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APPENDIXDRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC _____*, approved on _____** .
Your attention is invited to The Problem (Paragraph 1) and the Con-
clusions (paragraph 5).

It is requested that an appropriate Committee of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff be directed to work in collaboration with the State-
War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East. *His further etc*
(same as paper 2)

It is ^{also} ~~further~~ requested that the SWNCC be advised of the Committee
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to which the subject is assigned.

* Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC
to the paper of which this letter is the Appendix.

** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves
the paper of which this letter is the Appendix.

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SECRETCOPY NO. 15 April 1945ENCLOSUREPOLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:JAPAN'S UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE--GENERAL ORDERS:POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIALReferences: SWNCC 16 Series
SWNCC 21Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far EastTHE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of General Orders on political, economic and financial matters for issuance in connection with the unconditional surrender or collapse of Japan *by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Armed Forces.*

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Subcommittee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific-Far Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems, the Subcommittee submit in each case to SWNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

3. The subject, "Japan's Unconditional Surrender or Collapse--General Orders: Political, Economic and Financial" appears as item V-7 on the revised list. (SWNCC 16/4).

4. See attached slip

5. The conclusions and recommendations which follow are submitted in compliance with paragraph 6 b of SWNCC 16/2.

CONCLUSIONS

6. It is concluded that:

a. The scope of the General Orders on political, economic ^{and} financial matters should include only those measures which require

SECRETCOPY NO. 15 April 1945ENCLOSUREPOLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:JAPAN'S UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE--GENERAL ORDERS:
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIALReferences: SWNCC 16 Series
SWNCC 21Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far EastTHE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of General Orders on political, economic and financial matters for issuance in connection with the unconditional surrender or collapse of Japan *by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Armed Forces.*

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Subcommittee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific-Far Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems, the Subcommittee submit in each case to SWNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

3. The subject "Japan's Unconditional Surrender or Collapse"

4. While the preparation of the General Orders on political, economic and financial matters will require assistance from the Department of State and the Treasury Department, comparable general orders or directives have been prepared by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the Military Government Section, Central Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Personnel particularly qualified to prepare these general orders is available in these two agencies.

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immediate post-surrender action by the Commander-in-Chief.

b. The War Department (Civil Affairs Division) should be requested by SWNCC:

- (1) TO prepare the initial draft of these General Orders.
- (2) TO collaborate with the Military Government Section, Central Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and with other appropriate Federal agencies in the preparation of the general orders, and
- (3) TO submit the report to the SWNCC ~~through the Subcommittee for the Far East.~~

c. ~~The SWNCC Secretary should simultaneously direct the Subcommittee for the Far East to review the report when received and forward it with its recommendations to SWNCC.~~

d. The report should then be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comment and ~~recommendations from the military point of view.~~

e. The draft of the paper prepared by the War Department in collaboration with the ~~proper agencies of the Navy Department~~ ^{other governmental agencies} should, when received by ~~the Secretary of~~ ^{the} SWNCC, ^A be issued as a numbered SWNCC paper.

- d. The SWNCC Secretary should then simultaneously:
- (1) Request the J.C.S. through its Secretary to designate the appropriate J.C.S. agency to consider the subject.
 - (2) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate J.C.S. agency designated to consider the subject.
 - (3) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East etc.

Here copy paragraph marked in BLUE

e. The appropriate J.C.S. agency should then report to the J.C.S. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be requested by SWNCC to designate an appropriate agency:

(1) to prepare the initial draft of a paper or papers on the above subject, and

(2) to collaborate with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East in the preparation of an integrated report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. The SWNCC Secretary should simultaneously:

(1) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate JCS agency designated to consider the subject.

(2) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to secure appropriate views within the State, War and Navy Departments, and coordination with other civilian agencies as may be appropriate. (Such views and coordination should generally be secured after collaboration by the appropriate JCS agency and the Coordinating Subcommittee has resulted in tentative agreement.)

d. The appropriate JCS agency should then report to the JCS, giving divergent views, if any. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

f. Upon receipt of a report from the JCS, SWNCC should consider the report with such further advice as may be necessary from the appropriate officials within the three Departments.

g. The final paper as approved by SWNCC should be transmitted to the interested governmental departments and agencies as approved governmental policy for their guidance, and where appropriate, for proper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7.8. That the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

a. Approve the above Conclusions.

b. Dispatch the letter in the Appendix to the Secretary of War ~~Joint Chiefs of Staff~~ and to the Secretary of the Navy.

SECRETAPPENDIX

Secretary of War, and
DRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Secretary of the Navy

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC _____ *, approved on _____ **. Your attention is invited to "The Problem (Paragraph 1) and the "Conclusions" (Paragraph 5).

It is requested that ~~an appropriate Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~~ be directed to work in collaboration with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East. It is further requested that ~~the initial draft paper~~ be prepared by the JCS agency designated.

~~It is also requested that the SWNCC be advised of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to which the subject is assigned.~~

It is requested that appropriate agencies of the War and Navy Departments collaborate in the preparation of a paper or papers on this subject for submission to ^{the} SWNCC through the State War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East.

* Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to the paper of which this letter is the Appendix.

** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves the paper of which this letter is the Appendix.

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COPY NO. —10

21 April 1945ENCLOSURE

POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
JAPAN'S UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE--GENERAL ORDERS:
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

References: SWNCC 16 Series
SWNCC 21

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of General Orders on political, economic and financial matters for issuance by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Armed Forces in connection with the unconditional surrender or collapse of Japan.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Subcommittee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific-Far Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems, the Subcommittee submit in each case to SWNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

3. The subject, "Japan's Unconditional Surrender or Collapse--General Orders: Political, Economic and Financial", appears as Item V-7 on the revised list. (SWNCC 16/4).

4. While the preparation of the General Orders on political, economic and financial matters will require assistance from the Department of State and the Treasury Department, comparable general orders or directives have been prepared by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the Military Government Section, Central

Enclosure

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Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Personnel particularly qualified to prepare these general orders is available in these two agencies.

5. The conclusions and recommendations which follow are submitted in compliance with paragraph 6 b of SWNCC 16/2.

CONCLUSIONS

6. It is concluded that:

a. The scope of the General Orders on political, economic and financial matters should include only those measures which require immediate post-surrender action by the Commander-in-Chief.

b. The War Department (Civil Affairs Division) should be requested by SWNCC:

(1) To prepare the initial draft of these General Orders.

(2) To collaborate with the Military Government Section, Central Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and with other appropriate Federal agencies in the preparation of the general orders, and

(3) To submit the report to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

c. The draft of the paper prepared by the War Department in collaboration with the other governmental agencies, when received by the SWNCC Secretary, should be issued as a numbered SWNCC paper.

d. The SWNCC Secretary should then simultaneously:

(1) Request the J.C.S. through its Secretary to designate the appropriate J.C.S. agency to consider the subject.

(2) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate J.C.S. agency designated to consider the subject.

(3) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to secure appropriate views within the State, War and Navy Departments, and coordination with other civilian agencies as may be appropriate. (Such views and coordination should generally be secured after collaboration by the appropriate J.C.S. agency and the Coordinating Subcommittee has resulted in tentative agreement.)

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e. The appropriate J.C.S. agency should then report to the J.C.S. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

f. Upon receipt of a report from the J.C.S., SWNCC should consider the report with such further advice as may be necessary from the appropriate officials within the three Departments.

g. The final paper as approved by SWNCC should be transmitted to the interested governmental departments and agencies as approved governmental policy for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS


7. That the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:


a. Approve the above Conclusions.


b. Dispatch the letter in the Appendix to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

APPROVED:



EUGENE H. DOOMAN

General Strong

General Brooks

Colonel Harloe

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APPENDIX

DRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR, AND
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC _____*, approved on _____**. Your attention is invited to "The Problem" (Paragraph 1) and the "Conclusions" (Paragraph 6).

It is requested that appropriate agencies of the War and Navy Departments collaborate in the preparation of a paper or papers on this subject for submission to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

- * Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to the paper of which this letter is the Appendix.
- ** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves the paper of which this letter is the Appendix.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

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SM-1447
27 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE:

Subject: Initial Allied Control Machinery
For the Japanese Empire.

Enclosure: Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff from the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee dated 24
April 1945 transmitting copies
No. 49 each of SWNCC 88 and SWNCC
88/1/D.

The enclosed report by the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee for the Far East is referred to
the Joint Civil Affairs Committee for collaboration with
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee by prepar-
ing the draft of a paper on the above subject and by
presenting the military implications.

The integrated report will be submitted to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff with a recommendation from the
military point of view.

A copy of this directive has been furnished
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

When the enclosure has served its purpose it
is requested that it be returned.

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

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Far Eastern Subcommittee

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8 May 1945

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WAR DEPARTMENT:**

**Subject: Japan's Unconditional Surrender
or Collapse--General Orders:
Political, Economic and Finan-
cial.**

1. By informal action on 8 May 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved the recommendations contained in SWNCC 89, copy of which is attached.

2. It is therefore requested that the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, in collaboration with the Military Government Section of the Navy Department, prepare the initial draft of this paper or papers and submit the resultant study or studies to the SWNCC for consideration.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

Encl.

Cy no. 48, SWNCC 89.

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8 May 1945

**MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICER IN CHARGE, MILITARY GOVERNMENT
SECTION, CENTRAL DIVISION, OGNO, NAVY
DEPARTMENT:**

**Subject: Japan's Unconditional Surrender
or Collapse--General Orders:
Political, Economic and Finan-
cial.**

1. By informal action on 8 May 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved the recommendations contained in SWNGC 89, copy of which is attached.

2. It is therefore requested that the Military Government Section, Central Division, OGNO, Navy Department, in collaboration with the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, prepare the initial draft of this paper or papers and submit the resultant study or studies to the SWNGC for consideration.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee;

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

Encl.

Cy 49, SWNGC 89.

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S E C R E TCOPY NO. 28SWNCC 8817 April 1945Pages 1 to 5, Incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEINITIAL ALLIED CONTROL MACHINERY FOR
THE JAPANESE EMPIREReferences: a. SWNCC 16/2
b. SWNCC 16/4Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report by the Far East Subcommittee, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

SWNCC 88

SECRETENCLOSUREPOLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
INITIAL ALLIED CONTROL MACHINERY FOR THE JAPANESE EMPIREReport by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far EastTHE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of statements of United States policy to be incorporated in a paper or papers on the subject:

a. "The Creation of Initial Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire", to include:

(1) Japan proper and Karafuto (Southern part of Sakhalin)

(2) Formosa

(3) Korea

b. United States views on the establishment of a U.S. Nucleus Group for Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Subcommittee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific-Far Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems the Subcommittee submit in each case to SWNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

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3. "The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and other Areas: Initial Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire and other Areas", and "U.S. Nucleus Group for Allied Control Machinery" appear as items 5 and 6 under Item IV on the revised list (SWNCC 16/4).

4. The conclusions and recommendations which follow are submitted in compliance with paragraph 6 b of SWNCC 16/2.

DISCUSSION

5. Inasmuch as it is contemplated that Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire, including Karafuto, Formosa, and Korea, will be directed in its initial stage by military personnel of the participating nations, a request from SWNCC for the initiation of such a paper or papers should go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If Allied Control Machinery is to be established in areas other than those enumerated above, special papers will be later submitted with respect thereto.

CONCLUSIONS

6. It is concluded that:

a. In general, the scope of the paper or papers with respect to the Japanese Empire should include:

(1) a discussion of the general organization of the Initial Control Machinery;

(2) a discussion of the desirability of dividing the areas to be occupied into zones to be controlled by one or more of the Allied Nations;

(3) a discussion of the manner in which Control Machinery may extend to the various parts of the Empire, including Karafuto, Formosa, and Korea and the several zones which may be created;

S E C R E T

(4) a draft of an agreement regarding zones of occupation and organization to be entered into by the participating nations; and

(5) recommendations on the organization and composition of a U.S. Nucleus Group for Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be requested by SWNCC to designate an appropriate agency:

(1) to prepare the initial draft of a paper or papers on the above subject, and

(2) to collaborate with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East in the preparation of an integrated report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. The SWNCC Secretary should simultaneously:

(1) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate J.C.S. agency designated to consider the subject.

(2) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to secure appropriate views within the State, War and Navy Departments, and coordination with other civilian agencies as may be appropriate. (Such views and coordination should generally be secured after collaboration by the appropriate J.C.S. agency and the Coordinating Subcommittee has resulted in tentative agreement.)

d. The appropriate J.C.S. agency should then report to the J.C.S. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

e. Upon receipt of reports from the J.C.S., SWNCC should consider the reports with such further advice as may be necessary from the appropriate officials within the three Departments.

S E C R E T

f. The final papers as approved by SWNCC should be transmitted to the interested governmental departments and agencies as approved governmental policy for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

- a. Approve the above conclusions.
- b. Dispatch the letter in the Appendix to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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S E C R E TA P P E N D I XDRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC _____*, approved on _____**. Your attention is invited to "The Problem" (paragraph 1) and the "Conclusions" (paragraph 6).

It is requested that an appropriate Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed to work in collaboration with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East in the preparation of a draft paper or papers on the subject. It is further requested that the initial draft paper be prepared by the J.C.S. agency designated.

It is also requested that the SWNCC be advised of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to which the subject is assigned.

* Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to the paper of which this letter is an Appendix.

** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves the paper of which this letter is an appendix.

SECRETCOPY NO. 105 April 1945ENCLOSUREPOLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:INITIAL ALLIED CONTROL MACHINERY FOR THE JAPANESE EMPIRE

Reference: SWNCC 16 Series

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far EastTHE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of statements of United States policy to be incorporated in a paper or papers on the subject:

a. "The Creation of Initial Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire", to include:

- (1) Japan proper and Karafuto (Southern part of Sakhalin)
- (2) Formosa
- (3) Korea

b. United States views on the establishment of a U.S. Nucleus Group for Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Subcommittee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific-Far Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems the Subcommittee submit in each case to SWNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

3. "The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and other Areas: Initial Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire and other Areas," and "U.S. Nucleus Group for Allied Control Machinery" appear as items 5 and 6 under Item IV on the revised list. (SWNCC 16/4).

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4. The conclusions and recommendations which follow are submitted in compliance with paragraph 6 b of SWNCC 16/2.

DISCUSSION

5. Inasmuch as it is contemplated that Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire, including Karafuto, Formosa, and Korea, will be directed in its initial stage by military personnel of the participating nations, a request from SWNCC for the initiation of such a paper or papers should go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If Allied Control Machinery is to be established in areas other than those enumerated above, special papers will be later submitted with respect thereto.

CONCLUSIONS

6. It is concluded that:

a. In general, the scope of the paper or papers with respect to the Japanese Empire should include:

(1) a discussion of the general organization of the Initial Control Machinery;

(2) a discussion of the desirability of dividing the areas to be occupied into zones to be controlled by one or more of the Allied Nations;

(3) a discussion of the manner in which Control Machinery may extend to the various parts of the Empire, including Karafuto, Formosa, and Korea and the several zones which may be created;

(4) a draft of an agreement regarding zones of occupation and organization to be entered into by the participating nations; and

(5) recommendations on the organization and composition of a U.S. Nucleus Group for Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be requested by SWNCC to designate an appropriate agency:

(1) to prepare the initial draft of a paper or papers on the above subject, and

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(2) to collaborate with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East in the preparation of an integrated report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

g. The SWNCC Secretary should simultaneously:

(1) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate JCS agency designated to consider the subject.

(2) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to secure appropriate views within the State, War, and Navy Departments, and coordination with other civilian agencies as may be appropriate. (Such views and coordination should generally be secured after collaboration by the appropriate JCS agency and the Coordinating Subcommittee has resulted in tentative agreement).

d. The appropriate JCS agency should then report to the JCS. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

e. Upon receipt of reports from the JCS, SWNCC should consider the reports with such further advice as may be necessary from the appropriate officials within the three Departments.

f. The final papers as approved by SWNCC should be transmitted to the interested governmental departments and agencies as approved governmental policy for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

* There will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to the paper of which this letter is **RECOMMENDATIONS**

7. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

a. Approve the above conclusions.

b. Dispatch the letter in the Appendix to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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APPENDIX

DRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC _____*, approved on _____**. Your attention is invited to "The Problem (paragraph 1) and the "Conclusions" (paragraph 5).

It is requested that an appropriate Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed to work in collaboration with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East in the preparation of a draft paper or papers on the subject. It is further requested that the initial draft paper be prepared by the JCS agency designated.

It is also requested that the SWNCC be advised of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to which the subject is assigned.

* Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to the paper of which this letter is an Appendix.

** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves the paper of which this letter is the Appendix.

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Page 1.

Par 3. "The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and other Areas": Initial Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire and other Areas, and U.S. nucleus group for Allied Control Machinery" appear as items 5 and 6 under item IV on ~~Attachment 10/4~~ the revised final Survey 10/4.

6 6. P. 2

1. to prepare the initial draft of a paper on papers on the above subject, and
 2. to collaborate with the Staff - War - Navy Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Far East in the preparation of an integrated report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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(LT COL FAHEY)

2 April 1945

ENCLOSUREPOLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EASTINITIAL ALLIED CONTROL MACHINERY FOR THE JAPANESE EMPIREReference: SNCC 16 SeriesReport by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Far EastTHE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of

Statements of U.S. policy to be incorporated in a paper or papers on the subject: ^A "The Creation of Initial Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire", to include:

- (1) Japan proper and Karafuto (Southern part of Sakhalin)
- (2) Formosa
- (3) Korea

b. U.S. views on the establishment of a U.S. Nucleus Group for Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Sub-Committee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific Far-Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems the Sub-Committee submit in each case to SNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

3. "The Creation of Allied Control Machinery" and "U.S. Nucleus Group for Allied Control Machinery" appear as paragraphs ^{items} 5 and 6 under Item IV ("The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and Other

*see note***SECRET**

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Areas") on the revised list (SNCC 16/4).

4. The conclusions and recommendations which follow are submitted in compliance with paragraph 6 b of SNCC 16/2.

DISCUSSION

5. Inasmuch as it is contemplated that Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire, including Karafuto, Formosa, and Korea, will be directed in its initial stage by military personnel of the participating nations, a request from SNCC for the initiation of such a paper or papers should go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If Allied Control Machinery is to be established in areas other than those enumerated above, special papers will be CONCLUSIONS later submitted with respect thereto.

6. It is concluded that:

a. In general, the scope of the paper or papers *should with respect to the Japanese Empire* include:

- (1) a discussion of the general organization of the Initial Control Machinery;
- (2) a discussion of the desirability of dividing the areas to be occupied into zones to be controlled by one or more of the Allied Nations;
- (3) a discussion of the manner in which Control Machinery may extend to the various parts of the Empire, including Karafuto, Formosa, and Korea and the several zones which may be created;
- (4) a draft of an agreement regarding zones of occupation and organization to be entered into by the participating nations; and
- (5) recommendations on the organization and composition of a U.S. Nucleus Group for Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be requested by SNCC g to designate an appropriate agency ~~to collaborate with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Far East in the preparation of draft papers on the above subject.~~

*All
note*

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g. The SWNCC Secretary should simultaneously:

(1) Direct the Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate JCS agency designated to consider the subject.

(2) Direct the Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Far East to secure appropriate views within the State, War, and Navy Departments, and coordination with other civilian agencies as may be appropriate. (Such views and coordination should generally be secured after collaboration by the appropriate JCS agency and the Coordinating Sub-Committee has resulted in tentative agreement).

d. The appropriate JCS agency should then report to the JCS. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

e. Upon receipt of reports from the JCS, SWNCC should consider the reports with such further advice as may be necessary from the appropriate officials within the three Departments.

f. The final papers as approved by SWNCC should be transmitted to the interested governmental departments and agencies as approved governmental policy for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

a. Approve the above conclusions.

b. Dispatch the letter in the Appendix to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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APPENDIX

DRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC _____*, approved on _____**. Your attention is invited to the problem (paragraph 1) and the conclusions (paragraph 5).

It is requested that an appropriate Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed to work in collaboration with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Far East in the preparation of a draft paper or papers on the subject. *It is further requested that the initial draft paper be prepared by the JCS Agency designated. ~~SWNCC~~ ~~subject~~*

It is ~~also~~ ^{also} requested that the SWNCC be advised of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to which the subject is assigned.

* Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to the paper of which this letter is an Appendix.

** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves the paper of which this letter is the Appendix.

SECRET

S E C R E TCOPY NO. 28SWNCC 88/1/D24 April 1945STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEDIRECTIVEINITIAL ALLIED CONTROL MACHINERY FOR
THE JAPANESE EMPIREReferences: a. SWNCC 16/2
b. SWNCC 16/4
c. SWNCC 88Note by the Secretaries

1. SWNCC 88 is hereby referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East for necessary action.

2. The Far East Subcommittee will collaborate with the appropriate Joint Chiefs of Staff agency in the preparation of an integrated report to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SWNCC.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretary

SWNCC 88/1/D

S E C R E TCOPY NO. 28SWNCC 877 April 1945Pages 1 to 4, Incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEETHE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE AND
OTHER AREAS: AREAS TO BE OCCUPIEDReferences: a. SWNCC 16/2
b. SWNCC 16/4Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report by the Far East Subcommittee, is
circulated for consideration by the Committee.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

SWNCC 87

S E C R E TE N C L O S U R EPOLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE AND
OTHER AREAS: AREAS TO BE OCCUPIED

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of statements of policy to be incorporated in a paper on the subject: "The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and Other Areas: Areas to be Occupied".

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Subcommittee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific-Far Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems the Subcommittee submit in each case to SWNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

3. The subject, "The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and Other Areas: Areas to be Occupied", appears as Item IV-1 on the revised list (SWNCC 16/4).

4. The conclusions and recommendations which follow are submitted in compliance with paragraph 6 b of SWNCC 16/2.

SWNCC 87

S E C R E TCONCLUSIONS

5. It is concluded that:

a. In general, the scope of the paper or papers should include a discussion of: The advisability of establishing or continuing military Government in each of the following areas--Japan Proper, Japanese Karafuto (Southern Sakhalin), the Japanese mandated islands, Korea, Formosa, Manchuria, specific areas in China Proper, French Indo-China and Thailand.

b. The Department of State should be requested by SWNCC through its Secretary to prepare a draft paper or papers on the above subject.

c. The draft of the paper or papers prepared by the Department of State should be submitted to the SWNCC Secretary who will issue a numbered SWNCC paper on the subject.

d. The SWNCC Secretary should then simultaneously:

(1) Request the J.C.S. through its Secretary to designate the appropriate J.C.S. agency to consider the subject.

(2) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate J.C.S. agency designated to consider the subject.

(3) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to secure appropriate views of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and coordination with other civilian agencies as may be appropriate. (Such views and coordination should generally be secured after collaboration by the appropriate J.C.S. agency and the Coordinating Subcommittee has resulted in tentative agreement.

e. The appropriate J.C.S. agency should then report to the J.C.S. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

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f. Upon receipt of a report from the J.C.S., SWNCC should consider the report with such further advice as may be necessary from the appropriate officials within the three Departments.

g. The final paper or papers as approved by SWNCC should be transmitted to the interested governmental departments and agencies as approved governmental policy for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

a. Approve the above conclusions.

b. Dispatch the letter in the Appendix to Mr. Eugene H. Dooman, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Dunn.

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S E C R E T

A P P E N D I X

DRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO MR. EUGENE H. DOOMAN,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. DUNN

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC _____*, approved on
_____**. Your attention is invited to The Problem (para-
graph 1) and the Conclusions (paragraph 5).

It would be appreciated if you would inform this Com-
mittee as to the date by which you would be prepared to submit
a draft paper or papers on the subject of SWNCC _____*.

The initial draft of this paper or papers will, of
course, deal primarily with the political aspects of the problem.

- - -

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- * Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to
the paper of which this letter is an appendix.
** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves
the paper of which this letter is an appendix.

SECRETCOPY NO. 105 April 1945ENCLOSUREPOLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE AND OTHER AREAS:
AREAS TO BE OCCUPIED

Reference: SWNCC 16 Series

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far EastTHE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of statements of policy to be incorporated in a paper on the subject: "The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and Other Areas: Areas to be Occupied".

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Subcommittee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific-Far Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems the Subcommittee submit in each case to SWNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

3. The subject, "The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and Other Areas: Areas to be Occupied", appears as Item IV-1 on the revised list. (SWNCC 16/4).

4. The conclusions and recommendations which follow are submitted in compliance with paragraph 6 b of SWNCC 16/2.

CONCLUSIONS

5. It is concluded that:

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SECRET

a. In general, the scope of the paper or papers should include a discussion of: the advisability, from a political point of view, of establishing or continuing military Government in each of the following areas--Japan Proper, Japanese Karafuto (Southern Sakhalin), the Japanese mandated islands, Korea, Formosa, Manchuria, specific areas in China Proper, French Indo-China and Thailand.

b. The Department of State should be requested by SWNCC through its Secretary to prepare a draft paper or papers on the above subject.

c. The draft of the paper or papers prepared by the Department of State should be submitted to the SWNCC Secretary who will issue a numbered SWNCC paper on the subject.

d. The SWNCC Secretary should then simultaneously:

(1) Request the JCS through its Secretary to designate the appropriate JCS agency to consider the subject.

(2) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate JCS agency designated to consider the subject.

(3) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to secure appropriate views of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and coordination with other civilian agencies as may be appropriate. (Such views and coordination should generally be secured after collaboration by the appropriate JCS agency and the Coordinating Subcommittee has resulted in tentative agreement.

e. The appropriate JCS agency should then report to the JCS. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

f. Upon receipt of a report from the JCS, SWNCC should consider the report with such further advice as may be necessary from the appropriate officials within the three Departments.

g. The final paper or papers as approved by SWNCC should be transmitted to the interested governmental departments and

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agencies as approved governmental policy for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:
- a. Approve the above conclusions.
 - b. Dispatch the letter in the Appendix to Mr. Eugene H. Dooman, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Dunn.

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APPENDIX

DRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO MR. EUGENE H. DOGMAN,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. DUNN.

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC _____*, approved on _____**. Your attention is invited to "The Problem" (paragraph 1) and the "Conclusions" (paragraph 5).

It would be appreciated if you would inform this Committee as to the date by which you would be prepared to submit a draft paper or papers on the subject of SWNCC _____*.

The initial draft of this paper or papers will, of course, deal primarily with the political aspects of the problem.

- * Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to the paper of which this letter is an appendix.
- ** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves the paper of which this letter is an appendix.

SECRET

2 April 1945

ENCLOSURE*insert here*POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST: AREAS TO BE OCCUPIED
(Reference to SWNCC 16/2 Series)*new title as in Par 3.*Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Far EastTHE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of statements of policy to be incorporated in a paper on the subject: "The Advisability of Instituting a Military Government throughout the Japanese Empire and Other Areas."

*same as Par 3.*FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Sub-Committee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific Far Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems the Sub-Committee submit in each case to SWNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

3. The subject, "The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and Other Areas: ⁶³ Areas to be Occupied", appears as item IV, ²⁰ 1 on the ^{revised} ~~initial~~ list. (SWNCC 16/4. ~~Appendix~~).

4. The

S E C R E T

-2-

4. The conclusions and recommendations which follow are submitted in compliance with paragraph 6 b of SWNCC 16/2.

CONCLUSIONS

5. It is concluded that:

a. In general, the scope of the paper ^{or papers} should include a discussion of: the advisability, from a political point of view, of establishing ^{or continuing} Military Government in each of the following areas--Japan Proper, Japanese Karafuto (Southern Sakhalin), ^{the Japanese mandated islands} Korea, Formosa, Manchuria, specific areas in China, Proper, French Indo-China and Thailand.

b. The Department of State should be requested by SWNCC through its Secretary to prepare a draft paper ^{or papers} on the above subject.

c. The draft of the paper ^{or papers} prepared by the Department of State should be submitted to the SWNCC Secretary who will issue a numbered SWNCC paper on the subject.

d. The SWNCC Secretary should then simultaneously:

- (1) Request the JCS through its Secretary to designate the appropriate JCS agency to consider the subject.
- (2) Direct the Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate JCS agency designated to consider the subject.
- (3) Direct the Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Far East to secure appropriate views of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and coordination with other civilian

agencies

-3-

agencies as may be appropriate. (Such views and coordination should generally be secured after collaboration by the appropriate JCS agency and the Coordinating Sub-Committee has resulted in tentative agreement.

e. The appropriate JCS agency should then report to the JCS. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

f. Upon receipt of a report from the JCS, SWNCC should consider the report with such further advice as may be necessary from the appropriate officials within the three Departments.

g. The final paper ^{or papers} as approved by SWNCC should be transmitted to the interested governmental departments and agencies as approved governmental policy for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

a. Approve the above conclusions.

b. Dispatch the letter in ^{the} Appendix "A" to ~~the~~ Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Dunn.

Mr. Eugene H. Doonan

S E C R E T

APPENDIX

Mr. Eugene H. Doonan,

DRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. DUNN

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC _____*, approved
on _____**. Your attention is invited to The
Problem (paragraph 1) and The Conclusions (paragraph 5).

It would be appreciated if you would inform this
Committee as to the date by which you would be prepared
to submit a draft paper^{or papers} on the subject of SWNCC _____*.

The initial draft of this paper^{or papers} will, of course,
deal primarily with the political aspects of the problem.

- * Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to
the paper of which this letter is an appendix.
- ** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves
the paper of which this letter is an appendix.

SECRET

23 April 1948

**MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Eugene V. Dooman, Special Assistant
to the Assistant Secretary of State,
Mr. Dunn.**

Subject: Politico-Military Problems in the Far East.

1. There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC 87, approved on 23 April 1948. Your attention is invited to The Problem (paragraph 1) and the Conclusions (paragraph 5).

2. It would be appreciated if you would inform this Committee as to the date by which you would be prepared to submit a draft paper on the subject of SWNCC 87.

3. The initial draft of this paper, will, of course, deal primarily with the political aspects of the problem.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

**CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary**

**Enclosure:
Cy. No. 36, SWNCC 87.**

**Copy for:
Far East Subcte.**

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24 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Politico-Military Problems in the Far East:
The Military Occupation of the Japanese
Empire and Other Areas: Areas to be
Occupied.

References: a. SWNCC 87
b. SWNCC 87/1/D

1. Enclosed is a copy of a study prepared by the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State which has been referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East for necessary action.
2. It is requested that an appropriate agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed to work in collaboration with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East in the preparation of a report on this study.
3. It is further requested that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee be advised of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to which the subject is assigned.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:
Cy. 49, SWNCC 87/1/D

Copy for:
Far East Subcte.

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SECRETCOPY NO. 28SWNCC 87/1/D23 May 1945Pages 1 to 7., Incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEDIRECTIVEPOLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE
AND OTHER AREAS: AREAS TO BE OCCUPIEDReferences: a. SWNCC 16/4
b. SWNCC 87Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State submitted in compliance with reference b, is hereby referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East for necessary action.

2. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East will collaborate with the appropriate agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the preparation of a report to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SWNCC.

CHARLES W. MCCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

SWNCC 87/1/D

S E C R E TE N C L O S U R EPOLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE
AND OTHER AREAS: AREAS TO BE OCCUPIED

Report by the
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the advisability of establishing and continuing military government in the Japanese Empire, Manchuria, specific areas in China Proper, French Indo-China and Thailand.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 87, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 April 1945 and transmitted to the Department of State by the SWNCC Secretariat on 23 April 1945, requests that the Department of State prepare a draft paper or papers on the above subject for submission to the SWNCC Secretary. The covering letter to the Department of State adds that the initial draft of the paper or papers will deal primarily with the political aspects of the problem.

3. Military operations in the Far East will determine the areas in which military government will be established during the combat period. In certain areas, however, political factors will be extremely important and should be given careful consideration.

4. The various strategic, political, social and ethnic factors involved make it necessary to consider the problem separately for the following areas within the Japanese Empire:

- a. Japan proper (the main islands of Japan with their outlying smaller islands);
- b. Japanese Karafuto (Southern Sakhalin);
- c. Korea;
- d. Formosa; and
- e. the Japanese Mandated Islands.

S E C R E T

5. Military government has already been established by the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, in the Japanese Mandated Islands and in certain other areas of the Japanese Empire as Iwo Jima and the Ryukyu Islands.

6. The problem as it relates to French Indo-China is treated in the draft paper on "American Policy with Respect to Indo-China", requested by SWNCC at its tenth meeting, 16 February 1945, and will be referred to SWNCC in the future.

7. The enclosure to SWNCC 5/2, approved by the SWNCC on 9 February 1945 concludes that:

"Participation in civil affairs in Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless United States forces are employed there. In the event of operations involving the use of United States forces the extent of participation by the United States in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the United States commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations."

8. The problem of the establishment and continuation of military government in Manchuria will be considered in the draft paper requested in SWNCC 67. The problem in reference to Hong Kong is treated in the draft paper requested in SWNCC 111.

9. The problem as it relates to specific areas in China proper has already been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State. They have agreed that:

"The Chinese Government might be informed that ... the military administration of any territory recovered from the Japanese by United States forces is on a purely temporary basis and is entirely without prejudice to the future political status of the territory in question..."

"The Chinese Government might be further informed that in the event strategic developments bring about the occupation

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by American forces of Chinese territory now occupied by the Japanese, the administration of civil affairs will be turned over to the Chinese governmental authorities as soon as military exigencies permit."

("Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions to General Stillwell", enclosure to letter from JCS to Secretary of State, dated 15 September 1944.)

DISCUSSION

10. See Appendix.

CONCLUSIONS

11. It is concluded that:

a. As to Japan proper

Military government should be established and should continue until order has been reestablished, until those terms of surrender requiring immediate execution have been carried out, and until there has been established a Japanese Government capable of discharging civil governmental functions and which will be politically acceptable to the United Nations.

b. As to Karafuto

If Karafuto is within the theater of operations of the supreme allied commander for Japan, the policies of occupation for Japan proper should be applied. If Karafuto is under a Soviet theater commander, the competent military and political authorities of the American Government should decide whether American participation would be advisable in combat operations and civil affairs in Karafuto.

c. As to Korea

There should be joint occupation and military government in Korea with representation of other states not so large as to prejudice the effectiveness of American participation. Military government should continue until an interim international supervisory authority is established or Korea becomes independent. However, if Soviet troops occupy Korea prior to its occupation by a substantial number of troops of

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any other of the United Nations, the question of American participation in such occupation should be reconsidered.

d. As to Formosa (including the Pescadores)

If Formosa is occupied by American forces in the course of operations, military government should be established and continued until Formosa is transferred to Chinese sovereignty or until an appropriate time when such military government could be turned over to China.

e. As to French Indo-China

It is inadvisable for American forces to establish or participate in any military government in Indo-China except to the extent that American military operations require civil affairs administration during combat operations in combat areas.

f. As to Thailand

See paragraph 7 above.

g. As to Specific Areas in China Proper

See paragraph 9 above.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that the SWNCC Secretary process the paper in accordance with existing procedure.

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SECRETAPPENDIXDISCUSSION

1. In reference to the occupation of Japan, the Department of State has recommended that during the first period following Japan's unconditional surrender or total defeat "the immediate terms of surrender for Japan will be enforced, and Japan will undergo the stern discipline of occupation ..." "The second period will be one of close surveillance; restrictions will be progressively relaxed as Japan demonstrates its willingness and ability to live at peace with other nations." The Department of State has further recommended that military government in Japan "should continue until order has been reestablished, until those terms of surrender requiring immediate execution have been carried out, and until there has been established a Japanese Government capable of discharging civil governmental functions and which will be politically acceptable to the United Nations ... The length of time during which United Nations forces may be required in Japan is scarcely subject to determination in advance. It is believed, however, that a prolonged occupation of Japan should be avoided."

2. The Soviet Union has territory contiguous with Japanese Karafuto and has a special interest in the military government of that area, regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan. The Department of State has recommended, therefore, that if Karafuto is within the theater of operations of the supreme allied commander for Japan, no special consideration be given Karafuto as its military government would be part of the military government of Japan proper. However, the Department of State has also recommended that if Karafuto is placed under a Soviet theater commander, "the competent military and political authorities of the American Government should decide whether American participation would be advisable in combat operations and civil affairs in Karafuto."

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3. The Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek states that the United States, China and the United Kingdom, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." Furthermore, the Soviet Union has territory contiguous with that of Korea. In view of the profound interest of all four of these countries in the future of Korea, the Department of State has recommended joint occupation and military government for Korea. It is assumed that the representation of states other than the United States would not be so large as to prejudice the effectiveness of American participation. The Department of State further recommended that American military and naval authorities should be prepared to continue participation in the occupation until an international supervisory authority is established or until Korea becomes independent.

4. The Department of State has also recommended that if the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan and if Soviet troops occupy Korea prior to its occupation by a substantial number of troops of any of the other United Nations, the question of American participation in such occupation will have to be considered anew.

5. The problem of the establishment and continuance of military government in Formosa is closely related to future military operations. The Department of State has recommended that "if the armed forces of the United States undertake and effect the occupation and liberation of Formosa, a military administration for civil affairs in Formosa will be established by the United States." It is envisaged that such civil affairs administration will continue until such time as Chinese sovereignty in Formosa is restored.

6. A draft paper on "American Policy with Respect to Indo-China", requested by SWNCC at its tenth meeting on 16 February 1945, is in the process of receiving the approval of the Depart-

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ment of State prior to its submission to the President for final approval. It states: "American troops should not be used in Indo-China except in American military operations against the Japanese."

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

C
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SM-1869
25 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE:

Subject: Military Government in the Japanese
Empire and other Areas.

Reference: J.C.S. 1367.

J.C.S. 1367 is referred to the Joint Civil Affairs
Committee for:--

- a. Collaboration with the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East
by presenting the military implications and,
- b. Submission of the report of the Subcommittee
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a recommend-
ation from the military point of view.

(signed)

C. R. PECK,
Colonel, Infantry,
Executive Secretary.

Copies for Far Eastern Subcommittee

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SECRET**COPY**

30 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: SWNCC Papers Referred to JCS for Collaboration with the SWNC Subcommittee for the Far East.

1. The following SWNCC papers were forwarded to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on dates indicated requesting collaboration between the appropriate JCS agencies and the SWNC Subcommittee for the Far East:

SWNCC No.	Subject	Date Submitted	Assigned to
70/1/D	Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper.	2 May 45	JPS & JIC
109/1/D	United States Policy in Regard to Thailand.	10 May 45	JPS & JIC
110/1/D	Problems of Occupation Concerning Special Areas the Legal Status of Which is Uncertain.	16 May 45	JCAG
111/1/D	Treatment by United States Occupation Forces of Special Areas: Hongkong.	15 May 45	JPS & JIC
87/1/D	The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and other Areas: Areas to be Occupied.	24 May 45	JCAG

2. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff defer consideration of these papers until reports now being prepared by the SWNC Subcommittee for the Far East are completed at which time they will be forwarded to the JCS for the necessary collaboration.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
Acting Secretary

Copy for:
SWNC Subcte. for Far East.

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SECRETCOPY NO. 1

POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST
THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE
AND OTHER AREAS: AREAS TO BE OCCUPIED

References: a. SWNCC 16/4
 b. SWNCC 87
 c. SWNCC 87/1/D

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the ^{politics in regard to the establishment} ~~advisability~~ of establishing or continu-
^{civil affairs administration or as the case might require} ~~ing~~ military government in the Japanese Empire, Manchuria,
^{through} liberated areas in China proper, French Indo-China and Thailand
 following the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In accordance with the request contained in SWNCC 87, the Department of State has expressed its views on the above subject. The State Department paper (SWNCC 87/1/D) has been considered and used by the Subcommittee for the Far East in the preparation of this report.

3. The problem discussed herein appears as Item IV-1 on the "List of Politico-Military Problems in the Far East" (SWNCC 16/4).

4. The various strategic, political, social and ethnic factors involved make it necessary to consider the problem separately for the following areas within the Japanese Empire:

- a. The four main islands of Japan with their outlying smaller islands including the Kurile and Ryukyu Islands;
- b. Japanese Karafuto (Southern Sakhalin);
- c. Korea;
- d. Formosa; and
- e. The Japanese Mandated Islands.

5. Military government has already been established by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas

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^{Area of}
in the Japanese Mandated Islands and in certain other areas of the Japanese Empire such as Iwo-jima and the Ryukyu Islands.

6. SWNCC, on 30 May 1945, approved a paper on "Policy with Regard to Indo-China" (SWNCC 35/11) and transmitted it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for such action as deemed necessary. The paper states: "American troops should not be used in Indo-China except in American military operations against the Japanese."

7. The enclosure to SWNCC 5/2, approved by the SWNCC on 9 February 1945, concludes that:

"Participation in civil affairs in Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless United States forces are employed there. In the event of operations involving the use of United States forces the extent of participation by the United States in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the United States commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations."

8. The problem of the establishment or continuation of military government in Manchuria will be considered in the draft of the paper requested in SWNCC 67. The problem in reference to Hong Kong is treated in the paper requested in SWNCC 111.

9. In connection with the consideration of the establishment of civil affairs administration in liberated areas of China proper as an incident to military operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State have agreed that:

"The Chinese Government might be informed that ... the military administration of any territory recovered from the Japanese by United States forces is on a purely temporary basis and is entirely without prejudice to the future political status of the territory in question..."

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"The Chinese Government might be further informed that in the event strategic developments bring about the occupation by American forces of Chinese territory now occupied by the Japanese, the administration of civil affairs will be turned over to the Chinese governmental authorities as soon as military exigencies permit."

("Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions to General Stillwell", enclosure to letter from JCS to Secretary of State, dated 15 September 1944). (J.C.S. 999/3).

DISCUSSION

10. See Appendix.

CONCLUSIONS

11. It is concluded that:

a. As to the four main islands of Japan with their outlying smaller islands including the Kurile and Ryukyu Islands:

Military government should be established and should continue until order has been reestablished, until those terms of surrender requiring immediate execution have been carried out, and until there has been established a Japanese Government capable of discharging civil governmental functions and which will be politically acceptable. *to the U-S.*

b. As to Karafuto:

If military government has been established in Karafuto by a United States commander as an incident to military operations, this administration should be continued into the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the treatment of Japan. If this has not taken place, military government should be established in Karafuto after the defeat of Japan as part of the overall occupation and military government of Japan proper. If the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan, decision as to participation of United States forces in the military government of Karafuto must be made on the basis of our policy, to be

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decided on a high level, with respect to Soviet aims in the Far East.

c. As to Korea:

Regardless of whether civil affairs administration has been established by a United States commander as an incident to military operations, there should be joint occupation and military government in Korea during the post-defeat period. The United States forces of occupation should be large enough to insure the effectiveness of American participation.

d. As to Formosa:

If Formosa is occupied by American forces in the course of operations, the civil affairs administration which will have been established should be continued into the post-defeat period until an appropriate time when such military government could be turned over to China. If civil affairs administration has not been established as an incident to combat operations, United States forces should not establish military government in Formosa during the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

e. As to the Japanese Mandated Islands:

The military governments which have or will have been established in the Japanese Mandated Islands ~~and in certain other areas of the Japanese Empire~~ prior to the defeat of Japan ~~such as Iwo-jima and the Ryukyu Islands~~ ^{enlarged and added as necessary} should be continued into the post-defeat period. ~~and explain~~

f. As to French Indo-China:

Military government should not be established in Indo-China except in the event that United States military operations against the Japanese may bring our armed forces into Indo-China. ~~If military government has not been established as an incident to combat operations,~~ United States forces should not establish ~~or continue~~ military government in Indo-China during the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

SECRETg. As to Thailand:

Participation in civil affairs in Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless United States forces are employed there. In the event of operations involving the use of United States forces the extent of participation by the United States in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the United States commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations.

h. As to Liberated Areas in China proper:

If strategic developments bring about the occupation by American forces of Chinese territory now occupied by the Japanese, the administration of civil affairs will be turned over to the ^{appropriate} Chinese ~~governmental~~ authorities as soon as military exigencies permit. Military government should not be established by United States forces in China proper following the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that:

a. This report be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a request for their comments from a military point of view.

b. Upon approval by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee the report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the War and Navy Departments for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

SECRETAPPENDIXDISCUSSION

1. Military operations in the Far East will determine the areas in which military government will have been established during the combat period. It is the purpose of this paper to determine the advisability, particularly from the political point of view, of continuing military government in these areas, and of establishing it in other areas, following the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

2. In reference to the occupation of Japan, during the first period following Japan's unconditional surrender or total defeat the immediate terms of surrender for Japan should be enforced, and Japan should undergo the stern discipline of occupation. The second period will be one of close surveillance; restrictions will be progressively relaxed as Japan demonstrates its willingness and ability to live at peace with other nations. Military government in Japan should continue until order has been reestablished, until those terms of surrender requiring immediate execution have been carried out, and until there has been established a Japanese Government capable of discharging civil governmental functions and which will be politically acceptable ^{to the United States} ~~to the United Nations~~. The length of time during which ^{occupying} United Nations forces may be required in Japan is scarcely subject to determination in advance.

3. The Soviet Union has territory contiguous with Japanese Karafuto and has a special interest in the military government of that area, regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan. If the Soviet Union does not enter the war and if Karafuto is within the theater of operations of a United States commander, no special consideration need be given Karafuto as its military government would be part of the military government of Japan proper. However, in the event of the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan, decision as to participation of United

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States forces in the military government of Karafuto must be made on the basis of our policy, to be decided on a high level, with respect to Soviet aims in the Far East.

4. The Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek states that the United States, China and the United Kingdom, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." It will be noted that the Soviet Union is not a party to this Declaration. Furthermore the Soviet Union has territory contiguous with that of Korea. In view of the profound interest of ^{several} all four of these countries in the future of Korea, the Department of State has recommended joint occupation and military government for Korea. The United States forces of occupation should be large enough to insure the effectiveness of American participation. This Government should be prepared to continue participation in the occupation until an international supervisory authority is established or until Korea becomes independent.

5. The problem of the establishment and continuance of military government in Formosa is closely related to future military operations. If the armed forces of the United States undertake and effect the occupation and liberation of Formosa, a military administration for civil affairs in Formosa should be established by the United States. However, if civil affairs administration has not been established in Formosa as an incident to military operations by the time of Japan's unconditional surrender or total defeat, it is not considered advisable or necessary that Formosa be occupied by United States forces or that military government be established by such forces for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan. It is envisaged that, in this contingency, Formosa will be occupied and administered by Chinese forces.

Civil Affairs administration or
6. Military government should not be established in Indo-China except in the event that United States military operations against

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the Japanese may bring our armed forces into Indo-China. ~~If~~
military government has not been established as an incident to combat
operations, United States forces should not establish ^{or continue} military govern-
ment in Indo-China during the post-defeat period for the purpose of
enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE
FOR THE FAR EASTSECRET

9 June 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE.

Subject: Politico-Military Problems in the Far East:
The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire
and Other Areas: Areas to be Occupied.

References: a. SWNCC 16/4.
b. SWNCC 87.
c. SWNCC 87/1/D.

Enclosure: Subject-named report.

1. In compliance with the directive contained in reference c and in accordance with the new procedure for handling Far Eastern Subcommittee papers, a report on the above subject is forwarded herewith.
2. The report has been approved by all Subcommittee members, or their alternates.
3. In the opinion of the Subcommittee, no coordination outside of the three departments was considered desirable.

For the SWNC Subcommittee for the Far East:

G. J. HENDERSON,
Acting Secretary.

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POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE
AND OTHER AREAS: AREAS TO BE OCCUPIED

References: a. SWNCC 16/4
b. SWNCC 87
c. SWNCC 87/1/D

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the advisability of establishing or continuing military government in the Japanese Empire, Manchuria, liberated areas in China proper, French Indo-China and Thailand following the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs (FM 27-5; OPNAV 50E-3) defines military government as follows:

"The term 'military government' is used in this manual to describe the supreme authority exercised by an armed force over the lands, property, and the inhabitants of enemy territory, or allied or domestic territory recovered from enemy occupation or from rebels treated as belligerents." Of late the term 'military government' has been used to describe the supreme authority exercised by an armed force over the lands, property, and the inhabitants of enemy territory whereas the expression "civil affairs administration" has been used to describe the less drastic measures essential to the maintenance of law and order incident to the conduct of military operations in allied or domestic territory recovered from enemy occupation. However, in this report the term "military government" will be used as defined in FM 27-5; OPNAV 50E-3.

3. In accordance with the request contained in SWNCC 87, the Department of State has expressed its views on the above subject. The Department of State paper (SWNCC 87/1/D) has been considered

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and used by the Subcommittee for the Far East in the preparation of this report.

4. The problem discussed herein appears as Item IV-1 on the "List of Politico-Military Problems in the Far East" (SWNCC 16/4).

5. The various strategic, political, social and ethnic factors involved make it necessary to consider the problem separately for the following areas within the Japanese Empire:

- a. The four main islands of Japan with their outlying smaller islands including the Kurile and Ryukyu Islands;
- b. Japanese Karafuto (Southern Sakhalin);
- c. Korea;
- d. Formosa (including the Pescadores); and
- e. The Japanese Mandated Islands.

6. Military government has already been established by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas in some of the Japanese Mandated Islands and in certain other areas of the Japanese Empire such as Iwo-jima and some of the Ryukyu Islands.

7. SWNCC, on 30 May 1945, approved a paper on "Policy with Regard to Indo-China" (SWNCC 35/11) and transmitted it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for such action as deemed necessary. The paper states: "American troops should not be used in Indo-China except in American military operations against the Japanese."

8. The enclosure to SWNCC 5/2, approved by the SWNCC on 9 February 1945, concludes that:

"Participation in civil affairs in Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless United States forces are employed there. In the event of operations involving the use of United States forces the extent of participation by the United States in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the United States commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military

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operations."

9. The problem of the establishment or continuation of military government in Manchuria will be considered in the draft of the paper requested in SWNCC 67. The problem in reference to Hong Kong is treated in the SWNCC 111 series. Another paper is likewise being prepared on "Problems of Occupation Concerning Special Areas the Legal Status of Which is Uncertain" (SWNCC 110 series). This paper relates to the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, the Diplomatic Quarter at Peiping, the French Leasehold of Kwangchowan, the several British, French, Italian and Japanese concessions in China, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands.

10. In connection with the consideration of the establishment of military government in liberated areas of China proper as an incident to military operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State have agreed that:

"The Chinese Government might be informed that ... the military administration of any territory recovered from the Japanese by United States forces is on a purely temporary basis and is entirely without prejudice to the future political status of the territory in question..."

"The Chinese Government might be further informed that in the event strategic developments bring about the occupation by American forces of Chinese territory now occupied by the Japanese, the administration of civil affairs will be turned over to the Chinese governmental authorities as soon as military exigencies permit."

("Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions to General Stilwell," enclosure to letter from J.C.S. to Secretary of State, dated 15 September 1944). (J.C.S. 999/3).

DISCUSSION

11. See Appendix.

SECRETCONCLUSIONS

12. It is concluded that:

a. As to the four main islands of Japan with their outlying smaller islands including the Kurile and Ryukyu Islands:

Military government should be established and should continue until order has been reestablished, until those terms of surrender requiring immediate execution have been carried out, and until there has been established a Japanese Government capable of discharging civil governmental functions and which will be politically acceptable to the United States.

b. As to Karafuto:

If military government has been established in Karafuto by a United States commander as an incident to military operations, this administration should be continued into the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the treatment of Japan. If this has not taken place, military government should be established in Karafuto after the defeat of Japan as part of the over-all occupation and military government of Japan proper. If the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan, decision as to participation of United States forces in the military government of Karafuto must be made on the basis of our policy, to be decided on a high level, with respect to Soviet aims in the Far East.

c. As to Korea:

Regardless of whether military government has been established by a United States commander as an incident to military operations, there should be joint occupation and military government in Korea during the post-defeat period. The United States forces of occupation should be large enough to insure the effectiveness of American participation, and such participation should continue until an international supervisory authority is established or until Korea becomes independent.

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SECRETd. As to Formosa (including the Pescadores):

If Formosa is occupied by American forces in the course of operations, the military government which will have been established should be continued into the post-defeat period until an appropriate time when such military government could be turned over to China. If military government has not been established as an incident to combat operations, United States forces should not establish it in Formosa during the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

e. As to the Japanese Mandated Islands:

The military governments which have or will have been established in the Japanese Mandated Islands prior to the defeat of Japan should be enlarged as may be necessary and continued into the post-defeat period.

f. As to French Indo-China:

Military government should not be established in Indo-China except in the event that United States military operations against the Japanese may bring our armed forces into Indo-China. United States forces should not establish or continue military government in Indo-China during the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

g. As to Thailand:

Participation in military government in Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless United States forces are employed there. In the event of operations involving the use of United States forces the extent of participation by the United States in military government should be the subject of recommendations by the United States commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations. United States forces should not establish or continue military government in Thailand during the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing

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decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

h. As to Liberated Areas in China proper:

If strategic developments bring about the occupation by American forces of Chinese territory occupied by the Japanese, except the special areas considered in the SWNCC 67, 110 and 111 series, the administration of civil affairs will be turned over to the Chinese authorities as soon as military exigencies permit. Military government should not be established by United States forces in China proper following the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. It is recommended that:

a. This report be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a request for their comments from a military point of view.

b. That the conclusions contained in paragraph 12 be approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and that the report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the War and Navy Departments for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

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APPENDIX

DISCUSSION

1. Military operations in the Far East will determine the areas in which military government will have been established during the combat period. It is the purpose of this paper to determine the advisability, particularly from the political point of view, of continuing military government in these areas, and of establishing it in other areas, following the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

2. In reference to the occupation of Japan, during the first period following Japan's unconditional surrender or total defeat the immediate terms of surrender for Japan should be enforced, and Japan should undergo the stern discipline of occupation. The second period will be one of close surveillance; restrictions will be progressively relaxed as Japan demonstrates its willingness and ability to live at peace with other nations. Military government in Japan should continue until order has been reestablished, until those terms of surrender requiring immediate execution have been carried out, and until there has been established a Japanese Government capable of discharging civil governmental functions and which will be politically acceptable to the United States. The length of time during which occupying forces may be required in Japan is scarcely subject to determination in advance.

3. The Soviet Union has territory contiguous with Japanese Karafuto and has a special interest in the military government of that area, regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan. If the Soviet Union does not enter the war and if Karafuto is within the theater of operations of a United States commander, no special consideration need be given Karafuto as its military government would be part of the military government

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of Japan proper. However, in the event of the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan, decision as to participation of United States forces in the military government of Karafuto must be made on the basis of our policy, to be decided on a high level, with respect to Soviet aims in the Far East.

4. The Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek states that the United States, China and the United Kingdom, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." It will be noted that the Soviet Union is not a party to this Declaration. Furthermore the Soviet Union has territory contiguous with that of Korea. In view of the profound interest of several countries in the future of Korea, the Department of State has recommended joint occupation and military government for Korea. The United States forces of occupation should be large enough to insure the effectiveness of American participation. This Government should be prepared to continue participation in the occupation until an international supervisory authority is established or until Korea becomes independent.

5. The problem of the establishment and continuance of military government in Formosa (including the Pescadores) is closely related to future military operations. If the armed forces of the United States undertake and effect the occupation and liberation of Formosa, a military administration for civil affairs in Formosa should be established by the United States. However, if military government has not been established in Formosa as an incident to military operations by the time of Japan's unconditional surrender or total defeat, it is not considered advisable or necessary that Formosa be occupied by United States forces or that military government be established by such forces for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan. It is envisaged that, in this contingency, Formosa will be occupied and administered by Chinese forces.

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6. Military government should not be established in Indo-China except in the event that United States military operations against the Japanese may bring our armed forces into Indo-China. United States forces should not establish or continue military government in Indo-China during the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

SECRETCOPY NO. 28SWNCC 87/214 June 1945Pages 8 to 16, Incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEPOLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE
AND OTHER AREAS: AREAS TO BE OCCUPIEDReferences: a. SWNCC 16/4
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8. The enclosure to SWNCC 5/2, approved by SWNCC on 9 February 1945, concludes that:

"Participation in civil affairs in Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless United States forces are employed there. In the event of operations involving the use of United States forces the extent

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of participation by the United States in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the United States commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations."

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"The Chinese Government might be informed that ... the military administration of any territory recovered from the Japanese by United States forces is on a purely temporary basis and is entirely without prejudice to the future political status of the territory in question ..."

"The Chinese Government might be further informed that in the event strategic developments bring about the occupation by American forces of Chinese territory now occupied by the Japanese, the administration of civil affairs will be turned over to the Chinese governmental authorities as soon as military exigencies permit."

("Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions to General Stilwell", enclosure to letter from J.C.S. to Secretary of State, dated 15 September 1944) (J.C.S. 999/3).

S E C R E TDISCUSSION

11. See Appendix.

CONCLUSIONS

12. It is concluded that:

a. As to the four main islands of Japan with their outlying smaller islands including the Kurile and Ryukyu Islands:

Military government should be established and should continue until order has been reestablished, until those terms of surrender requiring immediate execution have been carried out, and until there has been established a Japanese Government capable of discharging civil governmental functions and which will be politically acceptable to the United States.

b. As to Karafuto:

If military government has been established in Karafuto by a United States commander as an incident to military operations, this administration should be continued into the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the treatment of Japan. If this has not taken place, military government should be established in Karafuto after the defeat of Japan as part of the over-all occupation and military government of Japan proper. If the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan, decision as to participation of United States forces in the military government of Karafuto must be made on the basis of our policy, to be decided on a high level, with respect to Soviet aims in the Far East.

c. As to Korea:

Regardless of whether military government has been established by a United States commander as an incident to military operations, there should be joint occupation and military government in Korea during the post-defeat period. The United States forces of occupation should be large enough to insure the effectiveness of American participation, and such participation should continue until an international

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supervisory authority is established or until Korea becomes independent.

d. As to Formosa (including the Pescadores):

If Formosa is occupied by American forces in the course of operations, the military government which will have been established should be continued into the post-defeat period until an appropriate time when such military government could be turned over to China. If Military government has not been established as an incident to combat operations, United States forces should not establish it in Formosa during the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

e. As to the Japanese Mandated Islands:

The military governments which have or will have been established in the Japanese Mandated Islands prior to the defeat of Japan should be enlarged as may be necessary and continued into the post-defeat period.

f. As to French Indo-China:

Military government should not be established in Indo-China except in the event that United States military operations against the Japanese may bring our armed forces into Indo-China. United States forces should not establish or continue military government in Indo-China during the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

g. As to Thailand:

Participation in military government in Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless United States forces are employed there. In the event of operations involving the use of United States forces the extent of participation by the United States in military government should be the subject of recommendations by the United States commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military

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operations. United States forces should not establish or continue military government in Thailand during the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

h. As to Liberated Areas in China Proper:

If strategic developments bring about the occupation by American forces of Chinese territory occupied by the Japanese, except the special areas considered in the SWNCC 67, 110 and 111 series, the administration of civil affairs will be turned over to the Chinese authorities as soon as military exigencies permit. Military government should not be established by United States forces in China proper following the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. It is recommended that:

a. This report be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a request for their comments from a military point of view.

b. That the conclusions contained in paragraph 12 be approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and that the report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the War and Navy Departments for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

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SECRETAPPENDIXDISCUSSION

1. Military operations in the Far East will determine the areas in which military government will have been established during the combat period. It is the purpose of this paper to determine the advisability, particularly from the political point of view, of continuing military government in these areas, and of establishing it in other areas, following the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.
2. In reference to the occupation of Japan, during the first period following Japan's unconditional surrender or total defeat the immediate terms of surrender for Japan should be enforced, and Japan should undergo the stern discipline of occupation. The second period will be one of close surveillance; restrictions will be progressively relaxed as Japan demonstrates its willingness and ability to live at peace with other nations. Military government in Japan should continue until order has been reestablished, until those terms of surrender requiring immediate execution have been carried out, and until there has been established a Japanese Government capable of discharging civil governmental functions and which will be politically acceptable to the United States. The length of time during which occupying forces may be required in Japan is scarcely subject to determination in advance.
3. The Soviet Union has territory contiguous with Japanese Karafuto and has a special interest in the military government of that area, regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan. If the Soviet Union does not enter the war and if Karafuto is within the theater of operations of a United States commander, no special consideration need be given Karafuto as its military government would be part of the military government of Japan proper. However, in the event of the entry

S E C R E T

of the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan, decision as to participation of United States forces in the military government of Karafuto must be made on the basis of our policy, to be decided on a high level, with respect to Soviet aims in the Far East.

4. The Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek states that the United States, China and the United Kingdom, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent". It will be noted that the Soviet Union is not a party to this Declaration. Furthermore the Soviet Union has territory contiguous with that of Korea. In view of the profound interest of several countries in the future of Korea, the Department of State has recommended joint occupation and military government for Korea. The United States forces of occupation should be large enough to insure the effectiveness of American participation. This Government should be prepared to continue participation in the occupation until an international supervisory authority is established or until Korea becomes independent.

5. The problem of the establishment and continuance of military government in Formosa (including the Pescadores) is closely related to future military operations. If the armed forces of the United States undertake and effect the occupation and liberation of Formosa, a military administration for civil affairs in Formosa should be established by the United States. However, if military government has not been established in Formosa as an incident to military operations by the time of Japan's unconditional surrender or total defeat, it is not considered advisable or necessary that Formosa be occupied by United States forces or that military government be established by such forces for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan. It is envisaged that, in this contingency, Formosa will be occupied and administered by Chinese forces.

S E C R E T

6. Military government should not be established in Indo-China except in the event that United States military operations against the Japanese may bring our armed forces into Indo-China. United States forces should not establish or continue military government in Indo-China during the post-defeat period for the purpose of enforcing decisions relating to the post-defeat treatment of Japan.

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SECRET

15 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:**Subject:** The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and Other Areas: Areas to be Occupied.**References:** a. SWNCC memo dtd 30 May 45 in which JCS was requested to defer action on five SWNCC papers.
b. SWNCC 87/1/D.

1. Attached herewith is a copy of SWNCC 87/2, a draft report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East on the above subject.

2. It is requested that this report be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comments from a military point of view.

3. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East is available for consultation with the appropriate Joint Chiefs of Staff agency designated to study this paper and is prepared to consider incorporation of such changes as may be suggested.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. MCGARTHY
Secretary

Enclosure:
Cy. No. 49, SWNCC 87/2.

Copy for:
Far East Subcte.



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