chief point—the methodological advantage of a parallelistic treatment of physiological and psychical facts—if, letting metaphysics alone, he laid stress merely on the empirically observed parallelism of the two classes of phenomena.

Ebbinghaus insists upon treating psychology as science of the soul, but he is very careful to define the soul as mere "totality (*Gesamtheit*) of . . . contents and activities" (pp. 41, *et al.*). In the concrete description of forms of consciousness he obviously, however, conceives the soul as far more than this mere *Gesamtheit*, or aggregate. He speaks, for example (p. 143), of "a characteristic independence of the feeling-activity of the soul," explains esthetic emotion through "Verinnerlichung zu meinem eigenen Ich" (p. 173)—in a word, he constantly implies the persistence, uniqueness, and fundamental reality of a soul (better, perhaps, called "self" or "I") which is no sum of parts. Indeed, the only argument of Ebbinghaus, in favor of the Humian theory of soul-as-aggregate, is based on the misconception that the soul (or I), in any other sense, must be a being "apart from" and "opposed to" its experiences. "The soul," he says (p. 41), "has thoughts, sensations, wishes; is attentive, . . . remembers. . . Yet it is *nothing besides the totality (Gesamtheit) of these contents and activities*—[it is] not a being which would remain over if one were to abstract from all its experiences, or which, as an independent power, could oppose itself to them." By these words, Ebbinghaus is rightly disclaiming the mischievous Lockean fiction of an empty or "simple" soul-substance distinct from the self. But his objection has no force when directed against the conception of conscious self, or I, as fundamental, yet not opposed to its experiences, as persistent and unique (and so *more than* a mere sum of its contents or activities), yet as *inclusive* of these contents. In truth, this conception really underlies Ebbinghaus's own psychology.

The second main division of the book (pp. 43 *seq.*) discusses the elemental phenomena of the life of the soul (*die Elementarer-scheinungen des Seelenlebens*). It presents few important divergences from the teaching of the "Grundzüge," in the successive consideration of (a) the simplest contents of psychic being (*die einfachsten Gebilde des seelischen Seins*), (b) the fundamental laws of psychic becoming (*die Grundgesetze des seelischen Geschehens*), (c) the outer effects of psychic events (*die äusseren Wirkungen der seelischen Vorgänge*). Under the second head, Ebbinghaus seems to have grouped together, with a sort of Kantian heading, all that will not readily fall into his other divisions. Certainly the four topics, attention, reproduction, practise, and fatigue, are incompletely coordinated. Under the first head Ebbinghaus enumerates, as elemental contents, (1) sensations (peripherally excited), (2) sensations centrally excited (*Vorstellungen*), which, he claims, are of radically different nature, and (3) feelings—pleasantness and unpleasantness; for he rejects the Wundtian doctrine of the three dimensions. The most important part of this teaching, in the view of the writer of this notice,

is the admission (pp. 57-60) of certain elemental conscious contents, which Ebbinghaus calls the general attributes (*allgemeine Eigenschaften*) of sensation. In detail, this teaching is open to criticism. Three general attributes are named: spatial relation, temporal relation, and "unity and plurality." But the list is obviously too short—it omits not only two of the "general attributes" which the "Grundzüge" recognizes—the consciousness of likeness and of difference—but others as well, for example, the consciousness of opposition and of degree. Moreover, the differences between the space-consciousness and the consciousness of temporal relation are insufficiently emphasized.

The physiological conditions of sensation are briefly treated. Ebbinghaus does not even allude to the complicated modification of Hering's color theory which he suggested in 1893, but wisely abandoned by the time of the publication of the "Grundzüge." His present preference is for the von Kries theory (pp. 65, 66).

The third division of the book, "Complications (*Verwicklungen*) of the Life of the Soul," discusses, on the one hand, perception, memory and abstraction, speech, thinking and knowing, and believing (*Glauben*); and, on the other hand, feeling and acting. There is nothing peculiarly distinctive, here, in the description or classification. The argument against indeterminism seems inappropriate to a work on psychology.

The closing section on "The Highest Achievements (*die höchste Leistungen*) of the Soul" presents a brief but very interesting treatment of religion, art, and morality regarded as the soul's methods of defending herself against three evils: (1) the unknown future, (2) the inadequate material environment, and (3) evils that rise from social intercourse. This basis of classification has, perhaps, the opposite defects of being uncoordinated and yet a little artificial. For the psychologist, surely, religion and morality are better distinguished from art as having a personal, not an impersonal, object; and are better distinguished from each other in that religion conceives the personal object as divine, whereas morality is a conscious relation to human society. The gist of these distinctions is, indeed, embodied by Ebbinghaus in his teaching. With illuminating emphasis he presses the likeness between the religious and the every-day human relation. "To gain the help of the gods," he says (p. 162), "one must approach them just as one approaches men whose favor one would gain." "The free accomplishment of acts whose objective result is to further the preservation of the totality—these," he says (p. 183), "are the two basal criteria of morality."

No section of the book is, taken by itself, more admirable than that which considers the esthetic consciousness. It is described as pure happiness untouched by desire (*reine begehungslose Freude*, pp. 169, 171) and the work of art is rightly said to tranquilize and to free the soul. In the detailed discussion of the work of art, the psychological point of view is not so closely held. The introduction of these closing sections is to be warmly welcomed as an indication that psychology is coming back to its own, that the study of sensation and affection, of association and emotion, is recognized as a necessary basis, not as an alternative,

of the study of the most developed and complex and significant of conscious achievements. Thus the little book admirably justifies the sound conclusion that "through the analytic and abstract study of manifold particulars"—and only through such study—one may hope to gain "a clear vision of the bewildering riches of the whole" life of the soul.

It is impossible to withhold comment on a bibliography of such haphazard nature as that of the "Abriss." Exclusive of the brief list of text-books and of the references appended to his historical sections (pp. 16, 17, 155), Ebbinghaus cites five periodicals (all German) and about fifty books and articles (three in French, two in English, the others in German). He makes no allusion to psychologists of the Meinong school and to writers in English who contend for the disputed theory upheld in his doctrine of the general attributes of sensation; he does not refer to Flechsig in his references to writers on the nervous system; and he cites the earlier instead of the later works of several writers (*cf.* p. 17). In so brief a summary it is, of course, unfair to ask for exhaustive references, but Ebbinghaus's omissions are unaccountable unless one assume that his bibliography is made on a basis of personal preference and of accidental acquaintance.

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*Kants kritischer Idealismus als Grundlage von Erkenntnistheorie und Ethik.* OSCAR EWALD. Berlin: Ernst Hofmann & Co. 1908. Pp. ix + 314.

The aim of this book is at once critical and constructive. The book thus falls naturally into two parts. The first part, which covers about one hundred pages, is a searching criticism of the idealism of Kant. The criticism, however, is positive in its import and forms the basis for the second part of the book, in which are stated in some detail the author's own views concerning the solution of the problems which the critical philosophy forces upon us.

According to Dr. Ewald, the origin of the categories as Kant tried to deduce them can not be thought. And the first part of his book undertakes to point out why this is so. The essence of the discussion seems to be that Kant's fundamental error lies in his failure to differentiate sharply between the problem of perception and the problem of knowledge. Perception is viewed by Kant too much as a creation of the perceiving subject; the categories of the understanding are superimposed, as it were, upon the data of sensuous experience. Subjective idealism is the result. The way around this difficulty is to draw a sharp distinction between the problem of perception and the problem of knowledge, and to hold fast to the position that the latter alone forms the proper object of transcendental criticism. It is by this way that Dr. Ewald hopes to transcend the subjectivism of Kant and to give to the categories, if not complete objectivity, at least all the objectivity which really belongs to them. And the second part of his book develops this position in some detail.

The very least that can be said concerning Dr. Ewald's criticism of