




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


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
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REMARKS

ON

THE MILITIA

OF

CANADA.

KINGSTON:
PRINTED AT THE DAILY NEWS OFFICE.
1864.

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PREFACE.

In offering these remarks to the consideration of the Canadian public, and more especially of my brother legislators, I have to apologize for the haste with which they have been unavoidably thrown together.

I think, however, that they will find the facts stated correct, and not without interest to those who wish to examine this subject for themselves.

To avoid increasing the length, already perhaps too great, I have added in an appendix some extracts and speeches which deal in detail with one or two points only slightly alluded to in the main body of the pamphlet, but to which I think some attention should be directed.

R. J. CARTWRIGHT.

KINGSTON, Aug. 26th, 1864.

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It is now not much less than four years since the outbreak of the American civil war disclosed alike to Canada and to England how completely this Province was placed at the mercy of its republican neighbors, so long as it continued in its present unprotected state, and how enormous were the resources of the enemy with whom it might be called to contend.

It is nearly three years since the capture of the Confederate Ambassadors revealed with equal clearness the deep-rooted feeling of jealous enmity by which the bulk of the American people are actuated towards Great Britain and her dependencies, while it showed also how flimsy were the barriers which commercial interests could interpose to prevent collision between the two nations, when once their angry passions were aroused.

It is two years and more since the rejection of the Militia Bill brought in by the Cartier Government drew forth from the English press and from not a few English statesmen the most emphatic declarations—many times repeated since—that England could not and would not undertake the defence of Canada, unless Canada was prepared to contribute, and that in no slight measure, towards her own protection ;—and about an equal space of time since the special commission, appointed by the Imperial and Colonial Governments to inquire into the position and resources of this country, reported in due form

that without a thorough and effective organization of the militia, entirely apart from the volunteer corps, it would be impossible to make anything like a proper provision for that purpose.

Nevertheless, in spite of all this, and although the leading English journals have of late (under a misconception of the real facts of the case, which would be ludicrous if it were not calculated to do immense mischief) ceased commenting on our alleged indolence and apathy, and instead betaken themselves to expressing their surprise that, to use the words of the *Times*, "The Canadian Parliament should have adopted the measure introduced by Mr. Sandfield Macdonald almost unanimously, after rejecting *the much more moderate scheme of M. Cartier and his colleague!!!*" it is unfortunately too true that up to the autumn of 1864 not one single company of militia has been organized, or received even the miserable six days' drill which is the maximum *permitted*, not enjoined, by the much lauded enactment of Mr. Sandfield Macdonald above referred to.

Neither is the recklessness of our present course much lessened by the reflection that in thus leaving the whole burthen of our defence to rest on our volunteers in the event of any sudden emergency like the affair of the Trent, it is thrown on a body which, however valuable as an auxiliary, and however creditable to the zeal and patriotism of the people as apart from the Government, has been again and again pronounced inadequate to such a task, not only by the special commission above named, but also by each successive Minister of Militia who has spoken officially on the question, and who, no matter of what party, have all concurred in declaring that, without in the least disparaging the gallantry of the volunteers, the simple facts that they have the power of disbanding themselves, in most cases at two and in all at six months' notice, and are drawn in most disproportionate numbers from one particular section of the population—four-fifths being supplied by our towns and villages, *i.e.* by about one-tenth of our people

—would, *per se*, make it unfair, indeed impossible, to treat them as a regular force available for continuous service.

Such, then, in brief, after four years' warning and wrangling, is the position in which we find ourselves—without one battalion of organized militia—without any embodied force whose services we could command for six weeks together—relying on a blind belief in the utter exhaustion of the North at the expiration of the present contest, or on the equally groundless supposition that if hostilities occur at any future period, we shall be sure to have ample notice, ample time to organize and discipline our forces and obtain succor from abroad—choosing utterly to ignore the fact that we are now, for the first time in our history, side by side with a first class military power; and that while the very geographical position of Canada, wedged midway between the north-eastern and north-western sections of the Federal States, is sure to render her acquisition an object of intense desire to the ambition of American statesmen—if not indeed absolutely indispensable to the preservation of the remainder of the Union*—so our enormous frontier and comparative total want of back country, coupled with the extraordinary facilities afforded by modern science for the transport of large bodies of men at short notice, render it to the last degree improbable that any lengthened breathing time will be allowed should the Northern Government ever resolve on assailing us.

That such an attitude is likely to redound to the credit of Canada at home or abroad, few, we think, are likely to maintain; and while we admit that it is quite possible that no such invasion may ever take place—especially if proper precautions were taken to repel it—it still becomes all who have the honor or the safety of their country at heart, who prefer to hold it by some better tenure than the pleasure of an arrogant and capricious neighbor, and all who know the vigor and celerity with which the Americans are wont to push any scheme of conquest,

*Vide Appendix A.

to consider well how they would propose to resist the onset of 200,000 or 300,000 soldiers trained in no holiday school of war and led by commanders who, whatever their technical deficiencies, are at least well used to handle large masses of men, and reckless at what cost they achieve their end.

Two things at any rate seem obvious—that in a country like Canada, which is for the most part singularly devoid of natural defences,* such an attack can only be combatted successfully by opposing to it a very considerable numerical force of disciplined troops; and secondly, that while it is always a matter of doubt how far England may be able to assist us with additional soldiery at the critical moment, no one can believe that our 10,000 or 20,000 volunteers and garrisons of perhaps half as many regular troops could stand the shock for a fortnight; or that if Canada was once overrun and occupied by the Americans, they could be expelled without an expenditure of blood and treasure frightful to contemplate.

It follows therefore that any scheme which proposes to provide effectually for the defence of Canada must do three things.

It must provide a large numerical force.

It must ensure this force being so far disciplined as to permit of its being embodied at short notice.

And lastly, it must offer a reasonable prospect of holding the enemy at bay long enough to admit of assistance arriving from England, and to allow for the chance of her being engaged in other wars.

That such a scheme is feasible, and even easy of execution, we fully believe—nay, more, we are prepared to show that in the end, calculating the expense over a reasonable term of years, it will be found both relatively and absolutely cheaper than the most unsatisfactory system now in vogue, though we do not pretend to say that it is capable of being carried into effect without some sacrifice on our part, or without the active and energetic co-operation of the mother country.

*Vide Appendix A.

Before entering on details, however, it may not be amiss to contrast the present relative expenditures of the two countries in this direction. On doing so we find that England, or rather the British Isles, with a population of about thirty millions and a revenue of seventy, expends annually rather more than one-third on her army and navy, while Canada, with a population of two millions and a half and a revenue of two millions sterling, has consented latterly, not without reluctance, to devote one hundred thousand pounds, or one-twentieth of *her* income, to the same purpose.

In like manner, while England maintains a standing army (vide estimates for 1864) of about 146,000 men all told, independently of volunteers or militia, at an annual cost of fourteen millions* (allowances to non-effectives included), and while she sends some 12,000 of these to form the garrison of Canada, at a yearly cost of some five or six millions of dollars to her, and a proportionate benefit to the country for whose sake this expenditure is being incurred—Canada on her part, leaving army and navy entirely out of the question, has not seen fit hitherto to provide one single regiment of militia, preferring to rely wholly on a body of volunteers whose services are terminable at brief notice at their own will and pleasure.

The bare recital of these facts, it must be confessed, goes far to justify the censures which have been heaped upon us for our lukewarmness in this matter; and indeed so keenly has the utter indefensibility of our present position been felt on all sides, that no party has had the hardihood to defend it in the abstract, but have rather confined themselves to idle assertions that there can be no war, and will be no war between England and the North—or else that we will always have abundance of time to prepare for it if it does come, and that at present our poverty is so great, and the expense of any really efficient scheme so heavy, that it is quite out of our power to do anything. And indeed it is but fair to say in mitigation of the

*The exact sum is £14,844,888 stg. for 1864-5, but this includes a little over a million for volunteers and militia. Vide Appendix D.

apparent apathy of the Canadian Legislature, that this last plea is so far true, that besides being heavily in debt, the amount of accumulated taxable wealth is relatively much smaller in a country like ours; and that on the occasion of the rejection of the first Militia Bill our Parliament had been frightened out of its propriety by the introduction of a very heavy budget, showing a deficit of nearly one-fifth as between regular annual income and outlay—wholly apart from proposed cost of militia. Possibly, had a British minister been obliged to come down to the House of Commons with a statement that there was an annual deficit of fourteen millions for which it was necessary to provide by laying on fresh taxes, and a further intimation that he would require about ten millions more for an entirely new purpose, he too might have encountered similar difficulties.

Be that as it may, however, it is apparent that now that the deficit has been provided for in a most satisfactory manner, all these arguments *ad misericordiam* have lost their force, nor would they at any rate have affected the main point at issue, viz., under what system the sum voted by the Legislature can be expended to the best advantage, whether the amount of the grant be large or small.

Hitherto, so far as we are aware, but three distinct systems can be said to have been brought under the notice of Parliament.

Foremost of these stands the measure introduced by the Hon. John A. Macdonald in May, 1862, shortly after the Trent difficulty, which proposed, in brief, to enrol from thirty to fifty thousand militiamen, and to drill these for one month each year for three or five years, and which, whether or not objectionable in some minor details, was probably the best suited to begin a proper militia organization on a scale sufficiently large to be useful in that particular emergency, and was besides recommended by the special commission, and we understand approved by the Imperial authorities. At the same time, while doing full justice to the merits of this plan as a whole, and as adapted for an extraordinary crisis like that

which it was designed to meet, we may be permitted to express some doubts whether it would work equally well as a permanent system of instruction. There seems reason to think that the withdrawal of so large a body as 50,000 men from industrial pursuits, though only for a short time, might cause inconvenience, and, which is much more important, that the constant recurring service for five years would worry and annoy the men, be much more expensive, and leave them, after all, far less efficiently disciplined than an equal or even shorter period of continuous instruction.

The second scheme, of which Mr. Sandfield Macdonald is the author, and which is the one now actually in operation, can hardly be said to propose the organization of a militia at all, as it barely permits the Governor to call out a part of the first class, *i.e.* the unmarried, militiamen for six days' drill in each year, without specifying any number whatever; and in fact relies almost entirely for efficiency (in Mr. S. Macdonald's own words) on the establishment of a couple of military schools, to be attached to regiments serving in Canada, in which the militia officers were to be trained for some two months, if they chose to attend—a very useful and proper measure in itself, but hopelessly inadequate to meet the exigencies of the case.

The third system, which it is the object of this pamphlet to explain and discuss, may be best described as consisting of the following propositions:—

1st. That taking into consideration the peculiar position of Canada, it is indispensable to have a distinct understanding—most probably a formal convention, treaty if any like to call it so—with the Imperial Government, in which the contribution which Canada, *as a Province of the Empire*, ought to make towards her own defence, should be precisely defined.

2nd. That it should be laid down as a fundamental principle that the volunteers were to be regarded purely as an auxiliary body, and that the chief portion of our expenditure ought to be devoted to disciplining a certain proportion of the regular first class militia, the total number to be fixed by convention as

above stated, but supposed likely to range from 50,000 to 100,000 men.

3rd. That as the number required would probably be too large to admit of their being called out simultaneously—even were it desirable to do so—they should be drilled in annual instalments of so many thousand a year, each detachment to serve for say six months in open field.

4th. That these militiamen, after having once received six months' instruction, should be thenceforward free from all further duty in time of peace, but should continue liable for actual service for a period of ten years, and thereafter be formed into a reserve, not to be called out except in extreme emergency.

5th. It was further proposed*—though not at all as part of the original system, which contemplates the formation of a well organized militia on a footing suited to the resources of the country, and so adjusted that it might be kept up by ourselves without any extraneous aid—that as Canada was very much in arrear, and a sudden emergency might arise before such a scheme could be fairly carried out, a special offer should be made to the English Government, agreeing to train a double or treble number of men in the first two or three years, provided they would assist us with a loan of money for that purpose at three per cent, and allow a portion of the troops in garrison here to be brigaded with and act as instructors to our militia—by which means, without any actual outlay on their part, we could probably afford to drill twice as many men as we could otherwise.

It ought perhaps to be noted in connection with this project that the demands proposed to be made on England are made solely on the ground that such a war would be in the strictest sense Imperial, and not Colonial; and in the next place, that although the author does undoubtedly believe that Canada is quite able to maintain a militia 100,000 strong, giving each

*Vide Appendix B.

man six months' actual discipline in the manner above detailed, the system itself might be applied equally well to any smaller number of men, serving for a shorter period, provided it be not less than three months; and therefore, that those who shrink from the cost of disciplining 100,000 men for six months, might be ready to consent to that of maintaining 50,000 men for three.

Apart from this, it only remains to observe that none of the systems we have been endeavoring to describe are intended to conflict with those fundamental provisions of our original militia law which have subsisted from the very earliest period in Canada, and by which every adult male inhabitant between the ages of 18 and 60 is placed at the disposal of the Government in case of war or imminent danger thereof, and are capable of being called out in due order—first, the unmarried men from 18 to 45; second, the married men between the same ages; and lastly, those between 45 and 60.

This power, whatever its value, remains untouched; and when it is remembered that the total number liable to serve under this law, which is not only unrepealed, but actually repeated and embodied in our very latest enactment,* is little short of 500,000 men—that 25,000 youths annually attain their majority in Canada, and that there are now on our militia muster rolls nearly 200,000 unmarried men, almost all under thirty years of age, all of whom are bound by law to serve in the militia when called out, it certainly does not seem an extravagant proposal that 10,000 or even 15,000 of their number should be embodied in rotation for a few months each year, and taught the duties of a soldier's life by actual experience in open field; while it may be affirmed with some confidence, that six months of such discipline would imprint the lesson so indelibly on our hardy rural population that they would con-

*Vide Dep. Adj. Gen. Report for 1863, by which it appears that we have some 470,000 militia of all ranks, and about 160,000 first class service men. These numbers are estimated from returns confessedly imperfect, and from comparing them with the census of 1861 there seems reason to think the figures in the text are nearer the real number.

tinue perfectly able to take their places in the field, at very short notice, during the whole term for which it is proposed to hold them liable to active service.*

It is not pretended, of course, that such a force can be looked on as the equals of regular troops, though it has been proved repeatedly that they very soon attain a wonderful degree of proficiency if mixed with a fair proportion of veteran soldiers; but it must always be borne in mind, that except in the now improbable contingency of an immediate contest with the North, they would probably be found not much inferior to their antagonists in point of mere discipline, and, which is of yet more importance, that since it is impossible, in cases where a large numerical force is to be organized with but limited means, to give each man more than a few months' drill in any given number of years, the question is narrowed down to this—not whether six months' drill is enough to make a man a good soldier for the rest of his life, but whether, having only six months' instruction to give him altogether, it is better to instruct him for that period continuously and once for all, at a time of life when such lessons have a natural tendency to infix themselves in mind and body—or whether it is better to call him out for a week or a fortnight for ten or twenty years in succession, taking care to allow plenty of time to elapse on each occasion to enable him to forget any smattering of drill he may have picked up before.†

It may be added that, independently of the fact that this plan of training men for a few days every year has proved a most signal failure in many of the American States, one-half at least of a militia disciplined by annual instalments would always be pretty fresh from their instructors' hands; and it is a fair question whether the volunteer movement, if judiciously managed, might not be turned to good account as a means of keeping a considerable number of these men in a very respectable state of discipline. While as regards the continuous length

*Vide Appendix C. †Vide Appendix B.

of service which some parties may consider objectionable, we are convinced, after careful inquiry, that the majority of our agricultural classes, so far from looking on it as excessive, would decidedly prefer undergoing the necessary amount of training once for all in early life rather than be dragged away from their business year after year, as they must be under any other system which proposes to create any effectual organization at all.

These considerations, however, are of the less consequence, because, while most objectors are willing to admit the superior efficiency of such a militia, at least as compared with any other within our power to raise, they are wont to take refuge in the alleged enormous expense of such a course of discipline, conveniently ignoring the fact, that although it may make a vast difference in the ultimate efficiency of the men themselves, it can make none in the absolute cost to the people of Canada whether they drill a given number of militia for a fortnight a year for twelve years, or drill one-twelfth of that number for six months each year during the same period—unless indeed it should prove that the former operation costs considerably more than the latter, owing to the larger and proportionately more expensive drilling apparatus, staff, etc., which would be required to impart the least semblance of instruction to a large number of men suddenly called together.

But waiving this point, and taking it for granted that all parties, convinced of the practical uselessness of these six day militia musters, tacitly allow them to drop into oblivion, as there seems much reason to suppose will be the case—it is evident to demonstration that we are about to expend within the next ten years, in the mere payment of staff and volunteers' allowances, a sum fully adequate to train and discipline a most respectable militia.

In proof of this it is only necessary to call attention to the following figures, which can be verified from our own official statistics:—

1st. It appears that in the years 1863 and 1864 Parliament has voted about a million of dollars for military purposes, though it is probable the entire appropriation may not be expended.

2nd. That we are now committed to an annual expenditure in this direction of some half a million of dollars, which, if the militia get any drill at all, will probably be increased to three quarters.

3rd. That up to this moment every penny we have spent has gone to staff or volunteers, with the exception of the grant to schools for officers.

4th. That it is manifest, therefore, if we go on as we have begun, we will expend a sum of five millions of dollars, perhaps much more, within the next ten years—while as sole result of this large expenditure, we will have possibly 10,000 or 12,000 volunteers (the latest returns to March, 1864, show the average attendance at drills to be under 7,000 men, and we know they have not increased since) free by operation of law at the end of each term of five years, even if they do not choose to avail themselves of their right of disbanding on giving two months' notice, and all for the self-same cost for which we might obtain a most efficient* militia 50,000 strong, every one of whom would have undergone his six months' service, and who would be completely at our disposal if required through the whole period of vigorous manhood!

Startling as these facts really are, and incredible as they may appear to those who are ignorant of the prodigious wastefulness of a false economy and a radically bad system, we think a very little reflection will serve to convince our readers not only of the real extravagance of our present arrangements, but also of the truth of the remaining part of our proposition, viz., that it is quite practicable to drill, feed, pay, clothe, and maintain any reasonable number of our unmarried youth at a cost of \$100 per head for the six months—or at least that there

*Vide Appendix C.

is nothing *prima facie* absurd in declaring that a few thousand lads of eighteen or twenty with no families to provide for, may be supported comfortably and even remunerated, in spite of all deductions, at the rate of three shillings per working day, which is quite as high a rate of wages as they would probably obtain in most parts of Canada. Even were it otherwise, and were the drawbacks for their rations and other inevitable deductions so heavy as to absorb the great proportion of their wages, the sacrifice of a few months' time in early life would be no great price to pay for being taught to defend their country efficiently, and would be amply compensated by the moral and physical advantages which every man, high or low, derives from being subjected at some time or other to strict military discipline and systematic training in any athletic exercise.

Such a sacrifice, if sacrifice it be, is one which every country has a right to exact in time of need, nor do we fear that many will be found to murmur at the proposed scale as insufficient if they will reflect that even now, in spite of many exceptional circumstances which tend to augment the expense in that service, the total outlay for an American private soldier is very considerably less than \$300 a year in gold, probably about \$120 for the six months—while in the British army, which we may fairly take as our proper standard, the average cost of the individual foot soldier is decidedly under £40 stg. per man, showing that \$100, the sum named by us, is a very fair estimate for the half year.*

It is of course true—and we call the especial attention of our readers to the fact, for nothing has tended to create more confusion on the subject—that the cost of maintaining a *standing army*, complete in all its branches, staff, cavalry, artillery, and so on, is vastly greater, in proportion, than that of maintaining an equal number of trained infantry; so much greater indeed, that while the extreme cost of the individual British foot soldier is less than £40 stg. a year (it appears to be

*Vide Army Estimates for 1864 and Appendix D.

just that sum if allowances to officers and to higher paid portions of the service are included), the average cost as a member of the standing army is swelled to fully £100 stg. per man.

But it must always be borne in mind that it is of the very essence of our plan to provide a militia and *not a standing army*, and to train that militia by actual service in camp during the summer months, thereby dispensing with all the costly and cumbrous paraphernalia of stores, barracks, arsenals and the like, and reducing our expenditure to the very lowest minimum consistent with the health and efficiency of the men—a minimum which certainly ought not to exceed the sum usually spent on an English foot soldier.

If, indeed, the Imperial authorities, not content with this, were to call on us to provide a standing army adequate to defend a country one thousand miles long by some fifty deep, at the odds of ten to one, the bravest might well decline the hopeless task; but England, if we understand her meaning aright, does nothing of the kind.

All she asks, or rather all she warns us of, is simply this—that since it is impossible in her peculiar position to keep more than a small number of trained soldiers at command for a sudden emergency, it is absolutely necessary that we should provide a reasonable contingent of disciplined men, the which if we do, she on her side, as becomes the richest nation and the greatest naval power in the world, will not stint to supply us to the utmost with ships, with stores, with arms, with leaders, with a nucleus of veteran troops, and in one word, with everything we may need to give strength and stability to our levies.

As to those cavillers who are perpetually harping on the disturbance of the labor market, and the demoralization of our youth by idling about in camps, it is enough to say as regards the first ground of complaint, that it is as hard to suppose the withdrawal of 10,000 or even 15,000 lads per annum out of 200,000 first class militia (being an average of say ten per township or one hundred per county throughout Canada),

would be likely to interfere seriously with industrial pursuits, as it is to believe that our hardy backwoodsmen, half of whom think nothing of passing whole winters in the lumber shanty, scores of miles beyond the furthest verge of settlement, would be alarmed at the prospect of spending a few summer months in open field—though this objection also has been gravely advanced.

While, as to the other plea, that a camp life of the kind proposed would tend seriously to demoralize the youth of this country, surely these virtuous critics have forgotten that there is the widest possible difference between the life of a finished soldier in a garrison town and that of a recruit in a camp of instruction; and further, that they are most signally mistaken if they suppose that discipline of the nature and extent of that to which our militia would be subjected would allow them to lead a very idle existence, or that six months' steady training in athletic exercises is one whit more calculated to dispose those undergoing it to profligacy or debauchery than the comparatively idle objectless career of many of these very youths, if left to vegetate on their fathers' farms.

And lastly, passing by these trivial objections as ones which, if applicable at all, apply equally to any scheme for creating a sufficient force, we would fain ask those Canadians who, careless of the vast issues involved, still murmur against the expense incurred by any effective measure of defence, whether, when they cry out against an annual expenditure of £200,000 stg. or £100,000 stg. as excessive and disproportionate to the resources of a country numbering near three millions of people, they are aware, that if we were to adopt the lowest European standard, which is about one in every hundred of the population—a proportion which most political economists are agreed is not too great in any well regulated government—we should be called on to maintain a regular standing army from 25,000 to 30,000 strong?

Or to pursue the comparison a little further, and assuming the cost of the English army as a fair criterion, are they aware

that the expense of maintaining a standing army of barely 2,000 men for one year would equal that of embodying 10,000 militia for six months; or in other words—and we hardly know how we could well put the whole case more forcibly before the reader—that in ten years we might raise and discipline one hundred thousand militia, giving each man half a year's instruction in the manner proposed, for *precisely the sum which it would cost us to support a standing army of two thousand men for the same period.*

Let us be honest in this matter. We cannot pretend, with the example of the American States before us, that it is out of our power to maintain an army of 2,000 men if we choose to do so; but if we will not do this, or its equivalent, let us at least cease to delude England and ourselves with idle professions of loyalty and anxiety to preserve the alliance between us, while refusing, as a government and in our collective capacity, to take any sufficient steps to contribute towards our own defence.

Let us remember that so far, nothing like a fair or definite proposition has been submitted to the Imperial authorities.

Let us remember that if their demands have in any instance appeared captious or excessive, they have been made in sheer despair of seeing us take any action of our own accord.

Let us remember, too, that there are many reasons why such a proposal should emanate from our own Government, who may be supposed to know our wants and resources better than any other parties.

Rarely, if ever, have any two countries been better able to supplement each other's deficiencies, and rarely have the elements of strength and weakness been more curiously commingled in any case than in ours.

On the one hand, constituting in ourselves a State far from contemptible in mere numbers and intrinsic resources, forming an integral part of one of the greatest empires now existing, and completely protected from attack on all sides save one—

we yet find ourselves, as regards that single enemy, entirely without defences of any kind, natural or artificial, beyond those which our own arms and the distant succor of the parent state can afford.

Ourselves again, without even the semblance of a navy, without arsenals, without veteran soldiers, and with a half exhausted treasury besides, we yet possess a brave, hardy, and intelligent population, containing the best possible material for the formation of a most efficient militia, and we are at the same time most closely connected with a country which is able to supply us in abundance with the ships, the stores, the experienced officers, and the available wealth we stand in need of, and which is deficient only in that one thing which we might easily contribute, namely, a body of disciplined men numerous enough to repel a sudden and vigorous onset.

✓ In our antagonist, on the other hand, we have to deal with a people who, though possessing, and certain to possess, during the lifetime of the present generation at least, a very powerful even if imperfect military organization, and able to hurl an immense force against us at a very short notice, are withal likely to emerge from their present conflict seriously exhausted and incapable of any very lengthened effort for some time to come.

Surely, we may ask, do not all these indisputable facts prove beyond a doubt the absolute necessity of coming to some clear understanding with the Imperial Government, and of providing such a force, if we provide any at all, as may enable us to resist the severe but brief attack of an enemy who knows well that his only chance is to overwhelm us at once before tardy assistance can arrive?

Doubtless, in approaching the English Cabinet on this subject, the offers we should make ought to be of a substantial nature, if only for the reason that while a proposal to provide a well trained militia 50,000, much more 100,000 strong, would beyond question ensure a most attentive consideration of our requests, it is hardly likely that a demand for aid to carry out our

present most flimsy scheme of defence could even obtain a hearing.

As regards the convention itself, what we believe we might reasonably offer on the one hand and demand on the other, is briefly this.

We should agree to provide within a certain fixed time a militia of not less than 50,000 men, who should all undergo a given period of service in open field.

But we might fairly ask in turn, that the British Government should allow part of their garrisons to be brigaded with our militia in their camps of instruction, and so soon as a section had finished the stipulated term of service, that they should lend us a certain specified sum at three per cent, and, it might be, supply the militia themselves with arms, drill instructors, and perhaps uniforms, gratis or at reduced rates.

For it must be remembered by any who object to such requests as unreasonable, that the task of Canada after all is no light one, and that such a militia so trained and embodied would be placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government and their commanders in this Province in a very different sense from that in which any body of volunteers can be said to be so, and consequently (the more especially as they would remain available for some ten or fifteen years) demands may properly be advanced on their behalf which it would be preposterous to urge in the case of a transient and irregular force such as volunteers must necessarily be.

Neither should it be overlooked that such assistance, though of the most material benefit to Canada, need not cost the Home Government one farthing, with the exception of the arms and clothing, which being actually in store in Quebec, as we are informed, might possibly be thrown in by way of encouragement in the event of our agreeing to raise the larger number of militia, a number which it may be as well to observe would equal *one-fifth* of our whole adult male population.

Of the great direct advantages to England herself which would result from the successful establishment of such a

system, both in enabling her to reduce her garrisons here in time of peace, and in freeing her from the necessity of making those sudden extraordinary exertions to reinforce us which have already cost her so much, we have hardly room to speak; nor for the same reason can we do more than hint at the desirability to us in Canada, even if our negotiations failed, of removing from ourselves the onus of negligence and indifference to our own defence, and the extreme importance in every point of view of knowing exactly to what extent England could or would come to our assistance.

At any rate, be that as it may, whether England aid us or whether she refuse to aid us—whether we pay six per cent or three per cent—whether we spend five millions or ten—it is equally important that the money we do spend should be laid out as profitably as possible, and that it assuredly will *not* be under a system which at best only promises to supply us with some 12,000 dissatisfied volunteers for the self-same outlay which might produce a most excellent militia of at least four times their strength.*

In conclusion, we may be pardoned for saying, that momentous as this question undoubtedly is—momentous as it is to decide on the best mode of employing our resources and to ascertain how far or on what terms we can count on the assistance of Great Britain in this particular emergency—it is of yet more importance that some distinct line of policy should be settled on as between the parent state and her colonies.

At present it would almost seem as if England, after having spent two centuries and ransacked half the world to find sites for new colonies—after driving off every European rival who attempted to secure the least fragment for himself—and even waging the bitterest hostilities with such of her own colonies as had grown strong enough to aspire to independence—was suddenly resolved to exert all her energies to rid herself of the troubles and responsibility of presiding over the immense empire which is springing up around her.

*Vide Appendix C.

With this in the abstract we can have no quarrel. If the duties of the position be too great for her strength, England is in the right to abdicate it as soon as possible; but it is useless to deny that the constant semi-official proclamations of her anxiety to be rid of us, and her inability to protect us, *no matter what the cause or origin of war*, while at the same time she herself will take no active step to sever a connection which on her own showing is full of peril to both—are not calculated to increase our respect for British statesmanship, or to lessen the undercurrent of dissatisfaction which is sure to exist in such a case.

Nor, while we own frankly that we do not think Canada has hitherto taken reasonable precautions for her own defence, can we by any means admit that it lies in the mouths of English statesmen to speak of our supineness as if they had always maintained their own country in a perfect state of defence, much less to talk of the past connection of England with the Canadas as if it were one long record of benefits and favors on the one side and apathetic indifference on the other. They may have forgotten, but we have not, that their only claim on the inhabitants of one large section of Canada was the forcible subjugation of their forefathers—while the retention of the remaining portion is mainly due, not to the success of their generals or the wisdom of their statesmen, but to the devotion of a little band of determined loyalists who preferred to sacrifice every prospect they had in life rather than fail in their allegiance to the British flag, and whose descendants have, once at least since then, held their own against as desperate odds as ever England herself has had to contend with.

Neither can we allow—even without discussing vexed questions of former interferences in our domestic politics—that we have derived those peculiar benefits from our alliance with her which most Englishmen choose to assume we have enjoyed.

We believe, indeed, that our union with the British empire was and is productive of great benefits, both morally and socially; but at the same time there is no denying that in order

to secure those advantages we had to submit to great immediate material sacrifices, so great indeed that nothing but the peculiar race and religion of the bulk of the Lower Canadians, and the peculiar circumstances which attended the foundation of Upper Canada, could have prevented this country from casting in its lot with the Union in former days.

Now, no doubt, the position is widely different; but, even now, it would be well for our English friends to remember that we have risks to encounter and arguments to advance as well as they.

They may say, and doubtless with truth, that but for the position of Canada they might go to war with the United States, or rather with what is left of them, without the least fear of consequences.

We on our side might maintain with equal reason, that but for our alliance with England we would have no fear of going to war at all.

And if it be urged that we are no help, but rather the reverse, in carrying out the Imperial policy, it is fairly open to us to retort that, as we have no voice in deciding what that policy is to be, we ought not to be taxed heavily on account of or exposed defenceless to dangers which that very policy may inflict upon us; and that when we find English authorities expressing their determination not to allow their 10,000 or 12,000 troops to be sacrificed because of our apathy and neglect, but by no means equally explicit in their assurances of adequate support even if we do exert ourselves to the uttermost—we Canadians, with certain episodes in our own past history before our eyes, may be pardoned if we have some uncomfortable doubts how much worth the assistance of the mother country may prove should she chance to be engaged in other wars at the critical moment, or how far the ravage and invasion of the richest and most populous parts of Canada would be compensated to us even by the greatest ultimate success or the most complete blockade or devastation of the Yankee seaboard.

In fact, it is not too much to say that there are one or two questions yet unanswered, floating dimly in the minds of the people of Canada, and raising doubts which we fear will have to be removed before any great national effort is to be expected from them—and these are, first, whether the English Government are really willing to assist us to the full extent of their power; and secondly, whether, granting their willingness, their and our combined resources are sufficient to hold out a reasonable prospect of defending Canada as a whole against American invasion.

As to the first, the English Government will, we doubt not, speak for itself at fitting time and place; but as to the second, which is the more important, inasmuch as a very great number have secretly taught themselves to look upon it as impossible to protect Canada, at least beyond the point to which British fleets can ascend the St. Lawrence, it may not be amiss to state briefly the grounds on which a contrary opinion is advanced.

It may be admitted at once, as now clearly evident to all parties, that the old United States could have overpowered all resistance had it chosen to hurl itself on Canada as it did on its own seceding States; but granting this, it by no means follows that it is equally in the power of the Northern fragment to crush us altogether, or even to maintain a violent and protracted warfare.

Nor is this opinion urged merely from considering the extent to which their resources have been diminished by their present conflict, severe as it is, but still more from the fact that in any future war they would never dare to fling their forces upon us in the same headlong fashion they did upon the South, so long as that South exists as a powerful and bitterly hostile nation adjoining their frontier for almost as many hundred miles as theirs does ours; or, in shorter phrase, that their power for mischief is no longer to be measured as thirty millions against three, or even as twenty, but rather as 20—10 is to 3—a vastly different problem.

We may add, too, as a consideration by no means to be lost sight of, that whereas the North all through this present war have been receiving enormous supplies of men and material from Europe, and at the same time extracting the bulk of their real revenue from their customs, all these resources would be at once and hopelessly cut off in the event of a war with England, and they in their turn would find themselves subjected to those privations and inconveniences which have heretofore pressed so heavily on the South—without the stimulus of fighting for home and liberty which has alone enabled the latter to bear up under the ordeal.

And though it would be both unsafe and unwise to lay too much stress on the exhaustion of the North; and though we do not doubt that even after the termination of the present struggle they could still contrive to array an army of two, three, or even five hundred thousand men, in any cause they had at heart, still we think, in view of the imperative necessity they would labor under of maintaining a large force in reserve to watch their Southern frontier and protect their seaboard, all must admit that it is scarcely probable they would be able to support such an armament for any great length of time, or that they would ever have more than 250,000 men at the outside at their disposal for the conquest of Canada—a force which, how great soever, is yet not so overwhelming but that the combined resources of England and of Canada might suffice to meet it, if the former can furnish but 50,000 regulars to back the 100,000 militia which, as we have shown above, we hold it quite possible for Canada to supply on her part.

Large as these numbers may sound, we have only too good proof in the recent history of America that it is abundantly *possible* to make such exertions; and at any rate as regards ourselves, we have a right to say that such odds, great as they are, ought not to terrify men fighting on the defensive and on their own soil, nor are they at worst one half as formidable as those which our own forefathers overcame in 1812, or as the gallant Southerners have defied for four long years of desperate

struggle, unaided and unrecognized by a single European State.

Nor is it to be forgotten while discussing this subject, that, as nothing tempts to crime so much as apparent facility for its commission, so, on the other hand, the bare knowledge of the fact that the conquest of Canada would require so large an armament would operate most powerfully to prevent the attempt ever being made—not merely from the evident magnitude of the enterprise, but also because that very magnitude would necessitate such preparation and consequent delay as would give American statesmen time to reflect, and English and Canadian ones opportunity to prepare to repel it.

✓ But so long as Americans believe (and we admit, looking at our existing state of preparation, with every appearance of reason) that an army of 50,000 men, easily collected at a few days' notice from any part of the North, could overrun Canada to the very gates of Quebec, before the news could well reach London—just so long as this continues possible, so long will the temptation to feed fat their ancient grudge and repair their losses at our expense continue to be almost too great for human virtue to withstand, though if it were once well understood by the people of the North that war with England for the acquisition of Canada meant a standing army of half a million, and a bloody, protracted and desperate contest, neither Congress nor Cabinet would be likely to drift into it unawares, or to choose that path as the easiest route to popularity at all events.

For the rest, we must say plainly that while yielding to none in our anxiety to see Canada do her duty as a Province of the Empire, it is not in the interests of Canada alone that we wish to have that duty clearly defined, and to know whether the Empire in its turn is prepared to fulfil its part towards its Province.

We desire to see Canada take her proper place as an ally, and no longer a mere dependency on the mother country, and we admit distinctly that up to this time she has not fully

recognised her obligations in that behalf. But that once done—those obligations faithfully discharged—we are prepared to claim for her the privileges as well as the duties of such a station, and if England disdains our alliance, or professes her inability to perform her fair share in a contract for mutual defence, then, in Heaven's name, let us bring our connection to an honorable close before it involve us and them in further difficulties, and perhaps in a ruinous and unprofitable contest.

The people of Canada, at least, have no sort of desire to become a drain or an incumbrance on England. And if the people of Great Britain have really come to the opinion that they derive no adequate benefit from their connection with us—if they are really of opinion that they have nothing to lose in losing control over half a continent—and in losing the Canadas they will assuredly lose every foot of ground they hold in British North America—if they consider that it will redound to their credit and advantage to let the keys of the North Atlantic drop into the hands of a bitter and jealous rival, the only one, too, who has shown the power and the will to dispute their maritime supremacy—all we ask is that they should acquaint us with their decision quickly and explicitly. *Only it is well that the British public should know that we in Canada are not prepared to admit that England maintains her connection with us wholly on our account and for our benefit; and further, that although unwilling to part so long as the tie between us is one of mutual affection and respect, we have no wish to continue as a drag and a burthen on the Empire.

And much as we hear of the risks and the difficulties to which England and English garrisons are exposed in defending Canada, it is impossible for us not to remember that such risks are trifling after all compared with those to which near three millions of people would have been exposed, for a quarrel in which they had no sort of concern, had war broken out at the time of the Trent imbroglio; and that heretofore, whenever disputes have arisen in matters where we were directly inter-

ested, British statesmanship has invariably delighted to display itself at our expense, as in barring the channel of the St. Lawrence to attack, and in surrendering our only path to the sea through British territory, and thus throwing great and needless obstacles in the way of our confederation for mutual support with the maritime provinces.

Of the fact that in the last attempt to conquer Canada we were left to struggle for full two years with very scanty succors, we say the less, because we are fully aware that England at that crisis was scarce able to assist us; but if it be made a taunt to us that our loyalty has risen marvellously since it became manifest that annexation to the North could hardly benefit us much in a pecuniary point of view, we may retort that after disregarding for some sixty years the great material advantages that union would have bestowed upon us, it is something more than ungenerous to talk of abandoning us now when our fidelity to England has lost us all the gain of half a century of unexampled progress, and her desertion might leave us to bear a large share of burthens which we had no voice in incurring.

✓ For it is mere trifling to deny that without a still further schism among the Northern States, the position of Canada or of British North America, as an independent power, is quite untenable as yet, whatever it may become at some future period; and therefore, that abandonment of Canada does not mean the erection of a friendly neutral state, but, in all human probability, the addition of three and a half millions of people and the whole North American seaboard to a foe, already too powerful, who will know well how to extract from such an acquisition resources and means of mischief of which English statesmen are perhaps but dimly aware.

Certainly, the events of the last few years, if they have taught England nothing else, ought at least to teach her rulers that there lurks deep in the minds of the American people a feeling of jealous and unreasoning enmity to England, which needs but a pretext and an opportunity to break out into open

flame—and if they suppose that allowing the North to acquire possession of British North America, and with it a hundred times more facilities for assailing English greatness in its most vital point—is at all likely to diminish their vindictiveness and their determination to wreak a full revenge for the thousand imaginary, and, it may be, some few real, wrongs they believe themselves to have sustained at our hands, then they have paid but little attention to the whole current of American affairs for the last two generations, or to the effect which four years of savage civil war have wrought in the national character.

As for us, though outwardly it may seem as if our fate depended most on our own exertions, it will turn in reality, as is ofteneft the case with dependencies, however powerful, on the tone and attitude of the mother country; hence it is that it is doubly needful her decision should be made and acted on without delay.

If Canada is to be held, *coute qui coute*, we have no more to say.

If Canada cannot be kept, and England wishes us to ask for our independence—let us know it at once.

If, on the other hand, England will stand by us to the last on certain conditions, it is high time those should be stated and our course be shaped accordingly.

In any event, it behoves both parties to put an end to the vacillating and irresolute attitude in which they stand, each doubting the other's loyalty or ability to protect or defend—afraid to break off, and yet unwilling to come to an understanding—afraid to give offence, and yet practically in some measure taunting and alienating each other—afraid of war, and yet afraid to act on the supposition that such a thing is possible.

It is time, we repeat, that this state of things were brought to a close—time that English statesmen should avow their determinations, and call upon us for ours.

This at least we have a right to require of them ; and if before this be done Canada should be conquered or even overrun and occupied for any length of time in a war originating out of some question of Imperial policy, or which had for its object avowedly the wresting of this country from the dominions of Great Britain—it needs but little foresight to perceive that the humiliation and soreness which such a calamity would inevitably produce in the minds of the Canadian people would be sure to react in the shape of a feeling of bitter resentment against the parent State for having neither protected them against such attack, or, if unable to do this, for having allowed them to drag on a connection which was likely to terminate in such a result.

How far such feelings would be modified or intensified by the reflection that we were ourselves considerably to blame, is an open question, though we fear that the knowledge that Canada individually has no sort of ground for quarrel with the Northern States, (for an assault on us for the express purpose of revenging themselves on Great Britain cannot surely be treated as arising out of any policy of ours, and they would find easier modes of compelling us to enter their confederacy than open war, were our connection with England at an end)—would go far to produce the latter consequence.

And yet, loath as we are to believe in the bare possibility of such an issue, none can deny that this or something like it would be the natural and appropriate termination of a state of things like the present, if Canada continue to decline taking any effective measures for her own defence, and if England persist in making audible proclamation to all the world that her colonies are in future to lie at the mercy of any opponent strong enough to overpower them—nay, that she would be rather thankful than otherwise to any one who would relieve her from the care of possessions which it would appear to be out of her power either to preserve or to relinquish.

APPENDIX.

A.

SPEECH ON THE ADDRESS, AUGUST, 1863.

Mr. CARTWRIGHT.—As I have the misfortune to differ from the member for Brant in toto, in the view he has taken of the position of the country, I would like, with the permission of the House, to state the grounds on which I have based my opinion. I confess I have much hesitation in addressing the House on a subject of so much importance. But I may, perhaps, be pardoned for reminding the House that there is no other subject at all approaching this in importance in which so complete a revolution has been effected by the events of the last few years—none other in dealing with which we will be so completely deprived of the benefits of past experience. Formerly, if we had met together to deliberate on the best mode of defending ourselves against a like danger, we might have fairly argued that it would require many months for the foe to concentrate or organize his forces—that his preparations could never be made in secret—that it would be time enough for us to prepare when we saw his troops assembling on our frontiers, and that even if the worst came to the worst, as between two brave undisciplined mobs, both equally brave and equally unorganized, the one which fought on its own soil, especially if backed by even a very small number of veteran troops, was almost sure to win against the heaviest odds. Now, however, as every member of this House well knows, the whole conditions of the case are completely changed; and though I would not flinch from the struggle because it may have to be maintained against heavy odds at the outset—I trust no man who hears me would do that—still it is worse than idle to disguise from ourselves or from the country that now, if war does come upon us, we shall have to deal with an enemy who has become, whatever he may have been before, a first-class military power in every sense of the word—who can bring against us, at the very shortest notice, an immense body of well-trained troops, amply provided with transports and munitions of war, and who, despite the deficiencies of some of their leaders, have proved again and again, on many a hard-fought field, that they possess their full share of the courage and endurance we are apt to arrogate as the birthright of our race. And therefore, Mr. Speaker, although I am very far from despairing of the safety of our country, because, as I said, we may have to hold our own against heavy odds at the outset, I cannot but feel that no ordinary exertions and no ordinary precautions will be needed to enable us to maintain

ourselves against an antagonist like this, especially when we remember that we occupy a country which is, at this moment, one of the most defenceless in the world—which, neither by climate, by geographical position, or by its natural or artificial fortresses, presents one single obstacle to the invaders' path—which, in one word, if assailed, must rely almost solely on the courage and the discipline of its sons to stem the torrent, at least till distant succors can arrive. Such, Mr. Speaker, is the country, and such the position, for whose defence we are called to provide; nor do I believe we can point out, along a frontier of more than a thousand miles, one single place of importance, which is two good days' march from American soil, or one single town, except, perhaps, that in which we stand, which could retard an invading army for an hour. And it may be well for us to bear in mind that though there are numerous instances in which small States, relatively weaker than we are, have baffled all the attempts of superior powers to subjugate them to their sway, there are none, none at least which I can recollect, in which the contest has terminated in their favor, except in cases where they were protected by inaccessible mountain ranges, as in Scotland or Switzerland, or by numerous artificial defences as in Holland, or by the very vastness and solitude of the territory which it was attempted to subdue, as with the United States themselves some eighty years ago, and with the Southern States to-day; or else, gentlemen, mark me, by the skill and forethought with which their government had trained their people to meet the coming shock. And am I to be told, Mr. Speaker, as some hon. gentlemen have not scrupled to hint, that, granting all I say is true—granting that we do actually lie helpless at the mercy of the American people, still there is no need for apprehension here—that we may all stay quiet, each man under the shadow of his own vine and his own fig tree, because the American people are too great and too mighty a people to care for the acquisition of such an unconsidered trifle as this Canada of ours—because they are too wise, too calm, too generous, I suppose, to assail their ancient foe in her only vulnerable quarter? If we are to be told, and if the country is to be told, that we are in no danger, because it is not worth while for the Americans to go to war for the sake of obtaining possession of Canada—that they would have no object to gain in conquering us—then I beg to call the attention of hon. gentlemen to one or two geographical facts, which can neither be gainsayed or denied, and which go far, indeed, to show that if this present struggle terminates unfavorably for the North, if the South does succeed in establishing its independence, then, Mr Speaker, then, and in such case, our Northern neighbors will not only have the strongest possible interest in obtaining possession of Canada, but what is more, they must obtain it, unless they are prepared to submit to yet further disintegrations of their still enormous empire. I do not know whether it has attracted the attention of the members of this House, but it is nevertheless the fact that the battle of Antietam itself was fought a short two hundred miles from the southern shores of Lake Erie, and that General Lee's outposts during both this and the preceding campaigns are said to have penetrated to within five or six days' march of the same quarter—or, in other words, that if the State of Virginia succeeds in accomplishing her secession, the great regions of the North-West and the North-East must remain as it were hanging apart, connected only by a comparatively narrow isthmus of territory, and

liable to be rent asunder by a hundred accidents. While on the other hand, just between these two great divisions of the North-West and the North-East, filling up the gap, and, as it were, the very key-stone required by manifest destiny to bind them together, lies Canada, so completely enveloped by their protecting arms that an air line drawn from St. Paul's, Minnesota, to the northern boundary of the State of Maine, would pass full one hundred miles north of the most northern portions of Canada, at any rate one hundred miles north of Ottawa and of Penetanguishine. Are we to be told, Mr. Speaker, that there is no danger here, that here is no temptation to a warlike and ambitious people? Why, sir, there is not one single statesman in Europe, or in America either, who would not tell us that the bloodiest wars have been waged, from time immemorial, for objects not one-tenth part as valuable to the people that coveted their possession. They would tell us that God has provided but two main arteries for the Continent of North America; that no dominant State can by possibility exist on this Continent which does not possess the absolute control either of the St. Lawrence or the Mississippi. They would remind us that the fate of North America has been fought out, once and again, on the very ground on which we stand, and they would warn us that men who, like the leaders of the Northern States, have trodden under foot their own most sacred traditions—who have sinned against light and knowledge—who have kindled a conflagration which may yet wrap the world in flames, and which will most certainly, I fear, consume their own rights and liberties, and done all this solely to gratify the insane lust of boundless empire, are not the men who will pause to count the cost, if any chance presented itself, to repair, at our expense, the losses and the humiliations they have incurred. And, though it is true we shall not have to face them alone (if face them we must), although in our mother-country we possess a most powerful and determined ally, ready and willing, if only time be given her, to aid us to the last, sustained by whom, I doubt not, we shall be able, if we only do our part faithfully and well, to roll back the fiercest tide of invasion from our shores; yet we must never forget that such is the nature of England's power, such the conditions of her greatness, that the very constitution of her empire compels her, more than any other people of equal strength, to scatter her armaments far and wide, over land and sea, and that her aid, though certain, can hardly help being tardy, too tardy to avoid the worst consequences from our negligence, if we cannot provide some effectual means of self defence till help can come. All that she has to give I doubt not we shall have in time of need. Arms, supplies, funds, leaders, ships—if we can use them—will be furnished without stint; but men, trained men, in sufficient numbers to repel a sudden invasion she cannot supply, for the best of all reasons, that she has not got them to send; and even the mightiest nation cannot extemporise them at an hour's notice, as our Northern neighbors have learned to their cost. Men, therefore, I repeat—trained men in sufficient numbers to repel a sudden attack—are what the Imperial Government, and I think justly, demands at our hands; and surely the very instinct of self-preservation would teach us to comply with the request, when we know that our enemy, in six weeks, could place one hundred thousand men on our frontier, while our protectress could scarcely, in as many months, with pain and difficulty, bring together half that number to our aid. How and in what manner that demand can best be answered, are matters which can be more fitly

discussed hereafter. All I can say, in conclusion, Mr. Speaker, is this, that I trust this House will then show itself mindful that it is the choice of a people who have made it their proudest boast that, of all England's hundred colonies, they alone are the representatives of men who sought this northern land, not driven forth by the pressure of penury at home; not through restless love of change; but because they preferred to give up house and land, to risk life and liberty itself, rather than swerve one inch from their duty to their country and their sovereign. And I trust also that they will show by their zeal and liberality on this momentous occasion that they are determined to wipe off the stain which unfortunately now rests on the loyalty of Canada, and which I believe every man in this House, be his politics what they may, regrets as deeply as I do.

B.

SPEECH ON HON. J. SANDFIELD MACDONALD'S MILITIA BILL, SEPTEMBER 1863.

MR. CARTWRIGHT.—MR. SPEAKER—I entirely agree with the honorable introducer of this measure in believing it to be one of momentous character; probably, all things considered, the most momentous which has ever been submitted to a Canadian Parliament. We may escape a war with the Northern States, or we may not. I for one believe that that result is to a great extent under our own control, and that the moment which sees us placed in an effective position of defence, sees the danger largely diminished, if not altogether removed. But war or no war, every reflecting man must clearly perceive that the time has come for a thorough reconsideration of our relations with the mother country—that we must either rise to the rank of allies and confederates of England, at least so far as North America is concerned, or else must prepare to sever a connection which we lack either the will or the ability to maintain. So long as we remain allies of England, and so long as England continues mistress of the seas, there is but one foe whom we have to dread; and the question is practically narrowed down to this, whether we are prepared to face the risk of a collision with that enemy, or whether, rather than run that danger, we prefer to burst the bond of union and establish ourselves as an independent State.

We have lived in peace and safety under the shadow of the British flag for fifty years, but still I think there is no denying that, even though we be the cause and temptation to war, our chief danger does arise from our connection with England. Were we once an independent State, I do not believe the Northern States would feel at all disposed to molest us, because they know that in all likelihood the course of events would soon induce us to unite our fate with theirs, or that even if we proved blind to our manifest and glorious destiny, a little wholesome pressure on our commerce would soon bring us suppliant to their feet. I need hardly say, Mr. Speaker, which way my own personal wishes tend. All I desire is that this House should see clearly the issues which really lie before us. We know that Canada will probably ultimately become independent; and if any man or any considerable party in this country honestly believe that

the time has come to prepare for becoming independent, in the interests alike of England and ourselves, their arguments might deserve consideration. At any rate, Mr. Speaker, it would be a far more honorable, far more respectable, attitude to declare themselves convinced that we ought to prepare ourselves for independence, than, while outwardly professing the utmost loyalty and anxiety to maintain our union, yet practically refuse all efficient co-operation even for our own defence. Be sure, Mr. Speaker, the people of England will not much longer bear patiently with the listless indifference our government, if not our people, have displayed, or consent to add to their own heavy burthens the task of entirely providing for the protection of a nation three millions strong, who will not take one effectual step on their own behalf. I wish to be clearly understood. I have not the least desire to impeach the loyalty of any man or any party in Canada. I fear no treason or treachery at the hands of any Canadian, but I do fear the apathy and listlessness shown in many influential quarters, and the determined blindness which refuses to admit the least possibility of war. I have no wish to tax the patience of the House by a recapitulation of the arguments which I used on a previous occasion to prove the extreme defencelessness of our position, and the temptation it presents to the cupidity of our American neighbors. It is scarcely worth while to argue these matters with men who will persist in expressing their confidence in the peaceable and amicable intentions of a people who, according to their own official statistics, have embodied every third male adult in their country for the prosecution of a war of conquest—who will persist, in the face of a thousand proofs, in denying that that people is actuated by a feeling of the bitterest hostility, if not to us, at all events to the nation of whom we form a dependency—and who ignore, apparently at least, the fact so well known to every student of American history, that, from the very moment the pilgrim fathers first set foot upon its shores, the absolute dominion of this continent has been an object of the intensest desire, not only to them and their descendants, but to every Englishman who inhabited it. Surely, Mr. Speaker, we Canadians ourselves a living proof of the desperate struggle the two great powers of Europe so long maintained for its mastery, must know full well how deeply rooted is that idea in every American mind, even if we did not now see that passion culminating in one of the most desperate and desolating wars which history has ever recorded. But I will not attempt to convince men who are prepared to assert that we are now in an effective state of defence, or that the American people do not entertain feelings of hostility towards England, and have no end to serve in conquering and annexing us. All these things must be taken for granted, Mr. Speaker, before the necessity of discussing such a measure as that now before us could ever have arisen, and we must presume that the government at least are fully convinced of the truth of these assertions before they would have consented to introduce it.

As regards the details of this Bill, Mr. Speaker, I shall only say that I believe many of them may be turned to good account; and at any rate I am glad to find that the honorable Minister of Militia has distinctly enunciated the principle that the country must rely mainly on her militia for defence. I am as proud as any man, Mr. Speaker, of the zeal and devotion of our volunteers, and I believe this country lies under a very deep obligation to them for preserving the courage and loyalty of our

people from the imputations which would otherwise have been thrown upon them. But for all that, I must say plainly that the more I reflect on the subject, the more I am convinced that their proper place is only as an auxiliary body to a regular force, whether it be composed of an effectively trained militia, as it should be with us, or a standing army as with other powers. I believe, sir, that the opinion of the people of Canada, if fairly ascertained, would be found to agree with what I have just expressed; and that they, too, while justly proud of the patriotic spirit of our Volunteers, do not, nevertheless, desire to place their chief reliance on that movement as a means of defence. I believe that the feelings of the people of Canada have been much misrepresented on this subject; and while it may be true enough that the utter inefficiency of previous militia organizations may have prejudiced them somewhat against the various systems which have been proposed for their acceptance, it was really but the defectiveness of the systems of which they complained; and that once satisfied of the possibility of creating a really effective militia, they will submit without a murmur to any expenditure which this House may see fit to impose. But I believe also, Mr. Speaker, that the instinctive good sense of our people has long since convinced them that it is impossible to obtain an effective soldiery, or even an effective militia, without subjecting them to some continuous discipline for a reasonable length of time. They know, sir, that something more is needed to make a man effective than mere knowledge of a few elementary manoeuvres—that he must be taught how to handle his arms, how to march, how to encamp; must, in one word, be subjected to actual military discipline for a length of time, which, without rendering him unfit for the ordinary duties of life, would make him efficient at short notice for the whole remainder of his existence. Depend upon it, Mr. Speaker, we cannot safely entrust the defence of a country to the amusement of a holiday afternoon. If we are ever to have an efficient force, that force must be trained by continuous discipline. I repeat, it is idle to suppose that a soldier or a militia man needs only to be perfect in his drill, or even to possess a tolerable aptitude in the use of his weapons—he requires to be trained to habits of obedience, to acquire the capacity of undergoing fatigue; habits which can only be attained by some temporary separation from the ordinary pursuits of life. And I must say, that I believe it has been a radical defect in many of the systems which have been proposed for our consideration, that they have all proceeded on the idea that it was possible to render men effective by training them for a few weeks or days in each successive year, and then turning them loose to forget during the remainder of the period all they had gained in each brief interval. Why, Mr. Speaker, what would be the result were we to apply such a principle to any ordinary scheme of education? I put it to the common sense of this House, were you to take a lad from the plough and attempt to instruct him in the commonest branch of learning, on the system of teaching him for two or three weeks in each year, and then dismissing him to forget during the remaining fifty all that he had previously acquired—I ask this House how long this hopeful system might be prolonged before he would have mastered the first principles of knowledge; whereas, had one-tenth part of the time thus fruitlessly wasted been spent in continuous instruction, he would have learned the lesson once and forever. Why should we apply to the education of our citizen soldiery a system which all would

admit to be hopelessly vicious were it applied to any other pursuit whatsoever. Let this House fix the number of men whom it thinks should constitute the permanent militia of Canada—let it decide how many months of consecutive training would suffice to render these men really efficient—I am contending for the principle not for the details—but let us at least determine that the contingent of Canada, be it large or small, shall be effective as far as it goes, and that every man it contains shall be so far trained that he may be able without shame to take his place in the field beside the soldiers of England.

The principle I advocate, Mr. Speaker, is neither new nor untried. It is one which has long been in use among many of the European powers, with slight modifications, and notably, I believe, in Prussia, from the time of Frederick the Great downwards; and it is one which, in some shape or other, has always been adopted by small States as the only mode in which they could possibly raise and discipline a force at once numerous enough and effective enough to oppose a barrier to the onset of a much superior foe. It is not my intention, Mr. Speaker, to enter into any minute details of this measure; but for the sake of illustrating my meaning—though I beg the House to remember that I introduce my figures for the sake of illustration chiefly—let us suppose that the House saw fit to decide on raising and disciplining a militia of 50,000 strong, to be raised say 20,000 next spring, 20,000 the year after, and thenceforward at the rate of 10,000 men in each successive year, each man to be subjected to at least six months consecutive actual training (in the open field if possible), and to be afterwards freed from all further military discipline, but required to hold themselves in readiness for a period of say five or ten years in case of actual war, thenceforward to constitute a body of reserve, only to be called out in circumstances of the most urgent national peril. Can any man say that such an effort would be out of fair proportion to our population and resources? I shall not stop to point out how useful our Volunteer system might become, were such a militia once trained and distributed through the country, or what privileges and exemptions might fairly be accorded to these men during the time they remain liable to active service. Neither will I do more than hint at the great benefits both physical and moral that would accrue to the vast bulk of our youthful agricultural population from being subjected to a little wholesome military discipline in early life. But I do say, that while no man can justly maintain that our youth would be exposed to any undue hardships by being obliged to undergo a single summer's training in a country which sends forth tens of thousands of hardy lumbermen and woodcutters to brave all the rigors of our Siberian winter, so neither can any man justly declare that such an exertion would be disproportionate to our resources and our numbers, whether we take for our standard of comparison the efforts put forth by the American colonies on many occasions prior to their separation from Great Britain, or of our own forefathers in the war of 1812, or of the smallest and poorest of the American States at the present moment.

Why, Mr. Speaker, even the little State of Maine has already furnished a quota of more than 40,000 men to the Federal Army; and Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, have each severally contributed contingents, as I am informed, of more than 100,000 each; and will any honorable member dare to rise on the floor of this House and declare that it is impossible

for Canada, with a population five times that of the former, and I believe double that of some of the others, to raise and discipline 50,000 men for one single summer for the purpose of her own defence, or rather, and which would be the fairer mode to describe my proposal, to train 10,000 each successive year?

I know well, Mr. Speaker, that many, even of those who admit the substantial truth of my assertions, will take refuge in the deplorable position of our finances as an all-sufficient excuse for refusing to take one really effective step in our own defence. If this be all, Mr. Speaker, if this House be willing to admit the truth of the principle, though unwilling to incur the cost of carrying it into effect, then I say that, humiliating as the confession may be to a country like ours to admit that our own extravagance has deprived us of the power to protect our very existence, it would be far better to state our real position frankly and honestly to the Imperial Cabinet, and obtain from them as a temporary loan, at low rates of interest, the wherewithal to put ourselves at last in a reasonable state of defence. I know something, Mr. Speaker, of the temper of the English people, and something of the temper of the men who now stand at the head of their affairs; and I feel perfectly assured that, once convince them that we are at last thoroughly awake to the duty of our own defence, once propose a really satisfactory military convention, and there is no fear that they will turn a deaf ear to our request. Moreover, there are good and sound reasons why England should gladly accede to such a proposition. We know that the mere effort of reinforcing her garrisons in North America is stated to have cost her first and last some ten millions of dollars, and that she is even now annually expending some \$8,000,000 in the maintenance of those very troops; and it is hardly to be supposed that her government would hesitate to lend us the utmost amount which we would require rather than sink perhaps five or six times the sum in the probably useless attempt to repair the consequences of our neglect.

But at any rate, Mr. Speaker, be this as it may, let England aid us or not, I must altogether refuse to believe that while it was possible for us to expend more than forty millions of dollars in improving our internal communications, and to squander millions upon millions in erecting an extravagant and costly pile of buildings at Ottawa, it is utterly out of our power to incur any extraordinary outlay for the preservation of our national existence—or that a country like ours, equal in wealth and numbers to many an independent European Kingdom, can afford to declare itself a cipher in affairs of peace and war, to act as if it were practically wholly unconcerned with the question whether or not it should be made the battle-field of contending armies—the theatre of all the miseries which we have seen inflicted on States that but a few months ago deemed themselves as safe from the scourge of war as we can possibly hope to be. And if this were not enough, did we need any additional incentive to do our duty, we might find it in the consideration that whatever course we, the premier colony of England, may decide on pursuing, will in all likelihood materially affect not only ourselves but the whole circle of colonial relations with the Empire. If we return a sufficient answer to England's just demand—if we show that ours is no fictitious lip loyalty, but that we do earnestly desire to maintain our connection with our parent land, and are willing to bear a fair proportionate

share in the burthen of our own defence, it will go far to prove the possibility of erecting our whole colonial system into a great British confederacy. If, on the other hand, the people of this country see fit to declare that the effort is beyond their ability, and that the interest of England no less than ours requires that we should put an end to a union which, so long as we continue in our present position, is indeed but a source of weakness to her and danger to us, why then we might have some right to congratulate ourselves on our discretion, if not on our loyalty. But if after three years' warning, we can find no better answer than is contained in this mockery of a measure which I hold in my hand, then I do assert, Mr. Speaker, that we shall stand for ever degraded as a people who, while unable to deny the existence of the danger, yet showed themselves devoid alike of the courage to prepare to meet it manfully, or of the prudence to withdraw from it while there was yet time.

C.

SPEECH ON THE ADDRESS, 24TH FEBRUARY, 1864.

MR. CARTWRIGHT.—MR. SPEAKER—Before this paragraph of the Address be finally disposed of, there are a few points to which I wish to call the attention of the House. It will be in their recollection that there was much difference of opinion last session as to the proper system to be pursued, both with militia and volunteers. Now, sir, though I am far from asserting that I have been able to give this matter the attention it deserves, I may be permitted to say that I have taken some pains during the recess to make myself acquainted with the condition and feelings of our Volunteer Force, and the result of my inquiries has been to convince me that there is a pretty general and widespread feeling of discontent amongst them at the treatment they have received from Government. I must add, in common justice to the Hon. Minister of Militia, that some of their complaints did not appear to me very well founded, or at least that they entertained expectations out of the power of the Province to gratify, if any expense is to be incurred on behalf of the regular militia. But, at the same time, after making all reasonable deductions, no one can deny that there is much in the position in which they find themselves to justify dissatisfaction. Right or wrong, Mr. Speaker, it is certain that they are the only embodied force now existing in Canada, and it is only natural that they should hold themselves entitled to the special consideration of Government, so long as that continues to be the case. I have been charged myself, though most unfairly, with depreciating the services of the volunteers. So far from that, I say now, as I have always said, that they have done a most excellent piece of service, and that their country will ever owe them a deep debt of gratitude for throwing themselves into the breach till some proper organization can be matured—an organization which should distribute the burthen, as statesmen ought to do, evenly over the surface of the whole nation—not leave it as now so arranged as to crush to earth the willing few. But I say also, Mr. Speaker, that now that time has been given, it is absurd, it is unworthy of the Government, to wrest these gallant fellows' devotion into an excuse for throwing the whole burthen of the defence of the

country upon them—much more, to make it a taunt to men who step forward to relieve Canada from the ignominy which *their* factiousness, *their* mismanagement, had brought upon us, that, forsooth, the volunteer movement was a failure, because, though avowedly intended as a temporary substitute, avowedly designed as an auxiliary to our regular militia, it is not of itself enough to do what it never pretended to do—is not able, with a force drawn from one-tenth of our population, to defend not merely that portion, but the whole remaining nine-tenths to boot! Sir, the volunteer movement is not a failure, but I very much fear Her Majesty's present government in Canada is a failure—notably in their militia department, and, *par excellence*, in that part of it which concerns our volunteers. Why, sir, the whole system as it stands is an absurdity and an anomaly: the very titles are misnomers, the very provisions of the law self-contradictory. We have volunteers serving of their own free choice, subjected or attempted to be subjected to strict discipline—enrolled militia bound by law to do duty exempt from all drill or training whatever—we have hon. gentlemen in one breath denying that *six months'* continued instruction is enough to qualify men to serve on an emergency—in another asserting that *six weeks* in a military school will not only enable them to act as officers, but even to instruct others in the elements of soldiership. We have them at one moment declaring that there is not the slightest ground for apprehending danger from the United States, and straightway proposing to appropriate one-seventh of our available income to the task of preparing against such a war. We have them in one and the same speech avowing that volunteering was a failure as a means of defence, and that it was their fixed intention to have no other means of defence whatever!!! If the volunteers are to be maintained, as I hope they may be, let us treat them as such, not attempting to enforce strict discipline upon men over whom, from the very nature of the case, we can never exercise any real control, not harassing them and perplexing ourselves with innumerable regulations, or fretting ourselves too much as to *how* they attain proficiency—but as is done in England, and as was suggested, I believe, by my hon. friend the member for Kingston, assigning a certain sum per man to each efficient corps, and confining our interference to taking careful precautions that no payment be made for any man who is not fully up to the proper standard. Such a course, I have reason to know, would be at once far more popular with the volunteers themselves, and far more economical to the public purse, besides being far more consistent with what I hold to be the only true theory with regard to volunteers, viz., that they are to be looked on purely as an auxiliary body, most useful, most admirable in that respect, but no more to be considered our sole or even chief means of protection than our volunteer country justices the sole and final dispensers of justice throughout our community. As to the existing Militia Law, Mr. Speaker, for the amendments to which I see so much credit is claimed, I am not disposed to find much fault with it—in fact, I believe that with a few alterations it could be made to suit our purpose well enough. Neither do I know that it would be advisable to ask for any great addition to our present annual expenditure for military purposes—our yearly outlay being perhaps as much as we can well afford to incur—but I do deliberately assert that having regard to our peculiar position, to our internal resources, our means of defence, our relations to the Imperial Government—and lastly, but not

leastly, to the strength and character of the only antagonist whom we have to fear, it would be hardly possible to spend our money to less advantage than we are now doing; and, in a word, that given the problem how to get through the largest sum with the least beneficial result, our present system would afford an almost perfect solution. It seems to have been assumed on both sides, Mr. Speaker, that that system having no other merit that I know to boast of, perhaps *because* it had no other merit, must therefore of necessity be a cheap one. The House, and the country, too, seem to have imagined that it was impossible that gentlemen whose sole claim to office lay in their supposed frugality, could have committed themselves to a scheme which, as I shall presently show, costs us double, nay quadruple, per head more than any other need do if properly managed. This assumption of cheapness I can by no means acquiesce in. I maintain, and I think the House will agree with me therein, that there is but one mode of thoroughly testing any of these systems. Given the total expenditure for military purposes during a sufficiently long period, and given also the number of men you have fit for service at the end of that period, and the total sum expended, divided by the number of efficient men so produced, will give you the exact cost per man under that particular system. Now, sir, apply that test to our present arrangement, and what do we find? Why, we find that every efficient volunteer now produced costs the country on the average more than \$40 per head per annum, that is to say, over \$200 each in every period of five years, and over \$400 in every period of ten years; and what is more, that even without exercising their right to withdraw on giving a few months' notice, every volunteer is, *ipso facto*, free from further service on the expiration of five years—while on the other hand, a most effective militia, ready for service during the whole period of manhood, might be trained and disciplined for a cost of \$100 per man, perhaps less. These are facts worth attention, Mr. Speaker; and surely no man, whatever his prejudices, will be found to declare that a well drilled militia 50,000 strong is not in every way preferable to one-fourth their number dissoluble at a bare six or two months' notice: and yet this is precisely the result we will arrive at, on the expiration of any given period of ten years, the cost in either case being exactly the same. It would be easy, Mr. Speaker, to go on to multiply examples of the absurdities and inconveniences of a system which absorbs one-third, if not one-half, of our whole appropriation in mere allowances to staff officers and instructors, and which professes to be administered by a gentleman who combines in his own person the three-fold offices of Minister of Militia, Attorney-General, Premier, and, we might almost add, whipper-in for his whole Cabinet. But, as time is drawing on, I shall merely take occasion to notice briefly two or three objections which were thrown out to-day against the scheme which I had the honor of submitting to this House last session. As to the cost, which is so great a stumbling-block in the minds of many hon. gentlemen who have chosen to confound the cost of maintaining a militia with that of a standing army, and who are terrified by visions of stores, arsenals, barracks, and I know not what costly and cumbrous paraphernalia thereto belonging, let it suffice to assure them that my plan contemplated nothing whatever of the kind. All it proposed was simply this, to assemble a certain proportion of our first-class service men, and to encamp them for a few summer months in convenient positions in company with a few detachments of regular soldiers, and my estimates of

the cost were in fact based on the amount requisite for maintaining an ordinary English or American foot soldier for an equal time, assuming only,—what we have every reason to expect we may rely on obtaining, in any such attempt—the active and cheerful co-operation of the mother country. As to the much more important question whether the amount of training proposed, viz., six months, would suffice to make them always thereafter capable of serving in the field at a few weeks' notice—I must speak with some caution—since while perfectly certain that it would go much further towards effecting that end than a much longer period of desultory instruction, with frequent breaks and long intervals between, nothing but actual experience could determine this point absolutely. This, however, may be said, which is indeed well known to every trainer and gymnast, that when once a certain proficiency in any athletic exercise has been attained, the person attaining it, though without constant practice he very soon falls off from any high degree of proficiency, is always able, so long as health and vigor remain intact, to regain his former skill in a very short period; and further, that most men can be brought to the highest point of perfection they are ever likely to reach in six months or less. If this prove true, as there seems every reason to suppose it may, with regard to military habits and exercises as well as athletic pursuits, it would go far to prove my case—at any rate a brief experience would show whether it is correct or not. As to the other objections, which, so far as I know, are these three, the injury to industrial pursuits and demoralization to the young men themselves caused by withdrawing them from their occupations and shutting them up in camps, and also the necessity of obtaining them by conscription or ballot, I have to reply that the slightest consideration might have shown those hon. gentlemen that the withdrawal of so very small a number as one hundred lads per county for a single summer can hardly by any possibility retard the commercial or agricultural interests of a country like ours, while as to the demoralization consequent on collecting a few thousand young men in camp in proper situations, passing over the very bad compliment which these gentlemen pay to our Canadian youth, in supposing mutual contact is likely to corrupt them to so alarming an extent, it is as well to remember that theirs will be no life of idleness or garrison routine, but one which, if properly managed, will provide abundance of healthy exercise for body and mind. And I may add, I have yet to learn, Mr. Speaker, what there is in strict and systematic physical training to predispose men to that profligacy and debauchery which some affect to dread, and which is in truth rather the invariable concomitant of an effeminate and luxurious mode of living. As for the necessity of obtaining the requisite number by ballot, though it ought to be enough to point out that this is the mode prescribed by our existing law, I shall just observe that no man has a right to assume that our militia would refuse to volunteer for the purpose till the experiment had been tried and failed, but that even if they did decline to come forward in that manner, it would be as absurd to leave the country undefended on that score as to leave our taxes uncollected because the contributors would not pay unless compelled. There are some powers, Mr. Speaker, which no nation and no government can possibly resign without giving up the power of maintaining its very existence; and if there be one of those which is plainer than another, it is that of requiring that a reasonable number of its inhabitants should submit to be trained to defend themselves and their country

in such manner as the government of that country shall prescribe. But this, Mr. Speaker, is a point on which it ought to be unnecessary to dwell at length, nor do I wish to detain the House by entering into more minute details on the general subject, though I do unhesitatingly assert that the sole and only result of our present system, whether persisted in for five, ten, or twenty years, will be to leave us in possession of a small and comparatively inefficient force, over whom we can have no proper control, for the self-same cost which might furnish us with double, quadruple, or octuple their number of disciplined militia, who would always be thoroughly at our disposal, and who, with the assistance we might expect from the mother country, would be able to maintain their ground right manfully against all comers. And I assert also, that while everything that has transpired—(outside the walls of this House, that is to say)—since the time of the Trent difficulty, has gone to show that the people of Canada, as a whole, are anxious and earnest to do *their* duty in this matter, loyal to their allegiance, ready to bear any burthen Ministers may see fit to impose for *that* object, those hon. gentlemen on the other hand have squandered most valuable opportunities and failed most deplorably in taking advantage of the facilities which the then temper of our people afforded them for making every reasonable provision for the defence of this Province. Perhaps, Mr. Speaker, considering the circumstances under which those hon. gentlemen obtained power, this is not much to be wondered at—perhaps it may be that their factious folly on that occasion has tied their hands and prevented them from taking those steps which their better judgment would have dictated had they left themselves free agents on this question. Be that as it may, though I fear they have flung away chances which may never return, I do trust most sincerely that ere this session be brought to a close we shall see something like an adequate system of defence set on foot, and may be able to return to our homes with the knowledge that we have at last obtained some better safeguard against danger than our present most flimsy organization—some better security for peace than the guileless moderation of our Yankee neighbors—some better means of repelling attack than a revised militia muster roll.

D.

The figures from the Army Estimates for 1864-5 are as follows:—

1st. Clothing.....	£ 596,694 stg.
2nd. Provisions.....	520,301 "
3rd. Allowances and Pay.....	5,051,257 "
Total.....	£6,168,252 "

This includes pay of regimental staff, officers, cavalry and artillery, and a few other items not at all requisite to include in estimating the true cost of a foot soldier. Prices of provisions, fuel, and so forth, are also much higher at most stations than in Canada.

The number of men (exclusive of those serving in India) is 145,654 of all ranks, and the total vote demanded for them amounted in 1864-5 to £8,619,087 stg., of which about two millions and a half were for forage,

special staff allowances, and some other items no way directly affecting the cost per head.

The remainder of the expenditure required to make up the whole sum of £14,888,884 stg. consists of votes for stores, ammunition, works and buildings, and so on.

In the Cornhill Magazine for August, 1864, appears an analysis of the exact cost of a British soldier per week, which we subjoin :—

	<i>s. d.</i>
" 5½ lbs. of butcher meat, at 6d. per lb.....	2 10
10½ lbs. bread, at 1½d. per lb.....	1 4
Expenses of vegetables, tea, coffee, milk, &c., at 2½d. per day	1 5½
Washing at ½d. per diem.....	0 3½
Lodgings, at 3d. per night.....	1 9
Pocket-money (after deducting washing, and expenses of clothing for which the soldier pays), at 4d. per day.....	2 4
(The dragoon clears about 6d.)	
Clothing found gratis, value about £4 per annum.....	1 6
Advantages of the absolute certainty of these allowances at the same rates, no matter what the cost to Government may be, of medical care and attendance, and full pay when sick, the value of bounty and free kit received on enlist- ment, the likelihood of a small pension if invalided, prospec- t of good-conduct pay, promotion, &c., estimated at...	1 0
Total weekly substantial receipts of the soldier under the present <i>regime</i>	12 6"

From this, which appears approximately correct, the probable cost of rations for a large number might be set down at from 5s. to 6s. stg. per week. As before observed, there is no reason why this should be exceeded or indeed equalled in Canada.

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