

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 3  
(Obtain from G-2)

PLACE TOKYO  
DATE 2 Oct. 45 TIME 1000

Division Of Origin: M F C

SUBJECT: MANPOWER.

Personal interrogated and background of each:

KAMEYAMA, Seiji -- Vice Minister of Welfare and Head of  
Labor Section since February, 1945.

Where interviewed (office): Meiji Building.


Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. O.W. De WOLF, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. Otis CARY, USNR; Mr. George KIMURA, Japanese  
Foreign Office.

Summary:

- (1) Labor dislocation caused by U.S. bombings.
- (2) Organization of Labor Section.
- (3) Responsibility of Labor Bureau.
- (4) Procedure of Labor Bureau.
- (5) Other Governmental Agencies Concerned with Labor.
- (6) Availability of Statistical Information.
- (7) Evaluation.

*February 5/45*



1. General: American bombing attacks caused severe dislocations in the target areas which in turn resulted in a high degree of absenteeism and a consequent slump in production, KAMEYAMA said. He estimated that in bombed areas there was a 60% decrease in production. KINURA interpolated that this decrease lasted for two or three weeks as a result of the attacks. By-products of the bombing attacks, in addition to the actual destruction which affected labor, included the following:

(a) Decentralization of factories which in turn produced transportation difficulties; i.e., necessitated workers taking a longer time to and from work and decreased their efficiency.

(b) Contributed heavily to the inadequacy of the food supply.

(c) Produced material shortages, both through destruction of material and disruption of freight transportation, which resulted in workers idling at their posts because of no materials to work with.

To offset these difficulties, KAMEYAMA said, the Japanese government resorted to employment of students and school children and tried various methods of stimulating production and attendance at work. These included extra food, clothing, shoe and beer ration chits for factory workers together with other privileges. For example, the Division of Housing of the Labor Section concerned itself solely with aiding factory workers at the expense of non-essential civilians. Concerning the use of students (reported in the Nippon Times for 3 September 1945 to have numbered 2,274,729 mobilized) KAMEYAMA said that mobilization reached full swing in the Summer of 1943 and that their contribution was generally effective. It is worthy of note, however, that parents refused to send their children to factories as the bombings became more severe.

Because of the priority of other information required from Mr. KAMEYAMA, no attempt was made to inquire in detail as to the effects of the bombing attacks. It was felt that a general outline would suffice until such time as the field team arrived to make its searching investigation.

2. Organization of the Labor Section, Ministry of Welfare:

KAMEYAMA produced a Table of Organization in English of the Labor Section as it is presently set up. One copy of the chart, together with a brief explanation of each section's responsibilities, is attached to this memorandum as Appendix A. \*

KAMEYAMA promised to have prepared other organizational charts modeled after Appendix A to show the Welfare Labor Section as it existed at the time of the China Incident, the outbreak of World War II and at other periods when important changes were made. It is expected that preparation will require approximately one week and, when completed, should give an overall picture of the Labor Section from 1936 to the present.

In the near future, KAMEYAMA expects the Division for Housing to be elevated to Bureau status, because of the critical housing situation. He also expects the Sections for Planning and Mobilization to be given a Bureau status. Both are required, he said, to meet the present emergency.

\*Chart not reproduced, original may be consulted in office of Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division.

### 3. Responsibility of the Labor Bureau:

At the outset, KAMEYAMA pointed out that there were two types of Japanese factories -- those operated by the Military and those operated by civilians. While KAMEYAMA was responsible for mobilization of labor for both types, the actual guidance of the military-operated factories was directed by the old Munitions Ministry. KAMEYAMA was concerned with guidance of the civilian factories. Guidance in these instances was tantamount to control of labor policies.

In this connection it is of extreme importance to note that the Japanese froze labor in "vital" industries only such as, for example, iron and steel and aircraft manufacture. Skilled labor was the primary concern of the Labor Bureau and the impression was left that the remaining classes of labor, while used in non-military pursuits under the cognizance of the Bureau, were given secondary consideration. Apparently employment of such labor was left up to private concerns and control association. Further exploration will be undertaken along this line to attempt to determine the line of demarcation, if any, and where data on the "unfrozen" labor. KAMEYAMA has promised to furnish a list of the so-called "vital" industries and additional information regarding the utilization of skilled labor is expected from a Japanese chart which he furnished. This requires translation.

Of interest here is a statement by KIMURA that home factories virtually disappeared during the war. Prior to the war Japan was noted for its plethora of home industries, or family factory units. During the war those with sufficient skill were placed in factories where it was felt that their talents could be better utilized.

### 4. Procedure of the Bureau of Labor:

As explained by the two Japanese, orders issued by the Bureau of Labor, or transmitted by them, went to the prefectural governments and thence to the various police sections. Police Departments included a Mobilization Section and a Factory Administration Section. Further exploration of this procedure is necessary.

### 5. Other Governmental Agencies Concerned with Labor:

As stated previously in the memorandum, the former Munitions Ministry was also concerned with various aspects of Japanese wartime manpower allocation. Among other things, all mining and all Military factories (arsenals, etc.) were directly under the Ministry of Munitions. Steps are being taken to interview a Mr. OKAMATSU, of the Munitions Ministry for a definition of the Ministry's responsibilities, its organizational structure and date available.

KAMEYAMA and KIMURA indicated that the war and Navy Departments had considerable authority in manpower allocation, which they used. Both men appeared reticent to talk about the Military in any respect and a separate line of investigation will be established. KAMEYAMA did say, however, that about the middle of the war, military authorities started to give much more consideration to deferment of workers with special or technical skills.

### 6. Availability of Statistical Information:

It is still a matter of conjecture as to how much statistical information will be available. It was pointed out that the Welfare Ministry Building burned down prior to the war with a consequent loss of records. During the war, the Ministry moved from one building to another and destroyed all records which officials considered non-essential. Since April, 1944,

KANEYAMA said, the ministry has virtually stopped getting out statistics because of inability to get information, poor communications and the necessity for eliminating paper work.

7. Evaluation:

Mr. KANEYAMA appeared cooperative, intelligent and friendly. At the conclusion of the conversation he made a point of saying that he would be glad to receive the interviewers at any time at his reception room at the Ministry. He came prepared with certain information of value and readily assented to securing such additional information as was asked for. He voluntarily offered the services of any of his experts at any time and understands that both he and his subordinates will be called upon later for more detailed information.

## A P P E N D I X "A"

### DIVISION OF PLANNING:

Responsible for planning for the mobilization of all types of workers, including industrial, agricultural and Koreans.

### DIVISION OF INVESTIGATION:

Responsible for the investigating demands for workers and recommending re-allocations.

### DIVISION OF MOBILIZATION:

In conjunction with the Ministry of Munitions, responsible for decisions as to various requirements for manpower and making the necessary allocations.

### DIVISION OF LABOR MANAGEMENT:

Responsible for discipline of workers, factory rules relating to hours of work, etc.

### DIVISION OF PAYMENT:

Responsible for determining the wages for the various classes of workers. Also responsible for issuance of extra rations and methods of stimulating production.

### DIVISION OF HOUSING:

Responsible for housing for the entire nation. However, because of extreme paucity of material toward the end of the war, the Division necessarily confined its efforts to aiding essential factory workers only.

### THE BUREAU FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE:

This bureau and its various Divisions was not explored in view of the other matters concerning labor which had to be covered during the limited time of the interview.

A P P E N D I X "B"

Persons suggested by Mr. KANEYAMA as useful contacts for further information about Japanese manpower included:

Mr. OKAMATSU	Chief of Commercial Affairs Commerce & Industry Ministry
Mr. Gantaro SUEHIRO	Professor Imperial University (possibly foremost academic authority on Labor)
Mr. Keinoshin NAKAMURA	Former Vice-Minister of Welfare
Mr. Yoshio MOCHINAGA	Governor, Yogo Prefecture and former Welfare Vice-Minister (reportedly and excellent source).

A P P E N D I X "C"

Publications from the Ministry of Welfare  
furnished by Mr. KAMEYAMA: (all require translation)

Rules for Mobilization

Rules Regarding Payment

Rules Regarding Management

Comparative Table of Old and New  
Registrants Differentiated by  
Industry and Prefectures.