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Vol. 14

Congress of the United States

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

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December 3, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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TESTIMONY OF:

MILES, Major General Sherman (Resumed)

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT  
VOL. 14 (5)

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## S. Con. Res. 27

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Monday, December 3, 1945

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Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,  
of counsel, for the joint committee.

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1  
2           The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

3           When the committee recessed on Friday, Congressman  
4 Cooper was in the process of examining General Miles.

5           Before we resume, the Chairman would like to ask  
6 counsel, in view of the interest in the time when General  
7 Marshall will appear before the committee, and in view of  
8 the statement that was made the other day that he would, ad-  
9 vise counsel and the committee what his schedule might be  
10 so that we might determine that matter, I should like to  
11 ask counsel if he has any information on that matter.

12           Mr. Mitchell: Yes, Mr. Chairman. On account of his  
13 plans to leave for China, he has a rather tight schedule  
14 and this morning, about a half an hour ago, I advised that  
15 he would like to testify, commence his testimony on Thursday,  
16 December 6, at 10 o'clock and that arrangement has been made,  
17 subject, of course to the committee's approval.

18           General Marshall's examination will cover all phases of  
19 the inquiry with which he was concerned, including the events  
20 of December 6 and December 7, as to which we had originally  
21 expected to make a special order later.

22           At the conclusion of General Miles testimony, we would  
23 like to call General Gerow and get as far as we can with  
24 him before General Marshall is called, because there are  
25 certain things that General Gerow knows that would be well

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1  
2 to lay into the record if we can before General Marshall  
3 is called.

4 But it is 10 o'clock Thursday, if that is agreeable  
5 to the committee.

6 The Chairman: In view of General Marshall's situation,  
7 I am sure there is no objection on the part of the committee  
8 to having him come Thursday, no matter whom it may displace.

9 Congressman Cooper.

10 Mr. Gesell: Mr. Chairman, before Congressman Cooper  
11 begins there are two other matters I would like to bring to  
12 the attention of the committee.

13 General Miles informed me this morning there are two  
14 points in his testimony which he wishes to modify and I  
15 think he should be given that opportunity before the examina-  
16 tion commences.

17 Also the question was raised during General Miles  
18 examination, both by questions from counsel and members  
19 of the committee concerning this matter of the delay in  
20 translations of certain messages which were sent by the  
21 Japanese prior to December 7, but not translated, decoded  
22 and made available to the Military Intelligence Division  
23 until sometime after the 7th or late on the 6th.

24 I, when that came up advised the committee that we  
25 had witnesses scheduled. both from the Army and the Navy who

1  
2 would give detailed information concerning that matter. I  
3 would like to elaborate that statement for the information  
4 of the committee, and point out that in the case of the  
5 Army the Signal Corps, not the Military Intelligence Division,  
6 was responsible for interception, decoding and translation,  
7 as has been testified.

8 We have made and are making a detailed inquiry into  
9 the Army and the Navy records and will be in a position  
10 with respect to all of the messages in question, we believe,  
11 or at least, the great bulk of them, to present to the com-  
12 mittee through those witnesses, both from the Army and Navy  
13 records, the following information:

14 The time at which each of the messages in question was  
15 intercepted;

16 The monitoring station which intercepted the message;

17 The time at which the message was forwarded by the  
18 monitoring station to the Army Signal Intelligence Service  
19 or to Naval Communications, as the case may be;

20 The method by which the monitoring station forwarded  
21 the message, whether by airmail, teletype or radio;

22 The time at which the intercepted copy was sent by the  
23 Army Signal Corps Intelligence Service, or Naval Communica-  
24 tions, or vice versa for processing, that is to say, decoding  
25 and translation.

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

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1  
2 That material is all being assembled and will be pre-  
3 sented to the committee through the witnesses who were  
4 directly concerned in those phases of the matter.

5 The Chairman: General Miles, you want to, before  
6 Congressman Cooper proceeds, you want to make a statement  
7 with reference to your testimony heretofore given?

8 TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES

9 (Resumed)

10 General Miles: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

11 I find that, on reading the transcript, that in one  
12 case my testimony was wrong. I understod, or got the im-  
13 pression, erroneously, that counsel was speaking in the  
14 past tense. What he asked me was:

15 "Do you have any information as to whether or not  
16 General Short or other Army officers knew of these Navy  
17 messages?"

18 The Chairman: Would you mind indicating what page of  
19 the record that appears?

20 General Miles: On the bottom of page 2223.

21 I replied:

22 "I have no specific information on that point."

23 That was true as of 1941. It was not true as of  
24 today, or as of last week.

25 I had seen last week, and before I gave this testimony,

1 **Witness Miles**

2 a copy of an affidavit from Colonel George W. Bicknell,  
3 Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in Hawaii  
4 before Colonel Clausen.

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Witness Miles

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In this affidavit Colonel Bicknell says:

"Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret Volume 'C', testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, U.S.N. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consul, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere."

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Witness Miles

1  
2 The other point I would like to make, Mr. Chairman, is  
3 that I fear on rereading my testimony that I have given the  
4 impression of complacency on my part and on the part of my  
5 Division with regard to these delays in the magic messages.  
6 I very deliberately avoided testifying to the technical side  
7 of the decoding of these messages.

8 (1) Because I am not competent to really go into the  
9 technical side of it; and

10 (2) Because you will have before you a competent officer  
11 of the Signal Corps who handled this matter directly.

12 It was not, of course, my province, but I would like to  
13 say we were by no means complacent about it. We knew simply  
14 the difficulty of doing this work. Three processes had to  
15 be performed. A message had to be deciphered, then it had  
16 to be decoded, and then the Japanese had to be translated  
17 into English

18 I have testified as to what my Division was able to do  
19 to aid the Signal Corps in translations. The other two very  
20 important and highly technical processes of deciphering and  
21 decoding we were not competent to aid in and I felt sure that  
22 those devoted men who spent so much time on it were doing  
23 everything they possibly could in the matter.

24 The astonishing thing, Mr. Chairman, was not that these  
25 messages were delayed in the process of translation from

Witness Miles

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Japanese to English, but that we were able to do it at all.  
 It was a marvelous piece of work on the part of the highly  
 technical men who handled that extraordinary job of breaking  
 codes and ciphers

Shefner follows.

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10:15

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Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice Chairman

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2 The Chairman: Is that all?

3 General Miles: Yes, sir.

4 The Chairman: Congressman Cooper?

5 The Vice Chairman: General, toward the end of your tes-  
6 timony at your last appearance I asked you a question that I  
7 would like to repeat at this time to connect up with the pre-  
8 vious testimony that you have given.

9 On page 2275 of the record I asked you the question:

10 "General, I understood you to say that for years  
11 it had been understood by the Army -- I assume that  
12 means, of course, the high ranking officers of the  
13 Army -- that hostilities with Japan would involve an  
14 attack on Hawaii, and that a knowledge of the Japanese  
15 people caused the anticipation of a surprise attack."

16 And then I asked you if that is substantially and in essence  
17 your statement on that point.

18 Then you answered:

19 "That the possibility if not the probability of  
20 an attack on Hawaii was inherent in a Japanese war.  
21 You gentlemen of the Congress appropriated millions of  
22 dollars for that fortress. Against whom were you build-  
23 ing it?"

24 Then I asked you:

25 "I understand that, but what I am trying to get

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice Chairman

2 at is your statement that it had been understood by the  
3 Army for years that that was the situation."

4 And you answered then:

5 "That is correct, sir."

6 Then I asked you:

7 "Then would it naturally follow that the military  
8 commander at Hawaii might reasonably be expected to  
9 understand that also?"

10 And your reply then was:

11 "I could certainly say that the four Generals  
12 under whom I have had the honor to serve at Hawaii gave  
13 me every indication that they understood that situation  
14 all right."

15 Now, that answer, of course, still stands as you  
16 gave it there?

17 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: And it does come within your know-  
19 ledge then that the four Generals who were in command of the  
20 Hawaiian Department during your period of service there under-  
21 stood the situation as you have indicated by the statement  
22 you have made here?

23 Senator Lucas: Did he answer?

24 General Miles: Yes, sir, I can make that absolutely  
25 flat statement. I worked under those commanding Generals in

Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice-Chairman

1  
2 the preparation of war plans, the revision of war plans and of  
3 the defense projects and I am convinced that all of those  
4 four gentlemen, as well as General Drum who later took com-  
5 mand and when I was here in the War Plans Division, thorough-  
6 ly understood that that out-post had one sole mission, the  
7 defense of the naval base in a Japanese war.

8 The Vice Chairman: Then as far as you know that was  
9 the understanding by all of those who were in command of the  
10 Hawaiian Department?

11 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

12 The Vice Chairman: Now, I assume that the whole pur-  
13 pose of all of these war games and similar activities in  
14 which the Army engaged from time to time was more or less as  
15 a practice to be trained and prepared for the time when the  
16 real thing might come, is that true?

17 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: And throughout the years there had  
19 been various war games and maneuvers and practices of that  
20 kind?

21 General Miles: That is true, sir.

22 The Vice Chairman: Now, the results of those war  
23 games and practices were reported to the War College and  
24 other divisions and branches of the Army for study and pre-  
25 paration, were they not?

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice Chairman

2 General Miles: Reports were made on the large maneu-  
3 vers by the Hawaiian Department to the General Staff in Wash-  
4 ington. They were usually reviewed by the War Plans Divi-  
5 sion of the General Staff. Many local maneuvers, war games  
6 and exercises were not, as I remember it, reported to Wash-  
7 ington.

8 The Vice Chairman: But it was the practice to make use  
9 of the experience gained during those war games and practices  
10 of that type, wasn't it, for the benefit of our officers of  
11 the Army who were not engaged in the particular game at the  
12 time?

13 General Miles: Yes, sir. Our war plans for the de-  
14 fense of Hawaii, the defense project and the war plan itself  
15 had been built up during years of study and experience of  
16 various maneuvers and exercises. It was a splendid command  
17 in which to serve as a G-3, both from the point of training  
18 and of operations, because there was but one situation you  
19 had to consider and one enemy and all of your experience and  
20 the experience of men who had gone before you was all down  
21 one path.

22 General Wells particularly saw that every officer land-  
23 ing in Hawaii, - saw to it that every officer landing in  
24 Hawaii for duty with the Hawaiian Department read certain  
25 documents on the defense of Hawaii, documents which used

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice Chairman

2 the term "Orange" as the term for the enemy and everybody  
3 knew who "Orange" was.

4 The Vice Chairman: That was a part of his duty to do  
5 that, wasn't it?

6 General Miles: That was an order of General Wells, cer-  
7 tainly, regarding all officers of all ranks who joined the  
8 Hawaiian Department.

9 The Vice Chairman: Well, wasn't it a part of the duty  
10 of any officer in command of Hawaii to do that, to be famil-  
11 iar with the experiences gained through these previous war  
12 games and maneuvers and experiences of that kind?

13 General Miles: I would say so, sir.

14 The Vice Chairman: So then it would be reasonable to  
15 assume that it was a part of the duty of any commander in  
16 command of the Army forces in Hawaii to familiarize himself  
17 with the experience gained through previous war games and  
18 maneuvers of that type?

19 General Miles: Yes, sir, I think that is a correct  
20 statement. When I was in the War Plans Division in the middle  
21 thirties we went even beyond that and attempted to have  
22 ordered to Washington for a short period of duty not only com-  
23 manding Generals going out to Hawaii but their chief staff  
24 officers, so that we could have consultations with them on  
25 that very point, the existing war plans and the experiences



1 Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice Chairman

2 that were behind those war plans. I remember distinctly  
3 General Patton coming to Washington at our request before he  
4 went to Hawaii as G-2.

5 Mr. Gesell: Congressman Cooper, I do not like to inter-  
6 pose but I think the committee should be informed --

7 The Vice Chairman: I yield with pleasure, of course.

8 Mr. Gesell: (Continuing) -- that General Miles has  
9 made available to us this morning the excerpts from the  
10 memoranda of General Drum which he referred to in his testi-  
11 mony as relating specifically to the matter that the Congress-  
12 man is covering in his testimony.

13 I have one copy of these excerpts here and have just  
14 glanced at them. I think they are quite pertinent and I  
15 would like to hand them to you or have them put in the record.

16 The Vice Chairman: Well, read it at this point.

17 Mr. Gesell: The reference occurred at page 2168 and  
18 2169 of the transcript and I think one of the members of the  
19 committee or counsel, I forget which, asked General Miles to  
20 make available the material that he was referring to in the  
21 correspondence of General Drum and that is the reason that it  
22 is material to have this come to us at this time.

23 The Vice Chairman: All right, read it in at this point.  
24 Allow me to inquire, though, before you do that, when was  
25 General Drum in command at Hawaii?

Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice Chairman

General Miles: General Drum, as I remember, sir, took command in 1935, I should say about the middle of the year 1935 and I think he was out there three years.

The Vice Chairman: Three years, is that right?

General Miles: But I am not sure of that. I think three years.

The Vice Chairman: 1935, and that would take him to about 1938?

General Miles: And General Herron was in command before General Short.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

General Miles: Perhaps General Drum was there only two years.

The Vice Chairman: All right. Proceed then, Mr. Gesell and read them.

Mr. Gesell: The first is entitled:

"EXCERPT FROM MEMORANDUM FROM MAJOR GENERAL H. A. DRUM, COMMANDER, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WAR DEPARTMENT, DATED SEPTEMBER 21, 1935:  
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MISSION HAWAIIAN DEPT."

(Reading):

"Many assumptions are plausible as to an enemy's action against Hawaii. The variable factor relates to the location of our fleet at the time of an emergency or

Witness Miles:

Questions by the Vice Chairman

1  
2 its success in an encounter with the enemy's main fleet.  
3 We can enumerate enemy's possible modes of action as in-  
4 cluding blockades, air raids, naval raids, landing  
5 raids, air attacks, Naval attacks, landings in force,  
6 local uprisings and sabotage or any combination of these.  
7 We can assume with some certainty that local uprisings  
8 will occur on all the islands of the territory and that  
9 the first enemy hostile action will be attempted as a  
10 surprise. With our fleet present in the Pacific and un-  
11 defeated, hostile external action will probably be lim-  
12 ited to air, naval, and land raids combined with local  
13 uprisings. Hostile naval success would, no doubt, be  
14 followed by a combination of blockade and landing and  
15 air operations in force.

16 "Pearl Harbor, with its dry dock, its shops, gas  
17 and oil tanks, and ammunition storage, and our air in-  
18 stallations on Oahu are extremely vulnerable to air at-  
19 tacks. One oriental power is strong enough in surface  
20 vessels and aircraft to execute successful air attacks  
21 against these objectives unless intercepted in sufficient  
22 time and with sufficient strength to defeat the attacks.

23 "The doctrine that the only certain way to defeat  
24 an aggressive air force decisively is to destroy it on  
25 its base is sound and is applicable to the defense of

Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice Chairman

1 Oahu. To prevent the destruction of or serious damage  
 2 to our air fields on Oahu and Pearl Harbor by hostile  
 3 aircraft, carriers must be sunk or driven off before  
 4 they can launch their aircraft and the enemy must be pre-  
 5 vented from establishing air bases on other islands  
 6 within range.

7  
 8 "From either an offensive or defensive viewpoint of  
 9 our problem, timely information of a hostile approach  
 10 is essential. The essential factor in this connection  
 11 is to receive warnings of the approach of hostile air  
 12 forces in sufficient time to permit our air forces to  
 13 leave the ground and attack the enemy's carriers before  
 14 they are within airplane operating radius of our vital  
 15 installations on Oahu.

16 "Assuming that carrier based bombardment airplanes  
 17 have an operating radius of 200 miles and that our bom-  
 18 bardment is 'in readiness' and loaded with the proper  
 19 types of bombs - the highest practicable degree of readi-  
 20 ness - first information of the carriers must be re-  
 21 ceived when they are at least 300 miles from Oahu in  
 22 order for our bombardment aviation to attack the carriers  
 23 before they launch their aircraft. Advance notice of  
 24 greater length of time is desirable. The maintenance of  
 25 an aerial screen nearly 2000 miles long requires a large

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Witness Miles:

Questions by the Vice Chairman

number of airplanes. Economy demands the operation of some of our airplanes from the most distant islands in the archipelago such as Kauai and Hawaii in order to reduce the time of flight to and from the 300 miles circle."

Now, the other memorandum, if the Congressman wishes me to proceed.

The Vice Chairman: Yes, I would like for you to proceed but let us have the date of the one you just read.

Mr. Gesell: That was dated September 21, 1935.

The Vice Chairman: That is a memorandum of General Drum?

Mr. Gesell: That is right.

The Vice Chairman: To the War Department?

Mr. Gesell: To the Adjutant General, War Department.

The Vice Chairman: War Department. All right, go ahead.

Mr. Gesell: Now, the next one is an excerpt from the memorandum of Major General E. T. Conley, the Adjutant General, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated April 2, 1936.

I take it this is a memorandum going the other way, from the War Department to the Commanding General, dated April 2, 1936.

The Vice Chairman: That would be correct, wouldn't it, General?

Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice Chairman

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2 General Miles: Yes, sir. That was the final answer of  
3 the War Department to General Drum's letter of September,  
4 1935, which the counsel has just read.

5 The Vice Chairman: And that was the statement from the  
6 War Department to the Army commander at Hawaii?

7 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

8 Mr. Gesell: This reads:

9 "4. 'The need for suitable air fields (on the  
10 outlying islands) as an essential and vital element of  
11 the defense plans of the Hawaiian Department.'

12 "a. This point concerns our use of outlying air  
13 fields in defense, primarily against hostile sea-borne  
14 aviation. The enemy's use of such outlying fields  
15 would be dependent, as already indicated, upon our abil-  
16 ity or inability to deny them to him, and upon his abil-  
17 ity to repair the damage done to them by our initial  
18 demolition or subsequent air bombardments.

19 "b. In the basic letter (Paragraph 3 b) the point  
20 is stressed that the only certain way to defeat an ag-  
21 gressive air force decisively is to destroy it on its  
22 bases. From this it is argued that our air forces  
23 based on Hawaii and Kauai would be of appreciable ad-  
24 vantage in attacking hostile air forces while still on  
25 their carriers.

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Witness Miles:

Questions by The ViceChairman

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2 "c. The War Department recognized that the instal-  
3 lations at Pearl Harbor are vulnerable to air attack;  
4 that the enemy may have sufficient sea power to make such  
5 an attack from carriers; that the only certain way to  
6 defeat such a hostile air force is to sink or drive off  
7 the carriers before they can launch their planes; and,  
8 finally, that timely information of a hostile approach  
9 would be the essential factor in this problem.

10 "d. The question therefore arises whether our air  
11 forces based on Hawaii and Kauai could solve this prob-  
12 lem. This appears very doubtful when viewed in the light  
13 of the latest information on possible enemy sea-borne  
14 air power.

15 "e. Information received from the Office of Naval  
16 Intelligence is to the effect that each of the four Orange  
17 carriers is capable of a sustained maximum speed for  
18 eight or ten-hour runs of between 25 and 28.5 knots an  
19 hour. This would mean that these carriers, during an  
20 eight-hour night, could make an approach of between 215  
21 and 245 miles, or in a ten-hour night an approach of be-  
22 tween 270 and 305 miles.

23 "f. Furthermore, according to information from the  
24 Office of Naval Intelligence, the radius of action of  
25 existing Orange carrier-based bombers is 330 miles.

Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice Chairman

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2 This radius will undoubtedly be materially increased as  
3 aviation is further developed. But it is not even safe  
4 to use the radius of existing Orange bombers in our cal-  
5 culations, since the enemy might conceivably expend his  
6 planes in non-return flights provided the target is of  
7 sufficient importance. On such flights they could go  
8 about 600 miles (the range equals somewhat less than  
9 twice the radius with bombing loads). Hence the fastest  
10 Orange carrier running in to launch a bombing attack  
11 against Oahu would be at least 600 miles, and might be  
12 900 miles, from Oahu by dusk of a ten-hour night. If,  
13 upon reaching her dusk position she were discovered by  
14 a Blue observation plane, she could be prevented from suc-  
15 cessfully launching her bombers the following dawn only--

16 "(1) If our observation plane tracked her through-  
17 out the night, a most difficult operation involving  
18 continuous circling and about 900 miles of flight;  
19 and

20 "(2) If our bombardment planes were so accurately  
21 directed as to catch the carrier just at dawn.

22 "g. In order to surmount these serious difficul-  
23 ties and enable our bombers to catch the carrier before  
24 she enters the screen of night, we would have to discover  
25 her before she reaches her dusk position, i.e., 65



Witness Miles:

Questions by The ViceChairman

1  
2 miles (or 100 miles if the enemy chose to expend his  
3 bombers) from that position (distances covered by car-  
4 rier at cruising speed while our bombers were coming  
5 out 600 miles (or 900 miles)). Our observation plane  
6 would then have to track the carrier for 4 (or 6) day-  
7 light hours, in spite of whatever the carrier's pursuit  
8 planes could do. In any event, it would necessitate  
9 the carrier being discovered 665 miles (or 1,000 miles  
10 from Oahu.

11 "h. An observation screen even 665 miles from  
12 Oahu would require that our planes cover a perimeter  
13 of about 4,180 miles - an impossible task.

14 "i. Lastly, it should be noted that, if the hos-  
15 tile carrier and her bombers approached from the north-  
16 east, with the trade wind, they would have the following  
17 advantages:

18 "(1) The hostile sea and air speeds would be in-  
19 creased, whereas our air speeds would be reduced,  
20 and, in consequence, our observation screen would  
21 have to be still farther from Oahu than indicated  
22 above.

23 "(2) The enemy would at all times be closer to  
24 Oahu than to Hawaii or to Kauai, because of the  
25 geographical configuration of the Hawaiian archi-

Witness Miles:

Questions by The Vice Chairman

pelago.

"(3) His bombers would approach Pearl Harbor from the most favorable direction, that over the Koolau Range, which is almost continually shrouded in a cloud bank.

"j. The air bases on Hawaii and Kauai would be, respectively, 222 and 120 land miles from Pearl Harbor. It can be shown diagrammatically that should the hostile carriers approach Oahu from any point in a segment of 325° approximately from the northeast clockwise around to the north, these air bases would be of value, both in the maintenance of the observation screen and in the interception of the carriers by our bombers. But there would still remain a segment of 35° of possible hostile approach in which these air bases would be of no value, and a hostile approach from this segment would be materially aided by the prevailing trade wind.

"k. For the above reasons it would appear that long-range bombardment based on Hawaii and Kauai, while of assistance in the defense of Oahu, would not solve the problem presented and, therefore, could not justify the great initial and continuing expenses involved in peace-time garrisons adequate to their ground defense in war."

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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10:35 Am

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1  
2 I am sorry to interpose, but it seems that is perti-  
3 nent to what you were reading.

4 The Vice Chairman: That is all right. Am I correct,  
5 General, in my understanding that these two documents just  
6 read into the record by counsel relate entirely to Hawaii?

7 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: The first document read was a  
9 memorandum from General Drum, the Commanding General of  
10 the Hawaiian Department, covering his views and ideas with  
11 respect to the defense of Hawaii, and that memorandum was  
12 sent to the Hawaiian Department; is that correct?

13 General Miles: Yes, sir, it was an official letter  
14 covering General Drum's ideas and desires with regard to  
15 the defense of Hawaii from an attack by Japanese planes  
16 based on carriers. That is to say, so much of the letter  
17 as has been read refers to that particular point.

18 The second letter the counsel read was the official  
19 reply of the War Department to the basic or original letter  
20 from General Drum in which the whole matter was thoroughly  
21 gone into from the War Department point of view. It should,  
22 of course, be noted that in early 1936 we were just beginning  
23 to build our big bombers and radar was unknown.

24 The Vice Chairman: The second memorandum read into the  
25 record by counsel was the War Department's views and position

1 Witness Miles Questions by: The Vice Chairman  
2 with respect to the points raised in General Drum's  
3 memorandum to the War Department?

4 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: And all of it related to the possi-  
6 bility of an air attack from carriers by Japan upon Hawaii  
7 and Pearl Harbor?

8 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

9 The Vice Chairman: Now, is it correct to assume that  
10 succeeding commanders of the Hawaiian Department had the  
11 benefit of this expression and information from the War  
12 Department on this point?

13 General Miles: I have every reason to believe that  
14 that important letter, correspondence was on file in the  
15 Hawaiian Department.

16 The Vice Chairman: And for practical purposes, that  
17 letter from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department  
18 amounted to a blueprint as to a defense to meet hostile  
19 air attack from carriers from Japan?

20 General Miles: It amounted to a discussion of that  
21 problem, Mr. Congressman. I cannot say it was a blueprint,  
22 because at that time we were not able to give General Drum,  
23 nor were we ever able to give the commanding general out  
24 there sufficient airplanes to cover this enormous perimeter.

25 It is a discussion of the problem as it existed in 1936

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Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1  
2 when, as I pointed out, radar was unknown.

3 The Vice Chairman: Well, the fact that radar later  
4 existed, would be an additional advantage that the commander  
5 of the Hawaiian Department might utilize in furthering that  
6 defense program, was it not?

7 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: The fact is that everything the  
9 War Department told him in that letter or communication would  
10 still obtain, and if subsequent to that time radar or anything  
11 else that might contribute to a defense of Hawaii came into  
12 existence, why that would be that much additional that he  
13 might have to utilize for the purpose of defending Hawaii?

14 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: And of course the fact is that the  
16 actual attack on December 7, 1941, was made by Japan as an  
17 air attack from airplane carriers?

18 General Miles: So far as I know, sir, it was made almost  
19 exactly as we had worked it out with General Drum in 1935-36.

20 The Vice Chairman: The actual attack occurred almost  
21 exactly as was worked out in this communication from General  
22 Drum and from the War Department back to the Commander of  
23 the Hawaiian Department?

24 General Miles: So far as I know, from what has been  
25 published on the Japanese operation, the actual operation was

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Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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1  
2 very similar to what we had worked out with General Drum  
3 in 1935-36.

4 The Vice Chairman: Then, General, I understood you  
5 to state that during the time you were stationed in Hawaii  
6 -- I believe as an Operations Officer --

7 General Miles: Yes, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: That war games were worked out and  
9 executed that involved an air attack by Japan on Hawaii at  
10 that time.

11 General Miles: Yes, sir. It was always assumed that  
12 no serious attack could be made on Hawaii without the use  
13 by Japan of strong air forces. It was always assumed, even  
14 in a landing attack, with no intent to bomb the Fleet, it  
15 would have to be supported by very strong air forces.

16 The Vice Chairman: Now, General, just a few other  
17 questions. I do not want to detain you too long because I  
18 know other members of the committee want to inquire of you.

19 Did you, as a general officer of the Army, and as G-2  
20 of the Army General Staff, consider the message of the Chief  
21 of Staff of November 27, 1941, to the Commanding General of  
22 the Hawaiian Department as sufficient warning to cause proper  
23 and necessary alerts to be put into effect?

24 General Miles: I did, sir, most definitely.

25 The Vice Chairman: And then the following day, I believe

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1  
2 November 28, you, as G-2 of the General Staff of the Army  
3 sent a message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

4 General Miles: I did, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: And you regarded that as a suffi-  
6 cient warning to cause an alert to be put into effect?

7 General Miles: I did not regard my message to the G-2  
8 of the Hawaiian Department as one which in itself would  
9 have caused any action by the Commanding General. If I  
10 had so regarded it, I would not have sent it. My message  
11 of November 27 was supplementary to the message sent by  
12 General Marshall, Chief of Staff, so that in any warning  
13 to my opposite number in Hawaii, the G-2, I was simply carry-  
14 ing out a policy, a decision which had been made by my  
15 Chief, the Chief of Staff of the Army.

16 The Vice Chairman: Well, it would serve the purpose of  
17 further accentuating it, would it not?

18 General Miles: I understood so, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: Now, isn't it true that after a  
20 sufficient warning was given to the Commanding General of  
21 the Hawaiian Department, such as you considered the message  
22 from the Chief of Staff of November 27, 1941, to be, he was  
23 presumed to know what to do to defend Hawaii, and those  
24 under his command ?

25 General Miles: I assume, sir, that he had no other

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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purpose or reason for having that command than that.

The Vice Chairman: No other reason for them being there, was there?

General Miles: That was the essential reason, from the Commanding General down to every last soldier who was on that island.

The Vice Chairman: The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department at that time was a Major General, wasn't he?

General Miles: He was a Lieutenant General, sir.

The Vice Chairman: A Lieutenant General.

Well, of course, then, there was not any corporal or sergeant in command there, and a lieutenant general of the United States Army would be presumed to know what to do if somebody started to shooting at him, would he not?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: Now one other question, if I may,  
3 General, with respect to these intercepted Japanese messages.

4 I, of course, expect to wait until the officers of the  
5 Signal Corps appear to ask them more in detail about it, but  
6 I understood you to say that the Signal Corps of the Army was  
7 under the Chief of Staff, or the Chief Signal Officer of the  
8 Army reported to the Chief of Staff.

9 General Miles: Yes, sir. The heads of all branches of  
10 the Army were directly under the Chief of Staff.

11 The Vice Chairman: And the Signal Corps did not come  
12 under G-2 or Army Intelligence?

13 General Miles: It did not come under G-2 or directly  
14 under any other branch of the General Staff.

15 The Vice Chairman: Now did the Quartermaster Corps,  
16 the Engineer Corps and various other similar branches of the  
17 Army also come under the Chief of Staff and not under G-1,  
18 G-2, G-3, G-4, as the case might be?

19 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: These intercepted messages had been  
21 received by you prior to the time about which I inquired the  
22 other day, had not they? The inquiries I addressed to you  
23 at the other session were with respect to the messages re-  
24 ceived and sent from November 24, 1941 to about December 6,  
25 1941, but intercepted messages from Japan had been brought

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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to your attention before that time, had they?

General Miles: Oh, yes sir.

The Vice Chairman: Had your attention been attracted by unusual delay in the decoding and translation of those messages?

General Miles: No, sir. I remember that I knew and noted that the period of time between when the message was sent and when I saw it in English varied considerably with different messages, which I thought was perfectly natural, knowing something about the difficult science of cryptology, and the ability of all countries to change rapidly their ciphers although they could not change their codes very rapidly.

I thought at that time I had every reason to believe that the SIS section was doing everything possible to give us those messages as rapidly as they could, and I repeat, the amazing thing was that they could give them to us at all.

The Vice Chairman: I could well appreciate that point, General, but the fact is that they did intercept them and that they did decode and translate them.

General Miles: Decrypt, decode and translate them.

The Vice Chairman: And as shown by these exhibits to which attention has been invited, it took varying periods of time for that to be done.

General Miles: That is true, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Well, of course the message was inter-

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 cepted the day it was sent from Tokyo or from Honolulu, as  
3 the case might be, was it not?

4 General Miles: That was certainly true of all radio  
5 messages.

6 The Vice Chairman: Well, would not any message have to  
7 be intercepted at the time it was being transmitted?

8 General Miles: By radio, yes, sir.

9 The Vice Chairman: Yes, by radio. So that the date that  
10 it was sent was the date that time began to run so far as the  
11 decoding and translating of that message was concerned?

12 General Miles: That is true, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: Now, then, one other question, I  
14 believe, if I may, General.

15 Has it been the custom of the Army for a long time in  
16 peacetime to allow all personnel of the Army who can be spared  
17 from essential work to take week-ends off?

18 General Miles: If they can be spared, if the situation  
19 is such that they can be spared it was normally the custom  
20 that, in times of peace, the officers could leave their posts  
21 by permission of their Commanding Officers, yes, sir.

22 The Vice Chairman: What I was endeavoring to get at,  
23 General, has not that been the practice, or the custom, for  
24 a long time when we were not at war for personnel of the Army  
25 to be given the opportunity to take week-ends off?

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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General Miles: Yes, sir, as long as I can remember. Of course that was under the limitation that you could not take too many of these. Somebody had to be back on the job.

The Vice Chairman: I realize that, but I just happen to recall, at times when I visited, as an illustration, Walter Reed Army Hospital, or the Navy Hospital at Bethesda, to visit friends on Saturday or Sunday, I was rather impressed with the very minimum number of people who were on duty, and that all the others were taking the week-end off. Was my impression correct?

General Miles: I think you were correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Did that same custom prevail through all branches of the Army?

General Miles: I think that is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman: So that just the very essential and what might be termed the minimum number of people were kept on duty, and all of the others were given an opportunity to be off during the week-end?

General Miles: I think that is generally correct, sir. Of course the essential number depended on what the situation was, but in the piping times of peace it was usually reasonably easy to get the permission of your Commanding Officer to leave on Saturday, or perhaps from Saturday to Sunday.

The Vice Chairman: Well, of course whatever the situation

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman  
Mr. Clark

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may have been in Hawaii on that historic week-end of December

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7, 1941, it was under the control of the Commanding General

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in command there?

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General Miles: In the final analysis it was under the  
control of the Commanding General, yes, sir.

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The Vice Chairman: And if personnel did have the week-end  
off, why, it had to be at his permission, or certainly in accord  
with his policy?

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General Miles: That is true, sir.

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The Vice Chairman: I thank you.

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The Chairman: Senator George.

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Senator George: Mr. Chairman, I have a memorandum which  
I neglected to bring with me this morning. I will pass at  
the present time. I want to ask a very few questions later.

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The Chairman: Congressman Clark.

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Mr. Clark: General Miles, the term "alert" has been used  
frequently in the course of these hearings, the word "alert"  
Just what does that term fully signify in military parlance?

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General Miles: "Alert" is a status of readiness. You  
alert a command, for instance, to be ready to receive an order  
to move. In the War Plans for many years we had established  
a certain status of alert, 1, 2, 3, or A, B, C, each one being  
definitely directed to a certain situation, and the purpose  
of the alert was to see that the forces alerted were prepared

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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to meet that situation.

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Mr. Clark: Now the terms "surprise" and "surprise attack" were also frequently mentioned in this record. Would you mind stating to the committee what your understanding, in a military sense, of that term "surprise" is?

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General Miles: Well, I should define a surprise attack as one whose objective was to catch the enemy unprepared, unalerted to meet that attack. There is no hidden or technical meaning that I know of in that term. It means exactly what the English words convey.

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Mr. Clark: Well, there was a thought in my mind that coincides with your own, but I also considered whether or not a military attack without a previous declaration of war would be considered as a surprise attack.

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General Miles: A surprise attack in the highest form of surprise, I would say.

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Mr. Clark: Now in the analysis and evaluation of the military situation in the Pacific, which you have already been asked about, you stated several alternatives that would be open to Japan, including movement into Indochina, attack on Hainan, and other things, the Philippine Islands. You did not in that evaluation anywhere touch upon the question of the possibility of a surprise attack. I was wondering why you did not go into that.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2       General Miles: Those were lines of action which we  
3 were trying to define as possible lines of action for Japan.  
4 We did not go into the question of how she would conduct  
5 tactically any attack which she made, and surprise is one of  
6 the tactical principles. We knew, from the characteristics  
7 of the Japanese people and from sound military doctrine, that  
8 they would, if they could, utilize the tactical principle of  
9 surprise. But we were not, in those estimates, referring to  
10 any tactical principles she might employ, we were looking at  
11 it from the broader point of view of the lines of action she  
12 would be apt to take.

13       Mr. Clark: That was more or less the natural line of  
14 action, was it not?

15       General Miles: What we thought were the obvious actions.  
16 I would not say the natural actions, but the most obvious  
17 actions from all the information to the existing situation.

18       Mr. Clark: Now at that time there had been a message  
19 from the Ambassador to Japan to which you have referred, sug-  
20 gesting a surprise attack on Hawaii, and I believe the Secretary  
21 of State had something to say about the possibility of a  
22 surprise attack after the 26th of November.

23       I notice in the messages released by the Chief of Naval  
24 Operations, I think Admiral Ingersoll, in which he speaks  
25 of a surprise aggressive attack. Now in reading your analysis

1 Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

2 and evaluation of the military situation in the Pacific, and  
3 in the light of the action by Japan, the question arose in my  
4 mind as to why you should not deal in that analysis with the  
5 element of surprise.

6 General Miles: The documents to which I think you refer,  
7 Mr. Congressman, were written for the Chief of Staff and other  
8 military officials covering a great many difficult subjects.  
9 We did not think it necessary, and I still fail to see why it  
10 should be necessary, for us to constantly repeat in such docu-  
11 ments the obvious. All soldiers have been taught the principle  
12 of surprise; it is among the principles of war. I knew in  
13 my own mind, so far as Hawaii was concerned, we constantly  
14 thought of the element of surprise being in any form of attack  
15 that the Japanese might make, that it was a possibility or  
16 probability.

17 I think that is the answer, sir. We did not want to  
18 constantly repeat the obvious to the gentlemen who had a great  
19 deal to read, and we were asking them to read an awful lot  
20 anyway.

21 Mr. Clark: I recollect your statement on your direct  
22 examination that you considered an attack on Hawaii as being  
23 inherent in the military situation.

24 General Miles: As the possibility or the probability of  
25 an attack on Hawaii I considered it inherent in any war with

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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Japan we might have, no matter how that war started.

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Mr. Clark: Now, from a military standpoint and aside from the fact that the Hawaiian Command was taken unawares, leaving that out of consideration, was the attack of December 7 a surprise attack?

General Miles: I fail to understand the question, sir.

Mr. Clark: I am asking you, from a military standpoint strictly and in view of your statement that an attack there was inherent in the military situation, I am asking you whether in that sense the attack was a surprise attack?

General Miles: Surprise to me or to whom, sir?

Mr. Clark: Yes, to you.

General Miles: I would like to expand on that question a little bit, sir. In estimating the situation, whether verbal or on paper, there are two principles that should be followed: One is never to lose sight of or ignore anything that the enemy may do which is within its capabilities whether you think it is wise for him to do that or not.

The second is to concede to your enemy the highest form of good sense and good judgment.

Now I think we have followed both of those principles. Now if you would like to ask me whether I thought it was a surprise, we never lost sight of the fact that Japan, if engaged in war, would very probably attack Hawaii, and we took action

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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on November 27 in warning our outposts, "This situation for which you have been billeted is facing you."

Then we also followed, I think, the sane principle. We did grant the Japanese the best of good sense. We did very much question whether he would attack Hawaii, because such an attack must result from two separate decisions on the part of the Japanese, one to make war against the United States, which we thought at that time in the long run would be suicidal, as has since transpired, and, two, to attack a very fortress and fleet, risking certain ships that he could not replace, and knowing that the success in that attack must rest very largely on that surprise being successful; in other words, finding that fortress and that fleet unprepared to meet the attack.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D.C.

Hook follows

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 Mr. Clark: Do you mean unprepared or unalerted?

3 General Miles: I mean both, sir.

4 Mr. Clark: Well, cannot a command be prepared even  
5 if it is unalerted?

6 General Miles: Not if they were unalerted, sir.

7 Mr. Clark: I mean aside from that. You said something  
8 about there being no proper element of surprise, that sur-  
9 prise is based on unpreparedness, or the failure to be  
10 alerted.

11 General Miles: Are you speaking, sir, of the military  
12 weapons and means available or of the personnel that handle  
13 those things? No gun will go off unless the man pulls the  
14 trigger, and if the man who is supposed to pull the trigger  
15 is not prepared to pull the trigger then that gun is unpre-  
16 pared.

17 Mr. Clark: I am speaking of both, General, and asking  
18 you whether the success of that attack rested on the lack  
19 of the things you have just mentioned, the lack of alertness?

20 General Miles: I think, sir, it can safely be said  
21 that the success of that Japanese attack depended, in very  
22 large measure, on their catching the forces unalerted and  
23 therefore unprepared to meet that attack.

24 Mr. Clark: Well, it comes down then to a question of  
25 not being on the alert, does it not?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 Mr. Clark: I had in mind to ask you some questions  
3 about the delay in decoding and translating these messages,  
4 but in view of the counsel's statement that other witnesses  
5 will be called on that, I will waive that.

6 I would like to call your attention now to the message  
7 of General Marshall of November 27. I understood you to say  
8 on your direct examination that the mere fact that that  
9 message was signed by the Chief of Staff himself had a  
10 certain significance.

11 General Miles: Yes, sir, it had great significance.

12 Mr. Clark: What was it?

13 General Miles: The messages commonly go out on the  
14 signature of the Adjutant General. Any assistant chief of  
15 staff could have directed the Adjutant General to send a  
16 message, or an assistant chief of staff could sign it him-  
17 self. Very rarely was there a message signed by General  
18 Marshall.

19 Mr. Clark: Let me interrupt you a moment just there.  
20 Messages were sent prior and subsequent to November 27 to  
21 the Hawaiian Command by the Chief of Staff?

22 General Miles: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Clark: What is the significance of this particular  
24 message being signed by the Commander in Chief himself, or  
25 the Chief of Staff himself?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 General Miles: Well, the significance lies in the  
3 fact that he was Chief of Staff, that he was doing some-  
4 thing which is not ordinarily done, and by putting his name  
5 to that message, it carried to any military mind, I think,  
6 -- it certainly would to mine -- a mine, a much greater sig-  
7 nificance than had it been signed "Adams," or "Miles," or  
8 "Gerow," or anybody else.

9 Mr. Clark: And that would be well understood by the  
10 commanders, the several commanders to whom it was sent?

11 General Miles: I think so, sir.

12 Mr. Clark: Were any others of these numerous messages  
13 that we have examined signed by the Chief of Staff himself?

14 General Miles: I did not hear the first part of your  
15 question, sir.

16 Mr. Clark: I say, were there any others of these numerous  
17 messages we have examined signed by the Chief of Staff?

18 General Miles: I recall none, sir.

19 Mr. Clark: I wish to direct your attention briefly  
20 to the language of this message. It says: "You are directed  
21 to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures you  
22 deem necessary." I understood you previously to say there  
23 were three methods of reconnaissance available: above the  
24 water, on the water and under the water. Is that correct?

25 General Miles: Yes, sir.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 Mr. Clark: Now, what were the existing facilities  
3 in Hawaii at that time for reconnaissance generally?

4 General Miles: The Army Air Forces and radar.

5 Mr. Clark: Could ships have been used for that pur-  
6 pose?

7 General Miles: I presume so, yes, sir.

8 Mr. Clark: The reason I asked you that question, I  
9 understood you to say the other day there were three  
10 methods open: By air, by surface operation, and by sub-  
11 marine operation. That is what I understood you to say.

12 General Miles: Yes, sir. Of course, the Army con-  
13 trol no submarines and very few surface ships.

14 Mr. Clark: I was not speaking particularly of the  
15 Army, General. I mean all of the facilities at the command  
16 of the Commanding General.

17 General Miles: You refer, Mr. Congressman, to that  
18 particular sentence in General Marshall's message to General  
19 Short?

20 Mr. Clark: Yes, sir.

21 General Miles: That is why I was answering for the  
22 Army only, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 Mr. Clark: This message also directed what should be  
3 done in the event of hostilities, that Rainbow No. Five  
4 should be put into operation insofar as the Japanese  
5 were concerned?

6 General Miles: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Clark: Now, there is a short sentence in this  
8 message consisting of three words "Report measures taken."  
9 That was an order from the Chief of Staff, was it not?

10 General Miles: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Clark: Can you direct the committee's attention  
12 to any message that complies with that order?

13 General Miles: The committee has, I believe, before  
14 it, General Short's reply to General Marshall's message  
15 referring to General Marshall's message by its number. I  
16 did not see that message.

17 Mr. Gesell: That is the one that appears at page 12,  
18 I believe, Congressman, of Exhibit 32.

19 Mr. Clark: Yes.

20 Now, that message, dated November 28, from General  
21 Short, says, "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage.  
22 Liaison with Navy" -- the next word I am not familiar with,  
23 "REURAD" --

24 General Miles: "Reference your."

25 Mr. Clark: "Reference your 472 27th."

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 That "472 27th" was, of course, General Marshall's  
3 message of that date, was it not; General Miles?

4 General Miles: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Clark: Now, you have told the committee that in  
6 the preparation of that message of General Marshall, all  
7 reference to sabotage was eliminated; is that correct?

8 General Miles: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Clark: Do you consider that message from General  
10 Short that I have just read, in any way responsive to the  
11 message from General Marshall of the 27th?

12 General Miles: I certainly do not consider it an ade-  
13 quate reply, if that is what you have in mind, sir.

14 Mr. Clark: Does it in any way refer at all to the  
15 Marshall message except by number, or to anything in the  
16 Marshall message?

17 General Miles: That is true, sir; the Marshall message  
18 did not mention sabotage, nor did it mention liaison with  
19 the Navy.

20 Mr. Clark: Now, I am asking whether you, as a military  
21 man consider that message from General Short as in any way  
22 responsive to the message from the Chief of Staff?

23 General Miles: No, sir.

24 Mr. Clark: Did you at the time catch the fact that  
25 it was not responsive?



Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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General Miles: I didn't see the message until the following month, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Clark: Whose business was it to see this message and ascertain whether it was responsive to the message of the Chief?

General Miles: The message was sent by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division. I believe no other officers of the War Department.

Mr. Clark: Now, that is the only message, is it not, from General Short that even purports to refer to General Marshall's message of the 27th?

General Miles: So far as I know that is correct, sir.

Mr. Clark: Well, doesn't it indicate to any military man who would examine it that the Hawaiian command had done no more than to go on an alert against sabotage?

General Miles: I would much prefer that that question be answered by one of the officers who did see the message, sir, at the time.

Mr. Clark: Well, I don't want to press you, General, but it seems to me with your long and varied experience, you are well qualified to give the committee an opinion.

General Miles: Very well, sir.

My opinion is that that message itself was a totally inadequate reply to the message it purported to reply to.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 Although it did not say the department was alerted against  
3 sabotage only, there is certainly an inference that that  
4 was the fact. The next phrase about liaison with the Navy  
5 might or might not have implied that General Short was in  
6 consultation with the Navy regarding the measures which  
7 he would put into effect, and hence that a further reply  
8 might be expected from General Short, or might not.

9 Mr. Clark: Well now, the Marshall message, as you  
10 have already said, contained the one sentence order to  
11 report measures taken, and on the following day this short  
12 Short message came in. What I am asking is whether or not  
13 that doesn't disclose to a military man, that he had taken  
14 no measures other than anti-sabotage?

15 General Miles: There was that inference which might  
16 very well be drawn from General Short's reply.

17 Mr. Clark: What other inference would be possible  
18 from that reply?

19 General Miles: The further inference -- the other  
20 inference was, or might have been that a reference to  
21 liaison with the Navy meant that General Short was then in  
22 communication with the Navy regarding the measures which  
23 would be jointly put into effect and that a further reply  
24 from General Short might, therefore, be expected.

25 Mr. Clark: Now, this same message, from the Chief of

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 Staff of the 27th, was sent, in substance, to the West  
3 Coast Command and the Philippine Command and the Panama  
4 Command, was it not?

5 General Miles: It was, sir.

6 Mr. Clark: Now, I direct your attention to the action  
7 of the Philippine Command -- it appears on page 11 of these  
8 messages, in which General MacArthur refers to the order  
9 from General Marshall; or the message from General Marshall,  
10 as to reconnaissance being extended and intensified in  
11 conjunction with the Navy. "Ground security measures have  
12 been taken. Within the limitations imposed by present  
13 state of development of this theatre of operations, every  
14 thing is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense.  
15 Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist  
16 between Army and Navy."

17 I should like also to direct your attention to the action  
18 taken by the Western Command, a rather long message of more  
19 than a page. in which the state of alert is mentioned, and  
20 the measures that are being taken are gone into in some detail.  
21 And then the message from the Panama Command, which sent a  
22 short message on the 29th, saying that a full report was  
23 being made by mail which was followed by a letter of some  
24 three pages detailing all of the measures taken by that com-  
25 mand in response to the message from the Chief of November

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 26th. You are familiar with all of those?

3 General Miles: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Clark: Isn't there a very marked and noticeable  
5 difference between the response from these other commands  
6 and the response from the Hawaiian Command?

7 General Miles: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Clark: Doesn't it make, in fairness now -- I am  
9 trying to get my own thinking straight, General; that is  
10 all I am after. I am not meaning to cross-examine you in  
11 the ordinary sense of that term -- but doesn't it make the  
12 failure of the Hawaiian Command to respond specifically  
13 at a time which you have yourself referred to as a crisis  
14 conspicuously outstanding?

15 General Miles: Yes, sir; it reflects the very definite  
16 degree of alertness of those four commands you mention.

17 Mr. Clark: Coming a little closer home, ought not some-  
18 body in the War Department to have detected and called at-  
19 tention to that difference?

20 General Miles: There again I would very much rather  
21 that question be answered by one of the gentlemen who did  
22 see that message.

23 Mr. Clark: But with this conspicuous difference, and  
24 what I hope I am fair in terming a wholly unsatisfactory  
25 response from the Hawaiian Command, the records in the War

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6th?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Clark  
Senator Lucas

1  
2 Department remained in that condition from the 27th of  
3 November to the 7th of December, without any further report  
4 from the Hawaiian Command; that is correct?

5 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

6 Mr. Clark: That is all.

7 The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

8 Senator Lucas: General Miles, with respect to the  
9 testimony that you just gave to the Congressman from North  
10 Carolina, did you see any of these messages that were sent  
11 by the other commands other than the Hawaiian Command?

12 General Miles: I saw no others.

13 Senator Lucas: You saw none of those messages until  
14 after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

15 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

16 Senator Lucas: Were any of those messages discussed  
17 with you by anyone in the Army previous to Pearl Harbor?

18 General Miles: I remember no discussion on those  
19 messages, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: So, insofar as these important messages  
21 are concerned, you knew nothing about any of them until  
22 after the Pearl Harbor attack?

23 General Miles: That is correct, sir. They were not  
24 a responsibility of my division, and I did not know about those  
25 messages.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Whose responsibility was it?

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General Miles: The implementation of War Plans, war preparations, was the responsibility of the War Plans Division, General Staff.

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Senator Lucas: Who was the head of that?

7

General Miles: General Gerow.

8

Senator Lucas: Did he ever discuss with you at any time, either before or after, these messages?

9

10

General Miles: No, sir, he did not.

11

Senator Lucas: General Miles, in the early part of your testimony, you related to the committee that being in charge of G-2 of the General Staff, you reported the information assembled to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall.

12

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Will you give the committee just a little more detailed information upon that phase of your responsibility?

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General Miles: Providing information to General Marshall?

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Senator Lucas: That is right.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
 2 Can you elaborate just a little on what you did in the  
 3 way of giving information to General Marshall, Chief of Staff.  
 4 How often did you see him and what did you discuss when you  
 5 gave him this information during this crisis?

6 General Miles: Well, sir, all of the magic, of course,  
 7 was going directly to General Marshall through my own officers.  
 8 I saw General Marshall from time to time when he sent for me.  
 9 Largely I avoided going to see him on my own initiative unless  
 10 I had something very important because he was an extremely  
 11 busy man. I had the responsibility and did prepare certain  
 12 memoranda giving him information on various points and it is  
 13 all now before the committee.

14 Senator Lucas: When you say General Marshall was an  
 15 extremely busy man, would you care to elaborate just a little  
 16 more on that for the record and tell the committee just what  
 17 he was doing say a couple of weeks before this attack took  
 18 place? What was his chief responsibility at that time?

19 General Miles: He was going a herculean task. We were  
 20 building an Army. We weren't getting any too much support  
 21 from the American people at that time. Looking back on it,  
 22 we have had four years, nearly four years of war, when the  
 23 Congress of the United States was giving us everything we  
 24 asked for and the people were entirely behind us, but in those  
 25 pre-Pearl Harbor days that did not exist. We were fighting

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 to build an Army for the United States. General Marshall had  
3 to appear before various committees of Congress on numerous  
4 occasions. He was doing a great deal of work himself in super-  
5 vising the training, the maneuvers of the new Army, the equip-  
6 ment of the new Army, all sorts of problems were being presented  
7 to him. He was in direct communication with the higher policy-  
8 making officials of the Government, the Secretary of State,  
9 Secretary of War, of course, and the President, and the Secretary  
10 of the Navy. He was carrying an enormous burden, which later  
11 had to be very largely taken off of his shoulders by the com-  
12 plete reorganization of the War Department and the establishment  
13 of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff.

14 But at that time he was not only directing the higher  
15 policy and strategy of the United States so far as the military  
16 strategy went, but building an Army, literally building an Army,  
17 and administrating that Army at the same time.

18 Senator Lucas: In that important work that General  
19 Marshall was doing at that time it was obviously necessary  
20 that he depend upon subordinates for much vital information  
21 that went into making the final decision?

22 General Miles: It was, sir.

23 Senator Lucas: G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 were the four im-  
24 portant branches of the military government that was constantly  
25 furnishing him the information?



Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2           General Miles: Yes, sir, and he was even in more direct  
3 touch with War Plans Division.

4           Senator Lucas: You also stated, General, that this same  
5 information that you gathered from time to time from various  
6 sources was disseminated to others, including the overseas  
7 departments.

8           Now, I want to deal with the Pearl Harbor disaster as  
9 an example in your giving military estimates to the overseas  
10 departments from time to time. Let me first ask you this  
11 question: With whom were you dealing with in Hawaii at the  
12 time of the disaster and some weeks before?

13           General Miles: All the information we were sending to  
14 Hawaii went through the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department.

15           Senator Lucas: And who was the officer in charge of  
16 G-2 in Hawaii?

17           General Miles: Colonel Fielder.

18           Senator Lucas: Colonel Fielder?

19           General Miles: Yes, sir.

20           Senator Lucas: Did General Short, who was commanding  
21 the Hawaiian Department, have complete control over the  
22 activities of Colonel Fielder in charge of Military Intelligence  
23 there?

24           General Miles: Yes, sir, Colonel Fielder occupied the  
25 same relation vis-a-vis General Short I occupied vis-a-vis

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas:

1  
2 General Marshall. Colonel Fielder was an Assistant Chief of  
3 Staff to General Short.

4 Senator Lucas: What were your instructions to Colonel  
5 Fielder with respect to disseminating information you sent to  
6 him to General Short?

7 General Miles: I had no responsibility and took no action  
8 in that matter, sir. That was a matter entirely within the  
9 purview of the Commanding General or the Chief of Staff of the  
10 Hawaiian Department, how they wanted to run their own staff.

11 Senator Lucas: In other words, after you sent information  
12 to G-2 in Hawaii that was the end of your responsibility?

13 General Miles: Yes, sir. It would have been absolutely  
14 and entirely out of my waters if I had attempted to lay down  
15 any rules or regulations as to how General Short's staff should  
16 be run.

17 Senator Lucas: I understand that, but you being interested  
18 in sending out this information to G-2 in Hawaii, from the  
19 standpoint of Intelligence, did the Colonel who was in that  
20 branch of the service out there, and under the direct command  
21 of General Short, did he report to you as to the receipt of  
22 this information, or give you any evaluation upon it from his  
23 point of view?

24 General Miles: Yes; the G-2's of the overseas departments  
25 were sending to us information which they had received or

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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evaluations of information which we were furnishing them from  
time to time, sir.

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Senator Lucas: Well, then, I am correct in my understanding  
that what you sent to G-2 in Hawaii was information only?

5

6

Colonel Miles: Yes, sir.

7

8

Senator Lucas: Insofar as the Intelligence branch of  
the Government was concerned?

9

General Miles: Yes, sir; evaluated information.

10

11

Senator Lucas: It was in no sense a directive and couldn't  
be under regulations?

12

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

13

14

Senator Lucas: The only fellow who had the power to  
issue directives, as I understand it, to anybody in the Hawaiian  
Islands was General Marshall himself?

15

16

General Miles: Yes, sir; any directive that involved a  
tactical decision or implementation of war plans.

17

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19

Senator Lucas: And if no directive was sent by General  
Marshall then the evaluation of any information that you sent  
from the Intelligence branch of the service in Washington to  
Hawaii became solely a matter for General Short and his officers  
in Hawaii?

20

21

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23

General Miles: Yes, sir; for whatever use they wanted to  
make of it.

24

25

Senator Lucas: I think I asked you but I am not sure

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 that I clearly understood you: Did you get reports from  
3 Colonel Fielder -- was that his name?

4 General Miles: Fielder.

5 Senator Lucas: Colonel Fielder. Did you get reports  
6 from Colonel Fielder upon the information that you sent to him?

7 General Miles: I remember no specific instance, Senator,  
8 but I do know that it was the common custom from time to time  
9 to receive from G-2 overseas departments their "come-backs"  
10 as we used to call them on information that we were sending  
11 them.

12 Senator Lucas: Was there any regulation or order in the  
13 War Department which compelled Colonel Fielder to report back  
14 to you the receipt of this information and his evaluation of  
15 it in any way?

16 General Miles: No, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: In other words, whatever information you  
18 sent to G-2 in Hawaii as far as the command there is concerned  
19 they could completely ignore it and you would have no way  
20 of knowing whether they acted intelligently on it or not?

21 General Miles: No, sir; that depended on the regulations  
22 or policies of the Hawaiian staff, as to how they wanted to  
23 use that information.

24 Senator Lucas: Well, don't you believe that it would  
25 have been wise and judicious for the Chief of Naval Intelligence

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 were in Washington to have known whether or not they were  
3 intelligently using this information, from your viewpoint?

4 General Miles: The Chief of Naval Intelligence?

5 Senator Lucas: No, no. I am talking about the Intelligence  
6 Department in Hawaii in the command of General Short. I am  
7 merely asking you whether or not you don't believe it would  
8 have been valuable information for you to have been informed  
9 from time to time as to what they were doing with the informa-  
10 tion you were sending.

11 General Miles: It would have been valuable, and I think  
12 it was so understood. It was always valuable for Military  
13 Intelligence to receive what we called "come-backs" from  
14 our people in the field. But I want to make this point clear,  
15 that General Short's staff was General Short's staff.

16 Senator Lucas: I understand.

17 General Miles: And neither G-2 or War Plans Division, or  
18 anybody else in the General Staff in Washington had or should  
19 have had authority to require any of General Short's staff  
20 officers to do anything.

21 If it came to a situation in which G-2, we will say, in  
22 Washington, thought that G-2 in Hawaii, or Manila, was completely  
23 falling down, his only recourse was to go to the Chief of Staff  
24 and say, "Will you please inform the Commanding General in  
25 this place that we are not getting the proper response from his  
staff and he is not being properly served by his staff."

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Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: Well, now, in addition to the Intelli-  
3 gence officer in Hawaii on behalf of the Army there was also  
4 an Intelligence officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff?

5 General Miles: That is true, sir.

6  
7 Senator Lucas: Do you know what the agreement or what  
8 the regulations were with respect to these Intelligence offi-  
9 cers in Hawaii coordinating the information that they got  
10 from Washington and agreeing upon the effect of it?

11 General Miles: The policy that has always been in ef-  
12 fect so far as I know in the Hawaiian Department was a com-  
13 plete exchange of information between the G-2 of the Hawaiian  
14 Department and the Intelligence officer of the 14th Naval  
15 District, or when the fleet was present, of the fleet.

16 Senator Lucas: Well, did your G-2 officer report to  
17 you at any time that that was being done?

18 General Miles: No, sir, and he was not my G-2 officer.  
19 He was General Short's G-2 officer.

20 Senator Lucas: Yes, that is correct, that is my error,  
21 but at the same time he is the individual to whom you were  
22 sending the information and not General Short.

23 General Miles: I was sending it directly to the G-2,  
24 yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: Now, I want to ask you this, General  
Miles: In making up these military estimates that have been

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 referred to by counsel from time to time in the record here,  
3 what were the factors here in making those determinations  
4 and how did you acquire them?

5 General Miles: How did we acquire the information?

6 Senator Lucas: Yes, that is right. How did you acquire  
7 the information upon which you based these military estim-  
8 ates that you sent to overseas departments?

9 General Miles: We acquired information which eventually  
10 went into the estimate of, we will say, Japan in a great many  
11 different ways, Senator: Through our military attaches,  
12 through our observers, through the State Department and all  
13 of its ramifications, including its embassies, legations and  
14 consulates, through contact with civilian firms and the  
15 press, through contact with the Office of Naval Intelligence,  
16 F. B. I., a great many different sources of information and,  
17 as I testified, I was constantly trying to enlarge the scope  
18 of the information coming in by establishing close liaison  
19 with the other departments of the government.

20 Senator Lucas: Well, now, much discussion has centered  
21 around the intercepted messages sent out by the Japanese gov-  
22 ernment. I think you have testified that those intercepted  
23 messages were also included as one of the factors in making  
24 your determination as to what military estimates you would  
25 send to the departments. Is that correct?

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 General Miles: The estimates actually sent to the de-  
3 partments were estimates on different countries, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: On different what?

5 General Miles: On different countries.

6 Senator Lucas: Yes, sir, that is correct.

7 General Miles: Based on the running digests that we  
8 maintained on that country.

9 Senator Lucas: Well, of course, I am confining these  
10 estimates primarily to the Japanese situation.

11 General Miles: Yes, sir. Magic gave us current infor-  
12 mation rather than static information as I have used the word,  
13 which formed the basis of the estimates that we sent out.

14 I have already gone into the fact that the information  
15 that we received from Magic was not officially sent to the  
16 overseas department because of the great value of the secret  
17 that we were breaking the code.

18 Senator Lucas: I appreciate that but I was wondering  
19 what weight you gave, if any, to these decoded messages that  
20 were received from time to time in making up your military  
21 estimates on the Japanese situation, or did you give them any  
22 consideration at all?

23 General Miles: Oh, yes, sir, we gave them great con-  
24 sideration, as far as the estimates that we were submitting  
25 to the Chief of Staff and to the President and to the Secre-



29 84

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2 tary of War, and so forth.

3 Senator Lucas: Well, I understood you to say in answer  
4 to a question asked you by Senator Barkley, as I recall, the  
5 chairman, Senator Barkley, asked you this question:

6 "Was there any particular difference in the rela-  
7 tive importance given to these intercepted messages with  
8 respect to the Panama Canal, Hawaii, the Philippines,  
9 Southeast Asia or any other regions covered by these  
10 intercepted messages relative to the movement of ships?"

11 "General Miles: If I understand your question,  
12 Senator, these messages as a whole primarily indicated  
13 to us what we already knew or could very easily sus-  
14 pect, that the Japanese were doing everything they could  
15 to follow the movement of our warships, as I said yester-  
16 day, just as we were doing with regard to following the  
17 movement of Japanese warships."

18 And that was the answer that sort of led me to conclude that  
19 perhaps from your viewpoint this information was not con-  
20 sidered so important because you say that it primarily indi-  
21 cated the things that you already knew.

22 General Miles: The intercepted Magic on the movement  
23 of ships was not by the Military Intelligence Division con-  
24 sidered of primary importance, it was primarily Naval, and  
25 the messages taken as a whole indicated something that we

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 already very strongly suspected, that they were following the  
3 movement of every one of our ships.

4 Senator Lucas: Well, I believe, General Miles, that I  
5 agree with you, taking these messages as a whole, that they  
6 were dealing with the arrival and departure of warships, but  
7 I want to direct your attention, as counsel did, to the mes-  
8 sage that was sent from Tokyo to Honolulu on September the  
9 24th, 1941 and interrogate you just briefly about that mes-  
10 sage.

11 That message was transmitted by the Army on November the  
12 9th, 1941, some fifteen days after it was intercepted.

13 Mr. Mitchell: October.

14 Senator Lucas: Or October the 9th, that is right.

15 Now, as I understand this was an Army intercept and came  
16 directly to you in due course. After it was intercepted and  
17 decoded and translated it came then into your hands?

18 General Miles: It came to me, yes, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: Now, do you recall at the time of dis-  
20 cussing this particular message with anyone when you received  
21 it?

22 General Miles: No, Senator, I do not recall any speci-  
23 fic instance in which I discussed this particular message  
24 with anyone. Since this message has again been brought up I  
25 would like to point out that as we now see it it looks very

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 much like an indication of Japanese intent of some sort with  
3 regard to Pearl Harbor, but at that time also it meant, if  
4 you like, the interest of the Japanese as to whether or not  
5 and when the Fleet was going in or out of Pearl Harbor.

6 Pearl Harbor is very narrow, has very restricted waters,  
7 and the position of those great ships there, as I understand  
8 it, particularly those that are tied up to the dock, would  
9 indicate to a naval mind something of the intend of the  
10 commanding Admiral of the Fleet to take his fleet to sea  
11 within a reasonable time, or not, or it might indicate that  
12 the position of these ships was very much desired because of  
13 the Japanese intent to execute a submarine attack on these  
14 ships.

15 Senator Lucas: Well, every one of these versions had you  
16 looked at it then as you look at it now, of course, it would  
17 have given you serious concern, I take it.

18 General Miles: Well, you cannot take a message like  
19 that singly, Senator, and say that it is very serious when you  
20 know that back of this message there have been all sorts of  
21 other messages that we had intercepted regarding Japanese  
22 interest in our ships wherever they might be.

23 Senator Lucas: Well, that is true, General, and I should  
24 like to direct your attention to the first message that is  
25 in this exhibit, which was received, decoded and translated,

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 dated December the 2nd, 1940, and that message was sent from  
3 Honolulu to Tokyo and it tells about the ships that were ob-  
4 served in Pearl Harbor.

5 I don't know whether you know it or not, but from that  
6 time on, from December 2, 1940 until September the 24th, 1941,  
7 there were, as I understand from an examination of this  
8 exhibit, seventeen messages sent between December 2, 1940  
9 and September 26, 1941 from Honolulu to Tokyo and there wasn't  
10 a single message during that time that was sent from Tokyo  
11 to Honolulu.

12 Now, would that have any significance had you noticed  
13 that at the time in making up your military estimates on the  
14 Pearl Harbor situation?

15 General Miles: I do not think that that point came to  
16 my attention at that time, Senator. It was so obvious to me  
17 that Tokyo need say very little to Honolulu because Honolulu  
18 was in a position from those hills to look down on Pearl  
19 Harbor and to study the movement of every ship entering in  
20 and going out and her berth, and so forth, where she was  
21 berthed. It was obvious to us that we could not prevent the  
22 Japanese from reporting very accurately the movement of our  
23 ships in Pearl Harbor and its adjacent waters.

24 Senator Lucas: Well, that may be, General. I further  
25 want to take a little time with this. I want to talk a

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 little about this message in paragraph -- well, first, it  
3 comes from Tokyo (Toyoda) -- I don't know how to pronounce  
4 that, but as I understand it he was the Foreign Minister  
5 of Japan at the time the message was sent and that was dur-  
6 ing the reign of the Konoye cabinet.

7 Do you know whether or not Tojo was in the Konoye cabin-  
8 et?

9 General Miles: In which Konoye cabinet, sir?

10 Senator Lucas: Well, on October 16, 1941 when it fell;  
11 was Tojo connected with that cabinet in any way?

12 General Miles: I cannot tell at the moment.

13 Senator Lucas: Well, anyhow, he became the Premier im-  
14 mediately following the fall of that cabinet.

15 Now, in paragraph 2 of this message it says:

16 "With regard to warships and aircraft carriers,  
17 we would like to have you report on those at anchor."

18 Well, now, where did they anchor warships and aircraft  
19 carriers with respect to Pearl Harbor? That is, it is not  
20 in the harbor. Where do they anchor?

21 General Miles: Would you tell me what page you are  
22 reading from, Senator?

23 Senator Lucas: Well, I am reading from exhibit 2 on  
24 page 12.

25 General Miles: Yes, I have that. Oh, yes.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2 Senator Lucas: It says:

3 "With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we  
4 would like to have you report on those at anchor."

5 Then it says in parentheses:

6 "these are not so important."

7 What does he mean by that?

8 General Miles: I think just what it says, sir, those  
9 anchored in Pearl Harbor and not tied up to wharves or in  
10 the docks.

11 Senator Lucas: Why does he say that? What would be  
12 your reaction now when he says "these are not so important"?  
13 What does he mean by that?

14 General Miles: Well, obviously, I suppose -- it is not  
15 so obvious. I would suppose that the ships tied up at  
16 wharves and in the dock, he meant the dry dock, were not pre-  
17 pared for immediate sortie from the harbor or at least pre-  
18 pared to leave the harbor as soon as those which were  
19 anchored in the fairway.

20 Senator Lucas: Well, I am glad to have your impression  
21 of what that means.

22 Then we go to the message, which proceeds to say:

23 "If possible we would like to have you make mention  
24 of the fact when there are two or more vessels along  
25 side the same wharf."

2810

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2 Why would he want that information, in your opinion?

3 General Miles: I do not know, sir, of course, but I  
4 would assume that they wanted it because two or more vessels  
5 tied up at a wharf would mean that at least the inner one  
6 could not come out as quickly or as soon or did not expect to  
7 leave as soon as the outer one or the one anchored in the  
8 fairway.

9 Senator Lucas: Well, now, it seems to me, - I do not  
10 want to unduly press the question, but it seems to me that a  
11 careful reading of this one message at the time, with a fair  
12 analysis of it, would have indicated that something pretty  
13 seriously desperate was going to happen on Pearl Harbor be-  
14 cause, as I understand this message, this message does not  
15 talk about the arrival and departure of warships. They are  
16 asking and seeking to get definite information about Pearl  
17 Harbor and the ships that are in there.

18 General Miles: Well, there was a great fleet in that  
19 harbor and I think it was perfectly natural that the Japanese  
20 wanted to know the condition of that fleet as to its ability  
21 to leave that harbor or its intent to leave that harbor with-  
22 in a reasonable time. I have forgotten how long it took the  
23 fleet to actually sortie from the harbor, but it was some  
24 considerable time.

25 Senator Lucas: Do the words "Strictly Secret" on

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2 that telegram indicate any unusual significance?

3 General Miles: I do not know what import that phrase  
4 had, sir. All of these, of course, were --

5 Senator Lucas: Well, on all the telegrams that were  
6 sent from Honolulu to Tokyo the words "Strictly Secret" or  
7 "Secret" does not appear and I wondered if that had any sig-  
8 nificance at all in view of all of the telegrams going from  
9 Honolulu to Tokyo avoiding the use of the words. Apparently  
10 it does not, in your opinion.

11 The Chairman: Well, twelve o'clock having arrived the  
12 committee will suspend until two o'clock.

13 (Whereupon, at 12 o'clock Noon, a recess was taken  
14 until 2:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)  
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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

3

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

4

Senator Lucas, you may resume your questioning of General Miles.

5

6

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES -- (Resumed)

7

Senator Lucas: General Miles, when we adjourned at noon we were discussing the message sent by the Tokyo Government to Honolulu on September 24 of 1941.

8

9

There is another question or two I desire to interrogate you upon with respect to that message.

10

11

You advised me this morning that this message was decoded and analyzed by the Army. I want to know what other members of your force in the Intelligence branch of the Government had an opportunity to examine and scrutinize that message or any others that came to your attention.

12

13

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General Miles: That message, like all other messages of magic, was seen by Colonel Bratton and his small group of officers who were handling the Japanese intercepts. Aside from those few officers in the Far Eastern section of the Military Intelligence Division, no one except myself in the Division saw those messages.

18

19

20

21

22

23

Senator Lucas: Did Colonel Bratton see this particular message, the message that we are now discussing?

24

25

General Miles: Did he see it?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1

Senator Lucas: Yes.

2

General Miles: I feel sure that he saw it, yes, sir.

3

Senator Lucas: Do you remember having any discussion with  
him about it?

4

General Miles: No, sir, I do not.

5

Senator Lucas: Now, I direct your attention to page 13  
of Exhibit 2, which is the reply message from Honolulu to  
Tokyo and also it seems as though they sent the same thing to  
Washington, D. C. Again they refer to the message as "strictly  
secret". Do you recall ever seeing that message in view of  
the fact that it was translated by the Navy?

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General Miles: In all probability I saw that message.  
Senator, it made no difference whether the Navy translated it  
or the Army translated it so far as my seeing the particular  
message is concerned. If it was of importance I saw it.

Senator Lucas: In other words, you had a liaison between  
the Navy Intelligence and the Army Intelligence whereby all  
of these messages that were intercepted, decoded and trans-  
lated were analyzed and examined by both branches?

General Miles: It was more than that, sir. The actual  
translation, of course, including the decrypting and decoding  
was a joint activity of the Signal Corps and Naval Communications.

Senator Lucas: Thank you, sir.

Will you give to the committee those who were assigned to

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 that joint mission of analyzing and taking care of these  
3 messages?

4 General Miles: The analyses of the messages were made  
5 by the Intelligence Service of the Army and Navy.

6 Senator Lucas: Whom did that include? What I am trying  
7 to find out is the different people in the Army and the Navy  
8 that actually saw these messages which started coming from  
9 Tokyo on September 24, 1941.

10 General Miles: Within the Military Intelligence Depart-  
11 ment, as I have already testified, Senator, was Colonel Bratton  
12 and one or two of his subordinates who immediately handled  
13 messages, and myself. That was all in the Military Intelligence  
14 Division. Who saw them in the SIS of the Signal Corps I am  
15 not prepared to state but you will have witnesses who can  
16 testify on that.

17 Senator Lucas: I am not going into that. You are not  
18 prepared to state who saw these messages or who analyzed them  
19 in the Navy Intelligence, I take it?

20 General Miles: No, sir, I am not prepared to state that,  
21 in view of the other witnesses who you will have.

22 Senator Lucas: On that same page of Exhibit 2 there is  
23 another message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 15,  
24 1944, Number 111, which reads as follows:

25 "As relations between Japan and the United States

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

Do you understand that that message was referring to the message sent from Tokyo to Honolulu on September 24?

General Miles: I don't see any indication that it was directly -- that it directly referred to the message of September 24, Senator.

Senator Lucas: All right.

This message comes from Tojo, who was at that time at the head of the Military Government in Japan, was he not?

General Miles: On the 15th of November?

Senator Lucas: That is right.

General Miles: This is "Togo". Not "Tojo".

Senator Lucas: "Togo". Who was Togo?

General Miles: I think he was Foreign Minister but I am not positive.

Senator Lucas: All right.

Now, do you recall having any discussion with any of the members of your staff with respect to that message or the message that I just previously read from Honolulu to Washington telling about the mooring of ships in the vicinity of Ford Island, the Navy dock in the Navy Yard, and other matters

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

(2)

1  
2 contained?

3 General Miles: I remember no specific instances, Senator,  
4 but I would like to point out that the message dividing Pearl  
5 Harbor into districts for espionage reports, like other messages  
6 concerning the Fleet based on Pearl Harbor, were primarily  
7 within the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence  
8 to evaluate. I knew that ONI regarded them as being a part of  
9 the Japanese espionage net covering all movements of U.S.  
10 warships and vessels everywhere they appeared. I am not  
11 competent to testify as to what ONI should have done or should  
12 not have done about messages directly concerning the Fleet.

13 I can point out in the same book of messages items that  
14 might well indicate Japanese intentions to attack Panama and/or  
15 the Philippines. But what does all this come down to? We  
16 had known for many years that all three of those outposts  
17 would probably be subject to an attack in a Japanese war.  
18 That is why we had our forces on them and why the Chief of  
19 Staff warned them when he considered the time had arrived  
20 that hostile Japanese action was possible at any moment.

21 Senator Lucas: Will you point out to me one message  
22 that went from Tokyo to Panama that indicates that they are  
23 going to attack the Panama Canal, that is now found in Exhibit 2?

24 General Miles: On page 34 is a message in which is ex-  
25 hibited Japanese interests in maps and charts of the Panama

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Canal Zone.

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Senator Lucas: Page 34 of Exhibit 2?

4

General Miles: Of this exhibit which we have before us.

5

Senator Lucas: My exhibit reads "From Buenos Aires to

6

Panama; Buenos Aires to Tokyo." Is that the one?

7

General Miles: From Buenos Aires to Panama.

8

Senator Lucas: Yes.

9

General Miles: It was regarding a series of maps and

10

charts which we were very much interested in getting ahold of.

11

It was being passed around among the Japanese agencies.

12

Senator Lucas: Of course, I am talking about messages

13

that came from Tokyo to Panama; not from Panama to Tokyo. And

14

that is because of the importance I attach to the first message

15

that came from Tokyo to Hawaii on September 24, 1941.

16

General Miles: I do not find, Senator, any specific

17

message from Tokyo to Panama in this respect, but the messages

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from Panama to Tokyo were along intelligence lines which might

19

very well have indicated the interest of Japan in formulating

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plans for an attack on the Panama Canal.

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follows

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2:15 PM

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1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Well, as the head of G-2 did it make any  
3 difference from the standpoint of the importance of a message  
4 whether it came from the consul in Hawaii to Tokyo or the  
5 consul in Panama to Tokyo, or whether the message came from  
6 the War Minister in Tokyo to Panama or from the War Minister  
7 in Tokyo to Hawaii?

8 General Miles: I think sir, that it was more the sub-  
9 stance of the message which was important rather than the  
10 sender. A message from Tokyo to one of the Japanese spy  
11 agencies, if we may call them such, if it indicated the  
12 line of intelligence they wanted followed was, of course,  
13 of great significance but also the messages going the other  
14 way indicating what line of intelligence was being sent and  
15 apparently received with approval by Tokyo was also signifi-  
16 cant.

17 Senator Lucas: I agree with you that both messages were  
18 significant but what I am trying to ascertain is what the In-  
19 telligence branch of the military service considered more  
20 significant, whether a message coming from the War Minister  
21 of Japan to the consul, or one from foreign countries to  
22 Japan, or whether it makes any difference or not?

23 General Miles: I cannot say that it made any difference  
24 per se who sent that message. It was the substance of the  
25 message more than the sender.

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: In other words, then, your conclusion  
3 is that a message going from Honolulu to Tokyo, sent by  
4 some spy or the Jap consul or somebody interested in the  
5 Japanese government, took on no more significance from the  
6 standpoint of military intelligence than a message coming  
7 direct from the Foreign Minister of Japan to Hawaii or Panama  
8 or some other point?

9 General Miles: No, sir. Both indicated an interest of  
10 the Japanese in the particular line of intelligence which  
11 the message contained or directed.

12 Senator Lucas: Well, as I looked over these records,  
13 General Miles, I found that from August 2, 1941 to November  
14 22, 1941 there were twenty-four messages going from Panama  
15 to Tokyo and there was only one message coming from Tokyo  
16 to Panama and that was on August 2, 1941, which is the first  
17 message translated in exhibit 2; and as I examined these  
18 messages I hoped that I might even get the answer from you  
19 as to the real significance of messages going from foreign  
20 governments to the home government, or whether there was  
21 any significance, any different significance in the messages  
22 coming from the home government to the foreign government  
23 where consuls or their agents were located and I hope that  
24 I am not wrong in my assumption that you say that there is  
25 very little difference.



1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 General Miles: There is very little difference per se  
3 in the sender of the message. The substance of the message  
4 in both cases told us or indicated to us what the Japanese  
5 were interested in finding out about that particular place.

6 Senator Lucas: And that is your conclusion notwithstanding  
7 the fact that every indication from September on was to  
8 the effect strained relations with Japan were getting worse  
9 and worse all the time?

10 General Miles: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Lucas: Well, I direct your attention to another  
12 one of these messages found on page 15 of exhibit 2 and it is  
13 dated November the 20th, 1941, "Strictly Secret". It says:

14 "Please investigate comprehensively the fleet --  
15 bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reser-  
16 vation."

17 Then the last one from Tokyo to Honolulu, November 29,  
18 1941 and which does not have the secrecy attached to it. It  
19 seems to me there is a reason for it because they ask for no  
20 particular information other than this:

21 "We have been receiving reports from you on ship  
22 movements, but in future will you also report even when  
23 there are no movements."

24 that being transmitted by the Navy.

25 Now, with respect to the Philippines you stated that

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2 there were messages that you could pick out from the Philip-  
3 pines that were comparable to the one which I read, discous-  
4 sing and analyzing the blueprint for the bombing of Pearl  
5 Harbor. I would like to have you find that for me if you  
6 could.

7 General Miles: You wish one, sir, from Tokyo to Manila?

8 Senator Lucas: That is right, Tokyo to Manila.

9 General Miles: On page 71 from Tokyo to Manila, October  
10 4, 1941, from Tokyo (Toyoda); I believe he was a member of  
11 the cabinet at the time. (Reading):

12 "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new de-  
13 fense works along the east, west and southern coasts of  
14 the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress,  
15 strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else  
16 which may seem of interest."

17 That was the first one I find; there may be others.

18 Senator Lucas: And you think that message is just as  
19 significant as the one that was sent to Hawaii or Honolulu  
20 on September the 24th?

21 General Miles: I cannot say that it has exactly the  
22 same significance, no, Senator. What I am saying is that  
23 there are messages in here like the one I have just read, in-  
24 dicated strong Japanese interest in obtaining information  
25 which might help them in an attack on the Philippines as well

Questions by Sen. Lucas

Witness Miles:

1  
2 as on the fleet. The fleet, of course, was primarily a mat-  
3 ter of responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence  
4 and I hesitate very much to give an estimate or an evaluation  
5 of a purely naval message.

6 Senator Lucas: Well, you want the committee to under-  
7 stand that it is the responsibility, then, of the Naval  
8 Intelligence Service to evaluate these messages which went  
9 directly to Hawaii and the Philippines involving what seems  
10 to us now from what we know as a possible attack upon either  
11 Pearl Harbor or the Philippines?

12 General Miles: Those messages which had to do primari-  
13 ly with the United States Fleet then based in Pearl Harbor  
14 or near Pearl Harbor, yes, sir, that was primarily the re-  
15 sponsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence to put a  
16 naval evaluation on those messages.

17 To continue further, if you like, with messages from  
18 Tokyo to Manila, there is another one on page 82 in which it  
19 is stated: (Reading)

20 "The Naval General Staff has requested that inves-  
21 tigation be made on the following items. Please ar-  
22 range as you think best for the same:

23 "These items in regard to each port of call:

24 "(1) Conditions at air ports on land.

25 "(2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 "(3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land  
3 forces.

4 "(4) State of progress being made on all equip-  
5 ment and establishments."

6 Senator Lucas: Well, now, was that a factor in the con-  
7 sideration of the evaluations that you made for Military  
8 Intelligence in connection with the overseas possessions?

9 General Miles: I did not quite understand you, sir.

10 Senator Lucas: I say you just now read the message from  
11 Tokyo to Manila dated November the 5th, 1941. When you  
12 transmitted this military intelligence to overseas possessions  
13 did you take that into consideration?

14 General Miles: When we were estimating on the possibility  
15 or probability of Japanese lines of advance we did take this  
16 message and other messages into consideration. We did not  
17 transmit any Magic to the overseas departments.

18 Senator Lucas: No, I understand you did not transmit  
19 any Magic to overseas possessions. What I am asking you is  
20 whether or not when you were notifying the overseas posses-  
21 sions of the possibility of an attack on the Philippines by  
22 the Japs you took into consideration this particular message?

23 General Miles: Yes, sir. The Chief of Staff undoubtedly  
24 took all of these Magic messages into consideration as I cer-  
25 tainly did on the 27th of November when the Chief of Staff

1 Witness Miles:

2 decided that the time had arrived to warn the overseas depart-  
3 ments.

4 Senator Lucas: Well, that brings me up to this state-  
5 ment, General: It is difficult for me to understand how you  
6 took this into consideration with respect to an attack on the  
7 Philippines and did not take into consideration the message  
8 of September the 24th and the following messages into real  
9 serious consideration with respect to the attack upon Pearl  
10 Harbor, because to me the messages with respect to Pearl Har-  
11 bor were more clear in what they were attempting to do than  
12 the latter. That is my opinion and my own conclusion.

13 General Miles: Well, Senator, exactly the same warning  
14 message was sent by the Chief of Staff on November the 27th  
15 to all three of the overseas departments and the West Coast.  
16 They all had the same warning and the warning was based on  
17 the fact that we had believed for many years that they would  
18 be all subject to attack in the event of a Japanese-American  
19 war. That was why they were there and the only reason in  
20 the case of Hawaii, at least, why they were there.

21 Senator Lucas: I want to direct your attention to the  
22 testimony that you gave Friday on page 2244 -- no, I will  
23 strike that because I went over that this morning. That was  
24 the question that Senator Barkley asked you and which you  
25 answered and I think I have included that in the previous tes-

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

timony.

But on the following page, 2245, Senator Barkley asked this question:

"And the Hawaiian Islands. Somebody in each of these regions was reporting to Tokyo, or somebody who reported to Tokyo the movement of these ships over the various periods running from 1940, some period in 1940 up to and approaching the 7th of December 1941 and the question I would like to ask is whether the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department treated all of these intercepts, so far as you know, in the same way and with the same degree of importance, or whether they singled out this information from either the Panama Canal or from Hawaii or the Philippines or Southeast Asia for any special treatment in regard to precautionary measures which might be taken in any of these different regions?"

And your answer is:

"Well, they were primarily messages which concerned the Naval Intelligence rather than the Military. Obviously, Senator, we were more interested in the fact that the Japanese were following our ships in our own waters, Panama, Hawaii and the Philippines, than we were the Dutch East Indies, or any other places headed here 'miscellaneous.'"

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2 And, as I understand it, your answer there, like the  
3 previous answers to my questions on all of these matters, was  
4 it was your understanding that these messages primarily con-  
5 cerned the Naval Intelligence rather than the Military In-  
6 telligence for a correct analyzation of what might or might  
7 not happen as a result of the information you were getting.

8 General Miles: Senator, the Chairman's question con-  
9 cerned the movement of ships and my answer is yes, sir, for  
10 all these messages concerning the movement of ships and par-  
11 ticularly those which concerned directly the United States  
12 Fleet based in Pearl Harbor it was primarily the responsibil-  
13 ity of Naval Intelligence to analyze and evaluate such mes-  
14 sages.

15 Senator Lucas: Well, of course, there you just talk  
16 about the movement of ships but we have been talking all the  
17 way along about all of these intercepted messages regardless  
18 of whether or not they had anything to do with the movement  
19 of ships.

20 Your next statement below there on that same page:

21 (Reading)

22 "Taking the messages as a whole, I do not think  
23 they indicated any particular place in which you could  
24 say the Japanese will attack there, or the most prob-  
25 able, that they will attack there, solely based on those

38 10

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2 message s."

3 Of course, that includes all of the messages that you  
4 received, I assume, upon which you based that statement.

5 General Miles: The latter reply does, sir, but the  
6 first reply at the top of that page was a direct reply to  
7 the Chairman's question concerning the movement of ships.

8 (Reading)

9 "Somebody in each of these regions was reporting  
10 to Tokyo, or somebody who reported to Tokyo the move-  
11 ment of these ships over the various periods running  
12 from 1940, some period in 1940 to and approaching the  
13 7th of December 1941 and the question I would like to  
14 ask" -- all in one sentence -- "is whether the Military  
15 Intelligence Division of the War Department treated all  
16 of these intercepts, so far as you know, in the same  
17 way."

18 That clearly referred to the intercepts on the movement  
19 of ships. I am very sorry if I misunderstood the Chairman  
20 in making my answer.

21 Senator Lucas: I may have misunderstood the question  
22 and answer and the General has explained.

23 Let me direct your attention now to page 2220 of the  
24 record where Mr. Gesell asked you this question -- he was  
25 discussing there the question of the burning of the codes.



Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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There was a message sent out by Admiral Stark which states as follows -- this was sent out on December the 6th, I think it is.

Mr. Gesell: December 3rd.

Senator Lucas: December 3rd?

General Miles: December 3rd.

Senator Lucas: (Reading):

"BELIEVE LOCAL CONSUL HAS DESTROYED ALL BUT ONE SYSTEM ALTHOUGH PRESUMABLY NOT INCLUDED YOUR EIGHTEEN DOUBLE-FIVE OF THIRD."

Mr. Gesell continuing says:

"My question, General Miles, is whether you knew at the time that the Navy was transmitting messages to their representatives in Hawaii advising Hawaii of the intercepted Japanese messages indicating code destruction?"

"General Miles: I did, sir.

"Mr. Gesell: Were you consulted in connection with that?"

"General Miles: I believe that I was. I knew that"---

General Miles: Senator, would you tell me the page again?

Senator Lucas: I am sorry. It is 2220.

General Miles: 2220, all right.

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Beginning down past the middle of the  
3 page.

4 General Miles: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Lucas: (Reading)

6 "General Miles: I believe that I was. I know that  
7 I knew that those messages were going out.

8 "Mr. Gesell: Did you know that a message had been  
9 received from Hawaii stating that they had knowledge  
10 there that the local consul was destroying his code?

11 "General Miles: I believe that I did, sir.

12 "Mr. Gesell: The Army did not send any messages  
13 to General Short in respect of code destruction, did it?

14 "General Miles: No, sir.

15 "Mr. Gesell: What is the explanation of that?

16 "General Miles: The main reason was that the code  
17 experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was par-  
18 ticularly strong on the point that their code was much  
19 more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of  
20 great importance in security that a message be sent in  
21 only one code and not two and we had every reason to  
22 believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to  
23 Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army au-  
24 thorities there."

25 Do you know, General Miles, whether or not that message

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 was transmitted from the naval authorities to the Army au-  
3 thorities?

4 General Miles: I know now, sir and have testified to  
5 it, bringing in the affidavit of the officer in the G-2  
6 office in Hawaii who saw those messages regarding the burn-  
7 ing of the code.

8 Senator Lucas: And it was transmitted then from the  
9 Navy to the Army?

10 General Miles: It was transmitted; they were trans-  
11 mitted.

12 Senator Lucas: According to that affidavit.

13 General Miles: According to that affidavit, yes.

14 Senator Lucas: You received no report on it at the  
15 time from anyone in Hawaii?

16 General Miles: I did not receive any report at the  
17 time.

18 Senator Lucas: Was there any arrangement or any agree-  
19 ment between the Navy and the Army at that time which would  
20 definitely fix that question as to when a message so import-  
21 ant as this was transmitted by the Navy that it would be  
22 ultimately transmitted on to the Army?

23 General Miles: Yes, sir, there was a long standing  
24 agreement or policy of complete interchange of information  
25 between the Army and Navy, both in Hawaii and other places

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

where we operated together.

I have testified, Senator, that not only was that so, but I knew the strong desire of the Chief of Staff for his subordinates of all ranks to keep in close contact with the Navy wherever we were operating together and I had received a letter from the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department stating specifically that his liaison with the Navy as well as with FBI was complete.

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 2:35 PM

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2        Senator Lucas: Of course I am only taking your statement,  
3 which was made in answer to an inquiry of Mr. Gesell, that  
4 you had every reason to believe that the message would be  
5 promptly transmitted.

6        It occurred to me to ask why, when war was hanging in  
7 the balance, you relied upon the assumption at that particular  
8 time that an important message of this kind was to be trans-  
9 mitted by the Navy rather than the Army.

10        General Miles: Well, sir, the question of relying on  
11 an assumption, based, as I say, on their good knowledge of  
12 what had been laid down as a policy, and the letter from the  
13 responsible G-2 saying he had complete liaison, as against  
14 the risking of this secret of using the two codes, we were  
15 not ready to risk the secret if we could possibly avoid it.

16        Senator Lucas: Of course you did use two codes from  
17 Hawaii.

18        General Miles: Never in sending the same message.

19        Senator Lucas: What I am trying to determine in my own  
20 mind through these questions, General Miles, is as to the  
21 importance that you attached to obtaining a reply from General  
22 Short in connection with the burning of the codes, and what  
23 you did to follow it up, or whether you just trusted that the  
24 Navy would use its communication system, would do it for you?

25        General Miles: We trusted the Navy and the Army. Liaison

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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is a two-way proposition, Senator.

Senator Lucas: Yes, but the one-way proposition now is with the Navy, because that is the code which you fellows believed was the most secret.

General Miles: But it was equally the responsibility of the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see that we maintain a close liaison, that we should get such important information as the Navy collected, as it was the Navy's responsibility to give it to the Army.

Furthermore, let me say Hawaii had already been warned many days previous of the impending war by the Chief of Staff, and the burning of the codes was simply a strengthening of the information which the Chief of Staff, over his own signature, had given to Hawaii, that there might be a Japanese attack at any time.

Senator Lucas: I certainly agree with you that the burning of the code would seem to any ordinary reasonably prudent man, whether he was in Washington or whether he was in Hawaii, as being about the last act before serious difficulties between the two nations.

I am not trying to defend anyone and I am not trying to offend anyone here, I am trying to ascertain what the facts really were with respect to knowledge and the importance attached to the burning of the code, and what you did with

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 respect to it, or what the Navy did, that is my chief point,  
3 General Miles.

4 I wanted to direct your attention again to this page 2221  
5 where Mr. Gesell asked you another question:

6 "Did you give any instructions or directions to the  
7 Navy that action should be taken to see that these  
8 messages were made available to the Army authorities at  
9 Pearl Harbor?

10 "General Miles: Any instructions to the Navy?

11 "Mr. Gesell: To the Navy here that they should so  
12 transmit the messages that the Army would be certain to  
13 receive them.

14 "General Miles: No, sir, that was not considered  
15 necessary."

16 I think you have already probably answered that question  
17 with the answer to my previous question that you did not con-  
18 sider it necessary.

19 Now that brings me to this question that I want to ask  
20 you. It may not be quite within the realm of this investi-  
21 gation, but in view of the fact that here was an important  
22 message that was to be sent by the Military Intelligence of  
23 the Army to the Military Intelligence of the Army in Hawaii,  
24 you depended primarily and solely upon another branch of the  
25 service to transmit that information for you at a critical

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 period here in the history of our country. I am wondering  
3 whether or not you would care to make any statement as to what  
4 you think about having both of those branches, the Army and  
5 Navy Intelligence, under one command and one service, so that  
6 there could not be any question about you wondering whether  
7 or not the Navy, or assuming the Navy was going to transfer  
8 an important message or this kind?

9 General Miles: Senator, I believe thoroughly, and have  
10 believed for many years, in the unification of the services.  
11 I think that is one point that you have just brought out as  
12 an argument for unification.

13 Senator Lucas: Of course I do not know what the Navy  
14 would say about that, but I wanted to get your opinion upon  
15 it.

16 Now there is one other question. General Miles, do you  
17 know General Grunert, General Russell and General Frank who  
18 made the investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster in behalf  
19 of the Army?

20 General Miles: I do, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: They make this statement in their report  
22 concerning the Military Intelligence Division:

23 "The advantages accruing from this situation could  
24 have been calamitous. The Japanese Armed Forces knew  
25 everything about us. We knew little about them. This



Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 was a problem of all out intelligence agencies. This  
3 should not come to pass again. Our intelligence service  
4 must be brought in line with the part which we are to  
5 play in world affairs."

6 Do you agree with that statement?

7 General Miles: I do not, sir. I think the documents  
8 before this committee show clearly we knew a great deal about  
9 the Japanese Military Forces. We certainly knew a great deal  
10 about the Japanese Army, the Japanese Air Forces, and the  
11 Navy knew a great deal about the Japanese Naval Forces.

12 Senator Lucas: I only have before me the report. I  
13 never examined the testimony that was taken before the committee.

14 Do you know what they based that conclusion upon?

15 General Miles: I do not, sir. They did not ask me  
16 any questions which would have, to my mind, substantiated  
17 such a statement.

18 Senator Lucas: Are these gentlemen who were selected to  
19 make this investigation retired officers or are they still  
20 active?

21 General Miles: They were all active at the time.  
22 General Brunert is now retired. I do not know whether General  
23 Russell and General Frank have been retired or not.

24 Senator Lucas: They further said:

25 "We must know as much about other major world

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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powers as they know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligence planning by those charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our security. Our Intelligence Service should be second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M.I.D. It is a national problem.

"In the past our Intelligence Service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct all of these."

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Book follows

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Now, in view of the fact that they were talking about  
3 you primarily as head of the Military Intelligence at that  
4 time, at the time of this disaster, I wonder if you would  
5 care to elaborate upon any statement that they made, or  
6 to discuss it?

7 General Miles: To the extent that the Japanese knew  
8 more about us than we knew about them, that is true, sir.  
9 The Army and Navy had no money for espionage service. I  
10 do not think that the Congress of the United States, I do  
11 not think that the people of the United States would have  
12 been willing to appropriate the money through years and  
13 years which would have been necessary to build up an espion-  
14 age service against the Japanese comparable to what we sus-  
15 pected and knew, and now know they had against us.

16 We have simply never gone into that. I think that to that  
17 extent the observations of the Grunert Board are correct.

18 Senator Lucas; Well, it is true that all major powers  
19 of the world, except this country, have had for a long time  
20 past permanent world-wide intelligence services, have they  
21 not?

22 General Miles: And we had permanent world-wide intelli-  
23 gence services, but greatly limited in personnel and expendi-  
24 ture, and we kept above board also. We were not spying.

25 Senator Lucas: Did we have any foreign secret intelligence

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 service previous to the war?

3 General Miles: . No, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: Do you believe, from what you know as  
5 an expert in military intelligence, that we should know, or  
6 that we should have that type and kind of service throughout  
7 the world, as other nations do?

8 General Miles: It depends on what you want, Senator.

9 Senator Lucas: I want to protect my America.

10 General Miles: So do I, sir.

11 Senator Lucas: National defense is all I am interested  
12 in in this country. I am asking that question for information  
13 of a man who is an expert upon this question.

14 General Miles: My answer then is decidedly "yes."  
15 I consider a secret service, such as we eventually evolved  
16 in this war after we got into it, is a necessity for national  
17 defense at all times.

18 Senator Lucas: Do you believe that if such a system  
19 was provided for by the Congress of the United States, it  
20 should be linked with the military and naval intelligence,  
21 or should it be set out as an independent agency of its own?

22 General Miles: It must be linked with military and  
23 naval intelligence, sir, for the simple reason that only the  
24 military and naval intelligence can tell the agents of the  
25 people as to why type of information is really desired.