

Witness Stark.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Will you refer to your letter of August 28?

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Admiral Stark: 1940 or 1941?

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Senator Ferguson: 1941.

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Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, I have it.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: You referred in that letter, on the
3 second page of that letter, Admiral, down, "One again thanks
4 for the human side of the news", and this is what I want to
5 call your attention to:

6 "With regard to the general situation in the Pacific
7 about all I can say is that the Japs seem to have arrived at
8 another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate
9 to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them
10 but just what they are going to do I don't know."

11 What messages were you referring to to Kimmel?

12 Admiral Stark: I think --

13 Senator Ferguson: You said you could only intimate to
14 him. What were those messages?

15 Admiral Stark: I think the message to which I undoubtedly
16 referred there was the message which had been sent by the
17 State Department, as I recall, on 17 August, and to which
18 you have made reference previously.

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

20 Admiral Stark: This letter --

21 Senator Ferguson: Refers to that message?

22 Admiral Stark: I think so, yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Now, if the movement on the Kra
24 was a rejection of the note of the 17th of August and also
25 a rejection of the note of the 26th, wasn't the --part

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 message only a confirmation of that rejection?

3 Admiral Stark: I thought the 14-part message first
4 set up a confirmation of what they had said before and put
5 it all together and finally stated what, as I testified, we
6 had said in substance some days earlier, namely, that nego-
7 tiations were broken off.

8 Senator Ferguson: Was there anything said at the Atlantic
9 Conference about babying them along for three months, or
10 anything to that effect?

11 Admiral Stark: I never heard of it until it came up in
12 recent months.

13 Senator Ferguson: Do you remember preparing an instrument
14 with the Chief of Staff which provided a line beyond which
15 the Japs were not allowed to go?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell me whether you conferred
18 with the President on that before you drew it up?

19 Admiral Stark: I do not recall that we did. He got it,
20 of course, after we had drawn it up.

21 Senator Ferguson: Was it ever acted upon?

22 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Was it turned down by the President?

24 Admiral Stark: I do not recall any action with regard
25 to it. He had the information, I know, and I feel that he was

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 endeavoring to and was backing Mr. Hull in his efforts to
3 maintain peace, but as to giving us any clear indication,
4 or any indication of what he would do if they went beyond
5 this line, I have no recollection of his ever having given
6 us any intimation on that.

7 Senator Ferguson: On the 24th of November Senator Pepper
8 in a speech at Boston said that a line had been marked in
9 the Pacific and if the Japs crossed that line the United States
10 Navy would shoot without a declaration of war. Had you ever
11 heard of that before?

12 Admiral Stark: You mean before right now?

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

14 Admiral Stark: I may have. I would not have given it
15 any weight at the time.

16 Senator Ferguson: Here is your memorandum of the 17th --
17 no, of the 5th, where you put down a line, but you say it
18 has never been agreed to. Here is Senator Pepper on the 24th,
19 the same month, saying that a line had been marked in the
20 Pacific and that if the Japs crossed that line the United
21 States Navy, and that is your department, would shoot without
22 a declaration of war.

23 Was that a fact?

24 Admiral Stark: If the Senator if available may I suggest
25 you ask him.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: No, I am asking you. As far as
3 you knew was it a fact?

4 Admiral Stark: Not so far as I knew, no, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: You knew of no such line, that if
6 they crossed that your Navy was going to shoot?

7 Admiral Stark: We had no commitment or any intimation
8 that we would shoot until we were attacked, in which case we
9 would have done it without any orders from anybody, depending
10 on the scale.

11 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I would like to know how
12 far we are going into these irresponsible statements that
13 United States Senators previous to Pearl Harbor made. If we
14 get into that we will never get through.

15 Senator Ferguson: I am through with the statement. I
16 merely wanted to find out whether that was a fact, insofar
17 as the Admiral knew, and he was in charge of our Navy, and
18 he said it was not a fact.

19 And I take it for granted, Admiral, that you are the
20 man that would have known?

21 Admiral Stark: I think so.

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes. You say that our Fleet was on
23 a war basis. You still say that is a fact?

24 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: And that was done without consultation,

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 necessarily, with the President, merely with his assistant?

3 Admiral Stark: The President knew that I was going to
4 do that, I was getting everything ready as fast as possible,
5 had started in on that in 1939.

6
7 Senator Ferguson: I don't think that this particular
8 question has been asked you, Admiral.

9 What was the cause of the sending of the message of the
10 24th? What was in your mind when that message was sent, what
11 caused you to send a message?

12 Admiral Stark: Well, in general of course it was the
13 developing seriousness of the situation. We had at that
14 time the first deadline message. We had the Jap note also
15 as background, of September 20 --

16 Mr. Mitchell: November 20.

17 Admiral Stark: November 20. We were getting nowhere
18 and the situation, the gravity of the situation was just
19 generally increasing, and my own feeling was, after talking
20 with Mr. Hull, where I got most of my background, that the
21 chances of favorable conclusions, or favorable outcome of
22 our negotiations, were growing less and less, if they hadn't
23 already practically disappeared. That background, unquestionably,
24 was influenced by conversations with Mr. Hull.

25 Senator Ferguson: At the time you got it you even had
the change of the date, put over to the 29th, where they

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 stressed the "repeat 29th"?

3 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: In your conference at the White
5 House on the 25th, which was the day following, with the
6 President, Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox and General Marshall,
7 was the matter contained in these intercepts that you have
8 been given, about the deadline, discussed?

9 Admiral Stark: As I said before, Senator Ferguson, I
10 don't recall just what we discussed at that time. I think
11 everyone present had seen those messages, knew about them,
12 and we may have discussed them, but certainly it was common
13 knowledge to us at the time.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, couldn't that have placed the
15 date the President thought might, there was some talk about
16 being an attack by the next Monday, because that would be
17 the very date --

18 Admiral Stark: Monday would not have been the 29th,
19 would it?

20 Senator Ferguson: Monday was the 30th.

21 Admiral Stark: The 30th.

22 Senator Ferguson: Which was our 29th.

23 Admiral Stark: I don't know just why he made that
24 statement as regards Monday. It may have been a considered
25 statement or it may have just been one of those statements

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 which we all make at times, "Well, I wouldn't be surprised
3 if they attacked by next Monday." I don't know.

4 Senator Ferguson: Was this discussed, that Japan was
5 a nation that would probably attack before a declaration of war?

6 Admiral Stark: We all knew that, that was common
7 knowledge.

8 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that the President left
9 for Warm Springs on the night before he anticipated that
10 there would be an attack?

11 Admiral Stark: Yes.

12 Senator Ferguson: He went on the 29th.

13 Admiral Stark: Yes. I knew it.

14 Senator Ferguson: And the conversation was about the
15 attack coming on the 30th. How do you account for that,
16 was there any conversation is what I have in mind.

17 Admiral Stark: His plan was to go. He did go. He
18 knew that he could be called back if necessary. And, inci-
19 dentally, Mr. Hull asked me about calling him back and I said
20 I hated to do it but I advised that he come back before his
21 vacation was over. He needed the rest. He had planned it.
22 Wherever he would have been we would have been in constant
23 touch with him by telephone, if necessary, and a trip by
24 plane would have brought him back to Washington very quickly.

25 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Stark, as I get the picture

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 from what you have told us the President was greatly interested
3 in all these moves, all these intercepted messages, they
4 were being delivered to him daily, or hourly, as the case
5 might be, and it was anticipated that the deadline would be
6 on the 30th, and notwithstanding that on the afternoon of the
7 29th the President went to Warm Springs?

8 Admiral Stark: He did.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you have any conversation
10 with him about his messages, that would come through your
11 Navy, these intercepted codes, and so forth, while he was
12 at Warm Springs?

13 Admiral Stark: I do not recall having any conversation
14 with him while at Warm Springs.

15 Senator Ferguson: To whom --

16 Admiral Stark: While he was at Warm Springs.

17 Senator Ferguson: To whom were the messages delivered
18 while the President was at Warm Springs?

19 Admiral Stark: I don't recall that detail.

20 Senator Ferguson: That is a little more than a detail,
21 isn't it?

22 Admiral Stark: Well, it is a detail; arrangements were
23 made to get the President's mail to him by pouch, usually
24 flown down, locked pouch, or by courier, and they may very
25 well have been sent that way, or to his Naval Aide, I don't

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 recall it. I don't recall having taken the matter up.

3 Arrangements for his mail were generally made by his Aide.

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, at least, you don't recall any
5 conversation about that?

6 Admiral Stark: No, I do not, sir.

(3) 7 Senator Ferguson: There wasn't any doubt in your mind
8 that the President knew about the deadline being set on the
9 29th?

10 Admiral Stark: None.

11 Senator Ferguson: None whatever?

12 Admiral Stark: None whatever. When I say "none whatever",
13 those messages were being delivered regularly to the White
14 House and I assume that he saw them, and that is what I base
15 my answer on.

16 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

17 Do you know whether you ever had any discussions about
18 these important messages?

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. As I stated, we were talking
20 that situation over more or less continuously.

21 Senator Ferguson: With all that has been gone over
22 about these various messages, of the 27th and 26th, do you
23 now recall anything that you want to add, that you had
24 conversations about with anyone, as to why you sent one
25 message on the 27th, why you sent another, of a different

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 text, on the 28th?

3 Admiral Stark: Nothing beyond --

4 Senator Ferguson: Or, the 29th.

5 Mr. Mitchell: What messages are they?

6 Admiral Stark: Our messages and Army messages?

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

8 Admiral Stark: No, I think I have covered that in my
9 testimony rather fully.

10 Senator Ferguson: You don't know of any conversations
11 you had with the President or Secretary of War or Navy on
12 that question?

13 Admiral Stark: Beyond what I have testified to, which
14 is the fact they were familiar with them.

15 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether you ever dis-
16 cussed with the President the message which was intercepted
17 from Tokyo to Berlin on the 30th, it is at page 204 of our
18 Exhibit 1?

19 Admiral Stark: Are you referring to that part of the
20 message which stated:

21 "Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger
22 that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon
23 nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that
24 the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than
25 anyone dreams."

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Yes. You knew there was a tie-up
3 between Hitler and the Japs and you had this message in
4 your possession on the 1st. It was translated on the 1st.
5 Did you ever discuss that with the President?

6
7 Admiral Stark: I may have. The message was undoubtedly
8 sent to him. I had anticipated the effect of that message
9 by having previously stated in a dispatch that it might come
10 within the next few days, that dispatch being of the 27th,
11 and Marshall having stated it might come any time.

12 Senator Ferguson: Was this called to your attention,
13 that we intercepted parts 1 and 3 of that very vital and
14 important message, but we don't have part 2 here -- and I
15 want to read you the first line of part 3:

16 "If when you tell them this"--

17 Which would be referring to what was in part 2.

18 "If when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians
19 question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that
20 we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians
21 in our statement of last July."

22 Was there anything said about this missing part of this
23 important message?

24 Admiral Stark: I don't recall it.

25 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not anyone
got in touch with the Philippines, where they were intercepting

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 the same kind of messages, to see whether or not part 2,
3 which seemed to be vital in this language, was ever inter-
4 cepted?

5 Mr. Mitchell: What about page 211? They are scattered
6 around.

7 Senator Ferguson: That is a different number. I have
8 written to -- or asked counsel's office to write and try
9 to locate why they didn't get part 2 and why we don't have it.
10 That is why I am questioning the Admiral.

11 Admiral Stark: I don't recall it. We probably didn't
12 get everything. There may be gaps here and there all through
13 this.

14 Senator Ferguson: Here is a very vital message. There
15 are three places that they are being intercepted and decoded.
16 One is the British. One at the Philippines. One is here.
17 I am wondering whether this wasn't called to your attention
18 or whether you didn't notice in reading these dispatches,
19 whether you didn't notice it and say, "Where is part 2".

20 It says:

21 "If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians
22 question you" --

23 Which indicates what was said in number 2.

24 Admiral Stark: I don't recall it, Senator Ferguson.

25 Senator Ferguson: You don't recall it at all?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Admiral Stark: No, I have no memory with regard to it,
3 but it may be that you can get that from other witnesses.

4 Senator Ferguson: But at least it didn't strike any
5 chord in your mind?

6 Admiral Stark: It doesn't now, no, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: And doesn't even now?

8 Admiral Stark: It does not now. I don't recall it.

9 Senator Ferguson: You don't think that that could be
10 a very significant message -- did you ever try to get it from
11 the British?

12 Admiral Stark: I don't recall the incident. I believe
13 we were exchanging with the British almost continuously. It
14 is my recollection that we had a British Officer right in our
15 group in Corregidor and that we had an officer right in
16 their group in the Singapore area.

17 Gibson
18 follows

Witness Stark.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Senator Ferguson: Did we have them in London with them?

Admiral Stark: I don't recall that. We probably -- well, I don't recall. You can get that from the Department.

Senator Ferguson: Did you get over your desk, Admiral, admiralty messages?

Admiral Stark: Well, I got over my desk any admiralty messages which were intended for me.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I am talking about admiralty messages on this question of intercepts. For instance, they wired that about the Kra Peninsula.

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, I got that.

Senator Ferguson: Ship movement.

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. Those messages would come through the same channels through which messages from our own people came, and they would be delivered to me in the same manner.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall ever getting this part 2?

Admiral Stark: I don't recall the thing at all, no, sir. The answer is no.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall part 1 and part 3?

Admiral Stark: I recall the one about the war breaking out. To the best of my remembrance, I saw that at the time. That sort of rang the bell somewhere. But some of this is

Witness Stark.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 pretty difficult to separate after the intervening years, as
3 to whether you are thinking in terms of what you are reading
4 now or what you saw then. But I do think that I saw that
5 particular message.

6 Senator Ferguson: When you take that with the previous
7 message on the 29th from Berlin to Tokyo, where they hadn't
8 given them any information, then when the deadline comes
9 along we get this important information going right into
10 Berlin, doesn't that impress you that you knew about that?

11 Admiral Stark: I was greatly impressed when I sent out
12 a message stating it was a war warning and that the Japs were
13 expected to strike in the next few days. I don't know how I
14 could have made it stronger or more unequivocal.

15 Senator Ferguson: Of course, this all came after you
16 sent the war warning message.

17 Admiral Stark: This particular message did. The pre-
18 vious one you referred to did not. It was confirmatory of
19 our evaluation which we had made and sent out.

20 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall where you were when you
21 received the word of the attack?

22 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Where were you?

24 Admiral Stark: I was in the office.

25 Senator Ferguson: Whose office?

Witness Stark.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Admiral Stark: My own.

Senator Ferguson: Were you with the Secretary of the Navy when he received his message?

Admiral Stark: You mean the 1300 message? I was not with him when he received that. I believe he received that very shortly after I did. It was delivered to him in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson: I mean the attack message.

Admiral Stark: The attack message.

Senator Ferguson: This is a raid, not a -- what do you call it when it is not maneuvers -- no drill?

Admiral Stark: This was a raid. With regard to the Secretary's moves at that time, you know that there had been some telephone calls recorded, and I had been asked what they were, and trying to get back in my memory what they were, and I recently saw someone who was going up North, and endeavoring to check back on that, and I have learned this, and with full authority:

Secretary Knox had intended this morning going to Chicago with Mr. O'Keefe, who, I believe, was manager of his paper. His plane was standing by. He stopped in at the State Department. And after that conference, according to Mrs. Knox, who was waiting for him and expecting him to go on, he changed his plan and O'Keefe went on separately. The Secretary went

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Witness Stark.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 on down to the SEQUOIA, his naval yacht, for lunch, and she
3 remarked they were not ready for them, and not expecting them.
4 My guess would be that he received the dispatch while on the
5 SEQUOIA. He came to the office later and remained in the
6 office, getting home that night about 200, about 2:00 o'clock
7 in the morning.

8 Senator Ferguson: Were you in the Secretary of the Navy's
9 office between 12:00 and 12:30 on Sunday?

10 Admiral Stark: I don't recall, Senator Ferguson.

11 Senator Ferguson: To refresh--

12 Admiral Stark: The clear thing that stands out in my
13 memory is the discussion of the 1300 dispatch.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now, the 1300 dispatch is the 1:00
15 o'clock dispatch?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. My memory is extremely clear
17 on that.

18 Senator Ferguson: Does this refresh your memory; that
19 the Secretary of the Navy received that as you and he came
20 out of your office -- out of his office? He made a remark
21 about it. I am trying to get the remark, if you remember.

22 Admiral Stark: I do not remember discussing it with him.
23 As to the time of delivery, the dispatches were delivered, I
24 believe, by Kramer, who is going to be a witness here, and it
25 is my understanding that immediately after bringing the message

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Witness Stark.

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to my office, about 10:40, as I recall, he went directly to the State Department and delivered the message, delivered Colonel Knox a copy of that message.

The Chairman: It is now past recess time.

Senator Ferguson: I can't finish in the next few minutes.

The Chairman: We will recess until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:00 p. m. of the same day.)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

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TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK

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(resumed)

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The Vice Chairman: Does counsel have anything now?

7

Mr. Mitchell: Not just at present.

8

The Vice Chairman: Admiral, do you have anything to present before you proceed?

9

10

Admiral Stark: Sir?

11

The Vice Chairman: Do you have anything you want to present at this time?

12

13

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

14

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry.

15

16

Senator Ferguson: Admiral, did you know of any diplomatic relations being carried on with Japan along the same questions that we were carrying them on, by the British Empire, by London or by the Netherlands?

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Admiral Stark: I gather the question is --

21

Senator Ferguson: During the period that we were negotiating.

22

23

Admiral Stark: Did I know whether Great Britain or the Netherlands were carrying on?

24

25

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1

Admiral Stark: No, sir, I did not know.

2

Senator Ferguson: You had no information on that subject?

3

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

4

5 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, when you were moving the
6 vessels around in the Pacific was it called to your attention,
7 or did you ever get any information to the effect that Japan
8 made a protest that our fleet in effect had surrounded one
9 of their task forces or their fleet in the Pacific?

9

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

10

Senator Ferguson: You never heard of that in 1940?

11

Admiral Stark: I never heard of that at any time.

12

13 Senator Ferguson: We had no particular lanes laid out
14 at that time?

14

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

15

16 Senator Ferguson: That had never been called to your at-
17 tention, that there was a protest filed?

17

18 Admiral Stark: That is correct, it never had. When I
19 state that we had no particular lanes laid out, there were
20 certain areas wherein the fleet exercised.

20

21 Senator Ferguson: Yes, as far as our fleet was concerned.

21

22 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, as far as our local exercise
23 in an area.

23

24 Senator Ferguson: Well, it was also true when we were
25 exercising that we had some difficulty with parts of the Jap

25

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 fleet getting in there and observing those?

3 Admiral Stark: We seldom had fleet maneuvers when I was
4 in the fleet on the West Coast that some time or other during
5 the maneuvers a Japanese tanker or Japanese fishermen were
6 not present. That goes back a number of years.

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes. So we felt at that time they were
8 even using that means of obtaining information?

9 Admiral Stark: Always regarding our fleet formations and
10 how we were maneuvering.

11 Senator Ferguson: It was no surprise then for us to
12 learn how much in detail they had obtained the information at
13 Pearl Harbor?

14 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

15 Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar with the statement
16 made in exhibit 16 by Admiral Schuirmann in relation to the
17 note of August 17th?

18 Admiral Stark: That it was an ultimatum?

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

20 Admiral Stark: I did not know about that or did not re-
21 call it until after the discussion of that here before the
22 committee that there was an ultimatum and somebody discussed
23 that. We have had a lot of fun with Admiral Schuirmann about
24 it but I have no recollection of it otherwise.

25 Senator Ferguson: In exhibit 45, Admiral, there is one

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 sentence I would like to talk with you about in order to get
3 your explanation of it.

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

6 "The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the
7 memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to
8 the President that he request Japan to reopen the conver-
9 sations. He was assured on that point. It was agreed
10 that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries
11 before dispatch."

12 Will you explain that as far as your knowledge was con-
13 cerned, as to what it was?

14 Admiral Stark: Well, as I recall, the changes suggested
15 by Colonel Stimson were very minor and also, as I recall, he
16 did not want us to put the President in a position, or recom-
17 mend in any way that he go back to the Japanese in any way
18 which would walk back anything we had said. My recollection
19 is not too clear. I do not think it amounted to a great deal.
20 The memorandum stands about as it was. If he comes before the
21 committee he can give it himself and I would rather he would.
22 My remembrance is that we did not want to be out in a posi-
23 tion of -- or, rather, Colonel Stimson did not want to be, of
24 walking back on anything we had done.

25 Senator Ferguson: I had felt that there was some doubt

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 that he might appear and that is the reason that you, being
3 a top, high ranking officer of the Navy and being a party to
4 this instrument, in effect drawing it up, that you would be
5 able to explain that as far as the Navy was concerned.

6 Admiral Stark: Well, I think that is what it was.

7 Senator Ferguson: You have no better or different re-
8 collection than that?

9 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Was it considered that that was part
11 of the diplomatic-political angle that you were not to be con-
12 cerned with that you were strictly to keep to the military?

13 Admiral Stark: No.

14 Senator Ferguson: Was that explained to you in any way?

15 Admiral Stark: No, sir, we had the right to say anything
16 we wanted to. I think the message speaks for itself. Pri-
17 marily, and as I recall this message of the 27th so stated,
18 either that or the one of the 5th or both, - we were primarily
19 concerned with getting time.

20 Senator Ferguson: Did you understand this the same as I
21 understood that Admiral Turner understood, the memo of the 27th
22 was brought about by the British, that they wanted it drafted
23 and that they were after that information? It was to be given
24 to the President so that he could pass upon a question that
25 they wanted in relation to sending out some reconnaissance

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 planes?

3 Admiral Stark: I do not recall the British prompting
4 having anything to do with this memorandum.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, you recall in one of the diplo-
6 matic notes there is evidence that we were to send out three
7 scouting planes?

8 Admiral Stark: Yes. I do not know about the diplomatic
9 notes. I remember having directed Admiral Hart to do that
10 and stating that the British were -- I remember what you are
11 talking about now.

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

13 Admiral Stark: And that the British were scouting a cer-
14 tain area and this dovetailed with it. That may have been in
15 response to either a request of theirs or of their stating
16 where they were looking and asking what we were doing and, as
17 a matter of fact, I think I am correct in stating that Admiral
18 Hart was already doing that before we told him.

19 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, Admiral Turner gave us the
20 information that one of our planes in scouting had gone over
21 Formosa and there was a protest. Did you ever see that pro-
22 test?

23 Admiral Stark: I remember his stating it. I had forgot-
24 ten the incident.

25 Senator Ferguson: You have no knowledge of that?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Admiral Stark: I had forgotten it. I have knowledge of it now.

Senator Ferguson: You say you did have knowledge?

Admiral Stark: I say I had forgotten it. I have knowledge of it now from the statement which has been made.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know what was done about the protest? Had you any conversation with the President about it?

Admiral Stark: Not that I recall. I think not. I do not know what was done about the protest, whether it was let go or what not. They were flying over us in spots regularly and we knew it and they knew it.

Senator Ferguson: That was not one of the things that made the wording "Avoid the first overt act" to be put in the note? I assume that that was after the note was given.

Admiral Stark: That is with respect to the Army note?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Stark: I am not sure. I do not recall of the President having directly told us not to put in the dispatch, certainly we did not put it in, not to commit the first overt act. That, however, I knew to be general policy.

Senator Ferguson: It was the general policy?

Admiral Stark: General policy, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Are you familiar with Admiral Kimmel's retirement?

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Admiral Stark: Well, I know that he had retired, yes,
3 sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: And will you tell us what you know
5 about it? Were you consulted or conferred with?

6 Admiral Stark: I was directed.

7 Senator Ferguson: Who directed you?

8 Admiral Stark: It came to me from Colonel Knox regard-
9 ing the relief of Kimmel, regarding his detachment.

10 Senator Ferguson: Yesterday when you read the memo of
11 Secretary Knox to the President you did not find anything
12 there critical about his removal.

13 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now, when did Colonel Knox first talk
15 with you about the removal of or detachment of Kimmel?

16 Admiral Stark: Shortly after he came back and after com-
17 ing from the White House he directed that Kimmel be relieved.
18 There is a dispatch from the Secretary of the Navy to the
19 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 16 2105; that would be 16 De-
20 cember.

21 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

22 Admiral Stark: (Reading)

23 "You will very shortly receive dispatch orders de-
24 taching you as CINC Pacific and Commander-in-Chief U.S.
25 Fleet and ordering you report Com. 14 for temporary duty.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Inform Pye." -- that is Admiral Pye. "He will be your
3 temporary relief."

4 That is from the Secretary of the Navy and it bears my
5 initials and also those of Admiral Nimitz, who was Chief of
6 Personnel at that time.

7 Senator Ferguson: So you had no conversation with him
8 as to the cause, merely that you were approving or initialing
9 the order doing it?

10 Admiral Stark: I received my orders regarding Kimmel.
11 I was not consulted beforehand.

12 Senator Ferguson: Did he say he had any conversation with
13 the President about his removal or his detachment?

14 Admiral Stark: A Commander-in-Chief would not be removed
15 without the President's permission.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, of course, there is a distinction
17 between permission and a directive.

18 Admiral Stark: I say without his permission or without
19 his O.K.

20 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether it was on his di-
21 rection?

22 Admiral Stark: Well, I know that the Secretary told me
23 to send that dispatch and that the Secretary had been in touch
24 with the President. I never asked the Secretary whether the
25 President directed it initially or whether he did or whether

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Witness Stark

it was Colonel Knox' recommendation to the President and the President so ordered.

Senator Ferguson: But you took it then that it was on at least the President's order?

Admiral Stark: In effect, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. And how many days would you say that was after Colonel Knox returned from the Pacific?

Admiral Stark: I think it might be best to get the fact on that.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I do not have the information.

Admiral Stark: It was shortly after, I would say that.

Senator Ferguson: Was it hours or days or a week?

Admiral Stark: Well, I would say shortly. By "shortly" I mean perhaps in a day or two.

Senator Ferguson: Then he retired to the coast?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you have any conversation with him or anyone else about his resignation or retirement?

Admiral Stark: I wrote him, as I recall, with regard to his retirement and I have not seen a copy of that letter. Whether it was official or whether Admiral Kimmel may have a copy of it, I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: Well, what did you say? What was the substance of the letter you wrote him about his retirement?

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1

2 Now, when you said "official" did you mean whether you were
3 acting as an official or personal?

4 Admiral Stark: Whether I wrote him an official note from
5 Chief of Operations to Admiral Kimmel or whether it was one
6 of my "Dear Kimmel" letters.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, it would amount to the same
8 thing about his retirement?

9 Admiral Stark: It would be notifying him, yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: What did you write him?

11 Admiral Stark: My recollection, - and I want to make it
12 plain that this is recollection, - is that I discussed the
13 matter from one angle or another, suggested that I was not
14 trying unduly or even to influence him, pointed out that Short
15 had requested retirement and that he might want to parallel
16 that or he might not and asked him to advise me. I wish I
17 could find that correspondence and whether Admiral Kimmel has
18 a copy of it or not I do not know.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you write that after conference
20 with anyone?

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, with the Secretary of the Navy.

22 Senator Ferguson: Was it on his request that you do it
23 in that way, which was at least a polite suggestion, wasn't
24 it?

25 Admiral Stark: Well, he was familiar with it. Whether

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 it was my suggestion or his, I am not certain.

3 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever call anyone at the Mare
4 Navy Yard in relation to it?

5 Admiral Stark: At where?

6 Senator Ferguson: At Mare Island?

7 Admiral Stark: I think I did talk to Kimmel or to the
8 officer out there at the time with reference to getting some
9 word to him. Kimmel afterwards came to Washington.

10 Senator Ferguson: Do you remember what was said in that
11 conversation about asking him to retire?

12 Admiral Stark: No. I only remember the general subject
13 of retirement and that it was taken up.

14 Senator Ferguson: And he did retire on your suggestion
15 then?

16 Admiral Stark: He retired --

17 Senator Ferguson: That is, your suggestion from the Sec-
18 retary.

19 Admiral Stark: (Continuing) -- on his own volition. We
20 did not force him at all as I remember it. I never knew of a
21 man to put up a manlier, straighter, finer front than did
22 Admiral Kimmel in this entire picture at that time. His whole
23 bearing was exemplary and what I would have expected of him.

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes. I understand that the informa-
25 tion or opinion that you had was if he had not retired he

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 would have been removed?

3 Admiral Stark: If he had not retired I do not know just
4 what action might have been taken.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, had you a conversation with the
6 Secretary about that?

7 Admiral Stark: I do not recall that, when I got it.
8 We did not have to.

9 Senator Ferguson: You felt that he would do it on the
10 suggestion?

11 Admiral Stark: He did it. He did do it, I think, as
12 sizing up under all the considerations and, as he said, he
13 had only the best interests of the Navy and of the country
14 at heart, I believe almost in those words and what happened
15 to him he was not so concerned with at that time, the war was
16 on, and I believe his own size-up of the situation was that
17 the best thing for him to do at that time was to retire. Now,
18 if I am mistaken in that he can correct it and I would abide by
19 anything that he stated with regard to it.

20 Senator Ferguson: And did the Secretary of the Navy say
21 that he had had a conversation with the President or not about
22 his retirement? Was that a matter that only the President
23 could pass on?

24 Admiral Stark: I imagine that had been discussed with the
25 President because the future of those two officers at that time

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 was on a high level.

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, you assumed that that was true
4 when you were talking to the Secretary of the Navy?

5 Admiral Stark: I think Colonel Knox undoubtedly told the
6 President just what we were doing because I had kept Colonel
7 Knox fully informed.

8 Senator Ferguson: And how long was that after your let-
9 ter to him that he retired?

10 Admiral Stark: That he actually retired?

11 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

12 Admiral Stark: I do not remember the date of his re-
13 tirement, sir. Counsel can also get that from the Navy De-
14 partment if it is desired.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, one or two questions on the wind
16 message. Did you ever see the message that came from Batavia
17 in relation to the wind message, that had a little different
18 angle to it than ours. Instead of diplomatic relations being
19 broken off it used the word "war".

20 Admiral Stark: My recollection is very hazy on that en-
21 tire subject. I heard it discussed so much since then, before
22 the Navy Court of Inquiry and what has been testified to, I
23 know exactly to what you are referring; whether my remembrance
24 is in the light of what I have heard since or before I am not
25 sure. I do not recollect it except as it has come to us later

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 but I may have known it at the time.

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, it would be very significant,
4 would it not, that they expected if relations were broken off
5 it meant war?

6 Admiral Stark: It was very likely to mean war.

7 Senator Ferguson: That was your opinion whether you would
8 have had that message or not?

9 Admiral Stark: If we broke off relations?

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

11 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, I thought we were heading for it
12 pretty well anyway.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, the message that they sent
14 of fourteen parts was more than an ultimatum, was it not?
15 There was no chance to comply with that at all and never was
16 intended.

17 Admiral Stark: That broke off negotiations.

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes. In other words, you described
19 that the other day as an ultimatum. It was more than that, was
20 it not?

21 Admiral Stark: I described it as an ultimatum?

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

23 Admiral Stark: I do not recall but it was to break off
24 all negotiations.

25 Senator Ferguson: It was more than an ultimatum because

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 we could not even comply with it if we wanted to. They in-
3 tended war.

4 Admiral Stark: The message stands for itself I think,
5 Senator Ferguson.

6 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, did you hear before
7 the President sent this message to the Emperor that he was
8 going to send one? Were you consulted about that?

9 Admiral Stark: I believe I knew about that, yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: How long before the evening of the
11 6th were you informed about that message?

12 Admiral Stark: I do not remember just when. I knew
13 that there was talk about the President sending the message as
14 one last hope for continuing the peace in the Pacific. I
15 could not say just when I knew about it. I may have known about
16 it shortly after it was conceived, to which I believe Secre-
17 tary -- I do not know whether Secretary Hull has testified as
18 to that date or not.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any opinions or was any
20 opinion sought by the President from you on that?

21 Admiral Stark: I do not recall that it was. It was one
22 of those things that might do some good, could do no harm.
23 The issue was pretty well drawn at that time. It was what
24 might be called a last hope. I recall the President's message
25 with regard to the European war before it broke out and it is

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

one of those things which I believe we have always done.

Senator Ferguson: Now, in relation to that, as I am informed and I will ask you, did you hear that broadcast on the radio on Saturday evening, that the message had been sent?

Admiral Stark: I do not remember.

Senator Ferguson: That would be a very important matter, wouldn't it?

Admiral Stark: Important that I heard it over the radio?

Senator Ferguson: No, no, that you did hear it. You say you do not remember hearing it.

Admiral Stark: Well, I do not know that it would have been particularly important if I knew it was going that I happened to hear it over the radio.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Now you had said in the message of the 27th that diplomatic negotiations had ceased. Now I want to get your opinion on how that would be construed in the field, hearing it on the radio and knowing from press reports that on the 2nd or 3rd of December the President had made another request from the Japanese, and that was in relation to going into Indo-China, or Thailand, I do not have that message here at the present time.

Admiral Stark: I do not know to just what message you refer about the 2nd or the 3rd.

Senator Ferguson: There was a message sent on December 2nd. In the white book we have quite a number of conversations. In fact we have on page 777 of Foreign Relations one where Mr. Ballantine had an appointment with Mr. Terasaki, and one on December 1st stating "The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. Mr. Kurusu said that he noted that the President was returning to Washington in advance of his schedule and inquired what the reason for this was", and so forth.

Another note on December 2nd handed by the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine on December 2, 1941.

Another memorandum of a conversation on December 2, 1941. Another memorandum on December 5 between the Japanese

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Ambassador and the Department of State, stating, "The
3 German Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request
4 at the Department."

5 Admiral Stark: I remember those, or at least I have
6 seen them within the last few months. I thought you were
7 referring to a message which had been sent out from Washington.

8 Senator Ferguson: These are messages delivered by
9 Washington, or memoranda of conversations.

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Now that being true, and Admiral
12 Kimmel not knowing that the message of the 26th had gone,
13 and we were waiting for the reply on that message, and you
14 saying it had practically ceased, and all this information
15 going out from the articles in the newspapers, and the
16 President personally negotiating with the Emperor on the
17 night of the 6th, would not that cause a belief that your
18 former message about "they had ceased" was not exactly true?

19 Admiral Stark: I think the Commander in Chief knew
20 that I would not make such a flat statement and of such
21 gravity without full consideration, and I would believe that
22 if I said it, and said it to him officially, it was so.
23 I believe that that again backed up by the burning of the
24 codes, and even the burning of the codes in Honolulu, would
25 have outweighed anything else in his mind, or if he were in

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

doubt he could have asked me, and I feel he would have thought that I would have changed my message if there had been any reason to change it.

(2)

Senator Ferguson: Now did not your message, when you sent him a copy of the Army message, weaken it?

Admiral Stark: I did not think so.

Senator Ferguson: You did not think so?

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Reading it now, what would you say?

Admiral Stark: No, I do not think so. I think my message stands for itself.

Senator Ferguson: When was Singapore alerted, to your knowledge?

Admiral Stark: Singapore?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Stark: By the British?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, the British in Singaport.

Admiral Stark: I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: Had you any knowledge on that?

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that on the 6th, and right before the 7th, troop ships were sailing out of our West Coast at San Francisco?

Admiral Stark: Yes, I probably did know that. I recall

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 we were sending troops out, and I recall the action taken
3 the next day when we were wondering if submarines might not
4 be in that area.

5
6 Senator Ferguson: Did you see the Roberts Report before
7 it was filed?

8 Admiral Stark: I do not think I did.

9
10 Senator Ferguson: Were you requested to make any changes
11 in it?

12 Admiral Stark: I beg pardon, sir?

13
14 Senator Ferguson: I say were you requested to make some
15 changes in it? Do you have some information that you want
16 to get?

17
18 Admiral Stark: This was information on my statement
19 about sailings. I think I have covered that.

20
21 Senator Ferguson: You cannot recollect seeing the
22 Roberts Report before it was filed?

23 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: You were not consulted on it?

25
26 Admiral Stark: No, sir. What I saw about the Roberts
27 Report was the printed report.

28
29 Senator Ferguson: Nothing but the printed report, after
30 it was printed?

31 Admiral Stark: That is all I recall, yes, sir.

32
33 Senator Ferguson: And you have not, I take it, then

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 seen the original Roberts Report since?

3 Admiral Stark: No, sir, I have not. This is the
4 document which I saw (indicating), Docket 159, 77th Congress.

5 Senator Ferguson: That is the printed report. I want
6 to ask you now if you can recall going to the Secretary of
7 the Navy's office at noon prior to the 1300 message that
8 we talked about this morning, the one on attack, and talking
9 with the Secretary for some 30 minutes?

10 Admiral Stark: No, I have no recollection of that.

11 Senator Ferguson: Trying to refresh your memory, and
12 only for that purpose, when you and the Secretary were walking
13 out of the office the message was handed to the Secretary
14 advising him about the attack. Does that refresh your
15 memory?

16 Admiral Stark: I do not recall it.

17 Senator Ferguson: You do not recall anything being
18 discussed with the Secretary of the Navy on the morning of
19 the 7th?

20 Admiral Stark: No, I do not.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now I will ask you when you first
22 talked with the President on Sunday, the 7th of December, 1941?

23 Admiral Stark: I do not remember when I first talked
24 to him. It is my impression that I did talk to him after I
25 had talked to Pearl Harbor, but I do not remember the times of

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 those calls.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now to again refresh your memory,
4 and only that, from the evidence that has appeared in one of
5 the previous hearings --

6
7 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: -- of Captain McCullom coming to
9 your office and giving you a message and you indicated that
10 you were going to talk to the White House and lifted up the
11 phone and he left?

12 Admiral Stark: That was after the attack?

13 Senator Ferguson: No, before the attack. Do you recall
14 any conversation with the President prior to the attack?

15 Admiral Stark: No, I do not.

16 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall any with him that day
17 after the attack?

18 Admiral Stark: I think I did. It would have been the
19 most natural thing in the world and in accordance with my
20 regular procedure of giving him anything of importance, any
21 news of importance which I had, and I had been in touch with
22 the Commander of Pearl Harbor as regards what had happened
23 out there. I either would have told him personally or made
24 sure that he would have gotten it through Colonel Knox, or
25 his Aide. Usually I picked up the phone and without hesitation
gave the President everything I had of interest.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what his remark was to
3 you about the attack when you did discuss it with him, not
4 saying when the time was?

5 Admiral Stark: No, sir, I do not. I do not remember
6 what his expression was at that time when it occurred.

7 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall whether or not you ever
8 notified CINCPAC and CINCAF of the orders to the Atlantic
9 Fleet to start shooting German subs?

10 Admiral Stark: I think I covered that in my statement,
11 about telling them about the order.

12 Senator Ferguson: There was no official order?

13 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: It would be in that letter that I
15 read to your this morning, or that you read to me?

16 Admiral Stark: I do not recall having informed them
17 officially. I believe I sent them copies of the order and
18 told them in a personal letter.

19 Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral, is there anything that
20 you want to add on this record or that you want to take from
21 the record as far as any of my questions or any other questions
22 are concerned?

23 Admiral Stark: No, sir, I think of nothing at this time.
24 I will read the record over very carefully. I have not had
25 an opportunity to do it. If there is anything I will write

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 a letter to the committee. I was trying to think during
3 the noon hour if there was anything -- thinking of your
4 questions -- anything that I could add that would be helpful.
5 I could think of nothing that I could subtract and I cannot
6 think of anything that has not been pretty well covered, as
7 far as I am concerned.

8 Senator Ferguson: Then what you want to tell us is that
9 at least you have had a fair hearing, and a complete hearing,
10 that you have had an opportunity to give all your versions
11 and views before this committee?

12 Admiral Stark: Absolutely, yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Whether the questions were asked or
14 not, you have had that opportunity?

15 Admiral Stark: That is correct. If I thought there
16 was anything of any importance, or if I do think of anything
17 which I have left out, I would not hesitate to send it up.

18 Senator Ferguson: That was the purpose of my questions
19 to you.

20 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, I understand.

21 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

22 Senator Ferguson: I yield.

23 The Vice Chairman: Are you through, Senator?

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

25 Mr. Murphy: It seems at the time the Senator from Michigan

WLC

Witness Stark

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

placed in the record a series of messages between certain dates and at certain pages to Pearl Harbor he left out one particular message in Exhibit No. 2. I find that the message in regard to the Philippines is not there, but since there has been so much testimony about the bomb plot at Hawaii and some questions particularly by Mr. Gesell that the other messages were mostly ship movements, there has been some testimony by General Marshall to the effect that there were other messages that were not ship movement messages.

I would like to place in the record at this time reference to the entries in Exhibit No. 2 at page 34 which pertains to maps and charts of the Panama Canal Zone; at page 36, which speaks of a transfer of an air depot at Panama Canal, about the petroleum supply tanks being camouflaged, about the amount of food supplies there, about the shifting around of the use of the ammunition loading pier.

I would like also to place in the record the entry at page 122, again thinking about taking the maps of the Panama Canal out by plane so they would not be picked up.

Again, I would like to place in the record the message at page 125, and particularly this quotation:

"Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval preparations by enforcing various

WLC2

Witness Stark

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2 exercises to meet any eventuality."

3 And again I quote:

4 "Evidently the preparations are intended for
5 defense against Japan."

6 And again:

7 "Lately the departure of craft from the bay
8 has become infrequent but since the war, those
9 craft which do go out seldom return, even though it
10 be Saturday or Sunday."

11 I would like also to place in the record the entry at
12 page 123 outlining the preparations which the Russians made
13 in the month of June at Vladivostock.

14 I would also ask to have placed in the record the entry
15 at page 38 about the inspection for the location of airplane
16 bases and the construction of airports at Panama Canal.

17 Also the entry at page 39, dated October 18, 1941,
18 where the statement is made, "In order to find out the
19 plans of the Canal Command, I inspected the military establish-
20 ment at the Pacific end on the 10th." And again, "going on
21 at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with
22 fortifications. Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large
23 hangars, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks,
24 and eight barracks to accommodate 200 men each."

25 As well as the entry at page 40 in regard to gun emplace-

WLC3

1 Witness Stark
2 ments. The entry at page 51, and I would like to call
3 particular attention to that entry, wherein the following
4 language is used: -- it was sent on the 22nd of November,
5 1941, and not translated until December 25, 1941, but the
6 language is used:

7 "The United States Government is going on the
8 assumption that the attack on the Canal will be made
9 from both air and sea."

10 I would like also to put in the entry at page 52 which
11 speaks of the anti-air defenses on Lock No. 1, which is now
12 being used, are being improved. It states, "Of course,
13 there are anti-air defenses at Lock No. 3. The naval defense
14 area, patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends
15 in the north from Saliona Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to
16 Monepene on the Gulf of Fonesca. The southern limits extend
17 to the air base on the Galapagos Islands.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Stark.

Questions by: The Vice Chairman.

2 "Present Army strength is 47,000; naval, 10,000; Air
3 Force, 5,000. In addition, it is estimated that there is
4 approximately twice this general total, made up of the
5 families and laborers,"and so on.

6 I would like also to call your attention to the entries
7 at pages 58, 70, 71, 79, 81, 82, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, and
8 96, none of which are ship-movement reports but in effect
9 specific inquiries about the Aleutians and Alaska, about the
10 Panama Canal Zone, about the Philippines, as well as the
11 West Coast of the United States.

12 And I would like to call the particular attention of the
13 committee to the master plan for espionage at page 117.

14 The Vice Chairman: All of those pages are in Exhibit 2?

15 Mr. Murphy: All in Exhibit 2.

16 The Vice Chairman: All right, it will be so ordered.

17 Do you have something, Admiral?

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. I understand the committee
19 asked me for the time of transmission by radio to Honolulu
20 of certain of our dispatches, and I have it here. I will give
21 it to counsel. It just gives the time groups.

22 There is the message of the 24th, with which you are all
23 familiar, in which the time of transmission was 24--2355, and
24 it runs down through from that message of the 27th and those
25 with regard to the codes. I do not know who asked for it,

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Stark.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson.

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2 but counsel informs me that someone did.

3 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for a
4 moment and ask if you obtained the Munson report yet, or were
5 they delivered to you?

6 Admiral Stark: I think they have not yet come up.
7 Counsel was going to ask for them.

8 Senator Ferguson: At least they have not come to your
9 attention?

10 Admiral Stark: I will follow it up personally, to make
11 sure that they come through.

12 Mr. Mitchell: While we are on it, I will ask the
13 reporter to write into the daily transcript this memorandum
14 that has just been furnished by the Admiral, giving the times.
15 These were received by the Naval Radio Station at Honolulu
16 and are expressed in Greenwich civil time.

17 The Vice Chairman: It will be so ordered.

18 (The table referred to is as follows:)
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TOP SECRET

5 JAN 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN JOHN F. WALSH, USN.

Subj: Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack.

Ref : (a) Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark, dtd 3 Jan 46.

1. The following information is submitted in accordance with reference (a). The times given represent time received by Naval Radio Station, Honolulu, T. H., and are expressed in Greenwich Civil Time:

Originator	Date/Time Group	Month and Year	Time of Transmission to Radio Honolulu
OPNav	242005	November 1941	242355
OPNav	272337	November 1941	280106
OPNav	290110	November 1941	290238
OPNav	031850	December 1941	031956
OPNav	031855	December 1941	031952
OPNav	270038	November 1941	270209
OPNav	270040	November 1941	270558

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

/s/ JOSEPH R. REDMAN

Joseph R. Redman

Rear Admiral, USN

Chief of Naval Communications

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Witness Stark.

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: Is there anything else, Admiral?

3 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, just one short letter. You
4 may recall that in my testimony, when the question came up of
5 dawn at Honolulu, I stated I thought it was at least an hour
6 before the 7:55 time which was reported as the time of the
7 attack, and that I could get something definite on that from
8 the Naval Observatory. I made a request of the Superintendent
9 of the Naval Observatory, and I have his report, which, if
10 you would like to have it, I will read. It will clear up
11 that matter.

12 The Vice Chairman: You may proceed.

13 Admiral Stark: (reading)

14 "On December 7, 1941, sunrise at Pearl Harbor
15 occurred at 0627" -- that is 6:27 -- "time of 157°5
16 meridian (Zone 10^h 30^m). Nautical twilight began 52
17 minutes before sunrise, at 0535; and civil twilight
18 24 minutes before sunrise, at 0603. Civil twilight
19 is conventionally taken to begin in the morning when
20 the sun is still 6° below the horizon, and is intended
21 to cover the somewhat indefinite period during which
22 the natural illumination usually is sufficient for
23 ordinary outdoor operations to be carried on." That was
24 at 3 minutes after 6:00. "Nautical twilight begins
25 when the sun is 12° below the horizon, a time intermediate

Witness Stark.

1
2 between complete darkness and civil twilight. Actually,
3 the illumination varies greatly according to weather
4 conditions at the time.

5 "The moon was a few days past full (full moon
6 occurred on Dec. 3). The moon rose at 2005" -- that is
7 8:05 p. m. -- "on the evening of December 6 and set at
8 0925 on the morning of December 7 (Zone $10^h 30^m$ time)
9 at Pearl Harbor.

10 "The times of sunrise, and of moonrise and moonset,
11 are for the instant when the upper limb appears on the
12 horizon."

13 That is, you get the round sun, and the upper limb is
14 the tangent to the horizon.

15 The Vice Chairman: Is that all, Admiral?

16 Admiral Stark: That is all, yes, sir. I think the
17 important thing in that message is, in addition to the moon-
18 light, that at 6:03, the time of civil twilight, is a period
19 when natural illumination usually is sufficient for ordinary
20 outdoor operations to be carried on.

21 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, in that connection I would
22 like to call the attention of the committee to the fact that
23 in the narrative there is a statement by the commander of
24 one of the destroyers going into Pearl Harbor that visibility
25 was good between 5:00 and 6:00 that morning.

Witness Stark:

Questions by: Senator Ferguson.

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Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Admiral one question on that?

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Would the mountains make any difference in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Stark: I think very little. Of course you would not get the direct sun rays just as the sun comes above the water, but I think that time is all right, and particularly because of the fact that the moonlight out there is frequently brilliant.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire, Admiral.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: I assume at this time, Mr. Chairman, that
3 everybody connected with this examination has exhausted
4 every possible question that could be asked of Admiral
5 Stark, and I hesitate to take much of Admiral Stark's time,
6 but I think there are a few things that I think this record
7 ought to show.

8 Admiral, when were you relieved of your duties as Chief
9 of Naval Operations?

10 Admiral Stark: I was relieved in March, 1942.

11 Mr. Keefe: And was the letter which you read into the
12 record this morning from Secretary Knox dated at that time?

13 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: You were then assigned as Commander of the
15 European Fleet?

16 Admiral Stark: The U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, yes, sir.

17 Later on, the Fleet was known over there as a fleet, and
18 I was given additional orders.

19 I have a short and rathy pithy transcript here that I had
20 made up some days ago in case this question should be asked
21 me.

22 Mr. Keefe: I haven't any objection, but I would like to
23 shorten this up as much as I can and ask some very simple
24 questions that can be answered rather easily and without
25 going into too much length.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WLC2

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. This is rather short.

3 Mr. Keefe: What does it have reference to?

4 Admiral Stark: My duties in Europe.

5 Mr. Keefe: All right.

6
7 Admiral Stark: Upon my detachment as Chief of Naval
8 Operations, I was designated Commander, U. S. Naval Forces
9 in Europe with headquarters in London. In 1943, as preparations
10 for the invasion progressed, I was given additional duty by the
11 Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as commander, Twelfth Fleet.
12 Also in 1943, I was given additional duty by the Secretary of
13 the Navy as U. S. Naval Advisor to the European Advisory
14 Commission, an organization in London of representatives of
15 the Big-3 Powers, which was charged with making recommendations
16 concerning problems arising out of the war in Europe. In
17 November, 1944, I reached the statutory retirement age, but
18 continued in my command. In April, 1945, the U. S. Naval
19 Forces in the Mediterranean-North African area were added to
20 my command. On 16 August, 1945, I was relieved by Admiral
21 Hewitt.

22 During the pre-invasion, invasion, and post-invasion
23 phases of the liberation of France, Belgium and Holland
24 and the conquest of Europe, COMNAVEU was at all times the
25 representative of the Navy Department in Europe and in direct
control of all matters relating to convoys and shipping, anti-

WLC3

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 submarine warfare in general, the logistic support of all
2 naval forces in Europe (less Mediterranean) and the screening
3 agency through which all logistic requirements for the U. S.
4 Army, British Navy, and the navies of governments in exile
5 funnelled. COMNAVEU-COM-12 was in administrative control
6 of the submarine and surface forces of the United States Navy
7 which operated with the British Fleet in European waters (less
8 Mediterranean), of the air squadrons which operated with
9 Coastal Command, RAF, and of the naval forces and shore
10 establishments which were placed under the control of General
11 Eisenhower and the allied naval commander in chief for the
12 invasion of France. As the Senior U. S. Naval Officer in
13 Europe, COMNAVEU and Commander Twelfth Fleet received copies
14 of all orders regarding the operational control of naval forces
15 under the aforementioned commands and was in constant touch
16 with their dispositions and requirements. His assistance
17 in bringing about any needed adjustments was constantly sought
18 by Submarine, Air Force, Surface Force commanders, and Commander
19 Transport 122. Vice Admiral Kirk, USN, was in command of this
20 task force. He was the operational commander of the U. S.
21 Naval Task Forces engaged in the invasion of Normandy. COMNAVEU
22 was the senior naval advisor to the U. S. Ambassador to Great
23 Britain, Ambassador to governments in exile, and in effect to
24 the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, General
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

LC5

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: All right.

3 Admiral Stark: I read his message:

4 "I have no words to express my appreciation for
5 the great help you have given the Forces under my
6 command over the past three years. Your assistance
7 has been vital and the spirit in which it was rendered
8 has been the acme of generous cooperation.

9 "Good bye and good luck.

10 (Signed) Eisenhower."

11 Mr. Keefe: When was the citation from the Army by
12 which you received the Distinguished Service Medal?

13 Admiral Stark: It was initiated and bears the date of
14 15 July 1944.

15 Mr. Keefe: Now, have you that citation?

16 Admiral Stark: I have it.

17 Mr. Keefe: Will you read it into the record, please?

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir; I will eliminate the first
19 part which refers to previous decorations and Army require-
20 ments. It starts with:

21 "Recommendation for Award of Distinguished Service
22 Medal. * * *

23 "For Distinguished Service Medal: Admiral Stark,
24 while serving in support of the Army of the United States,
25 distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious service

WLC6

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 to the Government in a duty of great responsibility.

3 "Admiral Stark, as Commander of the United States
4 Naval Forces in Europe, was charged with the planning
5 and preparation of the United States naval aspects of
6 the launching of the campaign for the liberation of
7 Europe. These plans were coordinated with the United
8 States Army and the Armies of the Allies, as well as the
9 Navies of the other participating countries. From an
10 Army standpoint, the attack on Europe would have been
11 impossible without the complete report of the U.S. Navy.

12 "More than 4,000 naval ships and craft and over
13 100,000 naval officers and men were used in the V-Day
14 assault. The fact that these ships and men were avail-
15 able is directly attributable to the efforts of Admiral
16 Stark. The successful planning for the needs and employ-
17 ment of these ships and for the officers and men was
18 accomplished through the untiring efforts of Admiral
19 Stark and the close cooperation which he maintained
20 with the appropriate Army commanders and their staffs.
21 Every desire of the Army commanders for naval craft,
22 personnel and materiel was met in a most efficient
23 manner.

24 "The planning for this assault was complete to the
25 smallest detail on the part of the United States Naval

WLC7

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Forces and served to make the combined Naval and Ground
3 Forces of the United States an integrated unit.

4 "The efficient planning of Admiral Stark enabled
5 the United States Navy to assemble and maintain -- in
6 spite of unfavorable weather -- a list of a substantially
7 greater assault force than was first anticipated by the
8 Army commanders. The results so far accomplished in this
9 assault on the Fortress of Europe would have been impos-
10 sible without the complete and wholehearted support
11 on the part of the Navy.

12 "The service for this award is recommended has
13 been completed, as the original assault has been suc-
14 cessfully concluded."

15 And the proposed citation reads:

16 "Admiral HAROLD RAYNSFORD STARK, Commander, United
17 States Naval Forces in Europe, for exceptionally meritorious
18 service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility.
19 Admiral Stark was responsible for the planning, prepara-
20 tion and coordination of the United States naval aspects
21 of the launching of the campaign for the liberation of
22 Europe. Through keen foresight and exceptional administra-
23 tive ability, Admiral Stark was able to plan for and
24 meet the necessary personnel and materiel requirements
25 for this enormous operation. Only through his untiring

WLC8

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Efforts was the accomplishment of this successful invasion completed. The services rendered by Admiral Stark reflect great credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of the United States. Entered Naval Service from Pennsylvania.

(Signed) "Dwight D. Eisenhower, General, U. S. Army, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces."

May I add, of course that would have been impossible for any commander to attain without a wonderful lot of personnel under him.

I might mention, for example, that an initial goal of readiness of the 4,000-odd craft, that is, of a large portion of them, was put at 85 percent readiness, which was higher than any other power had put it. We kept raising that, and in the last visit I made, particularly to the workmen, with their torches and whatnot, at all of the large number of stations we had, my constant plea was for 100 percent, and they all said they would give it. They were working day and night. They practically attained it. The over-all result for all stations being 99 percent plus. And what was accomplished was entirely due to the subordinate commands, which were the finest in the world.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: Admiral Stark, to get this matter chronologically in one piece, as a result of your service as Chief of Naval Operations you were cited by the President and awarded, as I understood your testimony, a gold star; is that right?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: At the termination of your service as Chief of Naval Operations you were given the letter from the Secretary of the Navy which you have read into the record this morning?

Admiral Stark: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: You then embarked upon service as Commander of the Naval Forces in the European area and as a result of that service rendered during the war you were decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross from the Navy -- from the Army?

Admiral Stark: Distinguished Service Medal from the Army.

Mr. Keefe: Distinguished Service Medal, I should say, from the Army, together with a citation from General Eisenhower and also a personal letter from General Eisenhower, which you have read into the record, when you left that service?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. That was a dispatch.

Mr. Keefe: In addition you were decorated by at least three foreign governments?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: Now, during this period of time between December 7, 1941 and the time of your relief from duty as Commander of the U. S. Naval Forces in the European area, did you know of any action taken by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King with respect to your conduct as Chief of Naval Operations prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: When did you first learn that Admiral King had recommended to the Secretary of the Navy that you be relegated to a position not requiring the exercise of superior judgment and to a position, and I quote, "in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors"?

Admiral Stark: I learned that after I returned home and when I was on what has become to be known as terminal leave. In other words, my service had terminated. I am still waiting orders for retirement. I first saw that, as I recall, in the press.

Mr. Keefe: Were you officially notified by a finding by the Secretary of the Navy that you should be retired under circumstances so that you could never again serve in the Navy in a position that might require the exercise of superior judgment?

Admiral Stark: Not until it was published. I had no previous knowledge of it.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: So upon your return from your service in Europe, after receiving citations from the President of the United States, from the Navy Department, from the War Department, and from at least three foreign governments, you learned for the first time, in the press, that you had been retired under these circumstances which I have just related?

Admiral Stark: That I was to be retired.

Mr. Keefe: Were to be retired?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Have you been retired?

Admiral Stark: Not yet, sir. I was placed on four months leave, as is customary. That four months was up on December 24, but in view of these hearings I have not yet been retired. My service was over really when I returned home.

Mr. Keefe: Is it accurate for me to say, as a layman, that during all your service as Chief of Naval Operations you were the opposite number of General Marshall?

Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes.

Mr. Keefe: You as Chief of Naval Operations and he as the Chief of General Staff were opposite numbers?

Admiral Stark: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: He having responsibility on the Army side and you on the Navy side?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: And from your testimony that you have given
3 before this committee I conclude that you feel that as Chief
4 of Naval Operations you did everything which you considered
5 possible and proper for you to do to alert the Navy prior
6 to December 7?

7 Admiral Stark: I thought so.

8 Mr. Keefe: At Pearl Harbor?

9 Admiral Stark: I thought so, yes, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: And you say that principally because, as
11 you have reiterated time and again, you sent the message of
12 November 24 and the war warning message of November 27?

13 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, plus the code dispatches.

14 Mr. Keefe: Plus the code burning dispatch that followed
15 on the 3rd of December?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, and plus the background of
17 many months before.

18 Mr. Keefe: Well, plus the background of information
19 relating to the general situation which you knew was in the
20 possession of Admiral Kimmel, our Commander on the Navy side
21 at Pearl Harbor?

22 Admiral Stark: What I had sent and the efforts that
23 we had made in preparation.

24 Mr. Keefe: Let me ask you this, it is one of the things
25 that bothers me as a layman: When you sent this order, or

Witness stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 this message of November 27, you stated in it, in substance,
3 that Admiral Kimmel was to take certain deployment measures?

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

(4) 5 Mr. Keefe: You stated that it was a war warning message.

6 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: Now, specifically what were the deployment
8 measures that you expected Admiral Kimmel to take?

9 Admiral Stark: A deployment means a spread. A defensive
10 deployment means a spread for defense. And I would take it,
11 and I believe it would be generally accepted, to intercept
12 and guard against surprise. My first thought would have been
13 a conference of Admiral Kimmel with his key people and with
14 the Army.

15 Mr. Keefe: Now, will you permit me to interrupt at that
16 point: Admiral Kimmel was in command on the Navy side?

17 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: General Short was in command on the Army side?

19 Admiral Stark: True.

20 Mr. Keefe: You would expect, would you not, that there
21 would be close liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General
22 Short?

23 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, and I have no reason to believe
24 that there was not.

25 Mr. Keefe: General Short received his directions from

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Kimmel received his from you as Chief of
Naval Operations?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: The evidence in this case shows that you
sent your message on the 27th, Marshall likewise sent a
message to Short on that day, and asked General Short to
report. You recall that, don't you?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Did you ask or expect Admiral Kimmel to
report to you as to measures taken?

Admiral Stark: No, I did not.

Mr. Keefe: Why not?

Admiral Stark: That was not Navy custom. It was not
my practice to ask the people in the field -- I gave them
a broad directive, expected them to carry out the details.
You may recall that Admiral Kimmel asked me not to send him
any categorical instructions, in one of his letters, but to
give him only broad general objectives. Prefacing that
request with the fact that I could not know or be too well
informed of the conditions confronting him on the spot. It
was not my practice, it never has been, to tell the "how to
do", but rather the "what to do".

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, Admiral, am I to understand from that statement that having sent your message of November 27 you had performed your full and complete duty as Chief of Naval Operations, and having given him this war warning and ordered him to take a defensive deployment, you had no further responsibility in the matter to see that the order which you had given was carried out?

Admiral Stark: I felt that way about it, that it was then up to him.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I am not asking how you felt, Admiral. I am asking you whether or not there was, in connection with your responsibilities of Chief of Naval Operations, a responsibility on your part to see that the order which you had given was carried out?

Admiral Stark: No, I did not feel that there was a responsibility on my part to see that the order was carried out. I gave the order and assumed that it would be carried out. I had the right to make that assumption.

Mr. Keefe: Is there a written order or booklet defining the responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations that covers that situation?

Admiral Stark: Not that particular point. I think it is Navy, general Navy custom, for a Senior to give a subordinate an order and leave it to the subordinate to carry it out.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: In that respect apparently there was a difference between the Navy and the Army because, as I recall General Marshall's testimony, he felt that it was his responsibility to see to it that his orders were carried out.

Admiral Stark: Well --

Senator Lucas: The Congressman is wrong about that.

The Chairman: He didn't say that.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Admiral Stark: Well, I do not know just what their
3 practice is. Our practice --

4 Mr. Keefe: So far as the Navy is concerned you have
5 stated them to be as just indicated?

6 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: In other words, Kimmel was supreme commander
8 out there in the Pacific area and when you gave him an order
9 it was assumed by you that that order would be carried out?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: And you did not feel that you were under any
12 responsibility to pursue the matter to see that it was carried
13 out, is that right?

14 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: Now, then, you expected Kimmel and Short to
16 get together and compare notes to determine what they should
17 do, did you not?

18 Admiral Stark: I did, yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: It is to be assumed that they did get to-
20 gether out there after receiving these messages, is it not?

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: Because I believe on the next day, on Novem-
23 ber 28th, you sent what purported to be a copy of the Army
24 message to Admiral Kimmel, did you not?

25 Admiral Stark: I sent it to him for information, yes,

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 sir.

3 Mr. Keefe: I understand, for information.

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, supposing these men got together
6 and Short says, "Here is a message from Kimmel, read this
7 over," and Kimmel says, "Here is one we got from Stark" and
8 Short says, "Here is one I just got from G-2, from Miles and
9 I have answered and here is what I have answered to Marshall,
10 that I am alerted against sabotage, liaison with the navy";
11 you were in constant contact with General Marshall here, were
12 you not?

13 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: You said you were in the closest contact with
15 him --

16 Admiral Stark: That is right.

17 Mr. Keefe: (Continuing) -- day after day during that
18 period of time.

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, I was; we always were.

20 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, if the Army had paid any attention
21 to Short's reply stating that he was alerted against sabotage
22 only they perhaps would have discussed that with you, would
23 they not?

24 Admiral Stark: Well, I do not know that they would.
25 That was something between them and their field commander. I

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 may say that the first I learned of the Short dispatch was at
2 the Roberts Commission. I did not know of it before that.

3 Mr. Keefe: Well now, Admiral Stark, it certainly must
4 have been of concern to the Navy to know what measures were
5 put into force by the Army because the Army was there to de-
6 fend the Fleet, wasn't it?

7 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, and the Army had --

8 Mr. Keefe: Your Fleet would have been in bad shape with-
9 out the protection that should have been afforded by the Army,
10 isn't that true?

11 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, but the outstanding things in
12 the Army message to me was that war might come at any moment
13 and directed Short to make a reconnaissance and I had directed
14 Kimmel to make a defensive deployment. The two hooked up to-
15 gether. Short had the stations on Hawaii, the radar stations
16 as one element for reconnaissance, he had a few planes, not
17 many, but that is where he would have been helped out in his
18 direction for reconnaissance by Kimmel, who had under the
19 Martin-Bellinger agreement assumed responsibility for the so-
20 called off shore reconnaissance with planes.

21 Mr. Keefe: Now, you as Chief of Naval Operations at any
22 time between the 27th of November and the 7th of December did
23 not know of your own knowledge that Kimmel was in fact alerted,
24 did you?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Admiral Stark: No, I did not.

Mr. Keefe: You simply assumed that he would follow your command?

Admiral Stark: I thought that that message was so outstanding, I had worked for hours over it and particularly the war warning, which was all out, that I thought it would convey what I intended it should convey. I thought it was very plain and it flew all the danger signals.

Mr. Keefe: The difficulty that I find in my thinking, Admiral Stark, and I want you to help me if you can, I have heard you say repeatedly did you did not expect an attack at Pearl Harbor; you were surprised, the President was surprised, General Marshall was surprised, you were all surprised, you did not expect an attack at Pearl Harbor and yet you expected Kimmel with less information than you had of the situation, even conceding this order which was given on the war warning, you expected him to be prepared against an attack which none of you thought would take place. Now, it is difficult for me to reconcile those two positions.

Admiral Stark: Well, I reconcile it this way, that I had sent to Kimmel for action a war warning signal containing a directive and containing what information we had, but the signal was sent to him for action and he was directed to take a deployment and it started out with, "This is a war warning."

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 A surprise attack on Hawaii was known to be a possibil-
3 ity. I did not expect it, I was surprised that it took place
4 at that time, but we all recognized it to be a possibility
5 and we had worked and pressed for months with regard to
6 drilling for it, if you will recall, training once a week for
7 this thing, we had pressed for weapons to repel it, we had
8 pressed for planes to be there, we had talked about it by
9 letter and by official letter, we had pointed out that war
10 might be preceded by it and here was war at our door and with
11 all that background and with the statement, "This is a war
12 warning" and to take a defensive deployment, we thought that
13 that would put them on a war footing out there so far as any
14 surprise was concerned. It did not but we had expected it
15 would.

16 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Admiral, I appreciate your state-
17 ment exactly but I still am in a fog to a certain extent and
18 am unable to understand your position and see if I can make
19 myself clear.

20 You say you were surprised that an attack took place, you
21 say you did not expect an attack to take place at Pearl Harbor.

22 Admiral Stark: At that time.

23 Mr. Keefe: Yet you say it was possible for an attack to
24 take place and you had spent your time getting ready to repel
25 that attack but in your warning to Kimmel you called his at-

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 attention to the place where you thought the attack would take
3 place, which was way off thousands of miles away, down in the
4 China Sea, Samoa and Kra Peninsula, and so on.

5 Admiral Stark: That is true, but the attack which we
6 envisaged down there, we stated that the makeup, and so forth,
7 of this amphibious expedition, not a raiding force or a car-
8 rier force but an amphibious expedition, and the points of
9 that amphibious expedition might be so and so.

10 There was no question, there had not been in my mind at
11 any time of an amphibious expedition against the Hawaiian
12 Islands. Now, the points mentioned there were in line with
13 what had gone before and that was the information that we had,
14 but one of the things that means a lot, I think, to the aver-
15 age naval officer when he gets a message, - that part of the
16 message was information. We could have sent that simply out
17 as a separate dispatch had we so willed, just to him for in-
18 formation, it could have been left out, but when we sent the
19 dispatch to him for action it was with the idea that there was
20 a war warning and that the attack might come in any direction.

21 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, let me understand this. Now, the
22 thing that I cannot understand is this and I hope you will
23 try and make it clear to a layman: Evidently you had a war
24 plan, Rainbow No. 5, which I hold in my hand, this big docu-
25 ment. I understood you to say this morning that that was the

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 outgrowth in its final form of your A-B-C-D.

3 Admiral Stark: A-B-C-1 was the Basic War Plan for both
4 the Army and Navy, Rainbow 5 and that, if it is the WPL-46,
5 is the Navy plan.

6 Mr. Keefe: Will you kindly tell me where in this plan,
7 which I assume was in the possession and within the knowledge
8 of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, where is the speci-
9 fic program set out that covers this so-called deployment
10 business preparatory to actual war?

11 Admiral Stark: You mean as to where any phrase in con-
12 nection with deployment is used?

13 Mr. Keefe: Where can I look in this plan to see what
14 the Commander, Kimmel, was to do when you told him to execute
15 a defensive deployment? If there is anything in this war plan
16 I would like to have you point it out.

17 Admiral Stark: There is one place where deployment is
18 mentioned. I do not think there is any place in the plan
19 where it would tell him what to do in connection with a de-
20 fensive deployment. That would be of his initiative to make a
21 defensive deployment which he thought was proper.

22 Mr. Keefe: Well, in the name of conscience then how am
23 I as a member of this committee to determine whether Admiral
24 Kimmel carried out the order that you gave to him if nobody
25 knows what the order means and what the deployment is to be?

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Supposing he took one ship and took it out to sea, that would
3 be a deployment, would it not?

4 Admiral Stark: That would be a partial deployment, yes,
5 sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: Well, is there anything in the Navy record
7 or in the files or in the war plans that I can point to which
8 says when an order is given to a commander to take a defensive
9 deployment he is to do A, B, C, D, E?

10 Admiral Stark: I think you will not find that anywhere.
11 From long naval experience a defensive deployment means a
12 spread in defense. That would be my definition of it.

13 Mr. Keefe: Would that mean then that he should take his
14 fleet out of Pearl Harbor and spread it out on the ocean, or
15 what does it mean?

16 Admiral Stark: Well, it would mean, in my opinion,
17 scouting with his planes, it would mean the disposition of
18 other forces such as submarines or light forces or perhaps air-
19 craft in accordance with his best judgment for defense. It
20 was a defensive deployment. Now, he did have, as we now know,
21 certain forces on the sea. He may have considered them as part
22 of a defensive deployment. He can testify as to that.

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, he had the Enterprise out, did
24 he not, with planes in the air?

25 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Scouting around. Admiral Newton had the
3 Lexington out with a task force, also with planes in the air;
4 and the balance of the fleet, except a destroyer that went out
5 that morning, I guess, was in Pearl Harbor. Now, would you
6 consider the fact that the Enterprise was engaged in the speci-
7 fic task of taking planes to Wake and the Lexington was en-
8 gaged in the specific task of taking planes to Midway, as I
9 recall, - those would not be defensive deployments, would they,
10 in accordance with your order?

11 Admiral Stark: If he had been sweeping ahead of him, and
12 as I recall, he did sweep ahead of him and if he were flying
13 any planes and I dare say they were and scouting around the
14 horizon it might very well be considered part of a defensive
15 deployment.

16 Mr. Keefe: Well, all right. Now, then, assume that he
17 did that. That, then, is at least a partial compliance with
18 your order then, is it not?

19 Admiral Stark: It very well might be according to what
20 they were doing and what we told them.

21 Mr. Keefe: Now, we lost a lot of ships in Pearl Harbor
22 and a lot of men. Do you conceive that your order and direc-
23 tive to make a defensive deployment involved the ships that
24 were in the harbor and, if so, how?

25 Admiral Stark: Well, as I have stated, I left that up

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 to him. It was impossible, - not impossible but generally
3 we did not know the ships that were in or what their condition
4 was or just what was out there, but the planes were one of
5 the means which could have been used and how many destroyers
6 he might have had at that time to accompany his battleships
7 if he wanted to put them out, and it is an open question whether
8 or not it would have been best to have them out or have them
9 were they were provided they were ready in other respects to
10 meet this attack.

11 I would hesitate to state without full knowledge and
12 without being on the spot at the time just what I would have
13 done there at that time. My feeling --

14 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, with full knowledge as to what
15 he did do --

16 Admiral Stark: My feeling is that I certainly would have
17 had my planes out, I would have had my radar going and I would
18 have been using my submarines and perhaps --

19 Mr. Keefe: Now, just a moment before you go further if
20 you will pardon the interruption. You say you certainly would
21 have used your radar. You mean ships' radar?

22 Admiral Stark: No, sir, I mean -- and I am glad you
23 picked that up. The Army radar.

24 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, then, let us talk about Kimmel
25 and then we will get to Short after a while. Let us stick

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 right with Kimmel. Certainly his radar would not be any good
3 with the ships located in Pearl Harbor and with these mountains
4 on all sides, would it?

5 Admiral Stark: Very little, if any.

6 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Admiral, what I am trying to get
7 at, and I wish we would stick right with that point, I want
8 you to tell this committee, if you can, what did Admiral Kim-
9 mel fail to do with respect to this order which you gave for
10 him to take a defensive deployment, specifically state what
11 he failed to do?

12 Admiral Stark: Well, if I may say so I would rather
13 the committee judge of his failure. My feeling is that if I
14 would have had this job and what we thought when we gave the
15 order, that one of the first things that he would have done
16 would have been to scout continuously with what aircraft he
17 had in the direction which he would have worked out as being
18 the most likely point from which an attack might come.

19 Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, did he have these aircraft
20 out?

21 Admiral Stark: I believe he did not.

22 Mr. Keefe: And thus you say he defaulted, because he
23 did not have proper reconnaissance by aircraft; that is number
24 one, is that right?

25 Admiral Stark: I say what I would have done and he did

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 and it is hindsight. It is hindsight and it is not hindsight.
3 You have asked me to state specifically what I think I would
4 have done and that is what I think I would have done and I
5 assume that is what was done. We were assuming that they
6 were scouting with everything they had in the air.

7 Mr. Keefe: Admiral Stark, if I may be so bold as to
8 interrupt. I am just a layman and I think most of the members
9 of the committee are laymen. You gave this Admiral, as Chief
10 of Naval Operations, an order to do a certain thing, to take
11 a defensive deployment. Now, you must have had in your mind
12 as Chief of Naval Operations that that placed the responsib-
13 ility upon Admiral Kimmel to do some specific thing. Now,
14 your answer to us is that that was in the discretion of Ad-
15 miral Kimmel, that he could do what he thought was the proper
16 thing to do. I am asking you what did you contemplate you
17 intended him to do when you issued that order to him, that
18 is what I would like to know?

19 Admiral Stark: Well, the answer to that is, starting
20 out again, if I may, first conference with the Army. We had
21 told Kimmel to take a defensive deployment, we had said that
22 war might come in a few days, we had stated the war warning.
23 Short was told war might come at any minute. He was told to
24 make reconnaissance.

25 Now, confining myself to what I intended and what I

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 thought Admiral Kimmel would do, I thought that they un-
3 doubtedly were considering if an attack did come where it
4 would come from and, of course, I would assume that it would
5 be air and submarine, either or both.

6 A defense against such an attack, either air or submarine
7 or both, is scouting with planes. Therefore, I would have
8 assumed that he would have scouted with his planes to the
9 best of his ability with what he had. I would have assumed
10 that he would have used his submarines to assist him in that
11 scouting and I would have assumed he would have weighed the
12 rest of the force he had, what he had at sea, what he had in
13 port, as to whether he had the best balance possible also to
14 assist in that scouting. He had fast task forces at sea,
15 which are well adapted to that sort of work, carriers whose
16 planes can cover a wide area, accompanied by defensive units
17 such as we usually have in a fast carrier task force, namely,
18 cruisers and destroyers. Those are the basic things I would
19 have assumed.

20 Mr. Keefe: Well, then, am I to assume or is the commit-
21 tee to assume that in the event that Admiral Kimmel states
22 here on the stand that he considered as the Commander out
23 there that it was the proper thing to do to have this fleet
24 deployed in Pearl Harbor as he had it, that he having exer-
25 cised that judgment was clearly within his rights and that no

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 criticism can attach to him because he exercised that judg-
3 ment under the circumstances? Are we to understand that?

4 Admiral Stark: He was within his rights to exercise
5 his judgment and when you have heard his judgment I assume
6 then you will be in position to weigh what I have said and
7 his judgment.

8 Mr. Keefe: Well, I realize the delicacy of these ques-
9 tions, Admiral Stark, because Admiral Kimmel is your friend
10 and he has been all through.

11 Admiral Stark: One of the closest and finest I ever
12 had and one of the finest I ever knew.

13 Mr. Keefe: Almost as close as a brother to you and be-
14 cause of that I shall not press it any further at this time
15 except that I want to call your attention to the fact that in
16 this war plan Rainbow No. 5 on page 17 of this photostat that
17 I have it says:

18 "Upon the receipt of the following OPNAV dispatch
19 the naval establishment will proceed with the execution
20 of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war:

21 "Execute Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5.

22 "(b) The date of the above dispatch will be M-Day
23 unless it has been otherwise designated."

24 Admiral Stark: Not until after the attack.

25 Mr. Keefe: Then was such a dispatch sent?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, at once.

Mr. Keefe: Then that put in operation the entire Rainbow No. 5 plan?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Upon the sending of that dispatch?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. It put it in effect against Japan.

Mr. Keefe: Yes, exactly. Now, then, so prior to the sending of that dispatch, "Execute Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5" these other dispatches did not have reference to anything contained in this War Plan Rainbow No. 5?

Admiral Stark: I believe the dispatch of the 27th directing the defensive deployment stated preparatory to carrying out the tasks herein, being to him for action, further showing, in my opinion, that we were expecting an attack and that this would come in effect.

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1 Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe.

2 Mr. Keefe: All right; now, Admiral, but there is no
3 similar document on the part of the Navy showing what a Navy
4 commander situated as Kimmel was, was to do before the receipt
5 of this "execute" message?

6 Admiral Stark: Admiral Kimmel's own plan drew up certain
7 things which he contemplated doing, or might consider necessary
8 to do before actual hostilities in his own Pacific plan, which
9 was predicated largely and necessarily on WPL-46.

10 Mr. Keefe: All right. Now I want to ask you a few ques-
11 tions about this 1940 alert.

12 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: You were Chief of Naval Operations at that
14 time?

15 Admiral Stark: I was.

16 Mr. Keefe: And General Marshall, through Adams, sends a
17 message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort
18 Shafter, stating:

19 "Immediately alert complete defensive organization
20 to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest
21 extent possible without creating public hysteria or
22 provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents.
23 Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further
24 orders. Instructions for secret communication direct
25 with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe.

2 Acknowledge."

3 Signed, "Adams."

4 Now, you were in close liaison with General Marshall at
5 that time, were you not?

6 Admiral Stark: I was, yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: Did not he ever discuss with you, as Chief
8 of Naval Operations, the background and the facts which
9 prompted him to send this alert order on the 17th of June,
10 1940?

11 Admiral Stark: I have stated that I do not recall that
12 clearly, and I can only assume that the reason I do not
13 recall it clearly is that I was not impressed, so far as
14 the Navy was concerned, with any particular gravity at that
15 time. That is the reason that I did not initially send
16 Admiral Richardson anything in regard to it, and I must have
17 looked on it, I assume I looked on it largely, as an Army
18 affair.

19 Mr. Keefe: Well, that is not what I asked you, Admiral
20 Stark, and that is not a direct answer to my question. My
21 question is whether or not you discussed this alert with
22 General Marshall. Now, if you didn't discuss it, or if you
23 do not remember it, that is one thing.

24 Admiral Stark: That is what I meant to convey. I do
25 not recall that alert.

Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, you had some communications with
3 Admiral Richardson in reference to it, did you not?

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, there were dispatches exchanged, but
5 the one thing I did recall when I came up here, and which I
6 checked upon later, was that Admiral Richardson had written
7 me and requested, if anything like that occurred again, he
8 would like to be informed beforehand.

9 Mr. Keefe: Did you give Richardson any orders for the
10 deployment of the fleet?

11 Admiral Stark: No, sir. We told him, in response to
12 his question with regard to it, to continue cooperation with
13 the Army. They were already working with the Army on it out
14 there, without any directive from me.

15 Mr. Keefe: Did you know that during this alert Admiral
16 Richardson took the fleet out of Pearl Harbor and went to a
17 secret rendezvous, giving the impression that he was sailing
18 to the Panama Canal, in order to try to stir up the saboteurs
19 of the Canal?

20 Admiral Stark: I remember that.

21 Mr. Keefe: Did you give that order?

22 Admiral Stark: I remember that very clearly. I think
23 the fact that it happened at this time was a coincidence. I
24 remember very distinctly telling Joe to take the fleet out and
25 to provide for a leak. When it was brought up to me, I said

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Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 "Yes," and I also recall extending his time two days, which
3 I also verified, the time was extended two days. We told
4 him to maintain radio silence, to start as theoretically head-
5 ing southeastward, in case any Japanese ship should see him.
6 It was an exercise at sea, but the primary purpose was that the
7 Canal authorities thought, if war came, that the fleet was
8 going into the Atlantic, and that some of their agents would
9 commit considerable sabotage down there. They were anxious
10 to apprehend these people, and we thought we might precipitate
11 action on their part. So after the Army had provided to
12 catch these people if they did start anything, and to break
13 this thing up, we then agreed and we sent the fleet to sea.
14 But that it happened at the same time as this alert is, in my
15 opinion, just a coincidence.

16 I have a dispatch here --

17 Mr. Keefe: I think it is already in evidence.

18 Admiral Stark: I think I have covered the thing.

19 Mr. Keefe: I offered it in evidence, I think, heretofore.

20 Admiral Stark: That I do recollect quite clearly, but
21 the other I do not.

22 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Admiral Stark, when General Mar-
23 shall ordered that alert on the 17th of June, 1940, he clearly
24 must have felt that there was some possible breach in the
25 relations with Japan that prompted him to put Hawaii on the

Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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alert?

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Admiral Stark: He has so testified, I believe.

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Mr. Keefe: Yes, he testified, but the reasons for it did not come in until after he left. I sought to get those, and we have them in the record now, the reasons which prompted that alert.

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Now, you cannot recall any of the conversations that took place between you and General Marshall which prompted Marshall to order an all-out alert in 1940?

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Admiral Stark: No, sir, I cannot.

Mr. Keefe: All right. Now I would like to ask a question which bothered me, with respect to this Rainbow No. 5, which places the Island of Guam in what is called category F.

Admiral Stark: I have the category here.

Mr. Keefe: Now will you state for the record what category F means?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, we have that, I am sure. This is out of Joint Action, Army and Navy, and refers to degrees of preparation, and they are put in categories of defense, A, B, C, D, E, and F.

Mr. Keefe: Well, take Guam to start with. That is in F. Now give us what category F means.

Admiral Stark: Category F: "Positions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject

Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupa-
tion but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces.
Under this category the employment of existing local forces and
local facilities will be confined principally to the demolition
of those things it is desirable to prevent falling into the
hands of the enemy."

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Then, so far as Guam was concerned, at the
3 time this basic war plan was devised it was the considered
4 opinion of both the Army and Navy that it could not be defended
5 and it therefore was placed in Category F that required those
6 on the island, through demolition or otherwise, to destroy
7 anything of value to the enemy and to permit it to be taken?

8 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: And to surrender?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: That is right, is it not?

12 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: Now, in what category was Wake placed under
14 this war plan?

15 Admiral Stark: I will have to look that up under the
16 war plans, sir. I think it is misplaced here.

17 Mr. Keefe: Well, I would like to get it also for Midway
18 and Samoa.

19 Admiral Stark: I think it is a safe assumption that
20 Wake may not be specifically mentioned, but it is included
21 in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, and on that assumption
22 the category of defense would be D. I will check the war
23 plans carefully, and if that assumption is inaccurate, I will
24 notify the committee.

25 The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier was in Category D.

WLC 2

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Then, I will ask to have placed in the record, Mr. Chairman, this document that has been presented to us, to which we may make reference to the record, as to these war plans.

Mr. Mitchell: I would like to find out where it comes from. I have been trying to locate it.

Admiral Stark: The reference I think is given at the top. It is from Joint Action of the Army and Navy.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, in the book, Exhibit 44, we have as item 6 Joint Coastal Defense Plan. Is that what it is?

Admiral Stark: No, sir, it is a book which has been approved by both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that covers joint action. I think it is FTP-145.

Mr. Mitchell: You mean it is not in any of the war plans we have had here at all?

Admiral Stark: No. Here it is. I think the assistant counsel has it.

Senator Ferguson: Was it in effect prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, it has been in effect for a number of years, with several changes.

The Chairman: That is Chapter V out of that book, is it?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. This is taken right out of the book.

WLC3

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: This is the printed publication of the
3 Public Printing Office, prepared by the Joint Board, and
4 revised by the Joint Board, 1935.

5 Admiral Stark: If I said FTP-145 I should have said 155.

6 Mr. Mitchell: I do not find anything like that on the
7 title page.

8 Admiral Stark: It is FTP-155.

9 Mr. Mitchell: What does FTP stand for?

10 Admiral Stark: Fleet Training Publication.

11 Mr. Keefe: Will you also give me the information as to
12 Midway?

13 The Chairman: Let us settle the question whether this
14 is to be printed at this point in the record, to which I
15 assume there is no objection.

16 Mr. Mitchell: No. It can be transcribed in the daily
17 transcript, but I wanted it identified. It says: "Joint
18 Action of the Army and the Navy, Chapter V, Coastal Frontier
19 Defense," but it does not say what volume it comes from.

20 The Chairman: That has been identified.

21 Admiral Stark: It states: "Joint Action of the Army and
22 the Navy". That might very well be clear enough.

23 Mr. Mitchell: It is a Public Printing Office publication
24 of 1935.
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Admiral Stark

The Chairman: All right. It will be printed at this point in the transcript.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

CONFIDENTIAL

JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

CHAPTER V

COSTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE

SECTION III

CATEGORIES OF DEFENSE AND REQUIREMENTS AND MEANS TO BE PROVIDED

30. Degree of preparation.--The degree of preparation in coastal frontier defense and the frontier defense measures to be taken, including the strength of the forces to be provided, depend upon the enemy and the character of the enemy operations to which coastal frontiers may be subjected in the early stages of a war. For the purpose of indicating the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken under specific situations, categories of defense are established as listed below. Decisions as to the "category of defense" required for each coastal frontier are included in all joint basic war plans except those for wars of a minor nature. These decisions constitute a directive to the Army and Navy commanders of the joint organization for coastal frontier defense as to the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken. They likewise constitute a directive to the

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1 War and Navy Departments as to the allocation of the means
2 required for this defense. Defensive sea areas will be pro-
3 claimed in time of actual or impending war as necessitated
4 by the nature of the war and the probable enemy.

5 31. Categories of defense.

6 a. Category A.--Coastal frontiers that probably will
7 be free from attack, but for which a nominal defense must
8 be provided for political reasons. Under this category,
9 only a sufficient part of the gunfire elements of harbor de-
10 fense will be manned in the strength required to create a
11 show of preparedness. The strength required will be that
12 considered necessary to repel small naval raids. A nominal
13 offshore patrol will be maintained.

14 b. Category B.--Coastal frontiers that may be subject
15 to minor attacks. Under this category, the harbor defenses
16 will be provided with one manning relief, and a part of the
17 obstacles will be prepared but not put in place. Certain de-
18 fensive sea areas may be established and a limited offshore
19 patrol may be instituted, with a limited control of shipping
20 entering and leaving harbors.

21 c. Category C.--Coastal frontiers that in all proba-
22 bility will be subject to minor attack. Under this category,
23 the coastal defense area should be provided, in general, with
24 the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet
25 the following enemy naval operations: those incident to con-

f3 1 trolling the sea; those against shipping; and minor attacks
2 against land areas. The harbor defenses should be fully
3 manned and air support arranged. Long range air reconnais-
4 sance will be provided, if practicable. If sufficient forces
5 are available, outposts will be established outside of harbor
6 defenses along the sensitive areas of the shore line. The
7 inner mine barrages will, in general, be established; a full
8 inshore patrol and complete control of shipping will, as a
9 rule, be instituted; and certain outer mine barrages and de-
10 fensive sea areas may be established, and a limited offshore
11 patrol instituted.

12 d. Category D.--Coastal frontiers that may be subject
13 to major attack. Under this category, the coastal defense
14 areas should, in general, be provided with the means of de-
15 fense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval opera-
16 tions preliminary to joint operations. All available means
17 of defense will generally find application, and a stronger
18 outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore,
19 than for Category C, will be required. Under this category
20 certain defensive sea areas will be established. In addi-
21 tion, an antiaircraft gun and machine-gun defense of important
22 areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; gen-
23 eral reserves should be strategically located so as to fa-
24 cilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans
25 should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely

to become theaters of operations. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force.

e. Category E.--Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to major attack. Under this category, in addition to the measures required for Category D, there will be required generally the concentration of the troops necessary to defend the area against a serious attack in force, together with additional naval forces to provide intensive inshore and offshore patrols. Defensive sea areas will be established. Air defense will be provided as in Category D. All or a part of the GHQ air force may be ordered to the threatened area to operate either under direct control of Army GHQ or under that of the Army commander of the theater of operations or frontier.

f. Category F.--Possessions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation, but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under this category, the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable to prevent falling into the hands of the enemy.

g. General.

(1) Where Categories D and E are applicable

f5 1 initially, local defense plans should provide for
2 the initial employment of such forces of the Army
3 and the Navy as may be required in addition to
4 those forces which are ordinarily available for
5 the initial defense of the coastal frontier in ques-
6 tion, and which can be diverted from the mobiliza-
7 tion and concentration of the Army forces, from the
8 United States Fleet, and from other naval forces,
9 during the period of mobilization and concentration,
10 without materially interfering with or seriously
11 delaying the operations to be undertaken in the
12 principal theater of operations.

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13 (2) Under all categories of defense, the Army
14 coastal frontier or Army sector commander is respon-
15 sible for the antiaircraft defense within the corps
16 area and naval district extending inland from the
17 frontier or sector, such antiaircraft defense to
18 include an aircraft warning service. Cases involv-
19 ing the antiaircraft defense of Army GHQ airdromes
20 and those where one corps area borders on two coastal
21 frontiers, will be specifically covered in appro-
22 priate Army strategical plans.

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