

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 43
(Obtain from G-2)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 16 Oct. TIME: 0900

Division of Origin: Capital Equipment and Construction

SUBJECT: SUMITOMO TSUSHIN KOGYO
(Manufacturer of Communications Equipment)

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Dr. TAKESHI KAJII - President.
NAGAO SAIKI - Managing Director.
HAROLD HIRATA - Liaison Man (A Nisei born in Hawaii -
Speaks English)

Where interviewed: Sumitomo main office.

Interrogator: Pfc. Jacobson.

Interpreter: Lt. Love.

Allied Officers present: None.

Summary:

1. Information about the Sumitomo Co. and communication equipment production was obtained.
2. Detailed production and other data will be obtained in two weeks.

VISIT TO SUMITOMO TSUSHIN KOGYO (Formerly the Nippon
Elec. Co.)

Interrogation by Lt. Love and Pfc. Jacobson.

Company Officials present were:

- 1 - Dr. Takeshi Kajii - President.
- 2 - Nagao Saiki - Managing Director.
- 3 - Harold Hirata - Liaison Officer of the corporation.
(A Nisei born in Hawaii-speaks English well)

1. The Corporation was given a standard electrical questionnaire which will be returned in 10 days for plants in the Tokyo area and within 3 weeks or a month for plants outside the Tokyo area. Three large plants are located in the Tokyo area.

2. In the manufacture of communications equipment in Japan, about 200,000 people were employed toward the end of the war. About 80% of production was devoted to wireless, and 20% to wired communications equipment.

3. Sumitomo leads Japan in telephone and telegraph manufacture, and is second in size to Tokyo-Shibauro in the manufacture of wireless.

4. About 25% of all communications equipment is made by Sumitomo.

5. Third in importance in communications equipment manufacture is the Nippon Yusen Co., with the Oki Co. ranking fourth.

6. The priority ratings of industries were:
- 1 - Aircraft.
 - 2 - Naval Vessels.
 - 3 - Light Metals.
 - 4 - Coal.
 - 5 - Steel.

It wasn't high enough for the communications industry. Mr. Kajii asserts that 50% of all materials desired were received.

7. Labor within the industry worked 2 and 3 shifts at times to meet emergency orders from the armed forces. The shift system was never on a complete factory bases, but for those departments which fell behind schedule.

Generally speaking, a one-shift 11 hour day was worked, with the extra 3 hours considered as overtime. There wasn't enough material to work a continuous double or triple shift.

Top salaries for office help were about 250 yen per month, with the average much lower. (About 70 for a beginner who had a good education)

Labor was a bit short at the beginning of the war, but was adequate once conscription of students for labor in factories began in the autumn of 1943. Draft deferment was obtained in 1943 and the years following by applying directly to the army through its representative at the plant.

8. Conversion of electrical plants to other types of manufacture did not occur in the communications sector of the industry. On the contrary, plants of the textile industry which ceased to operate, were purchased or leased to expand production of communications equipment. Wireless of all types was in great demand by the armed forces.

9. Vacuum tube manufacture, especially within the Tokyo-Shibauro Co. suffered more than any other sector of the industry. The Tokyo-Shibauro Co. is stated to have produced about 40% of all vacuum tubes.

10. A few plants of the Sumitomo Co. were damaged, but some of these had already evacuated their equipment to other plants when the damage occurred. Specific illustrations will be obtained in the detailed report the company will submit.

11. Production of wireless equipment was gradually increasing from year to year up to the autumn of 1944, when it began to drop.

The initial reason for the decline is a shortage of materials, according to Sumitomo Officials.

With intensified bombing in the Spring of 1945, production dropped sharply for two reasons:

- a - Actual bomb damage.
- b - Dispersal of factories.

Dispersal is stated to have caused more production loss than damage.

Officials weighted the losses as follows:

- Loss due to shortage of materials: 30%
- Loss due to bombings, dispersal, etc: 70%

Thus, a production loss would have resulted without specially bombing the industry. Lack of shipping is indicated as the main cause of the raw material shortage.

12. Copies of the reports on financial standing, history of organization, production of the company that were sent to GHQ have been obtained for preliminary study.