

Interr. TOJO (18 Jan 46)

Doc 4154

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CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 18 January 1946 - 1400-1620 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hideki Tojo
Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator
Commander Yale Maxon, USNR, Interpreter
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer

Q.: In your explanations of the Manchurian affair and the China Incident, haven't the answers been a bit more propagandistic than factual?

A.: No.

Q.: When did the creation of the new order in East Asia become part of the government policy?

A.: I was not directly involved at that time and do not remember exactly, but my belief is that it was after the outbreak of the China Incident and that it gradually became more and more explicit as time went on.

Q.: How long after the outbreak of the China Incident was it before this became the government policy?

A.: I don't like to say exactly, since I was not directly responsible and do not know in detail, but I believe it was after the outbreak of the Incident and that the policy became more clearly defined as time went on.

Q.: There had been an increasing demand for such a foreign policy, from the time of the Manchurian Incident on, had there not?

A.: As I explained yesterday, the feeling in regard to close ties with China had gradually increased.

Q.: As far as the Army officers were concerned, was this feeling not expressed in demands rather than by being just a feeling?

- A.: As to whether there was a demand or not, I was not responsible and cannot say, but I can say that both citizens and younger officers thought that closer ties with China ought to be established. The concept of East Asia grew with the progress of the war. At first, it embraced only China and Japan, then later, as the war situation developed, it came to include the Philippines, Thai, and Burma.
- Q.: At the time of the 1935-1936 assassinations, did the Government have such a policy?
- A.: No. I think not.
- Q.: During the two years that you were with the Kwantung Army, did you not find that most of the officers favored such a policy?
- A.: Of course at that time they felt that Japan and China were too far apart and should be brought closer together, but the policy had not crystalized and there was no concrete plan. Even the Government had no such definite plan.
- Q.: Weren't some of the Kwantung Army officers demanding such policy?
- A.: Many of them wanted a stronger policy but, since they were military officers, they had no authority to make political demands on the government. I believe that there was such a desire and, hence, throughout the Army there was such an atmosphere.
- Q.: How did the Kwantung Army officers compare with Army officers in Japan in respect to this feeling, particularly in numbers?
- A.: I hesitate to speak categorically but, since the Kwantung Army was closer to the problem, I dare say the feeling was stronger there.
- Q.: Among those who believed in a stronger policy, were there not more extremists among the Kwantung Army officers than among the officers in Japan proper?
- A.: Such questions require very specific answers which I cannot give. However, I have explained that possibly the feeling was stronger in Manchuria than here in Japan because of the closeness of the problem there. On the other hand, it might be argued that, since the February 26, 1936 incident took place in Tokyo, the feeling was stronger in Japan proper and spread from there to Manchuria.

- Q.: Do you know who was responsible for the February 26 Incident?
- A.: In regard to that, there was a court martial and the court records will show who was responsible. I was in Manchuria and cannot recall very well the names of the young officers involved.
- Q.: Do you think these younger officers had older officers behind them encouraging them to do what they did?
- A.: It is my guess that these younger officers were not encouraged by high ranking officers. I was in Manchuria at the time and, in accordance with the orders I received from the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, I suppressed such movements there. I can say categorically that in Manchuria no such thing occurred.
- Q.: When were you given orders by the head of the Kwantung Army to suppress these acts?
- A.: It was just after the February 26 Incident. At that time I was head of the Military Police of the Kwantung Army.
- Q.: Had there been any occurrence in Manchuria which led to this order?
- A.: Yes. As a result of the February 26 Incident in Tokyo there was an atmosphere of similar ideas in the Kwantung Army.
- Q.: Can you be more concrete about this situation in Manchuria at this particular time?
- A.: In Tokyo, there had been a coup d'etat, hence in Manchuria there was talk of a coup d'etat also. The Commander of the Kwantung Army did not know the exact situation in Tokyo, since there was no means of communication with Tokyo. However, in order to prevent a situation which might lead to a coup d'etat in Manchuria, he issued the order to clamp down. That was before he received any order from the Emperor on the subject.
- Q.: Who was the General of the Kwantung Army at this time?
- A.: That was General Jiro Minami, I believe.
- Q.: Had there been any specific acts in Manchuria just previous to General Minami's order?

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- A.: The feeling of unrest in Manchuria was not limited to the Army; it also included personnel of the South Manchurian Railway and civilians. I cannot remember too well, but there was a definite atmosphere of unrest which had spread from Tokyo and which did lead to various acts but which I have described as an atmosphere of unrest. At that time, I was head of the Military Police and worked closely with the head of the civilian police for the Japanese-leased territory in Manchuria.
- Q.: You were the head of the Military Police at that time. Will you describe in detail the nature of any of these acts.
- A.: I really can't say what specific acts took place, but the general situation is as I described it. The specific acts in Manchuria became also a part of the February 26 court martial that took place in Tokyo and definite information about them can be found in the records of those court martials.
- Q.: Didn't the trials show that there was a pre-arranged plan which included both the Tokyo uprising and the events in Manchuria?
- A.: I don't know. It was decided to hold all the court martials in Tokyo and I don't know whether the trial showed any such connection or not.
- Q.: How many individuals, either officers or civilians, were brought from Manchuria to Tokyo to be tried in connection with these disturbances?
- A.: I don't remember exactly, but I believe it was between ten and twenty individuals. As I recall, some hundreds were seized and questioned but after it was determined which ones had some connection with the Incident and which ones had not, this boiled down to between ten and twenty who were sent to Tokyo for trial.
- Q.: Do you remember any names of persons who were seized at that time?
- A.: They were mostly young people and I don't remember any of their names, but it is a matter of record if you want to look it up.
- Q.: Of those arrested in Manchuria at this time, about how many were Army personnel and about how many were civilians?
- A.: It is difficult to remember exactly and I don't want to state definitely, but my impression is that about one-fifth were Army and about four-fifths were South Manchurian Railway personnel or

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other civilians. I remember definitely that a majority of those taken were South Manchurian Railway personnel or other civilians. This included many Manchurian "Ronin" and civilians who were members of the "right wing". Many of those picked up were extremists who were already being watched closely.

Q.: In Japanese history, a "Ronin" was a fighting man without a regular master. Can you explain what a Manchurian "Ronin" was?

A.: It is difficult to explain, but generally speaking, a Manchurian "Ronin" was an individual without regular work who wandered about from place to place, either in search of profit or because he was so built that he liked to be on the move.

Q.: Were there any cases, do you think, when some of these Manchurian "Ronin" received money from other people to do these acts?

A.: I believe so. I think if you investigate the records of the trials you can find out definitely.

Q.: Were there not acts of violence committed at this time in Manchuria toward Chinese individuals and their property?

A.: No.

Q.: Had you taken precautions to prevent such acts by these individuals?

A.: There were no acts of violence toward Chinese. The spirit of the coup d'etat had no relation to Chinese or Manchurian individuals but was directed toward the Japanese government officials in office.

Q.: Is it true that some of these individuals arrested wanted the government to pursue a stronger policy in Asia?

A.: Yes.

Q.: Were there not some individuals who wanted the Kwantung Army to pursue a stronger policy in Asia?

A.: No that was not the point. A coup d'etat had taken place in Tokyo whereby the power had been seized from the authorities. The spirit of the coup d'etat had spread to Manchuria where we felt that similar events were brewing.

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Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR, 11-35-72
(Name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 5 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Yale Maxon
Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of August, 1946.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Myrtle B. Mills
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on 18th day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me TOJO Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, USNR,

Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO
(Place)

12 August 46
(Date)

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Q As far as the Army officers were concerned, was this feeling [referring to close ties with China] not expressed in demands rather than by being just a feeling?

A As to whether there was a demand or not, I was not responsible and cannot say, but I can say that both citizens and younger officers thought that closer ties with China ought to be established. The concept of East Asia grew with the progress of the war. At first, it embraced only China and Japan, then later, as the war situation developed, it came to include the Philippines, Thai, and Burma.